The War in the Gulf: Access and Photographic Coverage During the Crisis

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The War in the Gulf:
Access and Photographic Coverage During the Crisis

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Abstract

War is a tragic part of our society. War causes death and destruction not only to losers but also to the victors. In the age of real time television wars and from the daily bombardment of images from the battlefield in the media, political and military leaders have learned that fighting lengthy wars is nearly impossible for a democratic society.

The military, as an institution, is very methodical in its procedures and how it wages war. The media, as also an institution, publishes and disseminates information to the public on newsworthy events. By controlling media access to war events, the military can create this particular vision of war to the American public which, in fact, the military uses to create its own picture of reality.

Photojournalists have faced many challenges covering war. Whether voluntary or strict, some form of censorship has been placed on photojournalists. Photographs of dead or wounded American soldiers have always been handled with sensitivity. For photojournalists to gather or record information, they must have the greatest possible access to events. During times of war, photojournalists either have not been allowed access to combat, or they have had unlimited access to the action. Media access to war-time events has not been given First Amendment protection by the courts.

Since the invasion of Grenada in 1983, the media has been struggling with the military for access to combat operations. During the War in the Gulf, the media had limited access to the events of the war because only a handful of journalists and photojournalists covered the war via a pool system implemented by the military. This made access a problem.

With the exception, the primary scene and portrayal in photographs taken during the War in the Gulf, there were statistical differences in the areas of subject(s), and perspective of photographic images between the air and ground campaign. Of the 1,853 published images, a majority (60.3 percent) were of "combat related scenes," while 11.6 percent showed "actual combat scenes." Of the seven subjects that were coded as present or not present, the largest number of photographs, 877 (47.3 percent), showed American or Coalition weapons, equipment or targets in Iraq. The largest number of photographs with soldiers present were of American soldiers (873 or 47.1 percent). The photographs that portrayed the primary subjects showed a "situation depicting soldiers in action, but not in combat" 25.8 percent of the time. Photographs published during the war showed different perspectives; of these 1,114 (60.1 percent)
showed the subject(s) in a "normal view of people or objects which are identifiable."

During the war, more "actual combat" photographs were taken during the air campaign than the ground campaign. During the air campaign, most of the images of actual combat included: military supplied "Nintendo like" cross haired images of bombing targets over Iraq and Kuwait, photographs of Coalition planes launching on bombing sorties, and images from the battle of Khafji, a Saudi Arabian - Kuwaiti border town where Coalition and Iraqi soldiers actually shot at each other. The air campaign spanned several weeks and produced 1,167 (63.0 percent) of the images; the ground campaign lasted several days and produced 686 (37.0 percent) of the images. Coverage of the War of the Gulf tended to favor images from the air campaign.

From the first bombing attacks of Iraq to the Iraqi accepted cease fire, the War in the Gulf lasted 48 days. The overall image of the War in the Gulf was portrayed as a high-tech, mobile operation that placed no American soldiers in any actual danger. Images of war have given us a visual description that a battle has taken place and our perceptions of war have been molded around this recent encounter with war. War has deadly stakes that place people and machines in harm's way. Soldiers do die and bombs do kill people, but images from the War in the Gulf did not show the reality of war that was shown during World War II, the Korean War and especially the Vietnam War.
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Chapter I
Introduction

A news photograph is more than a picture that appears in a newspaper or news magazine. It communicates that something happened, and a photojournalist was present not only to witness, but to capture the event on film. A photograph is a nonverbal document containing a message that add substance to our experience and to our society.

War, a major part of our nation's history, is covered by journalists and photojournalists for their newspapers, magazines, radio networks, television networks and cable networks since these media have existed. Roger Fenton, James Robertson and Charles Langlois were the first photographers to record the events of the Crimean War. Many more photographers and photojournalists would follow their lead and record the events of war and conflict on film. From Matthew Brady, who chronicled the Civil War, to the nameless pool photographers who photographed the War in the Gulf (1991), photojournalists have been the witnesses of war. Photojournalists who cover a war serve as surrogates for those who remain at home. "The number of journalists who actually witness the violence, danger, bloodshed, and the snafus of combat is a tiny minority of those who go to cover the war."

When the troops march off to war, the photojournalists who follow them take the latest technological advances in the field of photography with them. It was technologically possible during the Spanish-American War to publish in newspaper and magazine photographs as half-tone images. During the Vietnam War, it took several hours and sometimes days to retrieve images from the frontlines. Today,

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2 In this thesis, the War in the Gulf will be used instead of Operation Desert Storm, the Persian Gulf War, or the the War in the Persian Gulf.


battlefield images can be transmitted via satellite to the photo editors’ desks within seconds.

Images of war give us a visual description of where a battle takes place, and they capture the mood of the times. The photographic history of war and combat is key to understanding the American perception of war. Our society has always been interested in news images and information about war. During the Civil War, Fletcher Harper, the publisher of Harper's Weekly, found that the public was interested in wartime images. Technologically, photographs were reproduced as line drawings which would be published in the press. War images published of the Spanish-American War included both sketch artists' drawing and half-tone photographs. During the circulation drives of the war, "publishers discovered the power of pictures not just to entertain but to mold public opinion." When the United States entered World War II, "Life and its fellow photomagazines had whetted the public's appetite for pictures and raised expectations about both the quality of images and the speed with which they appeared in print." From Vietnam war images, John Morris observed that, "No matter how powerful the images of war these photographers have captured, our fascination tends to outweigh our horror."

The Vietnam War will always be classified as the United States first television war, and combat images reached into American living rooms. The American public was exposed to more images of soldiers and civilians in actual combat than in any other war because television and print publications

5 Moeller, 4.


7 Ken Korbe, Sidney Korbe, and Betsy Brill, Spanish-American War "You Furnish the Pictures, I'll Furnish the War" from Proceedings of the 72nd Annual Meeting of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, Washington, D.C., 10-13 August 1989, ERIC, ED 310 459, 2.

8 Moeller, 181.


 supplied the American public daily with visual images of the Vietnam War. Photojournalists covering the Vietnam War had nearly unlimited access to information. By comparison, information access during the War in the Gulf was very limited just the opposite of the Vietnam experience. Was there a difference in the newspapers and magazines publication of images between the air and the ground campaign? How does this image of war compare with the Vietnam image? What overall image or constructed image emerged from the War in the Gulf?

During the War in the Gulf, higher television news ratings and newspaper sales showed that "the American public is staying extremely close to the news." On the first night of the War in the Gulf, President George Bush said this military operation would "not be a new Vietnam," and our forces military "would not fight with one arm tied behind their backs."13

The media were placed under tight ground rules for their war coverage. The military required media pool arrangements by allowing only a handful of journalists, photojournalists, and technicians to cover the war from the battle site, while the rest of the media covered it from the rear. The War in the Gulf was the first "real time" television war covered by the media live without pictures and sometimes with pictures from both sides of the conflict.14

Photojournalists must be present at a scene to record the events on film. With limited or no access to a battlefield, the visual report of the event is either lost or controlled by the military. During the War in the Gulf, photojournalists were placed in pools and were constantly escorted by military public affairs


officers. Walter Cronkite said, "With a rational censorship system in place, the press should be free to go where it wants, when it wants, to see, hear, and photograph what it believes is in the public interest."¹⁵

During the War in the Gulf, the photo pool was run by photo editors from the Associated Press, Rueters, Time, Newsweek, and U.S. News and World Report. Donald Mell, the Associated Press photo editor who coordinated the pool during the ground campaign, said, "There were nights when we had as many as 180 rolls of film coming in. That means over 6,000 images."¹⁶ From these images, the editors would choose 20 that would become the official photo pool report for that day. These photo editors selected the images that were presented to the American public.¹⁷

This thesis will examine the images of the War in the Gulf that were published in three national news magazines: Time, Newsweek and U.S. News and World Report, and the three top daily newspapers: New York Times, Los Angeles Times and The Washington Post.¹⁸ The three news magazines were represented in the photo pool by their photo editors. All three newspapers subscribe to news services from Associated Press and Rueters, and these news services photo editors were represented in the official photo pool.


¹⁶ Fialka, 37.

¹⁷ Ibid.

War is deadly. It is also the objective photojournalists cover with their cameras to capture images of action, danger, death and destruction. The camera brought the exotic and dangerous near. It satisfied a lust for seeing the action without placing the viewer at home is never in any danger. These images provide a soldiers' perspective of the war. Along with soldiers, photojournalists are witnesses to the horrors of war. A photograph may be worth a thousand words, because words cannot begin to describe the brutality of war that can be captured with a camera.

During the War in the Gulf, photojournalists were controlled by military ground rules and placed in pool arrangements. They had limited access to the front lines, the soldiers and the battles. Even when they were allowed access, photojournalists were accompanied by military escorts, and they relied on military messengers to get their film back to their editors in Ryhad, Saudi Arabia. This sometimes took days. In Ryhad, their images were reviewed by military censors before publication. Access was a major problem for photojournalists during the War in the Gulf. By controlling access and reviewing images, the military could shape the war's perspective presented to the American public.

The Social Construction of Reality

In their treatise on the social construction of reality, Berger and Luckmann wrote, "The sociology of knowledge must concern itself with everything that passes for knowledge in society." Barnes defined society as "a distribution of knowledge." He wrote that:

How people act depends upon what they know. Anything that is known may affect how people act. Therefore, everything that people know is constitutive of their existence as a

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society.³

The social construction of reality is "a dialectical process in which human beings act both as the creators and as producers of their social world."⁴ In this dialectic process, there is a distinction made between three types of reality: objective social reality, symbolic social reality and subjective social reality. Objective reality is apprehended by individuals in a common sense style of everyday life. Symbolic reality "consists of any form of symbolic expression of objective reality such as art, literature, media contents, or communication behavior."⁵ Subjective reality exists "where both objective and symbolic realities serve as an input for the construction of the individual's own reality."⁶ White observed that "Knowledge and reality emerges from a dialectic between objective facts and the subjective interpretation of them."⁷

According to Lang and Lang, media content falls into symbolic reality:

The press plays a pivotal role in this process of social construction. Most of what people know about public life reaches them second-hand, which is to say by way of the various news media. Despite the advent of television, it remains a fact that very little of what people know of politics is based on direct observation.⁸

They also postulated that "every communication system, no matter how sophisticated its technological base, inevitability injects some bias into the picture of reality it presents."⁹ Information, in the form of stories or images, flows from journalists and photojournalists to their perspective audience. These audience members can either accept or ignore what has been presented to them by the media as reality. Mediated knowledge


⁵ Ibid, 35.

⁶ Ibid.


⁹ Ibid., 200-201.
of this nature depends on what media systems disseminate because no picture replicate the world in its full complexity.  

Umberson and Henderson wrote that "the social construction of reality paradigm suggests that social phenomena are defined in a political and social context." In any society, some institutions have more power and authority than others to construct reality. "This power may be political or economic in nature, or based on specialized expertise, knowledge, and authority." Berger and Luckmann observed that:

Institutions always have history, of which they are products. It is impossible to understand an institution adequately without an understanding of the historical process in which it was produced. Institutions also, by the very fact of their existence, control human conduct by setting up predefined patterns of conduct, which channel it in one direction as against the many other directions that would be theoretically be possible.

After the Vietnam War, the American military believed and acted upon the myth that the "Vietnam War was lost because of the uncensored press coverage." President Bush and his advisors generated a necessity for the War in the Gulf for the American public and American Allies. During Operation Desert Shield and before the War in the Gulf, the experts decided "what information should be kept from the public and what information should be released to the public and the media." The Bush Administration adopted a policy of limiting access to the wartimes events to be reported to American public by the news media.

*The Photographic Image*

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10 Ibid., 198.


12 Ibid.

13 Berger and Luckmann, 52.


15 Umberson and Henderson, 3.
We are just beginning to realize the sustaining nature of the photograph.\textsuperscript{16} The camera has become an extension of our senses that can record events, and many disciplines depend upon the camera to see what the human eye cannot. Critics point out "the camera's convincing realism is at times more of a mystique than a reality," and that "the photographic record is true because 'the camera cannot lie.'"\textsuperscript{17}

Despite any discrepancies between reality and the realism of the camera's vision, our knowledge of the world has changed because photojournalists' views are edited:

These edited documents often contain a sufficient number of nonverbal truths to allow the audience to reconstruct schematic reality and to form concepts that have changed social thinking dramatically, demonstrating the fact-presenting value of the camera.\textsuperscript{18}

Banta and Hinsley wrote, "The photograph remains an ever-changing mirror, reflecting different realities at each viewing. As our understanding of history and peoples changes, the photographic image offers new insights into documented subjects and the attitudes of those behind the camera."\textsuperscript{19} With the passage of time, we find meanings that transcend the intentions with which an image was originally created.

People use images to communicate, but they also use images to give form to their concepts of reality. Photographs are representations of reality that are open to interpretation by individuals with different backgrounds and cultures. Photographs can also be classified as realistic images, objective views of reality and schematic images. Photographs can attract attention to a particular subject and convey information to the viewer. The photographic image can capture a small moment in time, and within that image, provide a message that affects viewer.

The impact of photographic images relies on the emotions that the viewer brings to the image. An important element of the photographic image is the viewer's perspective of the image. The viewer


\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{19} Banta and Hinsley, 25.
"constructs a meaning based on experience and expectations." These experiences and expectations are based on the viewer's culture, codes and conventions. Stuart Hall explored the idea of how a photograph can determine the news. He concluded that news photos take from and add to "the social stock of knowledge at hand in any culture," and it "represents a truncated version of this cultural code." News photos offer themselves as literal visual transcriptions of the real world.

Barthes places great emphasis on the connotation of the photographic image. He maintains that "the reading of the photograph is thus always historical; it depends on the reader's 'knowledge' just as though it were a matter of real language." Thus, the connotation isolates, records, and structures all the historical elements of the image, "all the parts of the photographic surface which derive their very discontinuity from a certain knowledge on the reader's part, or, if one prefers, from the reader's cultural situation." The denotative photograph, the literal reality of the image, "is powerless to alter political opinions: no photograph has ever convinced or refuted anyone, but the photograph can confirm, insofar as political consciousness."

Besides political photographs, Barthes also discusses traumatic photographs, which depended on the certainty that the scene really happened, and the photographer was present to capture it on film. This is "the mythical definition of denotation." Traumatic photographs of "fire, shipwrecks, catastrophes, violent deaths, all capture 'from life as lived.'" From World War II, striking images includes: the Pearl Harbor fireball rising behind wrecked planes at the naval air station, Marines raising the flag on Iwo Jima, and

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23 Ibid., 30.

24 Ibid., 30-31.

25 Moeller, 235.

26 Ibid., 20-21.
the atomic mushroom cloud over Hiroshima. Images from the Vietnam War are still remembered as symbols of that era:

1) the Buddhist monk immolating himself in 1963, 2) General Loan shooting the Viet Cong suspect during Tet 1968, 3) a little girl accidentally napalmed by South Vietnamese planes, 4) the Marine with the Zippo lighter, 5) the armored vehicle leaving the citadel at Hue with its cargo of wounded U.S. Marines, and 6) the single helicopter perched atop the U.S. Embassy in Saigon in April 1975.

Edward Stiechen, the former chief of the Army's photographic section in World War I and head of the naval aviation's photographic section during World War II, became convinced that "if a real image of war could be photographed and presented to the world, it might make a contribution towards ending the specter of war." Moeller wrote, "War photography observes for those who are not in the battle what they are missing, and reminds those who were what it is was like."

**Combat Photography**

Photographers and their editors have directed what the viewing public sees of war ever since halftone images appeared on the pages of newspapers and magazines:

Photographers make the event. Photographers choose the subjects to take and compose each shot by cropping out details that detract from the vision of what they want to show. Editors select those prints that will be seen by the public and frame them on a page. And, the public rarely recognizes that reality is manipulated through the lens of a camera and through the layout of a publication.

McMasters added: "Recording reality cannot guarantee that wars won't be undertaken again, but that they won't be taken in ignorance."

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27 Ibid., 236.


29 Moeller, 192.

30 John G. Morris, "This We Remember," Harper's, 245 (September 1972): 72.

31 Moeller, 3.

32 Ibid., 14.

When American soldiers are sent into combat, Americans turn to the media for quick and responsible dispatches about the war. The American public first experienced war photographs during the Civil War. Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper published line drawings of Matthew Brady's photographs from the war front. However, the first published war photographs appeared in the Illustrated London News which published Roger Fenton's photographs from the Crimean War (1854-56). The Spanish-American War, despite the small number of photojournalists covering it, is regarded as the first war in which photojournalism had a significant media presence.

The photojournalists who covered World War I faced strict censorship, and the press depended upon military communiques and photographs for the official version of the war. The War Department's, Committee of Public Information refused to release any photographs of destruction, or dead or wounded American troops that could have a depressing effect upon the American public. The Committee of Public Information and the censors believed that "because the public is so susceptible to the message of a picture," there was a "need of care in selecting those which might undermine that morale."

When the United States entered World War II, Life magazine had the country clamoring for images. Life and other magazines "had whetted the public's appetite for pictures and raised expectations about both the quality of images and the speed with which they appeared in print." Photographs were also a popular propaganda piece because they embellished what Americans back home believed about war—that it was dangerous but romantic.

During the Vietnam War, the American public could watch the war unfold in their living rooms on television. According to Sherer, "Television, in other words, was forced to sanitize combat photography

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35 Moeller, 48.

36 Ibid., 130-131.

37 Ibid., 137.


39 Moeller, 146.
because of audience considerations. "40 After examining the photographic portrayals of the Vietnam War by photojournalists David Douglas Duncan and Larry Burrows, Thompson and Clarke, said:

Photographic imagery provides one of the most powerful influences in forming, changing, and molding public opinion, since television and photojournalistic publications bombarded the public daily with visual stimuli. "41

Several research studies examined combat photographs. A few studies have focused on combat photographs, "42 readers' reactions to combat photographs, "43 and the use of combat photographs as a propaganda weapon in times of war and peace. "44 Edom examined the history of photo-propaganda by examining combat photos from the Crimean War to World War II. "45 Sherer compared combat photos from the Korean War and the Vietnam War; he found that "the image of war was not the same in both events."

The American public was presented images of the brutal side of combat during the Tet Offensive in 1968, while a more sanitized version of combat images was published during the Korean War. "46

Several research studies examined combat photographs from the Vietnam War that were published


45 Ibid.

in magazines.\textsuperscript{47} Patterson analyzed three news magazines—\textit{Time}, \textit{Newsweek}, and \textit{Life}—for news stories and photos from the war. He concluded that the news magazines "tended not to carry an excessive number of stories with photographs of combat, neither did they provide the American public with a large number of photographs of the dead, wounded, and dying."\textsuperscript{48} Sherer's examination of combat photos and public opinion found that "as public opinion shifted over time, so did the image of war change."\textsuperscript{49} Niemeyer examined combat photos published in three news magazines from August 1964 to August 1973. From her observations, "It was evident that the image of war did shift before and after the Tet Offensive."\textsuperscript{50}

Three studies examined combat images from the War in the Gulf. Lule examined the \textit{Newsweek} cover of the February 4, 1991, which featured the photo of a captured Naval Aviator, Lt. Jeffery Zaun, as he was shown on Iraqi television.\textsuperscript{51} Robert Lichter examined televised images of the war, most of which did not show combat or American military casualties. There were 1,217 individual televised camera shots showing nonmilitary damage. Of these shots, 48 percent showed damage to civilian areas in Iraq, 23 percent focused on the destruction of Israel, and 13 percent depicted the oil spill in the Persian Gulf.\textsuperscript{52} Lichter also compared combat visuals that appeared on the nightly news programs. Most of the visual images depicted the air campaign (594 camera shots from Allied planes) or Patriot missile launches over Saudi Arabia or Israel. The ground campaign was covered by a total of 404 camera shots.\textsuperscript{53} John Newhagen analyzed television news stories for the presence or absence of censorship disclaimer, the

\textsuperscript{47} Niemeyer, 1-71; Pattersons, 35-39; Sherer, "Comparing Magazine Photos of Vietnam and Korean Wars,"; and Sherer, "Vietnam War Photos and Public Opinion."

\textsuperscript{48} Patterson, 38.

\textsuperscript{49} Sherer, "Vietnam War Photos and Public Opinion," 394.

\textsuperscript{50} Neimeyer, 69.

\textsuperscript{51} Lule, 158-159.


\textsuperscript{53} Ibid.
censoring source, and the producing network.\textsuperscript{54} One of the focus of this study was television's primary vehicle for information is the picture, because "television images are rich in emotion-laden, nonverbal information."\textsuperscript{55} Newhagen concluded that "Stories that contained disclaimers tended to be more negative, more intense, and more critical than stories that did not regardless of the producing network."\textsuperscript{56}

Since, several research studies examined combat photography. This thesis will examine the overall image that emerged from the War in the Gulf and how it was presented in the print media because these combat images appear on the printed page. The photos were taken by photojournalists whose challenges include the media pools and covering the wars.

\textit{Challenges photojournalists have faced covering war}

Photojournalists covering a war often have their images censored and their presence on the battlefield restricted. Sometimes censorship is a gentleman's agreement between the military and the media, there have been instances where censorship was used with dictatorial powers. Military press censorship has a long history.\textsuperscript{57} Official military press censorship has a broad continuum, from voluntary censorship to strict review of images and dispatches from the front lines. Censorship places limits on the type of images published and it prevents photojournalists from recording events on film.

Lippmann observed from his World War I experience that "military censorship is the simplest form of barrier [to public information] but by no means the most important, because it is known to exist, and is therefore in certain measure agreed to and discounted."\textsuperscript{58} During World War I, all of the countries in the war, including the United States, imposed blanket censorship on photographers and journalists, who

\begin{quote}

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., 33.

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., 40.


\end{quote}
were also often banned from the front lines and the rear areas. The rules and guidelines were not always clear. Jimmy Hare, a photographer, wrote, "To take so much as make a snapshot without official permission in writing means arrest."

The underlying principle for this censorship was to prevent the enemy from obtaining useful information, and photographs were subject to the same type of censorship as print journalism. Photos of troop movements and materials were censored. Photographers covering the war "were well versed in what would and what would not pass, and therefore, took and submitted few controversial photographs."

One of the challenges faced by photojournalists is government or military guidelines and restraints used to protect national, military and operational security. The media and the military must try to reach a compromise between national security and the right of the public to be informed. The military has been consistent on its need to limit information on exact troop locations, their movements, ship sailings, the exact number of aircraft or troops, the identification of units being sent overseas and military strategy. Historically, the media have been willing to accept the issue of military security, because "information that may give tactical knowledge to the enemy was reasonably clear-cut."

Journalists have always conceded a need for operational security and protecting the lives of American troops. When it comes to the needs of national or military security, there is a fine line between First Amendment free speech and security, and "security prevails anywhere the military has control of the actual space."

As World War II's D-Day approached, the military set four main objectives for the Allied press

59 Moeller, 110.

60 Ibid., 114-115.


62 Moeller, 299.

censorship operation: security, speed, consistency, and censorship guidance and assistance to war correspondents. The governing censorship principle was "that the minimum amount of information will be withheld from the public consistent with security." 64

For Korean War photojournalists, censorship of still photographs followed the same guidelines imposed upon other journalists covering the war:

Control should be exercised over the release of photographs rather than taking them, and photographers are expected, however, to refrain from taking pictures that violate security or hamper the Armed Forces of their allies in the discharge of military duties. 65

Photographs approved for publication were a stamped ("Passed for Publication as Censored") and initialed on the back of the photo. If photos were required to be censored, portions of the photograph were either marked out or cut out by the censor. Photographs that were marked "Not to Be Released" were returned to the photographer's publication "to be filed with the negative as evidence of their censorship ruling." 66

In October 1983, the United States embarked on Operation Fury in Grenada to rescue American medical students and to help restore a democratic government. The media was barred from joining troops during the mission. Admiral Wesley McDonald, commander-in-chief of the Atlantic fleet, explained:

Media participation in the operation was restricted initially based on the military assessment of the importance that the element of surprise played in the successful execution of the mission and the consideration of the lives of both hostages and servicemen involved in the operation. 67

During Operation Desert Shield, from August 1990 to January 1991, the military began working on restrictions or guidelines for journalists covering the war while "maintaining operational security necessary to assure tactical surprise and save American lives." 68 The rules were also designed to stop

64 Gottschalk, 43.

65 Moeller, 280.

66 Ibid.


images of dead or wounded American soldiers from reaching relatives back home through media channels.

Nohrstedt points out from his observation of the War in the Gulf, that "every crisis situation involves critical judgements about the balance between the democratic right of information and security interest." ⁶⁹

Improvements in photographic technology raised additional censorship problems for photojournalists.⁷⁰ For example, during the Vietnam War, it took hours or days for film and photographs to reach the United States for broadcast or publication. With the improvement of satellite communications, it was possible during the War in the Gulf to transmit images and audio in real time. Gerbner speaks of "instant history:"

> Instant history is made when access to video-satellite-computer systems blankets the world in real time with selected images that provoke immediate reactions, influence the outcome, and quick freeze into received history.⁷¹

Reporting instantaneous information around the world presents a twofold problem. First, the possibility for instantaneous coverage of the battlefield is a tough issue. U.S. Marine General Walter E. Boomer said, "We worry about the enemy seeing in real time what we're doing." ⁷² The second problem relies on the journalists in the field. They have the potential to spread information around the world instantaneously from the war zone. This places more responsibility on the journalists in the field to verify and check information before reporting live form the battlefield.⁷³

The multinational nature of Coalition forces in the War in the Gulf, however, made it impossible to deny access to the region. The British military allowed their pool reporters to use satellite phones and

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satellite broadcasting equipment, which enabled British pool reports to get back to London more quickly than their American counterparts. American journalists were not allowed by the military to operate satellite equipment, which caused their reports to be delayed for several hours or even days. This forced American broadcasting companies to use British pool reports from the ground campaign.

With the development of communication technologies, the media brought the world closer together. The War in the Gulf was fought half-way around the globe, and the American public was able to watch it on their television sets in real time. The military can place strict guidelines and limit movement of the media covering the war, and this includes tight control on the release of photographic images of dead and wounded soldiers.

Photographic Images of Dead and Wounded Soldiers

During war, images of dead and wounded American soldiers have to be handled with sensitivity. During the Crimean War, Roger Fenton went to the Crimea to record the happenings with his camera. In the valley of the charge of the Light Brigade, he saw bodies covering the battlefield. He did not take out his camera because he knew that this was not the type of photograph he should take.

At the beginning of World War II, "one could publish photographs of the enemy or even the Allied dead . . .," but not of American soldiers. In mid-1943, President Roosevelt, the military, and the War Department reversed their policy on images of dead and wounded soldiers. "American soldiers could be shown bleeding, dying, and dead in the picture press." However, the censors made certain that the dead or injured soldiers could not be identified. "No one could say after looking at one of these photographs, 'That's my boy.'"

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74 Fialka, 63.
75 Taylor, 51.
76 Knightley, 15.
77 Moeller, 204.
78 Ibid., 205.
79 Ibid.
During the Vietnam War, the military released guidelines on combat photography. After discussing the sensitivity of the issue and the concern for the next of kin, the guideline stated:

There has been no effort to impose restrictions on movement of audiovisual correspondents in the field or to require in-country processing, review and editing of audiovisual material produced by accredited correspondents. We hope to preserve these freedoms and ask that correspondents cooperate by--

a. Not taking close-up pictures of casualties that show faces or anything else that will identify the individual.
b. Not interviewing or recording the voices of casualties until a medical officer determines that the man is physically and mentally able, and the individual gives permission.80

After Vietnam, the military stated that casualty information was extremely sensitive. An Army regulation regarding photographing and recording personnel in hostile areas was revised on July 15, 1979: "Care must be used in releasing information, photographs, and recordings of U.S. personnel and Allied forces killed, wounded in action, hospitalized, detained as a result of hostile action, or missing in action."81

The regulation prohibited photographs or recordings of recognizable wounded or dead personnel not identified by name; recognizable wounded personnel identified by name (until next of kin had been notified, unless the release was approved by the wounded); recognizable wounded personnel who had requested that their next of kin not be notified; surgical or other major medical care photographs or videotape recordings which identified the patient; deceased and/or wounded personnel in large numbers; mangled bodies, obvious expressions of agony, or expressions of severe shock; and personnel missing in action or detained before next of kin had been identified and search-and-rescue operations had been terminated.82

Before the War in the Gulf, the military was concerned with the privacy of wounded or dead soldiers' families. There have been instances where next of kin have learned about the death of a loved one through the media. Notification of the next of kin far outweighs the newsworthiness of the image, and "casualty photographs showing recognizable faces, name tags, or other identifying features should not be


81 Dykhouse, 53.

82 Ibid.
used before the next of kin have been notified. 83

Images of dead or wounded soldiers published in the media has a broad continuum ranging from no images of dead and wounded to images of dead and wounded soldiers in Vietnam. It has been argued that these images could have a depressing effect upon the public. While public opinion polls taken during the War in the Gulf showed that a majority of Americans supported military involvement, "this percentage dropped substantially when survey questions included reference to the deaths of American soldiers."84

**Combat Photographs and Public Opinion**

Our society craved images from war even before photographs could be published. During the Civil War, *Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper* and *Harper's Weekly* found that "images of the [Civil] war were particularly intriguing" to the public, and both publications' circulations soared. Images of war have an impact on public opinion. According to Umberson and Henderson, "political and military advisors are well aware of the link between death awareness and public support for wars."86

Photographs of American flags and yellow ribbons have been symbols of challenge, unity and strength. In past wars, the military and the government have censored images that would greatly affect the morale back home. Thompson and Clarke stated that "photographic imagery provides one of the most powerful influences in forming, changing, and molding public opinion, since television and photojournalistic publications bombarded the public daily with visual stimuli."87

Recently, the Clinton Administration found that photographic and television images shaped public opinion against the military's involvement in Somalia. In a botched raid against warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid, U.S. Rangers were trapped and battling Aidid's men from rooftops and buildings. After the smoke

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84 Umberson and Henderson, 3.


86 Umberson and Henderson, 3.

87 Thompson and Clarke, 280.
cleared, 15 American soldiers were killed, 77 were wounded, four were missing in action and one was taken captive. Americans were stunned as television aired footage and newspapers ran photos of Somalis dragging the body of a dead U.S. soldier through the streets. Chief Warrant Officer Michael Durant, who was taken captive after his helicopter was shot down, was videotaped by his captors answering questions. As television viewers watched Durant being interviewed, his battered and bloodied face became the symbolic image of the United States' involvement in Somalia.

After seeing the images from Somalia, Americans called upon their representatives in Washington to withdraw the U.S. troops. Members of Congress referred to the images and called upon President Clinton to bring the troops home immediately. National Security Advisor Anthony Lake said that "the photographs made the president 'very angry.'" Ironically, it was just 10 months earlier that images invoked the Bush Administration to send U.S. troops to Somalia to help feed the starving Somali people. With images of dead and captured soldiers, the public's opinion was swayed to recall our troops from the region. R. W. Apple, the New York Times Washington Bureau Chief, said the "journalism of images has always had a tremendous impact upon public opinion, and public opinion has always had a tremendous impact on government." Philip Taylor remarked that "Politicians no longer set the agenda--television images dictated it for them."

History of Photographic Access During Times of War

The Spanish-American War "was the first time that photographs of a major news event were published . . .," and "subsequent news events would be covered by the evolving technology of

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88 Louise Leif and Bruce B. Auster with Todd Shields and Sam Kiley, "What went wrong in Somalia?" U.S. News and World Reports, 18 October 1994, 34.


90 Ibid.

91 Ibid., 16.

92 Taylor, 15.
photography.⁹³ General William Shafter, commander of the U.S. Army's expedition to Cuba, was hostile to the press, "yet he permitted them extraordinary access to the land operations."⁹⁴ The photographs of the war could not capture the totality of combat, but "it was the first war in which the United States fought that photographs were taken showing action during battle."⁹⁵

When the United States entered World War I, the American Expeditionary Force was under the command of General John J. Pershing. Pershing did not allow American correspondents to have open access to military operations. He restricted coverage of the war by limiting the number of accredited correspondents to 31 and barring them travel to the front lines.⁹⁶ When the United States entered the war, the only authorized photographs of American forces were to be taken by the Army Signal Corps. Only accredited photographers were allowed to take images in the American zone. Those who were found taking images of forbidden subjects were severely disciplined.⁹⁷ Many military operations were closed to the press. The press had to rely upon the military version of the events, including photographs supplied to them by the Army.⁹⁸

During World War II, President Roosevelt—through an executive order—established the United States Office of Censorship. The Office of Censorship distributed the "Code of Wartime Practices for the American Press" which "concerned itself with what could be printed, not how that information could be gathered."⁹⁹ The censorship office "did not attempt to censor or restrict the access of the U.S. press to the

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⁹⁴ Moeller, 49.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 58.

⁹⁶ "Excerpts from the Defendant's (Pentagon) Lawsuit Brief," 397.

⁹⁷ Moeller, 111.

⁹⁸ Ibid., 131.

battlefield. The Associated Press' Don Whitehead, who covered several beach landings in the Pacific theater, was told by the commander of an assault unit:

We are ready to help you... The people at home won't know what is happening unless you are given information, and I want them to know... If you're wounded, we'll take care of you. If you're killed we'll bury you.

Photojournalists and correspondents suffered three main problems during World War II: transportation, communication and censorship. Transportation to the front lines was critical. It was up to the photographers and reporters to get to the fighting. Once they arrived, they would have to find some way of getting their images and stories back to the United States.

Communication between the fronts and the states was a giant hurdle. Because of the distance, photographers rarely saw their own work once it was processed and published. Moeller said, "They took pictures in a creative vacuum." Photographers and correspondents were always trying to get their images and stories back to their newsrooms while the news was still newsworthy.

In World War II, military censorship was handled differently, depending on if it was domestic information, if it was information from both the Pacific and Atlantic theaters of operation, or if it was naval information. President Franklin Roosevelt requested that the American news media voluntarily respect the censorship guidelines issued earlier, and he created the Office of Censorship under Byron Price, the former executive news editor of the Associated Press. Price's office dealt with censorship of all modes of domestic communication.

With the war in the Pacific raging on, General MacArthur engaged in dictatorial censorship. His restrictive news media policy included "multiple censorship of correspondents' copy before release,"

100 Ibid.
101 Ibid.
102 Moeller, 184.
103 Ibid., 187.
105 Gottschalk, 40.
of censorship for 'image building,'\textsuperscript{106} and "the policy of delaying the news and then compounding the belated release by linking bad news with stories of combat success."\textsuperscript{107}

In the Atlantic theater, the British and American representatives completed an agreement for joint censorship, which was housed at the British Ministry of Information. Under their large-scale task, this agreement consisted of creating censorship teams composed of military officers from both countries. These teams went ashore with invasion landing forces and accredited war correspondents and photojournalists during the invasion campaigns of North Africa, southern Europe, and D-Day. Before the D-Day invasion, the Joint Press Censorship Group composed four objectives of field censorship: "security, speed, consistency, and censorship guidance and assistance to war correspondents." This guidance established the principle of field press censorship: "that the minimum amount of information will be withheld from the public consistent with security."\textsuperscript{108}

The United States' naval censorship was rigid in both theaters of operation. But in the Pacific theater, censorship remained rigidly effective throughout the war. The Navy found it easier to censor and control correspondents aboard warships, because "they are limited in their movement, contacts, and communications, and can only report what they are told by a command that frequently does not have the full story itself."\textsuperscript{109}

Logistical problems limited the access of journalists and photojournalists to major battles in World War II. The major photo agencies (Associated Press, Acme, International News Photo and Life magazine) created a photographic pool in early 1942. Under this arrangement, the agencies pooled their resources by "supplying photographers for the war fronts from the staffs of all four organizations, whose pictures were then available to all four."\textsuperscript{110}

\textsuperscript{106} Knightley, 281.

\textsuperscript{107} Gottschalk, 40.

\textsuperscript{108} Ibid., 41-43.

\textsuperscript{109} Ibid., 41.

\textsuperscript{110} "Excerpts from the Defendant's (Pentagon) Lawsuit Brief," 398.
Photographic coverage from the Korean War was different from World War II because more photojournalists covered the events in Korea. Competition between photojournalists and journalists was keen. The absence of pool arrangement meant that everyone was trying to scoop the opposition.

At the beginning of the Korean War, General Douglas MacArthur tried to avoid formal censorship by using a voluntary press code. It did not work. After six months of chaos, official censorship was imposed on the press. The censorship of still images followed the same guidelines imposed on photojournalists during World War II. The guidelines said that "control should be exercised over the release of photographs rather than the taking of them."^{111}

During the Vietnam War, one of the least popular in America's history, the media had wide and unrestricted access to the battlefield. General Peter Dawkins said, "War is an ugly, dirty, obscene business, and if you take snippets of it and constantly expose the American public to its reality, that is going to profoundly influence their attitude towards the enterprise."^{112} The media were given ground rules which met the "military needs for operational security and safety of troops, and at the same time the needs of the press."^{113}

During the Vietnam War, journalists and photojournalists accompanied troops and naval units during operations. The official U.S. policy "was to provide military transportation for reporters to help them to visit combat and other areas."^{114} By using helicopter transportation, journalists were more mobile than their counterparts had been in any other war.

Several years later, the Reagan administration and the military watched with admiration as the British controlled the media during the Falklands War of 1982. The Falklands War was "the most

^{111} Moeller, 280.

^{112} Ibid., 363-365.


^{114} Sparrow, 68.
unphotographed war since the Crimean."\textsuperscript{115} This new military strategy on press restrictions was simple: "Keep the media as far away from war activities as possible for as long as possible, and put maximum restrictions on their working conditions."\textsuperscript{116}

In October 1983, the media faced total exclusion from the invasion of Grenada until the fighting was over. No television photographers were allowed to cover the invasion.\textsuperscript{117} This was the beginning of the end of open access to military operations.\textsuperscript{118}

After the military news blackout during the invasion in Grenada, a directive from Caspar Weinberger, the Secretary of Defense, established "press access to all future United States military operations."\textsuperscript{119} The Sidle Panel, under the direction of Major General Winant Sidle, consisted of a 12-member panel of former journalists, journalism professors and military public affairs officers. It worked out a plan for the news coverage of future military operations.\textsuperscript{120}

The Sidle commission recommended the creation of the Department of Defense National Media Pool. This media pool would be a rotating list of journalists, photojournalists and technicians who would cover the early stages of military operations on short notice. The pool would enable the media to cover the early stages of the operation in a remote area, "while still protecting the element of surprise, an essential part of what military call operational security."\textsuperscript{121}

The first use of the national media pool in combat conditions came during Operation Just Cause,

\textsuperscript{115} Edourado Bellando, War Coverage: The Case of the Falklands, from the Freedom of Information Center Report #494, 4 1984, ERIC ED 246 470.


\textsuperscript{117} Nohrstedt, 119.


\textsuperscript{119} "Excerpts from the Plaintiff’s (Press) Lawsuit Brief," 393.

\textsuperscript{120} MacArthur, 142.

\textsuperscript{121} Williams, 35.
the invasion of Panama on December 20, 1989. The Pentagon delayed the departure of the pool until just two hours before the fighting began. When the media pool arrived in Panama, the journalists were kept at Howard Air Force Base for five hours. During this delay, "the media missed the heaviest action of the operation." The pool was not able to get any accounts or photographs of the destruction of the Panamanian barrio of El Chorrillo in Panama City. This is where General Manuel Noriega's headquarters were located, or of the Panamanian civilians killed in the invasion.

From war to war, photojournalists access ranged from open access to no access to the world's battlefields. Experienced combat photojournalist, David Duncan said, he had "no war-photography philosophy... except keep down--and move in close." To capture the reality of war and, to record it on film or video, the photojournalists must be with the fighting.

Access

In our democratic society, the role of the media is to inform the public about the happenings necessary to self-government, and to act as a catalyst for public debate on important issues affecting our society. An important element of publishing and broadcasting the news is newsgathering. Journalists and photojournalists need access to an event to gather and record information. In the newsgathering process, the media must have the greatest possible access. According to Barry Zorthian, open access "fulfills its (the media's) role as an independent observer and surrogate for the public."

When it comes to a crisis such as war, the media can respond very quickly to cover the story. With technological advances such as portable satellite dishes and telephones, the media can relay information back to their newsrooms from anywhere in the world. According to Taylor, "this only [makes]
it all the more important for the military to ensure a tighter rein over their movements and activities. "127

The military and the government have learned that they can manage the media during wartime. During the Falklands War, the British military used the following rules to manage the media during the war:

Control access to the fighting; control all communication's facilities; exclude neutral correspondents; carefully screen your own; ban or delay all pictorial coverage, it has too much impact, in particular, ban live TV; check all the materials the journalists have gathered; censor, delay or suppress dangerous news; release bad news in dribs and drabs, so as to reduce its impact; play favoritism and reward patriotic reporters; and, blame 'technical reasons,' it is an excellent excuse in a lot of circumstances.128

In Deciding What's News, Hebert Gans writes, "At the national level, power is generally exercised by refusing access and is the primary form of censorship."129

As part of its accountability to the American public, the military should provide as much official information as possible in an accurate, candid, timely and complete manner.130 It is equally important for the media to perform as an independent representative of the public to check the accountability of the government and the military's accuracy and validity.131 The military has a right to protect information on tactical security that accomplishes its military mission. It needs to control access and place restrictions on the media during times of war. The public also has a right to know what is occurring during the war.

During the War in the Gulf, The Economist, while defending the military's restrictions and guidelines, stated:

A dutiful press that merely regurgitates what it is told is useless, in the field and at home. The job of the press is to tell the truth, about right and wrong alike. Such reports can force improvements and save lives . . . 132

Walter Cronkite argued that:

127 Taylor, 26.

128 Bellando, 6.


130 Zorthian, 102.

131 Middleton and Chamberlin, 43-44.

132 Taylor, 272-273.
The greatest mistake of our military so far is its attempt to control coverage by assigning a few pool reporters and photographers to be taken to locations determined by the military with supervising officers monitoring all their conversations with the troops in the field. An American citizen is entitled to ask: 'What are they trying to hide?' The answer might be casualties from shelling, collapsing morale, disaffection, insurrection, incompetent officers, poorly trained troops, malfunctioning equipment, widespread illness— who knows? But the fact that we don't know, the fact that the military apparently feels there is something it must hide, can only lead eventually to a breakdown in home-front confidence and the very echoes from Vietnam that the Pentagon fears the most.133

In the television age, many politicians believe that fighting lengthy wars is nearly impossible for a democratic society. Television can bring a war home nightly to the living room in living color, and when the scenes become gruesome, "public support for war vanishes."134

**The American Law of Access**

Under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, freedom of the press protects the media's right to publish newsworthy information for public dissemination. Obtaining access to events and resources has always been a part of the ingenuity of the media. In the Information Age, emerging technologies have opened new avenues of media coverage of events or crises. The use of computers and satellites raises new issues in access, censorship and the First Amendment.135 Although the First and Fourteenth Amendments bar government from interfering with a free press, the Constitution does not "require government to accord the press special access to information not shared by members of the public generally."136

There are several federal statutes and regulations that govern the relationship between photojournalists and the military. Some of these statutes "prohibit photography of defense installations and equipment and the trespass statute," and "prohibit entry to a closed post."137 Photojournalists need

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137 Dykhouse cites 50 USC 781-85, 18 USC 795-97 and 18 USC 1382, 2.
permission of the person in charge of a military area to take pictures within. There are specific regulations that deal with combat areas and to prohibit photographing or recording wounded or dead military personnel. "Establishment and Conduct of Field Press Censorship in Combat Areas" which outlines regulations governing overseas correspondents and the censorship requirements of photography, television and radio broadcast in combat areas.

The freedom of the press means little if information cannot be obtained. The news media's First Amendment rights to gather information have been reviewed by the United States Supreme Court. In 1965, the Court upheld the State Department's ban on travel to Cuba. The Court held that neither citizens nor the media have a First Amendment right to gather information. In the Court's words, "The right to speak and publish does not carry with it unrestrained right to gather information." In 1972, the Court addressed the issue of a reporter's right to refuse to reveal confidential sources before a grand jury.

It has generally been held that the First Amendment does not guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access to information not available to the public generally.

The current principles governing access flow from two cases decided by the Supreme Court on the same issue on the same day in 1974. In the first decision, Procunier v. Pell, reporters claimed a First Amendment right to interview specific prisoners in California jails. Prison officials, however, "believed that the media attention given to a few prisoners turned them into media celebrities." The Court decided that the prison regulations did not abridge the right of a free press:

The First and Fourteenth Amendments bar government from interfering in any way with a

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139 Dykhouse cites under Army Regulation 360-65, OPNAV 5530-3A and Air Force Regulation 190-11 issued in April 1966 and revised on July 15, 1979, 44.

140 Graber, 122.

141 Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965).


143 Id. at 684.

free press. The Constitution does not, however, require government to accord the press special access to information not shared by members of the public generally.\textsuperscript{145}

In the second case, \textit{Saxbe v. Washington Post}, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a federal prison rule that prohibited interviews of "individually designated" prison inmates.\textsuperscript{146}

For the court to recognize such a special status for the press, however, would have been to depart from the highly individualistic tradition of contemporary First Amendment jurisprudence.\textsuperscript{147}

Another case decided by the Supreme Court involved media access and law enforcement officials. In 1975, KQED, a public television station in San Francisco, California, learned of a suicide that had taken place in the Alameda County jail. The television station sought access from Sheriff Thomas Houchins to a portion of the Santa Rita jail, known as the Greystone section, where the inmate had committed suicide. When permission was denied by the sheriff, KQED with the Alameda and Oakland Branches of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People filed a suit arguing that its First Amendment rights had been violated by the denial of access to the facility.\textsuperscript{148} The Court upheld the restrictions imposed on jail visits by Houchins. With Chief Justice Burger wrote the Court opinion that said the First Amendment does not guarantee "a right of access to all sources of information within governmental control."\textsuperscript{149} This same control has been applied to military bases.

The Supreme Court recognized the nonpublic nature of military activities in a 1961 decision that held "the control of access to a military base is clearly within constitutional power granted to both Congress and the President."\textsuperscript{150} The business of a military installation like Fort Dix [is] to train soldiers, not to provide a public forum. A necessary concomitant of the basic function of a military installation has been "the historically unquestioned power of [its] commanding officer summarily to

\textsuperscript{145} Id. at 834.


\textsuperscript{148} Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1978).

\textsuperscript{149} Id. at 9.

exclude civilians from his area of command.\textsuperscript{151}

The right of access to information, news and images is a fundamental First Amendment issue. The concept of a First Amendment right of access to a courtroom, established in Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia and Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, is based on the concept that "the American people have a fundamental right to information about the activities of their government.\textsuperscript{152} When there is a basic confrontation between the First Amendment and a question of national security, the information in question must be examined to determine if there would be a "grave and irreparable injury to the public interest" if it was released.\textsuperscript{153} Although the public has a right to know what the government is doing, national security interests often take precedence and proscribe access to military actions.

**Legal Challenges During the War in the Gulf**

There were three lawsuits that contested the military restrictions on the media. On January 10, 1991, during Operation Desert Shield, a lawsuit was filed by the Center of Constitutional Rights on behalf of several writers, magazines and news organizations. The lawsuit charged that the military restrictions, placed on the media's access to the war, violated the First Amendment.\textsuperscript{154} The suit argued that the military guidelines "interfered for no legitimate reason with their [the media's] ability to gather news and that the censorship scheme constituted an unconstitutional prior restraint on the freedom of the press."\textsuperscript{155}

One month later, the second lawsuit challenging the military's press restrictions was filed by


\textsuperscript{155} Stebenne, 20.
Agence France-Presse (AFP), when the French news agency was excluded from the press pools. The agency complained that the military allowed Associated Press (AP) and Reuters to participate in the pool systems, but not AFP. The suit asked for a ruling that "the pool restrictions constituted an unconstitutional interference with the media's ability to gather news." The suit also requested that "photos produced by pool members be made available to AFP until the case was resolved." The media attorney claimed that:

In a drastic departure from the practices observed throughout the history of this nation, including the era of modern warfare and reflected in World War II and the Vietnam War, defendants and their recent predecessors have imposed restrictions on press access to overt military operations of United States armed forces which had formally been open to the media.

Often media attorneys complained that the pool system, the military escort and the security review process illegally interfered with their ability to gather and report news, and this was "in violation of the First Amendment's free press guarantee and the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause." The larger media players (the three major television networks, The Washington Post, The New York Times and Newsday) were invited to participate in the lawsuit but "declined either to join the suit or to contribute friend-of-the-court briefs once the suit was filed."

Both suits were combined because they raised the same issues. The Justice Department said "that the press restrictions had been imposed to protect the security of U.S. military forces," and "the use of pools was 'not intended to be a permanent feature of media coverage of the hostilities in the Persian Gulf.'" On February 25, U.S. District Court Judge Leonard Sand ordered the Defense Department to explain how the ground-war phase of the war would affect the media guidelines and ground rules.

Now that Operation Desert Shield has entered a new operational stage, is there any intent to revise or lift the regulations on media coverage previously furnished to this court? If so, when and in what respect? If the answer was no, the second question was: When, if

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156 Stebenne, 21.


159 MacArthur, 34.

160 Stebenne, 21.
ever, is it intended that said regulations will be revised or lifted?\textsuperscript{161}

Sand scheduled a preliminary hearing for March 7. Although the war ended before the case began, Judge Sand eventually issued his ruling which concluded:

That this Court cannot now determine that some limitation on the number of journalists granted access to a battlefield in the next overseas military operation may not be a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction valid under the First and Fifth Amendments.\textsuperscript{162}

By establishing pool coverage in the early stages of Operation Desert Shield, the war theater became a limited public forum. Although Judge Sand declined to decide "whether the government is constitutionally required to open the battlefield to the press as representatives of the public."\textsuperscript{163}

These lawsuits sought media access. They did not seek to establish a new right, but "sought to protect a right which has always existed and which defendants [The Department of Defense] have only recently, and very effectively, denied."\textsuperscript{164} The Department of Defense argued that

The use of news media pools to cover U.S. combat operations during the initial stages of Operation Desert Storm does not shut off access by the press to these operations. Rather, it controls press access by initially limiting forward area entry to nine newsgathering pools composed of eighteen or seven members each, which all news media are welcome to join.\textsuperscript{165}

Judge Sand wrote that

If the reasoning of these recent access cases were followed in a military context, there is support for the proposition that the press has at least some minimal right of access to view and report about major events that affect the functioning of government, including, for example, an overt combat operation.\textsuperscript{166}

A third lawsuit contested the military guidelines on behalf of several photographers, media representatives, veteran groups and family support groups. The lawsuit claimed that the decision to bar

\textsuperscript{161} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{163} Ibid., 413.

\textsuperscript{164} "Excerpts from the Plaintiff's (Press) Lawsuit Brief," 391.

\textsuperscript{165} "Excerpts from the Defendant's (Pentagon) Lawsuit Brief," 401.

\textsuperscript{166} Sand, 412.
public and press access to Dover Air Force Base violated the press' freedom to gather news and the citizens' rights of free expression. \(^{167}\) Dover Air Force Base received the bodies of military personnel killed in the war, and the plaintiffs asserted that "the military's restrictions were intended to shield the public from disturbing images of returning coffins rather than to protect the nation's security." \(^{168}\)

The Department of Defense countered, "The public had no absolute right of access to a military base and that closing the Dover installation to the general public and the press protected the privacy of grieving families and friends." \(^{169}\) The military argued that allowing access to the public and the press would raise a national security concern, by interfering "with base personnel's ability to carry out tasks related to the supply of material to U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf." \(^{170}\) U.S. District Court Judge Royce Lambeth denied the plaintiffs' request on February 25, saying "the military could limit access to its installation in furtherance of a legitimate purpose, and that protecting the privacy of the dead soldiers' relatives constituted one." \(^{171}\)

The media does not have the same constitutional protections for access as it has for the dissemination and publication of information. A crucial part of the newsgathering process for any journalists and photojournalists is access to a newsworthy scene or event. Within the last ten years, the military has successfully limited access to the media during military interventions. When contested, the courts agreed with the military's national and operational security claims; this was true during the War in the Gulf.

**Access during the War in the Gulf**

The War in the Gulf was the first major U.S. military commitment since the Vietnam War. Along with the military buildup, the media prepared for the biggest story of the Nineties. While President Bush

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\(^{167}\) Stebenne, 21-22.

\(^{168}\) Ibid., 22.

\(^{169}\) Ibid.

\(^{170}\) Ibid.

\(^{171}\) Ibid.
and Saddam Hussein were rhetorically drawing lines in the sand, the Pentagon prepared news media guidelines which proscribed interviews with military personnel without the proper military escort. There was also a military censor's "security review" established for all stories, photographs and video footage. Only a handful of journalists and photojournalists were allowed to cover the war from the front. The rest of the media covered the war from the rear.\footnote{Sydney H. Schanberg, "Censoring for (Military) Political Security," \textit{Washington Journalism Review}, 13, March 1991, 24.}

The use of news media pools during the War in the Gulf did not shut off access to military operations. During the early stages of Operation Desert Shield, the Washington bureau chiefs entered into an agreement with the Pentagon. This agreement allowed combat coverage by journalists and photojournalists working in pools but only when they were escorted by military public affairs officers. Nine newsgathering pools were composed of 18 or seven members each. Richard H.P. Sia, a reporter for the \textit{Baltimore Sun}, said that "Our [the media's] ability to gather meaningful news was severely inhibited." He added, "Much of the access to U.S. troops was strictly controlled by the Joint Information Bureau in Dhahran."\footnote{Richard H.P. Sia, interview by Victor J. Paul, 20 June 1994, Compu Serve Forum.}

Journalists in the media pools were highly competitive and were concerned with protecting their exclusive right to the news.\footnote{Ottosen, 140.} The media pools excluded foreign members of the press corp. Agence France-Presse, the French news agency, filed a lawsuit challenging their exclusion. Their lawsuit was combined with another lawsuit filed by the Center for Constitutional Rights on behalf of news organizations and journalists, which raised the same issues. The war ended before there was a resolution to the cases.

On August 10, 1990, eight days after Iraq invaded Kuwait, Navy Captain Ron Wildermuth wrote a secret 10-page memo soon to be known as Annex Foxtrot which outlined the military's public information policy. It emphasized one rule above all others for media coverage of Operations Desert Shield and Storm: "News media representatives will be escorted at all times."\footnote{MacArthur, 7.} The military spin doctors and censors were

\footnote{MacArthur, 7.}
quite successful in limiting media access to only "approved" news stories and information.\textsuperscript{176}

The real test of these guidelines, however, came during the ground campaign of the war. The Wall Street Journal's John Fialka said:

\begin{quote}
Censorship was not the problem... Access and communications were what too many Army units failed to provide--and as a result, the public did not get a clear, timely picture of the crucial Army effort, an effort that revealed the troops, their equipment, and their commanders in the great test of combat.\textsuperscript{177}
\end{quote}

News coverage of the War in the Gulf was unlike coverage of any other war. During its around-the-clock coverage of the War in the Gulf, Cable News Network (CNN) carried the following warning every hour:

\begin{quote}
CNN is working to bring you the most complete war coverage possible. However, various restrictions have been imposed on access to information and war locations. Iraq, Israel, and Saudi Arabia have imposed restrictions for coverage of war activity in their countries. The U.S. military and the British military are also restricting certain information and access. The authorities involved feel the restrictions are necessary for security reasons. CNN is respecting these guidelines and will tell you when the reports you see are affected.\textsuperscript{178}
\end{quote}

In his statement before the U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Assistant Secretary of Defense Pete Williams said, "They [journalists] are worried about how much access they'll have to the Army and Marines in the event the President decides to proceed with the next phase of the campaign, intensifying action on the ground."\textsuperscript{179} Molly Moore, the Pentagon correspondent for the Washington Post, remarked that "censorship was not the problem; access was the problem." She added, "Censorship in my mind is them telling me 'you can't report the outcome'... I think it's semantics in the way we look at censorship and the way we look at access."\textsuperscript{180}

In the War in the Gulf, the ground-campaign press arrangements were "suited to the peculiar

\begin{footnotes}
\item \textsuperscript{176} Walter S. Baer, \textit{Technology's Challenges to the First Amendment} (San Monica: RAND, 1992), 16-17.
\item \textsuperscript{177} Fialka, xiii.
\item \textsuperscript{178} Taylor, 24-25.
\item \textsuperscript{179} Williams, 41.
\item \textsuperscript{180} MacArthur, 160.
\end{footnotes}
conditions there. Journalists accompanied military units in pool systems. They were a part of a highly mobile operation. AP photographer Scott Applewhite said, "I've got to have that access, I've got to be able to use their vehicles, their helicopters."

The generals in the field controlled all access to the war. Pete Williams, in his statement before the U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, said before the war that "Our frontline units will not have the capacity to accommodate large numbers of reporters." While the Army was grudgingly accepting the photojournalists and journalists assigned to them, the Marines never seemed to get enough media in the field. They were badgering the Joint Information Bureau for more journalists, even as the ground campaign started.

Much of the media coverage during the war focused on the Marines, and left public unaware of the bigger picture taking shape on the Army's battles during the ground campaign. By denying access to many of the combat areas before the ground campaign, General Schwarzkopf was able to withhold information about the massive armored forces in positions along the Iraqi border.

Besides limiting access to military units and troops in Saudi Arabia, the main military mortuary at Dover Air Force Base was closed to the media. This closure precluded photography, videotaping or any news coverage of the arrival of war dead at the mortuary. One reason for closing the base to the media was the 1990 network broadcast that showed split-screen images of President Bush's speech glorifying the Panama invasion alongside rows of coffins bearing the troops killed in action. The military said that media access to Dover Air Force Base interfered with the ability to supply material to the U.S. forces in the

181 Williams, 33.

182 Fialka, 60.

183 Williams, 42.

184 Fialka, 27.


186 Schanberg, 54.

187 MacArthur, 245.
The War in the Gulf was the first real-time television war. Around midnight on January 16, 1991, the networks began receiving pool footage released by military censors. The footage showed fighter jets and bombers launching against targets in Iraq. CBS reporter Bob Simon noted that "the pictures were specifically chosen to produce the image of a neat, methodical, sleek, clean war, 'beautiful planes taking off in the darkness for Iraq.'" Later pool footage showed U.S. pilots bombing Baghdad. One pilot reported that "the bombing of Baghdad looked like Fourth of July fireworks, with the sky lighting up like a Christmas tree." ABC, used a British International Television News (ITN) report by Brent Sadler and footage shot by ABC cameraman Fabrice Moussus, who used a special night lens. The video showed explosions of light in the sky over Baghdad. Antiaircraft fire, tracer bullets and bombs, exploding in the sky, produced a spectacular sound and light show.

Some of the war's most memorable images were "the remarkable gun-camera footage of precision bombs, produced not by journalists but by the military." According to David Gergen, the former Reagan White House aide who helped pioneer the use of images to form public opinion, "those videos had an enormous impact on the American public." Most of the air campaign images featured on the television networks were camera shots from Allied planes or Patriot missile launches from Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Photojournalists who were lucky enough to be in one of the media pools, found that Army generals controlled the images the photojournalists recorded. Some of these restrictions bordered on the ridiculous.

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188 Stebenne, 22.

189 Kellner, 131.

190 Ibid., 135.

191 Ibid., 157.


193 Ibid.

Scott Pelley, a CBS news correspondent, said military escorts from the 18th Airborne Corp would not allow television crews to videotape soldiers arguing. Major General John H. Tilelli ordered that no pictures "could be taken of troopers unless they had their helmets on and their chin straps buckled."195

The photo pool was managed by photo editors from the Associated Press, Reuters, Time, Newsweek and U.S. News and World Report. Donald Mell, the Associated Press photo editor who coordinated the pool during the ground campaign, said, "There were nights when we had as many as 180 rolls of film coming in. That means over 6,000 images."196 From all these images, the editors chose 20 that became the official photo pool report for that day. The wire services transmitted those images to their newspaper customers because "that's essentially what the system could hold."197

The editors in the photo pool contended with other problems during the war. The Knight-Ridder/Chicago Tribune Newswire demanded a the leadership role in the pool, but the photo pool leaders rejected them.198 The sudden influx of photojournalists in Saudi Arabia created more difficulties because "A lot of them came off the plane and thought they were going to get a photo pass for the 50-yard line."199 By the time the war actually started, many photo pool positions were already filled.

On January 20, CNN's Peter Arnett reported from Baghdad that "seven allied POWs had been interviewed that evening on Iraqi TV, dressed in military uniforms and sitting in front of a white wall."200 The bruised and puffy face of Naval Aviator Lt. Jeffrey Zaun became a symbol of the POWs' plight. His image, along with the other POWs', was repeated on the television newscasts, was the topic of discussion on talk radio shows, and was front-page photos in newspapers and magazines. After the war, Zaun said that "his injuries resulted from ejection and that he punched himself in the face a couple of times so that he

195 Fialka, 16-17.
196 Ibid., 37.
197 Ibid.
198 Taylor, 38.
199 Ibid., 39.
200 Kellner, 189.
wouldn't be put on Iraqi TV."\(^{201}\)

The so-called battle of Khafji, a border town between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, was fought on January 31. This was the only skirmish during the War in the Gulf where soldiers shot at and killed each other. A French television crew, arriving at the outskirts of Khafji, was "greeted by angry shouts from attending pool reporters."\(^{202}\) French producer Alain Debos claimed, "the crew was forced at gunpoint by Marines to give up videotape it had shot of a wounded U.S. soldier."\(^{203}\)

The ground campaign began the night of February 22. As the American public waited for more information, the media found itself in a news blackout of information from the front lines. The news blackout lasted for the first 12 hours of the ground war. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney made this statement to the press on the blackout:

> I want to assure all of you that we understand our solemn obligation to the American people to keep informed of developments. But I am confident that they understand that this policy is necessary to save lives and to reduce American casualties, as well as those of coalition forces.\(^{204}\)

As the largest military attack since World War II got under way, the Army's system for supporting the media covering the war collapsed. Many couriers, military escorts and journalists, as well as news copy, film and videotapes, were lost in the desert.\(^{205}\) Television pool photographers had to get their images back to the censors to be cleared and fed to satellites for broadcast in the United States. Gary Matsumoto, an NBC and pool reporter assigned to cover the U.S. Army 24th Mechanized Division assault of Iraq, said:

> Our presence at the front was somewhat 'academic.' We'd shoot the action, but there was no way to get videotape back. Fine for the Library of Congress, a disaster for Nightly News. But even if the couriers had been swift and sure, the pool arrangement would have yielded poor footage.\(^{206}\)

\(^{201}\) Ibid., 191.

\(^{202}\) Ibid., 276.

\(^{203}\) Ibid., 276.


\(^{205}\) Fialka, 12.

\(^{206}\) MacArthur, 190.
The first video image from the ground war was from ITN's Sandy Gall's pool report of Coalition forces moving over Saddam Hussein's much-vaulted sand fortifications. As more pool footage cleared military censors, the television networks broadcast images of Iraqi prisoners, abandoned foxholes, burning oil wells and Coalition forces racing unimpeded through Kuwait and Iraq.

AP photographer John Gaps, working with the 7th Combat Engineers Brigade, sent a packet of film on the first day only to receive it back on the third day for some unknown reason. Another batch of his film arrived in Dhahran more than a month later. Gaps said, "I have these beautiful pictures and nobody will ever see them."

James Wooten, an ABC news reporter, had shot video footage of tank battles and an entire Iraqi company that surrendered to his television crew. Wooten went to Colonel Leroy Goff, the brigade commander, and told him, "The stuff I've got is going to end up in the archives unless I get out of here and get it on the air tomorrow."

Colonel Goff used one of the division's helicopters to fly Wooten to Dhahran so he could report his story live on "Good Morning America."

The most violent single event during the war occurred on February 25. An Iraqi Scud missile crashed into the American troop's barracks near Dhahran. The explosion and shock wave sent shrapnel into sleeping soldiers killing 27 and wounding 98. Scott Applewhite, an Associated Press photographer, was the first journalist to arrive. "He was shoved around by guards, he had his film confiscated, and then was escorted back to the Dhahran International Hotel by a public affairs officer," and was told that "host-nation sensibilities forbade any pictures."

As the pool system broke down toward the final hours of the war, journalists invaded Kuwait. Images of the massacre of the Iraqi military by the Coalition forces began to emerge. As journalists

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207 Kellner, 346.
208 Fialka, 21.
209 Ibid., 22.
210 Ibid., 56.
211 Ibid., 3.
wandered up the highway from Kuwait City to Iraq, they found evidence of the "Highway of Death." The
highway was littered with military and civilian vehicles used by Iraqis to flee Kuwait. "There were images
of one vehicle after another, mile after mile, piled upon each other, evoking a picture of a giant traffic jam
in which planes bombed and destroyed anything below themselves." Television networks "sanitized" the
video images of the Highway of Death by removing images of burned and mutilated bodies. A photograph
of "the ghoulish and charred body of a dead Iraqi soldier still seated upright in his disabled vehicle" was
taken by Kenneth Jarecke. It appeared in The Observer of London on March 3. Its later publication by
the British Guardian, created an uproar.

There were large gaps in the media's coverage of the War in the Gulf, and major battles went
virtually uncovered. Donald Mell, a photo editor for the Associated Press, reviewed thousands of images
taken by more than 40 photographers on the battlefield. He said, "There were no dead Iraqi soldiers. We
had these massive tank battles, but I did not see a picture of an American tank being fired during the whole
thing." Walter Porges, an ABC network vice president who reviewed the pooled television coverage of
the war, said, "I guess you could call it censorship by lack of access. There were a couple of big battles that
nobody's seen any pictures of yet."

Robert Schnitzlein, a Reuters photo editor, was correct when he said, "There is really no
photographic document of actual fighting in the Gulf." Michael Getler, foreign-news editor at The
Washington Post, agreed:

The war had the largest armored movement in history, and essentially no one saw it.
There are no pictures of it. There's nothing. I guess it was all dust-covered anyway, but

212 Kellner, 405.
213 MacArthur, 155.
214 Kellner, 431.
215 Fialka, 5.
216 Ibid., 6.
217 Kellner, 155.
there's nothing to record this.  

One problem with covering the ground campaign was speed. Most of the photojournalists in the photo pool discovered that M1 tanks are much faster in the desert than the Humvees in which they traveled with their escort officer. "Some photographers with the armored divisions shot the whole war on a few rolls of film and they never saw anything of importance."  

Not all of the photographers and journalists followed the military's guidelines during the war. The so-called "unilaterals" violated the pool rules by going unescorted in the battle area. The unilaterals were the first to report on the fighting in Khafji, the first actual ground battle between Allied forces and the Iraqis. Unilaterals operated under the assumption that if they were caught, they would be deported from Saudi Arabia. Some of the best photographs from the war were taken by a roving band of French photographers who called themselves the "Fuck the Pool" pool.  

Some photojournalists were harassed by the military. On February 3, Wesley Boxce, a photojournalist for *Time* magazine, was held for 30 hours by military police from the Alabama National Guard. He was blindfolded, searched and accused of being an Iraqi spy. Fred Bayles of the Associated Press and Laurent Rebourg, a photographer, were detained by the First Cavalry Division for six hours on February 5. "They were told they were being detained for working outside of the pool system." Christopher Walker, a reporter for the *London Times*, reported that a photographer working outside the pools was held for six hours by U.S. Marines. The photographer was told by an officer that "we have orders from above to make this pool system work."  

One of the most memorable photos of the war was taken by David Turnly of the *Detroit Free Press*.

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218 MacArthur, 159.
219 Taylor, 247.
220 Kellner, 155.
222 Ibid.
223 Ibid., 18.
Press. Tumly was with the 5th MASH unit helicopter when it rushed to a group of Bradley vehicles from the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division. The wounded were pulled from one of the Bradley vehicles that received a direct hit by "friendly fire." Sergeant Ken Kozakiewicz was rushed to the helicopter with a fractured hand. The medics put the body of the driver in a bag, put it on the helicopter, and handed the driver's identification card to Kozakiewicz. Tumly photographed Kozakiewicz crying after seeing the identification card of a slain comrade. It was only then that sergeant realized the body in the bag was his friend. This was the moment captured on film.

Tumly waited for a few minutes and asked the men for their names and how they would feel about having their picture published. They said, "Publish the pictures." A day later, the day of the cease fire, Tumly found out that his editors had not received his film yet. He checked with military officials and they were holding the film because there were casualties. They said, "We need to make sure that the next of kin in your [Tumly's] frames have been notified."

After leaving Saudi Arabia, Tumly called Kozakiewicz's family, because he was concerned that the picture had been painful to their family. Kozakiewicz's father, Daniel, was a Vietnam veteran. He told Tumly: "They're [the military] trying to make us think this is antiseptic, but this is war. Where is the blood and the reality of what is happening over there? Finally, we have a picture of what really happens in war."

Summary

War is a tragic part of our society. War causes death and destruction not only to losers but also to the victors. The reality of war is that people, soldiers and civilians, are killed, wounded, left homeless, and orphaned. In the age of real time television wars and from the daily bombardment of images from the battlefield in the media, political and military leaders have learned that fighting lengthy wars is nearly


225 Ibid.

226 Ibid., 6.

227 Ibid., 6.
impossible for a democratic society.

The military, as an institution, is very methodical in its procedures and how it wages war. The media, as also an institution, publishes and disseminates information to the public on newsworthy events. The military can create a lexicon of war as being very strategic and surgical, with limited casualties and minimal collateral damage to the enemy's civilian population. By controlling media access to war events, the military can create this particular vision of war to the American public which, in fact, the military uses to create its own picture of reality.

Lang and Lang postulates that a communication system, "no matter how sophisticated its technological base, inevitably injects some bias into the picture of reality it presents."228 This bias becomes evident in the coverage of an event.

Its image, as mirrored in the press, is a selective reconstruction of that event woven around a theme and a story line that makes it coherent. Some parts of the event will always be out of focus.229

Since the invention of photography, photojournalists have covered wars. From line drawings to color photographs, newspapers and magazines have published images of war. Morris writes that "No matter how powerful the images of these war photographers have captured, our fascination tends to outweigh our horror."230

Photojournalists have faced many challenges covering war. Whether voluntary or strict, some form of censorship has been placed on photojournalists. Photographs of dead or wounded American soldiers have always been handled with sensitivity. For photojournalists to gather or record information, they must have the greatest possible access to events. During times of war, photojournalists either have not been allowed access to combat, or they have had unlimited access to the action. Media access to war-time events has not been given First Amendment protection by the courts.

Since the invasion of Grenada in 1983, the media has been struggling with the military for access

228 Lang and Lang, 200-201.

229 Ibid., 201.

230 Morris, 78.
to combat operations. During the War in the Gulf, the media had limited access to the events of the war because only a handful of journalists and photojournalists covered the war via a pool system implemented by the military. This made access a problem.
Chapter III
Methodology

Access to the War in the Gulf by photojournalists and access to troops and to actual combat truly limited the media’s ability to gather information and images. Photojournalists covering the Vietnam War had unlimited access to nearly everything. By comparison, access in the War in the Gulf was very limited, the opposite of the experience in Vietnam.

The main research questions proposed in this thesis are: Was there a difference in the newspapers and magazines publication of images between the air and the ground campaign? How does this image of war compare with the Vietnam image? What overall image or constructed image emerged from the War in the Gulf? In order to answer these questions, this thesis will seek to answer the following sub-questions:

1) Is there a difference in the photographed scenes in published publications between the air and ground campaign?

2) Is there a difference in the primary photographed subject in publications between the air and ground campaign?

3) Is there a difference in the way the primary photographed subject was portrayed in publications between the air and ground campaign?

4) Is there a difference in the photographic perspective presented in publications between the air and ground campaign?

5) Is there a difference in the photographed scenes, subjects, portrayal and perspective between the War in the Gulf and the Vietnam War?

This thesis will examine the combat photographs presented to the American public by three national news magazines and three newspapers.

The still photographic image, a frozen moment in time, captures the essence of an event or a
subject. It can form, change and shape public opinion. Unlike the televised camera shots, the still image is a static unit that can be easily counted and quantified. Currently, there are no research studies that have examined still photos of the War in the Gulf.

**Methodology**

A content analysis research method will be used to analyze photographic images presented in three national magazines: *Time*, *Newsweek* and *U.S. News and World Report*; and the three top circulation daily newspapers: *New York Times*, *Los Angeles Times*, and *The Washington Post*. The magazines were selected because they are the three top news magazines based on circulation and news reputation. The War in the Gulf photo pool was partially run by the photo editors from these magazines. The newspapers were selected because they are the three top circulation daily newspapers. All three subscribe to Associated Press and Reuters news services, and their photo editors were represented in the official photo pool.

Other researchers were successful in using news magazines for examining combat photos. In another content analysis of news photos, Moriaty and Popovich used the same three news magazines in their research of photos and illustrations of the 1988 presidential and vice-presidential candidates. One

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3 According to *Editor and Publisher International Yearbook*, (New York City: Editor and Publisher, 1994), *New York Times* has a circulation of 1,141,366, *Los Angeles Times* has a circulation of 1,089,690, and *The Washington Post* has a circulation of 813,908.


researcher had success using newspapers for examining combat photos, and one researcher included "armed conflicts" as a category for his newspaper content analysis.

**Content Analysis**

Berelson defined content analysis as a "research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication." "Manifest content" means that the content is accepted to mean what is said or printed, and not what is between the lines. Krippendorff defines content analysis as a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from data to their context.

As a research technique, content analysis involves specialized procedures for processing scientific data. Like all research techniques, its purpose is to provide knowledge, new insights, a representation of "facts" and a practical guide to action; it is a tool. Content analysis has been used in several research studies to analyze news photographs. Some studies used content analysis of photographs of war, while

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9 Ibid.


several other studies have concentrated on the photographic images of war.\textsuperscript{13}

Television presented the War in the Gulf in real time, and newspapers and magazines were behind in their coverage. Photographic images were selected over television images because they provide simple, contained units that can be measured empirically. This thesis will be looking for images published in three national magazines and three leading newspapers during the War in the Gulf. This thesis will look at all photographic images taken in the war theater region between January 14, 1991, and March 18, 1991. This allows time for any photos taken during the ground campaign to be published. Photographic images that are formal portraits of military and government leaders, file photos, file photos of military equipment and facilities will be omitted from the study. The exception to formal portraits taken in content of the conflict will be examined.

Photographic images will be coded from microfiche copies of all issues of Time and Newsweek magazines, and from original magazine issues of U.S. News and World Report, and from microfilm copies of all issues of New York Times, Los Angeles Times and The Washington Post in the University of Nebraska at Omaha's Library. The author and two other coders coded randomly selected subsets of images.


from magazine and newspaper issues to establish intercoder reliability for this study. Following Krippendorff’s lowest standard recommendation, intercoder reliability level will be established at 0.67. The reliability was evaluated by using a method explained by Holsti:

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\text{Coefficient of reliability} = \frac{2M}{N_1 + N_2}
\]

In this formula, \(M\) represents the number of coding agreements, while \(N_1\) and \(N_2\) represents the number of decisions made by each coder. According to Stempel, "By reliability, we mean simply consistency of classification." Because there are only a limited number of studies using content analysis of war photographs, those studies were reviewed for guidelines and categories for this proposal. There is a real advantage to using a category system used in other studies, because the results of those studies will anticipate the kinds of results that are likely. The categories used in studies by Niemeyer, Patterson, Sherer, and Thompson and Clarke fit the format of this proposal and were adapted for this study. The categories include:

1. **Scene**—the moment captured in the image will be coded as:
   
   a. Actual combat setting with troops under fire and/or military equipment in action.
   
   b. Combat-related setting, pre/post-combat scene or troop movements in combat areas, but not actually in combat when the photo was taken.

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14 One of the coders was a male graduate student in the Communication department, who has recently finished his thesis. The other coder was a female, a former research assistant at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln who is a veterinarian.

15 Krippendorff, 147.


18 Niemeyer, 1-71; Patterson, 35-39; Sherer, "Comparing Magazine Photos...," 752-756; Sherer, "Vietnam War Photos...," 391-395; and Thompson and Clarke, 279-292.

19 Stempel, 128.
c. Non-combat scene, out of the field of combat, in areas of relative safety such as cities, headquarters, or other locations.

2. **Subject**—these subjects of the picture will be coded as being present, not present and equipment, weapons or targets destroyed:

   a. American soldiers.
   b. Coalition soldiers.
   c. Iraqi soldiers.
   d. Civilians (in the Middle East).
   e. Iraqi civilians.
   f. American or Coalition weapons, equipment, or targets in Iraq.
   g. Iraqi weapons, equipment, or targets in Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait.

3. **Portrayal**—the way in which the primary subject was portrayed will be coded as:

   a. Immediate life-threatening situation with dead or wounded present.
   b. Immediate life-threatening situation with no dead or wounded present.
   c. Situation depicting combat-related discomfort or fatigue.
   d. Situation depicting soldier(s) resting and relaxing.
   e. Situation depicting preparing equipment for war.
   f. Situation depicting soldier(s) in action, but not in combat.
   g. Situation depicting civilians with dead or wounded present.
   h. Situation depicting civilians with no dead or wounded present.
   i. Weapons, equipment or targets shown in a state of destruction from combat.
   j. Weapons, equipment or targets not shown in a state of destruction from combat.
   k. American or Coalition Prisoners of War (POW).
   l. Iraqi POWs.
   m. Situation depicting wounded soldier(s).
   n. Situation depicting dead soldier(s).

4. **Perspective**—the way in which the photograph captured the situation will be coded as:
a. Close-up, small number of people or objects which are identifiable.

b. Close-up, small number of people or objects which are not identifiable.

c. Normal view of people or objects which are identifiable.

d. Normal view of people or objects which are not identifiable.

e. Distant view of people or objects which are identifiable.

f. Distant view of people or objects which are not identifiable.

g. Blurred image.

Once the photographic images have been coded, they will be placed into two groups related to the air and ground campaigns. The first group will include photographs published from January 14, 1991 to February 23, 1991, during the air campaign. The second group will be photographs published from February 24, 1991, to March 18, 1991, during the ground campaign.

After the coding was completed, a series of cross-tabulations was ran to determine what was the story told through the published images. A Chi-square analysis was used to test the distribution of frequencies among the three magazines and the three newspapers. The results were used to answer the central research questions. Was there a difference in the newspapers and magazines publication of images between the air and the ground campaign? How does this image of war compare with the Vietnam image? What overall image or constructed image emerged from the War in the Gulf? In order to answer these questions, this thesis will seek to answer the following sub-questions:

1) Is there a difference in the photographed scenes in published publications between the air and ground campaign?

2) Is there a difference in the primary photographed subject in publications between the air and ground campaign?

3) Is there a difference in the way the primary photographed subject was portrayed in publications between the air and ground campaign?

4) Is there a difference in the photographic perspective presented in publications between the air and ground campaign?

5) Is there a difference in the photographed scenes, subjects, portrayal and perspective
between the War in the Gulf and the Vietnam War?
Chapter IV  
Results and Discussion

The media followed the American soldiers and their allies into battle during the War in the Gulf, but the duration was very short compared to other wars in American history. Photojournalists, working for their respective publications, recorded the war’s events on film. Through these photographic images, this thesis will answer the following research questions: Was there a difference in the newspapers and magazines publication of images between the air and the ground campaign? How does this image of war compare with the Vietnam image? What overall image or constructed image emerged from the War in the Gulf? In order to answer these questions, this thesis will seek to answer the following sub-questions:

1) Is there a difference in the photographed scenes in published publications between the air and ground campaign?
2) Is there a difference in the primary photographed subject in publications between the air and ground campaign?
3) Is there a difference in the way the primary photographed subject was portrayed in publications between the air and ground campaign?
4) Is there a difference in the photographic perspective presented in publications between the air and ground campaign?
5) Is there a difference in the photographed scenes, subjects, portrayal and perspective between the War in the Gulf and the Vietnam War?

Photographic images were coded from January 14 through March 18, 1991, of microfiche issues of Time and Newsweek magazines, and from original magazine issues of U.S. News and World Report, and from microfilm copies of New York Times, Los Angeles Times and The Washington Post in the University of Nebraska at Omaha’s Library. Intercoder reliability was measured by having two additional people code a subset of the studied images using the author’s categories and guidelines. Holsti and the Krippendorff's
guidelines establish 0.67 as the lowest recommended standard "Coefficient of Reliability" for intercoder reliability. Intercoder reliability test results for the categories met the recommended guidelines. Using cross tabulation analysis, the coded images were analyzed to provide answers to the research questions and sub-questions.

**Phases of The War in the Gulf**

The Vietnam War has been analyzed by other researchers who divided the war into two distinct phases: pre-Tet offensive (January 1968) and post-Tet. The photographic image presented during the Vietnam War differed before and after the Tet Offensive. Similarly, the War in the Gulf can be separated into two distinct phases; the air campaign and the ground campaign.

The War in the Gulf's air campaign began January 16, 1991, when Coalition forces started around-the-clock bombing missions over Iraq and Kuwait; these continued throughout the war. The ground campaign started on February 23 and lasted until February 28, 1991 when Iraq agreed to a cease-fire. For analytical purposes, photographic images during the air campaign were coded between January 14 and February 23, 1991. Images coded from the ground campaign were published between February 24 and

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2 Intercoder reliability test results for the following categories: Scene, 0.97; American Soldiers, 0.97; Coalition soldiers, 0.76; Iraqi soldiers, 0.90; Civilians (in the Middle East), 0.88; Iraqi civilians, 0.94; American or Coalition weapons, equipment, or targets in Iraq, 0.68; Iraqi weapons, equipment, or targets in Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, 0.88; Portrayal, 0.76 and Perspective, 0.92. See Appendix 2 for formula and results.


4 Niemeyer, 62; and Sherer, "Vietnam War Photos and Public Opinion," 394.

5 Since newspapers are published daily and magazines are published weekly, the author chose January 14 to correspond with the magazine issues released before the start of the war.
March 18, 1991.6

There were 1,853 images from the War in the Gulf presented in the newsmagazines and newspapers selected for evaluation. The images were evaluated for their primary scene, subject or subjects, portrayal of the subject(s) and the perspective of the image. The primary scene was coded for the moment captured in the image as either: "actual combat setting," "combat-related setting" and "non-combat scene. The subject or subjects of photographs were coded as present or not present. To determine the portrayal of the subject(s), the photograph was coded for the way the primary subject(s) was portrayed. Finally, the perspective was coded for the angle or view in which the photograph captured the situation.

During the war, more "actual combat" photographs were taken during the air campaign than the ground campaign. During the air campaign, most of the images of actual combat included: military supplied "Nintendo like" cross haired images of bombing targets over Iraq and Kuwait, photographs of Coalition planes launching on bombing sorties, and images from the battle of Khafji, a Saudi Arabian-Kuwaiti border town where Coalition and Iraqi soldiers actually shot at each other. The air campaign spanned several weeks and produced 1,167 (63.0 percent) of the images; the ground campaign lasted several days and produced 686 (37.0 percent) of the images. Coverage of the War of the Gulf tended to favor images from the air campaign.

**Scene**

Of the 1,853 images, 214 (11.6 percent) showed an "actual combat setting" with troops under fire and/or military equipment in action. The largest number of photographs, 1,118 (60.3 percent) fell in the "combat-related setting." These photographs show pre/post-combat scenes or troop movements in combat areas but not in combat when the photo was taken. In the final category, "non-combat setting," 521 (28.1 percent) of the images showed scenes away from the field of combat and in relatively safe areas (cities, headquarters, etc.).

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6 Even though the ground campaign started the night of February 23, images from the war zone would be delayed in publication by a coverage blackout for security review purposes. February 24, 1991 was selected by the author as the starting date for coding images from the ground campaign.
There was a difference in the presentation of actual combat images between the War in the Gulf (11.6 percent) and the Vietnam War (25.9 percent). Since photojournalists covering the War in the Gulf had less access and tougher guidelines than those covering the Vietnam War, there is a relative difference between the number of actual combat photos published in the press.

The War in the Gulf had 60.3 percent of its images in the combat-related category while the Vietnam War had 35.2 percent in this category. Photojournalists with access to the events of the war cover it differently than photojournalists with restricted access. The non-combat category photographic coverage between the two wars was similar. During the War in the Gulf, 28.1 percent of the images were non-combat, and 38.9 percent for the Vietnam War images.

War in the Gulf photographic images showed more "combat-related" than "actual combat" settings. The same is true from the Vietnam War, but there was a higher percentage of "actual combat" photographs presented to the American public. There was only an eight percent difference between the two wars in showing "non-combat" settings.

The presentation of the primary scene between the six publications showed no pattern of difference in the publication of "actual combat," "combat-related" and "non-combat" photographs (Table I).

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7 An average of "actual combat" photographs taken in Vietnam was obtained from the following research studies: Niemeyer, 64; Michael D. Sherer, "Comparing Magazine Photos of Vietnam and Korean Wars," Journalism Quarterly, 65 (Fall 1988): 755; and Sherer, "Vietnam War Photos and Public Opinion," 395.

8 An average of "combat-related" and "non-combat setting" photographs taken in Vietnam was obtained from the following research studies: Niemeyer, 64; and Sherer, "Vietnam War Photos and Public Opinion," 395.
TABLE I
THE PRESENTATION OF THE PRIMARY SCENE OF THE PHOTOGRAPHS DURING THE WAR IN
THE GULF BETWEEN THE SIX PUBLICATIONS BY PERCENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Actual Combat scene</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat-Related scene</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-combat scene</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=1,853

The Los Angeles Times published more photographic images, 586 (31.6 percent), than the Washington Post, 426 (23.0 percent), and the New York Times, 325 (17.5 percent). The Los Angeles Times published 59 photographic images of "actual combat scenes," while the Washington Post published 54 and the New York Times published 32 photographs. Newsweek magazine published 194 (10.5 percent) images compared to U.S. News and World Reports, 172 (9.3 percent), and Time, 150 (8.1 percent) photographs.

Even though Newsweek published the most photographs during the war, U.S News and World Reports published the most "actual combat scenes" with 31 (1.7 percent) photographs.

Subject

The subject or subjects of the photographic coverage were broken down into these categories:

American soldiers, Coalition soldiers, Iraqi soldiers, Civilians (in the Middle East), Iraqi civilians,

American or Coalition weapons, equipment, or targets in Iraq, and Iraqi weapons, equipment, or targets in Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. These subject(s) were coded as being present, not present and weapons, equipment or targets destroyed. American soldiers were present in 873 (47.1 percent) of the images. The statistical difference in photographic coverage of American soldiers between the air and ground campaign is shown in Table II.
TABLE II
AMERICAN SOLDIERS PRESENT OR NOT PRESENT IN PHOTOGRAPHIC IMAGES BETWEEN THE AIR AND GROUND CAMPAIGN BY PERCENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>American soldiers present</th>
<th>American soldiers not present</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air Campaign</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>32.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground Campaign</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=873
x²=4.17259, df=1, p<0.04108

There was a 1.1 percent difference between the number of American soldiers present in photographs when compared to the Vietnam War. Only 71 (8.1 percent) of the War in the Gulf’s photographs portrayed American soldiers in "actual combat;" a majority of the photographs, 527 (60.4 percent), portrayed American soldiers in a "combat-related" setting. "Non-combat" setting photographs accounted for 275 (31.5 percent) of the images that portrayed American soldiers.

Coalitions soldiers appeared in 200 (10.8 percent) of the 1853 photographs; in comparison, the Vietnam War photographs showed 18.8 percent. Very few War in the Gulf photographs, only 17 of 200, showed both American and Coalition soldiers together. There was no statistical difference for the presence or absence of Coalition soldiers between the air and ground campaign.

Iraqi soldiers were present in only 167 (9.0 percent) of the total images from the War in the Gulf. Of these images, 76 (45.5 percent) portrayed Iraqi soldiers as prisoners of war. American soldiers appeared in 30 of these images (18.0 percent) with Iraqi prisoners of war, and Americans were shown in more photographs with Iraqi soldiers than with Coalition soldiers. Photographs of enemy soldiers appeared more often during the War in the Gulf (9.0 percent) than during the Vietnam War (6.1 percent).

"Civilians in the Middle East," who lived in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Israel, were presented in...
317 (17.1 percent) photographs. Only three images (0.9 percent) showed civilians in "actual combat" scenes, and these images showed Israeli citizens during an Iraqi Scud missile attack which occurred during the Air Campaign. In 155 photographs (48.9 percent), civilians in the Middle East were shown in "combat related" scenes. Photographs depicting "non-combat" settings accounted for 149 (50.2 percent) of the images. Most of the "non-combat" photographs, 192 (60.6 percent), were published during the air campaign.

Iraqi civilians were present in 113 (6.1 percent) of all photographs published during the War in the Gulf. Only 3 (2.7 percent) of the 113 photographs portrayed Iraqi civilians in actual combat settings. One image occurred during the Air Campaign and the other two images appeared during the Ground Campaign. A majority of the images, 75 (66.4 percent), presented Iraqi civilians in "combat-related" scenes specifically, civilians living in bombed out buildings and streets. The remaining images of Iraqi civilians, 35 (31 percent), showed "non-combat" settings.

Photographic coverage of civilians in the Middle East and Iraq was consistent with equivalent photographic coverage of the Vietnam War. "Civilians in the Middle East" were present in 17.1 percent of the War in the Gulf photographs as compared to 20.2 percent in Vietnam.1 Civilians in the Middle East were counted in the following countries: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Israel. "Allied civilians" photographs, taken in Vietnam, were obtained from Niemeyer, 66.

13 "Enemy civilians" photographs, taken in Vietnam, were obtained from Niemeyer, 66.

14 An average was obtained from the following research studies: Niemeyer, 66; and Sherer, "Vietnam War Photos and Public Opinion," 395.
weapons, equipment or targets in Iraq.

Images of Iraqi weapons, equipment, or targets in Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait also appeared in newspapers and newsmagazines. There were 215 of the photographs (11.6 percent) portrayed Iraqi weapons, equipment, or targets present compared to the 6.6 percent during the Vietnam War.\textsuperscript{15} There were more photographs, 65 (3.5 percent), of destroyed weapons, equipment or targets during the War in the Gulf.

\textit{Portrayal}

Beside the subject(s) being coded as present or not in the published photograph, the photograph was coded the way in which the primary subject was portrayed. Following previous research studies, the author broke the portrayal area into 14 different categories.\textsuperscript{16} A majority, 478 (25.8 percent), of the 1,853 photographic images showed a "situation depicting soldiers in action, but not in combat." There was only one (0.1 percent) image that portrayed an "immediate life-threatening situation with dead or wounded present." It was published during the ground campaign and portrayed an American soldier. There were 1,167 photographs published during the air campaign and 686 during the ground campaign, and there was no statistical significance of portrayal of the primary subject between the air and ground campaign (Table III).

\textsuperscript{15} "Enemy weapons, equipment and targets" photographs taken in Vietnam, were obtained from Niemeyer, 66.

\textsuperscript{16} Portrayal was coded as: immediate life-threatening situation with dead or wounded present; immediate life-threatening situation with no dead or wounded present; situation depicting combat-related discomfort or fatigue; situation depicting soldier(s) resting and relaxing; situation depicting preparing equipment for war; situation depicting soldier(s) in action, but not in combat; situation depicting civilians with dead or wounded present; situation depicting civilians with no dead or wounded present; weapons, equipment or targets shown in a state of destruction from combat; weapons, equipment or targets not shown in a state of destruction from combat; American or Coalition Prisoners of War (POW); Iraqi POWs; situation depicting wounded soldier(s); and situation depicting dead soldier(s).
### TABLE III
PORTRAYAL OF PRIMARY SUBJECT IN PHOTOGRAPHS DURING THE WAR IN THE GULF BY PERCENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>12</th>
<th>13</th>
<th>14</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air Campaign</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground Campaign</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=1,853
x²=133.45660, df=13, p<0.00000

1= Immediate life-threatening situation with dead or wounded present.
2= Immediate life-threatening situation with no dead or wounded present.
3= Situation depicting combat-related discomfort or fatigue.
4= Situation depicting soldiers resting and relaxing.
5= Situation depicting preparing equipment for war.
6= Situation depicting soldiers in action, but not in combat.
7= Situation depicting civilians with dead or wounded present.
8= Situation depicting civilians with no dead or wounded present.
9= Weapons, equipment or targets shown in a state of destruction from combat.
10= Weapons, equipment or targets not shown in a state of destruction from combat.
11= American or Coalition Prisoners of War (POW).
12= Situation depicting wounded soldier.
13= Situation depicting dead soldiers.
14= Iraqi POW.

There are differences in some categories that must be noted when comparing the portrayal of the primary subject during the War in the Gulf to the same portrayal during the Vietnam War. In the "immediate life-threatening situation" category, 10.3 percent of the images from the War in the Gulf portrayed the primary subject. In Vietnam, an average of 15.6 percent of the photographs portrayed the primary subject in "immediate life-threatening situations."\(^{17}\)

"Combat-related discomfort or fatigue" was shown in 0.5 percent of the photographs portraying the primary subject during the War in the Gulf. An average 22.5 percent of the images portrayed "combat-related discomfort or fatigue" during the Vietnam War.\(^{18}\) Only 19 (1.0 percent) of the War of the Gulf

\(^{17}\) "Immediate life threatening situations" photographs, taken in Vietnam, were averaged from the following research studies: Niemeyer, 67; Sherer, "Comparing Magazine Photos of Vietnam and Korean Wars," 756; and Sherer, "Vietnam War Photos and Public Opinion," 395. In the Niemeyer study, the researcher broke this category into "immediate life threatening situations" with dead or wounded present or with no dead or wounded present.

\(^{18}\) "Combat-related discomfort or fatigue" photographs, taken in Vietnam, were obtained from the following research studies: Niemeyer, 67; and Sherer, "Vietnam War Photos and Public Opinion," 395. The Niemeyer study broke this category into "combat-related discomfort or fatigue" with dead or wounded
photographs showed wounded soldiers compared with 14.9 percent for the Vietnam War.\(^{19}\)

Only 14.6 percent of the photographs taken during the War in the Gulf portrayed subject(s) with destroyed "weapons, equipment or targets;" during Vietnam, 6.3 percent portrayed destroyed "weapons, equipment or targets."\(^{20}\) Many of these images included environmental targets; such as, oil spills, oil well fires, and wildlife effected by environmental hazards. Of the photographs that portrayed subject(s) with "weapons, equipment or targets" not destroyed, 2.7 percent of these images appeared during the War in the Gulf, and 7.6 percent during Vietnam.\(^{21}\)

**Perspective**

Photographs of the primary subject(s) were portrayed in several perspectives during the War in the Gulf. A majority (60.1 percent) of the images of subject(s) were shown in the "normal view of people or objects which are identifiable." The statistical differences between the perspectives of the photographs of subject(s) during the air and ground campaigns is shown in Table IV.


\(^{20}\) "Destroyed weapons, equipment or targets" photographs, taken in Vietnam, were obtained from the following research studies: Niemeyer, 67; Sherer, "Comparing Magazine Photos of Vietnam and Korean Wars," 756; and Sherer, "Vietnam War Photos and Public Opinion," 395.

\(^{21}\) Photographs portraying intact "weapons, equipment or targets" in Vietnam were obtained from the following research studies: Niemeyer, 67; Sherer, "Comparing Magazine Photos of Vietnam and Korean Wars," 756; and Sherer, "Vietnam War Photos and Public Opinion," 395.
American soldiers were present in 873 photographs and were portrayed from several perspectives during the War in the Gulf. A majority (65.3 percent) of the images of American soldiers was shown in the "normal view of people or objects which are identifiable." The "perspective" presentation of American soldiers in photographic images was similar to the results found for the War in the Gulf.

With the exception, the primary scene and the portrayal of photographs taken during the War in the Gulf, there were statistical differences in the areas of subject(s), and perspective of photographic images between the air and ground campaign. Of the 1,853 published images, a majority (60.3 percent) were of "combat related scenes," while 11.6 percent showed "actual combat scenes." Of the seven subjects that were coded as present or not present, the largest number of photographs, 877 (47.3 percent), showed American or Coalition weapons, equipment or targets in Iraq. The largest number of photographs with soldiers present were of American soldiers (873 or 47.1 percent). The photographs that portrayed the primary subjects showed a "situation depicting soldiers in action, but not in combat" 25.8 percent of the time. Photographs published during the war showed different perspectives; of these 1,114 (60.1 percent) showed the subject(s) in a "normal view of people or objects which are identifiable."

**Photographic images from the War in the Gulf compared to images from the Vietnam War**

The Vietnam and Gulf wars were different. The Vietnam War was fought in the jungle with no visible enemy and no clearly defined front lines. Images from the Tet Offensive of 1968 showed that safe areas, including the American Embassy, were vulnerable to enemy attack. The War in the Gulf was fought in the desert where national borders defined the battle lines until the ground campaign began. The lines

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### TABLE IV

**PERSPECTIVES OF SUBJECT(S) DURING THE WAR IN THE GULF BY PERCENT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CU which are ident.</th>
<th>CU which are not ident.</th>
<th>Normal view which are not ident.</th>
<th>Normal view which are ident.</th>
<th>Distant view which are not ident.</th>
<th>Distant view which are ident.</th>
<th>Blurred image</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air Campaign</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground Campaign</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=1,853

χ²=37.62071, df=6, p<0.00000
moved as quickly as the tanks advanced. The Vietnam War was fought during several presidential administrations, while the War in the Gulf was fought solely under the Bush administration. The photographic coverage of these two wars is also different.

Photojournalists were allowed nearly open access to events with minimal censorship during the Vietnam War. During the War in the Gulf, photojournalists had limited access to the events of the war and more strict guidelines on gathering photographic images. Access is a variable when photographic images from the Vietnam War and the War in the Gulf are compared.

There was a difference in the presentation of the scene between the two wars. Photographs from the War in the Gulf did not show the "actual combat" that the American public saw during the Vietnam War. More photographs of "actual combat" (25.9 percent) were taken during the Vietnam War than during the War in the Gulf (11.6 percent). In the category of "combat-related" photographs, 60.3 percent of these images were published during the War in the Gulf compared to the 35.2 percent published from the Vietnam War. During the War in the Gulf, 28.1 percent of the photographs were non-combat, and 38.9 percent for the Vietnam War images. There was statistical significance when comparing the scene of photographic images between the War in the Gulf and the Vietnam War (Table V).

22 An average of "actual combat" photographs taken in Vietnam was obtain from the following research studies: Niemeyer, 64; Sherer, "Comparing Magazine Photos of Vietnam and Korean Wars," 755; and Sherer, "Vietnam War Photos and Public Opinion," 395.
TABLE V
COMPARISON OF THE SCENE OF PHOTOGRAPHIC IMAGES BETWEEN THE WAR IN THE GULF AND THE VIETNAM WAR BY PERCENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>War in the Gulf 23</th>
<th>Vietnam War 24</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Actual combat setting</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>25.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat-related setting</td>
<td>60.3</td>
<td>35.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-combat scene</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>38.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$x^2=5.7448$, df=2, p<0.05

Photographic coverage of the Vietnam War presented more images depicting "immediate life threatening situations," "combat-related discomfort or fatigue," "dead or wounded soldiers" and destroyed "weapons, equipment or targets." 25 One major difference between photographs of the War in the Gulf and Vietnam War was the images of dead or wounded soldiers. During the War in the Gulf, there were no photographs of dead American soldiers and only 1.9 percent of the images of wounded American soldiers compared to the photographs of dead and wounded soldiers (14.9 percent) during the Vietnam War. 26

A difference was noted when the perspectives of photographs between the War in the Gulf and the Vietnam War were compared. To compare percentages between the two wars, the close-up, normal and

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23 n=1,853  
24 An average of photographs taken in Vietnam was obtain from the following research studies: Niemeyer, 1-71 and n=683; Sherer, "Comparing Magazine Photos of Vietnam and Korean Wars," 752-756 and n=148; Sherer, "Vietnam War Photos and Public Opinion," 391-395 and n=286; and Thompson and Clarke, 279-292 and n=306.

25 In Vietnam, 15.6 percent of the photographs portrayed "immediate life-threatening situations" compared to 8.0 percent during the War in the Gulf. "Combat-related discomfort or fatigue" was shown in 0.8 percent of the photographs portraying American soldiers during the War in the Gulf, while an average 22.5 percent of the Vietnam War images portrayed "combat-related discomfort or fatigue." During Vietnam, 6.3 percent portrayed destroyed "weapons, equipment or targets," while only 3.6 percent of the War in the Gulf photographs portrayed Americans soldiers with destroyed "weapons, equipment or targets." Percentages of photographs from the Vietnam War were collected from the following studies: Charlotte Niemeyer, "Recording the Vietnam War: Photographic Coverage in Newsmagazines from 1964 to 1973" (Masters' Thesis, University of Nebraska at Omaha, 1990), 67; Michael D. Sherer, "Comparing Magazine Photos of Vietnam and Korean Wars," Journalism Quarterly, 65 (Fall 1988): 756; and Michael D. Sherer, "Vietnam War Photos and Public Opinion," Journalism Quarterly, 66 (Summer 1989): 395.

distant views were combined to allow comparison with the Vietnam War. During the War in the Gulf, 11.0 percent of the photographs showed the close up perspective compared to 26.4 percent in Vietnam. Most War in the Gulf photographs (66.8 percent) used a normal view perspective; this was much higher than the Vietnam War (45.2 percent). More Vietnam War photographs were taken from a distant perspective (28.4 percent) compared to 19.1 percent taken during the War in the Gulf. There was also statistical significance when comparing the perspective of subject(s) of images between the War in the Gulf and the Vietnam War (Table VI).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE VI</th>
<th>COMPARISON OF THE PERSPECTIVE OF SUBJECT(S) OF IMAGES BETWEEN THE WAR IN THE GULF AND THE VIETNAM WAR BY PERCENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Close-up view</td>
<td>War in the Gulf\textsuperscript{28}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normal view</td>
<td>66.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distant view</td>
<td>19.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blurred view</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
\[x^2=7.3455, \, df=3, \, p<0.05\]

The overall image of the War in the Gulf

The photographic analysis showed that a majority of War in the Gulf images (60.3 percent) portrayed "combat-related" scenes, while only 11.6 percent showed "actual combat." Combat related scenes portrayed pre/post-combat scenes or troop movements in combat areas but not actual combat. The remaining 28.1 percent of the images portrayed non-combat scenes which were in areas of relative safety (cities, headquarters, or other locations).

\textsuperscript{27} "Close-up," "Normal view," and "Distant view" perspective photographs, taken in Vietnam, were obtained from the following research studies: Niemeyer, 68; and Sherer, "Vietnam War Photos and Public Opinion," 395.

\textsuperscript{28} n=1,853

\textsuperscript{29} An average of photographs taken in Vietnam was obtain from the following research studies: Niemeyer, 1-71 and n=683; and Sherer, "Vietnam War Photos and Public Opinion," 391-395.
Of the overall 1,853 images, 25.8 percent depicted soldiers in action but not in combat. Images portraying life threatening situations with dead or wounded only accounted for only 0.1 percent of the total photographs, while 10.2 percent of the images portrayed life threatening situations without dead or wounded. There were only 32 images (1.7 percent) showing wounded or dead soldiers taken during the War in the Gulf, and none of these images were of dead American soldiers.

American soldiers were present in 47.1 percent of the 1,853 images published during the War in the Gulf. Only eight percent of 873 images showed American soldiers in "life threatening situations," and only 0.1 percent showed dead or wounded. When American soldiers were in "life threatening situations," they could not be identified. Their faces were either unrecognizable or could not be seen in the photograph. American soldiers "resting and relaxing" account for 20.8 percent of the images, while 13.8 percent showed soldiers preparing equipment for combat. American soldiers were seen with Iraqi soldiers more often (3.1 percent) than with their Coalition counterparts (0.9); but 30 images (1.6 percent) showed Iraqi soldiers as prisoners of war. American soldiers were seen in more normal perspective photographs (73.1 percent) than in close-up (14.5 percent) or distant (12.0 percent) perspectives.

Images of civilians during the War in the Gulf were similar to those of civilians during the Vietnam War. "Civilians in the Middle East" were present in 317 (17.1 percent) images from the War in the Gulf compared to 20.2 percent of Allied civilians in Vietnam.³⁰ Twenty-two of the 317 images showed "civilians with dead or wounded," and 46 portrayed civilians with "weapons, equipment or targets shown in a state of destruction" from Iraqi Scud missile attacks. A majority of these images were taken after Iraqi Scud attacks in Israel. Since Israel was not a Coalition member, photojournalists were able to capture the real events of the war such as Scud missiles exploding.

Iraqi civilians appeared in 113 (6.1 percent) images during the War in the Gulf. This was similar to the 5.6 percent of enemy civilian photographs taken during the Vietnam War.³¹ Only 20 photographs depicted Iraqi civilians with dead or wounded present. Most of the images of dead Iraqi civilians occurred

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³⁰ Civilians in the Middle East were counted in the following countries: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Israel. "Allied civilians" photographs, taken in Vietnam, were obtained from Niemeyer, 66.

³¹ "Enemy civilians" photographs, taken in Vietnam, were obtained from Niemeyer, 66.
after bombs destroyed a shelter in Baghdad. These images were used by Iraq in an attempt to sway American and Coalition public opinion. Photojournalists and journalists in Iraq who covered this event where allowed open access with no official censorship.

Summary

Photojournalists who covered the War in the Gulf found themselves with limited access to the events of the war, plus guidelines and security reviews placed on them by the military. The overall image of this war was constructed as a high-tech, mobile operation that placed no American soldiers in any actual danger. Overall, the War in the Gulf photographs presented an image similar to a high-tech Nintendo game, but one that could not be turned off with a simple power switch.

War has deadly stakes that place people and machines in harm's way. Soldiers do die and bombs do kill people, but images from the War in the Gulf did not show the reality of war that was shown during the Vietnam War. The photographic coverage of the War in the Gulf differed from the Vietnam War in many ways.
Chapter V
Conclusion

War is not only a part of American history, it is the final step or part of American foreign policy. Wars have become more high-tech, and, so has media coverage. During the Civil War, photographs were not published directly. The images were used as models for the line drawings used in Civil War era publications. During the War in the Gulf, satellite communications made near real time coverage of the war possible. Photographic coverage has evolved from the posed Civil War images of soldiers and the aftermath of battle to capturing the split seconds images of actual combat with photographs during the War in the Gulf.

Military and political leaders placed limitation on the number of journalists allowed to cover the war from the battle zone because of the media's ability to cover war in near real time. This allows for a security review of their products. In the age of real time television wars, the combat photojournalism of World War II, the Korean War and the Vietnam War is over. The unescorted photojournalists, who once accompanied soldiers on World War II invasion landings and into Vietnamese landing zones, have been placed in military escorted journalistic pools. The military provides them with an official version of the war. This is the age of a military/political constructed reality of war.

Access and Photographic Coverage of the War in the Gulf

When the small number of "actual combat" (11.6 percent) photographs is compared to the large number of "combat-related" (60.3 percent) and "non-combat" (28.1 percent) photographs, we can see that access to the battle areas was a determining factor in the photojournalistic recording of War in the Gulf. Images of life threatening situations and dead or wounded soldiers can only be taken if a photojournalist is present during the battle. Only 190 (of 1,853) photographic images published during the War in the Gulf depicted "life threatening situations," and 70 (3.8 percent) of those images showed American soldiers present in "life threatening situations." During the Vietnam War, with practically open media access, 15.6
percent of the photographs portrayed "life-threatening situations."¹

Images of dead and wounded soldiers accounted for only 1.7 percent of the total images published during the War in the Gulf. This percentage, compared to the 14.9 percent during the Vietnam War, shows a significant difference in the portrayal of dead and wounded between the two wars.² When access is limited, photojournalists can not capture the violent, life-threatening nature of war. In the battle zone, soldiers are shot and soldiers die. Only 13 images of dead Iraqi soldiers were published during the War in the Gulf. There were no images of dead American soldiers.

Before the War in the Gulf even started, there were over 100 American causalities caused by accidents. The military occasionally released a running tally of the American soldiers who died during the war.³ The true image of coffins coming home from the war zone was hidden because Dover Air Force Base, the military's main mortuary and receiving point for bodies, was closed to the media and to the public.

Conclusion

Public opinion during the War in the Gulf was very favorable and continued to grow throughout the war. The American public followed the news closely and believed the media was doing a good job covering the war.⁴ With limited access to the real war and a security review of all media products during the war, the military was able to construct a high-tech mobile image of war with smart bombs and laser guided tank weapons always hitting their targets. The smart bombs image was played in military briefings,

¹ "Immediate life threatening situations" photographs, taken in Vietnam were obtained from the following research studies: Niemeyer, 67; Sherer, "Comparing Magazine Photos of Vietnam and Korean Wars," 756; and Sherer, "Vietnam War Photos and Public Opinion," 395. The Niemeyer study broke this category into "immediate life threatening situations" with dead or wounded present or with no dead or wounded present.


replayed on the evening news, and published in newspapers and magazines. This image, a product of the military not the media, was loved by both the public and the media.

The military constructed the conditions under which the media would cover the War in the Gulf. If the media wanted to cover one of the biggest stories in the decade, adherence to the military ground rules was a must. The military limited photojournalist access by using a pool system which allowed only a handful of journalists to cover the war with the active military units. The remaining journalists covered the war from a safe rear area. The system allowed a few photojournalists into the field to cover the war while hundreds covered each step taken by the military.

During the War in the Gulf, the military launched thousands of bombing sorties against Iraq and Iraqi positions in Kuwait, more than any other war in American history. Robert Schnitzlein, a Reuters photo editor, said, "There is really no photographic document of actual fighting in the Gulf." Michael Getler, foreign-news editor for The Washington Post, agreed:

The war had the largest armored movement in history, and essentially no one saw it. There are no pictures of it. There's nothing. I guess it was all dust-covered anyway, but there's nothing to record this.

In this age of real time television coverage of wars and conflicts, political and military leaders have learned that fighting lengthy wars is nearly impossible for a democratic society. From the first bombing attacks of Iraq to the Iraqi accepted cease fire, the War in the Gulf lasted 48 days. The overall image of the War in the Gulf was portrayed as a high-tech, mobile operation that placed no American soldiers in any actual danger. The images of war have given us a visual description that a battle has taken place, but our perceptions of war have been molded around our recent encounter with the War in the Gulf. The contest of war has deadly stakes that place people and machines in harm's way. Soldiers do die and bombs do kill people. Images from the War in the Gulf did not show the reality of war that was shown during World War II, the Korean War and especially during the Vietnam War.

The Future of Photographic Images in the "Real Time" Media World

5 Kellner, 155.

During the War in the Gulf, the American public was entranced with the "real time" war-news coverage. News junkies could watch CNN--24 hours-a-day for the latest developments. Even though television was the mainstream source of news and information, the American public still turned to newspapers and magazines for war information, and photographic images were still on the printed page for people to view.

The photographic image will always have a place in the "real time" media world. Cameras, film stocks, darkrooms and printing processes continue to evolve with other technological advances. The photographic images will always remain as frozen moments in time. A photographic image on a printed page was placed there for its newsworthiness and its attention attracting value. Many newspaper stories use banner headlines and large colorful photographs to tell the American public that something happened in the world. Newspapers and magazines of the future will be in a different format via computer via on-line services, and photographs will still be an important part of the medium.

During the fiftieth anniversary celebration of the end of World War II, photographic images of the war are being republished along with veterans' accounts of the war. Historical war photographs are frequently resurrected from newspapers and magazines' photo files. War images are a part of our culture and our collective consciousness. Americans will always remember the photographs of Marines raising the American flag on Iwo Jima during World War II; of a naked Vietnamese girl running down a road after her village was napalmed; and the targeting cross hairs placed precisely on a Iraqi target before it was destroyed. These photographs were the news of their day; they now remind us that these events actually happened.

When the space shuttle Challenger exploded in 1986, the world watch and rewatched videotapes of the event. The photographic image of the fireball and the smoke in the sky gave us an image to remember. After the federal building in Oklahoma City was bombed, the photographic image of a fireman handing a limp child to a paramedic captured America's front pages and the heartfelt sorrow of a nation. The photographic images captured the events and it left us with permanent moments etched in time.

Wars and disasters have brought our nation together and torn it apart. Photographs rallied support for wars and disaster victims, and drove public opinion against military involvement in Somalia.
Photographs are not colorful filler, they are a powerful part of a medium that communicates in visual and nonverbal terms. Researchers have not yet explored the sustaining nature of photographic images.

**Future Research**

Research will be needed in the area of military controls to the media's access to battles areas during times of war. Other research should examine photographic images for propaganda to build or destroy public support for military actions. As women's combat role becomes more active, the photographic coverage of their role or roles should be studied. This author believes that the examination of future combat photographs should be redefine the portrayal category to fit the particular situations of the photographs in the context of the conflict in question. This thesis adjusted this category to fit the situations of the War in the Gulf.
Appendix 1

Instruction for Coders


When coding, look at the photographic image and at the cutline or caption. The cutline will indicate certain information needed for coding. Photographic images that are formal portraits of military and government leaders, file photos, file photos of military equipment and facilities will be omitted from the study. The exception to formal portraits taken in content of the conflict will be coded for the study.

During the training session, the author will explain the coding sheet key and the coding sheet. A magazine will be used in training of the coders to demonstrate the process of coding. Your coding will be used to determine intercoder reliability. There are no right or wrong answer. Code the images the way you see it. Once again, thank you very much.
Coding Sheet Key

Scene—the moment captured in the image will be coded as:
1. Actual combat setting with troops under fire and/or military equipment in action.
2. Combat-related setting, pre/post-combat scene or troop movements in combat areas, but not actually in combat when the photo was taken.
3. Non-combat scene, out of the field of combat, in areas of relative safety such as cities, headquarters, or other locations.

Subject—these subjects of the picture will be coded as being present or not: (1=Present, 2=Not present and 3=Destroyed equipment, weapons or targets only for category 6 and 7)
1. American soldiers.
2. Coalition soldiers.
3. Iraqi soldiers.
5. Enemy civilians.
6. American or Coalition weapons, equipment, or targets in Iraq.
7. Iraqi weapons, equipment, or targets in Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait.

Portrayal—the way in which the primary subject was portrayed will be coded as:
1. Immediate life-threatening situation with dead or wounded present.
2. Immediate life-threatening situation with no dead or wounded present.
3. Situation depicting combat-related discomfort or fatigue.
4. Situation depicting soldier resting and relaxing.
5. Situation depicting preparing equipment for war.
6. Situation depicting soldier in action, but not in combat.
7. Situation depicting civilian with dead or wounded present.
8. Situation depicting civilian with no dead or wounded present.
9. Weapons, equipment or targets shown in a state of destruction from combat.
10. Weapons, equipment or targets not shown in a state of destruction from combat.
11. American or Coalition Prisoners of War (POW).
12. Situation depicting wounded soldier.
13. Situation depicting dead soldiers.
14. Iraqi POW.

Perspective—the way in which the photograph captured the situation will be coded as:
1. Close-up, small number of people or objects which are identifiable.
2. Close-up, small number of people or objects which are not identifiable.
3. Normal view of people or objects which are identifiable.
4. Normal view of people or objects which are not identifiable.
5. Distant view of people or objects which are identifiable.
6. Distant view of people or objects which are not identifiable.
7. Blurred image.

Publication—
1. New York Times
2. Los Angeles Times
3. Washington Post
4. Time
5. Newsweek
6. U.S. News

Date—
Indicate date
### Coding Sheet

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<th>Coal. Soldier</th>
<th>Iraqi Soldier</th>
<th>Civil in ME</th>
<th>Enemy Civil</th>
<th>A&amp;C: WE&amp;</th>
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Appendix 2  
Intercoder Reliability

The author and two other coders coded randomly selected subsets of images from magazine and newspaper issues to establish intercoder reliability for this study. Following Krippendorff’s lowest standard recommendation, intercoder reliability level will be established at 0.67. The reliability will be evaluated by using a method explained by Holsti:

\[
\text{Coefficient of reliability} = \frac{2M}{N_1 + N_2}
\]

In this formula, M represents the number of coding agreements, while \(N_1\) and \(N_2\) represents the number of decisions made by each coder.

Intercoder reliability results for the following categories are:

Scene = \(\frac{2 \times 57}{72 + 72}\) = 0.79  

American soldiers = \(\frac{2 \times 70}{72 + 72}\) = 0.97  

Coalition soldiers = \(\frac{2 \times 55}{72 + 72}\) = 0.76

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1 One of the coders was a male graduate student in the Communication department, who has recently finished his thesis. The other coder was a female, a former research assistant at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln who is a veterinarian.

2 Krippendorff, 147.

3 Ole R. Holsti, Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1969), 140; and Richard W. Budd, Robert K. Thorp, and Lewis Donohew, Content Analysis of Communications (New York: Macmillan Company, 1967), 68.
Iraqi soldiers $= \frac{2 \times (65)}{72 + 72} = 0.90$

Civilians in ME$^4$ $= \frac{2 \times (63)}{72 + 72} = 0.88$

Iraqi Civilians $= \frac{2 \times (68)}{72 + 72} = 0.94$

American WET$^5$ $= \frac{2 \times (49)}{72 + 72} = 0.68$

Iraqi WET$^6$ $= \frac{2 \times (63)}{72 + 72} = 0.88$

Portrayal $= \frac{2 \times (55)}{72 + 72} = 0.76$

Perspective $= \frac{2 \times (66)}{72 + 72} = 0.92$

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$^4$ Civilians (in the Middle East).

$^5$ American or Coalition weapons, equipment or targets in Iraq.

$^6$ Iraqi weapons, equipment, or targets in Isreal, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait.
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