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Analysis of the Quasigroup Block Cipher
Advisor Information
Abhishek Parakh
Location
UNO Criss Library, Room 107
Presentation Type
Oral Presentation
Start Date
7-3-2014 1:15 PM
End Date
7-3-2014 1:30 PM
Abstract
In this research we focus on the analysis of the Quasigroup Block Cipher co-developed by Dr. Parakh and Mr. Battey. Cryptographic routines are continually subjected to attacks from those who wish to gain unauthorized access to protected information. Thus as one cryptographic system is retired, others must be devised to take its place. The Quasigroup Block Cipher (QGBC, which is based on Latin squares i.e. Sudoku) has proven to be statistically sound when evaluated by industry standard tools provided by the National Institute of Standards and Technology. Hence, a second proving of the cryptographic system is necessary. In this research project we subject the QGBC to linear and algebraic analysis to determine its strengths and weaknesses. From our findings we propose alternate solutions to enhance the security of the cryptographic algorithm, and demonstrate possible attacks.
Analysis of the Quasigroup Block Cipher
UNO Criss Library, Room 107
In this research we focus on the analysis of the Quasigroup Block Cipher co-developed by Dr. Parakh and Mr. Battey. Cryptographic routines are continually subjected to attacks from those who wish to gain unauthorized access to protected information. Thus as one cryptographic system is retired, others must be devised to take its place. The Quasigroup Block Cipher (QGBC, which is based on Latin squares i.e. Sudoku) has proven to be statistically sound when evaluated by industry standard tools provided by the National Institute of Standards and Technology. Hence, a second proving of the cryptographic system is necessary. In this research project we subject the QGBC to linear and algebraic analysis to determine its strengths and weaknesses. From our findings we propose alternate solutions to enhance the security of the cryptographic algorithm, and demonstrate possible attacks.