The Impacts of State-Imposed Fiscal Rules on Local Government Fiscal Performance: Does Institutional Design Matter?
Advisor Information
Carol Ebdon
Location
UNO Criss Library, Room 225
Presentation Type
Oral Presentation
Start Date
4-3-2016 11:30 AM
End Date
4-3-2016 11:45 AM
Abstract
This study attempts to explore the impacts of state-imposed fiscal rules on budgetary and fiscal performance at the local level. Specifically, the goals are to provide a profile of state-imposed fiscal rules, focusing on cross-sectional and longitudinal differences in their design, and to examine how differently designed state-imposed fiscal rules affect municipal government fiscal health. To capture the institutional heterogeneity of state-imposed fiscal rules, I review state laws constraining municipal fiscal administration, code them using the sub types or categories of each fiscal rule as coding scheme, and cluster states which have a similar design of fiscal rules. Panel regression models including dummies for each identified rule design and other fiscal health, institutional, political and socioeconomic variables are performed in order to observe the varying effects of differently designed state-imposed fiscal rules. The findings will be used to address theoretical and practical implications.
The Impacts of State-Imposed Fiscal Rules on Local Government Fiscal Performance: Does Institutional Design Matter?
UNO Criss Library, Room 225
This study attempts to explore the impacts of state-imposed fiscal rules on budgetary and fiscal performance at the local level. Specifically, the goals are to provide a profile of state-imposed fiscal rules, focusing on cross-sectional and longitudinal differences in their design, and to examine how differently designed state-imposed fiscal rules affect municipal government fiscal health. To capture the institutional heterogeneity of state-imposed fiscal rules, I review state laws constraining municipal fiscal administration, code them using the sub types or categories of each fiscal rule as coding scheme, and cluster states which have a similar design of fiscal rules. Panel regression models including dummies for each identified rule design and other fiscal health, institutional, political and socioeconomic variables are performed in order to observe the varying effects of differently designed state-imposed fiscal rules. The findings will be used to address theoretical and practical implications.