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The Hyperintellectual in the Balkans

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The Hyperintelectual in the Balkans
Recomposed

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Abstract

Although hypointellectuals have long been a part of our cultural landscape, it is in post-conflict societies, such as those in Bosnia and Kosovo, that there has arisen a strong need for a different breed of intellectual, one who is more than simply a social critic, an educator, a person of action, and a compassionate individual. Enter the non-partisan intellectual—the hyperintellectual. It is the hyperintellectual, whose non-partisanship is manifested through a reciprocating critique and defense of both the nationalist enterprise and strong interventionism of the International Community, who strives to create a climate of understanding and to enlarge the moral space so as to reduce the divisiveness between opposing parties. It is in this way that the hyperintellectual acts as a catalyst for the creation of a democratic culture within the civil societies of Bosnia and Kosovo.

Covering Conjectures:
The Intellectual (Hypointellectual)
Bleeds into the Hyperintellectual

I am not impressed with those who call themselves intellectuals, or, better yet, public intellectuals. The word has become a worn-out title that is often appropriated by those who simply gibber on social media platforms about the politics and economics of the day. Of course, this is not totally unrelated to the word’s late-19th century French origin. Coined during the Dreyfus affair, the word came to refer to those thinkers, people like Emile Zola and André Gide, who were willing to intervene in a public forum even if it meant risk to their personal well-being (Le Sueur 2001: 2; see also Drake 2005 and Jennings and Kemp-Welch 1997). Risky as their acts were, acts which required a certain amount of courage to pull off, it is the “publicity” of these acts that gives us cause to label the Zolas and Gides of the world as “public intellectuals.” The American jurist and legal theorist Richard Posner puts it nicely. Public intellectuals are those who take a serious interest in “matters of general public concern of...a political or ideological cast” and who express themselves “in a way that is accessible to the public” (2003: 35). And so both Zola and Gide came
forward to make their views known, perhaps serving as the conscience of French society, and propelled by the belief that one cannot walk away from some miscarriages of justice.

Yet one person’s miscarriage of justice is another’s justice (or, in the case of Alfred Dreyfus, another person’s prejudice) as evidenced by the deep division that the Dreyfus affair created in France during the 1890s and early 1900s, with some thinkers, such as the anti-Semite Edouard Drumont, publicly condemning Dreyfus. This shows that not every public intellectual was reading from the same script, some were oppositional while others were curatorial in their response to the prejudices of the time. Revolutionaries as well as reactionaries populated the scene.

Although the days of the French Third Republic are long gone, public intellectuals and those who take an interest in them continue to be plentiful, as well those public intellectuals who turn their gaze upon themselves in the hope of making sense of their own kind (which includes someone like Posner).

It is safe to say that with so many interested parties, it is not surprising that there is an enormous body of literature on public intellectuals. I, for one, have looked at only a tiny fraction of the corpus. Besides its sheer size, the literature is also quite varied in its conceptions of the intellectual. Yet there are common threads of meaning among those conceptions. Influential twentieth century thinkers like the Palestinian literary theorist and cultural critic Edward Said, the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur, the French existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre, and the American political philosopher Michael Walzer are among those who have contributed significantly, each highlighting some of these threads.

The language of threads adopted here is not meant to indicate support for either an essentialist or intersectionist theory of identity of the intellectual, though I find the latter to possess more explanatory power than the former. What it does indicate, however, is that I am treating the question “What is an intellectual?” like “What is a taxi driver?” It is a question about the set of observable conditions that are sufficient for someone to be a public intellectual. The problem with this treatment is there are far fewer clear-cut cases of public intellectuals than there are clear-cut cases of taxi drivers. This is because the objections to a specific person being an intellectual will likely mount, while the reverse is likely to be true with those who are said to be taxi drivers. This should be no surprise given a cursory reading of Said, Ricoeur, Sartre, and

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1. To get a feel for the literature, see, for example, Aronowitz (2012); Bamyeh (2012); Benda (1928); Bender (1997); Èrzioni and Bowditch (2006); Faflak and Haslam (2013); Hollander (1998); Jacoby (1987); Jennings and Kemp-Welch (1997); Johnson (2007); Melzer, Weinberger, and Zinman (2003); Posner (2003); Poyner (2006); Shils (1972); Small (2002); and Sowell (2012).

2. Said, Sartre, and Walzer are examples of the sort of self-reflective public intellectual that was previously noted. Ricoeur, on the other hand, was more inclined to write for an audience made up of fellow academics, including professional philosophers.
Walzer suggests that there are many uses of the word ‘intellectual’ compared to that of ‘taxi driver’: for example, the intellectual is viewed as a critical outsider by Said, as a political educator by Ricoeur, as a person of action by Sartre, and as a caring insider by Walzer as compared to a person who makes a living by driving a taxi. Yet these threads, when taken together, constitute what I believe to be an adequate definition of one type of run-of-the-mill intellectual or hypointellectual (its binomen being Publicus intellectualis hypo). There are many other types, some of whom may not only be a little less critical, less educating, less active, and/or less caring, but may not possess much of any of these threads. Such an intellectual would be just another run-of-the-mill intellectual, albeit a severe type of hypointellectual. I am not in the least interested in this “ugly” intellectual, and am not very interested in its more robust counterpart, except insofar as it represents the intellectual who is once removed from the centerpiece of this work, the quirky intellectual, who I refer to as the hyperintellectual (Publicus intellectualis hyper). The quirkiness (or q-ness) of the hyperintellectual is derived from a commitment to non-partisanship (a lack of bias qua one-sidedness but not an absence of perspectivism), which places the hyperintellectual in sharp contrast with the hypointellectual. It is in this sense that the hyperintellectual is an “anti-intellectual,” the ‘anti’ signifying the hyperintellectual’s non-partisanship that makes him or her less predictable and formulaic than the hypointellectual.

Describing intellectuals in the way that I have, however, fails to mention the space within which they operate, i.e., civil society. ‘Space’ is an abstract term that has more than one meaning and one referent, including the space that computers and the Internet have given us access to—the electronic medium of cyberspace. Yet space is nonetheless readily accessible to us because it is part of our everyday speech and lived experience. We talk about and experience space in different ways, one way being “as that which allows movement” (Tuan 1977: 6). We enter into it and we exit it; we smell, taste, feel, see, and communicate as we make our way through it. Once we pause, that location becomes a place like the one at which civil society is made real. Of course, real does not always mean humane and supportive of human development, democracy, and peace. Civil society as the space of human association and relational networks is often made toxic by the xenophobia and chauvinism reflected in hate speech and violence. Yet civil society is sometimes the wellspring for a culture of dialogue, tolerance, moderation, and the mutually beneficial resolution of conflicts; the sort of culture that embodies the attitudes and values of democratization. Political instrumentalities like freedom of expression; free, fair, and frequent elections; and procedures to bring about peaceful change are crucial for democ-

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3 An instance of a taxi driver may not be as clear-cut as it appears. We may consider those drivers of cars with pink moustaches who give rides free of charge in Omaha, Nebraska as fuzzy cases.
The Hyperintellectual in the Balkans: Recomposed

The Hyperintellectual in the Balkans: Recomposed

racy, but they are only as effective as the culture that binds them. It is civil society 
that provides the space within which culture shapes how people behave politically. 
What we find today are civil societies that harbor a mosaic of political cultures in continuous tension with one another, with some cultures being more supportive of democracy than others. For the most part, pluralism comes with its own risks of repeated contestation. “When we discover that there are several cultures instead of just one and consequently at the time when we acknowledge the end of a sort of cultural monopoly, be it illusory or real,” as Ricoeur reminds us, “we are threatened with the destruction of our own discovery. Suddenly it becomes possible that there are just others, that we ourselves are an ‘other’ among others” (1965: 278). And with all those others the possibility for disagreement and antagonism, and occasionally violence, is but a human constant.

It strikes me that of all the “shakers and movers” of culture, the hypointellectual is no less important an actor than the rest of the lot in well-developed democratic civil societies, like those in the United States, France, Denmark, and Sweden. When it comes to the United States, Posner locates what he calls “the market for public intellectuals” (Posner 2003: 41–82). It is a marketplace inhabited by the likes of Noam Chomsky, Cornell West, and Paul Krugman. The hypointellectual is also an important actor in civil societies that are far less democratic; sometimes working on behalf of and sometimes struggling against the time honored constraints of authoritarianism (the People’s Republic of China, North Korea, and the Russian Federation come to mind).

Although the hypointellectual dominates many societies as a force for either the status quo or for social change, I find extraordinary value in the hyperintellectual. This is even true in well-developed democratic civil societies where there continues to be a need for an intellectual who is more than simply a social critic, an educator, a person of action, and a compassionate individual who favors one side over another. However, it is within post-conflict societies, such as those in Kosovo and Bosnia, that there exists an urgent need for the hyperintellectual. What is distinctive about the hyperintellectual is the degree to which this intellectual conducts social criticism, political education, action, and “caring insiderism” not as an ideologue, but as a non-partisan. The tasks of criticism, education, and the rest are conducted in a non-partisan way such that what is objectionable and defensible within each opposing camp is given voice. Although the hyperintellect may appear to be affiliated with a particular group simply because their position on an issue is the same as that of the group in question, it is just that, an appearance. Over the course of time, while examining a host of issues, the hyperintellectual

4 After all is said and done, however, there may not be a “best” voice that results from reasoning and impartial scrutiny. As Sen so succinctly notes: “[e]ven the most vigorous of critical examination can still leave conflicting and competing arguments that are not eliminated by impartial scrutiny” (2009: x). Perhaps we should be satisfied with a new voice that is simply more reasonable.
will be seen to have shifted “affiliations” from one group to another to another, siding with conservatives one day, liberals the next, and socialists the following day. This shifting, however, is evidence that the hyperintellectual is not beholden to any one stakeholder, whether it is a party, organization, or government. This is especially important for the building of post-conflict civil societies like Kosovo and Bosnia because the hyperintellectual is seen as “having no dog in the fight,” thus as someone who is sincere about reducing the divisiveness between peoples. Whether the tension is between ethnic nationalists themselves; between them and the strong interventionists from within the International Community (IC); or between the governed and their corrupt, inept, and greedy elected officials and their functionaries—a new set of boogie men, it can all be addressed by the hyperintellectual so that there is at least a growing sense of communities.

It is worth remarking that to appreciate the pervasiveness and malevolence of the divisiveness caused by ethnic nationalism is to recognize how personal and group identities are intimately bound to the Other and Otherness. No wonder nationalist elites of all sorts have matter-of-factly Othered one another; this being no less true of nationalists in Kosovo and Bosnia. However, there is more to the Othering process that meets the eye, for at a much deeper level, the process is a reflection of a “hierarchical” ontology (i.e., the set of things and relationships that are said to exist in the world), which casts the categories of ethnicity and religion as dominant over those of citizenship and humanity. Juxtaposing one of these categories against another for the sake of in-group cohesiveness eventually creates disdain for the ethnicity and religion of the Other, and thus xenophobic psychology (fear of the Other) and chauvinistic morality (the moral superiority of one’s own ethno-religious group) (Conces 2005). It is all the more pernicious when this ontological-psychological-moral triad is wedded to the history and tradition of the Balkans.

Unfortunately, interethnic relations and governance in Kosovo and Bosnia in some ways have not improved following Kosovo’s independence in 2008 and the signing of The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (GFAP), more commonly known as the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), that brought an end to the fighting in Bosnia. The xenophobia and chauvinism partly responsible for thirty years of unrest in Kosovo and the Bosnian civicide of the 1990s continue to polarize Kosovar and Bosnian societies, pitting the various ethnic groups and their leaders against each other, as well as against the IC and its strong interventionist efforts in de-
The Hyperintellectual in the Balkans: Recomposed

Democracy building (see Appadurai 2006: 117-118). The current round of tension includes violent clashes between NATO-led KFOR units, as well as EULEX and Kosovo police units, and Serbs in Serb-controlled municipalities in North Kosovo between 2011 and 2012; bomb blasts, the shooting of a Serb Councilman, and masked men disrupting a polling center in north Mitrovica during 2013-14; the dysfunctionality within the government of the Bosnian city of Mostar, which was still without a City Council in April 2015 because of the municipality’s unconstitutional electoral process; and the veiled secessionist rhetoric occasionally delivered by Milorad Dodik, the president of the Republika Srpska, and that has put the IC and some in Sarajevo in a tenuous situation regarding their response to provocations. Then there was the torrent of protests that took place in February and March 2014 in Bosnia. The rank and file of the protestors cut across ethnic lines, with increasing numbers of Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs having become disenchanted with their lives. The Bosnian Spring began peaceful but became violent, with government buildings in Tuzla and Zenica, and the presidency building in Sarajevo going up in flames (Conces 2014). They had reached a breaking point and were fed up with the country’s high unemployment (almost 45 percent), endemic poverty, corrupt and ineffective governance, and the international overseers who perpetuate Bosnia’s “protectorate” status. Who could blame them for being incensed with the multitude of elected officials and functionaries who failed to govern but who nevertheless enjoyed the benefits of a privileged position. Since then, much of the activity of the protestors has been channeled into organizing plena—places where people gather to formulate their demands for change.

But the plena seem to have lost their momentum, while the imprint of ethnic nationalism and the IC’s influence remain steadfast in the Balkans. On the one hand, those with nationalist leanings see the strong interventionism by the IC as incursions that weaken their self-determination and undermine their ethnic identity, a portrayal that casts the IC’s democracy building efforts in a less than favorable light. On the other hand, the IC views the meddling of nationalists as an attempt to undermine Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) which established the mandate of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to ensure peace and normalcy within Kosovo, as well as regional stability, and those formal agreements and institutions of democracy building in Bosnia, particularly the DPA. Regardless of whether the various parties accept responsibility for these incursions and meddlings, continuous tension between ethnic nationalists themselves, and between them and the cosmopolitan interventionists, has created an opening for the hyperintellectual as a transformative agent between these apparent rivals. As this essay will make clear, it is the hyperintellectual, who through a reciprocating critique and defense of the nationalist enterprises and strong interventionism and the rest, strives to create a climate of un-
derstanding and an enlargement of moral space so as to reduce the divisiveness between opponents. Tackling the issue of moral space is of the utmost importance because the chauvinistic morality of the nationalist shrinks or collapses the space within which people navigate in respectful ways. Enlarging it is achieved in ways that reflect an inflationary model of morality, one that finds empathy (and hospitality) to be more important than the simple permissiveness of tolerance or, worse yet, “disengaged toleration,” which is to say that “you are right in your community and I am right in mine” (Sen 2009: x). But this enlargement process is not simply the creation of a willingness to interact in close proximity, for it is dependent upon the ease with which people are able to be in close proximity with one another. It is when the environment becomes enriched in ways that create proximity that the hyperintellectual becomes more of a catalyst for a democratic culture within the civil societies of Kosovo and Bosnia.

The remainder of this essay is organized in the following way. In Part I, I provide an elaboration of the hyperintellectual, one that distinguishes the hyperintellectual from the hypointellectual by means of a thorough examination of the “fifth” characteristic of non-partisanship. Part II offers a definition of civil society and shows that the hyperintellectual can serve as a catalyst for democratization within civil society by creating a climate of understanding that reduces the divisiveness between opposing parties. Part III offers a discussion of the inflationary model of morality, a model that exposes another way in which the hyperintellectual can be a transformative agent for democratization, this time by enlarging the moral space of rivals. By reflecting on the nature of moral space, with a focus on its obstacles as well as remedies, I will show the importance of hospitality, particularly as it pertains to the enlargement of moral space. Part IV acknowledges the bounded effectiveness of the hyperintellectual.

**ELABORATING ON THE HYPERINTELLECTUAL**

The terms ‘intellectual’ in the late-19th century and ‘public intellectual’ in the 20th century were coined in an attempt to label a sort of person who was already present in the world. On the one hand, it referred to someone providing a public defense even at great risk to themselves. On the other hand, it pointed to someone who was engaged in a public debate about important concerns and who was not beholden to the state, the university, or the media. The 21st century coinage of ‘hyperintellectual’ and ‘hypointellectual’, however, is not simply about labeling, but about taxonomy, hence the earlier reference to the hyper and hypo species of the genus Publicus intellectualis. This taxonomy of intellectuals is both descriptive and normative. It is descriptive insofar as having defined the hypointellectual in terms of a broad range of varied magnitudes of four common attributes and looking around the world, we find things which answer to this definition. In fact, the hypointellectual is the most prevalent of intellectuals. The project is also normative...
insofar as this run–of-the-mill intellectual is juxtaposed to an intellectual that we should want to inhabit societies—the hyperintellectual, a highly endowed hypointellectual who is also a non-partisan. Stipulating this definition to the word ‘hyperintellectual’ and valuing the presence of a non-partisan intellectual is one thing, whether there are intellectuals in the world which answer to this definition is a matter for another essay. For now it is enough to lay out in further detail the characteristics of which the hyperintellectual is a composite. The distinguishing attribute of non-partisanship will require a more thorough examination than the others simply because of the objections that many have launched against its very possibility.

A Menagerie of Characteristics...

The first characteristic—that of the social critic—is alluded to by Edward Said in his *Representations of the Intellectual* (1996). “The public role of the intellectual,” declares Said, is “as outsider, ‘amateur,’ and disturber of the status quo” (1996: x). For Said, being an “insider,” an “expert,” a “professional” leads one to become more concerned with serving power and promoting special interests and one’s career than with speaking the truth, for speaking the truth requires a readiness to disturb the status quo. In effect, the intellectual tends to be an oppositional figure, one whose consciousness is guided by dissent rather than accommodation. By disturbing the status quo, the intellectual breaks down inherited ways of viewing the world, those stereotypes and categories that often hamper our dealings with others. The intellectual strives to move beyond the easy or the familiar, to the point of “defamiliarizing” the obvious (Amsterdam and Bruner 2000: 23). It is the responsibility of the intellectual, declares Said, to “question patriotic nationalism, corporate thinking, and a sense of class, racial or gender privilege” (1996: xiii). The intellectual thus offers the public a message that confronts orthodoxy and represents those segments of the population that are often forgotten by those who dominate society. Michel Foucault iterates this characteristic when he writes that the role of the intellectual is “to question over and over again what is postulated as self-evident, to disturb people’s mental habits, the way they do and think things, to dissipate what is familiar and accepted, to reexamine rules and institutions” (1988: 265). For Said, then, the creation of a disturbance simply reflects the intellectual’s “oppositionality” (2004: 135) or homelessness. It is, as Said sees it, not so much a matter of leaving one’s physical home than it is being an *exile* in

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6 This includes the actions of the whistleblower, actions that provoke a public debate, such as those of Edward Snowden, to the dismay of the U.S. intelligence community.

7 Posner (2003: 31) introduces this distinction between oppositionality and opposition. An important element of the former is a sense of moral “homelessness,” something that Theodor Adorno refers to when he writes: “It is a part of morality not to be at home in one’s home” (1974: 39). I take oppositionality to be indicative of a willingness or an urge to search for that which is morally reasonable.
the sense of being skeptical and critical of the received opinion of one’s own community.

However, the disturbance created by the intellectual is not a matter of opposing one dogma with another, of replacing one ideology with another. And this includes becoming enamored with the ideology of the weak and the downtrodden in the name of dissent or resistance to the brutality of imperial power and military occupation—that is, the straightjacket of critique. Again, Said is a case in point. As the political scientist Joseph Massad perceptively notes, being a “secular critic” played a central role in Said’s intellectual life: “He insisted on being politically godless in an age dominated by the worship of political deities—the ‘West,’ Soviet Communism, U.S. imperialism, nationalism of all varieties, to name the most prominent” (Massad 2010: 23). And, in some ways, it meant things Palestinian as well: “I take criticism so seriously as to believe that, even in the very midst of battle in which one is unmistakably on one side against another, there should be criticism, because there must be critical consciousness if there are to be issues, problems, values, even lives to be fought for” (Said 1983: 28). This helps us to understand his public criticism of the Palestinian leadership and many Palestinian intellectuals surrounding the Oslo Accords of 1993-95. Said’s commitment to justice and Palestinian rights and self-determination branded the Accords as an accommodation to power, marking the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Palestinian Authority (PA) as participants in a one act play with Israel as its stage director. As far as Said was concerned, “Capitulation!” was in its tenth season when he died of leukemia in 2003 (Massad 2010: 24).8

The intellectuals’ homelessness, which we find instantiated in the likes of Said, is to be expected, given (1) that even moral judgments in favor of the dispossessed are often, if not always, predicated to some extent on speaking to the truth of empirical claims9 and (2) that no individual (or group) has a strangle hold on the truth. In regard to this latter claim, perhaps the British philosopher J. S. Mill had it right in his essay On Liberty when he wrote of one of the advantages to a diversity of opinion: since the “general or prevailing opinion on any subject is rarely or never the whole truth, it is only by the collision of adverse opinions that the remainder of the truth has any chance of being supplied” (1962: 180). Or, through another lens, the adverse opinion (of the weak and the downtrodden), is rarely or never the

8 For a glimpse of the full force of Said’s critique of Arafat and the PLO, see Said (1996a) and (2005). A fine example of the depth of Said’s criticism is the following: “Arafat is finished: why don’t we admit that he can neither lead, nor plan, nor do anything that makes any difference except to him and his Oslo cronies who have benefited materially from their people’s misery? He is the main obstacle to our people’s future” (Said 2004: 96).

9 Saree Makdisi (2008) notes that following the Oslo Accords of 1993-95, “Said found himself battling not only the injustice of Israel’s policies and the historical injustice of Zionism itself but also the corruption, ignorance, and poor judgment of the Palestinian leadership” (57).
whole truth on any subject so that a collision with the prevailing opinion is needed for a more robust speaking to the truth. This means *the opinions and practices of the weak and downtrodden sometimes yield to fact and argument*, an outcome that the hyperintellectual is ready to acknowledge.

The synthesis of the hyperintellectual continues with the second characteristic alluded to by Paul Ricoeur. For him, the intellectual is someone who is a political educator, an individual committed to motivating people through “good counsel” to become responsible citizens who can work and live together within a framework of a democratic economy (1974, 1986, 1992). I suggest that good counsel is more about creating people through an acculturation process than it is about simply motivating people to behave in certain ways. More precisely, good counsel can promote “responsible citizens” through building certain kinds of epistemic and political cultures.

The process of making responsible citizens can be understood epistemically insofar as the hyperintellectual qua educator functions as a role model, setting an epistemic standard for others to adopt. In short, the counsel strives to create good epistemic agents, that is, “persons who believe propositions because they have epistemic reasons (which increase the probability that one’s beliefs are true)...” (Conces 2009: 24). Just as important, however, is that the hyperintellectual acquires these reasons through no small effort of their own. In a way, this effort reflects what Kant had in mind when he broached the subject of enlightenment.

Enlightenment is man’s release from his self-incurred tutelage. Tutelage is man’s inability to make use of his understanding without direction from another. Self-incurred is this tutelage when its cause lies not in lack of reason but in lack of resolution and courage [laziness and cowardice] to use it without direction from another. *Sapere aude! “Have courage to use your own reason!”*—that is the motto of enlightenment (1986: 263).

So the hyperintellectual is intellectually autonomous, rather than conformist; someone who is not reliant on another for the “direction and control of...[their] thinking” (Paul and Elder 2002: 32).

Such agents not only take epistemic reasons and autonomy seriously, but they possess commonplace self-restraints on reasoning. These restraints include the various regulative ideals or epistemic goods such as understanding, intelligibility, and trustworthiness; and the intellectual virtues such as humility (vs. arrogance), empathy (vs. narrow-mindedness), and integrity (vs. hypocrisy). In addition, the good epistemic agent acknowledges “the

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10 To speak of intellectual autonomy in this way does not require us to decide whether the hyperintellectual is either an extreme or weak epistemic egoist as defined by Zagzebski (2009: 88), for these two forms of epistemic egoism include the agent either demanding proof of *p* that can be determined by the agent’s own faculties or evidence that the other person who is providing the evidence is trustworthy, respectively. In short, “both kinds of egoist think that the fact that someone else has a certain belief is never *as such* a reason for them to believe it” (88).

Interesting enough, epistemic concerns have been clearly recognized by a number of economists, including Adam Smith’s introduction of the impartial spectator (1976), Gunnar Myrdal’s discussion of objectivity and bias (1969), Amartya Sen’s treatment of impartiality, and Thomas Piketty’s casting of the role of intellectuals, including social scientists (2014). At the start of his massive Capital in the Twenty-First Century (2014), Piketty succinctly notes that the role of intellectuals, including social scientists, is to “redefine the terms of debate, unmask certain preconceived or fraudulent notions, and subject all positions to constant critical scrutiny” (3). Surely, what Piketty and the rest have in mind in some form or another is good epistemic agency!

Understanding responsible citizenship in epistemic terms makes the social critic and the educator supportive of one another because truth is at the heart of both roles. It is no wonder that the hyperintellectual does not take these roles to the extreme. On the one hand, the hyperintellectual qua critic does not engage in fanatical dissent, which is blind, incessant critique of the Other. Such dissent is the hallmark of those who are intolerant, self-righteous, overly certain, and zealous. The hyperintellectual is less vulnerable to such dissent because the sort of weak reasoning and suspension of commonplace self-restraints on reasoning are contrary to the hyperintellectual being a good epistemic agent. On the other hand, the hyperintellectual qua educator does not acquiesce to power. Such acquiescence would mean a transformation of the role of the intellectual to “one of closing debate, not opening it; of serving power, not challenging it; of humoring authority, not speaking truth to it” (Massad 2010: 42)—that is, becoming a mouthpiece of the decisions, policies, and vision of those in power. It is precisely because the hyperintellectual is a good epistemic agent that the commonplace self-restraints on reasoning are not significantly reduced or abandoned, allowing the hyperintellectual to educate with truth to power (and to lack of power). Criticality is not replaced by loyal obedience. Of course, the intellectual as a good epistemic agent could find some state policies justifiable, especially if the state is not criminally totalitarian or outright fascist. Educating others about the legitimacy or efficacy of state policy, for example, need not amount to “cutting a deal” to make life easier for the intellectual.11 But exhibiting acceptable epistemic agency does require a heightened sense of scrutiny of policies that are the products of state, corporate, or other institutions of power. Some believe that a balance must be struck between the two extremes. Laying out this balance, Said writes, that

the intellectual ought neither to be so uncontroversial and safe a figure as to be just a friendly technician nor should the intellectual try to be a full-time

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11 For a discussion of fanatical reasoning, see Conces (2009: 34-36).
Cassandra, who was not only righteously unpleasant but also unheard.... But the alternatives are not total quiescence or total rebelliousness (1996: 69).

But what is the relevant level of description for explaining the actions of an intellectual? Is it, as Said believes, on the level of a “friendly technician” and a “full-time Cassandra,” in which case he believes there must be a balance, or is it on the level of good epistemic agency developed as a social critic and educator, in which case there is no need for a balance but is simply a matter of resisting extremes. What is at stake is far more nuanced than Said’s passages indicate.

But promoting this agency is also integral to creating responsible citizens who can “live and work together,” for surely the good epistemic agent, more than the fanatic, is likely to be someone who is able to meaningfully interact and become deeply interdependent with a diverse group of others, especially in deliberative democracies that do not simply have legitimacy based on the aggregation of preferences through voting but rather as a result of authentic deliberation.12 Such deliberation produces less partisanship, enhances sympathy with the plight of others, and increases commitment and consensus building. It does so by placing more value on evidence-based reasoning, agreeing that reasons need to be public and understandable, and being open to the possibility of changing one’s mind. These are the hallmarks of non-fanatical reasoning.

Good counsel can also promote responsible citizens through the creation and maintenance of specific types of political culture, including, though not limited to, one that is supportive of a liberal democracy. Such a culture fosters moral content that falls under the general heading of liberty, equality, justice, and fraternity. And it is replete with the specifics of individual rights; equal opportunities; equal respect for persons; equal liberties of speech, association, and conscience; and the rest. So the hyperintellectual can give good counsel through the integration of such content in his or her analyses and judgments.

Political culture is far more expansive, however. The American philosopher Martha C. Nussbaum claims in her book *Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice*, “all political principles, the good as well as the bad, need emotional support to ensure their stability over time, and all decent societies need to guard their public sphere, complete with a lived interconnectivity; maybe it is more like a donut, one on which being good epistemic agents living and working together is simply not feasible. But surely the donut can be traded in for a sphere, for it is simply an engineering problem."

12 Some may say that much of what I offer is not very applicable to present-day Palestine and that Said was right after all: “Better disparity and dislocation than reconciliation under duress of subject and object; better a lucid exile than sloppy, sentimental homecomings; better the logic of dissociation than an assembly of compliant dunces” (Said 2000: 17). Yet creating a citizenry and a community is a work in progress. Perhaps Palestinian and Israeli Jew do not live on the surface of a shared
against division and hierarchy by cultivating appropriate sentiments of sympathy and love” (2013: 2-3). Not only must the moral content win the minds of citizens, but their hearts must be won over by strong emotions which support that content. Being a proponent of a liberal society herself, Nussbaum contends that the political cultivation of emotions has two distinct tasks: (1) to bolster strong commitment for national goals, projects, and visions that are beyond the narrow agendas of the personal and that “require effort and sacrifice” and (2) to reduce the harmful “tendencies to protect the fragile self by denigrating and subordinating others,” especially when group identity is involved (2013: 3).13 She argues that love is fundamental for a decent society because the emotions that sustain such a society are rooted in love. One emotion that is particularly important for this work is compassion and its connection with empathy. It is at the core of the inflationary model of morality, which is part of a framework for situating the hyperintellectual in modern-day civil society building and democratization, as well as a catalyst for the creation and maintenance of a democratic culture.

But nothing in the rendering of the political educator as one who gives good counsel through the creation and maintenance of epistemical and political cultures indicates that this role is contrary to that of the social critic. Nothing that has been stated so far about good epistemic agents, epistemical and political cultures, and emotions indicates that a judgment by the hyperintellectual in favor of the state or an international organization administering a territory would be evidence that the hyperintellectual is simply an accomplice of that ruling hegemony. On the contrary, the judgment could simply comport with the fifth characteristic of the hyperintellectual—non-partisanship—which creates the possibility to challenge what some take to be a self-evident wrong perpetrated by the state or some other powerful entity. Consequently, the hyperintellectual does not become a part of the “dialogue of the deaf,” subservient to either side’s “vision of history” and claims of being misunderstood, manipulated, or exploited (see Dragović-Soso 2002: 130-131).

The third characteristic, that of the person of action, lies at the heart of a shift that eventually dominated Jean-Paul Sartre’s thinking on the intellectual, a move away from his initial portrayal of the intellectual as the committed writer (one who dwells in the realm of thought) to that of the revolutionary or militant (one who dwells in the realm of action), a move that was made final during the late 1960s. Douglas Kellner’s insightful unpublished paper (1975) on the trajectory of the Sartrean intellectual is most useful in this regard.14

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13 I have addressed this concern with the xenophobia and chauvinism of ethnic nationalism in Conces (2005, 2002).

14 One of the best exposés of the shift in Sartre’s thinking on the intellectual can be found in Douglas Kellner’s unpublished paper “Intellectuals and Revolution: A Study of the Philosophical–Political Trajectory of Jean-Paul Sartre” (1975).
Kellner, in surveying Sartre’s writings on the intellectual, takes Sartre’s writings immediately following World War II and into the 1950s as portraying what he refers to as the “classical intellectual.” Early on, beginning with a series of essays in *What is Literature?* (1947), Sartre focused on the intellectual as writer, one who commits literature to the expansion of freedom (Kellner 1975: 5). As France became more embroiled in the Algerian problem, Sartre’s rendering of the intellectual was increasingly framed within the colonial experience and the function of the intellectual took on an increasingly moralistic tone, albeit not limited to denouncing the injustices in Algeria. As Kellner notes, “the sphere and arena of the intellectual [for Sartre] is the word: writing and talking. The function of the intellectual is critical and negative: to describe and denounce” (10). The 1950s also saw Sartre take a Marxist turn in his philosophy while certain events within the political realm (the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956) led to his distancing himself from the USSR and the French Communist Party. The classical conception of the intellectual continued to hold sway for Sartre, but this was to end in the 1960s.

Kellner notes that Sartre’s conception of the intellectual began to change starting with a lecture series that Sartre delivered during a visit to Japan in September-October 1966 which were subsequently published under the title “A Plea for Intellectuals” (1974). At the heart of this new conception is a contradiction that emerges in the life of intellectuals within a class society. On the one hand, the intellectual is a technician who produces practical knowledge through the search for universal truth for the good of all. However, this technician becomes subservient to the interests of dominant ideologies, groups, and institutions within a class society. Thus, “a contradiction emerges between the universality of intellectual labor…and the particularity of the interests served” (17). The intellectual realizes this contradiction and becomes cognizant of functioning as a tool for the ruling class. With the recognition of further contradictions, the intellectual becomes rebellious and, being seen as such by the authorities, draws their attention in order to bring him or her back into the fold. The intellectual has two ways to respond to the ruling class: conform to it or refuse to be its agent. It is the latter response, which amounts to trying to resolve these contradictions, that leads to the genuine intellectual. However, this requires the intellectual to “leave the realm of ideas and see that social change can only come through mass action and that they themselves must work on the level of action and events (and not merely ideas)” (22). In other words, the genuine intellectual investigates the personal and social in order to bring about change. But if there is to be change, such as the elimination of discrimination, the intellectual must not only modify his or her thinking and the thinking of others by offering convincing arguments, but must also modify his or her sensibility, for discrimination is also an attitude comprised of a cognitive, affective, and action triad (Sartre 1974:...
However, these modifications alone are not sufficient to eradicate this problem because the intellectual’s most valuable work in challenging a problem like discrimination occurs on a far different, though not wholly unrelated, level. Since discrimination is not simply an idea, but an idea that is actualized in events that are dated and localized, the intellectual must produce concrete events that serve to reject discrimination at the level of events (1974: 251). The intellectual needs “to join [an action]..., to...participate in it physically...” (1974: 261). The intellectual must be engaged; hence, the intellectual is a “person of action”; and, since he or she is battling the ideas and culture of the ruling class, the intellectual is also a revolutionary or a militant in the name of the oppressed. This new revolutionary was the end point of the trajectory of Sartre’s thinking about the intellectual which found its most concise expression in a 1971 interview with the political scientist John Garassi. For Sartre, “the intellectual who does all his fighting from an office is counterrevolutionary today, no matter what he writes” and that “the intellectual who does not put his body as well as his mind on the line against the system is fundamentally supporting the system—and should be judged accordingly” (Sartre 1971: 117-118).

While in general I agree with Sartre that the intellectual often needs to act in ways that are much more risky than wielding a pen or pounding a keyboard, I do not agree with him that the intellectual per se must be a revolutionary and that as a revolutionary he or she must also act in this more expansive way as contrasted with the counterrevolutionary, who apparently remains indoors at a writing table or computer and, thus, impotent to combat the system.15 Although this discourse makes sense in regard to the hyointellectual, it is not applicable to the hyperintellectual. Indeed, my contention about the epistemic foundation of the hyperintellectual does not support acts that are rigidly revolutionary or militant, or, to put it in slightly different terms, as always siding with the least favored and most oppressed of society, and always in a more risky sort of way. Acts can include writing or picketing that are not revolutionary in nature, but rather reactionary, statist, or simply supportive of the structures of power and authority that only occasionally oppress. Sartre’s casting the genuine intellectual as someone engaged in the fight against the system is overshadowed by the hyperintellectual’s epistemic character. What is foundational for hyperintellectualism is that it is epistemically improvisational; there is no ideological script for actions to adhere to, no ideological patron to satisfy. Being improvisational amounts to being a non-partisan, which is the fifth characteristic of the hyperintellectual. The hyperintellectual is not in lock step with or against the influence of the powers that be, whether those powers refer to the state, corporations, or parties. Such loyalty, the requirement that a per-

15 It appears that Sartre was of the view that not to engage in action only enhances the possibility that any revolutionary gains will be lost, thereby justifying the label “counterrevolutionary.”
son is in favor of this side or that side, for
the left or the right, is what is indicative
of the hypointellectual rather than the hy-
perintellectual. Even though there being
no privileging of either the revolutionary
or the reactionary as always being a good
moral agent, there is the possibility that
both the revolutionary and the unrevolu-
tionary are intermittently good epistemic
agents. That is to say, they can both be
occasionally good moral and epistemic
agents; neither one being absolutely good
(or, absolutely bad) in either way. And as
far as action goes, what is important is the
breadth of actions that are incorporated
into the regiment of the hyperintellectual.
Even though the power of ideas is formi-
dable, that “all human actions are carried
out and find their meaning and signifi-
cance in a cultural ambience of ideas...”
(Callicott 1995: 35), the battle against in-
justice or the defense of truth may require
not only putting “pen to paper,” but also
standing in a picket line for either those
who claim little power and who feel that
their needs are not being met or those
who are in power (perhaps even the state)
because such participation is itself a con-
crete event in the public domain that is
recordable and which sends a message.

The fourth characteristic is insider-
ism. Although being an insider may seem
contrary to the social critic as an outsid-
er, Michael Walzer, best known for his
Spheres of Justice, makes it clear that this
need not be so. In a more recent book
The Company of Critics: Social Criticism
and Political Commitment in the Twentieth
Century, Walzer refers to the critic as an
insider insofar as the person exhibits a
certain mindfulness and commitment to
the society in question. The critic is one
“who care[s] about what happens to it
[the society]” (2002: xi). To take a criti-
cal stand and a caring attitude toward a
society, however, does not mean that the
critic must meet the demand for objec-
tivity through a “radical detachment, ab-
solute impartiality, or a God’s eye view of
the world...” (2002: xii). On the contrary,
the critic must be “engaged” in the society,
and this engagement comes only from
one’s own subjective situation. As Franz
Rosenzweig makes us clearly aware,

the single condition imposed upon us
by objectivity is that we survey the en-
tire horizon; but we are not obliged
to make this survey from any position
other than the one in which we are, nor
are we obliged to make it from no po-
sition at all. Our eyes are, indeed, only
our own eyes; yet it would be folly to
imagine that we must pluck them out
in order to see straight (1961: 179).16

Although this engagement does not
require the critic to reside within the soci-
ety in question (one can be a critic in exile
or an expatriate critic), it does require a
certain degree of knowledge about that
society. There are many different perspec-
tives and sets of experiences from which
intellectuals voice their criticism. But the
“good” social critic (though not necessar-
ily the successful one) is not just someone

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16 I am struck by how similar this is to Geertz
(1986), when he states “we cannot live other
people’s lives, and it is a piece of bad faith to
try” (373).
who is empirically informed. The intellectual is someone, declares Walzer, to whom we need to listen, who “touch[es] our moral nerves...and force[s] us to look at what we would rather avoid, the wrongness in our own society, in our own lives” (2002: xiii). The intellectual is in possession of the moral virtues of courage, compassion, and a good eye (2002: xiv-xvii). Moral courage is important because it involves the ability to continue criticism when one’s fellow citizens (even friends) are silent or complicit. The hypointellectual practices a form of radical forthrightness. Compassion also has its place because knowledge of human suffering is crucial for appropriate criticism. And a good eye is valuable because the critic must be open to the world in order to be honest about the presence of oppression, exploitation, and injustice.

**Plus Q-ness:**
**Being a Non-Partisan is a Bitch**

So far the characteristics or threads that define the diverse set of hypointellectuals and that serve to define in large measure the hypointellectual have been laid out in such a way that it may give the impression that moving from the most minimal type of intellectual to the most severe hypointellectual (one whose characteristics are accentuated) to the hyperintellectual comes with relative ease. However, any hypointellectual who desires to turn “hyper” faces a set of difficult challenges, a sort of Scylla and Charybdis that will serve to deter many an intellectual.

On one side of the narrow straight is Scylla, the many-headed monster, who is ready to manhandle all those who stray too close. Scylla, in this argument, are deficiencies associated with each of the four characteristics—critical insider, political educator, person of action, and caring insider. On the other side of the straight, however, is Charybdis, a whirlpool that destroys those ships that cannot escape it. In the present argument, Charybdis is the danger of partisanship or bias that gives the other characteristics a distinct ideological aura, leading the intellectual to take sides whenever the occasion arises. It is in this sense that the intellectual has an ideological patron. The resulting disturbance leads to one ideology replacing another; an epistemical and political culture limiting who can live and work together, as well as how liberal a society can become, the abandonment of any desire to solve the contradictions in favor of becoming a “hired hand” for those who rule or command; and a caring for some within society and not others. It is, in short, the entrenched exclusivity that exists today. Not only must the hyper-intellectual significantly possess all four characteristics of the hypointellectual, he or she must possess a certain degree of quirkiness (q-ness) vis-à-vis the fifth characteristic, non-partisanship, the one char-

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17 “Compassion [is] ...a state of mind that is nonviolent, nonharming, and nonaggressive. It is a mental attitude based on the wish for others to be free of their suffering and is associated with a sense of commitment, responsibility, and respect towards the other” (The Dalai Lama and Cutler 1998: 114).
acteristic that acts as a “glue” (possibly vaccination) for the rest and that results in an amalgam (possibly health). This is the final and most important piece of the elaboration of the hyperintellectual.

In exploring the meaning of non-partisanship, it is best to first discuss how it differs from impartiality, which has come under heavy criticism. Examining both Iris Marion Young’s 1990 *Justice and the Politics of Difference*—a postmodernist critique of impartiality, and Marilyn Friedman’s 1989 “The Impracticality of Impartiality”—an article that is both critical and revisionary, is helpful in this regard."\(^{18}\)

Both Young and Friedman remind us that impartiality has been treated as an ideal throughout much of modern ethical theory. The “unbiased standpoint” has even seeped into everyday moral thinking as the “privileged standpoint for critically reflecting on normative matters” (Friedman 1989: 645). Yet impartiality is destined to controversy; Young views it as being extremely *problematic*, while Friedman finds impartiality to be *elusive*.

According to Young, the ideal of impartiality arises in its association with a paradigm of moral reasoning that situates the reasoner within a moral point of view that is both universal and objective (99). The process by which the theorist or the agent arrives at this point of view is “by abstracting from all the particularities of the circumstances on which moral reason reflects” (100). It is an attempt to reduce plurality to unity, denying or repressing difference, through a threefold abstraction leading the impartial reasoner to be detached, dispassionate, and a universal reasoning subject. The impartial reasoner denies the experiential and historical particularities of a situation, allowing for the treatment of situations from the same moral principles. The impartial reasoner abstracts from feelings and interests that he or she may have in regard to the situation. Also, the impartial reasoner abstracts from the partiality of affiliation that is part of what constitutes concrete subjects, leading to a point of view that any and all rational agents can adopt (100). The result of these abstractions is a point of view that is devoid of concreteness; it is a “transcendental ‘view from nowhere’.”

But Young is keen on showing the problems of impartiality. First, particularity will always be in operation regardless

\(^{18}\) Friedman, more so than Young, alerts us to the diversity of terms used to refer to an “unbiased normative standpoint.” Terms like ‘bias’, which is “the unduly favoring of one party, person or group of persons when disputes arise or interests compete,” and ‘prejudice’, which “a judgment formed prior to due consideration” are often used interchangeably with ‘impartiality’. Friedman combines them in referring to the sort of “favoritism that is not based on due consideration, or supported by good reasons” (1989: 646-647). I will use the term ‘impartiality’ though the other two terms will surface later in my discussion of this topic. It should also be noted that Young’s postmodernist critique, that highlights the discarding of difference for unity, draws heavily from Stephen Darwall (1983) and Thomas Nagel (1986) for her discussion of impartiality found in chapter four entitled “The Ideal of Impartiality and the Civic Public.” Friedman’s refers to Darwall and Nagel as well, though it is more of a conceptual analysis that focuses on the weaknesses of two theoretical models of impartial moral thinking—the methods of universalization and models of social contract—but closes out the article with a recommendation for dealing with bias.
of abstraction since the abstraction process generates a dichotomy or an opposition between the impartial and universal aspects of a moral context and those that are partial and particular. In addition, there is a dichotomy between reason and feelings. Although reason is defined in a way that calls for their expulsion, feelings and interests simply do not go away. They are an ever present source of motivation. Thus, partiality and impartiality are two sides of the same coin (97, 103). Second, impartiality is an impossible ideal because moral reasoning cannot (and should not) purge particularities of context and affiliation. As far as Young is concerned, the ideal of impartiality is a fiction: “No one can adopt a point of view that is completely impersonal and dispassionate, completely separated from any particular context and commitments” (103). And, since all viewpoints are “situated,” they cannot be universal. They are all entrenched in particularity. Third, impartiality has an ideological function (that is, supportive of domination and oppression) insofar as it masks the ways in which dominant groups claim universality of their own perspectives and justify hierarchical decision making (97).

But the ideals of impartiality and non-partisanship are not one and the same. Whereas impartiality is a so-called transcendental view, a move away from the moral agency of concrete human beings in a world of particularity, non-partisanship is an acceptance of the concreteness of our being and the particularity of the world that we live in, a full acknowledgment of our perspectivism while disallowing one or more perspectives from exhibiting some form of favoritism, whether it be analytically differentiated as a bias or a prejudice.19 Favoritism amounts to partisanship, an attitude that leads a person to naturally take a side in a conflict from the very start. Moreover, he or she will view problem after problem, issue after issue, in the way that any other socialist, or liberal, or conservative would view problems and issues.20 So this is what it means to be a partisan, to be attached to a particular ideology or group affiliation and an associated cluster of perspectives that biases judgments one way or another. Being so attached also means that one can be identified, whether it is a matter of self-identification and/or other-identification, as a “socialist” or “liberal” or “conservative” or whatever other kind of hypointellectual.

19 A treatment of perspective qua bias is developed within the writings of Gunnar Myrdal (1968, 1969, 1970). In his strongly worded attack on the myth of objectivity in research, Myrdal points to the important role that our biases play in research: “There is a tendency for all knowledge, like all ignorance, to deviate from truth in an opportunistic direction….A first pre-condition when trying to unfetter our minds from biases in order to reach a truer perception of reality is to see clearly the opportunistic interests affecting our search for truth and to understand how they operate” (1970: 3-4). Myrdal’s point is a valuable one, but it is also important to distinguish between bias qua favoritism and bias qua perspectivism.

20 This echoes Nagel’s work, though Nagel takes it back to the fundamental level of evidence in his uncovering the lunacy of the postmodern, relativist project: “The subordination of the intellect to partisan loyalty is found across the political spectrum, but usually it takes the form of a blind insistence on the objective truth of certain supporting facts and refusal to consider evidence to the contrary” (2005: 461).
The non-partisan, on the other hand, will evaluate each problem or issue so that what is objectionable and defensible within each opposing camp is given voice. The hyperintellectual as non-partisan does not enter into the discussion or the debate biased or prejudiced one way or another, but open to the possibility of agreeing with one side or another or neither depending on the outcome of the analysis. What is important is not a particular side, but that the debate is kept alive to the very end, which hopefully gives rise to the more reasonable position. Young herself allows for the possibility of the non-partisan given her contention that the entrenched particularism of human beings does not mean that we are “only self-regarding, unable and unwilling to consider other interests and points of view” (114). There may be nothing like a universal point of view that is the same for each and every rational agent, a Rawlsian-like original position or a Nagelian-like view from nowhere, but that does not rule out the possibility that an intellectual, for example, will consider “other interests or points of view.” In this regard, “to consider” another point of view is not the same as “to adopt” another point of view. It simply means that they are “sympathetic” or open to evaluating other points of view without summarily accepting or dismissing any one of them.21

The feminist political philosopher Susan Okin (1989), in her attempt to resurrect the Rawlsian original position as a reasoning process that arrives at the best outcome by taking into account all particular viewpoints in society, herself seems to reject the “adoption” paradigm in favor of the “sympathy” paradigm when she contends that the resurrection is predicated on the moral reasoner simply being able to be “sympathetic” with other positions and points of view. Young, to my dismay, fails to distinguish the two paradigms (Young 1990: 105)

All but one point of view may survive the evaluation process, but that occurs only as a result of the process and not due to some bias.22

Of course, this view of non-partisanship is not without its difficulties. First, there is the mechanism by which a person becomes or remains a non-partisan. How are perspectives kept at bay from becoming biases or prejudices? In attempting to answer this question, however, we face a host of practical problems. For instance, how do we become cognizant of perspectives as perspectives that bias or prejudice our moral thinking about issues and problems that we face in life? But enumerating our potentially distorting perspectives, which are themselves dynamic, is not something that we are in the habit of doing. Then, again, there is little reason to catalog the entirety of one’s perspectives (if possible) at any given time. It is enough to simply be mindful of those potentially distorting perspectives that are relevant for the situation in which we currently find ourselves. Even so, this is not as easy as one might believe, for as Friedman notes, “for good psychological reasons, each person’s unaided thinking cannot be trusted to discern its own biases. One’s own thinking—explicit and
implicit, avowed and tacit—is not fully transparent to oneself” (655–656). For Friedman, then, it is through the assistance of “interpersonal and public dialogue” that biases and prejudices become recognizable to us.

But even if we personally and interpersonally succeed in listing the relevant perspectives, there remains a further practical problem—keeping one’s perspectives at bay until “due diligence” is achieved. What does it mean to “keep perspectives at bay” so that they are “disarmed” of their distorting power? Does it simply mean saying to oneself, for example, “I will not make reference to elements of my socialist ideology when working on a particular problem”? But would that even make a difference? Twisting Freidman just a bit, even if ideology or gender, race, religion, ethnicity, class background, etc., are referred to, this does not mean that ideology and those other particulars will not “influence” the consideration, thus making it partial rather than impartial. Surely, to simply say it isn’t so does not mean that it isn’t so. Freidman with Darwall in mind is correct about the crux of the problem when she states that “the problem is that there is no way to ensure that one’s normative thinking is not being tacitly affected by one’s own subjective particulars or debarred motivations” [regardless of them being referred to] (652). Indeed, the consequences are enormous:

Beliefs about the causes of poverty and about society-wide responsibilities to the poor may well reflect the motive force of one’s own class background. Beliefs about the legitimacy of subsidized daycare at professional meetings may reflect the motive force of one’s parental status. One’s degree of tolerance for sexual and other sorts of social violence may reflect the motive force of one’s gender (652–653).

But even though there is no guarantee that our normative thinking will not be distorted in the ways mentioned or yet to be mentioned, it does not follow that there is no method for improving our critical moral thinking through uncovering our perspectives qua biases. In fact, Friedman has suggested one: interpersonal and public dialogue. However, I think Friedman does not fully appreciate the value of her own method, for it is not simply that “the beneficiaries, victims, observers, and so on, of one’s behavior may be better situated than oneself to discern biases hidden behind one’s articulated moral attitudes, because they can comprehend those avowals contextually in the light of ones’ related actions and practices” (656). What is buried by this discussion of the “observant Other” in this dialogical relationship is the very act of “calling us out on it,” of shouting at us in no uncertain terms that we are biased or prejudiced in this way or that way, perhaps not so to the Other who shouts but biased or prejudiced to another Other who is aware but remains silent or who is not even aware of our favoritism.

Second, there is the issue of the self-identification and/or other-identification of an intellectual. The non-partisan is said to take on problems or issues

23 Friedman focuses on the “unmentioned” particularities, but my concern includes those that are mentioned.
on an individual basis, judging each on its own merits. On one day and concerning one problem, the hyperintellectual judges in such a way that he or she “appears” as a liberal to some onlookers. The next day and concerning another problem, that same hyperintellectual may judge in a way that he or she “appears” to be a conservative to the very same onlookers. But what happens if a hyperintellectual just happens to judge each and every day in a way that gives the appearance of a socialist? Nothing noted thus far rules out such a possibility, albeit slim as it may be. Do we then brand that hyperintellectual a socialist? If so, then the distinction between the socialist as ideologue and the hyperintellectual as socialist may have vanished. If this distinction remains viable, then how is it to be made? If there are no practical guidelines by which these differentiations can be made with confidence and accuracy, then the efficacy of this conception of a non-partisan intellectual is placed into question. This, in turn, jeopardizes the concept of the hyperintellectual. These are vexing issues. Without a solution to the twin concerns of non-partisanship and identification, the prospects do not look good for a coherent concept of hyperintellectual. However, I have elected to simply mention these issues, delaying a more rigorous analysis for another time, or to be carried out by someone else.

Pause

To be honest, some may find this description of the intellectual to be contestable. They may even doubt whether the intellectual holds as a distinction from the non-intellectual. But even if there is a deep affinity between many or most intellectuals, intellectuals are not as monolithic a group as one might think. There are many kinds of intellectual to be considered—people who are less oppositional and educate in ways that are less promoting of good epistemic agency and democratic culture, or do not have much interest in moral virtues, but who do engage in considerable action.

We are left, thus, with a group of spectra. Think of each of the four characteristic spectrums as ordered arrangements of a particular characteristic with an assigned value on the interval \([0, 1]\) indicating the extent to which the characteristic is exhibited. A value of 1 indicates that the characteristic is fully exhibited, while a value of 0 indicates the characteristic is not exhibited whatsoever. This might suggest that there are only 14 combinations and, so, only 14 kinds of hypointellectual. But there are values in between 0 and 1 for each spectrum, thereby greatly increasing the kinds of hypointellectual. Recalling the previously noted set of characteristics—less oppositional, less promotional of epistemic agency and democratic culture, less interested in moral virtues, but action oriented—we might simply assign the following values \([.6, .5, .6, .9]\) to make up its unique spectral set. What this “spectral description” affords us is a much more encompassing definition that is not confined to the traditional labels of leftist, or, neo-conservative. In fact, I am not sure how these traditional categories would be understood in terms of spectral sets.
However, what is most important about these sets is that higher numerical values get us closer to the sort of intellectual—the hyperintellectual—that is needed to promote a culture of dialogue, tolerance, moderation, and the mutually beneficial resolution of conflicts. Accordingly, someone is a hyperintellectual to the extent to which he or she reflects those characteristics that promote such a culture in a non-partisan manner, which is the principal distinguishing characteristic between the hyperintellectual and the hypointellectual.

It is also important to keep in mind that hyperintellectuals operate within the space of civil society, a space that is crucial for geographical territories that are in need of democratization (Bremer and McConnell 2006; Chandler 2000; Diamond 1994, 2005; Fine 1996; Held 1995; Seligman 1992). Two post-conflict territories in need of democratization are Bosnia and Kosovo, places in which the International Community’s (IC) reconstruction efforts continue to include the creation of civil societies and the democracies that such societies help to sustain.

Although these efforts look upon political institutions like “free, fair, and frequent elections” and “freedom of expression” as crucial for democracy (Dahl 2005), these institutions are only as effective as the culture that “holds” them together (Gibson 2004) or the web that suspends them (Geertz 1973). Integral to this support is civil society, for it is within this space that culture shapes how people behave politically. As Bruce Parrot reminds us, “It stands to reason that political culture affects whether citizens choose to support moderate or extreme political movements and parties, and whether they choose to engage in democratic or anti-democratic forms of political participation” (1997: 21-22). This is no less true for Bosnia and Kosovo, where a culture of dialogue, tolerance, moderation, and the mutually beneficial resolution of conflicts is crucial for democracy building. So, I now turn to a consideration of civil society and how the hyperintellectual can act to enhance understanding and reduce divisiveness between rivals.

**The Hyperintellectual’s Task: Building a Climate of Understanding**

**The Public Sphere and Civil Society**

In establishing the relationship between the hyperintellectual and civil society, it is important to first understand the idea of public sphere as explored by Jürgen Habermas in “Offentlichkeit” (1989) and the idea of civil society as formulated by Michael Walzer in “The Idea of Civil Society” (1991). Habermas characterized the public sphere as a domain of our social life in which such a thing as public opinion can be formed. Access to the public sphere is open in principle to all citizens. A portion of the public sphere is constituted in every conversation in which private persons come together to form a public….Citizens act as a public when they deal with matters of general interest without being subject to coer-
We speak of a political public sphere when the public discussions concern objects connected with the practice of the state (1989: 231).

The public sphere appears when people come together to discuss public concerns, with the “political” variant being created when those individuals discuss matters of politics. In other words, the political sphere is created with the “dialogical publicity” of one’s politics. It is never a matter of remaining “private,” but always a matter of being within a discursive space.

But as Noëlle McAfee notes in Habermas, Kristeva and Citizenship, the public sphere is neither the lived, communicative space of the home or work place, nor is it a part of the official structure and mechanism of governance (2000: 81-101). Instead, the public sphere is a social space in which people can freely come together to engage in meaningful dialogue about issues that concern them (Habermas 1996: 360-361). It is that part of the spatial network which exists between the private sphere and the state.

What then of the relationship between the public sphere and civil society? Walzer points out, “civil society’ name[s] the space of uncoerced human association and also the set of relational networks—formed for the sake of family, faith, interest, and ideology—that fill this space” (2002: 293). Civil society is a more encompassing space because it includes the entire array of public spheres. Although civil society involves a communicative encounter, the emphasis here is on civil society as an “associational life.” But of what exactly are the networks composed? For Walzer, they include the “unions, churches, political parties and movements, cooperatives, neighborhoods, schools of thought, societies for promoting or preventing this and that” (293). Student and trade unions, churches, and the like, however, do not fully describe civil society’s networks, for these networks also include associations such as garden and bowling clubs, interest groups, and coffee klatches (McAfee 2000: 83). There are also the press, professional organizations, women’s organizations, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). These associations and networks of common interest or concern (which in many cases have little, if any, regard for politics) occasionally allow people to leave the confines of their homes and workplaces to enter into a more expansive common life, whereby civility can be furthered and the good life made pronounced.

But the means by which people today operate within civil society have changed radically with the arrival of the Internet. Not only has the Internet made the more traditional “brick and mortar” venues and institutions easier to manage and more reachable, but the Internet has allowed new tools like email, blogs, and open letters to help create powerful networks of communicative encounters and human association that are incredibly more expansive, less centralized, and more spontaneous than past networks. There is no question the situation has been decidedly improved by technological innovation.

But what about the relationship between civil society and democracy? The belief that civil society is not only compatible with or promotional of democ-
racy, but that a strong civil society is an essential building block of democracy is widely held and often expressed. This is particularly evident from the coverage and analysis of the Colour Revolutions (Rose-Georgia 2003; Orange-Ukraine 2004-2005; Blue-Kuwait 2005); the Yugoslav 5 October Revolution (2000 Bulldozer Revolution); and the more recent Spring Revolutions (Arab 2010-; Turkey 2013-; Ukraine [Euromaiden] 2013-; Venezuela 2014-; and Bosnia and Herzegovina 2014). In many of these, particularly the Color Revolutions, NGOs played an important role in the advocacy of democracy. However, we would be misleading ourselves in denying that civil society “can be racist, exclusionary, backward and recalcitrant” (McAfee 2000: 84). Bosnia and Kosovo, being settings of deeply-entrenched conflicts, are still dealing with the divisiveness of xenophobia and chauvinism related to ethnic nationalism. In those cases, associational life may have little to do with civility, at least civility as it pertains to interethnic group interaction.

Harold Saunder’s distinction between “civil society” and “democratic civil society” is illuminating and gives us an ideal to work towards. Whereas the former is simply that complex network of associations and relationships that citizens generate to deal with the problems they face throughout life, the latter reflects a “qualitative” change in the sort of network that the person is a part of, i.e., “the ways citizens relate within … [groups] and how these groups relate to others—[through] deliberation, dialogue, collaboration rather than authoritarian or adversarial interactions” (2005: 58). The importance of the former over the latter cannot be understated for democracy. This has been put so nicely by David Cooper in his 2007 essay, “Is Civic Discourse Still Alive?” that it is worth repeating at length:

Simply put, civic discourse is that mode of collective democratic counsel. It is the way citizens think about, form, and articulate their relations with public issues. Civic discourse happens through speech acts that span all sorts of rhetorical forms and practices, from diatribe and polemic to argument, debate, deliberation, and, not the least as we shall see, ordinary face-to-face conversation and personal narrative. I like to think of civic discourse as the rhetorical framework of democracy. It has to be strong enough to support and preserve the durable footings of democratic dissent—assembly, free speech, petitions of grievance. Its joints need to be flexible enough to accommodate changing climates, new voices, and new modes of communication such as digital environments and global information networks. And yet the framework needs enough human scale and respect for vernacular to sustain democracy as local, intimate, and interpersonal (2014: 115).

Admittedly, the hypointellectual and the hyperintellectual each play a role within a democratic civil society, an environment rich in civil discourse, but their roles are not the same because of the presence or absence of partisanship. Returning to Cooper, we can see how those roles play out:
The public sphere—the marketplace of civic discourses in a democracy—is neither a boxing ring nor a place of perfect harmony or dependable consensus-building. Instead, public culture is pulled between these extremes, while language practices tend to obey the historical, political, and social forces that set public culture in motion. At any one moment in time it may seem as though civic discourse ebbs strongly—pulled by the tidal action, for example, of a nation’s recovery from the shared traumas of war, economic depression, natural disaster, and dislocation—or wanes precipitously, following the active fault lines of national divisions, ideological inertia, partisan gridlock, and exhausted social capital. [This is a]...view of civic discourse that oscillates between these extremes, one that both encourages consensus-building and deliberative action and tolerates conflict, argument, and sharp elbows (117-118).

Perhaps the roles are captured in the following way: the hypointellectual tends to “work against” the Other, whereas the hyperintellectual tends to “work with” the Other.

What we have here, then, is the propagation of a democratic culture that can help to ward off an overpowering state and constrain the more authoritarian elements within society. The groups that contribute to this culture often do so as “the vanguard of political reform and demands for governmental transparency” as noted by Benazir Bhutto in her book Reconciliation: Islam, Democracy, and the West (2008: 291). She goes on to write:

They are the internal election monitors. They stand up against violations of human rights. They work with international groups that promote democracy to guarantee a fair political process but not a guaranteed political outcome (291).

But to acknowledge that civil society is Janus-faced, as Saunders leads us to believe, is to recognize its fragility. Thinkers and doers of all kinds, including the ethnic nationalist variety, often become self-proclaimed intellectuals who proudly show their xenophobia and chauvinism in the hope of increasing their ranks and power within an increasingly fragmented society. Thus, they operate within civil society in ways that are antithetical to democratic culture. But no matter how precarious the situation, the ideal is for civil society to incorporate an increasingly democratic culture of dialogue, tolerance, moderation, and mutually beneficial resolution of conflicts. Clearly, the political public sphere can play a dominant role in promoting a democratic culture; moreover, I submit that the hyperintellectual can play a dominant role within this sphere.

Hyperintellectualism in Bosnian Democratization and Peace-Building

How might the hyperintellectual express his or her presence in developing a democratic culture within the political sphere of
civil society? The hyperintellectual might be useful in enhancing understanding between rivals which could lead to a reduction in the divisiveness between them. Remember that the hyperintellectual is a social critic, a political educator, a person of action, and a caring insider bundled in a non-partisan way. It is by being a social critic as expressed in an oppositionality to any single ideology, a political educator as shown by a commitment to motivate people through good counsel to become responsible citizens who can live and work together, a person of action expressed in an engagement that brings about concrete change in society, and a person who cares about the target society that the hyperintellectual can help to promote and sustain dialogue, understanding, tolerance, moderation, and mutually beneficial resolution of conflicts as the core elements of a democratic culture. By “showing how engagement is done,” the hyperintellectual helps to develop a democratic political culture.

But how might this engagement play out in civil society? What exactly is the hyperintellectual up against? For quite some time this engagement meant the hyperintellectual had to hone in on the relationship between the International Community and the ethnic nationalists (whether in or out of government). Given that the IC’s peace-building efforts were the mechanism through which progress could be anticipated, getting the IC and nationalists of all kinds to work together was essential for success. However, the IC’s administration of Bosnia is seen at times to be contrary to the interests of the various ethnic communities, with the potential of producing more and more divisiveness. But if the hyperintellectual can successfully argue for the moral legitimacy of these efforts, these efforts may be one less source of divisiveness. (This also applies to arguing against the moral legitimacy of those efforts in favor of some alternative. Whichever way, the key is to reach some sort of persuasive equilibrium that leads to increased welfare).

But this is not an easy task. After all, the war in Bosnia unleashed a toxic combination of ideology, national interests, power, and violence that led to the deaths of many tens of thousands of people and diminished welfare of those who survived. Given the nexus of the conflict, the antagonists themselves were unable to bring about an end to the conflict, causing the IC to eventually intervene, resulting in a “sign or else” agreement (the Dayton Peace Agreement) that included long-term international involvement that was non-negotiable. The IC was doing its best to influence the decision-making of the belligerents to accept an agreement that would turn Bosnia into an international protectorate for the foreseeable future. 25 It could be said that from the very

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25 This is not a case of libertarian paternalism as developed by Sunstein and Thaler (2014). Whereas in some loose way the influence brought to bear on the belligerents by the IC could be construed as its paternalistic aspect insofar as there is an attempt “to steer people’s choices in directions that will improve the choosers’ own welfare,” there is not much that smacks of being libertarian because it lacks the freedom to “opt out of specified arrangements if they choose to do so” (1161-1162). For more on libertarian paternalism, see Sunstein (2014) and Thaler and Sunstein (2003) and (2009).
beginning the IC’s efforts at improving the welfare of those affected through democratization and peace-building were framed in terms of the diminution of state sovereignty and autonomy (Chandler 2000: 34-35).

Indeed, the obstructionism inherent in ethnic nationalist politics was an impetus for drafting the DPA in a way that mandated the IC taking on the role of manager of the Bosnian state. To be more specific, the UN High Representatives, being the final authorities in Bosnia regarding the interpretation and implementation of Article V of Annex 10 (Agreement of Civilian Implementation of the Peace Settlement or DPA) to the General Framework for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and being the recipients of the Bonn Powers of 1997, for years resorted to using a heavy-handed approach in countering the negative effects this ideology had on the civil implementation of the DPA. Sometimes the intervention has been directed at the state level, such as when High Representative Wolfgang Petritsch removed Ante jelavić from his position in the three-member Presidency of BiH in March 2001 on the grounds that jelavić was seriously obstructing the implementation of the DPA. A similar situation occurred in March 2005 when High Representative Paddy Ashdown dismissed Dragan Čović from the Presidency of BiH.

At other times the intervention has been directed at the municipal level. The January 2004 decree made by Ashdown is a case in point. After years of eroding the civic and multi-ethnic character of the city of Mostar, evidenced by the existence of costly parallel municipal structures and services—over US$19 million annually (Alic 2004), and the unwillingness of members of the two ethnic-based ruling parties in Mostar, the Bosniac Party of Democratic Action (SDA) and the Croatian Democratic Union of BiH (HDZ BiH), to engage earnestly in municipal governance, Ashdown, in the exercise of the powers vested in the position of High Representative, presented the people of Mostar with the statute by which their city would be governed. Being an advocate of the multiethnic structure of Bosnia and recognizing that the unification of the city of Mostar was one of the preconditions for Bosnia to sign the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), a precursor to EU membership, Ashdown made the need to break the stalemate by imposing measures an imperative “even if...[those measures] are sometimes a little antidemocratic” (Ashdown 2004). Not only would the statute reflect the “unity theme” by creating a single, multiethnic administration, but it would provide a streamline electoral process that would at the same time attempt to take care of the needs of the

26 jelavić’s obstructionist behavior began with an illegal political demonstration on Election Day in November 2000 and a provocative speech in 28 February 2001 in Busovača, and it culminated on 3 March 2001 with a gathering in Mostar that was the occasion for an unconstitutional initiative meant to establish illegal parallel institutions.

constituent peoples and others. Instead of there being 194 elected officials, there would only be 35, and they would be elected through a process by which 3 would be sent from each of the 6 newly created electoral units and the remaining council members would be elected in a city-wide vote. In addition, there would be provisions for establishing minimum numbers of council members for each constituent people and the others, as well as setting a maximum number of council members for each of the constituent peoples at 15, making sure that “no constituent people can be dominated by another” (Ashdown 2004). This unyielding and uncompromising measure and those that preceded it were understood by many in the IC as justified because they were in keeping with the wide mandate of the DPA and its numerous annexes and extensions.

Now, it so happens that in June 2011 and January 2012, the BiH Constitutional Court ruled that the electoral system of the Mostar statute was both unconstitutional and discriminatory. 28 Apparently, the rulings by the Constitutional Court did not strike down the statute, but only the electoral process. Unfortunately for the people of Mostar, lawmakers in Bosnia’s House of Representatives failed to adopt changes to the electoral law for Mostar on 14 May 2014, which once again took Mostar out of the local election cycle in October 2014 (Jukic 2014).

In passing, however, it is worth mentioning that the High Representative and the OHR appear to have taken a slightly less hands-on approach to the political quagmire in Bosnia over the past few years. Although the Prime Minister of the Republika Srpska Milorad Dodik campaigned during the 2010 Presidential election on a platform of veiled secession and engineered the crisis over the referendum that would have challenged the legitimacy of the national judicial system and the powers vested in the HR, Dodik was never sacked. On the contrary, he is currently the President of the Republika Srpska. Yet until the High Representative’s mandate is ended and the conditions for closure of the OHR met, nationalists of all persuasions will continue to find at least some of the practices of these foreign overseers to be unacceptable, thus creating a project for the hyper-intellectual.

But there is more. Another project, as crucial as the first, concerns the demand by many Bosnians for accountability and dignity of their own government officials that started in earnest with the Babylution of 2013 but that kicked into high gear with the Spring 2014 protests and subsequent plena (McRobie 2014). 29 More and

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28 It was unconstitutional insofar as there was a tremendous discrepancy in the number of votes that were required to elect council members from each city unit and that the voters in the central zone were only able to elect council members from the citywide list of candidates. It was found to be discriminatory insofar as the voters from the central zone were not provided with equal voting rights (see Ashdown 2004).

29 The Great Flood of 2014 that struck portions of the Balkans could be the pretext for those in power to take back control from the plena and those who oppose the state and the IC. This refers not only to Naomi Klein’s (2007) “disaster capitalism,” but also to what I call “disaster governance.”
more Bosnians have grown tired of the
dominant ideology that has paralyzed
the country and that has led to direct
reconciliation. This includes many people who
were previously indifferent to activism. They are fed up with the incompetence,
greed, and corruption of their politicians
who are increasingly seen as caretakers of
a peace agreement run amok. Moreover,
the electorate is becoming wiser to the
willful blindness—the intentional place-
ment into a position of being unaware of
the facts in order to avoid civil or crim-
inal liability—of those who are in power,
whether they be government officials or
corporate managers. Facing loss of power
it is no wonder some of these individu-
als preach deafness to the human suf-
fering around them. The causative nexus
may not be completely understood, but it
is reasonable to think that much of this
growing unrest is not ideologically driven,
ethnic nationalist or otherwise. The battle
between ideologues is not a precursor for
the hyperintellectuals’ involvement; the
hyperintellectual can just as well foster
understanding between citizen groups,
government officials, and corporate lead-
ners so as to make any debate more mean-
ingful and efficacious.

But it is to the tension between the
democratization and peace-building ef-
forts of the IC and the nationalists that
we turn to as a point of entry for the hy-
perintellectual, one that is crafted within
a theoretical framework that is broadly
construed in terms of paternalism and
libertarianism. At the center of the debate
over the moral legitimacy of democra-
tization and peace-building in Bosnia are
the crucial but rarely posed questions of
whether such efforts are, on the one hand,
instances of self-protection or paternal-
ism, or, on the other hand, straightfor-
ward means to greater degrees of auton-
omy (not exactly libertarianism). If the
IC is to successfully guide the rebuilding
of Bosnia by gaining the cooperation of
the Bosnians themselves, they must do
more than give their policies and decrees
a purely legalistic justification vis-à-vis
the DPA. Those of the IC must examine
the moral justification of their work and
ask how their efforts are judged in terms
of protectionism, paternalism, and auton-
omy-enhancing.30 A sketch of how the
hyperintellectual might proceed would be
useful.

Unlike motorcycle helmets and retire-
ment programs or default rules and the
notion of voluntariness that are the stan-
dard fare in the debate over paternalism
in America (see Dworkin 1983; Sunstein
and Thaler 2003; Salvat 2008), the poli-
cies of the High Representative and the
OHR as juxtaposed to recalcitrant ethnic
nationalist segments of Bosnian soci-
ety are only adequately framed within a
broader context of self-protectionism, pa-
ternalism, and autonomy enhancement.
In order to meaningfully contribute with-
in this context, the hyperintellectual must
first define ‘self-protectionism’ and ‘pa-
ternalism’, and then decide which of the
IC’s measures fall under each. In search-
ning for a starting point, Gerald Dworkin’s
“Paternalism,” is an excellent choice. We

30 Autonomy is the capacity to be a self-leg-
islating agent who takes responsibility for his
or her actions.
get a sense of what self-protection means in the following passage by Mill that is much quoted by Dworkin:

The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others (Dworkin 1983: 19; Mill 1962: 135).

Mill ends this passage with a statement that is not quoted by Dworkin: “His own good, either physical or moral, is not sufficient warrant” (135). The sort of conduct that Mill has in mind is not purely self-regarding or personal; it is other-regarding. And given that it is important to protect the integrity of the individual so that he or she can enjoy being an autonomous agent, self-protection is sufficient to warrant intervention in the lives of others.

How does this conduct relate to Bosnia? Suppose nationalist elites were paralyzing municipal institutions of the city of Mostar through political feuding and genuine incompetence, thereby hampering the distribution of the much needed services of water, electricity, law enforcement, and trash collection to the city’s residents. If going without these goods and services meant that people were harmed, and if Ashdown’s 2004 decree were intended to prevent Bosnian nationalist elites from causing further harm, then there would be at least a prima facie warrant for such a decree. And if being harmed by doing without goods and services diminishes one’s autonomy, then the cessation of harm can only be autonomy-enhancing. It is a prima facie warrant, however, because a clear burden of proof must be placed on the authorities to demonstrate the exact nature of the harm being done to the residents of Mostar and how the High Representative’s measures will prevent further harm and enhance autonomy. The burden of proof is needed not only because any interference with people’s liberty of action in such dramatic ways needs to be justified, but also because it can reasonably be assumed that each measure taken by the IC is likely to be viewed as an attempt to undermine nationalist interests, in which case providing a justification would preempt nationalist rhetoric. What makes the hyperintellectual’s argument for the warrant, as well as its being a prima facie warrant, especially important is, in part, that it is non-partisan: it gives voice to both sides and presents the hyperintellectual as “having no dog in the fight.” And without a dog in the fight, the hyperintellectual acquires a certain degree of acceptance by both the nationalist and the representative of the International Community.

But might some of these same measures have a paternalistic dimension as well? Perhaps, but only after confusing paternalism for something else. Suppose we follow Dworkin’s definition of paternalism, which is “the interference with a person’s liberty of action justified by reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests, or val-
ues of the person being coerced” (1983: 20). If we focus on the rationale for implementing more coercive peace-building measures like restricting nationalist elites from political participation and eliminating parallel institutions, we can acknowledge that the reasons originally adduced to support these measures do in fact reflect “the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests, or values” of Bosnians. But these measures, as in the case of Mostar, are a tough response to actions that are harming residents of that city. So to say that the IC’s efforts are paternalistic suggests paternalism to be something it is not, i.e., wholly concerned with other-regarding conduct. As I read Dworkin, however, paternalism is concerned with self-regarding conduct or matters that are “exclusive” to the person. But the feuding and incompetence in Mostar is none other than other-regarding conduct. Consequently, the discussion need go no further: the sort of peace-building measures that we have in mind are all other-regarding and so fall outside paternalism. The most that can be given is a protectionist justification. Yet ending this discussion may be premature.

Although the IC may construe these more coercive peace-building measures as imposing restrictions on other-regarding conduct, thereby allowing the IC to protect people from certain kinds of harm, nationalists may still disagree with this view. In fact, ethnic nationalists of whatever kind may not only claim that no harm is being done to members of other groups, but may also claim that the conduct in which they are engaged is self-regarding insofar as it allows members of their own ethnic group to behave in ways that they deem important and that reflect their conception of who they are as individuals possessing a certain ethnic identity. Thus, some of those peace-building measures that are said to be protectionist are now construed by the nationalist as paternalistic and, therefore, unjustified.

Here, too, the hyperintellectual must place a heavy and clear burden of proof on nationalists and members of the IC to demonstrate the presence or absence of risk of harm, because the argument for paternalism turns on there being neither harm nor the likelihood of harm to others. If no harm is being done, then the conduct that is being addressed by interventionism must be other-regarding, thereby making the claim of paternalism groundless and eliminating any need for the IC to argue for justifiable paternalism.

It may seem that proving or disproving harm or the risk of harm is a relatively simple task. However, harm is understood in different ways. A young man, for example, who is a Bosnian Croat nationalist living in Mostar, may look at the parallel institutions and acknowledge that the feuding and incompetence have led to some “inconvenience” to the residents of west Mostar, yet still believe this a better arrangement and a step toward acquiring more autonomy and the eventual creation of a Croat state within Bosnia. Is this inconvenience the sort of harm that other-regarding conduct and protectionism require? Or is this arrangement a matter of self-regarding conduct that is for the person’s “own good” (or, now it seems, group-regarding conduct), and
The situation is obviously more complicated than this. Take, for example, that same Bosnian Croat nationalist living in west Mostar. Suppose he possesses a strong sense of solidarity with his ethnic community and believes that what is good for the Croats of Mostar is also good for him. He has been made aware of the evils of ethnic nationalism but continues to remain true to his beliefs by repeatedly voting for and giving consent to his nationalist leaders. Is this a case of not sufficiently understanding or correctly appreciating the dangers that may await the nationalist? If so, do we judge the young man’s voting behavior to be unreasonable though not irrational?31 And if the High Representative responds by saying that most reasonable people do not wish disruptions in their utilities and being victimized by violent assault, thus presuming that this individual did not wish to run those risks either, then what do the nationalist and High Representative have to talk about? (see Feinberg 2003). Not much, though the hyperintellectual can do much to further this conversation.

However, the hyperintellectual is also characterized as someone who is an insider, who cares about the society in question, a caring that is predicated on the possession of the moral virtues of courage, compassion, and a good eye. Of these, compassion is particularly interesting given its role in the inflationary model of morality, a model that can support democracy building by enlarging moral space through the utilization of empathy (and hospitality). Even though people tend to pride themselves on being tolerant of others, democratization may be better served in the long run through empathy and hospitality.32 In what follows, I shall discuss this model of morality so that the last connection can be made between the hyperintellectual and democratization.

31 See Salvat (2003: 12) for Feinberg’s distinction between reasonable and rational.

32 Martin Marty points out that “one of the problems with tolerance within pluralism is that those who tolerate often have the power or the will to remake “the other” into some manageable image. Hospitality permits—indeed, it insists on—regarding the other as being really different” (2005: 124). Surely, we want to move beyond mere tolerance. Whereas hospitality is a movement towards recognizing and welcoming me for who I am, tolerance suggests that those who occupy a privileged position get to decide whether to put up with me.
philosophy as a reasoned analysis of the nature of morality and all that it requires of us, then we find throughout Plato’s dialogues what amounts to the beginning of a very long debate over “how we ought to live.” It is reason rather than emotion that prevails in our deliberations. When it comes to searching for a “universal and objective” foundation of morality, it is again reason that is found to be the worthy candidate. Kant is the epitome of this reason-bound view of morality. He argued that it is not because we possess the capacity for feeling that we are moral agents, but because we have the capacity for reason. At the heart of morality is respect for others, which unfolds from the supreme moral principle: The Categorical Imperative. If we are to respect other persons, as stated in The Formula of the End of Itself, it is because we ought to “act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end” (Kant 1967: 91).

But should respect for others be our sole interest? What about concern for others, i.e., care shown towards the Other’s autonomy? As Arne Johan Vetlesen points out in his Perception, Empathy, and Judgment, Kant has no place for concern within morality because concern turns on our capacity for feeling (1994: 1). But perhaps Vetlesen is correct to question the opposition between respect and concern. Could someone have respect for others, i.e., take into account the integrity of those other persons—their inviolable right to decide what is in their best interests—and not “show any concern for the weal and woe of those others” (1994: 2)? Similarly, does it even make sense to talk of showing concern for someone while not also having respect for that person? Not at all, for autonomy and integrity seem to work together. Clearly, there is a place for concern in moral performance.

Of course, reason is important in morality, particularly when the very possibility of rational discourse concerning moral judgments is cast aside by those who have adopted a faith-driven morality. I believe the philosopher Daniel C. Dennett is correct when he writes that anybody who professes that a particular point of moral conviction is not discussable, not debatable, not negotiable, simply because it is the word of God, or because the Bible says so, or because “that is what all Muslims... believe, and I am a Muslim....” should be seen to be making it impossible for the rest of us to take their views seriously, excluding themselves from the moral conversation, inadvertently acknowledging that their own views are not conscientiously maintained and deserve no further hearing (2006: B8).

He goes on to explain:

Suppose you believe that stem-cell research is wrong because God has told you so. Even if you are right—that is, even if God does exist and has, personally, told you that stem-cell research is wrong—you cannot reasonably expect others who do not share your faith or experience to accept that as a reason. The fact that your faith is so strong
that you cannot do otherwise just shows...that you are disabled for moral persuasion....And if you reply that you can, but you won’t consider reasons for and against your conviction,... you avow your willful refusal to abide by the minimal conditions of rational discussion (2006: B8).

Therefore, there is something to the primacy traditionally given to reason. And it is understandable why many have taken the standard model to be an acceptable alternative to faith-driven morality, for we are not talking about matters of taste but moral concerns that require rational justification.

Even so, perhaps we need a more “holistic” account of morality—i.e., an inflationary model—that includes, but is not limited to, reason’s role in making moral judgments through the use of principles and norms, in order to more adequately capture the moral predicament of persons who are endowed with both emotional and intellectual faculties. Indeed, we must explain how we become “attentive” to such a predicament. Perception, Empathy, and Judgment is very helpful in this regard. Vetlesen “retrieves” the notion of moral perception and the importance of emotion, particularly empathy, for this perception which he cites as the first stage of moral performance.

Exploring moral performance in this way offers a more adequate account of morality, for we realize that the emotional faculty of empathy is our principal mode of access to the moral domain, which is showing concern and having respect for others. Moreover, in recognizing the importance of empathy for moral perception and thus for moral performance, Vetlesen’s inflationary model provides us with the theoretical basis needed to understand how the hyperintellectual can promote the formation of a democratic culture by expanding the moral space of ethnic nationalists.

The Inflationary Model, the Hyperintellectual, and Democratization in the Balkans

What, then, are the relevant aspects of the inflationary model for demonstrating the other way in which the hyperintellectual can contribute to democratization? The notion of moral performance is an overarching one. It includes, but is not limited to, the more often talked about concept of moral agency. Agency refers to the capacity to make moral judgments and be motivated to act in certain ways. In short, it offers an explanation of how moral considerations are action-guiding. But a moral theory that adequately attends to the scope of moral performance must include not only judgment and action, but also moral predicament. This is because a predicament invokes judgment.

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33 Even Nussbaum goes so far as to acknowledge that moral principles do not apply themselves to situations; we also require perceptions of the salient features of the situation in which we find ourselves (2012: 143).

and action. So regardless of whether two well-informed, rational individuals who use the same moral theory make similar moral judgments and act in similar ways, it is crucial that the two individuals first “attend” to the objects of moral judgments. How do we come in contact with the “stuff” of moral judgments? Vetlesen’s answer is simple:

Moral perception provides and shapes the setting for moral judgment and moral action. Moral judgment is concerned with the cognitive grasp, assessment, and weighing of the weal and woe, of the well-being, interests, and rights of all the parties affected by a situation...In passing judgment on how best to act considering the viewpoints of all concerned..., I will need norms and principles to guide me in my deliberations. But my cognitive-intellectual knowledge in this field... comes to naught and remains impotent if I am not sensitive to, if I do not “see”..., the situation at hand as a morally relevant one....The sequence of moral performance is set in motion by an act of moral perception. Moral perception takes place prior to moral judgment and provides the basis for its exercise (4-5).

What allows us to “see” the situation as a morally relevant one? Vetlesen writes:

We experience the objects of moral judgments through emotion.... Emotions anchor us to the particular moral circumstance, to the aspect of a situation that addresses us immediately, to the here and now. To “see” the circumstance and to see oneself as addressed by it, and thus to be susceptible to the way a situation affects the weal and woe of others, in short, to identify a situation as carrying moral significance in the first place—all of this is required in order to enter the domain of the moral, and none of it would come about without the basic emotional faculty of empathy (4).

In further characterizing empathy, Vetlesen adds the following:

It is by virtue of this faculty that I can put myself in the place of the other by way of a feeling-into and feeling-with. Empathy allows me to develop an appreciation of how the other experiences his or her situation; empathy facilitates the first reaching out toward and gaining access to the other’s experience, but empathy does not... mean that I myself come to feel what the other feels. I do not have to feel the other’s feeling in order to grasp, and thereupon be able to judge in light of, how the other experiences the situation he or she is in (8).

Given that moral perception is what “initiates” moral performance, a person’s inattentiveness or indifference—lack of empathy—to the moral circumstances of a situation, will have devastating results for passing judgments. Perhaps this is less of a problem for those who reside in situations of relative tranquility, for there will be frequent personal interactions that are “felt” to be positive. At some point the basic emotional faculty of empathy is triggered. But consider those situations
that are less than tranquil. Given the hatred and anger that often overwhelm the empathic response of those who espouse ethnic nationalism, nationalists may become “combative” and stricken with a “malevolent” form of inattentiveness. It is not simply a “lack” of empathy, but rather a set of contrary emotions that inhibit empathy. In the case of “benign” inattentiveness or indifference, the Other has little, if any, moral significance. In the case of combativeness, however, the situation is much worse, for it is likely that some harm will be done to the Other. The quantity and quality of felt interactions will be different. The possibility of respect and concern toward the Other at this point ceases; increasing the weal is not an option, but increasing the woe is, and this situation is contrary to empathy. In such a hostile situation, moral perception must be “jump-started” by the reinvigoration of empathy (or attentiveness), thereby allowing one to once again recognize the Other’s moral significance and well-being.

But what exactly is to be reinvigorated? Unlike gathering evidence and drawing inferences about someone else’s situation or placing oneself in a similar situation as another in order to experience as best as possible what it feels like to be in that other person’s predicament, empathy (or “participatory imagination”) “requires some type of distinction between self and other, and a type of imaginative displacement” (Nussbaum 2013: 146). Here again, not all imaginative displacements (forms of perspective taking) are the same; they are not interchangeable. Results of empirical psychological research have indicated that there are two distinct forms of perspective taking, imagine other and imagine self, each evoking different emotional effects as well as different motivations (Batson, Early, and Salvarani 1997). On the one hand, imagining how another feels (imagine other), especially if they are “vivid” imaginings, produces an increase in empathic emotions (like sympathy and compassion), reflecting an other-oriented emotional response along with an altruistic motivation. On the other hand, imagining one’s own feelings if one were in the situation of the other produces empathic emotions as well as personal distress, reflecting a self-oriented aversive emotional response along with egoistic motivation (Batson 1991, 2011). And so the work done by empathy as it pertains to moral perception and moral judgment is closely associated with empathetic emotions and not just the imaginings. It is because of these emotions that the connection between imagine other and moral perception and judgment is solidified. The best way to promote moral performance is through the imaginative displacement of focusing on another’s feelings rather than one’s own.

Interestingly enough, the role that these empathic emotions play, whether

35 Granted, the harm created by indifference is potentially greater than that caused by hatred, primarily because of its indiscriminateness (Vetlesen 1994: 252-253), but hatred has a certain directness to its harm that indifference does not possess.

they are directly the result of an imagining, goes well beyond placing us in a position to make a formal moral judgment. Long-winded moral judgments are important, but what is also of considerable importance is the work of empathic emotions in intimately connecting us with the predilections of others, which could trigger a pre-judgment act on our part to alleviate suffering and misery. Although moral judgments do a lot of work for us insofar as they are “normally multifaceted involving intrinsic motivation, belief, and emotion” (Campbell 2007: 348), empathetic emotions by themselves can quickly channel us to act in certain ways.

Some would have us believe that empathy and its associated emotions are not hard to come by, that we continuously find ourselves in situations that allow us to learn how to broaden our attention to include others, to combat the constant temptation of narcissism. Vetlesen is one of those who believes that empathy (attentiveness) can be learned. Supposedly, I can learn to see that a situation addresses me in a certain way, and that positions me to take notice of the Other’s moral circumstance, to have empathetic emotions, and to have concern for the Other (though Bateson and Nussbaum contend that imagine other is the sort of empathy that needs to be experienced, and, no doubt, learned). This takes place in everyday life, in what Tom Kitwood calls:

our countless small and unreflective actions towards each other, and the

patterns of living and relating which every human being gradually creates. It is here that we are systematically rejected or discounted, accepted or rejected, enhanced or diminished in our personal being (1990: 149).

It is in everyday life that we create moral space, space within which we are a part of a web of “person-enhancing” relationships characterized by dignity and respect. However, there seems to be a hollowness to this proposal. Given that everyday life is full of both acceptance and rejection, enhancement and diminishment, how is empathy to be learned? And how is it to be learned in the more stressful conditions of combativeness, such as those fostered by ethnic nationalists? If people are continually rejected and have their personal being diminished, it is not likely that they will learn the attentiveness needed to feel empathy. Combativeness may prevail with its emotions of anger, envy, shame, and fear, thereby preventing a “healthy” emotional response and, thus, the debacle of moral performance.

Again, this is especially true of societies in which ethnic nationalism is a principal component of peoples’ identity and a cause of much conflict. In fact, the moral space in these situations could, at best, be “compressed,” and, at worst, “closed.”

It should be no surprise that compressed—

37 Nussbaum makes the problem of narcissism an important one in her work. See Nussbaum (2012: 20-58; 2013: 161-198).
sion and closure are possibilities given the Othering that is invoked by the ontological-psychological-ethical triad of an ideology like ethnic nationalism. Ethnicity is the ontological category whose relevance is exaggerated, making it dominate in so many situations and contexts; persons are pigeonholed and labeled according to an ethnic identity. Identifying and labeling people is important for the ethnic nationalist. Of course, people in every society choose labels that parcel out group identities to individuals around them, thereby causing a certain degree of divisiveness and disharmony within their communities. But some identities are a bit more troublesome than others. This is especially true when identities like ethnicity and religion become internalized within competing ideologies that have been linked to past violence. In this regard, ethnic nationalism begins to rear its ugly head.

But this ontology does not sit idle, disconnected from the rest of the person’s lived experience. It may be behind the “Gaze turned Glare” that a young Bosniac woman experiences as she walks past a group of Serb men drinking coffee at Kafe Bar Davidoff in Srebrenica, a glare which reflects a xenophobic psychology, a fear or suspicion of the ethnic Other. Granted, fear can be useful in allowing us to survive dangerous situations (including the fear that is evoked when coming face-to-face with signs like “Mines!” or “Falling Rocks”). Some fears are natural and self-focusing, while others are more or less taught and are Other-directed, such as those associated with the aforementioned signs, and others that are associated with groups, including ethnic groups. Fear and suspicion can displace any concern or sympathy for the ethnic Other. Mistrust can be overwhelming. It short-circuits, at least temporarily, how we see another person as being fully equal in human dignity and worth, and thus deserving of our respect. It denies any real opportunity for a “person-enhancing” relationship. Even though the respected Other possesses worth that is not contingent on our own valuation, the fear that displaces is ours regardless of its being warranted or not. The compression or closure of moral space, space within which dignity is recognized and respect given, has begun.

Apart from the ontology and psychology of ethnic nationalism, there is its morality, which is also part of the compression/closure of moral space. In this case, a chauvinistic morality takes one’s own ethnic group to be morally superior to the other groups, which once again contrib-
utes to the “hollowing out” of the Other’s human dignity and, thus, respect that he or she should be given. Some individuals may be morally superior to others in terms of their deeds and intentions, but that is a far cry from this moral extensionism that characterizes ethnic nationalism. Ethnic nationalists fashion history, from actual events and lived history to remembered history and the narrative of a people, by embedding and protecting one’s own ethnic group with the moral high ground and by projecting onto one’s ethnic competitors qua enemies the everlasting negativity of chosen traumas. The web of history provides identity with some of its most enduring elements, giving enemies varying degrees of realism, is generically noted by the Canadian philosopher Trudy Govier:

They are real, because they really do exist in the objective world of events. Yet at the same time, these enemies are constructed and imaginary, because they are in so many respects the projections of interpretations and fantasies (2002: 151).

This same idea is set so powerfully, yet so cynically within the Balkan context by Michael Ignatieff when he writes that truth is related to identity. What you believe to be true depends, in some measure, on who you believe yourself to be. And who you believe yourself to be is mostly defined in terms of who you are not. To be a Serb is first and foremost not to be a Croat or a Muslim. If a Serb is someone who believes Croats have a historical tendency towards fascism and a Croat is someone who believes Serbs have a penchant for genocide, then to discard these myths is to give up a defining element of their own identities (1996: 114).

I say cynically because Ignatieff apparently believes there is “less to truth than meets the eye,” that one’s ethnic nationalist identity “in some measure” trumps what it takes to be a good epistemic agent. This simplistic thinking comes perilously close to providing an epistemological foundation for the ancient hatreds thesis that was prevalent in some circles during the war in Bosnia. It would imply that the ethnic nationalist is stuck in the groove of fanatical reasoning, thus eliminating the nationalist from being an agent for positive social change. Although Bosnia today is not a hotbed of progressivism, it is not what it was in 1995. For that matter, it is not what it was in 2012. Numbers of ordinary citizens have joined local plena in order to participate in meaningful political discourse. Such citizen engagement is surely having some moderating influence on Bosnian identity politics. Yet xenophobic psychology and chauvinistic morality prevails in Bosnia. And the results are not surprising. When group identities are formed to secure communities from their competitors, the formation of this communal cohesiveness often creates, for example, disdain for the ethnicity and religion of the Other. It is this disdain that is exhibited in xenophobic psychology and chauvinistic morality.

But the question remains: how do we expand or open moral space that will even-
tually allow for moral perception or for seeing the morally relevant circumstances of peoples’ situations? In an earlier work, I emphasized that practical measures such as intercultural education, storytelling, and moral imagination have been used to expand the moral circle (or moral space), thereby “allowing them [people of different cultures] to experience fellow-feeling (or empathy) with the other, and to act in a more compassionate and civically responsible way toward them” (Conces 2005: 166). Indeed, NGOs such as the network of Nansen Dialogue Centers have been successful at bringing together different peoples in order to deconstruct stereotypes and to enhance understanding between them. Their investment in civil society building can generally be construed in terms of offering safe space for the re-establishment of interpersonal relationships. Although these practical measures remain useful as devices to rekindle empathy, it now seems clear that their use and viability are predicated on people’s willingness to interact in close proximity, whether this is completely self-induced or partly brought about—through incentives and/or coercion—by the government, the International Community, or a NGO.

**Close Proximity**

However, before a person can exhibit a willingness to interact with the Other in close proximity, which ideally would include a face-to-face encounter, he or she must be able to do so. Of course, one’s ability may be hampered due to a bodily limitation (e.g., being a paraplegic), a psychological limitation (e.g., being an agoraphobic), or a social limitation (e.g., being threatened by members of one’s own group). However, there are other constraints, some of which deal with the physicality of places, that is to say, localities that have acquired meaning and value, such as the urban centers within which people live, work, and visit (Tuan 1977). The constraints that come to mind are the result of urban design/architecture and the placement of certain kinds of evocative objects.

**Urban Design and Architecture**

Urban design and architecture does not hold sway in every city and to the same degree. While some cities are the result of years of haphazard construction, others have at least some elements of planning and purpose no matter how misbegotten. In *Political Emotions*, Martha Nussbaum provides insightful treatments of these topics, noting that cities and buildings are more than just masses of steel and concrete; they have much to do with how people live their lives, whether they are “inside” or “outside” the cities and its buildings. Nussbaum writes in *Political Emotions*:

"Cities bring people together from different ethnic, racial, economic, and religious backgrounds. Entrenched suspicions often divide them, and these suspicions can be either diminished or augmented by the layout of urban space. Urban architecture creates ways..."
of living, sometimes fostering friendship, sometimes reinforcing fear. There are always grounds for fear in cities: crime, the volatility of employment, the diversity of groups and languages. But architecture can do a great deal to exacerbate fear into open hostility or to assuage it, encouraging problem solving in a spirit of fellowship (328).

Her treatment of New Delhi, India and the Hyde Park neighborhood in which the University of Chicago resides go far in illustrating her points, precisely the sort of features that cities should not have if they are to be lenses for building humane relationships and communities.

New Delhi (not the old Delhi) is the sort of city ill-suited for human habitation. As Nussbaum writes: “New Delhi seems like a place that is all about plan and not at all about people, a place where people, apart from the very affluent, have a hard time having a daily life. No place to walk to the market, to chat, to run into people of all trades, castes, and classes [my italics]” (329). Indeed, thanks to the British, a thriving interactive Hindu and Muslim urban community became fear ridden and fractured, the antithesis of fellowship that has yet to be reversed.

Nussbaum’s rendering of the University of Chicago in Hyde Park ends on a much more positive note. The founders of the university might have started with a socially innocuous architectural plan to create “an inward-looking scholarly community” (333), separated from its surround environs in both mind and body, but that plan eventually exposed the same fear and fracture along race and class lines, epitomized by the Gothic style buildings with their courtyards and the grassy Midway Plaisance separating what was once the boundary between the university and the majority African American Woodlawn neighborhood to the south. The university’s isolation was furthered by the maze of one-way streets and dead ends and occasional fence, some of which “stood as a symbol of hostility and an inward-looking mentality—not malevolent, as were the British in Delhi, but disdainful toward the neighborhoods in a culpably obtuse manner” (335).

As far as this part of Chicago is concerned, a remarkable turnaround has occurred over the past twenty years. The university administration now thinks of the university “as a partner of the neighborhoods, pursuing interaction and associated living, not to mention the mutual advantage of safety” (336). Indications of this shift include its operation of charter schools in Hyde Park, new construction of university facilities in other parts of Hyde Park and in Woodlawn (including an arts center) as part of a revival of that neighborhood, university police patrols in Woodlawn, and the revamping of the Midway as a safe point of interaction between the different communities. Although there remains much work to do, there has been significant progress towards openness and inclusivity, cooperation and partnership, and fellowship. Such changes are the result of civic design, the design of cities and towns with the goal of creating persons who are more inclined to work towards civic improvement. These efforts have decidedly ad-
dressed the proximity issue and improved the chances for meaningful interaction between Others.

**Enclaves and Evocative Objects**

Perhaps the starkest examples of localities in which members of different groups are not in close proximity, thereby making it exceedingly difficult to interact with one another even if there were a desire to do so, are the ethnic enclaves found in the Balkans. I have written elsewhere about these enclaves and the role that evocative objects play in establishing and maintaining (as well as reducing and eliminating) these monoethnic communities, but let me iterate a few key points set within the context of Bosnia and Kosovo (Conces 2013abcd).

Multiethnic societies are those that not only exhibit pluralism of ethnic peoples, but those peoples are in a dialogical (or multilogical) relationship. There is no such thing as a heterogeneous non-interactive multiethnic society. Interaction and integration are important aspects of the multiethnic society. Those societies that possess pluralism, although short on interaction and integration, are more aptly referred to as being plural monoethnic composed of ethnic enclaves.

It is within these areas of high concentrations of more or less monoethnic communities that we find displays of evocative objects that are infused with meaning, thereby offering understanding and stirring emotions within persons, prompting them to act in fairly predictable and well-defined ways. These objects that are tied to particular ethnic nationalist ideas and passions, when placed in the home, are fairly innocuous. It is unlikely that they will offend or provoke outrage in onlookers, since the onlookers are either their owners or like-minded family and friends who have accepted an invitation to enter the home. They know full well what to expect. It is when these objects pass into public space, viewed by more and more people that problems begin to arise. The space into which they enter becomes increasingly more public as the objects move farther from the interior of one’s home: from being hung from a wall in one’s bedroom to being draped over a window shutter, and then beyond to the car that is plastered with decals and driven around town, to the façade of government buildings, to city squares, to billboards on hilltops. It is as a result of this outward projection that these objects form parts of cityscapes; cognitively, emotionally, and conatively informing people in different ways, acceptably for some and unacceptably for others.

For instance, members of a dominant ethnic group may see a particular array of objects as infused with meaning that harkens back to an ethnic-paramilitary group that was instrumental in the creation of a new state that is largely ruled by the dominant ethnic group itself, thus empowering those objects to stir pride in members of that same ethnic community. However, the ethnic group that had the territory wrestled from them and that are now just another minority may gaze at these same objects and infuse them with meaning of a past defeat with all its atrocities, stirring
in them seething hatred and desire for retribution. Clearly, these evocative objects serve as boundary markers, as clear indicators of domains of ethnic dwelling. Members of the various ethnic groups know full well where they are. Ethnic enclaves exhibit what is called an ethnic manifold, the defining feature of which is that any public position within the enclave would look and feel like a place of a particular ethnic community. This is because the evocative objects found in that enclave would be of one “ethnic” kind and would inform members of that particular ethnicity in ways unique to them.

These objects are much more, however. They are instrumental in creating and sustaining the enclaves themselves. They do this because evocative objects are both centripetal and centrifugal in their affect. Take the example above. On the one hand, the objects of the dominant group in that place encourage others of that group to come together. These objects are centripetal for them; they make members of the dominant group feel welcomed in that place and help to build cohesion of that ethnic group. On the other hand, these same objects are centrifugal for members of the once powerful ethnic minority. These objects discourage them from being in that place, from interacting and establishing new relationships with the new dominant group. A particular message is sent to the minority: “You are not welcome! You are not one of us!”. Of course, the landscape would be very different in a place dominated by a minority-majority population because the centripetal and centrifugal outcomes would be reversed.

More insidious for both parties, however, is that by not having set foot in a place that place becomes a “pure idea” for them, a place that someone else has told them about. And so it is an “idea” that can be easily manipulated by each other’s local leaders, including politicians, members of the Fourth Estate, educators, and hypointellectuals. These persons of influence can exploit ignorance, uncertainty, and fear to promote the xenophobia and chauvinism of their respective ethnic nationalisms. Ethnicity or blood trump the fact that they share the same geography and, more importantly, that they are citizens of the same country.

Such outcomes become more significant when we realize that these evocative objects function not only to claim public space and make a place home, but they also make group identity more visible, particularly ethnic national identity, which in turn claims political power, control, and agency. Where individuals have made this group identity their dominant public identity, the perceived need for boundaries and control, both materially and symbolically, becomes great. Moreover, when the situation is one in which a once strong ethnic minority and a weak ethnic majority have traded places of power and governance, objects that are ethnically nationalized become just another means by which the political struggle remains alive. And it remains alive especially for those leaders who want to take advantage of a “captive audience” to solidify their political power and to increase divisiveness and uncertainty among their community.
The Case of Bosnia and Kosovo

Before we begin to connect enclave living and evocative objects/architecture with democracy building and the extent to which the hyperintellectual can even make a difference, we need to be clear about what sorts of objects and architecture are at work in the Balkans, beginning with Bosnia and ending with Kosovo.

Although it all depends on where you are in Bosnia, one is usually not very far from objects and architecture that bear the mark of ethnic nationalism. Perhaps flags are one of the more common objects that invoke both positive and negative feelings in some of its citizens and visitors. Whether it is a time of celebration or a time of protest, flags are often used to make a statement and to create a boundary. On the night of July 21, 2008, the night that Radovan Karadžić, former President of Republika Srpska, was arrested in Belgrade, hundreds of people in cars and on foot converged at the Eternal Flame (Vječna vatra), located at the intersection of Marshall Tito Street and Ferhadija, the main pedestrian street in Sarajevo. It was here that some Bosniacs waved the flags of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-98), the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-95), and Turkey. Photos taken of the early 2014 protests that turned violent in Tuzla and that spread to other cities in Bosnia also show the use of flags, including the flag of the Republic of Bosnia. More troublesome uses of flags can be found in the “divided” city of Mostar, where Croat nationalists regularly display the flag of Croatia, as well as the Vatican flag.

Of course, flags are not the only objects that invoke nationalist sentiments. For example, there is the Mostar Derby, the football match between Mostar’s intercity teams—FK Velež Mostar and HŠK Zrinjski Mostar—that is usually populated with fascist salutes, Swastikas, and Ustashi symbols. Fascist graffiti is also found throughout the city. It is quite common to find a U with a cross in it, the sign of the Ustashi. Monuments are often targeted by these graffiti “artists,” including the Monument to the Victims of Fascist Terror on which was painted various slogans (such as “Smrt Turcima” (“Death to the Turks”)). Clearly, the monument itself has become a battleground for nationalists.\(^4^1\) Of course, evocative objects come in all sizes, some being quite large. The 33m tall cross that was erected on Hum Hill high above Mostar, visible from both Muslim and Christian quarters is a case in point. Then again an object can be physically altered in ways that make the re-appropriation by one group against another more indelible. Such an alteration and re-appropriation

\(^4^1\) Bosnia’s monuments have this in common with the monuments surrounding the Spanish Holocaust. It is almost as if modern Bosnia and modern Spain are in competition with each other to show how their own battle over memory has been made indelible. Yet Bosnia has nothing that is comparable to Valle de los Caídos (The Valley of the Fallen), a place where people go to pay homage to their heroes, including Franco, whose crypt is located in the valley. See Treglown (2014) and Preston (2012).
The Hyperintellectual in the Balkans: Recomposed

took place in January 2014 in the city of Visegrad, the site of one of the worst war atrocities perpetrated by Serb paramilitaries on the Bosniac people during the conflict. In this case, Bosnian Serb authorities removed the word ‘genocide’ from a memorial plaque in the Straziste Muslim cemetery. With a grinder in hand, a worker, backed by a cadre of police officers, removed each letter, one by one, from the stone face of the memorial. (Not surprisingly, family members of the victims re-appropriated the memorial by using red lipstick and re-writing the word ‘genocide’ on its stone face). Other examples include the road signs that have the Cyrillic text blacked out.

Kosovo is no different from Bosnia in this regard. Indeed, there is a preponderance of public objects in Kosovo’s cities that carry different nationalist ideas and passions. Take, for example, the capital city of Prishtina. It becomes apparent after an hour long car ride through the city centre (‘qendra’) and the districts of Velania, Ulpiana, and Dardania that the flag most displayed by its Albanian residents is the double-headed eagle of its southern neighbor Albania. And whenever there is a perceived challenge to Kosovo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, especially when Serbia is involved, you can be sure that the Albanian flag will be in mass, as was the case during the June 2013 protest after Kosovo’s parliament approved an EU-brokered agreement on normalizing relations with neighboring Serbia. Of course, segments of the population can rally to give its support as well, even with the blue Kosovo flag in hand. This was the case during the same month when residents of Prizren gathered to support Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Among the flags of Turkey, Albania, and Bosnia was the flag of Kosovo, with its six white stars symbolizing its major ethnic groups.

This preponderance is confirmed when buildings in the capital are examined. Take, for example, the Sports Complex in the central part of the city. The east end of the building faces the Newborn monument, which marks the Declaration of Independence of Kosovo. On the same end are an Albanian flag and a large photo of Adem Jashari, an architect of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), who was killed in 1998. The photo shows Jashari dressed in full combat regalia. The international airport southwest of the capital is named in his honor, as well. But the use of the Albanian flag to claim public space is also found within government buildings, such as in the office of the Ministry of Diaspora.

The Albanians in Kosovo are not the only ones displaying evocative objects that anchor their particular nationalist narratives. Granted, there are not many objects of Serbian nationalism in Prishtina itself (the unfinished Christ the Savior Cathedral at the university is the most obvious), but crossing the Mitrovica Bridge over the River Ibar brings one face-to-face with an array of objects that serve the Serb nationalist cause in their enclave of north Kosovska Mitrovica. Both state and civil flags of Serbia are commonly displayed. They can be seen hanging from light poles and university buildings, as
well as on a hilltop billboard. And it is not uncommon to find a photo of someone like Slobodan Milošević displayed in the business district. In addition, the Serbian dinar is used as currency and the music of the Serbian singer Ceca, known for her turbo folk, a blend of nationalist folk and techno music, can often be heard emanating from homes and cafes. The atmosphere is one of being in Serbia and not Kosovo.

Whether it be a flag like Albania's double-headed eagle or Serbia's tricolour, or a photo like that of Jashari atop a Sports Complex or a calendar photo of Milošević hanging on a bakery wall, these objects are clear indicators of domains of ethnic dwelling. They reflect the boundaries that describe the fragmented nature of Kosovo society.

Democracy and Deliberative Democracy

It must not be forgotten, however, that this newly formed state was forged from oppression and violence, in part between peoples of different ethnic groups. It is one thing to have democratic legitimacy based on the aggregation of preferences that occurs in voting, it is an entirely different matter to have that same legitimacy be the result of authentic deliberation. Perhaps the latter is especially important for Kosovo, a country fragmented into ethnic enclaves and whose Albanian electorate continues to create an inequity in political power. This asymmetrical power structure raises some doubt to the legitimacy of the democracy itself. This doubt is furthered by the presence of enclaves because enclaves are not only crucibles within which ethnic identities become dominant for individuals, but they are also breeding grounds for competing ethnic nationalist ideologies.

The ontological-psychological-ethical triad of an ideology like ethnic nationalism is destructive to a stable and harmonious peace and a well-functioning democracy. The overbearing ethnic categories and the accompanying xenophobia and chauvinism are the culprits. Given that peace, harmony, and democracy are predicated on a continuing exchange of ideas, the fact that enclaves push different ethnic peoples farther and farther apart leads to a short-circuiting of this exchange and produces increasing amounts of uncertainty and mistrust. Enclaves are even more troublesome, since empathy and associated emotions (e.g., compassion and sympathy) allow a deep appreciation of how the Others experience their lives. If the Other is out of sight and out of mind, then it will be difficult to empathize with that person who you already dislike.

But to bring about a stable and harmonious peace, and something resembling a deliberative democracy, requires that ideas are more than just exchanged. They are part of the process of reconciliation, the development of a mutual, conciliatory accommodation between “formerly” antagonistic groups. Given that reconciliation requires interpersonal forgiveness, which entails the recognition of a moral judgment followed by a letting go instead of seeking revenge, reasoning and the commonplace self-restraints on reasoning be-
come crucial. And not, to be sure, the sort of weak reasoning (and lack of self-restraints) of the fanatic, which leads to the fanatic’s self-righteousness, intolerance, extreme certainty, credulity, and zealousness.

For a democratic decision to acquire a certain degree of legitimacy, it must be the result of authentic deliberation. Such deliberation produces less partisanship, more sympathy with the plight of others, and increases commitment and consensus building. It does so by placing more value on evidence-based reasoning, agreeing that reasons need to be public and understandable, and being open to the possibility of changing one’s mind. These are the hallmarks of non-fanatical reasoning.

**Deliberative Democracy and Civic Design in Kosovo**

Unfortunately, little of this will occur in Kosovo unless there is reason-giving and emotionally situated dialogue that cuts across enclaves. In a sense, that would amount to the core activity of deliberative democracy running rampant. An effective way for this to take place is through people having face-to-face contact with others so that their worlds collide. So the more a society is composed of discrete ethnic groups, some of which have a long history of antagonism with one another, the more there is a need for integration. It is through integration and the demise of ethnic enclaves that Kosovo will become a multiethnic society.

A multiethnic Kosovo, however, cannot simply be wished into existence. And enclaves will not suddenly disappear because of the deal that was struck between Kosovo and Serbia in April 2013. A multiethnic society will unfold through the creation of a collaborative environment, one that is in large measure inclusive, integrated and interactive, peaceful, and respectful of difference rather than simply tolerant of it. How is this to be done?

It is in part accomplished through civic design, the design of cities and towns with the goal of creating persons who are more inclined to work towards civic improvement. In this case it includes a reduction or elimination of public evocative objects that are likely to be divisive along ethnic lines. Part of this divisiveness is created through the memories that are reawakened from the sight of these objects. The Albanian flags displayed on buildings and from cars throughout Prishtina and Serbian flags found on hilltops and light poles in north Kosovska Mitrovica are such objects. Dealing with them would go some way to making these places more hospitable to members of locally non-dominant ethnic groups. Indirectly, it would be a way to tinker with people’s memories and narratives. The hope is that

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42 I have written elsewhere that a legal approach that relies on drafting laws to deal with evocative objects that are overly provocative might be both unrealistic and unacceptable in Kosovo. A better approach would be to “promote reason-giving and emotionally situated (read empathetic) dialogue to create the self-imposition of standards that would ensure those who display such objects in order to create ethnic enclaves. Surely, that would be legal and should be acceptable to most” (Conces 2013d: 13).
Hospitality and the Hyperintellectual

So I return to the question, how is this participatory attitude (or attentiveness) to be “triggered” so that intercultural education, storytelling, and moral imagination can stir up empathic responses in people who are able to be in close proximity if they so desire? Or, how is attentiveness to be triggered so that the programs undertaken by the Nansen Dialogue Centres stir up the empathic responses of its participants? The American theologian Martin Marty, in reference to “collisions of faiths,” provides us with a clue when he writes that the first address to collisions between “strangers” should be “a call that at least one party begin to effect change by risking [my italics] hospitality toward the other” (2005: 1). It amounts to receiving the Other, someone who may be an acquaintance or a friend. However, in the most challenging situations, it means receiving a stranger, one who may be disliked or even hated. This occurs to some degree when the Nansen Dialogue Centres invite persons to participate in their programs, but more so when those same individuals apply what they have learned in their own communities. It is when they stray from the protective workshop and offer hospitality to others that they face the difficult challenge of re-establishing relationships with their neighbors.

Whether it is friend or foe, there is always difference that erupts as Others who come face-to-face, not as if there were one person looking “into” a mirror and seeing himself or herself, but rather as two persons looking at each other through a glass window pane. No matter how “ hospitable” the host becomes (no matter how dialogical they become), there will always be a space of Others (since dialogue presupposes difference or nonidentity [do not think of the more expansive ‘différance’ of the philosopher Jacques Derrida 1973]).

Hospitality begins with a perceived “need” to effect change in the world, not any sort of change, but positive change. It could be something as personal as a void which needs filling or a relationship that requires attending. But the perceived need may also be the precarious situation of the Other, some sort of crisis that must be addressed—one need within another. No matter the number of needs, “hospitality is expressed in terms of the needs of the host, not in terms of the duty to the visitor, stranger or arrivant” (Nursoo 2007). If there were no perceived need, there would be no welcome by a host; and if there were no welcome by a host, there would be no expression of hospitality.

In the welcoming of hospitality, there is an invitation “delivered” to the Other, thus making it conditional hospitality rather than unconditional or absolute hos-
The Hyperintellectual in the Balkans: Recomposed

Global Outlook, A Journal of Global Affairs and Comparative International Development

pitality (see Derrida 2000a, 2000b, 2005). It could be a verbal utterance of “Welcome,” a silent nod or hand gesture, a note, the opening of a door, or any combination thereof. Unlike Derrida, however, I do not see this sort of hospitality that is made conditional by an invitation, to involve, in any typical situation, rights, exchanges, contracts, or violence. For Derrida, conditional hospitality is composed of all this and is thus limited, whereas the law of hospitality is absolute. He writes: “This principle demands, it even creates the desire for, a welcome without reserve and without calculation, an exposure without a limit to whoever arrives [l’arrivant]” (2005: 6). And yet Derrida himself recognizes in hospitality part of what I find to be important in how persons live their lives:

Yet a cultural or linguistic community, a family, a nation [I would add ‘person’], cannot suspend, at the least, even betray this principle of absolute hospitality: to protect a ‘home’, without doubt, by guaranteeing property and what is ‘proper’ to itself against the unlimited arrival of the other; but also to attempt to render the welcome effective, determined, concrete, to put it into practice [le mettre en oeuvre] (2005: 6).

The doors to my flat and office are locked. Those places are not available to the Other without an invitation to enter. It is up to me. Although I open up my home or office to the Other, it remains mine unless I decide otherwise. And there are certain expectations by both parties, expectations that might not be met. For example, I expect not to be murdered by the one I welcome; I suspect that the person who enters my home or office expects the same. But it is the nature of expectations to be open to the possibility of denial, of the expectation not being met. Hence, the invitation and entry are by their very nature “risky.” Welcoming the Other includes a “risk,” which means that the host, as well as the “invited” one, who must decide whether to take a risk by accepting the hospitality, could incur some cost even if the cost were simply that the interaction does not enhance or open the moral space between the two.

Could hospitality with its invitation and risk taking also be a part of the life of the hyperintellectual? Yes, if we take the virtue of courage to be a form of risk taking, and a risk taking that is prior to the ability to continue criticism when one’s fellow citizens are silent or complicit. It is a risk of extending an invitation to the Other to engage in the cooperative venture of hospitality. By not taking sides and being a good epistemic agent, the hyperintellectual is behaving courageously and taking a risk of extending an invitation to everyone as Other. It is through defending and criticizing positions of all parties at some point that the hyperintellectual offers the gesture of hospitality. It is risking hospitality in its broadest, in its most non-ideological sense, that the hyperintellectual further contributes to democracy building. This could be the hyperintellectual’s most important contribution. Perhaps hospitality rather than oppositionality is what the hyperintellectu-
tual strives for on the road to democrati-
ization. The outcome is uncertain, but if successful, showing hospitality

inevitably involves us in a sympathetic passing over into the other’s life and stories and a coming back into our own life and stories enriched with new insight. To see life through a story which requires us to welcome the stranger is to be forced to recognize the dignity of the stranger who does not share our story (Fasching 1994: 9).

Clearly, taking such a risk means that we are forced to attend to the Other and to be addressed by the moral circumstance, thereby provoking concern and respect for the Other. Unfortunately, there is no easy solution to preventing ethnic nationalism from constraining moral space through demonizing the Other and leading people to be inordinately combat- ive. As I previously suggested, however, empathy appears to be sometimes overwhelmed by combativeness in members of different ethno-religious groups, such that the resulting animosities are to a de-
gree taken to be a part of their psyches. But empathy need not be lost, misplaced, or overwhelmed for long; it can be rekindled, though it may take great effort on the part of many. It is at this juncture that hospitality becomes important, for one must decide to take a “risk” and extend hospitality to the Other. The absence of such a gesture may well result in the mor-
al space remaining compressed or closed. In a word, hospitality is a portal through which we all can enter shared moral space, though there is no guarantee that we will all make the trip. But it is when hospital-
ity takes the form of intercultural educa-
tion, storytelling, and moral imagination that real progress is likely; and there is no reason why the hyperintellectual cannot become a participant in this process. This is especially true of the hyperintellectual who is perhaps more like a moral theo-
rists, someone who projects new concep-

While I agree that the hyperintellec-
tual can, in a very practical sense, help others to engage, it is expected that some individuals may still not be inclined to be hospitable, in which case they must be “prompted” to do so. This is where the IC must be willing to accept the paradox of democracy formation as a condition of its work in religiously and ethnically frag-
mented societies. If ethno-religious com-
munities are unwilling to engage with one another, then the IC must dictat
institutions and policies that require members of these communities to work and live together, allowing them greater opportuni-
ties to engage in hospitality so as to move closer to creating their own democ-
racy. Ultimately, “risk taking” is what will bring about a democratic culture in the Balkans. “Playing it safe” will only perpet-
uate the undemocratic status quo. Change will come about when enough people rec-
ognize, both theoretically and practical-
ly, that hospitality is essential for moral agency, and that concern and respect for one’s fellow human beings, as well as for the creation of a democratic culture are required. Once again, the hyperintellec-
tual can be useful, though in this case it
would be in terms of offering theoretical (philosophical) support for the moral legitimacy of the IC’s peace-building efforts. By clarifying these efforts as instances of self-protectionism and autonomy-enhancing, the hyperintellectual can make strides in reducing the divisiveness between parties who are at odds with one another.

However, to say that the hyperintellectual can “make strides” by employing a philosophical argument, often made impenetrable by formal logic and technical language, so as to demonstrate that the peace-building efforts would be more justice-, equality-, or liberty-producing than its contenders, is not to say it is the argument that must prevail. Indeed, there may be many prevailing arguments unless they are reduced in some arbitrary fashion. This idea of “contrary positions that simultaneously survive,” developed most prominently by Amartya Sen, can serve as a reminder that the absence of a zero sum debate need not bring decision-making to an immediate halt. Sen puts the point thus: “Arbitrary reduction of multiple and potentially conflicting principles to one solitary survivor, guillotining all the other evaluative criteria, is not, in fact, a prerequisite for getting useful and robust conclusions on what should be done” (2009: 4).

I have sketched a theoretically compelling framework for situating the hyperintellectual in modern-day civil society building and democratization, as well as a practical scheme that recognizes this intellectual as a catalyst for the creation of democratic culture. Although I have perhaps failed to make a convincing argument tying the hyperintellectual to democratization, it nonetheless strikes me as encouraging that the inflationary model of morality has brought us to a plausible framework for the best the hyperintellectual has to offer. It is my hope that this effort to offer a practically oriented theoretical framework in this way can not only limit the slandering of the intellectual in the public domain, but also may open up new possibilities for the creation of democratic culture in places like the Balkans.

**ESTRANGEMENT QUÁ SUICIDE: THE CURSE OF THE HYPERINTELLECTUAL**

In a sense, the hyperintellectual informs us all, including the nationalist and the interventionist, that our predicament is like staring at bits of shattered mirror. As we poke at the shards, declares Kwame Anthony Appiah, we see that each shard reflects one part of a complex truth from its own particular angle....[However] you will find parts of the truth (along with much error) everywhere and the whole truth nowhere. The deepest mistake,...is to think that your little shard of mirror can reflect the whole (2006: 8).

Understanding can only be achieved within a group. But the costs and bene-

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43 Sen (2009: 14) aptly cites Bernard Williams in this regard: “Disagreement does not necessarily have to be overcome” (Williams 1985: 133).
fits are not distributed equally within that group. The work of the hyperintellectual involves a collective-action problem, insofar as all those who live that “way of life” incur the costs, but huge segments of society share the benefits that might come from such work. Perhaps this is the best that the hyperintellectual can hope to attain. The hyperintellectual has contemplated, intervened, taken a risk, and incurred the cost. The hyperintellectual goes about trying to change the world but at the price of alienating almost everyone. But this is to be expected given the five defining but often countervailing features that drive the hyperintellectual. While being the caring insider, person of action, and the political educator may be quite appealing to many, wielding an unrestrained critical eye in a non-partisan (quirky) way may eventually drive away any supporters, thereby reducing his or her effectiveness. To put this in more concrete terms, it is when colleagues do not respond to emails or return phone calls, producers cancel television interviews, blogs become unpopular and officials of a university or other institutions question their “loyalty” and, thus, their usefulness, that the impact of the hyperintellectual within civil society begins to shrink. Being marginalized may be the universal experience of the hyperintellectual. Perhaps at some point a threshold is reached whereby the hyperintellectual is silenced.

Although reason may well continue to rule, visceral feelings of inadequacy, resentment, and rage will remain. This is the existential fury that must be restrained. Yet it is only by living against the grain and enduring the estrangement and fury that the hyperintellectual holds to his or her vocation, readying a new set of projects for the following day. Day in and day out the hyperintellectual transgresses boundaries and combats monological and dialogical dogmatism. It is a struggle that is soothed by various technologies; but the Internet does not inoculate the hyperintellectual against estrangement. But so what! The fact that there is estrangement to be endured is itself a kind of success—for it means that courage, compassion, and hospitality are still alive. The practice of virtue remains alive and well. Perhaps the economist E.F. Schumacher had it right:

> The violence that is in the process of destroying the world is the cold, calculating, detached, heartless, and relentless violence that springs from over-extended minds working out of control of under-developed hearts. A person who does not feel his thoughts but merely entertains them...is capable of limitless violence....

> Modern civilization can survive only if it begins again to educate the heart...for modern human beings are now far too clever to be able to survive without wisdom (1977: 313).

If nothing else, a sense of such single-mindedness and sacrifice for a more democratic and humane society offers people a basis for hope even when circumstances seem to provide none. Yet there is never any guarantee of success beyond this minimalist sense. The hy-
perintelectual may come and go without having any discernible impact on the direction of the society.

Perhaps the effectiveness of any single hyperintellectual is often short-lived, although the collective impact of a growing number of hyperintellectuals may have long-term consequences for democratization efforts. Gaining momentum for such change may be even more likely if the siphon theory of social change is adopted by the hyperintellectual; if he or she can “locate the strategic set of people...who could create such momentum” (Lederach 2005: 94). If enough of the right people in Kosovo, Bosnia, and elsewhere become convinced that the world is not black and white, democracy and human relations may have a better chance to spread.

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The Hyperintellectual in the Balkans: Recomposed

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