

9-25-2019

Normative Dimensions in Christian Ethics

Bharat Ranganathan

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/relfacpub>

 Part of the Religion Commons

Please take our feedback survey at: https://unomaha.az1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_8cchtFmpDyGfBLE

Normative Dimensions in Christian Ethics

Bharat Ranganathan and Derek Alan Woodard-Lehman

The contributors to this volume are motivated by two concerns. First, we want to clarify the relationship between religious ethics and Christian ethics. Second, we want to specify the contributions that Christian ethics makes to religious ethics.¹ Apart from this Introduction, however, our respective contributions are not methodological ones. Some of us directly address these concerns. For others, these concerns are part of the intellectual landscape that informs our implicit background assumptions. But for all of us, our primary aim is to *show*, rather than *say*, what normative Christian ethics is and why it matters for contemporary religious ethics.²

How do we view the relationship between religious ethics and Christian ethics? In our view, the relationship between religious ethics and Christian ethics is analogous to that between rectangles and squares. That is to say, not all religious ethics (in the plural) are Christian ethics.³ But all Christian ethics *are* religious ethics. Likewise, not all Christian ethics are confessional. But much confessional ethics are Christian ethics. In other words, the ethicist's

¹ Despite its widespread use, debates about what is and isn't "religious ethics" continue. For two sustained efforts at defining religious ethics, see Reeder (1998) and Miller (2016). Reflecting on the first 25 years of the *JRE*, Reeder is concerned with defining what a "religion" is, a definition about which we must come to *some* agreement in order to prosecute questions under the aegis of "religious ethics." Writing nearly 20 years after Reeder, Miller draws upon Wittgenstein's notion of "family resemblances" to think through the interrelation of religion and ethics.

² For an analogy, consider the engagement between the contributors to Hick and Knitter (1987) and (especially) those to D'Costa (1990). Focusing on the theology and philosophy of religion, these volumes examined exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism with regard to religious truth and salvation. While D'Costa (1990) positioned itself as offering a direct and exclusivist response to the inclusivist and pluralist challenges posed in Hick and Knitter, not all of the contributors to the D'Costa volume engaged with the proposals found in Hick and Knitter. Moreover, not all of the contributors to D'Costa offered strictly exclusivist responses. Nonetheless, all the contributors did engage with the problems (and language) associated with exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism. See our later discussion about how our volume complements Bucar and Stalnaker (2012).

³ For the phrasing "religious ethics (in the plural)," see Bucar and Stalnaker (2012).

intellectual expertise can be Christian ethics without the ethicist's spiritual experience concomitantly being Christian. Among the contributors to this volume, some of us are confessing Christian whereas others are not. Some of us are Catholic and some are Protestant. Our respective confessional (or non-confessional) identities notwithstanding, we hold that Christian ethics *is* religious ethics. Not because Christian ethics is a species of some universal genus of either religion or ethics; rather, because the persons and practices involved with Christian ethics also act and interact with those involved in religious ethics.

To be sure, in this broad sense Christian ethics is religious. We hope to refine the distinction between religious ethics and Christian ethics *and* redefine their relation. What motivates this hope? Following decades-long trends in religious ethics, we seek to distinguish between confessional (theological) and non-confessional (philosophical) approaches to Christian ethics. To our minds, the ethicist doesn't need to identify as a Christian to do work in Christian ethics. Being Christian isn't a necessary condition for doing Christian ethics. Against some other decades-long trends, we further wish to distinguish between descriptive and normative approaches to Christian ethics within religious ethics. We believe that ethicists can and should do normative Christian ethics as religious ethics. This places us between Christian ethics and religious ethics as they are commonly understood.

On the one side, many Christian ethicists deny that Christian ethics should—or even could—be religious ethics. Some contest the very category of religious ethics itself. For example, Stanley Hauerwas frequently and influentially argues that the sheer variety of disparate practices and beliefs that are counted as “religious” or “religion” creates insoluble descriptive and comparative problems. Given this variety, he writes, “I have worried that a phrase like ‘knowing about’ another tradition is not sufficient to understand the practices of another tradition” (2003, 400). Because there simply does not exist “some one quality, character, or essence” (403) that can be ascribed to everything scholars routinely refer to as a religion or the religious, Hauerwas “doubt[s] that there exists any standpoint that makes such comparison unproblematic” (400). On views like this, the intrinsically normative dimensions of Christian ethics do not allow for the description and comparison that are characteristic of religious ethics.⁴

⁴ For a far more critical view about the relationship between Abrahamic and non-Abrahamic thought, see Milbank (1990).

On the other side, religious ethicists and other scholars of religion find the normative methodologies of Christian ethics similarly problematic. Genealogists like Talal Asad (2003) and Saba Mahmood (2005) suspect that normative methodologies necessarily relies on sociopolitical hegemony and cultural hierarchy that perpetuate presumptions of Western Christian superiority. In order to avoid such hegemonic and hierarchical presumptions, Elizabeth Bucar and Aaron Stalnaker note that contributors to their volume, *Religious Ethics in a Time of Globalism: Shaping a Third Wave of Comparative Inquiry* (2012), “*topically* ... pursue themes that are not commonly addressed in philosophical and theological ethics, such as bodily vulnerability and relations of dependence within families and teaching groups” (2012, 2 emphasis added). Moreover, “*Methodologically*, this research builds from textual analysis, ethnography, or other extended case studies to provide thick descriptions of culturally embedded ethics” (2). On views like this, the inherently descriptive and comparative dimensions of religious ethics do not allow for the normative dimensions that are characteristic of Christian ethics.

We attempt to refine the distinction between Christian ethics and religious ethics, and to redefine the role of normative ethics within religious ethics, not as a complaint *against* the comparative and descriptive turn in religious ethics, but rather as a complement *alongside* this turn. In one sense, we see our contributions as companions and conversation partners for the contributors to Bucar and Stalnaker (2012). Likewise, we see this volume as a modest counterpoint to the turn away from comparison and description in Christian ethics. In short, we put forward approaches to, and appropriations of, the normative dimensions of Christian ethics that we believe make constructive contributions to religious ethics.

To that end, we organize our contributions around three normative dimensions in Christian ethics: scripture, tradition, and reason. By “scripture,” we mean the narrative witness of the matriarchs and patriarchs, the prophets and priests of Israel, and the apostles of the earliest Church as recorded in the two testaments of the Bible. By “tradition,” we mean the collective and collected wisdom of Christian communities across time, whether or not that wisdom is articulated explicitly in texts and/or embodied formally in institutions. (The absence of Creeds and Confessions, or Bishops and Popes, is not the absence of tradition.) By “reason,” we mean critical reflection on the substance and basis of Christian belief and practice, especially normative judgments about ethics.

To single out these three dimensions is not to deny the existence of others. For example, the so-called Wesleyan Quadrilateral adds experience to these three. Christian practices could be distinguished as a further sub- set of tradition, and so on. To focus on these three dimensions is to isolate them neither from one another nor from others. Nor is it to set them out once and for all as stable and immutable givens. Each dimension is fluid. Moreover, the relations between and among them are dynamic. All have been and remain subject to contestation and revision. For example, there are tensions among the priestly, prophetic, and kingly strands of the Tanakh. There are contradictions within the Pauline and Pseudo-Pauline Epistles. The canon of scripture itself varies across Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and various Protestant communities. And the relative center of gravity within the canon shifts within those communities across time and place.⁵ Nonetheless, scripture, tradition, and reason inform the rules of the game, so to speak.⁶ But while they provide rules, these dimensions don't predetermine how the game will be played. Indeed, they cannot. Despite whatever consensus exists and might emerge among the contributors to this volume, dissensus remains, to say nothing about the diversity and heterogeneity within Christian ethics and religious ethics more generally.

We approach the normative dimensions of Christian ethics as scholars trained in religious ethics. Although our aim is to soften the distinctions and surmount the divisions between Christian ethics and religious ethics, they remain relevant to the temperament and techniques that shape our respective contributions. We all have been trained in approaches oriented toward Christian ethics as a form of religious ethics rather than toward an exclusively theological form of Christian ethics. We have benefited from an intellectual landscape in which the *Journal of Religious Ethics (JRE)* has become the premier venue for publication, and in which the Society of Christian Ethics (SCE) holds its annual meeting concurrently with those of the Society of Jewish Ethics (SJE) and the Society for the Study of Muslim Ethics (SSME). Moreover, like earlier religious ethicists, all of us have been

⁵ For a recent overview about the ways in which “authority” has been contested in Christian thought, see Carnes (2014).

⁶ On the rules of the game in relation to Christian theology, see Griffiths (2014a, 1). See also Griffiths (2014b). Cf. Ranganathan and Clairmont (2017, 617–619).

trained in moral and political philosophy, and integrate insights from those disciplines in our work. And although each of us focuses on Western religious thought and Christian ethics, we are conversant with other religious traditions as well.

Consent to and dissent from the rules of the game, however, aren't limited to something as *narrow* as Christian ethics. Consent and dissent affect the study of religious ethics more broadly as well. Consider, for example, the history of religious ethics. In the "Editorial" (1973) introducing the *JRE*, the editors comment upon the state of religious ethics. "Given the present state of our discipline," they write, "we have no illusion that essays on Buddhist, African, Hindu or Islamic ethics will come our way as readily as will essays on Christian or Jewish ethics. We realize that we will not easily escape in our initial issues the parochialism and Western bias that tends to characterize the present state of our discipline" (3) For the editors, success in the field of religious ethics would mean expanding the field beyond Judeo-Christian ethics; moreover, it would include engagement with the myriad disciplines with which religious ethicists are in conversation, for example, the history of religions, political theory, cultural anthropology, developmental and humanistic psychology, sociology, and aesthetics (4).

In many ways, religious ethics *has* expanded in many salutary directions. Several religious ethicists—for example, David Little and Sumner Twiss (1978), Ronald Green (1978), and Robin Lovin and Frank Reynolds (1985)—have expanded the study of religion and ethics beyond Judaism and Christianity. In the "Towards a Comparative Philosophy of Religions" conference series at the University of Chicago and (later) book series from SUNY Press, scholars engaged in comparative ethical, philosophical, and theological study, scholars whose work continues to inform the current studies in contemporary religious ethics.⁷ And we are now in the midst of the third wave of comparative religious ethics, with scholars becoming ever more conversant with different religious traditions and employing new and sophisticated research methodologies. But despite these new directions in religious ethics, Bharat Ranganathan and David Clairmont note that there continue to be debates about (i) the relationship among religious ethics, theological ethics, and the philosophy of religion; (ii) the purposes of comparative inquiry, including the scholar's relation to his or her subjects;

⁷ For an overview of this conference series, see Bantly (1990).

and (iii) the very range of religious traditions being considered (2017, 617–618). Christian ethicists and religious ethicists continue to observe the rules of the game. Even so, the rules remain open to clarification and revision, particularly in response to innovations in how players play the game.⁸

It is precisely this interdisciplinary and interreligious milieu that generated this volume. Many of the contributors have collaborated on conference panels at Harvard Divinity School (2013), Yale Divinity School (2014 and 2015), the American Academy of Religion (2014 and 2015), and the Society of Christian Ethics (2015 and 2016). Several of the chapters in this volume began as papers presented at these conferences. Each chapter, as well as the volume as a whole, has benefited from the scholarship and relationships sustained by this collaboration. And together, they foreground the continuing importance of normative methodologies in the study of religious ethics even as they highlight how scholarship that focuses on a single moral and religious tradition aids reflection and deliberation about ongoing moral, social, political, and religious issues in contemporary society.

The nine chapters in this volume are organized into three sections: Scripture, Tradition, and Reason. Some of these chapters converge in important and surprising ways, owing (in no small part) to the confessional and non-confessional stances of the contributors. Equally importantly, some of these chapters (sharply) diverge in equally important and surprising ways, owing again to the confessional and non-confessional stances of the contributors. What should become apparent, we hope, is that while we are playing the game, these convergences and divergences illustrate that we ourselves are

⁸ Consider, for example, the changing evaluations regarding the interpretation and application of the “traveling” rule in the National Basketball Association (NBA). The basic rule has long been that the player with the ball gets two steps continuing his motion after receiving a pass or picking up his dribble. On earlier interpretations, moves like the “jump stop” (i.e., taking the first step off one foot but landing on both) and the “Euro-Step” (taking two steps in different—usually lateral—directions) were viewed as violations. Now they are commonplace. Even more recently, the “step back” (i.e., taking two steps in opposite directions—forward then back or forward then sideways) has become accepted. On the (laxity concerning) interpretation and application of rules, Stu Lantz, the longtime color commentator for the Los Angeles Lakers, often lamented that “if something is a foul in the first two minutes, it’s a foul in the last two minutes!” On the rules of the game and soccer, see Stout (2004, 272); on the rules of the game and baseball, see Rawls (2008).

debating the very rules that govern the game. We are confident that these ongoing debates among the contributors signify a strength rather than a weakness.⁹

In the first section, “Scripture,” each of the contributors concerns themselves with the normative commitments involved with engaging scripture. For example, what are the possible different interpretive strategies for reading scripture? What does the use of one or another strategy say about the interpreter’s purposes? Are there better and worse ways of reading scripture? How might reading scripture help the reader address pressing issues of moral, political, and theological concern? How does scripture aid in the process of moral formation and development? Does reading scripture alone help our moral formation? Or does scripture need to be read along with other potentially formative practices?

In the first chapter of this section (Chap. 2), Jamie Pitts reflects on the practices and principles at work when Christian ethicists read scripture. He argues that ethicists must be responsibly “involved” readers, that is, as readers seeking to become aware of how their various relational entanglements shape their reading and writing about the Bible. Such an awareness requires self-critical reflection about the ethicist’s own normative commitments, and how those commitments relate to normative claims discernible in biblical texts. Pitts then surveys and criticizes a range of approaches to ethics that prioritize the ethnographic study of moral worlds, foundationalist normative evaluation, political critique, and the development of a single moral tradition considered in isolation from others. He suggests that these approaches tend to minimize aspects of ethicists’ involvements with the world and with texts such as the Bible. Drawing on James McClendon’s “Baptist” ethics, which offer an alternative approach that emphasizes a broader range of readerly involvements, Pitts develops a constructive proposal. For Pitts, McClendon’s treatment of the “principalities and powers” passages in the Bible reveals him to be a more comprehensively involved reader, and displays how an ethicist can grapple with his or her own powers of reading. In conclusion, Pitts indicates where McClendon minimizes his racialized and gendered involvements, and urges ethicists to read the Bible with the marginalized.

⁹ To borrow from Gene Outka: “normative disagreements do not issue in accusations of personal disloyalty or betrayal.” Rather, in this endeavor and in our other collaborations, we have worked to “sustain[] a joint commitment to standing up for one’s views and to friend- ship” (2015, 24).

In the second chapter of this section (Chap. 3), Gary Slater has a related, yet narrower, aim: namely, deploying the hermeneutical repertoire of interfaith reading practices to integrate descriptive and normative approaches to Christian ethics. He does so as part of a larger project of imagining how scripture shapes moral reflection. He argues that Scriptural Reasoning (SR) provides logical resources and hermeneutical strategies that extend beyond the parameters of its own practices. SR provides strategies that not only clarify a text's content at a surface level, but also navigate seemingly contradictory interpretations, explicate implicit background assumptions, and, above all, demarcate contexts that mediate between the text and particular communities of readers. Slater then positions the resources of SR between comparison and normativity, contributing to a religious ethics that has the capacity to describe moral worlds both within and across communities, compare them, identify their distinctive normative commitments, and apply them in diagnosis and repair of the problems SR uncovers.

Niki Kasumi Clements concludes the section with Chap. 4. She reanimates the scriptural hermeneutics of John Cassian (c.360–c.435), focusing on the dynamic links between *exegesis* and *askesis*, reflection and action, and authority and agency. For Cassian, scripture is absolutely authoritative but incredibly obscure and therefore requires interpretation. To understand exegesis only as an intellectual exercise or assertion of power, however, neglects its relation to other forms of *askesis* in his *Conferences* and *Institutes*. For Clements, as for Cassian, scriptural interpretation renders lived practice and practical knowledge (*praktike*) inseparable from contemplative knowledge (*theōretike*). Toward this end, Clements draws from the work of critical theorist Michel Foucault, who found in Cassian the resources to think together interpreting a text and interpreting oneself. Drawing on these thinkers, she argues that interpretation does not lead to keen description or reflection alone, but must impact one's practices, one's *tropos*, one's very way of life. The perspective she develops allows us to not only see the relevance of Cassian's ethics to Christian thought and practice, but also approach Cassian's texts with a critical eye for how they enable reflection on contemporary religious ethics beyond the particulars of Christian predicates.

In the second section, the contributors turn to the vexed relationship among human reason, scriptural evidence, and the authority of religious tradition. Examining thinkers ranging from the modern to contemporary periods, the contributors to this section pursue

questions that are perennial in the history of philosophy, philosophy of religion, and theology. For example, what is the “moral law”? What is the “natural law”? And what is the “divine law”? How do rational moral agents, who are both conditioned and free, conform themselves to or free themselves from one or another form of law? In other words, what is “self-governance” in light of these sometimes complementary, sometimes conflicting, understandings of law? Given the normative demands of law, how is the rational moral agent supposed to relate to himself or herself and to his or her neighbors? In exchanging reasons about what is and isn’t the law, what sources may the agent draw upon in service of his or her arguments?

The first chapter in this section, Derek Alan Woodard-Lehman’s chapter (Chap. 5) reconsiders common assumptions about the opposition between religious tradition and modern freedom. In the wake of Immanuel Kant’s philosophical revolution, modern freedom has been defined as autonomy. As Kant puts it in his 1784 essay, “An Answer to the Question: ‘What Is Enlightenment?’,” modern freedom requires breaking free from the “self-incurred minority” imposed by traditional forms of authority in order to think for oneself and to live a life of one’s own. Above all else, it requires breaking with the heteronomous and paternalistic authority of the church and religious tradition. Against these assumptions, Woodard-Lehman develops and defends Karl Barth’s account of Reformed tradition in order to demonstrate that neither the textual authority of scripture and the Confessions, nor the social authority of church, precludes modern freedom. With Barth, he reconceives authority in Reformed tradition as a form of freedom that incorporates Kantian self-legislation and Hegelian mutual recognition. Beyond Barth, he employs this reconception of authority and freedom to illustrate how Reformed practices of pedobaptism and catechism are nothing other than a highly formalized and dramatically ritualized praxis of moral formation meant to bring minors into their majority within the community.

In Chap. 6 Jason A. Heron asks whether a Thomistic perspective on the natural law is of any use to ethicists—religious or philosophical—interested in both normativity and contextualization. In addition to Aquinas himself, Heron engages the works of several contemporary thinkers, including Vincent W. Lloyd, Richard Rodriguez, Michael Baxter, and Cristina Traina. He argues that the Thomistic natural law tradition should be a critical dialogue partner in the conversation about moral normativity and social context. This tradition

offers ethicists with an effective way of speaking about the human capacity to speak in a variety of subsidiary moral registers indexed to various social contexts and modes of human activity. Heron contends that this subsidiary structuring of moral speech enables human communities to navigate the tensions of normative moral claims and context-dependent descriptions of choice and action.

In the final chapter in this section (Chap. 7), Martijn Buijs looks to the late philosophy of F.W.J. Schelling. He argues that, despite his disregard for moral philosophy, and even in the absence of explicitly ethical writings, Schelling offers critical resources for normative judgments in Christian ethics. Buijs begins with an overview of the two components of Schelling's philosophy: negative (logical) and positive (historical). He then explicates Schelling's anthropology, and its inspiration in the Fall narratives of Genesis. With this general philosophy and specific anthropology in hand, he then argues that the Schelling's late thought is a resource for developing a religious ethics as the articulation, evaluation, and prescription of moral norms found in Christian scripture. Although Schelling mounts a fundamental critique of conventional approaches to such religious ethics, it is a philosophical recasting of Paul's own critique of the Law. Like Paul's theology, Schelling's philosophy leads to the necessity for a God outside of the mere concept, a God encountered in the history of religious consciousness.

In the third section, "Reason," the contributors turn to the relationship between Christian ethics and normative and practical ethics. Most importantly, what difference (if any) does the modifier *Christian* make for Christian ethics? Relatedly, moral and political philosophers continue to explicate ever more complicated versions of consequentialist, deontological, and virtue theoretic reasoning. Does Christian ethics fit within one or another normative moral and political theory? Given that Christian thinkers have grappled with their moral, political, and theological commitments in relation to ever-changing cultural, political, and social circumstances, does Christian ethics stand within these circumstances or beyond them? And how should Christian ethics be understood to relate (or not relate) to new scientific and social-scientific data? Following many naturalistic philosophers, should Christian ethics be accountable to and continuous with new data? Or given its eternal sources, should Christian ethics be independent of and discontinuous with such data?

In this section's first chapter (Chap. 8), Bharat Ranganathan reexamines the Protestant

social ethicist Paul Ramsey. Given its reliance on God's righteousness, he argues that Ramsey's ethics certainly is Christian. But it is just as certainly deontological. While this argument may seem straight-forward, Ranganathan observes, Ramsey's characterization of the deontological character of Christian ethics is frustratingly murky. Specifically, the analytic distinctions Ramsey makes aren't sufficiently precise. In order to show why Ramsey holds that Christian ethics ought to be construed as deontological, Ranganathan reconstructs Ramsey's arguments from *Basic Christian Ethics* (1950) to appreciate his foundational claims about the Christian moral life. Then, drawing from several influential contemporary deontological moral and political philosophers, Ranganathan assesses Ramsey's arguments, noting both the character and criteria of Ramsey's distinctively Christian deontology. He turns, finally, to Ramsey's later writings on medical ethics. Ramsey's arguments about physician-patient interaction, Ranganathan argues, lend clarity to his earlier work. These later arguments, he shows, help better appreciate why Christian ethics should be construed as a particular kind of deontology.

Whereas Ranganathan draws from Ramsey to argue for Christian Deontology, Autumn Alcott Ridenour's chapter (Chap. 9) argues that Christian ethics cannot be reduced to a single normative philosophical framework. Instead, given its unique motive and end, Christian ethics appropriates elements found in a variety of normative theories. Turning to Augustine and Reformed Augustinianisms, she offers a constructive interpretation of the roots of Christian ethics, one that is ineliminably founded on a relationship with Christ. Drawing on canonical figures such as Augustine, Calvin, Edwards, and Barth, Ridenour emphasizes the centrality of Christ in their respective ethics. For these thinkers, she argues, the Christian moral life is one of reception and action, one that involves union with the Divine that requires loving the neighbor in ways that entail virtue, obligation, and sometimes consequentialist reasoning. Given the relationship with both Christ and the neighbor, the Christian moral life also fundamentally involves relationality.

In Chap. 10, Jon Kara Shields describes the teaching practice of CanaVox, a pro-marriage social movement, and examines its relationship to Catholic teaching—particularly its discourse of the common good. She first explicates CanaVox's platform as an interpretation and extension of Catholic teaching on marriage, gender essentialism, and the role of women. She then assesses the moral warrants and methods of self-tutelage practiced by its

members through based on the group's syllabus of literature and leader's guide. Shields argues that these texts offer a flattened, partisan politicization of natural law discourse that is alienated from its religious roots. And she critiques the highly selective appropriation of empirical research and personal testimony that CanaVox offers as corroborative evidence. As such, Shields concludes that CanaVox encourages its participants to strengthen their identification with a package of unreflective, politicized values unmoored from their originating ritual community, its public virtues, and authorities. She concludes by noting the obligations of Catholic moral theologians and Christian ethicists to combat political vices of condescension and inoculation, and to offer critique of the ideological quality of seemingly universal natural rules encoded in political discourse that are in fact rooted in particular historically religious commitments.

The contributors of this volume, each on our own and all of us together, aim to think through, clarify, and refine the relationship between Christian ethics and religious ethics. While we represent a wide spectrum of intellectual, methodological, and practical commitments in the landscape of religious ethics, we neither survey nor represent the entire landscape. While we highlight important thinkers and problems that must be addressed, "there are other important questions, religions, and traditions that remain to be explored further as the field continues to develop" (Ranganathan and Clairmont 2017, 617). We are all keenly aware that we live in a world that is ever more interconnected and pluralistic. But at the same time, we are increasingly isolated and divisive. For Christian and religious ethicists alike (1 Pet. 2.11), the omnipresent task is to rise to the moral and political challenges that confront us all.

Bibliography

Asad, Talal. 2003. *Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, and Modernity*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Bantly, Francisca Cho. 1990. *Deconstructing/Reconstructing the Philosophy of Religions: Summary Reports from the Conferences on Religions in Culture and History, 1986–89, the Divinity School, the University of Chicago*. Chicago: Divinity School.

Bucar, Elizabeth M., and Aaron Stalnaker. 2012. Introduction: The Third Wave of Comparative

- Religious Ethics. In *Religious Ethics in a Time of Globalism: Shaping a Third Wave of Comparative Analysis*, ed. Elizabeth M. Bucar and Aaron Stalnaker, 1–26. New York: Palgrave.
- Carnes, Natalie. 2014. A Reconsideration of Religious Authority in Christian Theology. *Heythrop Journal* 55 (3): 467–480.
- D’Costa, Gavin, ed. 1990. *Christian Uniqueness Reconsidered: The Myth of a Pluralistic Theology of Religions*. Maryknoll: Orbis Books.
- Editors. 1973. Editorial. *Journal of Religious Ethics* 1 (1973): 3–4.
- Green, Ronald. 1978. *Religious Reason: The Rational and Moral Basis of Religious Belief*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Griffiths, Paul. 2014a. What Are Catholic Theologians Doing When They Do Comparative Theology? *Studies in Interreligious Dialogue* 24 (1): 40–45.
- . 2014b. Response to Judith Graber. *Studies in Interreligious Dialogue* 24(1): 57–58.
- Hauerwas, Stanley. 2003. Between Christian Ethics and Religious Ethics: How Should Graduate Students be Trained? *Journal of Religious Ethics* 31(3): 399–412.
- Hick, John, and Paul F. Knitter, eds. 1987. *The Myth of Christian Uniqueness: Toward a Pluralistic Theology of Religions*. Maryknoll: Orbis Books.
- Little, David, and Sumner Twiss. 1978. *Comparative Religious Ethics: A New Method*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Lovin, Robin, and Frank Reynolds. 1985. *Cosmogony and Ethical Order: New Studies in Comparative Ethics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Mahmood, Saba. 2005. *Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Milbank, John. 1990. The End of Dialogue. In *Christian Uniqueness Reconsidered: The Myth of a Pluralistic Theology of Religions*, ed. Gavin D’Costa, 174–191. New York: Orbis Books.
- Miller, Richard B. 2016. *Friends and Other Strangers: Studies in Religion, Ethics, and Culture*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Outka, Gene. 2015. On Reformed Christianity and Natural Human Rights. In *Religion and Public Policy: Human Rights, Conflict, and Ethics*, ed. Sumner B. Twiss, Marian

Gh. Simion, and Rodney L. Petersen, 24–44. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ramsey, Paul. 1950. *Basic Christian Ethics*. Louisville: Westminster/John Knox.

Ranganathan, Bharat, and David A. Clairmont. 2017. Introduction: Ethnography, Moral Theory, and Comparative Religious Ethics. *Journal of Religious Ethics* 45 (4): 613–622.

Rawls, John. 2008. The Best of All Games. *Boston Review: A Political and Literary Forum*.
<http://bostonreview.net/rawls-the-best-of-all-games>

Reeder, John P. Jr. 1998. “What is a Religious Ethic?” *Journal of Religious Ethics* 25 (3): 157–181.

Stout, Jeffrey. 2004. *Democracy & Tradition*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.