The Tipping Point to Terrorism: Involvement in Right-Wing Terrorist Groups in the United States

Anne M. Stacey Reeser

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The Tipping Point to Terrorism: Involvement in Right-Wing Terrorist Groups in the United States

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University of Nebraska at Omaha

by

Ann M. Stacey Reeser
May 2011

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The Tipping Point to Terrorism: Involvement in Right-Wing Terrorist Groups in the United States

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University of Nebraska, 2011
Advisor: Dr. Pete Simi

Abstract: This dissertation focuses on right-wing terrorism (RWT) in the United States perpetrated by adherents to the White Supremacist Movement (WSM). In depth case history data were collected using a variety of sources and analyzed on 66 federally indicted WSM terrorists representing 10 different terrorist organizations in the United States from 1980-2002. The primary means of analysis was a qualitative case analysis using narrative data to uncover what influences an individual to become involved in a terrorist group. Specifically, I analyzed the influences of: 1) structural components, 2) family dynamics, and 3) non-familial relationships on the involvement process. Results from this study can provide valuable theoretical and practical implications to understanding terrorists and terrorist groups.
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<table>
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<tr>
<td>ADL</td>
<td>Anti-Defamation League</td>
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<td>AN</td>
<td>Aryan Nations</td>
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<td>ARA</td>
<td>Aryan Republican Army</td>
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<td>ATS</td>
<td>American Terrorism Study</td>
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<td>CI</td>
<td>Christian Identity</td>
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<td>CSA</td>
<td>Covenant, Sword, and Arm of the Lord</td>
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<td>DHS</td>
<td>Department of Homeland Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>KKK</td>
<td>Ku Klux Klan</td>
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<tr>
<td>LW</td>
<td>Left Wing</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIPT</td>
<td>Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism</td>
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<td>NIJ</td>
<td>National Institute of Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRM</td>
<td>New Religious Movement</td>
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<td>RW</td>
<td>Right Wing</td>
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<td>RWE</td>
<td>Right Wing Extremism</td>
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<td>RWT</td>
<td>Right Wing Terrorism</td>
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<tr>
<td>SM</td>
<td>Social Movement</td>
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<td>SPLC</td>
<td>Southern Poverty Law Center</td>
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<td>WPP</td>
<td>White Patriot Party</td>
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

In recent decades, terrorism has become one of the most consistently discussed “social problems” within academic, political, legal, and public arenas (LaFree & Dugan, 2004; Rosenfeld, 2004). Despite a large amount of research, there is relatively little conclusive knowledge and a number of questions remain unanswered. The following study uses a mixed methodological approach to analyze 66 US right-wing extremists indicted for terrorist-related charges. In general, I seek to answer how individuals become involved in right-wing terror (RWT) groups. More specifically, I focus on three interrelated questions: (1) What are the “structural components” of the involvement process (e.g., place of involvement, type of involvement, length of process, etc.)?; (2) What is the influence of family dynamics on the involvement process?; and (3) What is the significance of one’s non-familial relationships to the involvement process (this will include an examination of the relationship between right-wing extremist [RWE] groups and RWT groups)?

There is little consensus on precisely how to define terrorism, who qualifies as a terrorist, and how or why people engage in such behavior. One of the most important questions that remain unanswered is how to effectively counter terrorism. Since 9/11, there have been unintended and potentially severe consequences from the recent surge of terrorism research. In fact, since 2001, the term “terrorism” has become largely associated with the Middle East and Islamic religion (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000; Ferber, 1999; 2003, p. 64). This has clear implications in terms of perpetuating dangerous stereotypes in an increasingly polarized world. The damage does not end with stereotypes however. The remarkably disproportionate amount of attention, funds, and
research to one type of terrorism allows for other violent and marginalized groups to mobilize undetected (Vohryzek-Bolden, 2003).

The following study focuses on right-wing terrorism (RWT) in the United States, much of which is related to the white supremacist movement (WSM). While most extremists are not terrorists, all terrorists are inherently extremists (Bjorgo 1995). One cannot discuss a particular type of terrorism without providing an overview of the historical context and current state of the broader extremist or social movement (SM) to which it belongs. Further, a terrorist’s or terrorist organization’s connection to the broader SM may be real or perceived. In other words, the broader SM need not be aware of nor endorse the existence of a person or organization acting on behalf of the SM.

The extreme right-wing refers to a variety of groups that adopt and promote one, or any combination of the following beliefs: anti-government, anti-Semitic, anti-homosexual, anti-abortion, anti-immigration, and racist (Kaplan & Bjorgo, 1998; Smith, 1994; Vohryzek-Bolden, 2003). One of the most pervasive beliefs among the extreme right-wing is the inherent sense of racial superiority which serves as a motivating force in their effort to gain power (Vohryzek-Bolden, 2003). The extreme right-wing can thus be further delineated into other categories including, but not limited to, black supremacists,

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1 There has been a great deal of debate among scholars who study the WSM regarding the appropriate term to use when referring to its adherents. Researchers have traditionally used ‘white-power’ or ‘supremacists’ to denote these individuals, however, some experts have pointed out that the term white ‘separatist’ may best categorize the contemporary movement arguing that it accounts for varying degrees of supremacy ideology and it is a more analytical movement term for the purposes of objective social science research (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000, pp. 9-11). Contrary to such arguments, ‘supremacist’ will be used here because the term separatist is inextricably linked to holding supremacist ideological beliefs (Ferber, 1999).

2 Though there are various typological rubrics, the most commonly utilized have been religious fundamentalist terrorism, religious new age/apocalyptic terrorism, nationalistic-separatist terrorism, left-wing, single-issue, and right-wing terrorism. For further discussion on typologies and explanations of the above typologies see Crenshaw (1992), McCauley (2002), Piven (2002), and Post (2004).
Jewish extremists, some single-issue groups such as anti-abortionists, patriot and non-sanctioned militia organizations, and white supremacists.

**Justifications for the Study of RWT**

One of the reasons to focus on right-wing terrorism is simply because relative to other types of terrorism, RWT is one of the more understudied areas. Due to my study’s exploratory and inductive approach, the results will inform existing theoretical frameworks that lack empirical testing. The very nature of terrorism has made it a remarkably difficult field to collect empirical data on. Most terrorism scholars agree that as a field it is still in its “infancy” (Bergesen & Lizardo, 2004, p. 51; Cooper, 2001; Crenshaw, 2000; Hoffman, 2006; Laqueur, 1999; Victoroff, 2005) and in fact, many of the conclusions drawn in the field are highly impressionistic (Laqueur, 1999). To the extent that terrorism research neglects RWT, it is unclear whether findings from other types of terrorists are applicable to RWT. This lack of attention to RWT has significantly hindered theoretical development. The need for this type of research becomes even more clear when considering mounting evidence from the Southern Poverty Law Center and other organizations suggesting that RWE and RWT groups have been growing and consistently involved in planning terror attacks over the past decade. In fact, from 1995 to 2005, more than 60 terrorist plots from the extreme right, including bombings, arsons, and assassinations, were uncovered (Blejwas, Griggs, & Potok, 2005). Despite popular belief regarding where the next terrorist attack will come from and who will be responsible, it is clear that the right-wing has posed and does pose a significant threat to the United States.
The WSM is the oldest type of RWE and has the longest tradition of perpetrating domestic terrorism in the nation’s history (Blee, 1991; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000; Gardell, 2003; White, 2006). Contemporary developments regarding changing patterns in recruitment and funding, as well as the state of the economy also provide justification for research as the following are potential catalysts for increases in RWT (Smith, 1994). During the 1980’s and 1990’s, Christian Identity based white supremacist groups began increasingly targeting prison ministries and skinhead gangs all over the country to gain membership (Smith, 1994). Christian Identity is a religion based on the superiority of the white race (discussed in detail later) and has served as a religions justification for terrorist violence among these organizations for several decades (Vohryzek-Bolden, 2003). The fact that these organizations are infiltrating prisons under the guise of religion, and also recruiting marginalized youth is reason for concern as this is increasing the number of violent prone individuals entering these organizations (Smith, 1994). The WSM has been gaining considerable membership over the past couple of years however, and it appears the most influential dynamic producing this latest upsurge is the current controversy surrounding illegal immigration (ADL, 2007c; Avila, Tribolet, & Francescani, 2007; DHS, April, 2009; SPLC, 2007b; Vohryzek-Bolden, 2003). Some white supremacist groups are using the immigration issue as a platform in order to expand their base of support3.

Regarding funding, RWT organizations are beginning to cross the line into organized crime, specifically drug dealing (Smith, 1994). This strategy is unprecedented among the ‘white right’ because engaging in drug use or the drug trade has previously been condemned by their ideological beliefs (Smith, 1994). Involvement with drugs has

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3 See Appendix A, Figure 1.
traditionally been perceived by the WSM as a problem in minority communities and used as evidence of non-white inferiority (Smith, 1994). Additionally, a recent and unanticipated alliance has formed between individuals within the WSM and Islamic terrorists in the Middle East (Kemp, 2007). Law enforcement intelligence suggests that a loose coupling has formed between the two divergent extremist groups because of their shared hatred for the United States government (Kemp, 2007). Though precise amounts are unknown, it has been estimated that groups within the WSM have supplied Middle Eastern Islamic terrorists with hundreds of thousands, upwards to possibly millions of dollars (Kemp, 2007; Simi, Smith, & Reeser, 2007). In terms of the economy, its current instability may stimulate membership because this provides a further source of frustration and anger towards minority populations and the government, thus a justification for action, regardless of how misplaced the blame (Blazak, 2001; Smith, 1994). The WSM has historically placed blame on policies that promote demographic representation in schools/workforce (e.g., Affirmative Action) for their own rates of unemployment or earning low wages (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000).

Finally, the recent and historic election of Barack Obama in 2008, the nation’s first African-American president, has intensified the perception among white supremacists that America is controlled by “alien” interests. The election of a black president, new restrictions on firearms laws, and the continued downturn of the U.S. economy are all issues utilized by these groups to gain membership (Simi 2008; DHS, 2009). Many argue it is only a matter of time before these groups not only grow in numbers, but in terroristic action (DHS, 2009). The report especially warns about RW lone wolf terrorists and small terrorist cells as being the greatest threat because they are
the most difficult individuals to locate and monitor (DHS, 2009). In summary, failing to study RWT has severe consequences both in terms of minimizing theoretical development and undercutting counterterrorism strategies.

Generally speaking, it is clear that there are important reasons to analyze RWT. It is also noteworthy to briefly point out that studying RWT should be of specific interest to criminologists for several reasons. First, while terrorism has yet to be conclusively defined⁴, at the very least, one necessary element is that terroristic behaviors are by definition criminal (Hamm, 2005; LaFree & Dugan, 2004). Secondly, there is evidence indicating that terrorists often exhibit prior criminality unrelated to their future acts of terrorism (Hamm, 2002, 2004). Finally, some criminologists that have contributed to terrorism scholarship have been sharply critical of their colleagues and argue that criminologists have a responsibility to be at the forefront of terrorism scholarship (Hamm, 2005; LaFree & Dugan, 2004; Rosenfeld, 2004).

**Historical Overview of the WSM**

To analyze RWT in the United States, the history of RWE movements must first be addressed. While not all scholars are in agreement on how to categorize the WSM in the United States⁵, the most widely employed scheme will be used to discuss its emergence and development. The WSM can be discussed as having four branches, including the Ku Klux Klan (KKK), Christian Identity religion, neo-Nazis, and racist skinheads (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000). It should be mentioned that these four

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⁴ For further discussion regarding the intricate and controversial process of defining terrorism as well as variations and elements of definitions of terrorism see Crenshaw (1992), Hoffman (2006), Laqueur (1999), and the most comprehensive, Schmid & Jongman (1988).

⁵ See Berlet’s and Vysotsky’s (2006) arguments for an alternative approach based on ideological beliefs and the display of their ideology within the movement.
branches, however, are not mutually exclusive from one another, and, in fact, have overlapping memberships and beliefs. Likewise, while all are part and parcel to the WSM, there is certainly dissent from one another within a branch and across branches. Nonetheless, the movement shares the most fundamental aspects of white supremacist ideology and thus will be discussed accordingly (Simi & Futrell, 2010).

One of the oldest formal organizations dedicated to white supremacy in the United States is the KKK (Gardell, 2003). The KKK has a very complicated history that has ebbed and flowed, having at least three phases of activity⁶ (Blee, 1991, 2002; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000; Ferber, 1999; Gardell, 2003). In response to Reconstruction after the Civil War, defeated Confederate soldiers founded the Klan in 1865 (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000; Ferber, 1999; Trelease, 1971). Though originally created for the more benign purposes of amusement and camaraderie among veterans, the Klan would quickly morph into a violent terrorist organization with localized chapters (known as “dens”) spreading throughout the Southern states (Blee, 1991; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000; Ferber, 1999; Trelease, 1971). By 1867, the first national convention had representatives from every Klan den and a very intricate hierarchy was formed and led by a single Grand Wizard, General Nathan Bedford Forrest (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000). The organization’s goal was plainly laid out, Klansmen were charged with maintaining white power and supremacy in the South by any means necessary including brutal violence (Blee, 1991; Trelease, 1971).

⁶ Gardell (2003) discusses the Klan as having 5 distinct eras, the first three being the same as will be discussed here, the last two stages he discusses are most often referenced as nuanced extensions of the third era by most other scholars.
Though reports of official Klan violence in this initial era are not precisely known\(^7\), it is certainly the case that the KKK was responsible for a great deal of violent victimizations including murders, rapes, whippings, cases of torture, and countless lynchings (Blee, 1991; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000; Ferber, 1999; Trelease, 1971). Violence by Klansmen became so widespread that even Southern whites not involved in the Klan became quite fearful (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000). The Klan’s first era had a very short lifespan that quickly transformed in purpose and rapidly grew with a peak membership of over a half million members by the late 1860’s (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000). However, the Klan ‘officially’ collapsed after a 5 year reign of terror in the South (Trelease, 1971). Multiple reasons have been offered as to why the organization became defunct so quickly. While some maintain that the Klan was ended due to either white upper-class fear or that the Southern states were steadily regaining control from forced Reconstruction and economic deprivation, the more likely reason was that Forrest feared for his own reputation and safety from criminal prosecution by the government (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000). It is worth noting that though the Klan’s first appearance was ‘officially’ over, some disaffected members continued to be active in intimidation tactics and actual violence well into the 1870’s (though nowhere near a half million members) (Trelease, 1971).

Nearly half a century later, the second era of the KKK began in 1915 (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000). This second era would be the least violent as well as the “heyday

\(^7\)Dobratz and Shanks-Meile (2000) have pointed out that a portion of crimes attributed to the Klan based on an offender’s regalia for example may have been an individual posing as a Klansman to shift blame, arouse doubts about Klan activities, etc. Further, Trelease (1971) finds that some of the victimizations against African-Americans at this time were actually committed by community vigilantes and not the Klan (e.g., case of an arrested African-American murderer being killed by a member of the community while in custody) (p. 289).
of the Klan,” with membership ranging from two million to as high as eight million (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000; Ferber, 1999). Heightened membership was likely due to a shift in reputation since the first Klan era (Blee, 1991; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000; Ferber, 1999). Part of this modified status was due to the second era founder William Simmons, a recently “defrocked” Methodist preacher accused of “moral impairment” (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000, p. 38). Simmons used the immense popularity of D. W. Griffith’s infamous film *The Birth of a Nation*\(^8\) (1915) to attract sympathetic moviegoers to his group by strategically placing group meeting announcements near film advertisements (2000). In addition, the country enacted far stricter immigration laws and open anti-Semitism, anti-Catholic, and anti-immigrant sentiments were common at that time (Blee, 1991; Ferber, 1999). As the Klan enjoyed a more positive reputation and white America became more intolerant of difference, membership not only grew in size but also expanded upwards in the status of its members. For example, public figures holding Klan membership included one United States Supreme Court (USSC) Chief Justice, one USSC Justice, and one President (two others were suspected members including President Truman) (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000). The KKK’s second wave made more of an effort to enter into political circles, and some candidates that were publicly endorsed by the Klan were elected into office (Trelease, 1971). It is also in this era that the Klan broadened their frame of prejudices beyond blacks to include Jews, Catholics, and many other ethnicities and religions (Blee, 1991; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000).

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\(^8\) Griffith’s silent film is famous for both its effect on the Klan as well as its place in cinematographic history (establishing ‘feature’ length films, quality and shots, etc.). Stating that the film depicts the KKK in a positive light is a gross understatement. The Klan is depicted as being the heroic saviors of the South and sole protectors of its culture and white womanhood. The North and South had polar opposite reactions to the film, as Southerners celebrated the film, Northerners rioted in vehement opposition (Blee, 1991; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000).
1991). Further, while people often associate the Klan with the Civil War or Civil Rights, it is in this era that widely known Klan traditions were established, including the notorious tradition of cross burnings (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000). While the Klan of the 1920’s lasted nearly two decades longer than their predecessors, they too disbanded rather suddenly (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000). Unlike their predecessors that collapsed due to external pressure, this Klan seemed to be fraught with internal dissension and corruption leading to criminal indictments (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000). By the 1930’s, several Klan leaders were prosecuted for crimes of corruption and violence, and politically powerful members quickly distanced themselves from association as it became recognized that this ‘new’ Klan had the same ideals as the first: the maintenance of white supremacy through brutal violence (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000).

The final wave of the KKK was well under way by 1958 (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000). Instigated by the civil rights movement and most notably the decision to desegregate schools in the landmark Supreme Court case of Brown v. Board of Education (1954) the new KKK resembled the original organization. Though this era had the least amount of members reaching a maximum of approximately seventy thousand, the level of violence endorsed and perpetrated by the organization was extremely high (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000; Ferber, 1999). One possible reason for the smaller size yet widespread incidents of violence is that during this third era the Klan was extremely decentralized with dens competing for membership nationwide (Ferber, 1999). By the late 1960’s the organization was beginning to decline in membership and activity due to leadership corruption and criminal activities (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000; Ferber,
In addition, the Klan became a major target of Congressional and FBI investigations where it has been estimated that by this time the Bureau had over two thousand informants planted in the hierarchy of the organization (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000). The organization again began to fall.

While the Klan from this point to the present has never fully disappeared, it has never reemerged and become as large as in past eras. By the mid- to late-1970’s the Klan was taken over by David Duke and membership was extended to Catholics and more heavily advertised to women (as women had already formed chapters of their own in the Klan of the 1920’s) (Blee, 1991; Gardell, 2003). Often referred to as the “television era” of the Klan, Duke attempted to move the organization towards a more polished and professional reputation, or what Gardell (2003) has referred to as a failed attempt at presenting the Klan as a “nonviolent, ‘white civil rights’” organization (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000; Gardell, 2003, p. 81). As Duke’s ambitions for political office grew he decided to step down as leader of the KKK, and some members welcomed this transition (Gardell, 2003). Around this time the other branches and dens of the Klan were led in different directions. Rather than follow Duke’s mainstreaming, prominent Klan members like Bill Wilkinson, Louis Beam, and Glenn Miller preferred to restore the “good old days” of Klan violence (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000; Gardell, 2003, p. 51). And indeed, this effort culminated at an anti-Klan march in North Carolina where Klansmen and neo-Nazis perpetrated a mass shooting that killed five and injured several others (Gardell, 2003).

While leaders like Wilkinson restored the Klan’s violent history, Robert Miles, a well-known white supremacist, restored the Klan’s element of secrecy (Dobratz &
Shanks-Meile, 2000; Gardell, 2003). In an attempt to bring back the terroristic nature of the Klan that Duke tried to shed, Miles argued that “secrecy breeds fear…respect begins with fear” (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000, pp. 178-179; Gardell, 2003). The other goal of secrecy was to avoid the mass infiltration by the federal government that the Klan experienced in the late 1950’s and 1960’s, which led Miles to encourage the establishment of disconnected and independent Klan dens nationwide (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000; Gardell, 2003). Throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s the Klan continued to decentralize into numerous factions (Gardell, 2003). As Klandom became more fragmented, internal dissension between dens increased over who belonged to the “true bloodline” of the Reconstruction Era Klan (Gardell, 2003). Creating more problems for the Klan, Morris Dees and the Southern Poverty Law Center began their monitoring program of the Klan by the 1980’s (i.e., Klanwatch), which included more than just detection of dens and counts of members (Gardell, 2003). A series of successful civil lawsuits ensued awarding victims of Klan violence monetary settlements that bankrupted factions of the Klan (Gardell, 2003). The Klan had continued to lose membership and by the 1990’s had split into two major factions led by Thomas Robb and James Farrands, probably totaling around eight thousand members (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000; Gardell, 2003).

The most recent Klan developments include increased activity within longstanding groups as well as the emergence of new groups in areas that have not traditionally been linked to such activity (ADL, 2007b). Some of the highest levels of activity coming from established chapters are in Tennessee (Brotherhood of Klans), Indiana (Church of the National Knights of the KKK), and Mississippi where the White
Knights of the KKK have been holding highly visible recruitment events (ADL, 2007b). The emergence of chapters in areas of the country not typically known for Klan activity has mostly taken place in Mid-Atlantic states such as New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland, and West Virginia (ADL, 2007b). Traditional Klan regions are also experiencing growth in new chapters, especially in Florida and Texas (ADL, 2007b). Not only is the increase in new chapters of interest, but it is also the immediate growth of membership that is causing watchdog groups and law enforcement agencies a great deal of concern (ADL, 2007b). For example, the Empire Knights of the KKK was founded in 2005 and has already claimed the establishment of chapters in 18 states in less than three years (ADL, 2007b).

The second branch of the WSM in the United States is the Christian Identity religion (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000). Christian Identity has been influential and pervasive within the WSM and some scholars refer to it as “white supremacist orthodoxy” (Barkun, 1997, p. 3). While the first official Christian Identity church in the United States was not established until 1946, the Identity religion dates back to the mid-1800’s in Great Britain, known as British Israelism (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000). Briefly stated, this religion promotes the notion that the white race is “…the direct descendants of Ancient Israel, and therefore God’s chosen people” (Perry, 1998, p. 301). Christian Identity religion is essentially an adaptation of British Israelism (Dobratz and Shanks-Meile, 2000). Charles Totten, Howard Rand, and William Cameron, all representatives of British Israelism in the United States are most often credited with the transformation of the religion into the anti-Semitic and racist theology of Christian Identity (Barkun, 1997). As people became drawn in and involved in meetings for
British Israelism through the leaderships of Totten, Rand, and Cameron, many anti-Semitic publications and viewpoints were being circulated during the 1920’s and 1930’s regarding the Jewish conspiracy to dominate the world⁹ (1997). By the 1940’s and 1950’s Wesley Swift, a former Klansman, became the most influential Identity adherent in the WSM (Ferber, 1999). The religion slowly transitioned to accepting and preaching anti-Semitic viewpoints as doctrine where Jews were recognized as being directly linked to the devil (Barkun, 1997; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000). The three core beliefs that characterize Christian Identity are: 1) pure Aryans are the true descendants of the tribes of Israel, thus God’s chosen people; 2) the Jews are the direct descendants of Satan and can be traced to Eve’s sexual relationship with the serpent in the Garden of Eden; and 3) the world is on the brink of the apocalypse where whites are charged with saving the world from Jewish hegemony (Barkun, 1997). As various churches began to emerge ‘preaching’ such beliefs, Christian Identity religion gained a place in the WSM as biblical justification for violence (1997). In fact, it is probably no coincidence that two of the most dangerous WSM terrorist groups in contemporary history (the Order and the Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord discussed later) were comprised of a majority of Identity fundamentalists. Like the Klan however, Christian Identity has become significantly splintered over the decades (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000). Even though there is a great deal of diversity within the movement when it comes to religion, Christian Identity is the pinnacle of WS theology. Currently, specific estimates of actual churches that purport to be Christian Identity (or some derivation) are unknown. Christian Identity adherents number between 2,000 and 50,000 in the US (Barkun, 1997).

⁹ The most famous of these publications, The Dearborn Independent, had strong ties to Henry Ford who was well-known for his anti-Semitic beliefs (Barkun, 1994).
The third branch within the WSM is broadly known as neo-Nazis (also may be referred to as National Socialists) (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000). One of the first official neo-Nazi organizations to emerge was in 1958, founded by George Rockwell (2000). Influenced by a constellation of factors including the influx of immigrants, the emergence of civil rights, and especially the anti-German–American sentiment in the United States during and after World War II, Rockwell established the National Socialist White People’s Party (2000, p. 57). Interestingly, like cross-burnings are associated with the KKK, the often heard phrase “white-power” came from Rockwell in his writings and speeches throughout the 1950’s (2000, p. 58). Less than a decade later however, Rockwell was assassinated by a fellow member of his organization (2000). For years after this incident, there would be several changes in leadership and splintering of members leading to the formation of many groups under the neo-Nazi umbrella (2000).

Regardless of minor discord for various reasons, these groups do share core values and goals while going through periods of splintering and merging (2000). Neo-Nazi organizations are often modeled after Hitler and his Nazi military (2000). While the Klan is heavily influenced by its own history, and Christian Identity by “creative” interpretations of the Bible (Perry, 1998), neo-Nazi’s often use Hitler’s Mein Kampf as a foundational source (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000). This branch also has a history of being the most active in terms of demonstrations, leafleting, propaganda/comics, and books\textsuperscript{10} (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000). The Southern Poverty Law Center (2007) currently estimates that there are nearly 200 neo-Nazi groups active in the United States.

\textsuperscript{10} One of the most well-known leaders in the American neo-Nazi movement, the late William Pierce of National Alliance, authored the infamous Turner Diaries, the fictional race war book that was Timothy McVeigh’s “blueprint” for the Oklahoma City Bombing (Smith, 1994).
today (SPLC, 2007a). Neo-Nazis are probably most closely linked in overlapping membership and symbolism with the fourth branch of the WSM.

The fourth branch that is part of the WSM in the United States is most commonly referred to as skinheads\(^{11}\) (Dobratz and Shanks-Meile, 2000). Skinheads are the least understood branch of the WSM (2000). The likely reason for this is that skinheads are typically younger than members of their counterpart organizations\(^{12}\) (Hamm, 1993). Because of their age, skinheads’ beliefs and membership are likely more fluid than adult members. Consequently, many skinhead members will grow out of these groups with age, while adults in other organizations have come to solidify their attitudes, values and identities in their respective WS organizations (Hamm, 1993). This characteristic has made it quite difficult for researchers to get an accurate categorization of groups and members (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000). Certainly, however, their historical emergence is well known.

Skinheads originally emerged in Great Britain in the 1960’s and were essentially classified as a deviant youth subculture, characterized by their punk rock music and haircuts (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000). These were loosely based groups of young people that came from working-class families that were quite prejudiced towards immigrants (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000). Skinhead style crossed the ocean and started to appear in the United States, mostly in the punk rock scene, in the 1970’s (Simi, 2006). The punk scene eventually splintered as some punks became increasingly

\(^{11}\) It is relevant to note that not all skinheads are racist, and in fact, non-racist skinheads (e.g., Skinheads Against Racial Prejudice [SHARP] outnumber their racist counterparts (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000; Ferber, 1999). Within the context of this analysis, ‘skinhead’ can always be understood as meaning a racist skinhead.

\(^{12}\) Although the age factor makes sense and is a claim that is often made, it has not yet been verified by empirical evidence.
radicalized, or “hardcore” (Simi, 2006, p. 149). These hardcore youth marked the beginnings of early skinhead gangs that adopted traditional skinhead style (e.g., shaved heads, boots, etc.), territorial violence with other street gangs, and varying forms of delinquency (Simi, 2006). Overt racism however, was not a central characteristic of early skinhead gangs (Simi, 2006). In these formative years, skinheads were part of a larger rebellious youth subculture and as time went on, skinheads emerged as a more distinct youth culture (Simi, 2006). While the majority of racist skinhead gangs were not politically active in the WSM and restricted their use of violence to defend their own territories (Simi, 2006), some skinhead organizations became a hotbed for recruitment into adult organizations (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000; Hamm, 1993). For skinheads that did not age out of their white supremacist beliefs, they could ultimately ‘graduate’ to more sophisticated white supremacist organizations, or at the very least, leadership roles within their current gangs (Hamm, 1993). Tom Metzger, a well-known white-supremacist, and Richard Butler, founder of the Aryan Nations organization, actively recruited skinheads into their groups as did others in the WSM (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000). Many individuals in the other three branches of the WSM commonly refer to skinheads as “…the security forces and the foot soldiers in the movement” (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000, p. 67). Estimates differ in the number of racist skinhead organizations in the United States, from conservative estimates of around 80 groups (SPLC, 2007a) to higher estimates of approximately 110 organizations (ADL, 2006).

While there is a great deal of overlap between ideology and membership among the Klan, Christian Identity believers, neo-Nazi’s, and skinheads (Berlet & Vysotsky, 2006; Gardell, 2003; Simi & Futrell, 2006), there is discord within each of the four
categories and across categories, creating a complex web of various WSM organizations that in actuality are based around central tenets of RWE (i.e., anti-minority, anti-government, etc.). Gardell (2003) refers to the WSM as a “smorgasbord” of varying ideologies (p. 67). Further, as society has become progressively more tolerant of particular lifestyles, it seems that groups claiming to be a part of the WSM are openly becoming more active as evidenced by Waldner, Martin, and Capeder’s (2006) analysis of gay racist skinhead forums on the internet. As the author’s note, most would “dismiss gay skinheads as a contradiction in terms” and historically it unequivocally would have been (Waldner, Martin, and Capeder, 2006, p. 165). Cases such as these however (though rare), demonstrate quite clearly that the WSM is not one unitary phenomenon, and fundamental differences can exist within the same social movement. What the above discussion does provide is a chronological picture of the manifestations of the core factions of the WSM in the United States. Particular groups within these core factions that are a part of this analysis will be discussed in more detail in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 (Data and Methodology, Results and Discussion, and Conclusion respectively).

As stated above, the following mixed methodological study will analyze RWT, most of which are connected to the WSM. The above historical discussion provided an overview of the emergence of the WSM in the United States. The purpose of the following analysis is to explore how individuals become involved in RWT and the relationship between RWT and the broader SM to which it belongs (WSM). I focus on the intricate process by which people join or are recruited into these terrorist groups. I am examining whether individuals go from ‘0-terrorism’ so to speak, or alternatively, are they exposed to an extremist group first and progressively become radicalized to the
point of joining a terrorist group? It is this process and the dynamics that surround it that I am concerned. To summarize then, I will be focusing my attention on three interrelated issues; (1) What are the structural characteristics of the involvement process? (2) What is the influence of family dynamics on the involvement process? (3) What is the significance of one’s non-familial relationships on the involvement process (this will include an examination of the relationship between right-wing extremist [RWE] groups and RWT groups)? Finally, and while discussed in greater detail later, the above three questions are not mutually exclusive and indeed will involve some overlapping concepts and measures\(^\text{13}\). This should not be viewed as unusual or problematic due to the fact that the areas under analysis are complex social processes that cannot be precisely delineated from one another.

\(^{13}\) See Appendix A Figure 2 for a Path Analysis Model of Research Questions and Analytical Tools which will be discussed in great detail later.
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

There has been a great deal of research on why individuals join informal and formal groups. This question has been applied to a broad range of organizations including volunteer groups (Becker & Dhindra, 2001; McPherson, 1981; Rotolo, 2000), civic and leisure groups (Hagedorn & Labovitz, 1968; Rotolo & Wilson, 2003; Serow, 1991), political interest groups (Faich & Gale, 1971; Forsythe & Welch, 1983; Knoke, 1986; McCulloch, 1990), college fraternal and sorority organizations (Kimbrough, 1995; Mongell & Roth, 1991), farming co-ops (Cell, 1980; Rook & Carlson, 1985), labor unions (Seidman, London, & Karsh, 1951), and church congregations (Bibby & Brinkerhoff, 1973; Levi, 2003; D. V. A. Olson, 1989; G. L. Wilson, Keyton, Johnson, Geiger, & Clark, 1993). Though not an exhaustive list, the aforementioned illustrates past research regarding why individuals join conventional organizations. Following della Porta (1995, p. 166), I will examine, “How and why do people join underground organizations”? This question, though seldom researched, has been addressed mostly in the social behavioral science fields of social movements, new religious movements (NRM) (previously referred to as cults), and most recently, terrorism. What do we know from these interrelated fields? While these disciplines have addressed a variety of issues, the following will provide a detailed overview of previous findings as it relates to characteristics of the involvement and/or recruitment processes.

In addition to using terrorism research (which has comparatively been the least studied area regarding involvement processes), I am also using research from social movements and NRM to guide my dissertation. Though the study of involvement processes has been applied to a variety of groups/organizations (see above), these
additional two fields are most closely related to terrorism in that the decision to join any
groups of these types requires an individual to deviate from mainstream society. Indeed,
identifying “a collectivity” of semi-organized (or fully organized) individuals promoting
change in the society to which they belong, also known as a social movement, inherently
suggests that these individuals are deviating from the current establishment because they
have a specific grievance with the current status quo (McAdam & Snow, 1997, p. xviii).14

Likewise, NRMs deviate from its host society’s mainstream religious
organizations which are usually defined by the prevailing establishment (Melton, 2004).
As Melton (2004) points out, the status of NRMs “…are thus primarily defined not by
any characteristic(s) that they share, but by their relationship to…religious life
represented by the dominant churches” (p. 27). For example, one of the largest churches
in the United States that is commonly intertwined with some of the most well-known
schools, universities, and medical institutions, the United Methodist Church, is defined
by Greece’s government as a “destructive cult” because it deviates so far from their
dominant Orthodox faiths (Melton, 2004, p. 25). NRMs are better characterized when
considered within the field of religious studies’ church-sect-new religion spectrum
(2004). Churches are the dominant religions within a society, sects are those religious
organizations that tolerably differ (in beliefs or proceedings) from the host society’s
churches, and NRMs differ to a degree that is entirely unacceptable to the host society’s
churches and sects (2004).

14 Like most fields in the social sciences, there is not a single, agreed upon definition of social movements
(McAdam & Snow, 1997). However, what is used above is part of McAdam and Snow’s (1997) definition
formulated after having identified the most common elements found in scientific definitions of this
phenomenon.
Finally, past scholarship in the study of terrorism will be used. Though more seldom researched than its anti-mainstream counterparts mentioned above, there have been some key works concerning an individual’s involvement in terrorist groups. Also like social movements and NRMs, defining terrorism has become a “conceptual minefield” for scholars and government officials alike. Nonetheless, nearly all past studies claim that terrorism involves the following: dissident violence (or threat of) inciting emotions of fear (terror) in a country’s government/citizenry for the purposes of forced political and/or social change advantageous to the perpetrator(s) (terrorists) (Schmid & Jongman, 1988). Regardless of particularities in meaning, studies in all three of these interrelated fields have yielded two recurring themes accounting for how individuals come to be involved in subversive organizations. The vast majority of social movement, NRM, and terrorist group participants join due to either 1) biographical availability or 2) social networks (frequently a combination of both characterizes the process of becoming involved).

Biographical Availability

Social movements, NRMs, and terrorist groups are all organizations centered on ideological convictions. The logical answer as to the reason individuals join these types of groups is simply an extension of the above statement: individuals join such groups because they share in the organization’s ideological proclivities. This seems like a valid assumption and indeed may account for some individuals who join these types of groups.

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15 For a comprehensive discussion of definitions of terrorism, see Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman’s (1988) *Political Terrorism*.
16 Again refer to Appendix A Figure 2 for the Path Analysis Model of Research Questions and Analytical Tools.
More telling, however, is the fact that it cannot possibly explain the countless number of individuals “whose attitudes place them in the ‘latitude of acceptance’” with a particular social movement, NRM, or terrorist group’s ideology but do not engage in any form of participation or activism with the organization (McAdam & Paulsen, 1997, p. 148). In fact, it has been widely accepted that psychological attributes and individual predispositions cannot explain an individual’s decision to join these groups (McAdam & Paulsen, 1997; Snow, Zurcher Jr., & Ekland-Olson, 1997). Personal beliefs are certainly not irrelevant and may matter in terms of one’s likelihood for attempting to join these groups. But in the actual commitment to an organization, personal beliefs are often secondary to other circumstances simultaneously taking place. One of these processes is known as biographical availability. A concept developed primarily in social movement research, biographical availability is best defined as “the absence of personal constraints that may increase the costs and risks of movement participation…costs and risks of protest activity are not equal for everyone” (McAdam, 1986, p. 70). More simply stated, an individual can only join a group if they are in fact available to do so, regardless of ideological beliefs. Examples of personal constraints most often analyzed include an individual’s age, education level, socio-economic status, employment status and occupation type, marital status and family, religious affiliations, and life turning points (e.g., divorce, job change, moving, etc.). Findings regarding each of the most common aforementioned constraints will be discussed.
Age

An individual’s age appears to be highly correlated with membership in a social movement, NRM, or terrorist group. Providing evidence for a commonly assumed strategy regarding recruitment, Blazak (2001) finds that neo-Nazi skinheads frequently gain membership by scouting area high schools for disaffected youth as a means to increase organizational membership. Unlike Blazak’s (2001) predatory model, Smith finds that the average age of individuals indicted for terrorist-related charges is nearly two decades older between 32-35 (1994). The above are exceptions however and the vast majority of research has found that individuals that join these groups tend to do so during the years in between the above cases. Analyzing nearly a thousand applicants volunteering for the 1964 Freedom Summer project in Mississippi, Doug McAdam (1986) was able to draw many conclusions regarding one’s propensity to join a high-risk social movement\textsuperscript{17}. McAdam (1986) argues that the window years from about 20 to 26 are critically relevant to social movement participation because outside of this range people become biographically unavailable. Before the age of 20, young people are too constrained by the wishes of their parents, usually involving school, the need for adult supervision, etc. (1986). While after age 26, people are too constrained by the responsibilities of adult responsibilities, such as maintaining a full-time job, marital partnerships, and raising children (McAdam, 1986). Similarly, research on NRM participants reveals that very few join while younger than 18 due to parental dependency.

\textsuperscript{17} The Freedom Summer campaign of 1964 was a project that enlisted college students from mostly the northern parts of the United States as volunteers to help staff freedom schools, register black voters, and raise awareness of Civil Rights activism in the South. Participation in Freedom Summer can be considered a high-risk/cost social movement due to the fact that participants needed to commit to living and working in the South for two months over the summer, and financially support themselves. Further, three volunteers were kidnapped and murdered by segregationists at the beginning of the project, while intimidation, beatings, and unlawful arrests continued throughout the summer (McAdam, 1986, p. 71).
and supervision (Levine, 2003). Between the ages of 21 to 26 young adults are relatively free to depart from the influence of their parents’ religious/spiritual beliefs for the first time (Levine, 2003). Indeed this is a time of forming one’s adult identity while at the same time still free of any adult-like constraints, well over half of NRM participants report joining during these years (Barker, 1984; Dawson, 2003; Levine, 2003; Rochford, 1985; Wright & Piper, 1986). However, some researchers have found that as the required level of commitment becomes less demanding as is the case in some NRM, the distribution of ages at which people join becomes more widespread (30’s-40’s) (Carter, 1990; Latkin, Hagan, Littman, & Sundberg, 1987; Palmer, 1994; Wallis, 1977; B. Wilson & Dobbelare, 1994). Also consistent with the majority of social movement and NRM research, Sageman (2004) found that the average age of Islamic Jihad terrorists was 25. This finding is consistent with a great deal of past research on various terrorist typologies where nearly all participants joined between the ages of 18 to 31 (Clark, 1983; Handler, 1990; Hassan, 2001; Pedahzur, Perliger, & Weinberg, 2003; Russell & Miller, 1983; Strentz, 1988; Weinberg & Eubank, 1987). Though there are some outliers, the majority of individuals become involved in social movements, NRMs, and terrorist organizations in their 20’s during that window of availability between being dependent on their parents and developing adult responsibilities.

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18 Sageman (2004) has a total of 172 terrorists in his sample. He defines all of them as being Muslim, following the Salafi interpretation of Islam. Such an interpretation is a “revivalist movement” in which its followers attempt to “restore” Islam to a fundamentalist or “authentic” ancient form advocating and using violent/terroristic means (Sageman, 2004, p. 1). Throughout his work, Sageman (2004) refers to his sample as Salafi Mujahedin (meaning Muslim guerillas engaged in a Jihad). He defines Jihad as “any form of activity, either personal or communal, undertaken by Muslims in attempting to follow the path of God”, and further refers to his sample of Islamic terrorists as being engaged in the “global Salafi Jihad” (Sageman, 2004, p. 1). It warrants noting that these terms (i.e., Jihad, Jihadist, Mujahedin, Fundamentalism, Fundamentalist) are not without contentions and in fact are currently under a great deal of scrutiny and debate. Please refer to Martin Marty’s and R. Scott Appleby’s extensive work for further discussion of the issues (1992, 1994, 1996).
Education

Findings regarding an individual’s level of education as a predictor of involvement in a social movement, NRM, or terrorist organization have been mixed. Oliver (1997) found that active members in a collective action neighborhood association were consistently more highly educated than token (nonparticipating) members concluding that there were two possible reasons. Educated individuals have learned more skills that provide them with the ability to better help the social movement or those less educated are likely in more restrictive occupations working more hours (1997). Regardless of the reason, educated individuals are more biographically available to participate (1997). The above is an example of a socially acceptable and even encouraged social movement, and common belief is that participants in less mainstream and even abhorrent social movements are likely less educated.

To the contrary, Blee (2002) found in her interviews of 34 women active in the WSM that 85% had graduated high school and nearly half were college educated. Also studying the WSM, Aho (1990) finds that of 383 participants, 38% have high school degrees, 25% have some college education, 20% have a four-year degree, and nearly 10% have a graduate degree. Of 89 WSM activists, Simi and Futrell (2008) found that the majority had a high school degree and 25% had at least some college education. Likewise, scholars have consistently found that NRM participants tend to not only be more educated than the general US population, but exceptionally so (Dawson, 2003). A study examining a sample of Scientologists found nearly 60% had a four year degree (Wallis, 1977), while more than a quarter of the members in Church Universal and Triumphant have graduate degrees (Jones, 1994), and in the NRM known as the
Rajneeshpuram, 36% of members have graduate degrees (12% of which are doctorates) and the remaining 64% all have a four year degree (Latkin, et al., 1987). The aforementioned groups are only examples that provide a picture into a much broader pattern regarding education and NRM involvement. Indeed, in their national survey of nearly 13,000 households, Bader and Demaris (1996) confirm that the more highly educated an individual is, the more likely they are to affiliate themselves with a NRM than a mainstream church. There are mixed findings in terrorism research.

Confirming social movement and NRM findings, Sageman (2004) finds that of 132 Salafi Jihad terrorists 29% have some college, 33% have a four year degree, 5% have a master’s degree, and 4% have a doctorate. In other words, 70% of terrorists in his sample were college educated (2004). But, contrary to Sageman’s (2004) terrorist sample and Blee’s (2002) WSM activist sample, Smith (1994) found that his sample of WSM terrorist indictees were less educated with only 12% having a college degree, 33% having a GED or less, and the remaining indictees were high school graduates. Though mixed findings exist, it appears that joining a social movement, NRM, or terrorist organization tends to be correlated with an increased level of education. It is possible that as individuals become more formally educated, they also become more biographically available in a number of ways. Some examples may include a greater amount of skill sets attractive to an organization, more free time to participate (working less jobs/hours), and having a more open worldview to allow for deviating from mainstream society.

19 It warrants mentioning however that Brent Smith’s (1994) sample is made up entirely of indictees. In other words, these are not proven terrorists like those in Sageman’s (2004) sample or experienced WPM activists like those in Blee’s (2002) sample though it is probable that this is the case.
Socio-Economic Status

Findings regarding the correlation of socio-economic status (SES) with involvement in a social movement, NRM, or terrorist group are quite similar to those regarding education levels. Oliver (1997) found that active participants in the collective action neighborhood association were significantly more likely to own their own homes and have much higher incomes than token members. Whether it was due to time constraints (e.g., working more hours, multiple jobs) or resources (e.g., transportation), the poorer an individual is, the less biographically available he is to participate in social movements (Oliver, 1997). Interestingly, while Blee (2002) found that nearly all of the WSM activists in her sample were at least middle-class, Blazak (2001) found that high school youth in lower SES classes were most likely to be recruited into skinhead organizations. One of the most consistent findings in the NRM literature is that a disproportionate number of participants are from middle and upper SES classes (Barker, 1984; Dawson, 2003; Jones, 1994; Latkin, et al., 1987; Levine, 2003; Rochford, 1985; Wallis, 1977; B. Wilson & Dobbelnaere, 1994; Wright & Piper, 1986). Findings in terrorism research have been more mixed and it appears that SES is correlated with the type of terrorist group. For example, terrorist scholars analyzing Islamic terrorists and left-wing terrorists find that the majority come from at least middle-class, and many from upper-middle to upper-class backgrounds (Hassan, 2001; Pedahzur, et al., 2003; Russell & Miller, 1983; Sageman, 2004; Strentz, 1988; Weinberg & Eubank, 1987). But, in the few studies looking at RWT, findings indicate that the majority of these individuals come from lower to working class backgrounds (Handler, 1990; Smith, 1994). The majority of research (but certainly not all) supports that individuals from middle-class or higher SES
backgrounds are more biographically available to join social movements, NRM, or terrorist organizations, and thus are more represented than their lower-class counterparts in these populations.

**Employment Status and Occupation Type**

Arguably, education level, SES, and employment status/occupation type are variables measuring similar concepts. In other words, the more educated an individual is, the more likely they are to be in a higher economic bracket because they are more likely to have secure employment at a well paying job. Though there has been very little research on employment/occupation type, it is not surprising that the few findings regarding these variables follow the same pattern as level of education and SES relating to an individual’s likelihood for involvement in social movements, NRMs, or terrorist groups. McAdam (1986) found that 78% of his Freedom Summer social movement participants were either unemployed or employed part-time; this however was merely due to the fact that the vast majority of participants were college students. The remaining 22% were employed full-time and 70% of which were teachers (1986). Further, those applicants that were employed full-time were significantly more likely than their unemployed counterparts to follow through by participating (as opposed to withdrawing after application). This finding lends a great deal of support for the idea that participating in high-risk and demanding organizations is highly dependent upon one’s biographical availability (namely, teachers have summers off) (1986).

Even in more unpopular social movements like the WSM, researchers have found that most were employed full-time in professional occupations (Blee, 2002). In his
research on Salafi Jihad terrorists, Sageman (2004) found that very few were employed full-time. However, prior to joining the Jihad (a high-risk and extremely demanding anti-mainstream movement), 43% were in professional occupations, 33% were skilled workers, and 24% were unskilled workers (2004). Again, due to the demands of terrorism, this sample of Islamic Jihadists chose to leave their jobs in order to be available to the group (2004). Nearly all of them however, were previously employed full-time, most of which in professional careers (2004). Also following previously established patterns in education and SES for RWT particularly (and again opposite of the majority of findings for other organizations), Smith (1994) found that most RWT indictees were unemployed or underemployed. Most research finds that individuals who join an anti-mainstream organization are or were previous to joining the group employed full-time in professional occupations. Those who remained in their occupations seemed to have jobs that allowed them availability to join their respective groups, and if not, many joiners chose to quit their jobs in exchange for more availability.

Marital Status and Family

It seems logical that being married, and especially having children would decrease one’s biographical availability thus decreasing their likelihood for joining a social movement, NRM, or terrorist organization. Like employment status and occupation type, there has not been a great deal of research specifically analyzing the influence of family circumstances. Though McAdam (1986) concluded that the very young were constrained by parents and the older were likely constrained by adult responsibilities (loosely defined as being in the workforce, having a family, etc.), he did find that married applicants were
far less likely than their unmarried counterparts to withdraw from participating in Freedom Summer. Overall however, the majority of participants were unmarried (1986). Though generally less biographically available than individuals without family responsibilities, a plausible explanation for married applicants being less likely to withdraw from participation once it was time to depart for the site of Freedom Summer is possibly due to a greater degree of stability in their lives allowing them to better predict future events/scheduling (1986). Similarly, Blee (2002) found that most of her social movement participants were married with children. However, these results may be less representative of other social movement participants for two reasons. First, this may be an artifact of an entirely female sample (2002). Second, the social movement these women are participating in believe strongly that it is a woman’s duty to marry and bear children for the movement (2002).

Focusing on a different angle regarding the effects of marital status on NRM participation, Bader and Demaris (1996) found that the amount of marriages a person has significantly increases their likelihood of joining a mainstream church or a religious sect, however has no influence on a person’s likelihood for joining a NRM. Finally, prior research regarding terrorists finds that “most terrorists are unmarried and that those who are married tend to sever family ties upon embarking on a terrorists career” (Sageman, 2004, pp. 79-80). Sageman (2004) finds the opposite however, in his examination of 114 Salafi Jihad terrorists, where 73% were married and the majority of which had children. From the little research that has analyzed the effects of family situations, it can be asserted that it is not uncommon for anti-mainstream organization participants to be married and raising children. However, it is clear that further research must be done on
more participants in different organizations, and especially studies that attempt to explain existing correlations.

Religious Affiliations

An individual’s lifelong religious affiliations have been substantially overlooked as to whether it has an influence on joining a social movement. Indeed, Aho (1990) asserts that “it is still an open question how religious backgrounds are transmuted…into political activism” referring to this as an “immense theoretical gap” in the literature (1990, p. 185). In his assessment of right-wing extremists in the United States, or what he refers to as the Patriot Movement, Aho (1990) finds that there appears to be a mixed spectrum of participants reporting everything from mainstream religious upbringing (e.g., Catholicism, Protestantism, etc.) to no religious upbringing. Findings in much of the NRM research also indicate mixed results, although some researchers have concluded that the “unchurched” (Dawson, 2003, p. 123) are more open to cult participation than those with a history of having been involved in mainstream religion (Stark & Bainbridge, 1980). For example, over 75% of participants in the NRM known as Nichiren Shoshu in Great Britain claim that they did not belong to any religious organization prior to joining, and 47% claim that they have never been introduced to religion at all (B. Wilson & Dobbelaere, 1994). Likewise, only 40% of all members of Rajneeshpuram claim to have been involved in a religion prior to joining (Latkin, et al., 1987). It is possible that having no prior experiences with religion leaves an individual more susceptible, or biographically available, to joining a NRM.
To the contrary however, Wright and Piper (1986) found that out of 90 participants in the Unification Church, Hare Krishna, and Children of God/Family of Love NRM, 41% were raised Catholic, 41% were raised Protestant, 9% were raised Jewish, and the remaining 9% claimed no childhood affiliation. Though they do caution that 86% of those raised in a mainstream religion claim that their participation and indoctrination was nominal at best (e.g., mass on holidays, etc.) (1986). Nonetheless, this population is still distinct from being entirely “unchurched” (Dawson, 2003, p. 123).

Other work on Hare Krishna, however, has yielded different findings. Fifty percent of Rochford’s (1985) sample were not only raised in religious homes, but 77% assert that they were educated in mainstream religious schools, with over half attending church on a weekly basis and another 30% attended mass at least occasionally.

Like social movement research, religious affiliation has been largely if not entirely overlooked in terrorism scholarship with Sageman’s (2004) work on Salafi Jihad terrorists being one of the few exceptions. Of 108 terrorists, 49% report having been raised in religious households, and approximately 15% had an Islamic based formal education (Sageman, 2004). Just prior to joining the Jihad however, 99% of 155 terrorists report being extremely devoted to the Islamic faith (2004). Reported numbers from childhood and adult affiliation should be taken with caution though as this sample particularly is taken from an area traditionally marked by widespread religious affiliation (more so than Western countries) (2004). It is possible that these numbers are inflated compared to other terrorist typologies in less religious areas of the world. The influence of religious affiliation, in relation to joining social movements, NRM, and terrorist organizations is in need of further inquiry. As it stands, results have been predominantly
mixed with the exception of some emerging patterns of the “unchurched” being more susceptible to joining NRMs.

**Life Turning Points**

Another necessary condition in Lofland and Stark’s (1965) and Lofland’s (1966) theory of conversion developed from their NRM research on Doomsday Cult converts is that individuals must be at a self-perceived turning point in their lives when they come into contact with the group to be joined. A life turning point can be understood as:

a moment when old lines of action were complete, had failed, or had been or were about to be disrupted, and when they were faced with the opportunity or necessity for doing something different with their lives (Lofland, 1966, p. 50; Lofland & Stark, 1965, p. 870)

This opportunity to do something different with one’s life is essentially having a greater degree of biographical availability (desired or forced) than those that are not at a turning point in their lives. The authors consistently found this to be the case with each individual that joined the Doomsday Cult (1966; 1965). Analyzing over 500 conversion experiences of the NRM known as Nichiren Shoshu Buddhism in the United States, Snow and Phillips (1997) find some support for Lofland and Stark’s (1965) model of conversion. Measuring potential life turning points like job loss, divorce, military drafts, dropping out of school, and close encounters with death, the authors find that over 70% of converts claimed to be at a life turning point just prior to joining the Nichiren Shoshu Buddhists (Snow & Phillips, 1997). In their survey of nearly 12,500 families regarding church, sect, and NRM involvement, Bader and Demaris (1996) also attempted to measure life turning points specifically focusing on the number of marriages, residential moves, adult employment, and the authority figures in one’s childhood as turning points
that may influence an individual’s likelihood for joining a church, sect, or NRM. The author’s found that life turning points had the greatest influence on individual’s joining churches and sects, but contrary to Lofland (1966) and Lofland and Stark (1965), turning points showed no significant effects on the likelihood for joining a NRM (1996).

There is a great deal of evidence to suggest that prior to joining a NRM, individual’s perceive themselves as being at some decision point in their lives. There is also significant evidence to suggest however that such turning points are not a necessary condition to conversion as Lofland and Stark (1965) and Lofland (1966) once asserted (Bader & Demaris, 1996; Snow & Phillips, 1997). Claiming that being at a turning point in life prior to joining a group like a NRM is fraught with problems beyond calling it a necessary condition. Indeed, Blee’s (2002) research on women in the WSM points to the ambiguous, subjective, and retrospective nature of self-identified turning points influencing their conversion. Blee (2002) finds that each of the WSM activists she interviewed recalled a story of conversion into the movement that was very exact and detailed pointing to specific incidents (often with race as a backdrop) and using their new found racist ideology to define their pasts. The problem however, was that her data suggest a very different story of conversion. While Blee (2002) asserts, like other researchers have, that turning points may account for some influence in the conversion process, it is clear that the women in her sample have created a story completely ignoring other factors. More specifically, in each of her cases, women ignored their greatest influence of all; social networks.
Social Networks

As stated earlier, the wide acceptance that psychological attributes and individual predispositions cannot fully account, or even minimally account for an individual’s decision to join social movements, NRM’s, and terrorist organizations has prompted scholars to analyze other processes (McAdam & Paulsen, 1997; Snow, et al., 1997). In addition to biographical availability, there is substantial evidence pointing to the influence of social networks. Originating in anthropology over a century ago, the study of social networks was breaking analytical ground by looking at the influence of one’s interpersonal networks in various social situations like the diffusion of information, social behaviors, and social cohesion (Granovetter, 1973). Through the decades, the analysis of social networks, especially as they relate to joining or being recruited into an organization, has most often been demarcated into three categories. The first and most common area of social network research has focused on the strength and number of ties one has to the object in question (in this case, a subversive group like a social movement, NRM, or terrorist organization). The second area of social network influence specifically related to joining an organization is the number of memberships one has in interrelated groups like the organization in question. Finally, the influence of extra-group ties (ties external to an organization that an individual belongs to) has also been analyzed as a factor influencing the likelihood of joining or being recruited into an organization.

Strength and Number of Ties

The strength (i.e., degree of intimacy between two people or type of relation to another person) and number of ties has proven to be one of the most influential aspects of
social networks on a person joining or being recruited into a social movement, NRM, or terrorist group. In his analysis of over 950 Freedom Summer applicants, McAdam (1986) found that participants claimed to have two times as many friends as fellow applicants and to claim that they knew (i.e., acquaintance or less in terms of the strength of tie) at least three times as many known activists on their applications than those applicants that were “no shows” to the site of Freedom Summer (p. 64). In a follow up study on Freedom Summer applicants, McAdam and Paulsen (1997) conclude that the preexisting ties to friends and acquaintances also in the pool of applicants are pivotal to whether a person actually participates. Indeed, these individuals serve to reinforce the potential recruit’s identity with the social movement, thus sealing their decision to join (1997). This is a recurring finding in much of the social movement literature, where the majority of individuals in a social movement recruit from within their preexisting social networks (Blazak, 2001), and likewise, individuals that join a social movement already know individuals within the social movement (Aho, 1990; Blee, 2002; Futrell & Simi, 2004; Gould, 1997; Snow, et al., 1997). In her comprehensive analysis of left-wing social movement activists and terrorists in Italy and Germany, della Porta (1995) found that friendship ties were the single most important factor influencing an individual’s likelihood for joining the social movement. She found that 75% of participants had at least one preexisting friend in the movement already (1995). Further, 75% of those had more than one preexisting friend, while another 50% had seven or more (1995). Della Porta (1995) found that those with seven or more friendship ties were often a function of several members of the same social group deciding to join at the same time (also referred to as block recruiting). Finally, in analyzing the individuals from social movements that
eventually moved to operating underground as terrorist organizations, della Porta (1995) concluded that the strength of the friendship tie with the recruiter mattered considerably more than one’s dedication to the ideological beliefs of the movement. In other words, the stronger the friendship was, the more likely the social movement activist would follow the recruiter underground to become a terrorist. Reiterating the finding that joining must be a consequence of something beyond parallel ideology, Aho (1990) states:

…converts are not particularly identifiable by their stupidity, by their genius, by their craziness, or by their transiency, but instead by the largely accidental fact of their having bonds with people already in or sympathetic with the movement… (p. 210).

Research in NRM’s has yielded similar findings. In fact, in the first comprehensive study of NRM conversion, Lofland and Stark (1965) and Lofland (1966) assert that a potential convert must experience an affective bond with a NRM member (thereby strengthening their network tie), and additionally, any ties external to the NRM (extra-NRM) must be non-existent or at least weakened. Indeed, the authors found that a preexisting friendship link usually preceded ultimate conversion into the “Doomsday Cult” (Lofland, 1966; Lofland & Stark, 1965). For NRM scholars who later tested the applicability of the necessary conditions in Lofland and Stark’s (1965) and Lofland’s (1966) Theory of Conversion, the majority of research indicates that individuals are most influenced to join an NRM because of preexisting social networks (Dawson, 2003; B. Wilson & Dobbelaere, 1994). Seeking more detail regarding the influence of networks, Stark and Bainbridge (1980) assessed and compared the influences of social ties in two NRM’s and one conventional faith (Mormonism). The authors found a significant amount of evidence for the importance of the strongest type of social tie influencing a person’s likelihood for joining a NRM or a conventional religious; family ties (Stark and
Bainbridge, 1980). In fact, nearly 75% of joiners in one of the NRM’s and the sample of Mormons had preexisting family links (Stark and Bainbridge, 1980). Additionally, preexisting friendship ties were also found for the majority of members in these organizations (Stark and Bainbridge, 1980). Finally, the authors also found that those least likely to defect were those that claimed to have made the strongest friendship bonds with members unknown to them prior to joining the group in question (Stark and Bainbridge, 1980).

Similar to some of the NRM research, Sageman (2004) also finds kinship ties to be of tremendous importance in joining Islamic terrorist organizations. In addition, Sageman (2004) was able to conclude that joining the terrorist group for many of the individual’s in his sample preceded any ideological commitment to organizational beliefs, certainly illustrating the power of social networks. Like della Porta (1995) in her work on left-wing terrorists, he also found that strong friendship bonds were nearly as influential as kinship ties. Finally, Sageman (2004) also uncovered a pattern that showed not only the importance of strong ties, but the role that weak ties can play in being recruited into Salafi Jihad terrorist groups. Reaffirming the most classic and early work regarding the “strength of weak ties” in social structures and relationships (Granovetter, 1973), Sageman (2004) found that weak social ties were pivotal in linking independent cliques of close friends that wanted to join the terrorist Jihad but did not know how. These linkages would often lead to block recruitments of clusters (Sageman, 2004). There is strong evidence to suggest that the number of ties one has to a social movement, NRM, or terrorist organization influence an individual’s propensity to join a group where the greater number of social ties holds a greater amount of influence. The strength of
one’s ties also seem to be an important factor where the more intimate or close a social
tie can be defined as being, the more likely it is to have a greater amount of influence, 
though even weak ties have been proven to be important as well.

Membership in Interrelated Organizations

There has also been a great deal of evidence to suggest that having multiple 
memberships in interrelated organizations is common among social movement 
participants. In his sample of right-wing extremists, Aho (1990) found that the majority 
of his sample had a number of lateral group memberships, where no particular group was 
necessarily more radical than the other but where they were all groups within the same 
broader social movement. Being so densely networked into a social movement through 
various outlets seems to strongly secure one’s commitment (Aho, 1990).

Other researchers have found that multiple memberships can cause a person to 
become increasingly radical in their beliefs eventually leading to their participation in a 
more extreme group. McAdam (1986) for example found that participants in Freedom 
Summer belonged to a greater number of politically based interest groups and had 
significantly higher levels of involvement in Civil Rights activism than their “no show” 
counterparts. It is logical that participants had more experiences with political activism, 
especially regarding Civil Rights, and had over time increased in their willingness to 
engage in high-risk activism like the Freedom Summer. Similarly, Almeida (2005) 
consistently found that participants with a high degree of “multi-sectoralness” (i.e., 
membership in an array of ideologically related social movement organizations that cut 
across different social groups from students to workers to clergy, etc.) (Almeida, 2005, p.
were the most likely to later participate in high-risk protest activity. Finally, della Porta (1995) concluded that most left-wing Italian and German terrorists were previously radicalized in at least one political activist group before moving underground. Like the amount of individual social group ties and the strength of those ties, the number of memberships across organizations also influences joiners by inducing radicalization. The likely reason is due to the increased amount of one’s social ties to a movement through several group memberships, which simultaneously decreases ties and communications external to the movement. In other words, their lives become enveloped in “the movement”.

**Extra-Group Ties**

Often overlooked in social network research on recruitment and joining processes is the possibility that ties can hinder one’s proclivity to join a group or organization. As Gould (1990) points out, most social network studies are initiated with an unspoken “…presupposition that existing social relations exert an unconditionally positive influence…” on an individual’s decision to join an organization (as cited in McAdam & Paulsen, 1997, p. 147). Indeed, one of Lofland (1966) and Lofland and Stark’s (1965) necessary conditions for joining a NRM was that individuals experience a weakened, if not entirely severed relationship with extra-group ties. Providing some evidence for the plausibility of such conditions, among McAdam’s (1986) sample of Freedom Summer applicants, “no shows” report a significantly higher number of extra-group ties that are oppositional to Civil Rights activism than those who participated (McAdam & Paulsen,
While a relatively under-researched area in social network scholarship, it can still be concluded that extra-group ties are influential.

**Past Research and Present Research Questions**

Research in social movements, NRM’s, and terrorism has yielded two major findings accounting for why individuals join such groups. Though ideological compatibilities increase the likelihood an individual will join a particular organization, it can be conclusively stated that people are either propelled or restrained the most by biographical availability and/or their social networks. Precisely how much influence various aspects of these processes hold is not fully understood however, and this is especially true in regard to joining terrorist groups. Indeed, the only comprehensive studies on joining terrorist groups are della Porta’s (1995) left-wing terrorists, and Sageman’s (2004) work with Islamic terrorists, as well as some similar analyses also with Islamic terrorists conducted by Horgan (2008, 2009) and the NYPD (Silber & Bhatt, 2007).

This dissertation focuses on the involvement processes of individuals who joined right-wing terrorist groups in the United States. I specifically examine (1) the structural characteristics of the involvement process (this will include an assessment of the biographical availability of indictees), (2) the influence of family dynamics on the involvement process (this includes an assessment of both biographical availability and social networks), and (3) the significance of one’s non-familial relationships on the involvement process (this will assess an individuals social networks, including an
examination of the relationship between right-wing extremist [RWE] groups and RWT groups). In the next chapter, I discuss the methods and data.
CHAPTER 3: DATA & METHODS

Mixed Methodology Research Design

In this chapter I will provide a detailed overview of the data in terms of sample selection and cases, sources used for data collection, data collection processes and methodological analyses, including the development of variables and coding, the development of case narratives, and finally, research limitations. This dissertation utilizes a mixed methodological approach to analyze the data for this exploratory study. As methodologists have stressed, the choice of research methodology is secondary to research questions (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). In other words, given the nature of my research questions and analytical concepts, a mixed methodological approach is required. My inquiries involve complex social processes that can only be minimally quantified, thus qualitative analyses must also be employed in order to delve into the intricacies of my data. The quantitative, variable-oriented portion is exploratory and inductive in nature and will only include frequencies and cross-tabulations in order to understand the distribution of my data (Ragin, 1987). This will be a traditional, case-study approach by doing qualitative case analysis (W. Olson, 2004; Ragin, 1987; Ragin & Becker, 1992; Rihoux, 2006; Stake, 1994).

I analyze in-depth case history data on 66 federally indicted WSM terrorists representing 10 different terrorist organizations in the United States. This data was also collected for an NIJ Grant that I worked on as a graduate research assistant (PI: Pete Simi, Title: “The Operation and Structure of Right-Wing Extremist Groups”, #: 2006-IJ-CX-0027). Two individuals were actually never indicted due to extraordinary circumstances. One individual was killed in a standoff with federal authorities and the other individual committed suicide while in custody awaiting charges. Further, regarding the latter mentioned case, authorities had not yet charged this individual as they were attempting to bargain with him for information regarding his co-conspirators. Had each individual
analysis is the individual indictees, who were included in the sample as part of a three stage process. Indictees were first selected based on their inclusion in *The American Terrorism Study Database* (ATS), which I used to establish the parameters of my sample; my cases are persons federally indicted for terroristic behaviors, thus officially labeled by the government as being a terrorist\(^{21}\) (Smith & Damphousse, 2006). The ATS project began in 1988 and is a comprehensive dataset including all federal terrorist indictments that occurred in the United States from 1980-2002\(^{22}\) (2006). I am using the ATS data due to the fact that it was the first publicly released dataset on terrorists in the United States, and is currently regarded as the most detailed source of information on domestic terrorists and the incidents they are alleged to have been involved in to date. Within the dataset, indictees are categorized and coded by their terrorism typology (i.e., international, environmental, left-wing, lone wolf, right-wing, etc.). After RW indictees were selected from the ATS dataset, non-WS RW indictees provided a sampling pool of 179 persons from 27 WSM groups.

The second stage of sample selection involved the development of activity thresholds. An activity threshold was developed because not all of the 179 RW-WS terrorists represented in the ATS database were indicted for acts of terrorism. In fact to

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\(^{21}\) Though largely beyond the scope here, it warrants mentioning that the government has a great deal of discretion regarding precisely who is and who is not a terrorist committing terrorism (Smith, 1994). ‘Indicted terrorists’ then are actually prosecuted under a constellation of already federally criminalized offenses, though the investigatory label of “terrorism” raises the priority level and designated resources to a case (1994). Certainly a limitation of the dataset when one is strictly concerned with behaviors and is restrained by political semantics. Nonetheless, the ATS provides concise and practical selection parameters. For further discussion regarding governmental labeling see Hoffman (2006), Schmid and Jongman (1988), and Smith (1994).

\(^{22}\) An exception to this is if a particular terrorism case has not been officially “closed”. For example, if a terrorist was indicted in 2000 and the case was still open beyond 2002 (at any stage; trial, appeals, etc.), then privacy laws, due process, issues of national security and the like would bar it from inclusion (Smith, 2007).
the contrary, less than half of the indictees were actually indicted for the actual
implementation of one of two types of crimes; an actual terrorist act(s) against a
designated target(s) or an instrumental violent crime(s) to enable future terrorist attacks
against a designated target(s) (e.g., armed robberies). The remaining individuals were
charged with a constellation of preparatory offenses aimed at executing their plans
(whether a terroristic plot or an act to support an impending terroristic plot)²³. This
discrepancy is not meant to minimize the severity and potential threat of such preparatory
behaviors by would-be terrorists because the detection of such actions should
undoubtedly be considered symptoms of impending terrorist incidents in need of
prevention. For the purposes of this analysis, the distinction between those that
committed acts and those that prepared or conspired to commit acts (terrorism or
instrumental crimes for terrorism) may matter. In other words, it begs the question
whether those that were apprehended prior to implementation would have implemented
anything at all. For the purposes of an inquiry into the properties of terroristic
involvement, however, it is arguably a necessary substantive condition that each of my
cases has crossed the threshold from contemplation to overt commission. While it is
possible that the properties could be identical in both contexts, it is equally possible that
the properties could be entirely different²⁴. After this filter was applied, 76 WSM
indictees representing 12 WSM terrorist groups remained.

The third consideration used to construct the sample relates to whether there was
enough secondary data not only available on each indictee’s particular case, but also their

²³ Examples of such preparatory behaviors may include crimes such as the possession and/or stockpiling of
illegal weaponry (firearms, explosive materials/devices), various combinations of conspiracy to commit
offenses (often amounting to a conversation with co-conspirator and infiltrator), various types of fraud, etc.
²⁴ This is an interesting, nonetheless empirical question requiring analysis which is beyond the scope here.
backgrounds. Based on information availability, the final sample is comprised of 66 terrorist indictees representing 10 WSM terrorist organizations\textsuperscript{25}. It should be noted that this includes two persons (each from a different group) that were not a part of the official list of RW indictees. These individuals were core members of their respective WSM terrorist groups, and the only reason they were not indicted was due to their deaths (prior to indictment)\textsuperscript{26}. Though I am concerned with the involvement and/or recruitment process on an individual level, the 10 WSM terrorist organizations included in this analysis provide a rich sample characterizing the broad spectrum of the various types of groups within the larger WSM. For example, the organizations range from two to thirty members, located from across the United States, fractured into small cells to residing on heavily guarded compounds, and being ideologically steeped in religion to entirely secular\textsuperscript{27}. Yet each group had similar, if not the exact same objectives that included destroying the U.S. government and attempting to start a violent race war that would ultimately lead to an Aryan nation.

**Table 1: Sample Demographic Characteristics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>95.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Race</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White (non-Hispanic)</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adolescence (13-18)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young Adult (19-24)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult (25-40)</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{25} See Table 1 for Sample Demographic Characteristics

\textsuperscript{26} Though briefly mentioned in a footnote earlier, it certainly warrants mentioning again. To reiterate, one died in a shootout with federal authorities and the other by suicide while in the custody of authorities. They undoubtedly would have been indicted as they played vital roles in the terroristic behaviors executed by their groups.

\textsuperscript{27} See Appendix B, List 1 for synopses of each group represented in the sample.
Mid-life (41-55) | Retirement (56+)
---|---
15 | 5
22.7 | 7.6

Branch (by Group, N=10)
- Ku Klux Klan: 1, 10
- Christian Identity: 3, 30
- Neo-Nazis: 0, 0
- Racist Skinheads: 1, 10
- Combination: 5, 50

WSM Group (by Indictee, N=66)
- Aryan Nations: 4, 6
- Aryan Republican Army: 6, 9
- Covenant, Sword, & Arm of the Lord: 14, 21.2
- Fourth Reich Skinheads: 2, 3
- Oklahoma City Bombing: 3, 4.5
- Oklahoma Constitutional Militia: 29, 43.9
- Order: 2, 3
- Order II: 3, 3
- Phineas Priests: 1, 4.5
- White Patriot Party: 1, 1.5

Some may question whether 66 cases is a large enough sample for analysis.

Although this is a relatively small sample according to conventional quantitative social science standards, there is a long tradition of qualitative case analysis that relies on in-depth studies of small samples (Athens, 1992; Shaw, 1966). Further, the utility of a study analyzing the process of involvement into a RWT group is extremely important because it has not yet been done for this typology. One of the reasons it has never been done is simply because a comprehensive dataset with variables relevant to the involvement process has not been constructed for RW terrorists. Also, any individual level analysis that has ever been done to this point on terrorists typically has involved smaller sample sizes. This is simply an extension of the nature of terrorism itself, meaning that the behavior and its perpetrators are a relatively rare occurrence anyway. In other words, the total sampling pool is few in number from the start. Finally, 66 cases is enough when
one considers the high degree of source exhaustion and precision in collecting and analyzing secondary data to obtain personal and in-depth life history information on each indictee.

**Data Sources**

Data for both the variable-oriented portion and the in-depth, qualitative case studies were collected from a wide array of secondary sources. Sources ranged from newspaper articles (usually published during a group’s or indictee’s arrest and/or trial), websites (e.g., government, terrorist group, watchdog groups, research institutes, personal information finder sites), peer-reviewed scholarly articles, journalistic accounts including books and documentaries, academic books, documents made available by the freedom of information act, watchdog group reports and publications, information from the RWT group or indictee (e.g., books authored by the group/indictee, manifestos, declarations of war, websites, biographies), court records, court transcripts, police reports, FBI 302’s (agent reports), surveillance records/transcripts, witness transcribed interviews, and even psychological evaluations/reports. Effort was made to locate as many sources as possible to obtain relevant information. The amount of information available for each indictee/group was not evenly distributed. In some cases there was little information, while in other cases the amount of information was tremendous (e.g., Oklahoma City bombing conspirators). In addition, I was also was granted access to ethnographic data.

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28 For a comprehensive list of secondary data sources see Appendix B, List 2.
29 All secondary sources were collected by me with the exception of court records, court transcripts, police reports, FBI 302’s, surveillance records/transcripts, witness transcribed interviews, and psychological evaluations/reports. These sources were available as downloadable PDF files from the ATS Database (obtained from [www.tkb.org](http://www.tkb.org)).
collected from 89 WSM individuals in phases between 1996 and 2005\textsuperscript{30}. The data were collected by face to face and telephone interviews, as well as participant observations in WSM individual’s homes, social gatherings, and WSM events. Portions of this data includes information specific to several terrorist indictees included in my sample. Therefore my use of this ethnographic data is limited to the information relevant to only these individuals\textsuperscript{31}.

**Collection & Methodological Analyses**

Data collection and coding of information on each indictee was completed group by group. As briefly stated earlier, one of the biggest strengths of my data is the high degree of intercoder reliability or investigator triangulation (Berg, 2004; Huberman & Miles, 1994; Singleton Jr. & Straits, 1999). The principle investigator on the NIJ grant and I worked side by side during the collection and coding processes. Both of us searched for sources for each indictee, and each source found was analyzed by both of us. This allowed us to check and verify our interpretations of all sources of data as well as the information itself in terms of accuracy, meaning, relevance, etc. Further, the sheer quantity of secondary sources that we analyzed provided another advantage; source triangulation (Berg, 2004; Denzin & Lincoln, 1994). In other words, we were often able to verify information on most variables for indictees by finding such information in more than one (sometimes many) sources, thus ‘triangulating’ the information and greatly

\textsuperscript{30} The data were collected by Pete Simi and supported by the National Science Foundation (SES – 0202129), the UNLV Graduate College Research, and the University of Nebraska, Omaha’s Office of Sponsored Programs.

\textsuperscript{31} Due to confidentiality concerns with regard to the information made available to me from this data, identifying information cannot be connected to any quotations that I utilize. I will attempt to at least provide the RWT organization the indictee was a member of where possible unless doing so would compromise their identity. If the name of a RWT indictee is provided, it signifies that the information is publically available.
increasing the validity and veracity of our data (Berg, 2004; Denzin & Lincoln, 1994).
When a situation arose where sources provided conflicting information, we investigated
until we had more credible sources in greater number confirming the information one
way or another. As stated earlier, this is a mixed methodological analysis. The data I
collected was organized into both a quantitative database in SPSS and a qualitative
narrative database in Excel.

Variables: Quantifying the Data

Because this analysis is an exploratory study, the development of variables and
codes was a fluid process that constantly evolved throughout the data collection
(Huberman & Miles, 1994; Levin-Rozalis, 2004; Singleton Jr. & Straits, 1999). As
already mentioned, I have chosen this area to research partly due to the fact that there is
less known about RWT and far less about the process of involvement into RWT groups.
Due to the very nature of the topic and the state of existing empirical research, when
discussing exploratory research, especially on gangs and social movements, Singleton Jr.
and Straits (1999) point out that initially, “there are no clearly delineated independent and
dependent variables, and therefore, no categories within which to classify what one sees”
(p. 91). Based on my research questions then, I chose to look for and include measures
that would likely be useful in painting a picture of the involvement process. Some
measures were included as a result of prior research in terrorism and related fields such as
social movements and new religious movement studies discussed in the previous chapter,
while other measures were included simply based on more common practice
justifications that they may be relevant. Variables that attempt to assess biographical
availability issues are included in the measures for my first and second research questions while variables that attempt to assess social network issues are included in the measures for my second and third research questions. In addition, I analyze and report on other variables that I collected data on that measure characteristics of biographical availability that do not particularly fit one of my three research questions, but are nonetheless important in leading to an understanding of involvement processes 32.

To analyze my first research question regarding the structural characteristics of the involvement/recruitment process I used the following 20 variables; each indictee’s gender, date of birth, age at initial contact with WSM ideology, age at initial contact with the terrorist group joined, the geographical and social location of an indictee’s involvement/recruitment, the relationship between the indictee and the recruiter, the type of recruitment used (direct/indirect), whether media (literature, television, etc.) was used in the recruitment process, the number of recruiters involved in the process, the age of the recruiter(s), the gender of the recruiter(s), the type of RWT group the indictee was recruited into, the length of the recruitment process (measured by taking the date of joining minus the age at initial contact with terrorist group), each indictee’s level of involvement in the group 33, and whether an indictee has military experience (Aho, 1990; Blee, 2002; della Porta, 1995; Lofland, 1966; Sageman, 2004). For indictees with military experience, the following four variables were also measured; military branch, length of service, reason for leaving military, and whether they received specialized training.

32 See Appendix B, List 3 for the complete codebook of all variables.
33 For example, the following is a quote from a former RWT leader in my data, “He became an elder of [unnamed RWT group] around 1981…”. This quote would render the code of “leader, non-founder” for the indictee referred to here.
To analyze my second research question regarding the influence of family dynamics on the involvement/recruitment process I used the following six variables; each indictee’s marital status, whether the indictee has children, whether indictees with children are parentally involved with their children, whether an indictee has a family member that is already involved in the WSM, and for those with a family member involved, how many family members, and the relation of family member(s) involved (parent, sibling) (della Porta, 1995; McAdam, 1986; Noble, 1998; Oliver, 1997; Sageman, 2004).

To analyze my third research question regarding the influence of non-familial relationships on the involvement/recruitment process I used the following seven variables; indictee’s relationship to recruiter, whether the indictee had prior knowledge of the WSM, whether the indictee had prior membership(s) in other WSM organization, and if so, the number of prior memberships, the group type of prior memberships, their highest level of involvement during a prior membership, and whether they joined with one or more acquaintances/friends (joined as a clique) (Aho, 1990; Almeida, 2005; della Porta, 1995; Futrell & Simi, 2004; Sageman, 2004; Stark & Bainbridge, 1980).

To analyze biographical availability characteristics that do not fit one of the above research question categories, yet have proven to be significant influences, I collected information on the following 6 variables; current socio-economic status, education level, history of chronic unemployment, the indictee’s occupation at the time of arrest, current

34 The following excerpts from Flynn and Gerhardt’s (1995) *The Silent Brotherhood* is an example of how a statement would be taken as evidence that two RWT indictees were parentally involved in raising their children: “…[having] children meant everything…knowing how much children meant to [RWT founder and leader], asked his friend to be the godfather…talk mostly centered on their children’s future…but when love for [his] children entered the picture…”(pgs. 107-108).

35 The following is a quote from a former RWT group member in my data, “He [RWT group founder/leader] was like a father to me”. This quote would render the code of “mentor” for the relationship to recruiter variable.
religious preference, and whether the indictee was experiencing or had recently experienced a life turning point\textsuperscript{36} (Akhtar, 1999; Bader & Demaris, 1996; Clark, 1983; Handler, 1990; Hassan, 2001; Hubbard, 1971; Jager, Schmidtchen, & Sullwold, 1981; Levine, 2003; Lofland, 1966; Lofland & Stark, 1965; Post, 2004; Russell & Miller, 1983; Sageman, 2004; Smith, 1994; Strentz, 1988; Sulloway, 1997; Weinberg & Eubank, 1987).

Though this is the “quantitative”, variable-oriented portion, this is ultimately a qualitative study. For lack of better words, “qualitative designs are not copyable, off-the-shelf patterns, but normally have to be custom-built, revised, and ‘choreographed’” (as cited in Huberman & Miles, 1994, p. 431). With that statement in mind, as the process of data searching and collection progressed, variables and codes would evolve to sometimes exemplify emerging preliminary themes and sometimes to fit the available data. As mentioned earlier, data was collected in group by group, then indictee by indictee order. Advised by Huberman and Miles (1994), this was a constant cyclical process of four stages the authors refer to as data collection, data reduction, data display, and conclusions and verification. The beginning of my “data collection” stage was guided by some measures developed in SM, NRM, and terrorism studies (e.g., age at recruitment, prior extremist/terrorist group membership), however many variables were not yet created (Huberman & Miles, 1994; Stake, 1994). Indeed, as a part of my “data reduction” stage, biographies were also constructed (in Excel) for each indictee that included not only data

\textsuperscript{36}As some authors in the field have warned, nearly anything can be subjectively viewed as a life turning point (Snow & Phillips, 1997). For this reason, I have specifically limited a life turning point to include one or more of the following to have occurred within 18 months or less of joining the RWT group in question: marriage, divorce, birth of a child, close death (relative/friend), relocation, job loss, or the failure of a highly valued occupational/personal goal (e.g., Timothy McVeigh for example, often expressed his desire to be a Green Beret to family and friends. His failure of this goal has been determined to be a major turning point in his life (Michel & Herbeck, 2001). Evidence of a life turning point may include self-declared or family/friend/associate declared commentary in secondary source materials.
related to my analytical tools (biographical availability and social networks), but any life history data that appeared to be of possible relevance (Huberman & Miles, 1994; Stake, 1994). From these case narratives, I began organizing and refining the information (“data display” stage) thereby leading to the emergence of preliminary patterns and the development of new quantifiable variables, also referred to as the conclusion drawing/verification stage (albeit preliminary) (e.g., type of recruitment, length of recruitment, military experience, parental involvement) (Huberman & Miles, 1994; Stake, 1994). The development of further variables and codes after performing some qualitative case analysis inevitably returned me to the data collection stage to try and extract more information from data sources.

Two quantitative analyses will be run on these data; frequencies and cross-tabulations. It is important to note however that I am running frequencies to simply understand and illustrate the distribution of my data and will not be making any predictions or generalizations based on only those results. Further, because this is an inductive, exploratory study, I will run cross-tabulations to aide exploration. Cross-tabulations are an efficient means to uncovering points of convergence and discontinuity in my sample, indeed laying a foundation for starting my qualitative case analysis (Huberman & Miles, 1994; Lieberson, 1992; W. Olson, 2004; Ragin, 1987). Again, due to the fact that I am not making any predictions based solely on these analyses, it is unnecessary to run any inferential statistics. These quantitative analyses will help provide a high degree of direction in the in-depth, case-study portion.
My purposes here are to explore the process of becoming involved in a RWT group. In other words, what are the factors in a person’s life that “tip” a person over the line that divides non-terrorists from terrorists? While the process of developing codes and quantifying information can expose potential points of interest, it can also severely diminish particular details and richness of the information available and collected on each case. For the collection of data on each indictee, narratives were constructed detailing nearly any available information about their backgrounds and criminal cases even if at the time of collection the discovered information did not appear to suit any created variables. The purpose of this is not only to collect data that may become relevant in quantifying variables, but more so to produce as much depth in case narratives to later exemplify findings.

In an effort to illustrate the distributions in my data, I have chosen the case study approach known as qualitative case analysis. Qualitative research especially inductive approaches, seek to uncover a phenomenon where relatively little may be known about it (Babbie, 1998; Denzin & Lincoln, 1994; Levin-Rozalis, 2004; Singleton Jr. & Straits, 1999). Terrorism research in general is still in its infancy, and in many ways is still largely impressionistic (Crenshaw, 1998, 2000; Hoffman, 2006; Laqueur, 1999; Victoroff, 2005). This of course is due to the very nature of terrorism and terrorists; the act is a rare occurrence, and terrorists are not always readily accessible to talk with (e.g., covert operations, dangerous individuals, discovery and/or incrimination, if apprehended, a government may not allow access, etc.) (Laqueur, 1999; Victoroff, 2005). While other typologies of terrorism have received detailed attention (della Porta, 1995; Sageman,
right-wing terrorists in the United States are an understudied population (with the exception of sensational cases like Timothy McVeigh\textsuperscript{37}). Lastly, an aspect of terrorism research that requires further exploration is the process of involvement. If this process was better understood, it would not only make a significant contribution to academic research, but also counterterrorism efforts. The above factors characterizing the state of right-wing terrorism research justifies in-depth, qualitative case exploration.

Yin (1998) has identified five characteristics and skills that make good case studies. The first is to ask questions throughout the data collection process. The second is to absorb as much data as possible of various forms, and attempt to make sense of it (Yin, 1998). Third is to change data collection strategies when necessary (Yin, 1998). Fourth, to understand the field that is being studied providing a researcher the ability to interpret the data, not just record it (Yin, 1998). Finally, a researcher must be able to interpret the data in an unbiased manner (Yin, 1998). This analysis easily meets Yin’s (1998) first three requirements as constructing codes was a constant evolutionary process based on the richness of the data we found, as well as the broad range and depth of our secondary source collection, and our ability to try new means of information gathering for particular cases when necessary (e.g., resorting to www.peoplefinder.com). Yin’s (1998) final two points provide evidence explaining why a deductive approach to this topic of research and this data could be highly problematic. The ability to interpret one’s data in an unbiased manner requires that it not be analyzed under the lens of a theoretical framework (Yin, 1998). Indeed, to do so intrinsically biases one to absorb only those

\textsuperscript{37} Even in such sensational cases however, most studies to date have focused on individual-level factors such as psychological pathologies. For an exception, see Wright’s (2007) book on the RWT movement and the Oklahoma City Bombing.
points in the data that either clearly “fit” or clearly do not “fit” a given theory (Levin-Rozalis, 2004; Stake, 1994; Yin, 1998).

The construction of codes and categories were not preconceived by any one theory, and sometimes not by any theory at all for that matter. Rather, it was as the data were being collected, preliminary characteristics or patterns emerged that enabled me to ask questions and change my strategy as I went, a necessary stage (i.e., “data display”, “data reduction”, etc.) of qualitative case analysis (Huberman & Miles, 1994, p. 429). Stated differently, my data and methods will allow me to be interpretive and tell its “story” rather than letting a theory tell the story of my data (Stake, 1994, p. 240). More specifically, I intend to take the narratives made for each indictee and create more organized biographies of their lives providing more of a beginning, middle, and end so to speak of their path to becoming involved with their respective RWT organization (Huberman & Miles, 1994). These biographies will then be analyzed systematically using line-by-line coding. This will be a tedious process of constant cross-case comparing and contrasting, the bedrock of qualitative case analysis, where I will be uncovering themes related to the process of joining that cut across all cases (or likewise, do not) (Huberman & Miles, 1994; Olsen, 2004; Rihoux, 2006). In other words, while I am line-by-line coding each indictee’s biography for “originality” in their process of joining a RWT group, I am also seeking out “representativeness” of the process of joining a RWT group among my sample (Wieviorka, 1992). I am interested in uncovering whether there are some conditions (e.g., family dynamics, particular friends/cliques) that are necessary, or at the very least sufficient in influencing an individual to join a RWT organization (Lieberson, 1992; Olsen, 2004; Ragin, 1987).
will create matrices that will allow me to physically display thematic groupings of my indictees on particular variables. These matrices can be viewed as a more detailed narrative version of quantitative cross-tabulations. This systematic process of line-by-line coding of themes in the narratives and physically displaying them will provide me with a detailed analysis of the process of joining a RWT organization.

Indeed, while narrative data was collected in the spirit of documenting anything that could aide in constructing an indictee’s background at the broadest level, the data will be analyzed thematically narrowing around my research questions. Most specifically, I intend to especially exemplify military experience (research question 1), the role of children (research question 2), the role of past prior WSM group memberships (research question 3), the role of social cliques (research question 3), and the role of life turning points (biographical availability extra) with narrative case data. Finally, though I am not using any particular theory, I will use the qualitative case analysis results to inform theory, and in the data chapter will discuss various theoretical implications.

Limitations

As with any study, there are limitations of this analysis in terms of sample, data collection, and methodology. In terms of sample limitations, the parameters for inclusion in the present analysis were first decided based on whether the case was included in the ATS data. A condition of being included in the ATS data is that an individual must be officially labeled by the government as a terrorist for investigatory purposes\(^{38}\) (under the

\(^{38}\) In other words, committing “terrorism” and being a “terrorist” is a label that the government places on a case which increases the resources and attention that will be designated to its investigation and prosecution (Hoffman, 2006).
FBI’s definition of terrorism\textsuperscript{39}, and that the person must then be federally indicted (Smith & Damphousse, 2006). The case of RWT Eric Rudolph, infamous for perpetrating the bombing at the Atlanta Olympics in 1996, as well as two abortion clinics and a gay bar, illustrates this limitation very well (Vollers, 2006). Though nobody would disagree that Rudolph is a terrorist, and indeed his acts are substantively identical to those of McVeigh and Nichols in the Oklahoma City Bombing, the federal government did not label and indict him as a \textit{terrorist} because he reportedly acted alone (Smith, 1994; Smith & Damphousse, 2006; Vollers, 2006). In other words, a necessary condition for the government to label a case or person as terroristic, is that there must be an element of \textit{conspiracy} present, and obviously one cannot conspire alone (Smith, 1994). The logical extension of this same issue is that there may be missed cases during the study period (1980-2002) prosecuted at the state level that are substantively the same in terms of behaviors\textsuperscript{40}.

The limitations in terms of data collection and methodology have already been discussed above and thus only require brief mention here. I was limited in terms of the availability of information about a given case or individual. It warrants reiterating Sageman’s (2004) work on Islamic terrorists here. Currently considered one of the most thorough case studies in the field of terrorism, Sageman (2004) provided a

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{39} FBI terrorism definition: “The unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a Government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives” (Hoffman, 2006, p. 31).
\textsuperscript{40} The portion of RWT in the United States that my sample represents cannot be estimated during the study period due to the aforementioned limitations. It cannot be accurately estimated how often the federal government has \textit{not} labeled an individual or action as terroristic like Eric Rudolph, nor can the amount of state level prosecutions be accurately estimated as each state will vary in statutory definitions of \textit{terrorist} and \textit{terrorism}. Further, like the federal government, states will undoubtedly utilize a great amount of discretion (likely varying from state to state) regarding when to label a person or act as terroristic at all, inevitably excluding many acts that may in fact be terrorism. For instance, the development and adoption of state-level Hate Crime legislation starting in the 1980’s and expanding for the next two decades includes many types of behaviors that would in fact “fit” other governmental agency definitions of terrorism (e.g., the FBI) (Jacobs & Potter, 1998; Jenness & Broad, 1997; Levin, 2002).
\end{footnotesize}
methodological template for my qualitative analysis. Indeed, all of Sageman’s (2004) data for his 172 terrorists were collected by poring over and coding many of the same variables using the same types of secondary sources used here. More often than not however, due to the difficulty of obtaining much of the information sought, Sageman reported and discussed findings on less than 172 terrorists per variable. The same will be true here; my frequencies will not always be comprised of information on each of my 66 cases per every variable. Nonetheless, the results of Sageman’s (2004) work as well as this analysis still hold value in uncovering the process of terroristic involvement. Also, when information was identified and obtained it was subjectively interpreted and coded. To minimize the potential threats to the integrity of the data and later findings, we used a wide array of sources and achieved a high degree of intercoder reliability (i.e., source and researcher triangulation) (Berg, 2004; Huberman & Miles, 1994). Finally, and as is true of any studied population, the results of this analysis will not necessarily be able to be generalized beyond RWT in the United States, or possibly beyond these 66 cases. Nevertheless, these techniques provide a much higher degree of depth regarding the information known per individual case than a purely quantitative design could offer. This design will allow for the first detailed view of involvement processes in RWT organizations, and indeed will make a necessary addition to Sageman’s (2004) and della Porta’s (1995) case studies of Islamic and left-wing terrorists respectively.
CHAPTER 4: RESULTS & DISCUSSION

In the following section I discuss frequencies and cross-tabulations for each research question. I follow this with a detailed discussion using the narrative data to exemplify thematic findings.

**Structural Characteristics of Involvement Process**

In the first research question I asked, what are the structural characteristics of the involvement process? The following are the areas in which my sample was most heavily clustered\(^1\): gender (95.5% male), age at initial contact with movement ideas (18.2% childhood, 16.7% young adults, 18.2% adults), age at time of joining group (50% adults, 22.7% mid-life), social location of initial contact with group (69.7% home), relational contact between recruited and recruiter (54.5% friend), type of recruitment (72.7% direct), number of recruiters (34.8% one, 21.2% two, 22.7% self-starter), age of first recruiter (50% adult), gender of first recruiter (88% male)\(^2\), type of WSM group (27.3% Christian Identity, 63.6% hybrid), length of recruitment (24.2% 1 week-6 months, 21.2% 6 months-1 year), level of involvement (13.6% founder, 18.2% leader, 30.3% core, 28.8% member), military experience (52.3% yes, 47.8% no)\(^3\).

Some of the results were expected and thus warrant little discussion. For example, the fact that over 95% of indictees and 88% of recruiters are male is expected considering the RWE movement was started and has been dominated by men since the birth of the Ku Klux Klan in 1865 (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000). While women hold

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\(^1\) Refer to Appendix C, Table 1 for Research Question 1 Frequencies in their entirety.

\(^2\) Note that the “not applicables” (coded when an indictee was considered a “self-starter”, thus no recruiter existed) were removed to obtain a figure accurately depicting this variable.

\(^3\) The unknown cases (22) were removed for the results on this particular variable. With the unknown cases included, 34.8% have military experience while 31.8% do not, and 33.3% remain unknown. Both versions may be found in the frequency table (Appendix C, Table 1). It has been reported in-text without the unknowns here to gain some perspective when compared with the general population in the U.S. for military experience which will be discussed below.
some formal roles in the movement, they continue to play a supporting role overall (Blee, 1991, 2002, 2005; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000). Indeed, a major part of WSM doctrine includes an emphasis on traditional gender roles and a celebration of patriarchal attitudes and practices (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000).

The fact that over 50% of indictees are friends with their respective recruiter(s) confirms a substantial body of research regarding the influence of social networks on SM, NRM, and terrorism recruitment. This finding however, tells us little about the way in which non-familial relationships influence involvement, a topic which will be explored in great detail later in this chapter. The fact that over 60% of indictees joined a hybrid WSM terrorist organization simply reflects the broad overlap among the four branches discussed in Chapter 1. Over 60% of those indictees where length of recruitment was available reveal that they joined within one year of initial contact with their respective RWT organization. Finally, I have a well distributed sample in terms of level of involvement where nearly 60% of indictees are a combination of core members (defined as either being a member from the establishment of the group, or being informally “promoted” to a role that clearly indicates some degree of leadership and/or minor decision making responsibilities) and regular members (clearly members of the organization and well aware of all other members of the group and the group’s intentions and actions, though they hold no decision making powers), nearly 20% of indictees held distinct leadership positions, and finally 14% were actual founders of the RWT organization in question. This distribution of level of involvement provides a diverse sample of characteristics of the involvement process.
Particular findings warrant more detailed discussion including age of initial contact with WSM ideology, the indictee’s actual age at joining the RWT group in question, the social location of the recruitment, the type of recruitment and media utilized in the recruitment, the number of recruiters, the age of recruiters, and finally, the concentration of military experience in my sample.

Age of Initial Contact

Beginning with the age of initial contact with WSM ideology, 35% of indictees learned of WSM ideology after the age of 19, while nearly 20% were introduced to it during childhood. The two figures present very different life trajectories in terms of the eventual involvement with RWT groups.

The narratives indicate that the introduction to WSM ideas in childhood occurs in one of two ways. I refer to these two types of introduction as “Authority” and “Coincidence.” By authority, I mean that a respected adult in the subject’s life intentionally introduced the indictee to WSM ideas for the express purposes of persuading the indictee to take on the same ideology. Coincidence refers to a chance introduction to WSM ideas without the intent of persuading the indictee to adopt the beliefs. Over 60% of indictees introduced to the WSM during childhood learned from an adult authority figure. This introduction was sometimes extremely overt. For example, Pete Langan, a former leader in the Aryan Republican Army (ARA) recalled being introduced to the “mark of Cain.” The mark of Cain is a Biblical story that has often been interpreted as equating evil with the “darkness of human skin” (Hamm, 2002). The authority figure responsible for this was Langan’s neighbor, a devout Mormon working
as an FBI agent (Hamm, 2002). This teaching was further reinforced by the fact that Langan grew up during the 1960’s; a time when blacks were still routinely discriminated against. According to Langan who was raised in a very patriotic and pro-government family, the combined influence of the FBI agent’s authority and the racial experiences he was observing around him fostered the development of a profound sense of racial superiority at an early age (RWT Indictee #2).

Not all childhood authority introductions are as overt however. As opposed to the direct teaching of racial superiority, Michael Brescia, another ARA member, recalls observing his mother’s political actions. As president of a civic group in their community, his mother headed a campaign opposing the construction of a synagogue in their all Irish community (RWT Indictee #1) (Hamm, 2002). Here the authority figure leads by example rather than directly conversing about such ideological beliefs, which is a different way of communicating the beliefs but may have the same affect. By all other accounts, Brescia’s mother never provided him with overt prejudicial or racist teachings (Hamm, 2002). Over sixty percent of those introduced by an authority figure, learned WSM ideology early on in their lives. Some were quite literally educated by the WSM, like David Tate, an imprisoned member of the Order (RWT Indictee #32). This indictee’s family moved him to Richard Butler’s Aryan Nations compound during his early childhood where he was placed in an “Aryan Academy” home school with other children. Others, however, were taught particular beliefs in the home without any official affiliation with the broader WSM. Indeed, Richard Butler (RWT Indictee #51), for example, recalls being taught racist and anti-Semitic beliefs by his father, yet his father was never affiliated with any radical political groups.
Other subjects introduced to WSM ideology in childhood were presented with it differently. Instead of being formally introduced to such notions by a respected authority figure, approximately 30% of those introduced in childhood discovered WSM ideology by what can be described as coincidence. In other words, these indictees were introduced to it either by “stumbling upon” the ideology or being introduced to it for reasons other than indoctrination. Though coding particular narrative data as being mere coincidence may not appear to have a great deal of scientific precision, an entire field of sociological study has developed dedicated to what Robert Merton referred to as serendipity (Merton & Barber, 2004).

Among those interested in interpreting the significance of serendipity for research…happy accidental discoveries…occur when a trained observer encounters unexpected and unfamiliar data…the trained investigator is in a better position to evolve meaningful hypotheses. (as cited in Merton & Barber, 2004, pp. 197-198)

If scientists can uncover scientific results in a serendipitous manner during the course of their research, I suggest that social scientists can analyze people’s lives in a systematic way to uncover similar patterns of serendipity or coincidence. One RWT indictee recalls the following way in which he first learned of the WSM:

…I was first made aware of [WSM ideology] in my sixth grade social studies class. The study of reconstruction after the civil war. My social study text was vilifying the Ku Klux Klan because it stood up for the interests of white southerners. And I thought to myself ‘What’s wrong with that?’…Why is it okay for non-whites to be proud and cultivate their race, but it was wrong and evil for me…so from then on I wondered if groups such as the KKK still existed, and how could I find them. (Interview with Order member, 2004)

In this case, the Order member was being introduced to the WSM by an authority figure (sixth grade teacher and textbook), however the motivation was entirely different than the other cases above. This indictee was introduced to the WSM as a historical lesson which
then influenced him to seek out modern WSM groups quite early on in his life. Similarly, another indictee at a remarkably young age (7 years) began questioning the plausibility of the Holocaust which eventually led to his active denial of it (Lane, 2006). Growing up during WWII, one of the most influential WSM terrorists in the United States, David Lane (RWT Indictee #16), recalled being scolded by his mother for playing “Nazi soldiers” in his backyard (Lane, 2006).

When…I played soldiers I always wanted to be the German and proudly chanted ‘Heil Hitler’ and ‘Sieg Heil’ while giving the so-called Nazi salute. My mother told me to stop and even gave me a spanking…she regaled me with stories of the evil Germans and how they mass murdered Jews. I rebelled. Undoubtedly, without the vocabulary of an adult but with the uncontaminated mind of a child, I argued that it was not true…it did not seem logical or possible… (Lane, 2006, Chapter 2, p. 3)

Indeed, Holocaust denial has always been a widely known and supported conspiracy theory among the WSM (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000). This was the beginning of David Lane’s exploration of WSM ideology.

Neither of these two subjects received overt guidance toward WSM ideas instead their exposure appears to have been coincidental. The founder of the RWT organization known as the Order also came upon WSM ideology in the same manner. At the age of 11, Robert Mathews sat with his mother as she read the local Sunday paper (RWT Indictee #35). For an 11 year old, Mathews displayed an unusually passionate interest in government and politics. His mother, Una Mathews, was civic-minded and encouraged her son’s interest in politics. Growing up in the late 1950’s and early 1960’s, Robert Mathews was well aware of the Cold War and began to fear the spread of Communism. Scanning the newspaper one October morning by his mother’s side, Mathews came across a detailed advertisement for a radical RW political group known as the John Birch
Society (JBS), an organization “for fighting the communist influence” (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995, p. 41). Una Mathews’s ignorance about the organization coupled with simultaneous pride in her son’s interest in politics inadvertently facilitated his journey into the WSM.

To reiterate, nearly 20% of the indictees were introduced to the WSM in childhood and this occurred in one of two ways. Either an authority figure taught the child or a coincidental occurrence took place that led them to their discovery of WSM ideology. As for the nearly 35% of indictees that were introduced during young adulthood or adulthood, these cases will be discussed in greater detail when analyzing the influence non-familial relations has on recruitment.

**Age at Joining RWT organization**

The majority of indictees (over 70%) joined their respective RWT group after age 25. This finding contradicts a great deal of the biographical availability literature that suggests most individuals join NRM or SM between the ages of 18 and 23/24, the ages in which a person is likely to be most available due to freedom from parental control and marriage/children (Dawson, 2003; Levine, 2003; McAdam, 1986; Snow, et al., 1997). Though one could argue that many indictees may have joined other groups within the WSM at earlier ages, thus lending more support to previous findings regarding biographical availability, nearly 20% of indictees were not even aware of WSM ideology until after the age of 25. However, approximately 16% of indictees made contact with WSM ideology between the ages of 19-24, though this does not necessarily mean they joined other groups within the WSM during this time. This finding suggests that RWTs
join later than other types of terrorists and social movement activists (see also Smith, 1994). However, these slightly older ages do seem to follow previous studies of Middle Eastern terrorists (Sageman, 2004; Victoroff, 2005). One possible explanation for the older ages of RWTs in my sample is the WSM’s emphasis on the family which will be explored in greater detail in the next section (Research Question #2).

Social Location of Recruitment

Nearly 70% of actual recruitment takes place in a private home. Although interesting, it is not surprising given the secretive nature of terrorist groups. This finding is of interest considering that most individuals are recruited into NRM, SM, and mainstream religions in more public or semi-public settings, such as school, work, marches, music shows, etc. (Aho, 1990; Almeida, 2005; della Porta, 1995; Futrell & Simi, 2004; Gould, 1997; McAdam, 1986; Oliver, 1997; Simi & Futrell, 2006). Joining a law violating organization such as terrorist group may encourage greater secrecy in terms of recruitment strategies as compared to a radical activist group or non-mainstream religion. Thus, it makes sense that when recruiting an individual, recruiters and potential joiners alike seek the security a private home affords though there has been little evidence among other types of terrorists that recruitment is predominantly occurring in private homes (della Porta, 1995; Sageman, 2004; Silber & Bhatt, 2007).

Type of Recruitment

If 70% of recruitment/joining takes place in a private home, the finding that over 70% of recruitment takes place directly should not be surprising. In other words,
recruitment most often takes place face to face as opposed to indirect means. Because recruitment is typically face to face, there are few cases in this sample in which some type of media was used (either by itself or in addition to face to face recruitment).

Although propaganda is widely used in the WSM, it is curious that these materials were used less often among subjects in this sample. However, there are two possible explanations for this. First, extra materials are unnecessary at the level of terrorist organization recruitment. Indeed, nearly 90% of indictees were aware of the WSM and 65% of indictees had joined other WSM groups prior to joining their respective RWT groups. This suggests that these individuals may have already been aware of the movement’s literature and other materials. Secondly, indirect tools such as propaganda may be much less influential than face to face encounters and thus recruiters are more likely to rely on the former as opposed to the latter.

Nonetheless, a brief mention of the 21% of indictees that were subjected to media materials as part of their recruitment process is warranted. Upon further analysis, these indictees’ narratives reveal that they were subjected to many of the same media materials. In 50% of these cases two books were especially influential: *The Turner Diaries* and *The Silent Brotherhood*. *The Turner Diaries* (MacDonald, 1996, 1978), written under the pseudonym “Andrew McDonald” was authored by William Pierce the founder of the RWE organization known as the National Alliance and is a fictional account of a violent race war that ensues in the United States (MacDonald, 1996, 1978). *The Silent Brotherhood* (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995) is a journalistic account of one of the most violent RWT organizations in the United States and one of the RWT organizations in this sample also known as The Order. In the cases in which these texts were used, indictees were not
only taken with the stories but also motivated to act. One indictee for instance, William Guthrie, was so inspired after reading *The Turner Diaries* (MacDonald, 1996, 1978) that he painted a swastika on the side of the U.S. Navy ship where he was stationed in Europe (RWT Indictee #6) (Hamm, 2002). Indeed, the influence of *The Turner Diaries* (MacDonald, 1996, 1978) became tragically apparent to the general public when a copy was found in Timothy McVeigh’s possession immediately following his arrest after the Oklahoma City bombing (RWT Indictee #57) (Michel & Herbeck, 2001; Stickney, 1996).

In one particular RWT organization founded in the 1990’s, the Aryan Republican Army (ARA), one of the leaders assigned *The Silent Brotherhood* (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995) to the younger members as an educational tool to be studied. This leader, Mark Thomas, used it as a mechanism to teach his members on how their predecessors operated (RWT Indictee #5). In other words, Thomas used the text to show the necessary dedication and sacrifice of the Order members as well as to illustrate the organization’s mistakes (Hamm, 2002).

Though different types of media were not typically a central part of the recruitment process, it is clear that *particular pieces* of literature turn up in various cases across both decades. Also worth noting is the influence, or lack thereof, the internet played in this sample. Previous studies suggest that various types of extremists are using cyberspace for the purposes of recruitment and sustaining a sense of collective identity (Rogers, 2003; Sageman, 2004; Simi & Futrell, 2006; Tsfati & Weimann, 2002). Due to the time period under analysis here, the internet was non-existent for a majority of the indictees. Many of the indictees from the 1980’s were starting their RWT organizations back in the mid- and late 1970’s prior to the development of the internet.
Number & Age of Recruiters

The number and age of recruiters is also an interesting dimension when developing a general composite of the recruitment/joining process. While 35% of indictees join their respective RWT group while being recruited by one individual, 30% are recruited by two or more individuals, and 23% are self-starters that sought out the group on their own. Further, for those cases that involved a recruiter(s), over 75% of the single or first recruiter and over 75% of the secondary recruiters were between the ages of 25-40 (only eight indictees had more than two recruiters, also 75% of which were between the ages of 25-40). These results indicate that the recruitment process is not a predatory process which some research has contended (Barker, 1984; Blazak, 2001; Carter, 1990; Levine, 2003; Lifton, 2000). In other words, adult recruiters are not targeting teenagers coming from “broken homes” who are searching for a sense of belonging and a surrogate family (Blazak, 2001; Levine, 2003).

Military Experience

Finally, the concentration of military experience in my sample is substantially higher than the general U.S. population. At least 35%, and possibly as many as 52% of US RW terrorist indictees in my sample have military experience. As of 2000, only .102% of the US population had prior military experience \(^{44}\) (Census, 2000a, 2000b; DoD, 2000). There has been a consistent history of RWE in the US military. As stated earlier, the KKK was formed by confederate soldiers (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000)

\(^{44}\) This statistic (military experience in general U.S. population) was derived by taking the most recent available data from three different sources for the same year. 1) Civilian veterans in the United States as of 2000; 26,403,703 (Census, 2000a) and adding 2) Active military personnel as of 2000; 1,384,338 (DoD, 2000) and dividing the sum (27,788,041) by 3) The total U.S. population in 2000; 272,690,813 (Census, 2000b).
and the Klan’s first Imperial Wizard was a general in the Confederate Army. Since 1953, at least nine RWE organizations have been founded by active military personnel (SPLC, 2006). Many of these individuals have been high-ranking officers, including generals, rear admirals, commanders, lieutenant generals, and lieutenant colonels (SPLC, 2006). Some have even been members of elite special forces like the Navy Seals, Green Berets, and Delta Force Recon teams (Holthouse, 2006; SPLC, 2006). At least 4 KKK chapters were uncovered that were comprised of only active military personnel on US Army bases (SPLC, 2006). In 1990 it was discovered that a US Air Force Sergeant was the chief recruiter for the KKK for the entire state of Texas (SPLC, 2006). Sparked by the Oklahoma City Bombing and the murder of a black couple near Fort Bragg, N.C. by three white supremacist military personnel, Congressional hearings were held to assess the presence of RWE in the military (Holthouse, 2006; SPLC, 2006). A “zero-tolerance policy” was adopted directing recruiters to reject extremists trying to enlist in the military. Further, officers were directed to report individuals already enlisted whom they discovered to be extremists (by tattoos or behaviors). In theory, these individuals were supposed to be investigated, and if an officer’s suspicions were confirmed, the individual would receive a dishonorable discharge (Holthouse, 2006; SPLC, 2006). This crackdown however has not worked, especially in recent wartime where building recruitment numbers is imperative (Holthouse, 2006; SPLC, 2006).

Why is the disparity in military experience among RWTs compared to the general population crucial to study? As Department of Defense gang investigator Scott Barfield has said “today’s white supremacists in the military become tomorrow’s domestic terrorists once they’re out…We’ve got Aryan Nations graffiti in Baghdad…That’s a
problem” (Holthouse, 2006, pp. 1-5). Military personnel are neglecting the problem due to enlistment pressures and the need for personnel overseas (Holthouse, 2006). What is motivating RWE individuals to join the military? Or is the military creating RWEs? Some RWEs have strongly endorsed the idea of movement members joining the military for the purposes of receiving weapons training and infiltrating the system. An article appearing in the National Alliance’s Resistance magazine provided encouragement to join the US Army and advice on how to do it:

Light infantry is your branch of choice because the coming race war, and the ethnic cleansing to follow, will be very much an infantryman’s war...Do not—I repeat, do not—seek out other skinheads...During your service you will be subjected to a constant barrage of equal opportunity drivel...keep your mouth shut. Endure it. If you are ever questioned about “race relations” parrot the following lines: “There are no races in the Army, we are all green”...If you are a leader in the skinhead movement advise your newly recruited members to not get tattoos and tell them their first duty as a skinhead is to join the Army and become a trained infantryman. As a professional soldier, my goal is to fill the ranks of the United States Army infantry with skinheads. As street brawlers you will be useless in the coming race war. As trained infantrymen you will join the ranks of the Aryan warrior brotherhood (online article by Peiper, 1999).

The military’s desire to investigate the prevalence of RWE today has waned since the Congressional Hearings in the 1990’s because of the War in Iraq and Afghanistan (Holthouse, 2006). Based on history in the examples given above, it is very important to know how pervasive RWE in the military is, especially considering the large number of Iraq and Afghanistan war veterans returning home. Once the prevalence of RWE in the military is identified it is important to further examine why this relationship exists.

In my sample of RWT indictees with military experience (using the figure of 35% because they are the “knowns”), 17% were founders of their RWT organization, 22% were leaders in their RWT organization, and the remaining 43% were core members of
their respective RWT organization. The majority were enlisted in the Army (44%), 17% Navy, 9% Marines, 9% Air Force, 13% served in more than one branch, and 9% are unknown which branch(s) they served in. While over 40% of those indictees with prior military experience were core members, ultimately an additional 40% were the principal role players in their RWT organization in question (founders and/or leaders). Stated differently, over 80% of those indictees with prior military experience were not merely average members of RWT organizations, but rather played a significant role in their respective groups.

Due to the time period of this sample, some observers have argued that an attraction to paramilitary/militia behaviors and groups was a larger cultural trend that emerged in the post-Vietnam War Era (Gibson, 1994). Gibson (1994) argues that during the 1980’s American culture became characterized by a paramilitary emphasis and a new definition of war and warrior. He argues that this was a bi-product of America’s failure in Vietnam, which led to an explosion of military, anti-government, and world domination themed media consumed by popular culture (films like “Rambo,” “Mad Max,” “Patriot Games,” “The Hunt for Red October,” etc.). The country’s military defeat in Vietnam after a long history and reputation as the strongest military in the world contributed to a “cultural identity crisis” among White American men (Gibson, 1994). Gibson’s (1994) argument is that this crisis led to a desire to consume movies, shows, and games that were violently themed with wars portraying white men as the “ultimate victor.” The civil rights movement and other progressive social movements, changing demographics, rising national debt and crime rates compounded the white male identity crisis (Gibson, 1994). Prior to the 1970s, the cultural identity of white males was
associated with domination and privilege in all spheres of life. As Gibson (1994) points out however, “customary male behavior was no longer acceptable in either private relationships or public policy…Men had to change, but to what? The vast proliferation of warrior fantasies represented an attempt to reaffirm the national identity” (pp. 11-14).

The current political climate in the United States is not unlike the climate twenty years ago, including the stress of a long and costly war, the immigration of non-white populations, a sizeable national debt, and additionally, the election of the first African-American president. In fact, there has been a noticeable increase in right-wing militia groups in the past two years, including over 50 newly identified organizations (D'Oro, 2009; Simi & Futrell, 2010). Further, several of the groups recently founded have been started by military veterans (D’Oro, 2009). With a current political climate that is strikingly similar to that discussed by Gibson (1994), what can be learned from some of the personal accounts of the RWT indictees in my sample?

There are three themes of military experience as an impetus to participation in RWT: military rejection, internal military conflicts, and embittered veterans. Two RWT indictees in particular became involved in anti-government behaviors almost immediately after leaving the military which coincided with their failure to secure a position in Special Forces Units (Hamm, 2002). In other words, these RWT indictees suffered from military rejection. William Guthrie, a leader in the Aryan Republican Army (ARA), spent over 3 years in the Navy ending his career with a dishonorable discharge (2002) (RWT Indictee #6). Guthrie, viewing the Navy SEALS as “the toughest military training in the world” (as cited in Hamm, 2002, p. 122), eagerly started his training in the Special Forces Unit shortly thereafter being rejected due to physical agility failures (2002). Following his
dismissal from the Special Forces Unit, Guthrie became deeply angered at the U.S. government and went AWOL (2002). During his return to serve time for his AWOL episode, a fellow Navy man loaned him the white supremacist book *The Turner Diaries* (2002). After reading the fictional race war novel, Guthrie painted a large swastika on the side of his ship (2002). Subsequently, Guthrie received a dishonorable discharge after his court-martial hearing (2002). According to one of his closest friends and Aryan Republican Army founder Pete Langan, “Guthrie’s major gripe with the U.S. government was that he did not become a Navy SEAL. After getting kicked out of the Navy, he began a one-man vendetta against the government” (as cited in Hamm, 2002, p. 122).

Timothy McVeigh found himself in similar circumstances with the U.S. military (2002) (RWT Indictee #57). Contrary to Guthrie, McVeigh had some previous introduction with anti-government ideas prior to joining the U.S. Army in 1988 (Michel & Herbeck, 2001; Wright, 2007). McVeigh was especially concerned with the government violating his 2nd Amendment rights and gun-control laws; indeed neighbors and family friends later interviewed after the Oklahoma City Bombing recall him being quite interested in firearms and paramilitary lifestyle from an early age (Michel & Herbeck, 2001; Wright, 2007). From the time McVeigh joined the military he was recognized as being a disciplined soldier by his superiors and peers as well (Michel & Herbeck, 2001; Wright, 2007). Former military peers also have commented that while McVeigh was a model soldier he seemed to have an abnormal lack of interest in social aspects of life during routine furloughs and breaks (Michel & Herbeck, 2001; Wright, 2007). When other soldiers were going out drinking, McVeigh would remain on base cleaning his personal arsenal of guns (Michel & Herbeck, 2001; Wright, 2007). After
coming back from the Gulf War as a decorated soldier, McVeigh joined the Army’s Green Berets and like Guthrie’s experience with the Special Forces, McVeigh was quickly “washed out” and returned to basic infantry (Michel & Herbeck, 2001; Wright, 2007). McVeigh then decided to leave the Army to return to civilian life as a security guard (Michel & Herbeck, 2001; Wright, 2007). Through this period of dealing with rejection from the military, McVeigh’s disapproval of the U.S. government grew to disdain (Hamm, 2002; Michel & Herbeck, 2001; Wright, 2007). As with Guthrie, McVeigh was rejected by a government that he had wanted to represent as an elite soldier. McVeigh was also inspired by Pierce’s “*The Turner Diaries*” and he ultimately sought out the company of likeminded individuals who helped him blow up the federal building in Oklahoma City (Hamm, 2002).

In another indictee’s case, an Order member found that internal military conflicts could partly account for his path into a RWT organization. Although he respected the military and wanted to join, after he entered the military he became disillusioned and opposed much of what he encountered in the military. Contrary to Guthrie and McVeigh’s initial introduction to WSM ideas taking place while active in the U.S. military, the Order member recalls being exposed to such ideas as far back as elementary school (interview with Order member). He states that his first experience with thinking about white supremacist ideas was during a 6th grade class focused on the Civil War Era (2004). He stated:

> My social study [sic] text was vilifying the Ku Klux Klan because it stood up for the interests of white southerners. And I thought to myself “what’s wrong with that”? I seen [sic] Mexicans, Indians and blacks promoting their race and yelling racial slogans all throughout the 1960’s. So I was confused! Why is it okay for non-whites to be proud and cultivate their race, but it was wrong and evil for me to be proud of my race? And from my point of view, it seemed my race had the
most to be proud of! So, from then on I wondered if groups such as the KKK still existed, and how could I find them (interview with Order Member, 2004).

He recollects however that his feelings of minority inferiority and white superiority were developed during his time in the US Marine Corp. In 1973, after being arrested for a felony property crime, a judge offered him a choice between going to jail or enlisting in the US Marine Corp. Though he went AWOL in less than 3 years of service, the Order member insisted that his experiences with black Marines and the differences in treatment towards blacks and whites by the military set the basis for his later beliefs about race and the US Government. He recalls about going AWOL:

The best fighting force the world ever seen [sic] was destroyed by negroes…White Marines did all the work while blacks lazed around…They did as they please. But whites were expected to be shipshape 24/7. I was fed up with the hypocrisy [sic], negroes, and the Marines…I don’t blame blacks, I blame the administrators of the Corps for letting down the good Marines to appease the blacks, who were known throughout the Corps as being “shitbirds”. That was basically when I turned my back on society. Because it wasn’t just the Marine Corps that mollycoddled the blacks, but all of society (interview with Order member, 2004).

After he went AWOL, he returned to Arizona and began committing property crimes with his younger brother to “make ends meat” (interview with Order member 2004). By 1974, he was finally caught and given a sentence of 5-8 years in the Arizona State Prison. His negative experiences in the Marine Corps with blacks were exacerbated during his time in prison. He recalls:

Prison was a powder bag of racism, and it was there that I decided I did not want non-whites around me, at all. They tried to kill me twice, once by knives, and once by trying to set me on fire while I slept. It is ironic that it is in that prison at that time that I found the add in “Easy Rider” [magazine] for white racial organizations…including the K.K.K. By this time, yes, I hated all non-whites (interview with Order member, 2004).
His experiences in the Marine Corps, coupled with his experiences in prison, created a strong hatred for both the US Government and minority populations. Prior to either the military or prison, however, his initial exposure to WSM ideas was in the sixth grade when learning about the Ku Klux Klan. Although in the sixth grade he was already sympathetic to the WSM he had no life experiences that actually “pushed” him into actively pursuing the movement. Less than 15 years later, after a variety of negative experiences with minorities, he was again introduced to the KKK. It was this second introduction that pushed him into actively seeking entrée into the WSM. Without his personal experiences in the military however, he says he would not have had such a disdain for the US government (interview with Order member, 2004).

The founder of the Order, Robert Jay Mathews (RWT indictee #35), also struggled with an internal conflict toward the US military. Mathews’ dream of going into the military, however, never came to fruition because of a particular personal conflict.

Having grown up during the late 1950’s and 1960’s, Mathews developed a strong interest in politics at a young age (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995). At the age of 11 Mathews found a newspaper article advertising The John Birch Society45 (JBS) leading him to become fearful of communism and even more interested in joining the fight against it (1995). Mathews soon became a dedicated and valued young member of JBS and continued to radicalize his conservative beliefs (1995). Facilitating this radicalization, Mathews also began studying the Book of Mormon and going to Temple with some of his high school friends raised in the religion (1995). Mathews soon began to become obsessed with their straight-laced lifestyle and viewed them as “model teenagers,

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45 The Southern Poverty Law Center defines this group as a “Patriot” group of the far right-wing adopting strong opposition against big government. In other words, this group supports limited government, and is very anti-communist, socialist, and opposes wealth redistribution and taxes (SPLC, 2010).
industrious, clean-living kids with whom he shared a conservative…philosophy” (1995, p. 42). He began to become regimented in this lifestyle and, at the same time, suspicious of any persons not involved in his new found organizations that opposed ideals like communism and even taxation (1995). He began to argue with his parents that his teachers in high school were promoting their own agendas and that a university setting would be even worse referring to colleges as “hotbeds of communism” (as cited in Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995, p. 44).

He advised his parents that “there was one institution that was perfect for him…the U.S. Military Academy at West Point” (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995, p. 45). Though his father, an Army veteran, would have rather he attend a civilian college or the Air Force Academy, he wrote letters to the Senate and Congress and helped his son obtain a West Point entrance exam (1995). Mathews’ father was relieved that his son’s anti-government sentiments were diminishing (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995). However, Mathews’ trust of the government collapsed following the infamous My Lai massacre of 1968, which involved the mass murder and torture of an estimated 500 Vietnamese women and children in South Vietnam during the war (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995; Gibson, 1994). It was not, however, the massacre that affected Mathews. Instead, it was the 1971 court-martialing and later murder conviction of Lieutenant William Calley of the US Army that bothered Mathews (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995; Gibson, 1994). Mathews found his conviction to be an example of the US government using Calley as a “scapegoat” (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995, p. 45). What further disturbed Mathews was how the incident at My Lai helped turn public opinion against the war (Gibson, 1994). Shortly before he was to take his entrance exam for West Point, he told his father that he felt the military
was too corrupt and no longer aspired to be a part of it (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995). The My Lai incident changed Mathews’ view of both the US government and especially the US military forever, leading him down a path to right-wing radicalization that would eventually make him one of the most notorious RWT group leaders in the WSM.

Finally, embittered veterans are likely the greatest concern considering the current political climate as it relates to immigration reform, the election of our first black president, and the lack of support for the war in the Middle East (D’Oro, 2009; DHS, April, 2009; Gibson, 1994; Simi & Futrell, 2010; SPLC, 2006). Two RWT indictees provide examples of embittered combat veterans: James Sherman Dye (RWT Indictee #11) of the Order and Kent Yates (RWT Indictee #49) of the Covenant, Sword, and Arm of the Lord (CSA). Both men were Vietnam veterans and were severely impacted by their experiences not only during the war, but especially upon their return home to the US (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995; Gibson, 1994; Noble, 1998, 2004). Dye was severely injured in Vietnam by shrapnel from a mortar explosion which left him with a metal plate in his head (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995). Dye was proud of his combat status and considered it “his red badge of courage” (1995, p. 195). However, after returning home, he quickly learned that the people he thought he was protecting and fighting for in the US were anything but grateful:

…he was treated with scorn for having served bravely and with honor in the Marine Corps. He came to believe that it was a useless war and the men who fought it had been pawns in a rich man’s game. The experience embittered him, weakened his self-esteem, and drove him to drink (1995, pp. 195-196).

Dye began to resent his combat status, and particularly the injuries he suffered for a country that not only did not appreciate his personal sacrifices, but in his view hated him for it (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995). Not only did Dye develop an alcohol problem, he was
also underemployed and looking for someone to blame (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995). Surrounded by friends in similar circumstances, they started to place blame on minority groups (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995). At the age of 36, Dye joined his first WSM group, a local chapter of the KKK (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995). Within months, Dye would meet Mathews through his links within the WSM (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995). By this time, Mathews had already established the Order, and was actively seeking out like-minded men who desired vengeance against a government that had wronged them (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995). Dye’s military training and experience would not only be appreciated, but sought after as an extremely valuable commodity (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995).

Similar to Dye, Kent Yates of CSA was a Vietnam veteran who served in the Army (interview with CSA member, 2004). Interestingly, Yates achieved what McVeigh and Guthrie could only dream about, and, in fact, made it into the Special Forces, the elite Green Berets (Wright, 2007). Much like Dye, his skills were especially valued by his respective RWT organization (interview with CSA member, 2004). Jim Ellison (RWT Indictee #36), the founder of CSA recruited Yates to be the group’s munitions expert and run the compound’s armory (interview with CSA member, 2004). Though CSA never carried out their plans to bomb the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Yates was responsible for successfully developing the explosives to do it\( ^{46} \) (Wright, 2007). Yates too was disappointed with his homecoming to US soil after the Vietnam War (interview with CSA member, 2004). Like Dye, he felt he had made a great deal of sacrifice in his military service (2004). Instead of returning home to a hero’s welcome, he returned home to hostile territory. Tired of the public’s lack of support for the war and

\( ^{46} \) See Appendix B, List 1 for more information regarding CSA’s failed plans to bomb Oklahoma City, but many other successful terroristic acts and attacks.
its soldiers, Yates moved his wife and children to a religious extremist compound in Indiana known as Padanaram (2004). While this compound served to separate them from society, it was generally peaceful and had no anti-government ideals. Finding his place in CSA fulfilled his desire to wage war on a government that he felt had failed him (2004).

Clearly there are a disproportionate number of RWT indictees with prior military experience. Over the past decade, leaders within the WSM have discovered the value of military experience as it relates to tactical knowledge of warfare, weapons, and discipline, and for the past several years have been heavily advertising this value to “foot soldiers” of the movement encouraging them to enlist (Holthouse, 2006). This is interesting because the timeframe of the sample under analysis here had little encouragement from the WSM or other RWT groups to enlist, yet still had a highly disproportionate pool of ex-military within their ranks. This likely occurred for a variety of reasons as Gibson (1994) has argued, including the lack of support for and loss of the Vietnam War, a poor economy, social changes in minority rights, immigration, and the changing nature of the American male’s role in society. Considering the US is currently engaged in a costly and long war in the Middle East with dwindling support, has an economy defined by a widespread mortgage crisis, inadequate healthcare, and high unemployment rates, is divided about immigration reform, and is adjusting to the historical election of a minority president, the logical extension is that the WSM and RWT organizations will soon have an even higher proportion of skilled/trained military vets than the sample under current analysis. Those individuals already involved in the WSM are being influenced to join the military for the experience, and those coming
home from tours of duty receiving their discharge papers are being targeted as potential recruits in the WSM and RWT groups (D'Oro, 2009; DHS, April, 2009; Gibson, 1994; Holthouse, 2006; Noble, 2004; Simi & Futrell, 2010). Based on the RWT indictees in my sample, their experiences with the military were pivotal in their later involvement with the WSM and their respective terrorist organizations.

There is definite link between WSM and/or RWT groups and individuals with military/combat experience. The need to better understand this relationship between extremist group involvement and military experience is critical given current circumstances (DHS, April, 2009). Military personnel returning may also be especially unique compared to those veterans of past conflicts because a majority of soldiers are serving an average of more than one tour, each of which is a longer period, and time off between deployments has been shorter (Hosek, Kavanagh, & Miller, 2006). As the Department of Homeland Security has warned, embittered military veterans from the Iraq/Afghanistan war coming home to a less than favorable political climate may be a serious threat to the US (DHS, April, 2009).

To briefly summarize the structural components of the recruitment process, certain variables illustrate very well what the recruitment process looks like. Most indictees were introduced to the WSM in general after the age of 19 (sometimes by an authority figure and sometimes by coincidence) and a vast majority joined their respective RWT organization after the age of 25. Those serving as recruiters appeared to be approximately the same age or slightly older than those they recruited, the majority being over the age of 25. Nearly three-quarters of all RWT indictees were recruited directly, face-to-face with their recruiter(s). Also, three-quarters of the time this process
took place behind the closed doors of a private home. Finally, an extremely disproportionate amount of RWT indictees (possibly half, but at least 35%) have military experience. These indictees have had a very difficult time assimilating back into civilian life after their discharges, and in many cases their affinity for the WSM began during their time in the military.

**Family Dynamics of Involvement Process**

In the second research question I asked, “What is the influence of family dynamics on the involvement process?” The following are the areas in which my sample was most heavily clustered:

- Marital status (57.6% married), children (42.4% yes), parental involvement (39.4% yes), family members involved in WSM (50% yes), number of family members involved in WSM (36.4% one), relation of first family member involved (28.8% spouse).

**Table 2: Research Question 2 Clusters**

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<th>Variable</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>18.2</td>
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<td>Married</td>
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Refer to Appendix C, Table 2 for Research Question 2 Frequencies in their entirety.
Nearly 60% of RWT indictees in this sample were married and nearly half had children. Of those that had children, 40% were actively involved in raising their families. This is interesting because the idea that these indictees were bound to families is contrary to most of the research on one’s likelihood to become involved in a SM (McAdam, 1986; Oliver, 1997), NRM (Levine, 2003; Lofland & Stark, 1965), or terrorist group (della Porta, 1995). In his analysis of Salafi Mujahedin Muslim terrorists, however, Sageman (2004) found that at least 73% were married with children. He notes the uniqueness of this finding compared to previous research, but also mentions that this pattern is consistent with the culture and tenets of the religion (2004). Further, aside from Sageman’s (2004) analysis, little research within terrorism studies has focused on variables involving parenthood.

What does the qualitative data collected in this analysis help to uncover as to why a majority of RWT indictees are “married with children”? Similar to the jihadists Sageman studied, I argue that having an Aryan wife and bearing Aryan children are central tenets of the WSM, a movement that was the beginning of the indictees’ radicalization into RWT organizations (Blee, 1991, 2002; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000). The WSM has utilized the ideals of Aryan procreation in propaganda and recruitment strategies for decades (Blee, 1991, 2002; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000). This is partly due to the fact that the ideology of the WSM requires movement followers to not only replenish but increase the “pure” white population to combat an increasing

<table>
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<th>Relation of Family Members Involved</th>
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<tr>
<td>Spouse</td>
<td>19</td>
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</tr>
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</table>
minority population which they perceive as a threat to the existence of the “white race” (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000). In fact, the “14 Words,” a movement mantra which was penned by David Lane, a member of the Order, while imprisoned has become one of the most popular slogans and a common tattoo within the WSM (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000). The “14 Words” stands for the following phrase: “We must secure the existence of our race and a future for White children” (as cited in Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000, p. 17). As many WSM scholars have pointed out, this phrase is at the “core” of WSM ideology, which helps to explain why a majority of the RWT indictees under analysis here are “family men” (2000). One WSM member had the following to say regarding families and children: “We all know the movement begins with the family. If you can’t save your family, then what’s the point? Keeping your families pure and raising your kids among your kin is what we fight for” (as cited in Simi & Futrell, 2010, p. 19).

Robert Mathews’ (RWT Indictee #35), founder and leader of the Order, entry into RWT illustrates the familial aspect of white supremacist ideology. In the late 1970’s, having read a book by right-wing leader, William Gayley Simpson, Mathews learned that “abortion, birth control, and zero population growth, readily embraced by many whites, were the knives with which the race was slitting its own throat…minorities write the law of the land…” (as cited in Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995, p. 106). Finding a wife and bearing children soon became one of Mathews’ most sought after goals:

…Debbie [Mathews’ wife] and Bob suffered together through several miscarriages in the first four years of their marriage. It was devastating for a

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48 See Appendix A, Figure 3 for an advertisement from Aryan Nations. The blond-haired, blue-eyed, Aryan girl is supposed to incite concern in movement members in an effort to become involved in the WSM and grow their families for the impending ‘race-war’.
couple to whom children meant everything. Bob wanted as large a family as he could support (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995, p. 107).

While trying to bear children naturally, the Mathews’ decided to register with an adoption agency and, in 1981, the couple received news they would be adopting a baby (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995). Following David Lane’s 14 Words, preserving a white future for his new son, Clinton, became Mathews’ primary concern. According to another member of the Order, Ken Loff, Mathews emphasized “their children’s future, even when it was about taxes, economics, school busing, affirmative action, or some other government policy Bob was condemning” (as cited in Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995, p. 107).

In fact, Aryan children became the core theme of the ceremonious establishment of the Order. Prior to making his fellow Order brothers take the Oath that he authored, Mathews told them:

I would like to remind all of you what is at stake here. It is our children…and their very economic and racial survival. Because of that, I would like to place a white child before us as we take this oath (as cited in Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995, p. 124-125).

Not only did Mathews place an Aryan baby in the center of the circle of the first 9 men to join the Order, but he threaded the ideology of saving the future for Aryan children throughout the Oath:

I, as a free Aryan man, hereby swear an unrelenting oath upon the green graves of our sires, upon the children in the wombs of our wives…I have no fear of death, no fear of foe; that I have a sacred duty to do whatever is necessary to deliver our people from the Jew and bring total victory to the Aryan race…should one of you fall in battle, I will see to the welfare and well-being of your family…and as true Aryan men with pure hearts and strong minds face the enemies of our faith and our race with courage and determination…we are in a full state of war and will not lay down our weapons until we have driven the enemy into the sea and reclaimed…the land of our children to be (as cited in Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995, p. 125-126).
From a white supremacist perspective, forming a terror group is, in part, an effort to defend the family unit. One of the co-founders of the CSA explained the prevalence of RWTs with spouses and children in the following way:

…see most leaders don’t like singles because they’re not controllable, they have no concerns, they can pick up and leave whenever they want to. Married with kids are much easier to control, they’re more susceptible to the propaganda to begin with and they can be controlled by propaganda, make ‘em think they’re doing everything for their family and kids (interview with CSA leader, 2004).

Aside from the importance of one’s children in terms of motivating a person to join a RWT group, other factors involving familial relationships may also affect the process of joining a RWT group. As stated above, half of the RWT indictees had other family members involved in the WSM movement. Nearly 40% of indictees had at least one family member involved and another 10% had two or more family members involved (spouse, 30%; parent, 10%; sibling 6%).

To briefly summarize findings regarding the involvement process and the influence of family, I found that over 50% of RWT indictees were married with children (and the 3 females in the sample were wives and mothers). Though it would seem that these individuals would be less inclined to dedicate their lives to a violent organization due to restricted biographical availability, it is clear that RWT is derived from a SM that promotes traditional ideals related to familial relations. That terrorists connected to left-wing social movements tend to be single and childless (Smith 1994) reflects, in part, the different ideological orientation toward families that differentiates left and right-wing movements. Thus, a social movement’s ideological composition creates a “demographic funnel” where certain types of people with certain types of demographic characteristics
are more likely to become active in the movement. It is from this point of initial political activism where individuals may eventually gravitate toward terrorism.

Non-familial Relationships of Involvement Process

In the third research question I asked, “What is the significance of one’s non-familial relationships on the involvement process?” The following are the areas in which my sample was most heavily clustered: relational contact between recruited and recruiter (54.5% friend), prior knowledge of WSM (87.9% yes), prior extremist/terrorist group membership (65.2% yes), prior number of WSM group memberships (39.4% one), prior types of WSM group memberships (16.7% Christian Identity, 15.2% hybrid, 21.2% combination), highest level of involvement in prior group (42.4% member), and joined as clique (63.6%).

Table 3: Research Question 3 Clusters

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<th>Variable</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>% unknown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relational Contact between Recruited &amp; Recruiter</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Prior Types of Group Memberships</td>
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<td>Christian Identity</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combination (various group memberships)</td>
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<td>21.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest Level of Involvement in Prior Group</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1.5</td>
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Refer to Appendix C, Table 3 for Research Question 3 Frequencies in their entirety.
Relational Contact

Individuals who join RWT groups are typically recruited through pre-existing friendship networks. These friends recruited approximately 55% of RWT indictees into their respective RWT organization. Recruiters may use a target’s children as a “hook” to influence the recruitee. For many potential recruits, the person presenting the “hook” is just as important as the “hook” itself.

Psychological studies of terrorism refer to these as “lures” or “pull factors” (Horgan, 2008, p. 90). Some scholars contend that the lures are not necessarily valuable by themselves and must be presented to a target by the “right person” in order for the recruitee to influence them to progress in their level of involvement with the organization (Horgan, 2008; Moghaddam, 2005). If the target views the recruiter as a “role model” in addition to their friendship then “a source of authoritative legitimacy for the justification of…engaging in violent acts” has been established (Horgan, 2008, p. 88). Many RWT leaders seem to have a deep understanding of the value of loyal friendship. When a valued friendship with a role model is combined with a valued lure (whatever the target values as most important like children), one of the highest predictors of joining a terrorist organization has developed (Horgan, 2008; Post, Sprinzak, & Denny, 2003). In other words, the lure can be significantly more valuable when it comes from a person that one is already emotionally close to and respects.

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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Core</th>
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<td>Member</td>
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<td>42.4</td>
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<td>Joined as Clique</td>
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<td>30.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>63.6</td>
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</table>

50 The next highest frequency were for those individuals that sought the RWT organization out on their own with no person actively recruiting them (12% of RWT indictees).
Order leader Bob Mathews (RWT Indictee #35) understood the value of lures and friendship. This was illustrated in the relationship he had with his close friend Ken Loff (RWT Indictee #17). Loff, a man who was extremely devoted to the well being of his wife and children, recalls that prior to his decision to join Mathews as part of his terrorist plans “talk mostly centered on their children’s future…” (as cited in Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995, p. 107). By all accounts, Mathews was not only charismatic but had a knack for understanding people’s lures. Where Loff could be manipulated with discussions of his children’s future, Mathews could speak to and adapt to the unique needs of other members (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995). For example, another Order member talked about how important his friendship to Mathews was in becoming a member of the terrorist organization:

…I felt Bob [Mathews] was a father figure or more appropriately, the older brother. He was 10 or 12 years older than me. He never met me before, yet he welcomed me into his home. Helped me purchase my first vehicle; taught me to operate heavy machinery; gave me a place to live; helped me find gainful employment. Where my Father was all about “you can’t do such-and-such because…” I wasn’t properly trained…or I lacked funds…or it wasn’t socially acceptable. Robert Mathews on the other hand would get excited about my ideas and help figure out ways to implement them or offer a different spin, but he’d try his damndest to make it work…I looked up to him (interview with Order member, 2004).

This Order member was open to Mathews, in part, because his relationship with his father lacked closeness and was deficient in a number of ways. Mathews morphed into the father that the Order member perceived he never had. Indeed, Mathews was involved in several experiences akin to “rites of passage” (i.e., getting his first car, teaching him how to use tools and machinery, providing shelter, and helping him get on his feet with a job) that a parent often facilitates for his/her child. For the Order member, seeing Mathews perform these parental duties established a strong bond between the two. In return, he
provided Mathews and the Order a high level of loyalty and obedience. In fact, when Mathews asked this member to kill another member suspected of working with law enforcement, the Order member faithfully obliged (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995).

The fact that over half of the sample was recruited into their RWT group by a friend should be analyzed in relation to the existence of the other non-familial relationship variables such as, prior knowledge of the WSM, prior WSM and/or RWT group memberships, the amount of prior memberships, and finally, whether an individual joined by themselves or with one or more friends.

**Knowledge & Memberships in the WSM**

**Knowledge without prior WSM memberships**

In addition to pre-existing friends recruiting over half of the indictees, 90% of the subjects also had prior knowledge of the WSM and more than 65% had prior membership in a RW extremist or terrorist group (25% of which had two or more memberships). This suggests a progressive process of entry into RWT groups. This progressive radicalization of involvement follows the most recent psychological research arguing that one’s involvement in terrorism is likely a succession of extremist behaviors (Horgan, 2008; Moghaddam, 2005). As discussed earlier, previous research in SM and terrorism (specifically left-wing) has also found that the more memberships a person has had or does have within a particular movement, the more likely they will be to join a more radicalized group and engage in aggressive activities to further the goals of that movement (Almeida, 2005; della Porta, 1995).
For the minority of indictees that had prior knowledge of the WSM but had no formal memberships to RWE or RWT organizations, the data indicate that most of them were aware of the WSM from various types of media sources. Some were introduced to the WSM media happenstance. This again is an example of coincidence, similar to Merton’s science of serendipity (Merton & Barber, 2004). As discussed above, an Order member revealed in his interviews that learning about the Ku Klux Klan in 6th grade history class was his first introduction to the WSM. An unintended consequence of his educational introduction to the WSM was that it peaked his interest enough to seeking out WSM materials and propaganda. This self-education led him into becoming a sympathizer with the WSM prior to any formal memberships.

For others, their introduction to the WSM was from another person. Both William Guthrie (RWT Indictee #6) of the ARA and Timothy McVeigh (RWT Indictee #57), the core conspirator of the Oklahoma City Bombing, were given WSM materials by people they were quite minimally associated with even after the fact (Hamm, 2002; Michel & Herbeck, 2001; Wright, 2007). Guthrie was given The Turner Diaries by a fellow Navy bunkmate to read to pass time (Hamm, 2002), while McVeigh was given WSM propaganda for the first time while trying to become an activist for the protection of 2nd Amendment gun rights (Michel & Herbeck, 2001; Wright, 2007).

Some were introduced to the WSM and motivated to join by actual news reports of the WSM. A CSA leader stated that 2 members, David McGuire (RWT Indictee #39) and Timothy Russell (RWT Indictee #42), came to join the organization and moved their families to the CSA compound after viewing news media coverage on TV of the organization. These two individuals had no prior associations with the WSM or RWE.
groups. It warrants mentioning that Russell was a member of a gun club organization and a CSA leader states that he went to local gun shows in the area of CSA inquiring about CSA after the media coverage. For Russell, it was a combination of both being in the “right place” (gun shows) at the “right time” (during CSA media coverage) (interview with CSA leader, 2004; Noble 1998).

In some cases, subjects frequented locations that while not exclusively right-wing extremist are used by RWEs for the purposes of recruitment because these locations are known to attract individuals with certain leanings or inclinations toward RWE. Several RWT indictees became aware of the WSM after having memberships to gun clubs and gun activist organizations. Such organizations are not generally considered to be extremist groups and do not endorse any political stance other than that of the 2nd Amendment; an American citizen’s right to keep and bear arms51. While these organizations are legal and are not formally affiliated with any other type of SM, they are known as spaces which attract far right adherents. Though it would be inaccurate to allege that the majority of those that frequent gun shows or hold memberships in gun clubs are likely to be RWE, a minority of enthusiasts are indeed related to these groups (interview with CSA leader, 2004). The CSA leader warns when speaking of RWT recruitment “…if you’re going to go to places like gun shows, you have to know how to handle yourself so you don’t get sucked in” (interview with CSA leader, 2004). By “sucked in,” he is referring to joining a RWE or RWT group and, in fact, CSA recruited at least four members in this way (interview with CSA leader, 2004). CSA members

51 According to a CSA leader among other sources, eight RWT Indictees were members of gun clubs/organizations prior to RWE involvement (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995; Michel & Herbeck, 2001; Noble, 1998; Wright, 2007). Indictees were from The Order, CSA, and conspirators in the Oklahoma City Bombing. Gun organizations included the well-known National Rifle Association (NRA) and the American Pistol & Rifle Association (APRA).
Timothy Russell (RWT Indictee #42), Richard Snell (RWT Indictee #43), Ivan Wade (RWT Indictee #46), and William Wade (RWT Indictee #47) were all known members of gun organizations prior to their involvement with RWE and RWT organizations.

Finally, another interesting case is of another Order member. He was also recruited into the terrorist organization (the Order) by his closest friend Bob Mathews (RWT Indictee #35). But his pre-RWT involvement is also illustrative of the relationship between friends and gaining initial knowledge of the WSM. Growing up he recalls being in high school at the same time as a later associate of the Order\(^{52}\) (interview with Order member, 2004). Though originally meeting him during his 6\(^{th}\) grade school year in a “live government” class, this associate was a couple of years older than him and it was not until high school when they played on the same basketball team for two years that they really got to know one another (2004).

[Order associate’s] Dad helped coach my junior high school basketball team and we played on the same team our freshman…and sophomore years of high school. We had many friends in common but we didn’t really hang out together until after we graduated from high school (interview with Order member, 2004).

Once he graduated high school he maintained close contact with this associate (2004). By this time, the associate had found his way into the WSM and was an active member of a RWE organization known as the National Alliance (2004). In 1982, the Order member was taking a political science class in college and was assigned to interview someone that was involved in political activism (2004). He knew that this associate was involved in the National Alliance but generally did not understand what,\(^{52}\)

\(^{52}\) This other Order member never took the organization’s oath, nor was he ever made into an official member of the organization after the fact (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995). He was however a known member of the RWE organization known as the National Alliance and he was also known to many members of the Order, especially the Order member providing the interview. This associate was never federally indicted for any crimes relating to terrorism.
and more importantly how the group was fighting for social or political change (2004).

What he learned about the WSM from his associate and the National Alliance appealed to him as he too wanted to be part of something. The Order member, however, was searching for more than the kind of diagnostic assessments that groups like the NA provide, he was also looking to actively resolve these problems.

I know my journey [into the WSM and RWT] started with a term paper I wrote for a Poli-Sci class…The gist of my term paper was that the N.A. [National Alliance] had many valid points. Yet people like [the Order associate] were good at throwing stones and identifying a problem but they were short on solutions. It seemed as if they’d rather knock the system, point fingers at the flaws of others and yet they seldom had something better to offer. Robert Mathews was different…(interview with Order member, 2004).

For his term paper, the Order member tagged along with his associate to a National Alliance convention. It was at this convention that the “Order member” met and immediately gravitated to Bob Mathews (2004).

When I first met him [Mathews], he was a member of N.A. He was trying to entice like-minded people to form a community in Eastern Washington that he dubbed W.A.B. for White American Bastion. He was looking to create jobs. He was willing to give of himself. He didn’t claim to have all the answers…Bob wanted to assist them [the WSM] in helping them achieve their goals, let them do all the long range planning, let them determine how to get there, Bob would simply bring like-minded people together and hopefully build a tight community dedicated to the preservation of our race (interview with Order member, 2004).

He was so taken with Mathews that he declined a membership into the National Alliance and instead followed Mathews to Washington. In less than two years from this first meeting, the White American Bastion Mathews spoke of had become the Order, and this Order member was not only swearing into the group’s terroristic oath, but he was acting it out.
Knowledge and prior WSM memberships

Of the 65% with prior memberships, 40% had more than one membership. This finding is important because as Almeida (2005) found the more organizations that activists are a member of within a particular SM, the more likely they are to become high-risk activists. Almeida (2005) defined this as “multi-sectoralness” and argues that it can be one of the greatest strengths to the longevity and success of social movements explaining, “the more a person is structurally connected to multiple organizations and sectors of the opposition, the more credible is the call for protest participation in a popular movement” (Almeida, 2005, p. 76). Similarly della Porta (1995) found that a majority of her cases of left-wing terrorists in Europe had been in the SM and the SM’s extremist groups for several years prior to becoming radicalized into a terrorist organization. Multi-sectoralness provides one indication of how embedded an individual is within extremist networks. As others have already pointed out (Almeida, 2005; Horgan, 2008; Moghaddam, 2005), the dimension of multi-sectoralness is often missing in much current psychological research that has been used to develop terrorist profiles. Studies that neglect the dimension of multi-sectoralness are ignoring a significant aspect of the radicalization process.

Most of the RWT groups in my sample are comprised of members with prior extremist affiliations. For example, the largest RWT group in my sample, the Order, was comprised of members from the American Pistol and Rifle Association (APRA), the John Birch Society (JBS), several small Christian Identity (CI) churches nationwide, Aryan Nations (AN), National Alliance (NA), various chapters of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK),

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53 High-risk activism in Almeida’s (2005) research means a person has transitioned from legal/peaceful forms of activism (e.g., peaceful protests, petition signing) to activism behavior that borders on being illegal to outright violent forms (e.g., stalking, property destruction, physical attacks on personal targets).
and, in fact, several were former members of the Covenant, Sword, and Arm of the Lord (CSA). CSA is the second largest terror group in my sample and several CSA members were tax resistance activists, former members of various CI churches, members from AN, KKK chapters, and other militia/paramilitary organizations. The results of my data confirm that a high level of multi-sectoralness is significant dimension of the radicalization process, in part, because it represents a “closing off” of the person from non-extremist social networks.

**Joined as Clique**

Nearly 64% of the RWT indictees joined their respective RWT group with at least one or more individuals. This recurrent pattern was also found in della Porta’s (1995) data with left-wing terrorists. Della Porta referred to the process as “block” recruitment where several members of one group would join a terrorist group together (1995, p. 168). In fact, one of the terrorists she interviewed stated “A choice made in cold blood, such as ‘now I will become a terrorist’ does not exist. It was a step-by-step evolution, which passed through a kind of human relation…with the people I worked with” (as cited in della Porta, 1995, p. 168).

The Order is a good example of block recruitment. For example, husband and wife Robert and Sharon Merki (RWT Indictees #19 and #20 respectively) joined the organization as a couple. The Scutari brothers, Richard and Frank (RWT Indictees #29 and #28 respectively) joined together. Charles Ostrout (RWT Indictee #23) and Ronald King (RWT Indictee #15) were co-workers and friends at Brinks working with armored trucks and moved to Washington and joined together. Ostrout and King became
instrumental in planning the armored truck car robberies for the group. Jackie Norton (RWT Indictee#23) and Randall Rader (RWT Indictee #27) were members of CSA together and collectively decided the Order was a better fit for them and moved to Washington to join the group. Denver Parmenter (RWT Indictee #25) and his best friend Randolph Duey (RWT Indictee #10) left a bar one afternoon after an in-depth conversation about the WSM and joined AN together and shortly after joined the Order together. Andrew Barnhill (RWT Indictee #7) helped founder Bob Mathews (RWT Indictee #35) recruit Sherman Dye (RWT Indictee #11). Dye would soon bring with him William Nash (RWT Indictee #21) and George Zaengle (RWT Indictee #34). Clearly, block recruitment, or what I refer to as joining as a clique, characterized the process of joining the Order. This same pattern was found across the ten RWT groups in my sample. After further examining this pattern across all of the organizations, I found that even though there was nearly two decades of time between some of the group’s formations and activities, each of the ten groups could be linked to one another by at least one member in less than two degrees of social separation. In other words, over a 22-year analysis period, nearly one member of each group knew at least one member of another group. This suggests that the subculture of RWT may be characterized as a “small world network” (Watts & Strogatz, 1998, p. 440) where nodes (in this case people) not connected to each other are linked by a small number of connections. Further research is needed to more closely examine the social network properties of US RWT groups (1998).

To briefly summarize the findings regarding involvement and the influence of non-familial relationships on the involvement process, social friendships were a crucial factor for the process of joining RWT groups for the indictees in my sample. Over half
of the indictees were recruited into their RWT group by a friend whom they considered to be one of their closest and most valued personal relationships. It is also the case that their close friend, the recruiter, offered a valued lure to gain the indictee’s membership. Over 65% had previous memberships in various WSM groups prior to their joining the RWT organization providing a broad overview of the WSM as having a high degree of multi-sectoralness. This multi-sectoralness has made the movement, and especially the RWT organizations, a small, interconnected world across time (decades apart) and space (nationwide). Also, the majority of RWT indictees join their RWT organizations with at least one friend.

Biographical Availability Variables

As stated earlier, some characteristics of one of my analytical tools, biographical availability, have proven to be significant influences on joining yet do not fit one of the three research question categories. Despite this, I argue it necessary to have collected and analyzed data for these variables. The following are the areas in which my sample was most heavily clustered\(^5\): current socio-economic status (24.2% middle class, 22.7% working class, 36.4% lower class), education level (15.2% less than high school, 22.7% high school diploma/GED, 22.7% some college), chronic unemployment (47% no), current occupation (10.6% clerical, 16.7% service, 10.6% skilled, 12.1% unemployed), current religious preference (54.5% Christian Identity), life turning points (34.8% yes).

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\(^5\) Refer to Appendix C, Table 4 for Biographical Availability Variable Frequencies in their entirety.
### Table 4: Biographical Availability Clusters

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<td>Current Occupation</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>34.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional &amp; Higher Administrator</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Worker</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled Worker</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
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<td>12.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
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<td>1.5</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Religious Preference</td>
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<td>34.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Christian Identity</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Odinism</td>
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<td>1.5</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6.1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life Turning Points</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>60.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>3</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>34.8</td>
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As a reminder, biographical availability is best defined as “the absence of personal constraints that may increase the costs and risks of movement participation…” meaning indictees in my sample joined their RWT group because along with their ideological beliefs, they were simply available to do so (McAdam, 1986, p. 70). Given the current pressure placed on terrorism scholars to develop a terrorist profile (Horgan,
2008), and the fact that the majority of terrorist profiles involve individual level variables (Horgan, 2008; Moghaddam, 2005) the implication of the above findings lead to an important conclusion. In agreement with other terrorism scholars, a useful profile cannot be developed on individual level variables alone (Almeida, 2005; della Porta, 1995; Horgan, 2008; Moghaddam, 2005). The diversity in backgrounds of RWT indictees in my sample illustrate that the recruitment potential for RWT organizations stretches across a variety of individual circumstances. Indictees in my sample come from every socio-economic status, every education level, are not chronically unemployed and come from various occupational fields.

Two variables do however have significant clustering around single measures. The first is that over half of the RWT indictees religious preference at the time of joining their respective organization was Christian Identity (this warrants little discussion here as it has been covered in the previous sections). The second is that at least 35% of indictees were experiencing life turning points at the time they joined their RWT group. To reiterate, life turning points can be understood as a point in a person’s life when, in their opinion, their current trajectory is no longer suitable and “they were faced with the opportunity or necessity for doing something different with their lives” (Lofland, 1966, p. 50; Lofland & Stark, 1965, p. 870).

In recollecting about his own path to the Order, one member discussed how he was unhappy with his life and knew he wanted to do and belong to something different: “I was searching…but not [specifically] searching to become involved in the things I segued into…” (interview with Order member, 2004). This member stated he was

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55 For 60% of the cases there was not enough available information to make a conclusive judgment as to whether they were experiencing a life turning point. However, it is likely that more than 35% of the indictees were at the time that they joined.
looking for something to belong to even though he did not set out to become a member of a RWT group. For him, his journey started on an individual level because of life turning points, and “segued” into becoming a RWT because of factors on a social level (i.e., friendships and networking within the WSM). Similarly, the CSA leaders Kerry Noble (RWT Indictee #41) discussed in his autobiography how he was unhappy early on in his young adult life and was ready for a change when he chose to uproot his wife and child and move to the CSA’s compound in Arkansas (Noble, 1998). These two examples illustrate the 35% of indictees that were in a general state of unhappiness about their current situations and actively decided to find something to belong to and redefine the course of their lives. Rarely could one factor be identified as to why these particular indictees were unhappy, but some examples include loneliness, concerns about politics and the state of particular rights/laws (e.g., gun laws, crime rates, immigration), divorce, professional failures, and lack of assimilation into mainstream society (e.g., military veterans).56

The most important point to take away from this discussion of factors related to biographical availability is that while the above measures are often used in terrorist profiles, they are not enough. The structural components, family dynamics, and peer relations also have a significant impact on whether a person joins a terrorist group. While things like education and socio-economic status should be measured and analyzed for patterns, analyses must be more complex.

56 These factors also have been known to lead to other deviant behaviors such as substance abuse and more common types of criminality.
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS & IMPLICATIONS

The study of terrorism is one of the fastest growing fields within the social sciences (Schmidt and Jongman 1988). This study used a mixed methodological approach to analyze 66 federally indicted RWTs in the United States. I empirically examined how individuals become involved in RWT organizations. Specifically, I tried to identify and isolate characteristics of the involvement process by focusing on three interrelated questions; (1) What are the “structural components” of the involvement process? (2) What is the influence of family dynamics on the involvement process? (3) What is the significance of one’s non-familial relationships to the involvement process? I began the dissertation by providing an overview of the white supremacist movement, the social movement from which most right-wing terrorists emerge. I also explored past studies of terrorism and how previous research informed my study.

Though there remains disagreement on how to precisely define the term terrorism or who qualifies as a terrorist (Crenshaw, 1992; Hoffman, 2006; Schmid & Jongman, 1988), the necessity of studying terrorism is of critical importance\(^{57}\). Terrorism, generally understood as dissident violence (or threat of) inciting fear in a country’s government and its citizens for the purposes of producing political or social change (Schmid & Jongman, 1988), has existed for centuries. In the advent of new technologies in a global economy however, the destructive potential of terrorist attacks has never been so significant (Laqueur, 1999). Two characteristics of contemporary society are related to the profound destructive potential of terror attacks: technology and the existence of a global marketplace (1999). Technology has decreased the difficulty involved with

\(^{57}\) Defining terrorism and a terrorist is a very complex field of research and remains controversial not only an academia but also in legal realms. The intricacies of this topic were far beyond the scope of my study.
obtaining weapons of mass destruction (Laqueur 1999). Further, the modern world has made international borders almost non-existent for the purposes of terrorist acts. In addition to the murder of civilians, terror attacks produce a variety of other consequences. For example, the attacks on September 11th, 2001 shut down airport travel for weeks, left people stranded away from their homes, and triggered an economic crash in many world markets. The impact of 9/11 was felt on an international scale despite the attack occurring in a single country. The attacks in London on July 7th, 2005 and Mumbai on November 26, 2008 had similar consequences.

Recent activity by terror groups like al Quaeda has created a situation where the term “terrorism” is nearly synonymous with the Middle East and Islamic religion (Ferber, 2003, p. 64). Because of this, a disproportionate amount of research has focused on Islamic terrorism. The focus on Islamic terrorism has resulted in a neglect of other types of terror (Vohryzek-Bolden, 2003). Additionally, I argued that there are at least six other justifications for studying RWT, all of which signify that this marginalized extremist movement are mobilizing. First, Christian Identity has been making inroads into prison ministries nationwide and recruiting a number of violent offenders (Smith, 1994). The second is the significant amount of concern over illegal immigration and the WSM’s capitalization of it as a “fear tactic” to recruit more members (ADL, 2007b, 2007c; Avila, et al., 2007; DHS, April, 2009). The third is the recent expansion into what can be considered for the WSM to be non-traditional forms of criminal enterprise. There is a great deal of evidence indicating the involvement of skinhead and neo-Nazi gangs in the drug trade (Simi, et al., 2007; Smith, 1994). Fourth, a recent financial alliance has been forming among certain WSM groups and Islamic terrorists in the Middle East (Kemp,
2007; Simi, et al., 2007). Law enforcement intelligence suggests that groups within the WSM have been filtering large amounts of money to the Middle East (Kemp, 2007; Simi, et al., 2007). Fifth, the economic crash of 2008 is still having an impact on families across the US. This economic instability provides another source of frustration that the WSM tries to manipulate for recruitment purposes (Blazak, 2001; Smith, 1994). Finally, the historic presidential election in 2008 presents two issues that the WSM is contending with. The fact that it is a democratic president raises concerns regarding firearms laws, governmental assistance programs, and more lenient immigration laws. And, Barack Obama is the country’s first African-American president. Since Barack Obama has taken office, there has been an increase in newly formed WSM groups, membership in established organizations, increased production of propaganda, and terroristic threats made on government officials including the president (DHS, April, 2009; Montopoli, 2009). Researchers and law enforcement need to start devoting attention and resources specifically to the analysis of RWT.

While there are many types of terrorism, and many subtypes of RWT, most RWTs stem from the WSM. The WSM can be further delineated into four core branches; Ku Klux Klan, Christian Identity, neo-Nazis, and skinheads (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000)\textsuperscript{58}. Though there are some areas of discord between the four branches, and even within, there is also substantial overlap among the branches.

In order to provide a starting framework for analyzing the joining process of a terrorist, I reviewed previous research on the process of joining in three fields of study, social movements (SM), new religious movements (NRM), and terrorism. Because terrorism research is in its “infancy” (Bergesen & Lizardo, 2004, p. 51) and a majority of

\textsuperscript{58} For a detailed discussion of a historical overview, refer back to Chapter 2.
conclusions are impressionistic (Laqueur, 1999) it was necessary to review previous findings in SM and NRM. From this literature review, I was able to develop a more detailed conceptualization for my research questions. Individuals joined deviant groups due to either 1) biographical availability or 2) social networks, and possibly a combination of both. Biographical availability can be understood as “the absence of personal constraints…” leaving a person available to be involved in an organization (McAdam, 1986, p. 70). Social networks can be understood as measuring the amount and strength of social ties a person has to the dissident group, the amount of memberships a person has to related organizations of the dissident group, and finally any social ties the individual has external to the dissident group, which may delay or stop the person from joining.

Using a mixed methodological approach, I analyzed 66 federally indicted RWT representing 10 RWT organizations in the United States from 1980-2002\textsuperscript{59}. Data for each of the 66 cases and their RWT groups were derived from secondary source materials\textsuperscript{60} and ethnographic data collected by direct interviews, phone interviews, and participant observations in private homes, social gatherings, and WSM events from 1996-2005\textsuperscript{61}. Two databases were created, qualitative narratives were placed in Excel and quantitative variables were coded into SPSS. This was an exploratory, inductive based study so developing variables and coding them was a fluid process as the nature of the data was

\textsuperscript{59} Indictees were selected for inclusion from The American Terrorism Study (ATS) Database by a filter process (Smith & Damphousse, 2006). The filter process for inclusion required that an indictee had to 1) be a WSM RWT, 2) be indicted for committing an actual terrorist attack or an instrumental crime to further a future terrorist attack, and finally 3) have enough available secondary data to analyze.

\textsuperscript{60} For a comprehensive list of secondary data sources see Appendix B, List 2.

\textsuperscript{61} The data were collected by Pete Simi and supported by the National Science Foundation (SES – 0202129), the UNLV Graduate College Research, and the University of Nebraska, Omaha’s Office of Sponsored Programs.
constantly changing. To answer my research questions, I specifically sought out measures to paint a picture of the involvement process. Some measures were derived based on prior research in SM, NRM, and terrorism while others were developed on common practice that they may become relevant. Research question one regarding the structural components of the involvement process involved 20 variables and included several measures to analyze the biographical availability of indictees. Research question two regarding family dynamics involved six variables and included measures to analyze both biographical availability and social networks. Research question three regarding non-familial relationships involved seven variables and included measures to analyze social networks. Additionally there were six biographical availability variables that I addressed in the analysis that did not fit one of the three research questions. They were included due to the fact that prior research has found them to be significant influences.\textsuperscript{62} Frequencies and cross-tabulations were run on the quantitative data as a means to understand the distribution of my data, however no predictions or generalizations were made based on these analyses. The results of the quantitative analyses helped guide my in-depth case analysis of the data. Through this direction, I was able to uncover recurring patterns in my data on the joining process of RWT indictees.

Theoretical & Practical Implications

Theoretical Implications

What are the theoretical implications of the factors analyzed that “tip” a person over the line, dividing non-terrorists from terrorists? There are suggestions for theoretical research based on results from each of my research questions.

\textsuperscript{62} Appendix B, List 3 provides the complete codebook for all variables.
Structural Characteristics and Theoretical Implications

Gender

Based on my sample, RWT joiners and recruiters are almost always men. This finding follows conclusions from past research on SM, NRM, and in terrorism for all typologies (Aho, 1990; della Porta, 1995; McAdam & Snow, 1997; Sageman, 2004). The implication of this finding is that the greater amount of attention placed on men in research and counterterrorism strategies are warranted. This is not to say that female members and potential recruits should be ignored, and indeed to do so could lead groups to mobilize females as perpetrators more often which, while still rare, is starting to happen (Blee, 2005; Ness, 2005). But if there is one generalization that can safely be made it is that, like criminality, men are significantly disproportionate joiners and perpetrators of terrorism. In general, researchers have taken for granted the fact that terrorism is predominantly male perpetrated. In his examination of the increases in violence and paramilitary-based groups for white men, Gibson (1994) analyzed political and popular culture in the US post-Vietnam and indeed concluded that the increases were a symptom of a cultural identity crisis for white males. Researchers should continue to look into broader cultural patterns like Gibson (1994). Concerns have been expressed on the current cultural changes in the US both politically and economically that could lead to increased levels of violence and RWE and RWT organizations (DHS, April, 2009).

Age

The majority of indictees learned about the WSM and joined groups in the movement during adulthood. Consequently, the RWT organizations that they joined also
occurred in adulthood. This contradicts past SM and NRM research, but seems to confirm some previous findings from studies of terrorism (Sageman, 2004; Smith, 1994; Victoroff, 2005). I argued that these cases particularly were influenced by the dynamics of family and friends, which likely account for the older ages (implications for these cases will be covered later). Various indictees were introduced to the WSM during childhood however. Even in these cases, the majority did not actually join RWT organizations until they were in adulthood. Further, when it came to the point of joining a RWT organization, these same indictees were predominantly influenced by either family dynamics and/or non-familial relationships in their adult lives. This finding confirms previous in-depth case studies of left-wing and Jihadi terrorism (della Porta, 1995; Sageman, 2004).

The indictees introduced to the WSM in childhood spent many years progressively becoming acquainted with the movement and achieved increasingly radical memberships in various organizations. This finding has several theoretical implications. The most recent psychological research on terrorism suggests that joining a terrorist group is a deliberate process of radicalization (Horgan, 2008; Moghaddam, 2005; Silber & Bhatt, 2007). The indictees that were introduced to the WSM in childhood entered into a phase of self-identification with movement ideology at the time of introduction (Silber & Bhatt, 2007, p. 30). They began to identify with the messages of the WSM, independently examine the ideas through propaganda or seeking out representatives of the movement, and eventually began “slowly migrating away from their former identity” and “re-defining” themselves as WSM activists (Silber & Bhatt, 2007, p. 30). As they became further engulfed in the WSM, they started a radicalization process where each
group they associated with was more extreme than the last. Eventually, anything other than the actual goals of the movement became less relevant in their lives (Horgan, 2008). Moghaddam (2005, p. 161) utilizes a “staircase” analogy of climbing six floors of radicalization from self-identification to committing terrorist acts. Following the theories of radicalization offered by Horgan (2008) and Moghaddam (2005), the RWT indictees in my sample that were introduced in childhood and were recruited into terrorist organizations as adults, progressively became more isolated from their former lives and more intimate with the ideology and people (non-familial relationships) in their new lives. Ultimately, this led to making the decision to climb that final level of stairs into their respective RWT group and commit acts of terrorism (Moghaddam, 2005).

The theoretical implication here is that future terrorism research must continue to analyze it as a progression of behaviors. The most effective method for gaining insight into a terrorist’s decision to join a group and commit acts of terrorism are in-depth case analyses of their lives, like Silber and Bhatt’s (2007) and the present analysis. Terrorism is too complex of a process to be explained with simplistic variables that are measured from the time an individual joined a group and committed an act of terrorism (Horgan, 2008; Moghaddam, 2005). Researchers must start to analyze the events in a person’s life that shape that person’s availability and progression into radicalization (Horgan, 2008; Moghaddam, 2005).

Social Location of Recruitment

Almost three-quarters of actual recruitment into a RWT organization took place in a private home. Because joining a violent, criminal organization like a terrorist group is a
high-risk behavior, these results would seem logical that terrorists would seek the
security of a private home. However, past research on SM, NRM, and terrorism have
found that recruitment more often takes place in public or semi-public settings like
prison, school, work, rallies, music shows, and churches/mosques (Aho, 1990; Almeida,
2005; della Porta, 1995; Futrell & Simi, 2004; Gould, 1997; McAdam, 1986; Oliver,
1997; Sageman, 2004; Silber & Bhatt, 2007; Simi & Futrell, 2006). Joining a SM or
NRM is lower risk than joining a terrorist organization, but my results differ from past
research on other types of terrorism as well. The implication of this is that future
research must explore the differences between particular types of terrorism and common
locations of recruitment. Certain typologies may be more or less marginalized from the
mainstream society with which they are operating. To the extent that this is true, certain
terrorist types may perceive their recruitment operations as requiring more or less
secretiveness. In the United States, the groups that comprise the WSM are highly
marginalized from the mainstream and are viewed as socially repugnant. The indictees in
my sample appeared to be well aware of this and thus it makes sense that as their
extremist ideology and behaviors radicalized, they would seek the refuge of private
homes and compounds. Future research should compare terrorist typologies in this
respect.

**Type of Recruitment**

The majority of RWT indictees were recruited with face-to-face methods. Media
sources and technology played a minimal role in most indictees recruitment. Although

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63 One exception to this is the case study by Silber and Bhatt (2007). However, while I found a majority of
my sample was recruited in a private home, Silber and Bhatt (2007) found that private homes were used far
less than public and semi-public settings like mosques, gyms, and bookstores.
the WSM is well known for their production of propaganda materials for the purposes of recruitment, the level of terrorist recruitment may mean that additional materials teaching about the broader WSM are unnecessary as most of the individuals joining RWT groups were already familiar with its goals and teachings.

This finding lends even more support to the psychological research suggesting that involvement in terrorism is a progression of radicalization (Horgan, 2008; Moghaddam, 2005; Silber & Bhatt, 2007). Many of the RWT indictees under analysis were aware of the WSM’s propaganda materials prior to their contact with their respective RWT organizations. It may be that indirect tools played a role in the self-identification phases or “floors” of their radicalization process (Horgan, 2008; Moghaddam, 2005; Silber & Bhatt, 2007). Finally, technology-based recruitment via the internet was not present in my sample simply based on the time period under analysis.

Military Experience

A significantly disproportionate amount of the RWT indictees had prior military experience compared to the general population. I found that their military experience highly influenced the radicalization process. Based on my qualitative analyses, I found themes of perceived rejection by the military, internal conflicts with how they were treated by the military, or embitterment based on the treatment received by civilians after leaving the military. While there is a great deal of watchdog group based bulletins (ADL, SPLC) and government intelligence reports (DHS) that discuss extremism within the military, there is little social scientific research in this area. Because there are large populations of soldiers returning from military conflicts that the US has been involved in
over the past decade (DHS, April, 2009), and there is evidence of the WSM encouraging
members to join the military to gain tactical and weapons training, it is imperative that
researchers start examining the link between military experience and joining terrorist
groups. Are certain types of people who become RWT attracted to joining the US
military? Are there certain characteristics about the military that somehow create RWT?
These questions need to be empirically explored.

**Family Dynamics and Theoretical Implications**

Well over half of the RWT indictees in my sample were married and raising
children at the time they decided to join their respective terrorist group. This differs from
most previous research on SM, NRM, and terrorism (della Porta, 1995; Levine, 2003;
Lofland & Stark, 1965; McAdam, 1986; Oliver, 1997; for an exception see Sageman,
2004). Though Sageman (2004) did not have a great deal of qualitative data to explore
why his sample were mostly married with children, he suspected it was related to the
centrality of family life within the Muslim religion. Similarly, having an Aryan wife and
bearing Aryan children are central tenets of the WSM and indeed terrorist recruiters
emphasize the value of family to gain membership. Future research should continue to
explore the ways in which terrorist movements utilize the family as a means to recruit
members and gain obedience to commit terrorist acts. It is likely that in movements
where being married and having children are not central to the ideology, fewer of its
members will be bound to families. If this is the case, biographical availability specific
to *not* having a family may be a more predictive factor for the decision to join a terrorist
group.
Non-familial Relationships and Theoretical Implications

Non-familial relationships were a prevalent factor in the process of joining RWT groups for the indictees in my sample. A close friend recruited more than half of the indictees into their respective terrorist organization. This confirms a great deal of prior research in SM, NRM, and terrorism (Aho, 1990; della Porta, 1995; Lofland, 1966; Sageman, 2004; Silber & Bhatt, 2007; Stark & Bainbridge, 1980). Friendship seemed to be more valuable to an indictee when coupled with “lures” that were important to them offered by the recruiter (Horgan, 2008, p. 90). The theoretical implications of this finding confirm what many scholars have argued, namely that the decision to join a terrorist group is a complex process (Horgan, 2008; Moghaddam, 2005). Future research should focus on gathering rich qualitative data that can more fully describe the friendship between a terrorist and their recruiter, and the use of lures, if any, across terrorist typologies. It is likely that the strength of a friendship and the use of lures may be more or less important based on the type of terrorism. In other words, it is possible that individuals attracted to joining certain types of terrorist groups may be motivated more intrinsically than others and not require the strong bonds evidenced in my results. This certainly seems like the case for lone-wolf terrorists. Nonetheless, it is an empirical question that requires further analysis.

The results of this analysis also indicate that there is an extremely high degree of multi-sectoralness within the WSM. For past research that does measure this concept, my results coincide with previous findings (Almeida, 2005; della Porta, 1988; Sageman, 2004). Future research should analyze dismantled groups in order to see if they have links to newly formed organizations. This type of research could help in the development
of theories of disengagement and, based on results similar to mine, the reestablishment of the same individuals (or those closely linked to them) in new organizations.

Lastly, in regard to non-familial relationships, a majority of RWT indictees joined their RWT organization with at least one or more of their friends. There is not a great deal of research in this area in SM, NRM, or terrorism, but for the research that has been done, my results confirm past findings (della Porta, 1995; Sageman, 2004). This pattern of “block recruitment” (della Porta, 1995, p. 168) or as I refer to it as clique joining, consistently turned up in my qualitative narratives. Again, the implication of this is that more research needs to be done, across terrorist typologies, using a qualitative case study approach. This information for most of the RWT indictees in my sample would not have been uncovered in a purely quantitative analysis. Such patterns would not have been found in della Porta’s (1995) analysis of left-wing terrorists (LWT) either as it was through case narratives that she discovered this same pattern. Are there some terrorist typologies that rely more or less on friends to climb that last set of stairs to terrorism in the involvement process (Moghaddam, 2005)? A LWT in della Porta’s (1995) sample stated clearly that becoming a terrorist was an “evolution” of “human relation” with the people he associated with (p. 168). Sageman (2004) similarly found consistent patterns of small clusters of friends joining sects of the Jihadist terrorist movement. Though he did not have a great deal of qualitative data to illustrate these relationships, he argued that bonds of joining with friends were a critical element to ideological commitment and in fact “…it may be more accurate to blame global Salafi terrorist activity on in-group love than out-group hate” (Sageman, 2004, p. 135).
The clearest finding from my analysis is that joining a terrorist group is a process of radicalization not occurring at the point of officially joining, but rather occurring over a period of time and experiences, as some terrorist scholars have already suggested (Horgan, 2008; Moghaddam, 2005). There has been a great deal of effort to develop profiles of terrorists that have predictive abilities. The intricate nature of friendships, multi-sectoralness, and clique joining (as well as some structural components and the role of family) has yet to be included in a terrorist profile (Horgan, 2008). Most profiles involve individual level variables that have been quantitatively analyzed. As Horgan (2008) argues, “when we assume static qualities of the terrorist (a feature of profiles), we become blind to the qualities of the dynamics that shape and support the development of the terrorist” (p. 84). In other words, future research should shift its framework for how profiles have previously been constructed to fit the terrorist. Instead, we need to profile the process, not the terrorist (Horgan, 2008; Moghaddam, 2005).

**Practical Implications**

What are the practical implications of the factors analyzed that “tip” a person over the line that divides non-terrorists from terrorists? There are real-world suggestions that could be put into practice based on results from each of my research questions.

One could argue that the practical implication of my results should be to explain why RWT manifests within a society at all. This would include getting to the root causes of the broader SM to which terrorists are ideologically connected, like the WSM. While this is undoubtedly an important implication, I start with the assumption that hate-inspired, marginalized groups like the WSM are likely to always exist as long as there are
individuals that have complaints and frustrations with their lot in life. Further, segments of these populations will radicalize themselves into terrorists (Moghaddam, 2005).

Though hateful SM and terrorist groups may always exist, the execution of their violent acts can be detected and prevented. It is important however to consider the consequences (intentional and unintentional) of prevention and intervention efforts. Simi and Futrell’s (2010) analysis of the WSM and spaces of hate (i.e., rallies, white power music shows, homes, home-schooling, compounds, churches, etc.) poses the following question: “…how much [should] a democratic society tolerate from Aryans and other extremist groups” (p. 124). Outright repression of WSM activity, proposed by watchdog groups (e.g., SPLC) and even federal law enforcement (e.g., DHS), the authors warn could actually increase violent activity within the movement because the movement’s hate spaces provide an outlet for them to freely voice their frustrations (Simi and Futrell, 2010). It is a very real possibility that without these spaces even more members of the WSM would transition into the underground and begin their journey of getting involved in a RWT organization (Horgan, 2008; Moghaddam, 2005; Simi & Futrell, 2010). As Simi and Futrell (2010) consider, we must also be very cautious in continuing to expand governmental powers that border on infringing constitutional protections as a practical means of thwarting extremist and terrorist action. That being said, are there practical implications based on my results that do not include outright repression or greater expansion of state powers?

The greatest practical implication is that law enforcement must be educated on the process of joining a homegrown, RWT group. While many law enforcement agencies

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64 Since September 11th, 2001, the Bush administration started a number of practices under the USA PATRIOT act that have been contested as being unconstitutional (most importantly, new policies and practices on surveillance and privacy rights) (Simi & Futrell, 2010).
may be aware of some of the existing intelligence reports regarding terrorists, this is most often occurring at federal levels in regard to Islamic fundamentalist terrorists. This is another negative effect of the term “terrorism” becoming synonymous with Muslim based terrorist groups, which was discussed in detail earlier. Not only can other terrorist typologies mobilize undetected, but they can do so simply because law enforcement agencies are less informed about their characteristics. This knowledge needs to be filtered down to law enforcement at all levels, but especially locally. Local agencies know their communities best in terms of crime areas, crime problems, and the major players in their criminal population. Further, this information needs to be passed down beyond detectives in intelligence units who are no longer working the streets on a daily basis. Patrol officers have the most current knowledge on the crime areas, problems, and criminals within their jurisdictional boundaries. The street cop will be the first to recognize unusual activity and unusual faces in his/her area. The implications that I propose have nothing to do with outright repression or further infringement of constitutional rights, rather, it has more to do with education of law enforcement and intelligence gathering practices.

**Basics of the WSM**

Police departments nationwide have a certain number of in-service training hours that are mandatory for their police officers. While it varies from state to state, officers must be trained in firearms, defensive tactics, and most relevant here, various courses (e.g., search and seizure law, surveillance/counter-surveillance, interrogation, gangs). Police departments could have classes based on terrorism typologies and the identifiers of
the broader SM from which they stem. While certain identifiers for branches of the WSM are commonly known from popular media (e.g., “doc martin” boots with red laces, red suspenders, shaved heads, swastikas), more obscure yet extremely common symbols within the movement are less widely known in mainstream culture (e.g., “14 word” tattoos, CI or Nordic based symbolism/propaganda, *The Turner Diaries*, “88” tattoos signifying the numeric version of “Heil Hitler”, etc.). Offering such a class to educate street level officers on some of the basics of SM and terrorist groups (specifically the WSM and RWT groups here) is one initial practical implication of my results. After learning some ways to help identify these individuals, what are the practical implications specific to my results?

**Social Location & Type of Recruitment**

The fact that RWT indictees are usually recruited in a private home by face-to-face encounters also bears practical implications for law enforcement officers. Law enforcement officers can be proactive in gathering intelligence at the street level to pass on to intelligence bureaus within their agencies and joint task forces (squads created that have federal and local law enforcement officers working together). When police officers encounter an individual they think may be a RWT they should conduct a field interview with them to gain some basic, and to the extent possible, accurate personal information about the individual. This is not an uncommon practice among law enforcement officers already. For example, during the course of a legal vehicle or person stop, if there is additional information that a police officer deems important to pass on for various reasons that are beyond the scope of the original violations, he/she will simply conduct a
brief field interview. This information is then passed on to the bureau section (i.e.,
property crimes, gangs, fraud/forgery, violent crimes) that is most relevant to whatever
suspicious circumstances arose and were observed by the officer.

This information gathering technique is quite brief and does not extend the time
of the initial stop to unreasonable levels. Further, the reasons for the questions asked
during a field interview do not have to be revealed to the target and if the target refuses to
give the requested information, they are released without any ramifications. Field
interviews are specifically relevant to private home-based recruitment strategies because
part of a field interview is to obtain a current address for an individual (which can easily
differ from their driver’s license or vehicle registration). Also, since most recruiting is
done face-to-face, officers can field interview the individuals that the target is with when
stopped (i.e., passengers in a vehicle). If friendships are as important as the present
results suggest, people that they are stopped with may also be members of the WSM that
are experiencing a radicalization process.

Military Experience

The practical implications of indictees with military experience are two-fold.
Based on the case narratives, several RWT indictees became radicalized during their time
in the military. Though the military purports a “zero tolerance” policy banning extremist
beliefs/behaviors, the reality is that military recruiters and officers have adopted their
own informal “don’t ask/don’t tell” practice on the issue (Holthouse, 2006). Because
there is great pressure on the military to increase and retain personnel due to conflicts in
the Middle East, numbers have become very vital. Military officials, like law
enforcement officers, must be educated on how to identify these individuals. Further, there must also be policy development regarding the identification of extremist military personnel. If individuals are identified as extremist, should they be immediately discharged? In other words, is a zero tolerance policy the best option or are there other ones that could be developed (e.g., educational rehabilitation perhaps)? If a zero tolerance policy is the best option, then the military must also develop policies of accountability for military recruiters and officers that knowingly learned of extremist individuals and behaviors, but turned a blind eye.

Discharged RWT indictees with previous military experience should be extremely important to law enforcement. The military provides individuals with advanced weaponry and tactical training, and in many cases this is better training than law enforcement officers receive. Indeed, the very reason some RWE and RWT join the military is due to encouragement from WSM leaders for this training: “As street brawlers you will be useless in the coming race war. As trained infantrymen you will join the ranks of the Aryan warrior brotherhood” (online article by Peiper, 1999). Based on previous major incidents with RWE and RWT, including the 2011 Arizona active shooter that included the murder of a US senator (rejected Army applicant), the 2009 Fort Hood active shooter (Lt. Gen. in the US Army), the 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing (former US Army soldier), and the 1992 Ruby Ridge barricade/standoff (former US Green Beret), encounters with extremists that have either been rejected by the military and more importantly actually have military training, can be a major officer safety issue. One implication is simply for officers to document prior military experience when conducting a field interview with an individual that they believe to be a RWE. Should a standoff
situation happen in the future with any individuals that have previously been field interviewed and military experience is included, law enforcement charged with neutralizing the situation may or may not need to change their tactics based on this documented information.

Family Dynamics & Non-familial Relationships and Practical Implications

If we know that most RWT are married with children, most are recruited by their most valued friend, most have multiple memberships within the broader WSM, and most join a RWT with at least one or more close friends, these are all fairly simple characteristics for law enforcement to document during the course of their regular duties for intelligence building purposes. The idea is that this information would be forwarded to whatever bureau is charged with intelligence gathering on deviant groups/organizations in their jurisdictions. The receiver of this information would presumably begin a general work up of intelligence on individuals, specifically focusing on those measures that have consistent patterns based on empirical research of being influential as to whether a person joins a RWT group.

This should not be viewed as the government extending police powers. Indeed, such practices are common and have been used for decades. The difference, however, is that there has been a lack of education and attention towards domestic terrorism, specifically from the RW. If the very purpose of terrorism research is to understand it and the processes involved so as to be able to predict or prevent it, then the practical implication of my results should be to assist in the education of law enforcement about

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65 This could be a gang unit, a counterterrorism unit, a general intelligence bureau, and may even be the local federal law enforcement field office for smaller police departments without the resources of a large municipality to have their own investigative bureaus.
RWT and enable their efforts to gather meaningful intelligence (Horgan, 2008; Moghaddam, 2005; Silber & Bhatt, 2007).

**Limitations**

The limitations of my analysis are regarding the sample, data collection, and methodology. The sample could not include any other RWT that were not federally indicted by the US government. This means that there are some missed cases that were prosecuted on a state level between 1980-2002 that involved the same criminal behaviors as the indictees in my sample. I was also limited in my data collection and methodology based on the availability of information on each of the 66 RWT indictees. Some of my frequencies did not always include information for every indictee per variable. The information that was collected was also subjectively coded into the variables I developed. However, to minimize any threats to the data that subjectivity posed, a high degree of intercoder reliability was achieved in terms of source triangulation and researcher triangulation (Berg, 2004; Huberman & Miles, 1994).

However, to minimize any threats to the data that subjectivity posed, a high degree of intercoder reliability was achieved in terms of source triangulation and researcher triangulation (Berg, 2004; Huberman & Miles, 1994).

Finally, and not unique to this study, it is unknown if my results can be generalized not only to other RWT, but terrorists in general. However, the techniques I used provided a far greater in-depth analysis than

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66 The FBI terrorism definition provides the following: “The unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a Government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives” (Hoffman, 2006, p.31). Additionally, to be indicted federally as a terrorist, a necessary condition is that they are conspiring with 1 or more people. Therefore, a lone wolf like RWT Eric Rudolph was not included in The ATS database (Smith, 1994; Smith & Dumphouse, 2006; Vollers, 2006).

67 Previous similar research on terrorism like Sageman’s (2004), Silber and Bhatt’s (2007), and della Porta’s (1995) encountered the same problems however. Regardless, a great deal of information was obtained in these studies and in the analysis here providing rich findings that should not be rendered useless when information could not be found equally across cases (Sageman, 2004).

68 An exceptional amount of secondary data sources and a wide variety of different types of secondary data sources were obtained and harvested for their information. Further, myself and the principle investigator on the NIJ grant worked side-by-side during the entire collection and coding processes for additional protection.
just a quantitative design could have. The richness of the narrative data has allowed for
the first detailed view of the involvement process for RWT, providing a valuable addition
to previous research on the involvement process of other types of terrorism (della Porta,
1995; Sageman, 2004).

What are the tipping points to terrorism? Joining a terrorist group is a complex
process that takes place over time and is influenced by many dynamic factors. Most
RWT indictees, were more influenced by the dynamics of family and friendships rather
than individual level factors. Terrorism scholarship must continue to view the process of
involvement as an intricate one that requires in-depth analyses of the life histories of
terrorists. Research must also continue to focus on RWT coming from the WSM. The
following quote from a RWT indictee leads one to consider the current political and
economical climate in the US and hopefully conclude that terrorism from the RW is a
real, not a perceived, threat.

…like the core CSA people, most people just really love God and their country;
and we loved God and our country. You find anybody at the right time in their
life when they’re unhappy and they’re recruitable [sic]. If you’re happy with your
life, you’re not recruitable [sic]. If you’re T’d [sic] off and you are in the right
places, like gun shows, you’ve opened yourself to being talked to and you’re
recruitable [sic]…Look, everyone has things they’re upset about or don’t like to
do, but for the most part we’re happy people…Plus, if you’ve never belonged to
something bigger than yourself it’s a good feeling…I think that’s what gets
people and keeps people too…And it’s so much easier to blame others for your
problems like blacks, minorities, etc. Another thing is when you’re out of hope, if
you don’t have hope that things can get better, like the government, you’re pretty
messed up. What keeps you in is belonging, no feeling of personal responsibility,
and no hope that it can get better (interview with CSA leader, 2004).
References


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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Figures, Pictures and/or Photographs

Figure 1

This billboard (photograph retrieved from www.immigrantsolidarity.org) could be found displayed in the city of Las Vegas, Nevada as of 2006 (SPLC, 2005). What is important to note here is that the National Alliance is a very well known neo-Nazi organization in the United States (Berlet & Vysotsky, 2006; Smith, 1994). In fact, it was the leading organization of the extreme right throughout the 1990’s (Berlet & Vysotsky, 2006). The founder, William Pierce, is the author of the well-known fictional book “The Turner Diaries” which is often attributed as having heavily influenced Timothy McVeigh in the Oklahoma City Bombing (Stickney, 1996). Having no knowledge of RWE groups, let alone WSM organizations, this billboard looks fairly benign to the passing citizen. What is clear is the plausibility of a non-racist and non-prejudiced individual that is
interested in stopping the influx of immigrants calling the phone number for the National Alliance and supporting or even joining the organization for reasons unrelated to the race or ethnicity of immigrants.
Figure 2:

Path Analysis Model
Research Questions & Analytical Tools
Joining a RWT Group

R1
Structural Components

R2
Family Dynamics

R3
Non-Familial Relationships

ANALYTICAL TOOL
Biographical Availability

ANALYTICAL TOOL
Social Networks
Figure 3

What Did You Do During The Revolution

http://aryan-nations.org
Appendix B: Informational Lists

List 1: Synopses of WSM Terrorist Groups

Aryan Nations (AN)

Founded by the recently deceased Richard Butler, Aryan Nations (AN) was technically an organization within an organization (Balch, 2002). Started in 1978, AN can be referred to as the “political arm” of Butler’s Church of Jesus Christ Christian established only 5 years prior in northwestern Idaho (Balch, 2006, p. 85). The core ideology of the group was based on the Christian Identity religion, and indeed, Butler was a very well-known proponent of the faith having been mentored by one of the most influential preachers in the early expansion of Identity in the United States, Wesley Swift (Balch, 2006; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2000). Over time the organization began to resemble a mixed bag of WS ideology beyond Christian Identity to also include an array of neo-Nazi and apocalyptic practices and beliefs (e.g. military uniforms, survivalist camps and training, etc.) (ADL, 2007a; Balch, 2006). During AN’s near 30 year tenure, the 20-acre compound in Coeur d’Alene, ID was the site of many well-attended “Aryan World Congresses” where Butler promoted the intermingling of the various factions of the WSM from all over the country (Balch, 2006). In fact, such congresses would often become the meeting, and even recruiting location for other RWT organizations, especially the Order (Balch, 2006; Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995). Membership estimates ranged from an earlier following of approximately 6,000 members in the 1980’s to a

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Names of individual indictees are normally not mentioned in this analysis to maintain the confidentiality/anonymity of those indicted (even though one can consider federal indictments to be public knowledge). However, some names are occasionally mentioned where an individual is the well known founder of an organization or the case is so very infamous that it can be assumed to be common knowledge regarding the individuals that are responsible for the acts of terrorism (e.g. Oklahoma City Bombing Conspirators).
mere 1,000 members prior to its collapse in 2004 (ADL, 2007a; Balch, 2006; Smith, 1994).

Balch (2006), finds that the downfall of AN can be attributed to a combination of external and internal factors. Externally, the organization faced a great deal of opposition from the community and local law enforcement that started in the 1980’s and greatly intensified during the 1990’s (2006). Internally, the 1990’s were a time of transition from the organization’s heyday a decade before. Membership turnover took a turn for the worse in terms of the types of individuals attracted to the organization (Balch, 2006). According to Balch (2006), the “family atmosphere” of the 1980’s was gone leaving room for more unsavory characters in the broader movement to join (p. 100). The turnover extended beyond followers to the organization’s leadership as well (2006). As new members and new leaders came into the group, internal disagreement about goals and power increasingly became the norm (2006). Most detrimental to AN’s ability to sustain itself had to do with both internal and external financial problems (2006). Internally, it suffices to say that over time the organization’s expenditures outweighed its income (2006). Externally, AN was bankrupted by a lawsuit involving compound security guards assaulting a mother and son on the perimeter of the premises (ADL, 2007a; Balch, 2006). Membership continued to dwindle upon sale of the AN compound, and most especially Butler’s death in 2004 (ADL, 2007; Balch, 2006). Though other groups in the country tried to claim the namesake of the organization, AN is now defunct (Balch, 2006).
Aryan Republican Army (ARA)

Arguably known as one of America’s most dangerous right-wing, domestic terrorist cells, the Aryan Republican Army was established in the living room of one of its three founders (Hamm, 2002). Within two years the group doubled in size, and though still small, was responsible for well over 20 violent armed robberies (some entailing rapes and murders) spanning from coast to coast (Hamm, 2002; MIPT, 1995). More so than many other RWT groups, the ARA was probably most diverse in terms of member demographic and social characteristics. Nonetheless, the glue that bonded them was their racist, neo-Nazi and skinhead ideology (Hamm, 2002, 2004). While the group had no formal or official location of operation, a farm in northeastern Pennsylvania and the very well-known Elohim City⁷⁰ in eastern Oklahoma became places of frequent visitation and sometimes temporary residences for all members (Hamm, 2002).

Interestingly, the ARA’s notoriety as a terrorist cell did not really come from the crimes its members actually committed, but rather from those that some of its members were suspected of committing (Hamm, 2002; MIPT, 1995). Some of ARA’s members, as well as Elohim City, became major sources of legal and media attention shortly after the Oklahoma City Bombing (Hamm, 2002; MIPT, 1995). Though never charged in connection with America’s most violent domestically perpetrated terrorist attack, many

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⁷⁰ Elohim City is a white supremacist, Christian Identity based community that was founded by Robert Millar in 1973 (Shook, Delano, & Balch, 1999). Located in eastern Oklahoma and still in existence today, Elohim City has practically become a Mecca within the broader WSM. Nearly all of the most well-known WST organizations can be connected to Elohim City (regardless of strength of tie), though it should be noted that Elohim City has maintained a non-criminal image (Barkun, 1997; Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995; Gardell, 2003; Hamm, 2002; Noble, 1998; Stern, 2003). In other words, while well-known terrorists have been connected to Elohim (e.g., Timothy McVeigh), Elohim has never been legally connected to any incidents of crime or terrorism. Further, not all individuals within the WSM are in agreement as to Elohim’s relationship within the broader movement. While most scholars would argue that Elohim is a part of the movement (Hamm, 2002), some groups and individuals within the movement and within the community itself would not classify Millar’s community the same way (Noble, 1998; Shook, et al., 1999).
still remain highly suspicious of some of its members (Hamm, 2002). The small group collapsed upon their arrests and later indictments by 1997 (Hamm, 2002; MIPT, 1995).

**Covenant, Sword, & the Arm of the Lord (CSA)**

Located in northern Arkansas near the Missouri border, the terrorist organization that would come to be known as the Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord (CSA) initially began as a religious community (Barkun, 1997; Noble, 1998). On over 200 acres of land, the 10-15 families that made up Zarephath-Horeb church enjoyed a “…simple…although high…” standard of living (Noble, 1998, p. 65). Coupled with strict dietary standards that included occasional, nonetheless extreme fasting, no drinking, no drugs, and no smoking, the ‘congregation’ met for praise meetings and Bible studies almost daily (Noble, 1998). The group’s founder, Jim Ellison, and some of its key leaders or *elders*, including Kerry Noble, soon began making new interpretations of the Bible that would lead their group down a dark path (Noble, 1998). By 1978, the group was fully entrenched in Christian Identity religion (Noble, 1998). Soon after, the group changed its name to the Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord, and adopted very severe anti-government, anti-Semitic, and racist beliefs (Noble, 1998).

The CSA compound quickly became a paramilitary and survivalist training camp where its members anticipated and prepared for the inevitable and looming race war (which even included a mock city to simulate and practice urban warfare) (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995; Noble, 1998; Smith, 1994). While some members had legitimate jobs in the local industries and commerce (i.e., sawmill, Wal-Mart), the majority were supported by less than typical means (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995; Noble, 1998; Smith, 1994).
Generating the most income for the compound was the production and sale of firearms (including semi-automatic rifles), silencers, and explosives at local gun shows (Smith, 1994). Such a locale also provided extraordinary opportunity for finding and recruiting new likeminded members (MIPT, 1995). Ellison also encouraged his followers to engage in mostly petty theft, as well as pawning one’s personal goods that were not key to warfare survival (e.g., wedding bands) (Noble, 1998; Smith, 1994). All of the funds generated through the above means were used for stockpiling remarkable amounts of weaponry, chemicals, and explosives, as well as more benign materials like food and first-aid (Noble, 1998).

Interestingly, and largely unknown by many, CSA also planned to bomb the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City nearly twelve years before it actually was destroyed in the most violent domestically perpetrated terrorist incident in US history (Noble, 1998). Though the aforementioned plans were fortunately never executed, CSA was responsible for some devastating events. Within one year, the group had successfully carried out the bombing of a community church known to support homosexuality in Missouri, a Jewish community center in Indiana, the detonation of explosives near a natural gas pipeline in Arkansas, the robbery and murder of a Jewish pawnshop owner, and the murder of an African-American State Trooper in Arkansas (Noble, 1998; Smith, 1994). In addition to their violent crimes, a strong link between themselves and arguably the most violent domestic terrorist organization in the nation’s history, known as the Order, brought a great deal of attention to their compound (Smith, 1994).
In April of 1985, CSA’s crime spree and cross-organizational networking was brought to a less than abrupt halt when its members finally surrendered after a four day standoff with federal authorities (Noble, 1998). In a search of the compound that would last days, performed by a number of law enforcement officers from various agencies, CSA’s allegiance to starting a race war would be illustrated. Nearly 200 firearms, including machine guns and assault rifles, as well as thousands of rounds of ammunition for each, and massive amounts of explosives were confiscated (1998). So vast was the amount and types of explosives found that the government carried out controlled detonations for three days (Noble, 1998, p. 172).

Fourth Reich Skinheads

Started and based in southern California, the Fourth Reich Skinheads were established some time in the early 1990’s by two teenagers (MIPT, 1995). Though the ultimate size of the group remains unknown, estimates range from approximately 20 to 50 young individuals, mostly men (MIPT, 1995). Regardless of membership numbers, court transcripts and investigation records make it clear that only a handful of individuals were responsible for the actual incidents of terrorism (MIPT, 1995). Indeed, only two individuals were indicted and convicted of such crimes (MIPT, 1995).

The main goal of the group was to no longer wait for the race war to begin, but rather instigate it to begin (MIPT, 1995). Aside from the groups elaborate plots to assassinate influential African-Americans including Reverend Al Sharpton, Rodney King, and Louis Farrakhan, the group did bomb a few homes in minority neighborhoods, as well as a Synagogue (MIPT, 1995). Interestingly, most of the group’s conspiring
conversations were taped as they had been under close federal surveillance with the help of a cooperating witness for months (MIPT, 1995). In July of 1993 Fourth Reich’s most active members, including its main leader, were arrested and indicted (MIPT, 1995). The government found their crimes to be so grave that the organization’s youngest member was transferred into the adult system (MIPT, 1995).

Oklahoma City Bombing Conspirators

Undoubtedly the most widely publicized and known RWT are the perpetrators of the tragic Oklahoma City Bombing; Timothy McVeigh, Terry Nichols, and Michael Fortier (MIPT, 1995). Usually coined as the worst domestically perpetrated terrorist attack in U.S. history, it is said that McVeigh’s impetus for terroristic action was the government standoff in Waco, Texas against the Branch Davidians in 1993 (Michel & Herbeck, 2001; MIPT, 1995). Sickened by the excessive government use of force against the religious branch, McVeigh enlisted the help of his two friends to take action against the government (Michel & Herbeck, 2001). It is worth noting that McVeigh’s disapproval and hatred for the government had been growing for many years before Waco and was brought on by a host of issues. While not an exhaustive cataloguing, some of the more well known inciting incidents for him include having been rejected by the Army’s elite Green Berets, his growing disdain for the government imposing more gun control laws in the 1990’s, and especially inspiring was the now infamous fictional novel *The Turner Diaries*71 (Michel & Herbeck, 2001; MIPT, 1995). Waco however, was certainly the last straw for McVeigh, and two years of planning culminated with the

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71 *The Turner Diaries* (MacDonald, 1996, 1978), written under the pseudonym “Andrew McDonald”, was authored by William Pierce the founder of the RWE organization known as National Alliance. It is an account of a violent race war that ensues in the United States (MacDonald, 1996, 1978).
bombed the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City on the anniversary of the Waco siege (Michel & Herbeck, 2001). The significance of the date was not lost on anyone, especially the extreme right which seems to hold a great deal of reverence for 4/19 (Michel & Herbeck, 2001; Smith, 1994). McVeigh was executed in June of 2001, while Nichols was sentenced to natural life in prison, and Fortier cut a deal with the government and received only 12 years imprisonment in exchange for his testimony against his co-conspirators (MIPT, 1995).

**Oklahoma Constitutional Militia (Universal Church of God)**

The Oklahoma Constitutional Militia was a small, Christian Identity based cell established by Willie Ray Lampley in 1994 (MIPT, 1995). Like many RWT organizations, Lampley had ties to Robert Millar’s white supremacist compound known as Elohim City in the Ozark Mountains of Eastern Oklahoma. Lampley was known to make frequent visits there to discuss white supremacist ideology and the threat of a Jewish led New World Order (1995). In the early 1990’s, Lampley, his wife, and two other co-conspirators began overtly planning to bomb a number of gay bars, abortion clinics, and offices belonging to the Southern Poverty Law Center and the Anti-Defamation League as a means to carry out what he believed to be God’s punishment on such alleged sinners (MIPT, 1995). All plans were curtailed after their arrests in 1995 (MIPT, 1995). Found in their possession was significant quantities of ammonium nitrate and the stockpile of various weaponry (MIPT, 1995).
Order (Bruder Schweigen/The Silent Brotherhood)

The group known as the Order narrows the gap with McVeigh and his co-conspirators for being the most notorious and violent RWT group in U.S. history. Also like McVeigh, its founder Robert Jay Mathews was inspired by *The Turner Diaries* (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995), especially the fictional rebel organization starting the race war which called themselves “the Order” (MacDonald, 1996, 1978, p. 73). In the Fall of 1983, Mathews had formed his Order, and even though the group had a relatively short lifespan, they were responsible for a remarkable inventory of terroristic acts (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995; Smith, 1994). The majority of their crimes, and certainly what they are best known for, were a string of armored truck armed robberies that raised upwards of $4 million dollars for the group (a great deal of the money was funneled to other WSM organizations) (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995; Smith, 1994). The group was also involved in a rather large counterfeiting operation, smaller armed robberies, and even murders, including the assassination of Alan Berg, Denver’s Jewish radio talk show host (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995; Smith, 1994).

Many of its members came from Butler’s Aryan Nations (Smith, 1994). In fact, some have considered the Order to be a radicalized, underground terrorist cell of Aryan Nations which is entirely inaccurate considering Butler is presumed to have been unaware of the Order’s actions (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995; Smith, 1994). Mathews’ innermost circle of initial members was approximately 9 individuals, though the group would expand to nearly 30 within months (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995). The Order would weave a complicated web of network ties with other RW persons and groups nationwide that would provide not only more criminal opportunities on a larger scale, but also shelter
and safe house locations (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995). Like Aryan Nations, the Order was a mixed bag of WS ideology, some claiming Christian Identity or another form of Nordic based faith (e.g. Odinism, Asatru, Paganism), whereas others were more secular in their racist beliefs (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995; Gardell, 2003; Hoskins, 1990). In less than two years, the Order was abruptly dismantled by the government with the help of an informant that was a relatively close associate to the group though never a member (Martinez & Guinther, 1999; Smith, 1994). While most Order members were arrested, indicted, and convicted, Mathews’ reign ended less quietly. After a two day standoff with federal authorities on Whidbey Island, WA, Mathews was killed in a house fire started after federal authorities shot flares inside (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995; MIPT, 1995). Obviously no longer in existence today, many former Order members can be contacted by mail as evidenced on their own website www.freetheorder.org (Pierce & Scutari, 2004-2006).

**Order II (Bruder Schweigen Strike Force II)**

As the name suggests, the group known as the Order II perceived themselves to be an extension of Mathews’ original Order (Smith, 1994). Established in 1986 in Idaho, the group’s membership only totaled 7 individuals, all of which were or had been members of Aryan Nations (Smith, 1994). Further, all of the members of Order II were not only sympathetic to the Order’s cause, but had also been friends with many of them (Smith, 1994). The group’s leader, David Dorr, was so inspired by Mathew’s that as Smith (Smith, 1994) states, “…the group imitated on a local scale what Mathews had attempted nationally” (Smith, 1994, p. 79). Dorr’s Order was responsible for a least six
bombings and at least two murders, all of which were local crimes (1994). A rather interesting distinction for the group is that three of its members (including its founder) appeared on *Oprah* to represent and defend the WSM that same year (Smith, 1994, p. 78). Also quite interesting is that as of 2006, *twenty years* later, Oprah had referenced that very same show with deep regret saying that in retrospect she had done nothing but give the WSM a platform to advertise their hateful viewpoints (Winfrey, 2006). By 1988, the group’s remaining five members (one was already in prison for unrelated crimes, another murdered by the group presumably for snitching) were all convicted for actions that in their eyes never came close to those of the original Order (Smith, 1994).

**Phineas Priests**

The Phineas Priests present an interesting predicament for law enforcement and also distinguish themselves from other groups in this sample. The Phineas Priests are more of an unorganized organization, what some may refer to as a group of “leaderless resistance” (MIPT, 1995). Leaderless resistance can be described as rather small cells of individuals, or even *an* individual, acting on behalf of a broader organization’s or movement’s goals without a directive or blessing, and possibly without even their knowledge (Blazak, 2001; MIPT, 1995). The indictees in this sample, upon arrest and indictment, have claimed to be members of the Phineas Priesthood (Gardell, 2003; MIPT, 1995). The concept of being a Phineas Priest can be found in the Bible in Numbers 25, though most self-proclaimed priest holders were likely inspired by Identity follower Richard Hoskin’s book *Vigilantes of Christendom* (1990) (Gardell, 2003). Hoskin’s (1990) interpretation of Numbers 25 provides Christian Identity believers with the
justification to commit acts of violence on others that they perceive are an abomination to the chosen people of Israel (i.e., pure Aryans). Targets of course could include interracial couples, abortion clinics, any ethnic or racial minorities, synagogues, etc. (Gardell, 2003; MIPT, 1995). For the individuals in this particular cell of Phineas Priests, their actions included bank robberies and bombings (MIPT, 1995).

White Patriot Party

Founded in 1980 by Frazier Glenn Miller, the White Patriot Party (WPP) was a RWT organization that transitioned out of the former North Carolina Knights of the Ku Klux Klan (MIPT, 1995; Ridgeway, 1995). Considering the violent objectives of RWT organizations, the WPP was exceptionally large for being more than a radical social movement group with estimations around 3,000 members (MIPT, 1995). Like his white supremacist counterparts in the Pacific Northwest, his plan was to create an all-white nation but instead to do so in “mother Dixie”, otherwise known as the South (Ridgeway, 1995, p. 119). Along with many other R(Miller, 2008)WT groups during this time period, Miller’s WPP was one of the beneficiaries of the Order’s most infamous crime, the Ukiah robbery, receiving $300,000 of the $3.6 million stolen (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1995; MIPT, 1995). The WPP was dismantled in the mid-1980’s after plans for the assassination of Morris Dees, a famous civil rights activist for the SPLC, were discovered (MIPT, 1995). Shortly after in 1988, Miller turned state’s evidence and testified in a Sedition trial against more than a dozen RWT from three different RWT groups in the United States (MIPT, 1995). After his testimony, Miller was perceived as a turncoat to the WSM by many (MIPT, 1995). As of 2008, Frazier Glenn Miller remains
tremendously active in the WSM and is currently campaigning in Missouri for a seat in the United States Congress (Miller, 2007; MIPT, 1995).
List 2: Variables

**General Information**

**Variable 1 - - GRPNME**  
*Group Name*

**Variable 2 - - RCTNME**  
*Recruit Name*

**Research Question #1: Structural Characteristics**

**Variable 3 - - GENREC**  
*Gender of Recruited*  
0=Female  
1=Male  
99=Unknown

**Variable 4 - - DOB**  
*Date of Birth*

**Variable 5 - - AGECONT**  
*Age at Initial Contact with Movement Ideas*  
0=Childhood (0-12)  
1=Adolescence (13-18)  
2=Young adult (19-24)  
3=Adult (25-40)  
4=Mid-life (41-55)  
5=Retirement Age (56 and Over)  
99=Unknown  
*if exact year or timeframe is known record in ( ) in Excel only.*

**Variable 6 - - AGECONTGRP**  
*Age at Time of Joining Group*  
0=Childhood (0-12)  
1=Adolescence (13-18)  
2=Young adult (19-24)  
3=Adult (25-40)  
4=Mid-life (41-55)  
5=Retirement Age (56 and Over)  
99=Unknown  
*if exact year or timeframe is known record in ( ) in Excel only.*

**Variable 7 - - GEOLOC**  
*Geographic Location*  
City, State
Variable 8 - - SOCLOC
Social Location of Initial Contact
0=Home
1=School
2=Work
3=Church
4=Neighborhood
5=Prison/Jail
6=Other
99=Unknown

Variable 9 - - RELABET
Relational Contact Between Recruited and Recruiter
0=Relative (If 1 specify relationship)
1=Schoolmate
2=Co-worker
3=Inmate
4=Friends
5=Stranger
6=Mentor
7=Other (specify)______________________
98=Not applicable
99=Unknown

Variable 10a - - TYPREC
Type of Recruitment
0=Direct (face-to-face)
If 0 Skip to 11
1=Indirect (mediated)
If 1 Skip to 10b
2=Combination (direct & indirect)
If 2 Skip to 10b
3=Self-starter
If 3 Includes Indirect Sources Skip to 10b; If No Indirect Sources Were Present Skip to 11
99=unknown

Variable 10b - - MEDIA
Media used in Recruitment Process
0=Literature
1=Music
2=Televisual material
3=Internet
4=Combination
98=Not Applicable
99=Unknown
Variable 11 - - NUMBREC
Number of Recruiters
1=1
2=2
3=3 or more
4=Self-Starter
99=Unknown

Variable 12-16 - - AGEREC (1,2,3,4,5)
Age of Recruiters
0=Childhood (0-12)
1=Adolescence (13-18)
2=Young adult (19-24)
3=Adult (25-40)
4=Mid-life (41 -55)
5=Retirement Age (56 and Over)
98=Not Applicable
99=Unknown
*if exact year or timeframe is known record in ( ) in Excel only.

Variable 17-21 - - GENDREC (1,2,3,4,5)
Gender of Recruiter (s)
0=Female
1=Male
98=Not Applicable
99=Unknown

Variable 22 - - GRPTYP
Type of Group
0=Klan
1=Christian Identity
2=National Socialist
3=Skinhead
4=Hybrid (Specify)
5=Militia/Paramilitary
99=Unknown (hard to define)

Variable 23 - - LENGREC
Length of Recruitment
(Days, Months, Years)
0=7 days or less
1=8-180 days (1 week-6 months)
2=181-365 days (6 months-1 year)
3=366-730 days (1-2 years)
4=731-1825 days (2-5 years)
Variable 24 - LEVINVOL
Level of Involvement
0=Founder
1=Leader (non-founder)
2=Core (non-leader)
3=Member (non-core)
4=Non-member (but associated with group/actions)
99=Unknown

Variable 25 a to e - MIL
Military Background

MILEXP 25a.
Military Experience
0=No
1=Yes
99=Unknown

MILBRA 25b.
Branch of Service
0=Army
1=Navy
2=Air Force
3=Marine Corps
4=Coast Guard
5=National Guard
6=Other
7=Foreign Military
8=Combination of core US branches
98=Not Applicable
99=Unknown

MILLEN 25c.
Length of Service
0=One year or less
1=2 years
2=3 years
3=3 or more years
98=Not Applicable
99=Unknown

MILLEAV 25d.
Reason for Leaving
0=Honorable Discharge
1=Dishonorable Discharge
98=Not Applicable
99=Unknown

**MILSPTR 25e.**
*Special Military Training*
0=paratrooper
1=military police
2=tech sergeant
3=platoon leader
4=vehicle gunner/sergeant
5=security detail/sergeant
6=small arms
7=Airborne
8=Ranger
9=Navy Seal
10=Green Beret
11=No Special Training
98=Not Applicable
99=Unknown

**Research Question #2: Family Dynamics**

**Variable 1 - - MARSTAT**
*Marital Status*
0=Single (never married)
1=Married
2=Divorced
3=Widowed
4=Co-habitating
99=Unknown

**Variable 2 - - CHLD**
*Children*
0=No
1=Yes
99=Unknown

**Variable 3 - - PARINVOL**
*Parental Involvement*
0=No
1=Yes
98=Not Applicable
99=Unknown

**Variable 4a - - FAMINVOL**
*Family Members Involved in WSM*
Variable 4b - - NUFAMINV
*Number of Family Members Involved*
0=No
1=Yes
98=Not Applicable
99=Unknown

Variable 4c - - RELFAMINV (1,2,3,4)
*Relation of Family Members Involved (up to 4)*
0=Parent
1=Sibling
2=Spouse
3=Child
4=Grandparent
5=Aunt/Uncle
6=Cousin
7=Other
98=Not Applicable
99=Unknown

Research Question #3: Social Networks

Variable 1 - - RELABET
*Relational Contact Between Recruited and Recruiter*
0=Relative (If 1 specify relationship)
1=Schoolmate
2=Co-worker
3=Inmate
4=Friends
5=Stranger
6=Mentor
7=Other (specify)
98=Not applicable
99=Unknown

Variable 2a - - FAMINVOL
*Family Members Involved in WSM*
0=No
1=Yes
98=Not Applicable
99=Unknown

Variable 2b - - NUFAMINV  
*Number of Family Members Involved*
1=1
2=2
3=3
4=4
5=5+
98=Not Applicable
99=Unknown

Variable 2c - - RELFAMINV (1,2,3,4)  
*Relation of Family Members Involved (up to 4)*
0=Parent
1=Sibling
2=Spouse
3=Child
4=Grandparent
5=Aunt/Uncle
6=Cousin
7=Other
98=Not Applicable
99=Unknown

Variable 3 - - PRIKNOW  
*Prior Knowledge of WSM*
0=No
1=Yes
99=Unknown

Variable 4a - - PRIGROUP  
*Prior Extremist/Terrorist Group Membership*
0=No
1=Yes
99=Unknown

Variable 4b - - PRINUMB  
*Prior Number of Group Memberships*
1=1
2=2
3=3
4=4 or more
98=Not Applicable
99=Unknown

**Variable 4c - - PRITYPES**
*Prior Types of Group Memberships*
0=Klan
1=Christian Identity
2=National Socialist
3=Skinhead
4=Hybrid
5=Militia/Paramilitary
6=Combination (combination of 1 or more of 0-5)
98=Not Applicable
99=Unknown

**Variable 4d - - PRILEVINV**
*Highest Level of Involvement in Prior Groups*
0=Founder
1=Leader (non-founder)
2=Core (non-leader)
3=Member (non-core)
4=Non-member (but associated with group/actions)
5=Variety of Roles
98=Not Applicable
99=Unknown

**Variable 5 - - CLIQUES**
*Whether Indictee Joined with Other(s)*
0=No
1=Yes
99=Unknown

**Biographical Availability Variables**

**Variable 1 - - CURRSES**
*Current Socio-Economic Status*
0=Upper Class
1=Middle Class
2=Working Class
3=Lower Class
99=Unknown

**Variable 2 - - EDULEV**
*Education Level*
0=less than high school
1=high school diploma or equivalency
2=some college
3=2-year college degree
4=4-year college degree
5=graduate school
6=trade or vocational school
99=unknown

**Variable 3 - - CHRUNEMP**

*Chronic Unemployment*

0=No
1=Yes
99=Unknown

*Chronic unemployment is when a person is unemployed more than 50% during their adult years*

**Variable 4 - - CURROCC**

*Current Occupation*

0=Professional and higher administrator (e.g., doctor, teacher, banker, government official)
1=Clerical (e.g., clerk, office manager, secretary, bookkeeper)
2=Sales (e.g., Sales manager, shop owner shop assistant, buyer, insurance agent)
3=Service (e.g., restaurant owner, policeman, barber, janitor)
4=Skilled worker (e.g., foreman, motor mechanic, printer, seamstress, tool and die maker, electrician)
5=Unskilled (e.g., laborer, porter, unskilled factory worker)
6=Farm (e.g., farmer, farm laborer, tractor driver)
7=Unemployed
99=Unknown

**Variable 5 - - CURRREL**

*Current Religious Preference*

0=Protestant
1=Catholic
2=Jewish
3=Mormon
4=other
5=None
6=Christian Identity
7=Odinism
99=Unknown

**Variable 6 - - TURNPTS**

*Life Turning Points (e.g., recent marriage/divorce/children, job loss, relocation, family death)*

0=No
1=Yes
99=Unknown
### Table 1: Frequencies, Research Question 1 – Structural Characteristics

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