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The narrative of Lieutenant Colonel L.R. Stacy, C.B., Bengal Native Infantry, whilst in the Brahooe Camp, inducing the submission of Nasseer Khan, only son of the late Meer Meerab Khan, khan of Khelat; and in the subsequent operations of General Nott's army in its march to and its return from Kabul

Lewis Robert Stacy

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THE NARRATIVE

OF

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL E. R. STACY, C.B.

NURGAL native infantry,

WHilst IN THE BEARSOOO CAMP, DURING THE SUBMISSION OF NASERED KHAN, ONLY SON OF THE LATE MEER MEERAB KHAN, KHAN OF KHELAT;

And

IN THE SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS OF GENERAL NOITK'S ARMY IN ITS MARCH TO AND ITS RETURN FROM CAUL.

FROM THE SHERSHOPE PRESS.

18(4).
Various circumstances have combined to retard the printing of the following Narrative, among which the illness of the Writer may be mentioned as one of the most prominent. It is now printed—though not published—for private circulation among his friends, to many of whom a detail of the difficult negotiations which led to the submission of Nanee-bhan will not be without interest. It may also be considered to possess some historical value as an authentic record of the measures by which the tranquillity of Baluchistan was secured at the critical period of our reverses at Cawul. It does not profess to give a general view of the proceedings beyond the Indus, or of the military movements of the army to which Col. Stacey was attached, but is confined to those transactions in which he was personally engaged.
SECTION I.

From the commencement of Colonel Sturgis’s political duties to the Installation of Niuswee Khan.

After the re-occupation of Khelat by the troops under Major General Nott, on the 3rd Nov. 1840, I marched with the return force for Kandahar on the 7th of the same month. Before leaving Khelat, I wrote to Mr. Ball, offering to take Political charge of it, and to attempt to induce the young Khan to come in. On the 14th, we reached Moostung, where we left Capt. Macn’s Regiment, and on the 19th dropped the Shah’s Horse Artillery and the greater part of the Cavalry at Kwetta. On the 22nd, we reached Kella Abbas, and on the morning of the 26th marched to the foot of the Kohjuck. Major General Nott proceeded direct to Chummun. I sent over the carts attached to the 18 pounders direct to Chummun, with two Companies 43rd, and the Ramah of Skinner’s Horse at 3 p.m., having taken off the greater part of the material loaded on the 18 pounder spare carriage. We tried the road by the watercourse; I had been twice before over the Kohjuck, each time with guns, and I gave a decided preference to this road. Lieut. Walker, who commanded the Artillery, also preferred it. We took up the spare carriage with such comparative ease, that we returned for a gun, which we carried up as satisfactorily. As it was moonlight, the sepoys volunteered to bring up the second 18 pounder, but I declined their assistance. The next morning, the 27th of November, we took up the remaining 18 pounders. It was a miserably cold day with a high wind, and occasional drifts of snow. The tackle was so decayed that our difficulties were doubled; but by dint of hard and constant labour, and good humour, we got everything into Camp at Chummun at 5 p.m. Thus the Company of European Artillery, and the six Companies of the 43rd N.I. accomplished, without a halt, a task which it had taken two and three days to perform, with double or treble their number. Never did men work harder or with better spirit. -On going to General
Soit, to report every thing safe into Camp, I received orders to return and assume political charge of Khelat.

As the snow still threatened, the force moved towards Kandahar the next morning, and I retraced my steps with an escort of eighteen horsemen for the fourth time, over the Kohjuck. The natives were busily employed in cutting up and carrying off the flesh and hides of the camels which had dropped the day before. They did not molest me, but they were so numerous, that I considered it prudent to wait for my baggage on the top of the pass. As soon as it was clear of the pass, I pushed on to Kella Abdoolla, to prepare refreshments for the people and cattle. Lieutenant Bosanquet, commanding the post and Aehunayre Horse, kindly gave me his assistance, and every thing was ready by the time the baggage reached, which was near sunset. I proceeded on the following day to Kwetta, which I reached in three marches, with an escort of 10 Aehunayre horsemen.

I remained five days at Kwetta hoping to receive instructions from Mr. Ross Bell. I found Mr. Masson there still in confinement. I visited him daily, and gained considerable information from him of the character of most of the chiefs of the Khanate of Khelat who were well known to him; and to his information on this head and to his recommendation of Mooliah Nasseer Oollah Babee, as an active, upright man, I consider much of the success which has attended my undertaking to be due. Before leaving Mr. Masson, he drew up a paper for me, describing the leading characteristics of the principal sirdars and servants of the Khelat state.

We left Kwetta, on the 7th December and reached Moostung on the 9th. Mr. Masson had recommended Shadee Khan Iliubearane to me, as a man well acquainted with the country, and friendly to the young Khan. On my arrival at Moostung, I sent for this man, and after an hour's conversation, had a Persian note written to Mooliah Nasseer Oollah which I sent off by a kossid, furnished by Shadee Khan. Mooliah Nasseer Oollah reached my tent by 4 r. u. the next day. He conversed with me till late, and agreed to join me at Khelat in six days, and to assist me in my negotiations with the young Khan. He was a personal friend of Nasseer Khan's, and his relative Mooliah Faiz Ahmed Babee, another man strongly recommended to me by Mr. Masson, was even more intimate with the
young Prince, the latter and Moolah Fair Ahmed being disciples of
a Syud, who had made many converts to some new and peculiar way
of thinking. It was agreed, that I should send an invitation to Fair
Ahmed in Shurnarak, which was accordingly done by a kossid the
next morning.

I reached Khelat on the 13th December, and Moolah Nasseer
Oolla faithfully joined me on the 17th. On the 26th, I received Mr.
Ross Bell's instructions, which were: 1st. that the Khan should disband
his army; 2d. that he should wait on Mr. Bell at Bugh under guar-
antee of safe conduct.

Having made every enquiry into the state of affairs, I dispatched
Moolah Nasseer Oolla under an escort of six Brahooec horsemen
with a letter to the young Khan at Zedeed. He returned with a very
polite reply from the Khan on the 21st of January, to the effect that
he had dispatched Sirdar Meer Esah Khan Mhengal and Darogah
Gool Mahomed to meet and consult with me at Khelat. Moolah
Nasseer Oolla assured me that the young Khan was most anxious to
have come himself, but that the Sirdars would not hear of it. He
also informed me that the distrust of the honour and sincerity of the
English in the Khan's Camp, was greater than he could express.
When the Khan first named Darogah Gool Mahomed as one of those
to be sent to me, he flatly refused to move, and it was only when the
Khan declared that if the Darogah declined the office, he would go
himself, that the Darogah acquiesced. I did not think it advisable
to hold the proposed conference within the walls of Khelat. The
village of Toke was therefore selected, on the advice of Darogah
Gool Mahomed. It is about 14 miles S. E. of Khelat.

I accordingly proceeded at an early hour of the day fixed, on the
23rd January, towards the village of Toke. When about half way,
a horseman galloped up to us from Darogah Gool Mahomed to
say, that he supposed we were to be had at Toke, that the horses were
unfit, and that he must come in that direction. I accordingly
struck off to the right, and reached Rodungah about 1 p.m. For the
last four miles of the road we observed horsemen on the top of the
hills, who disappeared as we approached them. Sirdar Meer Eeekh
Khan Mirzaeul, and Darogah Gool Mahomed came out to meet me. After mutual embraces and the usual enquiries after each other’s health, we returned to the village. It was evident that my visit without a single sepoy, or a guard of any description astonished the deputies. I observed that every preparation had evidently been made against a surprise. Rodenjoh is a small miserable village, with only two small orchards, and every appearance of most abject poverty. We went into a hovel carpeted for the occasion, when after the prescribed courtesies of the country, I observed that the day was wearing away, and I had a long distance to travel back to Khelat; I therefore proposed to discuss the object of our meeting. The room was accordingly cleared, and the party reduced to Sirdar Esaah Khan, Darogah Gool Mahomed, Moollah Nasseer Oolla, Moollah Mahomed, and myself. The Darogah spoke first, but his demands were preposterous. I at length stopped him, observing that the subject of our consultation lay within a very narrow compass. It was whether the young Khan wished once more to try his fortunes in the field, or was anxious to obtain terms? I then explained to them the two points, which must be considered before negotiations could be opened; the first that the Khan should disband his army, and the second that he should wait upon Mr. Bell. I promised to guarantee his safety to Mr. Bell’s Camp, and to accompany him myself both there and back, if he and Mr. Bell could not agree on the terms. After much conversation, the Darogah said, they wished for terms and were ready to disband their army and agree to such conditions as Mr. Bell should offer them. The deputies had a long list of grievances, from the time the army crossed the Indus to their defeat at Kootroo, an event which appeared to press most upon their minds. I informed them that these were subjects for after consideration. I finally agreed, on the part of Mr. Bell, that the young Khan should be allowed to come to his paternal uncle, Peer Ahmed Azim Khan at Zheeree, unmolested; that I would meet him there to consult about his journey to Mr. Bell.

I considered it necessary to embrace the opportunity of this meeting, to advert to the murder of Lieut. Loveday; the result was the following detail from the Darogah. He said that Moeez Nasseer Khan, and he were riding from the field of battle, after their defeat at Doodur; a body of Sheerwances came up and the young Khan required
about Lieut. Loveday, they replied, he had been slain; the young Khan repeated the word "slain"? The Sheerwanees replied, in the affirmative. The young Khan observed, "then you have dishonored me and my country," and gave vent to every epithet of abuse, which the anger of the moment dictated. The Darogah observed that the disgrace and disadvantage of such an act was great and certain. From that moment, Mahomed Khan Sheerwanee, and his tribe were forbidden the presence; they subsequently put ropes round their necks, and came to the Durbar to crave pardon, but it was refused. Interest was made through their wives, but it was equally unsuccessful. Darogah Gool Mahomed declared that the beating and ill treatment of Lieut. Loveday was utterly without foundation. Subsequently, on the 24th July 1841, I received a petition from Mahomed Khan Sheerwanee, requesting a hearing. I called him to Khylat and told him what I had related above without mentioning from whom I had received the information. He declared, there was not one word of truth in it. He said the oppressive conduct of the late Lieut. Loveday's Moonshee, as farmer of the revenues of Moostong, had excited the hatred of all classes; and that when the Moonshee headed the sepoys, and fired on them, the people collected from all sides, and ultimately killed all the sepoys with the exception of three. He also denied that his tribe had ever sought to be restored to favour with ropes about their necks, or that their wives had ever made interest for them. Moollah Nasseer Oolla and Moollah Mahomed were present when the Darogah gave me his version of the affair at Rodenjoh, and I therefore invited them to hear Mahomed Khan Sheerwanee's story. The subsequent capture and trial of Kaessoo Raessanee, the murderer of Lieutenant Loveday, proves the correctness of his statement.

I did not reach Welat till long after dusk. I left it for Zheeree on the 27th January, and marched to Capatoh; the next day, to Nechara; the day following to Pundaran, and on the 30th reached Zheeree. The march from Capatoh to Nechara was most distressing. It can scarcely be traversed by any force; the route to Pundaran is very difficult for laden cattle. Between Capatoh and Nechara the first obstacle is the Kund-i-Capatoh, a very steep and difficult ascent, over a narrow path on the side of the hill; this leads up to a table land. After passing the valley of Sonkoom, we had to climb...
over the Kund-i-Soorkun. Some miles beyond this, we reached the Channeeree, which for miles is only passable with the greatest caution by camels lightly laden. At the end of the Channeeree, is the "Chaneet-i-Bader," or "well of Bader" which never overflows, but remains throughout the year at one particular height, the water being about four feet from the surface. It is beautifully clear, and tastes well. Beyond this is the famous pass called "Jaugar," which for eighty yards lies through a rock cleft narrower, with a road not more than four to seven feet broad. Camels at this spot must be unloaded, and their burdens carried through by men; they are reloaded at the road wide of.

Meer Mahomed Azim Khan, brother of the late Mehrab Khan, who was residing at Zheeree, was ever very inimical to British interests. On the arrival of Esah Khan and the Darogah at Zheeree, they discovered that Meer Azim Khan had written to the young Khan in their absence not to trust the English. It was therefore resolved that the Darogah should go to the Khan and endeavour to dissuade his mind of this idea, and escort him to Zheeree, whilst my safety was entrusted to Sirdar Meer Esah Khan Mhengal. On the arrival of Sirdar Meer Esah Khan, and the Darogah at Zheeree, Meer Azim Khan openly objected to any negotiation being entered upon with the English; and declared he would oppose it all in his power. He had also stationed a man of the name of Malloke, a shikaree, in the pass, to murder me as I passed, but Sirdar Esah Khan Mhengal, having notice of this intention, planted his men in such a position as to intercept the assassin, who had concealed himself in some underwood, but was discovered, and asked what he did there. He confessed his errand, and pleaded poverty as his reason for having undertaken such a job. Esah Khan ordered his matchlock to be broken, which was instantly done, and with a few cuts the shikaree was dismissed to his employer. Sirdar Esah Khan openly upbraided Meer Azim Khan with his perfidy. The Prince, in his anger, told Esah Khan, that if the shikaree failed in his errand, he himself and his followers would cut me up, and my party as we entered Zheeree. The old chief told him, that he must first kill the Sirdar of the Mhgans; that I was under his protection, and that they must walk over his dead body to reach me. Thus to the good offices and high honor
of the real chief of the Mhengals, Sirdar Meer Eshk Khan, may I consider myself indebted for my life.

Darogah Ghul Mohammed returned on the 4th February, but without the young Khan. The distrust of the people was beyond belief; for though I was amongst them without a single sepoy, yet they feared a Chappar, and never passed a day without sending out horsemen in every direction to reconnoitre. The Darogah adverled to the Kunooz-chappar, and Llent. Loveday's having set a price on his head. This fact was corroborated by Sirdar Meer Eshk Khan. After much conversation with the Harogah, it was settled that the young Khan should visit me the next morning; and that I should conduct him direct to my quarters, instead of losing a day in etiquette.

I met the young Khan at 11 a.m. about a mile from my quarters, dismounted, embraced, exchanged compliments and rode back. It was in vain however to think of entering on business; he had about 6 or 600 men with him, chiefly cavalry, many on camels. These men dismounted and forced themselves into my small apartment till it was crowded. The Khan and the Chiefs strove to prevent this, but in vain; not a man would quit the room though repeatedly ordered to do so, and we were forced to submit to their presence. On entering, the young Khan was somewhat alarmed, but his fears soon wore off, and he gained his full self-possession, and conversed freely on hunting, shooting, and such topics. It was nearly 1 p.m. before he left me. On parting, I presented him with a rich kinkah, a shawl, a Persian Jeenum carpet and sword, and a pair of beautiful inlaid matchlock chargers of Persian manufacture, and some other trifles, with a bag of 1,000 Rupees. After Midnight Azim attended the young Khan. His conduct throughout was rude, and whilst I was speaking to Aghoon Mohammed, he explained, "Friends with the English! I dont trust them, particularly this one, sitting here." The Brahooee Mooleesee also complained of most indecent, and even offensive language from Meer Azim Khan, who as he was leaving the room said to him, "did your mother marry the Colonel Sahib, that you are so fond of him?" The Mooltee replied, "you are the brother of Meer Mowree Khan; such language is unbecoming." The Darogah was left behind to talk of business.
while the Khan went to pray at the shrine of some saint. The Da-
rogah began upon the old subject and asked what terms were to be
given, though I had repeatedly told him that this was a subject
which Mr. Bell only could discuss. The Kootroo chuppoo was an
external theme, as well as the treacherous seizure of Beegar Khan.
They all declared, that after the Kootroo chuppoo, they could place
no reliance on the English, for our own vakeel was in camp when
it was attacked. So generally was this affair at Kootroo considered
by all the Chiefs as the height of treachery, that it was impossible
to get over it. I therefore proposed to the Darogah that I should be
left in the Brahooee camp, as a hostage, whilst the young Khan
went to negotiate with Mr. Bell at Baugh. After some deliberation,
this was refused. I therefore resolved to go myself, as the Khan and
his Chiefs had requested, and procure for them a safe conduct to
visit Mr. Bell.

I visited the young Khan on the following day the 6th of Febru-
ary. He came out some distance to meet me, and we dismount-
ed opposite his tent, a miserable, old, low, worn out pal, lined with
green baize, and supported on two rickety poles. On leading
me in, he feelingly advered to his misfortunes and said it was the
best, the only tent he possessed, that he was ashamed to ask me to
enter it. I had previously arranged through the two vakeels, Mool-
lah Nasser Oollah, and Moolah Faiz Ahmed, that I should have a
private conversation with the Khan, before we met in Durbar. At
the door of the tent, therefore, his attendants turned off to their res-
pective quarters, and I was left with the Khan, Darogah Goor Muh-
ayed, and the two vakeels. We conversed long on the state of af-
fairs and his wishes. The Khan insisted on the positive necessity
of adhering to the advice of his Chiefs in Durbar, as it was the law
of the land. It was in vain that I endeavoured to shew him, that the
minds of some of the Chiefs were already made up to prevent his
accompanying me to Mr. Bell, and that the advice some of them
offered arose from their own fears, not from a regard to his interests,
or the good of their country. I alluded to the fall of his father
by the perfidy of his servants, and begged him to think for him-
sell. He persisted in the necessity of following the advice of his
Durbar as an important a point; the more so as he was but a boy
himself, and said terms he
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himself. He begged me to make terms for him; he took off his ring, and said, "give this to Ross Bell Sahib; tell him to affix it to any terms he may think proper, and I will agree to them; say, I trust to his generosity; tell him that I am an orphan, have lost my father, my country, my all; that I never presumed on an equality with the English, and that I have done nothing but in self defence. Whatever Ross Bell Sahib requires, (cabool,) I agree to it. Give him my seal, that it may be binding." I gently put back his hand with the ring, saying it was impossible. I told him I could give no explanation of the Kootroo affair; and as the Chiefs appeared resolved not to permit him to go with me to Mr. Ross Bell, I should go myself and learn the particulars. The Khan said, "you have shown me the greatest kindness; you have brought two of my best friends, Moollah Nasseer Oolla and Moollah Faiz Ahmed; they both join with the Darogah, in advising me to rely on your friendship. You say you will go to Mr. Ross Bell; may I ask you to do me two favours; first to tell him I am not afraid of him, that I am afraid of other people, and of another chuppo; secondly, that Meer Bolser is the friend of my heart, that if he will release him, and send him to me, I shall be most grateful." Meer Bolser is not only a great favorite of the Khan’s, but Meer Bolser’s sister, is the mother of the girl the young Khan is to espouse, and she was in a village close by. I promised him I would mention both points favourably to Mr. Ross Bell.

Here our consultation ended, and servants were dispatched to summon the several Chiefs to Durbar. They were soon in attendance; the Sirdars were seated around on the carpet, whilst the Khan and I were on a chuppo, covered with a white cloth. After about a quarter of an hour of general conversation, the crowd were ordered to withdraw, and the Khan, the Sirdars and I were left to business. The young Khan opened the discussion; his voice faltered a little at first, but he soon gained confidence, and spoke with considerable freedom, and great command of language. His attitude was good; his body reclining gently forward, his left arm resting on his shield; the whole scene was very picturesque. He began by drawing a picture of the misery in which I found him, and to which he had been reduced by the English; of
the loss of his Father, and his country; of his subsequent wanderings and persecutions by Looch, Lovetch; of the refusal of Captain Bean to give him a few quarters of grain, with permission to reside at Nandikere; of his utter destitution after the departure of Kootnoo; of his orphan state, and tender years; and the difficulties at such an age of discerning friends from foes. He said, that his life was one of misery, and that if the Kootnoo of it would bring peace to the country, he was ready to resign it. Turning directly to me, he said, that the Canderar merchants, passing to Bombay have often mentioned the kind manner in which you have treated the troops in Canderar, and the protection you have given to persons and property. My own subjects of Kootnoo have described the kind treatment they experienced at your hands, when General Snott occupied that country; this, together with your coming amongst us unattended, induced me to look upon you as a true friend. But, said he, my father and I have experienced great hardship from the English; our shores have been cherished and rewarded by you; and since the departure of Kootnoo, I cannot rely on your faith. The scheme of Sadjar Khan was also quoted as another breach of faith, which rendered the Khan’s personal attendance on Mr. Bell, without previous arrangements, unavoidable. Much was said about Col. Bures, and Major Leech; about Capt. Bean, and Lt. Lovetch, and the deceptions which accompanied his father’s domicile. The Khan concluded by expressing a wish to hear the opinions of those present; and as the eyes of the Chiefs were bent on me, I observed that the object of my visit was to bring about an interview between the Khan, and Mr. Bell; that I was authorized by Mr. Bell to guarantee to the Khan and his Sirdars, perfect security to come and go; that Mr. Bell would receive him and his Chiefs with respect and friendship, and that if, after the interview, the Khan should not be satisfied and wish to return, I was to accompany him back in safety to any spot he choose. Akcoom, Mohammed Haidoo, then objected decidedly to the Khan’s going to Mr. Bell at any rate, before assurances had been received of safety. He spoke in bitter terms of our wars of faith, but was silenced by the Khan. Little order was observed after this; several of the chiefs spoke at one time, and the conversation became general. Thus three hours passed, but I could not con-
The general feeling of distrust. With the exception of the two
values who had come with me, almost all the others in Durbar were
opposed to the Khan's visiting Mr. Bell. Finding I could not suc-
cceed that day, I proposed to retire to my camp, six miles off, and
to renew the discussion on a future day, and soon after rose to take
my leave. At this moment, the Khan said, it had ever been the
custom of their house to make presents to all men of distinction,
who visited them, but that in the choppo at Kootroo, all the little
property which remained to him, was carried off by the English;
that he had nothing but horses to offer me, and had desired the
two best he possessed to be prepared for me, but that they were so
unworthy of my acceptance, he feared I might be displeased, as they
were fitter to carry burdens, than a man of my rank. The end
of the Pal was now lifted, that I might see them. I told him not to
think of presents, and expressed my regret for his misfortunes, and
my hope that he would accompany me to Mr. Ross Bell. The horses
were two rawboned animals, that appeared to have lived upon air;
indeed such was the dearth of grain and bosall, that it was with
the greatest difficulty, even with my assistance, that rations could be
supplied to the Khan's camp.

The next day the young Khan sent me a letter he had received
from Sirdar Meer Bohoor, who spoke highly of Mr. Bell's treatment,
and of the handsome presents made him, on receiving his dismissal.
It now became necessary to make some arrangements for the dis-
ccharge of the Khan's soldiery, whom neither he nor I could support;
and I sent Moollah Nasseer Oollah, to him to discuss the matter. He
returned in the evening and said that the young Khan was delighted
by the return of Meer Bohoor. Although his son, and a hundred and
dirty-two men of the Meer's tribe are still in prison and had been
in chains in Sukkur, yet the treatment their Chief has received,
and his subsequent release, will remove much discontent and his re-
turn will teach the Khan and his Sirdars to place reliance on my
assertions. The Moollah reported the misery in the Khan's camp to be
excessive, and stated that from morning till night men came in front
of the Khan's tent, complaining that they were without rations, and
their horses without either barley or bosall. I desired the Moollah
to ascertain, as nearly as possible, how many men could be got rid of
and from what part of the country they came, being anxious to assist
in sending them back to their homes, if the Khan had not the
means of doing so. The next day I was under the necessity of al-
lowing Mehool Fatiah Ahamed to leave me; his half brother having sel-
exed a considerable property, which he was rapidly converting to his
own use in Candahar.

On the 9th of February it was arranged that the young Khan should
spend the day in my tent, that we might endeavour to make ar-
rangements for disbanding some of the hungry rabble for whom
it was next to impossible to procure support. On his arrival he told
me his life was a perfect burthen: that his people came to him
from morning till night, crying out in front of his tent that they and
their cattle were starving. Though only fourteen or fifteen years
old, the constant misery of the last two years is visible on his face.
He related to me that on one occasion, they were reduced to such
straits when pursued by Lieut. Loveday and his men, that but for
a doro which was shot and immediately dressed for him, he thought
he could not have survived. He fully agreed to the necessity of
disbanding his army, but the difficulty was to find out how they conld
be paid up. I had brought 8,000 Rupees with me; but the people
in the Khan's camp were estimated at 6,000 men. Some might be
rid of, for as small a sum as 5 Rupees, and a few seers of grain; some
of the chiefs of minor consideration agreed to retire, if their ex-
penses and that of their followers were paid to them. It was re-
solved that on the following day enquiry should be made and a
report prepared. I candidly told them my means were small and
that my assistance must be very limited. On the subject of going to
Mr. Bell, I could gain no concession, nor could I separate the Khan
from the Sirdars. If on any occasion, I took the boy on one side,
in the presence of showing him any thing, we were instantly followed
by some of the attendants; and during the whole time he was with
me, I could obtain no opportunity of conversing with him alone. I
was consequently forced to speak before the Chiefs; but their minds
were made up, and nothing could induce them, they said, after the
Kootroo chuppo, to allow the Khan to go to Mr. Bell, till I had
procured from him a distinct promise of safe conduct. I found it ne-
cessary therefore to agree, that he should proceed direct to Mr. Bell
at Bughd with Sirdar Meer Kamool Khan Ilium, Sirdar Meer Esh
Khan Munool, and Sirdar Meer Boheer Zheeree. The three Sr.
had the necessity of all having several converting to his
Khan should not be allowed to make any
arrangements for whom he wished to come to him
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cheap. Each to
five Sirdars were empowered by the Khan to reply to all questions; and
be agreed to abide by any arrangements they might make with Mr.
Bell in his name. We were to proceed down the Moulia pass, to
leave the young Khan at Nurh, whilst the three Sirdars and I proceeded
by forced marches to Mr. Ross Bell at Bangb.
A letter from Mr. Bell of the 7th instant, reached me on the 11th of
February. It enclosed one for Meer Nassor Khan, and I resolved to
strengthen the efforts of Sirdar Meer Kamal Khan and Sirdar
Meer Bahore Khan to induce the young Khan to accompany me by
sending off Mr. Bell's letter to him at gun fire. I hoped much from
the accession of strength to the reasonable party in Meer Kamal
Khan, and Meer Bahore Khan. On the 12th, however, the Sirdars
brought word that an anonymous letter had been received in the
Khan's camp from Khelat, saying, that a chyoooo was setting out
from that place to seize the Khan and his Sirdars. This completely
frightened these silly people, and threw the whole camp into com-
motion; but I soon shewed the Sirdars the folly of believing such
a report and assured them that, whoever had circulated it, was not
friendly to the Khan. But I was sadly disappointed to hear from
Meer Kamal Khan, who is decidedly the boldest and ablest of the
Sirdars, that nothing could induce them to allow the Khan to proceed
to Mr. Ross Bell, till I had been at Baugh, and arranged for its se-
curity. I urged on them the very friendly character of Mr. Bell's
letter, and entreated that the Khan might accompany me at once, but
they would not listen to anything; and the day passed without any
making any progress. On this day, letters were received by Meer
Bahore, from Mahomed Hussain and Zayid Mahomed Shereff saying,
that Gundava, with 1000 Rupees per mensis, had been settled on
Beboee Ganjan. This produced new confusion. There were many
significant looks, and much whispering. I pleaded that Beeboe Gan-
jan was the senior wife of the late beloved Mihrab Khan, and that
she ought not to be left destitute because differences existed be-
tween Nassor Khan and the Company. They observed, that "Gan-
dava belonged to the Khan, and was not the Company's to give; that
if Beeboee Ganjan was to be assisted, it should have been with money,
not by the gift of territory." I replied, that this might be but a tem-
porary arrangement, or that no such arrangement might have been
made at all; but that the act, if true, showed how much Mr. Ross
Bell had the interest of the Almehyes at heart. Nothing I could urge however appeared satisfactory; the arrangement evidently did not please them.

I find that I have rather misjudged the advantages to be expected from Meer Boboer's arrival in camp. He promised much at first, but he is vacillating and has been gained over by the opposite party. He is also double tongued. With the reasonable party he never cease to laud Mr. Ross Bell and the Company, and to boast of the attentions and court paid to him at Baugli. With the opposition, he does nothing but talk of his ill treatment at Kootroo, of the harsh conduct pursued towards his son, and the 133 prisoners taken on that occasion, and marshalled all the way to Sukkur in irons, and of the misery they endure there. I had hoped however that the perusal of Mr. Bell's letters would produce a favorable change; and I was happy to find that when the Khan had read them, he expressed himself perfectly delighted, and observed that all obstacles appeared at an end. A Durbar was immediately summoned, and the Khan expressed his gratitude both to that gentleman and to myself. Much discussion followed. Sirdar Fakker Mahomed of Nuh, said, "this is very fine advice of Mr. Ross Bell's; come with all your Chiefs. Mr. Ross Bell is a clever man, he would throw the net over us all on one side." Others of the opposition expressed similar opinions, always winding up their speeches with the necessity of some guarantee before their Khan should be allowed to proceed to the English camp. This opposition appeared to annoy the Khan, who observed, "if I am resolved to go—if I am taken prisoner there, well and good; if I am not seized then, I may be so another time; this is the fourth time I have been invited, and I am resolved to go. I will proceed this day to Col. Stacey, and arrange for our march to Baugli—we will march to-morrow." But his wishes were soon overruled, and the horses which had been brought, were sent back to their pickets; and on Naasuruddin Onás's entering the Khan's tent, he was informed that it was necessary Meer Kamaul Khan and Meer Boboer should pay their respects to me before any thing decisive was fixed. As Naasur Ainin Khan, and Mahomed Khan Bakti were the only people at breakfast with the Khan, I am doubtless indebted for this disappointment to them.

It was at length settled that we should start the next morning.
Nothing I could say, at the meeting, to dispose him to change his mind, could
influence him to be convinced. I wrote to the opposite party, expressing
myself as far as possible, and explaining that if he would not allow us to
leave the Khan with a written security for himself and camp, and proceed
with the three Envoys and a letter from the young Kamaul, who agreed
to abide by any arrangements they might make with Mr. Bell in his name,
our march on the 15th February was delayed by the crippled state of my
Commissariat. The number of people with Meer Kamaul Khan, Meer
Boheer and the other Chiefs, indented heavily on my stores. Our
protracted stay here seems to have produced a famine, and I was this
day forced to decline giving any further pecuniary aid, till we should
reach Nurrh; but I arranged that a supply of grain should be sent across
from Baughwunna, via Zeedee and Gouroo, for the subsistence of the
Khan in my absence at Baugh. We marched to Gazan, but it was late
before we got to our ground. It appears that there was a serious disturbance
in the Khan’s camp yesterday. The opposition party, aided by Meer
Boheer and his sister, Mahnaz Beebee, the mother of the Khan’s proposed
bride, prevailed on him to cancel the nomination of Meer Kamaul Khan,
as one of the deputies who was to accompany me. This new arrangement
was no sooner determined on, than Siradar Meer Boheer was deputed to
acquaint Meer Kamaul Khan of it. Judging from the violent temper
of Meer Kamaul Khan and the mean vanity of Meer Boheer, it may
be supposed the greeting was not very cordial. After hearing the
Khan’s message, Meer Kamaul gave Meer Boheer the benefit of his
opinion in no measured terms, and then called for his arms, accoutred
himself, and going direct to the Khan’s tent, asked if his name had
been erased from the list of Chiefs, who were to wait on Mr. Ross
that evening, and was answered in the affirmative. The Siradar then told the
Khan that as his services were so lightly esteemed, he begged to
withdraw them altogether. He further said that, no Ahmedzey of his
should saddle a horse by his (the Khan’s) command, that the agree-
ment he had made with Col. Sturg should stand. Moollah Nasser
Oolah had been sent to the Khan’s tent, and from him I learnt the
particulars of this transaction, and resolved the next morning to
take up the matter to rights. I sent off Moollah Nasser Oolah to
gather round Meer Kamaul Khan that I should stand by the agreement I had
made, and that I should be with him
almost immediately. I also desired the Moolah to expostulate with the Khan on the danger of these vacillations. When I arrived at their encampment I had to pass Meer Kamaul's tent on my road to the Khan's, and offered him the usual salutation. He was much gratified, and thanked me for my condescension. I assured him I would go to the Khan and put all right. On approaching the Khan's tent, I met Moolah Nasseer Oollah, whom I had sent to remonstrate with the Khan on the inconsistency of his act, and he informed me that the Khan was very sorry he had been induced to listen to Kamaul Khan's enemies, and that he was now willing to adhere to the first arrangement. We then proceeded to his tent, when every thing once more became friendly.

Up to this time messages only had passed between the families of Nasseer Khan and Meer Kamaul Khan, relative to the marriage of the former with a daughter of the latter; but this evening the Khan sent a confidential servant to ask me, if I had any objection that the "Mungazeen" should be made. I replied I knew of none, and should be very happy to hear it was settled. That night every thing was arranged; the girl is about three years old. The famine appears to have spread to this part and indeed all over the country. Misable objects present themselves in every direction, and they assure me that very many had fallen victims to hunger. They do not hesitate to receive and eat bread from the hands of my Chamar syces, and grass cutters.

We marched on the 17th to Pissee Bait and entered the Moolk pass a few miles after leaving Gazzee. The next day we reached Piestah Khan; not a bust was seen yesterday or to-day. The fears of the Khan's camp of a chuppo are beyond description; the arrangements are as great as if they expected to meet the most vigilant enemy. We are now within ten or twelve miles of Nurrh. I told the Sirdars it was impossible to make such marches with laden camels, and that I must leave my heavy baggage under their care at Nurrh. This day my largest Arab eat some of the poisonous grass which abounds in this pass, and died in great agony. On the 19th February we were forced to halt, the cattle being completely knocked up. Moolah Nasseer Oollah told me that my intention of leaving my servants and heavy baggage behind had inspired more confidence in the Khan's camp than any thing I had ever said or written; but their fears were
not dispelled. As we approached our ground yesterday, I observed
men on horseback on the hills, and the moment a halt was resolved
upon, a Chief and his tribe took possession of each side of the road.

We reached Nurh on the 20th February. It contains only a few
sheds Gidans (blanket tents). The people came into camp, and
finding the Khan and Sirdar Meer Boheer there (the country belongs
to the latter) milk was soon in abundance. Preparations were made
for our separation on the morrow. The Khan’s camp will be left
with five days supply, and Zeedee, Koody, and Baughwanna are to
supply food for five other days, by which time we hope to be back.
The Khan’s only riding horse appeared to be so done up on this march,
that I gave him one of my Arabs, when we halted half way. He was
very much pleased with the animal, who was galloped in every di-
rection over ground, the surface of which was covered with large
round loose stones; but he performed to admiration.

We were detained making arrangements at Kurrub Moolah pass
on the 21st. The Khan was evidently very unwilling to be left
at Nurh. When we were all nearly ready, he sent to say that se-
veral of his Chiefs would take the opportunity of going to visit their
homes, and that he should be without a “white beard,” in his
camp. He asked if I should be offended if Sirdar Eesh Khan re-
mained with him, and his eldest son, Khan Mahomed, proceeded in
his stead. The request was so much pressed that I could not refuse.
I had never seen the Khan in such low spirits. As we parted he
said, my fate is in your hands; I had only time to say, “be happy; I
am your friend; all will be well.”

On the 23rd February, we reached Gaurunwae, and found three
families living under a shed, open on all sides. We saw a few single
houses and some considerable patches of cultivation on our march.
On the 24th we reached Peer-u-Chutta; our supplies ran short.
Many visitors came out to meet the party. I sent off a horseman to
Capt. Wallace at Kootroo, and by nine in the evening received five
maunds of oaka aid some dhal. We had rain during the night.
The next day we arrived at Kootroo about 12 o’clock, and I sent on
to Capt. Wallace, the Assistant Political Agent, who, on our reach-
ing his tent, received us outside in the sun. I introduced the Chiefs
to him, but we were never asked to enter it; the Chiefs were more

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astonished than even I was by such treatment, and we took our leave.

We halted on the 36th, when Rheimdad, the ex-Naib of Shawl, presented himself to us. I was sorry to see this man at large, for I knew his character too well not to dread the result. He asked my permission to go into the Khan’s camp, but I proposed that he should remain at Kootroz till I returned. As soon as he was gone, I spoke seriously to the deputies, particularly to Duragh Gool Mahomed, who advocated the ex-Naib’s joining the Khan. Several hours were passed in this discussion. Moollah Naasir Oollah finding how strenuously I insisted that Rheimdad should not be permitted to join the Khan’s camp, did all in his power to induce the Chiefs and the Darogah to prevent it. They left it for me to decide; but the Duragh could not be moved. On breaking up the meeting I said to the Darogah: “Well, it is in vain to talk further on the subject; remember my words. Rheimdad will jump on your neck, and throw you down in the mire.” The Duragh replied, he is my son, I gave him my daughter, he is my friend and a faithful servant of the Khan’s, let him go to North. I answered only by advising him to remember my words; and with pain and anguish did the Darogah recall them to mind, when on the 6th April following, Rheimdad carried off the Khan. Rheimdad owes his advancement, and even his life, to Duragh Gool Mahomed, for he never remitted the revenues of Shawl. The Naibship of Shawl was given to him through the influence of the Duragh, and it was through his intercession that his life was spared when, on his arrival at Khe-late, he was imprisoned by Mehrab Khan, and that he was subsequently restored to office. He is the head of a gang of thieves and altogether as cunning a rogue as I have ever seen.

On the 27th February, we reached Gajan, where I received a letter from Mr. Ross Bell, urging us to hasten our march. The next day we arrived at Sharah. The 1st March, we were at Jellall Khan. The nullahs on this day’s march were exceedingly troublesome and difficult, the last almost impassable from the depth and the velocity of the stream. Here we found Capt. Le Messurier, Bombay 14th N. I., Superintendent of the Sindh Survey, who gave us a hearty welcome. The next day we had the happiness of reaching Bough about 3 p.m. We entered the camp with our arms; and Mr. Ross Bell received the Chiefs on our arrival. After about an hour’s conversation, they
was not only very uneasy at our protracted absence, but declared the country could no longer subsist him. I made advances for the purchase of grain from the Hindoos, and the hire of camels; the latter at a Rupee a day; a seer of attah was not procurable without difficulty. We started to rejoin the young Khan on the 15th. On the night of the 13th, a Persian letter had been received by my Brahooee Interpreter, from Lieut. Hammersley's Mooshee, Sahur Allen, saying that I was ordered to join my Regiment at Kandahar, and that Lieut. Hammersley had been appointed to Kheefat. I had dined in the Bombay camp, and was not aware till the morning, that this information had been industriously circulated. Soon after, the Chief asked me to know if it was true. I was forced to acknowledge that it was Lord Auckland's order. Much consternation was felt on the subject, and it was determined to make an appeal to Mr. Ross Bell from the Khan and all his camp.

On the 16th March, we made only a short march to Peer-a-Chutta, to enable the camels with the supplies to reach us at nightfall; and the next day made a tiresome march to Pehoe. It is a pretty spot, enclosed by hills with a beautiful stream of water well stocked with fish. Several gardens were scattered over the landscape; our camp was well supplied with milk.

We reached the young Khan's camp at Nur-e, March 20th, about 2 P.M. He was much pleased at our return, and it was with difficulty he permitted me to quit him. Kamaul Khan's niece died the very day we started from Kokoon, he was therefore under the necessity of remaining a day behind, but he joined us the same evening. Soon after his arrival, at the request of the Khan, I joined him in a visit of condolence to that Chief. About an hour afterwards, the Deputies and I waited on Meer Nasseer Khan, and I presented the letter and compliments of Mr. Bell. I concluded by informing the Khan that Mr. Bell had generally addressed himself more particularly to Meer Kamaul Khan, not only as the man of highest rank among the deputies, but as his (the Khan's) relation, and I proposed that Meer Kamaul Khan should be desired to relate all that had occurred. Every thing had combined to put him in the best possible humour. He had been charmed with his reception the moment we reached Mr. Bell's camp, with the Chiefs' being allowed to enter the camp and Durbar with their arms; with their kind reception and the
assurances of friendship which were given, and with the restoration
of lands and of some money levied by the Naib. He narrated the
shooting matches at Baugh, with the burrah Sahib and the other
Sahibs. He dwelt minutely on every kind expression he could re-
call to mind, as having fallen from the Sahib-i-Kulan (Mr. Ross Bell);
on this subject he was quite excited. He defended the propriety of
Mr. Bell's refusal to release Meer Boheer's son, and the Zheeree
prisoners taken at Kootroo with admirable tact. Meer Boheer was
absent escorting the Beebee Ganjan, and I should have been sorry
if he had been present. The Chief concluded his address by appeal-
ing to Khan Mohamed and the Duragah for the truth of what he
had said. They both applauded the correctness of the report. Be-
ing called on to speak, I recapitulated all that had transpired, and
said that the detail of Iianlaul Khan was as faithful as the reflecti-
on in a looking-glass. The Khan again expressed himself much pleased
and asked many questions, and when told of the shooting matches
the Chiefs had with Mr. Bell and the other gentlemen, he much re-
gretted he had not been allowed to go with us.

As no supplies were to be had, we crossed the next day to Goo-
roo, where there was not the vestige of a hut; and only some trifling
cultivation dependant on the rain for moisture. We reached Zeedee
on the 22nd about 12 o'clock, where we found the Khan's mother.
The Hindus soon appeared to claim payment for the grain supplied
to the camp in my absence. The Khan's party had been reduced to
great distress; and he had pledged every thing he possessed of value
—a saddle with golden ornaments, several ornamented bridles, be-
side his own mother's ornaments. The next day I was engaged in
enquiring into the claims of the grain merchants. As it was impos-
sible to redeem any of the property in pawn, I did all I could to per-
suade the Hindus to allow the poor boy the use of these articles,
promising, that I would see the loans repaid, when he made terms
but they would take nothing but my signature, and this I could not
afford. By the 25th all accounts were settled.

A Sowar was dis-
patched to Khelat with cloth, &c. to be made up for the young Khan,
that he might appear decently before the Sahib-i-Kulan.

On the 26th March, we moved to Kandar. This place is some dis-
tance from the road; the encamping ground is a lovely spot; the fine
tall willows afford a shade during the greater part of the day, and a
beautiful stream of water—beautiful only in appearance—true nur-
muring by. The water here is of so pernicious a quality, that the Khan
of Khelat and Sirsars of Kandahar were in the habit of sending their
men to reside here, when they wished to get rid of without the charge
of bloodshed; and the natives declare that these poor victims seldom
survived the year. Since writing the above, I find it is the very
water which is so detrimental to health. In the town of Kand-
dar, the Natives have dug wells, the water of which, they declare,
is excellent. Meer Khanak Khan has done the same at Bungawana,
and, as he told me, with the happiest effect. About half way we met
the camels which were to bring on the remainder of our supplies.

The 27th March, we found the road approaching the ridge which
must be passed in going to Bungawana, miserable. Bungawana has
five villages, besides a small one behind the hill, round which the
water, which is in ill repute, is conducted. On the 28th an attempt
was made by means of an anonymous letter, to prevent the Khan's
going any further. Rheinlad was doubtless at the bottom of the
plot. He had become very forward and assumed all the airs of office
at Zheedee. He takes a prominent part in every thing. The Dargah
must now feel his mistake in rejecting the advice I gave at Kootroo
to keep this man out of the Khan's camp. I am told that, embolden-
ed by Rheinlad's way of talking, one of the Khansads spoke dis-
respectfully of me; that the Khan was greatly offended and told
them I might be a "Feringhee" and a stranger, but that I had not
told lies; that I had been true to my engagements, and that he
therefore felt more confidence in me than in any one else in his camp.
He said that they might do as they pleased; but that he should accom-
pany me to Mr. Ross Bell's camp, even if he went alone. He told
them that the Col. Sahib, Ross Bell Sahib, and the Lord Sahib were
his friends, and that he was willing to go, if they sent him to India,
to Calcook, or to London. He concluded by saying "lool at this tent
(the single pole tent Mr. Ross Bell had given to Beebee Ganjan and
which she had lent the Khan). We are all sitting under its shade;
the pole is the Col. Sahib, take away the pole, and the tent will fall,
and smother you. Whatever the Colonel advises, I shall do.

It is too evident that Rheinlad is endeavouring to work the base-
ful of Good Mohamed. The moment he had departed to bring his
family to camp, Rheinlad began to throw out insinuations against
him, but was silenced by the Khan, who observed, that whether the Darogah had acted wisely or not, he had ever been faithful to him and his fortunes, and that he should ever feel grateful to him. On the 29th of March, I had a visit from Fakeer Mahomed Benigow, Sir-dar of Naib, who had always kept aloof during our conversations. I expressed a hope that all his fears of the English had vanished; he replied without hesitation in the negative. I asked him to explain himself, and he said, if you will answer me one question on the oath of Husrut Esah (Jesus Christ) I will believe you honest. Do you, said he, intend to deliver the Khan into Mr. Ross Bell's custody? I explained to him how impossible it was for such an act to be committed by an English Gentleman, after he had given his word to the Khan; and this Mr. Ross Bell had done. This question of Fakeer Mahomed arose from a joke played off by Meer Kammul Khan some days ago. As he was passing the tents of those who were of the opposite party, they asked him what terms he had made; and he replied with much pleasantry, "we have got all our lands back, on the promise of taking the Khan to Mr. Ross Bell to be sent to India, and to this I have agreed." The perusal of Mr. Ross Bell's letter in Durbar the evening of Meer Kammul Khan's arrival, has greatly calmed the fears of the people. Meer Mahomed Azim Khan still continued to follow the camp, with the hope of obtaining some money from the Khan; but I protested against it. This man is so lost to all sense of propriety that his principal attendant Shah Gassey Taj Mahomed, left him some days ago. The gold button which all the Chiefs wear on the right shoulder to fasten the shirt, was sent to the bazar for liquor. His followers remonstrated in vain, and his Shah Gassey left him.

Further attempts have been made to shake the Khan's resolution to go to Shuol Kote. Two letters have been dropped in the camp; one distinctly stated that I was leading the Khan to captivity, and that Shah Nawaz Khan was to be placed on the throne. The second gave a detail of a battle said to have been fought between the combined army of Kuhudil Khan and Yar Mahomed, and that of General Nott, in which the troops of the latter were utterly routed, his two great guns taken, and the slaughter of his army only stopped by the approach of night. It was said that General Nott and a few Sepoys were seen flying towards Cabool. These letters were conceal-
ed from me, but I discovered that something was wrong, by receiv-
ing a request that we should halt. As the grain had arrived, I
remonstrated; but though the Sirdars were present, and every
preparation had been made, it was in vain, and a halt was resolved upon.
As soon as it was dark the Sirdars met, and a most stormy debate
followed of course. The opposition, headed by Rheimdad, outman
me, and even the rational party became alarmed. The Khan, how-
ever, declared that they were the letters of evil disposed men. About
11 o'clock night, Moolla Nasseer Oolla was sent for. After hear-
ing what had happened, he told them they were worse than children,
that the veriest fool in camp could rob them of their senses. The op-
posite party strongly questioned my sincerity, and high words again
ensued. The Khan said he would believe me sooner than any Brahooe
or Belooche. Mohamed Sudeeg said, I was the only man in camp who
spoke the truth. Moolla Nasseer Oolla observed that the Colonel's
fate was untoward; and that he had thrown himself amongst men who
could not appreciate him. They told Moolla Nasseer Oolla, that all
the said was of no avail, as he was a Feringhee's slave. Nasseer Oolla
replied, that he was the Colonel's slave, the slave of a man of truth
and honor and a soldier, and not the slave of those who slew men in
chains and defenceless—in allusion to the murder of Lieut. Love-
day.

The next morning every thing was as quiet as if nothing had hap-
pened. The Khan came to my tent very early and begged I would
not be offended at what had passed during the night. Darogah
Gool Mahomed soon followed, and offered an apology in the name of
the camp. I simply explained to them, that so long as they chose to
place reliance on letters without seals attached to them, every evil
disposed person could disturb the harmony of our camp; that as long
as any thing, however trifling, was concealed from me, they could not
expect our cause to succeed; that their cause, was my cause, and
that our interests were one and the same. The next day the Khan
was attacked with fever, and, after much persuasion, I was allowed
to give him some medicine. On the 31st of March, the two Chiefs
Kamaul Khan and Meer Eshah Khan rode to my tent fully armed
and equipped, and under considerable excitement. They informed
me that they were come to explain why they had refused to attend
the Durbar the last two or three days; that men of no rank posses-
and that their honor was not therefore safe, in as much as they were pledged to accompany the young Khan to Mr. Ross Bell, while these men of no rank (evidently allying to Blaimund and others who had usurped all authority in the camp, were persuading the Khan not to proceed. They said that they and their followers were ready to move, I endeavored to pacify them. I applauded their strict sense of honor in adhering to the agreement they had made with the Company, though it was only verbal, and assured them, that as soon as the tents were ready I should march, and that I would go to the Khan, and fix a day for moving.

During the day I spoke to the young Khan of the complaint made by his best friends, the Sirdars Kamaul Khan and Esah Khan, of the want of respect paid them, and the danger to which he would be exposed if he threw himself into the hands of Blaimund and the other Khanzads. I begged him to think for himself, to scout those who were afraid to speak their thoughts aloud, to disregard all letters without seals and to pay attention only to men of honor and respect. He was very much embarrassed, declared his reliance on me, and said he was ready to move the day after to-morrow. It was arranged that I should march to Nogie half way to Zhewah, the next day, and that the Khan and his camp should make the latter place in one march on the day following. On the 1st April, I went to Moor Kamaul Khan and satisfied him of the Khan's attachment to the Sirdars. I then called on the Khan, and assured him that the chiefs were satisfied; and, with my old friend and companion, Esah Khan, mounted the camels and rode to Nogie. The next morning we marched to Zhewah; and the Khan and his camp joined us in the afternoon. On the 3rd we moved to Jingeerah; the roads were not so good this day, and in some places the camels had considerable difficulty in moving. Another letter was dropped in camp to-day, stating that the Murrees and Kujjucks had united, attacked and defeated Mr. Ross Bell's army, and locked him up in the Bolan. The Khan has been much reduced by his illness and continues very weak. There is a report in the camp that Mahomed Khan Shewanny has passed up the Sarawan hills; and that though the Khan refused him permission to accompany the camp, he presented him with fifty Rupees. I doubt the latter part of this from the great scarcity of money in camp. Such indeed was the distress that I was forced to
send 200 Rupees to the Khan's mother from Nogie for her subsistence till her son could supply her. This poor woman had actually pawned her jewels before she would allow her son's gold and silver ornamented saddles and bridles to be taken; when deprived of these, she had no mode of subsistence left.

On the 4th we halted at Soherab to save the expense of camel hire. Here our grain was exhausted. I sent to the Hindoos to purchase some, but a report was spread that the Brahmoos would be allowed to plunder it and the Hindoos fled to the hills. I sent them assurances of protection, and a promise to hear their complaints. It appears, that that lawless man, Meer Azim Khan, made a chuppo on this place some months ago, and carried off the greater part of their grain. On the 5th day the Hindoos returned and promised to provide three day's provisions by the morrow; we therefore halted. In the early part of the day, the Darogah Goool Mohomed called on the part of the Khan with the draft of a letter to Mr. Ross Bell. I approved of it, but objected to the names of Capt. Bean and Lieut. Louday being introduced. I explained to him and the Moonsoo that this was not customary, and that it would not promote the Khan's wishes. I also proposed that milder language should be used when speaking of the grievances they had suffered from the time of Capt. Bean's installation at Kwetta up to the Kootroo chuppo. My suggestions were attended to, and a little after sunset the letter was brought to me corrected according to my suggestions, with a message from the Khan, that if any thing objectionable still remained, he would order the Moonsoo to alter it. I returned the letter to the Khan, and assured him that it was unobjectionable, and that I was certain Mr. Bell would be pleased with it. Rheinmaid, the author of every difficulty, appears to have extracted a promise from the young Khan that he should be the bearer of this letter to Mr. Bell. This was never communicated to me when the question of its transmission was discussed, and I strongly recommended that it should be sent by Meer Emr Khan, chief of the Menglis, more particularly as this Chief had been prevented by me from paying his respects to Mr. Bell, when I accompanied the deputation to him. This was agreed to, and after dinner I wrote introductory letters for him to Major Clarkson, commanding at Khelat, to the Officer commanding at Moostoong and to Mr. Ross Bell, announcing the pur-
abstemiously pawned; silver or gold of theirs, or of camel so to pursue would be sent them in days. It happened on the part of their to provide. In the last part approved me. Loth-ness that he Khan's men whom I of Clapy. My letter was in a manner remained, e letter to and that mad, the promise a letter to the quas-mentioned Mienjada, by paying it to him, letters for wear conti the purpose of his journey, and bespeaking attention to him and his followers.

On the 6th April, I rose and breakfasted as usual, and having sent off the baggage, waited sometime for the Khan. Meanwhile, a Duf-fadar of Irregular Horse, who lived between Mr. Bell's and the Khan's camp, came and informed me that there had been no little agita-
tion in the night in the Khan's camp, that people had been passing all night from Rheindal's tent to the Khan's, and that lights had been burning till late in the morning. On hearing this, I dispatched Moollah Nasseer Oollah to the Khan to say that if he had complet-
ed his meal, I would move on gently; and that if I came to any ground where I found hares, I would wait till he came up. Moollah Nasseer Oollah rose immediately and went to the house occupied by the Darogah, whom he found in great grief. The Darogah told him that letters had arrived from Khelat which declared that I was taking the Khan to captivity, that Rheindal had taken the letters to the Khan, and that the Sirdars had resolved it was dangerous for the Khan to proceed. Moollah Nasseer Oollah asked the Darogah if he had taken leave of his senses, that he should be sitting there whilst evil men were ruining his master. After considerable trouble, Mool-
lah Nasseer Oollah persuaded the Darogah to accompany him to Rheindal's tent who had gone to the Khan's, whether they followed him, and entered into conversation on the subject. The Moollah treated with proper contempt the reception of letters without seals, and unhesitatingly asserted that there had been written in the camp, or by the directions and under the instructions of people who were in it. He begged them not to disgrace themselves by attending to such trash; but to proceed as they had agreed on, and to rely on my truth. But Rheindal had gone too far to recede, and besides, it was well known, that although he had been released, he dreaded go-
ing towards Shagai Kot, where he had behaved in a villainous man-
er to Captain Beau. Moollah Nasseer Oollah finding it impossi-
ble to induce these people to alter their resolution, rose and said he should go and inform me of what had passed. Rheindal overtook him before he had gone many yards beyond the compound gate, with a body of Sepoys, and Fakser Mohamed Bozenjer, and walked with him to the spot were I was pacing up and down, waiting for his return.

The sight of the men convinced me that something had gone wrong,
and that I had augured but too correctly, when as his liberator from Sukkur, and admission into the Khan's camp, I predicted in a letter to Mr. Ross Bell, that he would introduce anarchy and confusion into it. Approaching with his band of ruffians and that simpleton, Sirdar Fakserah Munsed of Nal, he said, the Khan pressing his compliments to me, but did not wish to proceed any further, and begged I would return to Khelat. I quietly told him I did not believe that the Khan was unwilling to go any further, and that I should go to him and hear it from his own lips. Passing through the crowd, who reluctantly made way for me, I walked gently towards the compound in which the Khan lodged. I observed Rheimdad speaking to his men, and immediately after, two or three ran ahead to the Khan's tent. As I entered the inner door, I found the compound filled with armed men under great excitement. Of this I took no notice, but simply asked in which room the Khan was. On reaching it, the first thing I saw, was the Khan himself held back by Rheimdad's people. I subsequently found that this man had removed all the usual personal guards of the Khan and supplied their places by sixteen men of his own. The Khan was standing by the charpoy he had just risen from, and two of Rheimdad's servants, one at each end, with their left hand grasping their swords, stood in the most menacing attitude, and endeavored to look as fierce as possible. Great excitement pervaded all present. The tears came to the Khan's eyes as I took his hand and desired him to be seated, and placed myself on his left. The Khan attempted to apologize for his rudeness in not having come to meet me beyond the threshold of the door. He saw, I understood the turn matters had taken, and continued the long string of complimentary enquiries customary with the Brahooes. I then turned to the Durbar (only Fakserah Munsed and Utta Khan being present) and exchanged compliments with them. Rheimdad did not enter the room. After a momentary silence, I addressed the Khan, and told him that Rheimdad had come to inform me that he did not wish to proceed any further, and that as I disbelieved it, I had come myself to learn his wishes. The young Khan did not hesitate a moment, but in a manly and decisive manner assured me that he wished to go with me, but that the Durbar would not allow him; that letters had been received in camp, on reading which, the Sirdars had resolved that he ought not to proceed; that
these letters positively asserted, that he was to be seized at Khelat or Shawl Kote; that this information was derived from our own sepoys, and that Shah Newauz was to be replaced on the throne. I remarked that his Chiefs were not present, and I proposed that we should wait till the evening when Meer Boheer Khan and Meer Ramael Khan would be in camp, and a Durbar might be held, insomuch as a Durbar of two Chiefs, and those of a junior grade, was a mockery. Atta Khan and Fakser Mahomed immediately interrupted me, and said that it was settled that the Khan should go no further. I then leaned towards Atta Khan and began to converse with him, but found that he had indulged more than usual in bhang, and was too insensible for business; all the reply I could obtain was, "It is settled; we are not angry with you; go your way to Khelat; you have always spoken the truth; go to your own camp, we are going back." I then turned to Fakser Mahomed, who assured me that letters had been received from Khelat stating that the Khan was to be seized, and Shah Newauz replaced on the throne, and that this news came from our own Sepoys. He added that he could not prevent the seizure of the Khan, if Mr. Ross Bell, who was my senior, ordered it, and that they all believed the contents of those letters, more particularly as the Lord Sahib had removed their friend (meaning me,) and sent (Husley Sahib,) Captain Hemmersley, their enemy. I told him the letters were of the same spurious character as those sent to Baughwanna, and that they had been written by people in camp to serve their own purposes. I demanded to see the letters, but this was not granted, on the plea that I should hang the writer the day I reached Khelat. I observed it was not a hanging matter; and that I would do nothing more than bring the writer before an enquiry (sherrifft) and punish him if they said he deserved it. Fakser Mahomed would only repeat: "It is resolved; the Khan shall not go any further. Atta Khan, whom I next addressed, only gave me the same answer, that the Durbar had determined on the return of the Khan, and that he could do nothing. Final-
ly, I addressed Meer Ensh Khan who was present, reminded him how he had boasted of his influence, of the number and bravery of his tribe, and of his friendship for the Khan, and told him this was the time to exert himself. The old man said too truly it was vain for him to speak in an assembly in which he stood alone, that he had told the Khan how utterly unworthy of credit the letters were, but that the people appeared to be mad, and were running away their master's only friend. I again addressed the Khan and asked him if he really wished to accompany me. He said, I have told you so before all these people. I asked who was to prevent his going to Mr. Bell if he wished it. Atta Mahomed said, the Durbar has resolved that he should not go. I asked him whether he was the monarch, or the subject, that he should say the Khan shall not go? I then turned to the Khan and said, two Chiefs cannot make a Durbar, you should rather wait for the other Chiefs, of whom Sirdar Meer Kamaul Khan is expected to reach the camp by 4. P. M. You are the master, not the slave; if you wish to remain till your Chiefs come into camp, who will prevent you? Women put on ornaments for show, but a man braces on his arms to defend himself. Do you wear a sword and shield to look at, or to support your authority with? The words "rise, take you leave, and go to Khelat," which had been repeatedly said at intervals, were now uttered at once by the greater part of the assembly and the excitement appeared to increase. I told them that when I went they would lose their best friend. Each Khan, Moollah Nasseer Oollah, and Moollah Mahomed, who had several times begged me to retire, on seeing the effect of my last remark, became more urgent for me to rise. To have done so, at such a moment, would have appeared ridiculous. As a last effort, therefore, I made the Brahooe Interpreter say that we were all the Khan's friends and wished to do that which might lead to his peace; but that at this moment the Sirdars were absent, that they would be here by 4. P. M., and that we ought to wait till then. But every effort was useless; they had resolved to go back. I had now been two hours and more attempting in every way I could devise, to alter the silly resolution of this mock Durbar, but in vain. I therefore turned towards the Khan, and told him I would proceed to the apricot orchard, where I had encamped, and wait till Sirdar Meer Kamaul Khan arrived. I saw that they were
all anxious that I should take my leave; “rise, go,” was echoed on all sides. I therefore rose and said, “remember I do not leave you till you have said you wish it; let no one say, when I am gone, that I broke my promise, or receded even a hair from my engagements.” They unanimously replied that no one should say anything against me, that I had always acted up to my promise. Then shaking hands with the Khan, I walked slowly towards the door. Each Khan placed himself close behind me, Moollah Nasseer Oollah was on my right, and the Brahooe Moonibee, dying of fright, on my left. Several horses were in the yard saddled; these we mounted and proceeded to the orchard, where my horses and camel were waiting for me. I sat down on the carpet, telling Sirdar Esah Khan and Moollah Nasseer Oollah, that I would wait a little in order to take leave of Kamaul Khan. They both dissuaded me from this step and urged me to mount immediately which I was forced to do; I therefore requested Meer Esah Khan to leave me, and to attend the Khan, and to tell Kamaul Khan that not a shadow of blame was attached to his master, who had been constrained to adopt the measure he had taken by Rheimdad, and that if the Sirdars had been present, this retrograde movement would never have occurred.

Having mounted my horse, I rode to Soormasing, which I reached about 3 o’clock, and found a dawk packet waiting for me. While I was reading the newspaper, Moollalt Nasseer Oollah and others came to me and begged I would mount without delay, as from all they had heard and seen, they feared the Brahooees would surprize us during the night. I argued that if they had wished to kill us, they had enjoyed a better opportunity for doing so when we were separated from our servants, and that they would scarcely dare to attack us now we could muster upwards of thirty men. Nasseer Oollah observed that if any thing happened to me, he and his family would be dishonoured and ruined for ever, and that if I did not care for myself, I should at least regard him and those who attended me. At length I consented to the proposal, and ordered the tents to be struck and the camels called in from grazing. Every thing being ready, we moved off, ordering the servants to keep together and to stop at Rhodenjoh for the night. I placed myself under the orders of Moollah Nasseer Oollah’s son, Ismoothullah, and left the Moollah himself with the servants and baggage. Ismoothullah is a fine stout young
man, a famous shot and a good swordsman. We were four of us, well armed and mounted. Issutullah left our route to be chosen by one Abdool Kurreem, who was fond of dear stalking and knew every inch of the country. At a broad stony water course of loose pebbles, this man quitted the high road and led us down a considerable distance to the right, where he stopped, and turning towards us, said with a laugh, "if they can track us over these stones, they are better sportsmen than I am." He then proceeded in an direct a line as the nature of the country would permit, leaving Rhodenjoh to the right. We reached Kheht about 10 P.M. I subsequently heard that Rheendiad had said, that if the Durangah, Moollah Nasseer Oollah, and I opposed the Khan's going back, we should be cut down on the spot. From all that had passed in Durbar, and from what I have since heard, I have no doubt of the accuracy of this statement; for Rheendiad had removed all the Khan's guard, and placed his own servants in personal attendance on him. During the whole of the conference two men stood behind us with their hands on their swords.

I have mentioned in the preceding details that I was often solicited to rise and take my departure and that Sirdar Pakeer Mahomed of Nal and Atta Khan Sassoolie of Zhedee often repeated this request, as well as Moollah Nasseer Oollah. My Vakeel, Moollah Mahomed, my Brsnoo interpreter and Sirdar Meer Eas Khan Minregul, subsequently informed me that signs were frequently made in Durbar by people who drew their hands across their throats; and that it was whispered, "kill the Feringhee." They also told me that Rheendiad had been employed in exciting the people outside to kill me all the time I was engaged in this mock Durbar, and that failing of success he called out to them, "if you are afraid of the Feringhee, bring me my arms that I may fight him." On the morning of the 8th April, I was walking out with Major Clarkson, commanding 42nd Bengal N. I. and the garrison of Khelat, and related to that officer the remark of the Khan in the mock Durbar, that "even our own Sepoys said the Khan was to be seized on his arrival at Khelat." Major Clarkson naturally doubted the truth of the assertion and attributed it to some evil minded person. I gave him the name of one man in particular, who being a Miswari- man and non-commissioned officer, enjoyed much of their confidence.

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of the这里是Burtom Havildar. Major Clarkson remarked as a man came towards us, "this is the very man you speak of." As he came up, I put the question directly to him: "they say in the Bazar you have told the Bullatees, that when the Khan comes in, your Regiment is to seize him—is this true?" He replied, yes, I have often said so in joke, and who has not? When we go to the Bazar we laugh and joke with the Bullatees, and say we are to seize the Khan, &e. Major Clarkson was distressed that his men should have spoken so thoughtlessly, and immediately forbade such loose talk on so serious a subject. About 11 a.m. on the 8th, Kalla Khan arrived at Khelat, and gave the following particulars of what passed after I left the Khan's camp.

"After you rode off, they came and informed the Khan that you were gone, and requested him to mount, which he refused for some time, but was at length persuaded to do, though with great grief. After going about two coss he sent off Ichandohdad and four sowars, desiring him to beg the Colonel would not desert him. The Darogah also sent two of his men. About the fourth coss, the Khan again stopped, dismounted, and senting himself, cried bitterly. I advised him to return, but he replied that his Durbar would not let him. Shortly after this, I received an order to leave the camp and go to the English. I knew the danger of a refusal, and when the Khan's party mounted and rode on, I turned back to Soherab, where I slept that night and reached Khelat this morning."

On the 7th of April, I sent Mr. Bell a brief detail of these occurrences, and pointed out to him that though my negotiations were thus suspended for a time by the villainy of Rheimdad, they were far from broken off. Moollali Nasseer Oollah, the servants and baggage, reached Khelat about 4 p.m. Before they left Rhodenjoll, six horsemen joined them from the Khan's camp, under the confidential orders of the Khan. He asked for me and was told I had gone up to Khelat, where they also soon after arrived. Their object was to beseech that I would not desert them. They gave a melancholy account of the young Khan whose grief was excessive, and stated that Bleimad had assumed the command in camp and did whatever he pleased. A single horseman also arrived from the Khan, sent by the Darogah with a similar message. The next morning E 2
I sent them back with a note from Nasser Oollah, saying I had ever been their friend and would still remain so, if they wished it. I had brought in with me Mooladad who had joined me on the road, and declared that he had been forced to leave the Khan's camp, because he could obtain no pay, and his wife and family were starving. I knew however that he joined me because he was disliked by Rheimdad. I was advised to send him away, but I was too happy to find I had in camp a man who would be able to give me some account of the last days of Lieutenant Loveday, over whom this man had2 accounted guard. I therefore gave him every encouragement, and on going to Kwetta, took him over to Mr. Bell, by whom he was well received and detailed, very much to his own satisfaction, till further orders.

During the night of the 9th April, a horseman arrived from the Khan with a verbal message to say, that Meer Kamanul had sent the Khan on his retrograde movement, rescued him from the thraldom of Rheimdad, whom he had turned out of camp with ignominy, and that Meer Kamanul and other Sirdars would wait upon me immediately on the part of the Khan for orders. The horsemen declared that the Sirdars would be at Rhodenjoh on the 10th, and with me on the 11th. I must confess that since the occurrence at Solarah, I have felt more than ever proud of the influence I possess throughout the Khan's camp, and I was not a little gratified to learn that Meer Kamanul Khan, Meer Eshah Khan, and Meer Boheer Khan, went on their way to me, so soon after Rheimdad's villainy had disturbed the harmony of our camp. I sent out Moollah Nasseer Oollah to meet them, 1 of compliment, together with a supply of grain and an order for sheep, wood and grass equal to the wants of the party.

On the 10th April, Meer Kamanul Khan arrived at once, and gave me the same account which I have already detailed. It appears that when Rheimdad was turned out of camp, he went to Meer Mahomed Azim Khan at Zheeree, and attempted to raise the country, but the Meer was too cunning to undertake any thing without the sanction of war, and as they were wanting, refused to enter into Rheimdad's schemes. Rheimdad, heated in his design, sent and seized Ramoo, who had left the Khan's camp in disgust and gone to Zheeree. He had also been charged by the Darogah and Rheimdad with converting certain sums of money to his own use, amounting to 10,000 Rupees, though his devotion to the young Khan's interests...
is applauded equally by Mussulmans and Hindoos. The Dewan was seized and brought to Rheinmad's house, when 7,000 Rupees were demanded of him. The Dewan too truly pleaded poverty and said that he had pawned his wife's ornaments to support the Khan whilst I was absent at Baugh, and at Zeedee. Not being able to furnish the money, he was bound and placed in confinement. The next day Meer Azim Khan heard of the Dewan's ill-treatment, and assembling some of his armed people, went to Rheinmad's house, showed him as a faithless Khanazad, released the Dewan and told his oppressor to leave Zheeree the next day. Rheinmad, again disappointed, endeavored to persuade the people of Guddh, adjoining Zheeree, that the rupture at Soherab would bring an English army against them, and that they could not do better than fly to the hills with their valuables immediately: but this does not appear to have succeeded. After being foiled in all his attempts, he was forced to quit Zheeree and Guddh, and went to Punderan and Nechara; from thence he proceeded to Moostoong, where I found him on the 15th April, very comfort-ably encamped in the garden next to that occupied by Lieutenant Wallace, the Assistant Political Agent, on duty there. I requested Lieut. Wallace to send him immediately to Mr. Bell, but he pleaded that he had no horsemen, and I was under the necessity of sending to Brigadier England, commanding the troops at Moostoong, for a guard to receive and keep him in custody, as a public delinquent. The guard was sent, and Rheinmad made over to the custody of Brigadier England, to await Mr. Bell's orders. It is but just to Lieut. Wallace to notice, that Naib Mahomed Hussein, who was in attendance on that officer, had never reported to him that this Rheinmad was a notorious character. I was sitting with Lieut. Wallace when Mahomed Hussein opened to come in, and he acknowledged this omission, and spoke of Rheinmad as a man who had committed many crimes and who bore the worst of characters. I detail these circumstances in this place that the narrative may appear unbroken.

Meer Boheer Khan arrived late on the evening of the 12th April. The next day we arranged that Sirdar Meer Kamaul Khan, instead of going with me to Mr. Bell, should return with all expedition to Bangwanna, to prevent evil-minded people from persuading the Khan to leave that place; and to be ready to accompany him to Khelat, if, after hearing my explanation, Mr. Bell should invite him to re-
trace his steps towards that place. Meer Fard Khan are also to return.

I reached Moostoon on the night of the 15th of April, but could not move the next day on account of heavy rain. On the 17th of April, however, we ventured on our journey, but before we had gone any distance, the rain came down in torrents and scarcely held up a minute during our progress for thirty miles. Only four of our party reached Kwetta that night. Moollah Nasseer Oollah and three others found shelter in a cave on the northern side of the Luck Pass.

Meer Nasseer Khan’s letters to Mr. Bell and my explanation satisfied him that the Khan had not willingly gone back, and Mr. Bell therefore wrote to the Khan to assure him that the whole affair had been satisfactorily explained and to request him to proceed to Kwetta without delay, under the same assurances of friendship and respect which had been promised to him in former letters. Though it had been raining the greater part of the two last days and still threatened, I was too anxious to replace matters on a proper footing to wait for fair weather. I therefore started early on the 20th for Moostoon, which I reached about 4 P.M.

We pushed on early the next morning and reached Mungochur just as it grew dark. We had a miserably cold and unpleasant ride, as it rained almost all the way. The next morning we mounted about 8 o’clock A.M. and moved towards Khelat, which we reached about 5 o’clock in the evening. I lost no time in writing to the Khan and enclosing the letter from Mr. Bell, which I sent off to him. I wrote also to Meer Kamaul Khan at Baughwanna and to the other Chiefs and begged them to join me at Khelat with all speed.

Some disturbance appears to have taken place at Baughwanna, for the Darogah Goof Mohamed has been at Soherab, Zheeree and Gudh. Beebee Ganjan left Soherab for Khelat the very same day the Darogah retired to Zheeree and Gudh. On her arrival at Khelat, I waited upon her, but she denied by the beard of the Prophet that she knew any thing of the movements of the Darogah, which appeared strange, as he had resided with Meer Boheer Khan at Gudh. The object of his visit was no doubt to ingratiate himself with the family of the intended wife of Meer Nasseer Khan, the daughter of Mahzor Bebee, and the sister of Meer Boheer. I received a letter this day from Mr. Bell, with an extract of one
from Captain Bean, the Political Agent of Kwetta, reporting the departure of Darogah Gool Mahomed in the direction of Kharun. This movement caused Captain Bean to feel anxious regarding Khelat, as he was apprehensive lest the inhabitants of the town should rise in arms. His letter was as follows, "I cannot but think that Gool Mahomed's departure in the direction of Kharun, is fraught with some mischievous intent and consequently feel somewhat anxious regarding the safety of Khelat, with only one Regiment to garrison it, of which 120 men are in hospital, for although they might be able to repel any external assailants, a rising of its inhabitants within its walls (which is by no means an improbable event) would place them in a very precarious situation, and most serious consequences might result, before a reinforcement could reach them; there being no water in the citadel, the troops would be unable to maintain their posts, until aid could be afforded them from Moostoong."

But all these apprehensions were unfounded. Equally so was the report subsequently sent from Moostoong, that the Darogah was within eleven miles of that place with a force, and intended to surprise the weak detachment there. These silly reports tended considerably to disturb the harmony of our camp, and gave the evil-minded an opportunity of crossing my exertions to bring in the Khan.

On the 29th April, I received an order from Mr. Bell to quit Khelat on the evening of the 2d, or the morning of the 3d May, if Meer Mahomed Nasseer Khan did not join me by that time. If the Khan joined me, he was to be desired to discard Darogah Gool Mahomed, and Naib Rehimdand. No reply came from the Khan on the 30th and only two days remained of the period I was allowed by Mr. Bell to continue at Khelat. I therefore sent off Moodlah Nasseer Oollah and a servant, both well mounted on my own horses, to proceed direct to Banglawansa, and resolved to remain at Khelat till they should return with tidings of the young Khan's intentions.

On the 1st of May, a man named Kauder Bux arrived from Banglawansa, and said he wished to speak to me in private; I therefore directed every one to retire, on which he drew near and in a low tone informed me that he was Mr. Bell's chief epy, and had been sent down to Banglawansa by that gentleman to ascertain what the Khan and his Chiefs were about. He assured me they were all in a state of rascals, and had not the slightest intention of coming to me. He stated
that he had come up from Boughwanus in two days, and had thrown his horse; he therefore requested I would advance him money to purchase another and to provide for his travelling expenses. I put many questions to him, but was very much dissatisfied with his replies. I could not believe that Mr. Bell would send a man of such description down to Boughwanus without informing me of it. The interview ended in my allowing him to go about his business, without any pecuniary assistance. He managed however to change his horse, and that evening arrived for Kwetta. The following day I reported the circumstances by letter to Mr. Bell.

Moolah Naasor Qasih returned on the 3d May with information, that on learning that Lieut. Hammerley was coming to Khelat, and bringing more troops with him, and that the Kootroo troops were also in readiness to advance, the Khan had gone to Muskye; but without a single Chief. I sent the letters to Mr. Bell, pointing out at the same time that the departure of the Khan for Muskye would lead to no hostilities, and that it had been adopted simply as a matter of precaution.

On the evening of the 3d May, Meer Esah Khan arrived a little before sunset with letters from Meer Esahul Khan to Mr. Bell and myself, saying that having heard of offensive operations being in preparation against them, Meer Esahul Khan had been deputed to explain to Mr. Bell the cause of the Khan's removal to Muskye, till he could receive an explanation of the military preparations on both sides of Khelat. Both these letters were immediately forwarded to Kwetta, with a letter from myself expressing my great satisfaction at the manner the Chiefs had acted by remaining steady to their promises. I mentioned my interview with Kauder Bux to Meer Esahul Khan, and learned from him that he was the same man who had been to the Durbar at Boughwanus, but told them he was Mr. Bell's head spy, but that being a follower of the Prophet he would not betray them to the Feringhees. He stated that it would be dangerous to go to Khelat or Kwetta just now, as it was the intention of the English to seize the Khan and his followers at one of these places. At the time when Kauder Bux gave them this assurance, the Khan and his Sirdars were ready to move to Khelat, but after question- ing this 'Head Spy,' and another man from Kootroo, who affirmed that every preparation for the advance of the troops was com-
completed, it was considered necessary to place the Khan out of danger.
The movement of troops to Moostoong and the arrival of the 9th Company 42nd N. I. and two guns at Khelat, combined with the pre-
parations of the force at Kootroo, gave currency to the information of these men. The resolution of the Durbar to remove the Khan was therefore very natural. Instead of moving to Khelat, the Khan marched to Muskya and his chiefs separated to their respective homes, while Sirdar Meer Esah Khan was deputed to inform me of the rea-
son which had led to this alteration in their intentions. That chief determined also to write to Mr. Ross Bell regarding the conduct of Kauder Bux, and prepared a statement of what he had told the Sirdars and chiefs in durbar at Baughwanna, requesting at the same time that the man might be secured and confronted with him on his arrival at Kwetta.

On the 10th May, Prince Meer Mahomed Azim Khan, Sirdar Meer Taj Mahomed, and his mother Hoor Bebee, Meer Boheer Khan and the Zheeree, Punderan and Nudara authorities arrived at Khe-
lat at two in the afternoon, with the intention of accompanying me to Mr. Bell at Shawl. I sent out Moollah Nasseer Oollah to meet them. Esah Khan and Meer Boheer called the next day to ask me to guarantee the safety of the Khan during the time we might be absent, and I of course consented that he should remain unmolested, either at Baughwanna, Nal, or Muskya, till I could receive Mr. Bell's orders. We moved to Giranne on the 13th, and to Mungo-
chor on the 14th May. While at Girannee, Meer Azim Khan re-
ceived a letter from Captain Wallace, the concluding part of which stated, that Naib Mahomed Hussein was writing and would give him the news. By the same opportunity letters were received from the Bebee Ganjan, whose horseman brought them. The receipt of these letters caused great joy to the Meer's party, who, after perus-
ing them and conversing with the messenger, performed "Mubarih" to Meer Azim Khan, and saluted him as "Khan of Khelat." The Meer was delighted and promised to reward three of his adherents with Naibships. We did not hear of this farce till the next morning, when our servants, mixing with those of the chief, learned what had happened. It was soon communicated to Sirdar Meer Esah Khan and Meer Boheer Khan, and shortly after our arrival here, these two

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chiefs came to inform me of what had passed. I obtained a personal 
copy of Captain Wallace's letter and of that from Mohamed Hussein. His 
letter had the usual remark made in most native letters; "I send this 
by a man whom you may trust, believe all he tells you." There 
was nothing in Mohamed Hussein's letter to object to, but the 
bearer of the letter had evidently communicated some verbal mes-
...
After so flattering a mark of attention I could not but pay my respects to her, which I did. I related how Kauder Bux had led the Durbar to believe he was Mr. Bell's spy, and the lady remarked on the great good fortune of the IChan, in having such a friend as me. The next day I was requested to call again, as she said she had something particular to say to me. I attended as desired, and found Meer Azim Khan there; what a brace of hypocrites! After every one had been sent to a distance, the lady began her harangue, which lasted for half an hour, the burden of which was that she loved the IChan as though he was her own son; that he was the son of her husband, and therefore her son; that she had been considering night and day how she could induce him to come and form an alliance with the Company; with much more in the same strain. She finished, at length by saying, that the only way she knew of, was for her to go back with me to Khelat and reside in the citadel, and that when he heard of her residence there he would no longer be afraid. Had she known that I was fully aware of her having sought from Sir William Macnaghten the Guldee for the bastard of the slave girl, or of her having wished to form a regency with Meer Azim Khan, till the Khan came in, she would have saved herself this substantial proof of her love for intrigue, and her aptitude in falsehood.

A Durbar was held on the 22d May by Mr. Bell, when after the usual ceremonies, he assured the Prince and Sirdars that he had never seen Kauder Bux, and certainly never employed him; that Kauder Bux, in using his name, had committed an act for which he would be tried, and if convicted, punished. Esah Khan replied to Mr. Bell, and declared that Kauder Bux had come into the Durbar, and assured the Khan and all the chiefs that he was Mr. Bell's head spy, and that it was Mr. Bell's intention to seize the Khan and his Sirdars, either at Khelat or Kwetta. Mr. Bell repeated his assurances and promised that enquiry should be made into the matter. The durbar concluded with presents to the Prince and Sirdars. We were detained at Kwetta by one thing or another till the 31st May. Meer Esah Khan had left us on the 26th to return with Mr. Bell's assurances to the Khan, that the villain, Kauder Bux, had never been employed by him. He was also desired to write the Khan to return and join me at Khelat. Before we left us, he had an interview with Mr. Bell, when Kauder Bux was called in and the subject investigated. Esah Khan
recognized him as the person who had told the Durbar at Bauglvana that he was Mr. Bell's head spy, and that it was dangerous to proceed to Khelat, &c. On the 1st May, other evidence was taken and Kauder Bux stood fully convicted.

The day after Esah Khan left Mr. Bell, we heard that Shah Newaz Khan had reached Dadur. This caused great consternation in our camp, and I was asked to explain the cause; but I could only state that he had escaped, with the Ameers of Scinde, and was coming to Khelat, simply to make arrangements regarding his future abode. I had never been informed that Shah Newaz Khan had been invited. I mentioned to Mr. Bell the alarm this circumstance had caused in our camp, and letters were therefore sent of to direct him to halt at Dadur. Mr. Esah Khan heard of the circumstance at Khelat, and halted to hear from me. I was desired to assure him that the approach of Newaz Khan would not in any way interfere with the interests of Meer Nasseer Khan, and that I hoped he would not therefore attribute his movements in this direction, to any diminution of the good will of Mr. Bell. This satisfied Esah Khan, who proceeded on his errand. The explanation and assurances given on the spot, appeared to satisfy the Prince, his chiefs, and followers.

On the 21st May the Prince and his chiefs took leave of Mr. Bell in durbar, and on the 1st June we moved to Sin-l-ab and reached Khelat on the 8th by regular marches. On the 11th June, I sent off Moollah Nasseer Oollah and Dewan Rammoo to accompany the young Khan to Khelat. A cossid had arrived on the preceding night, with a letter to me from him, saying that he was very unwell at Musky, that the air and water of the place did not agree with his constitution, and that he only waited for Moollah Nasseer Oollah and Dewan Rammoo to commence his march to join me. On the 16th June, I received letters from Meer Kamal Khan and Darogah Goold Mahomed. The evident change of style in these letters, convinced me that they, at all events, would offer no further opposition to the coming in of the Khan. I sent these letters off to Mr. Bell without delay, pointing out the altered style of correspondence.

On the 19th June, I received a letter from Mr. Bell enclosing the copy of a letter through Brigadier England, from the officer commanding at Moonseroog, stating that Darogah Goold Mahomed had passed me to the eastward, and had been spoken with by the person
who gave the information, not ten miles from the post. I knew it was impossible, and I immediately wrote to Mr. Bell, giving him the locations of the Darogah, andcurring him that the report was as groundless as that made to and forwarded by Captain Beem, in May last. Upon this false and false information, however, Mr. Bell ordered Lieut. Wallace, Assistant Political Agent on duty at Moostoonng, to seize the Darogah. I felt that if such an order should get wind it would immediately stop the progress of the Khan towards me, and I therefore dispatched a cossid without loss of time to Mr. Bell, begging that no measures should be taken against the Darogah, who was quietly seated at Bangwanna. At the same time I sent Mr. Bell a detail of the location of every one of the chiefs, and remarked that if the Darogah contemplated any hostile measures, he would not have placed his wife and children within my reach. They were residing at Soherab.

These reports not only shew the perfect ignorance in which the authorities at Shawl and Moostoong were of the movements of the Chiefs, Sirdars and officers of the Khan’s Government, but the determination of the native officials to prevent if possible the coming in of the Khan. Moostoong was farmed by the Moonshee of Lieut. Loveday, the Assistant Political Agent of Khelat, and Shawl was a fertile source of emolument to the native establishments there. Both these places, as well as Khelat itself, would in all probability pass from their hands, if I succeeded in inducing the young Khan to come in. The opposition I met with, therefore, was in proportion to the prize at stake. After the death of Lieut. Loveday’s Moonshee, Golam Hoossein, Moostoong was in charge of Nalb Ahmed Shah, a creature of the Shah’s, and who was never backward in promulgating misrepresentations.

On the 21st June, I received letters from Moollah Nasseer Oollah and Dewan Rammoo from Baughwanna, stating that the Khan was preparing to leave Masye, and that if they made the usual marches, he would reach Khelat about the 28th instant. The Khan’s mother, his expected mother-in-law, and her daughter, with several others, had assembled at Baughwanna to meet him. Letters were also received this day from Darogah Gool Mahomed, who had reached Soherab, where he was to remain with his wife and family till the arrival of the Khan. The Darogah also asked my permission to
come to Khelat to confide me in matters of some moment connected with the Khan's approach, as soon as his sign would permit him to travel. He was carried from Bangawanna to Soherab in a Kulla. I gratified the request. The frequent reports that reached Khelat of Mr. Bell's intentions to send either Lieut. Hammersley or Lieut. Wallace to Khelat, and to withdraw me, induced me this day to remonstrate with him on the danger of such a step and to solicit that he would await the result of my sending Moollah Nasseer Oollah and Dewan Rammoo, to escort the Khan to me. I reminded him that he had always expressed himself satisfied with my exertions, and I therefore trusted that he would leave me to complete undisturbed by the presence of another, that duty which he had committed to my charge. I also observed that the country was quiet, the harvest coming in, and the city of Khelat daily improving. I showed him that there was no necessity for any immediate change, and that if he should make any, the country might once more be thrown into confusion.

The accounts from Bangawanna on the 25th June, stated that the Khan was ill of an ague. Dewan Rammoo and Meer Kamaul Khan had high words; the former was for proceeding directly to Khelat; the latter for delay. Dewan Rammoo prevailed, and camels were hired, twenty-two in number. Another question was agitated at Bangawanna, namely whether the Khan should be married before, or after his return from Kwetta; the Mungenee (betrothed) being present, it was resolved that he should be married immediately. Soon after, he sent for the Dewan to order camels to be hired, and the necessary preparations for marching to be made. Nasseer Oollah had remained behind; the Khan addressed him thus: "The Colonel sent you to bring me to him; you would not have come, if the Colonel had been false and deceitful. I have said I am resolved to go, and I have ordered the necessary preparations for marching. I have another reason for going; if I go on the invitation of the Colonel, and he is instrumental in restoring me to the throne of my ancestors, he will never remind me of the fact. If however I do not go now, but subsequently, on the advice of any of my chiefs, whoever accompanies me to the Colonel will always say, I gave you back your father's territory, give me this village, give me so many kwarans of grain, &c. To meet their wishes
I must contest injustice and shall lose my reputation. I shall go to the Colonel on this account, even if I had no better reason."

On the 26th, I received further notice of Mr. Bell's intention to send an officer to Khelat to relieve me, and I wrote a strong remonstrance against such a measure at the present crisis. On the 28th, I received a letter from him strongly disapproving of my allowing the Darogah an interview. I had no particular wish to see the Darogah, but I felt that a refusal would instantly stop the progress of the Khan and his party, and I therefore considered it necessary to receive his visits. From the accounts I received of the Darogah's illness, I expected he must die before he reached Khelat. In this letter Mr. Bell also ordered me not to remain at Khelat, after the 28th instant. The establishment of a provisional government was also spoken of as necessary, and Lieut. Hammersley was mentioned as having been appointed by the Government to take charge of Khelat. Mr. Bell spoke in high terms of my exertions, but gave over all hope of Nasseer Khan's ever coming in.

I received a joint letter on the 29th June, from Moollah Nasser Oollah and Dewan Rammoo, written at Banghwan, the 26th, in which they stated that everything had been settled, and that they were to make the first march to Nogye on the 29th. The young Khan had been married to the daughter of Mehnaz Beebee, though he was labouring at the time under a daily ague. Great sickness prevailed at Banghwan, where scarcely a man was free from fever. The 30th July letters arrived from the Khan, and Akoon Mahomed Sudeeq to Mr. Bell's address. Having his orders to open any of his letters, I read these previously to dispatching them to Shawlkote. They both contained assurances that the Khan would proceed without delay to join me, though he was very weak from ague, and the whole camp was more or less affected with fever.

Darogah Godul Mahomed was brought in on the night of the 4th July in a Kujjawa. The fatigue of travelling brought on constant vomiting, and I was called up in the middle of the night to prescribe for him. The Surgeon saw him in the morning, and gave him medicine. The same day I received letters from Mr. Bell dated the 3rd, saying that he had directed Lieut. Hammersley to proceed immediately and relieve me at Khelat, and much regretted I had remained there so
long. A copy of the public letter addressed to Lieut. Hammersley for his guidance, was also enclosed for my information. I immediately wrote to Mr. Bell, adverting to the letters I had forwarded to him from the Khan, and Akoon Mohamed Subeeg, on the same day on which he had written his orders and said that these letters must have reached him late on the 6th or early this morning; that I felt confident he would be anxious on reading them, to cancel his instructions, and detain Lieut. Hammersley at Kwatia, if that officer should not have already left Shawl. Though Mr. Bell had been induced to issue these orders, it was evident from the last paragraph of his private letter of the 3rd that he felt the force of my letters of the 29th and 30th June, for he wrote, "were it possible Meer Mohamed Nasseer Khan entertains any serious intention of joining you, he must actually have done so long before Lieut. Hammersley can reach Khelat, a circumstance which would, of course, render it unnecessary to proceed with any new arrangements pending a reference to Government."

The blame of not having come in has always been attributed to Meer Mohamed Nasseer Khan, but this is incorrect; insomuch as he has ever wished to ally himself with the English, and a careful attention to facts, from the time of his father's death to the present moment will convince every unbiased observer that the blame does not rest with him nor with Bebee Ganjan, Shah Newaz Khan, or the Darogah Gol Mahomed, or any one connected, in any way with the Brahooee Government; but it is to be attributed to the obstacles placed in my way by officers and men receiving British pay.

On the 8th July I received an express from Mr. Bell. However gratifying the contents might be, they were not unexpected. My letters of the 29th and 30th June had evidently suggested his resolution; and the moment he received Meer Nasseer Khan's, and the Akoon's letters, as also that from Dewan Rammo dispatched to him on the 3d instant, he lost no time in replying courteously to their communications, and cancelling the order for Lieut. Hammersley to proceed to Khelat. At the same time he congratulated me on the near prospect of success. Another express from Mr. Bell followed the above in about four hours. He informed me that rumours were afloat, that Nasseer Khan was approaching with no friendly intention, and begged that I would observe the greatest caution. Instructions were at the
same time forwarded through me to the Officer commanding the garrison to be on the alert. With regard to additional military precautions, nothing beyond the Officer of the day going the rounds twice during the night were considered necessary; the treasure was always in the citadel; no armed men had ever been allowed to enter the town, and the gates were always shut at sunset, and the watch at tattoo beating. I knew perfectly well that the Khan, when at Muskye, had only fourteen horsemen with him, and stated his arrival at Boughwannah, I had always received notice of the strength of the party. In the evening I replied to Mr. Bell, that although I could not dream of treachery, I felt it prudent to be ready to meet it; that every necessary precaution had been taken in the town and citadel; that every necessary precaution had been taken in the town and citadel; that I had prepared the Charbaugh for the reception of the Khan; that I did not feel the slightest doubt of his friendly intentions; that everything wore the most peaceful aspect; that the people were making up clothes for the Khan, as well as a saddle and saddle with golden ornaments; that fruit was sent off every afternoon, and that some of the wealthier inhabitants were preparing holiday dresses to go and meet their Prince. I also stated that Dewan Ramoo, on whom the Khan was entirely dependent for supplies of money, till he reached Soherab, was with me in Khelat, celebrating his son's marriage, and that the Dewan's horsemen came in and went out daily to the Khan's camp, so that we knew each day what was passing. Dewan Ramoo and the Hindoos of the town advanced the money for making up the ornamented saddle and bridle, and for several other articles; and it is certain that the Hindoos, after the cruel lesson they received in November 1839, will not, for years, remain within Khelat, if it should ever be threatened with a second attack, much less lend their money to assist an attacking party. I was however informed in confidence that most strenuous exertions had been used to prevent the Khan's coming in, and from a quarter where it was little expected; that even after he mounted, the party seized his horse's bridle, and begged him in the name of the Prophet to go anywhere but to Feringhees. The Khan remarked, that he was tired of following advice which only brought him into trouble, and that the Colonel had always spoken the truth and never receded even a hair from his engagement. The Khan acted upon this determination and I received daily accounts of his progress to-
wards Khelat. He was still ill with fever, but resolutely pursued his journey and arrived on the 12th at Soherab.

I received letters on the 13th July from the Khan and Moollah Nasseer Oollah; every thing was coming on well, but scarcely a man was free from fever in his camp; his mother also was laid up, and so was the Moollah himself. On the 17th, I learned that the Khan's fever and ague had reduced him to a shadow; and that his young wife was to be sent off with her mother to the residence of the latter, at Guddh. On the morning of the 18th, Moollah Nasseer Oollah's son, a tall stout man, was sent in from Soherab to me for medical treatment. From him I learned that the camp was suffering severely from sickness, and that they had not hands to load the camels. Darogah Goolmohamed was also dangerously ill, but Darogah God Mahomed better. One hundred and fifty sepoys were ill in hospital, and all the villages about Khelat were equally sickly.

The next day I received a letter and a message from the Khan who was very weak; the message was to the effect, that, instead of residing at Char Baugh, he would rather encamp at Babawattee; he also begged me to join him at Soherab. I wrote and begged him to come to Raisingh, promising to meet him there. The truth is, the Khan, or rather the people about him, were afraid lest he should be seized at Khelat, and they had an idea that my presence afforded the only chance of his safety. Darogah God Mahomed had been most anxious the last two or three days to obtain my permission for him to proceed to Mr. Ross Bell. He said he had received a very kind letter from Mohamed Hussein. I knew full well that it meant nothing more than that the writer was aware he was to fill the Darogah's place when the Khan came in. This letter however elated the Darogah not a little, and he talked as if he possessed Mr. Ross Bell's confidence; as if negotiations could not be carried on without him. He was therefore all anxiety to go to Mr. Bell's Camp.

The news from the Khan's Camp on the 22d and 23d July was, that a remonstrance I had sent him, on the subject of the delay, was delivered by my vakeel, Moollah Nasseer Oollah, attended by Meer Esh Khane and Meer Boheer. The Khan replied, that whether he was well or ill, better or worse, he would continue to move on, but he declined the aid of the doctor I had proposed to send him. Sir-
Dar Mahomed Khan Shwanna sent a horseman with a message, asking to be heard. I desired his messenger to bring me a letter with his master's seal, that I might be satisfied it was his real wish to see me. Darogah God Mahomed fears my interview with Sirdar Mohammad Khan, knowing how he calumniated this Sirdar at our meeting at Rhodengoh, by laying the odium of Lieut. Loveday's murder on him. The removal of Darogah God Mahomed, by slow degrees, from the influence he still holds, will be greatly facilitated by the presence of Mohammad Khan Shwanna. By this day's post I wrote to Mr. Ross Bell requesting him to allow the Darogah to come to Moostoong, or even to Kwetta, if I found no convenient opportunity of dropping him before, and stated that the letter written by Naib Mahomed Hussein to the Darogah, evidently with Mr. Bell's sanction, had so completely altered the man, that I felt this arrangement necessary, and that the appearance of God Mahomed even at Kwetta could be of no consequence; as, though I should prevail on the Darogah to quit the Khan, the latter would not think of retrograding. Dewan Rammo still remains very ill; he has been the staunchest friend of the Khan.

On the 24th July a horseman came in, to say that he had left the Khan about three coss on the other side of Rhodengoh, in a dreadful state of debility. The Khan sent an old and confidential servant of the family to me saying he was ashamed to ask me to come through the sun, but neither he himself nor his camp could be happy until I was once more amongst them. I accordingly rode out to Rhodengoh without loss of time, and found the Khan in a miserable state of weakness; indeed he was too weak to come out to meet me. On my arrival at the tent, he was brought forward a few yards supported by two servants. I was much shocked to see the ravages sickness had made in him, for he had been suffering from ague for forty-five days. I lost no time in administering medicine to him. The next day we sent off the tents about 11 A.M. and at 3 P.M. mounted: the Khan was very weak and we were forced to make six halts on the road to refresh him. I begged him to remain at a place rather more than half way, called Gwenei Soomunder, and promised to ride out again in the morning; but he would not listen to it, observing that I had been kind to him for ten months. It was evident from all the conversation I had with the Khan that he was heavily tried of Brahooee.
Dar Mahomed Khan Shurwanna sent a horseman with a message, asking to be heard. I desired his messenger to bring me a letter with his master's seal, that I might be satisfied it was his real wish to see me. Darogah Gool Mahomed fears my interview with Sirdar Mohamed Khan, knowing how he calumniated this Sirdar at our meeting at Rhodengoh, by laying the odium of Lieut. Loveday's murder on him. The removal of Darogah Gool Mahomed, by slow degrees, from the influence he still holds, will be greatly facilitated by the presence of Mohamed Khan Shurwanna. By this day's post I wrote to Mr. Ross Bell requesting him to allow the Darogah to come to Moostoong, or even to Kwetta, if I found no convenient opportunity of dropping him before, and stated that the letter written by Naib Mahomed Hussein to the Darogah, evidently with Mr. Bell's sanction, had so completely altered the man, that I felt this arrangement necessary, and that the appearance of Gool Mahomed even at Kwetta could be of no consequence; as, though I should prevail on the Darogah to quit the Khan, the latter would not think of retrograding, Dewan Rammoo still remains very ill; he has been the staunchest friend of the Khan.

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counsellors. It was dark however before we reached Khezat, but the

tents were already pitched. As I had not expected his arrival before

the morning of the 26th, it was an hour before we could get the

usual presents into camp. As soon as that was accomplished, I left

the Khan, and sent in a report of this auspicious circumstance. The

following is a copy of my letter:

To Ross Bazz, Esq.,

Political Agent, Khezat.

Sir,—I have the honour to report Meer Mohamed Naasor Khan is

with me, the guest of the Honourable Company. He arrived at vlan-
dengh yesterday, and sent on to give me notice of his approach, also

praying I would join him, which I did and rode with him to Khezat.

The young man is very weak, and much pulled down by his late ill-

ness. Thus has been accomplished the wishes of the Government

without the loss of a single life; the deeply rooted distrust of the

tribes towards the English, and their vindictive feelings against us,

changed to an anxious desire to ally themselves to the Honourable

Company and all has been brought about at an expenditure of less

than 20,000 Rupees. By far the greater part of this sum is chargeable,

if such should be the wish of Government, to the Khezat state as mo-

ney advanced, to enable the young Khan to disband his army, and for

subsistence for himself, chiefs and followers, during the time I was

negotiating with him. I cannot express the pleasure I feel on the

young Khan's arrival; a weight of responsibility is removed from my

shoulders, which was a constant and most painful source of distress-

ing anxiety. I never contemplated the disapprobation of Govern-

ment even had I failed, because from the day I threw myself unattend-
ed amongst these strange people, from the moment I opened negotia-
tions with the young Khan at Zheeree on the 5th February last, up
to the present moment, no man of any tribe has been in arms ag-

ainst us. Twice were the negotiations suspended, viz. 1st. By the

villainy of Rheimdad, and secondly, by the rascality of the prisoner

Kauder Bux, a member of the Bombay Head-Quartcrs. Still not a man
appeared in arms against us; on the contrary, a renewal of negotiati-
ions was each time immediately sought for, by a delegation of some of
the senior Chiefs of the Durbar. On my first going amongst these
people in the early part of February last, the feeling against our
countrymen was most irreverently hostile; they were still smarting under the remembrance of their discomfiture at Kootroo and the first discussion in Durbar, of the object of my visit, was consequently of rather a stormy nature, but the arguments quietly offered to their consideration, softened down these angry feelings, and the result of temper and conciliation has not only, I trust, led to the present happy occurrence, viz. the coming in of the Khan, but calmed their angry feelings against us and left in their place a favourable impression on the minds of both the Brahooee and Beloochee tribes, of the sterling value of our national character. I have perilled my life and suffered many privations the last seven months, but I was a volunteer for the duty, as well as volunteer for the Army of the Indus. If in the fortunate accomplishment of the task assigned me, I have merited your approbation, I shall forget the dangers, troubles, and losses I have encountered, in the pleasurable contemplation of the success of my exertions. I cannot in justice close this hurried report without bringing to your favourable notice, the highly praise-worthy conduct of Moollah Nasseer Oollah Babee, my Vakeel. From the moment he joined me on the 11th December, 1840, he has never slackened his persevering and valuable exertions, in carrying out the orders of Government. I therefore hope, after enquiry, you may be able to recommend him for some mark of approbation from the Government. The scale of allowances for the Establishment under me, was drawn out at a moment when my exertions had been foiled for a time by those two villains, Rheimdad and Kauder Bux; and I feared, at such a moment, to solicit for Moollah Nasseer Oollah, a monthly allowance, such as I felt his eminent and unwearied services deserved. I would now presume to suggest, that instead of 100 Rupees per mensem, Moollah Nasseer Oollah Babee should be allowed at least 200 Rupees per mensem, from the time of his accepting the Company's employ. I have the honour to be, Sir, Your most obedient Servt. (Signed) L. R. STACY, Lieut.-Col.

On Special Duty.

Kheerat, 25th July, 1841.
Early on the morning of the 26th, I accompanied Dr. Wright to the Khan. Sirdar Meer Taj Mahomed and Sirdar Meer Boheer were very ill; the letter was not expected to live. Meer Mahomed Azim Khan was in disgrace on all sides, being in a state of constant inebriety, from smoking bangh and drinking bazar spirits. Mahomed Khan Shavanner had sent to me the previous day to say that he was very near, and wanted permission to come and pay his respects which was readily granted. I immediately sent for him, and on the 26th had a conversation of some hours with him. The account he gave of the misconduct of the late Lieut. Loveday’s Moonshee, and of the party of sepoys under his orders, is the same as every one else gives. I desired him to write a petition to Mr. Bell which I promised to take with me when I accompanied the Khan to Khelat; and desired that in the mean time he would remain under my guarantee, at Nechara, until I sent Mr. Ross Bell’s orders for his future guidance. Darogah God Mahomed was very assuaged, or pretended to be so, notwithstanding the many broad hints I had given him that a more competent man was required to fill so important a situation as Vizier to a young Prince. I had received a letter from Mahomed Hussein, from the tenor of which, and from the favour he was in with Mr. Bell, I felt that it must have been written with the sanction of the Political Agent. In this letter, he requested my permission to join the Khan’s cavalcade, and I replied in the affirmative. At the same time I reported to Mr. Bell that I had done so, observing, that it would greatly assist me in removing the Darogah, which I recommended should be effected in the quietest way possible.

On the 27th July, I found that the Khan had escaped his ague and was decidedly improving. He rode to the Char Baugh, and back, to join the officers of the garrison at a ball shooting match, but the exertion fatigued him considerably. I now made arrangements for moving towards Mr. Bell, and for dismissing all the followers the Khan could spare, to save both the expense and the inconvenience of taking so large a party where supplies were so difficult to be procured. The Darogah appeared anxious to know, if, in speaking of him as unequal to the duties of his situation, I was in earnest, and accordingly paid me an unexpected visit, and requested all but a few confidential people who happened to be present, to withdraw, as he wished to consult me. When they had gone, the Darogah said the Khan
was now at Khelat; that it was time to ask before going further, what country he was to get; what money to set him up in the world, and what presents on reaching Kwetta. He remarked that the Company had given Shah Nawaz Khan 5,000 Rs. for furniture; 50,000 Rs. for his privy purse, and 100,000 Rs. as a present to his subjects. After much more of the same balderdash, I asked him if the Khan had desired him to deliver such a message to me, or if he spoke from himself. He replied, that he was the Khan's Darogah; that the Khan was a boy, and that it was therefore his duty to think of these matters. I told him not to trouble himself on the subject, as the Khan had more sense than all the Durbar, and knew he was on the way to Mr. Ross Bell, who alone could answer such questions. I immediately called to those sent out of the room to return to their places. The Darogah felt the mistake he had made, and said he left every thing to me, and should go with us to Mr. Bell, complete the negotiations, and then retire from public life, to this I gave the usual reply of "khoob."

On the 28th July, I was induced to call the attention of Mr. Ross Bell to the silly remarks and conversation of gentlemen with the natives of Kwetta, which spread to this place, particularly the reports from Rheimdad. I could not but suspect these reports were more than the silly thoughtlessness of the moment. In my report to Mr. Bell, I was obliged in justice to Sirdar Mahomed Khan Shavannee, to tell him that after my lengthened conversation with that Sirdar, he had declared by the beard of the prophet, that whoever told me what I related to him, was a villainous slanderer. He alluded to the detail given me of Lieut. Loveday's death by Darogah Gool Mahomed, at our first meeting at Rheendgh on the 25th January last. Fortunately, two of the three persons who were present at the time, were now in the room when I spoke of it to the Sirdar. From the detailed account he gave me of the conduct of Lieut. Loveday's Moonshee, Goolam Hussein at Moostoon, I could not feel surprised that he and his party were cut up. The Moonshee had farmed Moostoon, and thus enjoyed the power of being doubly oppressive. On the day when he and his party were defeated, his conduct was oppressive in the extreme. He led the Sepoys a considerable distance out of the town, to attack Mahomed Khan Shavannee and Malik Deenee Mahomed Shikan, firing on every one as he
went. Several respectable people who were present in camp, gave
evidence to the fact, as well as to the oppression of the Moonshee in
general.

On the 29th July, we moved on to my great satisfaction towards
Mr. Bell, and marched to Geranee, nine miles. The Khan was in high
spirits the first part of the way, but was much fatigued before he
reached our halting place. He was evidently too weak to start again
in the night, on a long march of twenty-two miles; we therefore
determined to remain during the heat of the day in the orchard we
occupied, and to move off in the cool of the evening. The next day
we reached Mangosochur without much difficulty; the Khan only rest-
ced twice on the road. On the 31st July we had a fatiguing march of
twenty-six miles to Gooroo. The Khan was so fatigued that he could
proceed no farther; we therefore dismounted and lay down in our
cloaks to sleep till morning. At break of day we came on to Amun
Oeldah Kamino. At 3 p. m. we mounted and reached Moostoong early
on the morning of the 1st August. There I found that the report that
I was to proceed to Kandahar immediately after my arrival with
the Khan at Kwetta, had been received. The Khan came to speak
to me on the subject, but I could only reply, as I had ever done, that
my remaining with him rested wholly with the Governor General.
The young Khan felt the difficulty he should experience on coming
to the throne of his ancestors, a perfect novice in the affairs even
of private life, surrounded by the very men by whose weak and evil
counsel his father had lost his throne and his life, and without
a single soul in whom to confide. He accordingly addressed a
letter to Mr. Ross Bell. The Khan's Moonshee was sent with it, as
usual to me, that I might read it before it was despatched. It ap-
pared to me any thing but extraordinary that the young Khan
should express himself as he did in this letter, for had he been my
own relative I could not have done more for him than I had done.
The following is a close translation of the letter in question made
with permission on the 11th September from the original:

To Ross Bell, Esq. Sec. &c. &c. (After compliments.)
Seal of the Meer Mahomed

Nasser Khan.

"I have received your very kind letter, and I perfectly understand
its contents, and am made happy by it. I am very very indeed to
hear you are so unwell, and am praying to God to restore you to
health, and trust God will grant my prayer. My own state is this. I
was very ill and so weak, that till now I was unable to come to you;
but I have made an effort to visit you for the purpose of strengthen-
ing our friendship, and becoming an ally of the Company. I
came to Khelat to wait on Colonel Stacy, and he accompanied me
from Khelat. We arrived at Kaniak Amin Onilla on the 31st July.

"I am coming, in dependence on God and his prophet, and your
honor, and you may depend on my proceeding to wait upon you with-
out delay: there is no doubt of this.

"I have heard that Colonel Stacy is to be removed in a few days,
by your order, from me. You know the minds of the Brahoos, Beloo-
chees, and of the whole subjects of Surtoon and Jelloon, and al-
so my own; we are made happy by the humanity and kindness of Col-
nel Stacy, because he is both a sensible and a good man. From the
time my father was killed, I and my affairs were in a bad state, un-
til Colonel Stacy came to Khelat, since which period every thing
has gone well, because the Colonel has been to me as a father.
The road via Beila to Boomeeana was shut, and the kaffis and
travellers could not pass by that road; but at present through the
exertions of Colonel Stacy, kaffis and travellers move backward
and forward without the least danger of being molested, which makes
every one happy. I hope, through the means of your friendship, I may not be
deprived of Colonel Stacy, for through him I hope to get my affairs
in proper order, and I am well aware that in the other gentleman
I should not find such a friend as he is; to lose him will grieve me
very much."

Seal of Nzer Mahomed Nasseer Kinn.

31st July, 1841.

About 8 A.M. I received a letter express from Capt. Wallace an-
nouncing the melancholy intelligence of the death of Mr. Ross Bell,
and reporting that he (Capt. Wallace) had assumed charge of the
office of Superintendent of Upper Sindh, until the arrival of Major
II
Outram. This communication also contained a very flattering notice of my exertions, and an acknowledgment of the great influence I possessed over the Khan and Sindins. I was also desired to assure the Khan that no change as it regarded him would take place, and that Major Outram sustained the same kindly feeling towards him, which had ever been evinced by Mr. Bell. It was in every way advisable to allow the Khan to hear of this event from no one but from me; I therefore requested him to come over to my tent alone. I ordered carpets to be spread under some trees a short distance from it. The Khan was with me in a very short time, and every one was ordered to retire, when I informed him of the death of Mr. Bell, and told him I had invited him alone, that I might know his wishes. He did not hesitate a moment in his reply: "You are my Father, and I am your Son; whatever you advise, I shall do." I told him it did not admit of a doubt that his alliance with the Company could alone make him happy; that there was no other path to the throne of his ancestors, and that the Company would be just towards him. I advised him therefore to trust implicitly to them as he bad seen the folly of Brahooee counsel. The Khan declared his resolution to unite himself to the Company on their own terms. I proposed assembling a Durbar immediately to ascertain their sentiments. This was assented to, and the servants were dispatched to summon the chiefs and officers. The Durbar was soon assembled. The Khan requested me to explain the cause of this sudden meeting and at such an hour. I accordingly placed the circumstance before them, following up the detail by observing, that the Khan was very young, and that it was the duty of his chiefs and men of experience, to advise him to the best of their ability. If his Durbar failed to give him good advice, to whom was he to look? It was highly gratifying to find that their reliance on British integrity led the whole Durbar, at once, to resolve on advising the Khan to throw himself on the generosity of the Company. The Khan, said they, has no father; his mother gave him to you at Zheeree; you are now his father, and we advise him to act in all matters as you desire. For two years before you came, he was driven from hill to hill, since your arrival his lot (nusseeb) has brightened; from your advice he may gain his father's throne; all the chiefs both of Juttawan and Surawun, look to you; if you are kind to him an
The general import of the speeches.

I received a letter on the 2nd August from Captain Wallace, enclosing letters from himself and Captain Browne to the address of Meer Mahomed Naseer Khan. I was requested to deliver them and to repeat the assurances of the kindliest feelings for his (the Khan's) interests, and to say that in Major Outram he would find a warm advocate with the Government of India, all which was done. Captain Wallace in his letter to me acknowledged the receipt of the Khan's letter of the 1st instant, and remarked most kindly on its contents. The following is an extract of his letter, "I have written to the Khan to disabuse his mind of the idea that you are ordered to Kandahar; it would be utter ruin at this crisis even to talk of such a thing." I had a second letter of this date from Captain Wallace still more flattering. It was dated Kewta, August 2, 1841. In it he said that Captain Bean joined him in these friendly expressions, and added, "I have sent a letter of encouragement to Mahomed Hussein. I do not write to the Khan, because you are so much better able to encourage him than I can be. Captain Bean and I are both of a mind, that you and you only, can manage matters at this crisis, and I have no doubt that he will be as anxious as I am, to see the Khan restored to his rights. I have in a preliminary precis pointed out the necessity of this; and am only waiting for a report from you, to write more fully on the subject, and am now going to meet Captain Bean to obtain his co-operation in the good work."

From the 3rd August to the 3rd September, nothing of any particular importance occurred. It required daily and constant attention to keep the Khan amused. Major Browne, 41st Foot, commanding Moostoong, and the officers of that corps paid the Khan the compliment of a visit. Major Browne also sent down the brass band several times and had a parade, at which the Khan attended as a private gentleman, and was much pleased. During this period, letters from Captain Wallace and from me induced Mahomed Khan Shahwunt to come in, which he did on the 1st September. He was the last chief who remained absent from us. No opportunity was lost to destroy the influence of Darogah Gool Mahomed. I had been obliged to remove him from the duty of making the daily disburse-
ments on the 1st August, owing to the general discontent which prevailed, both on this and on former occasions, by his holding back rations and insisting for more rations than there were men in camp. During the last years of Meer Meherab Khan's life the Darogah had grasped every appointment, without exception, under the Khanate, and placed his own favourites in them as deputies.

On the 3rd September, I received a letter from Major Outram, dated Kwetta, 2d September 1841, reporting his arrival at that station, and his having assumed charge of the Political Agency of Upper Schinde. Major Outram also enclosed a letter for the Khan, inviting him down to Kwetta. We marched to Feringhaid on the 4th; to Sir-i-ab, on the 5th, and into Kwetta on the morning of the 6th. Captains Browne and Kuyrett came out to Sir-i-ab to give the Khan a welcome. We rested the day of our arrival; and according to the custom of the country mutual enquiries passed between Major Outram and the Khan. After seeing him comfortably established in a tent pitched for him, I went to Major Outram, and was most kindly congratulated on the success of my exertions, and the zeal with which I had pursued the object of my duties. The next morning was fixed for Durbar.

At 8 A.M. I accompanied the young Khan to the Durbar, and introduced him to Major Outram. The Brigadier commanding the troops, Major General England, Captain Bean, and eight or nine officers were present. As might be expected, the youth was rather embarrassed at first, but on Major Outram's assuring him of the kindly feelings of Government towards him, he expressed his desire to become an ally of the Company, the value of whose friendship he said he was fully aware of. He added that he had often heard of their justice and liberality, and he had come to enrol himself amongst the number of their servants (Kizmugur-i-Company) to live under the shade of their flag, and that he was willing to accept whatever terms the Company might prescribe. Though abashed at first, he gained more confidence as the novelty of the scene wore off. In about half an hour the presents were introduced and the Khan shortly after took his leave. A salute of twenty-one guns from the civil lines, which was repeated in camp, announced the happy event of the Khan's acknowledging the paramount power of the British Government, and his alliance with it.
Thus was brought to a happy termination after nearly ten months of persevering trouble, the duty entrusted to me by Mr. Ross Bell. In the preceding pages I have strictly confined myself to a narrative of the negotiations, without offering any opinion on their political character. The obstacles I have had to overcome are not all set down, but enough is recorded to show how difficult was the task I had to perform, and enough, I hope to convince Government that Mr. Bell's nomination of an old officer for this responsible duty, was not made without a full consideration of the trials of temper to which he would be exposed, who should undertake to bring in Meer Mahomed Nas- seer Khan.

Whilst the last pages of this narrative were in the hands of the copyist, I received a letter from Meer Khan Mahomed, the son of Siradar Meer Esngh Khan, in reply to a letter I had written him, saying that Captain Le Mesurier would pass through Widd to Sommum, and bespeaking his attention to that officer. It should be recollected that this Siradar was one of the three who accompanied me to Mr. Ross Bell at Baugh; the following is a close translation of the letter:—

"To Colonel Stacy, &c. &c. &c. (After compliments.)

I have received your letter informing me of Captain Le Mesurier's intention of travelling this way, and my reply is this; when Meer Mahomed Nasseer Khan is placed on the throne of Khelat, then let Captain Le Mesurier come this way, and I will send some of my men to accompany him in safety to Beila; but the Brahooees very much distrust the English, because you told the Khan and my father to attend you, and you would settle their affairs; yet much delay has taken place. The Brahooees have no dependence on the English on this account. When this letter reaches, you must quickly arrange the affairs of the Khan, that he may be placed on the throne of Khelat; after that Captain Le Mesurier can come. Now the Brahooees are very much afraid if Captain Le Mesurier comes before the Khan is on his throne. Still I will protect him as far as Beila; but it would be better to settle the Khan's business, and for the Khan to come back to Khelat before Captain Le Mesurier comes this way."
it may readily be supposed, how many difficulties I have had to
combat. The bazaar who brought this letter, informed me that the whole
of Jelledom believed I had placed the Khan in captivity. These re-
ports were circulated from Moostong !

We remained at Kwerta to the 14th September. The interval was
agreeably chequered by paying and receiving visits. The military
bands attracted great attention, particularly the mounted band of the
3rd Bombay Light Cavalry. The regularity of the camp also excited
their astonishment, as did the arrangement of our Commissariat; but
when at a review which Brigadier England gave the young Khan, he
saw our Horse Artillery, there were no bounds to the expressions of
delight and astonishment among his followers. All eyes were turned
to the two splendid troops of Bombay Horse Artillery, commanded
by Captains Leslie and Leeson, and when the review concluded, and
we were leaving the ground, the praises of our army were in the mouth
of every Brahmeen and Deodoo do the council. When I accom-
ppanied the young Khan into his tent on our return, he remarked,
Oh! that horse artillery. I have seen a picture: it cannot be a reality;
and the cavalry, and the sepoys with the same clothes, the same tur-
bunds, the same weapon, and all moving about as if they were but
one mass: every thing done by one order. Who could fight against
such an army, who but the Gins (Genii) ?

We left Bwetta on the 15th September, with Major Outram and
his party, and reached Rahat on the 26th; the Khan accompanied
us and a short distance from the British Agency camp. The re-
pairs of the Meere (citadel) were not completed; but finding the
Khan anxious to take possession of the grounds, Major Outram agreed
to his wishes, and at 4 P.M. on the 27th, the young Khan was
attended to the Meere by myself and Captain Brown, the principal
Assistant, with an honorary escort. Nothing scarcely worthy of re-
mark occurred between this and the day fixed upon for the installa-
tion of the Khan. His followers considered the 6th October 1841, an
auspicious day, and this was therefore the happy day on which Meer
Mohomed Nasreen Khan, the son of the ill-advised, ill-fated Mehrab
Khan, a man, who, with all his failings, was an admirer of the English,
ascended the throne of his ancestors. The hour fixed on was four in
the afternoon. At the appointed time, Major Outram and every of-

ferer of duty was in attendance. After the usual compliments Major
Outram dwelt on the pleasure he experienced in not only meeting the Khan in the palace of Khelat, but in placing him on his paternal throne. The ceremony was in strict accordance with Brahooee customs. Major Outram was assisted by Brigadier England and myself. A close fitting vest was first handed to the Khan and put on by the Bismutgars; then followed the kummerbund. Major Outram then presented the sword; a rich khipah vughah was also drawn over his shoulders. Major Outram led him to his chair, and the Khan being seated, the first fold of the turban, binding the jiggali to the cap, was made by Major Outram, the second by the Brigadier, and the third by me. The turban being finished, Major Outram shook hands with His Highness, and offered his congratulations, "Moobarik Khan Sahib." Brigadier England followed, and I then offered my compliments. Every officer present left his chair and also came forward and shook hands, and offered Moobarik to the young Prince. After the officers had offered their congratulations, the chiefs and officers of state rose, and coming to the front of the carpet on which the Khan was seated, offered their respects. To the astonishment of every one present, the Moobarik offered to the Khan was extended to me by every native present: "Moobarik Khan Sahib; "Moobarik Colonel Sahib," resonated on all sides: I could not but feel highly gratified by this unexpected and flattering mark of respect and esteem, from the whole court, and Major Outram, Brigadier England, and all the officers present appeared delighted to fill their countryman held in such repute. I may be allowed perhaps to observe, that this is the first, and perhaps the only instance of the kind on record in my Asiatic court. On the conclusion of the ceremony a royal salute was fired from the citadel. The Khan possesses great command over himself; the only occasion during the ceremony in which he appeared the least overpowered, was when Major Outram and the British officers advanced to shake hands with him, and saluted him Khan of Khelat. The tears were then seen to start into his eyes, but he speedily conquered the emotion. To complete the ceremony according to Brahooee etiquette, Major Outram and the officers accompanied His Highness by a ride outside the city shortly after.

Thus ended the ceremony of Installation. In the evening the Ad-Jamuns and SaruWallahs dined their national dinner (chaup). It is
danced round a large fire and is very graceful and imposing, though there is a very great sameness in it. They move very slowly round in a circle to the music of kettle drums and brass clarionets. It was a most interesting sight, and gave considerable gratification to us all. I could not help thinking it must have been handed down to them from the Greeks.

On the 13th October, Lieutenant Loveday's murderer was brought in, and shortly after made over for trial in the Agency camp. He had renounced all our vigilance at defence, residing sometimes near Ungerah and Zewah, and at other times in the hills near Soherab. When questioned on the subject of putting Lieutenant Loveday to death, he gave the following account of the transaction: "On the day of the battle at Dadur, I, Kaisoo, was on duty over the prisoner, Lieutenant Loveday. Mooladad had gone towards the city of Dadur in the morning on business, and Kurrem Khan was with the troops. These three men had charge of Lieutenant Loveday. I was left alone with that officer. Soon after, the Khan's troops fled, the English army approached and I grew alarmed. The camel on which Lieutenant Loveday rode had been driven off with the rest. I came up to him and said, I must kill you, because the Khan's army has fled, and the English army is approaching, Lieutenant Loveday asked, if I had the Khan's orders to kill him. I replied in the negative. He then desired me to go and ask the Khan's orders, I went in the direction of the flying troops, but not finding the Khan, returned and told Lieutenant Loveday, that he had fled, and that I could not find him. Whilst all this was passing, the English army approached very near. I then came up to Lieutenant Loveday and told him the English army was close at hand, and I could remain no longer, but must kill him. Lieutenant Loveday said nothing, but merely put his hand to his moustache. Unable to wait any longer, I drew my sword, and killed my prisoner, and then fled with the rest of the people.

On the 15th October, Major Outram and his party left Khalat for the Bolan. On the 18th I left with the Khan to go by way of Moos- toong and joined Major Outram's camp on the 23d at Sir-i-bolan, and on the 29th of the same month reached Dadur.
SECTION II.

From the Installation of Nasuver Khan to the termination of Colonel Stacpoole's political duties at Khelat.

The Installation being over, and the Brahooee who had put Lieut. Lovelady to death having been secured and made over for trial to Major Outram, all that I volunteered to accomplish was more than completed. Major Outram, in his report to Government dispatched from Kwetta announcing my attendance with the young Khan of Khelat at that place, and his Highness's acknowledgment of the paramount authority of the British, and his wish to be numbered amongst their allies, pointed out the advantages which would accrue from my remaining with him for the present, and therefore recommended that I should continue on special duty until my Regiment, which was under orders to return to India, via the Bolan, should pass Dadur or Bagra.

Government had discovered that the various reports so industriously circulated against me from Kwetta were entirely unfounded; they were so kind as to appreciate my services when I brought in the young Khan, and, knowing the influence I possessed amongst the tribes, readily agreed to Major Outram’s proposal. It has been before observed that from the moment I threw myself into the Brahooee camp, not a shot was fired, and no interruption in any shape was offered by the Khan or his Sirdars to the British. The Bolan Pass is not included in this remark; it was under the political authorities at Kwetta.

The treaty having been completed with his highness Meer Mohamed Nasuver Khan, the two next points remaining to be considered, were,

1st. The opening of the Bolan Pass.
2nd. A treaty with the tribes inhabiting the ranges of Hills from the mouth of the Bolan, East, and South to within 20 or 25 miles of Skardu, including the most powerful and most hostile—the Pathans of Kalah.

To the first of these objects Major Outram requested me to give my immediate attention, and to use my influence in accomplishing the second when we should arrive at Dauder.

I explained briefly the causes which had led to the closing of the Bolan Pass, which were these:

1. The withholding after our arrival in the country the tribute which the Panj-Aukiurs yearly received, from the counts in the valley of Shad.

2. The treatment observed towards some Panj-Aukiurs enticed into Kwetta, five of whom were afterwards hung, (much correspondence on this subject passed, certainly not to the satisfaction of Government.) Their chief, Meer Bakar Khan, accompanied them, but was never after held in any respect. He was removed from the chiefship, and the clans elected for their Sirdar a younger brother, Meer Ghaffar Khan, and under his orders committed all the havoc which the English complained of. Due to return to the several reasons which led to the Bolan being closed against us.

3. Shah Humroor Daman Kaukur, a tributary or servant of Meer Ghaffar, was taken into service by the political authorities at Kwetta as a commandant of a corps of Bolan Rangers. He was a man of no account amongst the Kaukurs, though he was a brave, dashing soldier; consequently his withdrawal from his legitimate masters by Captain Bown, made the whole clan cut adrift, save those whom Shah Humroor prevailed on to leave their chief in company with him. This corps was formed of all the & of the country, and half or one third of the clans, I forget which, were allowed to be absent at a time ostensible at their homes, but in reality plundering and murdering in the Bolan Pass; for not a doubt existed after the enquiry made into the state of the corps on Major Outram's taking charge of the Agency after Mr. Bell's death, but that the Bolan was shut in a great measure by these very men, and that the murders and robberies were committed by them.

4. The haughty tone of the political Department at Kwetta to the young Khan, the son of Mehmb Khan, and his adherents. The
young Meer Mohamed Naseer Khan was idolized by Brahooee and Deloocheen, and just as much beloved and respected, as Shah Shoojaj’s puppet, Meer Shah Nawaz Ilhan was despised. The young Khan was strongly built, though on rather a small scale. He had handsome features, a beautiful herd of hair, (much valued by Brahooees) an excellent address, and a greater command of language than any native I have ever met. He was educated by Durugh God Mohamed, of course in the Brahooee style; that is, he had been taught to read Persian, to ride a horse, to shoot a ball correctly at the longest distances, and to enjoy the pleasures of the chase as well as on foot as an horseback.

5. The influence of Jan Allie Mooneshee, certainly not an honest man, also drove many from making advances; his name was ever coupled with the hanging of the Panzaye Icaukurs, and to his perfidy is their death attributed to this day.

6. The mixed tribes inhabiting Moostoong were driven to exercise the vocation of freebooters in the Bolan, by the tyranny of Golam Hussein, Lieutenant Lovedafs Mooneshee, who had been permitted to farm Moostoong; so that with the Nurrees on the East, the oppressed of Moostoong, Mungochew and Kaleet on the West, and the Bolan rangers on horse, it is only extraordinary how anything ever passed up safely. It must be attributed to the fact that every one acted separately and consulted only his own convenience and interests.

7. To all this it must be added, that the English in the first instance never paid the sum agreed upon for the safe passage of the army of the Indus up the Bolan; that God Mohamed was thirteen days in Kwetta waiting for this money, having been sent by Meer Mohamed Khan to receive it, and that the squires of the Durugh at Kwetta was complained of to the Political Agent. After one or two visits at the Agency house, the Mooneshee Jan Allie and those about Capt. Beaumont asserted that Darogah God Mohamed had returned to Khelat. While matters were thus carried on at Kwetta and Khelat by the Agent and his Assistant, I do not see how the Bolan could be otherwise than closed to the British. It should be borne in mind, that nothing but this state of disorder kept the several people there, (at Kwetta and Khelat) in their respective situations; for it was well known that if I succeeded in persuading the young Khan and his followers to come to terms, Khelat and Moostoong would immediately be
given over to him, if not Kwetta. Thus all the endeavours by forged letters and villainous emissaries, and every sort of deceit to prevent the Khan and his chiefs taking terms, are really accounted for.

To set these matters right, Major Orieen permitted me to open a communication with Meer Guffoor Khan Sannaye Kukur. I therefore wrote to him and his chief adviser Khudoboth Ramatoolah, requesting they would meet me at Moostoong, and promising that the utmost truth and sincerity which had marked my proceedings throughout my dealings with the Khan, should be observed towards them. I said that his master was now seated on the throne of his father, that the English and the Khan were one, and that the object of my invitation was to hear their grievances and to settle their claims reasonably. His Highness the Khan also wrote to say that the Colonel and he would be at Moostoong on such a day and date their attendance in order that he might hear their grievances and set their affairs. It appeared afterwards that the letter announcing the installation of his Highness the Khan, and the restoration of Moostoong, had not reached Meer Guffoor's camp. They had heard of it through their emissaries at Kwetta, but this was not sufficiently satisfactory to induce the principals to obey the mandate to meet me at Moostoong. Accordingly the day after our arrival there, the 29th October, a son of Salibzadah Ramatoolah and some five or six decent men from Meer Guffoor Khan arrived in camp with letters from the chief and his advisers. Letters amongst the Brahooees go for little, the last sentence is generally to this effect; "he is a trustworthy man; he will tell you all that has passed; believe what he says."

These people were feasted according to the fashion of the tribes, and the next day received in Durbar and delivered their letters, with the usual enquiries after our health, good fortune, &c., and on the following day were sent for to receive the replies to the letters they had brought; and their orders to return. The son of Salibzadah Ramatoolah was a very disgusting person. He had received as much as the young Khan could conveniently spare; but because he was not allowed to discuss the terms, because, in short, he found himself a cipher, he became sulky and would not address me, but endeavoured to draw the Khan into conversations on matters of state. To prevent any evil feeling between the young Khan and this incipient Mussalman Priest, I took upon myself to tell him in distinct terms,
that whatever had been promised would be strictly performed; that I knew both Meer Griffier and Sahibzadah Ramostoolah, who were both men of wisdom, that he was a child, and was simply sent from his master and father, with letters, not to ask questions, which was the province of men with white beards. I desired him to take the complements of his Highness the Khan, and the Colonel Sahib to his chief and father. He had then leave to depart, which he did in as early a humour as possible. On the following day we crossed over the Moostong Hills and encamped at the entrance into the Bolan pass.

The next morning we moved again and encamped at Sir-i-Bolan. We were to have joined Major Outram's camp at this place, but want of fodder had forced him to proceed a short march in advance. The Camp united on the 24th, and marched together through the pass to Dadur; not a shot was fired, not a soul was seen in the pass. There was an attempt to get up some such silly night attack as that at Nooshky, but such infatuation could only exist where there was a total ignorance of the country and the people. The moment I heard that the Nooshky attack was resolved upon, I wrote to Major General England and warned him of the result, and it turned out to be worse than I had anticipated. In the same Circular which was sent by the Khan on his installation to all his chiefs, announcing this event, they were strictly forbidden to allow any of their men to maraud in the Bolan under penalty of forfeiture of their estates.

To those whose lands lay immediately East and West of the pass, the strongest remonstrance was addressed. It was wonderful to observe how in fifteen or twenty days after, the pass was clear of all robbers. When we arrived at Dadur on the 29th of October, the settlement of the eastern boundary of Kutchee, from below, to within a short distance of Shikarpore, demanded our attention. This range of hills is inhabited by people of different tribes; but all bent on one object, plunder. The road between Shikarpore and Dadur was infested with gangs of robbers, and murders were committed close to Dadur itself. I first wrote to the Doda Murree chief, Meer Deen Mohamed, telling him the English and the Khan had entered into terms of friendship, that his Highness intended to visit Lehree, and that I should accompany him; that it was desirable the example of peace between him and the English should be followed by all chiefs; I therefore hoped he would come with Sirzard Meer Mohamed Khan Lehree Wallah, and Syed Ameer Shah and
Sirdar Belochee Khan and the other chiefs to a meeting, to that place.

The young Khan wrote to the same effect also, telling the Doda Murree chief, I was his father of whom he ought to have no fear. Letters were also sent to the chiefs in whose vicinity we were to travel, stating the date of our intended arrival at each stage to enable them to be present and do homage. The Khan's letter to the Murree Chief was framed with the greatest care. The Doda Murree tribe had resolved never again to have any thing to do with the English after their bad faith, and it was not until my friends the Sirdars from the Khan's camps, and the Syud Ameer Shah had explained how I had conducted the Khan to the throne of his ancestors, notwithstanding every impediment, that the Murrees would listen to the order to attend him at Lehree so long as a Feringhee was in his camp. The messengers with the letters were dispatched about the 8th November.

On the 12th November, constant complaints having been received from the political authorities at Kwetta of the inactivity, if not worse, of Naib Mohamed Sudeen, (a creature of the Shah's and put in by the Shah's influence,) I proposed to Major Outram to send up Naib Rheimdad who was still in confinement for his conduct to me at Soherab on the 5th April, 1841, as he was the only man I knew of whom Guffoor and his Khadar stood in awe. Even at this time Lieutenant Hammersley, Assistant Political Agent, had suspicions of Mohamed Sudeen's tampering with Guffoor's party and others. It was determined to send up Naib Rheimdad as an available servant to the Assistant Political Agent then in charge of the Kwetta Agency. Major Outram therefore wrote to Kwetta mentioning the arrangement. On the notice being received, it was strongly opposed; but Mohamed Sudeen's conduct becoming more questionable, the despatch of Naib Rheimdad was solicited with as much earnestness as it was at first obstinately declined. By permission of the Political Agent, the management of Rheimdad's release was entrusted to me.

It must be understood that the young Khan never would do any thing after the installation without consulting me. It was in vain that Mooldo Mohamed Hussein, the Wazir, attempted to prevent this, by creating delays and by all manner of contrivances. The Khan most strictly observed the promise he made me at Moostoong never to allow his seal to be put to a paper he had not read, and never to
trust his seal into the hands of any man. Moolla Mahomed Hussain had on one or two occasions when talking in private with his Highness Moolla Nasser Oollib and me joined with the young Khan in advocating the release of the Ex-Naib of Kwetta, Moolla Rheimdad. I remarked that the time had not yet come, that we had much to transact, and that Rheimdad's release might be considered at a future time. On the 10th November, I took the opportunity of Rheimdad's sending me a very submissive petition to consult the Khan on the subject of his liberation. His Highness begged me to arrange it, if I thought proper. I then explained my intention to release him, and to send him to Kwetta, which was highly satisfactory to the Khan. Moolla Nasser Oollib was called, and the arrangement met his approval; particularly as it would balance the power of the two parties, the leaders of which were the Wuzeer Moolla Mahomed Hussain, and the Darogli Gool Muhammad.

The next day I sent for Rheimdad to my tent without any of the guard. On his arrival, he thanked me for having saved him the disgrace of being brought to my tent under a guard, and promised to remember such kindness all his life. I spoke of his petition, and said that I had shown it to his master (Rheimdad is a Khanzad of the Khan's) that the Khan had promised to forgive his faults, if I could be induced to do so. The Naib's defence was plain, sensible, and to the point; he said he was guilty of having taken off the Khan, and that he had done so on account of the many letters sent to the camp. He steadily refused to say who he supposed were the authors of these letters, and declared even at Soherab, that he had no intention of turning back, till he heard that our own sepoys in Khelat openly avowed that it was the intention of the English to seize his young master at that place. He knew that I was under the orders of Mr. Ross Bell, and could not prevent it, and that as Byer Dooorhri was seized when he was induced to visit Postans Sahib, so might the young Khan. Again, he argued with himself, why should the Colonel, an "a1 kitabut" (a man of the book) a follower of Christ, feel such affection for one of a different creed; why should he take such interest in his affairs; why protect his life? In short, why should he act in every way, as if the Khan was his own son? He said, they sat up all night discussing the question, and that the point was decided that the Khan should retrace his steps, as the sepoys in the bazar said pub-
licly, that they had orders to seize the Talan as soon as the Colonel brought him to Khelat. This was the substance of Rheimdad’s de-

Now that he saw I was sincere, that I had adopted the or-

phan son of his Dastane (Master), that I had shielded him against all enem-

ies, and eventually placed him on the throne of his father, he felt he deserved I ought to imprison him; and when once I had placed 

Meer Mohomed Naseer Khan on the guddie of the Ahmadies, he would join with all Brahooees and Beloochees in praying God to hes-

bow every possible blessing on me.

I adverted to my soon leaving the Brahooee camp, and said that in four months I should join my regiment, and was therefor anxious to place men in power about my adopted son, who would be devoted to his interests. I allowed the ex-Naib to know that I was fully reconciled with his having kept back the revenue in the time of Meer Mehr Khan, but I added that I still believed him true to the 

Khan, and that if he wrote a solemn oath in the state Koran, to serve his master honestly, I would add my forgiveness to that of the 

Khan. Lastly, I mentioned that I had recommended Major Outram, by way of testing his devotion to his master, to send him to Kwatta un-
der the Political Agent at that place, and that my promotion beyond that must depend on himself. He was much pleased and made as abundant promises as Brahooees ever do on such occasions.

Every thing being satisfactorily arranged even to the chapter and verse of the Koran, on which Rheimdad was to write his oath, I sent orders to him to attend at my tent at 4 P. M. on the 15th. The 
guard was removed when my letter was sent to him. It was settled 

that I should precede him to the Khan’s tent, where only a few of the Sirdars and Officers should be sent for; and before them the ex-
Naib, after expressing his regret for the past, was to be pardoned.

This was done. Rheimdad wrote the oath with his own hand and every thing was so quietly conducted, that when the event transepted, the 

Khan’s people were quite astonished. Biiahomed Hnssein, the Wu-

zeer, returned at 9 p. M. three days before his time; he must have re-
ceived notice from some of his friends in camp of Rheimdad’s visit to 

Khan. He had ridden from Baugh, a distance of thirty-six miles, a good ride for a portly man like the Wuzer. I was sitting with 

the Khan when he came to the tent. After a little conversation on 

trifles, the release of Rheimdad was spoken of; the Khan knew full
well how disgusted the Wazir would be at this measure, but pre-
ceeding to be ignorant of it, he observed to the minister; "Ah! that 
must have made you happy; you wished it. Having failed to inter-
est the Colonel and me in his release, you persuaded Captain Knyvett 
to write to the Colonel on the subject; your wishes are now com-
plete." Before Mahomed Hussein came to the Khan’s tent, he sent 
a man to Rheimdad to offer his congratulations!
On the 19th November, the Political Agent received the visit of 
Rheimdad. In the evening he was called to the tent of the Politici-
cal Agent, when Major Outram made known to him his inten-
tion of sending him to Ketta to act under the Assistant Political 
Agent, and told him that his advancement would depend on his con-
duct. Major Sotheby’s detachment being about to march the next 
morning for Kwtta, Rheimdad was ordered to take forty horsemen 
and accompany the Major’s party through the Bolan to Shawk-kote. 
This was done and the detachment passed through without molesta-
tion.
On the 25th November, letters were prepared both from his High-
ness and from me to Meer Robuch inviting him to meet us at Lehree. 
He was promised safe conduct to come and to go, and received every 
assurance that he should have a fair hearing and be treated with every 
respect. On the 29th, Sahibzadah Ramatoolah and Meer Burkodar, 
brother of Meer Gufrace Khan, Futteh Khan, the son of Meer Amii 
Khan of Sungan, and Meer Esh Khan, chief of Mundye, with several 
others of less repute, came into camp. Refreshments were forwarded, 
and a respectable agent sent to make the usual enquiries.
On the 1st December, Meer Mahomed Khan of Lehree, arrived in 
camp with three servants of Dost Allie Khan, the brother of Meer Doda 
and uncle of the present Doda Murree chief, Meer Demi Mahomed. 
Much of the next day was spent in my tent with Meer Burkodar, 
Panayee Khanur, and Sahibzadah Ramatoolah. At the close of this 
visit it was settled that they should go to Lieutenant Hammersley, 
Assistant Political Agent at Kettta, on a bond of security signed by 
Major Outram and myself. This was prepared and given, and Major 
Outram wrote also to the Assistant Political Agent, desiring him to 
show kindness to Sahibzadah Ramatoolah, whose lands had been seiz-
ed on some charge of his ryots having assisted the Kaukurs. The 
3rd December was fixed for the hearing of the Murrees. Never were
there such obstinate men; they had been censured by Dost Allee or Meer Deen Mohamed with every notion of our bad faith and with accusations of other acts committed by us, which though I disproved, had, I found, been very plausibly put together. Bijar's seizure was ever foremost among these charges of bad faith, and I honestly confess, that I consider the charge substantiated against us. But the charge of Captain Postans's having shaved his beard, according to Brahooee custom, and given it to Syud Asmeer Shah in expiation of a breach of faith which he could not prevent, was easily disposed of by questioning the Syud himself, when it was found to be a deliberate falsehood. Captain Postans had shaved his beard just about this time, and our enemies having noticed it, spread all over the country the report that according to Brahooee usages, he had been forced to give his beard to Syud Asmeer Shah for the breach of his oath; namely, for his having sent Syud Asmeer Shah with an invitation to Bijar Khan to come and visit him, and then having made the letter over to the public authorities, who secured him, threw him into prison, and sold all his horses, camels and equipments by public auction. It was hours before I could completely satisfy these people, that the same sincerity which I had shown in the Khan's cause, should be observed towards them. I demolished all their arguments of our false dealings, except the seizure of Bijar Khan, and the attack on the Khan at Kootroo, and persuaded them to join with Meer Mahomed Khan Lehree in advising Dost Allee to waive the resolution the Murrees had come to, never to have dealings with a Feringhee, and never even to see one; and I finished by leaving their minds free from further objections to an interview with his Highness the Khan and myself. I owe much of the success of this protracted Durbar to the ability with which the young Khan handled every objection they offered. Not only those friendly to the young Khan's claims, but Brahooees and Beloochees have a very strong reliance on anything I promised, so that whenever those Murrees raised an objection, they always met some one ready to bear witness to the truthfulness which had ever marked my transactions. It gave me great weight in my dealings with strangers, that the young Khan ever paid me, both in public and in private, all the deference which a son observes towards a father among the Brahooees; and that the Chiefs approved this conduct may be inferred by their joining my name to that of his Highness on
the day of the Installation. Major Orme received these savages in the evening; he encouraged them to place reliance in whatever I had said, and told them he had heard from others that they had been unfairly dealt with; that he was ever ready to listen to any complaint and to give redress, and that they should place all confidence in the Colonel Sahib. Matters having been agreeably settled with them, they were feasted at high, and the next morning started for the tents of Dost Ali on about three stages in the hills East of Lehree.

On the 6th December the whole party which arrived on the 20th ultimo, took their departure. They were much pleased with their treatment, and a week’s intercourse with our camps appeared to have deprived them of much of their inveteracy against the English; so that when they did leave our camp, I considered that much had been gained by this week of civility and attention.

Every thing having been settled touching the Bolan pass, the restoration of Cutchee to the Khan, and all matters in the vicinity of Duhar, he resolved to march to Baugh to receive his accounts from the Nahi of Cutchee and then to visit Lehree, at which place it was arranged the Murree deputation should be received. We marched to Nowsherah on the 7th December about seven miles. The next day we proceeded fifteen miles to Mehesur towards Baugh, to which place we were to return after completing treaties with the Murrees, Booghtees, Doomkees, Jacksonees, &c., the tribes on the eastern range. The communication with the Murrees was both the most difficult and of the greatest consequence. Our faith, to say the least of it, had been placed in a questionable shape with this tribe; with their neighbours, the Doomkees, it was certainly broken. The strong hold of the Murrees had been invaded by an English force, and the Murrees having taken it back, cared very little about any terms with us; indeed the whole of Cutchee looked upon us as a faithless race. The overtures made to these people by our Politicals had been rejected throughout, and they had latterly refused even to receive letters, to see any European, or, in short, to have any thing to do with us. It was late before we reached our tents. The Khan had been out deer stalking, and we went to examine a hunting lodge given by his Highness to the Company for a staging bungalow, to save the expense of their building one at Mehesur. About 8 r., letters
were received from Dadur saying that matters had taken a brighter turn at Cabool.

Four thieves who had eluded the Dadur authorities for months were brought in this evening by a party of the Khan's horse; two of them were Murrees, the other two Jackranees. Their trial was very simple, and their punishment and dismissal from the camp to their own country as summary. They were heard, convicted, sentenced, and punished with the loss of the right hand to the wrist, and dismissed within the hour.

Letters were also this evening received from Meer Ajad Khan of Karum, the future father-in-law of the young Khan, soliciting permission to punish some tribes in the vicinity of Xal, who had made a cheepoo on some of his people. Letters were also received from Meer Taj Mahomed, the standard bearer of the Jellawuns, and from his mother, the beautiful widow of Reshid Khan, proposing to join us at Baugh. A desert from Kherat, with letters from Darugh. Goel Mahomed, Beebee Gaujan, Beebee Mahgunge, and a letter of repentance and promise of amendment from Prince Azim Khan, also reached us. The Darugh nodded most favourably on every thing relating to the Khanate. Beebee Gaujan made known her intention of joining the Khan, and thence proceeding on a pilgrimage to some holy spot near Larkana called Mitten, to make futteah on the decease of Meer Azad Khan, standard bearer of the Surrawuns, her relation and friend. Every body knew that intrigue brought her in such haste from Khelat; but she will be disappointed; she is in correspondence with Meer Shah Nawaz Khan.

We reached Baugh on the 9th, fifteen miles. To our great astonishment we found tents pitched for Meer Azim Khan and Beebee Gaujan. They arrived about 3 p.m. An hour after, I was sitting with the Khan; the Wuzeeer and the Court were talking on business, when the Meer rode up to the tent, quite drunk. It appeared that the usual supply of provisions had not reached his tent so quickly as, in his cups, he considered they should have done. After very short compliments he turned to the Wuzeeer, reminded him that he was the brother of Mehrab, an Ahmedzye, and not a dog. I said to the Khan, the Meer is come to speak to you on business; and I endeavoured to rise. The Khan unobserved took hold of my dress, intimating his wish I should remain. The Wuzeeer appealed to the Khan and myself if he had
not given the requisite orders the moment it was known that the Meer was expected. The Khan and I replied in the affirmative. I remarked to the Meer that I had received his letter, and was happy to read it; it his resolve to forsake liquor. He looked at me for an instant, and then burst out laughing, making many excuses and quoting from Hafiz till we were tired, and till he began to be unconscious from the effects of the liquor he had taken. I took an opportunity of leaving the tent. I was afterwards told that he spoke very improperly to the Khan, who replied, that he regretted to see the brother of the Shaheed (sacrificed) chief of the Ahmedzyes, his own relative, keeping company with liquor drinkers and bhang smokers, and lowering himself before the Brahooee and Beloochee. The Meer struck his tent, which had been pitched near us, and went about a mile higher up the nullah, on the banks of which our camp had been placed.

The Wuzeer reminded me, that not only had the Khan's mother, but that the Brahooees and Beloochees had given the Khan to me as a son, that he now came to ask me, what should be done with the Meer. We knew all well what had brought the Meer and Beebee Ganjan down through the snow from Khelat. The Beebee Ganjan lives on intrigue. In the time of Meer Mehrab Khan, this woman's advice was taken on all subjects and on all occasions, and cruelly did she abuse the power she held over her infatuated, ill-advised and unfortunate husband. She joined with the Moostoong Naib, Syud Amed Shah, in spreading reports, and used every means to prevent the Khan and Sirdars from coming in, for she clearly saw, she would lose all importance if they did. Disappointed in all her plans, her present speculation was with Meer Bahar Khan, of Zheeree, his father-in-law, a very respectable man, who, should he be sent to remonstrate with him; that the Meer should not be allowed to go with us to the frontier, but receive no order for his subsistence on the Gundrva state.
when we ascended in summer to Khelat, he should be placed under surveillance, and that the Beebee Ganjian should, in like manner, be allowed to enter the Meeree when she returned to Khelat, but never to leave it again, till carried out a corps; that the followers she had entertained should be reduced from 250 to 40, and that she should be told, that to appear in public was unbecoming the widow of a Shahed husband. I also recommended that in the course of time the concubines and the children of Meer Mehrab Khan should be taken from her charge, and their support drawn from Feringnbad, one of the richest villages of Moostung, which the Beebee Ganjian had wheedled out of Meer Mehrab Khan; that the bestowal of the daughters of the slave girl in marriage should rest with the Khan, and that the education of the Khan’s half brother should also depend upon his pleasure. I added that this arrangement would bring peace and comfort into the family by restoring to each that authority which the customs of the Brahmoos gave him; and finally, that for the present every thing should be passed over, as the time for action had not yet arrived. In my frequent private conversations with the Khan, I had submitted this plan to him; and he appreciated the advice. He was not therefore much surprised when his Wuzer reported all that had passed between us. He approved of the idea; and the drunken visit of the Prince only served to sink him still lower in the opinion of the camp.

Late at night, Syed Amire Shah and Meer Mohamed Khan Lehree and Meer Belochee Khan, with their followers and some Dada Murrees, arrived from Dost Allie in the eastern hills. They sent to report their arrival, and to request to be excused attending the Durbar till next morning; which was granted, and an order sent to the Naib to see them properly attended to. The next morning our messengers and those from Dost Allie Doda Murrees were received in Durbar. After the usual compliments, the letters were produced and presented to his Highness, to me and to the Wuzer. The letters expressed great fears of meeting us at Lehree, asked security, &c.,—with much more such stuff. After sitting some time, the party were told letters would be prepared and that in the mean time the Naib would supply all their wants.

On the 13th December we moved out. Our first halt was to have been at Churchur, which we reached about 3 p. m., but as there were
but three wells in the village, we moved on to the banks of the
unh, near it, about three miles off and fixed on a spot for the
camp. It was sunset ere our baggage arrived. A durbar was held un-
der a clump of trees; several minor chiefs attended and all were
much delighted with the young Khan, who is in every sense of the word
the idol of the people. We started again on the morning of the 14th
for Lahore. We were forced to halt, and hear what the Murrays of
this place had to say. Horse cloths were spread, and we were soon
seated. They informed the Khan that Captain French was preparing
a chappoo at Reebet. When I spoke of the impossibility of such an
act, I received the usual reply: "You would not do it, you are true,
but all your countrymen would," and then followed instances of our
several breaches of faith. Moolah Nasser Oolla asked them, if they
had heard any thing worse, they replied they had not; they then gently
remonstrated with them, reminded them that I had conducted every
thing I undertook with fidelity and success, and advised them to
rely on me. The young Khan also added his remonstrance, and we
rose to proceed on our journey. At this time one Kallundar, a Mur-
ree, who had attended the three different visits, and was by far the most
obstinate of all, came up to me and took hold of my dress, saying after
their custom, Swear the truth. I did not hesitate, but gave him my
hand, and swore to the sincerity of my intentions, and they were sat-
sfied. Their suspicions have been aroused by the intention of Cap-
tain French to join me, that he might be initiated into my mode of
managing business with this people, and be enabled to investigate
some cases in which he was concerned as Political Agent at Reebet.
He also wished for information respecting the sources of the Kujjuk ri-
ver and the right to the plains of Mool. But the proposed visit was
very inconsiderate; and unless I had stood very high with all the tribes,
would undoubtedly have been the means of breaking off the Murree
negotiations. We reached our ground about 1 P.M., when Syed
Ameer Shah with Meer Mahomed Khan Lehree and Meer Bhaloochee
Khan and the Murrays took their leave.

On the 16th December, about sunrise, Dost Allie and the Murrays
arrived, and drew up under some trees about two hundred yards from
our encampment. I was walking near my tent when they arrived.
Meer Mahomed Khan Lehree came with the compliments of Dost
Allie to announce his arrival. I sent Idiu back with Moolah Nasser
Oollah who invited them to repair to my tent, till the Khan should be ready. But the Murrees voted against Dost Allie's going, although he himself insisted on it, and Kallunder also declared that they were safe with the "Brahooee Colonel," one of the names I was known by. Dost Allie returned with Mooliah Nasseer Oollah, attended by Kallunder, and two others; the rest said they would remain where they were. After they had been seated and compliments had been exchanged, tea was brought. Dost Allie would not take any, and begged I would send to the Khan to receive him, and give him a speedy dismissal. Mooliah Nasseer Oollah said that every thing would be prepared for them, and that if they would not remain with us, they were of course at liberty to go. Dost Allie assured me he was willing to stay, but the Murrees would not hear of it, as they were certain that Captain French was preparing a chappoo, one of their people having witnessed the preparations. This was nothing more than a few things equal to three day's wants which Captain French had ordered to be got ready for himself and a friend.

I told Dost Allie that when Kallunder first knew me, no one was more hostile to me, but that being frequently in our camp and constantly in my tent, we had become friends, and that with his permission I would send Kallunder to speak with his brethren. Dost Allie replied, "not a Murree will take the bridle out of his horse's mouth." More than an hour was thus spent in persuasion Dost Allie that they had nothing to fear, and that they might remain a day with perfect safety. He evidently became more at ease when he saw the Brahooees so partial to me and heard every one extol the "truth speaking man." After considerable difficulty, Dost Allie agreed to return to his followers, and to persuade them to remain till evening or even to the next morning. I sent Nasseer Oollah with him; they determined to see the Khan before they gave me an answer. The Durbar was to be held at 10 a.m. At that hour the Shah Gassee, with several of the personal attendants of the Khan, went to conduct Dost Allie to the Durbar tent, and so it was so near, they went on foot.

Dost Allie arrived and made his prostrations to the Khan, as his Dunseel (Master), kissing his hands. The Khan motioned him to be seated near him. Dost Allie then called about half a dozen of the most respectable men by name, one after the other, and they were allowed to kiss the Khan's hands. The rest stood in front offering their
...and subsequently seated themselves. Never was there such
summit in a Durbar tent before; Dost Ali seemed to have little con-
trol over them. On his entrance, he betrayed considerable astonish-
ment to see me seated on the same carpet with the young Khan; a
place allowed to no one but the nearest relation. Business now con-

The Khan told them to be patient, and said he would relate all that
had happened, after which he would inform them of his future in-
tentions. He then gave an admirable detail of past occurrences; on
my account, he spoke with the greatest delicacy of the death of his
father, and of the assumption of his country by the English. He said
he had been unfortunate in not gaining the friendship of either Cap-
tain Bean or Lieutenant Loveday, but that God had sent him a second
father in the Colonel Sahib. Turning to me he again repeated it, place-
ing his hand on my arm, "this is my father, this is the friend who,
though I often did wrong, never forsook me. He is come with me; that
as the English and I are one, so may the Murrees be united
with me. Friendship shall reign over all the country." He assured
the Murrees that they might rely on it that every thing I promised
would be agreed to, as I had authority to conclude my arrange-
ment with them on the part of the English. I have seldom met a
man who won so much upon an audience as the young Khan. His
command of language was surprising; his ready comprehension, his
apt reply, his graceful figure, and his perfect Brahmoos beauty, com-
manded respect; but above all, he was "the Adenzye" and this seem-
ed to conquer all opposition.

When the Khan had finished, Dost Ali spoke, but said very little
in the way of objection. Soon after the Khan proposed a private
consultation and the Durbar broke up; I remained only a short
time. I had settled the terms of the treaty with the young Khan,
and therefore left Nasser Oollah on my part, knowing it would be
more palatable to the Murrees chief. The treaty was not long in
agitation. The Murrees were to renew their faith and allegiance to
the Khan and his friends, the English. One of the sons of the Chief,
or the nephew, was always to be in attendance on the Khan, when he
came down to Cutchee, with fourteen horsemen and for their support
a village was to be given them near Gunderv. As it was necessary
to tell the Murees what had been agreed upon, the hour of entering the treaty in the Koran was fixed for the next morning. On the 17th December, the Chiefs assembled early in Durbar, but there was very little discussion; as the Murees were very well satisfied. The treaty was read and approved by all, and it was then copied into the Koran by Moolah Mohamed Hussein. The Moolah handed it to the Khan who read and approved it, and gave it to Dost Allie, who was equally well satisfied. Moolah Mohamed Hussein then read it aloud to those assembled; and a general expression of approbation was given. The Murees were in great haste to be off, and the killaats were therefore called for and distributed. In about an hour Dost Allie and his suite came to my tent to take leave of me; they seemed much pleased, promised a thousand things, and spoke of the kind manner in which they had been received and treated. Before Dost Allie took leave of the Khan, it was settled that his son should immediately attend on him with the escort; they were to join him at Gundam.

On the 19th December, Bijar Khan called to interest me on behalf of two men confined at Bugh on the charge of murder. I referred the old man to the Khan. At 12 o'clock the warrant for the execution of Moorad for attempting the life of Lieut. Jenkins was sent to Dadur, as well as a very excellent letter from the young Khan to Major Outram, requesting that such offenders might be tried without delay, and, if found guilty, executed on the spot, without waiting a reference to his Highness. At 1 o'clock Captain French and Lieut. Forbes arrived; the latter very unwell. The next day letters were received from Kooshky, where all were happy under the new arrangement.

On the 20th December the right of his Highness the Khan to the country of Mull (Kore Zemeen) was finally settled, and Captain French made his report accordingly. It was subsequently confirmed.

A Moonshine from Major Outram's camp sent Moolah Mohamed Hussein the Lorena Native Newspaper containing an account of the situation of the English in Afghanistan, which was not very favourable to our interests. On the 22d December we heard of the withdrawal of our force from Killa Abdollah, but nothing appeared to shake the confidence of the young Khan, who always concluded by saying, "as long as you remain with me, I have no fear." He had
seven times said, if we are to fight the Afghans, I must get a Ca-
valry Regiment, and you and I will charge at their head and kill hun-
dreds. The lad’s eyes glistened with enthusiasm as he spoke of a
fight with the Afghans. The Political Agent having requested me
to ascertain what quantity of wheat could be collected, I sent word
on the 23rd December that a Kafila of seventy-two camels with very
superior wheat, was for sale close to us. The Khan also sent the
Political Agent an order for as much as he liked to take from
the stores in Khelat.

The letters received on Christmas-day announced the arrival of
the Killa Abdool’s force at Kwetta, in charge of Lieutenant Bosan-
quet (alma, his heliograph horseman). I sat down to dinner happy
even in my solitude and reflected with satisfaction on what I had
been able to accomplish. I had already re-established the character
of my country for honesty in all transactions; I was successfully
settling the country of the young Khan, and in the present clouded
state of affairs, I felt that my influence in this camp might benefit the
cause of my country. The next evening flattering letters were re-
ceived from Meer Deen Mahomed Sirdar, of the Doda Turrees. He
was grateful for the kindness and consideration shown to his uncle Dost
Ali and his followers, and expressed himself much pleased with the
terms, and notified his sincere acceptance of them. On the 28th, a
large kafila of wheat was sent off for the force at Dadur.

A detachment was also sent up through the Bolan pass under
Captain Woodburn. Great fears were entertained lest it should be
attacked, as I had moved off. I wrote in reply that there was no fear,
and as it proved, for not a shot was fired, nor was any molestation
offered. The Kaukurs would ever have remained staunch friends, had
they been treated with sincerity and justice.

On the 29th December, the son and nephew of Meer Belruck
visited and paid me a visit. My first impressions were much in
their favour. They were both fine large personable men, plainly but
neatly dressed, without any of that disgusting suspicion which mark-
et every chief of the Eastern ranges; and their manner was supe-
rior. The Khan desired to receive them in the evening to save time.
It is not customary to pay the first visit on the day of arrival, but
we had been much delayed, and his Highness’s presence was much re-
quired in Cutchee. I walked over with them to the Khan’s, who gave

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them a hearty welcome, and accepted the apology for Behruj's absence,—his age—which they made out to be seventy-two years. At this meeting I witnessed a ceremony which I had never seen before. After the tedious Beloochee customs on being seated, had been duly performed, Sooliman, the eldest son of Neer Behruj, stood up, and taking a bag of Rupees from his waistband, walked up to the Khan and said, "It has pleased God to restore the dhmedzye to his throne; we are all grateful for this blessing; we have no other Master; you have come amongst us and your presence here has given peace to the whole country." All present joined in invoking a blessing, during which Sooliman passed the bag of Rupees three times round the Khan's head, and then threw it to the attendants, to be distributed to the poor for prayers for the Khan's constant welfare. The next day Sooliman Khan and Islam Khan Boogtee signed their allegiance in the Koran, and afterwards received a kickut and permission to return home. On paying his farewell visit, he was presented with 200 Rupees for his expenses on the road.

Having completed the treaties with the senior tribes and received the written pledges of allegiance from the minor ones, we marched from Leleree on the morning of the 1st of January, and encamped on the banks of a canal about four miles from Charchar. The next day we arrived late at Baugh, a distance of twenty-six miles, and found two Companies of Bombay Infantry there, under Captain Farquhar and Lieutenant Johnston. I received a very long letter from Darogah Gool Xaliomed saying that he had not the shadow of suspicion now left; that he was fully convinced, that when God willed the death of Meer Mehrab Khan, he sent me to be a father to the young Khan. He reported very favourably of the state of the country.

On the afternoon of the 5th January, letters were received from Sirdar Meer Faqeer Mahomed from Kedge, and from Sirdar Meer Anad Khan Bokshume from Pungpooj, reporting that Kolun-dil Khan, with an army of 23,000 Afghans, was advancing in their direction, with the avowed intention of attacking the Khanate of Kharat. These letters were no sooner read than the Wuzeer said, these two Sirdars have not paid their revenue for three years, and they write this to discourage his Highness from proceeding against them. The Khan directed a letter to be written in reply, saying that they were to retreat in good order on the near approach of Meer Kolun-
dil Khan, and bring with them the three years’ revenue due to the state. Private letters mentioned that Beebee Ganjan had invited the Meer and his family into the Murree; that the Meer had accepted the invitation, and was safely lodged there. It was scarcely a month since Beebee Ganjan had joined in a very serious complaint of the Meer’s having become intoxicated and used very improper language to her; but now he is necessary to carry into effect her infamous views on the Khanum. She takes now of presenting a petition against the Khan and myself, and says that if Major Outram will not give her relief, she will go to Calcutta to the Lord Sahib. It is to be hoped the Khan will give this intriguing woman quiet quarters in the Murree, never to leave them.

Every thing having been settled at Baugh, we marched half way to Gurdwar on the 8th, and halted at a very old place, surrounded by a high wall in good preservation, called Nussoorabad. Here an express was received from Darugh God Mahomed containing letters from Fait Ahmed Beebee who sent a copy of the proclamation issued by the insurgents at Cabul, as well as a detail of the various reports brought to Shorawnk. I watched the feelings of the camp narrowly through the day, but could perceive no alteration, although the news transmitted through the horsemen who brought the express.

The young Khan came to my tent about dusk, and we had a very long conversation on the state of Cabul and the English. I explained to him that treachery might for a moment cause some loss, but that our resources were inexhaustible, that any disaster caused by treachery, would be punished a hundred fold; that we were strong at Kandahar, had a second army at Kwetta, a third at Undar, and two more on the banks of the Indus. His Highness never shewed any doubt of our ultimate superiority, nor did I see on this day or on any other, a moment’s vacillation on the part of the Brahooees. Indeed, the common remark whenever the subject was alluded to, was, “we have made terms with the English, we shall not be the first to break them.” The moment our baggage came up, I wrote a report to Major Outram, enclosing the original letters and sent off the packet by express horsemen. His Highness the Khan wrote also.

We reached Gourdaw on the 3rd of January, where we found Beebee Ganjo and the Meer, on the most friendly terms. About ten days after our arrival, I received letters from the Political Agent
desiring to know if I could not move to Dadur without giving any 
cause for suspicion. It had been previously determined by the Poli-
tical Agent that Gundurn should be the point of assembly for the 
chiefs at the signing of the treaty between the Honourable East In-
dia Company and his Highness, and as by this arrangement, we were 
likely to be detained there two months, no haste had been made in 
taking past accounts or expediting the arrangements for the present 
year. Previous to going to the Khan on the subject of moving to 
Dadur, I sent for the Minister and asked the time required to settle 
the land rents, &c. We conversed together for some hours on all 
subjects, and I was happy to find that the inauspicious news had not 
shaken the integrity of any of the tribes. On the 10th January, I 
intimated to the Khan that the Political Agent had much to do, and 
I feared he would only be able to remain a day or two, when he 
came to sign the treaty, and meet the Jam of Beilla and all the Sur-
rawun and Jellawun Sirdars.

On Saturday, the 22d January, I received letters from the Politi-
cal Agent announcing the murder of Sir William Macnaughten. I 
reflected deeply on my situation and the very serious responsibility 
now attached to my exertions. Unless I could succeed in keeping the 
Khanate of Khielat, composed of many different tribes, and divided 
into two distinct factions, true to the treaty, and unless I could 
persuade the Doda Murrees, Shogties, and all the tribes on the 
eastern frontier to abide by the arrangements made with them last 
month, it was evident all communication between the Indus and Da-
dur and Iwetta would be cut off, and with it, all hope that a sing-
le man above the passes would ever return to India. Indeed it 
might be feared that no one on the right bank of the Indus would 
escape, for Hyderabad would have let loose her swarms of Beloochees. 
Moolah Naasere Gulbah Babee had never failed me; on the contrary 
I am free to confess, that I should scarcely have succeeded in bring-
ing in the Khan, but for the sterling honesty of this man. He was in 
the habit of coming across and talking for an hour or two before I 
retired; and we always took that opportunity of discussing any sub-
ject which we did not wish to speak of before others. The Moolah 
came this evening as usual. After some trifling conversation I told 
him to put the fire in order; a habit so inerent in a Brahooee as in an 
Englishman, who wishes to stir every fire he comes to. The Moolah 

was particularly fond of this, and always took his post next to the fire
for the pleasure of regulating it. When the fire was arranged to the
old Moorish's satisfaction, he leaned back against the wall, his knees
confined by his 'lounges' passed across them, and round the waist. I
then adverted to the high character given of him by Mr. Mason,
which had led to his introduction to me; then to the success which
had crowned all his exertions, and the reward which the British
Government was preparing for him, viz. a silver snuff box with a
suitable inscription in Persian. I reminded him that I had never
concealed any thing from him; that he had always enjoyed my full
confidence and that I was now about to shew him the high sense I felt
of his integrity by intrusting him with the news brought by the last post.
I then told him that Mr. William Macnaghten had been induced to
meet the chiefs at a conference, and that they had shot him dead on
the spot.

Instead of offering any opinion himself, he asked me what I thought
should be done. I explained to him the position of the young Khan,
and said that he was recently seated on the throne, with a strong
party against him, headed by the wife and brother of the late Khan,
as well as his connections and three bastard children, with whom
Shah Newaz Khan was evidently in communication. I observed
that the Illahie Sirdar Meer Kamal Khan had given his sister in
marriage to Shah Newaz, that the Menguels were dissatisfied, and
that no great reliance could be placed in the chiefs on the eastern
boundary, and that it was evidently necessary to prevent any out-
break; for if one occurred, it would no doubt be the signal for a
general rise: because the Brahooees and Beloochees had so
enriched themselves by plunder the last two years, that it was with
difficulty the Sirdars could control them. I added, that if one
tribe failed in its allegiance and took up the cry of a religious war,
every Mussulman would join them. With this view of the case, and
knowing well that the young Khan's heart was set on a continued
union with the Honourable Company, I proposed that I should com-
municate the sad tidings to him, and be guided by the manner in
which he received them. The next difficulty was to arrange a pri-
ivate interview with the Khan without creating suspicion. Most
fortunately the Waseer and Dewan had collected the Zemindars at
a village about four miles north of Gundava, to settle the last two
years' accounts; they would be about the whole day, the Meer was always drunk, but Beebee Ganjan was ever awake. We arranged that as soon as I found the Wuzzee had taken his departure, I was to come over to the palace, when Moollah Nasser Oollah would apprise the Khan of my wish to speak to him in private. I determined to go in the first place and pay a visit to the Beebee Ganjan. It was near dawn of day before the old Moollah left me.

The next day after having paid a very long visit to the Beebee Ganjan and made myself as agreeable as possible, I passed on to the Khan's apartments. After I had been seated a short time, he remarked, "You have never been over the palace; if you wish to see, I will go with you." I understood his intent and rose up. He desired all but the Shah-ghassee and two orderlies to remain below until we returned. We passed through all the apartments in the three stories, and at last arrived on the roof. Here was one of those small buildings so frequently seen on the roof of Indian palaces, "a seat to enjoy the air." Here he desired the Shah-ghassee to remain while he and I went to the tower. He also desired the Moollah to be set up when he arrived. The poor old Moollah was fairly exhausted by climbing the miserable broken steps. The young Khan then led to the face of the steps of the tower and made me ascend first, saying "this was the seat of the martyred Khan of Khelat, my father; God has made it yours; go on; I'll follow."

Seated here beyond the hearing of all, I gave the young Khan an account of the death of our Envoy, of the treachery of the Afghans, and indeed of all that was going on; and remarked, "I shall be guided entirely by you. Whatever you advise me, I will do." I observed it would be impossible now for the Political Agent to come down to Dadur with the treaty, to meet the Jam and Sirdars; and I proposed that we should move up to Dadur, that we might hear the daily news which the dawn brought. His Highness was completely of my opinion, and Moollah Nasser Oollah voted also for a move as soon as it could be made without creating any suspicion. The Khan also saw the propriety of keeping the death of the Envoy a secret from all, and determined to give out that business prevented the Political Agent from attending the assembly of the Chiefs at
Gundava, and that he had begged the Khan to come with his chiefs and sign the treaty at Dadur. This was all managed without any suspicion, and the chiefs, who always received something from the Company in the way of subsistence when in our camp, were happy to accept the invitation.

This post of the 24th January confirmed all the evil tidings of the disasters at Calud. The Khan soon after went to say that he should be ready by the 27th. We quitted Gundava on that day, and the next morning the Khan, as usual, sent the Meer camels to transport his baggage; but just as we were ready to mount, his servants came to say their master had changed his mind, and would remain behind till our return. The Khan, although he scarcely spoke, was evidently much hurt. I begged him to mount, and promised to ride out with the Meer, when the cavalry moved off. I first sent my Moonshie hark with the camels to the Meer to say, that if they were bad, they should be changed; that if not enough, more should be sent, and that I waited at the palace until the Meer was ready, when I should have the pleasure of riding out with him. But my Moonshie returned without the Meer. I then sent Moonshie Nasser Oollah to him to expostulate on his conduct and to bring him to me. The Meer returned with the messengers; and Beebee Ganjan, who was present at the time, strongly remonstrated against his conduct. As I had left all my property at Gundava, to give confidence to the chiefs that we should soon be back, the Beebee felt no repugnance at the departure of the Court, or the Meer either. Indeed, she would rather the Meer should accompany us, as in him she had always a news-writer and spy in the Khan's camp, to keep her informed of everything that was passing. I added my regrets that the Meer should have acted so thoughtlessly. He promised to join us the next day; but the Beebee without hesitation said, "You are telling a lie, go now with the Colonel." The Meer declared he had nothing ready, but he gave me his hand over a sword, and swore to join us by the day we could arrive at Dadur. I knew he would not dare to break this oath, and taking leave of the Beebee Ganjan and the Meer, Moonshie Nasser Oollah and I mounted and rode to the camp.

On the 28th, we reached Saharan, a distance of fifteen miles; and the next day came to Sunnee. The Minister came to my tent before sunrise. I ordered the servants to withdraw, when he informed
me that three letters had been received express from the Durrah, and that the Khan had sent them to me. I pointed to the text and said, "not now, when we come to our ground," and we parted. A short time after we reached our ground, the young Khan being sick, I was not well, came to the spot where I was lying down. We sat some time in conversation, but there were people whom it would not have been prudent to order away, I therefore whispered to him that I would come over after dinner to his tent.

I went to the Khan's at I had promised, and the servants were ordered to withdraw. Then placed three Persian letters before me. The red ink signature of the Shahzadah, Saffer Jung, was conspicuous. His letter called on the Khan to join in the holy war of extermination, to expel the Christian dogs from the land of the Mohommedans &c. The other two letters were from Sirdars of the faction, with their seals affixed. After the Khan had read them, he raised his hand and said, "I have but one wish; I will be guided by you; I made a treaty with the Company; the Ahmudzye will not be the first to break it." I remarked, we should be at Dadur in two days, and if he pleased, he might wait till he had consulted with Major Outram, or if he thought the delay objectionable, he might write back, that the hour was not yet come to make war on the English; that he was surrounded by their armies, and that fire boats (our steams vessels) daily arrived with artillery and troops &c. from Bombay.

The Khan resolved on waiting till he had conversed with Major Outram, but gave me the letters requesting I would forward them by my own post. The letter of the Shahzadah, Saffer Jung, had his seal in red ink affixed to it. Of that from the chieftains, one had seven seals and the other five. I feared to lose them by the post, and therefore tied them in my turband, until I could place them in the hands of Major Outram at Dadur.

Moolali Faiz Ahmed made his appearance early on the morning of the 30th January at Nosherah, and gave me three letters from the Shahzadah, Saffer Jung, and the Sirdar, which had been sent to Shorawuk. They were to the same intent as those sent to the Khan. Faiz Ahmed told me the people of Shorawuk were never steady to their engagements and that he had no doubt they would speedily join the insurgents. But his account of the state of every thing at Khelat was very satisfactory, and I told him he had acted in such a
to give me great satisfaction, and that I should not fail to mention his conduct to the Political Agent, who I felt assured would be much pleased with him. He was at his house in Shorn-

walk when these letters were brought, and left it as soon after as he could do so without creating suspicion. It should be remembered that he was one of the men so strongly recommended to me by Mr. Mas-

son, and who behaved so well to Lieutenant Loveday.

We arrived at Dadur about 11 a.m. on the 31st January under a salute of twenty-one guns. Ceremony was dispensed with, and the young Khan paid the Political Agent a visit in the afternoon, from whom he received a hearty welcome; indeed his Highness was a gen-
eral favourite with every one in camp. The next day Major Outram returned his visit; and in the afternoon Major General England also visited him. On the 4th of February, replies were sent to the letters of the Shahzadah, Suftur Jung, and the insurgents; their purport corres-
pended with the advice I had previously given the Khan on the 29th ultimo. At Suseen, the Khan visited the Major General and was re-
cieved by a guard of honour. After the usual compliments had passed, and several Officers had been introduced, the band struck up. His Highness is very fond of music and appreciated the kind manner in which he had been received. Two of his chiefs, Sirdar Meer Kamal Khan and Sirdar Meer Esh Khan were in attendance; the former a great sportsman, the latter a great lover of tea, which he drank in every house he called at; as he spoke a little Hindustanee he was made welcome wherever he went. The visit was in every respect agree-
able.

The next day came off a shooting match for a handsome knife given by Major Outram. It was won by the young Khan, though Sirdar Meer Kamal Khan was opposed to him. On the 7th, the shooting was renewed for three prizes; Sirdar Meer Kamal Khan won the first, and the Khan the second; the third was shot for by the hunts-
men of the several chiefs, and won by the servant of Sirdar Meer Esh Khan.

On the evening of the 7th I acquainted the Khan, that informa-
tion which could be relied upon had been received of the assassination of Sir William McNaghten by the Afghans at Cabul. I had con-
municate it to his Highness on the 5th instant, that it was reported Sir William had been killed, but that the matter was still doubtful. After I had explained how he had met his death, the young Khan observed, “no good would come of such a deed.” There appears to be a certain feeling of hatred between the Afghan and Brahooee, and the Khan could therefore speak without reserve.

Nothing of any consequence occurred between the 7th and the 24th of February. These days were passed in amusement. Hunting and shooting parties, and ball shooting matches entirely absorbed the attention of the Khan and his Court. But I did not waste a thought on Cabul affairs. Once indeed, the Khan came to me and enquired with much anxiety whether Captain Pontardent was coming to succeed me, and whether I was going to leave him. I told him that I had no idea whatever of the kind; but that it was impossible to say what might happen on the morrow. On the 24th of February, I had completed an arrangement for the support of Meer Shoojahool Moolk. I stated on the part of the Khan, that Shoojahool Moolk had no real claim on the state; but this was overruled, and I was obliged to make the best bargain I could; I believe I was so fortunate as to satisfy both parties. The instrument was drawn out and sealed, and a copy left with the Khan, with Shah Newaz and with Major Outram. The next day Captain Pontardent arrived in Camp to join his appointment as Assistant Political Agent in Scinde and Beloochistan, to be stationed with the Khan at Khelat whenever I should join my Regiment.

But after Shah Newaz had put his seal to, and exchanged copies of the Khan’s arrangement for his support, he raised some objections, and the subject was again discussed with considerable warmth in my tent. Shah Newaz, a perfect gentleman. The cruelty of bringing Newaz Khan with Shah Shoojahool Moolk can scarcely be too much regretted, though it was done by the conduct of our public functionaries. He certainly had a claim to support when he was turned out of Khelat, but it should not have exceeded that which would have been given to one of the nobles of the Brahooee camp; it should have been proportioned to the poverty and dependence from which he was unexpectedly taken, and which would have put it out of his power either to assume the airs of a prince, or to tamper with the servants of the

Kutkut officials. Common sense dictated that he should have been sent to the left bank of the Indus, but every thing appears to have been done to keep up the ill blood between the parties, and accordingly Shah Newaz Khan, when driven from Khelat, was placed in the con-

fuses of the territory of his Highness the Khan, and was soon engaged in a correspondence with the Beebee Gunja and Sirdar Meer Kamal Khan in a treacherous combination, having for its object his return to the governorship of Khelat.

On the 28th February, the misunderstandings between his Highness the Khan and Newaz Khan were finally exchanged. Sirdar Meer Kamal Khan took leave of the Khan on the evening of the 26th March, previous to returning to his own house, his Highness went him four hundred Rupees, which the Sirdar sent back. If in the time of Meer Mehrb Khan, that sovereign had sent Meer Kamal Khan fifty Rupees and tie Sirdar had sent it back, it would have cost him his head, but the young Khan was not sufficiently strong on his throne to adopt decisive measures, and the times were too ticklish for me to advise severity. I therefore sent for the Sirdar and remonstrated with him on his conduct to his relative and sovereign. He made many excuses, but the

principal was, that the minister and his brother in Baugh, the Nub principal was, that the minister and his brother in Baugh, the Nub

learned that he was plundering the country, collecting loads for themselves, whilst I was borrowing money for the Khan; and that while the Sirdars were in rags, these Khonmads (house born slaves) were dressed in kurta. There was a great deal of truth in these remarks, but I told him, a house was not built in a day, and that in due time I would make enquiry into the malpractices of the Nub Maho-

med Ammer, but that this furnished no reason why he, who was the right hand man of the Khan in the Durbar, should so misbehave himself. I wished him to set an example to the Brahooees and Beloochistes of the Khans. He was satisfied and promised to accept the money and ve parted. In fact, the lavish expenditure of the English and the

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Jwetta of ticids. Common sense dictated that he should have been sent to the left bank of the Indus, but every thing appears to have been done to keep up the ill blood between the parties, and accordingly Shuch Nawaz Khan, when driven from Khelat, was placed on the confines of the territory of his Highness the Khan, and was soon engaged in a correspondence with the Beebee Gujjah and Sirdar Meer Kamal Khan in a treacherous combination, having for its object his return to the guddee of Khelat.

On the 28th February, the aomm blanks between his Highness the Khan and Nawaz Khan were finally exchanged. Sirdar Meer Kamal Khan took leave of the Khan on the evening of the 28th March; previous to returning to his home, his Highness sent him four hundred Rupees, which the Sirdar sent back. If in the time of Meer Muhammad Khan, that sovereign had sent Meer Kamal Khan fifty Rupees and the Sirdar had sent it back, it would have cost him his life, but the young Khan was not sufficiently strong on his throne to adopt decisive measures, and the times were too ticklish for me to advise severity. I therefore sent for the Sirdar and remonstrated with him on his conduct to his relative and sovereign. He made many excuses, but the principal was, that the minister and his brother at Baugh, the Naib Mahomed Ameer, were plundering the country, collecting lacks for themselves, whilst I was borrowing money for the Khan; and that while the Sirdars were in rags, these Khanzads (house born slaves) were dressed in khinkab. There was a great deal of truth in these remarks, but I told him, a house was not built in a day, and that in due time I would make inquiry into the malpractices of the Naib Mahomed Ameer, but that this furnished no reason why he, who was the right hand man of the Khan in the Durbar, should so misbehave himself. I wished him to set an example to the Brahooees and Beloochees of the Khanate. He was satisfied and promised to accept the money, and we parted. In fact, the lavish expenditure of the English and the amazing quantity of plunder made by all the lower classes has broken the bonds between them and their masters. The chiefs have frequently told me that their power over their vassals was gone.

General England had now resolved to move up the pass as far as Kwaita, and, if possible, towards Kandahar. General Nott having refused to evacuate that city. Captain Pontardent had arrived. I stood pledged to the Khan, i.e. the Government stood pledged that
I should remain with him, until my Regiment passed Kratta, Daulat or Raugh on its way to the provinces. The difficulty was, therefore, how to manage my accompanying General England without adding one more instance of bad faith to a list already too long. It was finally arranged that the Khan should be invited over to Major Gurnam's tent the following day, that my position should be explained to him, and a promise given that on the return of the troops I should rejoin his Highness at Khelat, or wherever he should be and remain a month or two with him.

The arrangement was accordingly completed on the 5th March. The Khan felt my intended departure keenly, but behaved with great consideration, when it was explained that now everything being settled, and an opportunity having offered for me to join my Regiment, I should not only lose the estimation of friends and companions, if I remained with him, but the honour of commanding my Regiment in battle. He gave his reluctant consent, and after a little reflection said, 'remember it is the agreement that you return to me at Khelat,'—which was guaranteed on the spot.

As the General was to move with his detachment on the 7th, the previous day was spent in completing whatever remained to be done before my departure. Two hundred Rupees were expended for a dinner in the Brahooee camp. The installation khiluts, which had been delayed in order that they might be presented at the assembly of all the chiefs at Gundava, were now presented to as many as were in camp. As I was to leave on the morrow, the greater part of the night was spent in explaining and discussing the safe keeping of the Bolan, the fidelity of the Khan and his Sirdars, the intrigues of the Beebee Gapijan and the Meer, of Meer Khush Khan and Shah Newar Khan, the extent to which Erench might be trusted, the character of Darogah Goor Mshomed, the treaties with the Marrunis, Googrihats, &c. The khiluts which had been ordered for Meer Esaah Khan, Dewan Hamoo, Moodiah Nuseer Gollah and Moodiah Moohomed Moombaba were not to have been given till a snuff box for the Sirdar and the Moodiah, and a silver goorgooree for the Dewan arrived from Calcutta; but in consequence of my sudden departure, they were presented on the morning of the 7th March. These khiluts had been ordered by Government as a mark of their approbation of the integrity which had marked all their dealings with me from first to last.
At 12 o'clock I made over charge of the office to Captain Pontar-
dent. The next morning at day light I went over to the young Khan
and sat with him till it was time to breakfast. I also explained to
his household the kindness of the Khan in giving me permission to
go, as well as the promise he had exacted of my return, and I exhort-
ed them to be ever true to their young Master. I paid him another
visit in the afternoon, and was permitted to present longies, turbands,
&c. I remained with him till four p. m., and then begged to wish him
good-by. He insisted on seeing me to my camel, and I allowed him
to attend me to a stream which divided the two camps and then took
leave. I had now to encounter the adieux of the Brahooees and Be-
noochees assembled at my tent. The parting from my native friends
was so painful as it was gratifying. I left camp late and did not
reach Kundyle till after dark.
Having thus quitted my post with the young Khan, I joined General England’s camp, and accompanied his detachment, "on special duty;" but I was directed in my written instructions not to interfere with the district of Shal. We were two days halted at Sir-i-Bolan by a high wind which blew incessantly; but with this exception we passed through the Bolan without the slightest molestation or inconvenience.

At that place, we received letters from Lieutenant Hammersley. On the strength of the interview of Burkodar Khan Panjye Kaukur, at the camp of Dadur in November last, his brother Meer Pokar Khan had been induced to visit the Assistant Political Agent at Kwetta. By the horsemen who brought these letters I was informed that Lieutenant Hammersley had placed Pokar Khan in confinement and that the chief had made his escape and fled to the hills. We therefore took the precaution of crowning the heights the following day, but no enemy appeared.

The Nahi Rahmad rode out to meet us and expressed the greatest gratitude to me for the restoration of the Khan, his Master, and of his slaves, meaning himself. On the 18th, Meer Shader Khan arrived from Montanaq with certain camel contractors, who had induced him to accompany them, to seek redress. On enquiry, I found that these men had contracted that a very large number of camels, six hundred in number, should be ready at such a spot on such a day; but they were two days after their time. The contract had almost been forced on them; it was made in the month of September at a time when all camels are driven down to Scinde to
avoid the cold, and to leave a part of the country where there is no grazing; for this they had been fined 1600 Rupees. It was very evident that by the letter of the law the contractors were punishable, but to deduct such a sum from a parcel of savages, and that at a moment when we so much required their services, was decidedly bad policy, and, as may have been expected, they would not allow a camel to come to our camp. When explained in this light, the money was paid.

Mohamed Suleeq being in the Pesheen valley, prevented any camels from being brought to us from that part of the country. On the 21st, Syud Rauth called and assured me that Meer Nasseer Oallah Khan was much disgusted with Mohamed Suleeq and his people, and that several of the chiefs were most anxious to separate from him, but he had so many soldiers, that this could not be accomplished; but that as soon as our victorious army entered the Pesheen valley, they would come over to us the first opportunity. As General England had now resolved to move forward, I both wrote to him and called on him to say that unless Naib Rheimdad was allowed to accompany us as far as the foot of the Kaljih, we should never obtain any atom of intelligence; that as I had no authority in the Shawl district, I could only inform the General that there was not another man who could give him any information whatever. The Assistant Political Agent prevented this man's accompanying General England. I then wrote to the General to say that it was necessary he should take guides from Shawl, as he must expect not only to find every village deserted, but to meet the enemy at Hykulzye. The next day I made a last effort to persuade the General to take Rheimdad, but it failed.

Orders were issued on the morning of the 23rd for the march of a detachment under General England. On the morrow, at 9 a.m., with much difficulty I persuaded Lieutenant Hammersley to allow Rheimdad to accompany me to Koochlak, to return from thence to Kwetta. Not a soul in the pass. During the day I received a reply from Meer Nasseer Oallah Terregaee (Hajee Khan's tribe) and sent him an immediate reply inviting him to our camp, and giving him every assurance of protection and respect. By the same opportunity I sent a letter to the Ex-Naib of Pesheen, Meer Safa-Oallah Khan Barrejyee, inviting him also to join me.

Early on the morning of the 25th I was standing outside my tent...
at Koochlak when I observed a man with an ax load of fowls go into the fort. He left his charge and came to the spot where my tents were pitched, and said, the Patans are coming, they are close ahead on the Hyderabad road; they will be here immediately. I took my telescope and examined the hills to the West, when distinctly saw horsemen; I counted twenty-three. One man on a white horse was very conspicuous. The number increased rapidly and I instantly went to the General's tent and reported the enemy's pickets on the hill above the river. The General could not believe it possible, and sent his A. D. C. Captain De Blacquiere to see. He had scarcely gone beyond the lines when he saw them with the naked eye and returned and reported accordingly. The General immediately ordered a troop of Cavalry to saddle, a detail of 20 men of Leslie's Horse, Artillery to act as dragoons, and six pounder Horse Artillery guns and the two flank Companies of H. M. 41st to be ready to follow the Cavalry. The Cavalry were ready in little time and moved towards the enemy, one or two of whom had crossed the river, and taken a look at our camp, and then returned to their comrades, who had mounted and were sitting down enjoying the scene. The flank companies and the two Horse Artillery guns soon followed. The enemy waited very quietly until our Cavalry turned to the right towards the only fordable ghat of the Lora river; they then mounted and disappeared. There was only a mile of interval between our mounted troops and the enemy, but it was miserable ground to get over, being full of ravines. We lost sight of our men in the low undulating ground as they approached the river. When the enemy mounted and retired, the General halted the guns and flank Companies. Our mounted party soon appeared again as they went at a steady pace over the hills on which the enemy had been located. At this time we observed about 100 footmen running for the Western hills. As our flank Companies had been halted, this retreat of the footmen was a most fortunate event for our mounted party. After this, we saw nothing more of our party till their return. It appears that they came upon the rear of the enemy's picket, some of whom, finding their horses were failing, drew up, faced about and charged down on our party. They fought well; five of them were sabred on the spot, but the rest escaped. On our side, we had two men wounded, two horses lost and one wounded. A kossid I had persuaded to go as far as Hyderabad, returned in the evening and said that he had seen a man having his wounds dressed, and had been told that there were two others in the village wounded. Another kossid who returned in the evening, declared that he left the letters I gave him in a bush, after showing them to Meher Nasser Oollah Khan's men; that both Meher Nasser Oollah and Meher Saif Oollah Khan were anxious to leave Mahomed Befteeg, but that their wives and families would be sacrificed if they attempted to join me at this time.

We halted at Koochlak on the 29th, but no information could be procured, nor did I ever expect it after it was settled that Nasir Ram-lundad was not to accompany the force. The following extract of a letter I wrote to General England before leaving Koota will show that I was fully aware of this before we marched; but the General placed reliance in another quarter.

Extract of a letter to Major General England,
Koota, 23rd March, 1842.

It will be necessary to take guides from this, as we must expect to find every village on the line of march deserted.

Which route do you propose to march by? I fear you will find the water at Hyderabad cut off. Hyderabad is supplied from the hills East of the hills of Nal Bazar, and the head of the water is about 8 miles from Hyderabad. There are spots where it may be had by digging from two to three feet; this I fear would not answer where you have so many horses and camels; and consequently we might have to march a second stage after an action with the enemy, which we must expect at Hyderabad.

Yours sincerely,
(Signed) L. R. Stacey.

This letter will also show that I knew perfectly well how to conduct the General to a safe place with plenty of water. After the action of the 28th, the letters of the Bombay staff officers could not testify exactly to this point; I have therefore quoted this extract to set the question at rest.

Syed Mahomed, who had promised to come to me at Hyderabad now made his appearance, but I could extract no information from him.
persuaded to go as far as Hyclalze, returned in the evening and said
that he had seen a man having his wounds dressed, and had been
told that there were two others in the village wounded. Another kos-
sid who returned in the evening, declared that he left the letters I
gave him in a trust, after showing them to Meer Nasser Oollah
Khan's man; that both Meer Nasser Oollah and Meer Saaf Oollah
Khan were anxious to leave Mahomed Sudeeq, but that their wives
and families would be sacrificed if they attempted to join me at this
time.

We halted at Koochlak on the 26th, but no information could be
procured, nor did I ever expect it after it was settled that Naul Rhee-
midal was not to accompany the force. The following extract of a
letter I wrote to General England before leaving Kwatta will show
that I was fully aware of this before we marched; but the General
placed reliance in another quarter.

Extract of a letter to Major General England,
Kwetta, 23rd March, 1842.

It will be necessary to take guides from this, as we must expect
to find every village on the line of march deserted.

Which route do you propose to march by? I fear you will find the
water at Hyclalze cut off. Hyclalze is supplied from the hills
East of the hills of Nal Bazar, and the head of the water is about 8
miles from Hyclalze. There are spots where it may be had by dig-
ging from two to three feet; this I fear would not answer where you
have so many horses and camels; and consequently we might have to
march a second stage after an action with the enemy, which we must
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the General to a safe place with plenty of water. After the action
of the 28th, the letters of the Bombay staff officers could not testi-
fy exactly to this point; I have therefore quoted this extract to set
the question at rest.

Syed Mahomed who had promised to come to me at Hyclalze now
made his appearance, but I could extract no information from him.
Before I sat down with him, I desired one or two of my servants, men of the country to pump his servants, whilst I was engaged with the master, but not a word was to be had beyond the fact that Mahomed Sudeep was at this village yesterday, and had left it about 10 o'clock; but where he had gone was not known. The day passed, and not the slightest information of the enemy could be obtained.

The 28th March was a sad day for the English. We were fully beat, but why, or how, it is not for this narrative to say.

We marched early, about six miles from camp and found the enemy capitably posted. Shortly after leaving our camp, we saw videttes on every hill to the left. I went myself to ascertain if the enemy were in force in the valley which lies behind and to the left. I had travelled this road once before when I left General Nott's force at Chummun for Kwetta in 1840. I examined the valley minutely with my glass, but only a few single men here and there, seeking for the enemy's entrenched positions, were to be seen; there were several small parties amongst the hills, all moving to their Head Quarters, when we were about a mile and half from the enemy.

The column was halted whilst the General and his staff rode forward to examine their position. Within half an hour the column was ordered to advance; on coming up to the place where the General was standing, Leslie's troop of Horse Artillery was ordered to form battery and try the men on the hills on the left which completely commanded the road. In the mean time the General took the column to the right; the Light battalion under that gallant officer, Major Apthorp of the Bombay Native Infantry, was ordered to the front.

I remained with the battery. Two guns were ordered to accompany the column. The enemy on the high hill, after standing about six or eight shrapnells, appeared resolved to storm the guns which had been left unprotected and were coming down in a dense crowd; the guns were beautifully served. Captain Leslie ordered grape to be ready; in the mean time he had two guns with round shot; the first went into the very centre of the crowd and brought down with it a heavy mass of earth; the second was fired with equal success and the whole body were in the greatest distress, making every endeavour to regain the top of the hill; in this situation several shrapnells were fired into them with great precision.

It was afterwards ascertained that the General had moved on the
smaller hill, seeing which, the force on the hill to the left attempted to join their comrades, but were prevented. As has been shown, a slight undulating ground descending to the road between these two hills concealed the column from us; the firing was smart, it was evident that the light battalion was engaged. Everything being settled on the left I went off in the direction of the firing. Crossing the first ridge I was astonished at seeing our men beaten back and rallying in disorder. I passed Major Apholcy whom they were conducting to the rear; he was sensible, and I think Assistant Surgeon Davidson was with him. I passed the light Companies where they had rallied, and walked on towards H. M. 41st, halted on the extreme right. General England and his staff were dismounted and talking in conversation not far from the place where the light Companies had rallied. I joined them; but as it was of little use to stand and lament over what could not be recalled, a retreat was sounded. I observed that the day might be retrieved, and offered to lead into the entrenched position with a hundred men properly supported. It should be observed that the men were in a fine state of courage, and anxious to go and recover the bodies of their comrades. The General remarked he had not men. I proposed that the left hill should be attacked first, as it commanded the smaller one. The enemy were certainly in strength and very bold, but our men burned with rage to see their comrades cut up before their faces. I think I pressed my offer three times, but the General felt he had too few men and too great a charge at stake.

In about a quarter of an hour, the General resolved to retreat and wait at Ketta till the arrival of the detachment of troops which was to have joined us here. I was asked for the nearest water and pointed it out in the distance. I then begged the General to remain until I should find a spot by which we could take the guns across the ravine immediately on our right. A place was soon found, and the retreat commenced. It was evening before we reached the Nia Bazar. Our reverse appeared to have affected the whole camp permanently; there was a sharp pitched which could have given greater confidence to an enemy; it was of no form or shape. H. M. 41st were huddled into the dilapidated fort of the old Bazar; the Artillery, Cavalry, and the light battalion and Native Regiments were in no order.

It rained heavily from 10 o’clock till past 11 a. m., after which it
cleared up, and the full moon shone forth. I had not gone to bed, but was standing at the door of my tent, when I saw Majors Wyllie and Davison passing from the General’s tent; other officers had been called by the General, but I had not been summoned. I addressed these officers, pointing to a string of camels, moving towards the godown, and asked if it was possible these men could have correctly understood their orders to load. There was an evident hesitation; no one seemed disposed to speak; the movement appeared to have been a secret. I am well known to these officers and can bear witness to their great merits. It was not a time for trifling; I therefore explained that though I had not been summoned, it was evident that the movement had been of a secret nature, and that the movement appeared to have been a secret. I am well known to these officers and can bear witness to their great merits. It was not a time for trifling; I therefore explained that though I had not been summoned, it was evidently resolved to retreat immediately, and that the surwans had received their orders to load. I then most earnestly begged them to return to the General and represent to him that to attempt a retreat at this hour, when the tents charged with rain, would lead to the destruction of his force; that it would begin in confusion and end in a disorganization, before we had reached the first stage, and that if the General would wait till daybreak, I would take him by a road direct to Hyderzay. After a lengthened conversation on the subject, the staff officers returned to the General and communicated the conversation which had passed between us. He adopted the advice, and the camels were ordered back, and the camp enjoyed repose till sunrise.

The next morning, the 29th, it was seven before we were ready to move off. The loss sustained was very great; and it fell in much greater proportion on the officers than on the Government. I lost my tent, servant’s tent, chair, table, &c. Our retreat the evening before was most orderly; that of this morning until we reached Hyderzay was not less so; but when it was discovered that we were not to halt there, considerable confusion ensued, and before we reached Koochak the force was in a state of confusion. At the Lora, near Hyderzay, two guns from the Horse Artillery were required to keep off the enemy. It was also necessary for me to mention, being on special duty with the detachment, that on arriving at the ground in the evening of the 29th, I pointed out the value of this position as may be gathered from Captain Boyd’s reply to me of the 17th of May, 1843, not only as giving us safety for the night, but offering every possible advantage for renewing the fight with advantage. Our supplies could be placed in the empty fort of Nin Bazar, whilst we moved out unnumbered to regain our credit.

On our arrival at Koochak on Wednesday the 30th, I found a letter awaiting me from Meer Gaffer Khan Panj-i-Ki-sor. Koochak was under Lieutenant Hammakerly, and my orders strictly forbid me to interfere in any way with any of his arrangements; I was therefore powerless. At sunset, some officers saw or thought they saw a body of men moving along the hills in front of our camp. Soon after, an orderly came out of the hills and informed the General in Hindustanee, that the Pathi had sent a舒来 and said the enemy’s army had crossed the river and were moving direct on the camp; of course we made the best of our way back. The line had been turned out but nothing could be seen by search, and great fear prevailed. The line, remaining under arms till 11 p. m., when a strong party of cavalry which had been sent to watch the country returned, saying, there was not a soul to be seen in any direction. The General went round the camp about 12 o’clock to see if all were on the alert. On his return, he consulted me as to the road, and enjoined me if the Moorsh Pass would be occupied. I had travelled both roads and with given, and therefore assured him that if the first pass should be occupied, I could take him by another road where they could offer any opposition without paying dearly for their attempt.

We marched again on the 31st, about 7½ a. m. The Koochak, or Moorsh Pass, being occupied, we passed steadily on, leaving the entrance on our left, well out of shot. To give precision to all, we not only moved very slowly, but halted from time to time, to enable the baggage to be collected on our reverse flank. In this manner we moved to the Ghaut, where a high and rugged rock rises abruptly from the river and consequently had to be crossed. The enemy had also left their first position, and were gathered in strength on a high ridge of rocks which connected the Koochak, or Moorsh Pass, with the Lora river, which abounds in quicksands. The artillery had crossed; the head of the column was crossing; a Company of Native Infantry had possession of the high rock over the river, where the enemy could not see them, and were pulling on to secure it. The enemy had been dropping shots into our baggage, some of which in hopes of arriving quicker at the ghaut, had been taken too near the
could be placed in the empty fort of Nia Bazan, whilst we moved out unencumbered to regain our credit.

On our arrival at Kooolak on Wednesday the 29th, I found a letter awaiting me from Mosse Guftor Khan Purnoo Kaukur. Kooolak was under Lieutenant Hammersley, and my orders strictly forbade me to interfere in any way with any of his arrangements; I was therefore powerless. At sunset, some officers saw or thought they saw a body of men moving along under the hills in front of our camp. Soon after, an orderly came out of breath and informed the General in Hindoostanee, that the Sahib had sent a salam and said the enemy's army had crossed the river and were moving direct on the camp; of course we made the best of our way back. The line had been turned out, but nothing could be seen by some, and a great deal by others. The line remained under arms till 11 p. m., when a strong party of cavalry which had been sent to scout the country returned, saying, there was not a soul to be seen in any direction. The General went round the camp about 12 o'clock to see if all were on the alert. On his return, he consulted me as to the road, and enquired if the Moorah Pass would probably be occupied. I had explored both roads and with guns, and therefore assured him that if the first pass should be occupied, I could take him by another road where they could not offer any opposition without paying dearly for their attempt.

We marched again on the 31st, about 7 A.M. The Kooolak, or Moorah Pass, being occupied, we passed steadily on, leaving the entrance on our left, well out of shot. To give protection to all, we not only moved very slowly, but halted from time to time, to enable the baggage to be collected on our reverse flank. In this manner we moved to the ghaut where a very high and rugged rock rises abruptly from the river and consequently had to be crowned. The enemy had also left their first position, and were gathered in strength on a high ridge of rocks which connected the Kooolak, or Moorah Pass, with the Lorra river, which abounds in quicksands. The artillery had crossed; the head of the column was crossing; a Company of Native Infantry had possession of the high rock over the river, where the enemy could not see them, and were pushing on to secure it. The enemy had been dropping shots into our baggage, some of which in hopes of arriving quicker at the ghaut, had been taken too near the
hills. The enemy appeared in such numbers that it was deemed prudent to drive them off, particularly as the baggage was up, and there was but space for a single camel to pass down to the river at a time. A spot was accordingly selected which offered a possible ascent; two Companies were to mount at the same time as to get the enemy between them and to cut off their retreat to the Moorzeh Pass. A Company was also sent round the base of the high rock on the river, to prevent the enemy’s escaping by the plains. Thus hemmed in, they lost eighteen killed on the spot; the others escaped. We had no casualty, and only two men were slightly wounded.

About 3 p.m. we reached Kwetta and were most kindly received by our friends. The letter which reached me at Koochklak from Meer Guffoor Khan contained a proposal for a meeting. The man who brought it named two persons whom Meer Guffoor wished to be sent to his encampment as hostages, during the time he should be in Kwetta. I readily prevailed on these men to agree to my own guarantee, and immediately went to explain Guffoor’s proposition to the General, before communicating his offer to the Assistant Political Agent. The General approved of the desired interview, being fully aware of the view Major Outram had taken of the claims of the Panayee Kaukurs on Shawl, when Meer Burkodar Panayee, on my invitation, visited the agency Camp at Dabar in November, 1841. To me, this application of Meer Guffoor’s for an interview appeared most desirable, because it would afford an opportunity of settling in one day the claims of the Panayee Kaukurs on any annual payment from Shawl, and it would give me an chance of withdrawing that tribe from the confederacy formed by Mahomed Sudeeq in the Pesheen valley. I accordingly sent Meer Guffoor’s letter to the Assistant Political Agent with another from myself. The reply was that there existed objections which should be made in writing to the General. The next morning the objections of the Assistant Political Agent were sent to me by the General, and I returned them with a letter attempting to show the fallacy of them; but the interview was understood to be refused.

On the 24 April plans of the most extensive fortifications for Kwetta were submitted and approved, and half the troops were employed on the works. It was this day reported that a manifesto had been posted from Lord Ellenborough. On the morrow, a Zatim horseman from Kandahar declared that there had been a great battle, that the English had lost a great many, but that the Afghans had lost more than double the number. He also reported that 150 men (Cavalry) from Shorawak had joined Mahomed Sudeeq, with 180 camels conveying attah, and that Meer Guffoor Khan was in treaty with Mahomed Sudeeq.

The excavations and intrenchments continued to proceed. This day we also received the Bombay Times of the 6th March which had some editorial remarks on the diary of an officer of the Bombay Infantry who passed down from Kwetta to Sannapanee. It was said: “the contrast between Kwetta and Khelat, furnished in the following letter, gives a good idea of a state governed by a chief they desired to have restored to them, the people the whilst being left alone, and a province we must insist on governing for the benefit of a Ruler we have imposed.”

On the 15th a string of camels with bussah came in through the Moorzeen pass. The drivers asserted that the enemy had retired from the vicinity of Koochklak. On the 15th, the 9th Native Infantry was ordered into the town. Every one was confounded by the multiplicity of the reports. Mahomed Kamberawee arrived from Moostong and told me that the Waraca, the people of Shorawak, had thrown off all allegiance to the Khan, and declared for the insurgents; that Dara-gah Gool Mahomed had sent for his brother Illyas Khan to command in Khelat till his Highness the Khan should arrive; and that the Khan was well and happy, and the Khanate flourishing.

On the 19th we gathered the following information from a servant sent out for bussah by Major Davidson’s head man; that Meer Saloo Khan and Mahomed Sudeeq had disagreed; that the latter had gone to the Shahbadah, Suffer Jung, and that Mahomed Sudeeq talked of following him. He stated that the troops of the enemy numbered about 2,500 feet and 1,500 horse, and that Mahomed Sudeeq had placed Meer Nissar Ullah Khan and Meer Guffoor Khan and two others in confinement on suspicion. Mahomed Sudeeq exerted himself to the utmost to persuade these people to adopt the cause of the insurgents, but it was evidently not popular in the valley. Meer Guffoor Khan Kandur had not completed his terms with Mahomed Sudeeq.
On the morrow, a Persian horseman from Kandahar declared that there had been a great battle, that the English had lost a great many, but that the Afghans had lost more than double the number. He also reported that 150 men, from Shorawak, had joined Mohamed Sudeeq, with 138 camels conveying with them that Meer Goffoor Khan was in treaty with Mohamed Sudeeq.

The excavations and intrenchments continued to proceed. This day we also received the Bombay Times of the 9th March which had some editorial remarks on the diary of an officer of the Bombay Infantry who passed down from Kwetta via Khelat to Sunanistan. It was said: "the contrast between Kwetta and Khelat, furnished in the following letter, gives a good idea of a state governed by a chief they desired to have restored to them, the people whilst being left alone, and a province we must insist on governing for the benefit of a Ruler we have imposed."

On the 13th a string of camels with boosah came in through the Kooloo pass. The drivers asserted that the enemy had retired from the vicinity of Kooloo. On the 15th, the 9th Native Infantry was ordered into the town. Every one was confounded by the multiplicity of the reports. Mooldad Ichmeree arrived from Moostung and told me that the Warrahees, the people of Shorawak, had thrown off all allegiance to the Khan, and declared for the insurgents; that Dangeesh Goord Mohamed had sent for his brother Illyae Khan to command in Khelat till his Highness the Khan should arrive; and that the Khan was well and happy, and the Khanate flourishing.

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placed in battery, opened fire. The left party having a much greater distance to move than the right, started sometime before it; they moved in excellent order led by their gallant commander, Major Simmonds. The Afghans moved to meet them, but the bold bearing of these parties dispirited the enemy, and not one would advance beyond the last sungah which was a screen made by piling stones on one another. As soon as the party on the left had gained the hill, the whole body moved forward with a hurrah for old England. The troops were as steady as on parade; the Artillery practice was admirable. Discipline and tactics were too much for the enemy, and they turned and fled. Captain Dalman was sent after them with the Cavalry, but only succeeded in coming up with a few who, however, showed themselves game to the last. The sword, I should say, is not the weapon for a trooper in Asia; if our men had been armed with spears, they would have killed many more and have suffered less. As soon as the Cavalry returned, the column moved on to the encamping ground, having first collected the remains of the gallant fellows who had fallen this day last month.

Nahomed Sudeeq and Meer Saloo Khan were jealous of each other. Meer Saloo Khan was appealed to by the natives of the Pesheen valley, who looked upon him as their head, against the conduct of Mahomed Sudeeq and his rabble, who took twenty sheep a day for their consumption, and refused payment for them, though five camels laden with treasure had been sent down to him to meet his expenses. Meer Saloo Khan was also disgusted that Mahomed Sudeeq should be placed in authority over him. The day before the action, Saloo Khan was called by Mahomed Sudeeq to beat his post, but made some excuse, and did not join him till the next morning. Subsequently, when I was treating with Saloo Khan, I heard that he was so angry with Mahomed Sudeeq, that he resolved to ruin him, which he completely effected by taking an opportunity of disheartening his choicest troops, by telling them that we had now brought two armies, and that to stand and be killed by guns was an act of folly, and that they must retreat, and fight when a better occasion offered. It will be remembered that Meer Saloo Khan went to the insurgent camp near Candahar to demand the command of the Pesheen valley and some money to carry on the war, both which were refused. Our good fortune favoured us here, for it was evidently this cir-
circumstances which induced Muzzafar Khan to listen to my proposal of
separating from the insurgents and joining the English.
During the last month I have found the greatest assistance from
Nasir Khan, a most respectable man, a partner in the largest
banking house in Shikarpur, and who accompanied Major Digbyson,
Deputy Commissioner General, as his agent. Depressed of the services
of Muhammad Nasrullah Chishti, I embarked at Khutta on new
serge, and without a word to rely upon, I was very fortunate in meeting
with Nasir Khan. Through the services of this man I found that
Muzzafar Khan was not very far off. I therefore had a letter care-
fully prepared and sent off in charge of two howdahs. A little before
sunset I received a letter from him, which was addressed to me and
to Lieutenant Bonaghe, formerly commanding the Aduabary horse.
Muzzafar Khan wrote, that we owed the flight of the troops on the 23rd
instant to him, and that he was attached to the Englishmen wished for
an interview. About 8 p.m. I received a reply to my letter. It was
much in the same strain as the letter written in the morning; only
he expressed a wish that Muzzafar Khan, Hafizullah Khan, and other
chiefs should be allowed to accompany him and make terms also, and
concluded with a promise to re-establish the dakhas immediately, if I
would order it. We reached Adabali Khan on Friday, 30th April, 1842.
At quarter in the morning I sent off a reply to
Muzzafar Khan, and at 11 a.m. despatched Huddush Khan with
Madho, a Hindoo, attached to Nast Moong Mull, under pretence of
two howdahs, to accompany Muzzafar Khan to camp.
On the 1st May 1842, Nast Moong, Zeboon Khan and Nasrullah
Chishti Khan came to me with a letter from Muzzafar Khan to
ascertain the terms which I proposed. They sat in my tent from
5 p.m. till 12; the food prepared for them was then reported
ready, and we separated. The next morning the chiefs were at
my tent as the drums beat; they were very anxious for presents,
as they assured that matters were settled. I remarked that it was
necessary to have the consent and seal of Muzzafar Khan, and I
declared my intention till that was done. We marched a little before
day light. On reaching the foot of the Khogik, we found the heights
crossed by the Bengal troops sent under Lieutenant Colonel Wymer
by General Neti from Kandahar.
On reaching Chinnar I learned that the chiefs sent by Muzzafar Khan


Khan were so indignant at being refused money and killets, that they had agreed not to communicate my arrangement to him. Finding this to be the case, I procured two horsemen through Saith Moor Hall, and having written a letter explaining every thing most fully, omitting the conduct of his chiefs, I dispatched them with a promise of 30 Rupees if they were successful. My letter was read to the bearer of it, and he was made perfectly master of the contents lest some Moonshee should read it otherwise than it was written to Meer Saloo Khan. My horsemen returned on the 6th May, accompanied by Atta Oollah Khan, the eldest brother of Meer Saloo Khan, who brought a most satisfactory letter from the latter, adding, that his brother would accompany me to Candahar, if I guaranteed him protection, and that he would conclude with the public Authorities the arrangements proposed by me. This was of course very satisfactory. I treated Meer Atta Oollah Khan with every respect, gave him quarters in my tent, and reported to General Nott the approach of the Moolls, for so he had become.

We reached Tukt-i-pool on the 7th May, and Deh Hazee on the following day. About 12 o'clock Meer Reheein Khan, Meer Nasseer Oodeen IChan, Terreenees, and Meer Noor Oodeen Khan joined my camp, begging to be included in the arrangements. To this I agreed, and they were protected, housed and fed, till they reached Canda-.

We arrived at that city about 12 o'clock, and I took the chiefs with me to the General, with whom I sat a short time. He wished me to make over both the papers and the parties to Major Rawlinson, which I accordingly did, in person, and with this act I ceased to be "on special duty." Some few days after this I called on the General, and found Major Rawlinson explaining my arrangements to him. I said I hoped the General approved of them, and received a reply in the affirmative; they received the General's signature on the spot. This was very satisfactory to me, for I had nothing whatever to guide me; no instructions, and no knowledge whatever of the General's wishes; I had therefore to think and to act for myself. When I returned to India, I found this circumstance perfectly unknown to Government; I therefore wrote to Major Rawlinson, who happened to be at Fe-
Camp, 4th January, 1843.

My Dear Rawlinson,

In conversing with Mr. Maddock the day before yesterday, I said it had been my good fortune to reopen the road between K loreen and Candahar, in May 1842, when I brought up to the latter place the elder brother of Saloo Khan, to conclude with General Nott the arrangements I had proposed to his brother Saloo at Killa Abdulla. I was present at General Nott's when you reported on it, but will you kindly write me a better stating that such was my good fortune, that I may show it to Mr. Maddock.

Yours, &c.

(Signed) L. R. Statl,

To Major Statl, &c. &c. &c.

My Dear Statl,

In reply to your reference on the subject of the re-opening of our communication between Candahar and Kwetta in May 1842, I can have no hesitation in bearing testimony to the value of your services on that occasion. It was in fact entirely owing to your exertions at Killa Abdulla, and your bringing with you to Candahar, Alta Ool. Khan, the elder brother of Saloo Khan, that we were able to make those arrangements with the Achukzee tribe, which provided for the re-opening of our Hawk communication with India and which maintained that communication regularly and uninterruptedly during the remainder of our stay at Candahar. I think it was mainly owing to the character you had established by your successful negotiations in Belochistnn, that Saloo Khan was persuaded to entrust you with his profite of submission and to commit his brother to your care, for the purpose of concluding arrangements with us at Candahar, and I am thus of opinion that you are fairly entitled to whatever credit is due to the happy results of our arrangements with the Achukzee.

Believe me, &c.

(Signed) J. C. Rawlinson,

To Brigadier Statl, &c. &c. &c.

Junction, 4th January, 1843.

(True Copy.)
Soon after the arrival of General England's Bombay detachment at Candahar, on the 10th May, 1842, a force composed of the following troops, under Brigadier Wymer was despatched to Kelaht-i-Ghilzie, to relieve and bring back the garrison of that place. Captain Leslie's Troop of Bombay Horse; Captain Blood's 9th Battery (horse); 2nd Bombay Cavalry; a detachment of the 1st Irregular Cavalry; a detachment of Christie's horse; H. M. 40th foot; the 24th, 16th and 38th Regiments of Bengal Native Infantry, and some few Nadra Settlers.

Brigadier Wymer's detachment left Candahar on the 10th of May, 1842. It was arranged in the enemy's camp that so soon as the Brigadier and his force should be well on the road towards Kelaht-i-Ghilzie, the Gazees of the whole Ghilzie country should attack that garrison, while the Gazees under Prince Suffer Jung, Meer Amed, Aker Khan, and other chiefs at the same time made an attack on Candahar.

Brigadier Stacy had been sent across the Urgundab on the 12th of May, with a force consisting of a Troop of Horse Artillery, Christie's horse, Haldun's horse, and a brigade of Infantry; viz. the 42nd and 43rd Native Infantry, and the 5th Shah's Infantry, but with strict orders to protect the crops and property of the people generally, the object of his march being solely to induce the Gazees in that quarter to try their strength in the field. The Gazees retired before this force, and the detachment returned to Candahar, after going as low down as Noorah Kurela, on the morning of the 17th instant, as directed. On the 27th and 28th May, the usual supplies brought daily to Candahar were nearly stopped; and the Gazees were seen moving on the hills, both towards Babawulle, and in the direction of Chilzeneh. On the 29th, as soon as day broke, the Gazees were observed in parties between the cantonment, which was unoccupied, and the Babawulle Ghaut.

Turner's Troop of Horse Artillery, Tait's Cavalry, the 42nd Native Infantry and the Shah's 5th Infantry had been encamped outside the town since the 23rd May. On the morning of the 29th, a little before 10 a.m. Brigadier Stacy received notice from General Nott.
that the Gauses were moving round towards his post, and recommended that the party over the cattle grazing, should be put on the alert. The party and camels were called in orders were at the same time sent to have the 42nd and 43rd Native Infantry ready, but not to fall in without further orders. About a quarter of an hour after this, a third order was received, directing Brigadier Stacy to march the 42nd and 43rd Regiments of Native Infantry to the cantonment, there to pile arms and await further orders. A request to be allowed to take the Horse Artillery guns under Lieutenant Turner and a Revolver of Cavalry, was granted. This compact little force was seen on the road. The 43rd Native Infantry had 326 bayonets, the 43rd Native Infantry, 222. Two complete Companies from each Regiment were on grazing guard duty; the other men on garrison and various other duties. As soon as they had cleared the house and gardens, the royal burial ground, nearly facing the English gate of Castello, the enemy were seen in strong parties from the two hills close to the cantonment up to the Babawalle pass.

As the detachment approached the open country near the cantonment, the enemy were perceived in great strength, assembling on the plain between the main Karwar or water course, and Babawalle, with the Babawalle and Kotal-Muwallie passes in their rear and the Babawalle gun road on their right. A pencil note was sent off to General Nott, giving him notice of the strength of the enemy and their position.

Brigadier Stacy took up a position near the barracks facing the enemy, and directly opposite the only spot where the equal was passable for guns. A small deserted village on the right of the position, walled in, and with only one entrance, was taken possession of by a Company of the 42nd Native Infantry. As soon as Brigadier Stacy had selected his position, he sent Lieut. Knox, Brigade Quartermaster, to requisition General Nott, that the enemy were rapidly forming, that besides the two passes and the gun road to Babawalle, the enemy had possession of the Chilawanh road, and had a force of from a thousand to twelve hundred men on the hill commanding it.

Captain Anderson arrived with the two remaining guns of Turner's troop, escorted by a party of an officer and 34 rank and file from the Bombay Light Infantry Battalion, and another party from the Bombay 25th N. I. of an officer and 30 rank and file. Some of the enemy's
orsc.~nen road up within range, and fired into the column. Some men got behind the walls of an old house at the foot of the hill on the left, firing long shots into the 43d, and wounded three or four men before they were dislodged. The two last guns were planted commanding a road behind the barracks, and which could be approached by the enemy from the Chilzeenah road on the left. A note was also received at the same time from General Nott, saying that Cooper's troop Horse Artillery, H. M. 41st foot (352 bayonets), and the Poonah horse had marched to join Brigadier Stacy.

This addition to the force soon arrived, and were placed in readiness to move forward, as General Nott and his staff reached the ground. Brigadier Stacy made over the command, reported the arrangement of the force, and particularly drew the attention of the General to the body of the enemy in possession of the hill on the left. General Nott approved of the arrangement, and instantly ordered the Light Companies of the Regiments under Brevet Captain Macpherson, 43d native infantry, to drive the enemy off the hills on the left, supported by the remaining Companies of the 43d Native Infantry. These Companies were soon in order, and on the word "forward," moved off rapidly with a cheer which prognosticated success. Major John, commanding the 43d Native Infantry, with the supports, moved on, inclining to the left towards a road at the foot of the hills beyond cantonments, and which led direct upon the Chilzeenah road.

The Ressalla of Christie's Irregular Cavalry under Lieutenant N. B. Chamberlain was in attendance at this point. No sooner had the light Companies driven the enemy down the hill on the Chilzeenah road, than Lieutenant Chamberlain was upon them. The footmen escaped over the garden walls, which extend almost up to the canal in front of cantonments, skirting the gun road; but their cavalry soon got jammed in the Chilzeenah road, which in the first part runs between the village on a rising ground to the left, and a long walled-in garden to the right, and is afterwards bounded by a deep and rapid canal on the left, over which the bridge—about a mile in advance—is not more than ten feet broad. Many of the enemy, finding it impossible to escape, made a virtue of necessity, and turning round met Lieutenant Chamberlain and his men with considerable impetuosity. Lieutenant Chamberlain's horse was killed under him, and he himself received a severe wound in the thigh; his Nabi Ressaldar and five men were
wounded at this point, but they left five wound to the enemy dead on the spot. The Light Companies killed many of the enemy in the garden, and Major Nash with the supports, and the two Horse Artillery guns posted in rear of the column, soon came up, and scattered the enemy in every direction. The greater part gained the Babawuli and road, screened by the many gardens in this direction; the rest continued the road to the lower ghaut of the Zanjabad, by the Chilabunth.

The chiefs, seeing the distress of this party, attempted to call off General Nott's attention by advancing and opening a sharp fire on the column. They maintained this fire but for a short time; it slackened as General Nott advanced, and ceased as our guns opened. As soon as General Nott saw the Light Companies ready on the left, he moved forward and directed the enemy. Major Rawlinson, with the Persian prince, Syed Aga Khan and his forces, about 100, and the horsemen attached to the Agony, were on the right beyond the village occupied by the Company of the 22d, moving parallel with General Nott, their right thrown a little forward. Captain Anderson's guns soon began to play, advancing with the Infantry column in alternate sections. The hill on the left was lost to the enemy from the moment our light Companies moved on it. This evidently disconcerted their main body; the steady advance of our main column, their left routed and their right threatened by Major Rawlinson and the Shah Prince, appeared to embarrass them. At this moment of evident consternation, a shot from one of the guns killed the Yaboo of Shimmudah Suffer Jung, standing close to the prince and the sleighs. A panic appeared to seize them all, and in a moment they made off by the three remaining routes open to them, viz. the gun-road, the Babawuli and Kota-ba-Mohinde passes.

Major Rawlinson and his party made a very capital charge on the first symptoms of the enemy's indisposition, and succeeded in killing several; those who escaped by the Babawuli pass, the road over which had been strongly fortified by a breastwork of stones, leaving only a narrow pathway, planted a white flag under which to enquire or die, and commenced a languid fire of pellmell. General Nott still steadily led on the column, and it was resolved that the road and the pathway should be stormed simultaneously that the 42nd being exactly opposite the breastwork should storm it, whilst Her Majesty's 41st Foot moved direct on the white flag. At this moment the column
was close to the Bambah (reservoir arched in). It was between 2 and 3 a. m., the thermometer, 137. The men had been out since 10 and 11 a. m.; the General therefore halted the column to give them an opportunity of taking a drink of water. The guns in the mean time made some capital shots at the sungah, or stone breastwork and dropped some shrapnel with admirable precision near the white flag. The column moved on to the tanks, her Majesty's 41st inclining a little to the right on the line of the pathway, the 42nd direct to the front; the enemy had not heart to stand. As the gun was rushed, those who were first up had the satisfaction of seeing the last of the enemy in full flight across the gardens bordering the river. Those of the enemy who fled by the gun road were punished by a section of Anderson's guns, which played upon them till they were out of reach of even round shot. Brigadier Stacy, who had gone over the ghaut with the two infantry Regiments, (her Majesty's 41st and the 42nd Native Infantry,) finding the enemy had completely disappeared, halted the men. Captain Polwhele arrived with orders from the General to send back her Majesty's 41st Regiment, and to take the 42nd Native Infantry back to camp by the gun road. Major Nash, with his party, missed the cavalry, which had been called back, pushed the enemy on the left and gave them no time to think of turning on the handful of men before whom they were flying like so many sheep. It was the distant booming of the two Horse Artillery guns with this party playing on the enemy descending to the river and which we distinctly heard, that induced General Nott to send Brigadier Stacy home. General Nott moved back with the troops so soon as her Majesty's 41st recrossed the ghaut. Brigadier Stacy marched round by the gun road, reaching his camp at a little after 5 a. m. On the road to camp, he received orders to bring the whole of his detachment and stores inside the city that evening, and he was also informed that to enable him to do so, working parties and cattle from both branches of the Commissariat, would be sent to bring in the grain, stores, &c. This was accomplished, and by 9 p. m. the whole of the stores and regiments were within the walls of Kandahar. The same night Brigadier Stacy received orders to march at 3 a. m. the following morning the 30th May, with a detachment, which would be placed under his command, consisting of Cooper's troops Horse Artillery, the whole of the Cavalry, the 5th Suite Infantry and the 2nd
brigade of infantry. It was conjectured, that the intention was to beat up the Sirdar's quarters, in order that the enemy might be perfectly convinced, we were always ready to meet them in the field even in the absence of half the force.

The several regiments met at the point of rendezvous at the hour named, and moved off quietly. The Brigadier directed the 3rd Native Infantry under Major Clarkson, to move on the Babawullee pass, with orders not to go beyond it, till the arrival there of the detachment by the gun-road, but simply to hold possession of the pass. The parties met and proceeded about a mile onwards, and there halted, whilst a small body of horse under Major Rawlinson went to reconnoitre. From the top of the hill under which the detachment was concealed, the enemy's force could be distinctly seen, moving off across the plain on the opposite bank of the river. A party of the enemy's horsemen exchanged a few long shots with our party on this side, and then crossing the river, rejoined the Sirdar. At one time Major Rawlinson had hopes of deceiving the enemy across the river, and the detachment moved on about a mile or a mile and a half to be ready for them; but though some few horsemen did cross, yet on finding the English at hand, they returned after reconnoitring.

The affair of the 29th had the effect of breaking up the confederacy of which Meer Ahmed, Mahomed Sudeeq and Uktar Khan were the principal actors. Shahzadah Sufter Jung was a mere puppet in their hands. After reaching the right bank of the Urgundab on the night of the 29th, the Sirdars and Chiefs held a Durbar, when very angry words passed, each charging the other with having lost the battle by his cowardice. Even if Brigadier Stacy's detachment had not been sent out on the 30th, it is supposed the enemy would have broken up for the time, and have awaited some more favourable opportunity. The demonstration on the 30th, however, set all doubts at rest, and fairly broke up the enemy's camp.

No Division Order was issued on the subject of these two days' work, but Brigadier Stacy and the officers commanding regiments desired them to communicate the Major General's thanks to their respective regiments.
Major General Nott's force reached Mockoor the 27th August, 1842. From Candahar to this place not a shot was fired. The village of Mockoor was deserted, and the Afghans, whom we saw perched on the hills, were considered to be those who had fled from it for safety. The picquets of the first brigade were within fire of these hills. A little firing was kept up during the night by the enemy, whose long Jezails enabled them to annoy us, without our being able to reach them with our musquets.

On the 28th August, 1842, the troops marched at 4 a.m. As the column passed by the hills, a few long shots were dropped on the enemy. As day broke we saw horsemen in small parties on our left, but they kept well under the hills; they were soon joined by a body of the enemy consisting of both Cavalry and Infantry. Although they must have been two or three miles off, they approached us, dragging their Jezails. Lieutenant Colonel Lane, commanding the rear guard, sent notice of the party to General Nott. The General wished to get this body of the enemy between the Cavalry of our rear guard under Lieutenant Chamberlain, and a party which he desired Captain Dalmanin, commanding the Cavalry, to detach immediately for that purpose, not knowing the nature of the ground, which towards the hills was full of very deep ravines with precipitous banks. General Nott did not however order any Infantry with the party. Captain Dalmanin sent Captain Christie with a party from his own Regiment of Irregular Cavalry, and two Resenals of the 1st Irregular Cavalry under Captain Fieldane.

Captain Christie moved towards the enemy's left for about a mile or a mile and a half, and was closing with them, when they came to the banks of a very deep nullah. A foot path was soon discovered by which the whole party had to file down, and form on the opposite bank. By the time our Cavalry had crossed and formed, the foremost of the enemy had nearly reached the bottom of the hills. Captain Christie now led at a smart gallop, and very soon closed on the rear of the enemy. Upwards of fifty were slain by this party, and twelve by the men under Lieutenant Chamberlain. Captain Christie lost in this affair one Duffadar and nine horses killed and Lieutenant,
9 cows, and 11 horses wounded. The greater part of this loss was inflicted by the infantry concealed in the ravines. Lieutenant Chambers was wounded in personal combat with one of the enemy's cavalry.

Ooosman Khan Ki-Karunzi.

Saturday 26th August, 1844 (v. m.)

The affair with the enemy in the morning did not delay the column; they arrived at Ooosman Khan Ki-Karunzi about 9 a.m.

About 1 p.m. the grasscutters of the Cavalry were seen running towards camp, believing that the enemy's horse had come down, and ran up several a they of course made for their own lines. By some misunderstanding, the 3d Bombay Cavalry bugle was sounded to saddle. Lieutenant Chambers was wounded in personal combat with one of the enemy's Cavalry.

The affair with the enemy in the morning did not delay the column; they arrived at Ooosman Khan Ki-Karunzi about 8 A.M.

About 1 p.m. the grasscutters of the Cavalry were seen running towards camp, believing that the enemy's horse had come down, and ran up several a they of course made for their own lines. By some misunderstanding, the 3d Bombay Cavalry bugle was sounded to saddle. Lieutenant Chambers, who had just come in with the rear guard, immediately moved off with the two Reswals of his own Regiment, and the Cavalry of the rear guard, accompanied by some of the grasscutters, to the fort behind which they heard the enemy were hidden, and where their comrades had been killed. It was about three quarters of a mile from camp. Captain Christie with such men as were ready went to the fort; but there was no appearance of an enemy; only ten or twelve horsemen were seen in a long distance in advance to the left. After looking well about, Captain Christie resolved to lead his party back to camp. Halfway between the fort and the camp, he fell in with two squadrons of the 3d Bombay Cavalry, under Captain Delamain. Captain Christie reported that he had examined the country round about and saw no symptoms of the enemy in the plains, save the few men who were a good distance off on the left.

He then joined Captain Delamain, at his request, and both bodies moved steadily onward. When abreast of the men seen by Christie, a party under Lieutenant Ravenscroft was sent in pursuit of them. They came up with them close under the hills and cut up five; on our side, Lieutenant Ravenscroft and three men were wounded. He subsequently died of his wounds. Captain Delamain proceeded to the end of the range of hill and turned to the left. Shortly after bringing up his right shoulder, he saw Shumshodin's whole army directly in front of him. The range of the hills parallel to which Capt. Delamain had moved, alone separated the two camps. The enemy's prospects...
had been won on the top of these hills from the moment we reached our ground. Captain Delamain halted, and sent back an officer (Lieutenant Brett) to Major General Nott for instructions. Shumshurdeen's cavalry was estimated at from 5 to 6,000 men and his infantry at about 2,000; the latter were on the hills. The enemy's cavalry moved towards us, and Captain Delamain gradually retired. The Jezailchees on the hills advanced quickly towards the corner of the hill round which he must necessarily have to pass before he could reach his own camp. As the enemy's cavalry advanced, they opened a destructive fire of matchlocks, and had wounded several, and were pressing us hard. As our party reached the corner, the Jezailchees harried us considerably, and their cavalry came on at a gallop. A large body of them was also intermixed with the Jezailchees, who had possession of this point. No option was left; they must be checked, or they would be upon us. Captain Delamain resolved to charge those on the declivity of the hill; our party accordingly halted and fronted, and a squadron under Captain Berry charged up the hill; the ascent of which was not very great. The enemy did not wait till our Cavalry had reached them, but when about two-thirds of the way up, met our squadron with their whole force. The crash was tremendous, our men were nearly overwhelmed; for about a minute they pried their swords well, but the weight of hundreds pressing on, forced them down and they were driven back with fearful loss. Those who could disentangle themselves, fled down the hill; the other squadron went about. Christie's and Hallen's horses did the same, and set off at a gallop. The dust rendered it impossible for the rear files to see before them, and several horses fell. They went at this rate for more than half a mile before their Officers could halt them; when they again showed front. The enemy contested themselves with the havoc they had made. Captain Jervey and Lieutenant and Brevet Captain Reeves fell in the charge. The Subadar Major, who was the oldest soldier in the Regiment, and wore a medal for Seringapatam and had distinguished himself on several occasions was also killed on the spot. 22 Troopers were killed; and Lieutenant McKenzie and 13 Troopers wounded.

The devoted gallantry of a Ressaldar of the 1st cavalry, late Shuk Sojah's force, deserves notice. In the retreat, rather flight, the dust was so thick, that it was utterly impossible to see a yard before one.
The enemy's Jezailcl~ees were still firing into the mass, when Captain Christie fell, horse and all, into an old Imarez. Finding it impossible to extricate his charger, he climbed on himself, and was following the troops on foot, when Ressaldar Wuzeer Khan passed him. It appears that he had nearly fallen into the same Imarez, that he saw Captain Christie's charger, and considered that his Officer must also be in the Imarez. Wuzeer Khan therefore dismounted in haste and searched, but finding no traces of Captain Christie, mounted and rode on. On reaching Captain Christie, he jumped off his horse and assisted on the other's mounting and galloping off, as the only chance of saving his life. But he refused, saying that the Gunners would cut him (the Ressaldar) to pieces. Wuzeer Khan therefore dismounted in haste and searched, but finding no traces of Captain Christie, mounted and rode on. On reaching Captain Christie, he jumped off his horse and insisted that the Ressaldar must accompany him, to press the Ressaldar to accompany him, mounted and joined his party. About five minutes after, Wuzeer Khan was seen emerging from a dry nullah behind which the Cavalry had rallied. After Captain Christie left him, he was attacked by three of the enemy, of whom he killed two and made his escape to the Nullah. This brave soldier has been recommended for the order of merit on a former occasion for gallant conduct in the field. A statement of the present affair in the prescribed form is also before Government.

The moment Lieutenant Brett reported the state of affairs to the Major General in camp, he ordered the assembly to sound. Captain Leslie's Horse Artillery was ordered off with the 38th Light Infantry to proceed as quickly as possible to Captain Delamain's assistance. The first Brigade of Infantry under Brigadier Woper, with Captain Blood's nine pounder Battery, and Captain Anderson's 2nd Troop Horse Artillery under Lieutenant Turner, conducted by the Major General, moved for the eastern side of the village or fort. Brigadier Stany, was sent with the 2nd Brigade Infantry, to the Western side with orders to proceed about half a mile on a mile in advance, and to support the advanced party if he should find they required assistance. When he saw that Captain Leslie and the 38th Bengal Light Infantry had passed beyond the spot where the Cavalry
were drawn up, he detached the 43rd Bengal Light Infantry with orders to keep them well in sight. The advanced party moved on to the scene of action, placed the bodies of the slain in doolies, and returned to camp. Major General Nott, finding the gates of the fort shut, and several shot having been fired from it on his party, desired the Artillery officer to open on them; they were battered on the third shot. The Light Companies rushed in; some entered by the gates and others climbed over, one man getting on another's shoulders at a spot where the wall had partially fallen. There were but few found within the fort, but they fought bravely, and it was half an hour before the last was killed. The women were placed under the protection of a guard; while the grain, wood and boughs were made over to the Commissariat, and the troops returned to camp. The bodies of Captain Berrey and Lieutenant and Brevet Captain Reeves were buried at 10 p.m. in a grave dug within a tent, and in the morning, boughs and every combustible at hand was laid over the grave and burned, to destroy any trace of the spot which held the bodies of these brave men. The same precautions were taken in the lines, where the bodies of the Natives were committed to the earth.

GEIZ.

Tuesday, 30th August, 1842.

As the force reached their ground on the morning of Tuesday, the 30th of August, a fort on the left of our camp fired a shot, which attracted particular attention, as the fort, to all appearances, had very few men in it, and with the force we had at our disposal, if properly applied, could not have stood half an hour.

Major General Nott resolved to punish the garrison, and ordered the detachment under his personal command, to be ready to move out at 3 p.m. for its destruction; but it was past 3 p.m. before the party was ready, and when they attempted to go owing to the nature of the camp, they found that the heavy guns (18-pounders) could not move. Another half hour was lost in getting them beyond the first obstacle; it was 4 o'clock before the party were on route.

Although H. M. 41st was formed ready as directed, it was not taken out in the first instance. The ground was very unequal and broken into ravines in every direction. The 3d Bombay Cavalry, Captain Delamain, the 16th Native Infantry, and the Kelat-i-Ghilzic Regiment,
Captain Craigie, the whole under Colonel Maclean, were posted to the left, with orders that as soon as a breach was made, the Infantry should storm, and the Cavalry cut up every man who attempted to escape. The General with the guns moved to the right, followed by Christie's horse, H. M. 40th and the 25th Native Infantry. He subsequently ordered the 16th Native Infantry to join him, which was done. Anderson's guns opened on a flank tower where some men showed themselves, but the enemy herded and waved their swords round their heads in defiance after every shot. The 18-pounder practice was not effective; and the object was changed after a very few shots, and consequently no impression was made. Many shots passed through the fort, and some over it, and nearly destroyed some of our own Cavalry. Finding matters made no progress, the General ordered up one of Blood's nine-pounder guns under the protection of a Company of H. M. 60th, to blow open the gate. The gun was run up to within 50 yards of it, and the very first shot went through it, but did no further harm. After a few rounds it was found that there were no more round shot. The Artillery therefore retired, but not before several men had been wounded.

Shumshoodeen's army began to appear about this time, in a rapid succession of small bodies, crossing the hills in front or rather to the right. The dismounted branch of the enemy kept more together this day than was customary, and took up a position under cover of the low range of hills. The Cavalry were as usual moving about, each chief taking his men where his own fancy led him, but always keeping an eye to the safe side; they were soon collected in considerable strength. H. M. 41st, which had been left in camp, was sent for, and Brigadier Stacy, who had been watching the progress of events with his telescope from a mound on the left of the camp, now left the mob of people assembled there, and went quietly caused the 12th and 45th Regiments N. I., the only remaining Regiments in camp to fall in; the 12 Native Infantry having been sent out early to protect the foraging party. Major Simmons, the field officer of the day, was on the alert, and every thing in camp was made ready in case of accident.

Several times it was supposed that the enemy would have succeeded in turning our right. The 45th Native Infantry, Major Clarkson, was the next corps sent for; fortunately, it was ready and moved out the moment the order was received; the position it was ordered to take up, was on the right of all, and nearest to the camp. Brigade Stacy arranged with Major Clarkson, that as the firing had been heavy and continuous, some ammunition should be sent to his post, and nothing of the same forwarded by him as soon as he reached the ground to Commanding Officers of Regiments, that such corps as might require it, should indent on that quarter instead of sending into camp.

H. M. 41st arrived in full time to share in the glory of the fight. On reaching the Major General's detachment, Captain Nelson met them with orders that they should form the Companies of H. M. 40th and 41st, and then back the enemy's skirmishers. General Nottack their main body; the right of the line was advanced, Regiments advanced with a brave hurrah; the Artillery just at this time a message from Captain Delahanty informed that a heavy body of Cavalry threatened the left, and were ordered to change their position to the left, and Delahanty's assistance. Major Brown was sent, and soon came to the banks of a deep nullah in which the enemy were thinly encumbered, plying long shot at the Cavalry, and were immediately driven out of that spot. This duty was soon accomplished, when Captain Palviree, A. A. G. came with orders H. M. 41st to rejoin the main column, as the enemy's Cavalry occupied the field. Before reaching it, however, another shot was received and the Regiment was desired to return to camp.

The steadiness and gallantry evinced in the formation and by the line with our skirmishers in front, was admirably served. It is generally supposed that the casualties were very few on our side. The enemy, as they would not wait a close fight, and were to the left, spread and ran too quickly; many even threw away their arms. The greatest loss of the enemy was on the right, from the flank Companies.

Two of the enemy's Horse Artillery guns were brought into action and admirably served. One was knocked out of action, and shot from one of our guns; the other, silenced by an enfilading shot, at a rapid rate. When their line broke, Christie's horse ranways. On their return, bearing that the gun had left, Captain Christie immediately followed it with Lewis's and Rees's of his Regiment, restored the
Allier Stacy arranged with Major Clarkson, that as the firing had been heavy and continuous, some ammunition should be sent to his post, and notice of the same forwarded by him as soon as he reached the ground to Commanding Officers of Regiments, that such corps as might require it, should direct that quarter instead of sending into camp.

H. M. 41st arrived in full time to share in the glory of the fight. On reaching the Major General's detachment, Captain Nelson met them with orders that they should form the supports. The Light Companies of H. M. 40th and 41st, and the 10th and 28th drove back the enemy's skirmishers. General Nott then prepared to attack their main body; the right of the line was turned forward; the Regiments advanced with a brave hurrah; the enemy broke and ran. Just at this time a message from Captain Delamain informed the General that a heavy body of Cavalry threatened the left; H. M. 41st were ordered to change their position to the left, and move to Captain Delamain's assistance. Major Browne was instantly in motion, and soon came to the banks of a deep nullah in which some of the enemy were snugly ensconced, plying long shots at the Cavalry. They were immediately driven out of that spot. This duty was scarcely accomplished, when Captain Poleshce, A. A. G. came with orders for H. M. 41st to rejoin the main column, as the enemy's Cavalry had quitted the field. Before reaching it, however, another order was received and the Regiment was desired to return to camp.

The steadiness and gallantry evinced in the formation and advance of the line with our skirmishers in front, was the admiration of all. It is generally supposed that the casualties were very few on the part of the enemy, as they would not wait a close fight, and were too widely spread, and ran too quickly; many even threw away their sandals. The greatest loss of the enemy was on the right, from the fire of the light Companies.

Two of the enemy's Horse Artillery guns were brought early into action and admirably served. One was knocked off its carriage by a shot from one of our guns; the other lumbered up and moved off at a rapid rate. When their line broke, Christie's horse charged the runaways. On their return, hearing that the gun had been taken off, Captain Christie immediately followed it with Lieutenant Chambers and two Bassalis of his Regiment, resolved to capture it.
They soon discovered the tracks of the wheels and pushing on at a good pace for upwards of a mile, saw the gun and a body of cavalry escorting it as they turned the corner of a hill. A shout gave the enemy notice of the approach of our party.

Lieutenant Chamberlain's first blow knocked off the driver of the near wheel horse; the traces of the leaders were cut, and the gun captured. The man who appeared to be most active in taking off the gun, proved to be a drummer of the 27th Native Infantry, who had gone over to the enemy; he was sabred. With the aid of some rope, the harness was so far mended, as to allow of the party bringing the captured gun into camp, which they reached after dark.

Whilst this was going on in advance, the General, finding the enemy completely disconcerted and dispersed, ordered Brigadier Wymer to lead the troops back to camp. The General and staff had moved off. Brigadier Wymer was following him, when information was brought to Captain Anderson that the whole of the enemy's ammunition, tents and baggage had been discovered, separated from the field of battle where they then stood, only by a low hill. Captain Anderson urged Brigadier Wymer to halt till he could destroy the ammunition. The request was referred to the General and followed by an order to the Brigadier that the troops should remain whilst the tents and baggage were burned and the ammunition destroyed. The quantity of ammunition proved considerable; it consisted of the stores which the enemy had taken from us at Ghuznee. Some single paled tents were also found here and burned as they stood. It was 8 p.m., before the troops reached camp. It should have been mentioned that Captain Anderson slung the dismounted gun under one of his waggons, and burned the carriage and harness; five of the gun horses were also brought into camp and sold by sutlers.

The killed and wounded in this action were comparatively few, but the effect of the battle was as exhilarating in our camp as it was disheartening to the enemy. Shumshoodeen had cut up our Cavalry on the 28th instant, when we lost three officers and more than twenty men. On this day Shumshoodeen again practised deceit, but was defeated. His guns were captured; his ammunition was blown up; his baggage and tents were burned; and such was the haste with which he quit the field, that half his men threw away their sandals to move the quicker.
The following Division Order was issued by Major General Sam. No. 354.

Camp Guine, 31st August, 1842.

The Major General commanding begs to offer his thanks to the whole of the Officers and Troops engaged in the action with the enemy yesterday. He is fully satisfied with their steady and gallant conduct and will not fail to bring it to the notice of the Supreme Government.

GUINTEE.

5th September, 1842.

The affair at Guine appeared to have silenced the enemy. From the 30th August up to the 5th September, there was scarcely a shot exchanged. The enemy’s outposts were often seen at a distance, and the spots where parties of them had bivouacked were easily known by the fresh horse dung, heenah, ashes, &c. The Sheeah Hazareehs had joined us in great numbers immediately after quitting Guine, and burned and destroyed every thing as we passed along, to revenge themselves for the tyranny practised on them by Shumshoodeem’s people—the mandas. What the Hazareehs could not carry away, they destroyed. They proved of great service to us, bringing the sheep, bullocks, fowls and goats which they took from the enemy’s deserted forts and villages to our camp for sale at the lowest prices.

The force encamped near Guinnee on the 4th, and on the 5th moved off without the General or Assembly sounding, at about 5 a.m. As we approached Guinnee, the road became miserable; the latter part of it was so intersected with ravines, and deep watercourses, that it is a matter of astonishment how the Horse Artillery crossed them. As we entered the country, they appeared to great advantage and in some order. Sultan Jan and Shumshoodeem and their immediate followers were conspicuous by their gay attire and superior horses. Being drawn up on a gently rising ground, their numbers appeared to advantage; their Cavalry were most numerous, and every thing denoted a resolution to overwhelm our comparatively diminutive force. The horse were marshalled below; the tuncines and water courses were filled with Jezailchees, but they fled before our men, whenever they met; the only decent show of resistance by these per-
from men fighting for their country, was by a party of matchlock men behind a long line of old wall on the Rock Bank, where they certainly stood pretty well, and did considerable execution, till they were driven from their post at the point of the bayonet. The hills also swarmed with Infantry, amongst whom, however, there appeared no order; they seemed to act independently of each other, and were in constant motion. The column paused to the right (East) of Ummereen, and then turned to the left at the garden called Sir John Kemm's Garden.

Major Sanders had been sent with the 16th Bengal Grenadiers and a party of horse to reconnoitre, and soon drew on him and his party a sharp fire from the watercourses. A couple of nine-pounder Guns were left under Lieutenant Terry, and a Company from the 4th Native Infantry under Captain Webster, which soon drove them back. Captain Webster pushed forward some of his men and took possession of one watercourse from which he completely commanded any advance in this direction, and remained there until picked up by the rear guard. The light Companies were soon skirmishing with the enemy: the Horse Artillery and 16th Bengal Grenadiers were called to the front. The enemy appeared resolved to try us this day, and pressed the 16th Bengal Grenadiers and light Companies, notwithstanding a sharp fire from Leslie's and Anderson's guns. One particularly good charge of Cavalry—considering it was by Afghans—was made on the 16th Native Infantry, by the elite of the Cavalry. Had they been better supported, they might have been fortunate, but their ranks evidently became thinner as they entered the bayonets; and when they were about twenty paces distant, a volley turned them to the right about; not more than six or eight men reached the bayonets, and these soon fell. The first Brigade was marching into camp by a road to the right of the garden. Seeing this, and knowing also that there was still work to be done, Brigadier Stacy sent Lieutenant Elliot, 4th Bengal Native Infantry, with his compliments to say it could not be General Nott's intention they should go to camp. Brigadier Stacy kept straight on towards the enemy. The 1st Brigade rejoined at the double. The 1st and 2d Brigades of Infantry pushed forward; the light Companies, and the 16th Bengal Grenadiers, supported by the Horse Artillery, had made the enemy turn. They ascended the hills north of the city. Brig-
dier Wymer followed them with the first Brigade directly in front. Brigadier Stacy led the 2d Brigade to the left, inclining to the point of action; both Brigades reached the top of the hills at the same moment, but only in time to see the enemy in full retreat. The 16th Bengal Grenadiers and light Companies never gave the enemy time to rally; they ascended the hill with them and continued to advance, until they reached the village of Bellall or Bettall. Brigadier Stacy's Brigade held the heights next to this place, and Brigadier Wymer's Brigade those nearest Rosa.

A message was brought by Captain Ripley, Deputy Post Master, and Captain Waterfield, I. D. C. from General Nott to Brigadier Stacy, desiring the latter to leave one Regiment on the hill, and to bring back the other two; this was immediately done. In passing the General, Brigadier Stacy went up to him to receive his orders. General Nott asked Brigadier Stacy if he had been on the heights, and was answered in the affirmative. The General then remarked that there was heavy firing in the rear, and that he wished Brigadier Stacy to proceed immediately with a portion of his Brigade to its assistance.

After leaving the Major General, Brigadier Stacy replaced the two remaining Regiments of his Brigade, viz. H. M. 41st and the 2nd Bengal Grenadiers. He ordered H. M. 41st to go to the camp, and moved on with the 2nd Native Infantry. Captain Leslie, and his Horse Artillery were halted abreast of the fort; and under cover of a garden wall close to the fort was the light Company of the Khair-ul-Ghilzie Regiment. Brigadier Stacy sent word to the General of their location, and said that he would bring them in before Leslie's battery moved. This was accordingly done; the Company reached Leslie's battery as the Ghuznee gun (Zubber Jungli) threw a shot close to Captain Leslie's right gun. Previous to moving, two round shot were returned; after which the guns limbered up and moved out of range. The Brigadier left a wing of the 2nd Native Infantry with them, and pushed on with the other towards the rear guard, which was distinctly seen coming on unmolested; the remaining wing of the 2nd Bengal Grenadiers was therefore sent to camp, and the Brigadier followed as soon as the rear guard closed. About two hours after all were in camp, the enemy made some good shots with the Zubber Jungli; the first was sent into the camp of H. M. 41st, and was duly

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reported to the Major General, but the General did not move the camp. A second fell in the lines of the 43d Native Infantry, and a third in those of the 2nd Native Infantry. After the third shot, an order was issued to sever the Camp, and the force moved to a spot close to the same. Before the whole was clear off, eleven shot had fallen in camp; amongst them was a camel and a bullock, were the only casualties. Two guns of the nine-pounder Battery were sent up to the hill above the fort, and three shots were fired, the first of these nearly struck the wall around the great Zobber Jungh; and the second hit the topmost wall of the Court yard in which this gun was placed.

There were but few apprises attached to the force; 300 Sepoys from the 16th Bengal Grenadiers and 42d Bengal Light Infantry were therefore told off for working parties during the night, and before morning they were ready for the morning parley, but which were sent back when, as day broke, it was discovered that the enemy had evacuated the fort. Judging from the fire of matchlocks from the fort on the hill, the numbers must have been considerable; they kept up as incessant but harmless fire from about 7 o'clock on the hill.

As soon as it was ascertained that the fort was evacuated, the 16th Bengal Grenadiers were sent to take possession of it.

The fort, city and citadel were doomed; and no labour or pains were spared to level this famous place with the ground. Major Sanders and his detachment were most zealous in their labours to carry out General Nott's orders; and on the 8th instant many victims fell a hand to finish most completely the work of destruction. The several mines were sprung between 4 and 6 o'clock, the wall was in flames and remained burning all night.

On the 9th, the force moved to Rosejah, about a mile North East of Rosa, took off the famed gates of Somnath from Mahmood's tomb and piled them on the 15-pounder spare carriage; no insult was offered to the presiding Moollahs, or to the tomb of Mahmood. On the 10th September 1842, Major General Nott's force moved with its pinnacles the first march towards India. It will be seen, that the Mahomedans did not allow us to carry off our trophy without an attempt to recover it and destroy the infidel captors.
On approaching our ground a few shots were sent amongst the Quarter Masters and their party. The encamping ground was very confined, and the camp was pitched in a saddle between a ridge of low hills.

Officers commanding brigades and corps and detachments were ordered to make arrangements for the protection of their own camp.

Several strong parties of the enemy appeared on the highest hills.

About 7 A.M., three soldiers of H. M. 41st went "to fetch a walk 1" passing through some corn fields, a party of the enemy who were concealed there, suddenly sprang up, rushed on them and killed two.

The third escaped to camp. A party was instantly sent out, but the enemy had fled. The bodies were brought in and buried in the afternoon.

The fort of Sydabad was that in which Captain Woodburn was so treacherously murdered, and it was therefore doomed to destruction. Nine were prepared as fast as the shortness of the time would allow, and the four bastions and gateway blown up; it was then fired. Several books and papers of Captain Woodburn and other officers were found here, and amongst other things the will of that lamented officer.

As night approached, the greatest pains were taken for the protection of the camp, for the enemy on the hills had increased considerably. The right of the camp (the 2nd Brigade) was attacked before it had struck 8 o'clock, but the enemy found arrangements had been made at all points for their reception and did not return. Some attempts were next made on the Horse Artillery and Cavalry lines, but with little success. In an attack on the left (1st Brigade) we lost one European killed and one wounded, and three Satires wounded.

SHIURABID.

Tuesday, 13th September, 1842.

The enemy were much bolder this day, and their numbers were very considerably increased. As usual, they gave our Quarter Masters and their party a few shot on their arrival on the ground. Near camp, and within one hundred yards of the road on the slope of a hill, there was a small but high tower, with only one small door, which was about eight feet from the base; three men were concealed in it.
who suffered the column and some of the baggage to pass, and then opened their fire. Fortunately a guard over some stores was passing at the time, and four men who were sent up to the tower, pointed their muskets upwards, and brought down one of the assailants; a fire lighted below induced the other two to come down, one of whom was killed close to the door, while the other succeeded in getting to a distance of forty yards, when a shot from one of the sepoys killed him on the spot. The enemy were strongly posted on the hills on three sides of us, and a number of small parties of from four to twenty men were prowling about, exercising their jebails, whenever any one came within range.

This day our picquets were necessarily increased; three times were the front picquets fairly driven in, and three times, after being reinforced, did they drive the enemy back, and finally hold their position during the night against repeated attacks.

A little before sunset some fifteen hundred or two thousand men assembled on the hills on the left and rear of the camp. The second brigade was on the left and had a picquet of eighty men on its flank; two guns were sent down to this picquet. At the same time a message was sent by General Nott to Brigadier Stacy requesting him to take a party of any men who might be ready, and drive off the enemy. A hundred and twenty bayonets from H. M. 41st and about as many of the 42nd and 43d Bengal Light Infantry were ready accoutred; with these the Brigadier moved towards the hills. A second party of similar strength was to follow as soon as ready. The Brigadier divided the party equally and directed them to go by two routes and meet on the hill occupied by the enemy. It was dark by the time they reached it, and the enemy had fled and taken up a position on a range further back. Both parties pushed on in silence for the next range, which was particularly steep; the summit was gained, but the enemy had again retreated. Brigadier Stacy halted the men for a few minutes to give them breath, and then faced about to return to camp, about two miles from which he fell in with the supports and, subsequently with a party of cavalry which the Major General had sent to his assistance. The whole party reached camp at 9 p. m.

About midnight the enemy attacked the left picquets; the Cavalry patrols were driven in. The officer on duty called in the advanced
By Division Orders of yesterday, the General sounded at 4½ and the Assembly at 5¼. The force moved off in the usual order. The only difference to be noted was in the detail of the rear guard, which instead of a wing, was, in consequence of the increased numbers and boldness of the enemy the last two days, increased to a complete Regiment of Infantry. The 38th Native Infantry, under Captain Burncy, was on this duty. The rear guard this day, commanded by Captain Burncy, consisted of two guns from Anderson's Horse Artillery under Lieutenant Frank Turner; 250 Christie's Horse under Lieutenant Chamberlain, and the 38th Native Infantry under Captain Burncy. As soon therefore as the force moved, the necessary arrangements were made for the protection of the baggage. The enemy's strength appeared pretty equally divided; their detachment to the right and in front of the old encamping ground was strongest in Cardry. Lieutenant Pocklington and Lieutenant Forquason with about 200 men were therefore placed on the left between the baggage and crescent shaped range of hills, which had been the scene of contention the day before, and on which the enemy were now in force. Lieutenant Napier was sent with 100 men to reinforce the Lohanee guard. It consisted of a Soohadar, Jemadar, four Hazildars, four Naiks and eighty men under a Native officer, selected for this particular service; their duty was to watch over the Lohanees, to see that they did not take away the cattle when grazing, or the camels, loads and all, which it was discovered they intended to do on the march. The men opposed to Brigadier Stacy yesterday were chiefly Lohanees. The guns, the Cavalry and the remainder of the Infantry, formed the main body of the rear guard, ready to give assistance in whatever direction it should be required.

The baggage, stores and ammunition were moving off; the arrangements for its protection were just completed, when a Lohanee...
camel driver fired off his matchlock. The enemy, who were seated on the hill on the left, instantly rose up and descended, shouting and flourishing their swords. They collected at the bottom of the hill and opened a very heavy ill-directed fire on the flankers under Lieutenant Pocklington and Forquason. They were coming on however in such a heavy body that the Officer commanding the rear guard moved the guns down towards them with a reinforcement of 150 bayonets; this had the effect of sending them back to the foot of the hills. It was subsequently discovered that the matchlock fired by the Lohanees in our camp was a signal to show the enemy in what direction they were to be found.

As the baggage and stores moved off, Lieutenant Pocklington's party marched parallel with it on the left flank. The ground being clear, the main body moved also; they were but a short time in motion when the two parties united and followed the rear, incessantly firing their jezails and yelling out their abuse of the Christian dogs.

The fear of punishment from the guns kept the main body out of range for some time, though the chief who commanded was distinctly observed riding about to the different groups with some well mounted followers, carrying white flags, encouraging them in advance. As the rear guard proceeded, they observed several jinies ride those in the rear from the hills on the left. The number of the enemy was estimated at two thousand five hundred in front on the right of the old camp, and about two thousand in the rear. By the time the rear guard reached camp, their number was nearly doubled.

About three miles from the old ground the first serious attack was made on the rear guard. The enemy moved as usual, pretty smartly at first; the Cavalry and Infantry shouting and bellowing like mad men, mixed up more like a crowd than an army. The balls from their long jezails began to tell; they exhibited the appearance of a charge and the guns were unlimbered and every thing was prepared to give them a warm reception; but the enemy, finding the column halted and ready to receive them, shortened their pace, and pulled up at a distance of about 5 or 600 yards; our Infantry moved right and left out of the way of the guns, which were all ready loaded. Four shots were sufficient to send the enemy flying; still it is but justice to them to say those four shots told severely amongst them; several horses were seen without riders, and great confusion ensued. I am not disposed to say that the Artillery had not had their share in the battle, but they were much too far to do much service. The Infantry teachers this day last menstrual with the enemy, who had been skirring all the way to our rear. Captain Uran brought his detachment into camp also. It would be unfair to the enemy to say that we sent off the enemy, but for his excellent conduct the day's battle was won.

14th September, 1843.

As we moved the encamping ground, the enemy was distinctly seen drawn up with as much regularity as our own, and about five hundred, their right resting on a precipitous hill, and their left on a deep valley running stream, but with banks perpendicular in most places was completely covered with the enemy's tents. The whole concealed a second detachment, and the main body was hidden behind the Cavalry. There was a real intention to dispute our further retreat, so strong, that the General moved the 12-pounders a mile in advance, the 18-pounders were moved nearer, and our cavalry and other moved through the pass to the right of this range of hills, leading to Midam. The Jemiliches, concealed behind the rocks with the activity of mules, then crossed the open ground between it and the hill, and heights moved down towards these two posts. As soon as the enemy broke up, General Hun man was called up, and the second Brigade of Infantry and the Artillery under Brigadier Scry were ordered to move parallel with the rest of the force.
without riders, and great confusion ensued. I believe it is acknowledged that our Artillery had had such constant practice that a bad shot was seldom made.

The Infantry flankers this day had resuant work. The guns were brought into play three times before we reached camp. It was one series of skirmishing all the way, yet not a volley was taken off. Captain Murry brought his detachment into camp about 2 p.m., and great credit was awarded him for his conduct in not only keeping off the enemy, but for his excellent protection of the baggage.

BIN-I-BADAM.

14th September, 1842.

As we neared the encamping ground, the enemy's Cavalry were distinctly seen drawn up with as much regularity as generally appertains to Afghan manoeuvres, their right resting on a very high and precipitous hill, and their left on a deep Nullah with a shallow running stream, but with banks perpendicular in most places. The hill above was completely covered with the enemy's Jezailchees—while the nullah concealed a second detachment, and a third party of Infantry was hidden behind the Cavalry. There was so much appearance of a real intention to dispute our further progress, their position was so strong, and their wild hurrahing and frantic gestures so incessant, that the General prepared his force for work. Leslie's troop of Bombay Horse Artillery was the first to open fire; every shot told admirably, and the enemy were immediately in confusion. Their Horse took a direction along the hills and never reined in till they were well out of the range of our shot. They separated about a mile in advance, one party going across the valley to the right, whilst the other moved through the pass to the left, which lies at the end of this range of hills, leading to Maidan.

The Jezailchees concealed behind the Cavalry scrambled up the rocks with the activity of monkeys; those in the nullah skulked across the open ground between it and the hill, whilst those on the heights moved down towards these two parties to cover their retreat. As soon as the enemy broke up, General Nott moved forward. The second Brigade of Infantry and the troop of Irregular Horse Artillery under Brigadier Stacy were ordered to cross the nullah and move parallel with the rest of the force. The firing from the hills
was incessant. General Netts had ordered Captain White with the 8th Light Company to disperse the Jezdellies. The hill in their possession almost commanded the encamping ground. After a momentary survey of the position, Leslie’s Horse Artillery, and Blood’s nine-pounders were directed to shell the enemy on the heights, whilst our gallant Light Companies assailed them in face of a very hot fire. Our men succeeded in capturing the heights which commanded the road, but there was one isolated high peak still in the possession of the enemy. It was found to watch our men and those of the enemy approaching as near as possible and firing at each other from behind fragments of rock.

The Cavalry with Leslie’s troop of Horse Artillery were sent down to disperse the body of Cavalry which had separated from their comrades and moved to the right, across the valley, and halted; they would not wait for the Horse Artillery; Major Delanerie therefore tried them with Cavalry only. Leaving the guns, the Cavalry broke into a gallop and moved steadily towards them. The enemy immediately broke and galloped off, some in one direction and some in another, and our men consequently pulled up and returned to camp.

One of Captain Blood’s wagons was upset under the hill and remained there a long time before it could be righted. The enemy kept up a constant dropping fire on the party employed in setting it to rights, and seeing the troops move into camp, grew bold and in some way descended the hill and rendered it necessary for us to send out the Grenadier Company of the 43d Native Infantry to drive them up the hill again. The camp was kept on the alert all day.

Captain Burney, commanding the rear guard, succeeded in bringing every thing safe into camp, but this brought such an accession to the ranks of the enemy, that the eighteen-pounders were ordered to be got ready for duty at 4 P.M. to clear the front and left of the second Brigade, whilst some light guns were moved to the right of the camp in order to accompany a small force sent to drive the enemy from a position they had taken up in that direction. They succeeded; for the moment the enemy observed our party move from camp, they retired.

The practice of the eighteen-pounders was very good, but day closed, and we were surrounded on three sides by the enemy. As soon as it was dark, they sent down parties of men who gave us no small alarm...
Our advanced sentries were posted in the nullah and could shoot at the enemy who were too well screened from a return fire, but these Jezailchees invariably ensonce their men and cover them in front. Our men could neither punish nor check them. About 8 p.m. the enemy commenced descending the hill in a body by a winding path opposite the centre of the second Brigade, yelling as usual like savages. A white flag which had been most actively carried about the whole day, was seen, and glimpses slightly caught of a mass of people around it; the moon was behind the hill.

When evening closed, it was supposed that their attack would be in this direction; for the only other road down was in front of Anderson's troop of Horse Artillery. The eighteen-pounders were therefore loaded and laid for an open spot where the road for fifteen or twenty yards was void of any cover. As the white flag reached this spot, one of the eighteen-pounders was fired, and the infernal yells which had been kept up, ceased in an instant; a most profound silence followed. The Jezailchees also ceased firing, and, wonderful to say, not another shot was fired on either side during the whole of the night. Various were the stories we received on the following day; the most probable was that their leader, a bigotted Moollah, had persuaded the people to a night attack on our camp; that he was descending towards us with his white flag, when at the spot just mentioned he halted to see if his men were well locked up. Just at this moment our eighteen-pounder was fired right into the midst of the party and killed the bigot and many of his followers, besides wounding many others; they decided therefore that it was not a propitious hour, and retired from further aggression that night.
the hills as if to take the road directly down the valley, compelling Lieutenant Colonel Lane with the 2nd Native Infantry to the right to occupy the hills, commanding the gunners leading to Maidan. The enemy were in parties on the hills. Three batteries of two guns each, about three quarters of a mile apart, opened on some of their heaviest bodies, while the column moved steadily on. As soon as the head of the column was in line with the gunners, General Nutt wheeled to the left and moved down direct upon it. An old castle strongly placed on a high and isolated rock, above the bed of the stream, held out for some time; but the guns soon found a convenient spot and opened on it while our light Companies made a sally right and left to get at them, as soon as the shot should make a path or drive them out. The enemy denied the castle and joined their friends on some exceedingly high hills in their rear; these were stormed and taken, but not without loss, and the enemy not only kept up a sharp fire on our men ascending, but pushed large stones over the sides of the hills, which, rolling down with fearful violence, carried everything before them. Both sides of the ghaut were now in our possession, and the column passed over to Maidan without further resistance. I consider Maidan the finest valley we have passed through during the campaign.

REAR GUARD FROM BEN-A-BADAM TO MAIDAN.

Thursday, 15th September, 1842.

The rear guard this morning consisted of two guns from the nine-pounder Horse Battery under Lieutenant Terry, a party of the 1st Irregular Cavalry with Captain Halden and Lieutenant Travers, and the 43d Native Infantry (less the Light Company) under Major Nash. Major Nash as the senior Officer commanded the whole party. The enemy were on the alert on all sides. Their greatest strength was on the right and front of the camp; they were strung on the hills to the rear of the camp, but as Major Nash had placed a Company in the nullah which skirted the road, they could not come down. As soon as day broke Major Nash made his arrangements; the guns had only to be wheeled round. The Cavalry were divided, and placed on the flanks and the 43d moved up to the guns, the point threatened by the enemy. The attack commenced by some Jezailshaus at-
tempting to gain a position on the rear and left which enfiladed the nullah in which the Company of the 43d as flankers kept the enemy from entering the camp by the rear. It was necessary to drive them back. Lieutenant Trotter, with another Company, was detached on this duty and drove off the enemy; but not till they had exchanged several shots, followed by loss on both sides.

The strong party on the right and front left the low hill on which they had assembled, and marshalled on the plain; the white flag was present and moving in every direction. Before General Scott moved off, he sent for Major Nash and desired him to send small parties through the camp to enforce greater alacrity in loading the cattle; it proved a very proper precaution, for the enemy appeared resolved to make an attempt on the baggage stores and Gates.

Before all the baggage was off, Major Nash was forced to check the main body of the enemy by a few round shot from the nine-pounders. When the baggage was then, the two flanking Companies were called in and the rear guard moved off. The enemy made their first attack on both our flanks, and afforded us a very creditable sample of their bravery. They came on steadily and not a man turned till our musquets began to tell. Lieutenants Trotter and Holroyd then charged the enemy very successfully on their flanks, and they turned and fled. It was in vain for our men to follow, and they therefore contented themselves with firing into the enemy as long as they were within shot; these two Companies suffered considerably in the affair. The right flankers not only held their own, but also drove back their assailants with considerable loss.

Failed in this attack, they once more attempted to get up a charge on the column; as soon as their resolution bore a substantive appearance, the guns were got ready, screened by the rear Company. When Lieutenant Terry considered the enemy within proper distance, the rear Company fired right and left, and the guns opened; the first shot was a cruel specimen of his skill and experience; it burst in front of the enemy, committing dreadful havoc. The second shot was equally successful, and burst amongst the enemy who had turned on receiving the first. Most unfortunately the second shot broke the axle of the gun; the right gun was advanced a few paces without any fuss, whilst a Company of sepoys placed before the broken one, concealed our misfortune from the immediate view of the
enemy. But when they halted and faced us again, it was very evident they concluded something had gone wrong; for preparations were renewed for another attack.

Captain Matthews volunteered to carry a message to the General, and he was despatched to say that the enemy were strong and bold, that it was utterly impossible to stop the baggage, and that a gun having broken down, not a man could be spared from it. Major Nash therefore begged that the broken gun might be replaced by a fresh one and were reinforcements sent to give protection to the baggage.

Lieutenant Terry bestowed his attention on the gun, and now and then, as any body of the enemy approached, gave them a round shot or a shrapnel from the front gun. The broken gun was taken off its carriage and slung under a wagon, the wheels and carriage were packed on camels, and when they were all loaded, they moved on, followed by parties of Jezailchers on three sides, who now and then sent in a long shot.

On the arrival of Captain Matthews at General Kott’s, two nine pounders were ordered down immediately under escort of some of Captain Christie’s Cavalry and two Companies, 42nd Native Infantry. They joined the main body of the rear guard about half way and moved with them. Matters went on smoothly till the rear guard began to ascend the glair looking into the beautiful valley of Maidan. Here the enemy’s force united and attempted to disturb our ascent. On a favourable spot some way up, the guns were placed in position for the last time this day, and a few shot drove the enemy far off.

The rear guard were not further molested; great credit was given to Major Nash and his detachment for this day’s work. No order was issued on the subject, but General Kott said he should take care and bring it to the favourable notice of Government. We lost 18 in the 43rd Native Infantry. Christie’s Horse and the 42nd Native Infantry also suffered. The total killed and wounded were 63, and 24 horses.

\[\text{\textit{IAVALLAT.}}\]

\textit{Thursday, 29th September, 1848.}

General Pollock, having resolved to punish Ameenoollah Khan, and his party, and at the same time to disperse the enemy’s forces in Khostan before he turned his back upon Cabul, directed the assembly
of a force under Major General McCaskill for offensive operations in the Kohistan. For this purpose General Pollock placed at Major General McCaskill's disposal, from his own force, two Squadrons H. M. 3rd Light Dragoons, one Squadron 1st Bengal Light Cavalry, Brigadier Tullock's Brigade, minus the 60th Native Infantry, and Captain Broadfoot's Sappers and Miners.

The following force under Brigadier Stacy was sent by General Nott to co-operate with the above. Two 18-pounders battering guns under Lieutenant Cornish, Captain Blood's nine-pounder, horse battery, Captain Christie's corps of Irregular Cavalry, 2nd Brigade, H. M. 41st Foot, and the 42d and 43d Bengal Native Infantry.

On the 26th September these two detachments joined at Khoja Rawash under the command of General McCaskill. We marched to near Zimmerree on the 27th, and encamped within four miles of Jalaliff on the morning of the 28th.

In the evening the General accompanied by Major Sanders and the general staff, with a reconnoitring party, went down to the left of the enemy's position to ascertain the style of country and to gain information as to the strength and position of the enemy. Their skirmishers, concealed in the ravines and water courses, practised long shots as usual. The firing latterly became brisk, but at such long distances, but little damage was done on either side. The return of our party to camp was evidently looked upon as a retreat, and we subsequently found that the enemy had so considered it, and made a feast to commemorate it.

Jalaliff is a place of such wonderful strength that every one at Cabul had settled in his mind, that we should lose a vast number of men in capturing it. This being the received opinion, every precaution was taken, not simply to prevent a reverse, but to secure the place with as little loss as possible. Brigadiers and officers commanding the Cavalry and Artillery with the general staff, were ordered to meet by 8 a.m. at the Assistant Adjutant General's tent to receive their instructions for the attack on the following morning; opinions were invited, and some discussion on the plan of attack took place. The plan first submitted was abandoned, and the right of the enemy determined on as the point of attack instead of the left. In the morning of the 29th September, the bugle sounded at a quarter before 6. The two columns of attack were as follows:

II 2
Right column under Brigadier Tulloch.

Mountain train, Captain Backhouse.
Sappers and Miners, Captain Brodholt.
H. M. 6th Foot, Major Taylor, K. H.
90th Bengal Native Infantry, Major Halil.

Left column of attack under Brigadier Stacy.

Two 18-pounders, Lieutenant Cornish.
Blood's nine-pounders, horse battery.
H. M. 41st Foot, Major Browne.
42nd Native Infantry, Major Chesser.
43rd Native Infantry, Major Nash.

Major Simmons, H. M. 41st, commanded the reserve consisting of two squadrons H. M. 3rd Dragoons and one squadron 1st Light Cavalry under Major Lockwood, as senior officer, and a wing of H. M. 41st Foot under Brevet Major Cockran. Captain Christie, with his corps of irregular cavalry, gave protection to the baggage. We moved nearly along the whole of the enemy's line, which was concealed from right to left behind orchard walls, the right column receiving at intervals a long shot from the Jezailchees. The gardens round the fort of Istaliff form nearly a semicircle. When General McCaskell, after advancing about a mile and half, turned gently to the right and found the enemy's Jezails reached his column, he ordered two of Blood's nine-pounders from the left column, and drove them back. The enemy thus forced back one and all retired upon the village of Emilla which was perfectly crowded with men, howling, dancing and waving their swords in defiance. The two columns had moved steadily on without interruption; as they reached the village, the Light Companies were thrown out to drive back the enemy's skirmishers, and shortly after, seeing they had left several openings in the walls, "forward" was the word. The Light Companies of H. M. 9th and the 26th Native Infantry followed by the column, pushed gallantly forward under a very heavy fire. The left column had a devoir of some distance to make to gain the right of the village before the Light Companies of H. M. 41st and the 42nd and 43rd Native Infantry received the word "forward," when they rushed on. The remaining part of the column had to move considerably to the left, as the ground would not admit of the guns travelling direct on the line of action; besides which, a considerable body of cavalry were posted about a quarter of a mile beyond it on the enemy's outward flank.

The attack on the village of Emilla was as bold in design as spirited in its execution. The two columns one from General Tulloch's, and the other from General Nash's army, showed a spirit of chivalrous emulation of each other, which was continued from this moment throughout the day; and no doubt led in some measure to success. Certainly the right column not only retired but outflanked the village of Emilla before the left, but the left was hindered by the left because the enemy were driven away, and therefore more severely at this spot from the 42nd and 43rd, than at any place in the whole campaign, from being crowded together and within walking distance away. Emilla being taken and fired, both columns flying enemy over hills and through orchard walls, giving them time to pause.

The right column passed considerably to the castle of Istaliff, and, crossing the stream which runs to that place, entered the town at the South Entrance in the town must have lost courage from Emilla. We were delayed there some time for a man to carry the intelligence of the town, the scene which presented itself can only be understood; the foot path which lead from Istaliff, winding over the range of hills, divided kistans, was crowded with women, wending their paths, scoured out of the sides of the hills, whose dresses reaching from head to foot gave these the appearance of masts. Antwerpish and his people in the night before, were among the first to fly.

The right column entered the town in two divisions. After the left column had completed the passage, the village of Emilla, a very respectable body of the enemy posted on their extreme right composed both of horse and foot, were unmolested and in possession of so considerable a position, would have been imprudent. It must also be said that it was impossible to take the guns much further, as the gardens which lie between this place and old Istaliff were...
action; besides which, a considerable body of Cavalry were posted about a quarter of a mile beyond it on the enemy's outward flank.

The attack on the village of Emilla was as bold in design as spirited in its execution. The two columns, one from General Pollock's, and the other from General Nott's army, showed a spirit of chivalrous emulation of each other, which was continued from this moment throughout the day; and no doubt led in some measure to our success. Certainly the right column not only reached but entered the village of Emilla before the left, but this made it harder work for the left, because the enemy were driven on that column, and they suffered more severely at this spot from the cross fire of the two columns than at any place or in any action during the campaign, and from being crowded together and within walls, could not easily get away. Emilla being taken and fired, both columns pushed after the flying enemy over hills and through orchards and gardens, without giving them time to pause.

The right column passed considerably to the right of the old castle of Istaliff, and, crossing the stream which runs at the foot of that place, entered the town at the South East corner. The people in the town must have lost courage from the first vigorous attack on Emilla. We were delayed there about half an hour; allowing this time for a man to carry the intelligence of its storm and capture to the town, the scene which presented itself on our approach to the city, may be understood; the foot path which leads from the back of Istaliff, winding over the range of hills, dividing Kohistan from Toorkistan, was crowded with women, wending their way up the zigzag paths, scamped out of the sides of the hills, while their snow white dresses reaching from head to foot gave them the appearance of a vast cavalcade of nuns. Ameenoollah and his party, so full of boasting the night before, were among the first to fly.

The right column entered the town in two divisions in a parallel line. After the left column had completed the attack on the fortified village of Emilla, a very respectable body of the enemy still appeared on their extreme right composed both of horse and foot. To leave these un molested and in possession of so commanding a position, would have been imprudent. It must also be remembered that it was impossible to take the guns much further, as the hills and gardens which lie between this place and old Istaliff were scarcely
passable for camels. It would consequently have been necessary to leave the two eighteen-pounders and four of Blood's nine-pounders, and as the enemy were ten to one, and had a fortified town to fight behind, we could not afford to leave even a wing to look after the guns.

Brigadier Stacy therefore ordered on the guns; the four guns of the nine-pounders, housed battery, were soon within range of the enemy, escorted by two Companies of the 43d Native Infantry. The Brigade moved on gently towards the town, and the eighteen-pounders were advancing steadily and near as hand. The first shot from the nine-pounders fell short and was welcomed by the enemy with a hurrah and brandishing of swords as usual, but the second shot was sent in amongst them and confusion immediately ensued. They fell back under the brow of the hill, and some of the horsemen took up a position on a hill about 100 or 200 yards in the rear. It was found that the nine-pounders could not reach the enemy at this distance, though the excellent practice of Blood's guns dropped the shot so close over the summit of the nearest hill under which the enemy had taken refuge, that they retreated again and joined their companions on the hill to the rear. By this time the eighteen-pounders were in position and opened; they fired but three rounds and never was practice superior; such shot told. In a moment it was a case of "suave qui peut," and we lost sight of this body never to see them again, at least on that day. An order was sent to the two Companies of the 43d Native Infantry to remain with the guns, and the Brigade then pushed on at a rapid pace.

The light Companies of H. M. 41st and the 42d and 43d Native Infantry had reached the first enclosure as the column crowned the top of the last hill. The 2d Brigade had made up their ground as they climbed over the first enclosure. H. M. 9th under Lieut.-Col. Taylor and 26th Native Infantry under Major Huish were on the right. To preserve order over such ground was utterly impossible; the greatest attention of commanding Officers was necessary to prevent our suffering from our own fire, so densely crowded were the groves and masses of fruit trees. The enemy, outflanked by the right column, and flying towards the town, fell in great numbers. Their fire was too high the whole day; indeed when once we got into an enclosure, and they had fired their matchlocks, they ran. Our men were particularly cool and steady; and, considering that the Kohistanis were under a cross fire from the village of Emilla to the old castle of Jalta, it is not astonishing that so many of them fell between these two places. We were so close all this time that our men never gave the enemy time to reload.

When the two columns entered the town of Ismail a firing had almost ceased, but all parties parleyed for the moment. When about two-thirds of the way up the streets were met as the streets crossed. One great body of the enemy, as the second Brigade passed, on a spur below as we reached the same was charged by the enemy. In a moment the 26th and the 43d Native Infantry made off; it was the race that men of both Companies dealt the capture, though in the General's dispatch, it was of H. M. 9th Foot. Brigadier Talbot with H. M. 42nd Native Infantry went down a fire gun was captured; from which point Lieutenant Quarter Master General rode back to report the total defeat of the enemy and the capture.

Brigadier Stacy, on reaching the tample of Court yard with a large chasse ment outside, found and ordered all the women and children were collected. Only one woman was wounded during the day. It was with one of these parties that Evans was slain. He was standing with his men, when the Afghans reported some woman and children in a house. The mosque. Lieutenant Evans, who had succeeded one or two of these parties, again volunteered his name with six or eight men of H. M. 41st to bring the women and children. On approaching the house, he was shot dead. Just at this time Brigadier Stacy received orders and afterwards to take up a position with his Brigade as near as possible to it. He immediately ordered possession of the fire enemy;
calmly cool and steady; and, considering that the Kohistaniases were under a cross fire from the village of Emilla to the old castle of Ista-
liff, it is not astonishing that so many of them fell between these two
places. We were so close all this time that our men never gave the
enemy time to reload.

When the two columns entered the town of Istaliff, the firing had
almost ceased, but six parties pushed on for the fort on the summit.
When about two-thirds of the way up, the heads of the two columns
met as the streets crossed. One gun had been found deserted by the
enemy, as the second Brigade passed old Istaliff. Another was seen
on a spur below as we reached the summit of the town; it was still
manned by the enemy. In a moment the Light Companies of H. M.
31st and the 43rd Native Infantry made off to charge it, and so equal
was the race that men of both Companies claimed the credit of its
capture, though in the General's Dispatch, it was given to an Officer
of H. M. 9th Foot. Brigadier Tulloch with H. M. 9th and a party
of the 26th Native Infantry went down to the spur, on which the last
gun was captured; from which point Lieutenant Mayne, Deputy As-
cistant Quarter Master General, rode back to General McCaskill to
report the total defeat of the enemy and the capture of the town of Is-
thaliff.

Brigadier Stacy, on reaching the summit of the town, fixed on a
Court yard with a large cheboutra outside, for his Head Quarters,
and thither all the women and children were conducted and placed in
safety. Small parties from each Regiment were sent for this purpose
in every direction, and as many as from 100 to 150 women and chi-
ldren were collected. Only one woman was wounded and one killed
during the day. It was with one of these parties that Lieutenant
Evans was slain. He was standing with his men, when one of the
Afghans reported some women and children in a house below the
principal mosque. Lieutenant Evans, who had successfully conduct-
ed one or two of these parties, again volunteered his services, and
went with six or eight men of H. M. 41st to bring up the women
and children. On approaching the house, he was shot dead.

Just at this time Brigadier Stacy received orders to fire the city
and afterwards to take up a position with his Brigade for the night as
near as possible to it. He immediately ordered parties to fire every
house, and to begin with that which was still firing on our men; of
the four Afghans who had defended it, three escaped by a dead run, but
the fourth was killed by a shot the moment he showed himself.

Khan Shereen Khan came from General McCaskill's camp and
gave Brigadier Stacy considerable assistance in collecting the women
and children, and about 2 o'clock the poor creatures were conducted
to a fortified garden close to the foot of the town, which had been
spared as belonging to a relation of Shereen Khan's, under an escort
commanded by a European Officer. As soon as this escort returned,
the General called in all the parties and moved to the castle
of old Iftalif. On the 5th a party under the orders of Major San-
ders was sent to complete the destruction of the town, and before
evening it was one blaze and continued burning the whole night and
part of the next day.

March from Khoord Cargul Pass to Tazeen over the Iftaliff.
Sunday, 15th October, 1842.

The force moved in the usual order. The rear guard, commanded
by Captain Leeson, 42d Native Infantry, consisted of two guns, 200
Irregular Cavalry and the 42d Native Infantry. The General beat
at five a.m. and the Assembly at six. This march over the Iftaliff to
Tazeen, fourteen miles of most difficult ground, I look upon
as one of the most distressing marches we made. The column
pushed on in the same reckless haste as usual; we passed five bodies
of sepoys at the first dip down towards the Pass, and led to the
narrow valley at the head of which lies Tazeen. No precautionary
measures were taken, though the mangled bodies and remnants of
baggage, bore witness that the Afghans had taken advantage of the
ground on the previous day. Nothing was thought of until the col-
umn was about half way through the pass, when an order was re-
ceived for the two Brigades to send back 100 men each to the head
of the pass; this was at a few minutes past 3 p.m. The column
reached camp at 4½ p.m.

We must now return to the rear guard. It was 9 a.m. before they
were off the ground. No sooner were they clear of the hill on the
right of our camp, and round which the road lay, than they saw horse
men in small parties on their right evidently watching their progress.

A Company was sent on to the Tinge in case the column should
have left it unguarded; but as no one had been left, the Company
was placed on a hill on the right which completely commanded it. It was so crammed with cattle and baggage that the rear guard was forced to halt. On the right, several very respectable bodies of men were observed moving ahead and to the right of the road, with the evident intention of attacking the rear guard at the entrance into the pass. The rear guard was halted at this spot an hour and a half. Soon after moving off, the horsemen, finding we had taken possession of the heights of the Thungee, moved across to our rear and gradually neared us, firing long shots into the column; we were therefore forced to open the guns on them. It was 2 p.m. as we reached the top of the Huft Kotul; here we observed the pass crammed with the cattle and baggage, and seeing it would be in vain to proceed, Captain Lesson sent the Cavalry to look out on the right, and directed two Companies to proceed ahead and secure the heights. Whilst halted here, the enemy collected in great numbers, coming as close as they dared. Some few shots having been fired into the column, it was deemed advisable, before entering the defile, to send these people as far off as possible. When therefore the time approached for moving on, Lieutenant Terry dropped some shrapnel among them and closed the practice with two round shot.

At 3 p.m. we first heard firing in the pass; an hour after we commenced descending. The Cavalry were at this point ordered into camp, being no longer of any service. About half a mile from the water course at the drop into the pass, we were forced to halt again; the enemy grew so bold that it was found necessary to crown the several heights with parties. It was twilight as we began descending into the pass when those in charge of the heights were ordered to drop down and form in the rear, as the rear guard column came abreast of their position. The column had scarcely reached the bottom of the pass before the enemy, who had been driven off, by the Artillery, collected again and rushed to the heights from which we had descended, and poured in a heavy fire. A party of the enemy had taken possession of a small hill which could only be seen as the column reached the water course; the nearest Company was ordered to drive them off; and the duty was most satisfactorily performed.

The body of the enemy, who had halted at the top of the hill and fired into us as we reached the bottom, were encouraging each other to descend. They had evidently a most wholesome dread of the
danger of coming too near; but they screwed up their courage at last, and as the last half of the column was disappearing to the left, rushed down the road, yelling and brandishing their swords as usual. The rear companies were alert and stood ready to receive them, and the guns once more opened and punished them severely, on which they fled.

Close to the water-course we met a reinforcement of 200 bayonets, sent back to the assistance of the rear guard by General Satt. A Company had been sent on to encourage the servants not to desert their charge. As the ridge of hills was by no means continuous, every break afforded shelter to an enemy, and we were obliged to capture the heights, first on the right and then on the left.

The enemy had so frightened the followers, and the servants in particular, that the greatest exertions were necessary to keep the men with the cattle. When any camel was wounded, it not only created a stoppage in the line, but there was such an uproar that the scene can only be imagined. The Company which had been sent ahead was constantly forced to drive small parties off the hill before the battle and baggage could pass on.

It was dark, and down in the hollow darker than above. We were crawling on at a snail's pace; the advance party challenging our pickets on the heights; enemy's shots were constantly exchanged, and the enemy fired at the mass of baggage or into the column. Our men sent a bullet at every match which was seen glowing as the Jezailies moved along the hills. The detail of killed and wounded will show, that notwithstanding it was night, the enemy could find the direction of the column. The rear party of the enemy was easily disposed of; but those to the right and left still plied their jezails, and it was found necessary to drive them out before the column could proceed. Four Companies therefore were told off for this duty, and they succeeded in driving the enemy from the heights and maintaining themselves there. Our loss was considerable, but the enemy must also have suffered, for they were not met again. Every thing being arranged to meet a second attack, attention was given to the baggage. Many servants had deserted their camels altogether; several camels and servants had been wounded. In short what with darkness and the rush to get forward, little could be done to assist them. The advance Company protected the baggage in its vicinity, but it was judg-
necessary to keep possession of the position then held to ensure
the safety of the rest. The ammunition camels of the detachment,
which had been placed for safety between the advance and the column,
contrived in the attack to get away. As soon as this was discovered,
it was resolved to send forward to camp both for ammunition and
doolies; for the killed and wounded far exceeded the carriages we
had with us. Lieutenant Holroyd, 43rd Light Infantry, volun-
teered to carry a message to General Nott. Captain Leeson accept-
ed his services and desired him simply to give a statement of our
present position, our total ignorance of the distance we had still to
traverse or the nature of the ground; and to request doolies and
ammunition to be sent immediately.

The cattle baggage having moved on, and no sign of the enemy
appearing, the rear guard prepared to follow. The parties on the
heights were called down, when the fire on the column was immedi-
ately opened; and the heights were instantly re-occupied. As it was
found that we could not carry off our killed and wounded, Captain
Leeson resolved to wait where he was till the doolies should arrive
from camp. The reinforcement consisting of H. M. 49th and two
Companies of H. M. 41st arrived at about 9 p. m. with the doolies
and ammunition; the killed and wounded were placed in the former,
and the pouches of the men replenished from the latter. Firing had
ceased since the last reoccupation of the heights. All being ready,
the picquets were called in, and they moved into camp without fur-
ther opposition. It was close on 10 p. m. when the rear guard reach-
ed camp.

March from Tazeen to Sen Baha.
Sunday, 16th October, 1842.

The force marched from Tazeen this morning at 6 a. m. in the
usual order.

Before we quitted the ground, the enemy appeared on the extreme
left in parties of ten and twenty. From the nature of the ground, the
camp had been necessarily pitched in one line, the right resting on the
line of mark, ready to move off the next morning. The enemy were
on the hills on both sides of the valley, but in very small numbers and
the main column and rear guard both reached camp between four and five miles with scarcely the exchange of a shot.

At such short range it was necessary from the movements of the gun to take possession of the heights both in front and rear; we were again forced to pitch in one line; the quartermaster and rear guards, considerably increased and under European officers, took possession of the heights, and a strong picket of 100 men, formed across the valley at each flank, rendered our position perfectly secure.

Notwithstanding most positive orders had been issued, that no camels should go out to graze, several came up, having nothing to give their cattle to eat, and having the option of leaving them to die of hunger or to graze 200 yards from our advanced post of the right picket. At first, about forty Afghans were seen stealing down the hills towards the camels; a second and third party followed, and some four or five camels were carried off. The soldiers made little resistance, and a Sergeant and his party were sent off, who succeeded in recovering the camels. It was chiefly composed of raw recruits, and they had scarcely turned their faces back when a shot amongst them drew attention to their right, where they saw a party of Afghans. It was in vain for the Sergeant to call them back. They marched off rapidly, and the non-commissioned officer followed them, hoping to bring them off. Many officers were watching with their glasses the scene which followed. The Afghans halted up the hills and the Europeans, not one to six; after them, the firing was very smart on both sides. It was hoped at first, that a party with a bugler would be able to call them back, and one was accordingly sent off. In the mean time so many Afghans assembled to encounter the Europeans that an order was sent to the right flank picket on the height to move quickly to the assistance of their comrades. They had commenced an animated discharge of shots, when the party from the picket hearing the firing, pushed on and coming round the point of a conical hill immediately saw the danger of their comrades, and with a thorough English hurrah, soon drew off the attention of the Afghans. It subsequently appeared that our men would not leave the enemy till, as the Sergeant explained, "the boys had handed them over the side of the hill."
They returned without the loss of a man, but had a severe lecture for their pains.

*March through the Jugdulluck Pass to Somanth, on the 19th October, 1842.*

This march nearly proved fatal to the famous sandal wood gates of the temple of Somnath, which were on the point of falling a second time into the hands of the faithless. The Assembly beat at 4 a.m.; but was not heard by the second Brigade; it was consequently nearly break of day before Brigadier Stacy moved off. The camp at Jugdulluck had been pitched in one line, the extreme of the left close to the entrance into the pass, and but this one road to it, the ground swampy in many places, and stony and irregular in others. The pass was so crowded with baggage, cattle, &c. that it was impossible the Brigade could pass them in this state; a party was therefore pushed ahead by single files accompanied by the Provost Serjeant, with orders to stop the baggage. This was accordingly done, the Brigade passed by files to the opening left for it, and then formed column. When nearly at the head of the pass, there was a halt occasioned by the steepness of the ascent. It was also found that the infantry column had moved on more than an hour before, without leaving a single man on the heights on either flank for the protection of the Artillery, the Gates, the baggage or any thing else. Brigadier Stacy immediately sent orders to Major Nash, to take possession with his troops of the large conical hill, about a mile from the outlet of the pass, and to detach parties to commanding heights on both sides, to communicate with the pickets of the rear guard, with which it was supposed Major Simmons would crown the heights previous to entering the pass. He was also directed to move on with his own in advance, as Major Simmons’s party came in sight; but always to keep up a communication with the rear. Captain Anderson’s two guns were also placed in position to command the high ground on the right of the pass. The Jugdulluck pass is exceedingly narrow, and the hills forming its sides though not very high, are covered with holly trees. At the same time a Company of the 35th Native Infantry under a Subadar, which had been sent back by General Nott, was placed by Brigadier Stacy under Captain Anderson’s orders to remain by the gates.
Matters having been thus arranged, Brigadier Stacy proceeded on with the 42nd Native Infantry, and Leslie's and Turner's troops of Horse Artillery. The enemy were discovered on the right of a nullah, moving round to the pass; two guns of Captain Leslie's troop immediately opened on them and drove them up the hills; but being screened by the holly bushes, they could only be seen as they passed between the intervals. Here it was found that not a single file of Infantry was with Captain Leslie's Horse Artillery. The Brigadier therefore sent a note to General Nott describing the state of affairs. It should be noted, that although the 43d Native Infantry had been distributed along the heights, still the enemy made several attempts on the baggage, though without success. The road turned to the left at the bottom of the hill and ran along a water course with high mountains on one side and low undulating hills on the other.

Brigadier Stacy having resolved on leaving a party here, Captain Dalyell was selected for this duty, and placed with eighty rank and file at this spot. The Brigadier had no sooner moved on, than the enemy approached this post in considerable numbers, and made repeated attempts on the baggage, but were always driven back by our parties. Finding Captain Dalyell too much for them at this point, the enemy assembled in stronger force on another hill on the left, a little in advance, and from it opened a dropping fire on the baggage as it passed. The parties who had kept the enemy in check on the first hill, were too weak to cope with their very increased numbers on the second hill; Captain Dalyell therefore took the whole of his party along the bottom of the ravine, and stormed the height successfully, driving the Afghans down the other side, and killing several of them. He himself, whilst leading on his men about half way up, was severely wounded by a ball which passed through the wrist joint, but he never halted for a moment or relaxed his exertions.

Captain Dalyell had been ordered to move on with his men as he saw the 43d under Major Nash approaching, but he considered the possession of this last hill of the utmost consequence, and, instead of moving on, remained until Major Nash came up with the 43d Native Infantry, when he represented the advantages of holding the hill, which, if lost, might not be retaken with similar success. Major Nash declined to relieve Captain Dalyell's party, and that officer therefore resolved to remain, till Major Simmons should come up. He was
not only suffering great pain, but was faint and weak from loss of blood. Captain Matthews, of the 42d Native Infantry, volunteered to take command of Captain Dalyell’s party, and Major Nash passed on.

The rear guard this day was commanded by Major Simmons, H. M. 41st. He was detained in order to burst the two eighteen-pounders, which were destroyed at this place. It was nearly 8 A.M. before the ground was sufficiently clear of baggage to allow of this operation. The enemy were in considerable force in the rear and were silently waiting Major Simmons’s departure to determine their next attack. As soon as the baggage was clear of the ground, the men under cover, and the eighteen-pounders burst, Major Simmons withdrew the pickets; the ground was most difficult, and any mistake or hurry would have been followed by considerable loss. The Major moved with strong flanking parties crowning the heights, and with two Companies in rear of the guns. He marched in this order through the pass, and did not lose a single load, and had only one officer and five sepoys wounded. The holly bushes concealed the enemy and gave them a good opportunity of firing and flying before our men could punish them. At the head of the pass, Major Simmons found Captain Anderson with his two guns and the Company of the 38th N. I., left there by Brigadier Stacy: these were sent on, and the guns placed in position about 5 or 600 yards ahead, to enable the two guns of the rear guard and the parties on both sides of the pass to be withdrawn without loss. Major General McCaskill’s division had suffered severely at this point, and the dead bodies lying in the road shewed the necessity of precaution. The men already ahead descended right and left under cover of Captain Anderson’s guns which did great execution; for the enemy, unaware of the precautionary measures which had been adopted, rushed up the hill in a body, hoping to cut up our small parties before they could join the main body, and the guns opened on them with such effect, that our parties were enabled to join this column without the loss of a single man.

Whilst this was passing, a report from ahead stated that the baggage was attacked near the post commanded, in the first instance by Captain Dalyell, and afterwards by Captain Matthews. Captain Tayler was immediately sent off with the Cavalry and succeeded in re-
covering several of the bullocks and camels; many of the enemy were killed. Captain Matthews was watching the progress of Major Simmons as he issued from the pass, and was withdrawing his parties who had occupied the height, when several men ran towards his post, explaining that the Afghans were carrying off the Company’s bullocks. Captain Matthews, finding it was not far from his post, instantly took a party of thirty men, in the direction pointed out, and on proceeding about a quarter of a mile came on four of the enemy, driving five of the bullocks before them. They left the bullocks and fled. Captain Matthews still pushed on, though only one Havildar and two sepoys had been able to keep up with him; two Europeans had also followed. About a quarter of a mile further on, over an undulating country covered with stunted shrubs, he came to a narrow valley where more cattle were recovered. These were collected under a smart fire from theLoading the company of the 42d Native Infantry was posted early by General Nott on some hills to the right commanding the road on that side, and not very distant from our outpost on the hills above camp. There was no fighting beyond the hills last mentioned, but it was dark when Major Simmons and his rear guard reached camp. In his report of this day he only mentioned the two guns of Captain Anderson’s Horse Artillery under the personal command of that officer, as left by Brigadier Stacy to keep the pass; but he afterwards addressed a letter to the Brigadier on the subject of this oversight, and said that he considered the maintenance of the heights by the 43d Native Infantry as having been the means of saving a great
portion of the baggage, as well as of many lives; and that if these arrangements had not been made, it is impossible to say what would have been the result, or what the extent of our loss.

March through the Khyber Pass from Lundekana to Alee Muzjid.

Friday, 4th November, 1842.

No opposition was offered to Major General Plot's army in the Khyber pass, North of Lundekana. They marched from Dukhla to Lundekana without a shot being fired, but from the latter place to Jumrood, there was one continued scene of skirmishing.

Orders were issued on the 3d November, that the two Infantry Brigades should move together; but early in the morning of the 4th, Brigadier Stacy commanding the 2d Brigade was ordered to remain behind, and bring up the Artillery, and the sandal wood Gates of the temple of Somnauth. The advance, the Cavalry, the 1st or Brigadier Wymer's Brigade, and all but two guns reached the encamping ground at Alee Muzjid before Brigadier Stacy got clear of the head of the Lundekana pass, and when he did reach the top of the pass, he found himself without support. He had therefore to make arrangements, single handed, for the safety of his Brigade, the baggage, the gates and stores, scattered over an extent of from seven to ten miles.

He was not only encumbered with the gates, but embarrassed by the rush of every description of baggage, stores, camp followers, &c, in a state of the greatest alarm, and pushing forward with a reckless disregard of orders.

The advance, the General and his staff, the General's and the general staff baggage, as well as the 1st or Brigadier Wymer's Brigade of Infantry moved off at 6 a.m. It was advisable to give them a wide berth, as Captain Leslie's Troop of Bombay Horse Artillery had to follow them; and any check to the latter on a narrow and steep road, with a precipice on the right, might have led to the most disastrous consequences. The road from the base to the summit of the Lundekana pass is cut out of the side of the mountain, and of course conforms to its irregularities, with the exception of one or two places, where the action of the water, or the melting of the snows, having laid bare the rock, it had been found necessary to build up a
The road is not of one uniform breadth, but may be calculated on an average at from twelve to fourteen feet broad. Brigadier Stacy moved to the mouth of the only road leading to the summit of the pass, sufficient space having been given to Brigadier Wymer's Brigade. Captain Leslie's Troop of Bombay Horse Artillery started, leaving some distance between every gun and wagon. This Troop gained the top of the ascent without assistance. Next followed Anderson's irregular Horse Artillery. From the inferiority of the estate, they could not run up the guns of themselves. Working parties from H. M. 41st Foot and the 42d Native Infantry were accordingly stationed at particular points, both to act as guards and to assist the guns, half the men taking charge of the arms on any projecting ledge of rock, whilst the other half were on the drag ropes. Turner's Troop soon passed the difficulties below, and a Company of H. M. 41st Regiment saw them safe to the summit. The nine-pounders hoisted Battery commanded by Captain Blood followed. 'To take up the sandal wood Gates was a difficult task, and cost more time than even the nine-pounder battery; but by dint of hard labour and good humour, this mass of wood was dragged to the top of the pass. At the summit of it, but below, in a ravine, on the right, lay the famous Jel-lalabad gun "the Cazee," considered second in importance only to the "Zubber Jung," of Ghuznee. It was off its carriage, and as no means were available for bringing it on, Brigadier Stacy resolved to turn it where it lay. Whilst he was conversing with Major Simmons, and Brigade Major Dixon on the subject, Major Sotheby, commanding the Artillery with General Nott's Force, happened to come up. The Brigadier pointed out the necessity of destroying the gun, and was assured by that officer that it should be done. The Major detailed the arrangements which had been made for its destruction, and Brigadier Stacy, finding that powder had been left for the purpose and that the duty of bursting "the Cazee" had been entrusted to an Artillery Officer, felt satisfied. It was about 12 or 2 P.M. when Brigadier Stacy with the gates, and his Brigade, after most severe labour, reached the summit of Luchekana pass, which opens on the plain between that and the mouth of the long defile ending at Abe Muzjid. Not a gun or a Regiment was to be seen, and even the last two guns of Captain Blood's Battery, which had delayed the detachment considerably, had taken advantage of the level ground, and pushed on; it was subsequently found that they were in a hollow, about a mile and a half in advance, held in check by the enemy.

The great fatigue the men had undergone called for a halt, which was accordingly made; the arms were piled and the men allowed to take refreshments. The summit of a hill on the left was covered with armed men, but whether they were friends or foes could not be known, as it was discovered that both were dressed much alike. A strong party of Captain Thomas's jumilahs held the head of the pass. Sergeant Elliot was sent back by the Brigadier to bring one or two of Captain Thomas's men to speak on the subject. The Brigade was in the ground and the baggage had just gained the head of the pass when a Sergeant galloped up and reported that the last two of their wagons with Captain Blood, were about a mile above on a single Light Company, fairly held in check by the enemy, showed in force on all sides and had complete possession of the top. H. M. 41st Regiment under Major Simmons marched at their assistance, with orders not to advance until Brigadier Stacy should join them. Lieutenant Anderson returned with two smart men of Thomas's jumilahs, questioned as to the people on the hills to the left, immediately a "they are Affreeds, you bitter enemies, the men who murdered last Brigade." Captain Thomas's men at the head of the pass were too near to allow of the enemy's coming down to the spot near which the second Brigade had been a moment before. The baggage having been shifted to the right, moved on with the gates and his Brigade for about a mile, where he stationed the 42d Native Infantry under Clarke, on a commanding ground facing the height, with orders to keep a sharp look out after the enemy as well as on the Affreeds in front. Half a mile in advance of the Brigadier's detachment came up with the two last guns of nine-pounder Battery. The enemy was growing strong and moved on to a rising ground, where they held the 2nd Native Infantry under M. G. Martin at bay. The men were ordered to those given to the 42d N. I. Infantry at the last position and were volleys. An opening was made both to the right and front,
taken advantage of the level ground, and pushed on; it was subsequently found that they were in a hollow, about a mile and a half in advance, held in check by the enemy.

The great fatigue the men had undergone called for a halt, which was accordingly made; the arms were piled and the men allowed to take refreshment. The summit of a hill on the left was covered with armed men, but whether they were friends or foes could not be known, as it was discovered that both were dressed much alike. A strong party of Captain Thomas's jenrilichees held the head of the pass. Lieutenant Elliot was sent back by the Brigadier to bring one or two of Captain Thomas's men to speak on the subject. The Brigade was seated on the ground and the baggage had just gained the head of the column, when a Sergeant galloped up and reported that the last two guns and their waggons with Captain Blood, were about a mile ahead with only a single Light Company, fairly held in check by the enemy, who shewed in force on all sides and had complete possession of the road.

H. M. 41st Regiment under Major Simmons was immediately dispatched to their assistance, with orders not to proceed further on, until Brigadier Stacy should join them. Lieutenant Elliot quickly returned with two smart men of Thomas's jenrilichees, who being questioned as to the people on the hills to the left, instantly replied, "they are Affreeds, your bitter enemies, the men who attacked your last Brigade." Captain Thomas's men at the head of the pass were too near to allow of the enemy's coming down on the plains, at the spot near which the second Brigade had been halted.

The baggage having been shifted to the right, Brigadier Stacy moved on with the Gates and his Brigade for about three quarters of a mile, where he stationed the 42nd Native Infantry under Major Clarkson, on a commanding ground facing the hill aforementioned, with orders to keep a sharp look out after the baggage, right and left, as well as on the Affreeds in front. Half a mile from this post, the Brigadier's detachment came up with the two guns of Captain Blood's nine-pounder Battery. The enemy were retiring; and the force moved on to a rising ground, where Brigadier Stacy left a wing of the 42nd Native Infantry under Major Farrington with similar orders to those given to the 42nd Native Infantry at the last post. On advancing further, an opening in the hills both to the right and left demanded attention.
Some baggage had already been carried off, and several dead bodies which had been shamefully mangled, marked the deadly hatred of the tribes to us and our followers. The other wing of the 2nd Native Infantry under Lieutenant Colonel Lane was posted here on a commanding position, a mile or a mile and a half from the last post, with orders to keep up a communication with it. Still moving on, the remnant of the Brigade came up with the Light Company of the 16th Native Infantry on an eminence about half a mile from the entrance into the defile. Here was also a collection of Irregular horse, baggage, camp followers, and others vociferating that an immense number of the enemy had driven them out of the pass.

It was found necessary to strengthen this post which was the fourth on the plain. It consisted of but a single Company; the Light Company of the 2nd Native Infantry was accordingly added to it. No farther deduction could be made from the strength of the Brigade, with such a stake as the Gates and guns in hand.

The Brigadier now moved into the defile with his troops, and the sandal wood gates, which by special orders were always escorted by a whole Regiment. The horses of the nine-pounder Battery and the bullocks, which dragged the gates, were exhausted; and the men had been on and off at the drag ropes all day. Still there was never a moment's hesitation, when the guns, waggons, or guns required their assistance. The enemy showed pretty strong as the detachment wound down into the defile, but they were broken into parties of from twenty to sixty, and there were many stragglers. As the Europeans observed, "the hills seemed alive with the filthy blackguards." From three to four miles of most difficult country remained to be traversed; attempts to send on an express had twice failed; but a third attempt was made by Lieutenant Elliot, who volunteered with some housemen; and it proved successful.

Brigadier Stacy reported, that on arriving on the plain above Landekana, he found himself alone, and the enemy in such considerable force near the head of the pass as to induce him to leave the 42nd Native Infantry in its vicinity; that with the 2nd Native Infantry, and the two flank Companies of the 2nd and 16th N. I., which he formed on the plain, he had completed a line of four posts to the entrance of the defile, each capable of holding its own against the enemy; that he had already taken two Companies from the 43rd Native Infantry on
duty over the gate, since he entered the defile; and expected every
moment to be forced to leave a third, to keep open the commu-
nication. He stated that three miles of the same country were yet to be
traversed, and that he presumed to suggest the necessity of holding
this tract by troops from the Alee Muzjid camp. Shortly after the des-
patch of the third note by the hands of Lieutenant Elliot, some of
the enemy had the temerity to fire several shot into the columns from
a gorge, which was evidently bounded by the hills and from which
there could be no escape but by the sides. The flankers had return-
red the fire, but Brigadier Stacy, seeing the advantage he possessed,
determined to make an example of the assailants and sent off two
parties, who crowned the hills right and left, whilst the third quietly
entered the gorge; seven of the enemy were shot and only one escap-
ed; there was no loss on our side. This triumph, however trifling,
evidently had a good effect, for the enemy were observed creeping
up the hills as fast as possible; nor was there a single shot fired after
this into the column between the spot marked by this occurrence and
Alee Muzjid, a distance of about three miles.

About a mile and a half from the spot from which Lieutenant El-
liot had been despatched, Brigadier Stacy met a squadron of the 3rd
Bombay Cavalry, sent back by General Nott. The officer brought a
note saying that the 16th Native Infantry, would follow immediately.
The Cavalry being perfectly useless, were desired to fall into the rear
of the column, and to return with the 2nd Brigade to camp. Lieute-
nant Colonel McLaren, with the 16th Native Infantry, soon met the
detachment, and gave the first tidings of the loss suffered by one of
General McCauley's Brigades the night before.

Lieutenant Colonel McLaren having received every information as
to the location of the line of posts, lost no time in pushing forward
to complete them, and to make such further arrangements as he
might judge proper. Brigadier Stacy and his detachment moved
forward reaching Alee Muzjid a little after sunset, and after a hard
day's work. The appearance of the detachment was evidently a re-
lief to many an anxious heart, for the disasters of the preceding even-
ing had caused the most unpleasant forebodings as to the fate of the
2nd Brigade and the Gates.

The line of posts in the defile already stationed there, was strengh-
tened, and Lieutenant Colonel McLaren placed others whenever
there appeared any necessity. These arrangements enabled the baggage to continue moving along the road the whole of the night. The last Camels with the rear guard did not reach Alee Muzjid till next 7 A. M. on the morning of the 5th November, 1842.

March from Alee Micjid to Juwmoor.

Saturday, the 6th November, 1842.

The encamping Ground at Alee Muzjid is very confined and surrounded on three sides by low hills which form a concentric circle within a range of much higher ones; the lower range was occupied by our pickets, which were considerably increased this day, as three sides of the higher hills were occupied by the enemy. The enemy annoyed us a little during the night. At the hour appointed, the Troops marched. Shots had been exchanged at intervals since break of day; but nothing worth mentioning took place till about an hour after the force had begun to move. The enemy then commenced a series of attacks on our pickets. The column was winding up the hill when the firing on both sides became animated; one picket was particularly hard pressed, and most of them on the right partially engaged.

Brigadier Stacy, observing that the strength of the rear guard was inadequate, or unequal to the duties expected from it, sent a proposal to Brigadier Wymer, General Nairn having passed on and the road being occupied by the Horse Artillery, that each should leave a Regiment from his respective Brigade to reinforce Major Browne, who commanded the rear guard, the latter to enable him to withdraw the pickets after the Gates, stores and baggage should have left the basin and reached the top of the first ascent. This however Brigadier Wymer did not think it advisable to accede to. At the foot of the first ascent Brigadier Wymer met Brigadier Stacy. The latter again urged on him to leave a Regiment with the rear guard, which was much too weak to complete its duties without very severe loss, if indeed it could do so at all, against the many heavy bodies of Khyberis on the different hills. The lowest calculation of their numbers was 3000 men, but it was generally supposed they had 5000. Brigadier Wymer however could not be induced to accede to this request, alleging that he had no authority to do so, and passed on.

Brigadier Stacy without further hesitation took the responsibility...
on himself, and sent Lieutenant Colonel Lane with the 2nd Native Infantry to take possession of the heights on the right, and to hold them till Major Browne, when withdrawing the rear picquets, should relieve him.

The firing had increased; several of the picquets had been tried by the enemy. Major Browne sent to Brigadier Stacy who was still on the ground to ask for assistance, and begged to retain the services of the 43rd Bengal Light Infantry, which he had halted until the Brigadier's orders should be received. He saw the necessity, or at least the wisdom, of the measure, and sent orders to Major Nash commanding the 43rd Bengal Light Infantry, to place himself under Major Browne's orders. Major Browne was now able to strengthen the line of picquets, and their arrangements instilled perfect confidence. The enemy made several rushes on these posts, but were beaten back in each attack, with very considerable loss.

In the mean time, the Somnauth Gates, the stores and baggage were passing up by the made road, and Lieutenant Colonel Lane, having possession of the heights on the right, yabbos, bullocks, asses and all were enabled to ascend the zigzag paths by the right and in front of the hill occupied by the Sikh Head Quarters.

The encamping ground at Alee Manjid is very irregular, with a fine stream of water running through it; the basin is nearly divided into two at the upper or northern end, by the proximity of the tower; a range of rocks which approach to within a few yards. As soon as the fort of Alee Manjid was blown up, which was about noon, and Major Browne had called in some of the advancing picquets, Lieutenant Terry, of the Bombay Artillery, went with a party to look out for a spot on which he might place a gun to keep in check a body of Khyberees, who appeared determined to cut in between the inner and outer part of the encamping ground. In the performance of this duty, Lieutenant Terry was severely wounded, and ultimately died of his wound. He was a young man of great promise, and respected and beloved by every one in camp.

Before the picquets were withdrawn, two guns were sent up, and placed in position on the top of the first ascent facing the basin, ready to play on the enemy, should they follow, either by the basin or by the heights on the right. As our picquets were withdrawn, the Khyberees appeared to gain courage, following in great force, and...
occupying the posts as we quieted them; they assembled on the hills
to the right in greater numbers than on any other spot. The Sikh
army had several detachments skirmishing with the Khyberees, who
had evidently been endeavoring the whole day to gain possession of
the road by the water course to the right. They were allowed to
remain unmolested till everything was ready with the rear guard to
move on. The guns then opened on them with good effect; and before
they could get out of range or under cover, received three or four
rounds. Few of these mountaineers were seen after this, but the Sikhs
had some sharp skirmishing to prevent their getting on our flank
by the road along the water course. The Sikhs were opposed with
great spirit by the Khyberees at this point; and having no assistance
from Major General Nott’s Force, suffered considerably; the
left of the Sikh army rested on this water course. If the Khyberees
could have turned this flank, our rear would have been in jeopardy.
The Sikh behaved very well throughout the day; it was from their
ignorance of tactics, that they suffered so heavily; they lost thirty-six
killed and had many wounded. Major Browne commanding the
rear guard, assisted by Major Simmonds and Brevet Major Cochrane
H. M. 41st Foot, withdrew from the encamping ground, suffering
only a loss of one officer and seven men wounded, and a total
throughout the day of one killed and fourteen wounded.

The experience gained by the march between Laundeana and Alee
Magid was not altogether thrown away. On this day posts were
left of sufficient strength at different points of the road to secure
the force from loss. Major General Nott left the light Company of the
Kelati-Ghilzi Regiment at the crest of the first ascent, on
the right of the Sikhs; and at the bridge over the ravine, Lieutenant
Colonel McLaren, commanding the 16th Native Infantry, was left with
six Companies to check the enemy in case they should attempt to
cut in on the baggage; at this point there were also some of the je-
nalchees and some Sikh troops stationed; not a load was carried off
this day.

Notwithstanding these precautionary measures, the Khyberees
managed to get beyond the left of the Sikhs, and, pushing on, took
possession of a hill on the south of the bridge, which commanded
the line of march; no notice was taken at first of this move-
ment, as only two or three men appeared on the heights; who it
appears were waiting to be joined by others; for on a sudden, the top of the hill was covered, and a sharp fire-opened on the rear guard and baggage. Major Browne halted. The Artillery Officers got the guns into position, and two parties were quickly told off to crown the heights. As soon as these parties had drawn on them the fire of the Khyberees, Blood's nine-pounders opened and soon forced the enemy to drop down on the other side of the hill; near the summit, they made one effort to drive back our parties, but in vain. The heights were disputed but a few minutes, when the enemy fled and our men, as they reached the crest of the hill, fired into them until they were beyond reach. At this spot Lieutenant Chamberlain was very severely wounded. In storming the heights, only five men were wounded, two of whom slightly. Beyond this, the Khyberees did not appear, and Major Browne reached camp with the rear guard about 4 P.M. The amount of killed and wounded this day was only fifteen, two Officers and thirteen Privates.
ERRATA.

Page 3, Line 9, for "20" read "100."

a 6, for "we" read "I."

a 16, for "there" read "there." 

a 26, after the semicolon add "viz." last line.

a 36, for "the man" read "this man."

a 29, for "if" read "had completed." read "had not completed."

a 35, for "Khandokal" read "Khandokal."

a 35, for "Bahawalpur" read "Bahawalpur."

a 29, after the second day, add "then."

a 39, for "Royar" read "Royar."

a 39, for "Corps" read "Corps."

a 86, for "Dundar" read "Gundar."

a 91, for "at Sunnah" read "a little before sunset."

a 95, for "Ameer" read "Ameen."

a 96, for "Shahid" read "Shahin."

a 98, add "two" before "six-pounder guns."

a 106, for "Moorg Mall" read "Moorg Mall."

a 127, for "or Bollia" read "or Bolia."

a 133, for " ​Fawaz" read "Fawaz."

a 133, for "Right" read "Left."

a 149, for "twin" read "twin."