

6-30-2023

Transnational Ties Between Selected U.S. and Foreign Violent Extremist Actors: Evidence from the Mapping Militants Project

Martha Crenshaw

Kaitlyn Robinson

National Counterterrorism Innovation, Technology, and Education Center

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/ncitereportsresearch>

Please take our feedback survey at: [https://unomaha.az1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/](https://unomaha.az1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_8cchtFmpDyGfBLE)

[SV_8cchtFmpDyGfBLE](https://unomaha.az1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_8cchtFmpDyGfBLE)

Transnational Ties Between Selected U.S. and Foreign Violent Extremist Actors



Evidence from the Mapping Militants Project

June 30, 2023

Research Team

Martha Crenshaw Stanford University

Kaitlyn Robinson Rice University



NCITE NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM,
INNOVATION, TECHNOLOGY,
AND EDUCATION CENTER
A U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER OF EXCELLENCE

About the Report. This report summarizes and assesses open-source evidence about transnational ties between violent extremist groups based in the United States and foreign state and non-state actors. Drawing from the detailed group profiles developed by the Mapping Militants Project, we find that the violent RMVE and AGAAVE universe is characterized by unstructured connections. U.S.-based RMVE and AGAAVE groups do not engage in widespread or systematic cooperation with foreign state and non-state actors. Rather, the connections that do exist across national borders are episodic, informal, fluid, and largely undirected. While we expect that these ties will not result in coordinated mass-casualty attacks in the near term, transnational relationships clearly have the potential to inspire acts of domestic terrorism by amplifying dangerous ideologies and spreading tactics and strategies to commit violence.

Questions about this report should be directed to Kaitlyn Robinson at krobinson@rice.edu.

This material is based upon work supported by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security under Grant Award Number 20STTPC00001-03-01. The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

About the Authors. Martha Crenshaw is a senior fellow emerita at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), at Stanford University. She is also professor of government emerita, Wesleyan University. She directs the Mapping Militants Project (MMP) and is a Principal Investigator with the National Counterterrorism Innovation, Technology, and Education Center (NCITE).

Kaitlyn Robinson is an assistant professor of political science at Rice University. She is a senior researcher on the Mapping Militants Project (MMP) and a research affiliate of the National Counterterrorism Innovation, Technology, and Education Center (NCITE).

Iris Malone, formerly a NCITE Principal Investigator, researched and authored material used in this report. Stanford University graduate Lindsay Thornton provided extensive research and copy-editing assistance. Material in this report was also based on research conducted by George Washington University M.A. graduate Robert English. Research assistance from several other Stanford University and George Washington University undergraduate students also contributed to this report's production.

About NCITE. The National Counterterrorism Innovation, Technology, and Education (NCITE) Center was established in 2020 as the Department of Homeland Security Center of Excellence for counterterrorism and terrorism prevention research. Sponsored by the DHS Science & Technology Office of University Programs, NCITE is the trusted DHS academic consortium of over 60 researchers across 26 universities and non-government organizations. Headquartered at the University of Nebraska at Omaha, NCITE is a leading U.S. academic partner for counterterrorism research, technology, and workforce development.



Table of Contents

Executive Summary	1
Introduction	3
Sample and Methodology	5
Transnational Linkages of U.S.-based RMVE and AGAAVE Organizations	7
U.S.-based organizations and their ties abroad.....	9
Atomwaffen Division (aka the National Socialist Order).....	9
The Base.....	12
Rise Above Movement.....	12
Patriot Front.....	13
Proud Boys	13
Three Percenters.....	14
Foreign organizations and their outreach to the United States.....	15
Russian Imperial Movement (RIM).....	15
Azov Battalion.....	16
Order of Nine Angles.....	17
Nordic Resistance Movement.....	18
Feuerkrieg Division	19
The potential for extremist ties with Russia	19
Conclusion.....	22
Endnotes	24

Executive Summary

This report summarizes and assesses open-source evidence about transnational ties between violent extremist groups based in the United States and foreign state and non-state actors. Its scope is restricted to racially and ethnically motivated violent extremists (RMVE) and anti-government, anti-authority violent extremists (AGAAVE). These types of extremism include white supremacy, Neo-Nazism, anti-Semitism, accelerationism (the belief that violence is necessary to bring about chaos and societal collapse), and beliefs in New World Order conspiracies, among other racist, xenophobic, and anti-government beliefs.

Importantly, most of our assessment focuses on the transnational ties of *organizations* or *groups* rather than rank and file individual members or followers of these groups. It draws from the detailed group profiles researched and developed by the Mapping Militants Project. U.S.-based groups analyzed in this report include the Atomwaffen Division, The Base, Rise Above Movement, Patriot Front, Proud Boys, and Three Percenters. Whereas the Three Percenters dates from 2008, the other groups got their start in the period from 2015 to 2018. The foreign organizations include the Russian Imperial Movement, Azov Battalion, Order of Nine Angles, Nordic Resistance Movement, and Feuerkrieg Division. We also discuss the possibility that foreign state actors, specifically the Russian Federation, are linked to U.S.-based groups.

Based on this research, we find:

- Based on our review of open-source information, we find little evidence that U.S.-based RMVE and AGAAVE groups engage in widespread or systematic cooperation with foreign state and non-state actors. Rather, the connections that do exist across national borders are episodic, informal, fluid, and largely undirected, and most involve vocal online communities rather than offline contacts.
- The lack of widespread or systematic cooperation may be due to several factors that make transnational relationship-building less desirable or more difficult. These factors include differences over goals and ideologies, doubts that transnational cooperation is necessary or beneficial, and the fluid nature of these organizations. RMVE groups appear more likely to share the beliefs of similar foreign groups (e.g., white supremacy). We find that RMVE groups have built more transnational connections than AGAAVE groups, which appear more isolated and have fewer international ties. We also suspect that differences between RMVE and AGAAVE ideologies have made RMVE-AGAAVE cooperation less appealing.
- Although most radicalization and mobilization activities take place online, meeting in person is still an important component of transnational interaction. We note instances of training, conferences, marches, rallies, and public entertainment events such as mixed martial arts competitions and music festivals that have involved making an effort to travel internationally. Recently the leader of the Rise Above Movement was arrested in Rumania.
- Although, in general, few “foreign fighters” from the United States are traveling to fight in Ukraine, we find that the ties between Ukrainian extremists and U.S.-based RMVE groups are the most explicit physical transnational connections in our data. We cite evidence that the Atomwaffen Division and the Rise Above Movement are connected to extremists in Ukraine. Members of The Base have also reportedly considered traveling to Ukraine.
- We find no open-source evidence that the Russian Government directly engages with, condones, or assists any

U.S.-based extremist group. However, some RMVE extremists in the United States may be open to building a relationship with the Russian Federation, and the Russia-based Russian Imperial Movement has connections to U.S. citizens. Russian-directed social media campaigns have also attempted to spread misinformation and amplify RMVE and AGAAVE rhetoric online, but the extent of Russian Government involvement is unclear.

In general, the violent RMVE and AGAAVE universe is characterized by unstructured, unsystematic, and loose connections that are both online and physical. These relationships are so far shallow and sporadic rather than deep and sustained. We do not see strong institutionalized cooperation or regular joint operational planning, although there is imitation and diffusion of ideas and tactics, largely online. Despite the potential for greater unity, there is currently little centralization; indeed, centrifugal forces remain strong. These divisive forces include ideological conflicts as well as the diffused organizational make-up of extremist groups. It is clear, however, that the U.S. Government should not neglect the threat. Policymakers, analysts, and other officials should be alert to indications of strengthening transnational connections, both physical and virtual.

Introduction

The threat posed by racially and ethnically motivated violent extremists (RMVE) and anti-government, anti-authority violent extremists (AGAAVE) in the United States has grown increasingly transnational.¹ In the last decade, several new RMVE and AGAAVE organizations have emerged in the United States with dedicated international outreach strategies, including plans to establish new chapters abroad and make cross-border contact with like-minded extremists. These transnational connections provide opportunities for extremists to spread their ideologies; learn new tactics; gain battlefield experience; and secure resources and support to strengthen their organizations.

Due to the unique challenges posed by a U.S.-based threat, governments may need to develop new countermeasures that differ from traditional counterterrorism tools.² A deeper understanding of the transnational dimension of the threat is necessary to inform any new policies or approaches. A report published in 2022 by the United Nations Secretary-General assessed:

The rising threat posed by terrorist attacks on the basis of xenophobia, racism or intolerance, or in the name of religion or belief, has been identified as a concern by a number of Member States. While such terrorism remains primarily domestic in focus, the motives, inspiration and goals underpinning such attacks are increasingly shared transnationally. Information suggests that such groups have increased their efforts online to form new connections, misuse the Internet and social media to exploit grievances and spread hateful narratives across borders, undermining inclusive and resilient societies. However, the emerging nature of the threat and the current lack of rigorous data and studies on its breadth and scope, presents challenges and requires further research.³

The purpose of this report is to help guide such a research program and aid policy makers by briefly summarizing the open-source evidence about ties between extremist groups based in the United States and foreign actors. Its contents draw upon open-source research conducted by the Mapping Militants Project. The profiles and data visualizations – including genealogical “maps” and network diagrams – consulted for this report are published online at <https://mappingmilitants.org>. Importantly, the majority of this report focuses on summarizing the transnational ties of *violent non-state organizations* rather than individual followers or political parties.⁴ We focus on evidence of connections between both state and non-state actors. These connections encompass a broad range of interactions, including alliances, messaging, mutual encouragement, attending the same conferences or training camps, and sharing of materials, symbols, and aesthetics.

In general, the violent RMVE and AGAAVE universe is characterized by unstructured connections. Overall, we find that organizational ties and relationships in RMVE and AGAAVE milieus are typically less formalized and systematic than those of many armed groups studied by terrorism researchers (e.g., jihadists). Formal and binding pledges of allegiance to an emir or leader, for example, would not be characteristic of the RMVE and AGAAVE extremist universe. Below we outline the forms of relationships that will be discussed further in our report:

Networking and Acquaintances. Groups may make attempts to network informally with other extremists, whether online or at in-person conferences or events (e.g., rallies, marches, music festivals, or martial arts competitions). Contacts may be anticipated but not planned in advance. Organizations engaged in these loose relationships could be described as acquaintances: their contact is casual and sporadic. Followers of several different groups may attend the

same events, such as rallies or street clashes with counter-protesters, without being directed by the group leadership to do so. This loose cooperation does not require ideological conformity. For example, group members associated with the U.S. anti-government movement have attended events with white supremacist groups, yet they do not formally cooperate with these groups and make public efforts to distance themselves ideologically. Personal connections play a role in this form of linkage.

Online communities. Many interactions take place online, and this ubiquitous virtual contact has drawn close attention from researchers.⁵ Online manifestos justifying violence and calling for imitation are widely disseminated across national borders through social media as well as encrypted channels such as Telegram. This form of linkage often involves the exchange of ideas, symbols, iconography, and memes. Governments can also use virtual channels to spread disinformation and amplify extremist messaging. It is difficult to measure the overall impact of these virtual connections beyond explicit statements claiming inspiration for violence, citing ideology, or asserting affiliation with existing extremists. There are a few examples of recruitment of U.S. nationals by foreign groups via online channels (e.g., Feuerkrieg Division, Order of Nine Angles).

Establishing foreign affiliates. Some groups in the U.S. RMVE sector deliberately call for the establishment of “chapters” or affiliates abroad. In other cases, foreign affiliates may develop on their own and self-identify as an affiliate, using the group name or brand without receiving direction from the central U.S.-based organization. The allegiance of foreign affiliates can be questionable; they often appear to enjoy considerable autonomy. Such nominal affiliations appear most often to be a form of branding rather than an indication of close cooperation.

Volunteering in foreign conflicts. The war in Ukraine and the prominence of the Azov Battalion as well as its international outreach efforts have encouraged some small number of foreign fighters from the U.S. RMVE sector (e.g., Atomwaffen Division, The Base, Rise Above Movement). It is difficult to obtain precise numbers of volunteers.

While we find evidence of transnational connections for several U.S. and European organizations, there appear to be limits to this internationalization. Conflicting ideological beliefs, xenophobic tendencies, leadership quarrels, and high levels of mistrust impede coordination.⁶ Support for nativism and xenophobic policies in one country conflicts with the preferences expressed by followers in other countries. For example, neo-fascist, white supremacist followers in Europe reject the growing support for ultra-nationalist and neo-fascist politics in Southeast Asia by ethnic Chinese and Malay extremists.⁷ Within Europe, a festival fell into disarray as ultra-nationalist Germans challenged the presence of Polish and “other foreign skinheads.”⁸ The isolationist tendencies of other sectors, such as the U.S. AGAAVE movement, can also impede coordination. These innate barriers to the global expansion of this violent movement may inhibit transnational spread, although contagion via social media channels is unlikely to dissipate.⁹

We find no open-source evidence that the Russian Government directly engages with, condones, or assists any U.S.-based extremist group. However, some RMVE extremists in the United States may be open to building a relationship with the Russian Federation, and the Russia-based Russian Imperial Movement has connections to U.S. citizens. Russian-directed social media campaigns have also attempted to spread misinformation and amplify RMVE and AGAAVE rhetoric online, but the extent of Russian Government involvement is unclear.

We draw on evidence from the Mapping Militants Project to support this assessment. In the following sections, we begin by describing our approach and providing a brief overview of the ideological composition of the violent extremist

groups based in the United States that are the subject of this analysis. We then summarize the extent and nature of transnational connections between U.S.-based organizations and extremist groups operating abroad. We also discuss the largely clandestine and limited involvement of Russia in promoting U.S. extremist messaging.

Sample and Methodology

Our analysis focuses on a sample of the organizations and ideologies associated with RMVE and AGAAVE ideologies. In a 2022 intelligence assessment, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation warned that groups and individuals associated with RMVE and AGAAVE posed the most lethal and pressing domestic terrorism threat in the United States.¹⁰

In this document, RMVE is defined as deriving from “political or social agendas which are deemed to derive from bias, often related to race, held by the actor against others, including a given population group. Racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists (RMVEs) use both political and religious justifications to support their racially- or ethnically-based ideological objectives and criminal activities.”¹¹ RMVE adherents seek to protect their racial or ethnic identity, which they believe to be under threat by foreign people, organizations, and ideas.¹² RMVE is a mixture of racist, anti-Semitic, xenophobic, homophobic, and misogynistic beliefs. RMVE ideologies include white supremacy – the belief that the white race and white culture are superior – and white nationalism – the view that countries or nations should be organized around a white national identity, sometimes advocating for the establishment of a white ethnostate.¹³ In general, actions taken by RMVE groups aim to denigrate minorities and promote ethnic, racial, cultural, religious, or linguistic uniformity in society.¹⁴ Some RMVE followers advocate for the adoption of accelerationist tactics in pursuit of their broader ideological goals. Broadly, “accelerationism” refers to instigating the collapse of what adherents see as a deeply flawed social order. Accelerationists have been responsible for perpetrating “lone wolf” terrorist attacks against civilians to provoke a race war and trigger the impending breakdown of society.¹⁵

The 2022 intelligence assessment defines AGAAVE as encompassing “anti-government or anti-authority sentiment, including opposition to perceived economic, social, or racial hierarchies, or perceived government overreach, negligence, or illegitimacy. This threat category typically includes threats from anarchist violent extremists (AVEs), militia violent extremists (MVEs), and sovereign citizen violent extremists (SCVEs).”¹⁶ In general, AGAAVE ideologies are characterized by a mistrust of federal authority, fear of foreign influence, and the need for paramilitary self-defense.¹⁷ AGAAVE groups believe the federal government – sometimes operating through a network of “Deep State” actors or foreign agents – is working to take away their constitutional rights. For example, the “New World Order” conspiracy theory holds that a group of elites is working to establish a global government that will enable the subjugation of the world’s population, including all Americans.¹⁸ In the face of these perceived threats to their personal freedoms, some AGAAVE followers prepare to engage in self-defense by stockpiling weapons, organizing militias, and participating in paramilitary training sessions.

RMVE and AGAAVE ideologies are not mutually exclusive; followers may mix nativist beliefs with racist or anti-government sentiments. The blending of many extremist beliefs across organizations – “salad bar” ideologies, according to one FBI official – has created some commonalities and fostered positive interactions among groups.¹⁹

Hundreds of RMVE and AGAAVE organizations are based in the United States.²⁰ These include local militias (e.g., Idaho Light Foot Militia), street gangs (e.g., Rise Above Movement), and organizations with national leadership (e.g., Oath Keepers). Our report focuses on transnational relationships among organized groups, not cross-border ties between

individual followers of highly unstructured online networks or diffuse movements (e.g., QAnon, Sovereign Citizens). Much existing research on transnational ties in the global extremist ecosystem has focused on online relationships between individual actors using the same hashtags or message boards, while group-to-group interactions and in-person meet-ups, trips, and networking events have received less attention from scholars.²¹ This report contributes new analysis of inter-organizational ties between RMVE and AGAAVE organizations in the United States, extremist groups operating abroad, and state actors.

This analysis draws on data collected by the Mapping Militants Project (MMP). All of the groups included in this report have full profiles on the MMP website.²² To construct a dataset of RMVE and AGAAVE group ties, MMP researchers began by investigating one prominent group operating abroad – the Russian Imperial Movement (RIM) – and one prominent group operating in the United States – the Atomwaffen Division. At the start of their research, RIM had just been included on the U.S. Specially Designated Global Terrorists list, and the Atomwaffen Division was also reportedly considered for U.S. designation. MMP researchers compiled, analyzed, and synthesized open-source materials to compose long-form group profiles that document each group’s organizational history, leadership, ideology, intergroup connections, and other organizational characteristics. These profiles are publicly available online at mappingmilitants.org. MMP researchers then used these profiles to identify other organizations that should be considered for research, including the Azov Battalion (Ukraine), the Rise Above Movement (USA), and The Base (USA). Since most AGAAVE organizations in the United States are not directly connected to RMVE groups, we followed a similar process to introduce AGAAVE groups into our sample. We first identified a prominent AGAAVE group – the Oath Keepers – and traced its ties to other organizations of interest, including the Three Percenters and Proud Boys.

During this process, MMP researchers collected, analyzed, and synthesized any information about the nature of connections between multiple actors in our data. In particular, MMP researchers coded the presence of five types of relationships: alliances, affiliations, rivalries, splinters, and mergers.²³ These relationships are either virtual, physical, or both.

It is important to note that this sampling procedure selects on the most visible and active RMVE and AGAAVE organizations. Our sample is not systemically collected, meaning that some organizations and relationships are missing from our sample. The data also selects on the existence of relationships and thus cannot be used directly to determine whether the presence or absence of ties between actors are frequent or infrequent or if they are associated with certain organizational characteristics, behavior, or outcomes.

However, this sampling method has several advantages. First, it can allow us to quickly get a sense of the nature and types of relationships that exist among prominent extremist groups in the United States and abroad. In particular, we can speak in great detail about actors of specific interest to the United States Government, including the Russian Imperial Movement, the Atomwaffen Division, and many domestic groups associated with the January 6 assault on the U.S. Capitol. Second, it can also enable us to qualitatively assess, conditional on having a relationship, how transnational ties might influence the organizational behavior, motivations, and resources of groups in our data. The detailed information collected for each group allows us to analyze how transnational connections affect the development of group structures, resources, ideologies, membership, leadership, and tactics and strategies.

The remainder of this report draws on MMP research to summarize the transnational ties of RMVE and AGAAVE organizations based in the United States and abroad. More information about each of these groups, and the accompanying dataset of their relationships, can be downloaded from mappingmilitants.org. It should be noted that several RMVE and AGAAVE groups researched by MMP – including the Oath Keepers and Patriot Prayer – are excluded from this report because they lack international connections, but their full profiles are available online.

Transnational Linkages of U.S.-based RMVE and AGAAVE Organizations

In general, the violent RMVE and AGAAVE universe is characterized by unstructured connections. While we find evidence of transnational connections for several U.S. and European organizations, there appear to be limits to this internationalization. Based on the evidence summarized in the following sections, we assess that U.S.-based RMVE and AGAAVE groups do not engage in widespread or systematic cooperation with foreign state and non-state actors. The connections that do exist across national borders are episodic, informal, fluid, and largely undirected, and most involve vocal online communities rather than offline contacts.

Among groups in our sample, we identify fewer transnational ties for AGAAVE groups than for RMVE groups. We find evidence that groups like the Proud Boys and Three Percenters have ideological connections – though no operational or physical connections – to associated chapters in Canada and Australia. In contrast, we find that RMVE groups have engaged in more transnational outreach and networking, most notably to extremists based in Ukraine. Some U.S.-based RMVE groups, like the Atomwaffen Division, have distinct international ambitions, but their efforts to engage in sustained cooperation have been unsuccessful. Most of their transnational operations consist of one-time meetings, events, or trips. Longer-term relationships are largely only expressed online or through group names and identities (e.g., several accelerationist groups in Europe use the same name and iconography as the U.S.-based Atomwaffen Division, of which they claim to be affiliates).

Types of transnational ties

In general, we observe four types of transnational relationships among RMVE and AGAAVE groups in our sample:

Networking and Acquaintances. Groups may make attempts to network informally with other extremists, whether online or at in-person conferences or events (e.g., rallies, marches, music festivals, or martial arts competitions). Contacts may be anticipated but not planned in advance. Organizations engaged in these loose relationships could be described as acquaintances: their contact is casual and sporadic.

Followers of several different groups may attend the same events, such as rallies or street clashes with counter-protesters, without being directed by the group leadership to do so. This loose cooperation does not require ideological conformity. For example, group members associated with the U.S. anti-government movement have attended events with white supremacist groups, yet they do not formally cooperate with these groups and make public efforts to distance themselves ideologically. Personal connections play a role in this form of linkage.

Online communities. Many interactions take place online. Online manifestos justifying violence and calling for imitation are widely disseminated across national borders through social media as well as encrypted channels such as Telegram. This form of linkage often involves the exchange of ideas, symbols, iconography, and memes. Governments can also use virtual channels to spread disinformation and amplify extremist messaging. It is difficult to measure the overall impact of these virtual connections beyond explicit statements claiming inspiration for violence, citing ideology,

or asserting affiliation with existing extremists. There are a few examples of recruitment of U.S. nationals by foreign groups via online channels (e.g., Feuerkrieg Division, Order of Nine Angles).

Establishing foreign affiliates. Some groups in the U.S. RMVE sector deliberately call for the establishment of “chapters” or affiliates abroad. For example, at its inception in 2016 Proud Boys claimed to have a number of foreign affiliates. In other cases, foreign affiliates may develop on their own and self-identify as an affiliate, using the group name or brand without receiving direction from the central U.S.-based organization (e.g., Atomwaffen Division/National Socialist Order). The allegiance of foreign affiliates can be questionable; they often appear to enjoy considerable autonomy. Such nominal affiliations appear most often to be a form of branding rather than an indication of close cooperation.

Volunteering in foreign conflicts. The war in Ukraine and the prominence of the Azov Battalion as well as its international outreach efforts have encouraged some small number of foreign fighters from the U.S. RMVE sector (e.g., Atomwaffen Division, The Base, Rise Above Movement). It is difficult to obtain precise numbers of volunteers.

Assessing the strength and danger of international connections

The lack of widespread or systematic cooperation among AGAAVE and RMVE groups may be due to several factors that make transnational relationship-building less desirable or more difficult. First, RMVE and AGAAVE groups are ideologically diverse. For example, we may observe little cooperation between RMVE and AGAAVE organizations because they do not share the same goals or motivations. Several AGAAVE groups in the United States have made efforts to actively distance themselves from RMVE organizations advocating white supremacy or white nationalism. For example, the leader of the Oath Keepers declared that the group would not participate in events alongside “known white nationalists.”²⁴ He stated publicly: “I dislike the neo-Nazis more than Anti-fa, since they try to worm their way in and by doing so, they harm the cause of liberty far more than the radical leftists could ever do.”²⁵

Additionally, some RMVE and AGAAVE groups may not see transnational cooperation as necessary or beneficial to their mission. U.S.-based AGAAVE organizations are largely focused on protecting themselves from the United States Government, while AGAAVE groups and movements operating outside the United States (e.g., Germany’s Reichsbürger movement) see their own country’s government as the enemy. Given these different adversaries, transnational cooperation may not be seen as useful by AGAAVE group members.

Finally, the fluid nature of many RMVE and AGAAVE organizations may impede cooperation. In most of the groups we study in this report, organizational structures and identities are loose and decentralized. Many group operations are organized without any specific direction from a central leadership. Even among organizations with a national presence (e.g., Proud Boys), local chapters have significant autonomy and make many decisions independently. Membership in most RMVE and AGAAVE groups is highly fluid, and individuals can belong to multiple groups at one time. A high level of mistrust and disagreement accompanies this organizational incoherence; for example, leaderless resistance as an organizational strategy (a key tenet of white supremacist accelerationism) does not easily lend itself to a coordinated global movement.

Even among groups that do engage in international outreach, the transnational connections we observe today seem unlikely to lead to coordinated mass-casualty attacks. Groups share ideas, tactics, and resources in these international relationships, but we do not observe efforts to systematically organize large-scale acts of violence. However, these ties may spread and reinforce dangerous ideologies that inspire individual and smaller-scale acts of violence (e.g., street fighting, brawling, hate crimes), creating the potential for violent escalation. As this ideological current gains

momentum, cooperation may increase. We see a need for further study of the conditions under which social movements shift from occasional use of violence to systematic violence and highly-planned acts of terrorism perpetrated by organized groups rather than individuals.

Although most radicalization and mobilization take place online, meeting in person is still important – we have noted instances of training, conferences, and public events such as mixed martial arts competitions or music festivals that have involved making an effort to travel internationally. Leaders of two of the groups we analyzed even relocated abroad. Although, in general, few “foreign fighters” from the United States are traveling to fight in Ukraine, we assess that the Ukrainian connection is the most explicit physical tie to U.S.-based RMVE extremist groups. We find evidence that the Atomwaffen Division and the Rise Above Movement are connected to extremists in Ukraine. Members of The Base have also reportedly considered traveling to Ukraine.

In addition to these inter-organizational relationships, we ask whether any foreign states provide aid to U.S.-based RMVE or AGAAVE groups. We focus specifically on the Russian Federation, as we see the most potential for support from this state actor. We find no open-source evidence that the Russian Government directly engages with, condones, or assists any U.S.-based extremist group. However, some RMVE extremists in the United States may be open to building a relationship with the Russian Federation, and the Russia-based Russian Imperial Movement has connected with U.S. citizens. Russian-directed social media campaigns have also attempted to spread misinformation and amplify RMVE and AGAAVE rhetoric online, but the extent of Russian Government involvement is unclear.

In the next three sections of this report, we summarize the evidence of transnational connections between U.S.-based groups and foreign state and non-state actors. It should be noted that while we do not observe widespread ties between American extremists and extremists abroad, there is clearly a potential for deeper and more systematic transnational cooperation in the future.

U.S.-based organizations and their ties abroad

This section summarizes the transnational ties of six prominent U.S.-based RMVE and AGAAVE organizations:

- Atomwaffen Division
- The Base
- Rise Above Movement
- Patriot Front
- Proud Boys
- Three Percenters

Atomwaffen Division (aka the National Socialist Order)

The Atomwaffen Division (AWD) –renamed National Socialist Order (NSO) after July 2020– is an accelerationist neo-Nazi organization operating in the United States with affiliates overseas. Founded in 2015, the group is known for its anti-Semitic, anti-LGBT, and apocalyptic beliefs.²⁶ AWD advocates the violent overthrow of what it calls the “System,” a catchall term for the U.S. federal government and other major societal institutions.²⁷ Drawing on anti-Semitic tropes, the group contends that a failure of American democracy and capitalism has allowed a supposed Jewish oligarchy to control global power.²⁸ AWD promotes the “accelerationist” doctrine that advocates violent revolution to establish a new white supremacist order.²⁹ The group shares several common neo-Nazi beliefs, such as admiration for Adolf Hitler,

and white supremacist conspiracy theories. However, AWD is unique in its open call for terrorist acts.³⁰

Members of AWD/NSO have both threatened and carried out violence against civilians and infrastructure. For example, in February 2023, AWD's founder Brandon Russell, who had just been released from prison after serving a five-year sentence for possession of bomb-making materials, was charged with plotting to attack the Baltimore power grid.³¹ He is said to have communicated plans and instructions for conducting the sniper-style attacks that he envisioned on Australian Telegram channels.³² The Australian government proscribed NSO/AWD as a possible terrorist threat in 2022 (already proscribed by the United Kingdom and Canada).³³

From its earliest days, AWD operated in a transnational environment. The group got its start on the Iron March online forum, a hub for neo-Nazis, white supremacists, and similar extremists from around the world. In addition to AWD, Iron March gestated a number of other likeminded groups, including American Vanguard, SKYDAS (a Lithuanian nationalist organization), the Azov Regiment (a division of Ukraine's National Guard that has fought pro-Russian separatists), the Nordic Resistance Movement, the Scottish Dawn, and the Antipodean Resistance (an Australian white supremacist organization).³⁴

AWD has forged connections with white supremacist and neo-Nazi groups in other countries, predominantly in Europe. Notably, AWD maintains ties to several "affiliate" groups, which claim some connection and loyalty to the central AWD cell based in the United States. These include groups that have sworn fealty to AWD central, publicly adopted the AWD brand, and/or propagated AWD ideology. Many connections are largely ideological or symbolic and occur online through social media networking. Some groups appear to have self-identified as affiliates, while others appear to coordinate more closely with AWD central. It is unclear to what degree AWD central exercises control over these affiliates.

AWD affiliates include the following groups:

- Sonnenkrieg Division (SKD) is the United Kingdom-based affiliate of AWD. SKD originated as a splinter group of the System Resistance Network, itself an alias of National Action (NA), a proscribed British neo-Nazi organization. In 2018, the group reportedly broke with NA and became independent.³⁵ In July 2018, some AWD members on Gab, a social network popular among extremists, began using the name "Sonnenkrieg Division," and SKD debuted its own Gab page a month later, identifying itself as an affiliate of AWD.³⁶
- Feuerkrieg Division (FKD) is an accelerationist neo-Nazi group that is highly influenced by AWD. FKD was founded in October 2018 as an AWD affiliate in Estonia and quickly expanded overseas. As of August 2020, FKD maintained a presence in Belgium, Ireland, Germany, Latvia, the Netherlands, Norway, Russia, and the United Kingdom.³⁷ Formal cells were established in the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Germany in June 2019 and in Canada in August 2019. FKD posts on the encrypted messaging app Telegram have indicated that the group sought to recruit members in the United States, specifically in California, Texas, New York, and the Great Lakes states.³⁸ More details about FKD are outlined in our analysis of foreign-based groups in the next section of this report.

Leaked internal messages indicate a complicated relationship between AWD and FKD. While FKD has drawn much ideological inspiration from AWD, FKD's anonymous leader, known by the screen name "Commander," sought to keep his group operationally independent from both AWD central and Sonnenkrieg Division (SKD).³⁹ His emphasis on maintaining FKD's independence became apparent in early August 2019 when AWD

member Richard Tobin approached “Commander” on Telegram with a plan to merge the two groups and make FKD into a “vassal” subordinate to the “The Nucleus” of the U.S.-based Atomwaffen Division.⁴⁰ “Commander” firmly rejected Tobin’s efforts to establish a more hierarchical relationship, although he was open to having FKD and AWD work together.⁴¹ The two groups also reportedly share some members.⁴²

- Northern Order is a white supremacist group based in Canada that also identifies as an AWD affiliate. It boasts approximately 10 members and allegedly coordinates its activities with AWD.⁴³ A Northern Order member known online as “Alba” has claimed to be a member of the Canadian Armed Forces and advocates the establishment of a white ethnostate in British Columbia.⁴⁴ “Alba” is believed to be Brendan Cameron, a veteran and member of the Canadian Supplemental Reserve Force.⁴⁵ Cameron reportedly acted as a middleman between the Northern Order and the AWD central.⁴⁶
- AWD Deutschland is an AWD affiliate in Germany. It announced its existence in a 2018 video featuring a masked individual and an AWD flag in front of a castle where Nazi SS officers trained during the Second World War.⁴⁷ In the video, the group declared fealty to AWD central, referring to its members as “our true commanders.”⁴⁸ In October 2019, the group warned: “we are the Atomwaffen Division Germany and are continuing what began in America, as we are a globally networked far-right organization with contacts to militant groups throughout Europe and America.”⁴⁹ It was estimated to have “several dozen members.”⁵⁰
- AWD Russia was launched by AWD in May 2020. AWD announced the new branch via its German affiliate AWD Deutschland and released Russian translations of its ideological texts.⁵¹ AWD Russia then launched a Telegram channel, which AWD promoted on its own channel, to broadcast propaganda in Russian, including manifestos from terrorists Dylann Roof and Anders Breivik, James Mason’s *SIEGE*, and *The Turner Diaries*, a foundational anti-Semitic text in the American neo-Nazi movement.⁵²
- Ukraine allegedly hosts a group claiming to be an AWD affiliate, though the cell is not sanctioned by AWD central in the United States. Some sources have referred to this group by the name “AWD Galizien.”⁵³ “Galizien” refers to a unit of the Nazi Waffen-SS composed largely of ethnic Ukrainians. In December 2019, the self-declared AWD Ukraine released a video featuring five men wearing camouflage fatigues with AWD patches and threatening violence against Ukrainian politicians.⁵⁴ The men also wore blurred-out patches for two Ukrainian extremist organizations, the Azov Battalion and Right Sector.⁵⁵

AWD maintains connections to other extremist organizations abroad. These ties can be characterized as horizontal associations between independent groups, in contrast to the hierarchical nature of affiliation between the central AWD node and its extensions abroad. Most notably, AWD made efforts to network with the Azov Battalion, a unit of the Ukrainian National Guard (see discussion of foreign organizations below for more information). In 2015, AWD founder Brandon Russell reached out to an anonymous member of the Azov Battalion online. Presenting himself as “an avid supporter of the Azov Battalion” under the username “Odin,” Russell requested “some advice from you about my militia that I lead in the US.”⁵⁶ It is unclear what, if any, assistance he may have received. In January 2016, Andrew Oneschuk, a roommate of Russell, served as a guest on the Azov Battalion’s podcast, which frequently hosts representatives of European and North American organizations. He spoke about challenges facing Americans who wish to join the Azov Battalion in Ukraine as foreign fighters and expressed interest in learning tips to boost membership.⁵⁷

AWD has also been attracted to the ideology of the Order of Nine Angles (O9A or ONA), a Satanist neo-Nazi organization active in the United Kingdom (also discussed below as a foreign organization). The group valorizes Hitler,

champions the transgression of moral norms, and seeks to weaken society and replace it with a new civilization based on principles of fascism and Satanism.⁵⁸ After John Cameron Denton took over leadership of AWD in 2017, he integrated aspects of O9A's ideology into AWD's set of beliefs.⁵⁹ This move alienated some AWD members, but proponents of O9A succeeded in reshaping the core tenets of AWD towards the neo-Nazi occult.⁶⁰ For example, in 2019, then-U.S. Army Private First Class Corwyn Storm Carver, reportedly a member of AWD, posted photos online of himself with O9A paraphernalia.⁶¹ Other AWD members have posted messages indicating support for O9A in online chat rooms.⁶²

The Base

The Base is an accelerationist neo-Nazi organization that operated mostly online in the United States with some activity in Europe and outreach to Canada. It was established in 2018 by Rinaldo Nazzaro, a U.S. citizen who had previously worked as an analyst for the FBI and as a contractor for the U.S. Department of Defense.⁶³ Nazzaro has allegedly lived in St. Petersburg, Russia, since 2018.⁶⁴ A video posted online in March 2019 records Nazzaro wearing a t-shirt with an image of Russian President Vladimir Putin and the words "Russia, absolute power."⁶⁵ In November 2020, Nazzaro appeared on the Russian state-owned news channel Russia-24, where he denied links to Russian intelligence and defended The Base.⁶⁶ We found no evidence that the Russian Government supports The Base.

The group advocates a white ethnostate in North America and foresees the overthrow of modern society and an ensuing race war. The group is most active in the United States, although there have been reports of Base followers in other countries, including Australia, Canada, and South Africa.⁶⁷ In October 2020, Dutch police arrested two men accused of affiliation with The Base.⁶⁸ The Base aims to recruit military personnel, including a Canadian non-commissioned reserve officer who conducted paramilitary training in the United States.⁶⁹ In February 2021, the Canadian Department of Public Safety designated The Base as a terrorist entity.⁷⁰

Base members have also considered traveling to Ukraine. In a leaked phone call in 2019, Nazzaro raised the possibility of Base militants joining the conflict in order to gain military experience.⁷¹ One group member, 20-year-old Matthew Ryan Burchfield of Virginia, admitted to traveling to Ukraine to improve his combat skills.⁷² A Georgia prosecutor accused him of taking up arms on behalf of the Right Sector, a Ukrainian paramilitary organization.⁷³ No charges have been filed. As of early 2020, Burchfield claimed to be in Slovakia.⁷⁴ Burchfield has denied involvement with the Right Sector, denounced The Base, and said that his travels to Ukraine were not related to his membership in The Base.⁷⁵

Rise Above Movement

The Rise Above Movement (RAM) emerged in southern California in 2016 as a loose collection of neo-Nazis and white supremacists.⁷⁶ RAM operates essentially as a street-fighting club. Members train in mixed martial arts in order to engage their opponents at events such as political rallies, protests, and demonstrations. RAM members have been arrested by U.S. federal law enforcement for their use of violence at political rallies, though charges against some members have been dismissed. The group has sought to cultivate transnational links, most notably with the Azov Battalion in Ukraine.⁷⁷ RAM also maintains ties to the U.S. skinhead movement, which builds transnational connections with other skinhead groups largely via music festivals.⁷⁸

In April 2018, leader Robert Rundo and other members began a European tour with the declared intention to "bridge the gap between the two nationalist scenes."⁷⁹ In Germany, RAM attended the Schild und Schwert (Shield and Sword) Festival, a mecca for German white supremacists held yearly on Adolf Hitler's birthday.⁸⁰ In Ukraine, RAM was hosted

by Olena Semenyaka, head of the National Corps, the political wing of the Azov Battalion. RAM members joined the Azov Battalion for sparring at the Reconquista Club, a mixed martial arts (MMA) club affiliated with the group. Semenyaka later stated that Rundo and his compatriots “came to learn our ways” and “showed interest in learning how to create youth forces in the ways Azov has.”⁸¹ During their visit, Rundo entered an MMA competition for white supremacists from across Europe, allegedly becoming the first American to take part in the event.⁸² While in Kyiv, Rundo also reportedly got a tattoo of the logo for White Rex, a clothing label created by Russian MMA fighter Denis Nikitin (aka Denis Kapustin). Some accounts say Rundo toured with Nikitin, who is now the leader of the Russian Volunteer Corps, responsible for pro-Ukrainian incursions into Russia in 2023.⁸³ In a March 2020 video posted to YouTube, Rundo defended the Azov Battalion as the group came under scrutiny in the United States.⁸⁴

RAM members returned to Europe in early 2020 and participated in neo-Nazi events in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Serbia. This included a neo-Nazi march organized by the Bulgarian National Union, a nationalist political party; a neo-Nazi concert in Budapest; and an event organized by the Hungarian Hammerskins. RAM members also reportedly met with members of a Serbian nationalist group known as Kormilo.⁸⁵

In March 2023, Rundo was arrested in Romania and will reportedly be extradited to the United States to face charges stemming from earlier violence in California.⁸⁶ He had been in Eastern Europe for around three years. The Nordic Resistance Movement protested his imprisonment.⁸⁷

Patriot Front

Patriot Front (PF) is a white supremacist group founded by Thomas Ryan Rousseau in 2017 after the “Unite the Right” Rally in Charlottesville. The group espouses racist, anti-Semitic, and xenophobic ideologies, and its primary goal is to create a white ethnostate in the United States.⁸⁸ Most of the group’s activities focus on distributing propaganda, organizing demonstrations, and attending rallies. It is estimated that PF members have been responsible for more than 80 percent of the white supremacist propaganda distribution activities in the United States since 2020.⁸⁹ Leaked messages publicized in 2022 revealed Patriot Front to be tightly organized and extremely active in recruiting, including among the U.S. military.⁹⁰ Patriot Front members, including Rousseau, are on trial in Idaho for attempting a violent disruption of a gay pride event in 2022.⁹¹

According to the left-wing journalist collective Unicorn Riot, Patriot Front explicitly forbids relationships with other groups, or “parallel organizing.”⁹² However, the group reportedly has connections to domestic groups, including the Proud Boys, the National Justice Party, and the Rise Above Movement, and foreign groups. Specifically, in late 2019, Patriot Front members traveled to Europe, where they reportedly met with members of the Nordic Resistance Movement in Sweden and with the neo-fascist organization Casa Pound in Rome.⁹³

Proud Boys

The Proud Boys is an all-male extremist organization formed in the United States in 2016. The group is Islamophobic, anti-Semitic, homophobic, transphobic, misogynistic, and xenophobic. Some factions within the Proud Boys have accelerationist tendencies.⁹⁴ Group members attend events with organizations that advocate white supremacist ideologies, although Proud Boys leaders deny ties to these beliefs. The group joined with Oath Keepers to play a prominent role in the January 6, 2021, assault on the U.S. Congress to block the election of President Joe Biden. In May 2023, several of its leaders were convicted of seditious conspiracy in organizing the attacks.⁹⁵ Since 2021, Proud

Boys have mobilized to join anti-LGBT+ demonstrations.⁹⁶

The organization was founded in 2016 by Gavin McInnes, who was born in England and raised in Canada. He immigrated to the United States in 1999.⁹⁷ In 2016, McInnes launched “The Gavin McInnes Show,” which regularly featured extremist guests and began cultivating “an ideological space for frustrated young men to rally around.”⁹⁸ In July 2016, it was reported that McInnes had “convened his local ‘Proud Boys’ chapter for their first in-person meeting.”⁹⁹ Several months later, McInnes publicly announced the formation of the organization in an article for *Taki’s Magazine*, claiming over 1,000 members on its private Facebook page along with chapters located around the world, including in the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. McInnes also outlined steps for readers to start their own Proud Boys chapters.¹⁰⁰

Its transnational connections consist of loose and largely ideological ties to other Proud Boys chapters, including those in Canada, Australia, and Israel.¹⁰¹ In 2020, members of the Canadian chapter of the Proud Boys split off to form a new group known as Canada First.¹⁰² Canada First has posted neo-Nazi content and advocated violence against anyone who is not White.¹⁰³ The mainstream Proud Boys Canada reportedly attempted to distance itself from Canada First. In February 2021, the Canadian federal government designated the Proud Boys as a terrorist entity, citing its role in the violent assaults on the U.S. Capitol.¹⁰⁴ Shortly after, at least one Proud Boys chapter in Canada announced that it had “officially” dissolved itself.¹⁰⁵ Some Proud Boys members blamed Canada First for the Proud Boys’ terrorist designation.¹⁰⁶

In June 2022, New Zealand also designated the Proud Boys as a terrorist organization.¹⁰⁷ The New Zealand designation stated that the New Zealand and Australian Proud Boys organizations adhered to the ideology but were separate entities: “no credible link or coordination between chapters in Canada, Australia, or elsewhere has been observed.”¹⁰⁸

Three Percenters

The Three Percenters (also known as 3%ers, III%ers, or Threepers) is an anti-government extremist group founded by Mike Vanderboegh in 2008. It is composed of a loose coalition of local chapters with no centralized organization or authority.¹⁰⁹ The Three Percenters believe that small groups of armed citizens have a patriotic duty to defend the public from governmental tyranny. Members view themselves as modern-day counterparts to participants in the American Revolution, fighting not against the British but the U.S. federal government.¹¹⁰ On January 6, 2021, the Three Percenters participated in the storming of the U.S. Capitol, seeking to prevent the certification of Joe Biden as the victor of the 2020 presidential election. Several Three Percenters have faced charges for their participation in the riot.

The Three Percenters claims to maintain a presence in all 50 states and in Canada.¹¹¹ The Canadian III% began as a Facebook group after the 2015 election of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau. By 2017, the Canadian Three Percenters had established chapters in several Canadian provinces, the largest in Alberta and British Columbia. The group made its public debut at a rally hosted by the World Coalition Against Islam in Calgary on June 3, 2017, where they purportedly provided “security” for the anti-Islam activist Sandra Solomon. Members of the Canadian III% have since posed as “security” at similar rallies in cities throughout Canada, including Toronto, London, and Hamilton. The group was originally led by Robert “Beau” Welling, who also served as the president of the Alberta chapter. On November 28, 2018, leadership of the group transferred to Kazimir “Kazz” Nowlin, who sought to increase the group’s paramilitary training. In 2018, Maxime Fiset, a former Neo-Nazi who now works to counter violent extremism and radicalization, called the Three Percenters the “most dangerous” extremist group in Canada.¹¹² Canada designated the Three Percenters as a terrorist entity on June 25, 2021, saying the group posed a “significant threat” to Canadian domestic

security.¹¹³

Foreign organizations and their outreach to the United States

This section summarizes the efforts of five prominent foreign organizations to build contacts with U.S. citizens and U.S.-based extremist groups:

- Russian Imperial Movement
- Azov Battalion
- Order of Nine Angles
- Nordic Resistance Movement
- Feuerkrieg Division

Russian Imperial Movement (RIM)

The Russian Imperial Movement (RIM) is a white supremacist organization based in St. Petersburg. Founded in 2002, the group promotes ethnic Russian nationalism, advocates the restoration of the tsarist regime, and seeks to fuel white supremacy extremism in the West. RIM maintains contacts with neo-Nazi and white supremacist groups across Europe and the United States. In 2020, RIM and its leaders Stanislav Anatolyevich Vorobyev, Denis Valiullovich Gariyev, and Nikolay Nikolayevich Trushchalov were listed as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGT) by the U.S. Department of State. This was the first time that a white supremacist organization was so designated.¹¹⁴ In June 2022, the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated RIM leader Stanislav Shevchuk and prominent supporter and fund-raiser Alexander Zhuchkovsky.¹¹⁵ RIM's outreach to the United States and intent to build a global network were cited as reasons for the designation, along with RIM's support for Russia's assault on Ukraine.

While RIM has aggressively built ties with European groups, its outreach to U.S. organizations appears to have occurred on a personal – rather than a formal or institutional – basis. Starting in 2014, RIM sought to position itself at the forefront of the transnational white supremacist movement. As part of the campaign, reportedly known as “The Last Crusade,” RIM expanded its contacts with other white supremacist groups, especially in the United States and Europe.¹¹⁶ In March 2015, the group attended the International Russian Conservative Forum, a conference for white supremacists held in St. Petersburg and organized by Rodina, a Russian political party.¹¹⁷ Other attendees included U.S. white supremacists, such as Jared Taylor, the editor of the U.S. white supremacist publication *American Renaissance*. Also in attendance were European organizations, including Golden Dawn (Greece), the National Democratic Party (Germany), and Forza Nuova (Italy).

In June 2015, RIM joined Rodina in co-founding the World National Conservative Movement (WNCM). A network of worldwide extremist groups, WNCM opposes pluralism, tolerance, and other liberal values, according to its manifesto, and promotes the use of violence. RIM invited over 50 white supremacist and neo-Nazi groups from 28 countries to join WNCM, including the American Freedom Party, American Renaissance, League of the South, and Traditionalist Youth Network from the United States. In September 2015, RIM leader Vorobyev traveled to Sweden to meet with the Nordic Resistance Movement (NRM), a neo-Nazi group active across Scandinavian countries, and spoke at the NRM's “Nordic Days” event.¹¹⁸

RIM's primary contact within the U.S. white supremacist movement appeared to be Matthew Heimbach, founder of the short-lived neo-Nazi Traditionalist Workers' Party (TWP) and an organizer of the August 2017 “Unite the Right” rally in

Charlottesville, Virginia. After Heimbach was arrested in 2018 for assaulting his father-in-law, the TWP became inactive.¹¹⁹ Heimbach cited Russia as an inspiration for his organization and praised Vladimir Putin as the “leader of the free world.”¹²⁰ In September 2017, RIM members traveled to the United States to network.¹²¹ During visits to Washington, D.C., and Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, Heimbach hosted RIM leader Stanislav Shevchuk and posed with him for a photo in front of the White House while holding an imperial Russian flag.¹²² This meeting was reportedly the first between U.S. white supremacists and a Russian organization on U.S. soil.¹²³ In an interview with liberal news outlet ThinkProgress, Heimbach highlighted similar goals and declared that TWP was to represent the U.S. white supremacist movement in dialogues with RIM.¹²⁴ Heimbach allegedly received funds from RIM and met with their U.S. representatives several times.¹²⁵ Though he was invited to travel to Russia and train with RIM, it is unclear if he or any other members of the TWP did so.

Though Heimbach and his Traditionalist Workers’ Party appeared central to RIM’s U.S. efforts, RIM also networked with Sam Dickson, a lawyer affiliated with the Ku Klux Klan, and Jared Taylor, editor of the white supremacist publication *American Renaissance*, at the March 2015 International Russian Conservative Forum conference. The group reportedly offered to provide paramilitary training to organizers of the 2017 “Unite the Right” rally, including Richard Spencer, Jason Kessler, and Eli Mosley. However, both parties deny these reports.¹²⁶ As of June 2020, no U.S. citizens were known to have participated in RIM’s paramilitary training.¹²⁷

Azov Battalion

The Azov Battalion formed in March 2014 as a volunteer brigade to fight Russian-backed separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk.¹²⁸ In the following description, we use three names to refer to Azov: the Azov Battalion (the name under which the group was founded), the Azov Regiment (the name adopted after integration into the Ukrainian National Guard), and the Azov Movement (the network of the Azov Regiment, National Corps, and National Militia). In earlier sections of this report, we only use one term – the Azov Battalion – for clarity.

The Azov Battalion has roots in the “Patriot of Ukraine” (PU) militant organization, which had previously been active during the 1990s and early 2000s. In 2005, Andriy Biletsky recreated PU to champion white nationalist and anti-immigrant ideas. Following the annexation of Crimea, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense encouraged volunteer military units to mobilize against Russian-backed separatists in Donbas.¹²⁹ Biletsky and several other PU members formed the Azov Battalion in response to this call. On November 12, 2014, Ukraine designated the Azov Battalion a “Special Purpose Regiment” and formally integrated it into the National Guard within the Ukrainian Interior Ministry.¹³⁰ In December 2014, the PU formally disbanded, and the remaining members integrated into the Azov Regiment.¹³¹

As the Azov Regiment grew, it pursued international relationships and recruited foreign fighters. The group was initially composed of eastern Ukrainians with foreign fighters from Sweden, Spain, Italy, Canada, France, and Russia.¹³² The group later recruited from Belarus, Germany, and possibly the United States.¹³³ The Soufan Center reported that between 2014-2019 approximately 17,000 people from 50 countries – including the United States – traveled to fight in Ukraine, although it is hard to determine how many specifically fought with Azov.¹³⁴ A report by the Counter Extremism Project estimated that Western foreign fighters in Ukraine with previous ties to extremism numbered in the hundreds and that the Azov Movement was the key hub for these extremists.¹³⁵

Azov’s transnational networking and recruiting efforts developed into a hub of international activity.¹³⁶ As recently as 2020, National Corps specifically cited its desire for American recruits to fight against Russia and help counter perceived “pro-Kremlin” narratives in the United States.¹³⁷ In interviews with researchers, the Atomwaffen Division claimed to have sent members to Ukraine to obtain battlefield experience.¹³⁸ Members of the Rise Above Movement

(RAM) have also openly publicized meetings with members of the Azov Regiment and National Corps. A number of Russian nationals have also joined the Azov Regiment, facilitated by the fact that Azov is a largely Russian-speaking organization.¹³⁹

Azov's international outreach program is headed by Olena Semenyaka and aims to network with other organizations across the United States and Europe.¹⁴⁰ The program's activities include running events and recruitment efforts out of European and American white supremacist and neo-Nazi groups, such as the Nordic Resistance Movement, Rise Above Movement, Casa Pound, and Atomwaffen Division (AWD).¹⁴¹ For example, American White Nationalist writer Greg Johnson appeared and spoke with the Azov Battalion at the invitation of Semenyaka in Kyiv in early 2019.¹⁴² He also gave a lecture based on his Manifesto of White Nationalism. Johnson himself stated publicly that his trip was to learn from Azov: "I really want to learn how maybe we can do things better in the United States and Western Europe."¹⁴³

As noted in our discussion of the Atomwaffen Division, AWD maintains ties to the Azov Movement. In 2015, AWD founder Brandon Russell reached out to an anonymous member of the Azov Regiment online. Presenting himself as "an avid supporter of the Azov Battalion" under the username "Odin," Russell requested "some advice from you about my militia that I lead in the US."¹⁴⁴ It is unclear what, if any, assistance he may have received from Azov Regiment members. In addition to Russell, the Azov Movement is known to have made contact with at least one other AWD member. In January 2016, Andre Oneschuk, a roommate of Russell, served as a guest on the Azov Regiment's podcast, which frequently hosts guests from Europe and North America. He spoke about challenges facing Americans who wished to join Azov in Ukraine as foreign fighters and expressed interest in learning tips to boost membership of the extreme right.¹⁴⁵ In October 2020, Ukraine deported two American Atomwaffen members who were allegedly trying to join the Azov Regiment.¹⁴⁶

Ukraine allegedly hosts a group claiming to be an AWD affiliate, though the cell is not sanctioned by AWD central in the United States. Some sources have referred to this group by the name "AWD Galizien."¹⁴⁷ "Galizien" refers to a unit of the Nazi Waffen-SS composed largely of ethnic Ukrainians. In December 2019, the self-declared AWD Ukraine released a video featuring five men wearing camouflage fatigues with AWD patches and threatening violence against Ukrainian politicians.¹⁴⁸ The men also wore blurred-out patches for two Ukrainian extremist organizations, the Azov Battalion and Right Sector.¹⁴⁹

As noted, the U.S.-based Rise Above Movement (RAM) has also connected with the Azov Movement. According to an Azov member, RAM's leader Rundo and his compatriots "came to learn our ways" and "showed interest in learning how to create youth forces in the ways Azov has."¹⁵⁰ During their visit, RAM members joined the Azov Movement for sparring at the Reconquista Club, a mixed martial arts (MMA) club affiliated with the group.¹⁵¹ Rundo entered an MMA competition for white supremacists from across Europe, supposedly the first American to take part in the history of the event.¹⁵² While in Kyiv, Rundo also got a tattoo of the Viking warrior logo of White Rex, a clothing label founded by Russian MMA fighter and Azov Movement associate Denis Nikitin.¹⁵³

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2021 prompted U.S. citizens to travel to Ukraine with the express purpose of training with or joining the Azov Regiment. These individuals have included avowed neo-Nazis and white supremacists, as well as individuals subject to criminal investigation and arrest by American law enforcement. For example, when four RAM members were arrested by the FBI for violence at protests, the FBI's criminal complaint noted that the four had traveled to Ukraine with the express purpose of training with the Azov Regiment.¹⁵⁴ American military veterans have also joined Azov through their international recruitment program alongside European volunteers.¹⁵⁵

Order of Nine Angles

The Order of Nine Angles (O9A or ONA) is a satanic neo-Nazi organization founded in the 1970s in the United Kingdom, reportedly by British extremist David Myatt.¹⁵⁶ The group valorizes Hitler and champions the transgression of moral norms, including calling for rape and murder. Ultimately, O9A seeks to weaken society and replace it with a new civilization based on principles of fascism and satanism. O9A practices religious rituals in worship of Hitler and Nazism, which involve sexual acts and sacrifice (human or animal). The U.S. Department of Justice has characterized O9A's beliefs as "Satanic, anarchist, neo-fascist, neo-Nazi, and anti-Semitic."¹⁵⁷ Given O9A's secretive nature, accurate size estimates are difficult; they range from fewer than 10 to over 2,000 members worldwide.¹⁵⁸

O9A today operates decentralized networks active around the world. O9A's individual members and chapters, or "nexions," are located in countries including the United States, Australia, Brazil, Egypt, Germany, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, Poland, Russia, Serbia, Spain, and South Africa.¹⁵⁹ The vast majority of O9A's activities appear to occur online.

O9A's most notable U.S. connection is to the Atomwaffen Division (AWD). As we noted in the discussion of AWD, in 2017, AWD leader John Cameron Denton began incorporating aspects of O9A ideology into AWD's belief set.¹⁶⁰ For example, Denton added O9A's book *Hostia: Secret Teachings of the Order of Nine Angles* to the group reading list.¹⁶¹

In addition to AWD, O9A has attracted other U.S. followers. For example, Tempel ov Blood (ToB) is a low-profile U.S.-based affiliate of O9A. Although officially independent, ToB draws its satanist neo-Nazi ideology from O9A.¹⁶² The group describes itself as "a hybrid between a traditional satanic coven and a (religious) militant order."¹⁶³ One of its leaders has served as a "prolific publisher of O9A-related books through his Martinet Press imprint."¹⁶⁴

In June 2020, Ethan Melzer, a 22-year-old U.S. Army private from Louisville, Kentucky, was arrested and charged with "planning an attack on his U.S. Army unit by sending sensitive details about the unit – including information about its location, movements, and security" – to members of O9A over Telegram.¹⁶⁵ In March 2023, Melzer was sentenced to 45 years in prison.¹⁶⁶ He is said to have been a member of O9A before joining the army and to have been planning the attack before his unit deployed to Turkey, presumably against an unidentified U.S. military base in Turkey.

Nordic Resistance Movement

The Nordic Resistance Movement (NRM) is a pan-Nordic neo-Nazi organization operating in Scandinavia, primarily Sweden, Norway, and Finland. Founded in 1997 as the Swedish Resistance Movement before changing its name in 2016, the group has continually expanded and is currently a leading hub for neo-Nazi activism. Its official chapters operate in Sweden, Finland, and Norway. Branches in Denmark and Iceland are significantly smaller and less active, leading to some doubt over whether they can be considered branches.¹⁶⁷ NRM also has a significant social media following in Russia.¹⁶⁸ NRM members have trained with RIM through its Partizan paramilitary course. The NRM website stated that the group has "no immediate plans to expand outside of the North." It has, however, translated its political program into English and encouraged foreign adherents to "get organized."¹⁶⁹

Outside of Scandinavia and Russia, NRM has interpersonal connections with several other extremist organizations, including Der Dritte Weg in Germany, Legio Hungaria in Hungary, Casa Pound in Italy, National Action in the United Kingdom, and Golden Dawn in Greece.¹⁷⁰ NRM has also expressed support for and interacted with American extremist groups, particularly over social media.¹⁷¹ As noted above in our discussion of RAM, NRM has protested the 2023 arrest of its leader Rob Rundo. All of these groups share ideas, publicize others' media outputs, and occasionally travel to attend others' events. For example, the Finnish NRM branch planned an annual "612 March" in Helsinki on Finnish

Independence Day, where neo-Nazis and right-wing extremists from across Scandinavia and even the rest of Europe congregate. Before COVID-19, the march would usually attract up to 3,000 participants.¹⁷²

Feuerkrieg Division

The Feuerkrieg Division (FKD) was apparently founded online in 2018 by a 13-year-old based in Estonia known as “Commander.”¹⁷³ FKD is an accelerationist neo-Nazi group inspired by James Mason’s white supremacist *SIEGE* text.¹⁷⁴ Members advocate extreme acts of violence to spur a race war to purge racial, ethnic, and religious minorities and topple what they see as a corrupt political and social system.¹⁷⁵ They reportedly strive to establish a whites-only ethnostate where inhabitants will fend for themselves after society collapses.¹⁷⁶

Based on online postings, FKD members are primarily teenagers and live in at least twelve countries, including the United States, Canada, England, Ireland, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Norway, Estonia, Latvia, and Russia.¹⁷⁷ A 2022 *Politico* investigation detailed extensive efforts by FKD and other global movements to recruit Americans, especially teenagers.¹⁷⁸ In 2020, a FKD informant suggested that many FKD members were also active in other U.S.-based organizations, including the Atomwaffen Division and The Base.¹⁷⁹ In late 2021, FKD formed a tacit alliance with the Dallas-based Telegram community “Injekt Division.”¹⁸⁰ Its leaders were instrumental in forging an umbrella network (known as “Terrorgram”) with other *SIEGE*-inspired groups, like the United Acceleration Front (UAF) and National Socialist Alliance (NSA).¹⁸¹

U.S. citizens have been involved in violence encouraged by Feuerkrieg Division. For example, in 2019, FKD member Conor Climo posted under the username “Ben Dover” on Discord about his interest in using improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and Molotov cocktails to attack a Jewish synagogue and the LGBTQ community near his home in Las Vegas.¹⁸² On August 8, 2019, the FBI raided Climo’s home and seized materials that could be used to construct an IED.¹⁸³ He received a two-year prison sentence.

In September 2019, U.S. authorities arrested U.S. Army SPC Jarrett William Smith in Fort Smith, Arkansas. Smith had posted on Telegram under the username “anti-Kosmik” about a plan to target Beto O’Rourke, CNN, and antifa members using an IED. Smith claimed that he had joined the military because he was unable to travel to Ukraine to link up with paramilitary organizations (e.g., Azov and Misanthropic Division).¹⁸⁴ He pleaded guilty on February 10, 2020, and received a sentence of 30 months.¹⁸⁵

The potential for extremist ties with Russia

Thus far, we have focused on chronicling the relationships between extremist non-state actors. Extremist organizations may also forge connections to foreign state governments as a means of securing funds, ideological support, and other resources. In this section, we explore the potential for ties between RMVE and AGAAVE groups based in the United States and the Russian Federation.

We find no evidence that the Russian Government directly engages with, condones, or assists any extremist movement or organization based in the United States. While there have been alleged ties between Russia and extremist movements based in Europe,¹⁸⁶ there is no indication that the Russian Government has coordinated or supported any extremist organization in the United States. In this section, we outline three potential pathways for Russian influence in the future that should be of particular concern to the U.S. Government.

Pathway 1 (direct ties): Russian Federation officials may build direct ties to RMVE and AAGAVE organizations and followers based in the United States.

Under this scenario, the Russian Federation would aim to build direct relationships with U.S.-based extremists and supply them with aid to support their operations. Russia has done this with other extremist movements based in Europe.¹⁸⁷ If successful, this type of direct connection between Russia and U.S.-based extremists would fuel the development and growth of their organizations and ideology, exacerbating the already pressing threat of extremist violence.

At this time, there is no evidence of any direct ties between the Russian Federation and extremist organizations in the United States. However, we see a potential for ties with American RMVE groups and followers. Russia may currently exert some influence over Rinaldo Nazzaro, a U.S. citizen and the leader of the U.S. RMVE organization The Base who has lived in St. Petersburg since 2018. A video posted online in March 2019 records Nazzaro wearing a t-shirt with an image of Russian President Vladimir Putin and the words “Russia, absolute power.” Also in 2019, Nazzaro attended an event in Moscow hosted by the Russian Government that “focused on the demonstration of the results of state policy and achievements.”¹⁸⁸ In November 2020, Nazzaro appeared on the Russian state-owned news channel Russia-24, where he denied claims of a link to Russian intelligence and defended The Base.¹⁸⁹ There is no evidence that the Russian Government supports Nazzaro’s organization, The Base, but the extent of Nazzaro’s ties with the Russian Government is unclear.

Russia may aim to network with other American extremists in the future. Recent rhetoric by some RMVE extremists in the United States suggests that they may be open to building a relationship with the Russian Federation. Several RMVE extremists have spoken favorably of Russia and Vladimir Putin, viewing him as “a symbol of strength, racial purity and traditional Christian values.”¹⁹⁰ U.S.-based white supremacist Richard Spencer has called Russia the “sole white power in the world” and led a protest where white nationalists repeated “Russia is our friend,” among other chants.¹⁹¹ Matthew Heimbach, the founder of the U.S.-based white supremacist group the Traditionalist Worker Party, has described Russia as “our biggest inspiration” and Putin as “the leader of the free world.”¹⁹² Some U.S. citizens have traveled to Russia for networking purposes. For example, U.S.-based white supremacists Sam Dickson and Jared Taylor traveled to St. Petersburg in 2019 to attend a political conference organized by Rodina, a Russian political party.¹⁹³

These ties suggest that U.S.-based extremists might seek out Russian support or be willing to accept it in the future. Russia may also be able to wield influence over U.S. citizens traveling to Russia for networking events or, in the case of The Base leader Nazzaro, living full-time in the country.

Pathway 2 (indirect ties): Russian Federation officials may build ties with Russian or European extremist groups, which in turn could establish connections to U.S.-based groups.

Russia may forge indirect connections to U.S.-based extremist groups, working through like-minded intermediaries. As outlined in the previous sections of this report, American extremists are linked to several European extremist organizations, including groups based in Russia, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, among other countries.

Of particular note is the St. Petersburg-based Russian Imperial Movement, which has a history of being tolerated by the Russian Government. Prior to the war in Ukraine, the RIM’s hostility to Putin’s regime prompted police raids on its facilities; these raids ebbed when the group decreased its focus on Russian domestic politics and turned its attention to Ukraine.¹⁹⁴ In 2014, RIM began fighting alongside pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine.¹⁹⁵ In 2016, a member of the Imperial Legion interviewed by the BBC described the Moscow-RIM relationship: “we don’t receive any support, but

at the same time, we aren't hampered [by the Russian Government].¹⁹⁶ Currently, RIM and its paramilitary training program operate openly in Russia.¹⁹⁷ Analysts have noted that RIM's activities advance Moscow's goals in two major respects: supporting Russian-backed separatists in Ukraine and seeking to fuel white supremacist extremism in Europe and the United States.¹⁹⁸ One expert called RIM "useful" for the Russian Government.¹⁹⁹

As noted above, RIM has networked with several U.S. citizens. In September 2017, RIM members traveled to the United States.²⁰⁰ During visits to Washington, D.C., and Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, U.S. citizen Matthew Heimbach hosted RIM leader Stanislav Shevchuk and posed with him for a photo in front of the White House while holding an imperial Russian flag.²⁰¹ Heimbach allegedly received funds from RIM and met with their U.S. representatives several times.²⁰² RIM has also networked with U.S. white supremacists Sam Dickson, a lawyer affiliated with the Ku Klux Klan, and Jared Taylor, editor of the white supremacist publication *American Renaissance*, at the March 2015 International Russian Conservative Forum conference. The group reportedly offered to provide paramilitary training to organizers of the August 2017 "Unite the Right" rally of the extreme right in Charlottesville, Virginia, including Richard Spencer, Jason Kessler, and Eli Mosley. However, both RIM and the U.S. white supremacists deny these reports.²⁰³ As of June 2020, no U.S. citizens are known to have participated in RIM's paramilitary training.²⁰⁴

Such ties between U.S. citizens and RIM create an opportunity for Russian Government officials to connect with U.S.-based extremists. Through RIM, Russian Government officials could influence and provide resources to white supremacist extremists and organizations in the United States.

Pathway 3 (online influence): Russian Government officials may attempt to shape the discourse, radicalization, and mobilization of U.S.-based extremists through online propaganda and social media.

There is significant evidence that Russian-directed social media campaigns have attempted to spread misinformation inside the United States. Russia's efforts to influence U.S. presidential and midterm elections is one such example.²⁰⁵ In recent years, Russian campaigns and companies have also aimed to amplify extremist messaging in the United States, promoting conspiracy theories and giving extremists online space to share content.

Most notable are Russian efforts to boost the Qanon extremist movement, which is known for promulgating several conspiracy theories about the "Deep State" that have spurred violent criminal acts.²⁰⁶ On November 2, 2017, a suspected-Russian Twitter account known as "CrusadersPost" was the first account to use the term "Qanon" on Twitter.²⁰⁷ Between November 2017 and November 2020, Russian-associated Twitter accounts retweeted the hashtag #Qanon approximately 17,000 times, which made #Qanon the most common hashtag associated with a Russian account.²⁰⁸

In 2019, Twitter accounts suspected of being affiliates of the Russian Internet Research Agency – a Russian company known for its influence operations targeting the 2016 U.S. election – heavily promoted Qanon messages using the hashtags #Qanon and #WWG1WGA.²⁰⁹ *Russia Today* and *Sputnik* also increased their coverage of the Qanon theory between 2019 and 2020.²¹⁰ Twitter had prominent takedowns of Russian-associated accounts amplifying Qanon in 2019.²¹¹ In July 2020, Facebook and Twitter banned thousands of Qanon accounts.²¹² *Russia Today* then ran a series of articles about the ban, which heavily publicized it and provoked outrage among Qanon supporters online.²¹³ Social media analysis firm Graphik found that the incident increased the popularity of *Russia Today* news stories in the Qanon community.²¹⁴ Qanon conspiracists, who now span a number of countries and are largely independent of Q, support Russia's invasion of Ukraine as a blow against the "deep state." In 2022, for example, Qanon posts followed the Russian Government's lead in claiming that Russian airstrikes in Ukraine were launched to destroy American bioweapons labs.²¹⁵

The Russian Internet Research Agency (IRA) is responsible for at least some of this Qanon campaign.²¹⁶ IRA appears to operate mostly on mainstream platforms such as Twitter and Facebook, creating accounts and posts designed to sow division and manipulate users. For example, researchers found suggestive evidence that the IRA attempted to influence Twitter discourse surrounding the “Unite the Right” rally in Charlottesville in August 2017.²¹⁷ In 2020, it was reported that the IRA also tried to amplify stories and post memes on patriots.win, Gab, and Parler, but the effort did not gain much traction.²¹⁸

In addition to Russian-directed influence campaigns, Russia-based social media websites have also facilitated content-sharing and networking among extremists. In recent years, the Facebook-like Vkontakte (VK) has become a space for U.S.-based white supremacists to connect with other like-minded individuals around the world and share extremist content.²¹⁹ One researcher estimated that about 100 American right-wing groups are active on VK, many of which joined after being banned by Facebook.²²⁰ Another Russian social media site, Odnoklassniki, was used by the perpetrator of the May 2023 mass shooting at a shopping mall in Allen, Texas. He maintained a profile on the site where he shared racist content and posted scouting photos of the mall that he later targeted.²²¹

In general, it is unclear how much the Russian Government oversees these indirect efforts to shape and amplify extremist discourse in the United States. However, it is apparent that the United States is highly vulnerable to online influence operations and that Russia may take advantage of this vulnerability to encourage and amplify extremist actors in the future.

Conclusion

We do not find evidence of a cohesive global RMVE or AAGAVE movement. However, there is clearly a potential for deeper and more systematic transnational cooperation among existing extremist organizations in the future. We cite specific evidence of transnational connections for several U.S. and European organizations, but at present, there appear to be inherent limits to this internationalization. In general, the violent RMVE and AAGAVE universe is characterized by unstructured, unsystematic, and loose connections that are both online and physical. These relationships are so far shallow and sporadic rather than deep and sustained. We do not see strong institutionalized cooperation or regular joint operational planning, although there is imitation and diffusion of ideas and tactics, largely online.

These cross-border connections seem unlikely to lead to coordinated mass-casualty attacks, but groups can share ideas, tactics, and resources in order to keep spreading and reinforcing dangerous ideologies that inspire individual violence, recruiting followers, threatening perceived enemies, and engaging in smaller-scale acts of violence (e.g., street fighting, brawling, and hate crimes). These links create the potential for escalation. We have noted several recent examples of the willingness to use or threaten violence, including prison sentences imposed for participation in the January 6, 2021, attacks on the U.S. Congress, possession of explosives, and plotting an attack on a U.S. military base. Charges have also been brought for a plot to attack critical U.S. infrastructure.

Ideological differences and organizational fragmentation may impede closer cooperation. The AAGAVE elements of U.S. violent extremism are locally focused and appear to engage in less transnational cooperation than RMVE organizations. We surmise that there is more cross-national affinity and global ideological solidarity in the white supremacist, alt-right, and neo-Nazi ecosphere. Accelerationist groups, such as the Atomwaffen Division, have distinct international ambitions, but their efforts so far to build transnational ties have resulted in unsystematic, loose, and largely virtual connections. A high level of mistrust and disagreement accompanies this incoherence; for example, leaderless resistance as an organizational strategy (a key tenet of white supremacist accelerationism) does not easily

lend itself to a coordinated global movement.

Although a large portion of radicalization and mobilization takes place online, meeting in person is still important. We have noted several instances of training, conferences, and public events, such as mixed martial arts competitions that have involved making an effort to travel internationally. Leaders of two of the groups we analyzed even relocated abroad.

Although, in general, few “foreign fighters” from the United States are traveling to fight in Ukraine, we assess that the Ukrainian connection is the most explicit physical tie to American extremist groups, since Atomwaffen Division (AWD) members have traveled to Ukraine to connect with the Azov Battalion.²²² In interviews with *National Geographic*, members of the National Socialist Order (the rebranded AWD) leaders claimed to have sent members to train in Ukraine.²²³ In early 2016, Azov was known to be in contact with U.S. members of the Atomwaffen Division. Andrew Oneschuk, later killed by another member of Atomwaffen, was featured on Azov’s podcast, discussing the obstacles to Americans joining the Ukrainian militia, and he himself was encouraged to join Azov.²²⁴

In terms of foreign state support for U.S.-based groups, we found no open-source evidence that the Russian Government directly engages with, condones, or assists any U.S.-based extremist movement or organization. Some U.S.-based RMVE extremists may be open to building a relationship with the Russian Federation, and the Russian Imperial Movement has connected to U.S. citizens. Russian-directed social media campaigns have attempted to spread misinformation inside the United States, but the extent of official involvement is unclear.

Overall, we find evidence that some U.S.-based extremist organizations – primarily RMVE groups – possess international ambitions and have sought to forge connections with extremists abroad. While we expect that these ties will not result in coordinated mass-casualty attacks across borders in the near term, transnational relationships clearly have the potential to inspire acts of domestic terrorism by amplifying dangerous ideologies and spreading tactics and strategies to commit violence.

Moving forward, policymakers and scholars should pay close attention to extremist groups with transnational connections. These ties may help these groups develop the capabilities, motivations, and membership necessary to carry out more systematic and destructive acts of violence. Additional research is needed to understand the full extent of the connections between U.S.-based groups and other extremist actors abroad. In particular, there may be many more potential connections between U.S. citizens and extremist groups operating beyond Europe, including white supremacist and anti-government movements in countries like South Africa and Brazil. Overall, understanding the transnational nature of RMVE and AAGAVE will be key to dismantling extremist networks and containing the threat they pose to the United States.

Endnotes

- ¹ Counter-Terrorism Council Executive Directorate (CTED), “Member States Concerned by Growing and Increasingly Transnational Threat of Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism,” April 2020, United Nations Security Council, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ctc/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil.ctc/files/files/documents/2021/Jan/cted_trends_alert_extreme_right-wing_terrorism.pdf.
- ² Kaitlyn Robinson, Iris Malone, and Martha Crenshaw, “Countering Far-Right Anti-Government Extremism in the United States,” *Perspectives on Terrorism* 17, no. 1 (March 2023).
- ³ United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Secretary General, “Terrorist attacks on the basis of xenophobia, racism and other forms of intolerance, or in the name of religion or belief,” A/77/266, August 3, 2022. It is worth noting that concern about the internationalization of this movement is not entirely a 21st century phenomenon; see Paul Wilkinson, *The New Fascists* (London: Grant McIntyre, 1981).
- ⁴ In addition to these violent individual extremists and non-state actors, extremist political parties in Italy, Israel, Brazil, and Sweden have exhibited a parallel trend of electoral successes. Even fringe groups such as “Alternative for Democracy (AfD)” in Germany and Golden Dawn in Greece have attracted political support. A 2022 RAND report cautions that “despite the emphasis on informal online movements ... the main actors transnationalizing far-right discourse are far-right political parties and political leaders that push xenophobic rhetoric.”; Heather J. Williams et al., *Mapping White Identity Terrorism and Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremism: A Social Network Analysis of Online Activity* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2022), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1841-1.html.
- ⁵ Note the bibliography of references in the Rand Report cited in endnote 4.
- ⁶ Cas Mudde, *The Far Right Today* (Cambridge, England: Polity Press, November 2019).
- ⁷ Munira Mustaffa, “Right-Wing Extremism Has Deep Roots in Southeast Asia,” Global Network on Extremism and Technology, July 14, 2021, <https://gnet-research.org/2021/07/14/right-wing-extremism-has-deep-roots-in-southeast-asia/>; Shashi Jayakumar, “Singapore: The Lure of the Far-Right,” Global Network on Extremism and Technology, February 2, 2021, <https://gnet-research.org/2021/02/02/singapore-the-lure-of-the-far-right/>.
- ⁸ Tim Hume, “German neo-Nazis are trying to go mainstream with MMA and music festivals,” *VICE News*, April 24, 2018, <https://www.vice.com/en/article/wj79nq/german-neo-nazis-are-trying-to-go-mainstream-with-mma-and-music-festivals>. One interviewee said “he was also wary of the festival becoming too cosmopolitan, with the presence of so many foreign neo-Nazis. “I think they come because they envy the strength of what we have in Germany,” he said.”
- ⁹ Yassin Musharbash, “The Globalization of Far Right Extremism: An Investigative Report,” *CTC Sentinel* 14, no. 6 (July/August 2021), <https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-globalization-of-far-right-extremism-an-investigative-report/>.
- ¹⁰ See Appendix B and C in “Strategic Intelligence Assessment and Data on Domestic Terrorism,” Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Homeland Security, October 2022, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2022-10/22_1025_strategic-intelligence-assessment-data-domestic-terrorism.pdf.
- ¹¹ See Appendix B and C in “Strategic Intelligence Assessment and Data on Domestic Terrorism,” Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Homeland Security, October 2022, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2022-10/22_1025_strategic-intelligence-assessment-data-domestic-terrorism.pdf.
- ¹² Sam Jackson, “A Schema of Right-Wing Extremism in the United States,” International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, October 2019, <https://www.icct.nl/publication/schema-right-wing-extremism-united-states>.
- ¹³ Heather J. Williams, *A Dangerous Web: Mapping Racially and Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremism* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2022), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RBA1841-1.html.
- ¹⁴ Arie Perliger, *American Zealots: Inside Right-Wing Domestic Terrorism* (New York: Colombia University Press, 2020), 14-17.
- ¹⁵ Brian Hughes and Cynthia Miller-Idriss, “Uniting for Total Collapse: The January 6 Boost to Accelerationism,” *CTC Sentinel* 14, no. 4 (April/May 2021): 12-18, <https://ctc.westpoint.edu/uniting-for-total-collapse-the-january-6-boost-to-accelerationism/>.
- ¹⁶ See Appendix B and C in “Strategic Intelligence Assessment and Data on Domestic Terrorism,” Federal Bureau of Investigation

and the Department of Homeland Security, October 2022, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2022-10/22_1025_strategic-intelligence-assessment-data-domestic-terrorism.pdf.

¹⁷ Arie Perliger, *American Zealots*; Sam Jackson. *The Oath Keepers: Patriotism and the Edge of Violence in a Right-Wing Antigovernment Group* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2020).

¹⁸ Myles Flores, “The New World Order: The Historical Origins of a Dangerous Modern Conspiracy Theory,” Center on Terrorism, Extremism, and Counterterrorism, Middlebury Institute of International Studies, May 30, 2022, <https://www.middlebury.edu/institute/academics/centers-initiatives/ctec/ctec-publications/new-world-order-historical-origins-dangerous>.

¹⁹ Bruce Hoffman and Jacob Ware, “The Terrorist Threat from the Fractured Far Right,” *Lawfare*, November 1, 2020, <https://www.lawfareblog.com/terrorist-threat-fractured-far-right>.

²⁰ For a map of some of these groups, see Southern Poverty Law Center, “Hate Map,” accessed May 24, 2023, <https://www.splcenter.org/hate-map>.

²¹ For example, see Derek O’Callaghan et al., “An analysis of interactions within and between extreme right communities in social media,” in *Ubiquitous Social Media Analysis*, ed. Martin Atzmueller et al. (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2013), 88-107.; Aleksandra Urman and Stefan Katz, “What they do in the shadows: examining the far-right networks on Telegram,” *Information, Communication & Society* 25, no. 7 (2020): 904-923.; Thomas J. Holt, Steve Chermak, and Joshua D. Freilich, “An Assessment of Extremist Groups Use of Web Forums, Social Media, and Technology to Enculturate and Radicalize Individuals to Violence,” Office of Justice Programs’ National Criminal Justice Reference Service, January 2021, <https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/256038.pdf>.

²² Material for this report is taken from the following profiles published on the Mapping Militants website: “Atomwaffen Division,” last modified August 1, 2022, <https://mappingmilitants.org/node/338/>; “The Base,” last modified February 1, 2021, <https://mappingmilitants.org/node/536/>; “Rise Above Movement,” last modified September 1, 2020, <https://mappingmilitants.org/node/510/>; “Patriot Front,” last modified November 1, 2022, <https://mappingmilitants.org/node/2962/>; “Proud Boys,” last modified November 1, 2022, <https://mappingmilitants.org/node/490/>; “Three Percenters,” last modified April 1, 2022, <https://mappingmilitants.org/node/582/>; “Russian Imperial Movement,” last modified April 7, 2023, <https://mappingmilitants.org/node/513/>; “Azov Battalion,” last modified August 1, 2022, <https://mappingmilitants.org/node/341/>; “Order of Nine Angles,” last modified July 1, 2022, <https://mappingmilitants.org/node/481/>; “Nordic Resistance Movement,” last modified August 1, 2022, <https://mappingmilitants.org/node/471/>; “Feuerkrieg Division,” last modified December 2022.

²³ See the Mapping Militants website for specific coding definitions: “About Relationships,” Mapping Militants Project, accessed June 14, 2023, <https://mappingmilitants.org/about/about-relationships>.

²⁴ Joe Fitzgerald Rodriguez, “Presidio businesses rack big financial losses from ‘Free Speech’ rally,” *San Francisco Examiner*, August 29, 2017, https://www.sfexaminer.com/news/presidio-businesses-rack-big-financial-losses-from-free-speech-rally/article_28519e32-e9dd-50e6-9d83-c12207407b85.html.

²⁵ Derek Hawkins, “‘Boomer antifa’: White supremacists rip into paramilitary Oath Keepers for not being racist enough,” *The Washington Post*, June 16, 2017, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/06/16/boomer-antifa-white-supremacists-rip-into-paramilitary-oath-keepers-for-not-being-racist-enough/>.

²⁶ Mapping Militant Project (MMP), “Atomwaffen Division/National Socialist Order,” last modified August 2022, <https://mappingmilitants.org/node/338>.

²⁷ Jonah Engel Bromwich, “What Is Atomwaffen? A Neo-Nazi Group, Linked to Multiple Murders,” *The New York Times*, February 12, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/12/us/what-is-atomwaffen.html>.

²⁸ Molly Olmstead, “The Suspect in the Killing of Blaze Bernstein Belonged to a Neo-Nazi Group Allegedly Connected to Four Other Murders,” *Slate*, January 31, 2018, <https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/01/atomwaffen-division-blaze-bernsteins-suspected-killer-was-part-of-neo-nazi-group-tied-to-other-murders.html>.

²⁹ “Atomwaffen Division,” *Southern Poverty Law Center*, 2020, <https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/group/atomwaffen-division>.

³⁰ Jacob Ware, “Siege: The Atomwaffen Division and Rising Far-Right Terrorism in the United States,” International Center for Counter-Terrorism, July 9, 2019, <https://icct.nl/publication/siege-the-atomwaffen-division-and-rising-far-right-terrorism-in-the-united-states/>.

³¹ He had just completed a prison sentence for possession of explosives. Glenn Thrush and Michael Levenson, “Pair is Charged with Plotting to ‘Destroy Baltimore’ by Attacking Electrical Grid,” *The New York Times*, February 6, 2023, <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/06/us/politics/baltimore-electrical-grid-attack.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share&referringSource=articleShare>.

³² Joey Watson, “US neo-Nazi accused of sniper plot appears to have shared instructions with Australian far-right figures,” *The Guardian*, April 16, 2023, <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2023/apr/17/us-neo-nazi-accused-of-sniper-plot-appears-to-have-shared-instructions-with-australian-far-right-figures>.

³³ “National Socialist Order (NSO),” Australian Government, February 21, 2022, <https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/what-australia-is-doing-subsite/Pages/National-Socialist-Order.aspx>.

³⁴ Jacques Singer-Emery and Rex Bray III, “The Iron March Data Dump Provides a Window Into How White Supremacists Communicate and Recruit,” *Lawfare*, February 27, 2020, <https://www.lawfareblog.com/iron-march-data-dump-provides-window-how-white-supremacists-communicate-and-recruit>.

³⁵ Lowles et al., *State of Hate 2019: The People Versus the Elite?* (London, United Kingdom: Hope Not Hate, 2019), <http://www.hopenothate.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/state-of-hate-2019-final-1.pdf>.

³⁶ “Atomwaffen Division,” Counter Extremism Project, 2020, <https://www.counterextremism.com/supremacy/atomwaffen-division>.

³⁷ “Feuerkrieg Division (FKD),” Anti-Defamation League, October 7, 2019, <https://www.adl.org/resources/backgrounders/feuerkrieg-division-fkd>.

³⁸ “Feuerkrieg Division Attempts to Recruit in the United States, Announces Creation of More ‘Cells,’” *American Odyssey*, August 8, 2019, <https://medium.com/americanodyssey/feuerkrieg-division-atomwaffen-division-neo-nazi-far-right-group-ace4e698abc1>.

³⁹ Chris Schiano, “LEAKED: Neo-Nazi Terrorist ‘Feuerkrieg Division’ Organizing Chats,” Unicorn Riot, March 20, 2020, <https://unicornriot.ninja/2020/leaked-neo-nazi-terrorist-feuerkreig-division-organizing-chats/>.

⁴⁰ Chris Schiano, “LEAKED: Neo-Nazi Terrorist ‘Feuerkrieg Division’ Organizing Chats,” Unicorn Riot, March 20, 2020, <https://unicornriot.ninja/2020/leaked-neo-nazi-terrorist-feuerkreig-division-organizing-chats/>.

⁴¹ Chris Schiano, “LEAKED: Neo-Nazi Terrorist ‘Feuerkrieg Division’ Organizing Chats,” Unicorn Riot, March 20, 2020, <https://unicornriot.ninja/2020/leaked-neo-nazi-terrorist-feuerkreig-division-organizing-chats/>.

⁴² Chris Schiano, “LEAKED: Neo-Nazi Terrorist ‘Feuerkrieg Division’ Organizing Chats,” Unicorn Riot, March 20, 2020, <https://unicornriot.ninja/2020/leaked-neo-nazi-terrorist-feuerkreig-division-organizing-chats/>.

⁴³ Mack Lamoureux and Ben Makuch, “Violent Neo-Nazi Group Has Disturbing Plans For Canada,” *VICE News*, July 10, 2018, https://www.vice.com/en_ca/article/ev847a/violent-neo-nazi-group-has-disturbing-plans-for-canada.

⁴⁴ Mack Lamoureux and Ben Makuch, “Violent Neo-Nazi Group Has Disturbing Plans For Canada,” *VICE News*, July 10, 2018, https://www.vice.com/en_ca/article/ev847a/violent-neo-nazi-group-has-disturbing-plans-for-canada.

⁴⁵ Mack Lamoureux and Ben Makuch, “Member of a Neo-Nazi Terror Group Appears To Be Former Canadian Soldier,” *VICE News*, August 2, 2018, https://www.vice.com/en_ca/article/7xqe8z/member-of-a-neo-nazi-terror-group-appears-to-be-former-canadian-soldier.

⁴⁶ “EXPOSED: Prominent member of neo-Nazi group Atomwaffen Division is former soldier,” Canadian Anti-Hate Network, 2018, https://www.antihate.ca/exposed_prominent_member_of_neo_nazi_group_atomwaffen_division_is_former_soldier.

⁴⁷ Souad Mekhennet and Rachel Weiner, “As Trump vows crackdown on ‘antifa,’ growth of right-wing extremism frustrates Europeans,” *The Washington Post*, June 5, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/as-trump-vows-crackdown-on-antifa-growth-of-right-wing-extremism-frustrates-europeans/2020/06/05/7006eb40-9b94-11ea-ad09-8da7ec214672_story.html.

⁴⁸ Blazakis et al., “Special Report: The Atomwaffen Division: The Evolution of the White Supremacy Threat,” The Soufan Center,

August 2020, <https://thesoufancenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/The-Atomwaffen-Division-The-Evolution-of-the-White-Supremacy-Threat-August-2020-.pdf>.

⁴⁹ Souad Mekhennet and Rachel Weiner, “As Trump vows crackdown on ‘antifa,’ growth of right-wing extremism frustrates Europeans,” *The Washington Post*, June 5, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/as-trump-vows-crackdown-on-antifa-growth-of-right-wing-extremism-frustrates-europeans/2020/06/05/7006eb40-9b94-11ea-ad09-8da7ec214672_story.html.

⁵⁰ “Outrage in Germany over neo-Nazis’ political ‘kill list,’” *The Local Germany*, November 4, 2019, <https://www.thelocal.de/20191104/outrage-in-germany-over-neo-nazis-political-kill-list>.

⁵¹ Souad Mekhennet and Rachel Weiner, “As Trump vows crackdown on ‘antifa,’ growth of right-wing extremism frustrates Europeans,” *The Washington Post*, June 5, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/as-trump-vows-crackdown-on-antifa-growth-of-right-wing-extremism-frustrates-europeans/2020/06/05/7006eb40-9b94-11ea-ad09-8da7ec214672_story.html; “Extremist Content Online: Extremists Continue Exploiting U.S. Protests & Civil Unrest on Telegram,” Counter Extremism Project, June 8, 2020, <https://www.counterextremism.com/press/extremist-content-online-extremists-continue-exploiting-us-protests-civil-unrest-telegram>.

⁵² “Extremist Content Online: Extremists Continue Exploiting U.S. Protests & Civil Unrest on Telegram,” Counter Extremism Project, June 8, 2020, <https://www.counterextremism.com/press/extremist-content-online-extremists-continue-exploiting-us-protests-civil-unrest-telegram>.

⁵³ Blazakis et al., “Special Report: The Atomwaffen Division: The Evolution of the White Supremacy Threat,” The Soufan Center, August 2020, <https://thesoufancenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/The-Atomwaffen-Division-The-Evolution-of-the-White-Supremacy-Threat-August-2020-.pdf>.

⁵⁴ “Extremist Content Online: White Supremacists Celebrate Jersey City Shooting on Telegram,” Counter Extremism Project, December 17, 2019, <https://www.counterextremism.com/press/extremist-content-online-white-supremacists-celebrate-jersey-city-shooting-telegram>.

⁵⁵ “Extremist Content Online: White Supremacists Celebrate Jersey City Shooting on Telegram,” Counter Extremism Project, December 17, 2019, <https://www.counterextremism.com/press/extremist-content-online-white-supremacists-celebrate-jersey-city-shooting-telegram>.

⁵⁶ Tim Lister, “The Nexus Between Far-Right Extremists in the United States and Ukraine,” *CTC Sentinel* 13, no. 5 (April 2020): 30–41, <https://ctc.usma.edu/the-nexus-between-far-right-extremists-in-the-united-states-and-ukraine/>.

⁵⁷ Oleksiy Kuzmenko, “‘Defend the White Race’: American Extremists Being Co-Opted by Ukraine’s Far-Right,” *Bellingcat*, February 15, 2019, <https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2019/02/15/defend-the-white-race-american-extremists-being-co-opted-by-ukraines-far-right/>.

⁵⁸ Daniel De Simone, “Order of Nine Angles: What is this obscure Nazi Satanist group?” *BBC News*, June 23, 2020, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-53141759>.

⁵⁹ Kelly Weill, “Satanism Drama Is Tearing Apart the Murderous Neo-Nazi Group Atomwaffen,” *The Daily Beast*, March 21, 2018, <https://www.thedailybeast.com/satanism-drama-is-tearing-apart-the-murderous-neo-nazi-group-atomwaffen>; “Atomwaffen Division (AWD),” *Anti-Defamation League*, 2020, <https://www.adl.org/resources/backgrounders/atomwaffen-division-awd>.

⁶⁰ Lowles et al., *State of Hate 2020: Far Right Terror Goes Global* (London, United Kingdom: Hope Not Hate, 2020), <https://www.hopenothate.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/state-of-hate-2020-final.pdf>.

⁶¹ Lowles et al., *State of Hate 2020: Far Right Terror Goes Global* (London, United Kingdom: Hope Not Hate, 2020), <https://www.hopenothate.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/state-of-hate-2020-final.pdf>.

⁶² Lowles et al., *State of Hate 2020: Far Right Terror Goes Global* (London, United Kingdom: Hope Not Hate, 2020), <https://www.hopenothate.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/state-of-hate-2020-final.pdf>.

⁶³ Daniel De Simone and Ali Winston, “Neo-Nazi militant group grooms teenagers,” *BBC News*, June 22, 2020, <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-53128169>.

⁶⁴ Jason Wilson, “Revealed: the true identity of the leader of an American neo-Nazi terror group.” *The Guardian*, January 23, 2020, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/23/revealed-the-true-identity-of-the-leader-of-americas-neo-nazi-terror-group>;



Daniel De Simone, Andrei Soshnikov, and Ali Winston, "Neo-Nazi Rinaldo Nazzaro running US militant group The Base from Russia," *BBC News*, January 24, 2020, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-51236915>; Benjamin Wallace, "The Prep School Nazi," *New York Magazine*, March 30, 2020, <https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/03/rinaldo-nazzaro-the-base-norman-spear.html>.

⁶⁵ Daniel De Simone, Andrei Soshnikov, and Ali Winston, "Neo-Nazi Rinaldo Nazzaro running US militant group The Base from Russia," *BBC News*, January 24, 2020, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-51236915>.

⁶⁶ Ben Makuch and Mack Lamoureux, "Neo-Nazi Terror Leader on Russian TV: 'I'm a Family Man,'" *VICE News*, November 5, 2020, <https://www.vice.com/en/article/xgzxza/rinaldo-nazzaro-neo-nazi-terror-leader-on-russian-tv-im-a-family-man>.

⁶⁷ "The Base," Anti-Defamation League, 2020, <https://www.adl.org/resources/backgrounders/the-base>.

⁶⁸ Cyril Rosman, "Jonge rechts-extremisten opgepakt vanwege terreurverdenking, zijn lid van beruchte neo-nazigroep," *AD.nl*, October 30, 2020, <https://www.ad.nl/binnenland/jonge-rechts-extremisten-opgepakt-vanwege-terreurverdenking-zijn-lid-van-beruchte-neo-nazigroep-a4fb716e/?referrer=https%3A%2F%2Ft.co%2F>.

⁶⁹ Ben Makuch, Mack Lamoureux, and Zachary Kamel, "Neo-Nazi Terror Group Harboring Missing Ex-Soldier: Sources," *VICE News*, December 5, 2019, <https://www.vice.com/en/article/8xwwaa/neo-nazi-terror-group-harboring-missing-ex-soldier-patrik-mathews-sources>.

⁷⁰ "Government of Canada lists 13 new groups as terrorist entities and completes review of seven others," Government of Canada, February 3, 2021, <https://www.canada.ca/en/public-safety-canada/news/2021/02/government-of-canada-lists-13-new-groups-as-terrorist-entities-and-completes-review-of-seven-others.html>.

⁷¹ Ben Makuch and Mack Lamoureux, "Neo-Nazi Terror Group the Base Discussed Training Pipeline to Ukraine War," *VICE News*, October 15, 2020, <https://www.vice.com/en/article/jgqex8/neo-nazi-terror-group-the-base-discussed-training-pipeline-to-ukraine-war>.

⁷² Ben Makuch and Mack Lamoureux, "Neo-Nazi Terror Group The Base Linked to the War in Ukraine," *VICE News*, February 6, 2020, <https://www.vice.com/en/article/y3m3eg/neo-nazi-terror-group-the-base-linked-to-the-war-in-ukraine>.

⁷³ Jeremy Redmon, "Prosecutor: Alleged Georgia white supremacists planned to kill others," *The Atlanta Journal-Constitution*, February 23, 2020, <https://www.ajc.com/news/breaking-news/prosecutor-alleged-georgia-white-supremacists-planned-kill-others/LDVDIh2DXeq7umBUWR0rO/>.

⁷⁴ Ben Makuch and Mack Lamoureux, "Neo-Nazi Terror Group The Base Linked to the War in Ukraine," *VICE News*, February 6, 2020, <https://www.vice.com/en/article/y3m3eg/neo-nazi-terror-group-the-base-linked-to-the-war-in-ukraine>.

⁷⁵ Ben Makuch and Mack Lamoureux, "Neo-Nazi Terror Group the Base Discussed Training Pipeline to Ukraine War," *VICE News*, October 15, 2020, <https://www.vice.com/en/article/jgqex8/neo-nazi-terror-group-the-base-discussed-training-pipeline-to-ukraine-war>.

⁷⁶ A.C. Thompson, "Once Defiant, All Four White Supremacists Charged in Charlottesville Violence Plead Guilty," *ProPublica*, May 6, 2019, <https://www.propublica.org/article/all-four-white-supremacists-charged-in-charlottesville-violence-plead-guilty>.

⁷⁷ Christopher Miller, "Azov, Ukraine's Most Prominent Ultranationalist Group, Sets Its Sights on U.S., Europe," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, November 14, 2018, <https://www.rferl.org/a/azov-ukraine-s-most-prominent-ultranationalist-group-sets-its-sights-on-u-s-europe/29600564.html>.

⁷⁸ The U.S. skinhead movement is dominated by Hammerskin Nation, a neo-Nazi, white power skinhead gang that has been classified as the most violent and best organized skinhead group in the United States. It began in Dallas in the 1980s as the Confederate Hammerskins and then actively sought out other similar groups around the country, recruiting them as branches of the fledgling Hammerskin Nation in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In 1994, Hammerskin Nation expanded into Europe, building connections in Switzerland and Northern Ireland. Within a few years, Hammerskin Nation affiliates emerged in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Additional European branches were established in Germany, Spain, and Italy. White-power music and music festivals play a key role in mobilizing members and consolidating ideology across the various chapters. Members of different chapters travel within and across countries to attend these events. For example, the 2018 Hammerfest music festival held in San Diego, California brought together Hammerskin followers from the United States, Switzerland, Finland, Germany and Canada. For more on Hammerskin Nation see the following sources: "The Hammerskin Nation," Anti-Defamation League, February 6, 2017, <https://www.adl.org/resources/profile/hammerskin-nation>; "American White Supremacist Groups Exploiting International Connections." Anti-Defamation League. March 16, 2020. <https://www.adl.org/resources/blog/american-white-supremacist-groups-exploiting-international-connections> ; Arie Perlinger, "Challengers from the Sidelines: Understanding America's Violent Far-Right,"



Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, January 15, 2013, <https://ctc.westpoint.edu/challengers-from-the-sidelines-understanding-americas-violent-far-right/>; Arie Perliger, *American Zealots: Inside Right-Wing Domestic Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2020), 51-53.

⁷⁹ “Rise Above Movement (R.A.M.),” Anti-Defamation League, 2020, <https://www.adl.org/resources/backgrounders/rise-above-movement-ram>.

⁸⁰ “Rise Above Movement (R.A.M.),” Anti-Defamation League, 2020, <https://www.adl.org/resources/backgrounders/rise-above-movement-ram>.

⁸¹ Christopher Miller, “Azov, Ukraine’s Most Prominent Ultranationalist Group, Sets Its Sights on U.S., Europe,” *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, November 14, 2018, <https://www.rferl.org/a/azov-ukraine-s-most-prominent-ultranationalist-group-sets-its-sights-on-u-s-europe/29600564.html>.

⁸² “Rise Above Movement (R.A.M.),” Anti-Defamation League, 2020, <https://www.adl.org/resources/backgrounders/rise-above-movement-ram>.

⁸³ Christopher Miller, “Azov, Ukraine’s Most Prominent Ultranationalist Group, Sets Its Sights on U.S., Europe,” *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, November 14, 2018, <https://www.rferl.org/a/azov-ukraine-s-most-prominent-ultranationalist-group-sets-its-sights-on-u-s-europe/29600564.html>. ; Valerie Hopkins, “The leader of a Russian group involved in a border incursion is described by watchdogs as a neo-Nazi,” *The New York Times*, May 26, 2023, <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/26/world/europe/the-leader-of-a-russian-group-involved-in-a-border-incursion-is-described-by-watchdogs-as-a-neo-nazi.html>. ; Tim Hume, “A Russian Neo-Nazi Football Hooligan,” *VICE News*, July 26, 2018, <https://www.vice.com/en/article/435mjw/a-russian-neo-nazi-football-hooligan-is-trying-to-build-an-mma-empire-across-europe>.

⁸⁴ “Extremist Content Online: White Supremacist Group Green Brigade ‘Disbands’ Itself, Part of Dubious Trend,” Counter Extremism Project, March 23, 2020, <https://www.counterextremism.com/press/extremist-content-online-white-supremacist-group-green-brigade-disbands-itself-part-dubious>.

⁸⁵ “American White Supremacist Groups Exploiting International Connections,” Anti-Defamation League, March 16, 2020, <https://www.adl.org/resources/blog/american-white-supremacist-groups-exploiting-international-connections>.

⁸⁶ Nick Thorpe, “Robert Rundo: U.S. White Supremacist Arrested in Romania,” *BBC News*, March 31, 2023, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-65141285>; “Leader of White Supremacist Group Wanted in U.S. Arrested in Romania,” *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, March 31, 2023, <https://www.rferl.org/a/romania-rundo-us-white-supremacist/32344016.html>.

⁸⁷ Nordic Resistance Movement, “Activism Across the North,” April 14, 2023, <https://nordicresistancemovement.org/activism-across-the-north-free-rob-rundo/>.

⁸⁸ Nick Diaz, “Civil Rights Groups Urge Attorney General Merrick Garland to Launch Criminal Investigation into Patriot Front,” *Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law*, July 19, 2022, <https://www.lawyerscommittee.org/civil-rights-groups-urge-attorney-general-merrick-garland-to-launch-criminal-investigation-into-patriot-front/>.

⁸⁹ Jeff Dean, “Distribution of white supremacist propaganda increasingly coordinated, ADL says,” *NPR*, March 3, 2022, <https://www.npr.org/2022/03/03/1084159020/white-supremacists-propaganda-adl>.

⁹⁰ R. Kim Cragin, “Virtual and Physical Realities: Violent Extremists’ Recruitment of Individuals Associated with the US Military,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, (2022), <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2022.2133346>.

⁹¹ See Southern Poverty Law Center, “Examination of Patriot Front Phone Data,” May 8, 2023, <https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2023/05/08/examination-patriot-front-phone-data-delays-rousseau-trial>. There were 31 arrests in summer 2022.

⁹² Chris Schiano and Dan Feidt, “Patriot Front Fascist Leak Exposes Nationwide Racist Campaigns,” *Unicorn Riot*, January 21, 2022, <https://unicornriot.ninja/2022/patriot-front-fascist-leak-exposes-nationwide-racist-campaigns/>.

⁹³ “American White Supremacist Groups Exploiting International Connections,” Anti-Defamation League, March 16, 2020, <https://www.adl.org/resources/blog/american-white-supremacist-groups-exploiting-international-connections>.

⁹⁴ Matthew Kriner and Jon Lewis, "Pride & Prejudice: The Violent Evolution of the Proud Boys," *CTC Sentinel* 14, no. 6 (July-August 2021), <https://ctc.westpoint.edu/pride-prejudice-the-violent-evolution-of-the-proud-boys/>.

⁹⁵ Alan Feuer and Zach Montague, "Four Proud Boys Convicted of Sedition in Key Jan. 6 Case," *The New York Times*, May 4, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/04/us/politics/jan-6-proud-boys-sedition.html?campaign_id=60&emc=edit_na_20230504&instance_id=0&nl=breaking-news&ref=cta®i_id=19494657&segment_id=132102&user_id=3a4a9902e686887a7409dd6f7cca25dd.

⁹⁶ "From the Capitol Riot to the Midterms: Shifts in American Far-Right Mobilization Between 2021 and 2022," ACLED, December 6, 2022, <https://acleddata.com/2022/12/06/from-the-capitol-riot-to-the-midterms-shifts-in-american-far-right-mobilization-between-2021-and-2022/>.

⁹⁷ Zev Borow, "Will The Last Hipster Please Turn Out The Lights?" *New York Magazine*, November 19, 2004, <https://nymag.com/nymetro/urban/features/10488/>; Adam Leith Gollner, "The Secret History of Gavin McInnes," *Vanity Fair*, June 29, 2021, <https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2021/06/the-secret-history-of-gavin-mcinnnes>.

⁹⁸ "Proud Boys," Southern Poverty Law Center, accessed November 21, 2022, <https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/group/proud-boys>.

⁹⁹ Nicole Dissler, "Gavin McInnes and His 'Proud Boys' Want to Make Men Great Again," *Bedford and Bowery*, July 28, 2016, <https://web.archive.org/web/20190209020443/https://bedfordandbowery.com/2016/07/gavin-mcinnnes-and-his-proud-boys-want-to-make-white-men-great-again/>.

¹⁰⁰ Gavin McInnes, "Introducing: The Proud Boys," *Taki's Magazine*, September 15, 2016, https://web.archive.org/web/20160916202125/https://www.takimag.com/article/introducing_the_proud_boys_gavin_mcinnnes/.

¹⁰¹ New Zealand Police, "Statement of the Case to Designate the American Proud Boys as a Terrorist Entity," Government of New Zealand, June 20, 2022, <https://www.police.govt.nz/sites/default/files/publications/statement-of-case-the-american-proud-boys-terrorist-entity-20-june-2022.pdf>.

¹⁰² Justin Ling, "Canada Says the Proud Boys Are a Terrorist Group," *Foreign Policy*, February 3, 2021, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/02/03/canada-proud-boys-terrorist-group/>; Emma Paling, "Proud Boys Canada may have disbanded 'in name only,' researchers warn," *CBC News*, May 2, 2021, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/proud-boys-canada-dissolves-1.6011282>.

¹⁰³ "Let's Talk About if Canada's Proud Boys are Terrorists," *Canadian Anti-Hate Network*, January 11, 2021, https://www.antihate.ca/canada_proud_boys_designated_terrorists; Peter Smith, "One Group of Former Proud Boys has Devolved into Neo-Nazi Accelerationists," *Canadian Anti-Hate Network*, May 4, 2021, https://www.antihate.ca/former_proud_boys_devolved_neo_nazi_accelerationists.

¹⁰⁴ Ian Austen, "Canada Formally Declares Proud Boys a Terrorist Group," *The New York Times*, February 4, 2021, <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/03/world/canada/canada-proud-boys-terror-group.html>.

¹⁰⁵ Mack Lamoureux, "At Least One Canadian Proud Boys Chapter Has Shut Down Following Terror Designation," *VICE News*, February 17, 2021, <https://www.vice.com/en/article/pkd89b/at-least-one-canadian-proud-boys-chapter-has-shut-down-following-terror-designation>.

¹⁰⁶ Peter Smith, "One Group of Former Proud Boys Has Devolved into Neo-Nazi Accelerationists," *Canadian Anti-Hate Network*, May 4, 2021, https://www.antihate.ca/former_proud_boys_devolved_neo_nazi_accelerationists; Mack Lamoureux, "At Least One Canadian Proud Boys Chapter Has Shut Down Following Terror Designation," *VICE News*, February 17, 2021, <https://www.vice.com/en/article/pkd89b/at-least-one-canadian-proud-boys-chapter-has-shut-down-following-terror-designation>.

¹⁰⁷ Ayana Archie, "New Zealand's government classifies the Proud Boys as a terrorist organization," *NPR*, June 30, 2022, <https://www.npr.org/2022/06/30/1108841462/new-zealands-government-classifies-the-proud-boys-as-a-terrorist-organization>.

¹⁰⁸ New Zealand Police, "Statement of the Case to Designate the American Proud Boys as a Terrorist Entity," Government of New Zealand, June 20, 2022, <https://www.police.govt.nz/sites/default/files/publications/statement-of-case-the-american-proud-boys-terrorist-entity-20-june-2022.pdf>.

¹⁰⁹ "Three Percenters," Anti-Defamation League, June 26, 2017, <https://www.adl.org/resources/backgrounders/three-percenters>; "Michael Brian Vanderboegh," Southern Poverty Law Center, accessed May 24, 2023,

<https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/individual/michael-brian-vanderboegh-0>.

¹¹⁰ Arie Perlinger, *American Zealots: Inside Right-Wing Domestic Terrorism* (Columbia University Press, New York: 2020). ; "Three Percenter," Anti-Defamation League, July 13, 2020, <https://www.adl.org/resources/glossary-terms/three-percenters>.

¹¹¹ Mack Lamoureux, "Inside Canada's Armed, Anti-Islamic 'Patriot' Group." *VICE News*, June 14, 2017, <https://www.vice.com/en/article/new9wd/the-birth-of-canadas-armed-anti-islamic-patriot-group>; "The Three Percenters: Framework of Freedom, A guide to being a Three Percenter," *AnyFlip*, October 14, 2016, <http://anyflip.com/lfui/enst/basic>.

¹¹² Christopher Reynolds, "Canada adds U.S.-based Three Percenters and Aryan Strikeforce to terror list," *The Globe and Mail*, June 25, 2021, <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-canada-puts-us-based-three-percenters-on-terror-list/>; Mack Lamoureux, "Inside Canada's Armed, Anti-Islamic 'Patriot' Group," *VICE News*, June 14, 2017, <https://www.vice.com/en/article/new9wd/the-birth-of-canadas-armed-anti-islamic-patriot-group>; Kristy Hutter, "Three Percenters are Canada's 'most dangerous' extremist group, say some experts," *CBC News*, May 10, 2018, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/three-percenters-canada-1.4647199>; "The Three Percenters (III%)," *Montréal Antifasciste*, accessed June 12, 2023, <https://montreal-antifasciste.info/en/the-three-percenters-iii/>; Mack Lamoureux, "Canadian Anti-Islam Militia Changes Leadership, Starts New Training Program," *VICE News*, December 14, 2018, <https://www.vice.com/en/article/kzvyae/canadian-anti-islam-militia-changes-leadership-starts-new-training-program>.

¹¹³ David Ljunggren, "Canada puts U.S. Three Percenters militia on terror list, cites risk of violent extremism," *Reuters*, June 25, 2021, <https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/canada-puts-us-right-wing-three-percenters-militia-group-terror-list-2021-06-25/>; Amanda Coletta, "Canada labels the Three Percenters a terrorist entity," *The Washington Post*, June 25, 2021, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/06/25/canada-three-percenters-terrorist-entity/>.

¹¹⁴ "United States Designates Russian Imperial Movement and Leaders as Global Terrorists," U.S. Department of State, April 7, 2020, <https://www.state.gov/united-states-designates-russian-imperial-movement-and-leaders-as-global-terrorists/>.

¹¹⁵ "U.S. Sanctions Members of Russian Violent Extremist Group," *U.S. Department of the Treasury*, June 15, 2022, <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0817>.

¹¹⁶ Roland Oliphant, "Far-Right Russian group claims Donald Trump labelled them terrorists to win election," *The Telegraph*, April 12, 2020, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/04/12/far-right-russian-group-claims-donald-trump-labelled-terrorists/>.

¹¹⁷ Jason Blazakis et al., "Inside the Russian Imperial Movement: Practical Implications of U.S. Sanctions," The Soufan Center, April 2020, <https://thesoufancenter.org/research/inside-the-russian-imperial-movement-practical-implications-of-u-s-sanctions/>.

¹¹⁸ "Neo-Nazis in the North: The Nordic Resistance Movement in Finland, Sweden and Norway," Hate Speech International, March 2017, <https://www.hate-speech.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/neo-nazis-in-the-north.pdf>.

¹¹⁹ Mariya Omelicheva, "Designating the Russian Imperial Movement a Terrorist Organization: A Drop In The Bucket of Needed U.S. Counter-Extremism Responses," PONARS Eurasia, June 1, 2020, http://www.ponarseurasia.org/sites/default/files/policy-memos-pdf/Pepm653_Omelicheva_Jun2020.pdf.

¹²⁰ Jason Blazakis et al., "Inside the Russian Imperial Movement: Practical Implications of U.S. Sanctions," The Soufan Center, April 23, 2020, <https://thesoufancenter.org/research/inside-the-russian-imperial-movement-practical-implications-of-u-s-sanctions/>.

¹²¹ Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Samuel Hodgson, and Colin P. Clarke, "The Russian Imperial Movement (RIM) and its Links to the Transnational White Supremacist Extremist Movement," International Center for Counter-Terrorism, April 24, 2020, <https://icct.nl/publication/the-russian-imperial-movement-rim-and-its-links-to-the-transnational-white-supremacist-extremist-movement/>.

¹²² Ezel Sahinkaya and Danila Galperovich, "Radical Russian Imperial Movement Expanding Global Outreach," *VOA News*, May 9, 2020, <https://www.voanews.com/extremism-watch/radical-russian-imperial-movement-expanding-global-outreach>.

¹²³ Casey Michel, "Russian, American white nationalists raise their flags in Washington," *ThinkProgress*, September 22, 2017, <https://thinkprogress.org/russian-american-nationalists-washington-5bd15fd18eaf/>.

¹²⁴ Casey Michel, "Russian, American white nationalists raise their flags in Washington," *ThinkProgress*, September 22, 2017, <https://thinkprogress.org/russian-american-nationalists-washington-5bd15fd18eaf/>.

¹²⁵ Jason Blazakis et al., "Inside the Russian Imperial Movement: Practical Implications of U.S. Sanctions," The Soufan Center, April

23, 2020, <https://thesoufancenter.org/research/inside-the-russian-imperial-movement-practical-implications-of-u-s-sanctions/>.

¹²⁶ Mariya Omelicheva, "Designating the Russian Imperial Movement a Terrorist Organization: A Drop In The Bucket of Needed U.S. Counter-Extremism Responses," PONARS Eurasia, June 1, 2020, http://www.ponarseurasia.org/sites/default/files/policy-memos-pdf/Pepm653_Omelicheva_Jun2020.pdf?

¹²⁷ Tim Hume, "German Neo Nazis Are Getting Explosives Training at a White Supremacist Camp in Russia," *VICE News*, June 6, 2020, https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/g5pqk4/german-neo-nazis-are-getting-explosives-training-at-a-white-supremacist-camp-in-russia.

¹²⁸ "Profile: Who Are Ukraine's Far-Right Azov Regiment?," *Al Jazeera*, March 1, 2022, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/1/who-are-the-azov-regiment>; There is some conflicting information about the group's founding date with some sources claiming the group formed in May 2014. See, for example: Gabriel Baczynska, "Ultra-nationalist Ukrainian battalion gears up for more fighting," *Reuters*, March 25, 2015, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-azov/ultra-nationalist-ukrainian-battalion-gears-up-for-more-fighting-idUSKBN0ML0XJ20150325>.

¹²⁹ Andreas Umland, "Irregular Militias and Radical Nationalism in Post-Euromaydan Ukraine: The Prehistory and Emergence of the "Azov" Battalion in 2014," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 31, no. 1 (2019):105-131, DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2018.1555974.; Dina Newman, "Ukraine conflict: 'White power' warrior from Sweden," *BBC News*, July 16, 2014, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28329329>.

¹³⁰ Andreas Umland, "Irregular Militias and Radical Nationalism in Post-Euromaydan Ukraine: The Prehistory and Emergence of the "Azov" Battalion in 2014," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 31, no. 1 (2019):105-131, DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2018.1555974

¹³¹ Guy Chazan, "Ukrainian volunteer fighters with a luxurious seaside residence," *Financial Times*, August 1, 2014, <https://www.ft.com/content/f00b9d16-196a-11e4-8730-00144feabdc0>.

¹³² Sabra Ayres, "Driven by far-right ideology, Azov Battalion mans Ukraine's front line," *Al Jazeera America*, July 24, 2014, <http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/7/24/ukraine-azov-battalion.html>; Dina Newman, "Ukraine conflict: 'White power' warrior from Sweden," *BBC News*, July 16, 2014, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28329329>.

¹³³ Sabra Ayres, "Driven by far-right ideology, Azov Battalion mans Ukraine's front line," *Al Jazeera America*, July 24, 2014, <http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/7/24/ukraine-azov-battalion.html>; Dina Newman, "Ukraine conflict: 'White power' warrior from Sweden," *BBC News*, July 16, 2014, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28329329>. ; Jeff Seldin, "White Supremacists Lead New Wave of Foreign Fighters," *VOA News*, September 30, 2019, https://www.voanews.com/a/usa_white-supremacists-lead-new-wave-foreign-fighters/6176687.html.

¹³⁴ Jeff Seldin, "White Supremacists Lead New Wave of Foreign Fighters," *VOA News*. September 30, 2019, https://www.voanews.com/a/usa_white-supremacists-lead-new-wave-foreign-fighters/6176687.html.

¹³⁵ Kacper Rekawek, "Career Break or a New Career: Extremist Foreign Fighters in Ukraine," Counter Extremism Project, April 2020, https://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/files/CEP%20Report_Career%20Break%20or%20a%20New%20Career_Extremist%20Foreign%20Fighters%20in%20Ukraine_April%202020.pdf.

¹³⁶ Yassin Musharbash, "The Globalization of Far Right Extremism: An Investigative Report," *CTC Sentinel* 14, no. 6 (July/August 2021), <https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-globalization-of-far-right-extremism-an-investigative-report/>.

¹³⁷ Oleksiy Kuzmenko, "'Defend the White Race': American Extremists Being Co-Opted by Ukraine's Far-Right," *Bellingcat*, July 16, 2020, <https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2019/02/15/defend-the-white-race-american-extremists-being-co-opted-by-ukraines-far-right/>.

¹³⁸ Tom O'Connor and Naveed Jamali, "Ukraine's War Draws U.S. Far-Right to Fight Russia, Train for Violence at Home," *Newsweek*, February 18, 2022, <https://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-war-draws-us-far-right-fight-russia-violence-home-1665027>.

¹³⁹ Matthew Vickery, "Ukraine's Other Russians," *Al Jazeera*, September 26, 2015, <https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2015/9/25/ukraines-other-russians>.

¹⁴⁰ Christopher Miller, "Azov, Ukraine's Most Prominent Ultranationalist Group, Sets Its Sights on U.S., Europe," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, November 19, 2018, <https://www.rferl.org/a/azov-ukraine-s-most-prominent-ultranationalist-group-sets-its-sights-on-u-s-europe/29600564.html>.

¹⁴¹ Christopher Miller, "Azov, Ukraine's Most Prominent Ultranationalist Group, Sets Its Sights on U.S., Europe," *Radio Free*

Europe/Radio Liberty, November 19, 2018, <https://www.rferl.org/a/azov-ukraine-s-most-prominent-ultranationalist-group-sets-its-sights-on-u-s-europe/29600564.html>; Christopher Miller, "Ukraine Deported Two American Members of a Neo-Nazi Group Who Tried to Join a Far-Right Military Unit for 'Combat Experience,'" *BuzzFeed News*, October 8, 2020, <https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/christopherm51/ukraine-deports-american-neo-nazi-atomwaffen-division>; Tim Lister, "The Nexus Between Far-Right Extremists in the United States and Ukraine," *CTC Sentinel* 13, no. 5 (April 2020): 30–41, <https://ctc.usma.edu/the-nexus-between-far-right-extremists-in-the-united-states-and-ukraine/>.

¹⁴² Michael Colborne, "There's One Far-Right Movement That Hates the Kremlin," *Foreign Policy*, April 17, 2019, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/17/theres-one-far-right-movement-that-hates-the-kremlin-azov-ukraine-biletsky-nouvelle-droite-venner/>.

¹⁴³ Christopher Miller, "Azov, Ukraine's Most Prominent Ultrnationalist Group, Sets Its Sights On U.S., Europe," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, November 14, 2018, <https://www.rferl.org/a/azov-ukraine-s-most-prominent-ultranationalist-group-sets-its-sights-on-u-s-europe/29600564.html>.

¹⁴⁴ Tim Lister, "The Nexus Between Far-Right Extremists in the United States and Ukraine," *CTC Sentinel* 13, no. 5 (April 2020): 30–41, <https://ctc.usma.edu/the-nexus-between-far-right-extremists-in-the-united-states-and-ukraine/>.

¹⁴⁵ Oleksiy Kuzmenko, "'Defend the White Race': American Extremists Being Co-Opted by Ukraine's Far-Right," *Bellingcat*, February 15, 2019, <https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2019/02/15/defend-the-white-race-american-extremists-being-co-opted-by-ukraines-far-right/>.

¹⁴⁶ Christopher Miller, "Ukraine Deported Two American Members Of A Neo-Nazi Group Who Tried To Join A Far-Right Military Unit For 'Combat Experience,'" *BuzzFeed News*, October 8, 2020, <https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/christopherm51/ukraine-deports-american-neo-nazi-atomwaffen-division>.

¹⁴⁷ Blazakis et al., "Special Report: The Atomwaffen Division: The Evolution of the White Supremacy Threat," *The Soufan Center*, August 2020, <https://thesoufancenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/The-Atomwaffen-Division-The-Evolution-of-the-White-Supremacy-Threat-August-2020.pdf>.

¹⁴⁸ "Extremist Content Online: White Supremacists Celebrate Jersey City Shooting on Telegram," *Counter Extremism Project*, December 17, 2019, <https://www.counterextremism.com/press/extremist-content-online-white-supremacists-celebrate-jersey-city-shooting-telegram>.

¹⁴⁹ "Extremist Content Online: White Supremacists Celebrate Jersey City Shooting on Telegram," *Counter Extremism Project*, December 17, 2019, <https://www.counterextremism.com/press/extremist-content-online-white-supremacists-celebrate-jersey-city-shooting-telegram>.

¹⁵⁰ Christopher Miller, "Azov, Ukraine's Most Prominent Ultrnationalist Group, Sets Its Sights on U.S., Europe," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, November 14, 2018, <https://www.rferl.org/a/azov-ukraine-s-most-prominent-ultranationalist-group-sets-its-sights-on-u-s-europe/29600564.html>.

¹⁵¹ Christopher Miller, "Azov, Ukraine's Most Prominent Ultrnationalist Group, Sets Its Sights on U.S., Europe," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, November 14, 2018, <https://www.rferl.org/a/azov-ukraine-s-most-prominent-ultranationalist-group-sets-its-sights-on-u-s-europe/29600564.html>.

¹⁵² "Rise Above Movement (R.A.M.)," *Anti-Defamation League*, 2020, <https://www.adl.org/resources/backgrounders/rise-above-movement-ram>.

¹⁵³ Christopher Miller, "Azov, Ukraine's Most Prominent Ultrnationalist Group, Sets Its Sights on U.S., Europe," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, November 14, 2018, <https://www.rferl.org/a/azov-ukraine-s-most-prominent-ultranationalist-group-sets-its-sights-on-u-s-europe/29600564.html>.

¹⁵⁴ Francesca Laguardia, "Considering a Domestic Terrorism Statute and Its Alternatives," *Northwestern University Law Review* 114, no. 4 (January 2020): 1061–1099, <https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1430&context=nulr>.

¹⁵⁵ Simon Shuster and Billy Perrigo, "How a Far-Right Militia Uses Facebook to Train New Members," *Time*, January 7, 2021, <https://time.com/5926750/azov-far-right-movement-facebook/>.

¹⁵⁶ Jacob C. Senholt, "Secret Identities in the Sinister Tradition: Political Esotericism and the Convergence of Radical Islam,"

Satanism, and National Socialism in the Order of Nine Angles”, in *The Devil’s Party: Satanism in Modernity*, ed. Per Faxneld and Jesper Aa. Petersen (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 255.; Massimo Introvigne, *Satanism: A Social History* (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 357-358.; Lowles et al., *State of Hate 2020: Far Right Terror Goes Global* (London, United Kingdom: Hope Not Hate, 2020), <https://www.hopenothate.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/state-of-hate-2020-final.pdf>.; Nicholas Goodrick-Clarke, *Black Sun: Aryan Cults, Esoteric Nazism, and the Politics of Identity* (New York: New York University Press, 2002), 216.

¹⁵⁷ “United States of America v. Ethan Phelan Melzer, a/k/a ‘Etil Reggag,’ Defendant,” U.S. Department of Justice, June 4, 2020, <https://www.justice.gov/file/1287701/download>.

¹⁵⁸ Graham Harvey, “Satanism in Britain Today,” *Journal of Contemporary Religion* 10, no. 3 (October 1, 1995): 283–96.; Jacob C. Senholt, “Secret Identities in the Sinister Tradition: Political Esotericism and the Convergence of Radical Islam, Satanism, and National Socialism in the Order of Nine Angles”, in *The Devil’s Party: Satanism in Modernity*, ed. Per Faxneld and Jesper Aa. Petersen (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 257.; Connell Monette and John Shoup, *Mysticism in the 21st Century* (Sirius Academic Press, 2015), 80.

¹⁵⁹ Connell Monette and John Shoup, *Mysticism in the 21st Century* (Sirius Academic Press, 2015), 95.; Nick Lowles, “Order of Nine Angles,” Hope Not Hate, February 16, 2019, <https://hopenothate.org.uk/2019/02/16/state-of-hate-2019-order-of-nine-angles/>.; Ariel Koch, “The Nazi Satanists promoting extreme violence and terrorism,” openDemocracy, February 4, 2021, <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/countering-radical-right/nazi-satanists-promoting-extreme-violence-and-terrorism/>.

¹⁶⁰ Lowles et al., *State of Hate 2020: Far Right Terror Goes Global* (London, United Kingdom: Hope Not Hate, 2020), <https://www.hopenothate.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/state-of-hate-2020-final.pdf>.; Kelly Weill, “Satanism Drama Is Tearing Apart the Murderous Neo-Nazi Group Atomwaffen,” *The Daily Beast*, March 21, 2018, <https://www.thedailybeast.com/satanism-drama-is-tearing-apart-the-murderous-neo-nazi-group-atomwaffen>.; “Atomwaffen Division (AWD)/National Socialist Order (NSO),” Anti-Defamation League, 2022, <https://www.adl.org/resources/backgrounders/atomwaffen-division-awd-national-socialist-order-nso>.

¹⁶¹ “Atomwaffen and the SIEGE parallax: how one neo-Nazi’s life’s work is fueling a younger generation,” Southern Poverty Law Center, February 22, 2018, <https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2018/02/22/atomwaffen-and-siege-parallax-how-one-neo-nazi-s-life-s-work-fueling-younger-generation>.

¹⁶² Mapping Militant Project (MMP), “Atomwaffen Division/National Socialist Order,” last modified August 2022, <https://mappingmilitants.org/node/338>.

¹⁶³ “Atomwaffen and the SIEGE parallax: how one Neo-Nazi’s life’s work is fueling a younger generation,” Southern Poverty Law Center, February 22, 2018, <https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2018/02/22/atomwaffen-and-siege-parallax-how-one-neo-nazi-s-life-s-work-fueling-younger-generation>.

¹⁶⁴ Ali Winston, “Neo-Nazi Satanist Cult Is a Terrorist Group, Feds Say,” *Rolling Stone*, July 6, 2022, <https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-news/neo-nazi-1378280/>.

¹⁶⁵ “U.S. Army Soldier Charged With Terrorism Offenses for Planning Deadly Ambush on Service Members In His Unit,” U.S. Department of Justice, June 22, 2020, <https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/us-army-soldier-charged-terrorism-offenses-planning-deadly-ambush-service-members-his>.

¹⁶⁶ “Former U.S. Army Soldier Sentenced to 45 Years in Prison for Attempting for Murder Fellow Service Members in Deadly Ambush,” U.S. Department of Justice, March 3, 2023, <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-us-army-soldier-sentenced-45-years-prison-attempting-murder-fellow-service-members>.

¹⁶⁷ “Nordic Resistance Movement,” Counter-Extremism Project, accessed June 15, 2023, <https://www.counterextremism.com/supremacy/nordic-resistance-movement>.; Tore Bjørgo and Jacob Aasland Ravndal, “Why the Nordic Resistance Movement Restrains its Use of Violence,” *Perspectives on Terrorism*, December 2020, <https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/binaries/content/assets/customsites/perspectives-on-terrorism/2020/issue-6/bjorgo-and-ravndal.pdf>.

¹⁶⁸ Magnus Ranstorp and Filip Ahlin, “From the Nordic Resistance Movement to the Alternative Right: a study of the Swedish radical nationalist milieu,” Centre for Asymmetric Threats and Terrorist Studies (CATS), 2020, <https://www.fhs.se/download/18.23f6da6b173f8bed598498cc/1598877052261/Summary%20-%20From%20the%20Nordic%20Resistance%20Movement%20to%20the%20Alternative%20Right%20-%20a%20Study%20of%20Radical%20Nationalistic%20Environments%20in%20Sweden.pdf>.

- 169 “Nordic Resistance Movement’s Political Program in English,” *Kansallinen Vastarinta*, August 12, 2016, <https://www.vastarinta.com/nordic-resistance-movements-political-program-in-english/>.
- 170 Magnus Ranstorp and Filip Ahlin, “From the Nordic Resistance Movement to the Alternative Right: a study of the Swedish radical nationalist milieu,” Centre for Asymmetric Threats and Terrorist Studies (CATS), 2020, <https://www.fhs.se/download/18.23f6da6b173f8bed598498cc/1598877052261/Summary%20-%20From%20the%20Nordic%20Resistance%20Movement%20to%20the%20Alternative%20Right%20-%20a%20Study%20of%20Radical%20Nationalistic%20Environments%20in%20Sweden.pdf>; Marko Hietikko, “A world of hatred,” *Hate Speech International*, May 16, 2016, <https://www.hate-speech.org/a-world-of-hatred/>.
- 171 “Simon Lindberg,” Counter Extremism Project, accessed June 15, 2023, <https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/simon-lindberg>; Magnus Ranstorp and Filip Ahlin, “From the Nordic Resistance Movement to the Alternative Right: a study of the Swedish radical nationalist milieu,” Centre for Asymmetric Threats and Terrorist Studies (CATS), 2020, <https://www.fhs.se/download/18.23f6da6b173f8bed598498cc/1598877052261/Summary%20-%20From%20the%20Nordic%20Resistance%20Movement%20to%20the%20Alternative%20Right%20-%20a%20Study%20of%20Radical%20Nationalistic%20Environments%20in%20Sweden.pdf>.
- 172 Nicholas Potter, “The Pan-European ‘Ikea Fascism’ of Nordiska Motståndsrörelsen,” *Belltower News*, January 6, 2021, <https://www.belltower.news/nordic-resistance-the-pan-european-ikea-fascism-of-nordiska-motstandsroerelsen-109787/>.
- 173 Daniel De Simone, “Neo-Nazi Group led by 13-year-old boy to be banned,” *BBC News*, July 13, 2020, <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-53392036>.
- 174 “Feuerkrieg Division,” Anti-Defamation League, October 7, 2019, <https://www.adl.org/resources/backgrounder/feuerkrieg-division-fkd>.
- 175 “Feuerkrieg Division (FKD) proscribed as terrorist group,” Counter Terrorism Policing, July 17, 2020, <https://www.counterterrorism.police.uk/fkd-proscribed/>.
- 176 “Feuerkrieg Division,” Anti-Defamation League, October 7, 2019, <https://www.adl.org/resources/backgrounder/feuerkrieg-division-fkd>.
- 177 “Feuerkrieg Division,” Anti-Defamation League, October 7, 2019, <https://www.adl.org/resources/backgrounder/feuerkrieg-division-fkd>; Chris Schiano, “LEAKED: Neo-Nazi Terrorist ‘Feuerkrieg Division’ Organizing Chats,” *Unicorn Riot*, March 20, 2020, <https://unicornriot.ninja/2020/leaked-neo-nazi-terrorist-feuerkreig-division-organizing-chats/>.
- 178 Bryan Bender, Alexander Nabert, and Christin Brause, “‘I mean you no harm’: From troubled teen to neo-Nazi foot soldier,” *Politico*, July 16, 2022, <https://www.politico.com/news/2022/07/16/neo-nazi-white-supremacist-teenagers-00045589>.
- 179 Chris Schiano, “LEAKED: Neo-Nazi Terrorist ‘Feuerkrieg Division’ Organizing Chats,” *Unicorn Riot*, March 20, 2020, <https://unicornriot.ninja/2020/leaked-neo-nazi-terrorist-feuerkreig-division-organizing-chats/>.
- 180 Christopher Miller, “An International Neo-Nazi Group Thought to Have Been Dissolved is Recruiting Again in the U.S.,” *BuzzFeed News*, June 10, 2021, <https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/christopherm51/neo-nazi-feuerkrieg-division-returns-recruiting-us>.
- 181 Deeba Shadnia, Alex Newhouse, Matt Kriner, and Arthur Bradley, “Militant Accelerationism Coalitions,” 2022, Tech Against Terrorism and Center on Terrorism, Extremism, and Counterterrorism, https://www.techagainstterrorism.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/CTEC___TAT-Accelerationism-Report.pdf.
- 182 Nick Robins Early, Alexander Nabert, and Christina Brause, “Inside an international network of teenage neo-Nazi extremists,” *Insider*, July 16, 2022, <https://www.insider.com/international-teenage-neo-nazi-network-feuerkrieg-totenwaffen-accelerationism-2022-7>; Chris Schiano, “Man Arrested Planning Vegas Attacks Joined Neo-Nazi Party, Leaked Chats Show,” *Unicorn Riot*, August 10, 2019, <https://unicornriot.ninja/2019/man-arrested-planning-vegas-attacks-joined-neo-nazi-party-leaked-chats-show/>.
- 183 “Las Vegas Man Pleads Guilty To Possession of Bomb-Making Components,” U.S. Attorney’s Office, District of Nevada, February 10, 2020, <https://www.justice.gov/usao-nv/pr/las-vegas-man-pleads-guilty-possession-bomb-making-components>; Tess Owen, “Neo-Nazi Accused of Plotting Bombings Wanted to Recruit Middle Schoolers, Chats Reveal,” *VICE News*, August 15, 2019, <https://www.vice.com/en/article/vb5mpx/neo-nazi-accused-of-plotting-bombings-wanted-to-recruit-middle-schoolers-chats-reveal>.
- 184 Chris Schiano, “LEAKED: Neo-Nazi Terrorist ‘Feuerkrieg Division’ Organizing Chats,” *Unicorn Riot*, March 20, 2020,



<https://unicornriot.ninja/2020/leaked-neo-nazi-terrorist-feuerkreig-division-organizing-chats/>.

¹⁸⁵ John Hanna, "Satanist' ex-soldier sentenced to 2 ½ years in bomb plot," *The Associated Press*, August 19, 2020, <https://apnews.com/article/03e8abbd2a0a7c6d7f91113afafc508a>.

¹⁸⁶ Raffaello Pantucci, "Russia's Far-Right Campaign in Europe," *Lawfare*, April 9, 2023, <https://www.lawfareblog.com/russias-far-right-campaign-europe>.; Elizabeth Grimm Arsenault and Joseph Stabile, "Confronting Russia's Role in Transnational White Supremacism," *Just Security*, February 6, 2020, <https://www.justsecurity.org/68420/confronting-russias-role-in-transnational-white-supremacist-extremism/>.

¹⁸⁷ Elizabeth Grimm Arsenault and Joseph Stabile, "Confronting Russia's Role in Transnational White Supremacism," *Just Security*, February 6, 2020, <https://www.justsecurity.org/68420/confronting-russias-role-in-transnational-white-supremacist-extremism/>.

¹⁸⁸ Daniel De Simone, Andrei Soshnikov, and Ali Winston, "Neo-Nazi Rinaldo Nazzaro running US militant group The Base from Russia," *BBC News*, January 24, 2020, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-51236915>.

¹⁸⁹ Ben Makuch and Mack Lamoureux, "Neo-Nazi Terror Leader on Russian TV: 'I'm a Family Man,'" *VICE News*, November 5, 2020, <https://www.vice.com/en/article/xgzxqz/rinaldo-nazzaro-neo-nazi-terror-leader-on-russian-tv-im-a-family-man>.

¹⁹⁰ Alan Feuer and Andrew Higgins, "Extremists Turn to a Leader to Protect Western Values: Vladimir Putin," *The New York Times*, December 3, 2016, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/03/world/americas/alt-right-vladimir-putin.html>.

¹⁹¹ Tom Porter, "Charlottesville's Alt-right Leaders Have a Passion for Vladimir Putin," *Newsweek*, August 8, 2017, <https://www.newsweek.com/leader-charlottesvilles-alt-right-protest-all-have-ties-russian-fascist-651384>.; David Neiwert, "When White Nationalists Chant Their Weird Slogans, What Do They Mean?" Southern Poverty Law Center, October 10, 2017, <https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2017/10/10when-white-nationalists-chant-their-weird-slogans-what-do-they-mean>.

¹⁹² Alan Feuer and Andrew Higgins, "Extremists Turn to a Leader to Protect Western Values: Vladimir Putin," *The New York Times*, December 3, 2016, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/03/world/americas/alt-right-vladimir-putin.html>.

¹⁹³ Alan Feuer and Andrew Higgins, "Extremists Turn to a Leader to Protect Western Values: Vladimir Putin," *The New York Times*, December 3, 2016, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/03/world/americas/alt-right-vladimir-putin.html>.

¹⁹⁴ Andrew Roth, "A right-wing militia trains Russians to fight the next war – with or without Putin," *The Washington Post*, January 2, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/a-right-wing-militia-trains-russians-to-fight-the-next-war-with-or-without-putin/2017/01/02/f06b5ce8-b71e-11e6-939c-91749443c5e5_story.html.

¹⁹⁵ Robyn Dixon, "Inside White-Supremacist Russian Imperial Movement, Designated Foreign Terrorist Organization by U.S. State Department," *The Washington Post*, April 13, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/russia-white-supremacist-terrorism-us/2020/04/11/255a9762-7a75-11ea-a311-adb1344719a9_story.html.

¹⁹⁶ Andrew Roth, "A right-wing militia trains Russians to fight the next war – with or without Putin," *The Washington Post*, January 2, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/a-right-wing-militia-trains-russians-to-fight-the-next-war-with-or-without-putin/2017/01/02/f06b5ce8-b71e-11e6-939c-91749443c5e5_story.html.

¹⁹⁷ Michael Carpenter, "Russia is Co-opting Angry Young Men," *The Atlantic*, August 29, 2019, <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/08/russia-is-co-opting-angry-young-men/568741/>.

¹⁹⁸ Elizabeth Grimm Arsenault and Joseph Stabile, "Confronting Russia's Role in Transnational White Supremacist Extremism," *Just Security*, February 6, 2020, <https://www.justsecurity.org/68420/confronting-russias-role-in-transnational-white-supremacist-extremism/>.

¹⁹⁹ Robyn Dixon, "Inside White-Supremacist Russian Imperial Movement, Designated Foreign Terrorist Organization by U.S. State Department," *The Washington Post*, April 13, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/russia-white-supremacist-terrorism-us/2020/04/11/255a9762-7a75-11ea-a311-adb1344719a9_story.html.

²⁰⁰ Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Samuel Hodgson, and Colin P. Clarke, "The Russian Imperial Movement (RIM) and its Links to the Transnational White Supremacist Extremist Movement," *International Center for Counter-Terrorism*, April 24, 2020, <https://icct.nl/publication/the-russian-imperial-movement-rim-and-its-links-to-the-transnational-white-supremacist-extremist-movement/>.

²⁰¹ Ezel Sahinkaya and Danila Galperovich, “Radical Russian Imperial Movement Expanding Global Outreach,” *VOA News*, May 9, 2020, <https://www.voanews.com/extremism-watch/radical-russian-imperial-movement-expanding-global-outreach>.

²⁰² Jason Blazakis et al., “Inside the Russian Imperial Movement: Practical Implications of U.S. Sanctions,” The Soufan Center, April 2020, <https://thesoufancenter.org/research/inside-the-russian-imperial-movement-practical-implications-of-u-s-sanctions/>.

²⁰³ Mariya Omelicheva, “Designating the Russian Imperial Movement a Terrorist Organization: A Drop In The Bucket of Needed U.S. Counter-Extremism Responses,” PONARS Eurasia, June 1, 2020, http://www.ponarseurasia.org/sites/default/files/policy-memos-pdf/Pepm653_Omelicheva_Jun2020.pdf?

²⁰⁴ Tim Hume, “German Neo Nazis Are Getting Explosives Training at a White Supremacist Camp in Russia,” *VICE News*, June 6, 2020, https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/g5pqk4/german-neo-nazis-are-getting-explosives-training-at-a-white-supremacist-camp-in-russia.

²⁰⁵ “Treasury Escalates Sanctions Against the Russian Government’s Attempts to Influence U.S. Elections,” U.S. Department of The Treasury, April 15, 2021, <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0126>; “Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,” Office of the Director of National Intelligence, February 6, 2023, <https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2023-Unclassified-Report.pdf>.

²⁰⁶ See the QAnon Mapping Militants Profile for more information: Mapping Militant Organizations, “QAnon,” last modified June 1, 2022, <https://mappingmilitants.org/node/2981>.

²⁰⁷ Joseph Menn, “QAnon received earlier boost from Russian accounts on Twitter, archives show,” *Reuters*, November 2, 2020, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-qanon-cyber/qanon-received-earlier-boost-from-russian-accounts-on-twitter-archives-show-idUSKBN271181>; Joseph Menn, “Russian-backed organizations amplifying QAnon conspiracy theorists, researchers say,” *Reuters*, August 24, 2020, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-qanon-russia/russian-backed-organizations-amplifying-qanon-conspiracy-theories-researchers-say-idUSKBN25K13T>.

²⁰⁸ “What is QAnon and How are Online Platforms Taking Action Against it?” *Reuters*, October 15, 2020, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-socialmedia-qanon-factbox/factbox-what-is-qanon-and-how-are-online-platforms-taking-action-on-it-idUSKBN2702L5>.

²⁰⁹ Joseph Menn, “QAnon received earlier boost from Russian accounts on Twitter, archives show,” *Reuters*, November 2, 2020, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-qanon-cyber/qanon-received-earlier-boost-from-russian-accounts-on-twitter-archives-show-idUSKBN271181>; Joseph Menn, “Russian-backed organizations amplifying QAnon conspiracy theorists, researchers say,” *Reuters*, August 24, 2020, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-qanon-russia/russian-backed-organizations-amplifying-qanon-conspiracy-theories-researchers-say-idUSKBN25K13T>.

²¹⁰ Joseph Menn, “QAnon received earlier boost from Russian accounts on Twitter, archives show,” *Reuters*, November 2, 2020, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-qanon-cyber/qanon-received-earlier-boost-from-russian-accounts-on-twitter-archives-show-idUSKBN271181>; Joseph Menn, “Russian-backed organizations amplifying QAnon conspiracy theorists, researchers say,” *Reuters*, August 4, 2020, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-qanon-russia/russian-backed-organizations-amplifying-qanon-conspiracy-theories-researchers-say-idUSKBN25K13T>.

²¹¹ Ben Collins and Joe Murphy, “Russian troll accounts purged by Twitter pushed Qanon and other conspiracy theories,” *NBC News*, February 2, 2019, <https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/social-media/russian-troll-accounts-purged-twitter-pushed-qanon-other-conspiracy-theories-n966091>.

²¹² David Lawrence and Gregory Davis, “QAnon in the UK: The Growth of a Movement,” Hope Not Hate, October 2020, <https://www.hopenothate.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/qanon-report-2020-10-FINAL.pdf>; Joseph Menn, “QAnon received earlier boost from Russian Accounts on Twitter, Archives Show,” *Reuters*, November 2, 2020, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-qanon-cyber/qanon-received-earlier-boost-from-russian-accounts-on-twitter-archives-show-idUSKBN271181>; Joseph Menn, “Russian-backed organizations amplifying QAnon conspiracy theorists, researchers say,” *Reuters*, August 24, 2020, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-qanon-russia/russian-backed-organizations-amplifying-qanon-conspiracy-theories-researchers-say-idUSKBN25K13T>.

²¹³ Joseph Menn, “QAnon received earlier boost from Russian accounts on Twitter, archives show,” *Reuters*, November 2, 2020, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-qanon-cyber/qanon-received-earlier-boost-from-russian-accounts-on-twitter-archives-show-idUSKBN271181>; Joseph Menn, “Russian-backed organizations amplifying QAnon conspiracy theorists, researchers say,” *Reuters*, August 24, 2020, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-qanon-russia/russian-backed-organizations-amplifying-qanon-conspiracy-theories-researchers-say-idUSKBN25K13T>.



qanon-conspiracy-theories-researchers-say-idUSKBN25K13T.

²¹⁴ Joseph Menn, "QAnon received earlier boost from Russian accounts on Twitter, archives show," *Reuters*, November 2, 2020, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-qanon-cyber/qanon-received-earlier-boost-from-russian-accounts-on-twitter-archives-show-idUSKBN271181>.; Joseph Menn, "Russian-backed organizations amplifying QAnon conspiracy theorists, researchers say," *Reuters*, August 24, 2020, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-qanon-russia/russian-backed-organizations-amplifying-qanon-conspiracy-theories-researchers-say-idUSKBN25K13T>.

²¹⁵ Justin Ling, "False Claims of U.S. Biowarfare Labs in Ukraine Grip QAnon," *Foreign Policy*, March 2, 2022, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/02/ukraine-biolabs-conspiracy-theory-qanon/>.

²¹⁶ Joseph Menn, "Russian-backed organizations amplifying QAnon conspiracy theorists, researchers say," *Reuters*, August 4, 2020, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-qanon-russia/russian-backed-organizations-amplifying-qanon-conspiracy-theories-researchers-say-idUSKBN25K13T>.

²¹⁷ "Exploring the Russian Social Media Campaign in Charlottesville," *National Security Archive*, February 14, 2019, <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/news/cyber-vault/2019-02-14/exploring-russian-social-media-campaign-charlottesville>.

²¹⁸ "Step into my Parler," *Graphika*, October 1, 2020, <https://graphika.com/reports/step-into-my-parler/>.

²¹⁹ Olga Khazan, "American Neo-Nazis Are on Russia's Facebook," *The Atlantic*, May 20, 2016, <https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/05/extremist-groups-vknotakte/483426/>.; "VK.com: Linking American White Supremacists to International Counterparts," *Anti-Defamation League*, July 2, 2019, <https://www.adl.org/resources/blog/vkcom-linking-american-white-supremacists-international-counterparts>.

²²⁰ Masood Farivar, "US White Nationalists Barred by Facebook Find Haven on Russia Site," *VOA News*, April 10, 2019, <https://voanews.com/a/american-white-nationalists-barred-by-facebook-find-friendly-haven-on-russia-s-vk-website-/4871044.html>.

²²¹ Amy McDaniel, James Hartley, and Nicole Lopez, "Allen gunman 'had neo-Nazi ideation,' carried 8 legally purchased weapons," *Fort Worth Star-Telegram*, June 3, 2023, <https://www.star-telegram.com/news/local/crime/article275151316.html>.

²²² Christopher Miller, "Ukraine deported Two American Members Of A Neo-Nazi Group Who Tried To Join A Far-Right Military Unit For 'Combat Experience,'" *BuzzFeed News*, October 8, 2020, <https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/christopherm51/ukraine-deports-american-neo-nazi-atomwaffen-division>.

²²³ Tom O'Connor and Naveed Jamali, "A Year After 1/6, Ukraine's War Draws U.S. Far-Right to Fight Russia, Train for Violence at Home," *Newsweek*, January 5, 2022, <https://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-war-draws-us-far-right-fight-russia-violence-home-1665027>.

²²⁴ Oleksiy Kuzmenko, "'Defend the White Race': American Extremists Being Co-Opted by Far-Right Extremists," *Bellingcat*, February 15, 2019, <https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2019/02/15/defend-the-white-race-american-extremists-being-co-opted-by-ukraines-far-right/>.