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National Juvenile Justice Program Collaboration - Evaluation Report

Genevieve Burch
University of Nebraska at Omaha

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A DIFFERENT GAME
collaborating to serve youth at risk

JUVENILE JUSTICE PROGRAM COLLABORATION

Evaluation Report

Genevieve Burch, Principal Investigator

caur Center for Applied Urban Research
University of Nebraska at Omaha
NATIONAL JUVENILE JUSTICE PROGRAM COLLABORATION

Evaluation of a Collaboration of National Non-Profit Health and Welfare Organizations as They Worked Together to Serve Status Offenders and Other Youth at Risk

Funded by:
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
under the
Juvenile Delinquency and Prevention Act

Operated under:
The National Assembly of National Health and Welfare Organizations

American Red Cross, Association of Junior Leagues, Boys' Clubs of America, Boy Scouts of America, Camp Fire Girls, Girl Scouts of the USA, Girls Clubs of America, Jewish Welfare Board, National Council for Homemaker-Home Health Aid Services, National Council of Jewish Women, National Council on Crime and Delinquency, Salvation Army, Travelers Aid of America, YWCA of the USA, YMCA of the USA.

Genevieve Burch, Principal Investigator
Senior Research Associate
Center for Applied Urban Research
The University of Nebraska at Omaha

May, 1978
AUTHOR'S PREFACE

In design, this LEAA project offered the prospect of combining the funds and rational planning resources of a large Federal agency with the humanitarian values and the use of volunteers that have been hallmarks of the non-profit sector. The opportunity to evaluate this combination was exciting.

Over the past 14 months, this excitement has grown. At the national level the relationship between the public and private sectors has sometimes been cumbersome and lack of consensus problematic, but the success of the local program efforts have exceeded my initial expectations.

The evaluation of the program has stretched our research capabilities and required methodological innovations, some of which proved to be more successful than others. I wish to acknowledge our gratitude to and dependence on all of those persons who cooperated in the evaluation process, both locally and nationally. An estimated total of 275 days of staff time of national and local organizations were used in the evaluation plan. I particularly appreciate the time and energy contributed by the local and national project staff, especially Bob Murphy at the national office.

My professional gratitude goes also to the local field researchers for their dedication and persistence. The commitment of five senior social scientists to a part-time research effort was humbling. The names and accomplishments of these professionals are listed in Auxiliary Appendix E.

My professional colleagues at the Center for Applied Urban Research (CAUR) at the University of Nebraska at Omaha, the support staff, especially Joyce Carson and Scott Samson, and the graduate student assistants, Carole Davis, Jim Gahan and Henry Jason, were invaluable.

I wish to acknowledge especially the support and contribution to the project of Jim Marley, who helped the evaluation from the program
perspective and who was involved from the beginning. Special thanks go to Robert Bick and Gary Gentry, my research assistants; Beverly Walker, who read and interpreted my handwriting; Linda Ferring, who edited; Betty Mayhew, who made all arrangements for everything; and Dr. Murray Frost, Acting Director of CAUR, who critically reviewed the report and facilitated the final push.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

In 1975 the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration awarded funding to an unusual program designed to organize the voluntary youth serving agencies to better serve status offenders\(^1\) and to be an aid to the whole process of the removal of these young people from institutions. The program was unusual in that it was not developed by a single agency but rather by a collaboration of 16 (later 15) national agencies proposing to deliver community services by forming and supporting local collaborations focused on the issue of the status offender. These organizations were members of the National Assembly of National Voluntary Health and Welfare Organizations and had been meeting for over a year under its sponsorship and staffing in an attempt to develop an effective plan for working together in program areas.\(^2\)

This proposal for status offenders represented the first attempt to take the group's ideas about collaboration from theory to practice. The basic methodology of the proposed program was to staff a National Juvenile Justice Collaboration office and to form and staff five local community collaborations. The local collaborations would be formed to deal with status offender issues and have the responsibility of offering programs in the areas of advocacy, capacity building, and direct services. The local collaborations would also help develop a process of collaboration which would be useful in delivery of services in the future.

\(^1\) Status offenders are youth who have been adjudicated as delinquent on the basis of acts which are offenses because of their status as minors but which would not be offenses or crimes if committed by adults.

\(^2\) National voluntary agencies participating throughout the collaboration were American National Red Cross, Association of Junior Leagues, Boy's Clubs of America, Boy Scouts of America, Camp Fire Girls, Girl Scouts of the U.S.A., Girls' Clubs of America, National Jewish Welfare Board, National Council for Homemaker-Home Health Aide Services, National Council of Jewish Women, National Council on Crime and Delinquency, Salvation Army, Travelers Aid Association of America, YMCA of the USA, and YWCA of the USA.
General Findings

The evaluation of the program goals concluded that all local collaborations were successful in achieving the organizational development and program planning as called for in the proposal. The level of success in the actual implementation of the planned programs and the degree of development of a collaborative process varied from site to site. The achievement of successful organizational and planning capacities by the local collaborations reflects the quality of management which the project received from the national level. The national collaboration also offered organizational and program assistance to the locals with varying success but did not implement adequate capacity building and advocacy programs for the collaborating national agencies.

It is difficult to summarize the success of the process goals at each site. Most of the seven local, the regional and the national collaborations demonstrated real progress toward building the trust necessary for an inter-agency collaborative work style. All collaborations were successful in some areas, and all encountered problems in other areas.

How Were the Collaborations Successful?

This summary of findings for specific areas should be seen as highlights of the total process, which is presented in detail in the body of the evaluation report. The project was evaluated by the extent to which it was successful in its three major program tasks:

1. building collaboration organizations
2. planning and implementing programs
3. affecting member organizations

The extent to which the National Juvenile Justice Collaboration Project was successful in developing of the collaboration process at each site was also evaluated.

Building Collaboration Organizations

The collaborations were highly successful in developing the membership of local youth serving agencies affiliated with the original national collaboration. In the five local sites 90 percent of National Assembly
affiliates participated. In addition, 65 other non-profit agencies also participated in the local sites. All sites except Spokane sought the inclusion of public agencies, with 76 agencies participating at the four sites. The Connecticut collaboration which was the only regional structure was especially active in this regard having 51 active public agencies.

A key element in each of the local collaborations was the relation to the public agency responsible for service to deinstitutionalize status offenders. Such local collaboration site was able to involve the public agency in their area as an active member of the collaboration. The collaboration was thus the vehicle for a beginning relationship between a large number of the voluntary youth service agencies and the public agencies dealing with community care for status offenders. The public agency recipients of the DSO Grants were extremely supportive of the collaborations and were often a resource for collaboration staff in the process of implementation. They viewed the effort as long overdue and generally gave the collaboration more support and respect than they would offer individual agencies. The collaborations thus were able to establish themselves by activating a large number of the youth service agencies and achieving cooperative working relationships with the public sector.

Another area of concern to the evaluation was the degree of participation in the collaboration. This was evaluated in terms of:

1. recognition by participants of a common community problem.
2. formal commitment to participation in the collaboration.
3. allocation of some organizational resource to work on collaboration goals.
4. participation in activity related to collaboration goals.

Of these measures the allocating resources and the participation in work related to the collaboration goals were the most significant index of participation.

The level of participation according to these measures was a minimum of 4,082 recorded days of work representing a salary figure of $378,411. This minimum figure takes into account the contribution of only the National Assembly affiliates and thus was undercounted in two sites. It does not include the participation of the many fine non-affiliates and
public representatives. This participation occurred during a period when almost none of the affiliates had staff increases and some in fact absorbed budget and staff cuts.

The evaluation also considered the level of agency participation and the priority assigned to its work and index of participation. Forty-one percent of all affiliate representatives were executive directors ranging from a high of 58 percent (Spartanburg) to a low of 14 percent (national collaboration).

Planning and Implementing Programs

Three aspects of program planning and implementation were evaluated: a) the nature of the community needs assessments, b) the nature of the planning process and the plan itself, and c) the implementation process.

All collaborations performed needs assessment studies using statistics and youth surveys. An inventory of resources was completed by four of the sites. These assessments were accomplished in a very short time and under the press of deadline and show the results of such compression. It was the view of the locals that the national collaboration did not assist the local assessment process. The difficulty with needs assessments is a good illustration of the problem of compressing the time allowed for the development process in order to meet task goals of the grant. The fact that the decision by LEAA to wait for one collaboration (Tucson) to be in place before the others started meant that Tucson was rushed and the other sites had a six month delay in starting. Thus the needs assessment at each site, a sensitive area in need of careful procedures, was not fully developed. The national collaboration, under the press of project management, developed only a very general needs assessment. The Tucson collaboration, recognizing the value of a needs assessment, has now developed and implemented a complete document for future planning.

The planning process which resulted in the phased action plan represented another area of stress between planning procedures and the need to achieve project milestones. It was perhaps the most difficult of all the collaboration tasks with the most time spent in the attempt to produce it, the most committee activity—and the most frustration. The locals consistently reported frustration at so little help being
available from the national office and the national reported frustration at the difficulty of the pressure of compressed time lines and increasing responsibilities and demands. A basic pattern in all the collaborations (local and national) was the rush to get established, meet deadlines and plan as well as possible as they went along. For better or for worse, each collaboration inherited a whole system of previously existing relationships and problems. This affected the ability to respond to common time lines and milestones. The plans were produced with a varying degree of completeness and satisfaction and resulted from a great deal of effort, but clearly lacked sufficient time and organization to have served as a fully functioning planning instrument.

Programs were able to be implemented in all sites with over 1,000 status offenders and children at risk served. More than 2,900 community leaders and youth program staff for both public and non-profit agencies attended capacity building training sessions. Innumerable others received informational communication or in-depth planning instruments from three sites. In addition, all sites used public relations and media coverage. Four of the five local sites were able to implement programs which were collaborative in operation; these represented from 20 to 40 percent of all programs, excluding collaboration meetings or committees.

Cost efficiency was arrived at by dividing program cost by days of program contact per person to determine cost per person per day. In almost all cases costs were lower than the cost of similar service reported by the DSO Grantee of the public sector.

The five local collaborations and the national collaboration in the project then was able to plan and implement 116 different programs in 14-18 months in widely scattered communities. The fact that planning had to be rushed and sometimes altered in mid-stream should not detract from the very significant accomplishment in this area.

Affecting Member Organizations

One notable program effect was the participation of agencies in the program. Clearly agencies which have been involved in status offender planning and programs have increased their experience, knowledge and expertise. The evaluation also attempted to evaluate the actual change within participating agencies using before and after measures. The
outcomes from this analysis were limited due to the difficulty in obtaining sufficient material and the great variation of local factors. The fact that the evaluation was not funded to compare the five sites to sites without the collaboration was another limit on our ability to generalize about organizational changes.

One measure which allowed documentation was changes in attitudes of board members of the collaborating agencies. The evaluation showed that three of the five sites increased in their positive attitudes about non-profit agencies mixing status offenders with other children. These individuals were the decision makers of their communities, and thus their attitudes were significant.

Data from national organizations indicated considerable use of resources to develop programs and program material to use for direct service to status offenders and children at risk at other than collaboration sites either during the term of the project or before it began in the Fall of 1976. Incomplete and non-comparable data precluded further conclusions regarding the direct effect of the project in this area. This was also true in regard to training programs operated by the national organizations. Some excellent staff training by national appeared to be offered, but it was not documentable by the evaluation.

Building the Collaborative Process

The collaborations were all successful in getting organizational representatives working together on the problem of status offenders and other children at risk. In the second interview of organizational representatives, 41 percent reported that the collaborations had been most successful in getting people together and 82 percent said that they would involve their organizations in the collaboration again. Some conclusions concerning factors that affected the success in building collaborations were:

1. Geographical boundaries should be well defined and similar to organizational regions.

2. Collaborations are facilitated in areas where previous collaboration has been satisfying to participants.

3. Competing inter-organizational groups working on the same problems or issues should be consulted and included in the collaboration if possible. It may be necessary either to compromise with such groups or to allocate some control to them for a better use of community resources.
4. Unequal power among members may lead to unequal input of ideals; the group process must allow for input for all members.

5. The interpersonal skills, attitudes and work roles of staff coordinators must be clearly defined.

6. The lay leadership is extremely important in continuity, role perspective and loyalty.
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION TO THE EVALUATION

The Program

In late 1974, the staff and several members of the National Assembly of National Voluntary Health and Welfare Organizations made juvenile justice a program emphasis.\(^1\) An ad hoc task force on juvenile justice was formed to determine ways in which this emphasis could be advanced in member organizations both nationally and locally. Some of the member agencies of the Assembly were already involved in a National Coalition for Youth which met regularly in Washington. That group had worked for the passage of the Juvenile Delinquency and Prevention Act of 1974. Further, some Assembly member organizations had already placed high national priority on juvenile justice.\(^2\)

After several months of meetings, the juvenile justice task force applied for a grant from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) under the first phase of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, which was devoted primarily to the deinstitutionalization of status offenders.\(^3\) The major proportion of the deinstitutionalization funds went to public agencies in local communities to develop alternatives to

\(^1\) Members of the National Assembly are listed in Appendix A, Table 1.

\(^2\) The Auxiliary Appendixes (Volume II) contain additional tables, research rationale, research procedures and instruments, additional program information and the bibliography. It may be obtained by writing to the National Juvenile Justice Program Collaboration, 345 East 46th Street, New York, New York, 10017.

\(^3\) Status offenders are youth who have been adjudicated as delinquent on the basis of acts which are offenses because of their status as minors but which would not be offenses or crimes if committed by adults.
institutionalization of status offenders in detention or correction centers. Recipients of the public grant are referred to as the Deinstitutionalization of Status Offender (DSO) Grantees. The purpose of the grants was to remove status offenders from institutions and to provide some demonstration of how they could be served in local communities rather than in institutions.

The Juvenile Justice Task Force suggested also funding non-profit community based youth serving agencies also on the following assumptions:

1. **Non-profit agencies can provide valuable services to status offenders.** If status offenders are to be served in local communities, then local non-profit youth serving agencies should also be experimenting with ways to increase services to such youth.

2. **Non-profit agencies can be valuable and powerful advocates for status offenders.** If status offenders are to be served in local communities, then there must be a major effort to educate citizens, to change laws and to urge public service agencies to understand and accept status offenders in the community.

3. **Services and advocacy provided by a collaborative effort are more effective than each agency providing a separate effort.** Local services to youth are often fragmentary with a great deal of duplication in some areas and gaps in service in other areas. All local providers of service to a specific client group must work together to meet the needs of the clients in a more complete way. Police, probation, schools, social agencies, and public recreation must be aware of and supportive to each other's programs to serve status offenders.

4. **Non-profit agencies can develop the capacity to work with status offenders.** Status offenders have not been a traditional client group of most non-profit local affiliates of National Assembly agencies. However, non-profit agencies will be in the community long after LEAA monies are gone. If these agencies have a commitment to working collaboratively with each other and with the local public agencies and have increased their ability to provide needed services, then the money is well spent.

Based on these assumptions, the National Assembly's Juvenile Justice Task Force developed a proposal for a program grant:

> To develop the capacity of the national voluntary organizations and their local affiliates to serve status offenders and to develop, through collaboration, community-based services for status offenders as an alternative to detention/correction institutions.⁴

The basic method of the program was to bring together organizations with common values of service to youth in order to work together more

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⁴Program Proposal, p. 11.
effectively and without duplication of effort to deinstitutionalize status offenders. The process to develop the common, cooperative effort called for the organizations to work together with mutual exchange of information and ideas, sharing of resources and expertise, respect for each others' efforts and programs and a cooperative offering of needed services. A formal organization of these youth organizations would be formed and termed a collaboration.

A national collaboration was established to manage the program, work with the national organizations and assist in the development of local collaborations at five sites around the country. The national collaboration was composed of 15 member organizations of the National Assembly whose representatives were the national task force. The task force and the staff which was hired to assist in implementing the program formed the working parts of the collaboration.

Each local collaboration was a formal organization of a core of local affiliates of the National Assembly organizations, other public and private youth-serving agencies and the DSO Grantee. They were developed with assistance from the national collaboration. The separate organizations were to work together through the collaborations and separately to develop needed services for status offenders in the community.

The local collaborations were implemented by staff coordinators and set up offices. The organizational linkages, diagramed in Figure 1, indicate that the efforts of all organizations and staff are directed to the ultimate presence of community services to enable status offenders to be deinstitutionalized. In October, 1975, LEAA funded the National Assembly's juvenile justice program collaboration proposal for two years. The sites selected were Oakland, Spartanburg, Spokane, Tucson and a Connecticut region encompassing Danbury, Torrington and Waterbury.

The Goals of the Juvenile Justice Program Collaborations

Four goals were identified as the program became operationalized. Three of them were program goals and one was a process goal.

\[\text{5 Each of the cities also included a public agency that had received one of the Deinstitutionalization of Status Offenders (DSO) Grants from LEAA.}\]
The program goals for both the national and local collaborations were to:

1. Develop a viable collaborative organization of non-profit youth serving agencies.

2. Plan and implement needed programs and services.
   a. Programs that would increase the capacity of member agencies to serve status offenders.
   b. Programs that would enable the collaborations as organizations and its members separately to serve as advocates for status offenders.
   c. Direct services and programs for status offenders in the community.

3. Increase the capacity of member organizations to serve status offenders and other children at risk in the community.

The process goal was to develop a real collaborative style of operation among the non-profit agencies and between the public and non-profit agencies that would lead to future unified delivery of services.

Program and process goals are diagramed in Figure 2.
The Evaluation

The evaluation used two major methodologies. The first was descriptive analysis of both the development of the collaborative process and the collaboration programs. This entailed three procedures: a) monitoring the group process using the methods developed in small group research, b) analyzing the collaborations' organizational procedures and programs using accepted criteria of human service programs, and c) describing program activity and participants.

The second methodology was a quasi-experimental design to measure the effect of the program on a) commitment of the local organizations to the collaboration, b) the change in capacity of local organizations to serve status offenders and children at risk, and c) the degree of success in the service goals of the collaboration—advocacy and direct service. The procedures used were interviewing organizational representatives, content analyses of organizational media, analysis of organizational records such as budget and board minutes, and measures of board attitudes. Measures of these three factors were taken at the beginning of the program in
Fall, 1976, and again in Fall, 1977. Figure 3 diagrams the rationale of the evaluation. 6

FIGURE 3
METHODOLOGIES USED IN EVALUATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE COLLABORATIONS

Quasi-Experimental

before measures

organizational participation in collaboration organization

organizational capacity to serve status offenders/children at risk

services to status offenders/children at risk

descriptive analyses

collaboration organization and programs

collaboration organizational development

change in organizational capacity to serve status offenders/children at risk

change in services to status offenders/children at risk

after measures

organizational commitment to collaboration

General Findings

Program Development and Outcomes

The national collaboration had four major tasks: to manage the entire program grant, to provide assistance to the local collaborations, to staff the national collaboration's development of its own program goals, and to increase the service of member organizations to status offenders and other children at risk.

The evaluation shows that the national collaboration was effective in managing the project. The collaboration's assistance to the local collaborations

6 See Auxiliary Appendixes B and C for a complete discussion of research rationale and data instruments.
was hampered by a shortage of staff and was more successful in some tasks than others and more successful in some sites than others. It was more successful in assisting organizational development than in assisting program development, and it was more successful in Tucson, Spartanburg and Spokane than in Connecticut and Oakland.

The development of the national collaboration's own programs, while recognized as important by the national staff, was of considerably lower priority to them in comparison with the necessity of helping the local collaborations become operational. 7

The National Assembly organizations who participated in the national collaboration reported growth in their services to status offenders around the country in addition to the five sites. Since 1972, some of the national organizations have developed sound program materials and technical assistance for their locals to use with children at risk. During the course of the evaluation, most of the national organizations showed increases in communications about status offenders to their local affiliates around the country and many showed increases in their national advocacy activities.

The local collaborations had three major tasks: to develop a viable, working organization to work for status offenders, to plan and implement programs and services for status offenders, and to increase the services of members to status offenders. In general, the collaborations were very successful in organizing local youth serving agencies around the issue of local service to status offenders. Most were successful in planning capacity building, advocacy and direct service programs. The success in implementing programs varied somewhat according to the start-up time, the nature of the site and the difficulties of organization. The programs are continuing to be implemented since the cessation of data collection.

The local affiliates of National Assembly organizations increased their capacity to serve status offenders and other children at risk. Many were educating their boards and membership and training staff for future direct services. Many also donated part of their own facilities and staff in implementing the collaboration programs and some reported more status offenders in their regular programs than a year earlier.

7 This task is a major priority in a proposal to continue the project for two additional years.
Process Development and Outcomes

In the process analysis, we found that the collaborations were successful, using a number of techniques. The most successful technique was local staff persons encouraging the involvement of the collaboration members in all aspects of the program with the goals well defined around a specific problem, and with some consensus on goals, roles and methods. Collaborations that emphasized direct service to young people convicted of status offenses worked better if the collaborations had more homogeneous organizations or had smaller numbers of service deliverers involved.

Design of the Report

The remainder of this report will examine in detail the results of the evaluation of the National Juvenile Justice Program Collaboration in three program areas and one process area. The program areas are:

1. The manner in which local collaborations were organized.

2. The extent to which the collaboration planned and implemented needed programs and service in
   a) capacity building programs
   b) advocacy programs
   c) direct services for status offenders.

3. The extent to which member organizations increased their capacity to serve status offenders and other children at risk.

The program areas are the heart of the evaluation for the purpose of program accountability for LEAA, and is the subject of Chapter 2.

The process area is the nature of the collaboration process that developed and the situational and process factors that affected the collaborations. This is the major interest of non-profit organizations in terms of developing inter-organizational collaborations of service agencies in the future. In Chapter 3 we examine the process of small groups and describe each of the collaborations.

In Chapter 4 we look at the program and process together and indicate factors that affected the success of the collaboration and its program. This chapter includes the major scientific interest of the evaluation, the hypothesis that the group process affects the successful attainment of program goals. Chapter 4 also indicates some of the difficulties of the
evaluation process and suggests changes in methodology that would be helpful in further studies, and aspects of the problem in which further research would prove fruitful.

The appendix of this report contains tables referred to in the text. A separate volume of auxiliary appendixes includes the full research rationale, research instruments, additional data tables, the full bibliography, and persons involved in the programs and the evaluation.

How to Read this Report

There are several ways to read this report. Readers who are short of time will wish to read the attached Executive Summary and Chapter 4. Those interested in the organizational procedures of the collaborations and in the development and implementation of programs and services to status offenders and children at risk will wish to read Chapter 2. Those interested in the development of the collaboration process and its effect on program will wish to read the introduction of Chapter 3 and all of Chapter 4.

Readers interested in the development of a specific collaboration will find a section of Chapter 3 which relates to the particular site, in addition to the introduction to the chapter.
CHAPTER 2

EVALUATION OF THE COLLABORATION PROGRAM

Introduction

The major program method of the Juvenile Justice Collaboration Program funded by LEAA was to form a national juvenile justice collaboration which would then form collaborative organizations at five sites around the country. Representatives of 16 national organizations from the National Assembly formed the national task force. They, and the staff they hired to implement the program nationally and locally, comprised the working body of the national collaboration. The national task force and the national staff persons worked with local organizations involved in service to youth to form the local collaborations. The local collaborations then hired staff coordinators and began to plan and implement programs to serve status offenders to the community and thereby avoid their institutionalization.

The Sites

The five sites were Spartanburg, South Carolina; Tucson, Arizona; Oakland, California; Spokane, Washington, and the State of Connecticut. The sites were chosen because a) they were recipients of the LEAA public Deinstitutionalization of Status Offender Grants (DSO Grants); b) they represented different sections of the country; c) they represented variation in size and cultural diversity.

Spartanburg is a city of 46,000 in rural South Carolina. While it has been a traditional southern regional center, it is currently experiencing rapid economic and industrial growth.

Tucson is a major metropolitan area in the southwestern United States. The Tucson collaboration encompasses all of Pima County, with a population of about half a million. It has grown to this size from
about 50,000 in the 1940's so that a majority of residents are migrants into the area.

Oakland is an industrial suburb of San Francisco with a population of 360,000. The population has been slowly declining, with an increasing proportion of minority residents, and increasing unemployment.

Spokane is a city of 174,000 in eastern Washington. It is the regional center for about 200 miles. It had been a relatively old traditional city until the 1960's. During that decade, the population increased nearly 40% with younger, more educated, more politically liberal population.

In Connecticut, three towns in the eastern region were eventually selected for delivery of service since the voluntary organizations are not organized on a state basis. Danbury, with a population of 57,000, is in southeastern Connecticut. It is a growing town and becoming a suburb for New York middle management personnel. Waterbury, with a population of 113,000, is an industrial city which is currently economically depressed. It has high unemployment especially among youth. Torrington is a town of 32,000 located in rural northeastern Connecticut. While it is a manufacturing town it retains much of the rural culture.

The Goals

The program goals are diagramed in Figure 1, page 4. They were:

1. To form collaboration organizations of National Assembly affiliates and other youth serving agencies.

2. To plan or implement
   a. programs to develop members' capacities to serve status offenders
   b. programs or services that will increase community advocacy for status offenders
   c. programs or services that meet the direct service needs of status offenders.

3. To cause change in member organizations in their capacity to serve status offenders.

The General Findings

It is the conclusion of the evaluation that all of the program goals were achieved to some extent. After the early preorganizational tasks (including LEAA's insistence that one site be organized prior to
sign off), only 14 months remained for the achievement of the three program goals. The most successfully achieved goals are those which occurred earliest. A continual monitoring of the later tasks is necessary to report the results completely.

The building of collaboration, the first goal, was very successful. A total of 62 affiliates, 65 other non-profit youth serving organizations and 76 public organizations were involved in the seven sites. One national, one state, one regional and four local offices were established with support personnel and facilities. A documented total of 12 years of 7-hour person work days was contributed by members of these organizations in formal planning and program activities and an estimated additional 10 to 12 years in other collaboration activity.

The member organizations were committed to work for status offenders. For two-thirds of the participants the collaboration and/or work with status offenders was a high priority in their work.

The planning and implementing of programs was also highly successful. A total of 116 programs were planned, 62% of which had been implemented or were in operation by the end of the data collection. More than 1,000 status offenders and other youth at risk were served in a variety of programs. A total of 2,770 persons, primarily youth work professionals, participated in capacity building programs.

Over 3,600 community leaders and youth work professionals had sustained informational and educational contact about status offenders and innumerable additional people had short term media contact of some kind.

Some of the programs were not as successful as others but the total effect was to initiate public awareness, educate and train people who work with youth, and create some local community services for youth.

The building of member organizations' capacity to serve status offenders in their own programs showed fewer results in the short time after the implementation of programs. The national organizations, many of which have had status offenders as a priority for a longer period of time, showed the greatest increase in capacity since the beginning of the grant. The local agencies showed some increase in some
areas at some sites.

The remainder of this chapter details the degree to which the collaborations were successful in achieving these three program goals. In the first section, we will set the stage for the evaluation program by describing early tasks and the evaluation methods. In the second section, we will present the detailed evaluation of each of the three program goals.

Setting the Stage for the Program Evaluation

Before discussing the degree to which program goals were achieved, we need to set the stage for both the program and the evaluation of the program. This section will describe the early tasks involved in the collaboration and briefly describe the methods used in evaluating the program.

Early Developmental Tasks

Three early tasks preceded the local collaboration program activities and established the work style of the national collaboration. These tasks were the local site selection, the national work plan and local organizational development.

Site Selection. The task force and the staff developed criteria for the selection of the five local collaboration sites, modifying somewhat the criteria in the program proposal. Site selection was limited by several realities. First, local collaborations had to be in sites where the members of the National Assembly had sufficient numbers of local affiliates with which to build a collaboration. In addition, the LEAA insisted that the collaboration site be a location with a recipient of the public DSO Grant. There was apparently also some political maneuvering among national organizations over locations of sites. Finally, the national organizations wanted some geographical, demographic and cultural diversity among the sites.

The national task force and staff also developed a set of criteria for site selection based on the nature of the various systems to be involved: the DSO Grantee, other state and local public agencies, the nature of the voluntary organizations, and the needs of the community.
With the data all in, the national task force selected six sites by vote. The practical realities appear to have been more important in the selection than the service system criteria.

In the six sites selected, local affiliates of members of the National Assembly's Juvenile Justice Task Force members were contacted to inform them of the collaboration program and arrange for a visit by a team from the task force. One of the affiliates was selected to organize the visit, to invite appropriate persons and organizations to a meeting and to convene that meeting. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the project and elicit interest from local affiliates. From the six sites five were selected, leaving the sixth site quite hostile.

**National Work Plan.** The national staff had three functions in developing the local collaborations: organizational development, program assistance and fiscal management. In addition, they had these same functions for the national collaboration. There is no evidence of an explicit plan that adequately defined the jobs to be done, specified priorities or allocated adequate personnel to the various functions. For instance, plans were either explicated retrospectively to fit what had already developed or developed later to solve problems resulting from unplanned developments. For instance, job descriptions of local staff persons were developed long after they had been hired. Job differentiation at the National Assembly office was developed late in the first year. Additional personnel were hired as they were needed.

For organizational development, the program proposal said that national staff should spend one or two weeks at each site to help local organizations develop structure and help committees organize. National staff spent the time in Tucson, the first site to organize. The other sites started developing on their own in most cases with the bulk of the staff input at a later stage in their development or with less time at each visit because of the growing press of management matters on the national collaboration.

Some assistance in organizational development was offered at staff meetings with local staff from all five sites meeting together several times and all local staff and chairpeople twice. Other guidelines were offered by letters and phone calls to chairpersons and staff
outlining the committees and tasks of the collaboration, giving guidance in selection of personnel and further explaining the nature of the collaboration program.

All of the local coordinators except Tucson perceived a lack of structural guidelines for organizational development. The four later sites had more trouble than Tucson in their early stages. Several problems developed during this time that continued to plague the local collaborations: definition of membership, voting relationships between affiliates and non-affiliates, the staff-chair role relationships, the national-local staff relationships including the supervisory role, and the degree of freedom of the local collaborations from national control of program.

For program assistance, the program said that national task force members, who were staff persons with expertise in their own organizations, were to assist the locals in organizational development and in program materials. Technical assistance panels were to be organized and available on call from the local sites. Teams of national task force members were available for site visits from time to time. However, no workable plan for using the expertise of national organization's staff persons in program assistance was developed. At a later stage of the program, a technical assistance procedure was developed on paper. It involved primarily a file of material with bibliographic and program references and possible program personnel. Most of the program personnel were consultants rather than local or national National Assembly affiliate staff.

Other program assistance was offered by national staff by phone calls, on-site program assistance and some program assistance at staff meetings. Since the national staff were not themselves program specialists, most of this program assistance was of greater use in managing organizations than in developing programs. When the local coordinators were asked about problems, their most mentioned problem related to lack of knowledge of programs and their difficulty in getting assistance from the national staff.

The program proposal specified few guidelines for fiscal management. However, the resulting contract and the LEAA program monitor set down the criteria. The national staff hired a full time fiscal officer. In
addition the project director spent a great deal of time in fiscal and organizational management. The written guidelines for fiscal policy and procedures were much more explicit than those on organizational development or program. The time spent on fiscal management during staff meetings was greater and the manner of presentations more creative than those on organizational development or program.

This degree of emphasis appears to reflect both the values of LEAA and the personal style of the project director.

Several early organizational and program problems of the local collaboration resulted from a lack of attention to needs at crucial points in their development. This will be illustrated in Chapter 3. Several of the national collaboration's problems were also due to the absence of a plan which outlined program priorities. Attention to change of role was needed by the national task force as it changed functions and the absence of clear program plans for the national collaboration illustrate the problem.

In reality, the original two national staff, even when augmented by two additional staff persons, were not sufficient for the proposed tasks of the program. The lack of a rational plan merely meant that tasks not well attended to were a result of the selection of staff rather than a rational allocation of resources.

Local Organizational Development. Before LEAA would sign off on the total program, they required that one site be organized and a viable plan developed. Tucson was selected for the test because it was felt that the inter-organizational climate, the judicial stance around status offenders and the nature of the city would facilitate a rapid development.

The organizing process was similar in all sites. Following the site visit, a temporary chairperson called another meeting or two to discuss the extent of interest of local organizations and to give further explanations, if necessary, to potential members. In all sites, the local organizations were eager to participate. In most sites, they began the organizational process after hearing of their selection from New York, even before LEAA gave clearance to begin the other sites.

The specific sections of Chapter 3 describe minor variations in the organizing process at each site.
The first committees dealt with membership, statement of purpose and selection of personnel. A national staff person returned several times to most sites or advised the temporary chairpersons by phone. A national staff person was present for final screening and hiring of the coordinators.

**Summary of Early Development Tasks.** Even with the problems noted, each collaboration developed a working organization with office and staff within three to eight months of the first meeting, a remarkably short time for organizational development.

Two problems that limited the success of the total program are related. First, only a short period of time was allowed to develop relationships, build new collaborative organizations, and to plan and implement services to status offenders. LEAA's insistence on the one trial site without extending the life of the project deprived the other four sites of the time necessary to mount the program approved in the original proposal. The national task force might well have insisted on a written extension for the complete program when LEAA insisted on the trial site. At a later date an extension was asked for and received but by that time the rushing of decisions and processes had already created problems.

The second problem was a lack of adequate planning. With LEAA's stipulation of immediately organizing one site before the others could begin, the time for advanced planning was severely limited.

**The Evaluation Method**

The National Juvenile Justice Collaboration Task Force issued a request for proposal for the evaluation in June, 1976, and signed the contract in September, 1976, nine months after the project began. This left no opportunity for pretesting the early national organizational or collaborative process nor for any systematic monitoring of organizational procedures. A major reason for the delay was LEAA's ambivalence about evaluating this program. Originally, LEAA exempted the National Juvenile Justice Program Collaboration from its evaluation of the other DSO programs, even though the national task force had requested its inclusion. After the grant was announced, LEAA demanded that an evaluation be purchased with program money even though the program money had already been allocated.
The complete rationale for the evaluation, the research instruments and procedures are included in Auxiliary Appendixes B and C. At this point we will outline the program goals and briefly outline the major methodologies, the research personnel, the development of research procedures and instruments, and the data gathering techniques used.

Program Goals. To determine the proper methodology, it was necessary to clarify which aspects of the program were to be evaluated.

Three aspects of human services can be evaluated: program input, program throughput and program outcomes. Evaluation of program input would include the assessment of external resources that are used such as funding, source of staff expertise and participation of external organizations. Evaluation of program throughput would assess what goes on inside the organization, including the background for planning, the plans themselves, the intervention logics, the program operations and institutional development and maintenance. Evaluation of program outcomes includes independent tests to determine the causal relationships between the program and the desired outcomes.

In this case, complete evaluation of all three aspects of human service programs was not considered feasible or essential. The national collaboration's decision was that a thorough assessment of the program throughputs, or the organizational development, planning and operations, would be most useful to future program planners. A complete test of the effect of the program on the deinstitutionalization of status offenders was considered too costly and complex.

However, an attempt to measure the organizational outcome was judged to be worthwhile. This included an analysis of youth who participate in direct service programs. This analysis included demographic and offense records on the youth and some case and program data. In addition it included some outcome data from some programs.

The national collaboration also agreed to the evaluation of a second aspect of the organizational development, the process of the group formation and activity. Figure 4 shows the structure of the program in relation to the above discussion. We evaluated three program throughputs. The program throughputs were a) to organize collaboration of youth serving organizations around the issue of community services to status offenders, b) to develop a collaborative process that will increase
inter-organizational cooperation, and c) to plan and implement programs that will enable status offenders to be served in the community. The programs are capacity building, advocacy and direct service.

The program outcome evaluated was the change from Fall, 1976, to Fall, 1977, in the capacity of the National Assembly affiliates to serve status offenders. The definition of the goals, the operational indicators for these goals and the criteria for evaluation are included at the beginning of each of the evaluation sections.

Major methodologies. Two major methodologies or research logics were used in the evaluation: descriptive analysis of the through-put goals and quasi-experimental analysis of one outcome goal. The descriptive analysis treated the collaborations as service planning and delivery systems rather than as organizational structures. This kind of analysis required much data, gathered with a variety of techniques. The analysis also required a variety of techniques, including analysis of causal factors within each collaboration and comparison among collaborations, descriptive case history of organizational activity, and systems analysis of progress toward goals.

The quasi-experimental methodology was used to evaluate organizational change, the outcome goal. Organizational data were gathered in the Fall of
1976 and again in the Fall of 1977. Analysis varied from a simple comparison of percentages to a more complicated test of probability used on the attitude scales. Figure 3 in Chapter 1 diagrams the methodology.

**Research Personnel.** The evaluation was directed by a sociologist with extensive background in research methods and evaluation of human service programs. In September and October, 1976, a research team was formed, including a social scientist in each of the local sites and a social agency executive with expertise in human service organizations to be part of a research team. The remainder of the research team consisted of four graduate students, three in social work and one in criminal justice. The research staff at the Center for Applied Urban Research at the University of Nebraska at Omaha provided additional research support. Dr. Richard Hall, an expert in inter-organizational relationships from the University of Minnesota, was a consultant. The research team gathered in Omaha in early November, 1976, along with the local program coordinators and the national staff personnel to work out details of the evaluation.

**Development of Research Procedures and Instruments.** Before the first Omaha Conference, a library search was initiated to discover previous research, theories to guide the evaluation and instruments that might have already been validated. Working papers were developed and preliminary work on the attitude questions began.

At the conference, the researchers and the program people worked together for one day, with the program people identifying what they would like to know about their programs, what interference they would object to and discussing the delicate relationships in their collaboration.

The researchers met after that and wrote and sequenced questions for the interview schedule, worked on the group process analysis and selected and revised the attitude questions. They also worked together doing a process observation to assure greater reliability.

The ongoing staff interviews and the procedures for analysis of organizational data were developed from theories of leadership styles,

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9The local researchers were responsible for much of the local data. They are identified in Auxiliary Appendix E; the details of the 1976 Omaha planning conference and a subsequent 1977 Omaha planning conference can be found in Auxiliary Appendix C.
role behavior and organizational structure at a later date. Procedures for enhancing the response from organizations to our request for such items as budgets and board minutes were revised every six months as we repeatedly failed to receive these data.10

The research proposal called for evaluation of program outcomes. However, the national task force felt the time was too short for outcome to be apparent. Therefore, we substituted evaluation of throughputs or program plans and implementation procedures. Our criteria were developed from program theories.

Data Gathering Techniques. Six data gathering techniques were used in the evaluation. First, the local researchers interviewed participants in the local collaboration at the beginning and again at the end of the program. Because of the lateness of getting the evaluation contract, "before" interviews with representatives of the national collaboration were not possible.

Second, continuous running records of the collaborations were gathered to monitor the organizational factors and procedures. Third, organizational data from one program year before the collaboration started were collected in order to establish the organizational capacity and organizational services to status offenders during a base period. These data were collected again after six months to determine change.

Fourth, longitudinal analysis of staff activities was performed by developing a log for local staff to keep their daily activity. Fifth, the local staff persons were interviewed four times during the study period to determine their perceptions of their jobs, their interactions with their collaboration's members and their perceptions of the National Assembly office. Finally, an attitude scale about status offenders was developed to determine the attitudes of local affiliates' boards of directors. These scales were administered by the local field researchers at the beginning of the collaborations and again in Fall, 1977.

10 Our solution and recommendation are included in Auxiliary Appendix C.
Did the Collaborations Achieve Their Program Goals?

In this section we will evaluate what the collaboration actually did. There will be a sub-section corresponding to each program goal: building collaboration organizations to coordinate services for status offenders, planning and implementing programs and affecting the capacity of member organizations to serve status offenders.

Building Collaboration Organizations

In the program proposal, the objectives of the collaborations as organizations were to:

...develop and make operational in five project sites a collaboration of the 14 participating national voluntary agencies and other voluntary agencies....develop a formal working relationship between the collaboration and the local action Grantee.....to work together via a collaborative mechanism.

There were two criteria for evaluating the degree to which collaborative organizations were developed: a) did National Assembly affiliates join with other youth serving agencies in a collaboration? and b) to what extent did they participate in the work of the collaborations? The following sections report the nature of the collaboration's membership and the degree of participation.

Nature of Membership. The collaborations were highly successful in attracting the membership of local youth serving agencies affiliated with the National Assembly organizations. The membership by site is seen in Table 1, Appendix A. In all sites, 90% of National Assembly affiliates joined the collaborations.

It is difficult to evaluate membership of affiliates in Oakland and Connecticut, as both of these sites cover large areas with several branches of the affiliates. For instance, two different Girl Scout Councils are involved in the Connecticut region.

The collaborations varied on their inclusions of non-profit agencies that were not members of the National Assembly. A total of 65 are included in all sites. In most collaboration sites, these agencies were non-voting members. They were not included in the national collaboration.
The collaborations also varied on their inclusion of public youth serving agencies. Oakland, Spartanburg, Tucson and Connecticut actively sought public agency participation. A total of 76 public agencies were active at the four sites, as compared with only 23 National Assembly affiliates.

The Spokane collaboration made a decision not to include public agencies. However, the Spokane DSO Grantee is a public-private youth planning council which created Youth Alternatives as the operational unit for the grant.

A public agency in each collaboration site which had received a DSO Grant to provide community services for deinstitutionalizing status offenders was a principal participant of each collaboration. The nature of the DSO Grantees in the five sites varied. In Tucson it was the Juvenile Court; in Oakland, the probation department; in Spartanburg, the Youth Bureau, in Connecticut, the Department of Children and Youth Services; and in Spokane it was Youth Alternatives as mentioned above.

The LEAA stipulated that the public and private programs complement and not duplicate each other. For this reason a working relationship was essential and the collaborations were natural vehicles for coordination.

In each of the local sites, the DSO Grantee was active in the collaboration. Both the national collaboration and LEAA required a written Working Agreement between the DSO Grantee and the collaboration specifying the mechanisms of the relationship. Most of the collaborations served as vehicles for a beginning relationship between this part of the public youth service sector and the private sector. The presence of the DSO Grantee in the collaboration served two major functions. First, it gave the private sector a realistic perspective on the particular client population--status offenders. The DSO Grantee was less likely to romanticize possible programs, more in touch with status offenders and other children at risk and more practical. Second, some coordinators used the DSO Grantee as an ally to get the tasks of the collaboration under way. Because most of the local coordinators had had more previous experience in public agencies than in non-profit youth serving agencies, they were often frustrated with the committee process of the non-profit agencies and used the public agencies to help define the task and push toward the goal.
Most of the DSO Grantees wanted the collaborations in their cities. They recognized the benefits of having the extra money, extra interest in developing alternatives to institutionalization for status offenders and extra staff. The Grantees generally respected the collaborations, but were somewhat less respectful of the local individual agencies. They recognized that the collaborations had something to offer which they, with their more rigid mandate, could not. Most Grantees worked hard to move the collaborations toward their own goals, using them as resources to fulfill their goals.

Degree of Participation. The literature on inter-organizational relationship and community organization suggests that the relationships can range from loose informal interaction to hierarchical coordinating councils. The collaborations defined in the program proposal fell into a middle range between these two extremes, without the power of a hierarchical council such as United Way, but with more formal structure than either a coalition or merely informal interaction.\textsuperscript{11} The program proposal said, "it requires shared decision making, and subsequently some reduction in individual agency prerogatives. It requires a process of give and take with different participants making different kind of contributions."

The criteria of collaboration participation used in the evaluation of successful collaboration are:

1. Recognition by participants of a common community problem or need.
2. A formal commitment or contract to participate in collaboration goal activity.
3. Allocation of organizational resources to work on collaboration goals.
4. Participation in activity related to collaboration goals.
5. Participation in shared decision making process.

The fifth criterion, the decision making process, will be discussed


in Chapter 3. In this section we will describe the degree to which the other criteria were met in each site. The time sequence of the criteria is diagramed in Figure 5.

FIGURE 5

INDICES OF PARTICIPATION IN INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL COLLABORATION

Participation in a collaborative organization requires recognition of a common problem or need. In the first interview, collaboration members at each site were asked, "From your knowledge of youth and the community, what would you say are the THREE most important problems with youth here? (accept more than three if volunteered)." The responses are shown in Table 3, Appendix A. Most of the responses to the open-ended question related either to services for status offenders or to causal factors related to status offenders.

Tucson had the greatest consensus on any one problem with 69% of respondents reporting school and education as problems. Both Spartanburg and Waterbury respondents had 65% consensus on a problem. Spartanburg had the most total consensus. Sixty-nine percent of all responses were on the three most mentioned problems. Torrington had least consensus on the three most mentioned problems.

A formal commitment to the collaboration indicates the formal participation. The program plan called for a formal letter of commitment, with the intent that it be based on official board decision. The data on this measure were incomplete. Some coordinators were conscientious
in pursuing the letter and some were not. It was apparent to the evaluators that many organizations which produced a formal letter of commitment were inactive and many which produced no letter were very active.

The degree to which an organization allocates its own resources for collaboration goal related activity indicates participation in a collaboration. This measure represents a key factor in inter-organizational collaboration. Since many National Assembly affiliates had declining incomes, any new activity reduced the activity toward organizational goals. This is especially true in organizations with few professional staff. We measured the allocation of resources in three ways:

1. The number of days spent in collaboration activity;
2. The amount of salary that this represents;
3. The amount of in-kind contribution to the collaboration.

We measured the days in formal activity in two ways. In the interviews, we asked all respondents approximately how much time they spent each month in collaboration activity. We also counted the attendance recorded on board and meeting minutes. In most cases the latter numbers were greater than the former. Table 4 in Appendix A shows these data. We estimated each collaboration meeting at one half working day including travel, preparation and follow up. National collaboration meetings were one full day. The time of other formal meetings was taken from collaboration records. A total of 2,623 working days were recorded in formal collaboration meetings of all members. This is the equivalent of 12 working person-years at an average of 220 working days per year. We consider this an under-recorded amount since records from Connecticut were incomplete and some sites had no records of subcommittee meetings.

We had additional recorded or estimated activity from the affiliates because of the organizational analysis. An additional 2,136 days or 9.7 years can be documented or closely estimated. Both Oakland and Connecticut are under represented in this figure since some of the estimates were from calendars and logs of the coordinators. The additional participation of non-affiliates is completely unreported.

In summary, the national task force reported the most days of participation with an average of 142 per member agency. National activity covered a period of two and one half years while the local
collaboration activity covered from 15 to 21 months. Tucson reported
the most local participation with an average of 84 days per affiliate
(Table 4, Appendix A). Spartanburg and Spokane, for which data were more
consistent, reported an average of 48 and 47 days per agency, respectively.

The amount of staff salary represented by the participation of
affiliates in collaboration activity was calculated (Table 4, Appendix A).
Locally, the mean salary for professionals in each agency was used. It
was applied to volunteers from that agency also. Nationally the median
figure for all National Assembly organizations by organizational rank
was used. This figure was taken from a survey of national organizations
by the National Assembly. A total of $378,411 is the estimated figure
allocated by National Assembly affiliates to collaboration work.
Seventy-four percent of this total was from the national organizations.
The Tucson collaboration reported the greatest salary allocation of the
local organizations, with Spokane and Spartanburg similar.

Reported "in-kind" contributions from all affiliates to all colla­
boration was $2,145. We believe that this item was under-reported.
Several items of which we are aware were not reported. In addition,
unmeasurable under-reported items should not be overlooked. For
instance, several National Assembly affiliates used their own contacts
with funding sources to gain grants for the "match" that LEAA required.

The degree to which organizational members participate in collabora­
tion goal related activity is a fourth measure of degree of commitment to
the collaboration. The number of days of staff time given to the colla­
boration reported above is an indicator of collaboration goal related
activity as well as of allocating own organizational resources. Two
additional measures were used: the organizational status of the
collaboration representatives and the priority of collaboration work
in the portfolio of the organizational representatives.

The status of organizational representatives is shown in Table 4,
Appendix A. Forty-one percent of all affiliate representatives were
executive directors. The Spartanburg collaboration had most, where 58%
of their representatives were executive directors, and the national
collaboration had least, where only 14% were executives.\footnote{Division
heads on the national level were considered to be the same level of
influence and power as executive Directors of local collaborating agencies.} 58% were other

\footnote{Division heads on the national level were considered to be the same level of influence and power as executive Directors of local collaborating agencies.}
staff persons and 13% were board members. The Spokane collaboration reported the largest percentage of board members, 43%, because their members decided to include one board member from each affiliate.

The priority of the work in the collaboration for the representatives is also in Table 4, Appendix A. Collaboration work had the lowest priority among national collaboration representatives. Only 41% reported it among their list of the top 10 priorities. Ninety-two percent of the Connecticut representatives reported the collaboration among their top 10 priorities. Only 34% of Tucson representatives reported the collaboration among their top 10 priorities. Both the national and the Tucson representatives reported in the interviews that the collaboration had been a higher priority previously, especially during the planning stages.

Summary of Collaboration Building. At all sites, the collaborations organized collaboratively with formal commitments to work on the problem of local service to status offenders. Oakland and Connecticut collaborations had the lowest active participation from affiliates and from the DSO Grantees. Spartanburg and Connecticut had the most representation from other public. Most active participation in work toward collaboration was reported by the national collaboration and the Tucson and Spartanburg collaborations. The most active when average number of professional staff per agency is included was Tucson.

Planning and Implementing Programs

The actual work of the collaborations, once organized, was to plan and implement community based programs and services based on the service needs and the characteristics of young people charged with status offenses in each community, and the strengths of the local member agencies. The programs were to be developed collaboratively with input from the local DSO Grantee and other youth-serving agencies (public and private) to avoid duplication and to gain the support of possible users of the program. It was also hoped that by participating in planning and implementing programs and services for status offenders, the National Assembly affiliates would gain experience and therefore increase their capacities to serve status offenders in the future.

Four aspects of the collaboration planning and program implementation
were evaluated: a) the nature of the community needs assessments, b) the nature of the planning process, c) the plan itself, and d) the program implementation.

Needs Assessment. An essential ingredient in the program plan for each collaboration was a needs assessment. At this point the DSO Grantees were particularly helpful. A wide variety of techniques was used at the different sites (Table 5, Appendix A).

The program proposal perceived the needs assessment as a joint public-private activity not only to determine service gaps and devise programs to fill them, but also as a means of educating and involving agency leaders in the needs and problems of status offenders. The criteria for evaluating the needs assessment are:

1. The degree to which service inventory and service gaps in the community were determined.
2. Participation of affiliates in the process.
3. The degree to which gaps in service of the affiliates themselves were identified.

Nearly all collaborations gathered area demographic data on population characteristics and statistics on the number and nature of the status offender population. Three of the five used some youth input—two were previously completed youth surveys. Four used community input either in the form of assessment of community facilities or interviews of community youth work professionals. Four completed inventories of affiliate resources, programs and/or needs, two had brainstorming sessions with input from the affiliates and one collaboration analyzed 100 juvenile cases to assess their needs.

The national collaboration needs assessment procedures were limited. However, a great deal of preliminary documentation of overall needs of status offenders went into the preparation of the program proposal.

All of the local collaborations documented the service needs of status offenders in their communities. Spokane and Connecticut had the most complete inventory of community resources.

Tucson appeared to have had the most input of affiliates in their needs assessment procedures, Oakland and Spartanburg the least.
There was little organized agency self-assessment. While a self-assessment document was used in Tucson and national, both the return rate and the quality of the response was poor.

Several problems were apparent from evaluating the needs assessment procedures. First, the press of time did not allow for adequate needs assessment. If time had been allowed, this procedure could have been a factor educating and sensitizing the local organizations as well as the community. The Tucson collaboration recognized the weakness of its procedures and has since developed and implemented a complete document for use in future planning. It presents location and type of community service which will enable planners to recognize gaps in services.

Since the beginning of the program, the National Camp Fire Girls have developed a technical assistance package for local communities on how to determine needs for new programs. They suggest a 6-8 month time period and the extensive use of staff and volunteers. In contrast, the local collaborations had only a few weeks and had several other program priorities at the same time.

Second, there was a general lack of knowledge on the part of local coordinators and organizational representatives about procedures for needs assessment. Technical assistance, including some well-produced guidelines and training, might have helped. While there was some on-site assistance from national staff in this area, four of the five coordinators reported in the second interview that they had requested assistance on how to do needs assessment but had received none.

Third, a major part of the program proposal was for national and local organizations to assess what they needed to better serve status offenders. Hostility usually greeted any mention that organizations needed to be assessed. The organizations appeared to be loath to admit weaknesses. The national collaboration soon gave up when its members said that they would do needs assessment for their own use and not bring it back to the collaboration.

The Planning Process. Following the needs assessment, the collaborations were to develop a plan of action, or phased-action plan, for the remainder of the grant. The plan was called the phased action plan. Each collaboration was to develop programs that would fill gaps in services
identified in the community and organizational needs assessments. The plan was to be developed collaboratively with a sharing of information, resources and program expertise.

The planning process was perhaps the most difficult of the local collaboration tasks. The most time was reported spent on this task by members, the most committee activity, the most frustration and the least satisfaction. Most of the participants had never developed a program plan with national intervention for behavioral change included. Most had not planned for program evaluation and most lacked experience in procedures such as short-term staffing procedures and grants accounting.

The planning process was different in each collaboration and depended to a large extent on the selected perception and interests of the staff. In structure, most local collaborations had program planning committees that worked with the needs assessment material to develop the overall program.

In practice, the process did not work so collaboratively or efficiently. One coordinator, described the development process as: "I decided what they should do and manipulated them to do it. I had three committees; I staffed each meeting; I asked for a think piece or product; I gave assignments and provided information."

In another site, because of shortness of time, the collaboration members submitted program ideas, some a little vague, and the coordinator and chairperson fitted the various ideas into a plan. Another site circulated a list of programs for participants to indicate program areas to which they might respond. Few of the plans were developed through a collaborative process with members hashing out the details of the plan that fitted their own agencies participation patterns.

The national collaboration planning around program was different at each stage. Program planning during the early stage when the program proposal was being developed appears to have been by collaborative effort. After the program proposal was accepted, planning appeared to have been by the executive committee which, at that time kept no minutes. In later program planning, the staff decided what areas of program needed decisions, and prepared position papers for a committee. The committee decisions followed fairly regularly the points of the position papers.
The local DSO Grantee had a great deal of input into program planning. This was one of the mandates from LEAA. Most clearly recognized the direct service needs and the local gaps in services to status offenders. However, in at least two sites, some competition appears to have developed between the Grantees and their programs and other collaboration programs. In these sites, the collaborations had to approach planning for direct services in a round-about way so that the Grantee would approve and therefore refer clients to the program.

There were two major problems with the process of developing the program plan. First, the push of time precluded a collaborative working out of the details. This problem was exacerbated by the previous step, the lack of time for an adequate needs assessment. As time became short and the local coordinators received pressure from the national staff, the tendency was to write the program plan to appease national rather than to develop a collaborative document.

The second problem was the lack of program expertise available to the coordinators. It is at this crucial point that pre-arranged assistance from the national staff and task force would have contributed to better programs. Several coordinators turned to outside sources for their expertise. Those sources were not necessarily familiar with how non-profit organizations operate. The results were program plans to which the National Assembly affiliates could not easily relate.

The Plans. The phased action plans were evaluated on the basis of the following criteria:

1. Are the priorities suggested by the needs assessment study?
2. Are all program areas included in the plan?
3. Do the programs have a rational intervention plan?

Tables 5 and 6, Appendix A, show the data on the phased action plans.

The local program priorities varied in the degree to which programs related directly to needs assessment. Program priorities were identified by percent of program budget allocated and other resources allocated for implementation. Both Tucson and Spokane collaborations' plans closely reflected needs assessments and collaboration members' perceptions of
problems. The Spokane collaboration felt that the community services were good but not well known, utilized or coordinated. Spokane gave highest priority to community education and better use of resources, including volunteers. Spokane also set fewer priorities so that the impact would be greater.

Spartanburg and Connecticut's priorities seemed to be direct services to youth. They conformed well to their youth needs assessment. However in both of these sites the actual numbers of status offenders appeared not to warrant this priority. In both sites collaboration members cited community attitudes as one of the three top priorities, which would indicate that capacity building and advocacy should have had high priority.

Oakland's needs assessment study was judged least complete of all sites. Even so, the direct service plans failed to deal with priorities found in the needs assessment. The national had no needs assessment so its program plans cannot be evaluated on this measure.

All of the local program plans included capacity building, advocacy and direct services in their program plans. Direct service used the largest proportion of the program budgets. However, since much of the capacity building and advocacy was directed by the coordinator, part of the administrative costs were program-related.

The national collaboration did not have a program plan and allocated few resources for program. The program proposal had suggested three national conferences of agency executives. In addition, the participation of agency staff in local site visits was a capacity building activity. Some national staff work with individual agencies also could be considered capacity building. Neither of the latter two activities was part of a program plan. The national advocacy plan was developed in the middle of the second year.

In addition to capacity building, advocacy and direct service programs, most of the collaborations developed at least one program for facilitating the collaborative process. These programs ranged in extent from an assertiveness session at one site to a two day retreat of the national collaboration. In future collaboration programs some programs of this sort should be included as essential.

The continuation proposal contains capacity building and advocacy elements.
There was little chance to evaluate the program intervention rationale. The phased action plans were not specific. In many cases only brief descriptions were included. Tucson's direct service programs, which we examined, included several very good interventions and several that were not as good. Some programs from other sites included more detailed descriptions in their progress reports, written after the program. In some cases the intervention rationales were clear and very good. However, it is not clear whether this was a pre-planned intervention.

In summary, the plans required a great deal of effort from many dedicated people. Because of the extreme pressure from national staff and LEAA to get them in, they were less collaboratively produced and less consistent than they might have been. This was a primary factor in the program implementation.

Program Implementation. In spite of the short time available, programs were implemented at all sites. More than one thousand status offenders and other children at risk were served, some in long range training programs and some in short term, one session programs. Table 7, Appendix A, summarizes these data. Details on each site can be found in Tables 1 through 5 in Auxiliary Appendix A.

More than 2,900 community leaders and youth program staff from both public and non-profit agencies attended training sessions offered by the six collaborations.

More than 2,600 persons have received long term advocacy, informational communication or an in depth planning instrument, from three sites. This was in addition to the extensive T.V. impact in Tucson, the bumper stickers in several sites, radio and T.V. interviews and on-going public relations in newspapers.

We used two criteria from the program proposal to evaluate the implementation:

1. The programs should be collaborative. The program planners believed collaborative implementation would increase the contact with and knowledge about people from other youth serving agencies. This would then encourage them to implement other human services collaboratively.

2. The implementation should increase capacity of National Assembly affiliates. The program planners hoped to give National Assembly affiliates experience in serving a different client group in order to enable them to further serve the group. They hoped that affiliates would offer the programs through their own agencies.
In addition, implemented programs should serve enough people to be cost-efficient, be implemented according to the time planned and should take advantage of existing community resources. Table 7 in Appendix A shows the data.

The degree of collaboration in implementation varied from zero in Spokane to 36% of the programs in Tucson. The other three were 32% in Connecticut, 30% in Spartanburg and 19% in Oakland. Had we included the collaboration staff or committees in the count, the percentage would have been higher.

The percent of programs implemented by local affiliates varied from none in Spokane to 21% and 32% in Spartanburg and Tucson. The other two collaborations implemented 15% of their programs through the affiliates.

We measured cost-efficiency by dividing program cost by days of program contact per person to determine cost per person per day. All time units were reduced to the percentage of a day. Costs for direct services varied from $2.87 in Spartanburg to $41.54 per site in Tucson. Generally, the lower the cost, the less therapeutic the intervention. The costs were much lower than most interventions reported by the public DSO Grantee. We assumed that some of the staff and equipment costs were absorbed by the implementing body. If the implementer was an affiliate of the National Assembly, this was another measure of their participation in the collaboration.

Capacity building costs varied less, from an average of $3.93 in Spokane to $15.82 in Oakland.

Advocacy costs per contact were too varied in both content and audience for us to generalize. There was a great amount of public media donation of time and resources. The advocacy programs were also supported strongly by the National Council of Jewish Women and the Junior Leagues both locally and nationally and the National Council on Crime and Delinquency nationally.

The delay in implementation rates varied from only 15% of Spartanburg programs implemented within two months of projected schedules to 52% in Spokane and Connecticut and Tucson implemented 42% of programs on schedule and Oakland implemented 33% of programs on schedule. Closely related are

16 Cost efficiency rates and the method used to determine them are presented in Table 7, Appendix A, and Tables 1 through 5, Auxiliary Appendix A.
cancellation rates, or percent of planned programs cancelled. They varied from none in Tucson to 30% in Spartanburg. Table 7, Appendix A, shows these data.

We measured use of existing resources in implementation as the percent of programs implemented by community agencies including National Assembly affiliates. Connecticut implemented 63% of programs in community agencies with Tucson a close second with 61%. Oakland implemented only 10% of programs outside of the collaboration.

In summary Tucson's programs were implemented closest to all our criteria except cost. When the quality of the program was included, we perceived that the cost was quite in line. These criteria were not affected by the fact that Tucson began the programs earlier. Connecticut's measures of implementation were high but will probably develop little expertise or capacity of the affiliates to serve status offenders when the grant project is completed.

Summary of Planning and Program Implementation. We would suggest that planning and implementing 116 different programs in seven different communities in 14-18 months has been a remarkable feat. The facts that the planning was rushed and the programs less than perfect were not surprising. What has occurred is that numbers of people who have never planned and implemented programs "from scratch" are now a little more experienced. There are also 1,029 youths who received service, 2,930 adult youth workers who received training and innumerable persons more aware of the issue of status offenders. Two sets of factors affected the planning and implementation: organizational factors and program factors.

Three inter-related *organizational* factors affected the planning and implementation: the press of time, the incompatability of goals and the absence of immediate on-site program assistance from the non-profit perspective.

The local staff had two major directives. One was the directive to work with local organizations, mold them into a coherent body and plan programs with them. The amount of effort, time and skill involved in building a new organization that can function effectively appears to
have been minimized. The other directive was to develop, plan and implement new programs for status offenders. Most human service organizations spend many months developing and planning a few new programs. The collaborations were to plan many new programs in a few months. These two directives were incompatible in the time allotted for the program. Success in either or both of the directives required the staff to a) work with committees from the different youth-serving sectors (especially the National Assembly affiliates), develop an organization and set up an office; b) develop expertise in program planning, intervention logics, program evaluation; and c) become acquainted with the body of knowledge about status offenders and the effectiveness of past programs. These three different activities were to culminate in a plan of action within four months of the staff's hiring. When the push came, both LEAA and the national collaboration opted for programs over collaboration and quantity over quality programs because the alternative was no programs at all to show for the two-year grant.

Program Factors. From the analysis of the programs, several conclusions seem warranted. First, there was little indication in organizational records or interviews of how the collaboration priorities were set or resources allocated. The absence of clear priorities, set with the explicit consent of members, resulted in some programmatic confusion.

Second, program outcomes were not clearly explicated by the program proposal itself. For instance, was the desired outcome increased direct service by affiliates in the community or increased direct services in the community?

Third, the structure for implementing especially the direct service programs was important to the nature of the outcome. There were three structural arrangements for implementing programs: the collaboration as a direct service agency, the collaboration as a general granting agency, and the collaboration as a coordinator of funding which meets project priorities. The more involved the affiliates were with the implementation, the more their capacity was increased. The Oakland collaboration was an example of the collaboration as a direct service agency under the first coordinator. Spokane also appeared to fit this category. The Connecticut collaboration illustrated the collaboration as a granting agency with central staff monitoring and evaluating the
programs. Tucson and Spartanburg collaborations illustrated the collaboration as a coordinator of funding.

**Affecting the Capacity of Member Organizations**

A major goal of the program was to develop the capacity of community based non-profit agencies to serve status offenders. Many of these organizations have traditionally been involved primarily with "good kids." The very idea of a sexually promiscuous girl in the Girl Scouts or Camp Fire Girls seems ludicrous to many.

At this point, we could have used only the program participation of affiliates from the previous section as our measure of organizational capacity building. The rationale would have been sound. It is logical that if an organization collaborates to develop and implement a work-study program for youth referred by the courts, that organization will be better able to serve the same kind of youth in the future.

However, we wanted a separate measure of capacity, one that could be used in other communities to test their capacity to serve status offenders and children at risk. We wanted independent indicators of organizational capacity so that before and after measures could be made and any change over a period of time could be recognized. If base measures were taken, we could monitor change over any period of time. It also meant we could compare organizational capacity of cities that had the LEAA collaboration grant with that of cities with no grant.

First we had to define organizational capacity in a way that definition could be operationalized. The rationale and definitions are described in Auxiliary Appendix B. Briefly, the organizational capacity to serve any client group consists of the following elements:

1. The client group must be defined and recognized as a legitimate group for the agency.

2. The resources for meeting the needs must be allocated--board time, staff time, training, space, program materials developed.

3. The organization must be able to attract the clients--that is,
   a. be perceived by the client group or those making decisions for the client group as able to provide service; and
   b. be accessible to the client group geographically, in time, psychologically and culturally.

4. It must be organized to deliver the service.
This means that capacity to serve is not merely the delivery of service to a client group. Delivery of services to a new client group is an end product that requires internal organizational change in a number of ways.

We developed the following indicators as measures of capacity to serve status offenders. The procedures and measures can be seen in Auxiliary Appendix C.

1. Board attitudes toward the client group and the client needs. We developed an attitude scale with 23 items.

2. The presence of a policy statement with specific reference to status offenders, children at risk, problem youth.

3. The allocation of board time for discussion of status offenders.

4. Sensitizing the larger membership to the client group.

5. The allocation of funds, staff time or other resources for planning and implementation of programs/services for status offenders and children at risk.

6. Training of board/staff/members to understand or work with status offenders and children at risk.

7. Direct experiences in working with status offenders and children at risk.

8. Location of program units accessible to client population.

9. Service to status offenders.

10. Numbers of other children at risk served.

We measured the organizational capacity in Fall, 1976, and again in Fall, 1977. Since both the National and Tucson collaborations began before the evaluation, their data were not comparable. We did not measure the Connecticut organization because the membership was so fluid and the staff support available to the National Assembly affiliates there was less consistent.

The data are presented in the following section: first we will describe changes in the internal organizational indicators—of the capacity to serve from the first time of measurement to the second. The measures used correspond to items one through eight above. Second, we will describe changes in actual program/services delivered from the first time of the measurement to the time of the second. These will be considered
under two headings: external advocacy and direct services to status offenders.

**Changes in Internal Organizational Capacity to Serve Status Offenders and Children at Risk.** The board attitudes were measured by administering an attitude scale to boards of directors of local National Assembly affiliates near the beginning of the program, except for Tucson which was well under way in the Fall of 1976.

The attitude statement fell into three categories: personal social distance, attitudes about the punishment of status offenders, and general attitudes on the rights of children. Several general attitude items on status offenders and the offenses were also included.

The attitude scales were administered at organizational board meetings by the local researchers in Fall, 1976, and again in Fall, 1977. While we tried to standardize the procedures there was some variation, notably in Spokane, where some attitude scales were left for the executive director to administer. The 1977 Connecticut scales were less comparable because of the self-selective nature of their agreement to be retested. We analyzed the board as a unit even though there was turnover in membership. The rationale is that a board will tend to use education and selective recruitment to gain attitudinal consensus (Table 7 Auxiliary Appendix A). We also analyzed individuals who had taken the scale at both times.

Several findings from the attitude scales were suggestive of future directions of board education. First, in both Fall, 1976, and Fall, 1977, the attitudes of boards of directors toward status offenders were ambivalent. On the one hand, more than 90% of all respondents said status offenders need help, not punishment. On the other hand nearly half the respondents said that failure to punish status offenders encourages them to be bad. Table 8, Appendix A, shows this distribution by site.

Second, the most negative change in attitudes occurred in items related to punishment as a lesson to teach status offenders and detention of status offenders to protect society. Table 9, Appendix A, shows either little change or a negative change on the two detention items.

Third, board attitudes that changed most consistently from Fall, 1976, to Fall, 1977, were those related to personal social distance.
Table 10 shows the distribution of those agreeing to personal relationships with status offenders from time to time.

Even with this general analysis, it appeared that there was some change of attitude toward status offenders during the year. The difference between sites with and without the collaboration would be revealing. The summary item for capacity building showed that three of the five sites increased in their positive attitudes about non-profit agencies mixing status offenders with other children. These board members are the people who make the decisions and hence these attitudes are significant.

Of the sites, Spartanburg began as the most negative and had the highest percentage change in many items. If we discount Connecticut because of self selection, Spokane had most items with a positive change. There was a positive change of 13 of the 20 items.

A policy decision by the local board indicated that status offenders and other children at risk were proper clients or members; or that the organization should make an effort to serve such youth. This was considered a necessary capacity building effort. This indicator was collected from board minutes, program goals, annual meetings and other running records of organizations. The data in Table 12, Appendix A, indicate that four organizations in Spartanburg, three in Spokane, one in Oakland and one in Tucson had such policies toward status offenders. Of the 15 members of the national collaboration, eight reported policy statements in 1974 and 12 had policy statements in 1976. Some of the organizational literature suggests that national organizations are better able than locals to make unpopular policy statements because they are further removed from the membership. This indicates that many national organizations had already begun building their capacity to serve status offenders before the collaboration grant, and that perhaps the grant proposal was a result of the policy rather than vice-versa.

The allocation of board time was determined through an item analysis of board minutes in the base year compared with the collaboration year (Table 12, Appendix A). In the local sites board minutes of member organizations of the Spartanburg collaboration showed the most increase. All of the organizations showed increase in discussion about status offenders. The average increase was 10% over the base year.
Of the six national organizations which released board minutes for this report, only one showed an increase in discussion of status offenders. However, the data indicated that all had substantial board discussion during the base year. These six were among the seven most active members in the national collaboration.

Efforts to sensitize the larger membership to the client group was measured by the amount of information that related in any way to status offenders and children at risk in regular communication to members and special communication to members. We did a content analysis of these data where they were available.

We found only a small number of local organizations had begun to involve their members in the work with status offenders. Many of their local publications and communications were directly related only to program "how-to's." Some had no regular local communications to members. Oakland and Spartanburg had the most change in the number of message inches in their communication related to status offenders or status offenses. Spartanburg impact is greater since 50% of the organizations showed such a change.

All of the national organizations for whom we had these data showed an increase in communication to members in regular publications. The average increase was seven percent over the base year.

Many of the national organizations with Washington offices also sent out regular or periodic communication to members. Of the 12 for whom we have this data, 10 had an increase in messages about status offenders and children at risk. These messages tended to be informational about the politics surrounding allocation of Federal money and the delivery of programs/services to status offenders and children at risk. The section on advocacy will discuss this in more detail.

There was no new formal allocation of organizational resources for programs and services to status offenders reported by local organizations. This is not surprising since more than half of the organizations for which we have data had a decline in membership from the base year to Fall, 1977. Approximately one-third reported a decline in real income. During a time of financial reverse, organizations seldom increase allocation of funds for other than institutional maintenance.
Data from national organizations indicated considerable use of resources to develop programs, program material and other technical assistance for use in programs with status offenders and children at risk. Lists of these materials can be seen in Appendix A, Table 15. Some of the best materials we have seen are those from the YMCA, the Boys Clubs of America, the Girls Clubs, the National Council of Jewish Women and the National Council on Crime and Delinquency. While some of this material was developed before the grant, the continuation is certainly a result of the continuing support of the collaboration.

Some of the most active national organizations reported a decline in resources allocated for direct service to status offenders. Five of those for whom we had data reported a decrease in staff to work with youth especially problem youth. Grant monies for four of the five programs were expiring. Only one had any plans for the incorporation of the new emphasis into the regular budget.

Some resources were allocated informally for work with status offenders. As Table 12, Appendix A, indicates 38 percent of all local affiliates were involved in implementing collaboration programs. Much of the implementation cost of buildings and staff were in-kind donations from the implementing organization. The average cost of implementing these programs was far less than the cost of putting on the programs. Table 7 in Appendix A shows the implementation figures.

Another informal indicator of allocation of resources was the enormous allocation of staff time in the collaborations discussed in a previous section.

The training of board members, staff, and members to work with status offenders was measured in three ways: a) participation of staff/board/members in collaboration programs, b) meetings to which the collaboration staff spoke and c) other training provided by the organization.

Table 12, Appendix A, shows the days of staff/board/member training by the collaborations. Tucson started its program too early for us to collect this data, however, they reported considerable attendance at such training. Spokane trained the largest number of local affiliates to deal with status offenders. Both Oakland and Connecticut changed staff during the study period, so the data were incomplete and not comparable.
Data to measure change in location of program units were not easily accessible. We wanted to determine any change in the number of program units in high impact areas locally. Local organizations do not appear to keep records in this way. This indicates that planning for the location of new units is not done on the basis of where the need might be. Since the data are sketchy, the conclusions appear to be that density of status offenders and children at risk is not an important consideration in placing program units.

Nationally, new units to serve status offenders and other children at risk had begun around the country in other than collaboration sites. Some groups, such as the Camp Fire Girls and the Girl Scouts reported efforts to locate new program units in the inner city, in childrens' institutions, and in ethnic neighborhoods. However, the record keeping procedures on numbers and locations do not indicate the degree of any change which may have occurred.

Changes in Indirect Services—Advocacy. We have considered advocacy a service because the program output of several of the most active participants in the collaboration is advocacy rather than direct service. This is true of the Junior Leagues and the National Council of Jewish Women as well as the National Council on Crime and Delinquency.

We measured advocacy activity two ways: the amount of regular communication to members on external societal change toward a more positive stance on status offenders and children at risk, and any new advocacies program specifically related to external societal change. Table 15, Appendix A summarizes the data.

The collaboration staff spoke at board and other meetings of many local affiliates which we consider staff/board training. Three staff members at Spartanburg, Spokane and Tucson reported speaking to a total of 16 such meetings. The other two staff persons were new when we gathered these data. National staff reported little of this formal activity, but did report meeting individually with some executives and other staff persons of member organizations to increase their participation in the collaboration and to discuss change in their own organizations.

The local organizations reported little other training related to juvenile justice activities. National organizations reported quite a bit
of this activity. The Boy Scouts, Boys' Clubs, YMCA and 4-H were performing joint staff training with a juvenile justice emphasis. Campfire Girls reported a national training program with one session related to juvenile justice programs. The Girls' Clubs had four regional juvenile justice workshops to train staff. The Salvation Army ran a corrections conference in Washington. The National Council on Crime and Delinquency has run seminars and workshops around the country. Several excellent ongoing training programs such as the one by the YMCA were being dispersed into regional offices because funding had expired. Unfortunately, none of the national organizations had hard data on numbers and geographical distribution of staff training in these programs except the Junior Leagues, who reported that 205 local Junior Leagues attended five day training seminars funded by LEAA in 1973.

Direct experience with status offenders was gained by participating in implementing collaboration programs. The experience varied in both depth and variety. In Oakland the experience was limited to two direct service programs. In Spartanburg while 67% of affiliates were involved in implementation, they were involved in only two programs and only one in Spokane.

Tucson collaboration affiliates gained the most experiences in a variety of ways: writing, grants accounting, program planning, implementation and evaluation. Six direct service programs were let by contract to affiliates in that site.

The regular communication to members of local organizations show practically no advocacy-related messages in either Fall, 1976, or Fall, 1977. In Spartanburg, where the Junior League has a girls' home, there were messages both years primarily related to that facility. The Junior Leagues in both Tucson and Spokane also had messages both years somewhat related to social change.

The national organizations showed advocacy communications in both the base and current years. There was an increase in 10 national organizations and a decrease in two organizations. The latter included one of the most active and involved organizations.

No new advocacy activity was reported at collaboration sites by local affiliates from Fall, 1976, to Fall, 1977. Nationally, the Junior Leagues
and the National Council of Jewish Women reported an increase in advocacy activity at other local sites around the country. There was little evidence of formal advocacy activity among national direct service organizations.

Much non-formal advocacy activity was reported by national organizations. Some of them, such as the YMCA, were active in getting youth-related legislation passed. The YWCA was actively seeking to get its locals involved in legislative concerns for systems change.

Several of the national advocacy organizations developed special programs in the recent past. The Junior Leagues produced a film, which was shown on national television and is available for local information and education. The National Council of Jewish Women published a book reporting a national survey on the juvenile justice system and its detrimental impact on youth. The National Council of Crime and Delinquency sponsored an advertising campaign about status offenders. It also published a newsletter relating directly to legislation, research and other activity in the juvenile justice field.

While much of this activity preceded the Juvenile Justice Program Collaboration grant, the national organizations have continued to deepen their awareness and educate their locals. Our perception is that gradually they are taking status offenders as a legitimate, on-going concern.

Change in Direct Service Programs for Status Offenders and Other Children at Risk. In the introduction to the section on organizational change, we suggested that in order to serve a client group, the organization must be both accessible to that particular group and organized to serve it. Since most of the collaborations have only been in operation for 14-18 months, we cannot reasonably expect direct services to have changed very much. Organizations must plan and budget far in advance of a few months for this change to occur. The evaluation should continue to gather measurements on this variable for several years to determine long term change in client/member services. Other important factors are the number of adjudicated status offenders in the site and the nature of other services.
We measured change in direct services in three ways. Table 13, Appendix A, shows the data from these measures by site:

1. The number of status offenders and children at risk served by affiliates while implementing collaboration direct service programs.

2. The change in number of status offenders and children at risk served in own programs.

3. Any new program reported as started or planned with status offenders and children at risk and/or new monies received for service to these clients.

The numbers of status offenders and children at risk served in collaboration programs by local affiliates cannot be consistently reported here. Organizations in Tucson, whose program started several months early, served a total of 127 status offenders and children at risk in eight different affiliates. Seven Spartanburg affiliates served 73 youth and six Oakland affiliates served 113 youth. In other sites, the affiliates were not involved in implementing direct service programs at the close of data collection.

The implementation of the direct service programs by the affiliates required a great deal of input of the organization's own resources. One executive reported a match of thousands of dollars. It is certainly true that expenditures for buildings, recreational equipment, and executive, financial, secretarial and other staff time were not reimbursed. The average cost per day of the service to each youth excluding salary to the youth was lower than cost per day services reported by DSO Grantees in several sites.

Many organizations reported a change in services to status offenders in their own programs over the year. This may represent only a change in definition in the minds of respondents. However, at the very least, it represents an increase in sensitizing program people.

Many of the national organizations mentioned new programs around the country specifically related to status offenders. The actual data on the services did not reflect the change. Table 15, Appendix A, shows some of the reported new program units to serve status offenders and children at risk reported in the national interviews and program data.
Locally, new monies have been generated to serve status offenders. Tucson reported $96,000 from CETA and other new sources to support some of the collaboration programs. Spartanburg reported $4,650 in new money.

Nationally, several organizations received money from an LEAA prevention grant to continue the efforts by non-profit agencies toward developing alternatives to correctional institutions for young people convicted of status offenses and other children at risk. National organization data indicated other national programs under way. Some of the national organizations are making services for status offenders or children at risk a national priority. The National Council of Homemaker Health Aide Service has a new priority of family stability. Juvenile justice programs have become a high priority for the Girls' Clubs. The Boys' Clubs are giving emphasis to alcohol programs.

**Summary of Affecting Member Organizations.** Organizational change, especially in local areas, is a slow process and cannot be expected to show immediate results. Our data indicated a very positive prognosis for the future. Locally, the affiliates were becoming aware of status offenders and the need to serve them in the community. They were involved in the collaboration; they were becoming more sensitized and trained in dealing with status offenders; and they were just beginning to sensitize their board and members. Those who have had unrecognized children at risk in their programs were more aware and better able to work with them. For some this awareness will be translated into more and better direct services for children at risk. Only another measure at a future time will determine the long-term impact on the organizations.

The national organizations have been involved with the collaboration for a longer period. Some of them have been involved with status offenders since the early 1970's. The quality of the programs and program material indicate this continuing commitment. Some of the national organizations have become more involved with children at risk as a direct result of the collaboration. Some of them have refined their programs or added new emphasis as a direct result of their participation in the collaboration. In examining the usual trends of national organizational priorities, it was quite apparent that some of the nationals have committed more resources and for a longer period of time than usual.
The growing involvement, continuing participation and deepening commitment was difficult to document consistently because of the limited time and funds allotted for this evaluation, the inconsistent record keeping of the organizations, and the organizational nature of the nationals. However, the indicators that we had point to substantial growth in capacity of many national organizations to serve children at risk.

Summary and Conclusion: Did the Collaboration Achieve the Program Goals?

In summary, the collaboration did a commendable job in a short time. In fewer than two years one national and five local organizations were founded, staffed and operationalized. More than 60 local affiliates committed themselves to deinstitutionalize status offenders and to other children at risk; for most organizations, these were new client groups.

Many of the local agencies had never heard of a status offender nor had some of them more than a nodding acquaintance with each other. Few had ever collaborated in program delivery. In both rounds of interviews, a large proportion of representatives stated that the major effectiveness of the collaboration was getting them together. Many of the organizations found themselves working with public youth serving organizations for the first time.

The local collaborations, in a short time, demonstrated the kinds of programs that non-profit organizations can deliver for problem youth. Many different services to youth were planned and implemented at a relatively low cost. Some were excellent, some not so good; most of them add to our knowledge of the types of programs that are most effective for non-profit organizations to offer for status offenders and other problem youth.

The organizations in the collaborations committed themselves to the issues of deinstitutionalization of status offenders in a variety of ways. Most spent enormous amounts of time in the collaboration; many got their staff persons and board members involved in training for work with status offenders and other children at risk; some began the education process of their boards and members; some served status offenders and other children at risk in their regular programs; some collaborated with other agencies to try new programs. It is too soon to comment on the permanence of any new approaches but the prognosis for the future is bright.
CHAPTER 3

EVALUATION OF THE COLLABORATION PROCESS

It is difficult to develop a new service delivery modality in an already established community. It is even more difficult if the new service proposes to develop support from existing organizations with which it will be in competition. The basic hypothesis of this chapter is that some background demographic, and historical factors affected the nature of inter-organizational relationships both directly and indirectly. Background factors indirectly affected the collaboration structure and that change affected the collaboration process. Background factors directly affected participation in the collaboration and the process which evolved.

Figure 6 diagrams the relationship between these three sets of factors and the outcomes of the collaboration.

The evaluation of the collaboration process is presented in eight sections. In the first section we will define the factors in Figure 6

FIGURE 6

FACTORS INFLUENCING COLLABORATION PROCESS

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background factors

inter-organizational process

process outcomes

collaboration structure
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and describe how they were measured. Section 2 summarizes the key factors and draws some conclusions about collaboration. Sections 3 through 8 illustrate the model in the six collaborations using data from each.

Definitions and Evaluation Procedures

Background Factors

Three sets of background factors were important to the evaluation: key demographic variables, the nature of the social structure and the history of the collaboration itself.

Demographic Factors. Seven general demographic characteristics of each collaboration site were important to this evaluation: the size of the city, the source of income, the economic health, the percentage of youth, the racial mix, the urban-suburban mix and the geographical location. In addition, data on the number and type of offenses of the status offenders of the area were essential for background. Most of the demographic data were gathered from the 1970 census, the mid-decade estimates and area respondents.

Social Structure. The nature of the social structure relevant to understanding the collaborations included the nature of roles and status in the community, how traditional these roles were, who held power and influence and how change occurred in the recent past. These factors suggested where the local National Assembly affiliates fit in the social structure, how they perceived their relationships with their national organizations, their economic situation and their history of interaction. These data were gathered in interviews with participants and from insights of the local field researchers.

Collaboration History. The history of the collaboration process included identification of which party arranged the first meeting, which organizations attended, how the chairperson was selected, previous inter-organizational relations and key events in the early history of their collaboration. These data were gathered from interviews with the chairperson and from collaboration records.
Structural Factors

Decisions regarding membership, priority, roles of chairpersons and staff, staff-member relationships, and relationships to the national collaboration staff were considered keys to understanding the social structure of each local collaboration.

Membership. Data on decisions regarding who could join and the status of organizational representatives were collected from records of the collaborations.

Priority and Role of Chairperson. Roles and priority of chairpersons were determined in interviews at each site early in the study period, Fall, 1976, from the structured observations of collaboration meetings and from interviews with coordinators. Chairpersons' role perceptions were of two general types: as managing and decision making or as presiding over a forum for input of ideas and joint decisions.

Priority and Role of Staff. The priority and roles of coordinators were determined in interviews with staff people throughout the study period, daily logs kept by local staff and structured observation.

Staff-Member Relationships. The staff-member relationships were determined from the two member interviews, the four staff interviews and from the relationships apparent in the observations.

National-Local Relationships. The relationships of the local staff and members to the national staff and members were determined by the staff interviews and by analysis of communications between the national and local collaborations. The assessment included perception of supervisory roles and relationships and perception of program control.

Process Factors

Three major process factors were observed: inter-personal communications processes, the decision making processes and the presence and interaction of power persons or groups. The data for this analysis were obtained from the structured observation of process, interviews with members and analysis of the minutes of collaboration meetings.

Communication Process. Analysis of the communication process was based on insight from experimental research on communication materials. 17

The primary interests were the flow of communication during the meetings, from members to chair and staff and the nature of the communication's content. The process observation produced these data.

Decision Making Process. The decision making process was analyzed from the perspective of who made the inputs, whether decisions were made collaboratively, the relative weight of public and non-profit agency representatives and the staff roles in decision making. The data were from the process observations and the interviews and analyses of meeting minutes.

Power Sub-Groups. The activity of influential persons or subgroups was analyzed from the perspective of their role in setting priorities, in program decisions, in conflicts or crises and in implementing programs. Data were gathered from collaboration records, the interviews and process observation.

Process Outcomes

Several outcomes could be recognized from the process. In the second interview (Fall, 1977) we asked collaboration members what they considered the most successful activity of the collaboration, how effective they thought the collaboration was, and whether they would involve their organization again, knowing what they knew then. Responses to these were used as measures of process outcome. The ultimate outcome will be the nature of future inter-organizational collaboration and of future work toward collaboration goals.

Summary and Conclusion

Most of the seven local and the regional and national collaborations demonstrated real progress toward building an organizational structure for inter-agency cooperation and developing the trust necessary for an inter-agency collaborative work style at the end of their 14 to 24-month initiation period. All collaborations were successful in some areas, and all encountered problems in other areas.

The process of collaboration development was not a high priority of the national collaboration project directors. Practically no national staff time was spent to develop the national collaborative process or in programs
or staff training that would facilitate the local process development. Furthermore, the emphasis from national staff persons and LEAA on program goals and time lines was often at the expense of process. The national staff had little choice in this because of the nature of the project monitoring, the six months lost, and because of special conditions of LEAA's insistence on one site becoming operational before funding the other sites and LEAA's emphasis on getting direct services into the community immediately.

Nevertheless, should the non-profit service sector choose to develop inter-organizational mechanisms for delivery of services in the future, several factors that appear to have affected the direction of the inter-organizational collaborations and their relative success as organizations should be considered. Some of the factors summarized here will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.

1. When geographical boundaries are well defined and recognizable and fairly contiguous with organizational boundaries, potential membership is more consistently identified. The problems in Oakland and Connecticut illustrate this statement.

2. When recent history has been one of satisfying inter-agency cooperation, a collaboration can begin its goal activity sooner. Tucson, and Connecticut State are illustrations of this statement. Spartanburg and Oakland illustrate the need to build trust before moving toward goal activity.

3. When organizations belong to an already viable inter-organizational body with similar goals and similar memberships, competition and divided loyalties may be detrimental to the collaboration. This issue must be openly addressed rather than avoided as in Spokane and Tucson where conflict eventually emerged. It may be that a compromise of tasks to avoid overlap or an allocation of control over funds and staff to an already established collaborative organization might accomplish program goals more effectively.

4. When an organization in a collaboration has considerably more power or resources than other organizations, the least powerful tend to go along with the powerful or to let the powerful organization do the work. This was true in Spokane and, to some extent, Danbury, Torrington and Spartanburg.

5. When working with the non-profit sector if staff persons do not understand and respect how voluntary organizations work and how to staff committees, they cannot enable the organization to reach their full potential. Few of the staff persons of the collaboration project showed a real respect for the nature of the voluntary sector and the importance of enabling organizations who are donating time and resources to make their own decisions about programs.
6. When hiring staff persons as coordinators of inter-agency collaborations, committees should clearly define their own roles and the expectations of the staff. There are three general roles: that of facilitator or enabler, that of professional expert in the program, and that of executive director with organizational management priorities. The Spokane Coordinator tended to be an enabler; Tucson and Spartanburg coordinators and the National Associate Director functioned as professional experts who sometimes slid into an expert-advocate role. The first Connecticut and first Oakland coordinators and the National Director were primarily executive directors with management priorities. This is a crucial decision and will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.

7. When communication at meetings is too strongly controlled and too centralized, tasks are facilitated, but people are less likely to risk their own ideas.

8. When selecting the leaders of a collaboration, it is crucial that they have characteristics which will foster trust. Most functional collaborations appear to have: a) continuous leadership, b) leaders who work actively outside of meetings, c) leaders who preside over meetings rather than controlling the content, d) leaders who are organizational representatives rather than individuals and e) leaders who are volunteers rather than staff. Lay leaders are better able to commit themselves to the collaboration without having conflicts with their own jobs.

9. When hiring staff of inter-organizational collaborations, the issue of professional support must be addressed. A local collaboration staff person is in an isolated structural situation. Neither the national staff nor the local collaboration have a vested interest in this position. The staff person is expendable. Relationships are based on role rather than on personal interaction. Neither local or national organizational support can tolerate failure of the role to be fulfilled.

10. When organizing interorganizational collaboration, the issue of control and supervision of staff activities must be addressed. This is particularly true when the funds are provided by sources other than the collaborating organizations. This is a key structural issue and will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4.
The National Collaboration

The national collaboration was composed of members of the 15 participating national voluntary agencies. The working body was the national task force composed of representatives of the organizations. A legislative consultant who had been involved in writing the proposal was also a member. The task force met monthly with project staff to oversee the management and the implementation of the project goals and to facilitate the achievement of the goals which related to the national level.

Before getting into the actual process actions and decisions of the group it will be useful to fill in some of the background and direction.

The task force was originally constituted in late 1974 by the executives of the National Assembly to develop collaborative program models and directions in the area of youth service. As part of this activity the interagency project for status offenders was developed and then funded by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. The task force, with some change of membership but a basic continuity of leadership, then began to focus its attention on the implementation of this project.

Organizational Structure

As in the original form, the membership of this group was made up of a representative from each participating national voluntary agency. The typical representative was a staff member from the national staff of the agency and even in cases where the representative was a volunteer, he was still from the national level. In some cases members were previously known to each other from participation at national meetings or workshops as well as previous service on the original task force. The participation at the national level thus brought together people very knowledgeable about their own agencies, generally well informed of activities of other agencies throughout the country and clearly a part of the upper management of the voluntary social service sector.

In view of the scope of national organizations and the work responsibilities of many task force members there was rarely day to day contact

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18 Because the national task force was in operation before the evaluation began, the data gathered were in a different form from those from the other collaborations. Therefore, this section is not paralleled to the other sections of this chapter.
between task force members and committee work was often compressed. The travel schedules of some members made it at least as likely that they would meet en route than in New York where most were based. This movement and travel was occasionally functional when it corresponded to the need for some activity in a local site but it generally made long term and continuous planning and interaction difficult. The dynamics involved in this situation were obviously very different from those which took place in the local collaborations where there seems to have been more day to day interaction within a more narrowly defined setting.

While task force members came from similar social structures, some significant differences must also be noted. The collaborating national agencies varied in size, importance, service interest and delivery. Some agencies were hierarchical in structure; others were semi-autonomous confederations. Task force members thus represented organizations and held positions which varied greatly in importance, scope, power and responsibility. These differences notwithstanding the group was essentially homogeneous with universally accepted styles of discussion, presentation, committee procedure and language.

From this background several patterns of work and behavior were established early in the project and carried on consistently throughout the life of the grant. These patterns were organizational participation, chair function, staff function and role conflict.

Organizational Participation. There was a consistent record of attendance on the part of many representatives as well as an active participation in discussion of the issues of the meetings. The familiarity with the various issues of the grant and the consistent interest and concern in their outcomes reflect the continuing involvement of the task force members. This was also exemplified in the willingness of members to make presentations at various sites.

Chair Function. The chair person of the task force was a major influence in setting the style of presentation and both the content and flow of discussion. He was a major source of authority and stability both in and for the task force, having served the same function for the original group which developed the project. Meetings were run by the chair in a very enabling and involving style which consistently sought
out opinions and generally attempted to diffuse conflict by allowing all sides full expression. The chair worked very closely with the staff in attempting to develop the consensus necessary for task achievement. With his style and representing as he did a very major national agency, the chairman was a major source of authority, stability and continuity for the group.

Staff Function. The staff of the project was professional in its ability to present issues and deal with complicated management tasks. It was always prepared for meetings and generally well informed regarding the various issues of the grant. Staff was usually in the position of explaining and presenting information regarding the various sites and issues and seeking task force approval for directions and actions. Because of the nature of the project, multiple sites with many agencies, the presentations were often complicated and decisions were often needed on pressing matters. There was a constant tension between full disclosure/discussion and the need to get decisions made and tasks accomplished.

Role Conflict. The pattern of the staff reporting complicated information and the task force feeling itself in a very reactive position was an issue of continuing concern throughout the life of the grant. The project director was at times the point of this tension holding the twin responsibilities of task accomplishment and the involvement of the group in the collaborative process. The task force had not been fully reconstituted, in the movement from planning the grant to overseeing the implementation; with a clear delineation of staff and board roles, this fact increased the tension. In addition, some task force members felt that the director's style was excessively centralized and controlling.

Tasks of the Collaboration

The national collaboration started long before the evaluation. Therefore, we did not monitor first hand the ongoing task development until late in the first year. Several collaboration tasks continued to affect the total project: the site development, the relationship with LEAA, the development of priorities, the national phased action plan, the match, crisis management and the issue of continuation.

Site Development. The initial activity of the task force and of the project itself was concerned with the establishment of collaborative
structures in the five sites. This attention to sites was necessary but was the beginning of a continuing pattern of being overwhelmed by the responsibility of implementing the sites and managing them to the exclusion of the development of national capacity building and advocacy. It is of particular importance to note that the conditions demanded by LEAA called for the establishment of a collaboration in one local site (Tucson) before funds could be released for work in the other cities. This decision, which came from the administrator of LEAA and which was accepted by the original task force when it was involved in grant negotiations, had a major impact upon both the task force and the staff and most certainly upon their working relationship in the critical first six months of the project.

Relationship with LEAA. The special condition of LEAA was in some ways a point of unity for both staff and task force in that it put them together in the role of attempting to deal with the funding source, answer various objections and continue making progress. The initial relations with the LEAA project monitor were extremely difficult and this also tended to help foster a unity within the task force and between task force members and staff as they formed a common front. This pattern was repeated several times during the process of the grant. As issues of conflict with the government emerged, the task force and staff would join ranks and work diligently to attain the most positive outcome and protect the project. This was an area of real group strength, demonstrating an awareness of the government funding process and also a very strong commitment to the integrity of the proposal and the value of the work being undertaken. It is significant that over the course of two years all major obstacles were removed and very harmonious and enabling relations were established between the project and LEAA. It also indicated a basic pattern within the task force, namely that whatever differences existed within the group or with the staff, the overriding interest in continuing and supporting the project always evidenced itself at times of crisis.

Development of Priorities. Another effect of the special condition calling for the collaboration establishment in Tucson before releasing funds for other sites was much less positive and served to reinforce a tendency manifested very early in the group’s operations. This was the
conflict between the tasks of the grant and the process of collaboration. The special condition established by LEAA called for some specific tasks to be accomplished quickly and the group and staff began to focus very directly on this implementation task for Tucson somewhat to the exclusion of national collaboration issues and their own efforts at collaboration. The staff, in addition to the massive logistics of initiating five complicated local collaborations from a New York office, had the burden of getting one site fully operational before money would be available for the four others. This context does much to explain the previously mentioned tension between the national collaboration staff and some members of the task force concerning the role of each group. There was an agreement in principle that the staff person was responsible for day to day functions and that the task force should concern itself with major directions and issues, but there was a consistent lack of agreement of the part of some about the line between the two. The staff person was most conscientious of the need for task accomplishment, and while the task force members were aware of this need, they also wanted to be involved in the process. This gap was never really closed, although it never reached the point of causing major fracture. The group always responded to major issues but there was a constant tension. At the planning retreat held more than a year after the grant, issues were still being raised about "process" involvement and the respective roles of the task force and the staff. Only after some of this discussion was a job description for the national collaboration director developed. (See Auxiliary Appendix E.)

National Phased Action Plan. The initial concern about the logistics of implementing the collaborations in the local sites, dealing with LEAA and establishing working relationships with staff regarding project activity set the pattern for the national collaboration's function and concerns over the following year. As a result, almost no attention was paid to the national phased action plan. When the plan was considered in 1977, the discussion was very general, with the time considerably, and typically, shortened by pressing local site business. As mentioned previously, there were many reasons for this. In addition the very structure of the task force must also be examined. Though all task force members represented national agencies, these agencies were of very different
size and style and the degree of influence of members within these agencies varied widely. The ability of individual task force members to influence their own agencies was not a constant and therefore it was difficult to deliver a national plan which could be specifically implemented. From the point of view of the internal task force structure, there were also limits to the development of a strong effective national plan. There was also the question of impetus and direction. If the local was accountable to the national, the local coordinators to the national project director, and the national staff to the task force, then to whom was the task force accountable? Not only was there a question of the capacity of the task force to deliver and implement an effective national plan but there was also the question of staff's ability to push for it. None of the leverage that existed in the local collaborations existed on the national level. The competing issues, varying degrees of influence and limited leverage accounted for the minimal effort regarding a national plan, which contrasts strongly with the major successes of the national task force in many other areas.

The Match. This grant was awarded under the provision of a ten percent match which was to be used to draw down the awarded funds. The project was initially successful in raising money from foundations but ran into difficulty in raising the full amount. The first task force approach to the problem was to increase its efforts with foundations, enlisting executives to make presentations and at one point using a consultant. When matters became critical, staff and task force members were able to elicit pledges from the National Assembly organizations for the amounts needed and used these pledges for a match from a foundation. This accomplishment is evidence of the major commitment of the national collaboration to the project and is a demonstration of the strength of the collaborative effort. It was another demonstration of the task force and staff's abilities to deal successfully with crises and cooperate to overcome major obstacles. The fact that this particular issue revolved around money and that staff and task force members were able to gain the assistance of the Assembly staff and agencies in a time of budget cuts, decreased membership and falling contributions cannot be overstressed: it was a critical accomplishment on the part of the project management.

Crisis Management. The ability to respond to crises was also evident in actions taken by the task force with regard to site difficulties.
throughout the life of the grant and in particular in the case of difficulties in Oakland. The discussion regarding an attempted reconstruction of the Oakland collaboration evidenced a real sensitivity to the negatives of outside intervention as well as a willingness to offer whatever support services might be effectively used in reconstructing the local site. Several task force members attended a reorganization meeting in Oakland. In this situation as in other crisis incidents, the task force was able to unite, discuss possible alternatives and take (or approve) determined united action to meet the situation. This activity occurred in all the local sites except Tucson. This unity was less apparent during more ordinary discussions, a fact of which all members were aware but resisted directly confronting. (An attempt at "catharsis" during a two-day planning session was limited to only very general statements.)

**Continuation.** The national task force, on the basis of work by the national collaboration staff, prepared a proposal for continuation of the project. The continuation would allow local coordinators to continue in these positions, though it would provide only a small amount of service money. The national office would also be continued. The development of the proposal and its presentation to LEAA was another significant accomplishment on the part of the national task force and staff and would clearly have a major impact on the future of the collaborations. The task force itself was the proposal as an opportunity to reconstitute itself in a different form with project management and oversight, being just one committee of a larger task force agenda.

**Summary of the National Collaboration Process**

There were obviously many areas of accomplishment: site development, governmental relationships, the match, crisis management and continuation. There were also some areas of weakness: problems of priorities and national plans for capacity building and advocacy. One is struck by the enormous responsibilities assigned this group. It appeared that the structure of the task force was too narrow to deal effectively with the many necessary tasks assigned. This limitation had much to do with some of the limitations of the collaboration program. These areas should not detract from the very significant accomplishments of the national task force and staff in implementing the project.
Background Factors

The Tucson metropolitan area, which accounts for most of the approximately 500,000 people in Pima County, is located in south central Arizona. It is the second largest city in the state and is about 120 miles from Phoenix. It is only 70 miles north of the Mexican border. Tucson, like many cities of the sun belt, has had tremendous growth in the last few years. The 1975 population estimate shows a 26% increase over the 1970 population.

Tucson has moved from a small dusty regional "cow town" with a population of under 50,000 in the 1940's to a major metropolitan center. The earlier growth developed around the new electronic industries, attracting a wide range of professional persons. A major university has also attracted professionals.

The most recent growth is stimulated by the advantage of the sun belt for retirement, and the service industries have grown to accommodate the needs for new service. Tucson has also become a center of the youth culture. A 1973 estimate reports that 30% of the population is between ages of 10 and 25; 53% of the population is under 30.

Tucson has a relatively stable economy. The unemployment rate, 6% in late 1977, is not excessive. However, a large Mexican American population, estimated at 19% in 1975, the uncounted numbers of illegal aliens in the labor force, and the Indian population of about 3% do not benefit from the status of the economy. Many of these people live in squalid conditions with high unemployment, especially among the youth. The school drop out rate is high among the minorities, assuring the continuation of this cycle.

The cities and counties of Arizona are struggling to keep pace with the ever-increasing population. There is much opposition to deficit financing, and the state as a whole, including Pima County, tends to forego increasing social services in order to keep the state on a "pay as you go" basis.

The State of Arizona has a very conservative laissez-faire political stance of non-interference into local affairs. It has lost Federal funding rather than accept Federal standards in several recent instances.
Politically Tucson is reported to be somewhat more progressive. In addition, since most of Tucson's population is newly arrived, there are few old traditions. This means that society is more open, and social power is less concentrated in old structures. It also means that personal influence and expertise can be more readily developed.

This is exemplified by the nature of the Juvenile Court. Despite the conservative political stance in the state, the Pima County Juvenile Court was already in the process of deinstitutionalizing status offenders before the Juvenile Justice Delinquency and Prevention Act required deinstitutionalization.

The Pima County Juvenile Court was given the public DSO grant. It set up mobile diversion units for crisis intervention. When status offenders were apprehended, they were taken to the mobile diversion units and from there were referred to other services. The court contracted out the other services. It was a very expensive program to run because of the need for 24-hour coverage. Pima County reported 2,942 status offenders in 1975. The largest group was 1,716 runaways, with incorrigibles, moral infractions and substance abuse (alcohol and tobacco) accounting for about 350 each.

The National Assembly affiliates are fairly healthy in Tucson. Seven of the nine for whom we have data report an increase in budget above the cost of living increase from 1976 to 1977. None reported a decrease in United Way funding and only one reported a decrease from other funding sources.

The Pima County affiliates have good relationships with the national task force. About five (42%) knew the name of the national task force representatives. Another three (25%) knew the regional representatives. Table 17 in Appendix A shows these data. Six of twelve representatives reported that they had received some or much communication from their national affiliate about the collaboration. The other six report having received little such communication (Table 18, Appendix A).

There appears to be underlying competition among Pima County affiliates. Even while they work together there seems to be a lack of complete openness and trust.

Agencies and concerned citizens were already relating to each other in Tucson before the collaboration began. Three organizations were operating. The Coalition for the Community Treatment of Children was a
rather loose organization of individuals and agencies founded to advocate for change. The Metropolitan Youth Council (MYC) is a youth planning agency funded by the city and the county to coordinate service to youth. All youth programs were to be planned through the MYC in order to avoid duplication and to centralize accountability. The Pima County Court Foundation, a non-public advocate for the court, was also in operation. To some extent the collaboration was in competition with each of these groups although initially they were all very much involved.

Relatively little public-private interaction history was apparent except for the Juvenile Court. In fact, only recently have the public schools demonstrated any interest in involvement with anyone on the issue of status offenders and other children at risk.

In January, 1976, the Coalition for the Community Treatment of Children along with the Youth Development, Inc. (formerly, Youth Services Bureau) sent letters to interested persons to attend a meeting. The meeting was held in February where the National Director explained the program and indicated that Tucson was one of the cities under consideration. Many in the group felt that planning was already occurring through the Coalition and without program money the activity would be a duplication of Coalition activity.

In late March, Tucson was informed that it had been selected as a site and a second meeting was called. The National Director returned to help the local group develop plans for participation. The first steering committee was held March 31st. Officers were elected and committees appointed to draw up a job description, draft a statement of purpose and to screen and interview applicants for the job of coordinator.

The National Director returned in late April to outline the stages of development and LEAA requirements and to formalize the statement of purpose and the steering committee. He returned in early June to finalize the hiring of the local coordinator and to assist with the program planning work groups. During the latter part of June the National Director helped the steering committee establish priorities, formulate a timetable, and obtain approval of the phased action plan by the collaboration. In early July another national staff person assisted with revisions of the phased action plan, and it was sent to the national collaboration Office.
Structural Factors

The crucial decision on delineating qualifications for voting members and officers was made during the first steering committee meeting. Objections were raised when a non-affiliate representative and a concerned individual were nominated for office. The decision was that officers would be representatives of National Assembly affiliates and that all affiliates and representatives from the various operating coalitions would comprise the steering committee.

Priority and Role of Chairperson. The chairperson was a representative from the National Council of Jewish Women. She was strongly committed to the collaboration and its goals. Her priorities were to insure the collaboration would be permanent so that the spirit of the collaboration remained after the project period expired.

The chairperson's formal meeting role was primarily that of a presider. She moved the meeting along, referred to speakers, summed up points and called the questions. She reported a major concern to keep the procedure open so that people did not feel they were being manipulated. However, her leadership extended far beyond this formal role. She worked extensively with the staff to prepare for meetings; she attended and participated in most sub-committee meetings. She recognized the issues and persons most likely to cause open conflict and she directed the meetings in a way that minimized that conflict.

Priority and Role of Staff. Our first interview with the Tucson coordinator occurred after the phased action plan had been written. At that time the coordinator's priority was to push training for agency personnel. He felt that the agencies and the city as a whole would benefit from such training.

The staff role was a strong management role with control over the details of planning and managing the program. While he was instrumental in the direction of the program, he was also responsive to the members and involved them as much as possible in all phases of the collaboration.

When questioned about work plans, he reported both long and short term work tasks in mind. He specifically mentioned meetings and administration tasks. Table 19, Appendix A, shows that he reported about 41% of his time in appointment/phone calls, 35% in study/administrative/paper work and 17% in meetings. Table 20, Appendix A, shows that 69% of Tucson's
members reported frequent contact with the coordinator.

Staff-Member Relationships. The chairperson had an excellent relationship with the coordinator. They worked closely together setting up the agenda, the work to be done and doing some guidance about likely problems. Many of the members also had good relationships with staff. They generally felt he was doing an excellent job. However, about 20% of representatives reported that he was "one-sided," "controlling" or "going along with the influential affiliates." Even persons reporting that the coordinator was doing a good job appeared guarded when discussing their relationships with him. This guarded caution toward the coordinator characterized, to some extent the collaboration's relationship to the DSO Grantee.

The data support the contention that the staff person was a strong leader. He tended to do considerable staff work on his ideas and present them to the committee for their support. However, many of these ideas appear to have initiated in discussions at steering committee meetings and discussions with individual members. Once developed, he became an advocate for them reporting on them at meetings, answering questions and overcoming objections.

The conflicts in the Tucson collaboration tended to be over position boundaries rather than role definitions as in some other collaborations. We could say they were over "turf." For instance, on some issues the Tucson collaboration addressed, members who were very active in one of the other inter-organizational coalitions felt that the collaboration was intruding unnecessarily in their field. Some of the "turf" problems were a result of the emphasis by national that the local collaborations needed to find future support. This emphasis, of necessity, raised the question of competition for scarce resources. The several conflict issues seldom came into the open but did hinder the full development of inter-organizational trust.

National-Local Relationships. The Pima County collaboration staff person had few problems in his relationship with national during the early organizational phase. He felt national collaboration staff had been helpful and understanding. He did feel at a later time that several technical assistance requests had been responded to inadequately and some technical assistance that he did not wish was foisted upon him.

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He also felt that in the latter part of the program, communications were overly slow.

There was no indication of dissatisfaction of collaboration members with the relationship with national other than the complaint of the time pressure in the project beginning.

**Process Factors**

The meetings were mostly smoothly run and informational. Reports on the activities of the sub-committees and staff were made with questions asked from the floor. Some meetings however were very disorganized and without focus. These often dealt with new approaches, searching for solutions to problems, etc.

The National Assembly affiliates had good participation. The DSO Grantee representatives kept their participation at a minimum. When asked about their participation there were two responses: they did not wish to overly influence the direction of the collaboration and there were some personal political problems involved.

**Communication Process.** The communication process tended to be fairly centralized in Tucson. The staff person and the chair person represented about 48% of the actions at formal meetings, (Table 22, Appendix A). A large percentage of the chairperson's actions were related to running the meeting. The staff person's acts were primarily reporting committee activity, other collaboration activity, answering questions on reports, explaining issues, etc. There was good participation from most of the other collaboration participants. However seldom were more than one or two remarks made without their being directed to the coordinator for response. A sub-pattern was seen when a report was given by someone other than the coordinator. Questions were directed at that person following the report. At the end of that period the communication reversed back to a central pattern.

**Decision Making Process.** Tucson followed a formal decision making process. Table 21 in Appendix A shows that a relatively low percentage of decisions were made at steering committee meetings. The agenda items were more usually reports of progress not followed by formal vote. A higher percentage of decisions were made in the sub-committee, but that, too was relatively low. It appears that many decisions were made by staff, either based on previous discussion, on staff expertise or on
behind-the-scenes power blocs and then fully developed upon presentation to the steering committee.

**Power Sub-Groups.** There are several indications that there were informal behind-the-scenes power blocs in the Tucson area. The interviews indicate some hostilities over the perception that the staff was more favorable to one group or the other. Some of the persons most critical appear to have gradually become less active.

**Process Outcomes**

In general, the process outcomes of Tucson were positive. About 79% of the respondents in the second interview felt that the collaboration was very effective or moderately effective. Table 23 in Appendix A shows these data.

There was not as much concensus about what the collaboration had done best. An equal number, 33%, said that the collaboration was most effective in its advocacy program and in getting people together. Table 23, Appendix A, shows the distribution.

A remarkable 100% of the representatives reported that they would involve their agencies again, knowing what they did at the end of the study period.

**Conclusions About the Pima County Collaboration Process**

The Pima County collaboration appeared to have developed a process that was basically satisfying to participants who continued and fruitful in programatic outcome. It also evolved into a strong organization which developed and implemented successful programs. Several factors appear to have affected these outcomes.

First there was agreement between the national staff and the local collaboration over structure. The presence of a national staff person at key points during the early organizational stages virtually assured this agreement. The compatibility avoided a large conflict area present in the other collaborations.

Second, the Tucson agencies had a history of inter-organizational relationship. This means that the initial task getting to know each other was unnecessary. Third, because of the rush to get Tucson operational so that the other sites could begin, the collaboration moved swiftly past its land marks. Each land mark was successfully reached in
a minimum of time providing a great deal of satisfaction which was increased by the amount of recognition given by national.

Fourth, the collaboration had consistent and interested leadership from its chairperson and agreement between the chairperson and staff over their roles and priorities.

The major problem in the Tucson collaboration appeared to be the collaborative relationships among the members and the failure to encourage continuing trustful relationships. Whether this will hamper future working relationships remains to be seen.
The Oakland Collaboration

Background Factors

Oakland, a city of just over 361,000 in the San Francisco Bay area just east of San Francisco, is spread over a fairly large area. This fact, with the proximity of San Francisco as a central city and the proportion of the population who live in single family housing, gives Oakland the appearance of a large urban sprawl, crisscrossed by super highways and dependent upon the automobile.

The Bay Area increased in size following World War II. This rapid growth included a high proportion of blacks and Mexican Americans who moved from agricultural occupations to take advantage of the growing number of industrial jobs available.

The rapid growth without time for assimilation led to the division of Oakland into ethnic areas. In the 50's and 60's Oakland's total population started to decline. During this time the minority proportion increased. As with many large industrial cities during the era, parts of Oakland have become "ghettoized." In 1970, 35% of Oakland's population was black and 8% was Mexican American.

The Oakland Community is heterogeneous and relatively non-traditional. There appear to be diverse power structures; a person with prestige and power in one area does not necessarily have power in another area. Several different cultural patterns exist side by side with an apparent outward tolerance.

In the late 60's the Bay Area gained the reputation of being a haven for the contraculture. Some of the social experimentation remains and appears to have engendered a generally innovative climate.

In 1975, there were 3,200 identified status offenders in Alameda County. Since the County was too large for the small program grant to have an impact, the Oakland collaboration narrowed its focus to East Oakland. East Oakland has the highest concentration of minorities, 51% non-white and 37% with Spanish surname.\footnote{Description based on a 1969 planning brochure of East Oakland.} It has a high percentage of old housing in poor condition, high unemployment, a high percentage of

\footnote{Description based on a 1969 planning brochure of East Oakland.}
persons on welfare and a high percentage of persons below the poverty level.

In 1976, the Department of Probation received the DSO Grant. Their proposal was to offer family counseling to status offenders and operate two houses where young people are brought by the police.

The local National Assembly affiliates in Oakland have been hard pressed in the last few years. The cost of living in the Bay Area has risen faster than contributions to United Way and other non-profit funding. Six of the eleven responding organizations said that they had had a reduction in United Way funds in the past year. Four said that funds from other sources had also been reduced. The total budget of 4 of the 11 agencies either decreased or increased less than the cost of living during the period of the program.

The method of obtaining funds from either the United Way, public programs or other sources appeared to be highly political in Oakland with various power blocs competing for the scarce resources on which their survival depends. The tradition of "charity" was not as strong here as elsewhere but, the tradition against the use of government funds for non-profit human services is also not as strong. Some long-standing resentments over past inequities, funding slights and other incidents appear to exist among the Oakland agencies' inter-organizational relationships.

The local affiliates of National Assembly organizations did not appear isolated from their national representatives. Table 17 indicates that 8 of 11 affiliates (73%) knew the name of the national task force member at the time of the first interview.

The non-profit agencies in Oakland were not a unified group and did not appear to have a history of inter-agency cooperation. Apparent contributing factors are a) the urban sprawl, b) the heterogeneous nature of the area, and c) the fact that Oakland is not an independent city so far as the agencies go, but is a part of the Bay area region in planning, program and relationships.

Into this fiercely competitive atmosphere, a letter came in late 1976 to the local Camp FireGirls explaining the project and asking the Camp FireGirls' Executive Director to call a meeting of the National Assembly affiliates and other appropriate youth serving agencies.
Approximately 50 persons attended, to whom the National Director explained the program. A representative from the Oakland Manpower Office, who asked many questions about the nature of the funding and the time line, was selected temporary chairperson.

In mid-March a second meeting was attended by about 25 persons. During the next four or five meetings the group discussed a range of issues including program needs and priorities, money, levels of trust, etc. They also discussed the possibility of forming a collaboration with or without the money.

The group formed task forces to further plan programs, incorporation and funding. The small groups met two or three times a week with full meetings about once a month. Papers were drawn up for incorporating the group about the same time that a search for staff began. The group, however, has not incorporated at this time.

The group made two crucial decisions in the early stage. One was to incorporate for the purpose of becoming a political power in Oakland. This decision follows the guideline of grass roots organization popularized by Alinsky.\(^{20}\) The second was an informal decision that staff representatives were most appropriate members, somewhat excluding volunteers.

In advertising for staff, the position called for an executive director. The job advertisement called for a person who can organize, plan, develop and administer a comprehensive youth service and needs program in Alameda County.\(^{21}\) The staff person was hired to direct a program of service rather than to coordinate services by members.

During the summer, the chairperson gave up the chair and went onto the personnel committee. The second chairperson, a member of the Boy Scouts' staff, took over in late August and the coordinator was hired.

The staff person was without an office or secretary for several months. It was difficult to reach her by phone even though she had space at the Boy Scouts office. These months appear to have slowed the progress of collaboration somewhat, with apparently waning enthusiasm and commitment, and a lack of direction.


\(^{21}\) A copy of the job description can be found in Auxiliary Appendix E.
To overcome this, in November the coordinator proposed a program development seminar to deal with resources and attack the problem of lack of commitment to the collaboration. After some conflict with national staff who she felt handled the project review less seriously and promptly than necessary, the seminar was presented and revitalized the collaboration.

**Structural Factors**

Early in its history, the Oakland collaboration limited membership to staff. There were some non-staff persons involved, however, from the Junior League, the National Council of Jewish Women and the Camp Fire Girls. The early members felt that it was the staff that got things done in social agencies, and volunteers or board members tended to muddy the water. Other early members included representatives from the Oakland Manpower Department, Oakland Public Schools, Oakland Police Department, and County Probation Department, who was the DSO Grantee. Half of the participants in the Oakland collaboration were line staff rather than executive directors, and this presented a problem. These staff people were really unable to commit their agencies.

**Priority and Role of Chairperson.** The first chairperson of the Oakland collaboration thought that the collaboration's major goal was to become a political power so that the major public agencies, including the DSO Grantee, could be forced to improve their service for youth in East Oakland.

The second chairperson, the only leader observed, also stressed the politicizing of the traditional agencies as a primary goal. He felt this would be a valuable contribution to increasing the public service sector's accountability.

The second chairperson was designated president of the board rather than chairperson. He perceived his job as direction, with the executive director implementing the decisions. However, he appears to have taken little task responsibility outside of the meeting. The coordinator would occasionally push him to take a more active role in collaboration business but generally he deferred to her opinions and decisions. In some areas, the chairperson would request that the coordinator represent the group at some meeting or on a board. As the collaboration progressed the chairperson appears to have given even less leadership and the coordinator was making most of the decisions.
Priority and Role of Staff. The coordinator's major priority at the beginning was "the political education" of the local affiliates. She also saw the need to educate the group to real collaboration. She felt they really did not understand it. She perceived a major organizational task was to reduce committee work so that she could do the work herself.

The coordinator perceived herself as the director of a program. She intended to educate the local collaboration members out of their notions, which she considered naive. She saw herself as the major source of the program planning and the collaboration as the implementation agency with herself as director. A diagram developed by the staff person illustrates her role definition. It is a series of circles one within the other with the coordinator in the center. The diagram is included in Auxiliary Appendix E.

The coordinator's perception of her role is not inconsistent with the job for which she was hired. The job calls for an executive director to organize, develop and administer a comprehensive youth service and needs program for status offenders.

The Oakland staff person's operating style was more that of an independent professional than that of a coordinator. She tended to develop position papers and program decisions rather than enable the collaboration to discuss such issues. The data from the daily log shown in Table 19, Appendix A support this analysis. An average of only 25% of her time was spent in telephone calls and appointments and 26% was spent in study, paper work and administration.

The coordinator and chairperson had some conflict of role definition for several months after the coordinator was hired. During that time the collaboration office was housed in the Boy Scouts office where the chairperson was employed. The staff person felt the chair was using her as an employee rather than as the director of the collaboration.

Staff-Member Relationships. There was conflict between the coordinator and many of the Oakland collaboration members over proper staff role. Many of them expected her to follow their recommendations. She expected to lead them and to make her own decisions. At several meetings, the issue of staff role arose, usually with an implicit criticism of the staff. She would explain the incompatibility of their perception of the job and her perception of the job.
One of the areas of conflict was her lack of preparation for meetings and the follow-up work required. Consequently a number of conflicting situations arose, such as the members wanting to see the budget and staff person not having it available, or, conflict ridden discussions over elements of the phased action plan developed by the staff person. Much of the conflict was spearheaded by representatives of two of the affiliates. These representatives were relatively inactive and were viewed by some of the others as deviant and troublesome.

This unsatisfactory situation was relayed to the juvenile justice task force in New York by local members and a decision was made by the national collaboration that failure was imminent unless they intervened. A meeting was held on September, 1977, at which four national task force members and two national staff persons tried to clarify the issue and reexamine priorities. Following this meeting with some behind-the-scenes agreements, and with the help of national staff, the executive committee was re-constituted with a new chairperson. Shortly thereafter, the coordinator temporarily put the program implementation at a disadvantage at a time when full-time effort was most necessary. It was felt that the alternative of no staff at all would have been even more detrimental.

National-Local Relationships. One final structural issue was the national-local relationship. A great deal of conflict existed in the Oakland collaboration about the supervisory role of the national collaboration with regard to both staff supervision and program supervision. The coordinator felt that the supervision was unnecessary, cumbersome and belittling. She also felt that national staff supervision of program was not responsive to the local problems and needs. A time-lapse problem was perceived, where national staff appeared slow to recognize the need for immediate program decisions.

The coordinator's perception of her role and her ideas which developed in the phased action plan led to a crisis in Oakland. The plan outlined a separate direct service agency to be placed in East Oakland, with additional staff hired to implement all of the program. This was contrary to the philosophy of the program and the national task force and staff intervened. They felt hampered at every turn by the need to have national collaboration approval for every move. This surfaced when an early workshop was planned to get members together and improve communication. The
collaboration, led by the coordinator, planned the workshop with an outside consultant, and then felt that approval from New York was excessively slow.

A similar reaction to the phased action plan occurred. After months of hard work, the finished plan was not immediately accepted and the implementation could not begin. Part of the delay was caused by the coordinator’s failure to respond to questions or to begin implementing programs that had been approved. At the second interview, the collaboration representatives reported that one of their major problems had been with the coordinator.

Process Factors

The definition of roles was a problem reflected in the group process. Table 22 Appendix A, indicates that the chair and coordinator together accounted for about half of the action. With the new coordinator and chairperson, the percent declined to 27% of the few meetings we observed. The DSO Grantee accounted for 12% of the action when present. One interesting finding is the activity level of the affiliates. The three most influential affiliates and all other affiliates together account for a large percentage of acts. Most meetings were lively with discussion of those present. Much of this discussion, however, was conflict-related and from time to time a lot of it was destructive to the collaboration process.

Communication Process. The communication process was usually centralized in the Oakland collaboration meetings. The direction was from the chairperson to the floor and back, or from the staff person to the floor and back. There was good participation by most participants but very little discussion among them. Only occasionally were more than two or three remarks made from the floor without the chair or staff participating. The chair tended to move the meetings, while the staff responded to substantive questions.

Decision Making Process. The decision making process appeared to have been by consensus rather than formal action especially with the first chairperson and coordinator. Examination of the substance of discussions and decisions revealed that many decisions were related to petty matters such as days on which to have meetings, and little of programatic importance was decided in meetings. Table 21 in Appendix A shows that only 24% of items discussed were followed by formal decisions.
The direction in which decisions went appeared to have been controlled by the staff. The programs developed by the program committees were based on position papers developed by the staff. She chaired at least one of these sub-committees. At the board meetings, reports were given and while details were discussed, the nature of the program appeared not to have been discussed. Many of the meetings were reported as lack-luster and low-energy. This could have been because few important decisions were discussed.

Power Sub-Groups. Two changing sub-groups appeared to affect the life of the Oakland collaboration. In the formation days a difference in perspective arose between some of the minority persons and the representatives of the old line traditional affiliates. The minorities, who were the first and second chairpersons, and the staff perceived organizational development from a grass roots perspective. The notion of advice and direction from New York seemed ridiculous to them. The political realities of East Oakland were the important issue to them and their highest priority. These persons appear to have controlled the early collaboration patterns and expectations.

As the program got underway, the conflict between the grass roots persons and the influential affiliates surfaced, often around the role of the staff. However, the coordinator blamed the national staff for much of the problem and appears to have galvanized both groups against the national collaboration.

At another level a competition between some of the affiliates remained, probably related to past history. Different blocs emerged around different issues.

Process Outcomes

The process outcomes in Oakland were not outstanding. Asked during the second interview how effective they thought the collaboration was, 82% (14) said not very effective and 18% (3) said moderately effective. Table 23, Appendix A, shows the distribution in other sites.

During the first interview, 16 of 18 respondents thought the collaboration was beginning to move and would become effective soon. This change indicates that in late Fall, 1976, there was more hope for the Oakland collaboration than in late Fall, 1977.
When asked what they thought the collaboration had done best, 44% responded, "getting people together," 19% said planning programs and 19% said they didn't know. The distribution can be seen in Table 23.

When asked if they would involve their organization again, a surprising 94% (16) said yes and 6% (1) didn't know. However, most perceived that only 50 to 60 percent of other members would participate again. This is a good sign of continuing verbal commitment despite disappointment.

**Conclusions About the Oakland Collaboration Process**

Several factors that affected the Oakland collaboration process can be noted. First, many of the problems of the Oakland collaboration structure apparently could have been avoided with more direction from national staff early in the organizational stages. For six months while priorities, roles, patterns of interaction, job description and organizational perspectives were being developed, there was little interaction with national collaboration. The interaction which did occur was neither prepared for, acted on or reported locally. The six months between the organizational meeting and the hiring of the staff person allowed these patterns to set.

Second, the contradictory priorities from the national staff were more explicitly perceived in Oakland than elsewhere. The meeting at which the national task force and staff intervened openly addressed the question. Oakland members had thought collaboration was the priority. They felt now that the national collaboration had switched signals from collaboration to direct services. This confusion supports the hypothesis that inter-organizational collaboration, especially if the time is limited, works better around a single clearly defined goal or issue.

Third, there appeared to be no payoffs in the program for the Oakland National Assembly affiliates, and so commitment waned. Few of them had programs in East Oakland; they were to get little of the program money and little else either. Development of the phased action plan was very slow. When it was finished, participants appeared drained. Commitment to the collaboration fell sharply as summer approached and the necessity for mounting their own summer programs and the prospect of vacations increased.
Fourth, the Oakland collaboration felt that the national collaboration was putting them into a competitive position with other collaborations. They interpreted the message from New York to mean that more program funds would go to the collaboration with the phased action plan in first. This was contrary to fostering inter-organizational trust.

Finally, the choice of East Oakland as the impact area was problematic. Although the most pressing problems were found there, the affiliates had no vested interest in the area. Consequently the collaboration had to learn about the community and establish ties with other local activities as well as to develop a direct services project.

With all of the problems Oakland has had, most of the affiliates remained committed to change. They continued to serve youth in East Oakland, they were interacting with each other and they were becoming more aware of youth at risk at the end of the study period. With more realistic goals and structure, Oakland may very well overcome some of the other situational factors which plague them.
The Spartanburg Collaboration

Background Factors

Spartanburg County sits in the northwestern part of South Carolina at the foot of the Blue Ridge Mountains exactly midway between New York and New Orleans. The City of Spartanburg is a regional center for the County and is intersected by two Interstate Highways, I-85 and I-26. The estimated 1977 population was 46,485 within the City and 73,638 people within the urban area. The County has an estimated population of 192,100.

The Greenville-Spartanburg SMSA is the retail trade center of northwestern South Carolina. The cities of Spartanburg and Greenville (30 miles to the east) are rapidly growing toward each other and are expected to meet in the 1980's.

The Spartanburg area is presently experiencing relatively rapid economic and industrial growth, although a decade or two ago the area was characterized as economically depressed. These events are stimulating social changes which conflict with traditional behavior patterns. As new industries have moved into the area, they have also sent in large numbers of management level personnel who have become involved in civic affairs. They do not share the traditional southern cultural patterns, which occasionally places them in conflict with the traditional power structure. While much of the work force and political structure is composed of long-time residents and products of the traditional southern social structure, these newer elements are characterized by higher educational levels and active political participation. Their influence is increasing and this trend is likely to continue. These seeds of social change are not reflected in the Census data from 1970. For example, in 1970, only 1.5% of the population was of foreign stock but local respondents note that this percentage is increasing.

The educational attainment of Spartanburg County residents is low. In 1970, 64% of the population 25 years of age or older had not finished high school and 40% had not attended school past the 9th grade. In 1970, 14% of families were below the poverty line with a mean family income of $2,111. Of these, 12% were receiving some form of public assistance. At the same time, the median family income for all families
in the County was $7,924, and the mean family income was $8,908. These statistics reflect the fact that there is an economic bifurcation with a substantial number of families earning rather high incomes (the management levels and retailers), and a substantial work force of relatively uneducated and unskilled or semiskilled workers earning relatively low family incomes. The unemployment rate is presently at about 5%, although it jumped to 9.4% in 1975 when the energy crisis and economic depression in the textile market resulted in major layoffs in that industry.

A substantial number of young people drop out of school before completing the twelfth grade and subsequently many of them become problems to the juvenile justice system.

Culturally, Spartanburg has a traditional deep South social structure. The social values of politeness, non-conflict and surface friendliness are operative and genuine.

Educated and well-traveled, the Spartanburg professionals and others tend to be defensive about their cultures. While they recognize the problems of a traditional society in 20th-Century America, they also appreciate the advantages of group consensus, warm relationships and pleasant inter-personal relations. Many of them are working hard within the structure to achieve social change.

While most relationships are friendly on the surface, Spartanburg respondents indicate that society is fiercely competitive. This is indicated in inter-scholastic basketball where traditional rivalries amount to near hatred.

The National Assembly affiliates are highly visible and influential in Spartanburg. The reported membership/client contacts of about 53,000 represent about 28% of the County's total population. (This does not include the 300,000 contacts reported by the Salvation Army).

Many of the most influential people in town belong to the Junior League and/or the YMCA. The YMCA is a complete gymnastic and recreational facility and is well used by upper middle class residents. There are also two country clubs which cater to the affluent.

Reported salaries of staff members of the affiliates averaged about $9,600. This was relatively lower than salaries at other sites. Budgets of five of the six affiliates indicated a decrease in income or an increase rate less than that of the cost of living.
Spartanburg has no history of inter-organizational cooperation among the affiliates. There had been the usual competition for scarce financial resources from United Way. Several incidents were reported which indicated some resentment and bitterness at perceived past slights and injustices by the United Way.

Previous public-private cooperation did not extend much beyond the presence of Scout troops in the schools, a few referrals for recreation to the YMCA and referrals to the Junior League's Girls' Home. Previous grass roots non profit cooperation was virtually non-existent.

Into this atmosphere in early 1976, a letter arrived to the executive director of the YMCA from his national office. It was addressed to the previous executive who had retired and already had been replaced. It explained the project and asked him to call a meeting of National Assembly affiliate representatives and other pertinent youth serving agencies to meet with a site visitation team from New York.

One respondent reported that the meeting was horrendous. The site team was not there long enough to deal with southern customs; they called the "friendliness" shallow; they called the group racist because there were no blacks. (Nor were there any in some other collaboration sites.) After letters of apologies, a second site visit and a summer visit by the National Director to help with the hiring procedures, the Spartanburg collaboration was under way.

The local Spartanburg affiliates felt isolated from their national organizations. Of the 11 persons responding 45% (5) knew no one in the national or regional offices. When asked if they had been contacted by their national organization about the collaboration, 62% (8) said they had had no contact, 8% (1) said they had had some contact and 31% (4) said they had had much contact. One additional member said his regional staff person would not agree to let him join. Tables 17 and 18 in Appendix A show these data.

**Structural Factors**

By late June, the group was feeling a sense of movement. The YMCA executive was temporary chairman. The first committees dealt with external structure, personnel search, public relations, finding an office and equal opportunity. The Spartanburg group had received some assistance from national staff and task force members on the statement of purpose,
a job description, letters of commitment and the phased action plan.

In early July, the first chairperson went to Europe and a member of the Junior League became chairperson. She was a replacement for a previous Junior League representative and appeared to have assumed the role of chairperson without the vote of the members. The new chairperson felt the press of time and ran the meetings in a task oriented manner.

Priority and Role of Chairperson. The perception of the role of chairperson and the chairperson's own program priorities were sources both of direction and of tension for collaboration. The original chairperson was a strong leader but with a non-directive style. He worked behind the scenes to gain acceptance for his ideas. He appeared to have clearly understood the dual goals of program and process.

The second chairperson appeared to have perceived the program goals as the top priority of the Spartanburg collaboration. She had worked intimately with status offenders, recognized the need for service and saw this as an opportunity for Spartanburg to increase services. She also perceived, quite accurately, that to reach the program goals, as stated in the proposal in the limited time, a strong task-oriented leader was necessary. She also appeared to want to strengthen existing programs and services, and seemed uninterested in innovative new service.

This chairperson saw her role as to initiate, direct and coordinate the collaboration; the coordinator was to provide staff support to implement board decisions.

As the search for coordinator accelerated, the new chairperson reappointed the personnel committee, omitting some previous members and thereby causing hard feelings. She also appears to have made other executive decisions to facilitate progress toward the goal with which some other collaboration members and staff people disagreed with. The leadership style of the second chairperson and the disagreement over chair and staff roles and procedures ultimately led to a crisis in the collaboration. At least two meetings were spent in discussion about the staff role and job description; the coordinator was excluded from one of these. Eventually the conflict was so destructive that the national collaboration intervened. The National Director and several national task force members went to Spartanburg to facilitate some local decisions about leadership. Several weeks of negotiation, another national staff visit and a great deal of conflict followed until finally the Spartanburg chairperson resigned.
The Spartanburg collaboration was virtually without a formal chairperson for about three months. During that time committees continued to meet, and an overview of status offender case files was being performed as part of the needs assessment, but little other progress was made.

After the second chairperson was hired and then resigned, the collaboration looked around the community for "someone of equal status" to become chair. After two more months they found a person connected with the University of South Carolina who had been involved with status offenders.

Several meetings were spent in discussions about a new leader and the massive amount of work required to direct the project. At one time they considered a chairperson and vice-chair who would share the work. The vice-chair role as they described it was really that of a staff coordinator. There was also indication that some decisions were made behind the scenes.

The vice-chairperson, a non-affiliate member of the collaboration and a public participant, became chairperson during the interim between the second and third chairperson. He and the collaboration coordinator worked well together. During this time the phased action plan was written and finalized, primarily by them.

The third chairperson took the chair in June but in late October resigned because of health. During her short term of office she appeared to be in control of the meetings and to direct the interaction. She was very effective in terms of both style and position. She delegated responsibilities and followed up to see if they were being handled. As an outsider selected by the collaboration, she had no vested interest in any agency but truly cared about children and the goals of the collaboration.

The authority of leaders in the collaboration appeared to come from sources outside of the collaboration rather than from inside. They were looking for persons with status in the community not expertise on interpersonal skill within the collaboration. This is typical in traditional societies.

**Priority and Role of Staff.** One source of tension in Spartanburg was conflict over perception of staff role. The original coordinator perceived the staff role as that of facilitator. She expected the committees to make decisions and she would do the staff work—especially the implementation.
Her original priorities for the program were to enable some structured change to occur especially in the realms of racism and service to youth and to enable the local organizations to redefine the roles of non-profit organization in the field of human service and in relationships to each other.

The coordinator's work style indicates that either her real priority was program or that she was blocked in dealing with the organizational change and collaboration. About 50% of her time was reportedly spent dealing with program (Table 19, Appendix A). The log data also indicate that she spent more time than average in phone calls and appointments and this is reflected in the perception of the committee members when asked how often they related to her (Table 20, Appendix A).

In Spartanburg, no outsider is allowed to criticize the system. One must raise consciousness and stimulate the local citizens to suggest the needed changes and then help implement them. The multiplicity of goals and the limited time did not allow this process to develop. The coordinator tried but found the initial reticence of the members to suggest innovative or major changes frustrating. The pressure from the national collaboration to "produce" was also difficult to ignore.

While the coordinator and the committee appeared to agree on the role of coordinator, they did not agree on the role of the committee. The coordinator wanted planning decisions to be hashed out together in the collaboration even at the risk of confrontation and conflict. Instead, she felt that the committee was waiting for her to be the leader. Added to this was the strong task oriented second chairperson whose priorities did not include the collaborative process.

This conflict between the staff and other collaboration members was resolved three ways. First, the committees were gradually rearranged and the chairperson resigned. In the new arrangement, the coordinator functioned as expert and the chairperson ran the meetings. Second, work style was changed. The coordinator gradually changed from the facilitating role to a more central position, spending more time with other experts in the community in the planning and implementation of direct service programs. The data suggest that without the DSO Grantee and the Appalachian Council of Government representative, very little would have occurred in the Spartanburg collaboration. Third, staff priorities changed. The
coordinator gradually placed a higher priority on direct service program implementation.

National-Local Relationships. The relationship of the Spartanburg coordinator with national collaboration staff appeared to change over time and as the coordinator shifted roles. Originally she perceived the national staff as a source of support and expertise as she proceeded in her job. Several perceived failures of both support and expertise in the necessary time, amount and form precipitated a search for alternative local support. As she developed her own expertise, supervision from the national staff was tolerated with some diffused hostility.

Process Factors

The group process data indicate that when the second chairperson resigned the coordinator was more active in the meetings. The observations also indicate that in the later stage, the coordinator presented reports and information, brought program models and details into the meetings and, regularly made outside decisions for implementation on the basis of her own knowledge without referring back to committee.

Table 22, Appendix A, indicates that Spartanburg meetings were active, and that there was good participation by the DSO Grantee and other public agencies. This activity increased when the second chairperson resigned because not only was the DSO Grantee active but the acting chairperson was with the Appalachian Council of Governments. The analysis shows that the executive committee meetings were consistently dominated by the chairperson, the coordinator and the DSO Grantee.

Communication Process. The communication process in Spartanburg was centralized when the second chairperson was in control. Someone would speak, the chair would respond, another speaker, the chair, another speaker, the chair, etc. The break in this pattern came when someone reported. Then there would be some give and take around the issue before the pattern resumed.

When the interim chairperson took over the pattern changed somewhat. The chairperson did not respond to every response. However no decentralized communication pattern developed.
Decision Making Process. In the early months, decisions appeared to be made by vote with the second chairperson running things by Roberts Rules of Order. The decisions brought to a vote seem to have been developed outside of the collaboration, reportedly by the chair and one powerful sub-group. Issues would appear that had not been discussed either in the executive committee or with the coordinator. It is possible that many of the decisions brought to a vote were the results of the manipulations of the various power blocs behind the scenes. In later months the decisions appeared to have been engineered by the coordinator toward her program goals. On issues that she had given up, she did not push very much and so no formal decisions were made on those issues. Table 21, Appendix A, shows that formal decisions followed discussion of issues only 25% of the time in the sub-committee and 35% of the time in the executive committee.

Power Sub-Groups. Differences in perspective between two well-defined sub-groups, each led by a powerful affiliate, appeared to be behind much of the dissention in the Spartanburg collaboration. It appears that one was oriented to change without upset and the other was oriented toward better services without substantial change. Neither are very radical views. It is not surprising that the coordinator tended to ally herself with the latter.

Despite the conflict, tension and problems the collaboration was relatively successful in its process goals. At the time of the second interview, 29% of members felt the collaboration was very effective 50% thought it moderately effective and 21% thought it not at all effective. There was a general consensus about what the collaboration did best. About 64% (9) thought direct service was the highest accomplishment and 29% (4) thought getting people together was the greatest achievement (Table 23, Appendix A).

The collaboration members reported strongly that they would involve their organizations again knowing what they knew at the end of the study period. Seventy-nine percent (11) said yes, 14% (2) said not in the same way and one non-affiliate said no.
Conclusions About the Spartanburg Collaboration Process

Institutional change did not yet come to Spartanburg. However, there was no doubt that several important things had occurred. Certainly National Assembly affiliates were getting to know each other and beginning to trust each other. The public agencies were working with non-profit agencies in a respectful relationship.

Spartanburg presented a good opportunity to test interagency cooperation because it was small enough for the impact to be felt, and had no previous history of interorganizational cooperation. Five factors were important in understanding the Spartanburg collaboration. A major factor in Spartanburg was lack of consensus on role and procedure. More consensus could have been achieved had the time been longer, had leadership been more carefully chosen and had the explanatory materials on priorities been clearer.

A second factor was the direct intervention into the process by the national collaboration. We do not know what would have happened had this not occurred. A third factor was the suspicion and bias Spartanburg leadership has against Federal intervention into local issues. There were those who resented LEAA telling them what their children needed.

A fourth factor was the coordinator's change of roles. The change was quite functional for delivery of services to status offenders. The process, however, caused her to go to other sources for technical assistance that were not necessarily most functional for inter-organization cooperation or capacity building. Had the national staff or the national task force provided technical assistance on process and program, the programs could have been more easily understood by the local affiliates, and more readily planned and implemented.

A final factor was the interaction of the public representatives in the collaboration. The coordinator apparently felt more support from them than from most of the non-profit agencies and perceived more rewards from developing and implementing direct service programs with them.
The Spokane Collaboration

Background Factors

Spokane, a city of 173,698 in an SMSA of 305,600 on the eastern edge of Washington, is the regional center for an area 200 miles north into Canada and for eastern Washington, western Montana and northern Idaho. Through the mid-1950's Spokane had a relatively stable population. Since 1950 the population has grown 47%; about 11% from 1950 to 1960, 39% from 1960 to 1970 and 6% from 1970 to 1975. The growth includes a high proportion of young people who moved into the area because of the beauty of the natural surroundings and the outdoor recreational opportunities, and some increase in the older population.

The economy of Spokane reflects its status as a regional center. The regional university and medical services are located there; seven railroads converge on Spokane; about 27% of the work force is employed in retail and wholesale establishments and another large proportion of workers is employed in service industries. There are few large industries other than Kaiser Aluminum, but some electronic industry and tourism contribute to a healthy economy.

About 9% of the population was below the poverty line in 1970 and in October 1977 about 5% of the work force was unemployed.

Spokane and its area has a relatively stable society partially because of its isolated geographical situation, partially because of the nature of its population. It was settled in the late 1800's by Northern European farmers, workers on the seven railroads and a sizable Mormon group. Wealthy farmers from the area and Air Force personnel retire to Spokane which at one time established the third highest percentage of persons over 65 among the nation's cities.

The geographical isolation, the values of an agricultural population and the percentage of retired persons combined to give Spokane society an insular quality. The political situation tends to be conservative with several visible right wing organizations. There is a general suspicion of the Eastern folk, especially government and governmental interference. Social patterns are stable or slow to change. One respondent reported that "kids still drag up Riverside and meet at the drive-in on a Saturday night in Spokane." The conservative patterns, however, appear to be changing slowly with the population influx.
Social status and influence appear to be concentrated in the heart of the old familiar businesses and several larger religious institutions. This is changing somewhat because recent arrivals are young professionals who bring their own prestige.

Spokane is the only collaboration site with a non-public DSO Grantee, the Spokane Area Youth Committee (SAYC), a planning, coordinating and service assessment body of community leaders from both public and private sectors including a city councilman, the Chairman of the Board of County Commissioners, the Chief of Police, the Superintendent of the Spokane Schools, a Superior Court Judge and the Episcopal Bishop. Since SAYC is a planning body, it incorporated the second organization Youth Alternatives, to implement the DSO program. The program developed by Youth Alternatives was primarily crisis intervention by program staff and referral services to community agencies for status offenders. In 1976, Spokane reported 898 status offenders, about 76% of whom were runaways, 13% uncontrollable and 3% truant.

Spokane has an active volunteer population. The National Assembly affiliates appeared to be financially healthy. All seven showed a budget increase from Fall, 1976, to Fall, 1977. Five of the increases were significantly larger than the cost of living increase. The affiliates appeared to have active relationships with their regional or national offices. Ten of the fourteen respondents knew the regional program person or the national juvenile justice task force representative. Eight reported that they had received some or much communication from their national offices about the collaboration.

It appeared originally to both the site selection committee and the evaluation that Spokane had a well developed pattern of inter-organizational relations. On more careful consideration, this was not an accurate assessment. The inter-organizational relationships were built around persons rather than around organizations. There are a great number of interlocking board memberships which manifest themselves in split loyalties, inter-organizational gossip and competition for individuals, but apparently little inter-organizational cooperation. Even the Spokane Area Youth Committee, the inter-organizational planning body, considered its participants as influential citizens, not as organizational representatives. Because of this, considerable jealousy and hostility between organizations was
recorded in the interviews.

A considerable amount of inter-organizational hostility, bitterness and jealousy in Spokane is reported in reference to United Way. These feelings appeared to have institutionalized inter-organizational suspicion, reserve and lack of trust while preserving, on the surface, personal relationships.

The relationships between public and private agencies appeared to have been minimal, with some purchase of services from private agencies by the public agencies. The Spokane Area Youth Committee attempted inter-systems planning by including both public agencies and private citizens.

The first communication to Spokane from the national collaboration was in mid-February, 1976. On March 4th, eighteen representatives of Spokane agencies met to begin the collaborative process. In early March the National Director and national task force members made an initial site visit and the local agencies committed themselves to the program. A representative from the Junior League assumed the role of chairperson at the second meeting. The Spokane collaboration immediately formed five committees: steering, personnel, finance, nominating and program development. By late April, when the collaboration was informed of its inclusion in the final selection, a statement of purpose had already been developed.

From late April through August, the collaboration met at least monthly. Officers were selected, the program development committee developed, goals and objectives formulated and personnel committee began the search for a staff person. The chairperson reported that direction from the national collaboration was primarily through "numerous phone calls" between national staff and the chairperson. With the search for staff, the chairperson resigned and the nominating committee had difficulty replacing her. A volunteer from the YMCA assumed the temporary chair role.

In late August, a member of the national staff returned to Spokane to interview the final candidate for collaboration coordinator, and on September 1 the position was filled. The collaboration office was set up in the SAYC office in an open area with no privacy or sense of work space.

By late summer, some uncertainty, frustration and dissatisfaction was growing in the collaboration primarily around the leadership. The National Director spent two days in early October working with the Spokane
staff person, the new chairperson and the collaboration to help the process. The dissatisfaction continued and there was a noticeable rise in behind-the-scenes gossip, 'backbiting' and criticism. There was also open confrontation at the collaboration meetings. The local executives were loath to take responsibility to reshape the collaboration at this point for fear that it would appear to be a power play.

In early November the chairperson of the national collaboration spent a day in Spokane working with the local agency executives. He worked toward getting them to take responsibility for the leadership of the collaboration and to restructure the roles and tasks. He discussed with them various strategies that could be used for this necessary reorganization. Following his visit, the entire executive committee resigned with many rumors running through the various inter-locking boards.

In early December the National Director spent three days in Spokane working with the coordinator and the collaboration members. He worked to diffuse the feelings of the group about the resignations and restructuring and to plan strategies for the future. An all day workshop had been scheduled while he was there to develop program plans and priorities.

In the following weeks, the executives of the collaboration agencies began the restructuring. After a reluctant beginning the group discussed extensively the pros and cons of the options. They made several important decisions about the structure of the collaboration. There appeared to be no schism between the affiliates and the non-affiliates at this meeting and the beginning of rebuilding appeared to have occurred. During the remainder of December, the one major decision was that the executive of the affiliates should comprise the program committee. Reconstituted committees worked hard at developing the phased action plan even though the nominating committee had not named the new executive committee. This leaderless situation lasted until February when the collaboration voted on an executive committee with a rotating chairperson.

**Structural Factors**

At the second meeting, when the first chairperson took office, two crucial decisions on membership were made. First, it was decided that the collaboration should be composed of only non-profit organizations; second, that agency staff should bow out and only committed volunteers should participate in the collaboration. By the middle of May, however, it
became apparent to the volunteers that they could not make decisions that affected their agency's programs without staff participation and so the staff coordinator was invited back. The first chairperson then appointed both staff and volunteers to the collaboration committees.

In the reorganization meeting of the collaboration of December 9, 1976, several structural decisions were made. First, the program committee was to be composed of the executive directors; second, the executive committee would have six persons (plus the chairperson) at least half of whom would be volunteers with decision making power--presidents or vice presidents of boards; third, the chairperson should have leadership skills; fourth, the chairperson should be a volunteer; fifth, the SAYC, Youth Alternatives and United Way were to be non-voting members on the executive committee and the program committee.

A major structural factor in Spokane was the relationship between the Spokane DSO Grantee, the SAYC, the DSO program organization, Youth Alternatives, and the collaboration. In the early months of the collaboration, apparently before either collaboration staff or local agency staff were involved, a working agreement was developed outlining the structure of the relationship between the three groups called the Interlock. This agreement established a council through which, they would operate for "division of labor, sharing of resources and other matters that would avoid duplication" (Appendix E).

The crucial structure of the agreement was that the collaboration would be housed in SAYC offices with the SAYC contracting to provide space, secretarial, telephone, bookkeeping and payroll services as well as supervisory support such as monitoring programs, community and agency assessment and evaluation.

In late summer the Director of SAYC, who drew up the agreement, was replaced. The new administration of SAYC did not want the relationship and in November withdrew from the Interlock. No alternative relationship developed after that. The Spokane coordinator reported several attempts to develop a working relationship to no avail.

Priority and Role of Chairperson. The priority of the first chairperson, a member of the Junior League, was to enable the groups to work together. She was really committed to collaboration and a firm believer in the power of volunteers. Much of the early work of the collaboration was
because of her dedicated work. She was without staff and with support from the national office at a distance. Though she was not observed by the evaluation it is reported that she functioned in the role of organizer and manager, allotting tasks and committee roles, keeping records, and maintaining contact with the national office.

An interim chairperson took over when the first chairperson resigned. He functioned through the development of job description and the hiring of the coordinator and appointment of a permanent chair.

The third chairperson was a representative of a non-affiliate youth serving agency. His priority was to "get things rolling" toward results. By the time he was appointed, the collaboration had been in operation for seven months with little to show except the coordinator, a statement of purpose and several operating committees.

He perceived the role of chairperson as directing the meeting with the staff doing the work. He felt that the collaboration should "be run like you run your business; the volunteers just don't understand." He felt the pressure from national to produce but without direction. He also felt the pressure from SAYC was causing the collaboration to be less independent. The chairperson had little support from the collaboration members. Although the affiliates had been unwilling to take leadership themselves, they were critical of the leadership of the chairperson, his style of operation, his interaction with them and his role activities. The general discontent with the leadership was the issue about which the national collaboration intervened; the entire executive committee then resigned.

Following the resignation of the executive committee, the collaboration was without leadership for about three months because no one would take the chair. The collaboration finally voted to have a rotating chairperson. The second chairperson, who had been the interim chairperson following the original chairperson, had continued to provide a good deal of the leadership.

**Priority and Role of Staff.** The Spokane coordinator was interviewed by the evaluation team immediately after she was hired. Her highest priorities at that time were to attend meetings get to know people, and develop some workshops. She also mentioned developing communication via a newsletter. By the middle of October, she was aware of the problems
of organizational structure and the problems of leadership in the collaboration and these became immediate priorities.

The coordinator's work style was to develop the supportive work for the collaboration. She was aware of the jobs necessary to facilitate the operation. She took care of administrative detail and worked toward developing relationships with collaboration members. She appears not to have pushed her own ideas but to have enabled collaboration members to develop theirs. Table 19, Appendix A, shows that the coordinator spent an average of 39% of her work time in administration/study/paperwork and 57% in meetings and personal interactions.

The staff person's role relationships with collaboration members was to work behind the scenes to change the organizational structure; she worked with collaboration members so that they could develop their own ideas.

The role and style of the coordinator, combined with her inexperience, affected the collaboration. Many collaboration members reported that the leadership was "weak" even in the fall of 1977, though the collaboration programs had been planned and implemented as they wished. The collaboration perceived the coordinator's role as a leadership position rather than a staffing position, even though the collaboration members were loathe to give up any of their own power.

The staff-member relationships were generally good. With the staff in the background, there was little conflict around her ideas, or person or her job performance.

National-Local Relationships. The staff-national supervisory relationship was without conflict. The staff person appeared to accept supervision, ask for help when needed. While she expressed dissatisfaction with lack of technical assistance and support from the national collaboration who generally did not become emotionally involved with the national-local issues.

Process Factors

Most meetings in the Spokane collaboration were smooth and informational except for those prior to the restructuring sub-committee would report on their activities and the progress of programs, were then related.
Questions were raised and answered in a friendly non-hostile manner. The one exception was the activity of the SAYC representative who would often raise the negative position, point out possible problems and difficulties, and ask the probing questions. A certain amount of control was exercised in this way.

**Communication Process.** The communication process in the Spokane collaboration was inclusive, with active participation by most members. Table 22 in Appendix A shows that about 25% of actions were by the chairperson and 8% by the coordinator. Another 25% were National Assembly affiliates and 18% by other participants. The SAYC and Youth Alternatives (together constituting the DSO Grantee) were responsible for about 22% of all actions.

In the earlier meetings the director of Youth Alternatives participated as the juvenile justice program expert, and the SAYC representative often participated as the planning expert. The coordinator had little input in substantive information. About February, 1977, the coordinator began to participate more in the expert role.

The communication pattern was decentralized with many persons participating before returning the floor to the chair or the coordinator.

**Decision Making Process.** The decision making process appeared to occur in the executive and steering committees and less in the other sub-committees. Table 21, Appendix A, indicates that 43% of agenda items resulted in formal decision, considerably more than in the subcommittee. This may indicate a more formal decision making process. There was practically no conflict in this decision making process. However, the members report that many of the directions of the collaboration came from previous discussion around town, among the interlocking boards and that by the time a formal vote was taken, there was no need for conflict.

**Power Sub-groups.** The active presence of power sub-groups was mentioned in many of the interviews with both collaboration members and other respondents. The United Way and the SAYC and several of the affiliates were considered to be the leaders depending upon the issue. Several of the program directions of the collaboration appeared to result from power plays by a bloc to protect its own "turf." Several of the least successful programs appeared to be a result of lack of freedom to program where the
strengths of the collaboration lay. This is especially true of direct service programs where the referral relationship with SAYC was problematic.

**Process Outcomes**

Even with the problematic process, the Spokane representatives were generally positive in the outcome measures. Table 23, Appendix A, indicates that 10 of the 15 persons interviewed felt that the collaboration had been very effective or moderately effective. Seven of the 15 reported that the collaboration was most effective in getting people together. This confirms that the local agencies had had little previous interorganizational relationships. Six of the remaining eight mentioned advocacy or capacity building and one mentioned direct service.

Most of the Spokane respondents would involve their agencies again. Only two reported that they would not.

**Conclusions About the Spokane Collaboration Process**

Several factors appeared to affect the development and operation of the Spokane collaboration. First, about six months elapsed between the start of the collaboration and the beginning of the staff work because of LEAA's special condition. During this early organizing period there was a change in collaboration membership and leadership so that when the coordinator began there was not a large core of people who had been involved continually. Several of the most active and committed were no longer active. The new members were not socialized into the structures that the national collaboration thought necessary.

Second, with the six month start up time and the leadership crisis, nearly nine months elapsed before the collaboration had any sense of accomplishment. Third, the lack of consistent leadership was problematic to the collaboration.

Fourth, the structural relationships between SAYC, YA and the collaboration early in the collaboration exacerbated several problems such as competition for power in the juvenile justice field.

Fifth, the decision to exclude the public sector was a real problem especially when programs developed which required working relationships with public agencies. Finally, interlocking activity among private agency representatives in Spokane had an impact on new programs.
The Spokane collaboration moved a long way toward building working relationships among the non-profit agencies. They, more than many of the collaborations, had to face the factors of commitment and ownership. The staff person, operating as their employee rather than as their leader, forced them to consider the issue of leadership. They faced less effectively the issues of political intrigue and power among competing organizations and the public-private sector interaction. When these issues have been addressed, we feel that the active voluntary sector in Spokane can use its energies in a creative way to serve problem youth.
The Connecticut Collaboration

Connecticut is an industrial East Coast state of over 3,000,000 inhabitants. It is relatively small with much religious, ethnic, economic and political diversity. The history of Connecticut's cultural diversity is, to some extent, a remnant from the pre-revolutionary war township divisions. In other ways the diversity relates to the economic patterns. The southwest corner, extending from Bridgeport on the coast to Danbury inland, contains suburbs of New York City and some of the wealthier cities in the country.

Many residents are highly educated professionals with heavy concentrations of New York executive personnel, lawyers and bankers. Many national corporations have moved their headquarters out of New York City to take advantage of the pleasant suburbs and the lower taxes of this part of Connecticut.

Other sections are heavily industrialized. These areas have a concentration of immigrants or citizens of foreign parentage who came for jobs in the factories and are first to be unemployed when industry leaves. The flight of New England manufacturers to the Sun Belt has left pockets of unemployment and generally depressed economic conditions.

In addition, the northern sections of the state and some of the coast contain agricultural and fishing industries, many of which epitomize the New England Yankee conservative cultural and political stance.

The national collaboration originally selected the whole state of Connecticut as the site for several reasons: The DSO public grantee was a state agency, it would provide an opportunity to test a collaborative model on a state basis, and several coalitions of human service organizations were already operating in Connecticut on a state-wide basis. After several months of deliberation and negotiations, it became apparent that state wide program collaboration was not feasible. Rather than move to a local site, the state committee decided upon a regional collaboration in western Connecticut for delivery of capacity building and direct service programs while retaining the advocacy programs on the state level. Subsequently three towns in western Connecticut were selected for actual programs administered through the regional office--Danbury, Waterbury and Torrington.
Background Factors

The local collaboration site in Connecticut is most of Western Connecticut, an area corresponding to Region A of the State Human Service Districts divisions. The region encompasses a 42-town area covering a 1,365 square miles with a population of 475,070. The area is extremely diverse socially, economically, geographically, and politically. Three distinct types of communities are in the region: urban, rural and suburban. Median 1969 incomes ranged from $9,775 in Bridgewater, a small semi-rural town, to $16,833 in Ridgefield, an urban New York City "bedroom" community.

Eventually, the state steering committee decided to develop three local collaborations in Region A rather than only one. A regional executive committee with representatives from each would make policies, work with staff and be a liaison body with the national collaboration. While this decision appeared to be largely political, it did present the opportunity to test the regional concept of delivery of collaborative programs and to determine the extent to which collaborations could be viable without full staff. The national staff had warned the Connecticut collaboration earlier of the problem of trying to stretch the program funds over such a wide area.

The three collaboration sub-regions mirrored the state's diversity. The northwest section centered in Torrington, a town of about 32,000. Torrington was reported by collaboration members to be a manufacturing town with conservative status-quo attitudes. It retained the rural-farm cultural patterns and attitudes considered typical New England Yankee. The area is stable or declining in population as young people move away.

The Torrington area was reported by collaboration members to be a picture of economic contrasts. On one hand, a sizeable blue-collar population commuted 50 miles daily to Hartford because the pay scale was so low in Torrington. On the other hand, the area had a number of persons with old wealth, illustrated by the large show-place mansions and estates.

As in most of Connecticut, there is considerable town loyalty among the population in the northwest area. Torrington and Winsted, a nearby town, have long-standing feelings of competition and separation referred to by respondents as "local nationalism."
Waterbury, with a stable population of about 113,000, is the center of the southeastern portion of Region A. An industrial hub with several Eastern European ethnic populations, Waterbury is surrounded by 13 towns. Currently, the economy is depressed, with 7.2% unemployment for December, 1977, the highest rate in Connecticut.

Danbury, with a population of 57,000, is the center of the southwestern area of Region A. It is a town in transition from old native New England to New York middle management commuters. While the area is growing, the political control remains in the hands of long-term residents. This means that growth of human services has not kept pace with population growth.

The DSO Grantee in Connecticut was a council on Human Services, a state public structure coordinating 11 different departments responsible for service to youth. With a change of administration following the 1976 election, the Governor of Connecticut abolished the Council on Human Services. The Department of Children and Youth Services was then chosen to administer the DSO project.

Connecticut's DSO program attempted to test three service delivery models: maximum intervention with follow-up community services, limited crisis intervention with counseling by court personnel and with no follow-up, and limited crisis intervention services with no follow-up. The three models were to be tested in three different areas of the state. Testing the latter two models in areas where the collaboration existed presented a substantial problem for the DSO Grantee. While the director of the DSO public grant agency was enthusiastic in his support of the collaboration, the above problem required that the collaboration work with a status offender population which would not be involved with the DSO project.

From January to March, 1975, Connecticut had 648 status offender cases referred to the courts. About 25% of them were institutionalized in the state detention centers. The largest number of cases were runaways, with truancy in second place. There were 209 status offenders from Region A in 1975-76.

However, as the collaboration completed their community needs assessment, the public schools and youth bureau estimated that an additional 986 youth had committed status offenses without being in the juvenile justice system. It was the status offenders from Region A who were not
participating in the DSO project, and the non-adjudicated youth population for whom the collaboration ultimately planned and provided service.

The National Assembly affiliates in Region A were not easily identified. The regional organization of the affiliates were not contiguous with the boundaries of Region A or the sub-region. For instance, one of the sub-regions included Girl Scouts from two different councils, neither located in the region. This fact made the membership decisions ambiguous and time commitment to the collaboration from staff difficult.

The financial situation of the affiliates was declining. Two-thirds of those on which we had data reported a decline in United Way funds in late 1977. About one-half reported that other funds have been cut.

Although they were located closest to their national offices, the Region A affiliates reported less relationship with national office about the collaboration than the affiliates at other sites. Fewer than half knew the names of either national or regional representatives. Only 15% reported any communication from national representatives about the collaboration. Some of this communications gap could result from the late September choice of Region A as the Connecticut local site.

The Connecticut collaboration began with an agreement by three Connecticut State groups to co-sponsor an initial meeting in March, 1976. The three groups were the Connecticut Association for Human Services, The Connecticut Coalition for Justice for Children and the Connecticut Child Welfare Association.\(^{22}\) The meeting was convened in Hartford with interested affiliates and other youth serving agencies. The national staff, national task force members and the DSO Grantee described the project and invited their interest.

For several months, the collaboration functioned on the state level with the national staff and task force members actively involved with decisions of procedure philosophy and structure. Eventually the local nature of delivery of service by the affiliates and communities in the State led the collaboration to choose a local site.

The decision at to which local area the collaboration would move was a difficult one for the collaboration to solve. Hartford and Bridgeport

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\(^{22}\) The Child Welfare League of America was originally a member of the national collaboration but dropped out late in 1976. The local affiliate, however, remained involved.
were excluded because a special emphasis program being tested in Bridgeport and Hartford was perceived to receive more than its share of human service programs because of its status as State Capital. In June three proposals for local sites were presented to the national collaboration. Waterbury was chosen as the primary site and New London as an alternative site. The Waterbury proposal was later expanded to include all of Region A. There were feelings reported by some respondents that the latter decisions were made because of meetings "stacked" with representatives from Waterbury and Danbury.

The state steering committee met through the summer with the national staff. They drafted a statement of purpose, a plan of action, the organizational structure and a job description for project staff. In late August, they began screening applications for staff and recruited representatives from Region A for the steering committee. In early September the coordinator was hired, to begin work in late September.

By late August, a local and autonomous regional steering committee was instituted in order for the regional collaboration to be viable. A regional meeting was held September 17th and the transition was made at that time. Several key people from Region A had been active in the state collaboration. These people then assumed the leadership of the regional collaboration. The state steering committee retained management of the advocacy component of the project while the regional committee managed the capacity building and direct services components. That meeting broke up into the three sub-regional groups with the representatives agreeing to form coalitions or work through already in-place coalitions.

On October 8th, the new regional collaboration met as a temporary steering committee. It was presented with a staff person who had already been hired, a nearly finalized structure and a January 1 deadline for their phased action plan. At that point the staff person had no office of secretary; the regional committee was meeting to work together for the first time, local collaboration had not met and the community needs assessment on which programs were to be based not even begun.

October, November and December were spent establishing the structure of the collaboration, working on membership and setting up the office. The permanent office in Southbury was between Waterbury and Danbury in a pleasant suburban shopping center.
During the first three months of 1977, the three collaborations were rushing to do their community and agency needs assessments in preparation for developing the phased action plans. In both Danbury and Waterbury, the membership was still quite fluid and no working core had developed. The regional committee appointed a sub-committee to develop the plan. The staff person had to work with the three local groups, continue to build membership of public and non-profit agencies, encourage the needs assessment and guide the development of the plan.

In early April, the plan was submitted to the national collaboration for approval. Its basic elements were for an increase in regional staff to contract out and monitor programs implemented by local agencies. Some of the programs appeared not to be new and few were to be implemented by affiliates. The plan was not completely acceptable to either the national staff or LEAA. It was top heavy with regional support staff, and the amount of support of the direct service programs appeared low and in some cases. The grants to programs appeared to be reimbursements for programs already begun.

Although the national staff clearly accepted much of the Connecticut phased action plan, requiring revision of some elements completely and revision of only some words and phrases of other elements, the Region A collaboration perceived the response as rejection of their ability and as interference with their autonomy. These feelings blossomed into a four month battle between the Region A collaboration and the national staff. Much of the local energy appears to have been directed toward this hostility rather than toward revision of the plan or mobilizing for implementation.

Region A's delay in revising the plan combined with the national staffs' delay in immediately responding to their demands for a meeting generated continuing hostility, with the coordinator interpreting the communication between the two. The Connecticut representative perceived the National Director as obstructing the LEAA's sign off and their ability to continue. The National Director considered Connecticut's demands unreasonable in view of the fact that they had failed to revise their plans.\footnote{The National Director reported that his neck was in traction and his mother was dying during this period.} The situation came to a head at a July 29th meeting of all...
Region A collaborations. Following this meeting, a Torrington member wrote a letter to National staff expressing the feelings of the groups, and the group arranged to go to New York and "lay it on the table" to the national staff.

The conflict was fairly well resolved at the New York meeting. It became apparent to some of the local representatives that the perception of New York as the enemy was not accurate. The national collaboration staff seemed to be helpful and genuinely concerned with having the phased action plan accepted. The New York meeting also surfaced some real incongruities between the Torrington and Danbury ideas of program. (Waterbury was not represented.) Some of the problems between the local collaborations had been hidden behind the attention of the group to the outside enemy and New York.

The local staff person lost some credibility because of the New York meetings. She had been the lens through which the Connecticut members and the New York staff had viewed each other. It was apparent to both that the lens was somewhat distorted. It also became apparent that some of the delay in approval was her failure to make minor changes in the plan. The changes were made by the group in their hotel one evening and presented to the national staff next day.

In late August, 1977, the plan was finally accepted and implementation began. Almost immediately a different set of conflicts between the Connecticut staff and the New York staff began. The local staff person, in order to get the programs moving, began hiring staff, letting contracts and appeared to change programs previously agreed upon without allowing New York to approve the decisions and apparently without the full input of local decision makers. A final straw occurred when the Connecticut coordinator read the Oakland coordinator's letter of resignation to the collaboration. That letter was extremely hostile toward the National Director.

Upon hearing of these activities, the National Director contacted most of the local leaders to discuss termination of the coordinator. He went to Connecticut, terminated the coordinator on the spot and asked her to leave.

A local volunteer became interim coordinator while a search was instituted. In November a new coordinator was hired to start immediately.
Structural Factors

The organizational structure, which appeared viable on paper, was in reality problematic. Obtaining the size of staff necessary to solidify the structure and to firm the commitment of the affiliates as well as other members was not possible. One coordinator was responsible for all of the territory. The regional collaboration, therefore, tended to build on the previous inter-organizational relationships of local chairpersons and the priorities of the local staff personnel rather than to rather than to initiate new structures to address the issues of status offenders.

The Region A collaboration had representatives from the three local collaborations and operated a regional planning body for direct services and capacity building programs. The Waterbury collaboration, in the largest city, had a moderate to large membership of 43 with 11 listed affiliates, but with no continuing core of affiliates committed to pushing for the collaboration. The membership varied radically from meeting to meeting. It was difficult to get a membership list because people would come several times and never return. The Danbury collaboration was also large, with only seven affiliates among its 47 members. It reported 23 public organizations. The Torrington collaboration was a much smaller homogeneous group, built upon a coalition that had recently started in Torrington. Five of the nine non-profit members were National Assembly affiliates and another two were affiliates whose national organizations were not members of the national collaboration.

The regional Connecticut collaboration made a special arrangement with the Court for referral of status offenders. It was necessary for the collaboration to make other arrangements to work with public agencies who identify and refer other problem youth. This meant working with health officials, police and schools of 42 towns. The numbers of organizations that became legitimately involved was overwhelming. The lack of resources to really build collaboration of these organizations is quite obvious.

Priority and Role of Staff. The first coordinator perceived her role as a professional expert in the field of services to status offenders and a manager. Her first tasks were to build on her previous contacts with the public juvenile justice system in Connecticut to help educate the
non-profit sector. This role perception is consistent with the job description of coordinator through which she was hired. A copy is found in Appendix E.

In the two-page job description, non-profit or voluntary agencies are not mentioned at all. The phrase 'National Assembly affiliate' is mentioned twice but with no mention of working with voluntary agencies. The phrase 'work with volunteers' is the only indication of the non-profit field. The major emphasis of the job description is on fiscal and program management, staff support to committee, supervision of staff, liaison with various groups, and public relations.

The staff operational style reflects the above description of the role. Her reported activities early in the collaboration history were heavily weighted toward building relationships with influential local, public agencies, state-wide legislators and state government administrators. This is supported by the response of the first interviews of November and December, 1976, when 77% of the 39 persons interviewed who had attended some meetings or who were local affiliates had not met the staff person.

The interim coordinator was a volunteer and a member of the regional committee and the Danbury collaboration. While she performed many of the jobs necessary to undo some actions of the first coordinator, she never really perceived herself in a staff role. Her role continued as it had been before; a knowledgeable, active, well respected person, with whom some did not agree.

After an extensive search, the second coordinator was hired, also from the Danbury area. She was an able, intelligent person but was perceived as an outsider to many of the collaboration members. Many felt that she had loyalty to New York, rather than to the local collaborators.

The first coordinator's perception of the proper role with committee members also reflected her role perception. She felt that ideas for the collaboration programs would come primarily from her own expertise. She felt she needed to educate people about who status offenders are. She worried about being co-opted by local chairpersons or committees into following their ideas rather than her own.

Little conflict appeared in Connecticut over role expectations of the regional coordinator and the local members. The coordinator did not staff the local collaboration meetings, attending only about half of them.
The regional representatives accepted her planning-management role on the regional level and had little expectation of local support. They also accepted her role as liaison with New York and the DSO Grantee. The small amount of personal or professional support from the local representatives, however, was frustrating to the coordinator. She reported a need for more feedback from the local collaborations about her activities.

**National-Local Relationships.** The Connecticut regional coordinator's relationship with the national staff, however, was in continual conflict. She perceived that the levels of approval of programs from local to regional to national to LEAA was cumbersome. She argued strongly for a direct relationship to LEAA. Her own role perception of management and planning for three local collaboration was similar to the National Director's perception of his role. National, however, did not accept her perception of her role. The supervisory relationship with the National Director was affected by their developing personal incompatibility. It more clearly illustrated the structural problems of control. Since it was the site nearest to New York, there was more participation from both the national staff and the national task force. At one point, the Connecticut coordinator was receiving contradictory assistance from a national task force member and a national staff person.

Furthermore, the local members were closer to New York, could telephone about their problems and therefore could go around the expertise of the local coordinator to the expertise of the national staff.

**Priority and Role of Chairpersons.** The state chairperson was a volunteer member of the National Council of Jewish Women. She had been active in the Connecticut Association for Human Services and was an early founder of the Coalition for Justice for Children. Her interest and support gave the impetus for the Connecticut collaboration for its initial six months on the state level. When it became regional, she remained as the chairperson of the state collaboration where most of the Connecticut advocacy program was implemented.

Her role was perceived consistently as enabling changes in the system for dealing with children. To this end she worked through state public and non-profit agencies as an internal advocate, an external educator and a legislative prodder.
The local chairpersons were different in each site. The Waterbury chairperson was a director of a program which was already a collaboration between one affiliate and public agencies in Waterbury. He had been on the state steering committee and was instrumental in bringing the collaboration to Region A. The chairperson remained the keystone of the Waterbury collaboration. The Torrington chairperson was the executive of a National Assembly affiliate in Winsted, a neighboring town. His perception of the role was to organize efficiently and effectively. He was concerned that the power of his own agency not be a barrier to collaboration. His priority was to bring program money into the community for the good of youth.

The first Danbury chairperson was the executive of a local coordinating planning body, the Danbury Area United Social Service. He had been active in the state collaboration and was also instrumental in bringing the collaboration to Region A. He was a dynamic, intelligent person with great personal charm and charisma. His agency was funded primarily by Community Action Program funds which were expiring. He perceived the collaboration as a means to continuing what he felt was a vital service in Danbury.

His role was primarily to get local agencies to understand the problems as he did. In meetings he tended to interact as an expert rather than as a presider.

**Process Factors**

The nature of the collaboration meetings varied within the three collaborations and at the regional level.

**Process at the Regional Collaboration.** The Region A collaboration seemed to work well together with good relationships. The chairperson, also chair of the Waterbury collaboration, acted primarily in a chair capacity. There were usually three active members of the Torrington collaboration, two active Danbury collaboration members and one or two other active Waterbury members.

**Communications** usually followed the pattern of a report with discussion and the decisions made. The report would be made and the reporter would answer questions. After a report, a dialogue between the reporter and one or two other participants would occur. Other than the
chairperson, the coordinator and three other participants were most active (two from Torrington and one from Danbury). Table 22, Appendix A, indicates the distribution of action with 43% of the acts attributed to two of the most active non-affiliates.

The decision making process was fairly formal with votes following the discussion. Table 21 in Appendix A shows that 56% of all agenda items were settled by a formal decision.

The power blocs at regional level really represent each collaboration. In the end there were two that had impact, Danbury and Torrington.

Process in Waterbury. The Waterbury collaboration process hardly got off the ground. The meetings themselves varied greatly in both size and energy from month to month. The coordinator was often not there at all, came late or participated little. The records showed that many representatives attended one or two times only. Even so, the meetings were friendly and the group got along well with each other. The interviews of Waterbury respondents indicate a degree of hopelessness and cynicism along with the desire to try anything.

The communication process in the Waterbury collaboration was similar to a meeting rather than a working committee. Informative reports were given and a few questions asked. Because of the turnover, much explanation was necessary at each meeting. The chairperson, of necessity, was most active in the meetings both presiding and explaining. The level of exchange and discussion was low in Waterbury. Many representatives, including two representatives of National Assembly affiliates, came once or twice, sat through the meetings, asked one or two questions and never returned.

The first coordinator also had a low level of participation. At two collaboration meetings observed for the collaboration she said nothing during the meetings.

Few decisions were made in Waterbury. Table 21 in Appendix A shows that only 18% of items discussed were followed by a decision. Even programs for the phased action plan were not decided in the meeting but a list was circulated from which members were to choose projects.

We are not aware of power blocs operating in the Waterbury collaboration. It is apparent that the chairperson's agency would have some
influence on collaboration decisions because of his own dedicated commitment and participation.

**Process in Danbury.** The Danbury collaboration held large meetings with active participation by a core membership. There was constant turnover in Danbury but there was a larger constant group. The observer reported good relationships in the group with good humor and laughter often reported.

The **Communication process** in the group consisted of much reporting of progress and reports of activity to keep the members up-to-date on regional collaboration matters. The chairperson or another member of his agency acted as the program-planning expert and directed the process. There was little opposition to ideas supported by these two members. The participation of affiliates was very low in the process. Only 9% of all action was by affiliate, none of whom was in the core group or perceived as influential by interview respondents. The first coordinator's participation, when present, was to answer questions directed to her and to make reports on regional activities and planning matters. The second coordinator appeared to follow the same role.

The **decision making** appears not to have been done in the meetings. Only 17% of items raised in the agenda were followed by formal decisions. Rather, it appears that the decisions for Danbury were made regionally and reported locally or that a small core of collaboration members made the major decisions.

The presence of a **power bloc** in Danbury is indicated by the nature of the meetings and responses to the first interview. It was a leadership bloc which wanted to plan for and direct the collaboration's programs. Its power appears to have discouraged active participation by others in the work of the collaboration. In late 1977, when two of the members resigned, both the Danbury collaboration and programs were left with major problems.

**Process in Torrington.** The Torrington collaboration was a much smaller group with a history in the recent past of at least meeting with each other and a high proportion of non-profit organizations. Meetings were lively and enthusiastic.
The communication process was primarily controlled by the chairperson. However, during discussion or issues, the participation was vigorous by most members. The chairperson averaged 30% of the acts and other affiliates an additional 45%. Anyone reporting led the discussion on that report. The first coordinator, when present, participated little. She answered questions but did not appear to direct energies or discussions.

Much of the decision making occurred during the course of the meetings. This is reflected in Table 21, Appendix A. The decisions were worked out with vigorous participation among participants and little hostility. The meetings were small enough to give everyone an opportunity to participate without dragging the flow of the meeting.

While there did not appear to be power blocs in Torrington there were several marginal participants in the decisions of the collaboration generally representing women's affiliates.

**Process Outcomes**

Despite the problems recorded earlier, the process outcomes in Connecticut were fairly favorable. Although only 57% reported that they would involve their agencies again, six of the seven affiliates (86%) interviewed said they would probably participate again. These interviews were taken at the time of termination of the first coordinator when spirits were at their lowest.

At that same time 28% of respondents said the collaboration was very or moderately effective and another 43% said, hopefully, it was too early to tell. Fifty percent of respondents felt the collaboration had been most effective in getting people together.

**Conclusions About the Connecticut Collaboration Process**

The Connecticut collaboration started with several major situational disadvantages. The nature of the grant and the subsequent decision over locality, clients, population and referral procedures required much time from the national staff and task force. Consequently, they were able to devote less time to the local problems.

Several additional factors around structure and process contributed to the problem. Since they have been discussed above, we will merely list them here.
1. The lack of staff support necessary to build three new organizations.

2. The lack of lead time and staff available to build inter-agency trust before collaborative planning.

3. The decision to have a regional body coordinating three such different groups in such different areas with such different needs.

4. The unrealistic expectations on staff to give support to four new organizations, with a total of 15 to 20 committees with membership to enlist, use and support of 117 agencies scattered over 1,365 square miles.

5. Local chairpersons with declining budgets and little spare time to do major additional collaboration-related staff work.

6. Local leaders who appeared to be pushing their own agenda rather than the collaboration agenda.

7. Interpersonal and role conflict between local and national staff.

Even with its turbulent history and many unresolved conflicts, the Connecticut regional collaboration during its 14 months of existence has mobilized tremendous energy. If the staff were available to support their energy in each site, both the capacity building programs and direct services could be among the most productive of all of the collaborations.
CHAPTER 4

LESSONS FROM THE EVALUATION

We have reported on the collaboration program and the collaboration process in the previous chapter, following as closely as possible the strict rules of evidence in quantitative analysis. In this chapter we would like to combine those results with some of the other more qualitative findings of the evaluation. Our presentation and interpretation come from many sources, the collaboration staff, the field researchers, the research literature, the voluminous data not included in the report, and our own intuition.

This chapter has three purposes: first, to give some guidance to groups attempting to replicate inter-organizational collaboration programs; second, to suggest some hypotheses for further study of the phenomena studied in this evaluation; and third, to suggest some procedure that will make the relationship between research and program more productive for both.

Guidelines for Inter-Organizational Collaboration

We will briefly discuss four areas that should be resolved for inter-organizational collaboration to be successful: ground-rule decisions, structural decisions, program decisions and conflict-resolution decisions.

Ground Rule Decisions

There are four decisions that set the stage for inter-organizational activity and structure. In the beginning stage of collaboration, these decisions should be made explicit and some degree of consensus achieved.

Is the Collaboration for Planning or for Program? Planning and program collaborations have quite different tasks, require different memberships and have different outcomes. A planning collaboration can have a large heterogeneous membership. The wider the representation around
a problem, the more complete the plan will be. Members can include influential persons, professional experts, members of the potential client groups, organizational representatives, political representatives, volunteers and staff. The plan and the planning process require little organizational input other than time. However, since the outcome of such a collaboration is a strategy or plan, hopefully with some commitment of resources of the planners, organizational representatives should be included. A planning collaboration requires less commitment of the total organization since only one or two people are actually involved. However, the degree of interorganizational relationship achieved is also apt to be less intense.

A program collaboration requires a smaller, more homogeneous group with similar clients or potential clients, values, methods of operation, resources and power. Where the collaborating organizations are not similar, the collaboration must be carefully structured to minimize differences between them, especially power inequalities.

The Juvenile Justice Program Collaboration was, to some extent, both a planning and a program collaboration. During the early stages of the program, the planning was intense and the participation was maximum. As the programs were implemented, the general energy level decreased, a "let-down" was experienced and only organizations involved with implementation remained really satisfied. If the relationship between the task and the type of structure needed had been explicit, some of the problems about let-down, change of role, frustration and rewards might have been avoided.

Are the Goals of the Collaboration Primarily Programs or Processes?
A second decision necessary in inter-organizational relationships is the importance of the process goals relative to the program goals. Inter-organizational collaborations organize most effectively around specific issues or programs. While the two types of goals are not mutually exclusive, their relative importance affects a number of structural decisions.

Collaboration as an organization to achieve program goals requires strong central staff leadership with program expertise and a structure organized around the program goals.

Collaborating as organizations to build a process requires staff persons with training and skills in interpersonal relationships and an
organizational structure which is more responsive to the development of the representatives' expertise in relation to a program or issue.

When inter-organizational goals have a limited time for achievement, the process of building inter-organizational trust and work style receives much lower priority.

Who are the Collaboration Members: Individuals or Organizations? For inter-organizational program collaboration to be viable, representatives must represent the organization in some capacity, whether from the stance of staff, board, membership, volunteer or client. Furthermore, a person only marginally related to the agency does not really perform as a representative of that agency.

One of the problems of the national juvenile justice collaboration was that organizational representatives of some of the larger organizations acted as individuals rather than organizational representatives. They had neither knowledge of the larger perspective of their organizations nor opportunity for input from the collaboration into their organizations' decisions. Their votes and actions on issues and programs were taken without reference to their organizations. These decisions did not bind or even influence their organizations' cooperation.

What Stages of Collaboration has the Community Developed? A final decision at the start of inter-organizational collaboration is to determine the stage of collaboration that has been previously achieved. We would suggest that there are five stages in the development of collaboration:

1. Meeting around a common problem or issue
2. Getting to know each other
3. Developing a working style
4. Developing programs or plans
5. Developing trust and respect.

The development of trust and respect may never occur, may occur after the development of plans and programs or may occur simultaneously with these developments. Figure 7 illustrates the progression.
An area with a history of inter-organizational collaboration, if it has been satisfying to participants, requires less effort and time for further collaboration than an area without this history or with some dissatisfactory collaboration.

Structural Decisions

Once the ground rule decisions have been made, the structure of inter-organizational collaboration can be clarified and explicated. These decisions should be made by participants but with the guidance of some outside professional. Obviously these decisions will be made within the context of the community, the nature of the problem or issue and the explicit ground-rule decisions discussed in the previous section.

We perceive five major structural decisions: goal-priority decisions, membership decisions, leadership decisions, staff decisions and control decisions. In this section we will pose questions that correspond to evaluation results reported in detail in Chapter 3.

Goals and Priorities. The major goal of the juvenile justice collaborations was deinstitutionalization of status offenders. This was not, however, a program goal but rather the over-all guiding value. The project was designed to enable institutional change that would ultimately lead to community services for status offenders and other children at risk. Realistic program goals must be more narrowly focused than such a general statement. Program goals should be explicitly defined, measurable against program outcomes and realistic in terms of organizational resources. Following are some of the important questions about goals and priorities:
1. What are all of the specific goals of our activity?

2. How important to us are institutional maintenance, future funding, staff development, community support, buildings and grounds?

3. What are our most important priorities among our program goals, process goals and maintenance?

4. Does our allocation of resources (money, staff time and committee time) reflect our stated priorities?

5. Is there consensus among the membership about goals and priorities?

6. How will we deal with any lack of consensus?

Membership. Membership was discussed previously relative to types of collaboration. Other membership decisions need to be made, relative to the goals and priorities and the issues or problems of the collaboration. In the juvenile justice collaborations, for instance, when advocacy was a high priority, wider membership was functional for wider contacts. When capacity building of affiliates was a high priority, a more focused working membership was functional. The following questions are appropriate:

1. Who should belong to the collaboration and why?

2. Do we want only working members?

3. Are we willing to have some members in name only? Who and why?

4. How much staff time do we want to allocate to developing commitment of members and potential members?

5. How large a membership do we want? (Large groups are not functional as decision making bodies or as work groups.)

6. How homogeneous do we want our membership? (The more homogeneous the more consensus, the less conflict.)

7. Is the presence of potential client groups, power minorities, competing groups and funding sources in our membership functional toward our specific goals?

8. What is the basis for membership?

9. What roles and activities are expected of members?

Leadership. Leadership in the various juvenile justice collaborations was somewhat dependent on the local cultures. Several questions, however, are appropriate when developing the leadership of inter-organizational collaboration.
1. Will the leader's primary loyalty be to the collaboration or is the vested interest in the parent organization too strong? In the juvenile justice collaborations, the best leadership came from volunteers rather than from staff. (A staff person's major interest and commitment must be to his/her own job. Volunteers are more likely to develop stronger loyalty to organizations which they chair.)

2. Does the leader have a real commitment to the collaboration's goals?

3. Is the leader able to guide without forcing his/her own priorities?

4. Does the leader have inter-personal skills and experience in leadership, especially in the voluntary sector?

5. Does the leader have the personal qualities required to gain respect from the membership? (The leader does not need to have professional characteristics.)

Staff. The staff person in an inter-organizational collaboration is the only participant without a role in a supporting organization. The staff person, and perhaps the voluntary leadership, are the only participants for whom the collaboration is the major work priority. This puts the staff person in a very vulnerable position. On one hand, staff personnel lead, direct, cajole, and enable the members to reach the collaboration goals. On the other hand, if they are too far ahead of the membership, the organization can let them sink. We have already mentioned that staff should be hired to fit specific collaboration group-rule decisions. Some additional questions to be considered:

1. Does the staff person understand non-profit organizations, the functions of committees and boards and the staff function in such organizations?

2. Has the staff person had experience with the working of non-profit organizations?

3. Does the staff person respect volunteers and the contribution to human services of the voluntary sector?

4. Does the staff person have skills in inter-personal relationships, social work, community organization? (This is more important than knowledge about the juvenile justice system because the latter is more easily acquired.)

5. Does the staff person show ego problems? Will the staff have to motivate self rather than members?
6. Is the staff person well organized to handle the tremendous detail involved in staffing committees, developing membership, planning and/or programs, organizing and managing an organization?

7. Does the staff work style fit the major priorities of goals previously decided? (If maintenance is a priority, a manager-executive; if process is a priority, a facilitator, enabler; if program is important, a professional with program expertise.)

Decisions about the professional and personal characteristics of staff personnel are crucial in inter-organizational collaborations. The issues should be discussed openly before a job description is adopted. The actual duties and the lines of supervision of potential staff should be explicated and some consensus of the body reached before the search begins. If the collaboration reaches some consensus on roles of staff, it may very well resolve issues which otherwise would lead to conflict.

**Control Decisions.** The location of control is another crucial issue of a collaboration and must be resolved openly. In this program, the control by the national collaboration raised problems after the fact. Had some of the potential conflicts been anticipated, methods to deal with the conflicts in responsibility and supervision might have been avoided.

Control decisions depend on the source of financing, the nature of clients, the control of a specific profession and governmental regulation. We have no answers to the dilemma posed by dual control. However, unless there is agreement between participants at all levels over goals, priorities and the ground rules previously mentioned, problems of control and accountability will be compounded.

**Program Decisions**

The actual development of program depends on factors such as what is already in the community, what is needed, the budget, available staff, the nature of the client group, the structure and history of the sponsoring group, and the location of clients and programs. The juvenile justice collaboration programs were effective to the degree to which the following questions were addressed:

1. Were desired outcomes of each program specified?
2. Were the program activities designed so that they related logically to specific program outcomes?

3. Was there an attempt to evaluate whether or not program activities actually did reach program outcomes?

4. Was there a clear plan to implement programs?

5. Was there a structure of accountability that would permit the plan to be carried through?

6. Were clear incentives or rewards provided for all collaboration activities, both planning and program activities? (Altruism is seldom a sufficient reward for the input of organizational resources. To be really effective, a program should provide both long term and short term rewards; rewards for both planning and program; and rewards for both organizational and individual input.)

Conflict-Resolution Decisions

No matter how similar the backgrounds or perspectives of organizations or people, their positions will never be completely congruent. Therefore, in any inter-organizational collaboration some conflict is inevitable. The various conflicts in the juvenile justice collaborations were handled differently with different results. In Oakland and Connecticut, the conflict was originally diverted by directing energies at a common enemy, the national collaboration. In Tucson the conflict was never openly admitted but was present in a different form, resulting in lower levels of personal trust among participants. In Spokane, the conflict was directed at persons rather than at the differences in perspective, and in Spartanburg it was pushed on the table as an issue rather than dealt with as an inevitable presence.

In truly effective collaboration some mechanisms must be made available to identify conflict and handle it in a non-adversary way. In some ways, the successful resolution of conflict served to solidify the collaborations in this program. Having successfully weathered the storm together, participants appeared more open and trustful and more committed than before they were involved in the conflict. The presence of rational structures for conflict resolution, skilled leaders and staff persons and the absence of pathological competition facilitated adequate conflict resolution.
Research Hypotheses Suggested by the Evaluation

Each of the program guidelines suggested above are, in effect, working hypotheses that need further study. In this section, we will suggest some hypotheses which developed out of the theories and methodologies upon which the evaluation is based. Most of the hypotheses are consistent with either organizational theory dealing with participation or satisfaction or small group theory dealing with process or leadership. We will not attempt a description of the theories, but rather will briefly mention a theoretical area and suggest hypotheses which seem to fit our findings. A more thorough analysis of the findings must wait for a later date.

Organizational Participation

There is a growing body of theory and research on organizational participation in inter-organizational relationships. Our evaluation tends to support the following hypotheses.

1. Boundary personnel, or members somewhat peripheral to their own organizations, are more able to work for organizational change but have less influence in bringing change to their organizations than members such as executive directors or board members. They
   a. are more easily coopted into work for collaboration goals
   b. experience less role conflict
   c. gain more satisfaction from working for collaboration goals.

2. The more members of an agency's organizational set who participate in an activity, the more likely that agency will participate.

Goal Attainment and Satisfaction

1. Individuals feel satisfaction from attainment of group goals even if their contribution is not identifiable.

2. Group goals attained through individual performance set up competitive conditions.

3. Goals attained through group performance set up cooperative conditions.

Small Group Process

Much of the research on small group process has been experimental, using unacquainted individuals. In this evaluation, we did consistent longitudinal group analysis using structural observation. Our findings
suggested that organizational representatives interacted with each other in a different way than isolated, previously unacquainted individuals in task-groups. Some results of previous studies also appeared to be supported by our findings.

1. Persons with negative feelings toward goals and activities of a group interact less often and participate in group activities less.

2. The organizational status of participants and the community status of their own organization affects the power relationship in inter-organizational collaboration more than does the amount of interaction. This is contrary to the findings of experimental group process analysis.

3. Status in a group correlates with external status.

4. When group members perceive themselves as similar to each other, there is high interaction and a cooperative atmosphere, and conflict resolution occurs through consensus.

5. A group will strive for conformity of opinion except for individual members who disagree as a means for upward striving and personal recognition.

6. The larger a group, the less opportunity for feedback from members and the less opportunity for conflict and dissatisfaction to be resolved.

7. The degree of congruence between group goals and individual goals is affected by the individual original expectation of the group.

8. Group cohesion tends to form around a perceived common danger or enemy.

Leadership Roles

1. A leader whose status rests on skills and knowledge valued by the group is less approachable than a leader whose status rests on feelings and personal characteristics.

2. High status people in groups tend to conform to the group norms because they helped to develop those norms along lines of their own style.

3. The more control a leader exerts over group behavior the less able the group is to adapt to new behavior or ideas.

4. Leadership stability is related to organizational goal attainment and membership satisfaction.
The Relationship Between Program and Evaluation

In closing, there are several problems that arose between the program and the evaluation that wasted energy and were dysfunctional to effective evaluation. We have examined the basis for these problems elsewhere. Here we will discuss our perceptions of some of the problems in evaluating this program and make some suggestions for evaluating human service programs.

"In the Beginning..." There appears to be a general lack of commitment of program funders to real evaluation. While LEAA, HEW, and HUD usually include an evaluation mandate, they appear to mean fiscal accountability rather than program effectiveness when they include evaluation.

For this program, LEAA did not include extra funds for evaluation but forced the program grantee to fund the evaluation with program money. It is little wonder, then, that some local agencies and collaboration staff lacked commitment to evaluation. Another "beginning" problem was time. For pre-testing for program evaluation, the evaluation content should be in place four to six months before the program begins rather than 4-6 months after the program begins.

"Promise Her Anything But..." It is very important to the evaluation for the staff to understand and want the evaluation. Three of the original five local staff paid lip service to the evaluation but under-cut to various degrees our data gathering efforts. We involved the local program staff as much as possible in the development of evaluation procedures and tools. When program staff had strong objections to a procedure we very carefully reconsidered its use.

"The Shadow Knows..." The perception of the local field researcher by local collaboration members varied from time to time at all sites. Originally they were considered as spies. They were thought to have power over allocation of original funds, refunding and the future of the collaboration even though this was not so.

At other times they were asked to judge the effectiveness of the program, tell them how they were doing, and advise on problems.

"You'll Never Know Just How Much. . ." One of the problems with longitudinal data gathering on new programs is to feed back material that is helpful to the program without incurring the hostility that might make future data gathering difficult. Even this two year report may hamper our ability to gather future data. If program's staff were less defensive and evaluators less negative, this process might not be so difficult.

The difficulties involved mean that much of the evaluation is only now available to program planners who have already made plans for the next two years.

"I'd Climb the Highest Mountain. . ." When possible, in future research of any organizational records, budget or other necessary local data should be collected by researchers rather then depending on organizational personnel. It was more efficient and produced much less hostility for our research staff to go from Omaha to the five sites to gather and process the material on the spot than the constant return envelopes, letters, phone calls, and implied threats.

"One Has My Name the Other Has My Heart. . ." One of the problems of the process data was that local field researchers had difficulty remaining detached. Without exception they became interested in the program and grew to like and respect the members. All recognized the danger of being coopted. One field researcher reported at the end of a grueling conflict that he had observed,

While there's a lull in the action, let me deal with two things that are important to me. First, as is probably the case with all observers such as myself, I feel as if I'm always treading a fine line between scientific honesty and interpersonal betrayal. I've come to like many of the people in this project and to some degree I feel a personal stake in the success of this project. As time goes on, the struggle to be objective becomes increasingly difficult. By 'betrayal,' I refer to the personal nature of many of my observations. I must assume that no participant here will ever have cause to suffer because of the data I transmit to you. The trust that exists between the group and myself is so fragile a thing. We may relax together, and yet they know I am observing them—for what purpose, in what detail they really don't know, a very strange social structure, indeed.
This conflict reflects the emotion with which I end this report. I respect the program, I think it did a remarkable job against tremendous difficulties. The people involved are dedicated to the program and to providing better services for youth. I hope that "no participant will ever have cause to suffer because of the data I transmit to you."
APPENDIX A

TABLES
TABLE 1

MEMBER AGENCIES OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF
NATIONAL VOLUNTARY HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE ORGANIZATIONS AND
MEMBER AGENCIES OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE COLLABORATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency Name</th>
<th>Address</th>
<th>City, State</th>
<th>Phone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFL-CIO</td>
<td>815 16th Street, N.W.</td>
<td>Washington, D.C. 20006</td>
<td>(202) 637-5189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Council for Nationalities Service</td>
<td>20 West 40th Street</td>
<td>New York, New York 10018</td>
<td>(212) 398-9142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Foundation for the Blind, Inc.</td>
<td>15 West 16th Street</td>
<td>New York, New York 10011</td>
<td>(212) 924-0420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*American National Red Cross</td>
<td>National Headquarters</td>
<td>Washington, D.C. 20006</td>
<td>(202) 737-8300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Association of Junior Leagues</td>
<td>825 Third Avenue</td>
<td>New York, New York 10022</td>
<td>(212) 355-4380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Boys' Clubs of America</td>
<td>771 First Avenue</td>
<td>New York, New York 10017</td>
<td>(212) 557-7755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Boy Scouts of America</td>
<td>North Brunswick, New Jersey 08902</td>
<td></td>
<td>(201) 249-6000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Camp Fire Girls</td>
<td>4601 Madison Avenue</td>
<td>Kansas City, Missouri 64112</td>
<td>(816) 756-1950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds</td>
<td>575 Lexington Avenue</td>
<td>New York, New York 10022</td>
<td>(212) 751-1311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Service Association of America</td>
<td>44 East 23rd Street</td>
<td>New York, New York 10010</td>
<td>(212) 674-6100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Girl Scouts of the U.S.A.</td>
<td>830 Third Avenue</td>
<td>New York, New York 10022</td>
<td>(212) 751-6900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Girl's Clubs of America, Inc.</td>
<td>205 Lexington Avenue</td>
<td>New York, New York 10016</td>
<td>(212) 689-3700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goodwill Industries of America, Inc.</td>
<td>9200 Wisconsin Avenue</td>
<td>Washington, D.C. 20014</td>
<td>(301) 530-6500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Social Services of America</td>
<td>345 East 46th Street</td>
<td>New York, New York 10017</td>
<td>(212) 687-2747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*National Jewish Welfare Board</td>
<td>15 East 26th Street</td>
<td>New York, New York 10010</td>
<td>(212) 532-4949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lutheran Council in the U.S.A.</td>
<td>Division of Mission and Ministry</td>
<td>360 Park Avenue South</td>
<td>New York, New York 10010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Agency participants in National Juvenile Justice Collaboration Task Force.
MENTAL HEALTH ASSOCIATION
National Headquarters
1800 North Kent Street
Arlington, Virginia 22209
(703) 528-6405

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR RETARDED CITIZENS
2709 Avenue E East
Arlington, Texas 76011
(817) 261-4961

NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC CHARITIES
1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 785-2757

*NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR HOMEMAKER-HOME HEALTH AIDE SERVICES
67 Irving Place
New York, New York 10003
(212) 674-4990

NATIONAL COUNCIL OF THE CHURCHES OF CHRIST IN THE U.S.A.
475 Riverside Drive
New York, New York 10027
(212) 870-2385

*NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JEWISH WOMEN
15 East 26th Street
New York, New York 10010
(212) 532-1740

NATIONAL COUNCIL OF NEGRO WOMEN
1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 223-2363

*NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME & DELINQUENCY
Continental Plaza
411 Hackensack Avenue
Hackensack, New Jersey 07001
(201) 488-0400

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SETTLEMENTS AND NEIGHBORHOOD CENTERS
232 Madison Avenue
New York, New York 10016
(212) 679-6110

*NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE, INC.
500 East 62nd Street
New York, New York 10021
(212) 644-6500

*THE SALVATION ARMY
120 West 14th Street
New York, New York 10011
(212) 620-4908

*TRAVELERS AID ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA
701 Lee Street, Suite 600
Des Plaines, Illinois 60016
(312) 298-9390

UNITED SEAMEN'S SERVICE, INC.
One World Trade Center, Suite 2601
New York, New York 10048
(212) 775-1033

USO (United Service Organizations)
1146 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 466-8850

U.S. CATHOLIC CONFERENCE
1312 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 659-6600

UNITED WAY OF AMERICA
801 North Fairfax Street
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
(703) 836-7100

THE VOLUNTEERS OF AMERICA
340 West 85th Street
New York, New York 10024
(212) 873-2600

*YMCA of the USA
291 Broadway
New York, New York 10007
(212) 374-2172

*YWCA of the USA
600 Lexington Avenue
New York, New York 10022
(212) 753-4700

*Agency participants in National Juvenile Justice Collaboration Task Force.
## NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AFFILIATES IN LOCAL JUVENILE JUSTICE COLLABORATIONS

### OAKLAND COLLABORATION

- Dovie White and Loretta McDonnell
- Coordinators

- Boys' Club
- Boy Scouts
- Campfire Girls
- Girls' Club (Alameda)
- Girls' Club (San Leandro)
- Girl Scouts
- Junior League
- National Council of Jewish Women
- Travelers Aid Association of America
- Red Cross (Alameda)
- Red Cross (Oakland)
- YMCA (Alameda)
- YMCA (Stiles Hall)
- YWCA (Oakland)
- YWCA (South County)

### SPARTANBURG COLLABORATION

- Penny King
- Coordinator

- Boy Scouts
- Girl Scouts
- Junior League
- Salvation Army
- YMCA

### SPOKANE COLLABORATION

- Karen Harwood
- Coordinator

- Camp Fire
- Girl Scouts
- Junior League
- Salvation Army
- YMCA
- YWCA

### TUCSON COLLABORATION

- John Sloss
- Coordinator

- Boys' Club
- Boy Scouts
- Campfire Girls
- Girls' Club
- Girl Scouts
- Jewish Family Services
- Junior League
- National Council of Jewish Women
- Red Cross
- YMCA
- YWCA

### DANBURY COLLABORATION

- Veronica McNulty and Sydell Spinner
- Coordinators

- Boy Scouts (Norwalk)
- Campfire (Bethel)
- Family Children's Aid
- [Homemaker Health Air Service] (Danbury)
- Girl Scouts (Wilton)
- National Council of Jewish Women (Danbury)
- Red Cross (Danbury)
- YMCA (Danbury)

### TORRINGTON COLLABORATION

- Boy Scouts (Torrington)
- Girl Scouts (Torrington)
- Salvation Army (Torrington)
- YMCA (Torrington)
- YMCA (Winsted)

### WATERBURY COLLABORATION

- Boys' Club (Waterbury)
- Boy Scouts (Waterbury)
- Girls' Club (Waterbury)
- Girl Scouts (Waterbury)
- Junior League (Middlebury)
- Red Cross (Naugatuck)
- Red Cross (Waterbury)
- Salvation Army (Waterbury)
- YMCA (Naugatuck)
- YMCA (Waterbury)
- YWCA (Waterbury)
TABLE 2

MEMBERSHIP IN JUVENILE JUSTICE COLLABORATION, JANUARY 1977

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site</th>
<th>Collaboration Membership Number Early 1977</th>
<th>National Assembly Affiliates</th>
<th>National Assembly Affiliates Total Membership of Collaborating Organizations</th>
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<td></td>
<td>National Assembly Affiliates</td>
<td>Other Organizations</td>
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<td>Oakland</td>
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<td>65</td>
<td>76</td>
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NA = Data are not applicable.
N/A = Data are not available.
\textsuperscript{a}/Total includes 12 members of unknown status.
\textsuperscript{b}/Total includes 9 members of unknown status.
\textsuperscript{c}/Total includes 6 members of unknown status.
\textsuperscript{d}/Includes 12,702,000 youth members.
## Table 3

**Problems of Youth: Collaboration Members' Perceptions at Time of First Interview, Fall 1976**

*Question: From your knowledge of youth and the community, what would you say are the three most important problems with youth here?*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Oakland</th>
<th>Spartanburg</th>
<th>Spokane</th>
<th>Tucson</th>
<th>Connecticut</th>
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<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td>Percent of Respondents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Number of respondents</td>
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<td>15</td>
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<td>11</td>
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<td>44</td>
<td>48</td>
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<tr>
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<td>31</td>
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\[a/\] Total of three most mentioned responses divided by all responses.
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<th>Formal Membership</th>
<th>Percent Membership on Youth Problems</th>
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<th>Percent Reporting in Other</th>
<th>Percent Reporting in Other</th>
<th>Percent of Affiliates to National Affiliates</th>
<th>Days in Postal Activity</th>
<th>Days in Event Activity</th>
<th>Days in Evaluation Activity</th>
<th>Days in Evaluation Activity</th>
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<td>Percent of Affiliates to National Affiliation Total</td>
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NA = Data are not available.
N/A = Data are not available.
X/N = Data are not available.
1/2 = Percentage may not total 100 because of rounding.
1/3 = Data are not available.
1/4 = Data are not available.
1/5 = Data are not available.
1/6 = Data are not available.
1/7 = Data are not available.
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1/9 = Data are not available.
1/10 = Data are not available.
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1/14 = Data are not available.
1/15 = Data are not available.
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1/17 = Data are not available.
1/18 = Data are not available.
1/19 = Data are not available.
1/20 = Data are not available.
1/21 = Data are not available.
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<th>Priorities Identified in Program</th>
<th>Implementation Plans</th>
<th>Percent of Program Budget Allocated</th>
<th>Assessment of Plan</th>
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<td>Oakland</td>
<td>Statistics on status offenders and other youth</td>
<td>Early identification of problems</td>
<td>The collaboration staff was restructured to develop and supervise all programs in East Oakland</td>
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<td>The needs assessment plan was poor. It related adequately well to the implementation plan.</td>
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<td>Community services inventory</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>The advocacy budget was for a public relations specialist</td>
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<td>The implementation plan was not done collaboratively. It consisted of real capacity building or advocacy plans.</td>
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<td>Future objectives</td>
<td>Treatment of agency staff</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-Shelter for runaways</td>
<td>-Runaways</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-Educational resources</td>
<td>-Truvancy, alcohol abuse</td>
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<td>-Staff training</td>
<td>-Public relations</td>
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<td>-Resale unemployement</td>
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<td>-Problems in family living</td>
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<td>-School and community attitudes and awareness</td>
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<td>-Community services inventory</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Data from Professionals</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Case analysis</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Brainstorming</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Youth survey</td>
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<td>-Interviewed community professionals</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-Training</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-Data from Professionals</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>-Case analysis</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-Brainstorming</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-Youth survey</td>
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<td>-Statistics on status offenders and other youth</td>
<td>Education</td>
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<td>The programs related well to the needs assessment.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Conference to do self-assessment</td>
<td>-Work</td>
<td>-The plan called for the collaboration to administer all programs, some in cooperation with Youth Alternatives</td>
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<td>-Clerks represented a wide range of the community.</td>
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<td>Data from Metropolitan Youth Council</td>
<td>-Recreation</td>
<td>-The plan did not call for implementation collaboratively or by affiliates</td>
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<td>-The plan contained few direct service plans for status offenders but had more for children at risk.</td>
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<td>-Training</td>
<td>-Youth activities</td>
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<td>-Capacity building was provided through training rather than experience.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Improve schools youth attitudes</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Training in work with youth</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-Community awareness</td>
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<td>-Family relations</td>
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<td>-Affiliate resources</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Share information</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Reduce unemployement</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Improve schools' youth attitudes</td>
<td>(All areas of youth needs were important. They didn't prioritize.)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-Training</td>
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<td>-Community services inventory</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-Data from Professionals</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-Case analysis</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-Brainstorming</td>
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<td>-Youth survey</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-Statistics on status offenders and other youth</td>
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<td>The program won good but it had relatively little impact because it was not well integrated.</td>
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<td>-Recreation</td>
<td>-The capacity building plans were good</td>
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<td>-It made very good use of the collaboration.</td>
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<td>-Community services inventory</td>
<td>-Mental health services</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-The capacity building plans were good.</td>
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<td>-Data from Professionals</td>
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<td>-Case analysis</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-Youth survey</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Statistics on status offenders and other youth</td>
<td>Many children at risk in community</td>
<td>-Education</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>-The needs assessment was good.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-Youth survey</td>
<td>-Truvancy</td>
<td>-The direct service plan involved having central staff who supervised programs in existing community agencies</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-It related well to the needs of youth, poorly to organizational change but used community resources well.</td>
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<td>-Community services available</td>
<td>-Depression high</td>
<td>-Capacity building was implemented by collaborations and central staff</td>
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<td>-It planned well for additional central staff.</td>
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<td>-Data from Metropolitan Youth Council</td>
<td>-Parent-child relations poor</td>
<td>-Mental health services</td>
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<td>-Organizational self-assessment</td>
<td>-Agency training inadequate</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-Many children at risk in community</td>
<td>-Community attitudes negative</td>
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</table>

*Statistics were from a variety of sources. The ISO Grantee in most cases had extensive data on the status offenders. | 1/ | Includes state collaboration. | 2/ | Includes ombudsman, which is classified as capacity building by the plan. | 3/ | Includes state collaboration. |
TABLE 6

SUMMARY OF PROGRAM TYPES AND BUDGETS IN THE ORIGINAL PLANS

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site</th>
<th>Revised Budget</th>
<th>Original Budget</th>
<th>Administration</th>
<th>Capacity Building</th>
<th>Advocacy</th>
<th>Direct Service</th>
<th>Total Program</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Percent of Total</td>
<td>Reported</td>
<td>Percent of Total</td>
<td>Reported</td>
<td>Percent of Total</td>
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<td>Budget</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>41,125^d/</td>
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<td>20,450</td>
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<td>14,175</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5,500</td>
<td>6^e/</td>
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</table>

^a/ Original budget used for program because later comparable figures unavailable.
^b/ Includes a full time staff person for public relation, information and education.
^c/ Does not include Program Element AA.
^d/ Does not include Program Element U.
^e/ Advocacy is 13 percent of budget when State of Connecticut budget is included.
^f/ Direct service program at local site only.
## Table 7

**PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE COLLABORATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Total Number of Programs Planned</th>
<th>Percent on Time</th>
<th>Percent of Programs Implemented or in Progress</th>
<th>Percent of Programs Using Existing Community Resources</th>
<th>Total Persons Served</th>
<th>Total Contact Days</th>
<th>Cost Efficiency Rate</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oakland</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>460</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spartanburg</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spokane</td>
<td>21</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1,037</td>
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<td>Tucson</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>1,106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NA = Data are not applicable.
N/A = Data are not available.

Implementation began within two months of projected date.

Does not include programs implemented by collaboration staff or committees.


Status offenders included in this figure.

Cost efficiency rate is dollar cost per contact per seven-hour day. The rate is derived by the formula:

\[
\text{Cost Efficiency Rate} = \frac{A - B}{C \cdot D \cdot E} \cdot F
\]

Where:

- A = total cost
- B = salaries to youth
- C = hours per program per day
- D = number of participants
- E = number of days
- F = 7 hours per day

Does not include mass media contact with the general public.

Does not represent persons served to data but separated by program.

Numbers not available as of December 31, 1977 because program start was late.

Monthly mailing.

Cost efficiency rate based on persons served.

No Program Element B.

**Youth Service Manual** for planning and distribution to youth serving agencies. In addition, Tucson did some very imaginative advocacy especially with the media. We are unable to count number of persons served for television programming.

Monthly mailing by the state collaboration. In addition, attendance at state legislation committee, state conferences with presentations, legislative workshops, etc.
### TABLE 8

BOARD MEMBERS' ATTITUDES TOWARD PUNISHMENT OF STATUS OFFENDERS, FALL 1977

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oakland (86)</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spartanburg (53)</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spokane (150)</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tucson (269)</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut (72)</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Percentages may not total 100 in some cases, due to rounding.

### TABLE 9

CHANGE IN BOARD MEMBERS' ATTITUDES TOWARD DETENTION OF STATUS OFFENDERS, FALL 1976 TO FALL 1977

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oakland</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spartanburg</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spokane</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tucson</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The table shows the percentage of board members who agree and disagree with the statements over the two years.
TABLE 10

CHANGE IN BOARD MEMBERS' ATTITUDES TOWARD PERSONAL DISTANCE AND BEHAVIOR, FALL 1976 TO FALL 1977

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I would discourage my daughter from</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inviting a sexually promiscuous girl</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to stay overnight.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oakland</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spartanburg</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spokane</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tucson</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 11

CHANGE IN BOARD MEMBERS' ATTITUDES TOWARD MIXING STATUS OFFENDERS AND OTHER CHILDREN, FALL 1976 TO FALL 1977

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organizations should not mix status</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>offenders with other groups of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>children</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oakland</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spartanburg</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spokane</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tucson</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 12

**Change in Organizational Capacity of National Assembly Affiliates to Serve Status Offenders, Fall 1976 to Fall 1977**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site and Number (10)</th>
<th>Percent Organizations With Substantially Increased Capacity (As Perceived By Staff)</th>
<th>Change In Number With Substantially Increased Capacity</th>
<th>Change In Number With Substantially Decreased Capacity</th>
<th>Per Cent of Organizations With Increased Capacity in Program Budget</th>
<th>Per Cent of Organizations With Decreased Capacity in Program Budget</th>
<th>Board Awareness</th>
<th>Membership Awareness</th>
<th>Staff and Board Training</th>
<th>Organizations Implementing Collaboration Programs</th>
<th>Percent Of Collaboration Programs Implemented By Affiliates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oakland (13)</td>
<td>50 percent</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Considerable raised consciousness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spokane (7)</td>
<td>60 percent</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Much more knowledge in all areas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National (11)</td>
<td>50 percent</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*NA = Data are not applicable.

*Data are not available.*

*Change in attitudes between first interview (Fall, 1976) and second interview (Fall, 1977).*

*Represents only programs completed or currently in progress.*

*New staff number.*

*Changes in data gathering method.*

*Implemented program before form was developed.*

*See Table 15, Appendix A, for technical assistance developed for locals.*
TABLE 13

CHANGE IN ORGANIZATIONAL ADVOCACY AND DIRECT SERVICE BY NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AFFILIATES,
FALL 1976 TO FALL 1977

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site</th>
<th>Advocacy</th>
<th>Direct Service</th>
<th>New Monies Obtained or Allocated for</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of Organizations</td>
<td>Number of Status Offenders Served</td>
<td>New Programs Planned for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reporting 1975-76</td>
<td>by Individual Affiliates 1975-76</td>
<td>Status Offenders and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reporting Advocacy Activity 1977</td>
<td>for Future</td>
<td>Status Offenders and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reporting Communications 1975-76</td>
<td></td>
<td>Children at Risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1977 1975-76</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oakland</td>
<td>0 0 0 0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spartanburg</td>
<td>0 1 0 0</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spokane</td>
<td>0 0 0 0</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tucson</td>
<td>0 0 0 0</td>
<td>763</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>N/A N/A N/A N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>12 12b/9 12</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NA = Data are not applicable.
N/A = Data are not available.

b/Plus 10,000 reported by The Red Cross.

b/10 of the 12 for whom we have data increased advocacy content from previous year.

b/These data are not available in consistent form. Table 14 shows type and location of direct service programs.

b/These data are not available in consistent form.
TABLE 14

DIRECT SERVICE PROGRAMS DEVELOPED OR PLANNED
BY NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS FOR
STATUS OFFENDERS AND CHILDREN AT RISK
AT OTHER THAN COLLABORATION SITES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Boys Club</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>60 percent have tutoring classes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54 percent have work-training programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61 percent have youth employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 percent have drug/alcohol abuse prevention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Alcohol Abuse Prevention Project - 13 pilot sites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Health Project - 5 local sites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 local clubs were recipients of Honor Awards for Program Excellence centered around programs for status offenders.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Camp Fire Girls</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New Day Implementation Program</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Girls Clubs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>73 percent conduct juvenile delinquency programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88 percent conduct career/job development programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 percent have joint planning with juvenile delinquency authorities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Girl Scouts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eight direct service programs conducted by various local clubs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Junior Leagues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11 percent of programs were in criminal justice (101)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.4 percent of programs were in child welfare (77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reflected interest in:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Child Abuse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Youth Service Programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Juvenile Justice Research and Impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Volunteer Participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Citizens Involvement and Advocacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Juvenile Courts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
National Council for Homemaker Health Aid Services
Working with children at risk is high priority

National Council of Jewish Women
Task Force Progress Reports on Justice for Children list 77 different projects
The Justice for Children Programs had three major program pieces
1) children's rights
2) how to set up a group home
3) Coalitions For Action
Major areas of work in 1976
1) beginning direct service programs
2) monitoring court services
3) developing community awareness

National Council on Crime and Delinquency
Promoted the use of youth service bureaus
Helped schools increase capacity to
1) prevent delinquency
2) develop alternatives to juvenile incarceration
3) work with status offenders more beneficially

Young Men's Christian Associations
National Youth Project Using Mini-Bikes has 385 operating units
Local YMCA Juvenile Justice Programs:
1) 108 direct-prevention juvenile justice programs
2) 70 diversion programs
3) 13 alternative treatment programs

Young Women's Christian Associations
45 funded projects by community YWCA's from 1969-1972
11 intervention programs in New England Area
36 community association-sponsored projects
New York State YWCA Intervention Project (5 year) with 6 participating YWCA's
Boys Clubs

BCA National Director William R. Brecker serves on the President's National Advisory Committee for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention

four regional workshops on government funding

BCA Programs and Services Survey by Carole Kazlow, Ph.D. and Susan Lackman

BCA National Director met with HEW secretary and White House staff to formulate a national youth policy

Camp Fire Girls

Workshop for youth development and advocacy

Girls Clubs

4 regional Juvenile Justice Youth In Trouble Workshops

Juvenile Justice Specialists provided Technical Assistance to individual clubs

GCA training sessions designed to have impact on girls in conflict

GCA national staff members served on U.S. Women's Agenda Task Force on Juvenile Justice

GCA staff was represented on State Planning Agency and Regional Units

GCA staff attended symposium on status offenders in Washington, D.C., sponsored by National Council of Jewish Women

GCA appointed a Juvenile Justice Specialist to their National Staff

sessions on locating funding sources and developing proposals were held for local clubs at regional meetings

Resource News publications regularly reported information useful to the development of local programs

Juvenile Justice Specialist represents GCA on the National Task Force on Juvenile Justice, National Assembly of Voluntary Health and Social Welfare Organizations, Inc.

Junior Leagues

Impact - 4 year project funded by LEAA

1) provided orientation materials on crime and delinquency

2) Impact Training Institute was attended by 192 community delegates who then acted as consultants

3) Impact Follow-Up meetings were attended by 366 delegates, provided aid in program development and technical assistance upon request
National Council For Homemaker Health Aid Services
Costs of Homemaker-Home Health Aide and Alternative Forms of Service
Child Abuse and Neglect - What Can Be Done

National Council of Jewish Women
developed Children Without Justice promotional kit
published National Council of Jewish Women Symposium on Status Offenders: Manual for Action
published article in Federal Probation discussing new volunteer in juvenile justice
St. Louis Section prepared Child Abuse and Neglect Manual
was featured in The Youngest Outlaws: Runaways In America by Arnold P. Rubins (published by Julian Messner, A Division of Simon and Schuster, Inc, 1976) Chapter on the NCJW's Teaneck group home in Teaneck, New Jersey
served as a resource in the area of Juvenile Justice and Voluntarism at the Volunteers Conference in Wisconsin
presented "Symposium on Child Abuse: Let's Break the Cycle," held by NCJW Stamford Section and Junior League of Stamford and the Hospital Auxiliary of Stamford.

National Council on Crime and Delinquency
a basic service of NCCD is to provide technical assistance to state and local agencies and organizations; examples of the kinds of technical consultation offered include:
1) Community Consultations - Several hundred were made each year. (Program assessments and evaluations, on-site technical assistance, survey of training needs, management studies.)
2) Training Activities: 3 seminars, 5 workshops, 5 training programs

Young Men's Christian Association
"Planning For Juvenile Justice," a manual for local YMCA's
"The YMCA and the Juvenile Offender"
"The YMCA In the Streets," manual
"Report of Conference of Supervisors of the Detached Worker Program"
674 on-site visits to locals by 8 regional Juvenile Justice staff directors

Young Women's Christian Association
"Job Guidelines for Teen Counseling Training and Career Development"
"Lets Try a Workshop With Teen Women"
"Attention Is Needed, Action Is Called For"
27th National Convention - Juvenile Justice Optional Workshop
TABLE 16

SELECTED POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS OF COLLABORATION SITES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oakland</td>
<td>1,091,400 b/</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>$5,034</td>
<td>$9,626</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>56.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spartanburg</td>
<td>191,000</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>4,346</td>
<td>8,187</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>43.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spokane</td>
<td>305,600</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>4,499</td>
<td>9,137</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>898</td>
<td>64.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tucson</td>
<td>443,700</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>4,385</td>
<td>8,759</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>2,147</td>
<td>63.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waterbury</td>
<td>761,000</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>10,459</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>648</td>
<td>42.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N/A = Data were not available.

a/ Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area.
b/ Alameda County.
c/ No data were available for the other Connecticut sites.

TABLE 17

KNOWLEDGE BY LOCAL AFFILIATE OF NATIONAL TASK FORCE REPRESENTATIVE, FALL 1976

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site</th>
<th>Doesn't Know Anyone Nationally or Regionally</th>
<th>Knows Regional Representative Percent</th>
<th>Knows National Task Force Representative By Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oakland (11)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spartanburg (11)</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spokane (14)</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tucson (12)</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danbury (5)</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torrington (4)</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waterbury (12)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 18

REPORT BY LOCAL COLLABORATION REPRESENTATIVES OF COMMUNICATION FROM NATIONAL TASK FORCE, FALL 1976

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site</th>
<th>Amount of Perceived Communication</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Little</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oakland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spartanburg</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spokane</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tucson</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danbury</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torrington</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waterbury</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE 19

**WORK STYLES OF LOCAL COLLABORATION STAFF**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site</th>
<th>Percent of Time Reported in</th>
<th>Average Daily Number of</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Appointments and Phone Calls</td>
<td>Study and Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Meetings</td>
<td>Paper Work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Phone Calls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Appointments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oakland</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spartanburg</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spokane</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tucson</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a/\) Travel and miscellaneous not included.

### TABLE 20

**COLLABORATION REPRESENTATIVES' PERCEPTIONS OF FREQUENCY OF CONTACT WITH LOCAL COLLABORATION STAFF**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site</th>
<th>Percent Responding (^a/)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No Contact Only at Some Frequent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Meeting Contact Contact Contact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oakland (19)</td>
<td>21 5 32 42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spartanburg (21)</td>
<td>19 0 19 62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spokane (15)</td>
<td>33 0 20 47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tucson (16)</td>
<td>6 6 19 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut (39)</td>
<td>76 3 10 10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a/\) Percentages may not total 100 because of rounding.
TABLE 21

PERCENT OF ITEMS DISCUSSED AT COLLABORATION MEETINGS WITH FORMAL ACTIONS TAKEN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site</th>
<th>Total Number of Items Discussed</th>
<th>Number of Items Discussed With Formal Decision Recorded</th>
<th>Percent of Items Discussed With Formal Decision Recorded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oakland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - Subcommittee</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - Board</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spartanburg</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - Subcommittee</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - Executive Committee</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spokane</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - Subcommittee</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - Executive Committee and Steering Committee</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tucson</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - Subcommittee</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - Steering Committee</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - Region A</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - Waterbury</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 - Torrington</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 - Danbury</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - Task Force</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - Steering</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>115&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>/More than one formal decision recorded per topic discussed,
### TABLE 22

**ACTIONS OF COLLABORATION MEMBERS IN FORMAL MEETINGS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Total Actions</th>
<th>Chairperson/Coordinator</th>
<th>DSO Grantee</th>
<th>National Assembly Affiliates</th>
<th>Other Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Average Percent of Acts By Chairperson (When Present)</td>
<td>Average Percent of Acts By Coordinator (When Present)</td>
<td>Average Percent of Acts By DSO Grantee (When Present)</td>
<td>Average Percent of Acts By Three Most Influential Affiliates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oakland</td>
<td>2,897</td>
<td></td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Chair/1st Coordinator</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Chair/2nd Coordinator</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spartanburg</td>
<td>4,805</td>
<td></td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Chairperson</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Chairperson</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spokane</td>
<td>896£</td>
<td></td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tucson</td>
<td>1,721</td>
<td></td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region A</td>
<td>2,591</td>
<td></td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danbury</td>
<td>1,388</td>
<td></td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>N/A£</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torrington</td>
<td>1,565</td>
<td></td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>N/A£</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waterbury</td>
<td>507</td>
<td></td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>N/A£</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N/A = Data were not available.

£/ Percentages represent average participation per meeting attended throughout the observation period. Therefore row totals do not equal 100 percent.

£/ Chairperson represented one organization identified as most influential.

£/ Data gathering method varied from that used in other sites.

£/ Only two were identified as most influential.

£/ Had one or more influential non-affiliate.

£/ Did not attend observed meetings.

£/ None were identified as most influential.
TABLE 23
MEMBERS' PERCEPTIONS OF EFFECTIVENESS OF THE COLLABORATIONS, FALL 1976

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site</th>
<th>Respondents Number</th>
<th>Perceptions of Process Outcome</th>
<th>Perceptions of What Collaboration Did Best</th>
<th>Perceptions of Whether They Would Join Again</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Very Effective</td>
<td>Moderately Effective</td>
<td>Not Very Effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oakland</td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spartanburg</td>
<td>(14)</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spokane</td>
<td>(13)</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tucson</td>
<td>(14)</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>(14)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Percentages may not total 100 because of rounding or nonresponse.