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Cadet Voice

Extended Deterrence and Resilience in the Baltic States

Liam J. Connolly

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Since the end of the Second World War the United States has practiced extended deterrence as a means of resisting Russian expansion and aggression.¹ In Europe, the US has done this with the support of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. After the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, NATO shifted its focus away from Russia and grew to include several states which had once been part of the USSR; Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. However, it was not until after conflict broke out in Ukraine in 2014, and Russia re-emerged as a threat that the alliance was forced to seriously consider defending the Baltics.

For several years, NATO has concentrated its efforts almost exclusively on the structure and placement of military forces with hopes of rebuilding its once-strong deterrence posture in Europe. The modern, non-kinetic threat to the Baltic Three, however, demands more nuanced solutions which transcend the military sphere. For this reason, the United States and its NATO allies must focus more of their efforts in Northeastern Europe on resilience rather than traditional deterrence. A strategy of resilience in the Baltics must include efforts to counter propaganda and

information warfare, build societal cohesion and assimilate Russian-speaking people, and reinforce cyber security in both the private and public sectors. Altogether, these lines of effort will deny the Kremlin the ability to achieve political and strategic goals in the Baltics.

EXTENDED DETERRENCE VERSUS RESILIENCE

Extended deterrence is the concept in which one state guarantees that it will use its military forces not only for its own defense, but also for the defense of its allies. This is done with the intent to persuade a third-party mutual adversary to maintain the status quo in a conflict.² Regardless of the domain, deterrence, at its core, consists of two elements: capabilities and credibility. Deterrence is only functional when these elements come together and capabilities are matched with an actual willingness to employ such capabilities.

Signaling “will” is critical when it comes to proving the resolve and legitimacy of an alliance which includes an extended deterrence agreement.³ The United States has

¹ Second Lieutenant Liam Connolly (USAFA '19) is completing his pilot training.

² Schuyler Foerster, ed., *American Defense Policy*, 6th edition. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990).

³ Matthew Fuhrmann and Todd Sechser, “Signaling Alliance Commitments: Hand-Tying and Sunk Costs in Extended Nuclear Deterrence,” *American Journal of Political Science* 58, no. 4 (October 2014): 919–935.

long struggled with figuring out how exactly to signal to adversaries its true willingness to employ military forces and risk personal harm, or even survival, for the sake of another state's security. Signals which are too strong run the risk of escalating the conflict to a point which is too costly for either side.

This was the case in October 1969 when President Richard Nixon ordered the "Madman Nuclear Alert" and heightened the readiness of US strategic forces in hopes of bringing the Soviets to the negotiating table in Vietnam.⁴ Soviet leadership, however, was unsure how to interpret the message and experts conclude that the alert represented a serious miscalculation on behalf of US leadership and was ultimately detrimental to stability.⁵

On the other hand, weaker signals may embolden the adversary. In his landmark work, *Arms and Influence*, political scientist Thomas Schelling explained the dangers associated with allowing an adversary to slowly push the limits of a security commitment with tactics that meet, but do not cross, the threshold for retaliation. Schelling coined the term "salami tactics" to describe such activities and argued that, over time, the threshold for retaliation will be forced to rise and the adversary will earn greater freedom to exercise its will.⁶

In the nuclear domain, extended deterrence works to prevent nuclear-capable adversaries from striking allies and partners who lack

such capabilities. Nuclear deterrence is closely linked with punishment, or the threat of using strategic weapons to eliminate significant portions of an adversary's civilian population and infrastructure.⁷

Extended nuclear deterrence also works as a means of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. States have no need to pursue their own nuclear program if they feel assured by an ally's capabilities. For decades, the United States' nuclear umbrella has applied to each of its NATO allies and has expanded as the alliance has stretched eastward towards Russia. NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept explicitly states that, "[t]he supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States."⁸ Simply put, the United States' nuclear capabilities stand as the bedrock of NATO members' national security.

Much like nuclear capabilities, conventional forces also play an essential role in efforts to deter an adversary. Conventional deterrence, however, tends to be more closely associated with denial, or simply, "convincing an opponent that he will not attain his goals on the battlefield."⁹ Today, NATO members contribute troops and resources to conventional land, air, and sea forces, some of which are forward staged on the alliance's eastern flank.¹⁰ Given NATO's strictly defensive posture, these forces and their capabilities are meant to influence Russian

⁴ Scott Sagan and Jeremi Suri, "The Madman Nuclear Alert," *The MIT Press* 27, no. 4 (Spring 2003): 150–183.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Thomas C. Schelling, "The Art of Commitment," in *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).

⁷ John J. Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence*, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983).

⁸ NATO, "Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization" (NATO Public Diplomacy Division, November 20, 2010).

⁹ John J. Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence*.

¹⁰ David A. Shlapak and Michael Johnson, *Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO's Eastern Flank* (RAND Corporation, 2016).

leaders' calculus should they consider hostile military intervention within the borders of the alliance.

In the 21st Century, extended deterrence is not strictly limited to the conventional and nuclear domains. A truly effective modern deterrence posture incorporates the full spectrum of warfighting domains to make clear to the adversary that any act of aggression would prove to be too costly in the long term. US Air Force General John E. Hyten, the current Commander of USSTRATCOM, underscored the reality of this dynamic when he said the following:

The components of our nuclear triad have always been and will continue to be the backbone of our nation's deterrent force. That is where deterrence starts. But today it's more than just nuclear. It requires the integration of all our capabilities...¹¹

Deterrence theory was largely born out of the Cold War's bi-polar balance of power which rested on the strength of conventional and nuclear forces, but the dissolution of the Soviet Union has forced a dramatic shift in the global security environment. Adversaries have rapidly worked to gain an asymmetric edge given the United States' and its allies' sizeable conventional advantage.¹²

In turn, warfighting domains which exist beyond the conventional and nuclear spheres have become increasingly relevant in recent years. Most notably, states and non-state actors alike have begun working to exploit the

harmful, even militant potential of space and cyberspace. Beyond that, some countries, namely Russia, have incorporated "soft", traditionally non-military tools into military doctrine for achieving political and strategic goals.¹³ Rather than existing in separate spheres, economic, diplomatic, and informational tactics are now central to modern warfare. This full spectrum approach to conflict poses a challenge to traditional deterrence theory as leaders today are forced to consider how to address threats and acts of aggression which do not meet the threshold for a violent, military response.

Relative to extended deterrence and traditional methods of maintaining the status quo, resilience offers a more nuanced approach to meeting these modern security challenges. As explained by Dr. Guillaume Lasconjarias of the NATO Defense College, deterrence focuses primarily on the military sphere, whereas a strategy of resilience takes a "whole-of-society approach" to reducing a nation's vulnerability to 21st Century threats such as information warfare and cyber-attacks.¹⁴

Rather than preventing attacks before they take place, resilience ensures that the acts of aggression are unable to achieve the effects desired by the adversary. As members of the transatlantic political community, NATO member states pride themselves on fostering free and open societies. Unfortunately, this makes the world's most robust military

¹¹ General John E. Hyten, "2017 Deterrence Symposium Opening Remarks" (Omaha, Nebraska, July 26, 2017).

¹² Herbert Lin and Jackie Kerr, "On Cyber-Enabled Information/Influence Warfare and Manipulation," *SSRN* (August 13, 2017).

¹³ Mark Galeotti, "The 'Gerasimov Doctrine' and Russian Non-Linear War," *In Moscow's Shadows*, February 27, 2013.

¹⁴ Guillaume Lasconjarias, *Deterrence through Resilience: NATO, the Nations and the Challenges of Being Prepared*, Eisenhower Papers (Rome: Research Division - NATO Defense College, May 2017).

alliance exceptionally weak with regards to these threats.¹⁵

In practice, resilience includes a wide array of potential endeavors, which range from improving education, building societal cohesion, and strengthening law enforcement among other things.¹⁶ Because the focus is internal, each state's approach to resilience is likely to be unique. However, regardless of the means taken to achieve it, the ultimate goal is to enhance a nation's capacity to withstand prolonged pressure and aggression. To be clear, resilience is not a complete alternative to deterrence but rather a means of reinforcing and supplementing deterrence. Given the challenges and threats currently facing NATO in the Baltics, it is worthwhile to consider a shift in focus from deterrence to resilience in this specific corner of the alliance.

THE THREAT TO THE BALTIC THREE

In 2004 Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia were welcomed into NATO as full members, and thus became beneficiaries of the alliance's collective defense agreement.¹⁷ Likewise, the former Soviet republics also took their place under the shield of the US nuclear umbrella.

The Baltic States represent the eastern-most edge of the alliance and the farthest that NATO has reached into the Russian sphere of influence.

The Baltics' relationship with Russia dates back to the 18th century and the times when

the Russian Empire ruled what is now modern-day Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia.¹⁸ The Russian Revolution granted the Baltics a brief period of independence, but Soviet occupation took hold in 1940 as Europe nosedived towards the Second World War.¹⁹ Across the Soviet era, the Baltic States stood as part of the geographic "buffer" between Russia and the West.

Following WWII, the communist regime in Moscow implemented so-called Russification policies across the USSR in hopes of, "sovietizing the non-Russian population."²⁰ Ethnic Russians proliferated throughout the Soviet republics and along with them came Russian language and culture.²¹ As a result, over the course of fifty years of Soviet occupation the ethnic composition of the Baltic States was dramatically altered.

Today, in Lithuania, 5.8% of the overall population is ethnically Russian while 8% speak Russian as their primary language.²² In comparison, 24.8% of Estonians are ethnically Russian and 29.6% speak Russian as their primary language.²³ In Latvia, the state most severely impacted by Russification in the Baltics, 25.6% of the population is ethnically Russian while 33% of citizens identify Russian as their primary language.²⁴

In 2014 the Putin regime asserted that Russia has an obligation to "protect" ethnic Russians

¹⁵ Franklin Kramer, Hans Binnendijk, and Dan Hamilton, "Defend the Arteries of Society," *US New & World Report*, June 9, 2015, sec. World Report.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ Brad Roberts, *The Case for US Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2016).

¹⁸ Romuald J. Misiunas and James H. Bater, "Baltic States - Independence and the 20th Century," *Encyclopedia Britannica*.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ Robert J. Kaiser, *The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR*, Princeton Legacy Library (Princeton University Press, 1994).

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² "The World Factbook: Lithuania," *Central Intelligence Agency*.

²³ "The World Factbook: Estonia," *Central Intelligence Agency*.

²⁴ "The World Factbook: Latvia," *Central Intelligence Agency*.

and Russian-speaking people everywhere.²⁵ Russia, in turn, relied on this claim to justify the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula as well as their support for the bloody separatist movement in Eastern Ukraine.²⁶ Coupled with the history of the Baltics' relationship with Russia, this policy strongly implies that Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia are logical targets of Russian belligerence.

Already, the Baltic States have found themselves victims of low-level, non-violent Russian aggression.²⁷ In 2007, cyber infrastructure in Estonia was struck with massive "distributed denial of service" (DDOS) attacks after the Estonian government decided to move a Soviet war memorial outside the center of the country's capital city, Tallinn.²⁸ Although there has been no definitive proof that the attacks were ordered or carried out about by the Russian government, Estonian investigators claim to have traced the attacks back to internet users in Russia.

Likewise, Lithuania claims that between 2015 and 2016 the Kremlin was responsible for a wave of cyber-attacks against government systems.²⁹ More recently, in August of 2017 the Kurzeme region of Latvia experienced a widespread cell-service outage. A Russian ship equipped with electronic warfare capabilities was coincidentally located off Latvia's coast at the time of the outage, and

the country's intelligence services strongly suspected a connection.³⁰ These alleged attacks are consistent with what many officials in the Baltic countries say has been taking place consistently in the region for decades now since the Soviet Union disintegrated.³¹

Russia is also guilty of relying on state-backed media platforms and non-governmental organizations to deliver skewed news and information to Russian speaking populations in the Baltic States.³² The Russian government's "Compatriots Policy" functions as an arm of the state propaganda machine by linking pro-Russia organizations in the Baltics with necessary funding and resources.³³

Furthermore, Russian media outlets in the Baltics have become known for expressing anti-Western messages and tend to draw viewers in with higher production quality relative to local media outlets, which communicate in languages other than Russian.³⁴ Estonia's 2013 Internal Security Service Annual Report asserts that Russian influence operations in the country focus primarily on claims that, "Estonia supports Nazism; Russian-speaking people are discriminated against in Estonia *en masse*; [and] Estonia is a dead-end state that only causes problems for its Western partners."³⁵ Latvia and Lithuania have also been targets of

²⁵ "Transcript: Putin Says Russia Will Protect the Rights of Russians Abroad," *The Washington Post*, March 18, 2014, sec. World.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ Andrew Radin, "Hybrid Warfare in the Baltics: Threats and Potential Responses" (RAND Corporation, 2017).

²⁸ Will Goodman, "Cyber Deterrence: Tougher in Theory than in Practice?" *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, vol. 4, no. 3 (Fall 2010): 102-135.

²⁹ Andrius Sytas, "Russian Hacking Threatens Lithuania's Banks: Survey," *Reuters*, June 6, 2017.

³⁰ Reid Standish, "Russia's Neighbors Respond to Putin's 'Hybrid War,'" *Foreign Policy*, October 12, 2017.

³¹ Andrew Radin, "Hybrid Warfare in the Baltics: Threats and Potential Responses."

³² *Ibid.*

³³ Mike Winnerstig, *Tools of Destabilization: Russian Soft Power and Non-Military Influence in the Baltic States* (Swedish Defense Research Agency, 2014).

³⁴ Andrew Radin, "Hybrid Warfare in the Baltics: Threats and Potential Responses."

³⁵ *Estonia Internal Security Service Annual Review 2017*, Annual Reviews (Tallinn: Kaitsepolitseiamet, 2017).

claims that the government enforces “fascist” policies.³⁶

These examples represent elements of a larger influence campaign adapted to the 21st century information environment and geared towards fracturing ethnic populations in the Baltics while also cultivating general dissatisfaction with the state.

To be clear, these instances alone do not offer concrete proof of an impending Russian offensive with real, kinetic effects. Because Russian aggression in the Baltics thus far has been non-violent and mostly non-attributable, it is evident that they remain wary of the potentially staggering consequences associated with a conventional war between themselves and NATO for the sake of three states whose people have already soundly rejected Kremlin rule twice in the past century. Somewhere there exists a threshold at which point Russia’s provocative actions will be met with retaliation. To operate beneath this threshold and to continue to apply non-kinetic tools with the hope of reigning Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia back into its personal sphere of influence is Russia’s goal.

In order to understand this, much can be learned from the words of Russian leaders themselves. Mark Galeotti, a senior research fellow at the Institute of International Affairs Prague, famously published and analyzed a 2013 speech by Russian General Valery Gerasimov.³⁷ Galeotti coined the term “Gerasimov Doctrine” to refer to the speech which loosely outlined Moscow’s perspective on the rapidly-evolving security environment and the use of non-violent methods to achieve

political and strategic goals in the aftermath of the Arab Spring.

Initial analysis of the speech focused on the idea that non-kinetic activities such as those seen in the Baltics are a prelude to war. In other words, these activities are the Kremlin’s way of “stirring up the battlefield” before *really* engaging in conflict. In a more recent analysis of the speech, however, Galeotti writes, “[t]he point is this: If the subversion is not the prelude to war, but the war itself, this changes our understanding of the threat...”³⁸

Galeotti argues that Russia does not equate the line between non-kinetic and kinetic activities with the line between peace and war. Rather, war exists on a wide spectrum and begins with non-violent, non-kinetic activities, which impact the adversary’s political, economic, and psychological condition. This analysis fits the narrative in the Baltic States quite well.

Regardless of whether or not the conflict becomes violent, Russian non-violent aggression, as it stands today, poses a legitimate threat to stability in the Baltics and represents a serious challenge to the sovereignty of these states. An inadequate response from NATO gives weight to concerns that the alliance is not as resolute as it claims to be, and that the United States is not, in fact, a reliable partner in terms of security. For this reason, it is worthwhile to consider the signals that the United States is sending as well as the implications they have for deterring Russia in the Baltics.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Mark Galeotti, “I’m Sorry for Creating the ‘Gerasimov Doctrine,’” *Foreign Policy*, March 5, 2018.

³⁸ Ibid.

POLICY DEVELOPMENTS

The annexation of Crimea and the onset of the Russian-backed separatist movement in Eastern Ukraine in the spring of 2014 sent shockwaves across NATO. It had been over two decades since Western leaders had seriously considered the possibility of European states being violently attacked from the East. NATO was forced to re-discover its Cold War-era “playbook” and begin seriously thinking about Russia as an adversary once again.

In June of 2014, just months after the onset of the conflict in Ukraine, US President Barack Obama introduced the European Reassurance Initiative.³⁹ The President’s proposal, later approved by Congress, included \$1 billion in support of coalition exercises with NATO allies, the deployment of US military advisors, and the improvement of critical security infrastructure in Europe. Each of these lines of effort put special emphasis on Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland given their history with and proximity to Russia.

This policy was a clear and swift response to Russia’s decision to threaten peace on the continent. It was also a recognition of the fact that, since becoming bogged down in the Global War on Terror and naïve to the reality of great power competition, NATO’s force structure and capabilities in Europe had atrophied.

The 2016 election of President Donald Trump gave many proponents of transatlantic collective defense cause for concern. As a

candidate and president-elect, Trump openly called into question the efficacy of NATO and Article V several times.⁴⁰ Once in office, however, Trump’s tone changed. In 2017, President Obama’s original policy was re-named the European Deterrence Initiative and spending grew significantly to \$3.4 billion annually.⁴¹

Beyond that, the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy (2017) and Nuclear Posture Review (2018) were exceptionally candid in framing Russia as a legitimate, competitive adversary. Under the sub-heading “Promote American Resilience”, the most recent NSS asserts that, “actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies.”⁴² This accurately describes not just Russia’s efforts to interfere in American elections, but also the Kremlin’s hybrid strategy in locations such as the Baltics. Later, the document reads, “Russia seeks to restore its great power status and establish spheres of influence near its borders.”⁴³ This is a direct reference to the annexation of Crimea and Russia’s greater expansionary ambitions in the former Soviet Union. These quotes reflect the Trump administration’s realist perspective on international affairs and a break from the Obama administration’s optimistic outlook on relations with Russia.

With regards to the developments in the broader alliance, NATO heads of state and government gathered in Wales in September of 2014 with hopes of charting a new path forward in the face of a renewed, looming threat.⁴⁴ Leaders agreed that the alliance

³⁹ Office of the Press Secretary, “FACT SHEET: European Reassurance Initiative and Other U.S. Efforts in Support of NATO Allies and Partners,” *Whitehouse.gov*.

⁴⁰ Jenna Johnson, “Trump on NATO: ‘I Said It Was Obsolete. It’s No Longer Obsolete.’,” *The Washington Post*, April 12, 2017, sec. Post Politics.

⁴¹ Jen Judson, “Funding to Deter Russia Reaches \$6.5B in FY19 Defense Budget Request,” *Defense News*.

⁴² United States, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America” (President of the United States, December 2017).

⁴³ *Ibid*.

⁴⁴ NATO Heads of State and Government, “Wales Summit Declaration” (NATO, September 5, 2014).

needed to develop and implement an updated deterrence posture and took steps to begin restoring the foundations of collective defense in Europe. Among these steps was the pledge by each member to spend 2% of GDP on defense, as well as the establishment of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF).⁴⁵ The VJTF was to be brigade-sized and capable of responding to dynamic threats across the spectrum of warfighting domains.

NATO leaders gathered once again in Warsaw in 2016 and laid out a series of decisions meant to strengthen deterrence. Chief among these decisions was the introduction of the Enhance Forward Presence. This initiative directed the development and deployment of four multinational, defensive battalions in Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland respectively.⁴⁶ In Warsaw, the allies also nominally agreed to enhance resilience. NATO's definition for resilience, however, was narrow in scope and strictly related to response after an *armed* attack.⁴⁷

Altogether, there is no question that the United States and NATO have made notable progress with regards to restoring conventional deterrence in Eastern Europe, specifically in the Baltics. These developments, however, have remained almost entirely tied to the military domain and do little to address the most pressing threats actually facing Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. Fighter jets, warships, and tanks ultimately cannot prevent the spread of propaganda or attacks in the cyber realm.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Thinking along the lines of resiliency, NATO must look beyond strictly the military dimension and take a much broader approach to denying Russia its goals in the Baltics. There are a number of key areas in which the United States and allies ought to invest and turn their attention towards.

For example, media outlets associated with the Russian state propaganda machine play a central role in the Kremlin's influence strategy in the Baltics.⁴⁸ Unfortunately, many TV channels, radio stations, and digital outlets with pro-European slants do not broadcast or publish their work in Russian. Those who are multi-lingual have access to a wide variety of news sources (English, Latvian/Lithuanian/Estonian, and Russian) and are able to see-through absurd Russian propaganda.⁴⁹ However, members of society who, to begin with, are most vulnerable to Russian influence are left to consume media from pro-Kremlin sources, which also tend to have higher production quality, thus solidifying interest from viewers.⁵⁰

Essentially, there exist separate information spheres which are sharply divided by language. Working to ensure that Russian-speaking people in the Baltics have access to free and fair media will make them less susceptible to Kremlin-generated talking points and decrease dissatisfaction with the state.

⁴⁵ Guillaume Lasconjarias, *Deterrence through Resilience: NATO, the Nations and the Challenges of Being Prepared*.

⁴⁶ NATO, "Warsaw Summit Key Decisions" (NATO Public Diplomacy Division, February 2017).

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Mike Winnerstig, *Tools of Destabilization: Russian Soft Power and Non-Military Influence in the Baltic States*.

⁴⁹ "Disputing Putin: How the Baltic States Resist Russia," *The Economist*, January 2019.

⁵⁰ Mike Winnerstig, *Tools of Destabilization: Russian Soft Power and Non-Military Influence in the Baltic States*.

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, a US government funded endeavor, has done work along these lines since the Cold War and claims to have, “played a significant role in the collapse of communism and the rise of democracies in post-communist Europe.”⁵¹ RFE/RL discontinued services directed specifically for the Baltics in 2004.

Along the same lines, ensuring the assimilation and enfranchisement of ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking people in the Baltics is also of great importance. This issue most directly pertains to Latvia, the Baltic state most heavily impacted by Russian immigration during the Soviet era. According to the European Network on Statelessness, roughly 230,000 people currently living in Latvia (about 12% of the total population) fall under the classification of “non-citizen”.⁵² This is largely the result of harsh laws passed in the early 1990’s which prevented those who arrived in Latvia during Soviet times from becoming fully naturalized citizens. Non-citizens in Latvia are denied the opportunity to participate in formal political processes, cannot work in government, and do not have freedom of mobility within the European Union.⁵³

To make matters worse, the general use of Russian language in Latvia has also faced legal restrictions. A 2018 law approved by Latvia’s parliament and president severely limits the use of Russian language in schools across the country despite the fact that many students speak and understand little to no Latvian.⁵⁴

Both Lithuania and Estonia have taken more progressive approaches to ensuring that Russians living within their borders have opportunities equal to those of their ethnically native neighbors.⁵⁵ Yet, in an effort to preserve its sovereignty and erase the legacy of Soviet occupation, Latvia effectively played into the hands of Kremlin-backed propagandists and provoked the birth of pro-Russian political movements within its borders.⁵⁶ In order to counter the impact of such movements, NATO allies ought to encourage Latvia to adopt policies similar to those of its neighbors to the north and south, which open the door for citizenship and tolerate the use of Russian language in official capacities.

NATO has recognized the threat of cyber warfare and much progress has already been made with regards to cyber security in the Baltics. For example, upon request from Estonia in 2008 the alliance established the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence. The size and scope of this entity’s responsibilities has grown over the course of the past decade, and it remains responsible for research and implementation of technology, operations, strategy, and law relating to the cyber domain.⁵⁷ With the assistance of allies, the Baltics’ security apparatus to include military, law enforcement, and intelligence entities has become hardened against cyber-attacks.

However, one of the greatest remaining challenges with cyber security in the Baltics is the threat to private, non-governmental

⁵¹ A. Ross Johnson, “History of RFE/RL,” *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*.

⁵² Jo Venkov, “European Network on Statelessness,” *Not Just a Simple Twist of Fate: Statelessness in Lithuania and Latvia*, October 2018.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ Lucian Kim, “A New Law In Latvia Aims To Preserve National Language By Limiting Russian In Schools,” *National Public Radio*.

⁵⁵ Jo Venkov, “European Network on Statelessness.”

⁵⁶ Andrew Higgins, “Populist Wave Hits Latvia, Lifting Pro-Russia Party in Election,” *The New York Times* (New York, October 7, 2018), sec. Europe.

⁵⁷ “About Us,” *Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence*.

entities. Since the end of the Cold War, many elements of national security and defense which were previously the responsibility of the state have been contracted out and turned over to the private sector. This is especially true with regards to transportation and communication networks, both of which are vulnerable to cyber-attacks.⁵⁸

Valuable organizations and networks which are not directly connected to national security or NATO are also subject to threats in the cyber realm. This includes media outlets, internet providers, cell networks, health care facilities, banks, and energy infrastructure among many other things. Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia each pride themselves on having fostered a unique culture of technological innovation and expansion.⁵⁹

As a result, nearly everything and everyone in this region is, in some way, connected and dependent upon the internet. Evidence shows that Russia clearly understands this dependency and has at least begun to explore methods to exploit weaknesses in the cyber domain in the Baltics' private sector. In recent years, cyber operatives connected to Russia have infiltrated and impacted energy infrastructure, banking systems, and cell service networks in the Baltics.⁶⁰

Loss of access to any of these services could cripple the economy and shake citizens' faith in the state. NATO, backed by the United States influence and resources, must expand the cooperative relationship between the public and private sectors with regards to

cyber security. Moving forward, military, intelligence, and law enforcement organizations in the Baltics must work with civilian partners to ensure that the cyber realm is secure.

CONCLUSION

Extended deterrence, as traditionally practiced by NATO, provides an outdated model for security in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. Today, the threat from Russia facing the newest and most vulnerable members of the alliance transcends the military domain and includes a wide array of subversive, non-violent, and non-kinetic activities. Increasing the number of allied forces in the region and improving interoperability demonstrate a strong commitment to deterrence. However, the likelihood of a conventional, kinetic attack is low.

The presence of soldiers and warplanes cannot prevent information warfare or cyber-attacks before they take place. For this reason, NATO must begin strengthening resiliency in the Baltics. By improving the condition of Russian speaking people, combating propaganda, and strengthening cyber security in the private sector, the Baltics will be more capable of enduring Russian aggression over time.

⁵⁸ Guillaume Lasconjarias, *Deterrence through Resilience: NATO, the Nations and the Challenges of Being Prepared*.

⁵⁹ Alison Coleman, "Why Business Is Booming In the Baltics," *Forbes*, September 20, 2015.

⁶⁰ Gederts Gelzis and Robin Emmott, "Russia May Have Tested Cyber Warfare on Latvia, Western Officials Say," *Reuters*, October 5, 2017.