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Racial Sympathy and Support for Capital Punishment: A Case Study in Concept Transfer

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ABSTRACT
Beliefs about race, especially racial resentment, are key predictors of public support for capital punishment and punitiveness generally. Drawing on a conceptual innovation by political scientist Jennifer Chudy, we explore the utility of transferring into criminology her construct of racial sympathy – or Whites’ concern about Blacks’ suffering. First, across three data sets, we replicate Chudy’s finding that racial sympathy and resentment are empirically distinct constructs. Second, based on a national-level 2019 YouGov survey (n = 760 White respondents) and consistent with Chudy’s thesis, racial sympathy is then shown to be significantly related to the race-specific view that capital punishment is discriminatory but not support for the death penalty or harsher courts. Racial sympathy also is positively associated with advocacy of rehabilitation as the main goal of prison. Notably, in all models, racial resentment has robust effects, increasing punitive sentiments. Taken together, the results suggest that racial sympathy is a concept that can enrich criminologists’ study of how racial beliefs shape crime policy preferences in the United States and beyond, especially those with disparate effects on Blacks.

Virtually no inquiry focusing on race and criminal justice can ignore the momentous events that unfolded on the nation’s streets during 2020 in the aftermath of the police killing of George Floyd and the lengthy list of the unarmed Black victims before him (e.g., Eric Garner, Tamir Rice, Breonna Taylor). Sustained insurgency by African Americans has shown the Black community’s frustration with the social and justice-system inequities that are reproduced in police use of force, especially against people of color. Research reveals that, compared to Whites, African Americans are 2.3 times more likely to be killed by law enforcement officers (Zimring 2017) and over five times more likely than Whites to worry about police brutality – what Graham and colleagues (2020: 1) refer to as a “hidden injury of minority status.”

The protest movement, however, has been remarkable in another way: the large number of Whites whose concern for George Floyd and other victims moved them, in the midst of a pandemic, to don masks and march in communities from coast to coast. Polls following the incident revealed that these sentiments were widely shared, with 49% of White adults supporting versus 26% opposing the protests (25% did not express a view) (Easley 2020). Heartfelt concern and calls for action came from all sectors, including professional athletes and prominent coaches, entertainers, corporations, and the American Society of Criminology itself.¹

At the presidential level, a stark choice was offered. Donald Trump portrayed demonstrators as “thugs,” threatened to call out the U.S. military to quash insurgency, labeled governors “weak” for not “dominating” protesters, and held up a Bible in a photo-op in front of St. John’s Episcopal Church after Attorney General Bill Barr instructed police and National Guard troops to forcibly clear out media personnel and peaceful protesters (Chappell 2020; Miller, Lemire, and Balsamo 2020; Wise 2020). “He did not pray,” observed Bishop Mariann Edgar Budde. “He did not offer a word of balm or condolence to those who are grieving” (Miller, Lemire, and Balsamo 2020). By contrast, then-presidential candidate Joe Biden conducted a listening session at Bethel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Wilmington, Delaware, to hear the “black community express their collective anguish” (Astor 2020). In Philadelphia, he announced it was time “for the nation to deal with systemic racism” and promised “to heal the racial wounds that have long plagued our country” (Glueck 2020). Enough Americans, including 41% of Whites submitting ballots in the 2020 election, embraced his vision of racial justice to earn him more than 81.2 million votes and the presidency (CNN 2020).
These events demonstrate the importance of “racial sympathy” – a concept recently introduced by political scientist Jennifer Chudy (2021: 123; see also Chudy 2017) and “defined as white distress over black suffering.” This racial belief will likely prove critical in how White Americans interpret the death of George Floyd and similar incidents, their openness to criminal justice reform, and their political allegiances. As with other dramatic events communicated visually, specific concern with the Floyd killing captured on videotape is likely to fade (Slovic et al. 2017). Still, it remains to be determined if this spike in Whites’ concern about recent injustices has enduring effects on policing and other social policies.

The purpose of the current project is to show the benefits of transferring Chudy’s concept of racial sympathy from political science into our discipline. Our concern is mainly methodological – to present a case study in how a significant new concept might be imported into criminology systematically. We call this a case study both because the specific transfer of racial sympathy was important in and of itself and to make the broader point that criminology should use the approach reported here as an example to guide disciplinary concept transfers in the future. But beyond this goal, the substantive salience of racial sympathy in the current context is palpable. How Whites think and feel about African Americans might well matter in any policy efforts to address the challenge of police violence and, more broadly, systemic racism in the justice system and beyond.

To explore the potential relevance of racial sympathy to policy preferences, we chose to focus on public support for capital punishment and related punitive attitudes. We did so because race is inextricably entwined with these public opinions and because Chudy argued that racial sympathy’s effects should occur precisely when a social policy is race-related. Thus, research shows that there has been a long-standing racial divide in support for state executions, with the split between Blacks and Whites typically hovering around 25 percentage points (Butler et al. 2018; Johnson 2008; Unnever and Cullen 2007a; Unnever, Cullen, and Jonson 2008). Even though death penalty support has declined in the past quarter-century from 80% to 54%, this racial divide persists (Gallup 2019; see also Enns 2016; Pickett 2019). Thus, a 2018 poll by the Pew Research Center revealed a gap of 23 percentage points, with 59% of Whites compared with 36% of Blacks favoring the death penalty for those convicted of murder (Oliphant 2018).

Importantly, this racial divide has raised the question of why Whites are more supportive of
capital punishment. Scholars have documented that racial beliefs are linked to such punitiveness (see Butler et al. 2018). In particular, research has consistently shown that racial animus or resentment toward African Americans is a key source of Whites’ embrace of capital punishment (see, e.g., Bobo and Johnson 2004; Unnever and Cullen 2007b, 2010b; Unnever, Cullen, and Jonson 2008). In fact, negative racial and ethnic sentiments are related more generally to punitive attitudes, including cross-culturally (Unnever and Cullen 2010a, 2010b; Unnever, Cullen, and Jonson 2008).

Donald Kinder, a noted political scientist at the University of Michigan, has been prominent in measuring and studying the effects on policy opinions of racial resentment. Although progress has been made in some areas such as White support for racial equality (Moberg, Krysan, and Christianson 2019), untoward race-related views and barriers persist – as documented so chillingly by Isabel Wilkerson (2020) in *Caste*. Not surprisingly, scholars continue to assess how racial prejudice underlies punitive policies, especially those hostile to African Americans. Still, Kinder’s work on racial resentment is more than two decades old and, while it is a robust predictor of public policy opinions that remains a standard measure in social science studies, this racial attitude is not a source of current theoretical or methodological innovation. Under his guidance, however, Kinder’s doctoral students at the University of Michigan have recently undertaken research extending and revitalizing the study of racial beliefs and their consequences (see, e.g., Chudy 2017; Jardina 2019).

Most relevant here are Chudy’s (2017, 2021) analyses showing that public policy opinions among Whites are shaped not only by racial resentment but also by racial sympathy. Those with greater racial sympathy are more likely to support policies beneficial to African Americans, such as government aid to Blacks. She demonstrates as well that such sympathy diminishes punitiveness toward Black offenders. Although limited, research in criminology shows that orientations such as compassion, empathy, and religious forgiveness are related to less support for capital punishment and to lower levels of punitiveness (see, e.g., Applegate et al. 2000; Foglia and Connell 2019; Godcharles et al. 2019; Metcalfe, Pickett, and Mancini 2015; Unnever and Cullen 2007a; Unnever, Cullen, and Applegate 2005; Unnever, Cullen, and Bartkowski 2006; Unnever, Cullen, and Fisher, 2005). More generally in the social sciences, a call exists to explore a range of racial views, including Whites’ racial apathy (Brown et al. 2019; Forman and Lewis 2006) and racial emotions (Bonilla-Silva 2019).
In this context, the current project seeks to build on Chudy’s contribution within political science by assessing the merits of transferring or importing this concept of racial sympathy into criminology. Making this case involves two steps. First, methodologically, we examine whether racial sympathy and racial resentment are distinct constructs. Do the items measuring these two racial beliefs load on different factors in a factor analysis or, alternatively, on the same factor, indicating that they are two ends of the same attitudinal spectrum? We demonstrate that they are distinct constructs. Second, building on Chudy’s (2017, 2021) empirical findings, we show that racial sympathy shapes race-related public opinions and support for rehabilitation as a goal of imprisonment. Racial resentment remains a strong predictor, but, in these instances, does not nullify the effects of racial sympathy.

Because crime-related policies are consequential for Blacks and often have racially disparate effects, the relevance of racial sympathy to criminology seems palpable. As a prelude to the empirical analysis, Chudy’s contributions are considered, with a focus on the concept, measurement, and empirical consequences of racial sympathy. This discussion is detailed because Chudy is the inventor of this construct, and the credibility of its transfer depends on the strength of the foundation she has laid.

Racial sympathy

Concept

With the emergence of the civil rights movement and public rejection of outward expressions of racism, scholars observed the decline – though not the disappearance – of more traditional forms of racism (known as “Jim Crow racism” or “blatant racism”) carrying the view of “African Americans as genetically and socially inferior” (Kawakami, Dion, and Dovidio 1998; Unnever, Cullen, and Jonson 2008: 64). Instead, they documented a related form of racial animus embedded in “a combination of race hostility and traditional American values” (Kinder and Sanders 1996: 293) that views minorities’ disadvantaged state as being due to their own individual failings and as exacting undeserved governmental “handouts.” Early terms for this concept included “modern racism” (McConahay 1982), “laissez-faire racism” (Bobo, Kluegel, and Smith 1997), or “symbolic racism” (Henry and Sears 2002). Kinder and Sanders (1996) were the first to define this concept as “racial resentment,” or, the idea that “discrimination was illegal, opportunities were plentiful. Blacks should work their way up without
handouts or special favors in a society that was now color-blind” (Kinder and Sanders 1996: 105). Their scale is now the standard measure of this concept – and the one used in the current study. Importantly, racial resentment is an example of a political science concept transferred to criminology. It has proven to be a consistently strong predictor not only of punitive crime-control policies but also of a range of other outcomes, such as opposition to gun control policies (Filindra and Kaplan 2016; O’Brien et al. 2013). More broadly, research shows that racial resentment is a predictor of a variety of social policy attitudes, again fostering views that oppose a social welfare approach to addressing disadvantage in American society (Feldman and Huddy 2005; Henderson and Hillygus 2011; Hutchings and Valentino 2004; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Tuch and Hughes 2011; Unnever, Cullen, and Jonson 2008). Failing to include racial resentment in a policy analysis risks incurring omitted variable bias.

Recently, Jennifer Chudy (2017, 2021) has sought to expand inquiry into the impact of racial attitudes on public policy preferences. Because she recognizes the salience of racial resentment, she begins by noting that “scholars have found that racial prejudice is an important determinant of white opinion on public policy” (Chudy 2021: 122). For any novel racial attitude to prove significant, it must show its effects independent of racial resentment. With this challenge in mind, Chudy argues that an exclusive focus on out-group prejudicial views ignores the empirical reality that White views on race are marked not only by animus but also by more positive sentiments, including sympathy for minorities. Her project was thus to invent a new construct – racial sympathy – and to show its influence on public policy opinions.

Chudy (2021) makes five core points about racial sympathy. First, similar to racial resentment, she sees her construct as a racial attitude. An attitude usually is defined as a way of evaluating an object of attention – in this case, an out-group. Attitudes can be positive (as in sympathy) or negative (as in resentment). They can have a cognitive and/or an affective component. Second, Chudy (2021: 124) selects a very specific meaning for her construct, defining it as follows: “In the United States, racial sympathy refers to white distress over black suffering.” Third, racial sympathy is not a dichotomous sentiment but rather exists on a continuum. Whites can experience severe distress over Black misfortune, be indifferent to it, or lie somewhere in between these attitudinal poles. Thus, it should be assessed with a gradational measure. Fourth, Chudy contends that racial sympathy is a distinct racial attitude and not just the
opposite of racial prejudice (such as resentment). As a result, racial sympathy “is not merely the absence of prejudice, it is the presence of distress”; indeed, a “lack of prejudice does not create sympathy for African American suffering” (Chudy 2021: 125).

Fifth, Chudy (2017, 2021) is clear that her focus is on racial sympathy, not racial empathy. As the basis for her dissertation, she started the process “with few expectations about its form or content” and decided to listen to “how white Americans thought and talked about race” (2017: 36). In addition to securing qualitative data through MTurk surveys, she spent about 30 hours engaged in participant observation, casual dialogs, and structured interviews. Many of her insights came from attending a series of programs on “Understanding Race” planned by the College of Literature, Science and the Arts at the University of Michigan. The results showed that Whites’ responses to Blacks’ suffering were more often sympathetic rather than empathetic.

Although a complex concept, empathy involves perspective-taking – that is, the ability to imagine, cognitively and emotionally, what another person is experiencing (Batson 2009; Cuff et al. 2016). This is often called “empathetic identification” (Unnever and Cullen 2009). By contrast, sympathy involves feeling badly for someone, but no claim is made to know what it is like to be in that person’s shoes (Dictionary.com 2021). Chudy (2017: 39) observed that White students expressed “remorse” or “regret” about the negative situations Blacks faced. They were aware of and troubled by the personal suffering Blacks experienced in their lives. However, they were equally insistent that precisely because they were White, they “could not imagine what it was like to be black”; thus, they “did not articulate their attitude in empathetic terms” (2017: 37, emphasis in original). Lacking the claim of vicarious experience at the core of empathy, Chudy (2017, 2021) concluded that racial sympathy most aptly captured the positive racial attitude expressed by the Whites she observed.

**Measurement**

Beyond the conceptual innovation of advancing the idea of racial sympathy, the value of Chudy’s enterprise hinges on measurement – that is, on whether it can be shown that racial prejudice and sympathy are, in fact, separate constructs. One possibility is that prejudice and sympathy are two ends of the same attitudinal spectrum. In this scenario, items in a scale that measure prejudice and sympathy would be highly inter-correlated and, in a factor analysis, load onto a single factor. They would thus be tapping the same underlying latent
construct. Items assessing racial sympathy would merely be asking about racial prejudice in the opposite direction, perhaps to avoid acquiescence bias (Pickett and Baker 2014). They would be reverse coded in the subsequent multivariate analysis.

In her dissertation at the University of Michigan co-chaired by Donald Kinder, Chudy (2017) addressed this methodological issue, seeking to demonstrate that racial sympathy was not only conceptually but also empirically distinct from racial prejudice. Her approach involved three steps. First, consistent with the evolution of the study of racism, her research design included the most prominent measure of prejudice – racial resentment. Drawn from Kinder and Sanders (1996), this measure is a four-item scale that “focuses on levels of support for statements featuring negative traits and stereotypes about African Americans, such as the view that blacks do not try hard enough to get ahead” (2017: 61).

Second, in a key innovation, Chudy (2017, see also 2021) developed a measure of racial sympathy. Chudy recognized that racial sympathy can be documented throughout history (e.g., Whites’ advocacy for the emancipation of slaves, participation in the civil rights movement, and support of affirmative action) and thus is an important dimension of Whites’ racial beliefs. Attempts to measure racial sympathy prior to Chudy have either (1) measured racial sympathy as the inverse of racial prejudice, or (2) conflated attitudes of sympathy, empathy, and compassion into a single measure (see, e.g., Dovidio and Gaertner 2004; Iyer, Leach, and Crosby 2003). Thus, she sought to develop a measure of racial sympathy as its own independent construct.

Chudy’s qualitative research showed her that Whites’ sympathy was not an expression of “abstract and principled notions of equality” but a “reaction to tangible, personal suffering experienced by black Americans” (2021: 126). As a result, Chudy (2017) developed a series of four vignettes that described instances of Blacks experiencing racial discrimination. After reading each vignette, the respondents were asked the level of sympathy they felt toward the person or people described in the vignette and were given answer choices from “I do not feel any sympathy” to “A great deal of sympathy” (Chudy 2017: 57). Chudy’s (2017: 39–40) vignette measure differs from prior measures of concepts similar to racial sympathy because it “enabled subjects to react directly to specific stimuli rather than abstract notions of discrimination and inequality” while only asking about feelings of sympathy (not empathy and compassion). These vignettes are listed in Appendix A. Note that the use of these vignettes in a survey is practical. Based on
Qualtrics.com’s estimates, it takes approximately three minutes to read and respond to the four vignettes.

Third, to test the reliability, validity, and predictive power of this new measure, Chudy (2017, 2021) undertook a national-level study that included her vignette measure of racial sympathy and the standard measure of racial resentment. The index was administered on a module of the 2013 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) fielded in November 2013 by YouGov/Polimetrix. The 2013 CCES sample is a national web-based sample, and the developed vignettes were distributed to 1,000 respondents, with 751 identifying as White. She assessed the Cronbach’s alpha of each scale, with the racial sympathy alpha being .74 and the racial resentment alpha being .87. The scales are also shown to be negatively related \(r = −.45\). Furthermore, in earlier studies using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk), Chudy found lower correlations between racial sympathy and racial resentment \(r = −.19,\) and \(r = −.40\). This conveys the concepts are “negatively related, but not interchangeable” (Chudy 2021: 128). Then, most importantly, using her CCES sample, a factor analysis revealed that racial sympathy and racial resentment load on separate factors, indicating that they are indeed independent constructs (Chudy 2021: 128, Table 2).

**Consequences**

After having established her concepts as being distinct, Chudy then examined their effects on public policy preferences. She finds that racial sympathy has a significant and positive effect on Whites’ support for government aid to Blacks, increased federal spending on welfare programs, government subsidies for Black businesses, funding for schools in Black neighborhoods, and scholarships for qualified Black students, though racial sympathy does not have a significant effect on Whites’ support for affirmative action (Chudy 2021). Consistent with past research, racial resentment is significantly and negatively associated with all six public racialized policies. Chudy’s (2021: 129) analysis thus “confirms that resentment is a powerful component of white opinion in this policy domain.” Still, racial sympathy exerts effects even when controlling for racial resentment, suggesting, as Chudy (2021: 129) points out, that the “index is capturing unique dimensions of racial attitudes that low animus cannot.” Finally, Chudy’s key idea is that racial sympathy only has effects on policies that have a racial component. In a separate
analysis, she finds that racial sympathy is not a significant predictor of support for women’s affirmative action, opposition to abortion rights, or support for a government requirement for women’s unpaid parental leave (Chudy 2021: 131, Table 4).

The differential consequences of racial sympathy might be termed Chudy’s “activation thesis.” According to Chudy (2017, 2020), people differ in their racial sympathy. Such sympathy does not affect public policy opinion, however, unless “racial priming” occurs – that is, unless individuals encounter “certain language or frames” that “evoke racial thinking in politics” (2017: 116). In these instances, “whites’ sympathy is brought to bear on opinion” (p. 116). In survey research, this priming occurs when respondents are asked about policies as they apply to African Americans or, in an experiment, by altering the race of the offender in a scenario. Chudy (2021: 123) refers to this as studying “racialized public policies.”

Of particular interest for the current study is Chudy’s use of an experimental vignette factorial design in which respondents were randomly assigned one of two versions of a “crime blotter” that “depicted a fictitious Black neighborhood which had recently been the target of graffiti” (Chudy 2021: 132). In the first version, the photograph of the culprit was White, and in the second version, the photograph of the culprit was Black. Respondents were then asked to indicate the number of community service hours to which they believe the culprit should be sentenced. Her results show that White respondents who scored high on the racial sympathy scale assigned about half the amount of community service when the offender in the vignette is Black as opposed to White. Racially sympathetic Whites thus “are significantly less likely to inflict a harsh punishment on a black person who commits an offense” (Chudy 2021: 132). The current study builds upon Chudy’s empirical results by probing the relationship of racial sympathy to punitive crime attitudes.

Finally, assessing the racial underpinnings of capital punishment, including its discriminatory use, remains an ongoing policy concern. A strong case can be made that the death penalty, as applied in the United States, is a deviant enterprise. First, American exceptionalism in embracing executions, arguably, is a departure from the normative standards of Western nations – leading Garland (2010) to call it the “peculiar institution.” Even within the United States, ambivalence exists about the death penalty (Garland 2010). Twenty-three states and Washington, D.C. have abolished capital punishment
(Death Penalty Information Center 2021), and, as noted, public support for state executions of those convicted of murder has substantially declined (Enns 2016; Gallup 2019; Pickett 2019). Notably, in 2018, Pope Francis revised Catholic Church teachings, instructing that the death penalty was now “inadmissible” in all circumstances (Ladaria 2018). Catholic officials in the United States who promote capital punishment, such as former U.S. Attorney General William Barr, are being held up for special scrutiny for trumpeting their religious foundations while ignoring the Pope’s mandate (Cullen et al. 2021). Barr’s rushing the execution of 10 federal prisoners, the most by the federal government in a single year since the late 1800s, has been termed “Trump’s final cruelty” (Kim 2020). Second, it is equally disquieting that a robust source of death penalty public support is Whites’ racial animus (Unnever and Cullen 2007b). This finding calls into question the legitimacy of a sanction fueled by disreputable racial attitudes. Discovering factors that might lessen support for the death penalty – such as racial sympathy – merits attention.

**Research strategy**

The current project explores the potential impact of racial sympathy on support for capital punishment and, secondarily, on punitiveness. In doing so, we follow the strategy used by Chudy (2017, 2021) to show the relevance of the construct within political science. In political science and crime-related opinion studies, the concept of racial resentment looms large because of its robust effects across a variety of policy outcomes. In this context, Chudy’s strategy (and now ours) involved two steps: showing that racial sympathy is empirically distinct from racial resentment and showing that it has distinct effects on public policy opinions.

In the first step, using data from a 2019 national-level YouGov survey, supplemented with two MTurk surveys also conducted in 2019, we replicate Chudy’s (2017, 2021) analysis demonstrating that racial sympathy is a unique construct empirically distinct from racial resentment. The goal is to establish racial sympathy as a construct and measure that can be applied in the examination of racial attitudes within criminology and social science more generally. As shown, this appears to be the case. Notably, these findings are important not just for criminology but also for political science because they provide independent confirmation of
Chudy’s work outside her home discipline. This analysis is significant in and of itself.

In the second step, we then assess whether racial sympathy has consequences, focusing on support for capital punishment while including racial resentment in the models. This analysis is informed by Chudy’s activation thesis – that racial sympathy has race-specific effects. To assess this possibility, measures are included not only for global support for the death penalty but also for whether capital punishment in the United States is applied in a racially discriminatory way. Because research has shown that similar constructs such as empathy decrease support for the death penalty (see, e.g., Unnever, Cullen, and Fisher 2005), it is possible that racial sympathy might have a comparable (general) effect on both outcomes. By contrast, Chudy (2017, 2021) would hypothesize that racial sympathy would heighten the likelihood that Americans would see capital punishment as discriminatory (where a racial prime is present) but not support for capital punishment generally. This turns out to be the case, supporting the activation thesis.

Three other features of our approach are relevant. First, because racial resentment is a strong predictor of death penalty attitudes (Bobo and Johnson 2004; Unnever and Cullen 2007b, 2010a, 2010b; Unnever, Cullen, and Jonson 2008), a key consideration is whether racial sympathy will exert effects with this variable (and other control variables) in the same model. If racial resentment is the driving force connecting race to the embrace of the death penalty, then it is possible that it will render spurious any association between racial sympathy and this policy preference. This does not turn out to be the case with the racialized policy of belief in the discriminatory use of the death penalty.

Second, moving beyond capital punishment, we explore whether racial sympathy has general effects on policy opinions, asking respondents about their support for two policies long measured in polls (Cullen, Fisher, and Applegate 2000; Enns 2016). The first is support for “harsher courts,” which captures a more global punitiveness. The second is support for rehabilitation as the main goal or “emphasis” of imprisonment. The inclusion of rehabilitation is important because it is a progressive policy preference. Although inversely related, punishment and treatment attitudes are distinct and can be held simultaneously (Cullen, Fisher, and Applegate 2000; Mears, Pickett, and Mancini 2015;
Sloas and Atkin-Plunk 2019; see also Unnever et al. 2010). These analyses are intended to assess the generality of the effects of racial sympathy. No racial priming occurs in these survey questions, so Chudy would predict null effects for racial sympathy. This is the case for the harsher courts measure, but not for rehabilitation as a prison goal. The positive sentiment of racial sympathy appears to increase the positive policy of offender treatment.

Third, an obvious concern is that any effects attributed to racial sympathy might be due to respondents holding a global orientation for caring for others. As noted, prior studies have, in fact, reported that constructs such as compassion, empathy, and religious forgiveness decrease punitiveness, including support for the death penalty (Applegate et al. 2000; Godcharles et al. 2019; Metcalfe, Pickett, and Mancini 2015; Unnever and Cullen 2007a; Unnever, Cullen, and Applegate 2005, Unnever et al., 2006; Unnever, Cullen, and Fisher 2005).

To address this issue, the analysis includes a measure of “care/harm,” one of the five foundations of morality identified by Haidt (2012; see Graham, Haidt, and Nosek 2009). According to Haidt (2012), those high on this foundation are concerned “about harm and suffering” (p. xxi) and manifest “compassion,” “caring,” and “kindness” (p. 146). Research shows that, with some nuances (e.g., focus of the sanction, combined with justice/fairness foundation), care/harm is negatively related to punitiveness (see, e.g., Silver 2017; Silver and Silver 2017; Vaughan, Holleran, and Silver 2019).3 Our work thus contributes to this literature. We also include a measure for “egalitarianism,” which assesses support for equality in society and for making efforts to facilitate everyone’s success. As such, this variable could be considered another “control” for a caring orientation toward others (see also Chudy 2017).

Methods

Sample

To assess the effects of racial attitudes on the outcome variables, we commissioned YouGov to conduct the survey, which we developed and supplied, between June 7–10, 2019. The sample included 1,200 U.S. adult (18 and over) respondents. YouGov is a high quality, opt-in survey platform that draws respondents from its volunteer online panel of 2 million U.S. adults. Respondents are matched using a synthetic sampling frame constructed
from probability samples (e.g., Current Population Survey, American Community Survey), and propensity scores are created to weight the YouGov sample in accordance with the probability samples (Ansolabehere and Rivers 2013; Mercer et al. 2017; Vavreck and Rivers 2008).

Given the study’s focus on racial resentment and sympathy toward Blacks, the sample was limited to White respondents (n = 770) – as was the case in Chudy’s research. Due to missing data, the weighted analytic sample was reduced to 760 White respondents. Because the missing cases comprised only 1.3% of the sample, no need existed for data imputation in the multivariate analyses. The YouGov sample of White respondents has the following characteristics: 48.9% male; 20.5% with a Bachelor’s degree; 51.5% married; a mean age of 50.9 (SD = 17.8); 33.2% Republicans versus 28.8% Democrats; 18.2% from the Northeast, 38.1% from the South, 22.7% from the Midwest, and 20.9% from the West (see Table 1).

Two MTurk samples of White respondents were also surveyed in 2019 (Study 1, n = 396; Study 2, n=348). Although the main analyses with the dependent variables are limited to the YouGov sample, the MTurk data were used to explore the statistical properties of the racial resentment measure. The characteristics of the MTurk samples are presented in Appendix B.

**Independent variables**

**Racial measures**

The study’s focus is on the potential impact of *Racial Sympathy* on support for capital punishment and related policy views. As discussed previously, Chudy (2017, 2021) created an innovative measure of this predictor, developing four vignettes that describe situations involving the negative treatment of African Americans. The respondents were then asked, “How much sympathy do you have for” those described as experiencing discrimination in each vignette (“Laurette,” “the applicants,” “the Whittier community leaders,” and “Michael”). Possible responses were: 1 = a great deal of sympathy, 2 = a lot of sympathy, 3 = some sympathy, 4 = a little sympathy, and 5 = I do not feel any sympathy (for the person/groups specified). Items were recoded so that higher values reflected greater sympathy. The *Racial Sympathy* measure is a mean scale with a Cronbach’s alpha of .796 (factor loadings = .677 to .876). As noted, the vignettes are presented in Appendix A.

Also, as discussed above, the study includes the standard four-item measure of *Racial
Resentment (Chudy 2021; Kinder and Sanders 1996). The respondents’ response options ranged from 1 = strongly agree to 5 = strongly disagree. The four items of this scale are: (1) “It is really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if Blacks would only try harder, they could be just as well off as Whites”; (2) “Irish, Italians, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors”; (3) “Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten less than they deserve”; and (4) “Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower class.” Items 1 and 2 were reverse coded such that higher scores indicated greater resentment. Racial Resentment is a mean scale with a Cronbach’s alpha of .884 (factor loadings = .847 to .878).

Political orientation
Political orientation was measured by whether the respondents identified themselves as Republican and Conservative. Consistent with previous research (King and Wheelock 2007; Shelley et al. 2021), these measures were dichotomized to avoid loss of cases for those who answered “Not sure” (an option included in the YouGov core item for these variables) – 32 cases for party affiliation and 57 cases for ideology. Thus, they were coded as follows: 1 = Republican, 0 = others; 1 = conservative or very conservative; 0 = others). As a check, the data were also analyzed with ordinal measures of these variables, but no substantive differences were found in the relationships of racial resentment, racial sympathy, and the four outcomes explored.

Cultural beliefs
We adapted questions from Filindra and Kaplan (2016, 2017) to measure egalitarianism. Egalitarianism is a mean scale (α = .823, factor loadings = .656 to .824) measured with responses (1 = strongly agree, 5 = strongly disagree) to six items about whether the government should ensure equality (e.g., “Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed”; “One of the biggest problems in this country is that we don’t give everyone an equal chance”). Items were coded so that higher scores indicate more support for equality and thus egalitarian values.
Religiosity

This is a standardized mean scale ($\alpha = .826$, factor loadings = .860 to .921) computed from three questions measuring the importance of religion in respondents' lives, their frequency of praying, and their frequency of attending church.

Care/harm moral foundation

This is a mean scale ($\alpha = .542$, factor loadings = .631 to .669) based on responses (1 = strongly agree, 5 = strongly disagree) to four items measuring moral intuitions about harm and care: (1) “If I saw a mother slapping her child, I would be outraged”; (2) “It can never be right to kill a human being”; (3) “Compassion for those who are suffering is the most critical virtue”; (4) “The government must first and foremost protect all people from harm.” These items were adapted from the work of Graham, Haidt, and Nosek (2009) and show similar statistical scale properties reported in previous research (see, e.g., Chowdhury 2019; Smith et al. 2017; Yilmaz and Saribay 2017). Items were coded so that higher scores indicate greater
Concern for care.

**Salience of crime/threat**

To measure respondents' perceptions of crime salience and threat, we used two measures: fear of crime and dangerous world beliefs. *Fear of Crime* is a mean scale (α = .904, factor loadings = .790 to .900) based on responses to five questions that asked how afraid respondents were that someone in their household would fall victim to five crimes (theft, burglary, robbery, sexual assault, murder) in the next five years. Higher values indicate a greater fear of crime. From the work of Stroebe, Leander, and Kruglanski (2017), we also included a measure of dangerous world beliefs. Thus, *Dangerous World* is a mean scale (α = .794, factor loadings = .741 to .836) based on responses (1 = strongly agree, 5 = strongly disagree) to four items that asked about the security and stability of the social order (e.g., “There are many dangerous people in our society who will attack someone out of pure meanness, for no reason at all”). Responses were coded so that higher scores indicate a greater belief that the world is unpredictable and dangerous.

**Controls**

Measures were included for the standard socio-demographic control variables of *Age* (in years), gender (1 = Male), *Education* (1 = no high school, 6 = graduate degree), marital status (1 = Married), employment status (1 = Full-Time Employment), and region of residence (1 = Southerner). *Southerner* is coded as residing in a state in the South as defined by the Census Bureau Regions and Divisions (see https://www2.census.gov/geo/docs/maps-data/maps/reg_div.txt). This variable was included because of the South’s history of slavery, Jim Crow oppression, and cultural and policy embrace of capital punishment (Garland 2010; Maxwell and Shields 2019). Missing cases (n = 88; 11.4%) precluded the use of family income as a control. This is a common problem in YouGov studies because the income question includes the response option of “prefer not to say” (see, e.g., Haner et al. 2019). Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for all of the variables.
**Dependent variables**

To assess the respondents' policy views, we included three measures used extensively in previous research (Burton et al. 2020b; Cullen, Fisher, and Applegate 2000; Enns 2016): support for the death penalty, support for harsher courts, and belief that the main goal or “emphasis” of prisons should be rehabilitative rather than punitive. The wording for these measures was taken from questions employed for decades by the General Social Survey (death penalty and harsher courts questions) and by the Harris Poll (main goal of prisons question) (see Cullen, Fisher, and Applegate 2000; Enns 2016). Importantly, as recommended by Chudy’s (2021) research, a measure of a “racialized public policy” outcome – perceived racial discrimination in the death penalty – also was included. The central measures in the analysis assess public views toward capital punishment.

Thus, two capital punishment measures were employed – one general and one racial. First, the respondents’ support (1 = favor, 0 = oppose/no opinion) for the Death Penalty was measured by asking: “Do you favor or oppose the death penalty for a person convicted of murder?” Again, this is a standard question in public opinion research (Enns 2016). Second, to assess Chudy’s (2017, 2021) activation thesis that racial sympathy is more likely to predict responses to policies that affect African Americans (i.e., “racialized public policies”), we included a question on death penalty racial discrimination. The stem of this item, which contains a racial prime, reads as follows: “One debate is whether capital punishment is given out fairly or discriminates against minorities, especially African Americans who murder a White person. Which of these statements best reflects your views on the death penalty?” The response options included: 1 = The courts in the U.S. are “colorblind” – everyone is equally likely to get the death penalty; 2 = African Americans are a little more likely to get the death penalty than Whites; 3 = African Americans are much more likely to get the death penalty than Whites; and 4 = White people in the U.S. are, if anything, more likely to get the death penalty than African Americans. We code this as 1 = discrimination against African Americans (answers 2 and 3) and 0 = no discrimination against African Americans (answers 1 and 4).

Beyond capital punishment, Harsher Courts was measured by asking: “In general, do you think the courts in this area deal too harshly or not harshly enough with criminals?” Responses were coded such that 1 = not harsh enough and 0 = don’t know/about right/too harsh. Finally, support for a Rehabilitation Goal of Prisons (1 = rehabilitation, 0 = punishing the
individual/protecting society/ not sure) was measured by asking: “What do you think should be the main emphasis in most prisons – punishing the individual convicted of a crime, trying to rehabilitate the individual so that he or she might return to society as a productive citizen, or protecting society from future crimes he or she might commit?”

Results

Racial sympathy as a distinct construct

A key contribution of the current study is that we are able to replicate Chudy’s analysis on racial resentment and sympathy with our main YouGov study and two Amazon MTurk studies – all conducted in 2019 (see Appendix B for MTurk sample characteristics). The goal is to establish whether racial sympathy can be used in studies of racial beliefs in the social sciences, including criminology. As seen in Table 2 and Table 3, with few exceptions, our analyses yield results very similar to Chudy’s, lending clear and additional support to considering racial sympathy and resentment as separate constructs. The MTurk Study 2’s factor loadings differ by degree in some instances, but, even here, the results are comparable. The MTurk Study 1 and the YouGov Study report findings remarkably similar to Chudy’s. A comparison of Chudy’s Study with the YouGov Study is particularly relevant because each survey used a national-level sample and similar methodology.

Four results merit attention. First, the Cronbach’s alpha for racial sympathy is very similar (e.g., Chudy α = .74, YouGov α = .796). Second, the correlation between racial sympathy and resentment is comparable (Chudy $r = -.45$, YouGov $r = -.500$). Third, the four factor loadings for racial sympathy in Table 2 between Chudy and the YouGov study differ by no more than .056 (Vignette 2 – Chudy = .82, YouGov = .876). Fourth, when analyzed together, racial sympathy and resentment load on distinct factors for both studies (see Table 3).

Effects of racial sympathy and resentment

Capital punishment

Having replicated Chudy’s findings, the second stage is to assess whether racial sympathy is a predictor of criminal justice policy views. The main focus is on capital punishment, with other outcomes supplementing this analysis. The key comparison is with racial resentment because of its consistent effect of increasing punitiveness. Does racial sympathy reduce support
for the death penalty with racial resentment in the same model?
As seen in Table 1, the zero-order correlation between racial sympathy (as well as racial resentment) and support for the death penalty is significant and in the expected direction. However, in the multivariate analysis that omits racial resentment, racial sympathy is not statistically significant (see Model 1, Table 4). Consistent with previous research, racial resentment is a robust predictor of support for the death penalty (Odds Ratio [OR] = 2.180), controlling for a range of other predictors (see Table 4, Model 2). Racial sympathy remains non-significant.

### Table 2. Comparison of racial sympathy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistical Properties</th>
<th>Chudy Study</th>
<th>MTurk Study 1</th>
<th>MTurk Study 2</th>
<th>YouGov Study</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>751</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial Sympathy Scale</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>.778</td>
<td>.659</td>
<td>.796</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cronbach's Alpha</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor Loadings for Vignettes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vignette 1: Laurette–hiring</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>.859</td>
<td>.827</td>
<td>.846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vignette 2: Hair salon applicants</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>.835</td>
<td>.859</td>
<td>.876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vignette 3: Community leaders</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>.737</td>
<td>.552</td>
<td>.677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vignette 4: Michael–police</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.657</td>
<td>.529</td>
<td>.765</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explained Variance</td>
<td>.58%</td>
<td>.606%</td>
<td>.502%</td>
<td>.632%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correlation of Racial Sympathy Scale with Racial Resentiment Scale</td>
<td>-.45</td>
<td>-.511</td>
<td>-.360</td>
<td>-.500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 3. Comparison of racial sympathy and racial resentment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistical Properties</th>
<th>Chudy Study</th>
<th>MTurk Study 1</th>
<th>MTurk Study 2</th>
<th>YouGov Study</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Factor Loadings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vignette 1: Laurette–hiring</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>.109</td>
<td>.938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vignette 2: Hair salon applicants</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td>.064</td>
<td>.901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vignette 3: Community leaders</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>-.187</td>
<td>.621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vignette 4: Michael–police</td>
<td>-.23</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>-.275</td>
<td>.482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial Resentiment – Irish</td>
<td>.93</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.875</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial Resentiment – Generations</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.815</td>
<td>.066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial Resentiment – Try harder</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>.912</td>
<td>.127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial Resentiment – Deserve</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.794</td>
<td>-.084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explained Variance</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>50.7%</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*EFAs using Promax rotation

The key test of Chudy’s perspective is the relationship between racial sympathy and the race-specific measure of Death Penalty Racial Discrimination. Consistent with her activation thesis, in this case, racial sympathy is related to this outcome both as a zero-order correlation (Table 1) and without racial resentment in the multivariate analysis (Table 1, Model 3; OR =
1.698). Importantly, in Model 4, racial sympathy retains statistical significance with racial resentment added into the analysis. Note as well that racial sympathy has an impact even though the care/harm moral foundation and egalitarianism are also significant. Also worth mentioning is that dangerous world view had significant effects across all models in Table 4 and, as we will see, in Table 5 ahead.

### General effects

Now we consider whether racial sympathy has general effects beyond death penalty opinions. As seen in Table 1, where the bivariate results are presented, and in Table 5 (Models 1 and 3), where the results of the multivariate analyses are presented, racial sympathy is significantly associated with both support for harsher courts and support for rehabilitation as the main goal of imprisonment in the expected direction. The findings of the key analyses are reported on Models 2 and 4 in Table 5, where racial resentment is introduced into the
analyses. As expected, given Chudy’s work, racial resentment renders spurious the effect of racial sympathy on support for harsher courts. However, this is not the case with regard to offender treatment. As seen in Model 4, racial sympathy retains a significant effect on support for rehabilitation as the main goal of imprisonment. Again, this impact occurs even with care/harm and egalitarianism in the model.

### Table 5. YouGov data logistic regression models (N = 760).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Harsher Courts</th>
<th>Rehabilitation as Goal of Imprisonment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b (SE) OR</td>
<td>b (SE) OR</td>
<td>b (SE) OR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial Beliefs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial Sympathy</td>
<td>-0.231 (.095)</td>
<td>0.808*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial</td>
<td>- - -</td>
<td>- - -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resentment</td>
<td>- - -</td>
<td>- - -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Affiliations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>0.056 (.218)</td>
<td>1.057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>0.806 (.226)</td>
<td>2.238***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>- - -</td>
<td>- - -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Beliefs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egalitarianism</td>
<td>-0.020 (.189)</td>
<td>0.980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>-0.042 (.110)</td>
<td>0.959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care/Harm</td>
<td>-0.257 (.140)</td>
<td>0.773</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral Foundation</td>
<td>- - -</td>
<td>- - -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salience of Crime/Threat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear of Crime</td>
<td>0.128 (.097)</td>
<td>1.137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dangerous World</td>
<td>0.725 (.123)</td>
<td>2.065***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.019 (.005)</td>
<td>1.019***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>-0.162 (.181)</td>
<td>0.850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.056 (.059)</td>
<td>0.946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>0.180 (.177)</td>
<td>1.197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full-time</td>
<td>0.360 (.195)</td>
<td>1.434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>-0.087 (.176)</td>
<td>0.917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.770 (.044)</td>
<td>0.063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cox and Snell</td>
<td>.200</td>
<td>.224</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The data are weighted. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 (two-tailed)

### Discussion

This project is a case study in concept transfer, focusing on the transmission of the emerging construct of racial sympathy from political science to criminology. Transferring a concept can be done not only informally but also in a more formal or explicit way. That is the approach taken in this project, which seeks to call scholars’ attention to a new concept and thereby create a line of inquiry that can enrich the understanding of how racial beliefs shape policy
preferences. In this regard, the current study makes three important contributions. First, building on Chudy’s (2017, 2021) prior findings, we confirm that racial sympathy (a positive racial attitude) is distinct from racial resentment (a negative racial attitude). Second, we demonstrate that racial resentment – even with racial sympathy in the analysis – is a robust predictor of all outcome variables. Third, Chudy (2017, 2021) has shown that racial sympathy is associated with a range of racial public policies. We add to this emerging body of empirical findings. Consistent with her activation thesis, we find that racial sympathy is unrelated to punitive policy preferences generally but is related to race-related views on capital punishment. We also find, however, that racial sympathy has a significant and positive impact on support for rehabilitation. Taken together, these results justify further efforts within criminology to explore the impact of racial sympathy on public policy opinions, especially with regard to the sanctioning of justice-involved African Americans. These issues are explored in more detail below.

**Concept empirical replication**

Invented in political science (Kinder and Sanders 1996), the concept of racial resentment has played an increasingly prominent role in public opinion studies of crime-related policies. Chudy’s (2021) unique contribution was to suggest that another racial belief – Whites’ distress over Blacks’ suffering – was distinct from racial resentment and consequential in its effects. The current project presents an independent effort to assess Chudy’s claim that these two racial beliefs are, in fact, separate constructs. Importantly, we replicate – across three different national-level data sets – Chudy’s (2017) finding that racial sympathy is distinct from racial resentment. The pattern of results, including factor loadings, are remarkably similar, especially with our YouGov national sample. These results provide important evidence confirming Chudy’s contention that racial sympathy is a racial belief that merits inclusion in studies of public opinion regarding policies. In and of itself, this analysis represents a significant contribution to the social science literature.

**Effects of racial resentment**

A key criminological fact is that racial beliefs shape policy preferences. Consistent with a wealth of past research (e.g., Brown and Socia 2017; Unnever, Cullen, and Jonson 2008), our
analysis showed that racial resentment is a robust predictor of punitive attitudes. Even with a number of controls in the multivariate analyses, such animus not only was associated with increased support for capital punishment and harsher courts but also nullified the effects of racial sympathy. Racial resentment also leads people to deny that the death penalty is racially biased and to oppose rehabilitating incarcerated offenders. Recall as well that in all of Chudy’s (2017, 2021) empirical analyses of public opinion about social policies (whether race-related or not), racial resentment was a significant predictor. These findings also lend credence to criminologists’ concerns about the racial, if not racist, basis of the justice system (see, e.g., Alexander 2010; Tonry 2011).

An important challenge is to understand why racial resentment has such pervasive effects. One possibility is that resentment induces a certain callousness about sanctioning, where inflicting pain on offenders is embraced and considering offenders’ unjust treatment and potential needs is ignored. Phrased differently, it attenuates empathetic identification with offenders (Unnever and Cullen 2009). Another possibility is that racial resentment reflects a rejection of and negative affect (anger, fear) toward out-group members. This view would help to explain why racial resentment is related not only to punitive sentiments but also to policy preferences in other areas such as opposition to gun control (Burton et al. 2020c; Filindra and Kaplan 2016, 2017).

Another view can be drawn from the debate within political science over the measure of racial resentment (for a discussion, see Hutchings and Valentino 2004). One criticism of the racial resentment scale is that it conflates anti-Black sentiment with individualism. Therefore, the relationship between racial resentment and racial policies may be driven not by prejudice but by principles linking individual merit and effort to the attainment of the American Dream – a “belief in hard work, self-reliance,” and the existence of “an open opportunity structure” (Jardina Stephens-Dougan 2018: 6; see also Feldman and Huddy 2005). Kinder and Sanders’s (1996: 106) response is that their racial resentment scale was intended to capture not only racial prejudice but specifically “prejudice expressed in the language of American individualism” (see also Simmons and Bobo 2018). In an effort to assess the effect of “racially tinged” individualism beyond the effect of individualism alone, researchers have included measures of individualism or similar constructs as control variables in models predicting racial policies as well as non-racially-specific criminal justice policies. These studies show
that, controlling for individualism, libertarianism, egalitarianism, or attribution of criminal behavior to individual failings, racial resentment continues to be a significant predictor of public opinion on a range of issues (Filindra and Kaplan 2016, 2017; Johnson 2008; O’Brien et al. 2013). Notably, in our analyses, racial resentment exerted robust effects with a control for egalitarianism in the model.

One further issue, ignored in public policy studies, warrants notice. Although an assessment of racial sympathy evokes the recognized need to include a general measure of concern for others, research on racial resentment does not include a general measure of resentment. Dictionaries define resentment as “indignation or ill will stemming from a feeling of having been wronged or offended” (The Free Dictionary 2020). Resentment may be situational but also dispositional. Scales have been developed to measure gratitude and resentment (see Duran 2017; Watkins et al. 2003). Future studies should include a control for resentment so as to confirm the robust effects of racial resentment.

**Effects of racial sympathy**

In making the case for concept transfer, the inevitable question will arise: Does racial sympathy matter enough for criminologists to pay attention to it? It must be reiterated that Chudy (2017, 2021) already has shown that racial sympathy is a consistent predictor of social welfare policies generally and punitiveness toward specific offenders when Blacks are the focus of concern. Key to her perspective is “the activation of racial sympathy,” which she argues has “consequences for public opinion” (Chudy 2017: 114–15). As noted, this attitude only becomes salient when priming occurs – when “cues or frames that draw attention to black misfortune can alter the extent to which whites’ sympathy is brought to bear on opinion” (2017: 116). Our results are largely consistent with Chudy’s activation thesis. Racial sympathy is not related to support for capital punishment or harsher courts when the survey questions contain no racial activation. Note that the general moral foundation of care/harm, which is not a racial attitude, has a significant effect in the death penalty models. This finding is in line with research showing that empathy and similar factors manifest this association (see, e.g., Applegate et al. 2000; Foglia and Connell 2019; Godcharles et al. 2019; Unnever and Cullen 2007a; Unnever, Cullen, and Applegate 2005, Unnever et al. 2006 ; Unnever, Cullen, and Fisher 2005).
By contrast, the analysis demonstrates that racial sympathy has effects on policy preferences independent of racial resentment and in the way hypothesized by Chudy. Regarding death penalty discrimination, a clear racial prime was present: “One debate is whether capital punishment is given out fairly or discriminates against minorities, especially African Americans who murder a White person.” Even with significant effects found for racial resentment, care/harm, and egalitarianism, the analysis revealed that racial sympathy heightened perceptions that the death penalty was racially discriminatory. Again, Chudy (2021) was clear that as a “racial attitude,” racial sympathy’s effect should have stronger effects on public support for policies that are known to disproportionately affect African Americans. Lending empirical support to this race-specific prediction – one of the few of its kind in the public opinion literature – is important.

This finding is salient because so many crime-control policies manifest extensive racial disparities, such as the war on drugs (e.g., penalties for crack vs. powder cocaine), mass incarceration and its impacts on families and communities, collateral consequences of a criminal conviction, and police racial profiling and use of force (see, e.g., Alexander 2010; Clear 2007; Jacobs 2015; Manza and Uggen 2006; Tonry 2011). Public opinion surveys that wish to take race seriously should explore how racial sympathy has consequences for policy preferences in these and many other areas. Doing so not only avoids potential omitted variable bias but also promises to create a body of research that shows how positive racial attitudes matter across an array of crime-policies.

Furthermore, the racial sympathy perspective has implications for understanding large-scale collective responses to highly publicized, race-related incidents, such as George Floyd’s killing. In their study of the humanitarian disaster in Syria, Slovic et al. (2017) document that this tragedy inspired little public attention despite repeated reports of casualties in the hundreds of thousands. This situation changed dramatically with the publication of an “iconic photograph” of a “young Syrian child, Aylan Kurdi, lying face-down on a Turkish beach” (Slovic et al. 2017: 640). Attention to the disaster spiked immediately, including donations to the Swedish Red Cross campaign to aid Syrian refugees. Slovic et al. (2017: 640) attribute this sudden concern to the power of images to evoke an “empathetic response.” The video of George Floyd’s death had a similar impact. We would argue, however, that the reaction was not simply due to people’s empathy or care/harm moral foundation. Rather, the very
content of the response was racial, including support for Black Lives Matter, widespread kneeling at sporting events in Europe and the United States, and calls to defund the police so as to limit their presence in Black communities and invest instead in education and community improvement. Underlying this reaction was, at least in part, a mass activation of racial sympathy.

Notably, the analysis also revealed that racial sympathy was significantly related to support for rehabilitation as the main goal of imprisonment. Although this finding pertained only to a single question (albeit a standard item in national polls and academic studies), it suggests that racial sympathy might be an important source of support for a broad range of rehabilitative–human services policies (e.g., offender reentry, use of community alternative to incarceration, expanding treatment programs, reducing the collateral consequences of a felony conviction). At issue is why this effect was found when no racial priming was present. One possibility, which merits further attention, is that the positive attitude of sympathy matters when the policy being probed is itself positive.

Finally, as noted, a substantial body of research within criminology examines the relationship of racial beliefs to punitiveness, including death penalty support. How will racial sympathy fit into that line of inquiry? How else might the concept's incorporation into studies matter? Although waning in recent years, concerted efforts were made by officials on the political right to “play the race card” – that is, to link crime, especially violent crime, to African Americans. In the so-called “southern strategy,” Republican candidates sought to capture White voters by stereotyping Blacks as welfare cheats and super-predators (Maxwell and Shields 2019; Tonry 2011). The nourishing of racial resentment was one result. Another was the view of offenders as the “dangerous other” (Garland 2001: 180), and the strong association of race and crime – so much so as to create the stereotype of the “criminal blackman” (Russell-Brown 2009; see also Unnever and Gabbidon 2011). The consequences of this thinking are disquieting. The “psychology of American race relations,” notes Tonry (2011: 79), is “characterized by stereotypes of black criminals, unconscious preferences for whiteness over blackness, and lack of empathy among whites for black offenders and their families.” If encouraged, racial sympathy can potentially counteract this kind of thinking about crime – a possibility deserving of research attention.

Specifically, research shows that punitiveness will be higher when Whites see Blacks as
more violent than themselves, attribute Blacks’ waywardness to bad character rather than bad circumstances, and have little concern for the plight of Black offenders (Metcalfe, Pickett, and Mancini 2015; Unnever and Cullen 2012). Racial sympathy should mitigate these proximate cognitive causes of punitiveness versus African Americans. The hallmark of racial sympathy is Whites’ distress over Blacks’ suffering. Those high on this belief should be more likely to reject negative racial stereotypes, embrace causal attributions that see African Americans’ offending as arising from inequitable social circumstances, and want to help Blacks who they view as entrapped unfairly in a criminal life-course (see Unnever and Cullen 2009). They should thus favor more lenient punishments (Chudy 2021). Harboring a belief in the redeemability of offenders, they should also endorse progressive, human service-oriented interventions that seek to save Blacks’ from a life in crime rooted in disadvantage and suffering (see Burton et al. 2020a, 2020b, 2021; Butler 2020).

**Beyond racial resentment**

Criminology should continue to profit from developments within political science – and elsewhere – regarding the role of racial beliefs in shaping policy preferences. As noted in the introduction, the outpouring of Whites’ racial sympathy – from a presidential candidate to GenZ demonstrators – makes Chudy’s work on the concept’s development and measurement potentially significant. We would argue that criminological studies of race-related policies, whether in punishment or policing, should incorporate Chudy’s racial sympathy scale as a standard measure in the analysis. The study of racial beliefs should not be limited to racial resentment and similar measures of racial animus – only one side of the coin – as it has been for more than two decades.

Another line of inquiry also merits attention. Until this time, most research has focused on attitudes toward people of color. Now, however, there is a growing literature focusing on how views about “whiteness” affects public opinion. Beyond White supremacy, which involves a toxic mixture of racism and White hierarchical privilege, scholars are now probing the importance of White identity and consciousness in shaping policy preferences, including support for Donald Trump (see, e.g., Graham et al. 2020; Jardina 2019; Kaufmann 2019; Kulig et al. 2020; Maxwell and Shields 2019; Whitehead, Perry, and Baker 2018). This orientation might be called White nationalism or “ethno-traditional nationalism” (Kaufmann 2019).
These views about a desire to value White culture, traditions, and demographic majority are empirically related to, but distinct from, racial animus. The point is that similar to political science, the next generation of research on racial beliefs in criminology will profit from examining not only White attitudes toward minorities but also toward themselves.

Notes

1. Examples of White racial sympathy in the media are ubiquitous; two will suffice to make this point. First, former president George W. Bush commented: “Laura and I are anguished by the brutal suffocation of George Floyd and disturbed by the injustice and fear that suffocate our country . . . . It remains a shocking failure than many African Americans, especially young African American men, are harassed and threatened in their own country” (Neumann 2020). Second, Joe Burrow, Heisman Trophy winner and the first overall selection in the 2020 NFL draft remarked: “The black community needs our help. They have been unheard for far too long. Open your ears, listen, and speak. This isn’t politics. This is human rights” (Dellenger 2020).

2. Although they initially used a six-item racial resentment scale, in order to replicate their analyses, Kinder and Sanders's (1996) measure was reduced to the four items that had been used consistently across the 1986, 1988, and 1992 National Election Studies surveys. They explain that the four-item scale – the same used in the current study and in Chudy’s research – excludes the two questions from the six-item scale that are the “least justifiable as measures of prejudice (on the interpretation that prejudicial beliefs are erroneous)” and that may be confounded with their dependent variable (public policy on race) because they “explicitly invoke government” (Kinder and Sanders 1996: 120). The two items in Kinder and Sanders's (1996: 106) racial resentment study that are excluded from the four-item version of the scale are: (1) “Most blacks who receive money from welfare programs could get along without if they tried”; and (2) “Government officials usually pay less attention to a request or complaint from a black person than from a white person.” Thus, the number of items used in subsequent
scholarship varies, but the four items used in the current study and in Chudy’s research are standard (see, e.g., Bobo and Johnson 2004; Feldman and Huddy 2005; Henderson and Hillygus 2011; Johnson 2008; Segura and Valenzuela 2010; Unnever and Cullen 2007b).

3. Future research should examine closely the conceptual and empirical overlap between measures of empathy and the care/harm moral foundation (see Batson 2009; Cuff et al. 2016). Haidt’s (2012) Moral Foundation Theory – drawn from political psychology as opposed to social psychology – seems less orientated toward perspective taking and more oriented toward moral judgments that make someone feel virtuous – in this case, being concerned with preventing harm and being angry and troubled when this does not occur. It may be that a care/harm moral foundation, which is seen to have an evolutionary base and to develop early in life, fosters the development of empathetic identification. Again, however, this remains an issue to be investigated. Further, future research should include in the analysis a measure of empathy along with care/harm.

4. Evidence exists showing that findings from YouGov surveys generalize to the U.S. population (Ansolabehere and Schaffner 2014; Kennedy et al. 2016; Sanders et al. 2007; Simmons and Bobo 2015). Further, several studies have reported that YouGov’s sampling design rivals, if not outperforms, probability sampling methods (Graham, Pickett, and Cullen 2020; Kennedy et al. 2016; Vavreck and Rivers 2008). These findings, combined with the widespread publication of YouGov data in the leading social science journals and on a range of public policy issues, lend credence to the conclusion that YouGov data are now a standard source of public opinion data (Thielo, Graham, and Cullen forthcoming).

5. One weakness in the response set is that it assumes that the respondents shared a common understanding of the term “sympathy.” Future research might consider using more descriptive responses, such as the amount of “distress” that was felt. Further, although Chudy is focusing on genuine concern over Blacks’ misfortune, sympathy can involve a negative reaction such as feelings of pity. Such a response would likely be
experienced by African Americans as condescending and perhaps as a form of White privilege.

6. This wording is taken from the General Social Survey. The Gallup Poll uses a slightly different wording: “Are you in favor of the death penalty for a person convicted of murder?”

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**References**


**Appendix A. Racial sympathy vignettes**

**Items:**
How much sympathy do you have for the person described in each of the scenarios below?
(1) Michael is a young black man who lives in a Midwestern city. One day Michael is crossing the street and jaywalks in front of cars. Some local police officers see Michael jaywalk and stop and question him. Michael argues that he was just jaywalking and is otherwise a law-abiding citizen. The police officers feel that Michael is being uncooperative and so they give him a pat down to see if he is carrying any concealed weapons. Michael is very upset by this treatment.
(1) Milford is a mid-sized city in the Northeast. The main bus depot for the city is located in the Whittier section of Milford, a primarily black neighborhood. Whittier community leaders argue that the concentration of buses produces serious health risks for residents; they point to the high asthma rates in Whittier as evidence of the bus depot’s harmful effects. The Milford Department of Transportation officials, who are mostly white, state that Whittier is the best location for the depot because it is centrally located and many Whittier residents take the bus. Furthermore, it would be expensive to relocate the bus depot to a new location. Whittier community leaders are very upset by the Department’s inaction.
(1) Tim is a white man who owns a hair salon. His business is growing rapidly and so he decides to place an advertisement to hire new stylists. In the advertisement, he writes that interested applicants should come for an interview first thing next Monday. When he arrives at the salon on Monday, he sees a line of seven or eight people waiting outside the door, all of whom appear to be black. He approaches the line and tells the applicants that he’s sorry, but the positions have been filled. The applicants are upset; they feel they have been turned away because of their race.
(1) Mrs. Lewis, a white woman with young children, posts advertisements for a nanny on community bulletin boards. She receives many inquiries and decides to interview all applicants over the phone. Mrs. Lewis is most impressed with a woman named Laurette, who has relevant experience, is an excellent cook, and comes enthusiastically recommended. Mrs. Lewis invites Laurette over for what she expects will be the final step of the hiring process. When Laurette arrives, Mrs. Lewis is surprised to see that Laurette is black. After Laurette’s visit, which goes very well, Mrs. Lewis thanks her for her time but says that she will not be offered the job. When Laurette asks why, Mrs. Lewis says that she doesn’t think that her children would feel comfortable around her. Laurette is upset about Mrs. Lewis’ actions.
### Appendix B. Descriptive statistics for Amazon MTurk samples

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MTurk Study 1 (N = 396)</th>
<th>MTurk Study 2 (N = 348)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Racial Beliefs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial Sympathy</td>
<td>Mean or %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.55</td>
<td>3.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial Resentment</td>
<td>2.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Affiliations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative Ideology</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-demographic Variables</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<tr>
<td>Male</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>Married</td>
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<tr>
<td>Full-time Employment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Southerner</td>
<td>38.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Responses: 1 = a great deal of sympathy, 2 = a lot of sympathy, 3 = some sympathy, 4 = a little sympathy, 5 = I do not feel any sympathy