Yankees who fought for the maple leaf: A history of the American citizens who enlisted voluntarily and served with the Canadian Expeditionary Force before the United States of America entered the First World War, 1914-1917

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Acceptance Page

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<th>Department/School</th>
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<tbody>
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</tbody>
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Abstract

This thesis examines the American citizens who enlisted voluntarily and served in the Canadian Expeditionary Force before the United States entered the First World War. This study provides an overview of the CEF’s recruitment of Americans, the motives and consequences for Americans enlisting in the CEF, the CEF’s five “American” overseas infantry battalions, named the “American Legion,” which were designed to recruit American citizens, and the combat experiences of Americans serving in the CEF on the Western Front from 1914-1917. This thesis was based on the Canadian Department of Militia and Defence’s records of the CEF, Canadian war service records, the CEF’s enlistment records, American Department of State documents, personal papers and letters, autobiographies, and published accounts.

While the United States government remained neutral during the First World War, Canada’s expeditionary force to France and Belgium provided an opportunity for at least forty-one thousand American citizens to serve in an Allied army. Americans provided the CEF with a supplemental source of voluntary manpower, but their presence also raised political and military issues in Canada, diplomatic agitations between Great Britain, Canada, and the United States, and American citizenship questions for the CEF’s American volunteers. The Americans who served in the CEF before April 6, 1917, represented those citizens of the United States who disagreed with the Wilson administration’s decision to remain neutral for the first thirty-two months of the war.
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Introduction

This thesis discusses the American citizens who volunteered and served in the Canadian Expeditionary Force before the United States government entered the First World War on April 6, 1917. By examining the Canadian government’s administration of enlisting and recruiting American citizens in the CEF, the motivations and consequences for enlisting in the CEF, the history of the CEF’s “American Legion,” and the combat experiences of Americans fighting for the CEF in France and Belgium, this thesis aims to resurrect an important aspect of World War I that has heretofore received insufficient attention from historians.

In relation to the other scholarly works on this subject, three authors specifically address the history of the American citizens in the Canadian Expeditionary Force. Numerous publications account for the Americans who served in foreign armies other than the CEF in the First World War, and a sparse collection of American and World War I histories refer to Americans who enlisted into Canada’s armed forces, but the latter’s descriptions infrequently go beyond acknowledging the fact that Americans did serve in the CEF.

Fred Gaffen’s Cross-Border Warriors recounts the history of Canadians and Americans who served in one another’s armed forces from the American Civil War to the
Persian Gulf War. Gaffen provides a limited amount of material covering the Americans in the CEF. Most of his text contains extensive sections of quotations from one wartime memoir and several Canadian war records of Americans who fought for the CEF. Ronald G. Haycock’s article in *Military Affairs*, however, provides an admirable history of the Canadian Expeditionary Force's “American Legion,” which was organized to exclusively recruit American citizens. The same author’s subsequent book about the Minister of Militia and Defence, Lieutenant-General Sir Sam Hughes, reiterates the same information about the CEF’s “American Legion.” Both accounts briefly detail the history of the American Legion’s five overseas infantry battalions and the Canadian Department of Militia and Defence’s inability to mobilize these five regiments as an example of Hughes’ inept administration of the Department of Militia and Defence. Eric Smylie’s master’s thesis, “Americans Who Did Not Wait: The American Legion of the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1915-1917,” examines the five American Legion battalions and the diplomatic and political controversy this formation caused the Canadian government. Smylie makes good use of Canadian newspapers, accurately relates the conflict between Canada’s Prime Minister Sir Robert Borden and the Governor-General, H. R. H. Arthur, the Duke of Connaught, and thoroughly describes the organization and administration of the Canadian Militia before the First World War. But he does not account for, among other questions, American motivations for enlisting in the CEF, other than the sinking of the *Lusitania*, the consequences American citizens faced as a result of their enlistment, or
that the American Legion represented less than seven percent of the number of Americans who served in the CEF.

This thesis goes beyond existing published material by making a comprehensive overview of the Americans who volunteered and served with the Canadian Expeditionary Force from August 4, 1914 to April 6, 1917, which includes: explaining the CEF’s recruitment of American citizens, determining the number of Americans who enlisted into the CEF, describing the motivations and consequences for serving in the CEF while the United States government remained neutral, surveying the experiences of Americans in the CEF who fought on the Western Front, expanding previous discussions concerned with the government of Canada’s policy of administering the Americans in the CEF, particularly the American Legion, and the political and diplomatic repercussions the American Legion created between Canada, Great Britain, and the United States. The Americans who served with the Royal Canadian Air Force, Royal Canadian Navy, and Canadian armed forces in either Mesopotamia (Iraq) or Russia will be not be studied in this thesis because men enlisting in these two branches of service served directly in the British armed forces or were not considered a part of Canada’s expeditionary force to France.

The essential primary sources utilized to complete this thesis were the Department of Militia and Defence’s documents which reveal the Canadian military’s administration of the American citizens serving in the CEF. Compiled by the Canadian War Records Office, these records address the recruitment, mobilization, training, and various administrative correspondence of the American Legion’s five battalions - the 97th, 211th, 212th, 213th
and 237th Overseas Infantry Battalions. The private papers of Sir Robert Laird Borden and the Reverend Charles Seymour Bullock additionally include information essential to understanding the American experience in the Canadian Expeditionary Force. Borden's papers document the diplomatic quarrels between Canada, Great Britain, and the United States, and the political debate between Borden and the Governor-General. The papers and scrapbooks of Bullock, who served as a recruiting officer for all five American Legion battalions and commanded the 237th, offer additional evidence of CEF recruiting practices, the administration and formation of all the American Legion battalions, correspondence between Bullock and Hughes, and the backgrounds of several American Legionnaires. In order to identify the American citizens who served in the CEF, the Nominal Rolls or enlistment records of the CEF indicate who enlisted in the CEF, a volunteer's place of birth, and other information which reveal a volunteer's nationality.

The above materials are located in the National Archives of Canada in Ottawa, Ontario.

The CEF's War Service Records, also housed at the National Archives of Canada, and publications by Americans who served in the CEF offer historians an opportunity to get some insight into individual soldiers' motivations for enlisting in the CEF and also their experiences on the Western Front. The leading Canadian advocate for Americans serving in the CEF was the Minister of Militia and Defence, Lieutenant-General Sir Sam Hughes. Some of his correspondence dealing with the American Legion is in the Edwin Pye papers housed at the Department of National Defence's Directorate of History in Ottawa, Ontario. Pye's papers were examined, but unfortunately for this thesis, Hughes' private
papers had been recently donated by his family and were in the process of being compiled and indexed by the National Archives of Canada and were not available for examination. The government records of the United States, such as the *Congressional Records, U. S. Statutes at Large*, and the Department of State’s *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States*, provide valuable original sources concerning the expatriation of an American as a result of serving in the CEF before the United States government entered the First World War. These American records also provide the United States government’s diplomatic responses to the CEF’s recruitment of American citizens.

The first chapter of this thesis examines the Canadian Expeditionary Force’s recruitment of American citizens. Also included in this chapter is a discussion of the international agreements and American enlistment and neutrality laws that prohibited the CEF from recruiting in the United States. Furthermore, this section contains an explanation of the CEF’s recruitment of American volunteers and the American Legion’s recruiting practices, particularly its violations of American neutrality, which aggravated the Wilson administration.

Chapter two identifies and discusses the motivations that prompted American citizens to enlist in the Canadian Expeditionary Force. This chapter also explains the legal consequences faced by Americans who attempted to return to the United States after having enlisted in the CEF. Also ascertained will be how many American citizens volunteered for the CEF. The author has discovered new information and employs a new
method to determine which Americans misrepresented their nationality at the time of their enlistment.

Chapter three recounts the history of the five American Legion battalions from October 22, 1915 to March 21, 1917. Furthermore, this section details the diplomatic tension the CEF’s American Legion created between Canada, Great Britain, and the United States, and the political and military quarrels about the American Legion among the staff of the Department of Militia and Defence and Canadian authorities and between the Canadian Prime Minister and Governor-General.

The last chapter discusses the combat experiences of American citizens who served in the CEF on the Western Front from the Second Battle of Ypres on April 22, 1915 to Vimy Ridge on April 9, 1917, and describes their adventures, memories, and military achievements in the trenches. This chapter also covers what many Americans on the battlefields thought about the United States government’s neutrality up to April 1917 and the prospects of American entry into the war.

Immediately after Germany’s invasion of Belgium in August 1914, the British Empire excitably prepared to assist the military efforts of Great Britain, who had declared war on Germany and its allies on August 4th. In the absence of any statutory obligation to support its mother country the Dominion of Canada instantaneously offered its military services to Great Britain. The Canadian government promised immediately to dispatch a battalion - Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry - to serve in the British Army on the
European continent and a division would be delivered at a subsequent date. On August 6, 1914, Canada’s Minister of Militia and Defence, later Lieutenant-General Sir Sam Hughes, summoned the nation to volunteer for an overseas contingent, which was officially named the Canadian Expeditionary Force.

The Canadian Expeditionary Force mobilized as a volunteer force, and as an independent army distinct from the Militia of Canada. The CEF was organized and administered by the Department of Militia and Defence and fought under the command of the British Expeditionary Force. Throughout the First World War the CEF raised over six hundred thousand men and transported more than four hundred thousand of them to the Western Front. The CEF participated alongside the British Expeditionary Force on the battlefields in France and Belgium and distinguished itself in combat as a fighting force at the battles of Ypres, Festubert, Saint-Eloi, the Somme, Vimy Ridge, Passchendaele, Arras, and Amiens.

The hundreds of thousands of former British subjects residing in Canada and the native-born Canadians who enlisted in the Canadian Expeditionary Force were joined by approximately forty-one thousand Americans. This occurred despite the growth in pre-war years of a Canadian sentiment of anti-Americanism to the United States government’s expanding economic and political strength. In J. L. Granastein’s *Yankee Go Home?*, he asserted that the two “governments may have been cooperating, but anti-Americanism [in Canada] flourished on a popular level.”1 Although the exact number of 35,612 was determined by the Canadian Department of National Defence’s Directorate of History, this
investigation did not account for a number of Americans who misrepresented their place of birth when enlisting in the CEF.

Each belligerent in the First World War accepted citizens of the United States for military service, but most Americans sympathized with three Western Allies - Great Britain, France, and Canada. This attitude, as well as the proximity of Canada to the United States and the CEF's offering the highest daily wage of any army in the war, persuaded tens of thousands of American citizens to enlist into the Canadian Expeditionary Force. But, these three incentives alone do not explain why such a flood of Americans, some with successful and promising careers, left the United States to enlist in Canada's army at the risk of losing their American citizenship.

Although a number of circumstances and reasons can cause an individual to decide upon a specific action, at least three general reasons help explain why an American would enlist into a foreign army while the United States remained neutral: outrage at Germany's war atrocities, a desire to defend a common culture and ancestral homeland, and a wish to experience the adventure of war. Americans volunteered themselves for military service in Canada from outbreak of the war until the entrance of the United States at differing rates and times. But from 1915 to 1916 the majority of Americans enlisted in the CEF. In the spring, summer, and fall of 1915 many enlisted on account of the sinking of *Lusitania* on May 6, 1915, which outraged nearly all Americans, and in 1916, the Canadian Minister of Militia and Defence began authorizing battalions which were to be predominately filled with American citizens either living and working in Canada or from the United States.
Hughes’ plan to mobilize “American battalions” took shape as early as August 1914, given the abundance of volunteers from the United States - nearly eight hundred American-born soldiers served in the CEF’s 1st Division. Despite difficulties in gaining approval from Great Britain and Canada, because the American formations violated the United States government’s Foreign Enlistment Act of 1818 and threatened the neutrality laws of the United States, Hughes managed to implement his plan for the creation of a brigade of Americans to be called the “American Legion.” The American Legion consisted of five battalions: 97th, 211th, 212th, 213th and 237th Overseas Infantry Battalions, respectively headquartered in Toronto, Ontario; Vancouver, British Columbia; Winnipeg, Manitoba; St. Catherines, Ontario; and Sussex, New Brunswick.

In 1915 and 1916, the CEF aggressively recruited for American Legion volunteers both in Canada and the United States. This violated instructions from the governments of Great Britain and Canada to Hughes not to recruit outside of the Dominion. Besides Hughes, the Reverend Charles Seymour Bullock, an American citizen residing in Toronto, helped promote this aggressive recruitment. Bullock repeatedly solicited men in the United States and Canada to enlist into the American Legion and authorized other CEF recruiters to do the same. Canadian officers were arrested for violating the neutrality of the United States, and Germany accused the United States of showing partiality towards the Allies. After initial recruiting successes, the American Legion quickly degenerated on account of insufficient numbers of volunteers, desertion, and inappropriate conduct by its recruits. The inability to mobilize the American Legion and the agitation the Legion
caused the Canadian government with the United States prompted the CEF's military hierarchy to disband this recruiting experiment. The 97th Overseas Infantry Battalion came the closest to participating in the war, but during its final training maneuvers in England it was demobilized and its troops were assigned to other CEF battalions as reinforcements.

Despite the failure of this American Legion, thousands of Americans honorably served in the Canadian Expeditionary Force. For example, seventy-six CEF soldiers were awarded the Victoria Cross - the most prestigious military award of the British Army - and five of the seventy-six were American citizens. In addition to the Americans who earned a Victoria Cross, other Americans served with distinction in the CEF before the United States government entered the war - Tracy Richardson, Herbert McBride, Bob Elston, and Edwin Austin Abbey. Although not as famous as Alan Seeger of the French Foreign Legion or Arthur Guy Empey of the British Expeditionary Force, these men and a few additional "Yanks" authored articles and books about their experiences in the CEF in post-war publications. The experiences of the Americans in the CEF on the Western Front exemplify what most soldiers on the Western Front encountered: constant shelling; fear of mines, sniper fire, and gas attacks; intolerable trench conditions; and the frustration of ineffectual offensive campaigns.

Excluding the horrors every soldier faced in the First World War, American citizens serving in the Canadian Expeditionary Force encountered another more troublesome problem after they either completed their military service or were wounded in
action. The dilemma was the prospect of legally reentering the United States. This seemingly simple task was complicated by the laws of the United States which prohibited American citizens from taking an oath of allegiance when enlisting or accepting a commission in a foreign army. The Citizenship Act of 1907, an addition to the Foreign Enlistment Act of 1818, stated "that any American citizen shall be deemed to have expatriated himself when he has been naturalized in any foreign state in conformity with its laws, or when he has taken an oath of allegiance to any foreign state." Upon entering the CEF, all recruits, including Americans, were required to take an oath of allegiance to King George the Fifth. Thus, every American who enlisted into the CEF before April 6, 1917, expatriated himself. As an example, the petition to the State Department from Edward Dempster Griffin, an American who enlisted into the CEF on July 14, 1916, helps explain the legal intricacies connected with an American serving in a foreign army while the United States government remained neutral. Griffin's federal court case reveals how the American judiciary interpreted the laws governing American citizens who had enlisted in the CEF and attempted to return to the United States before April 6, 1917.

When the United States government's policy of neutrality crumbled upon Germany's declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare on February 1, 1917, Americans fighting overseas became excited about the prospect of serving under the Stars and Stripes. On April 6, 1917, the United States declared war on Germany and its allies, but the U. S. Army was not sufficiently mobilized to be able to participate immediately in the war. Understanding that the U. S. Army would not go into combat for several months,
the majority of Americans in the CEF decided to remain there until the American Expeditionary Force mobilized in France. If an American decided to transfer to the AEF he would seek a discharge from the CEF. Each transfer was settled on a case by case basis. Nonetheless, not all Americans in the CEF decided to wait for the AEF to be mobilized. Some requested an immediate discharge in order to serve as experienced military instructors.

The American citizens who volunteered and served in the Canadian Expeditionary Force before the United States government entered the First World War represent a small portion of the United States' population that not only supported the Allied war effort thirty-two months before the Wilson administration did so, but physically put their lives at risk in acting upon their convictions. American volunteers assisted the Dominion of Canada's efforts to provide the Allies with needed manpower on the Western Front during some of the greatest and most casualty-stricken offensives in British and Canadian military history. From August 4, 1914 to April 6, 1917, thousands of Americans offered their lives for Canada in a war that the United States government did not then want to fight.
Chapter One

The Canadian Expeditionary Force’s Recruitment of American Citizens

On August 4, 1914, Great Britain declared war against Germany and its allies when Germany violated Belgian neutrality after Belgium refused to permit the German Army to pass through its territory to France. This British action compelled the British Empire of numerous dominions, commonwealths, protectorates, and colonies to support Great Britain’s decision to fight the central powers of Europe. Each of the Empire’s political entities endorsed Britain’s declaration of war, including the Dominion of Canada.

Great Britain’s largest remnant of its continental North American possessions, Canada, formerly British North America, had organized as an independent governing nation in 1867, and “enjoyed virtual autonomy despite having a governor-general appointed by the British crown, who retained the right to veto legislation considered harmful to the British Empire’s interests.”³ Canada’s Governor-General was not only the representative of the crown, but the head of state representing the Dominion of Canada. The Governor-General retained the executive power of the Governor-In-Council, receiving advice from the Canadian Privy Council, the most important part of which is the Cabinet, and signing Orders-In-Council. The Prime Minister of Canada is the head of government who represents the political majority of the Canadian Parliament’s House of
After Confederation, the Governor-General was empowered to govern according to the wishes of the Prime Minister in all domestic issues.

Under the 1904 Militia Act, the Governor-General and his appointed cabinet had retained the authority to make any decision to proclaim a state of war and to deploy Canadian citizens abroad for military service. The Militia Act stated that the “Governor in Council may place the Militia, or any part thereof, on active service anywhere in Canada, and also beyond Canada, for the defence thereof, at any time when it appears advisable so to do by reason of emergency.”

Years before the outbreak of the Great War, Canadian authorities unofficially decided to support the military endeavors of the mother country. In 1910, Prime Minister Sir Wilfrid Laurier proclaimed, “When Britain is at war, Canada is at war. There is no distinction.” Accordingly, on the same date Great Britain announced its declaration of war against Germany, Canada entered the European war without issuing any official declaration of war. The Dominion’s decision to support Great Britain’s war against Germany occurred not because it was legally obligated to do so by His Majesty’s Government; rather the Canadian government had predetermined that it would systematically “contribute a force to Imperial defence abroad,” while retaining the privilege to determine the “nature and extent of its own [military] contribution.” On August 6, 1914, Great Britain acknowledged Canada’s participation in the war in a telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Andrew Bonar Law, to Canada’s
Governor-General, H. R. H. Arthur William Patrick Albert, the First Duke of Connaught and Strathearn:

With reference to my [Bonar Law] telegram of August 4th, His Majesty’s Government gratefully accept your [Connaught’s] offer to send [an] expeditionary force to this country [England], and would be glad if it could be despatched as soon as possible.\textsuperscript{8}

Most of Canada’s contributions to Great Britain’s war effort consisted of furnishing manpower for the Empire’s armed forces. Despite Canada’s meager population of 7,206,643 - a population less than the state of New York, and dwarfed by an American population over one hundred million - the Dominion provided Great Britain with 628,964 soldiers, 458,218 of whom served overseas.\textsuperscript{9} Nearly all Canadians who enlisted for overseas service served in infantry, artillery, cavalry and specialized units in France and Belgium. Canadians also served in the Royal Canadian Navy and ground forces stationed in Russia and Mesopotamia (Iraq).\textsuperscript{10} Furthermore, because no Canadian air service existed until mid-1918, more than twenty thousand Canadians up to that time enlisted into the Royal Naval Air Service and the Royal Flying Corps, the two air formations subsequently combined to form the Royal Air Force.\textsuperscript{11} Canadians also enlisted directly into the Royal Navy and British Army.

Not only did one out of every eleven Canadians serve in Canada’s armed forces, but Canada contributed mightily to the Allied war effort. Canada’s Atlantic and Pacific seaports offered the Royal Navy an opportunity to repair and refit its fleet, and the Royal Canadian Navy helped Great Britain coordinate and execute naval deployments against German submarines. Furthermore, Canada produced armaments, munitions, and raw
materials to sustain the war effort. Over one billion dollars worth of munitions was exported from Canada to various Imperial armies. Furthermore, Canada provided Great Britain with 709 million dollars in established credit to purchase commodities and foodstuffs. As a result of Canada’s support of the Allied war effort, the Canadian treasury gained more than nine million Pounds in its gold reserves from 1913-1919.

After Great Britain accepted Canada’s offer of an expeditionary force to the British Army on August 6, 1914, Canada’s Minister of the Department Militia and Defence, then Colonel Sam Hughes, summoned Canadian men to volunteer for the first overseas “contingent” - officially designated as the Canadian Expeditionary Force. This CEF formed as a component of the British Army to be exclusively deployed to serve in France and Belgium. Prime Minister Sir Robert Borden “readily agreed that strategy and the conduct of operations were matters for London, not Ottawa, to decide.” Similarly to the armed forces from Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and India, the CEF was an Imperial army allied with and subject to the authority of the British High Command.

During the First World War, the Department of Militia and Defence recruited, mobilized, and trained four CEF divisions, totaling 628,964. The CEF was organized and administered under the authority of the Department of Militia and Defence, but on the battlefield served under the commander-in-chief of the British Army, British Expeditionary Force in France, Field Marshal Sir John D. P. French until December 1915 and thereafter Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig. Because the CEF was under British command, the Ministry of Overseas Military Forces of Canada, created during the war, acted as the
liaison between the Canadian government and Great Britain’s War Office. The Canadian Ministry of Overseas Military Forces primarily directed the administrative affairs of its expeditionary force in England, but as the CEF developed into a formidable part of the British Army, the Ministry labored to increase the Canadian government’s authority of administering the military strategies of the CEF on the Western Front.18

From the Archduke Franz Ferdinand’s assassination on June 28, 1914, to the opening of hostilities in early August, Canada and Great Britain corresponded with each other regarding how to proceed if war erupted. On July 28, 1914, Great Britain notified Canada to adopt preliminary measures concerning mobilization and recruitment of troops for overseas military service. But, on August 4, 1914, British authorities advised the Governor-General that “there seemed to be ‘no immediate necessity for any request on our part for an expeditionary force from Canada,’ although it would be wise to ‘take all legislative and other steps’ which would enable such a force to be provided without delay if required.”19 Despite that dispatch, the Department of Militia and Defence hastily began formulating plans to send a contingent overseas.20 In addition to the Department of Militia and Defence’s mobilization schemes, on August 3, 1914, Captain Hamilton Gault, “a wealthy Montreal militia officer and veteran of the South African War,” proposed to raise and finance a unit of former Canadian Militia men for overseas service.21 When the Canadian proposal for an expeditionary force was accepted on August 6, Minister of Militia and Defence, later Lieutenant-General Sir Sam Hughes, summoned the nation to enlist in the new overseas army. Canadian authorities accepted Gault’s proposal on
August 8, but commissioned Lieutenant-Colonel F. D. Farquhar to mobilize the unit named Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry after the Governor-General’s daughter.22

The Canadian Expeditionary Force mobilized and recruited as a new military unit separate from Canada’s Active and Reserve Militias. The Active Militia, sub-divided into Permanent and Non-Permanent, was the military defense for the Dominion guarding Canada against foreign invaders and training for future conflicts. The Reserve Militia never organized as an armed force before the First World War due to an insufficient number of volunteers. Before the outbreak of the war, Canada’s Permanent Active Militia consisted of only 3,110 professional soldiers - the Royal Canadian Regiment and two cavalry regiments: Royal Canadian Dragoons and Lord Strathcona’s Horse - and 74,213 Canadians served in the Non-Permanent Active Militia. Although not attached to the CEF, the Canadian Active Militia aided the recruitment of volunteers for the new overseas contingent. Both the Militia and the CEF were subordinate to the Department of Militia and Defence.

Throughout August 1914, Canadian authorities - particularly the Governor-General, the Duke of Connaught, Prime Minister Sir Robert Borden, and Minister of Militia and Defence Hughes - administered the policy for recruiting men into the expeditionary force. Hughes exercised most of the authority over mobilizing the CEF, although Connaught, as Governor-General, was commander-in-chief of Canada’s armed forces. Excluding Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, in which eleven hundred
men enlisted in three weeks, the Department of Militia and Defence attempted to raise an overseas expeditionary force consisting approximately of 25,000 men to be transferred to the Western Front immediately. Militia Orders Number 372, issued by Hughes from Militia Headquarters in Ottawa on August 17, 1914, determined that the Canadian Expeditionary Force would contain one division of infantry and artillery, plus certain units supporting the requirements of the contingent. Furthermore, the Department of Militia and Defence asserted that the expeditionary force “will be Imperial and have the status of British regular troops” in accordance with British Army Act, Sections 175 and 176.

Before the First World War, and in conjunction with the precedent set during the Boer War when nearly seven thousand Canadians served in the British Army, the Department of Militia and Defence enrolled men into its expeditionary force strictly based on the “voluntarist principle so enshrined in British military culture.” This point was originally emphasized in a August 6, 1914, telegram from the Adjutant-General, Brigadier-General V. A. S. Williams, to the officers commanding Canada’s military divisions and districts: “Regulations to govern raising of a contingent for Overseas Service will be as follows Stop . . . Enrolment [sic] will be voluntary for all ranks . . .” The voluntary enlistment policy was publicly reiterated in an article appearing in the Montreal Gazette which quoted a speech by Defence Minister Frederick Borden: “I call for volunteers - volunteers mark you. I have insisted that it shall be a purely volunteer contingent. Not a man will be accepted or leave Canada on this service but of his own free will . . ."
Recruiting for the Canadian Expeditionary Force was entrusted to the Minister of Militia and Defence. Lieutenant-General Sir Sam Hughes, Minister from October 10, 1911 to November 9, 1916, deviated from the existing mobilization plan, Memorandum C.1209, established in 1911 on account of shortcomings Hughes perceived in the plan. The mobilization plan, established under then Militia and Defence’s mobilization officer, later the CEF’s Chief of the General Staff, Major-General Willoughby G. Gwatkin, required local militia commanders to raise volunteers from the militia regiment’s respective geographical section in the event of war. Therefore, instead of mobilizing existing militia units for overseas service, Hughes mobilized volunteers into new, geographically based battalions, although Hughes did mobilize certain overseas battalions “almost exclusively from militia units.”

Hughes believed that the mobilization of Canada’s overseas expeditionary force should be independent from the Militia because the Militia’s involvement would impede a necessary, rapid formation of the contingent. Therefore, on July 31, 1914, Hughes secretly instructed the officers commanding the military divisions and districts to consider the mobilization plan outlined in Memorandum C.1209 as “purely tentative.”

Throughout August 1914, Hughes frequently ignored established channels of communication, and he dispatched conflicting orders to local militia commanders by continually altering their authority to recruit and changing the requisite number of troops each military district was to recruit. Regardless of Hughes’ complicated administrative procedures, which frustrated his superiors as well as his subordinates, during the first six
months of the war, a high number of anxious and patriotic volunteers flooded the recruiting stations across the country. For instance, the Department of Militia and Defence determined that 25,000 soldiers would be the required minimum number of troops for the first overseas division of the Canadian Expeditionary Force, yet by September 8, 1914, 32,665 volunteers had enlisted for military service abroad.

The initial mobilization endeavors of Hughes are best explained by his biographer, Ronald Haycock, who described Hughes as an “egotistical and grand improviser.” Although Hughes’ mobilization ventures as Minister of Militia and Defence were a “one man show” with “little order and less administration,” his genuine enthusiasm for creating a national army provided the CEF recruitment process with tireless leadership that produced hundreds of thousands of Canadian recruits from a sparsely populated country during the Great War. Hughes directed the recruitment and mobilization of the only four divisions ever to constitute the CEF.30

The CEF’s recruitment of volunteers centered around its local recruiting stations. From the beginning of the war until the autumn of 1915, Canada’s Militia regimental commanders of each military district and division directed the recruiting process for each new CEF overseas battalion; afterwards each CEF overseas battalion was responsible for its own recruitment. Each CEF recruiting station enlisted volunteers for a specific overseas battalion. For example, either a Militia or CEF officer responsible for enlisting soldiers from a specific military district31 recruited potential citizens to enlist into an overseas battalion, usually by inciting their patriotic fervor. CEF recruiters were aided by
local recruiting leagues, numerous Canadian patriots, and the influence of Militia officers, who frequently “were drawn from the local elite,” and ordinarily “Canadian born and raised, often in the town, city, or county in which they recruited a CEF battalion.” Additionally, every overseas battalion’s regimental name and most of the recruits’ places of residence could be found within with the military district. For instance, the military district of central Ontario recruited for the 20th Overseas Infantry Battalion, whose regimental name was the Central Ontario Regiment, and the majority of whose volunteers had lived in central Ontario before enlisting.

The recruiting system for the Canadian Expeditionary Force functioned as an arm of the military. Historian Paul Maroney has observed that the process of enlisting a potential recruit “was as simple as an officer . . . setting up shop in the local armoury, making arrangements for medical examinations, and placing a sign in the window: ‘Recruits wanted for overseas service.’” As soon as a volunteer decided to enlist into the CEF, the recruiting officer was responsible for administering his transition from civilian to soldier. The CEF did not accept each man who presented himself before a recruiting station. Numerous volunteers willing to fight for Canada were rejected for not living up to the CEF’s regulations of enlistment, usually for failing the medical examination. In 1914, 4,945 volunteers were “struck off strength” at the first site of mobilization, Valcartier Camp, near Quebec City, Quebec, over two thousand for being medically unfit.
Reasons for rejecting a volunteer varied from being under age or refusing inoculations to having a spouse who protested her husband’s enlistment. Each volunteer for overseas service was required to pass a physical examination and fill out attestation papers. A medical examination, administered by a local physician or a CEF Medical Corps officer, examined a volunteer’s health and ascertained whether or not the volunteer met the CEF’s qualifications - being between 18 and 45 years old, and at least 5 feet 3 inches tall, excepting artillery men and machine gunners who had to be 5 feet 7 inches or taller. Initial mobilization orders from Hughes required that volunteers have previous military experience, but my examination of the CEF’s *Nominal Rolls* shows that this standard was not strictly enforced. Volunteers were accepted in their order of arrival upon completing a physical examination, but during the first year of recruiting, applicants were selected first from unmarried men, then from married men without dependents, and finally from married men with families. Wives of volunteers could cancel the enlistment of their husbands, although this regulation along with the height requirement were rescinded after July 1915, when Prime Minister Borden asked the Department of Militia and Defence to raise more recruits to reinforce the battalions who had fought at the Second Battle of Ypres.

Volunteers who met all physical qualifications filled out an attestation paper to enlist in the Canadian Expeditionary Force. This double-sided document was divided into six sections. The first section asked twelve general questions: name, country of birth, name and address of next of kin, date of birth, occupation, martial status, and previous
military service. Of the twelve questions, "Do you understand the nature and terms of your engagement?" and "Are you willing to be attested to serve in the Canadian Overseas Expeditionary Force?" were the two most important. The next section, "Declaration To Be Made By Man On Attestation," required the volunteer to acknowledge by signature his action of enlisting. The declaration of attestation reads:

I, __________, do solemnly declare that the above answers made by me to the above questions are true, and that I am willing to fulfil [sic] the engagements by me now made, and I hereby engage and agree to serve in the Canadian Overseas Expeditionary Force, and to be attached to any arm of the service therein, for the term of one year, or during the war now existing between Great Britain and Germany should that war last longer than one year, and for six months after the termination of that war provided His Majesty should so long require my services, or until legally discharged.38

The declaration of attestation was followed by the oath of allegiance to "His Majesty King George the Fifth," also acknowledged by the volunteer’s signature. At the bottom of the document a magistrate certified the legality of the enlistment - co-signed by the magistrate and recruiting officer. On the backside of the attestation paper was the certificate of the medical examination, the volunteer’s religious denomination, and verification from the officer commanding the unit.39

Every volunteer was required to complete the above process of enlistment, including those men transferring from Canada’s Militia to the CEF. Upon acceptance into the CEF, the recruit went to the mobilization center designated for his battalion, which varied according to the battalion’s division. At the battalion’s mobilization point, the recruit received his clothing, equipment, and basic military training and instructional exercises consisting of "physical training, musketry instruction, foot and arms drill and
entrenching.”40 Hereafter, the battalion waited until being transported to Salisbury Plain, England, to receive additional training before finally being sent to the Western Front.41

Because the Canadian Expeditionary Force recruited volunteers, a collection of volunteers often from certain geographic regions or ethnic groups would ask the Department of Militia and Defence to be organized into their own battalion. Irish and Scots, either subjects residing in Canada or Canadian-born descendants of immigrants, were the two groups who most frequently inquired about forming their own battalions. Similar requests also came from volunteers inhabiting a particular region of Canada. For example, the Department of Militia and Defence authorized the formation of the 236th Overseas Infantry Battalion, New Brunswick Kilties, on July 15, 1915, which consisted of Scots from the province of New Brunswick.42 Furthermore, Militia Headquarters mobilized battalions that recruited nationally, but were dominated by one ethnic group, such as the 197th and 223rd Canadian-Scandinavian Overseas Infantry Battalions. French-Canadian battalions were received with enthusiasm on account of their low enlistment numbers. Non-Caucasian battalion schemes proposed to the Department of Militia and Defence, however, were neither as frequent nor readily accepted. Historian Desmond Morton explained that “for racial reasons, offers by Japanese Canadians to form a battalion were rejected, although Japan was one of Britain’s allies.”43 Canadians of African descent received similar treatment, but North American Indians were usually accepted without difficulties, many of whom were mobilized into the 114th Overseas Infantry Battalion.
The Canadian Expeditionary Force was an army of many nationalities - seventy percent of the first contingent entered their place of birth on their attestation paper as a country outside of Canada. CEF volunteers were born in countries as far away as Poland, Russia, and India. Because these three nations were adversaries of Germany, their support for Canada’s armed forces was understandable. But citizens of the United States intriguingly enlisted while their country of birth abstained from participating in the First World War until April 6, 1917.

In contrast to Canada’s immediate support for the Allied war effort, the United States remained neutral for thirty-two months. During the first week of the war, President Woodrow Wilson issued a series of identical proclamations which stated that “the United States is on terms of friendship and amity with the contending powers. . . .” In theory the United States government’s neutrality was recognized by the belligerents from The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 which “established extensive rules designed to reduce the horror of war once it erupted and put into place neutrality regimes to inhibit the spread of war to other states.” From August 4, 1914 to April 6, 1917, the United States persistently attempted to maintain its policy of neutrality, despite being tested by German submarines sinking passenger liners and merchant ships. Notwithstanding the debate between some American citizens and the Wilson administration about the desirability of neutrality, approximately forty-one thousand Americans violated the neutrality acts of the United States to enlist into the CEF.
The Neutrality Proclamations issued by President Wilson reaffirmed the laws of the United States pertaining to neutrality. Wilson’s declaration was in accordance with “certain provisions of the act approved on the 4th day of March, A. D. 1909, commonly known as the ‘Penal Code of the United States.’” A public circular issued by the U. S. Department of State on August 15, 1914, reiterated these provisions by stating that “citizens of and persons within the United States are under legal duty to observe neutrality during the war in Europe; this duty is demarked in the neutrality laws and in the President’s proclamation.” An American who voluntarily enlisted into the CEF violated the first two provisions of the Neutrality Acts:

1. Accepting and exercising a commission to serve either of the said belligerents by land or by sea against the other belligerent.

2. Enlisting or entering into the service of either of the said belligerents as a soldier, or as a marine, or seaman on board of any vessel of war, letter of marque, or privateer.

The punishment for violating this law was a fine of three thousand dollars or imprisonment. Canada was considered a belligerent as defined by the August 5, 1914, American Proclamation of Neutrality, Number 1272, which indirectly identified Canada as a dominion of Great Britain and defined Great Britain as a belligerent by declaring “whereas a state of war unhappily exists between Germany and Great Britain.” Nonetheless, this and subsequent legislation, as well as the Neutrality Proclamations, proved to be ineffectual in deterring citizens of the United States from enlisting in foreign armed services.
Americans who volunteered for military service in Canada either enlisted into the CEF on their own initiative or had been persuaded to do so by CEF recruitment efforts. American volunteers had to present themselves, at their own expense, before a recruiting officer in Canada. Once an American offered his services to the CEF, he was accepted based on the same standards and regulations as any Canadian or British subject. On account of the CEF’s recruiting stations dispersed across Canada, Americans enlisted at a number of locations, but frequently they volunteered at a recruiting station just inside the Canadian border. Thus, as American citizens volunteered for enlistment at a variety of locations, they correspondingly were relegated to serving in any of the CEF’s overseas infantry, cavalry, artillery, or supporting regiments.

Although CEF enlistment records reveal that nearly every unit of the CEF contained some American citizens, most Canadian Expeditionary Force recruiters made no specific attempt to enlist Americans for service in any overseas regiment. The exception to this was the exclusive recruitment of Americans for the CEF’s American Legion and the occasional CEF recruiter whose recruiting district bordered the United States and who crossed into the United States to induce Americans to enlist in any CEF formation. This concept of recruiting American citizens originated with the Minister of Militia and Defence, Lieutenant-General Sir Sam Hughes.

Hughes’ plan to recruit Americans into the Canadian Expeditionary Force as a distinct battalion originated twenty-five days after the outbreak of the war on August 29, 1914. A trans-Atlantic cablegram from Hughes to Field Marshal, Horatio Herbert, First
Earl Kitchener of Khartoum and then British War Minister, offered “sixty thousand good fighting men from neighboring Republic anxious to help Britain and liberty” later adding that “they [Americans] would make a splendid legion.” Hughes developed a plan to enlist thousands of Americans from the United States without violating the neutrality laws of the United States. Kitchener responded by indicating that the Imperial Forces “shall be proud to have the help of men who wish to fight with us against the forces of military despotism,” but also reminding Hughes not to enlist or recruit any Americans outside of Canada.

Despite their need for manpower, British authorities remained hesitant about accepting Hughes’ plan because Great Britain neither wanted to compromise the neutrality of the United States nor risk losing a future ally and a great source of war supplies and financial assistance. In response to Hughes’ recruitment plan, the British Foreign Office advised Hughes to “respect the traditional [neutrality] policy of the United States Government;” however,

His Majesty’s Government will of course reserve to themselves the right to accept as a recruit any United States citizen who may present himself for enlistment in British territory, but they should, in Sir E. Grey’s opinion, give no encouragement to any offers of enlistment received from Americans resident in the United States, however gratified they may feel by the spirit shown in such offers. . . .

Furthermore, the Foreign Office informed Hughes that the final decision of accepting American citizens as recruits in the Canadian Expeditionary Force would be delegated to the Governor-General and the Secretary of State for the Colonies.
In a letter from British Colonial Secretary Andrew Bonar Law to the Governor-General, the Duke of Connaught, Bonar Law decided to leave the decision up to Connaught, whom Hughes disliked and mistrusted. Before this correspondence, evidence suggests that Connaught and other Militia department officers knew nothing of Hughes' concept to raise an overseas "legion" composed of foreigners. In view of Bonar Law's and the British Foreign Office's decisions to entrust Connaught with the authority over the proposed "legion," Hughes embarked to England in order to gain personal authority over his plan from higher ranking Imperial authorities. Sometime during his visit to England in October 1914, Hughes managed to win support for his "American Legion" scheme from Kitchener, then First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill, Acting High Commissioner for Canada Sir George Perley, and King George the Fifth. One contingency of this prominent group's approval of Hughes' plan was that the recruitment of American citizens for collective service in one military unit would not endanger relations with the United States so long as no Americans were recruited on American soil.

British authorities insisted that no American citizen would be recruited or enlisted within the United States because they recognized that American laws prohibited any belligerent from actively recruiting on a neutral nation's territory. This recognition was based on the United States' Foreign Enlistment Act of 1818, the British Army Act, and the neutrality acts recently reiterated by President Wilson in his Neutrality Proclamations. Hughes' recruitment plan, which relied upon Americans volunteering for enlistment into
the Canadian Expeditionary Force, conflicted with American neutrality and foreign enlistment laws. As a result, the enlistment of Americans into a single battalion proved diplomatically complex for Canada, Great Britain, and the United States.

In response to the War of 1812, during which Great Britain had actively attempted to persuade Americans who were British sympathizers to enlist into the British Army, the United States government enacted a law on April 20, 1818, forbidding Americans from accepting commissions or entering a foreign army while the United States government remained neutral. The wording of the Act, similar to the neutrality laws passed a hundred years later by Congress stated

> that if any person shall, within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States, enlist or enter himself or hire or retain another person to enlist or enter himself, or to go beyond the limits or jurisdiction of the United States with intent to be enlisted or entered in the service of any foreign prince, state, colony, district, or people, as a soldier or as a marine or seaman, . . . every person so offending shall be deemed guilty of a high misdemeanor, and shall be fined not exceeding one thousand dollars, and be imprisoned not exceeding three years . . . [as long as] the United States shall then be at peace with such foreign prince, state, colony, district, or people.\(^5\)

The British government appreciated this fact. For example, a letter to Hughes from the British Foreign Office stated that “Sir E. Grey [British Foreign Minister] understands that United States Law on this subject is still governed by the United States Foreign Enlistment Act of 1818. . . ”\(^5\) Great Britain further hesitated to accept Hughes’ American recruiting plan on account of the unfortunate experience of attempting to raise troops for the British Army on United States territory during the Crimean War. The United States vehemently refused to allow this to happen.\(^5\) Section 6 of the 1818 Foreign Enlistment Act hindered
CEF recruitment endeavors of American citizens as well by prohibiting "any person . . .
within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States . . . [from organizing] any military
expedition or enterprise, to be carried on from thence against . . . any foreign prince or
state, or of any colony, district or people, with whom the United States are [at] peace.\textsuperscript{59}

Just as the neutrality laws and the 1818 Foreign Enlistment Act of the United
States forbidding Americans from enlisting or accepting a commission from a foreign army
with whom the United States government was at peace, the same neutrality laws of the
United States also prevented foreign armies from entering American territory to recruit its
citizens. Sections three through seven, nine, and eleven (almost identical to Section 6 of
the 1818 Act) of the neutrality laws enforced by the Department of State and issued by
President Wilson prohibited a foreign army, such as the CEF, from recruiting or enlisting
American citizens within the boundaries of the United States. Provisions three through
seven differed from the 1818 Act as follows:

3. Hiring or retaining another person to enlist or enter himself in the service in the
service of either of the said belligerents as a soldier, or as a marine, or seaman on
board of any vessel of war, letter of marque, or privateer.

4. Hiring another person to go beyond the limits or jurisdiction of the United
States with intent to be enlisted as aforesaid.

5. Hiring another person to go beyond the limits of the United States with intent
to be entered into service as aforesaid.

6. Retaining another person to go beyond the limits of the United States with
intent to be enlisted as aforesaid.

7. Retaining another person to go beyond the limits of the United States with
intent to be entered into service as aforesaid.\textsuperscript{60}
The neutrality laws applied to any American citizen or resident, including those who remained a citizen or subject of one of the belligerents.

The Minister of Militia and Defence’s plan to recruit and enlist Americans also violated international agreements which restricted Canada from recruiting American citizens. It is unclear if Hughes or Canadian authorities were aware of the agreement, but the provisions applied to Hughes’ plans to recruit Americans. At The Hague Convention of 1907, the leading governments of the world convened at the request of German Emperor Wilhelm II to adopt certain international agreements. On October 18, 1907, the assembly endorsed “The Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land,” which defined the position of neutral nations and individuals “in their relations with the belligerents.” Article 4 of the convention’s pamphlet stated that a “Corps of combatants can not be formed nor recruiting agencies opened on the territory of a neutral Power to assist the belligerents.” This provision forbade the CEF from recruiting in the United States until the American government entered the war. Interestingly, Great Britain failed to ratify the international measures approved at the 1907 The Hague Convention, although not because of this section of the agreements.

Hughes neglected to consider the British Army Act of 1870, which regulated among other British military questions, the procedures of recruiting and enlistment. Section 95 (1) of the Act prohibited the British Army from organizing a “separate corps of foreigners for service in His Majesty’s Army.” Britain’s Army Council informed Hughes that “various offers of the services of ‘foreign legions’ have been made to the Army
Council and have been declined for the reason that altogether apart from the terms of Section 95 (1) of the Army Act, the recruiting regulations for the Army prohibit the enlistment of all foreigners.” Furthermore, the Army Council added, this applied to all Imperial Forces “whether as part of the Canadian Expeditionary Force or otherwise.”

Although discussed and approved by Kitchener and “His Majesty” in the early stages of the war, the recruitment of Americans for the CEF’s American Legion failed to materialize until October 1915. Hughes’ competing obligations as Minister of Militia and Defence and most Canadian and some British authorities’ reluctance to aggravate the neutrality of the United States government delayed measures to recruit Americans for a single military unit. Recruiting for the American Legion started two months before the Department of Militia and Defence recognized the Legion’s first battalion - the 97th Overseas Infantry Battalion. Unofficially the battalion began organizing on October 22, 1915, but Hughes did not authorize the formation as a CEF overseas battalion until December 22, 1915, under the command of Major A. B. Clark. Headquartered at Toronto, Ontario, the 97th organized on account of Hughes’ ingenuity for the concept and “as a result of a steadily increasing demand on the part of former American citizens living and doing business in Canada to have some distinctive part in the present war.”

The restrictions restraining Hughes’ recruitment of American citizens at first obliged him to concentrate on enlisting Americans who resided in Canada. But this recruiting endeavor resulted in low numbers of Americans enlisting into the new battalion during the first two months. The addition and coordination of Toronto’s American Club
under President Asa Minard and the Reverend Charles Seymour Bullock enhanced the recruiting efforts of the 97th. Before the American Club’s involvement with the 97th, it received little attention either from the CEF’s administration, Canadians, or Americans, yet once the Department of Militia and Defence “secured the cooperation of the American Club of Toronto . . . that the public began to know about the 97th.” The American Club, primarily composed of wealthy Americans residing in Ontario, financially assisted and aided the battalion’s recruiting efforts by compiling the names of Americans currently living in the Dominion.

Although the contribution of the American Club helped the recruitment of Americans into the CEF, the addition of Reverend Bullock to the Canadian Expeditionary Force proved to be the most important. Bullock, minister of Ottawa’s Congregational Church of Our Father, was born in Cold Springs, New York, had served with the 1st Cavalry of Illinois Volunteers during the Spanish-American War. First commissioned as a Captain of the 97th Overseas Infantry Battalion, Bullock served as the battalion’s first chaplain and recruiting officer “to raise a battalion of American citizens ostensibly resident in Canada for service overseas.” His recruitment headquarters was in Toronto’s Strand Theatre at 103 Yonge Street. Bullock’s main activity as a recruiter for the American Legion was speaking at recruiting rallies where American residents in Canada were encouraged to enlist, and where speeches were given and American, Canadian, and British patriotic songs were sung. In his speeches, Bullock enthusiastically asserted the political importance of the American Legion in Canada’s army, stating that it would “be a pledge of
North America to the world’s democracy.” Thirty recruits enlisted after hearing Bullock speak at a recruiting rally at Toronto’s Hippodrome Sportsmans Association on January 1, 1916. In addition to speaking at recruiting rallies at a variety of locations in Ontario, Bullock recruited American citizens in the United States. This violated American neutrality laws and The Hague Convention’s provisions, and endangered the relations between Great Britain and Canada with the United States. Bullock and a number of other CEF officers traveled through the United States recruiting Americans to serve in the CEF’s American Legion, despite the British government’s specific instructions to Hughes not to permit the recruitment of American citizens in the United States. As a reward for his recruiting efforts, Hughes promoted Bullock to Lieutenant-Colonel and commanding officer of the fifth American Legion overseas infantry battalion - the 237th.

From December 1915 to February 1916, the 97th Overseas Infantry Battalion enlisted 1,449 American citizens into the Canadian Expeditionary Force and rejected 451 others for being medically unfit. On account of the 97th’s success of filling its ranks, on February 15, 1916, Hughes created three more overseas infantry battalions - the 211th, 212th and 213th - reserved for American volunteers. As the 97th was authorized to recruit in Toronto, Ontario, each of the new American Legion battalions was assigned a particular region: Alberta and British Columbia to the 211th; Manitoba to the 212th; and St. Catherines, Ontario - near the New York State border - to the 213th. Several months later, a fifth American battalion - the 237th - was formed on July 15, 1916, to recruit in New Brunswick and eastern Canada. All five American Legion battalions recruited
American citizens for the remainder of 1916, except for the 212th and 237th which were amalgamated to the 97th Overseas Battalion on September 12, 1916. The American Legion enlisted a total of 2,746 American citizens from October 30, 1915, until the last of its battalions disbanded on March 16, 1917. This figure fell far short of Hughes’ optimistic estimate of sixty thousand American citizen volunteers.

The number of Americans who served in the Canadian Expeditionary Force’s American Legion represented only seven percent of the total number of Americans who enlisted in the CEF. Yet recruiting Americans for the Legion’s five battalions represented almost all of the CEF’s recruitment of American citizens. Recruiting for the American Legion’s battalions caused difficulties with the United States government because the recruiting tactics aggravated the Wilson administration, embarrassed some British officials, and frustrated Canada’s Governor-General, the Duke of Connaught, Prime Minister Sir Robert Borden, the CEF’s Chief of the General Staff Major-General Willoughby G. Gwatkin, and Deputy Minister of Militia and Defence Major-General Sir Eugene Fiset.

The Canadian Expeditionary Force recruited American citizens in ways similar to those used to recruit Canadians and British subjects residing in Canada. The battalion’s commanding officer was entrusted by the Department of Militia and Defence to enlist volunteers under army regulations until all ranks were occupied. The American Legion’s battalions recruited volunteers in the same manner, except that its recruiting stations and officers commonly violated CEF regulations prohibiting the recruitment of Americans in
Canada and the United States. CEF recruiting efforts in the United States were conducted by varied means such as posters, billboards, and personal letters from American Legionnaires to American citizens. Advertising in American newspapers, recruiting in the United States, and displaying American flags and national emblems at recruiting stations typified the American Legion’s violations of the United States government’s neutrality.

As early as January 27, 1916, - three months after the 97th Overseas Infantry Battalion began recruiting - violations by the American Legion surfaced in the United States. According to a letter to Hughes from an unidentified Canadian authority, Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, the British Ambassador at Washington, was informed by a State Department employee that the United States government understood that Americans were actively being recruited for the CEF. As evidence the State Department employee, identified as Polk, presented Spring-Rice with a flyer that read: “AMERICANS. ATTENTION. We want 500 fellows like you for the 97th Overseas Battalion and we want you now. Forward! To Recruiting Station 103 Yonge Street.” The letter warned Hughes that the “State Department are becoming a little unhappy about this recruiting . . . [furthermore] I think you ought to know this as there might be trouble with the American Government on the subject.”

Just as this notice reached the U. S. State Department, countless recruiting materials advertising for the American Legion’s battalions appeared in newspapers across the United States. Usually appearing in the sports section of a newspaper, an advertisement romanticized the experience of serving in the CEF’s American Legion and
frequently the recruiting ads promoted the CEF’s high wages and “separation allowances” for his family respectively provided by the Canadian government and the Canadian Patriotic Fund. For example, an announcement appealing to the emotions of American citizens - titled “Here’s Your Chance Americans!” - declared

THE BIGGEST ADVENTURE IN THE WORLD is open to you!...but THE UNITED STATES IS NOT AT WAR! You are not being called on to directly defend your homes, to directly defend your flag. The call is even broader and bigger. It has put aside nationalism - for this has become more a war of principles than of nations, of good against bad, or right against wrong. . . . IN YEARS TO COME the ‘American Legion’ men of today will be looked upon as heroes - not only of Canada, not only of the United States, but of the world. . . . The time has come - THE CALL TO ARMS - To FIGHT, FOR LIBERTY - as TRUE AMERICANS . . . real men are not afraid! It’s better to die a glorious death than live in inglorious idleness when the WORLD NEEDS YOU! You will be well clothed, well fed and well paid - honored, respected and loved by every Canadian.

Advertisements as elaborate as the above example or simpler ones that merely stated “Wanted - 300 active, able-bodied men at once. No. 2. Cromwell Street, Sarnia. Office open Sundays and Evenings,” appeared in newspapers across the nation, particularly in the states bordering the Dominion. Advertisements listing the locations of recruiting stations appeared in Canadian newspapers as well, “so that Americans whose inclinations lead them to join the American Legion coming from the U. S., know where to go.” While traveling in the United States, a staff member from the Governor-General’s office observed that the advertisements appeared “from one end of the country to the other.”

Newspapers in the United States printed more than CEF recruiting offers. Often articles warned young Americans not to be enticed by the Canadian Expeditionary Force’s American Legion. An editorial in the Grand Rapids News on April 20, 1916, cautioned
An example of a CEF recruiting advertisement inducing Americans to volunteer.81

HERE'S YOUR CHANCE AMERICANS!

THE BIGGEST ADVENTURE IN THE WORLD is open to you! A great chance to show yourself a man—to make a name for yourself—make your people proud of you—give yourself something to look back to with pride and pleasure!

Remember when you were a boy, how the Grand Army Men looked to you? Every man a hero—and prouder of his G.A.R. button than anything else? Well, they did their DUTY—they fought for their flag, defended their homes, upheld the Union. Is it a DUTY that faces you today, Americans? No, a private duty! No one on earth can COMPUL you to enter this fight—and no one WANTS you to enter it.

UNLESS YOU WANT TO GET INTO THE THING YOURSELF, because you know that it is the RIGHT THING TO DO! You know the story of the war—that Germany is the foe of liberty and civilization, that Germany has violated international law, and is a menace to the welfare of humanity. You know that—but the UNITED STATES IS NOT AT WAR! You are not being called on to directly defend your homes, to directly defend your flag. The call is even broader and bigger. It has put aside nationalism—for this has become more a war of principles than of nations, of good against bad, or right against wrong.

Because Canada was fighting for those very principles of liberty which every true American loves, thousands of Americans have flocked to her aid, enlisting in regular Canadian battalions. They are helping to repay the debt of gratitude to Canada for the 48,000 Canadians who fought for the North in the Civil War. And now, to further cement the friendship of Canada and the United States, there has come into being "THE AMERICAN LEGION," a full brigade of Americans, Native Born, or Naturalized, who are going overseas in distinctive units, officered from their own number, and who are to make history.

IN YEARS TO COME the "American Legion" men of today will be looked upon as heroes—not only of Canada, not only of the United States, but of the world. Every man will be a member of "THE MILITARY ORDER OF THE AMERICAN LEGION," and the insignia of that order is destined to become as famous as that of the G.A.R., only it will be much rarer. The organization is already formed—a fraternal body, sworn to eternal friendship, the relief and support of unfortunate members, and as a body to perpetuate the great purpose and the great fight its members fought, "FOR HUMANITY AND JUSTICE!"

BOYS—MEN—HERE'S YOUR CHANCE! If the red blood of manhood is in your veins, you cannot sit idly by! You must realize that the battle line of Flanders is the bulwark of civilization—that if it were to give way, not only Canada, but the United States, would surely be drenched in blood? Do you want German savagery on North American soil? Do you want a line of German forts on what is now the peaceful border line between the United States and Canada? NO—NO—NO—Not if you are REAL MEN! The time has come—THE CALL TO ARMS—"TO FIGHT, FOR LIBERTY—as TRUE AMERICANS!" You are not going just on a picnic, boys. Some of you will not come back, but the real men are not afraid! It's better to die a glorious death than live in inglorious idleness when the WORLD NEEDS YOU!

Come Overseas with the American Legion. We will make you one of us! Each of us has started as you will be doing. Each has an equal chance of winning promotion. There are vacancies for 100 officers and several hundred non-commissioned officers. These will be filled from the ranks. If you have the right stuff in you, you can get ahead. But whether you are private or officer YOU ARE AN AMERICAN LEGIONER! You will be well clothed, well fed and well paid—honored, respected and loved by every Canadian. THE CALL TO ARMS HAS COME. GET INTO THE SCRAP RIGHT AWAY, AND DO MORE THAN YOUR DUTY.
the youth of America that the Canadian government was conducting a campaign to lure young Americans to Canada by tempting them with lucrative employment opportunities, then persuading the youth to enlist into the CEF. Although the Department of Militia and Defence denied the charges of "misleading inducements falsely . . . to American citizens to come to Canada as CEF recruits," the accusations were true. A letter from the Duke of Connaught to Borden exemplified the Governor-General's grievance with this practice by condemning CEF recruiters of inducing "American citizens to cross into Canada, nominally for harvesting, but in reality to endeavor to persuade them to enlist for Overseas."82

Despite the Department of Militia and Defence's denial of misleading Americans to enlist in the CEF, it should be noted that CEF recruiters adopted a variety of recruiting methods, both legal and illegal, covert and overt, to fill the ranks of the American Legion. The 97th Overseas Infantry Battalion's publication, The American Legion Magazine, reported that "if a man is in Canada, then he will be asked to become a member of the Legion if he is considered to be a suitable man, but he must be in the Dominion before he can be invited."83 Prime Minister Borden issued a statement to discount similar rumors, declaring that Americans residing in the United States who visit Canada would not experience any more difficulties than they encountered on previous travels.84

Newspapers and other weekly publications not only contained advertisements inducing Americans to cross the border to enlist in the Canadian Expeditionary Force, but covered the recruitment of Americans in the CEF. Beginning in August 1914, the New
*York Times* periodically reported that thousands of Americans were enlisting in Canada’s armed forces for overseas service. For the remainder of the war this paper included articles about the CEF recruitment of American citizens and their service in the war and after the United States entered the war published casualty listings of Americans in the CEF. On May 28, 1916, the *New York Times* printed a two-page feature article explaining the American Legion’s formation and highlighting the lives of several American Legionnaires. Popular periodicals, such as *Outlook, Literary Digest,* and *New Republic,* occasionally published articles about the Americans in the CEF. Both types of publications and circulars were pro-Allied and often published articles bordering on propaganda. For instance, one article asked:

‘Why aren’t you in the [Canadian] army?’ ‘Oh,’ said I, ‘I’m an American.’ ‘That’s no excuse,’ the boy continued. ‘Americans are fighting too, thousands of them. We used to think they were afraid, but they’re just as brave as we are, after all.’

Canadian recruitment of American citizens went beyond advertisements in newspapers and periodicals, as some Canadian officers traveled to various points in the United States in order to recruit volunteers. Although this policy was regarded by Connaught, Major-General Gwatkin, and Deputy Minister of Militia and Defence Major-General Sir Eugene Fiset, and most British authorities as irresponsible and contrary to Kitchener’s instructions governing such policy, Hughes must have known CEF recruiters where recruiting in the United States, but failed to act because he most likely approved or unofficially authorized Bullock and other American Legion recruiters to recruit Americans in the United States. Evidence appears to contradict this assumption as Hughes was
ordered "in plain terms than no efforts to recruit may be made in the United States." Bullock, the most ardent American Legion recruiter, and other CEF recruiters either disobeyed Hughes' order prohibiting CEF recruiters from inducing American citizens to enlist outside of Canada or Hughes never made the order. Most likely Hughes did not instruct American Legion recruiters forbidding their recruitment in the United States, although he may have made a "lame duck" order to CEF recruiters in order to protect his involvement with the CEF's recruitment of Americans in the United States.

The appearance of CEF recruiters in the United States frustrated the United States government. The United States responded by prosecuting CEF recruiters for illegally inducing American citizens to enlist. This situation caused the U. S. Department of State to clarify what belligerent actions were permissible in the United States. The majority of the inquiries received by the State Department centered on charges by the German Ambassador at Washington, Count Otto von Bernstorff, accusing the United States of partiality towards the Allies. Replies explained the Wilson administration's position concerning former belligerent subjects residing in the United States and their obligation for military service. Both Secretaries of State during the First World War - William J. Bryan and Robert Lansing - repeatedly attempted to pacify Bernstorff by reaffirming the strict dedication of the United States to neutrality. As for foreign residents in the United States, the State Department notified American immigration authorities that the transportation of former subjects from any of the belligerents through the United States to points outside of the country for military service was permitted; however, the United States government
was under no international commitment by "which persons of foreign origin residing in
this country may be compelled to return to their countries of origin for military service,
nor is there any way in which persons may be forced into foreign armies against their will
so long as they remain in the United States." 88

Despite the United States government’s neutrality laws or The Hague Convention
of 1907’s agreements prohibiting foreign armies from organizing or recruiting within the
United States, officers of the CEF, such as Reverend Bullock, nevertheless recruited in the
United States by soliciting American citizens to voluntarily enlist into the CEF or its
American Legion. Often at the expense of the Department of Militia and Defence,
American citizens journeyed north to enlist after CEF recruiters gave them money and
directions to recruiting stations in Canada. Crossing the U.S.-Canadian border was
sometimes precarious because the Canadian government feared incursions from German-
Americans and Austrian-Americans. 89 On one occasion a Canadian border patrol guard
killed two American fisherman who unintentionally crossed the international line near
Niagara Falls. 90 To combat this paranoia, Hughes “persuaded Canadian immigration
authorities to relax substantially the entrance requirements for new arrivals.” 91

Although The American Legion Magazine’s first issue stated that the Legion’s
recruiting officers “have been enjoined strictly to refrain from violating the laws of
neutrality by urging or inviting men to cross the border” to enlist voluntarily, examples
abound of CEF recruitment activity in the United States. 92 Recruiting efforts differed in
degrees of discretion, as often recruiting agents appeared in "mufti" to personally
approach a prospective American volunteer, yet occasionally, as British Ambassador Spring-Rice informed Secretary Bryan, "uniformed Canadian soldiers wearing filled cartridge belts" frequently appeared in Detroit, Michigan. The majority of recruiting endeavors occurred undetected primarily because they were private conversations between undercover CEF recruiters and American citizens. For example, one American citizen reportedly crossed the border to enlist after a conversation with two CEF officers, who, having arranged to legally purchase munitions for the Canadian Army, advised him that if he enlisted in the CEF he would be granted a commission. And Bob Elston of the American Legion's 97th Overseas Infantry Battalion recruited in Niagara Falls and Buffalo, New York, in order to "round up the rookies the padre [Bullock] had told to congregate at the border." Elston searched the bars near the border for those Americans who had heard of the American Legion and wished to enlist in the CEF. He often gave them money for transportation to Toronto and provided them with directions to the 97th's recruiting station. Additionally, some Americans, who served in the CEF on the battlefields, returned to recruit in the United States as is evident by an unidentified Arizona man who gave recruiting speeches in the United States "like the appeals of a hot gospeller." His efforts resulted in the enlistment of twenty-three Americans before he stopped recruiting due to the wounds he had suffered in the war.

The most publicized account of recruiters soliciting American citizens for overseas service occurred when two British subjects, Dr. Thomas Addis and Ralph K. Blair, were convicted for violating the Neutrality Acts in the summer of 1915. Before being indicted,
Addis and Blair, considered the “ringleaders” of British recruitment of American citizens, had successfully recruited 155 American volunteers for service in the British Army, but were finally caught when federal agents intercepted thirty-two of those men traveling from San Francisco to New York in route to embarking for England for enlistment. The incident - accentuated by German Ambassador Bernstorff’s scornful correspondence to the State Department accusing the British of violating American neutrality - marked an increasing trend of Allied recruiters covertly soliciting Americans to enlist into their armed services.97

Similarly to Addis’ and Blair’s recruiting efforts, special agents of the U. S. Department of Justice arrested Canadian Expeditionary Force recruiters for violating the neutrality laws of the United States. On June 9, 1916, Captain H. J. Thomson was arrested for recruiting American citizens in Seattle, Washington, for the American Legion, presumably for the 211th Overseas Infantry Battalion headquartered at Vancouver, British Columbia. A few weeks later, the CEF’s Lieutenant Ernest Austin was charged in Seattle with violating the neutrality laws of the United States. Enlistment papers and advertisements found in Austin’s temporary Seattle residence and evidence demonstrating his active engagement of recruiting American citizens led to his prosecution for the infractions.98 Furthermore, a Militia and Defence Memorandum dated February 19, 1917, cited a recent recruiting endeavor by “an unidentified man [who] brought 178 men from California to Vancouver [for enlistment] at $1.00 a head.”99 Although CEF recruitment in the United States focused on enticing Americans of Anglo-Saxon heritage, the CEF
actively recruited African-Americans. For example, on October 21, 1916, W. G. R. Humphrey sent a letter to S. M. Maxwell encouraging African-American citizens from New York to cross the border and enlist in the CEF’s No. 2 Construction Battalion, an all-black formation, and inquired “would it not be possible for you [S. M. Maxwell] to induce one or more colored men to join you and come to Halifax [Nova Scotia]?”

CEF recruiters operated in a number of northern American states and cities, such as Chicago, Detroit, Cleveland, New York, Montana, Vermont, and Minnesota, in order to solicit American volunteers for enlistment, and in doing so each time risked incarceration by American authorities. In addition to prosecution by the United States government, a CEF recruiter possibly faced hostile encounters with Americans who wanted to maintain the neutrality of the United States government. For example, “some hyphenated fanatic in Detroit” wrote a letter to Lieutenant C. N. Moore threatening his life for having recruited American citizens in the city. Nonetheless, these threats must not have been effective on account of a letter from Horace Nugent, the British Consul in Chicago, to Prime Minister Borden which stated:

> It seems astonishing that orders forbidding attempts at recruiting in the United States which have been issued so frequently should continue to be disregarded. I must ask once more that effective steps be taken to prevent any recurrence of such incidents.

This correspondence appeared in Ottawa two days after Borden’s message to the CEF’s Adjutant General, Major-General W. E. Hodgins, requesting “that the instructions in this matter should be clear and ambiguous so that no action of any kind whatever should be taken to induce residents of the United States to come to Canada for enlistment.”
Canadian authorities discovered that they needed to strengthen the measures prohibiting CEF recruiters from soliciting American citizens within the United States. A week after the United States government asked Spring-Rice that Canada disband its American Legion, on May 15, 1916, Connaught, who had been informed of American objections from Spring-Rice, asked Borden if he would “pressure” Hughes to “discontinue the recruiting of American subjects.” Recruiting continued throughout the summer and into the fall of 1916, despite Connaught’s request and notwithstanding three of the five American Legion battalions being disband from September to October 1916. An official circular letter from the Governor-General to all recruiting stations issued on November 20, 1916, attempted to eliminate the recruiting practice, declaring

> on no account are advertisements to be published in the United States papers for recruits, and no inducements are to be offered by way of traveling expenses or otherwise to citizens of the United States to enlist in the Canadian forces, nor are any such to be solicited or approached to enlist; and any officer disregarding these instructions will be subject to immediate dismissal.

Before Connaught’s instructions no punishment existed for a CEF recruiter inducing Americans in the United States to enlist. CEF recruiters were merely informed that this practice was not permitted under any circumstances.

The recruitment of American citizens in the United States by the Canadian Expeditionary Force was not the only CEF recruiting method to aggravate American and Canadian authorities. At various American Legion recruiting stations, American flags and emblems were displayed. This practice of exhibiting American patriotic symbols was designed to influence American citizens to enlist voluntarily in the CEF, but this created
diplomatic tensions between the Dominion and its southern neighbor because the United States government wanted to give every appearance of strictly observing neutrality with no show of partiality towards any belligerent.

According to Sir John Willison, the editor in chief of *The Toronto Daily News*, displaying the "Stars and Stripes" in Canada was not unknown. He contended that for every British flag unfurled in the United States, a hundred American flags are flown in Canada, and "over many Summer cottages in Canada the American flag flies constantly, sometimes, one thinks, without due regard for Canadian susceptibilities." Nonetheless, the U. S. State Department and the Governor-General of Canada requested the removal of all American flags from CEF recruiting stations.

After being informed by the U. S. State Department that American flags were being made for the CEF’s American Legion by a Chicago flag manufacturer, on April 10, 1916, Spring-Rice appealed to the Governor-General to stop associating the Stars and Stripes with Canadian armed forces. The telegram from Spring-Rice also indicated the United States government’s grievance with American Legion battalions, specifically the 212th Overseas Infantry Battalion, carrying American flags while parading and recruiting posters in Canada using the American flag. The Duke of Connaught replied by denying that the American Legion paraded or will parade with the American flag and notified Spring-Rice that "the recruiting posters upon which that emblem is inscribed are being canceled."
A couple of months later, the CEF’s Adjutant-General, Major-General W. E. Hodgins, instructed the 212th, which had displayed an American flag crowned with a British flag, that “nothing can be permitted in any shape or form to claim any International connection of the 212th Battalion with the United States.” \(^\text{10}\) On June 8, 1916, U. S. Secretary of State Robert Lansing dispatched a letter to British Ambassador Spring-Rice indicating that American Consuls throughout Canada had observed recruiting stations displaying American flags alongside British flags “for the purpose of enlisting additional forces in the military unit known as the ‘American Legion.’” Lansing requested that this “misuse of the American flag” should cease. \(^\text{11}\)

As recruiting for the Canadian Expeditionary Force increased during the summer months of 1916, American Legion recruiting stations continued to disregard orders instructing them that “no American flags, banners or designs are to be displayed at recruiting offices where men are enlisted for American Overseas Battalions.” \(^\text{12}\) No Canadian official seemed to possess enough authority to restrict the displaying of the American flag. While traveling through Calgary, Alberta, the Governor-General witnessed a CEF recruiting station advertising as an “American Recruiting Office” for the 211th Overseas Battalion and exhibiting an American flag with the Union Jack. The 211th’s recruiters were immediately instructed to remove the flag. \(^\text{13}\) Furthermore, Clyde I. Webster, U. S. District Attorney in Detroit, Michigan, protested to the Department of Militia and Defence that American flags were repeatedly being displayed at the recruiting station in Windsor, Ontario. \(^\text{14}\)
The most infamous incident of the “misuse of the American flag” occurred at a recruiting station in Niagara Falls, Ontario. On May 30, 1916, James H. Goodier, the American Consulate Officer at Niagara Falls, observed a recruiting station for the 213th Overseas Battalion displaying an American flag and immediately protested to E. F. Morrison, the lieutenant in charge. Later that day, Goodier found the flag in exactly the same position as before. Goodier discretely beckoned Morrison “quietly to one side,” and once more asked him to remove the flag from the recruiting area. Morrison rebutted by justifying the display of American flags on the grounds that all the men joining the so-called ‘American Legion’ were Americans, that they had a right as such Americans to display the national emblem, and that in any event the flag was being utilized in all the recruiting stations for the American Legion, and was a necessity as part of their advertising campaign for recruits.

Despite Morrison’s defense, Goodier persuaded him to take down the flag. While Goodier watched the flag being removed from the tent, a private, F. R. Yearwood, sarcastically referred to the flag as “this ‘glorious’ rag” and insulted the United States government for its neutrality. Several hours later, Goodier returned to find the flag displayed inside the tent, “plainly visible from the outside.” Goodier “entered a verbal protest against the mere subterfuge of changing the flag’s position.” The following day Goodier returned to the recruiting station and found the flag still visible. Private Yearwood, who was the only soldier on duty, contemptuously inquired “Well what are you going to do now, take us across [the border] and have us shot at sunrise?” The State Department protested and the CEF investigated the station’s recruiting practices. Morrison was court martialed for his role in the altercation and Yearwood deserted.115
By the summer of 1916, the CEF's voluntary system of recruiting began to outlive its usefulness as enlistment numbers decreased. Various developments contributed to this, but the mounting casualties due to the aggressive Allied offensive campaigns on the Western Front in 1916 and competition for manpower from the industrial and agricultural sectors caused the Canadian authorities to make changes. The first move involved dismissing Hughes from his position as Minister of Militia and Defence on November 9, 1916, because his irregular recruiting methods had become increasingly disruptive to Prime Minister Borden, who disagreed with Hughes' philosophy that a volunteer army was the most effective military organization for Canada. Less than one year after Hughes' discharge, Prime Minister Borden's Government enacted the Military Service Act on August 29, 1917, which authorized military conscription for Canada.

Although conscription developed from the decreasing number of volunteers enlisting into the CEF and the absolute need to reinforce the overseas divisions, one unstated element that may have affected the recruitment situation that led to military conscription in Canada was the absence of American citizens enlisting. Never mentioned in the discussions of 1917 or in post-war publications as a factor for Canadian conscription, the United States government's entry into the war conceivably could have affected the recruiting numbers enough to accelerate this conscription policy. Evidence for this assertion is purely circumstantial; however, the United States entered the war on April 6, 1917, and only one month later, Prime Minister Borden publicly advocated for military conscription. Also, the Canadian government continued to recruit Americans
after April 6, 1917, indicating Canada’s need for Americans as volunteers, although this time with the consent of the Wilson administration. On May 8, 1917, President Wilson signed a bill that permitted Canadians as well as British recruiters to solicit Canadians, Britons, and Americans in the United States for service in their armed forces - this was known as the British and Canadian Recruiting Mission. Therefore, because the United States government was unsure of its immediate military contribution to the Allies and because the United States armed forces would require some time to mobilize and train its forces, eager and motivated American citizens continued to cross the Canadian border in order to volunteer for the CEF. Unfortunately for Lieutenant-Colonel J. S. Dennis, the head Canadian member of the recruiting commission, and the Canadian recruiters in the United States, their efforts were counteracted by the United States government’s enactment of the Selective Service Act on May 18, 1917, which implemented the draft for American citizens and all but negated the need for the British and Canadian Recruiting Mission, as Americans would now be required to enlist in the armed forces of the United States. Consequently, the removal of American citizens, who had been six to eight percent of the CEF’s volunteers before April 6, 1917, would have adversely affected the Canadian Expeditionary Force’s recruitment and enlistment and may have contributed to the Canadian government’s decision to enact conscription.

Recruiting American citizens as volunteers for the Canadian Expeditionary Force proved to be a frustrating task for the Department of Militia and Defence and Canadian authorities. From October 22, 1915 to April 6, 1917, the CEF’s American Legion actively
recruited Americans in the United States, which violated America’s neutrality laws and Foreign Enlistment Act of 1818, and The Hague Convention of 1907. Furthermore, CEF recruiting methods aggravated the United States government because American Legion recruiters solicited American citizens in the United States and associated American flags and emblems with Canada’s armed forces. Violations of the neutrality laws of the United States by CEF recruiters caused the Wilson administration to protest to the British Foreign Office and British Ambassador Spring-Rice about the CEF’s recruitment of American citizens. The recruiting controversy ended when Canada’s Governor-General and Prime Minister jointly decided to disband the American Legion’s battalions in part because the Legion’s recruiters had been the leading violator of American neutrality laws.
Chapter Two

Enlistment of Americans in the CEF: Motivations, Consequences, & Numbers

Before the Canadian government enacted the Military Service Act on August 29, 1917, to authorize the Dominion to conscript men between the ages of 18 and 45 for military service "beyond Canada, for the defence thereof," the Canadian Expeditionary Force actively recruited volunteers to enlist. From August 4, 1914 to August 29, 1917, filling the ranks of the CEF's infantry, cavalry, artillery, and specialized units relied on individual volunteers, whether Canadian or American citizens, to enlist. What motivated a volunteer to enlist in the CEF? The reasons why a Canadian or British subject resident in the Dominion would enlist in the CEF appear to be understandable, foremost among which was to fulfill a patriotic duty to serve "His Majesty's Government." But citizens of the United States, whose government decided to remain neutral during the first two and half years of the First World War, had somewhat more complicated motivations for voluntarily enlisting in the Canadian Expeditionary Force.

What primarily motivated American citizens to enlist in the Canadian Expeditionary Force were aggressive CEF recruitment and individual objectives. This chapter examines the different motives of the Americans who enlisted in the CEF in order to discover why more than forty-one thousand American citizens deliberately left the
United States from August 4, 1914, to April 6, 1917, to fight in the CEF. Although each American who enlisted in the CEF was driven by his own personal ambitions, common motivations for enlistment are nonetheless evident. In addition to surveying the enlistment motivations of American citizens, this chapter addresses the consequences, particularly that of expatriation, for an American who enlisted in a foreign army during the First World War while the United States remained neutral. Finally, this chapter will ascertain the aggregate number of Americans who enlisted in the Canadian Expeditionary Force by utilizing original sources heretofore neglected by American and Canadian historians.

Before the United States entered the First World War on April 6, 1917, thousands of American citizens had volunteered to serve in foreign armies, paramilitary organizations, and humanitarian endeavors. Excluding the involvement of American financial institutions and corporations, and the loans or grants by American citizens to the Allied governments, each of these volunteers tried to help the Allies defeat Germany by volunteering for military service, by offering medical assistance, or by organizing philanthropic relief for Allied citizens under German occupation. Although the United States government remained neutral until April 6, 1917, and insisted that its citizens observe impartiality toward all belligerents, thousands of Americans opted to contribute to the war effort, customarily at their own expense and frequently in favor of the Entente Powers.

No known figure or source accounts for the number of Americans who voluntarily enlisted and served in the armies of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Ottoman Empire,
Belgium, Italy, or Russia. The documentation of American military service in these belligerents’ armies, at best, remains superficial. On March 16, 1915, *The New York Times* printed an article about an American citizen who enlisted in the Belgian Army and participated in the defense of Liege.\textsuperscript{120} Outside of brief references like this, few materials exist which account for the small number of Americans who served in the armed forces other than in France, Great Britain, or Canada. A letter to the editor of the *New York Times* from a man from Buffalo, New York on October 5, 1916, questioned American newspapers’ biased coverage of Americans in Allied armed forces, complaining about the misrepresentation of Americans in the Germany Army: “I fail to find any mention of the myriad of ‘Americans’ who are fighting in the German ranks - men of German origin, but none the less ‘American’ citizens.”\textsuperscript{121} Despite this assertion that a “myriad” of Americans served in the German Army, evidence suggests that American citizens preferred to enlist in the armed forces of the Allies. As a *New York Times* article asserted on April 1, 1915, “there are no known cases of American officers, meaning officers of the United States Federal army, resigning to join the Germans, but there is more than one case of resignations to join the British forces.”\textsuperscript{122}

In the armed forces of Great Britain and France, American citizens abounded before the entrance of the United States into the war. No known study has investigated the exact number of Americans who served in the French or British armed forces, but hundreds of Americans enlisted and served in the British Army and Navy, particularly the British Expeditionary Force then serving in France and Belgium.\textsuperscript{123} Canada’s Directorate
of History of the National Defence Headquarters ascertained that 455 American citizens served in the Royal Flying Corps, Royal Naval Air Service, and Royal Air Force.\(^{124}\) The most notable Americans serving in British Army during the war were Arthur Guy Empey, John P. Poe, and Dillwyn P. Starr. Great Britain accepted each American who volunteered for military service on the same terms under which it enlisted British citizens or Imperial subjects, provided that each American volunteer presented himself for service within British-controlled territory.

American citizens desiring to volunteer and serve in the French armed forces were obliged to join the French Foreign Legion because French law forbade the French Army from accepting soldiers from neutral countries. Military historians Douglas Porch, Howard Swiggett, and John Laffin’s estimates vary from seventy to two hundred Americans who served in the French Foreign Legion (\textit{Legion Etrangere}), which was officered by French nationals and whose ranks consisted mainly of foreign volunteers.\(^{125}\) Famous Legionnaires from the United States who served in the First World War included Alan Seeger, Henry Farnsworth, and Charles Sweeney. Unlike the British Army, Americans tended to be assigned to certain units in the French Foreign Legion. John Laffin observed that the “1st Regiment [of the French Foreign Legion] was so Americanized that it became something of a tourist attraction and was probably visited by more French generals than any other unit.”\(^{126}\) Moreover, American volunteers distinguished themselves in the aviation squadrons of the French Air Force (\textit{Service Aeronatique}), particularly the celebrated Lafayette Escadrille. This squadron consisted of
thirty-eight Americans and four French officers, and was unofficially considered by French military authorities and its aviators as an American formation.\textsuperscript{127}

American citizens also volunteered to serve foreign nations in paramilitary\textsuperscript{128} and humanitarian work during the First World War. Paramilitary service, including that in military hospitals and ambulance services, offered Americans an opportunity to assist the Allied armies in non-combat activities. The American volunteer ambulance sections of H. Herman Harjes, Richard Norton, and A. Piatt Andrew allowed Americans, typically young, college-aged men, to participate in the war first-hand by transporting wounded soldiers from the front lines to dressing stations or hospitals.\textsuperscript{129} Additionally, hospitals, often converted chateaus, like the American Military Hospitals in France and the British Red Cross, accepted American doctors and nurses as volunteers. Furthermore, American citizens volunteered to serve in philanthropic humanitarian organizations that aided Europeans displaced or rendered indigent by the war by arranging food, clothing, and temporary housing. They served in such organizations as the American Hostels for Refugees and Herbert Hoover’s American Relief Commission.\textsuperscript{130}

Notwithstanding the courageous and benevolent voluntary efforts of American citizens in the aforementioned armies and medical and philanthropic organizations, Americans enlisted in Canada’s Army in numbers far exceeding those in any other belligerent’s armed forces. In 1927, Canada’s Directorate of History for the Department of National Defence calculated that 35,612 Americans had enlisted and served in the Canadian Expeditionary Force, which included sixty-three American women who served
as nursing sisters in the CEF's Medical Corps. This figure updated a previous
government investigation researching the numbers of foreign nationalities in the CEF; in
1922, the total for American citizens who had served in the CEF was thought to be
35,599. Based on the 1922 calculations, 19,966 Americans served in the CEF on the
Western Front - 2,138 of whom died while fighting for the Dominion. Out of the
628,964 soldiers enlisting in the CEF, nearly six percent were born in the United States.
Americans in the CEF also represented four percent of the CEF who served overseas and
four percent of the CEF’s deaths. However, according to several varying estimations
by publications and new research, these figures are short of the actual number of
Americans who enlisted and served in the Canadian Expeditionary Force.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Americans in the Canadian Expeditionary Force</th>
<th>Total Number of Americans In The CEF</th>
<th>Canadian Expeditionary Force Totals</th>
<th>Percentage of Americans In The CEF</th>
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<tr>
<td>Total Estimate From Previous Research</td>
<td>35,612</td>
<td>628,964</td>
<td>0.057</td>
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<tr>
<td>Author’s Estimate Of Total Based On New Research</td>
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<td>Served On The Western Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deaths On The Western Front</td>
<td>2,138</td>
<td>61,112</td>
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</table>
What caused so many Americans to travel to Canada with the intention to enlist in the Canadian Expeditionary Force? What motivated so many individuals from the United States to unnecessarily risk their lives in a war in which their country refrained from participating? Lastly, why would American citizens knowingly jeopardize their citizenship in order to fight for Canada in a European war against central European nations that regarded the United States on peaceable terms?

The relationship between the governments of the United States and Canada had been friendly since the War of 1812, and especially peaceful since the settlement of the border dispute between the Oregon Territory and British North America in 1848. Although no war developed, Canadians' anti-Americanism sporadically surfaced throughout the nineteenth century and into the beginning of the twentieth century, but this sentiment never escalated beyond infrequent Canadian political rhetoric aimed at the United States government's expansion across the North American continent. In the years immediately preceding the war, American and Canadian citizens freely and easily crossed each other's borders without passports or visas, usually with the intention to work, immigrate, or travel. For example, in 1913, more than eleven thousand Americans emigrated to the Dominion, approximately four times as many as the next most numerous immigrant - Russians. Nonetheless, in August 1914 it was remarkable how "two North American countries, living side by side and sharing many attitudes, should differ so sharply in their initial reaction to the war, the one thankful for three thousand miles of ocean between her and the conflict, the other eager to use the ocean as a highway to reach the
As the CEF’s casualties continued to increase during the war, many Canadians regarded the American government with contempt for its neutrality, but usually disguised this animosity from those Americans who were enlisting in the CEF.  

Despite Canada’s early entry into the war and the United States government’s neutrality, over forty-one thousand Americans enlisted in the Canadian Expeditionary Force. One American citizen who was working on a ranch in British Columbia disregarded the different war policies of the governments of Canada and the United States, and when asked if he was going to enlist in the CEF he laughed and replied “‘What do you mean go to war?’ . . . I wasn’t English; I wasn’t Canadian. I was from the good old U. S. A. and from all we [American cowboys working in Canada] could understand the States were neutral.’” He enlisted one week later in Vancouver.  

For some Americans, the neutrality of the United States government clearly was not a concern, as one American at an American Legion recruiting rally in Toronto declared, “‘Of course . . . the United States Government is neutral, but I have yet to find an American who is neutral.’” Nonetheless, the neutrality of the United States caused some Americans to hesitate before enlisting, such as Edwin Austin Abbey. In a letter to his parents, Abbey described the “impossible position” of the United States: “Honor demands that we enter the war, humanity that we stay out. I will do nothing until the United States [government’s] course is definitely decided.”  

The most obvious explanation why so many Americans were able to join Canada’s armed forces was the close proximity of Canada to the United States. It should not be
underestimated that Canada, which immediately entered the war on August 4, 1914, provided American citizens with an opportunity to enlist in Canada’s armed forces without exhausting their financial resources. Entering the armed forces of the remainder of the belligerents involved procuring passage across the Atlantic Ocean, an expensive and dangerous voyage during the First World War. Historian Gaddis Smith pointed out that had “Canada not existed, it would have been far more difficult for volunteers, especially men without funds, to have enlisted from the United States.”

One volunteer - Edwin Austin Abbey - decided that his best chances to enter military service was in Canada instead of his “original plan of going to England” because it was cheaper than arranging transportation to Great Britain. The greatest concentration of Americans resided in the northern states, which meant that Americans often had only short distances to travel to volunteer for the CEF. For example, in southern Ontario, American enlistments made up twenty percent of all volunteers prior to April 6, 1917. Evidence from CEF enlistment records indicate that the majority of Americans in the CEF resided in states in the Northeast, Northwest, and around the Great Lakes, although a number of Southerners, particularly from Virginia and Texas, enlisted in the CEF as well. On October 28, 1914, The Times reported that at the recruiting stations bordering the United States “nearly half the recruits are Americans.” The 97th Overseas Infantry Battalion’s The American Legion Magazine further emphasized the point by stating “a citizen of the United States…” presents himself at the recruiting station at Windsor [Ontario], through which port of
entry the majority find it most convenient to come because of the fact that Detroit is
across the river, only 5 minutes by ferry; the candidate is greeted with open arms.”

Americans joining Canada’s armed forces also encountered few cultural barriers
because most American customs and traditions resembled those of their northern
neighbors. A principle difficulty for American citizens in the French Foreign Legion arose
from most Americans’ poor comprehension of the French language, which frustrated
French officers and complicated training exercises and combat operations. Except for
French Canadians, Americans and Canadians spoke a common language. Therefore,
American citizens enlisting in the CEF failed to experience the confusion of a different
language that occasionally hindered Americans serving in the French Foreign Legion.
Additionally, the ancestral ties of many Americans to Britain motivated many Americans
to enlist in the CEF. In the 1995 film, Legends of the Fall, an American college student
complains to his father that their family’s relatives were dying in the trenches on the
Western Front, and consequently, he and his brothers were going to Canada to fight in the
war. Although a fictional reference, this example displays how some American citizens
identified with their heritage as a motivating factor for service in the CEF. The American
Legion’s recruiting effort concurred with this sentiment, exemplified in a recruiting
pamphlet entitled “American Legion Shows Blood Thicker Than Water.” But as
historian James Hudson observed “several [Americans] joined because they had a real
desire to help save the English people.” No doubt many of the Americans enlisting in
the CEF were recent immigrants from the United Kingdom or its Empire, which offered an
additional connection or perceived allegiance to “His Majesty’s Government.” An American Legionnaire in the CEF was quoted as saying that the Americans in the CEF “are responding to the call of duty to fight with our own.” Americans understanding of Canada and Great Britain caused thousands of Americans to identify with the Dominion’s and Empire’s participation in the war, producing a number of Americans who wanted to uphold their values by serving in their armed forces. For example, American CEF volunteer, Joseph Smith, acknowledged Germany’s violation of Belgian neutrality, but enlisted in the CEF, because he was convinced that Canada’s decision to enter the war was justified. In his autobiography, Smith wrote, “I trusted the [Canadian] government to know what it was doing.” Additionally, Captain John V. Frazier of the American Legion’s 213th Overseas Infantry Battalion recalled that he had enlisted for “call of the wild.” When Frazier’s interviewer “suggested that he could satisfy ‘the call of the wild’ as well fighting for Germany as for the Allies,” Frazier snorted at the notion and walked away.

American volunteers, particularly the educated and affluent, identified with French ideals and persuaded many Americans, who also sympathized with the defense of France and its civilization, to enlist in a foreign army. Most Americans who showed these sympathies served in one of the branches of France’s armed forces, but a modest number of Americans, many from the Ivy League Colleges and Universities, enlisted in the armies of Allies, including the CEF. Philip Sidney Rice, an American ambulance driver, described
why Americans voluntarily enlisted and served in the armies of Great Britain and Canada in order to defend France: "a love for the country and its refined culture."  

Similar governmental values and institutions also motivated Americans to enlist in the Canadian Expeditionary Force. Americans who volunteered for the CEF envisioned themselves as defenders of democracy because Great Britain and France also had popularly elected representative governments; on the other hand, Germany and Austria-Hungary, the perceived aggressors, were authoritarian monarchies, whose governmental authorities were subject to the crown and not to parliamentary majorities. Consequently, a number of Americans believed that Germany was the instigator of the war and therefore concluded the Allies’ war effort a just cause. Defending liberty and democracy was a common motivator for many American volunteers including those who enlisted in the CEF. For example, after purposely failing the entrance examinations to West Point Military Academy, Sylvester Chahuska Long Lance, a native American, enlisted in the CEF because he wanted to fight "under the colors of an army that was upholding" democracy.

For many Americans the decision to voluntarily enlist in the CEF evolved because of Germany’s inhumane war record, especially its submarine attacks on neutral merchant ships and passenger liners and the atrocities it committed in Belgium like the execution of British nurse Edith Cavell on October 18, 1915. An interview of Lord Northcliffe by a Chicago Tribune reporter revealed that Americans in a Canadian sector of the trenches referred to the Germans as "'slanheads' and said, 'If our people at home only knew what
they [Germans] are doing to French and Belgian women and children, they [Americans] certainly would agree that the war can't stop until the Prussians are down and out."161 A CEF recruiting poster appealed to this American perception:

Germany is the foe of liberty and civilization, and is a menace to the welfare of humanity. . . . Canada is fighting for those very principles of liberty which every true American loves. . . . the battle-line of Flanders is the bulwark of civilization . . . [therefore] put aside nationalism - for this has become more a war of principles and that of nations, of good against bad, of right against wrong.162

The sinking of the British passenger liner Lusitania on May 6, 1915, by a German submarine, in which 128 Americans died, aroused many Americans' passion to serve in the CEF after the Wilson administration's decision not then to enter the war incited "widespread public indignation."163 Influenced by CEF recruiting posters focused at soliciting Americans, such as "Enlist Now! Remember the Lusitania," Abbey, who was working in Shaw's Creek, Ontario in May 1915, expressed to his mother a deep dissatisfaction with the United States government's response to Germany's unwarranted sinking of this ship: "I am beginning to feel, as you do, that the [American] flag is disgraced; the honor of the nation being fumbled away. The time for neutrality has passed. Why is the United States so slow? I can think of nothing but the war. It seems immoral to think or plan for anything else." In letters to his parents before he enlisted in the CEF, Abbey repeatedly identified Germany as a "terrible menace" and frequently wrote about German abuses in Belgium.164 Furthermore, after the sinking of the Lusitania, an unidentified CEF American Legionnaire recruit from New Jersey explained that "All Americans are pro-Allies. There is no such thing as a German-American; we call
them just Germans. I have come over because I felt it my duty to do something toward
.crushing the power that could ruthlessly slaughter women and children,” and asserted
“there are many more like me itching to get into it.”\textsuperscript{165}

A very typical motive of Americans enlisting in the CEF was a desire to experience
the adventure of war. The armed forces of the United States had infrequently fought in
wars since the American Civil War ended in 1865. The campaigns against the native
American peoples, the Spanish-American War, and the Boxer Rebellion had been over for
more than a decade. But because the CEF accepted volunteers up to the age of forty-five,
a number older Americans, who had fought in Cuba, Philippines, and China, volunteered
for the CEF. This allowed experienced American veterans to enlist in the CEF. During
the United States government’s strict observance of its neutrality during the first thirty-
two months of the First World War, several Americans cited the desire for military action
as their reason for enlistment in the CEF. A month after the war started, Tracy
Richardson, a famed American mercenary from several turn of the century Central
American conflicts, crossed the Canadian border and enlisted in Princess Patricia’s
Canadian Light Infantry in August 1914 because he was “anxious to get to the fight”
before it ended without his involvement.\textsuperscript{166} Haskell C. Billings, a thirty-two year old
Captain of the 47th Regiment of New York’s National Guard, resigned his commission to
enter the CEF because “for a long time he had been anxious to see actual fighting.”\textsuperscript{167}
Herbert McBride’s motivations for leaving the Indiana National Guard as a Captain to
enlist in the CEF reveal a sense of what many American volunteers contended:
I am sorry I cannot say that those early stories of German atrocities, or the news of Belgium’s invasion impelled me to start for Canada to enlist and offer my life in the cause of humanity. Not at all, it was just that I wanted to find out what a ‘real war’ was like. It looked as if there was going to be a real scrap at last, and I didn’t intend to miss it this time. I had ‘lost out’ on two wars already; the Spanish-American and Boer War and now the opportunity was at hand I wanted to have a front seat.168

Each of the abovementioned motivations describe the primary reasons why an American would enlist in the CEF before the United States entered the war, but a number of other influences and factors contributed to Americans’ desire to join the Canadian Expeditionary Force. Knowledge of two historical events possibly persuaded some American citizens to enlist. First, there was the desire to repay France for the military achievements of the French General Marquis de Lafayette and the hundreds of French volunteers who had served in the Continental Army during the War of Independence. Second, was the desire to equal the efforts of forty to fifty thousand Canadians who had volunteered and served in the Union Army during the American Civil War.169 One CEF recruiting poster duplicated the last sentiment by indicating that Americans in the CEF “are helping to repay the debt of gratitude to Canada for the 48,000 Canadians who fought for the North in the Civil War.”170

Canadian Expeditionary Force wages, the highest in any army in the world starting at $1.10 per day for a private, caused several unemployed Americans to enlist during the harsh winter of 1915-1916. However, many of these “winter volunteers” deserted because they enlisted only for “a little easy money and a good place to live during the winter months.”171 The Germans were contemptuous of such soldiers and criticized the
Allies for having to hire foreigners to fight their wars. American volunteers responded to these German jibes by stating, that the CEF wages “may have seemed a very large sum to the German mind . . . [but most Americans] were certainly not the kind of men who could be attracted by a dollar and a quarter a day into giving up their usual occupations.”

The recruitment for the American Legion, as discussed in the previous chapter, motivated American citizens to enlist because Canadian recruiters bestowed Americans with an opportunity to serve in a CEF formation under the command of former American officers and graduates of West Point. This influence was heralded in the American Legion’s recruiting leaflets: “Yankee regiment pure and simple, commanded by a Yankee and manned by Yankees right down to the youngest drummer boy.” Furthermore, if an American volunteer feared for his family’s well-being while he served in the CEF, the Canadian Patriotic Fund, “debarred from rendering financial assistance to persons living outside the Dominion,” established auxiliary associations in a number of American cities which raised and administered “in each State the money required to place the American wives of Canadian soldiers on a similar footing to that of their sisters north of the line.” This factor allowed American citizens to enlist in the CEF without apprehension about the future welfare of their families and served as a comforting feature, if not a motivating element, in their enlistment into the Canadian Expeditionary Force.

After an American citizen decided to enlist in the CEF, he had to go to Canada. Most Americans who wished to serve in the CEF proceeded directly to the Dominion, but because the enlistment of Americans in the CEF was not the most common event for
Americans living in the United States, several Americans followed unusual avenues to enlist voluntarily. Harold E. Hartney, who later became a Lieutenant-Colonel in the U. S. Army, disregarded "all rules of military procedure . . . and wired Sam Hughes direct for permission to go over with the first unit, the wonderful Princess Pats." Although Hartney’s request came after Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry had left Canada, his initiative exemplified a number of Americans who did not understand the CEF’s enlistment procedures which prohibited the CEF from accepting any American volunteer through correspondence. By the end of August 1914, the Department of Militia and Defence had received more than sixty thousand letters from American citizens inquiring if they could secure a commission in the CEF, but the Department of Militia and Defence informed them that the CEF only enlisted men who personally appeared before a recruiter in the Dominion. Other Americans bypassed recruiting stations and proceeded directly to the Minister of Militia and Defence. After brief meetings with Herbert McBride and Coningsby Dawson, Hughes granted each a commission in the CEF. McBride entered as a Captain in the 38th Overseas Infantry Battalion and Dawson enrolled in the Royal Military College at Kingston, Ontario, later serving as a Lieutenant in the Canadian Field Artillery. This was a unique situation because the Canadian Expeditionary Force’s rules of enlistment required each volunteer to enlist as a private regardless of previous military experience, except for volunteers who had formerly served as officers in the Canadian Militia or had graduated from the Royal Military College. Americans with previous military experience as officers in either the United States Army, Navy, Marines, or
National Guard who entered an American Legion battalion frequently were granted commissions.

Whereas several factors and circumstances motivated Americans to enlist in the CEF, each American volunteer confronted only one significant consequence for enlisting in Canada's armed forces: the prospect of legally reentering the United States after either completing their military service, deserting or resigning from the Canadian ranks, or suffering a debilitating combat wound. With the United States officially neutral, the voluntary entrance of Americans into the Canadian Expeditionary Force caused the United States government to question the status of its citizens who volunteered for foreign military service. This situation revolved around the interpretation of Section 2 of the Act of March 2, 1907, concerning the expatriation of American citizens. The United States government, specifically the Department of State, attempted to inform and warn its citizens that under this law the United States would consider its citizens who volunteered for foreign military service as expatriates, contingent upon the fact that they took an oath of allegiance to a foreign state while the United States remained neutral. Therefore, an American who enlisted in the CEF was faced with the fact that his enlistment could result in his expatriation from the United States, although from August 1914 to October 1917, this consequence was most likely unknown to the majority of the CEF's American volunteers because this law was continually misunderstood and misinterpreted.

Under Article 6 of The Hague Convention of 1907, Americans wishing to enlist in the CEF were permitted by international agreements to cross the Canadian border and join
its armed forces without endangering the neutrality of the United States. This provision stated that the “responsibility of a neutral Power is not engaged by the fact of persons crossing the frontier separately to offer their services to one of the belligerents.”

However, on March 2, 1907, the United States government enacted a law which declared that

any American citizen shall be deemed to have expatriated himself when he has been naturalized in any foreign state in conformity with its laws, or when he has taken an oath of allegiance to any foreign state . . . And provided also, That no American citizen shall be allowed to expatriate himself when this country is at war.”

Although this act failed to prohibit any American from entering the CEF while the United States remained neutral, it presumably discouraged American citizens with the threat of losing their citizenship from enlisting into any foreign army that required an oath of allegiance to that nation.

For Americans enlisting in the CEF, the Expatriation Act was subject to the Department of State’s interpretation of the phrase “an oath of allegiance” because enlisting in a foreign army, although illegal under American neutrality laws and subject to a fine or imprisonment, did not constitute a change of allegiance. This was based on a number of court cases and historical precedents regarding the expatriation of Americans who entered a belligerent’s armed forces. Author and lawyer J. V. Best summarized the complicated situation stating that “as a general rule it may be maintained that the mere fact of entering into a foreign military service does not divest either nationality or domicil.”

Canadian Expeditionary Force volunteers from the United States encountered difficulties with the attestation papers they signed at the time of their enlistment, in which
they professed an allegiance to the King of the United Kingdom and Ireland. The oath, required by each CEF volunteer, reads as follows:

I,__________, do make Oath, that I will be faithful and bear true Allegiance to His Majesty King George the Fifth, His Heirs and Successors, and that I will as in duty bound honestly and faithfully defend His majesty, His Heirs and Successors, in Person, Crown and Dignity, against all enemies, and will observe and obey all orders of His Majesty, His Heirs and Successors, and of all the Generals and Officers set over me. So help me God.183

Therefore, any American who enlisted in the CEF expatriated himself when he signed his attestation paper, which acknowledged his oath of allegiance to the British monarch. Furthermore, the Department of State explained that “when service in a foreign army involves taking an oath of allegiance to a foreign state, an American citizen who enters such service must be deemed to have expatriated himself.”184 Federal courts determined that the oath of allegiance to a monarch equated an oath to a foreign state, or in this case an oath to King George the Fifth was equivalent to taking an oath to Great Britain.185

Expatriation from taking an oath of allegiance applied not only to Americans entering the CEF, but to Americans entering any British armed forces or Imperial army such as India, Australia, and New Zealand, because they required an oath of allegiance to King George the Fifth as well. On the other hand, Americans volunteering for the French Foreign Legion joined without endangering their citizenship because the French Foreign Legion obligated its volunteers to attest to “Legio Patria Nostra” - translated as “The Legion is our Fatherland” - not an oath to France.186

Although the law appeared to be straightforward, several American periodicals and newspapers, government departments, and citizens frequently misinterpreted the
Figure 2

Edwin Austin Abbey’s Attestation Paper for the Canadian Expeditionary Force.187
Expatriation Act or also relied on misinformation. In theory, the Act aimed to provide
"the necessary legislative definition of the means of expatriation, [establishing] 'an end to
the long circuit of doubt and uncertainty over the question of expatriation.'" From
August 1914 to April 1917, the Department of State repeatedly reiterated the position of
the United States government toward those American citizens enthusiastic about serving
in a foreign army because each citizen, whom the United States government presumed
understood the legislation, failed to acquaint themselves with this public law. A
November 1, 1915, circular notice from the State Department entitled, "Conditions of
Enlistment of Americans in Foreign Armies Involving Their Expatriation," acknowledged
a general misunderstanding by Americans as "a number of inquiries from people in the
United States" questioned "whether it is a breach of his duty as a citizen of the United
States to enlist in a foreign army." In this correspondence the State Department
succinctly explained the Expatriation Act of March 2, 1907, and advised all Americans to
observe the neutrality of the United States and avoid participating in the current war in
Europe. Interestingly, this notice came one day after the CEF's 97th Overseas Infantry
Battalion, the first of five forthcoming American Legion regiments, enlisted its first six
American volunteers.

Regardless of the clarification by the State Department, misinformation abounded
both in the United States and Canada about the citizenship status of Americans enlisting in
the CEF. Occasionally newspaper articles and popular periodicals fostered the ignorance
of this law by falsely reporting that Americans enlisting in the CEF would not endanger
their citizenship, although each publication most likely did so unknowingly. The *New York Times* published an account of the American Legion stating that Americans entering the CEF enlisted “without renouncing [their] American citizenship.” This article further alluded that taking an oath to King George the Fifth was not an act shifting one’s allegiances.190 A more erroneous account about the American Legion and Americans in the CEF appeared in *Outlook,* which pointed out that the CEF’s American volunteers were not worrying about losing their citizenship because “the officers of the [CEF’s American] Legion tell me [the author of the article] that the courts have already decided in the case of Americans who have returned to the United States after service in France that such conduct did not make them aliens.” Additionally, this same article indicated that Americans enlisting in the CEF would not violate their citizenship by taking an oath to serve King George the Fifth because they were “taking a special oath” which would not require an American to “jeopardize his American citizenship.”191 Both examples were negligent inaccuracies that helped to reinforce the misinformation about the status of American citizenship upon entering the Canadian Expeditionary Force.

In Canada, the situation of misinforming Americans continued. An American consular officer in Winnipeg, Manitoba, advised American citizens, who were curious about their citizenship status if they enlisted in the CEF, that their citizenship would not be jeopardized by military service in the Canadian Expeditionary Force.192 However, not all information about American expatriation in Canada was incorrect. The American Consulate at Vancouver, who publicly opposed the formation of the American Legion,
informed Americans who entered Canada "that their enlistment in the British Columbia battalion of the American Legion, the 211th Overseas Infantry Battalion, will cancel their citizenship."\(^{193}\)

Conflicting conclusions about the expatriation of American citizens in the CEF surfaced in the United States as well. An editorial appearing in the *New York Times* contended that men volunteering for the CEF were required to complete naturalization papers before entering the ranks, further adding that "this will prevent many an adventurous American from joining their [Canadian] colors."\(^{194}\) Although the editorial inaccurately asserted that CEF volunteers needed to fill out naturalization papers, it was correct in assuming that Americans enlisting in the CEF would be legally reprimanded for their enlistment, otherwise he would not have observed the risk. On the other hand, on October 9, 1915, the United States Department of Labor issued instructions to immigration authorities along the Canadian border to "not question the American citizenship of an applicant because of the fact that he enlisted in the Canadian forces." The Department of Labor issued similar instructions to the American Pacific and Atlantic port officials that American citizens returning from military service in German or British armies would be admitted to the United States without "question at all."\(^{195}\)

Factual inconsistencies from the various American publications and government agencies repeatedly misinformed Americans about the Expatriation Act. This caused confusion concerning the law for the duration of the neutrality of the United States. For example, an article in the *New York Times* appearing two years after the war started
attempted once more to reiterate the United States government’s position concerning
Americans in foreign armies. The article stated that “Americans fighting in the European
war who have taken an oath to a foreign State have automatically become expatriated.”196
Clearly most Americans misunderstood or disregarded the 1907 Expatriation Act’s
application to their citizenship. Ignoring the law appears to be the most common
explanation because of the great numbers of Americans who enlisted in the CEF.
Furthermore, the majority of the Americans in the CEF opined that the “worthiness of
their project” was above their citizenship. But as Alan James contended in his historical
analysis of American expatriation for the State Department, “some citizens who performed
an expatriative act [before the United States became a belligerent] maintained that they did
not do so freely,” contending “that they performed the act under duress.”197

The federal case of Edward Dempster Griffin exemplified an American who failed
fully to understand that his enlistment in the Canadian Expeditionary Force was an act of
expatriation. Griffin, who enlisted in the CEF’s 156th Overseas Infantry Battalion on July
14, 1916, was apprehended by United States immigration officers when he attempted to
reenter the United States after deserting from the CEF on August 5, 1916. Immigration
authorities determined that Griffin voluntarily expatriated himself when he took the CEF’s
oath of allegiance to His Majesty King, George the Fifth, and detained him for deportation
because the United States government now considered him an alien. Griffin claimed that
at the time of his enlistment he was “so intoxicated” when pledging his oath of allegiance
and completing his attestation papers that “he did not know and understand what he was
doing, or the nature and character of his acts. . . .” After soberly recognizing the consequences of his actions, Griffin attempted to return to the United States at the first opportunity.\textsuperscript{198}

Recognizing Griffin’s right as an American to voluntarily expatriate himself, the court decided that taking “the oath of allegiance to the King of Great Britain and Ireland, or to the British Empire, runs to the king, in whom, nominally, all the executive power of government is centralized . . . [Therefore,] an oath of allegiance to the king is an oath of allegiance to the kingdom and empire.” Under the Expatriation Act of 1907, the court concluded that Griffin was no longer a citizen of the United States and his unlawful, clandestine return to the United States violated Section 36 of the Immigration Act of February 20, 1907, which subjected him to deportation.\textsuperscript{199} Griffin’s case resolved the question of “whether the act of merely swearing allegiance to a foreign sovereignty on entering its military service, unaccompanied by emigration from the United States, resulted in expatriation under the [Expatriation] act of March 2, 1907.”\textsuperscript{200}

Griffin’s case, cited as \textit{Ex Parte Griffin}, established the judicial precedent for deporting Americans who attempted to reenter the United States after they had enlisted in the Canadian Expeditionary Force. Yet, establishing an American’s identity with the CEF proved to be difficult for American authorities. For example, an unidentified man from Michigan reentered the United States after being wounded during his service in the CEF. He lived at his home in Detroit until a group of German-Americans “demanded that he be deported on the ground that he was an alien physically unfit to support himself.”\textsuperscript{201}
Numerous Americans who crossed the Canadian border and enlisted in the CEF either misrepresented certain information on their attestation papers or covertly reentered the United States in order to mislead American immigration authorities about the history of their enlistment. Without specifically mentioning his motive, Joseph Smith falsified his attestation paper, as he recalled, “by the simple expedient of moving my birthplace a few hundred miles north I became a Canadian and a member of the expeditionary force - a big word with a big meaning.” Smith appeared to understand the expatriation law surrounding his enlistment and deliberately changed his place of birth to avoid complications about his citizenship in the United States.

From August 4, 1914, to April 6, 1917, the United States government considered Americans who enlisted in the Canadian Expeditionary Force as expatriates, but because thousands of Americans enlisted in foreign armies, the Department of State was only able to moderately control the Americans violating the Expatriation Law. During American neutrality, the State Department constantly attempted to increase its role in detaining American expatriates by enforcing stricter procedures for issuing passports and apprehending expatriates when they reentered the country. But, due to the large numbers of American citizens in the CEF and the difficulty in detecting those Americans, the majority of Americans in the CEF rarely confronted obstacles in reentering the United States. As an example, Roy M. Berrian, an American who enlisted in the American Legion’s 212th Overseas Infantry Battalion, served for six weeks in the CEF before
crossing back into the United States undetected and serving as a lieutenant in the U. S. Army's punitive expeditionary force in Mexico.\textsuperscript{204}

Overwhelmed with the prospect of alienating thousands of Americans who had gained invaluable combat experience while the United States remained neutral for thirty-two months, immediately after the United States entered the war, Congress began to take legislative steps to repatriate Americans who had served in foreign armies, including those in the CEF.\textsuperscript{205} On October 5, 1917, President Woodrow Wilson signed the bill which repatriated any American

who may be deemed to have expatriated himself under the provisions of the first paragraph of section two of the [Expatriation] Act . . . by taking, since August first, nineteen hundred and fourteen, an oath of allegiance to any foreign State engaged in war with a country with which the United States is at war, and who took such oath in order to be enabled to enlist in the armed forces of such foreign State, and who actually enlisted in such armed forces, and who has been or may duly and honorably discharged from such armed forces, may, upon complying with the provisions of this Act, reassume and acquire the character and privileges of a citizen of the United States.\textsuperscript{206}

Therefore, an expatriated American, who wanted to become a United States citizen after completing his military service in the CEF or desired a transfer from the CEF to an American branch of service, was required to take an oath of allegiance to the United States in the presence of an American official.

Although American citizens who enlisted in the CEF before the United States became a belligerent eventually were permitted avenues to “reassume and acquire” the rights of an American citizen, at the time of their enlistment the majority of Americans entering the CEF either disregarded the consequences surrounding their citizenship or
ignored the inconsistencies and misinformation about the position of Americans enlisting in foreign armies. As a result, those American citizens who enlisted in the Canadian Expeditionary Force while the United States remained neutral constituted the largest number of Americans serving in any foreign army.

Throughout the First World War a number of American, Canadian, and British periodicals and newspapers published estimates of the numbers of Americans in the ranks of the CEF. Most accounts generalized their figures, stating that hundreds or thousands of Americans had crossed the Canadian border to enlist in the CEF’s regiments. Occasionally, an article or the introduction to an autobiography speculated that six, nine, or sixteen thousand American citizens had enlisted and served in the Canadian Expeditionary Force. The New York Times frequently chronicled the progress of Americans who enlisted for military service in Canada, most likely because a large percentage of the Americans in the CEF had lived in New York or its surrounding states before the enlisting, and the CEF’s American Legion recruiters had targeted the state for American volunteers.

The New York Times printed numerous articles estimating the numbers of Americans in the CEF, particularly the enlistment statistics of the American Legion. On October 27, 1914, this newspaper reported that the Minister of Militia and Defence, Lieutenant-General Sir Sam Hughes, believed “200,000 Americans have gone to Canada in the hope of joining the Canadian forces. . . .” Although a speculatively optimistic and unrealistic figure, it illustrates not only Hughes’ grandiose plot to incorporate Americans
into the CEF, but the magnitude of Americans crossing the border to enlist. The *New York Times* revealed the numbers of Americans in the CEF through reprinting the official casualty listings from the Department of Militia and Defence. The casualty listings sporadically appeared from June 1915 to the end of the war, printing the names and hometowns of Americans serving in the CEF. For example, an article subtitled “More Americans in Last Night’s List of 102 - Seven Dead,” stated that five Americans “were killed in action and two died of wounds.” This brief article preceded a list of casualties - printed as: “Sergeant Vernon D. V. Stevens of Portland, Ore.; Privates Richard Barber of Ludlow Mass., Joseph Pratt of Virginia, Minn., James B. Soden of Cohoes, N. Y., and Sapper Walter Greenhill of Pittsburgh, Penn., are listed among the wounded.”

Throughout the First World War, the *New York Times* published hundreds of names of Americans who were either wounded, missing, or killed in action serving in the Canadian Expeditionary Force. This heightened the awareness of Americans in the United States of the number of American citizens participating in the war.

Besides the abundant accounts that speculated on the total number of American citizens in the CEF, I ascertained that new research was necessary because previous examinations did not account for the Americans who enlisted under false pretenses and the Americans who left connections to the United States on their attestation papers as a part of the total number of American citizens in the CEF. For example, the above cited Joseph Smith acknowledged that he misrepresented his place of birth by falsifying his attestation papers, proving that Americans enlisting in the CEF consciously altered their
enlistment documentation; accordingly, the total of American citizens in the CEF needs to be adjusted. Furthermore, in Harry Brittain’s book about his observations and experiences on the Western Front, he concluded that the total number of Americans in the CEF would fail to consider the “American citizens who for various reasons have given either assumed names or assumed places of residence at the time of enlistment.” The reason, most likely, was to avoid expatriation. In James Hudson’s book about the American citizens who served in the British aviation services during the war, he observed the same dilemma, adding that “because many of the young American flyers felt that they might lose their American citizenship by joining the British air forces, they sometimes listed their birthplace or citizenship as Canadian or English.” This poses ambiguities to the total number of Americans who enlisted and served in the CEF, or as Historian Bradley King concluded, “we will probably never know how many there were, as some preferred to remain known as ‘Canadian,’ while others were known to be Americans only by their immediate colleagues.” Consequently, identifying every American citizen in the CEF would be nearly impossible.

Every American in the CEF can not be accounted for because many American volunteers did not identify themselves as such in order to avoid being expatriated in the United States. The total number of American citizens who enlisted and served in the CEF was augmented with new research of the CEF’s enlistment records. Previous research by Canada’s Directorate of History for the Department of Defence used the attestation papers of CEF volunteers to determine their nationality. They ascertained their figures for
American citizens from the replies given to question “Number 2” inquiring, “In what Town, Township or Parish, and in what Country were you born?” Beyond this question on the attestation paper, no other CEF document revealed a volunteer’s place of birth. Therefore, the Directorate of History for the National Defence based their calculations strictly on the answers provided by the volunteer. Because American CEF volunteers, reporters, witnesses, and scholars acknowledged the fact that many American citizens falsified their attestation papers at the time of their enlistment, a connection from additional answers on the attestation papers of CEF volunteers was formed to determine which Americans possibly misrepresented their place of birth or were naturalized American citizens.

New research was influenced by J. V. Best’s assertion that “Some of these [soldiers on Allied casualty lists] no doubt . . . were born in the United States, others represented men of foreign birth who had become American citizens under our naturalization laws, while still others possibly had been aliens resident in this country [U. S. A.] previously to their enlistment in the foreign military service. . . .” Best concluded that “they were all Americans because they had gone from the United States to perform service in a foreign army or navy.” The methodology for calculating Americans in the CEF, previously believed to be a non-American consisted of reviewing the Nominal Rolls of the Canadian Expeditionary Force. The Nominal Rolls, divided up by regiments, condensed the attestation papers of the regiment’s volunteers into a book format, listing a CEF volunteer’s name, regimental number, rank, previous military experience (catalogued
as "former corps"), name of next of kin, next of kin's address, country of birth, and enlistment date. Previously, researchers looked at a volunteer's country of birth entry and if the volunteer entered "U. S. A." he was considered an American. But the answers to the "previous military experience" and "next of kin's address" questions provide information possibly identifying an American who entered a country other than the United States as his place of birth, consequently causing the Directorate of History for the National Defence to classify them as a nationality distinctly apart from the United States.

Any CEF volunteer who listed their next of kin with an American address, I deemed to be a citizen from the United States, regardless of his country of birth, because an American enlisting in the CEF who feared expatriation or was a naturalized citizen from the United States would not have been counted as an American citizen. For example, a man born in England, Norway, or New Zealand who emigrated with his family to the United States before or during the war and became a naturalized American citizen before his enlistment in the CEF would have registered his next of kin with an American address; such as, Albert Flynn, who enlisted with the 121st Overseas Infantry Battalion on November 17, 1915, and was born in Ireland, but his next of kin, James Flynn, resided in Minneapolis, Minnesota.²¹⁵

However, a problem arises with this assumption because it fails to account for the immigration of the volunteer's next of kin into the United States while the volunteer could have remained a citizen of his country of birth. This question would definitely apply to any CEF volunteer born in Canada, whose next of kin had an American address, but it
most likely would have been unusual for a man born outside of North America to travel to Canada strictly to enlist into the CEF. As an example, Frank Schultz, who was born in Poland and whose next of kin, Zquacy Kacyusky, lived on Warsaw Street in Detroit, Michigan at the time of his enlistment, entered the 1st Division’s Motor Transport Supply Column on September 19, 1914. Therefore, CEF volunteers who were Canadian-born and listed their next of kin with an American address were not counted as American volunteers, although they could have been American citizens.

Using Schultz as an example poses another problem with ascertaining Americans who misrepresented their identity as American citizens when enlisting. Volunteers like Schultz, who had affiliations to the United States which suggest they were American citizens, disguised their citizenship without lying on their attestation paper. For example, a volunteer, who was an American citizen, could have stated that he had been born in a country like Poland, which would have been true, because the question on the attestation paper only asked “in country were you born” and not for the volunteer’s citizenship.

A Canadian Expeditionary Force volunteer who at the time of his enlistment entered the U. S. Army, Navy, Marines Corps, or any state’s National Guard for his previous military experience on his attestation paper, was in my judgment an American citizen. This was ascertained because to enlist in any branch of the armed services of the United States, every recruit is required to take an oath of allegiance to the United States government, which made him a citizen of the United States. For instance, Frederick Oppoli, born in Holland, served in the U. S. Navy before enlisting in the CEF on
September 24, 1914, as a gunner in the 1st Divisional Ammunition Battalion.217

Therefore, any volunteer who entered a country of birth other than the United States or Canada on their attestation paper and who either entered their next of kin’s address with an American residency or listed his previous military experience with any United States armed service on their attestation paper, I considered an American citizen.

By applying the above methodology and examining approximately eighty to eighty-five percent of the *Nominal Rolls*, I ascertained that 5,466 CEF volunteers from the United States enlisted from August 4, 1914 to April 6, 1917.218 This increases the total number of Americans in the CEF from 35,612 to 41,078. Before my research this group of CEF soldiers were considered to have been born in a country other than the United States and therefore they were not thought to be Americans. This number of Americans who misrepresented or disguised their citizenship should be included as a part of the total number of Americans who enlisted and served in the Canadian Expeditionary Force.

Unfortunately, the exact total of Americans in the CEF may never be known, but my new research reveals even larger numbers. Thus, an estimation as high as fifty thousand American volunteers in the CEF would not be far off the mark.

The American citizens who joined the Canadian Expeditionary Force before the United States became a belligerent on April 6, 1917, proved to be nearly seven percent of the CEF’s volunteers. Primarily self-motivated to the extent of placing their desire to halt German aggression above their duty to obey an American law, these volunteers, often concealing their real identity, crossed the Canadian border to enlist in the CEF. That some
forty-one thousand American citizens voluntarily enlisted in the CEF from August 4, 1914 to April 6, 1917, demonstrated that many American citizens believed that the Allies were justified in fighting Germany, despite the United States government's policy to remain neutral to the conflict. For instance, when President Woodrow Wilson ran for reelection in November 1916, on the slogan that he had kept the United States out of war, thousands of Americans had already experienced the horrors of trench warfare. The service of those American citizens in the CEF before the United States entered the war, was a speechless gesture to the Wilson administration that its neutrality policy was not universally accepted by all Americans.

American citizens who enlisted in the CEF frequently did so for the same reasons that the United States government later entered the war, which suggests that their enlistment and service in Canada both anticipated, and possibly somewhat accelerated, the decision of the Wilson administration to declare war on Germany. Americans often volunteered for service in the CEF because of German submarine attacks aimed at American maritime trade or ships carrying American citizens - the principal immediate cause for the United States government's entry into the war on April 6, 1917. Because various American periodicals and newspapers celebrated or at least featured the CEF's American volunteers, their participation may have affected the attitudes of Americans toward the Allies.

Edwin Morse, an early chronicler of the experiences of Americans who volunteered for the Allied war effort, asserted in 1918 that "the influence of their spirit and
of their example upon public opinion in the United States in the first two years and a half
of the war was beyond calculation.”219 Not only did the enlistment of Americans in the
CEF directly aid Canada’s war effort, but it represents the fact that nearly all Americans
sympathized with the Allies more than historians have acknowledged; particularly given
the negligible numbers of American citizens volunteering for the Central Powers.
Chapter Two

Enlistment of Americans in the CEF: Motivations, Consequences, & Numbers

Before the Canadian government enacted the Military Service Act on August 29, 1917, to authorize the Dominion to conscript men between the ages of 18 and 45 for military service “beyond Canada, for the defence thereof,” the Canadian Expeditionary Force actively recruited volunteers to enlist. From August 4, 1914 to August 29, 1917, filling the ranks of the CEF’s infantry, cavalry, artillery, and specialized units relied on individual volunteers, whether Canadian or American citizens, to enlist. What motivated a volunteer to enlist in the CEF? The reasons why a Canadian or British subject resident in the Dominion would enlist in the CEF appear to be understandable, foremost among which was to fulfill a patriotic duty to serve “His Majesty's Government.” But citizens of the United States, whose government decided to remain neutral during the first two and half years of the First World War, had somewhat more complicated motivations for voluntarily enlisting in the Canadian Expeditionary Force.

What primarily motivated American citizens to enlist in the Canadian Expeditionary Force were aggressive CEF recruitment and individual objectives. This chapter examines the different motives of the Americans who enlisted in the CEF in order to discover why more than forty-one thousand American citizens deliberately left the
Chapter Three

The Canadian Expeditionary Force’s “American Legion,” 1915-1917

On October 22, 1915, Lieutenant-General Sir Sam Hughes’ plans for forming a Canadian Expeditionary Force battalion composed of American citizens materialized after months of public speculation and more than a year of postponements by Canadian officials reluctant to aggravate the United States government by encouraging individual violations of its neutrality. After discovering that thousands of Americans had enlisted in the CEF’s 1st and 2nd Divisions from August 1914 to September 1915, the Minister of Militia and Defence, Hughes, authorized the 97th Overseas Infantry Battalion as a regiment designed to recruit and enlist American citizens. By July 15, 1916, Hughes had organized five infantry battalions collectively designated as the “American Legion” and consisting of American-born soldiers.220

The administrative and organizational shortcomings and financial difficulties of this “Legion” will be discussed in this chapter. These problems, combined with the fact that the United States government did not like the Legion associating itself with the United States, persuaded the Department of Militia and Defence to deploy the CEF’s American Legionnaires to other existing regiments as reinforcements, twenty-two days before the United States entered the war on April 6, 1917. Although the American Legion only
represented twenty-seven hundred of the forty-one thousand American citizens who would enlist and serve in the CEF, its existence caused political and military arguments between the Dominion’s Prime Minister, Sir Robert Borden, and Governor-General, the Duke of Connaught, and between the Minister of Militia and Defence, Hughes, and the Militia staff, particularly the CEF’s Chief of the General Staff, Major-General Willoughby G. Gwatkin, and Deputy Minister of Militia and Defence Major-General Sir Eugene Fiset. Furthermore, the American Legion’s presence in the CEF produced some diplomatic uneasiness between the governments of Great Britain, Canada, and the United States.

As Minister of Militia and Defence, Hughes formulated the plan of enlisting American citizens into separate overseas infantry units of the Canadian Expeditionary Force. The first evidence of this scheme is his August 29, 1914, trans-Atlantic cablegram sent to British War Minister, Lord Kitchener, with the suggestion that sixty thousand Americans from the “neighboring Republic” could be enlisted in the CEF and organized into a legion.221 Canadian military historian Ronald Haycock observed that this action “was substantial for Hughes’ usual anti-Americanism.”222 Correspondence between Hughes and Kitchener also referred to raising separate units of Serbians and Russians, but there was no further action from the Canadian government to form these two nationalities into CEF regiments. Hughes later reported on September 11, 1914, to the British War Office that because thousands of Americans were enlisting in the CEF, a “Corps” of American citizens should be formed in order to entice more Americans to volunteer.223 During a visit to Great Britain the following month, Hughes received personal
authorization from Kitchener and other prominent British officials, including King George
the Fifth, to create his "legion" of American citizens. British endorsement of Hughes'
scheme was contingent upon prohibiting CEF recruiters from entering the United States
and soliciting the enlistment of Americans for service in the CEF. The British War Office
enforced this rule because recruiting in the United States violated the neutrality laws of the
United States government, the American Foreign Enlistment Act of 1818, and
international agreements of the 1907 Hague Convention. Hughes appealed to British
authorities because his plan was rejected by the Governor-General, Hughes' Deputy
Minister, later Major-General Sir Eugene Fiset, and the CEF's Chief of the General Staff,
Major-General Willoughby G. Gwatkin, all of whom disliked Hughes' idea to specifically
recruit American citizens for their own CEF infantry battalions.

Because of the disagreement between Hughes and senior Canadian officials to
enlist Americans into separate battalions existed, constant confusion surrounded the
British authorization to recruit Americans. The legitimacy of the proposed American unit
remained in question because two cablegrams from Sir George Perley, Canada's
representative in the Colonial Office, one dated November 25, 1914, and the other dated
December 2, 1914, authorizing Hughes to form a military unit composed of Americans,
disappeared from the Governor-General's files. Hughes had inferred his authority to form
a regiment of American citizens in the CEF because British officials had accepted the idea
of enlisting Americans into any of Canada's armed forces. On October 9, 1914, the
British Colonial Office sent a telegram to the Department of Militia and Defence,
transmitting a message from the British Foreign Office, which stated "explicitly that 'His Majesty’s Government will of course reserve to themselves the right to accept as a recruit any United States citizen who may present himself for enlistment in British territory.'" The Colonial Office reinforced the point "at the end of 1914" by dispatching a letter to the Governor-General that it would be "desirable to enlist Americans."

The Canadian desire to create an American battalion in the CEF paralleled French endeavors to form separate units of Americans in the French armed services. In August 1914, a group of Americans residing in Paris and calling themselves the "Rough Riders" attempted to form a separate unit of American citizens in the French Foreign Legion comprised of veterans of the Spanish-American War and "many famous western horseman of America." Although the "Rough Riders" failed to mobilize, Americans who enlisted in the French Foreign Legion attempted to form an American aviation squadron in the French Air Force. The Lafayette Escadrille (N-124), authorized in July 1915, formed out of the willingness of the thirty-eight Americans who wanted to fly in combat. Americans, such as Norman Prince and William Thaw, persuaded French authorities to permit an aviation squadron composed of Americans through their aerial combat achievements in other French air squadrons. Detaching Americans into distinct military units in the French armed forces differed from the CEF’s American Legion because the original concept came from the Canada’s Department of Militia and Defence instead of its American volunteers, whereas in the French formations the American volunteers proposed the idea to France’s military authorities.
Although Hughes had obtained the authority from British officials in 1914 to initiate his plans and mobilize units of American volunteers, he inexplicably neglected to create his American Legion immediately. His delay is best explained by his not having support from Connaught, the Department of Militia and Defence’s Deputy Minister, and the CEF’s Chief of the General Staff, who did not grasp Hughes’ enthusiasm and who did not wish to violate the neutrality of the United States, from which Canada imported much of its war supplies, particularly munitions. Although Hughes did not implement his American Legion proposal in 1914, the American and British press publicly speculated about the idea of a Canadian military unit composed of United States citizens. On February 8, 1915, a Times correspondent from Toronto reported that the Canadian Expeditionary Force was organizing a brigade of Americans, stating that “It is understood that sufficient [U. S. Army] officers from across the [Canadian] border have offered their services to the Militia Department to command a full brigade. . . .”229 Two months later the New York Times noted that hundreds of U. S. Army officers were resigning to enlist in the Dominion and that in “Ottawa there is newspaper talk of an American ‘brigade,’ to be officered by Americans. . . .”230 Each of these accounts alluded to the prospect of an American Legion in the CEF, even though Hughes continued to do nothing to authorize the endeavor.

Two obstacles confronted Hughes before he could authorize the Canadian Expeditionary Force’s American Legion: Section 95 (1) of the British Army Act and Article 4 of The Hague Convention of 1907. This military statute prohibited the British
Army or any Imperial armed force, including the Canadian Expeditionary Force, from organizing a “separate corps of foreigners for [military] service in His Majesty’s Army.” Hughes and Prime Minister Sir Robert Borden were informed of this provision, which forbade the formation of the American Legion in the CEF, from the British War Office during the summer of 1915. No evidence has been found to ascertain whether or not Hughes was aware that his American Legion scheme would violate the agreements of The Hague Convention of 1907, but Article 4 of the convention’s decree stated that a “Corps of combatants can not be formed . . . [from] a neutral Power to assist the belligerent.”

Great Britain refused to ratify these agreements, and therefore, it is unlikely Hughes or any Canadian military or political official would have been familiar with The Hague Convention of 1907’s statutes.

Sometime before the first battalion of the American Legion began recruiting in the last week of October 1915, Hughes avoided the laws restricting the American Legion’s formation by secretly planning to prohibit it from serving on the Western Front. As Minister of Militia and Defence, Hughes possessed the authority to determine when a regiment was to be sent to England for final training before being transported to the front. Hughes permitted the recruitment of American volunteers because he, presumably influenced by his superiors to avoid aggravating the United States, had no intention of sending the American Legion to fight as a combat unit. Thus, the American Legion’s recruiters unknowingly misled American citizens into believing that they would fight as a
separate unit composed of Americans. An undated memorandum from the Department of Militia and Defence to Prime Minister Borden indicated this sentiment:

It may be pointed out that it has never yet been proposed that the battalions in question should serve at the front as distinct units. Giving them the form of a battalion is simply, as in the case of purely Canadian battalions, a method of facilitating recruiting and training.

This fact was accordingly withheld from American volunteers crossing the border to enlist, who assumed and were informed by recruiters that the American Legion's battalions were formed to serve in the trenches of France and Belgium. Evidence of this misinformation appeared in a *New York Times* article which declared that "Canada is to have a complete brigade of 5,000 Americans by birth or parentage on the fighting line in Flanders." The emergence of the American Legion surfaced as one of many creative recruiting projects instituted by Hughes at a time when Canadian citizens continued to volunteer in great numbers for the Canadian Expeditionary Force near the end of 1915. In connection with Prime Minister Borden's announcement in December 1915, requesting that the CEF be doubled to 500,000, the American Legion was authorized and designated for the CEF's 7th Brigade, 3rd Division. The 97th Overseas Infantry Battalion was one of 141 battalions authorized in 1915. Furthermore, Borden's call for more CEF troops was associated with the CEF's difficult first year of the First World War. The CEF experienced heavy casualties as high as thirty-seven percent at Ypres in April and May 1915 because during that year, and later in 1916, Canadian tactics aimed at sacrificing soldier's lives in an attempt to capture German occupied territory, whereby offensive maneuvers were "met with bloody failure, and even successes were costly."
The American Legion’s first battalion, 97th Overseas Infantry Battalion, was authorized as an infantry unit of the Canadian Expeditionary Force on December 22, 1915, by General Order 151 from the Department of Militia and Defence. Recruitment for the 97th started two months previously and primarily focused on enlisting American-born citizens of Ontario, but low numbers of recruits caused the 97th’s recruiters to concentrate on soliciting American citizens throughout Canada and in the United States. The 97th and each succeeding American Legion battalion enlisted volunteers under the CEF’s regulations, although it maintained one requirement, exemplified by a 97th recruiting poster that proclaimed, “Any man of military age - between 18 and 45 - is eligible, provided that he was born in the United States, was naturalized there, or whose parents, one or both, were Americans.”

Hughes commissioned A. B. Clark as Lieutenant-Colonel and commanding officer of the 97th on October 30, 1915. For the first eight days the 97th organized under Colonel L. E. LaBatt, a Canadian who had commanded the 4th Overseas Infantry Battalion on the Western Front before being wounded, which resulted in his return to Canada. Clark, a former Colonel in the New York National Guard, and his staff, initially divided between Toronto and Hamilton, Ontario, recruited Americans for the 97th, but the number of volunteers presenting themselves was minimal until the American Club of Toronto, its President, Asa Minard, and Benjamin A. Gould, a prominent American businessman in Toronto, invested funds to promote the battalion, and Reverend Charles
Seymour Bullock, a Unitarian minister residing in Ottawa, assumed an active role in recruiting.\textsuperscript{242}

The 97th was headquartered at Toronto, Ontario, and mobilized its forces in the Process Building at Exhibition Camp, located outside of Toronto as a part of the Canadian National Exhibition military complex, but recruited throughout the province of Ontario, especially in the communities bordering Michigan and New York. The first three recruits - Duke Harding, Jack Lee, and William Irving - enlisted on October 30, 1915, at the Strand Theater on Yonge Street, shaking Bullock's hand and entering the CEF as the original American Legionnaires. On January 15, 1916, Clark resigned his command from the 97th stating that he had "lost the confidence of his subordinates."\textsuperscript{243} Correspondence between several staff officers of Hughes suggest that Clark resigned because he had embezzled the battalion's funds.\textsuperscript{244} More than eight hundred men on January 25, 1916, had enlisted, although most of the recruitment was under the leadership and guidance of Bullock, who was commissioned as Captain and chaplain of the 97th. In an effort to consolidate the Americans in the CEF into one battalion, the Department of Militia and Defence transferred a company composed of American-born volunteers from the 101st Overseas Infantry Battalion to the 97th on January 28, 1916.\textsuperscript{245}

Replacing Clark was Lieutenant-Colonel Wade Lytton Jolly from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Jolly, a thirty-eight year old graduate from Columbia University, had previously served in the U. S. Marine Corps for over thirteen years. He had participated in the Spanish-American War on Cuba and the Philippines, the Boxer Rebellion in China,
and in Panama in 1903 and Nicaragua in 1909-1910, before leaving his "lucrative building business" to enlist in the CEF. By February 1916, the 97th had enlisted 1,449 American volunteers of the sixteen hundred originally allotted to the battalion. This inspired Hughes to authorize three more battalions designated for the enlistment of American citizens. On February 15, 1916, the Department of Militia and Defence permitted the formation of the 211th, 212th, and 213th Overseas Infantry Battalions to begin recruiting and mobilizing, an action with which the CEF's General Staff disagreed because they disbelieved three more battalions could be filled with volunteers from the United States. Five days later, on February 20, 1916, Bullock was temporarily detached from the 97th for six weeks for the purpose of organizing the recruitment efforts of the 211th, 212th, and 237th. The three new American Legion battalions were not officially authorized until July 15, 1916, under Department of Militia and Defence's General Order 69.

The 211th recruited in the provinces of Alberta and British Columbia, the 212th in Manitoba, and the 213th in southern Ontario. Headquarters and mobilization camps materialized for the 211th at Vancouver, British Columbia under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel William M. Sage, at Winnipeg, Manitoba under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel R. S. Bates for the 212th, and Lieutenant-Colonel B. J. McCormick commanded the 213th at St. Catherines, Ontario. McCormick had served for sixteen years in the Michigan National Guard and briefly as a Major in the BEF on the Western Front before returning to Canada and enlisting in the CEF. Bates was a retired Brigadier-General of the Michigan National Guard. Eight days after the three new American Legion
battalions began enlisting and training volunteers from the United States, the New York Times announced the formation of the 211th, 212th, and 213th. The article's sentiment ostensibly indicated America's approval of the scheme and its support of the Allies' endeavors.\textsuperscript{250} Despite Hughes' optimistic belief that the three new American Legion battalions would fill their ranks as quickly as the 97th Overseas Infantry Battalion, the 211th, 212th and 213th experienced difficulties in obtaining American volunteers as their recruiting numbers were, at best, one-fifth of the 97th's enlistment by April 1916.\textsuperscript{251} Yet, this statistic failed to influence Hughes, who authorized a fifth American Legion battalion on May 15, 1916, designated as the 237th Overseas Infantry Battalion.\textsuperscript{252} For his achievements in recruiting for the 97th, Hughes commissioned Reverend Bullock as a Lieutenant-Colonel and commanding officer of the 237th. The 237th was headquartered near Sussex, New Brunswick and recruited in the provinces of New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Quebec.

As the summer of 1916 approached and the British completed their plans for an offensive campaign in the Somme to begin in July, the American Legion's recruitment stalled. By May 31, 1916, three of the American Legion's battalions had enlisted only 482 Americans, respectively, 211th: 293; 212th: 290; 213th: 99.\textsuperscript{253} In addition to the American Legion's inability to recruit the requisite number of troops to complete the battalion's ranks, administrative problems in each of the American Legion's battalions, but primarily in the 97th, surfaced as a result of "many false rumors [which] had raised the hopes of both officers and men . . . with the impression given that they were bound for the
Although each of the American Legion's battalions experienced difficulties in disciplining, supervising, and maintaining its forces, the 97th encountered the most problems, apparently because of its larger number of recruits than the other American Legion battalions and its longer duration which it was stationed in the Dominion.

The first problem the American Legion encountered was the inability of the senior officers to control their junior officers (referred to as subalterns in British or Imperial armed forces), non-commissioned officers, and enlisted men. No evidence indicates specifically what caused such general discontent among several of the CEF's American Legionnaires that senior officers did not enforce military discipline. Ineffectual commanders appeared to be an obvious explanation, but most of the senior officers and in general most of the American Legionnaires had previously served in the armed forces of the United States and therefore, understood the need for military regimentation.

The *New York Times* claimed that sixty-two percent of the Legionnaires had enlisted and served in American armed forces. A confidential report from Lieutenant-Colonel Jolly on the officers of the 97th revealed that forty-six percent (twenty-five out of fifty-four) of the 97th's officers had previously served in the armed forces of the United States. Perhaps an unequal proportion of officers to enlisted men contributed to the lack of discipline among the American Legion's battalions. The Militia's Chief of the General Staff, Major-General Gwatkin, suggested as much in stating that "the proportion of officers to other ranks is excessive" causing confusion among the ranks. But Bob Elston, the sixth man to enlist in the 97th, contradicted this and asserted his own theory:
It will be inexplicable to veterans why so much army service in the ranks did not make the Legion easily amenable to discipline. It worked the other way. They felt they knew enough soldiering to go at once into action. The discipline of training chafed them raw.

Elston also insisted that because so many former American servicemen served in the 97th they found it difficult to adopt to the British style military.258 Furthermore, Hughes evidently left the organization of the Legion “to a large extent” in the hands of Reverend Bullock, who had experienced a short military career in the U. S. Army and feuded with other American Legion battalion commanding officers, especially Lieutenant-Colonel Jolly of the 97th, about recruiting and administering a battalion.259 Bullock’s quick ascension to Lieutenant-Colonel was criticized by other American Legion battalion commanding officers, who attributed Bullock’s close relationship with Hughes as the only justification for Bullock’s promotion.260 Or, as Canadian military historian Ronald Haycock suggests, perhaps the discipline problems of the American Legion derived from the “presence in the [97th] battalion of a number of former mercenaries anxious for action.”261

In my opinion, the American Legion’s battalions experienced discipline problems because their volunteers, many of whom were primarily motivated to enlist in the CEF because they wished to experience the war, were extremely anxious to get to the front and fight. Combined with the fact that the longer American Legionnaires remained in Canada, the greater the probability these men would become undisciplined, regardless of who was in command. As a result the experienced and highly motivated American volunteers became bored with training and often expressed their frustration through violence.
The main disciplinary problem for the American Legion stemmed from disorderly conduct outside of the camp, usually associated with public drunkenness. From January to June 1916, in Toronto, mobilization site of the 97th, local authorities frequently detained American Legionnaires for bar room disturbances and other violations connected with the abuse of alcohol. This prompted Toronto’s Chief of Police and Mayor Tommy Church to complain repeatedly to the Department of Militia and Defence about the 97th’s conduct, characterizing the detachment as “the worst behaved battalion in the city.”

Most of the trouble that the American Legionnaires encountered centered on interregimental fights with other CEF battalions stationed in or near Toronto. Many of these confrontations were sparked by insults from “John Canuck” about the neutrality of the United States government. A former member of the 97th declared that “the Legion accepted all challenges. It broke monotony. There was pride of race in our resentment of slurs against America.” Bob Elston of the 97th recalled one such incident:

I was in the Tremont bar one night and elbows were lifting amid friendly bickering. Then a truculent Canuck remembered that President Wilson had just sent another note to Germany, protesting some neutrality infringement. There was a snarl: “Aw, Yank, send me a note about it!” And the roof blew off.

Both Hughes and Bullock believed that the drinking of alcoholic beverages corrupted soldiers. Hughes authorized Bullock to discharge any soldier of the American Legion who engaged in drinking or was found “guilty of immoral conduct.” But this punishment must not have been applied too often because several American Legion officers were not asked to resign their commissions after having been admonished for their drinking, and having had their drinking deportment entered in their records. For example,
in Captain Charles A. Botsford’s confidential report from the Department of Militia of Defence inquiry of the 237th’s officers, he received an overall characterization as a “Good Officer.” But the remaining comments stated that Botsford was “not always to be counted on” because when “drinking, [he] loses [his] temper.”

On March 27, 1916, British Colonial Secretary Andrew Bonar Law dispatched a cablegram to the Governor-General, requesting that the 97th be transported to England at the “first possible opportunity.” Acknowledging that the battalion’s ranks were not completely filled to sixteen hundred men, Bonar Law indicated that the battalion needed to be sent at an earlier date than originally planned because he feared the 97th’s “men will desert . . . in order to fight under the Stars and Stripes in Mexico.” This is the only evidence that the British government wanted any of the American Legion’s battalions to be transported to England. Rumors of being transported to the Western Front quickly surfaced at Exhibition Camp in Toronto, where the 97th was mobilizing. The hearsay appeared to be justified when the battalion received orders to move from Toronto in late May “with the impression given that they were bound for the front.” Instead the 97th merely relocated on June 10, 1916, to Aldershot Camp at Kentville, Nova Scotia, for the remainder of the summer, after a brief stint in Quebec City, Quebec, where the battalion’s problem with the law continued. On the second day of their encampment in Quebec City, nine American Legionnaires were arrested for a brawl at a local tavern.

Although unknown to the battalion or its commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Jolly, at the time, the 97th was prohibited from being transferred to England for further
training because the United States government objected to any battalion serving in the war under the designation of the "American Legion." The United States government's official request to withhold any CEF battalion from holding any title connected with the United States was sent to the British Foreign Office by the U. S. State Department on May 8, 1916. Hughes and other Canadian authorities should not have been surprised by this action. The British Secretary of State for the Colonies, Andrew Bonar Law, informed Canadian officials on April 7, 1916, that if the 97th was to be transferred to England for future service on the Western Front, "it should not be called the American Battalion as the United States Government would not like that."[271]

The Wilson administration objected to more than the regimental title, "American Legion," for the 97th, 211th, 212th, 213th, and 237th. The designation of American Legion was originally conceived by Hughes, who designed the name to be "comprehensive enough to permit expansion into any sized body."[272] The American Legion cap and collar badges consisted of a bronze maple leaf surmounted by the coat of arms of George Washington's family bearing the number of the battalion with one ribbon extending across the maple leaf bearing the words "Canada" on one side of the coat of arms and "Overseas" on the other side, under the coat of arms, a second ribbon contained the words "American Legion."[273] Shoulder badges, buttons, stationery, regimental flags, and other insignia marked with the "American Legion" name appeared as well, all of which were unacceptable to the United States government. Each of these grievances were conveyed
either to the British Foreign Office or to the British Ambassador at Washington, Sir Cecil Spring-Rice.274

During the summer of 1916, the 97th remained encamped at Nova Scotia while the other four American Legion battalions concentrated on recruiting Americans in Canada and the United States. From June to September, each of the American Legion’s battalion commanders confronted the task of not only attracting more volunteers, but more importantly of persuading the American Legionnaires not to desert or transfer to other CEF battalions. After the Department of Militia and Defence canceled the 97th’s orders to leave Canada for service on the Western Front in May 1916, some of the battalion’s officers resigned their commissions, several men deserted, and many others reinlisted in battalions about to be sent overseas.275 This occurred because many of the American Legionnaires of the 97th and a small number from the other American Legion battalions feared being denied an opportunity to serve in the war with the American Legion, which was one of the principal motivators for many American citizens who crossed the border to enlist in the CEF.276

Those Americans whose prospects of serving overseas with the 97th had been frustrated nonetheless remained committed to serving in the armed forces of Canada and occasionally transferred to other CEF battalions. Most often the requests to be transferred came from the 97th’s officer corps. American Legionnaire officers frequently wanted to retain their rank upon being transferred, like Lieutenant Humbert Thurston Scott-Huntington, who wanted to transfer to another CEF battalion because of the 97th’s
Several officers anxious to seize any opportunity to serve in the trenches of France and Belgium willingly resigned their commissions and reinlisted in other CEF battalions as privates. The 97th’s Adjutant, who was also 1914 West Point graduate, Major D. M. McRae, sent a letter to CEF Adjutant-General, Major-General W. E. Hodgins, dated July 21, 1916, which reveals the disappointment of many Americans in the 97th while the battalion remained encamped at Camp Aldershot in Nova Scotia for the summer. McRae described his disenchantment as follows:

I came to Canada in the hopes of seeing active service and after seven months waiting I feel that I can not afford to waste any more time. The continual disappointments relative to our departure for England have completely killed my interest in my work here and I feel that my services can be of no further value to this Battalion.

Members of the 97th transferred to the British Army as well, such as Lieutenant F. L. White who was granted a six-week leave of absence from Lieutenant-Colonel Jolly to “proceed to England at his own expense and risk for the purpose of obtaining a commission in the Imperial Army.”

Other volunteers left the American Legion to enlist in the armed forces of the United States in time to meet the perceived threat of a war between Mexico and the United States. In the summer of 1916, President Woodrow Wilson authorized U. S. Army Brigadier General John J. Pershing to lead a force - named the Punitive Expedition - composed of U. S. Army troops, into Mexico in order to capture the border raiding, Mexican revolutionary General Francisco “Pancho” Villa. Unfortunately, for the
American Legion’s recruiters, the United States needed soldiers, particularly former American servicemen, because the majority of American troops were stationed in the Hawaii, Philippines, and Panama, which left the United States Army with less than twenty-five thousand soldiers in the continental United States. Pershing’s expedition to Mexico resulted in minor skirmishes between the American contingent and the Mexican army. Although Hughes disliked the idea of losing recruits, especially when his management of CEF recruitment was increasingly criticized by officers of the Department of Militia and Defence and Canadian governmental officials, on June 22, 1916, he announced that “any [former] American National Guard officers now in Canadian Armies will be released so that they can serve the United States against Mexico.” This allowed men, such as Lieutenant Roy M. Berrian of the 212th, to return to the United States for service in Mexico because they believed defending the United States superseded fighting for Canada in a European war. Subsequently, Berrian reenlisted in the CEF on September 18, 1916, after he had participated in the fight against Mexico.

As a result of the desertions and transfers, the 97th lost more than five hundred men from February to July 1916, declining from 1,449 in February to 945 on July 21, 1916. During that same time period the five battalions of the American Legion combined lost twenty percent of their recruits due to desertion or transfers. The possibility of enlisting the minimum of one thousand American citizens for each overseas infantry battalion was rapidly diminishing as Legionnaires left and fewer new volunteers were enlisting for the battalions of the American Legion through the summer months of 1916.
On July 21, 1916, the remaining American Legion battalions consisted of 649 men in the 211th, 487 in the 212th, 272 in the 213th, and 162 in the 237th. This decrease in the numbers of men for the American Legion’s battalions reinforced the opinions of the Governor-General, Major-General Gwatkin, and Major-General Fiset, who originally opposed the formation of the American Legion.

Beginning in May 1916, opposition from the Governor-General, senior Department of Militia and Defence and CEF officers, and Great Britain’s Foreign Office to the American Legion caused the Department of Militia and Defence to reevaluate the concept of deploying American citizens in separate military units to the Western Front. Five days after the United States protested to the British concerning the American Legion’s existence on May 8, 1916, Hughes informed the British War Office on May 13, that the 97th would be embarking for Liverpool, England within the next two weeks to complete its training. This was preemptive move by Hughes to avoid losing Legionnaires to the U. S. Army during the United States government's campaign in Mexico. Bonar Law, Great Britain’s Colonial Secretary, sent a cablegram to Prime Minister Borden instructing him to cancel Hughes’ orders transferring the 97th to England because the Foreign Office feared aggravating the United States government. On May 15, 1916, the Governor-General forwarded a letter to Borden in which he candidly expressed his dissatisfaction with the American Legion and with enlisting Americans into the Canadian Expeditionary Force on three grounds:

First, it irritates the United States Government; second it opens a field for possible German spies to get through and obtain information; and, third experience has so often shown that American citizens do not always make the best of soldiers.
On May 19, 1916, Bonar Law asked Connaught to revoke the 97th’s embarkation orders because the British government believed that the “services of the Battalion cannot be utilized.” It is assumed that Borden acted on behalf of the Governor-General and not on his own initiative because the Prime Minister had reservations about interfering with Hughes’ affairs.

From May to August 1916, correspondence from the Governor-General to Prime Minister Borden exhibited the Duke of Connaught’s discontent with the American Legion in which he frequently considered disbanding the five battalions. Canadian opposition to the American Legion gained momentum after June 5, 1916, when the formation’s leading British advocate, Lord Kitchener, died while traveling to Russia. As Governor-General of the Dominion of Canada, the Duke of Connaught was also commander-in-chief of Canada’s armed forces. Connaught also held the rank of Field-Marshal in the British Army, and subsequently believed his military experience provided him with a more applicable understanding of Canada’s military affairs than Borden. For three months Connaught and Borden argued about the American Legion and its future existence. The conflict eventually caused Borden to raise constitutional questions concerning Connaught’s and His Majesty’s Government’s position over Canadian domestic matters. Connaught and Borden’s strife centered on what powers were entitled to Connaught as Governor-General of the Dominion of Canada. On July 12, 1916, in a letter from Borden to Connaught he reminded the Governor-General that his powers were limited by the
constitution. By August, Connaught had given up his campaign to disband the American Legion and on August 5, 1916, the Governor-General apologized to Borden for any misunderstanding. In October 1916, Connaught resigned as Governor-General. Years later Borden reflected in his memoirs that Connaught “never fully realized the limitations of his position as Governor-General” nor understood that as commander-in-chief of Canada’s armed forces his position was titular.

The Department of Militia and Defence’s Chief of the General Staff, Major-General Gwatkin, expressed his dissatisfaction and apprehensions with the American Legion to Borden. On June 18, 1916, Gwatkin issued a detailed memorandum on the subject of the American Legion, whose formation he contended had exposed Canada “to [the] charge of disregarding the neutrality of the United States,” which embarrassed the British Embassy at Washington and the British Foreign Office. Gwatkin concluded by suggesting that the CEF disband the American Legion “before more money is wasted” on the endeavor. Nonetheless, the CEF’s Chief of the General Staff reserved his comments for the 211th, 212th, 213th, and 237th only, believing that the 97th should not be disbanded despite its “bad reputation.” The financial feasibility of the American Legion appeared to be a concern for many Canadian authorities. A July 22, 1916, letter to Hughes from the Canadian High Commissioner’s Office in London expressed fear that “a great deal of money expended in the organization of these regiments will prove to be useless expenditure” and contended that if the American Legion’s battalions were “not to be utilized[,] they should disbanded.”
In August 1916, the 97th's ranks rapidly deteriorated, while the other four American Legion battalions, particularly the 212th and 237th, also failed to fill their ranks with the requisite number of volunteers. With the American Legion designation preventing the possibility of any service overseas and declining numbers of soldiers in the battalions, the Department of Militia and Defence's parliamentary secretary, F. B. McCurdy, proposed either to reorganize the five American Legion battalions by combining some of the battalions together or to disband the entire American Legion distributing the Legion's men to other CEF overseas infantry battalions as replacements. This scheme dashed Hughes' hopes of forming a brigade composed of American citizens, which had been his intention since 1914. In response to McCurdy's recommendation to Borden and Connaught, the commanding officers of the 97th, Lieutenant-Colonel Jolly, and 237th, Lieutenant-Colonel Reverend Bullock, who previously had exhibited public and private animosity towards one another, began to position themselves for the command of any future reorganized unit of Americans by insinuating that other commanding officer was an incompetent leader. Jolly submitted a confidential report on the officers of the 237th to the Department of Militia and Defence, criticizing Bullock and his subordinate's command methods, challenging his claim "to have raised the 97th Battalion," and adding only one positive comment about Bullock, "a good speaker." Bullock's reply charged Jolly with misappropriating battalion funds and attacked his "character and integrity as an officer and a gentleman." Jolly requested that a Militia Board of Inquiry address the personal
attacks, while Bullock demanded that the 97th’s finances be examined. Neither of the accusations resulted in any official investigation by the Department of Militia and Defence.

On August 30, 1916, the Department of Militia and Defence recommended that the 97th preserve its identity as a CEF overseas infantry battalion and that the 212th and 237th be amalgamated into the 97th. This amalgamation was designed to “obliterate the 212th and 237th” and fill the ranks of the 97th, which had been authorized to proceed to England on August 3, 1916, as soon as its ranks were filled. This British retraction of orders keeping the 97th in Canada occurred through the aid of the British War Minister, then David Lloyd George, who overruled the objections of the British Foreign Office which feared provoking the United States government. Until September 12, 1916, the date of the reorganization of the 97th Overseas Infantry Battalion, the 97th, 212th, 237th continued to recruit independently. The 211th and 213th remained intact and continued to recruit American volunteers. According to the law of the Dominion of Canada the authority to disband any Canadian regiment rested with the Governor-General as commander-in-chief of Canada’s armed forces. Connaught authorized Prime Minister Borden to disband the two battalions in question on October 8, 1916.

Officers of the 212th and 237th were either selected for transfer to the 97th, permitted to go to England, unattached, to join a different CEF overseas battalion, or forced to resign their commission from the Canadian Expeditionary Force. All other ranks from the 212th and 237th transferred to the 97th. Certain officers of the 97th, “who were obliged to leave the battalion on account of their positions being given to officers of
the 212th and 237th," either attempted to gain an appointment with another CEF battalion or resigned their commission. Resigning officers from the 97th received one month’s salary and free transportation to any point in Canada. If any former 97th officer did not receive an appointment, he was automatically retired from the CEF at the end of September 1916, with the understanding that he could reinlist in the CEF as a private.

The 97th’s non-commissioned officers, who lost their position due to the amalgamation, either accepted a demotion or were discharged from the CEF.301

Therefore, the reorganized 97th, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Jolly, selected officers from all three battalions to form its chain of command and combined the non-commissioned officers and enlisted men into one battalion. Out of the thirty-three officers of the new 97th, fifteen originated from the 97th, eleven from the 212th, and six from the 237th. The former commanding officer of the 237th, Lieutenant-Colonel Reverend Bullock, retained his rank and went to England as an unattached chaplain of the CEF. In London, Bullock established a “Vise Office” at 3 Southampton Street advising Canadian soldiers exposed to venereal disease and preached at various congregations throughout Great Britain.302 He remained in the CEF until January 20, 1920. Jolly offered Lieutenant-Colonel R. J. Bates of the 212th the position of second in command of the reorganized 97th at a demotion to the rank of Major. Bates refused Jolly’s offer and “was given 30 days leave of absence with pay on the 20th September[;]” after that date he would be dismissed from the 212th Battalion.303 Two months later, Bates, unaware that the 212th ceased to exist as an infantry battalion in the CEF or that he had been
discharged from the CEF, attempted to reorganize the 212th at Winnipeg, Manitoba, but the Department of Militia and Defence informed him of the status of the battalion and again offered him a position in the 97th. Bates declined the offer, stating that "he would never do anything to help the 97th Battalion." All debts incurred by the 212th and 237th prior to the amalgamation were assessed to the Department of Militia and Defence.

The reorganization of the 97th occurred without Hughes, who was in England during the amalgamation of the three American Legion battalions, or his acknowledgment. This exemplified how Prime Minister Borden had been reducing Hughes’ role as Minister of the Militia, beginning in August 1916, because Borden believed Hughes no longer maintained the capacity to direct the affairs of the CEF and the Department of Militia and Defence. The most obvious shortcoming of Hughes’ administration of the CEF as Minister of Militia and Defence was his failure to arrange a method of reinforcing the battalions in the trenches. In that same month Borden restricted Hughes from administering any recruiting campaigns and duties of the Canadian Expeditionary Force. On November 9, 1916, Borden dismissed Hughes from his post.

One week after the 97th reorganized, it sailed for Great Britain aboard the S.S. Olympic on September 19, 1916, with thirty-one officers and 798 men. Elston recalled the moment of the lonely departure: "no bands, no speeches, no tears, no cheers." The 97th’s departure coincided with the removal its “American Legion” designation on September 12, 1916. All distinguishing insignia and badges associated with the United States were removed by the commanding officers of the American Legion’s battalions
under orders from the Department of Militia and Defence. The reason for the removal of the “American Legion” designation was foreshadowed in a letter from Hughes to Lieutenant-Colonel Reverend Bullock on July 12, 1916. The Minister of Militia and Defence requested that the term “American Legion” be withdrawn from all references to the 97th, 211th, 212th, 213th, and 237th for “international reasons” in order to hasten the deployment of the battalions overseas.307 The American Legion’s new cap and collar badge markings read “acta non verba,” translated as “deeds, not words.”308 Replacing the “American Legion” designation ended the United States government’s protest to Canadian and British authorities concerning the formation. The Wilson administration had consistently objected to any foreign nation using the word “American” to designate a military unit, and previously had asked the French government not to use the name, “Escadrille Americaine.” The French complied by renaming the air squadron composed of American aviators to the Lafayette Escadrille.309

In England, the 97th trained until October 31, 1916, near the city of Otterpool in Kent County under the direction of the CEF’s 6th Canadian Training Brigade. While completing its final phase of military instruction, engaging in bombing, trench digging, and bayonet fighting drills, the mismanagement of the battalion’s finances was exposed as a result of the numerous outstanding debts and misappropriated funds by the officers and men of the 97th. From the beginning of 1916, the Department of Militia and Defence received a number of complaints from Toronto businessmen that members of the 97th repeatedly failed to pay their expenses. After the 97th moved from Toronto to Camp
Aldershot in Kentville, Nova Scotia, on June 10, 1916, it was difficult for Toronto businessmen to locate those soldiers who incurred debts in Toronto. For example, a letter from the Toronto law firm Rowell, Reid, Wood & Wright to the Department of Militia and Defence revealed the dilemma facing Toronto’s debt collectors:

You will of course appreciate the difficulties of the situation in that the 97th Battalion is officered by Americans, with whose financial or other responsibility we are in no way familiar . . . the Battalion is composed of citizens of the United States and has been moved from one Province to another making it impossible to retrieve their dues.310

Most of the unpaid accounts were from Toronto’s tailors and outfitters who furnished American Legionnaires supplemental uniforms, but claims from retailers of band instruments and sporting equipment appeared as well. On June 24, 1916, at the request of the 97th’s commanding officer, a Militia Board of Inquiry reported “a defiency in certain ordnance stores,” such as rifles, bayonets, and miscellaneous equipment. The missing items were charged to Jolly and his staff without further punishment.311 During the summer of 1916, paymaster Captain G. S. Jackson’s management of the battalion’s funds became increasingly troublesome as the 97th experienced a number of desertions. For instance, an unidentified sergeant and private stole eight battalion checques. Four of the checques were cashed in for over six hundred dollars, and four were never recovered. Both men deserted from the CEF.312

When the reorganized 97th embarked for Great Britain, its financial situation remained unsettled. The financial dealings of the 97th in England paralleled its actions in Canada as outstanding debts to local grocers amounting to hundreds of pounds caused
more controversy for the battalion. Sometime in October 1916, the 97th’s Lieutenant Charles Stewart Brady crossed the Atlantic Ocean back to Canada in order to settle the battalion’s affairs before a Department of Militia and Defence Board of Inquiry. In the preliminary hearings, the military court determined “that the internal affairs of the 97th Battalion were allowed to become badly disorganised from the lack of proper supervision by certain officers in charge of the battalion.” On November 2, 1916, Lieutenant-Colonel Jolly was found responsible for this condition and subsequently court martialed along with Majors A. B. Mason and B. C. Pitman. The Board concluded its investigation on May 12, 1917, in Seaford, Sussex County, England and recommended that Lieutenant Brady assist in collecting the outstanding debts of the battalion. Brady was “anxious to settle matters” because as an American citizen he wanted to immediately transfer to the U. S. Army. As late as 1927, former American Legionnaires of the 97th Battalion compensated the Canadian government for the misappropriated funds even for amounts as little as five dollars.313

In October 1916, it appeared possible that the 97th might serve on the Western Front, but Canadian and British officials feared aggravating the United States government as the Presidential elections of 1916 approached. On October 10, 1916, economist John Maynard Keynes, British Treasury Secretary, warned the British Cabinet to avoid irritating the Wilson administration stating that it would be “extremely difficult, if not impossible, to carry through financial operations on a scale adequate to our needs” with the loss of American capital.314 Canadian officials concurred with this British sentiment and decided
that it would be better for foreign relations to disband the American Legion instead of deploying the regiment to the Western Front which would further aggravate the Wilson administration. During the last half of the month, the Department of Militia and Defence began dismantling the reorganized battalion. The Legionnaires were shocked, believing they had been tricked by the British who had no intention of permitting the American Legion to serve as a unit in the CEF. The reorganized 97th protested to the British War Office, but it was to no avail. Initially, three hundred men were transferred to the CEF’s 4th Overseas Infantry Battalion, 1st Brigade, 1st Division, as reinforcements; and on October 22 and 27, 1916, 150 and 120 men were respectively transferred to the Royal Canadian Regiment on the Western Front, which was deployed near the French city of Courcellette as a part of the 7th Brigade, 3rd Division. The remainder of the unit, 428, either transferred to the Royal Canadian Regiment or Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry on November 1, 1916, one week before the 1916 Presidential Elections. The 97th officially disbanded on April 5, 1918, in accordance with Privy Council Order Number 532.315

The 211th and 213th continued to recruit and mobilize American citizens until both of the battalions embarked for Great Britain from Halifax, Nova Scotia, on December 20, 1916, once again aboard the Olympic. The two battalions arrived in England the day after Christmas, the 211th with twenty-five officers and 662 men and the 213th with five officers and 184 other ranks. Both the 211th and 213th were transported to England in order to disassemble the battalions and reassign the officers and men to other CEF units.
On January 20, 1917, the 26th Canadian Reserve Battalion absorbed the 211th, which transferred to the Canadian Railway Troop Depot on February 16, 1917. One month later, on March 21, 1917, the Canadian Railway Troops were amalgamated with the 218th Overseas Infantry Battalion, ending the existence of the 211th. The 213th's officers and men were absorbed by the 25th Canadian Reserve Battalion in two separate drafts, one on January 26, 1917, and the other on February 7, 1917. This battalion was not officially disbanded until September 15, 1920, by the Department of Militia and Defence's General Orders 149, although it had contained no soldiers since the February draft. Thus, sixteen days before the United States government entered the war against Germany and its allies, the Canadian Expeditionary Force eliminated the American Legion by dispersing the remainder of its troops among other CEF units. This allowed the Canadian government to disassociate itself from any military formation connected with the United States or its citizens.

Although the CEF's American Legion caused administrative and financial difficulties for Canadian authorities and the Department of Militia and Defence, not all of its history should be regarded as disreputable or ignoble. In an attempt to solicit more recruits and in honor of the formation, Prime Minister Borden declared July 29, 1916, "American Legion Day." The celebration, held throughout Canada, acknowledged "Canada's appreciation to the Americans who have taken up the sword of Justice." The event was marked by fireworks, parades, and "Base Ball" games. During the summer of 1916, the American Legion frequently participated in the "American Pastime" in order to
stimulate morale among Canadian citizens and American Legionnaires, whose rate of
desertion were the highest from May to September 1916. For example, on August 4,
1916, the 237th played a game against a team from the town of Digby to commemorate
the second anniversary of the declaration of war - the 237th won six to five.\textsuperscript{319}

Although the 97th acquired a notorious reputation for fighting in Toronto’s
taverns, Mrs. O. B. Shepherd, a respected member of Toronto’s community and a member
of the American Legion’s Auxiliary, frequently entertained the members of the battalion at
her home - she was nicknamed “The Mother of the Legion.”\textsuperscript{320} The American Legion
Auxiliary, mainly composed of wealthy Toronto women, provided the Legionnaires with
personal effects, including socks and towels, and arranged numerous social activities to
ease the boredom of being detained in Toronto during the cold winter months.\textsuperscript{321}

Desertion from the American Legion was a primary concern for its recruiters,
commanding officers, and particularly for Sir Sam Hughes, its architect and leading
Canadian advocate. Most men deserted because they either wanted serve in the Punitive
Expedition in Mexico, had used the Legion as a haven for the winter of 1915-1916, or
feared that remaining in the American Legion would not be the quickest means to the
front. Meanwhile, loyal American Legionnaires, who never wavered in adversity,
exhibited great enthusiasm for their battalions. Frequently, this excitement was displayed
on the parade grounds of the mobilization centers and in the neighboring cities of the 97th,
211th, 212th, 213th and 237th’s headquarters. The 97th outfitted a fifty man drill squad
and a full regimental band, both of which frequently performed in Toronto and
surrounding Ontario communities. The “American Legion March,” composed by John Philip Sousa, could be heard in every American Legion camp in addition to the lyrics of a separate American Legion song:

Not because our homes are threatened, Or our country calls to the fight.
We’re fighting because we want to, Because we love both Fight and Right.
There’s Tommy, and Mikey, and then Scotty, too, Canadi-an, Australi-an,
and the Hindu, English, and Irish, and Scottish, all swank,
Turn out, look us over, for we are the Yank.322

If the Legion was not singing, the American Legionnaires could read about themselves in the 97th’s The American Legion Magazine or the 211th’s Legion Weekly.323

The American Legion corresponded to a number of other Canadian Expeditionary Force infantry battalions. Under Hughes’ administration as Minister of Militia, the CEF organized more than 260 overseas infantry regiments and battalions; forty-eight served on the Western Front and two (259th and 260th) in Siberia, Russia. The remaining infantry units either remained in Canada as a part of the home defense or their officers and men were absorbed or drafted by other CEF formations as replacements. Therefore, when the reorganized 97th and the 211th and 213th journeyed to England and were redeployed into different CEF units, the American Legion resembled hundreds of other CEF infantry battalions that were disbanded before being deployed to Western Front.324 Often battalions were shown favoritism from Hughes, especially those regiments commanded by Hughes’ friends, like the American Legion, which endured months of objections from Canadian officials to its organization through Hughes’ close relationship with Bullock.325 Transferring American Legionnaires to other CEF infantry units as replacements followed
the Department of Militia and Defence’s decision to reinforce its forces using regiments recruited and dispatched from Canada as “‘draft-giving battalions.’” For example, the 79th Overseas Infantry Battalion refilled its ranks five different times and supplied the CEF with 1,020 officers and men as reinforcements.326

Canadian military historian Ronald Haycock has described the American Legion as a “dismal failure.”327 No doubt the five battalions of the American Legion encountered political and diplomatic obstacles in their recruitment and mobilization, exhibited inadequate leadership which in turn caused multiple problems, and never engaged in combat on the Western Front as a unit under American commanders. Nevertheless, the Minister of Militia and Defence had authorized the establishment of the American Legion as a “method of facilitating recruiting and training.”328 Therefore, despite the number and degree of difficulties the American Legion encountered, it met its main objective of facilitating the recruitment of an undetermined number of American citizens to serve in the Canadian Expeditionary Force. With the aid of Reverend Bullock, Hughes accomplished this, enlisting a total of 2,746 Americans into the CEF, a number far short of the sixty thousand “volunteers from the neighborhood of the American Republic” Hughes expected.329 The British Ambassador, Spring-Rice, and the British Foreign Office contended that the American Legion was an embarrassment before the United States entered the war. An “embarrassment” may have been an exaggeration because on May 30, 1917, soldiers of what had been the American Legion presented the 97th, 211th, 212th, 213th, and 237th’s regimental colors to the wife of King George the Fifth, Queen
Mary, at St. Paul’s Cathedral in London, England. After the war, the official regimental colors of the American Legion were donated to various locations: 97th to Sulgrave Manor (ancestral home of George Washington’s family in Hants, England); 211th to the United States National War Museum; 212th to the Canadian War Museum; 213th to the King Albert I of Belgium, and 237th to the French government.330

The American Legion of the Canadian Expeditionary Force was a novel plan to recruit American citizens in order to supply Canada, whose population was only eight million, with a supplemental source of volunteers. Lieutenant-General Sir Sam Hughes, enchanted by the possibility of enticing a large number of Americans to enlist in his Legion scheme, inspired men like Reverend Bullock to help him achieve his aim of establishing a brigade of American citizens in the CEF. As Minister of Militia and Defence, Hughes was entrusted by the Canadian government to raise a volunteer army. From October 22, 1915, to March 16, 1917, the Department of Militia and Defence invested enough resources to establish five “American” infantry battalions which provided the CEF with needed manpower, and the fact that the American Legionnaires were United States citizens and only amounted to twenty-seven hundred made no difference to Hughes or the CEF because Canada wanted more soldiers. Although the American Legion caused the Canadian and British governments political and diplomatic difficulties, experienced organizational, administrative, and financial debacles, and violated British military law and international agreements, it achieved Hughes’ aim of facilitating volunteers from the United States for service in the trenches of France and Belgium.
Chapter Four

American Combat Experiences in the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1915-1917.

Over forty-one thousand American citizens enlisted and served in Canada’s expeditionary force, and 19,966 of those Americans experienced the carnage of the Western Front in the First World War before the United States entered the war on April 6, 1917.\(^{331}\) Thereafter most Americans enlisted in the American Expeditionary Force (AEF).\(^{332}\) Although the CEF was much smaller than the enormous armies of France, Germany, Russia, Italy, the Ottoman Empire, Austro-Hungary, and Great Britain, British commanders Field Marshal Sir John D. P. French and Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig often assigned the CEF to trenches where it more frequently encountered Germans than did any other British Imperial units of comparable strength.\(^{333}\) This persuaded Canadian military historian C. P. Stacey to characterize the CEF as the “spearhead of the British Army.”\(^{334}\) American citizens who fought in the many offensive and defensive campaigns waged by the CEF, experienced some of the greatest battles of the First World War. A few of these Americans recounted their wartime adventures in autobiographies and newspaper and periodical articles; a larger number of Americans revealed their thoughts of the war in personal letters, and Canadian military records document the military achievements of Americans in the CEF.\(^{335}\)
Americans abounded in the battalions of the CEF from listening posts inside “No-Man’s Land” to reserve bivouacs miles behind the front lines. American citizens serving with the CEF in the trenches represented a cross section of American society from the Atlantic to the Pacific: farmers, writers, engineers, university students, soldiers of fortune, millionaires, and army, navy, marine corps, and national guard veterans. Americans in the CEF told various anecdotes about their different experiences in the war. Descriptions of their fears and thoughts, accounts of Canadian offensive and defensive operations, and chronicles of heroic individual actions evoke images of what all soldiers in the trenches endured. But the American point of view from August 4, 1914 to April 6, 1917, presents an unusual, and rarely recognized perspective on the First World War to the extent that American history textbooks infrequently acknowledge that twenty thousand American citizens in the CEF fought against the German army while the United States government remained neutral.

Numerous books by American citizens who served in the armed forces of the United States discuss and evaluate the American war experience after the United States entered the war. Most accounts by Americans who enlisted in a foreign army before the United States government declared war on Germany, like Arthur Guy Empey’s autobiography *Over The Top*, usually recount the American experience in the British armed forces, French Foreign Legion, or French Air Force. This neglect by historians of American participation in the CEF occurs primarily because few publications address the
experience of Americans who served in the CEF on the Western Front before the United States entered the war or at any other time.

From March 1915 to April 1917, Americans and Canadians in the CEF fought together in the trenches of Belgium and France against the Germans. At first glance, the CEF’s soldiers appeared to be a part of the British Expeditionary Force because their dress and equipment were so similar and the command structure between the CEF and BEF. The difference between the British and Canadian apparel was the Canadian jacket, web equipment, and rifle, but by the end of 1916 these variations were replaced by British models because they were more suitable for the conditions of trench warfare. The only way to detect a CEF soldier from a BEF soldier visually was to look for the woolen CEF patches on the upper sleeve of the uniform and an insignia sometimes on the helmet, although in the winter, the CEF’s troops could be distinguished from their British counterparts by their goatskin jerkins. The CEF’s distinguishing markings indicated a soldier’s division, brigade, and battalion. The command relationship between the CEF and BEF was intricate. The British High Command maintained the authority over the CEF’s four divisions, meaning they assigned the CEF’s position on the battlefield. Because Canada had few Canadian-born men who were professional soldiers in the British Army or Canadian Militia, the Department of Militia and Defence appointed British Army officers to command the CEF. From September 25, 1914, to June 8, 1917, Britain’s Lieutenant-General Sir E. A. H. Alderson and Lieutenant-General Sir Julian H. G. Byng commanded the CEF. For the remainder of the war Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur W.
Currie, a Canadian, commanded the CEF. Throughout the war, sixteen British Army officers were appointed to command divisions and brigades of the CEF.339

On the night of March 8, 1915, the CEF’s 1st Division under the command of Alderson, mobilized in Canada from August to December 1914, crossed the English Channel and entered the trenches in the British zone of the Western Front. Already in France were the troops of Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI), who had been sent overseas on October 3, 1914, as a demonstration to the British government of Canada’s determination to fully support Great Britain’s war effort.340 At the time the Canadian Expeditionary Force was assigned to the front lines, a series of trenches partitioned by a single strip of land - commonly known as “No-Man’s Land” - divided the belligerents from the Swiss border to the North Sea. There the German Army faced the armies of France, Belgium, and Great Britain on a battlefield marked by extensive defensive fortifications which made very difficult the waging of successful offensive campaigns. As Canada’s expeditionary force entered the lines assigned to the British Expeditionary Force, it encountered warfare heretofore unknown to Canadian military strategists.341 The initial efforts of the CEF in 1915 reflected that predicament as Canadian and British commanders accepted the strategy of sacrificing soldier’s lives in order to kill enemy soldiers and capture tactically advantageous ground.342 Unfortunately for the CEF’s commanders and the men in the trenches, the CEF “learned” trench warfare “in a bloodbath of confusion and misdirection.”343
The Canadian Expeditionary Force’s first action on the Western Front occurred on March 10, 1915, at the Battle of Neuve Chapelle. In one day of fighting, two CEF infantry battalions assigned to British reserve trenches observed the battle and seldom encountered the Germans. The Second Battle of Ypres, from April 22 to May 25, 1915, was the first battle in which the entire 1st Division of the CEF encountered the German Army. The first two days of this battle, remembered as the first “Gas Attack” on the Western Front, the German 38th Landwehr Brigade and 2nd Reserve Ersatz Brigade of the 26th and 27th Reserve Corps discharged chlorine gas at the 1st Division in an effort to disorient their defensive measures. The Canadians managed to hold on to most of their front lines at Gravenstafel Ridge against the German offensive, earning a distinguished combat reputation in its first battle. The 1st Division bravely closed a potentially disastrous gap in the line on the CEF’s left flank after a unit of French Colonials (45th Algerian Division) and Britain’s 87th Territorial Division retreated from their positions. Although the Canadians held their ground, their efforts cost the division 6,035 casualties, two thousand of whom were fatalities.344 This battle “introduced” Canadians to “those dreadful lists of casualties.”345

Romeo Houle of New Bedford, Massachusetts, served with the 14th Overseas Infantry Battalion, 3rd Brigade, 1st Division, CEF, during the first days of the Second Battle of Ypres.346 Houle recounted his memories of the Second Battle of Ypres in a *New York Times* article of June 4, 1916, in which he declared his intention to enlighten the American public about the horrors of trench warfare. He wrote of his disgust at the rats in
the trenches and suggested that the famous American poet, Edgar Allen Poe, “could have
got new inspiration from their dirty hordes.” He also related his great fear of mines and
told about the events at Ypres and in other Allied campaigns of 1915. Houle’s two most
perceptive descriptions of battle were of the German chlorine gas attack and of the CEF’s
defense of the Canadian’s exposed left flank at Ypres. Of this gas he remarked,

Gas? What do you know of it, you people who never heard earth and heaven
rock with the frantic turmoil of the ceaseless bombardment? A crawling yellow
cloud that pours in upon you, that gets you by the throat and shakes you as a huge
mastiff might shake a kitten, and leaves you burning in every nerve and vein of
your body with pain unthinkable; your eyes starting from their sockets; your face
turned yellow-green.347

When the 45th Algerian Division began to abandon its fourth line trenches in the
face of the German offensive, it unthinkingly endangered the CEF’s left flank. Houle’s 4th
Company responded by positioning two machine guns, a British-made Vickers and a
French constructed Hotchkiss, to repel the advancing Germans. Houle noted his
admiration of the Germans’ fortitude in attacking and said he would “never forget” them.
Further remarking that “when our guns suddenly spoke their front line melted; their
second crumpled before this destruction; but on, on, on they came, unflinching, marching
with even steps into certain death.” In response to the CEF’s defense of Gravenstafel
Ridge at the Second Battle of Ypres, German artillery bombarded Houle’s position
causing him to be hurled twenty yards from one of the explosions. Narrowly escaping
death, Houle was one of only sixteen out of the company’s original five hundred who
remained alive after 1915. He was subsequently honorably discharged from the CEF after
American authorities proved that he was under age when he enlisted.348
Houle was not the only American serving in the CEF at the Second Battle of Ypres, but his testimony exemplified his passion for what was occurring on the Western Front and how little most Americans understood the nature of the conflict. Unlike Houle who expressed contempt for the United States government's neutrality and for having removed him from military service in the CEF, Henry Lapierre wrote an article about the Second Battle of Ypres two months after the first gas attack occurred. Lapierre, who served with the CEF's 13th Overseas Infantry Battalion, 3rd Brigade, 1st Division, perceived this battle differently because his battalion served in the advance trenches, whereas Houle's battalion had fought in the support trenches. Under orders, Lapierre's battalion attacked the German lines before the gas shells disoriented the Canadian advance until "all at once our men began to totter and crumple up by scores. On all sides the soldiers dropped with hardly a sound and with no sign of injuries." Lapierre and his battalion confronted the enemy without gas masks and took heavy losses as 150 men survived out of 1,100. Although Lapierre suffered from gas inhalation, he continued to serve in the trenches until his mother obtained his honorable discharge from the British War Office. The reason or date for his dismissal can not be ascertained from Lapierre's account, but most likely he was discharged for being underage when he enlisted in the CEF.⁴⁹

Houle's and Lapierre's personal accounts capture the sentiment experienced by many soldiers in the CEF at Ypres on April 22 to 23, 1915, but the most distinguished American citizen who participated in the battle was Tracy Richardson. Before serving in
the CEF, Richardson, who had been born in Broken Bow, Nebraska, on November 21, 1892, had served in numerous armies and wars in Central and South America where he had earned an honorable reputation as a soldier of fortune in the banana republics from 1909 to 1914. His service as a full Colonel and Major respectively in the Nicaraguan and Mexican revolutionary armies are legendary and fantastic war stories. For example, Richardson single-handedly captured Managua, Nicaragua, for General Luis Mena by erroneously convincing the capital city’s defenders that they were surrounded by Mena’s forces. In Mexico, he contended that he personally negotiated a retraction of a 10,000 dollar bounty for his life from rival Mexican revolutionary General Francisco “Pancho” Villa. Besides Richardson’s ability to talk his way out of a difficult situation, he acquired an equally deadly capability to operate various models of machine guns with uncanny proficiency - a skill acquired under the tutelage of fellow banana republic mercenary Lee Christmas.350

When Canada entered war on August 4, 1914, Richardson left Mexico and enlisted as a private in the CEF with Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry. His low enlistment number, 865, attests that Richardson acted immediately to see action early in the European War.351 With the PPCLI he participated in several small battles from December 1914 to April 1915. Unlike Houle and Lapierre, Richardson experienced more of the Second Battle of Ypres than the days of the first gas attacks on April 22 to 23, 1915.352 Richardson’s observations focused on the battle’s “bloody attrition.” Before he entered the trenches Richardson had been billeted in the old Belgian cavalry barracks at
Ypres, where under bombardment he recalled “you would hear a most unearthly scream, then a gigantic explosion, and a big building would go down in a pile of brick and dust, burying whoever might be near.”

On May 4, 1915, when German artillery incessantly shelled Richardson’s machine gun section in the British trenches, Richardson believed that his unit had received “special attention from the German artillery.” From this experience of being “shelled,” he stated that “time and again our guns were dismounted, buried, dug out and brought into action again. Our numbers began to decrease; our trench became a shambles full of dead, wounded, broken guns and equipment. It did not seem possible that a human being could live.” Before the Germans destroyed all of his unit’s guns on the front line, Richardson suffered three wounds, but was able to crawl through a communication trench to a dressing station. Eventually he walked back to the city of Ypres under heavy German artillery fire. He was subsequently discharged as a result of his three wounds, one of which was caused by shrapnel that hit him between the shoulders and tore his back open to his hips. After his recovery, Richardson reinlisted with the CEF’s American Legion - 97th Overseas Infantry Battalion - upon passing a medical examination from the battalion’s lenient CEF physician, Captain B. S. Hutcheson. He was commissioned as a Lieutenant on September 28, 1916, and commanded the 97th’s machine gun section. Possibly exhausted from his wounds acquired from years of infantry service, Richardson later transferred to the British Royal Naval Air Service and in 1918 transferred to the American Expeditionary Force’s Signal Corps as a pilot.
For the remainder of 1915, the CEF continued to engage the Germans, but achieved relatively little offensive success as its front lines remained virtually unaltered. The Canadian Expeditionary Force attacked the Germans in their trenches by a series of offensives towards their defensive fortifications (trench, dugout, or pillbox) in order to "breakthrough" their lines and expose a gap through which further offensives might produce a strategic advantage. But, the development of the machine gun, the Allies' lack of military technology to counter this weapon, and the absence of new offensive techniques created few opportunities for successful offensive campaigns in 1915, 1916, or 1917.357

As a result, the CEF rarely engaged the Germans in 1915 and participated in only three more battles after the Second Battle of Ypres: Festubert (May 17 to 25), Givenchy (June 15 to 16), and Loos (September 25 to October 8). In none of the battles did the CEF achieve its objectives. At Festubert the CEF gained six hundred yards and lost 2,323 soldiers. Later, in two days of fighting at Givenchy, the 1st Brigade's 3rd Battalion, "to whom the attack had been entrusted," suffered 866 casualties out of one thousand men.358 The Battle of Loos witnessed the first battle in which the CEF's 1st and 2nd Divisions engaged the Germans. At Loos British and Canadian artillery bombarded German trenches with chlorine gas in retaliation against the German Army for having used poison gas at the Second Battle of Ypres. The offensive, celebrated by a story of one British battalion's dribbling of a soccer ball across "No-Man's Land," resulted in further failure
due to the changing wind altering the gas’s direction towards the Allies, the Germans’ position on higher ground, and the marksmanship of the German machine-gunners.\textsuperscript{359}

In 1916, the Canadian Expeditionary Force continued to operate in the Ypres Salient. From October 1915 to March 1916, the CEF did not fight in any large scale battle because the winter weather restricted offensive campaigns. Instead, the Canadian Corps, aware that the stagnation of the winter months might reduce morale, aggressively harassed the Germans by raiding their trenches with small infantry detachments, sniping, and “surprise artillery shoots.”\textsuperscript{360} In the spring of 1916, the CEF confronted two German offensives at St. Eloi Craters (March 27 to April 16) and at Mount Sorrel (June 2 to 15), in which the Canadians suffered nearly twice as many casualties as the Germans. Inclement weather, poor communications, and seven enormous pits of artillery shell holes caused disastrous consequences for the CEF at St. Eloi in less than one month’s fighting. The Battle of Mount Sorrel initiated the CEF’s newly formed 3rd Division, but German attacks on the Canadians inflicted almost ten thousand casualties. Both German assaults attempted to delay Canadian and British preparations for the Somme offensive, “which the enemy well knew to be impending.”\textsuperscript{361}

In an effort to relieve the German offensive directed since February 1916 at the French Army near Verdun, the CEF along with the British, Belgian, and French armies assaulted the German Army’s position around the Somme River from July 1 to November 18, 1916. This massive offensive made very small advances into German-occupied territory, but experienced numerous tactical failures and a devastating loss of lives. The
CEF, under the command of Lieutenant-General Byng since May 29, 1916, fought the Germans throughout the Battles of the Somme from the initial assault near Albert on July 1, 1916, to the capture of Beaumont Hamel on November 18, 1916. The CEF lost 7,230 lives at Flers-Courcelette (September 15 to 22, 1916) and obtained recognition for its achievements in the battle at Thiepval Ridge (September 26 to 28, 1916). At times the battle saw entire battalions being sacrificed with each attack and counter-attack, and the CEF’s inexperienced 4th Division, which had entered the trenches in September 1916, endured heavy losses of manpower and encountered “German troops whose orders were explicit: any officer who gave up an inch of trench would be court-martialed; and any sector of lost trench must be counter-attacked immediately.”

One American who experienced the harsh winter months of 1915-1916, the defense of the CEF’s positions in the spring of 1916, and the battles of the Somme was Herbert W. McBride. McBride recounted his adventures, observations, and memories of his CEF service in two autobiographies: *A Rifleman Went To War* and *The Emma Gees*. The first book emphasized his different experiences as a soldier in trench warfare, and the latter described the engagements of his battalion’s machine gun unit. Born on October 15, 1873, in Waterloo, Indiana, McBride resigned his commission as a Captain in the Indiana National Guard and traveled to Ottawa in order to obtain a commission in the Canadian Expeditionary Force from the Minister of Militia and Defense, Major-General Sir Sam Hughes. He received the rank of Captain in the 38th Overseas Infantry Battalion on February 1, 1915, and served as a “musketry instructor” with the
21st Overseas Infantry Battalion, which was commanded by Hughes’ brother Lieutenant-Colonel William St. Pierre Hughes. Discovering that the 38th was to be assigned to Bermuda instead of France, McBride resigned from this battalion on March 19, 1915, and reinlisted as a private in the 21st’s machine gun company on April 3, 1915.364

McBride’s battalion, a part of the CEF’s 4th Brigade, 2nd Division, entered the trenches before the Battle of Loos in September 1915, but his unit remained “outside of the immediate sphere of the action.”365 From October 1915 to March 1916, McBride served as both a fierce trench raider and expert sniper. Familiarity with firearms since his youth helped McBride become a marksman with rifles, revolvers, and machine guns.

Utilizing his skill with the Canadian-made Ross rifle - the standard CEF weapon for its infantry troops until being replaced in August 1916 by the more reliable British-made Lee-Enfield - from December 1 to 16, 1915, McBride accounted for twenty-five observed hits out of thirty-nine shots, eight of which were reported to have killed Germans. McBride described several of his adventures as a sniper; in one of these McBride’s spotter located a German officer standing directly in front of a tree with the morning sun to his back.

I had passed him over several times, but, when my attention was called to it, I saw him quite plainly - through my glasses. When I tried to pick him up through the sight, however, I had considerable difficulty in locating him, but, finally by noting certain prominent features of the surrounding background, I managed to find the right tree and got him centered in the sight and cut loose. I got him.366

During the “wet” winter months of 1915-1916, McBride contended that the “greatest game in the world” was raiding German trenches. This required maneuvering back and forth across “No-Man’s Land” in the dark under the watchful eye of German
lookouts, who sporadically discharged flares. A trench raider had to avoid German countermeasures, such as barbed wire, and “Boche patrols” in order to invade German trenches and capture information, prisoners, or supplies. McBride participated in numerous trench raids and thoroughly recounted his experiences as a trench raider, exemplified in his detailed account of his lone, successful capture of a booby-trapped German regimental flag, in what was considered a military coup by all soldiers on either side of “No-Man’s Land.”

When spring arrived in 1916, the Germans renewed their offensive by attacking the Canadian positions near St. Eloi on March 25, 1916. At the Battle of St. Eloi Craters, the CEF, including McBride’s 21st Battalion, repeatedly attempted to advance and occupy the seven craters of artillery shell holes, between the Germans and Canadians, in the face of German artillery which incessantly bombarded the area. McBride vividly described the landscape of this battle and the CEF’s struggles to capture the craters:

Alternating by brigades, we took and re-took the various craters and lost them. We could get in all right, but could not stay there long enough to consolidate the positions effectively against the heavy enemy artillery fire. Soon the whole terrain where the front lines had been and for nearly a half-mile behind them became a desolate waste. No trenches, no roads, no trees - nothing but a barren stretch of muddy ground, so thickly pock-marked with shell-holes that they were interlocked over the whole area. Our ‘line’ was merely an irregular series of detached posts, established in shell holes.

After receiving a commission as a lieutenant in command of the 21st’s machine gun section on May 31, 1916, and after a short encampment in Sandling, England, as an instructor for the CEF’s 4th Division, which entered the Western Front in September
1916, McBride returned to France in time to participate in the Somme offensives of October and November.369

The offensive undertaken by the British and the Imperial forces from July to November 1916, occurred on a front more than fifty miles wide in an effort to “breakthrough” the German defenses. McBride commanded the battalion’s machine gunners through most of the CEF’s Somme campaigns. The 21st’s Emma Gees370 supported the offensives and defended the CEF’s trenches against formidable German counter-attacks. Except for an off-duty infraction in Canada as an officer of the 38th Overseas Infantry Battalion, McBride received good remarks as an officer for his command of the 21st’s Emma Gees in the battles of the Somme. For example, during one of the CEF’s Somme engagements, McBride with a few other brave gunners crawled to the aid of one his men, who was the sole survivor from an advance trench, and continued to fire the abandoned machine guns of this advance trench, which saved the trench and preserved the gains of the attack.371 The date of McBride’s dismissal from the CEF remains uncertain. His military records contain two different dates, February 1917, and the date on which his overseas service ended, April 15, 1917. Nevertheless, McBride won one British and two French medals, and received seven combat wounds while serving in the CEF. After his discharge, he returned to the United States and reinlisted in the US Army.372

The battles of the Somme ended for the Canadian Expeditionary Force near Ancre in late November 1916. Similarly to the previous winter, the CEF did not participate in
any large battle during the winter months, as the troops again limited their fighting to small engagements like trench raids. The first notable action of 1917 for the CEF occurred on March 24 to 29, as the CEF cautiously advanced through miles of devastated land toward the “Hindenburg Line,” a system of defensive fortifications under construction since September 1916 and to which the Germans retreated approximately twenty-five miles. This rapid movement engendered a false sense of hope in the Canadians and the rest of the Allies that such newfound mobility would lead to open warfare. But, the CEF’s commanders discovered these new German defenses to be more concentrated and less vulnerable because the German command had reduced the length of its defensive lines by eliminating most salients. As a result, the CEF concentrated its first offensive of 1917 in one region - Arras.

At the Battle of Arras, April 9 to May 4, 1917, occurred the most distinctive CEF offensive operation during the first five days at Vimy Ridge. All four Canadian divisions attacked at once for the first time towards what was considered to be an impregnable German defense. By April 14, 1917, the CEF advanced nearly three miles (4,500 yards) capturing an “important tactical feature,” German artillery, weapons, and prisoners. This victory, considered to be one the CEF’s greatest achievements in the war, cost the CEF 10,602 casualties, 3,598 of whom died; nonetheless, the “losses were a marked improvement over the Somme,” concluded Canadian military historian Bill Rawling despite the fact that sixteen percent of the Canadians engaged in the battle of Vimy Ridge were killed or wounded.373
The actions at Vimy Ridge not only constitute a turning point in the Canadian Expeditionary Force’s trench warfare tactics but in the relationship of the Americans serving in the CEF with the Allied war effort. Three days before the CEF assaulted Vimy Ridge, on April 6, 1917, the United States government declared war on Germany primarily in response to the German government’s declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare on February 1, 1917, against all Allied and neutral shipping in the Atlantic Ocean. Therefore, at the Battle of Vimy Ridge, Americans in the CEF were truly Allied soldiers and no longer citizens from a neutral country serving in a foreign army. American citizens who served in the CEF at Vimy Ridge on April 9 to 14, 1917, represent those Americans who voluntarily enlisted before the United States entered the war. After this battle it becomes difficult to ascertain which Americans enlisted in the CEF before the United States entered the war and fought on the Western Front because some Americans chose to enter the CEF after the United States government declared war on Germany. Their insights facilitate an understanding of one of the last battles where thousands of Americans who enlisted before the United States entered the war and served in the CEF on the Western Front. Not only do American observations of Vimy Ridge reveal the CEF’s combat achievements, but they anticipate and express the attitudes of many Americans about the United States government’s course of action regarding Germany’s submarine warfare.

At the battle of Vimy Ridge, one American distinguished himself by carrying the Stars and Stripes on his bayonet onto the battlefield. Different New York Times articles
reported two separate men who claimed to have achieved this feat: Bob Davis and William Clancy. This newspaper unofficially reported on April 12, 1917, that a “young Texan” wounded from the encounter was responsible for charging on Vimy with the American flag aloft, but the article failed to mention his name. Based on the speculation of a newspaper from Temple, Texas, the New York Times reported that the people of that town understood that a man from Texas went into the battle with the American flag and knew that Bob Davis from Temple, Texas, was killed or wounded in that battle, and therefore, the people from Temple “put two and two together” and proclaimed Davis to have been that hero. Confusion arose when the New York Times published a letter from William Clancy, who was born in Boston, Massachusetts, but had given his home as Texas when asked by reporters in the hospital. Clancy declared that he “put the good ‘Old Glory’ on the battlefield at Vimy Ridge on April 9, 1917.” Clancy reported that on the morning in question he tied the flag to his bayonet and charged the redoubt, stating “it was the happiest day of my life, I assure you.” He further recounted that during this battle he had held a wounded comrade from Newark, New Jersey, who before he died kissed Clancy’s flag. The detailed description offered by Clancy appears to legitimize his story as the first American to carry the American flag on the battlefield in the First World War. 375

Americans, like Sylvester Chahuska Long Lance and Bob Elston, who had enlisted with one of the Canadian Expeditionary Force’s American Legion battalions, fought at Vimy Ridge. From October 1916 to March 1917, the American Legion’s 97th, 211th, and 213th battalions disbanded and their troops were assigned to other CEF regiments. This
reassignment of troops allowed hundreds of former Legionnaires to participate at Vimy Ridge. Long Lance, who had originally enlisted with the CEF’s 237th battalion and briefly served with the 97th after the two regiments were amalgamated on September 12, 1916, served at Vimy Ridge with the CEF’s 38th Overseas Infantry Battalion. According to Long Lance’s biographer, Donald Smith, during this battle Long Lance was “accustomed to seeing men ‘gutted and lacerated day in and day out,’ choked with the stench of blood, iodine, cordite, burnt flares and mud.” Although Long Lance escaped Vimy Ridge without injury, he was later wounded three times, once in the head on May 22, 1917, and once in each thigh in June 1917. According to Smith, several American newspapers, including New York’s *Sun* and *World*, told of Long Lance’s service in the CEF and emphasized the fact that Long Lance was a full-blooded American Indian and twice inaccurately reported him as a lieutenant, most likely because in letters to former Carlisle schoolmates Long Lance had promoted himself to that rank in a poem.376

Bob Elston enlisted with the American Legion’s first battalion, the 97th, on October 30, 1915, and served for a year in Canada and England. When the 97th disbanded on October 31, 1916, he transferred to the Royal Canadian Regiment, but always considered himself to be an American Legionnaire. Recalling his memories of Vimy Ridge in a six-part article for the Canadian periodical, *Liberty*, Elston detailed the action of the combat. With disgust he first pointed out that just days before the Vimy Ridge offensive started, while the imminence of the attack was obvious to both belligerents, an unidentified Legionnaire from Chicago, who served with Princess
Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, deserted and crossed “No-Man’s Land” with the intent to inform the Germans of the advance. Elston indicated that the treasonous Legionnaire could not have known the date or hour of the impending attack because orders had not been issued.

On the morning of Easter Monday, April 9, 1917, Elston “shivered from the driving wet snow,” and shared a last cigarette with his sergeant, reminiscing that before the assault “the bated stillness was like the hanging palpitant quiet of Palm Sunday morning in a great city.” The silence ended at 5:30 a.m. when the Canadian artillery began to bombard German strong points. In his article, Elston vividly described his experiences in the CEF’s infantry charge toward Vimy Ridge:

... stumbling blindly forward on the slow awful walk... a man swayed against me, clutching the stump of his arm. His mouth was wide open. He fell backward and was swallowed in the deep slime of an old mine. A potato masher bounced off my shoulder. It exploded harmlessly somewhere behind. I was on my hands and knees then, fighting off concussion. There was nausea and a madhouse of confusion. The corporal beside me was yelling something. A livid splash smashed his face away.

What followed this incident, Elston stated, would be “etched on my mind forever.” He witnessed a “Hun” stomping the face of a CEF soldier as he laid on the bottom of a hostile German trench. The German soldier noticed Elston and targeted him with his Luger revolver. Suddenly, Elston recalled, “a bayonet thawked into the Hun’s throat. The Lee-Enfield rifle spat flame at the same time, [and] tore out the back of his neck.” Just before reaching the heights of Vimy Ridge a German sniper wounded Elston in the leg as he began to take aim at an eager German scout toward the end of the first day of fighting.
Elston estimated that he crawled nearly twenty-five hundred yards before he received medical attention for his injury. Subsequently, Elston returned to the Royal Canadian Regiment after his wounds healed and remained in the CEF for the rest of the war.\textsuperscript{377}

Although Elston's observations provide a picturesque, first person account of the battle of Vimy Ridge, his story of the engagement emphasized his combat experiences rather than depicting the political circumstances surrounding the event. In fairness to Elston, he did acknowledge the entrance of the United States into the war, noting that on the night of April 7, 1917, several of the more than four hundred Americans in the Royal Canadian Regiment at Vimy Ridge wildly celebrated the news and stated that "there was a new pride in the stride of the Legionnaires" serving in the CEF's trenches before "Canada's most famous fight."\textsuperscript{378} But, the letters of Lieutenant Edwin Austin Abbey capture what many Americans in the CEF discussed after February 1, 1917 - the probability of the United States entering the war against Germany.

Abbey, who was born in Kilmacolm, Scotland on September 22, 1888, enlisted in the Canadian Expeditionary Force's 2nd Overseas Infantry Battalion on October 2, 1915. Before enlisting in the CEF he worked as a civil engineer in various locations in Ontario, although he was an American citizen from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, where his parents lived on 523 Chestnut Street. As a Lance Corporal, Abbey arrived in France on March 8, 1916, and was "wounded in the left shoulder from a piece of shrapnel, very early, about 12.30, Easter morning," April 23, 1916. After staying in a hospital in London, England, and briefly returning to Canada, Abbey rejoined the CEF in Flanders in August 1916, and
shortly thereafter was promoted to Lieutenant on November 25, 1916. Transferring to the 4th Canadian Mounted Rifles on December 2, 1916, and training in England throughout December 1916 and January 1917, Abbey reentered the CEF’s trenches on January 20, 1917. At Vimy Ridge, he lost his life on the night of April 9, 1917. According to two letters, one from Abbey’s commanding officer, Major A. P. Menzies, and the other from a Major Herzeberg to Abbey’s parents, he was shot in the heart while attempting to return to an advanced trench post under his command after spending the preceding four hours carrying an unidentified lieutenant to safety. Abbey apparently wandered into the German’s advance trenches where he was shot, dragged further behind German lines, and stripped of everything except his “identity disc.”

Despite Abbey’s heroics and unfortunate death at Vimy Ridge, his letters to his parents from the front lines offer a number of insightful observations on the deteriorating political situation between the United States and Germany. From his first letter home on May 12, 1915, to his last on April 6, 1917, in addition to informing his parents about his welfare and commenting about the war in general, Abbey repeatedly reviewed the United States government’s position regarding the war and speculated about when America would enter the war. Abbey’s most revealing letters appear just before the German declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare on February 1, 1917, and the entry of the United States into the war nine weeks later. For example, on January 23, 1917, in a letter to his father, William Burling Abbey, he stated that “the Germans are very consistent
with their high sea offensive, and we [Americans] cannot underestimate the seriousness of
the situation.” In the same letter he continued,

there is no question but that Germany will launch forth her U-boat warfare at the
first good opportunity, and then the United States will either be involved or sit still
and suffer a virtual blockade. If only our farseeing statesmen would understand
how they could secure their own safety, as well as that of Europe and the world,
by closing in and taking the bull by the horns and helping us wipe out this menace
to the world.382

Remarkably well informed for a soldier serving in the trenches, thanks to the
periodicals and newspapers sent to him by his mother, Abbey instantly criticized American
politicians for their inaction in response to the German submarine warfare policy. On
February 3, 1917, Abbey wrote, “Any one who can see no threat to the U. S. in the
avowed submarine intentions of Germany must be blind. Why wait till the crash comes
before acting?”383 An anxious Abbey longed to read or hear that the United States had
declared war throughout February 1917, but by the next month his eagerness turned to
frustration as German submarines started to sink American merchant ships. His
disappointment climaxed when news of the Zimmerman telegram reached him. Abbey’s
letter to his father on March 11, 1917, voiced his concern that “the frank admission by the
German Government of their plot to embroil Japan and Mexico with the United States,
now unanswered except by bickering in the Senate as to the advisability of arming
merchantmen, is an absurdity.”384 On the day the United States government declared war
on Germany, April 6, 1917, Abbey wrote to his parents before the assault at Vimy Ridge
“in case by God’s will” this would be his last letter: “To-day the news came to us here
that the United States had joined the Allies, so I go with the happy consciousness that I
am, and you are, fighting for our dear flag, as thousands of Americans have before us in the cause of Liberty."385

After America's entry into the war, the British War Office, the Ministry of Overseas Military Forces of Canada in London, England, and the American Embassy in London received a number of requests from Americans in the CEF either to transfer to an American armed force upon its arrival in Europe or to be discharged from the CEF in order to travel to the United States to enlist and serve in its armed forces. Such requests commenced as early as February 1917, but the majority of the inquiries were forwarded to the Canadian, British, and American governmental agencies after the United States government's declaration of war against Germany.386 It quickly became evident to the new Minister of Militia and Defense, Sir A. E. Kemp, Chief of the General Staff, Major-General W. G. Gwatkin, and Minister of Overseas Military Forces of Canada, Sir G. H. Perley, that they would have to establish a policy toward the Americans who had enlisted and served in the CEF before the United States entered the war. This threesome primarily considered how discharging or transferring more than ten thousand Americans - the Department of Militia and Defense's estimation according to Lieutenant-Colonel Reverend Bullock on April 25, 1917 - from the CEF would affect its ability to perform its obligations and keep its ranks filled, especially on the battlefield.387 On June 20, 1917, Kemp indicated that the "solution to this question depends very largely on one fact, Viz.: as to whether these applications are bona fide, and whether the discharge will be in the
nature of a transfer, i.e. followed up by enlistment in the United States Army.”388 And on July 3, 1917, Perley advised Prime Minister Sir Robert Borden that:

I decided that it would not be wise to entertain any application unless it came from the United States Government asking for an officer by name; any such request made officially would receive serious consideration and the person applied for would be released, provided that could be done without affecting the efficiency of the CEF, as it will be the object of the Canadian authorities to render every possible assistance to the United States Government.389

Furthermore, Gwatkin concluded on July 29, 1917, that a definitive policy would be a “mistake” because so many Americans were serving in the CEF and that a large number of whom may ask to be discharged. Gwatkin believed that transfers of American citizens from the CEF overseas posed numerous difficulties. On the other hand, Americans serving in Canada who applied for a discharge in order to transfer to United States’ armed forces should not be retained against their will because “most of them [will] desert.”390

Kemp’s, Perley’s, and Gwatkin’s recommendations eventually helped define the Department of Militia and Defense’s policy towards Americans who enlisted and served in the Canadian Expeditionary Force before the United States entered the war on April 6, 1917. All requests for discharge from these American citizens were directed to Militia Headquarters in Ottawa, where the Department of Militia and Defence reviewed each application individually and either rejected or approved a request depending on whether or not the discharge of the American in question would in any way disorganize his battalion. Discharge applications accompanied with an official request from the United States government were more likely to be accepted. Moreover, Americans who were deployed overseas had a lesser chance of being discharged than Americans still serving in Canada.
No records are available to indicate exactly how many applications for discharge the Department of Militia and Defence accepted or refused. Nonetheless, weekly lists of rejections distributed to CEF’s battalions starting in August 1917, indicate that a large number of applications were not approved. Furthermore, the United States War Department would not request the discharge of an American serving in the CEF “except in special cases, and where the transfer ‘is plainly in the interest of the United States.’” The War Department adopted this policy because it believed that American citizens in the CEF had enlisted for “patriotic motives” and that it would not matter whether they remained in the CEF or transferred to the AEF, “since they would be fighting for the same cause.” Besides, American transfers from the CEF to the AEF “might seriously disorganize [the former’s] units.” This policy applied only to Americans who served as enlisted men in the CEF and not to Americans who held CEF commissions. Therefore, most Americans who enlisted and served in the CEF before the United States government entered the war remained with the CEF as did Bob Elston. But other Americans like Tracy Richardson and Herbert McBride returned to the United States and reinlisted in its army.

A definitive policy concerning the Americans in the CEF was not formed until August 15, 1917, because Americans who had enlisted in the CEF from August 4, 1914, to April 6, 1917, lost their American citizenship by taking the oath to King George the Fifth when they enlisted in the CEF. The Department of Militia and Defence passed its policy two months before the United States government repatriated those Americans who voluntarily enlisted in the CEF before the United States entered the war with President
Wilson’s signing of the Repatriation Act on October 5, 1917. Nonetheless, from April 6 to October 5, 1917, the American government appears to have eased its limitations for Americans expatriated due to foreign enlistment, allowing American citizens who served in the CEF to enlist in the AEF despite the fact that technically they had expatriated themselves and were aliens who should not have been admitted into the United States.\textsuperscript{394}

For example, Herbert McBride was released from service in the CEF on April 15, 1917, but he returned to the U. S. Army as a Captain of the 139th Machine Gun Battalion, 38th Division, in August 1917.\textsuperscript{395}

The American citizens who fought for the Canadian Expeditionary Force on the Western Front were regarded by Canadians and British as astute trench warfare combatants. An unknown correspondent with the British armies suggested the Americans in the CEF “all have fought with a pluck and determination which have won them universal respect and admiration.”\textsuperscript{396} The greatest admirer of the Americans serving with the CEF in the trenches of Belgium and France was Lord Northcliffe. In the spring of 1917, Northcliffe journeyed to see for himself if a large number of Americans were indeed serving in the CEF. Afterward, he published an article which appeared in a number of newspapers and periodicals about his investigation of the Americans in the CEF.\textsuperscript{397} Northcliffe praised the fighting spirit and heroic deeds of these Americans, and asked all Americans in the United States who sympathized with these men to send them newspapers, magazines, chewing gum, woolen comforts, tobacco, or “any portable and preserveable little luxuries” to show appreciation for “these fine boys.”\textsuperscript{398}
Notwithstanding, Lord Northcliffe’s efforts to celebrate the service of American citizens in the CEF on the Western Front, five Americans who enlisted before the United States entered the war distinguished themselves for “most conspicuous bravery and devotion to duty” on the battlefield and earned the highest military honor in the Canadian or British armed forces, the Victoria Cross: Corporal Frederick George Coppins, 1st Division Cavalry; Captain Bellendon Seymour Hutcheson, Canadian Army Medical Corps, 75th Overseas Infantry Battalion; Lance-Corporal William Henry Metcalf, 16th Overseas Infantry Battalion; Sergeant George Harry Mullin, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry; Sergeant Rapheal Louis Zengel, 5th Overseas Infantry Battalion. Seventy-six of the Canadian Expeditionary Force’s 628,964 troops, or approximately one in 8,276 earned a Victoria Cross. Out of the 41,078 Americans serving in the CEF, one in 8,216 was decorated with a Victoria Cross. Therefore, five of the seventy-six, or one in fifteen Victoria Crosses were bestowed upon an American citizen. This contradicted the initial impression of Canada’s Governor-General, the Duke of Connaught, who stated that “American citizens do not always make the best of soldiers.”

Sergeant Mullin was born on August 15, 1891, in Portland Oregon. He enlisted at Winnipeg, Manitoba, on December 14, 1914, and was awarded the Victoria Cross (VC) for his actions on October 30, 1917, at the Battle of Passchendaele. Mullin single-handily attacked and captured a “pill-box” by throwing hand grenades at its sniper post, and then crawling on top of the pill-box to shoot the two machine gunners with his pistol, and forcing ten Germans inside the garrison to surrender.
At the Battle of Amiens on August 9, 1918, Sergeant Zengel advanced two hundred yards ahead of his platoon, captured a German machine gun emplacement; after killing its crew, he turned the German-made Maxims against the Germans to save his battalion’s right flank. Zengel was born on November 11, 1894, in Fairbault, Minnesota and had entered the CEF at Shorncliffe, England, on July 16, 1915. Corporal Coppins who registered his place of birth as London, England, on his attestation paper, was in fact was born in San Francisco, California on October 25, 1889. Coppins, who enlisted at Valcartier, Quebec on September 23, 1914, earned his VC on the same day in the same in the battle as Zengel. At Amiens, Coppins, “without hesitation, and on his own initiative,” persuaded four men to follow him and assault numerous machine gun emplacements. Although the four men with Coppins died in the attack, Coppins “reached the hostile machine-guns alone, killed the operator of the first gun and three of the crew, and made prisoners of four others, who surrendered.” Despite having been wounded in the assault, Coppins continued to serve throughout the attack on August 9, 1918, and did not leave the trenches until he was ordered to receive treatment for his wounds.

Captain Hutcheson, born on December 16, 1883, in Mount Carmel, Illinois, and Lance-Corporal Metcalf, born on January 29, 1889, in Waige, Maine, each received a Victoria Cross for their deeds on September 2, 1918, at the Battle of the Drocourt-Queant Line. Hutcheson repeatedly treated and carried wounded soldiers “under terrific machine-gun and shell fire” and often “in full view of the enemy.” Metcalf, “recognizing that his battalion’s right flank was not being held up,” rushed in front of a British tank and directed
it with a signal flag as he walked in front of the tank “in a perfect hail of bullets and bombs” until German strong points were overcome. Hutcheson had enlisted at Toronto, Ontario on December 14, 1915, and Metcalf had signed his attestation papers on September 23, 1914, in Valcartier, Quebec.\textsuperscript{404}

It is nearly impossible to ascertain what effect, either in morale or military achievements, American citizens serving in the CEF on the Western Front had on their Canadian comrades in the trenches. Based on the number of Victoria Crosses received, Americans on the battlefield distinguished themselves at an almost identical rate to Canadians. Americans were well received by Canadian and British officers and ranks. After interviewing the Royal Canadian Regiment, with which over four hundred Americans served in February 1917, Lord Northcliffe asserted, perhaps with some exaggeration, that Americans were “having a perfectly corking time, despite the mud,” and that their commanding officers were in “happy and pleasant relations” with their American soldiers.\textsuperscript{405} One example that displays how Americans in the CEF influenced the Canadian Army appears in the leisure activities of the soldiers. In June 1917, when the CEF’s 1st Division relieved the 3rd Division in the trenches, the 1st Division’s reserve encampment contained nine baseball fields, a testimony to the popularity of a distinctively American passion.\textsuperscript{406}

In memory of the Americans who served in the Canadian Expeditionary Force and who died while in service, Canada’s Prime Minister, W. L. Mackenzie King, asked President Calvin Coolidge on May 9, 1925, for permission to erect a memorial at
Arlington National Cemetery in Virginia. Coolidge and Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg approved of the monument designed by Canadian architect Sir Reginald Bloomfield on June 12, 1925. Two years later on June 23, 1927, a site was chosen at Arlington, two hundred and fifty feet northwest of the Memorial Amphitheater - Section 46, Grid O-24. The monument, named the “Canadian Cross” or “Cross of Sacrifice,” was constructed by Canadian contractor D. T. McIntosh and funded by the Canadian government at a cost of ten thousand dollars. On November 11, 1927, the Canadian Cross was unveiled in an Armistice Day celebration commemorating the end of the First World War, and the official presentation of the memorial by the first Canadian Minister to the United States, Vincent Massey, to Kellogg. The event, attended by Canadian, British, and American authorities and units of the Canadian and American armed forces, featured a number of speeches and musical performances. Canadian Minister of National Defence J. L. Ralston characterized the “Cross” as “our ‘stone of help,’ to keep forever vivid in your hearts our sense of the comradeship, courage, and faithfulness of these your sons, who came to us.” United States Secretary of War Dwight Davis declared, 

this monument will always be a source of pride to the citizens of the United States. It shall constantly remind us of the friendship and cordiality extending along our northern boundary, guarded only by the common love of liberty and justice in the hearts of the people of both Canada and the United States.

The “Cross of Sacrifice” stands twenty-four feet, three inches high on a fifteen foot broad octagonal base that rests on three receding octagonal steps. Composed of Canadian gray granite with a bronze sword imposed on the front face of the cross, the inscription on the east face reads: “Erected By The Government Of Canada In Honour Of The Citizens Of
The United States Who Served In The Canadian Army And Gave Their Lives In The Great War 1914-1918.”410

The experiences of American citizens who served in the Canadian Expeditionary Force on the battlefields and in the trenches of the Western Front before the United States entered the war, seldom differed from those of Canadian officers and enlisted men at the Second Battle of Ypres, the Somme, or Vimy Ridge. Except for the question of when the United States would enter the war, most Americans in the CEF before April 6, 1917, were preoccupied with the hardships of surviving trench warfare as were British, French, or any other soldier who endured the First World War. Nevertheless, extraordinary is the fact that before the United States entered the war, over forty-one thousand American citizens enlisted in the CEF and nearly half of them served in the trenches at a time when the United States government was trying to remain neutral in the war.

Unfortunately for American historiography this fact continues to be disregarded or overlooked in most published accounts of American history depicting August 1914 to April 1917. Perhaps the contribution of American citizens to Canada’s war effort before the United States entered the war remains so unfamiliar to Americans and Canadians today because American historiography of the war focused on those Americans who wanted the United States government to remain neutral in the war, and ignores those American citizens who early on supported the Allied war effort and advocated the entry of the United States into the war. This occurred because eventually the United States did enter the war on the side of the Allies, which justified the efforts of Americans, like those
serving in the CEF, who had been supporting the Allies before the American entry. But inexplicably their efforts have been underappreciated by American historians who have usually preferred to write about those Americans who disagreed with the Wilson administration’s decision on April 6, 1917, to enter the war, about the state of preparedness of the American military before the war, the American peace movements, or occasionally about famous objectors to Wilson’s neutrality policy, like President Theodore Roosevelt. Of those Americans who preceded the United States government’s decision to join the Allies, most have not been recognized for their service in the CEF, despite the appreciation of the American contribution to the CEF expressed here and abroad during and immediately after the war and despite the monumental reminder still standing in Arlington National Cemetery.
Conclusion

When the United States government entered the war against Germany and its allies on April 6, 1917, most American citizens no longer viewed Canada or its armed forces as an opportunity to serve in "the war to end all wars." Except for approximately three hundred Americans who traveled to Canada in order to enlist in Great Britain's Royal Flying Corps and Royal Naval Air Service, like Bogart Rogers and Oliver LeBoutillier, and for Americans who enlisted in the CEF, such as Raymond Chandler, in the aftermath of the American declaration of war, most American citizens willing to volunteer for military service entered the American Expeditionary Force commanded by General John J. Pershing.411

Indeed, many Americans who were serving in the CEF at this time wished to transfer or discharge from the Dominion's forces to the United States Navy, Marine Corps, or Army in order to serve their native country, although few were allowed to do so by Canada's Department of Militia and Defence. In response to American citizens in the United States entering British or Canadian armed forces, Americans serving in the CEF who preferred to transfer to the AEF, and a large number of Canadians and Britons living in the United States, on July 30, 1918, the governments of the United States, Canada, and Great Britain "permitted voluntary reciprocal military service of their subjects and
This allowed Americans who had enlisted in the CEF before the United States government entered the war to transfer to the AEF without interference from the Canadian or British government.

On November 11, 1918, at five o’clock in the morning the fourth and final armistice was signed by representatives from Germany and the Allies in the Forest of Compiegne, France, which effectively ended the war on the Western Front. When the fighting ceased six hours later, 2,138 American citizens had died while fighting for the Canadian Expeditionary Force. This represented four percent of the Canadian Expeditionary Force’s 61,112 total deaths.

In general, the service of Americans in the Canadian Expeditionary Force before the United States entered the war did not irritate the Wilson administration. Nonetheless, the CEF’s recruitment, particularly American Legion recruiters like Reverend Bullock, of American citizens in the United States and the CEF’s American Legion recruiting stations’ misuse of “Old Glory” and other American emblems associated with Canada’s expeditionary force was an irritant to the United States. The United States government also was angered by the mere existence of the American Legion in the CEF, which was specifically designed by Hughes to recruit and train American citizens for infantry service on the Western Front.

The Wilson administration, through the State Department, repeatedly asked the British ambassador, Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, in Washington and the British Foreign Office in London to terminate all recruiting efforts in the United States, including newspaper
advertisements, and to prohibit the American Legion from being deployed to the Western Front. The United States government's appeals to the British from January to October 1916, eventually contributed to the American Legion's disbanding, but once the American Legionnaires were assigned to different Canadian units beginning in October 1916, the Wilson administration had no objections to their service in the CEF. Regardless of how many American citizens served in a CEF regiment before the United States government entered the war, the Wilson administration never objected, as long as that unit did not officially associate itself with the United States. No doubt without American protests the American Legion most likely would have served on the battlefields of the Western Front, and given the number of former American military veterans in the American Legion, they would have fought with great courage, pride, and resiliency.

The British response to American citizens serving in the CEF was clear, but for its American Legion was often contradictory and ambiguous. The British War Office accepted all Americans who volunteered for military service in the CEF. But Great Britain did not want the CEF's recruitment of Americans to violate the United States government's policy of neutrality or its Foreign Enlistment Act of 1818, which could provoke the Wilson administration into cutting off American financial aid that helped sustain British needs for its war effort. Britain's War Office had no objections to Americans enlisting and serving in the CEF or in any of its Imperial forces, and neither War Ministers Kitchener nor Lloyd George disapproved of the American Legion, despite the fact that it violated the British Army Act of 1870's and The Hague Convention of
1907's agreements pertaining to military formations created for and composed of foreign or neutral volunteers.

Confusion arose when the Foreign Office delegated the authority over the American Legion in August 1914 to Colonial Secretary Andrew Bonar Law and to Canada's Governor-General, the Duke of Connaught, who was also the commander-in-chief of Canada's armed forces. The Minister of Militia and Defence, Lieutenant-General Sir Sam Hughes, who had had his proposal for an all American regiment approved by Kitchener and King George the Fifth in October 1914, believed that he controlled the fate of any American formation. Therefore, when Spring-Rice conveyed the United States government's disapproval of the American Legion and its recruiting practices from January to October 1916 to Connaught and Bonar Law, it was unclear who maintained the authority to discipline or disband the American Legion. Pressure from British officials, who feared aggravating the United States government's neutrality, influenced Canada's decision to disband the American Legion and assign the Legionnaires to other CEF units. Great Britain needed American capital, particularly after the failure of the Somme offensive in November 1916, to maintain its war effort more than it needed five infantry units of Americans in the trenches.

From the beginning of the war, the Canadian Expeditionary Force accepted American volunteers with open arms. Seven American citizens enlisted in Canada's first overseas unit, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry. The Dominion of Canada's population in 1914 was small in comparison to the European belligerents and as a result
the CEF did not turn away those Americans who were anxious to fight in the war. When Hughes recognized that a large number of Canada’s “neighbors” would be willing to volunteer for the CEF, he authorized recruiting schemes to attract more Americans. This was a resourcefully innovative discovery because it potentially provided Hughes with a vast number of volunteers, as long as he could induce American citizens to enlist in the CEF. His most aggressive recruiting idea for Americans was the American Legion, which he entrusted to his friend Reverend Bullock. Without Hughes’ involvement and development of the American Legion and his consistent advocation of American citizens as volunteers, perhaps fewer Americans would have enlisted with the CEF before April 6, 1917.

Unfortunately for Connaught, Borden, and Hughes’ Militia staff, the American Legion caused difficulties amongst themselves and with the United States government. Caught in the middle of the American Legion’s existence and misdeeds were Connaught and Borden. The Governor-General persistently attempted to control the abuses which aggravated the Wilson administration, but was uncertain to the degree of his power over domestic concerns in Canada, especially military affairs. By contrast, the Prime Minister allowed Hughes to subvert military procedures and apparently disregard Connaught’s and his Militia staff’s suggestions to terminate the American Legion’s grievances which aggravated the Wilson administration. This caused a political dispute between Connaught and Borden and it intensified diplomatic relations between Great Britain and Canada with the United States. Although the American Legion frustrated supporters and detractors of
the unit, the regiment did not impact Canada’s appreciation for the Americans who served in the CEF before the United States government entered the war. This would best be exemplified by the Canadian government’s memorial, “Cross of Sacrifice,” to the United States.

The Americans who enlisted and served in the CEF before April 6, 1917, were not unique to the First World War, as hundreds of American citizens enlisted in other Allied armies and presumably a few served in the forces of the Central Powers. What is uncommon is the fact that at least forty-one thousand, and perhaps many more, voluntarily enlisted in the CEF while the United States government remained neutral for thirty-two months. As Robert Lansing noted on August 22, 1914, “it had always been the right of individuals to enter the army of a foreign nation,” and he recalled “no war . . . in which there were not numerous foreigners in both armies and often so-called ‘foreign legions.’”415 But what may be more intriguing is the fact that more American citizens volunteered with the CEF for this war from August 4, 1914 to April 6, 1917, than for any other nation’s army at any other time in military history. As a result of their enlistment and service in the CEF, a precedent was established for the Second World War when “some 30,000 Americans” enlisted and served in Canada’s army, navy, and air force from September 3, 1939 to December 6, 1941.416

In 1917, French author and journalist, Paul Louis Hervier, suggested that the experiences of the Americans who served in the armies of Great Britain and France’s Foreign Legion “will later be jewels in American history.”417 A more appropriate
euphemism would have been a “diamond in the rough” because the Americans who served in the CEF are rarely noted in American history textbooks for their passion, which led more than forty-one thousand men to enlist in Canada’s army during the First World War at the risk of losing their citizenship, if not their lives. Personal motives for enlistment varied from a desire to experience the war to defending the world’s democratic institutions, but regardless of American reasons to enlist in the CEF, all Americans in the CEF who volunteered before the United States government entered the war refuted President Wilson’s myth that Americans were “too proud to fight.” At least twenty thousand Americans served in the CEF’s trenches on the Western Front and fought just as courageously as any other nationality that braved the elements and conditions of trench warfare from 1914 to 1917.

The more than forty-one thousand American citizens who voluntarily enlisted and served in the Canadian Expeditionary Force surely facilitated Canada’s war effort to a modest extent. Seven percent of the CEF’s volunteers were American citizens. Yet twenty-seven hundred American Legionnaires caused more political, diplomatic, and military difficulties for the governments of Great Britain, Canada, and the United States than did the remaining thirty-eight thousand Americans scattered among the CEF’s four divisions of infantry, cavalry, artillery, and specialized units. During the first thirty-two months of the First World War, these thirty-eight thousand Americans in the CEF served with near anonymity to the United States government, the Department of Militia and
Defence, and the CEF, although their American origin was probably known to their Canadian comrades in the ranks.

The objective of this thesis has been to polish Hervier’s “jewel in American history” in order to spotlight the incomplete scholarly accounts by American historians who have been inclined to overlook the contribution of American citizens to Canada’s and the Allies’ war effort before April 6, 1917. Certainly both American scholars and military buffs of the First World War have much to learn from studying the motives and combat experiences of Americans in the CEF, the CEF’s recruitment and enlistment of Americans, and the political, diplomatic, and military repercussions of the American Legion from August 4, 1914 to April 6, 1917.
Appendix

Concise History of the CEF’s American Legion

97th Overseas Infantry Battalion
  Commanding Officer: Colonel L. E. LeBatt (10-22-15 to 10-29-15)
  Lieutenant-Colonel A. B. Clark (10-30-15 to 1-18-16)
  Lieutenant-Colonel W. L. Jolly (1-19-16 to 12-24-16)
  Headquartered: Toronto, Ontario
  Formed: October 22, 1915
  Authorized: December 22, 1915
  Transported to England: September 19, 1916
  Transferred: October 1916 - 300 men to the 4th Overseas Infantry Battalion
  Drafted: October 22, 1916 - 150 men to the Royal Canadian Regiment
  Drafted: October 27, 1916 - 120 men to the Royal Canadian Regiment
  Drafted: November 1, 1915 - 428 men to the Royal Canadian Regiment and
  Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry.
  Disbanded: April 5, 1918

211th Overseas Infantry Battalion
  Commanding Officer: Lieutenant-Colonel W. M. Sage
  Headquartered: Vancouver, British Columbia
  Formed: February 15, 1916
  Authorized: July 15, 1916
  Transported to England: December 20, 1916
  Absorbed: January 20, 1917 to the 26th Canadian Reserve Infantry Battalion
  Transferred: February 16, 1917 to the Canadian Railway Troop Depot
  Amalgamated: March 21, 1917 to the 218th Overseas Infantry Battalion
  Disbanded: March 21, 1917

212th Overseas Infantry Battalion
  Commanding Officer: Lieutenant-Colonel E. C. Pitman
  Headquartered: Winnipeg, Manitoba
  Formed: February 15, 1916
  Authorized: July 15, 1916
  Amalgamated: September 12, 1916 to the 97th Overseas Infantry Battalion
  Disbanded: September 12, 1916
213th Overseas Infantry Battalion
  Commanding Officer: Lieutenant-Colonel B. J. McCormick
  Headquartered: St. Catharines, Ontario
  Formed: February 15, 1916
  Authorized: July 15, 1916
  Transported to England: December 20, 1916
  Drafted: January 26, 1917 and February 7, 1917 to 25th Canadian Reserve Infantry Battalion
  Disbanded: September 15, 1920

237th Overseas Infantry Battalion
  Commanding Officer: Lieutenant-Colonel Reverend Charles Seymour Bullock
  Headquartered: Sussex, New Brunswick
  Formed: May 15, 1916
  Authorized: July 15, 1916
  Amalgamated: September 12, 1916 to the 97th Overseas Infantry Battalion
  Disbanded: September 12, 1916
Endnotes

Introduction


Chapter One

4. The House of Commons is the lower house of Canada’s Parliament. Members of Commons are popularly elected which differs from the upper house, Senate, to which members are appointed by the governor-general with his cabinet upon consultation of the prime minister.


10. A total of 21,169 enlisted in Canada for overseas service other than in the Canadian Expeditionary Force. See *Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire During the Great War*. For more on the Royal Canadian Navy see Gilbert Norman Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada* (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1952).


13. Ibid., 20.


16. For more on the Canadian Expeditionary Force see Nicholson or Duguid's official histories.

17. A fifth division was temporarily formed and a sixth proposed, but neither of the two divisions materialized because simultaneous recruitment to reinforce the existing divisions propelled Canada to its limits of readily available manpower.


20. In Canadian and British political military terms a “contingent” is a quota of troops from a specific area or region - for example, a contingent from Canada.


22. Four other units similar to Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry were accepted by the British War Office, but after the Canadian government assessed that equipping and maintaining the Patricia's would cost about one million dollars for a year of overseas service, it abandoned the idea. These units' recruits were absorbed by the Patricia's and the First Division, CEF. See Nicholson, *Official History of the Canadian Army*.

23. The CEF divisional hierarchy consisted of three brigades of four battalions, and each battalion contained eight companies.


27. Ibid., 42.


31. Recruiting areas for military districts varied from a town, county, province, or specific region of Canada. Occasionally an overseas battalion was recruited nationally; usually this battalion consisted of a particular ethnic group such as Irish or Scots.

32. Maroney, “‘The Great Adventure,’” 64-65.

33. Ibid., 66.

34. This is a term the CEF used for rejecting a volunteer.


36. The Nominal Rolls combined the information from the recruits’ attestation papers arranged in battalions or military units of the CEF.

37. The attestation paper expanded the general question section from twelve to sixteen.

38. Public Archives of Canada, Attestation paper of Edwin Austin Abbey, Edwin Austin Abbey, First World War Service Files, ser. 150, file 02-3. Hereafter Public Archives of Canada will be referred to as PAC.

39. See Figure 2 on page 75 for a reproduction of a CEF attestation paper.


41. The length of time for a battalion to be transported to England and then to the front varied from weeks to months.


47. Ibid., 274.

48. Ibid., 547.

49. The CEF’s American Legion should not be confused with the American Legion formed in the United States after the First World War.

50. PAC, Hughes to Kitchener, 29 August 1914, Sir Robert L. Borden’s Papers, ser. 26, H 70, OC 322, 36342. Note, Borden’s papers are partially numbered. Page numbers will be given when applicable. Hereafter Sir Robert L. Borden’s Papers will referred to as Borden’s Papers.

51. Ibid., Kitchener to Hughes, 7 September 1914, 36346.

52. Ibid., W. Langley to Hughes, 31 August 1914, 36344.

53. Ibid., 36345.


55. Ibid.


57. PAC, W. Langley to Hughes, 31 August 1914, Borden’s Papers, ser. 26, H 70, OC 322, 36343.

58. Ibid.


62. Ibid., 2.

63. PAC, “Historical Record of the 97th Overseas Battalion, Canadian Expeditionary Force,” 5 January 1917, Department of Militia and Defence Records, ser. 9, III, D1, 4699. Hereafter the Department of Militia and Defence Records will be referred to as DMD.

64. PAC, L. Harcourt to Hughes, n.d., Borden’s Papers, ser. 26, H 70, OCC 322, 36351.

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid. Hughes’ General Orders 151 officially designated the unit as “97th Over-Seas Battalion.” Initially no reference to “Americans” was associated with the name of the battalion.

67. PAC, “Historical Record of the 97th Overseas Battalion, Canadian Expeditionary Force,” 5 January 1917, Department of Militia and Defence Records, ser. 9, III, D1, 4699.

68. Ibid.


71. Ibid.

72. Ibid.

73. Ibid.

74. Dividing 2,746 from 41,078 (new total for the number of Americans in the CEF, see chapter two) equals 0.066.
75. PAC, unsigned letter to Hughes, 27 January 1916, Borden Papers, ser. 26, H 70, OC 322, 36368.

76. Wages for a private for a private in the CEF started at $1 a day and an extra $.10 for combat duty. If a soldier was married the Canadian government supplemented the family’s income by granting the wife $20 a month while the Canadian Patriotic Fund added $5 a month for each dependent.

77. PAC, Copy of an American Legion advertisement, Borden Papers, ser. 26, H 70, OC 322, 36392. For a complete representation of this advertisement see Figure 1 on page 40.

78. PAC, Major-General W. E. Hodgins to Officer Commanding Military District No. 1, 26 May 1916, DMD, ser. 24, 182.


80. PAC, Connaught to Borden, 11 May 1916, Borden Papers, ser. 26, H 70, OC 322, 36379.


82. Ibid., Connaught to Borden, 2 August 1916, 36476.

83. The American Legion’s 97th Overseas Infantry Battalion published a small periodical in Toronto called *The American Legion Magazine*. The National Archives of Canada in Ottawa, Ontario, contained two copies of the circulars in the Reverend Charles Seymour Bullock’s private papers and scrapbooks, but it is unknown how many issues were printed or how it was funded. This should not be confused with the present *American Legion* periodical.


87. Hughes' private papers may shed some light on this subject in the future, but for now there is no evidence which documents any order from Hughes to Bullock or other CEF recruiters instructing them to avoid recruiting in the United States.


89. PAC, Connaught to Borden, 15 May 1916, Borden Papers, ser. 26, H 70, OC 322, 36377.


94. PAC, Major Tite to Major-General W. E. Hodgins, 22 February 1916, DMD, ser. 9, 182.


99. PAC, Department of Militia and Defence Memorandum, 19 February 17, DMD, ser. 9, 1753.

100. PAC, W. G. R. Humphrey to S. M. Mitchell, 21 October 1916, DMD, ser. 9, 4552.


102. PAC, Borden to Major-General W. E. Hodgins, 13 November 1916, DMD, ser. 9, 182.

103. Ibid., Borden to Hodgins, 11 November 1916.

104. PAC, Connaught to Borden, 15 May 1916, Borden papers, ser. 26, H 70, OC 322, 36401.


106. PAC, Department of Militia and Defence Memorandum, n.d., Borden papers, ser. 26, H 70, OC 322, 36401.


108. PAC, Spring-Rice to Connaught, 10 April 1916, Borden Papers, ser. 26, H 70, OC 322, 36372.

109. Ibid.

110. PAC, Department of Militia and Defence Memorandum, 4 July 1916, DMD, ser. 24, 5912, H.Q. 50-1-23.

111. PAC, Lansing to Spring-Rice, 8 June 1916, Borden Papers, ser. 26, H 70, OC 322, 36425.

112. PAC, Department of Militia and Defence Memorandum, 4 July 1916, DMD, ser. 24, 5912, H.Q. 50-1-23.

113. PAC, Borden to McCurdy, 3 August 1916, DMD, ser. 24, 5912.

115. PAC, Goodier to Lansing, 1 June 1916, DMD, ser. 24, 5912; PAC, Lansing to Spring Rice, 16 June 1916, DMD, ser. 24, 5912; PAC, Connaught to Borden, 2 August 1916, Borden Papers, ser. 26, H 70, OC 322, 36473.


117. Fred Gaffen stated that the British and Canadian Recruiting Mission enlisted approximately 45,000 recruits from the United States for the British and Canadian armed forces. It is inferred that most of these recruits were British and Canadian citizens residing in the United States as CEF enlistment records reveal that most Americans enlisting in the CEF did so before April 6, 1917. Fred Gaffen, *Cross-Border Warriors: Canadians in American Forces, Americans in Canadian Forces. From the Civil War to the Gulf.* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1995), 15-16.


**Chapter Two**


123. No known study accounts for the number of Americans who volunteered and served in the British Army during the First World War.


125. Howard Swiggett, *March or Die* (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1953), 117. This figure seems to low and contradicts French journalist, Paul Louis Hervier, who during the First World War cited as many as 200 Americans who had served in the Foreign Legion.


128. The term paramilitary is used here for American volunteers who served in the medical services, such as military hospitals and ambulance units, because they were neither military fighting units nor philanthropic endeavors. These volunteers worked in coordination with the Allied (frequently French) armies, but refrained from military engagements.


131. PAC, H. C. Osborne to J. L. Ralston, 14 October 1927, Department of Militia and Defence, ser. 24, 6561. This total was for the entire war, although most Americans enlisting in the CEF served before April 6, 1917. No study has calculated the total number of Americans who enlisted in the CEF before the U. S. entered the war. A total of 2,411 nursing sisters served in the CEF’s Medical Corps.


133. Ibid.; PAC, Department of Militia and Defence Memorandum, n. d., DMD, ser. 24, 1753.

134. PAC, “Country of Birth,” War Service Records of Veterans Affairs, ser. 38, 443. 35,612 out of 619,636 equals 0.057. 19,966 out of 424,589 equals 0.047 of Americans serving outside of Canada and 2,138 out of 60,661 equals 0.035 of CEF deaths on the Western Front.

135. PAC, H. C. Osborne to J. L. Ralston, 14 October 1927, DMD, ser. 24, 6561.


137. Totals given here were calculated by the Department of Militia and Defence, but are published here for the first time by the author. PAC, “Country of Birth,” n. d., DMD, ser. 38, 443.
138. Ibid.


153. PAC, Copy of American Legion Recruiting Pamphlet, Bullock papers, ser. 30, E 431. The underlined portions of the quote were taken directly from the pamphlet.

155. PAC, Copy of an unidentified newspaper clipping in Bullock’s scrapbook, Bullock Papers, ser. 30, E 431.


158. Morse, *The Vanguard of American Volunteers*, 4-5.


162. PAC, Copy of American Legion advertisement, Borden Papers, ser. 26 H 70, 36392.


169. Fred Gaffen estimated that 40,000 Canadians fought in the American Civil War. He also noted that Canadians served in both the Confederate and Union armies. Fred Gaffen, *Cross-Border Warriors*, 4.
170. PAC, Copy of American Legion advertisement, Borden Papers, ser. 26, H 70, 36392.

171. Ibid., Connaught to Borden, 1 June 1916.

172. “Americans Were Fighting Early At The Front,” Literary Digest 55 (17 November 1917): 82. The quoted $1.25 pay was for a corporal in the CEF.

173. PAC, Copy of 97th Overseas Infantry Battalion advertisement, Bullock Papers, ser. 30, E 431.

174. Henry Ames, “‘Fight or Pay’—Canada’s Solution.” North American Review 205 (June 1917): 861. The wife of a CEF volunteer received a monthly stipend of $20 and an additional $5 for each child.


178. In the future this act will referred to in the text as the Expatriation Act.


180. Statutes at Large 34 (1907): 1228. The italics in the quote are the direct representation of the law.


182. Ibid.

183. PAC, Attestation Paper of Edwin Austin Abbey, Lieutenant Edwin Austin Abbey, First World War Service Files, file number 02-3. For a complete representation of an attestation paper see Figure 2 on page 75.


186. Laffin, The French Foreign Legion; Philip Flammer, The Vivid Air.


193. Ibid.


195. PAC, Copy of letter from the United States Department of Labor, 9 October 1915, Bullock Papers, ser. 30, E 431.


199. Ibid.


204. PAC, Berrian to Hughes, 14 September 1916, DMD, ser. 24, 439.


207. "200,000 Americans At Canada’s Call," *New York Times*, 27 October 1914, 3.


212. PAC, Attestation Paper of Edwin Austin Abbey, Lieutenant Edwin Austin Abbey, First World War Service Files, number 02-3.


214. This methodology was formed after conversations and correspondence with Tim Wright, Personnel Records Officer of the National Archives of Canada in Ottawa, Ontario.

215. PAC, "Nominal Roll Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Men of the 121st Overseas Battalion," DMD, ser. 9 II, B3 79.

216. Canada. *Canadian Expeditionary Force: Nominal Roll of Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and Men* Vol. II (Ottawa: Government Printing, 1915). Interesting that Schultz entered Poland as his place of birth since it had not been an independent nation since the 1830s.

217. Ibid.
218. PAC, DMD, ser. 9 II, B3 79; PAC, DMD, ser. 9 II, B3 80; Canada, Canadian Expeditionary Force: Nominal Rolls of Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Men Vol. I-IV (Ottawa: Government Printing, 1919). Due to time constraints researching all of the enlistment records was not possible.


Chapter Three

220. The American Legion refers to all of the CEF’s overseas infantry battalions reserved for American citizens: the 97th, 211th, 212th, 213th, and the 237th. From October 22, 1915 until February 15, 1916, the American Legion specifically referred only to the 97th.

221. Haycock, Sam Hughes, 218.

222. PAC, Hughes to Kitchener, 29 August 1914, Borden Papers, ser. 26, H 70, OC 322, 36342.

223. Ibid., Hughes to Kitchener, 11 September 1914, 36347.

224. Ibid., Department of Militia and Defence Memorandum, n.d., 36400-36403.

225. Ibid.


227. Flammer, The Vivid Air.

228. The exception to this was former President Theodore Roosevelt, who on November 19, 1915, was rumored to have been given a commission from Canadian authorities to command a unit of Americans in the CEF. The CEF’s documents do not account for Roosevelt’s interest in serving in the CEF. Globe (Toronto), 19 November 1915. Found in PAC, Scrapbook of Bullock, Bullock Papers, ser. 30, E 431. The title of the article was torn off.


233. Ibid., 8.

234. PAC, Department of Militia and Defence Memorandum, n.d., Borden Papers, ser. 26, H 70, OC 322, 36400-34003.


237. Meek, *Over The Top!.*


239. PAC, “Historical Record of the 97th Overseas Battalion, Canadian Expeditionary Force,” 5 January 1917, DMD, ser. 9, III, D1, 4699.

240. PAC, Copy of 97th Overseas Infantry Battalion recruiting poster, Bullock Papers, ser. 30, E 431.

241. Asa Minard served as a Captain in the 97th and the 237th. His sons also served with the American Legion: Basil W. Minard and Asa R. Minard both served as Lieutenants in the 97th.

242. PAC, “Historical Record of the 97th Overseas Battalion, Canadian Expeditionary Force,” 5 January 1917, DMD, ser. 9, III, D1, 4699.


244. Ibid.

245. PAC, “Historical Record of the 97th Overseas Battalion, Canadian Expeditionary Force,” 5 January 1917, DMD, ser. 9, III, D1, 4699.


248. Ibid.

249. Meek, Over The Top!, 131.


252. The 237th Overseas Infantry Battalion was officially authorized on July 15, 1916, along with the 211th, 212th, and the 213th as a part of the Department of Militia and Defence's General Order 69. Meek, Over The Top!, 139.


254. PAC, "Historical Record of the 97th Overseas Battalion, Canadian Expeditionary Force," 5 January 1917, DMD, ser. 9 III, D1, 4699.


257. PAC, Department of Militia and Defence Memorandum, 21 July 1916, Borden Papers, ser. 26, H 70, OC 322, 36466.


265. Ibid., 10.


268. PAC, Surgeon-General Deputy Minister to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 27 March 1916, Borden Papers, ser. 26, H 70, OC 322, 36369; PAC, Bonar Law to Connaught, 27 March 1916, Borden Papers, ser. 26, H 70, OC 322, 36370.

269. PAC, “Historical Record of the 97th Overseas Battalion, Canadian Expeditionary Force,” 5 January 1917, DMD, ser. 9, III, D1, 4699.


271. PAC, Bonar Law to Connaught, 7 April 1916, Borden Papers, ser. 26, H 70, OC 322, 36371.


273. PAC, Department of Militia and Defence Memorandum, 17 June 1916, DMD, ser. 24, 1542, file 683-174-1.

274. PAC, DMD, ser. 24, 5912, file H. Q. 50-1-23.

275. PAC, “Historical Record of the 97th Overseas Battalion, Canadian Expeditionary Force,” 5 January 1917, DMD, ser. 9, III, D1, 4699.


278. Ibid., Major D. M. McRae to Major-General W. E. Hodgins, 21 July 1916.
279. Ibid.

280. PAC, Department of Militia and Defence Memorandum, July 14, 1916, DMD, ser. 24, 1127.

281. Ibid., Berrian to Hughes, 14 September 1916.

282. PAC, Department of Militia and Defence Memorandum, 21 July 1916, Borden Papers, ser. 26, H 70, OC 322, 36466.

283. Ibid.

284. Ibid., Law to Borden, 13 May 1916, 36376.

285. Ibid.

286. Ibid., Connaught to Borden, 15 May 1916, 36377.

287. Ibid., Law to Connaught, 19 May 1916, 36387.

288. Ibid., Borden to Fiset, 19 May 1916, 36382.

289. Ibid., Borden to Connaught, 12 July 1916, 36453-36461.

290. Ibid., Connaught to Borden, 5 August 1916, 36499.


293. Ibid., Canadian High Commissioner’s Office to Hughes, 22 July 1916, 36465.


295. PAC, Jolly to Camp Commandant Aldershot Camp, 1 September 1916, DMD, ser. 24, 4564, file 133-47-1-1.

297. PAC, Bonar Law to Connaught, 3 August 1916, Borden Papers, ser. 26, H 70, OC 322, 36482.

298. PAC, Aitken to Borden, 10 August 1916, Borden Papers, ser. 26, H 70, OC 322, 36502.


300. Ibid.


302. PAC, Scrapbook of Bullock, Bullock Papers, ser. 30, E 431.


304. PAC, Hodgins to Major Daly, 2 December 1916, DMD, ser. 24, 1542, file H. Q. 602-2-74.


308. PAC, Bullock to Hughes, 12 September 1916, DMD, ser. 24, 1542.

309. Flammer, *The Vivid Air*.

310. PAC, Rowell, Reid, Wood & Wright Law Firm to Assistant Adjutant-General Military District #6, 24 June 1916, DMD, ser. 24, 4564.


313. Ibid.

315. PAC, "Historical Record of the 97th Overseas Battalion, Canadian Expeditionary Force," 5 January 1917, DMD, ser. 9, III, D1, 4699.


319. Ibid., Copy of an unidentified newspaper clipping in Bullock's scrapbook, 4 August 1916.


324. PAC, A. Fortescue Duguid to Secretary of the Imperial War Museum, 13 September 1921, DMD, ser. 24, 1827, G. A. Q. 7-1.

325. Harris, Canadian Brass, 109.


Chapter Four


332. After the United States government entered the war, on May 8, 1917, the Wilson administration permitted the British and Canadians to recruit in the United States. See chapter one.


334. Ibid.

335. Although many Americans in the CEF corresponded with family and friends in the United States and Canada, few of these letters have donated to libraries or archives in Canada or the United States.

336. A CEF service jacket had a stand-up collar, seven buttons down the front, and skirt pockets with plain flaps; whereas, the BEF jacket had a stand-and-fall collar, five buttons down the front, and buttons on the skirt flaps. The CEF used a modified version of the Oliver web equipment up to the end of the Battle of the Somme before replacing it with the British web equipment. The CEF used the Canadian-made Ross rifle until August 1916 when it was exchanged for the British-made Lee Enfield rifle. Summers and Chartrand, *Military Uniforms in Canada*, 131-132.

337. On the upper sleeve of a CEF soldier’s jacket a patch of woolen cloth or an insignia painted on his helmet designated his division by the color of a rectangle - red for the 1st, blue for the 2nd, black or gray for the 3rd, and green for the fourth. Another piece of cloth or brush of paint above the rectangle marked the soldier’s brigade and battalion. The color - green, red, or blue - respectively denoted the first, second, or third brigade in the division, and the shape - circle, semi-circle, triangle, or square - respectively denoted the first, second, third, or fourth battalion in the brigade. For example, an insignia that had a blue rectangle with red triangle was the CEF’s 19th Battalion, 5th Brigade, 2nd Division. Ibid.

339. Ibid., 540-543.

340. The PPCLI was designated to the British Expeditionary Force’s 27th Division until December 1915 when it joined the CEF’s 3rd Division. For more on the CEF in the First World War see Nicholson, *Official History of the Canadian Army*.


342. Ibid., 217.


344. Meek, *Over The Top!*, 4; Morton, *Canada and War*, 64.


346. Before crossing the Canadian border to enlist in the French Canadian regiment, Houle had earned a living as a barber. Romeo Houle, “American Barber’s Grim Story,” *New York Times*, 4 June 1916, V, 1-3. It should noted that in Houle’s and the remainder of the battle accounts authored by Americans who served in the CEF used for this thesis that without corroborating evidence or testimony from witnesses that it is possible that their accounts may be inaccurate or exaggerated.

347. Ibid.

348. Ibid.


351. PAC, Tracy Richardson, First World War Service Files, ser. 150, file 8254-8.

352. The Second Battle of Ypres occurred from April 22 to May 25, 1915.


354. Ibid.
355. PAC, Major-General W. E. Hodgins to G. O. C. Military District No. 6, 28 September 1916, DMD, ser. 24, 4564.


360. Ibid., 135.


362. Ibid., 122.


366. Ibid., 88.

367. Ibid., Chapters 7, 8, 9; McBride, *The Emma Gees*, Chapter 8.


370. The CEF referred to their machine gun sections as the Emma Gees. This derived from the CEF’s signals MG standing for machine gunner.


374. In compiling its records to determine the country of birth of the CEF’s volunteers, the Directorate of History for the Department of National Defence did not identify those Americans who volunteered before April 6, 1917, from the American volunteers who volunteered after this date.


379. PAC, Edwin Austin Abbey File, First World War Service Files, ser. 150, file 02-3.


382. Ibid., 114-116.

383. Ibid., 122-123.

384. Ibid., 144-147.

385. Ibid., 165-166.

386. Most likely requests from Americans in the CEF started arriving at American, British, and Canadian government officials in February 1917 because Germany had declared unrestricted submarine warfare on all shipping, including neutral countries, in the Atlantic Ocean on February 1, 1917.

387. PAC, Bullock to Department of Militia and Defence, 25 April 1917, Bullock Papers, ser. 30, E 431.
388. PAC, Kemp to G. O. C. Military District No. 2, 20 June 1917, DMD, ser. 24, 4364.

389. PAC, Perley to Borden, 3 July 1917, DMD, ser. 24, 1127, 54-21-50-10.

390. PAC, Gwatkin to the Department of Militia and Defence, 29 July 1917, DMD, ser. 24, 1127, 54-21-50-10.


393. PAC, Assistant Adjutant General Military District No. 2 to O. C. No. 2, 15 August 1917, DMD, ser. 24, 4364.


399. PAC, Connaught to Borden, 15 May 1916, Bordens Papers, ser. 26, H 70, OC 322, 36377.

400. PAC, George Harry Mullin, First World War Service Files, ser. 150, file, 6474-21.

401. PAC, Raphael Louis Zengel, First World War Service Files, ser. 150, file 10677-70.


403. PAC, Frederick George Coppins, First World War Service Files, ser. 150, file 1988-47.


**Conclusion**


414. PAC, Department of Militia and Defence Memorandum, n.d., DMD, ser. 24, 288.


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