Sir Robert Laird Borden at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919

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SIR ROBERT LAIRD BORDEN AT THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE, 1919

A Thesis
Presented to the
Department of History
and the
Faculty of the College of Graduate Studies
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In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

by
Larry L. Kulisek
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Accepted for the faculty of the College of Graduate Studies of the University of Omaha, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts.

Chairman

Graduate Committee

Name

Department

Representative of the Graduate Council
Robert Laird Borden was one of those men in history whom fate seems to elect to lead nations in time of crisis. From a successful lawyer, content with his lot, Borden was suddenly thrust to the forefront of Canadian politics. He lacked the gift of eloquence, his speeches usually read better than they sounded, but his level-headed thought and determination earned him the confidence of his colleagues and the nation during a critical period of Canadian history. As a public servant, the Canadian statesman gave all. He returned from the Paris Peace Conference exhausted, and his poor health forced his retirement within a year. Later, however, when his health had been restored by a much deserved rest, Borden became Canada's elder statesman, serving his country in numerous ways until his death.

While his immediate predecessor as a Liberal Prime Minister, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, has perhaps been too frequently praised by biographers, Borden has been neglected. His Memoirs, compiled by his brother, provide the only comprehensive published record of his life and work. His role at the Paris Peace Conference was chosen for this study because it represents both a dual purpose: and success for Borden. He not only contributed to the making of peace but also used the Conference to gain international
recognition of the new dominion status in the British Empire. Too often, historians dealing with Borden tend to stress only his imperial policy and trace his activities at the Conference in that light, failing to realize that he made many important contributions to the peace itself. This work is an attempt to combine these two facets of Borden's career—his peace contributions and his role in the evolution of the British Empire.

This work could not have been attempted, nor completed, without the aid and encouragement of Professor A. Stanley Trickett, Chairman of the Department of History at the University of Omaha. I wish to express my gratitude and appreciation for his constant support in both the preparation of this thesis and my graduate career. In addition, Professor Ern J. Gum of the Department of History has rendered valuable assistance.

Larry L. Kulisek

Omaha, Nebraska

June 1, 1964
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>PREFACE</strong></td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>I. THE IMPERIAL POLICY OF ROBERT BORDEN TO 1917</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borden's Entry into Politics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 1911 Election</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borden's Prewar Imperial Policy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Visit to England, 1912</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Committee of Imperial Defense</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Naval Debates</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada at War</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immediate Support to the Empire</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Canadian Contribution</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Cost and Burdens of War</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Threat to Domestic Unity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conscription and Coalition Government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Threat to Imperial Unity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada's Faltering Economy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No share in the Determination of War Policy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Visit to England, 1915</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Threat of Canadian Withdrawal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partial Success</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>II. A VOICE IN THE EMPIRE.</strong></td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lloyd George and the British War Cabinet</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Imperial War Cabinet, 1917</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Imperial War Conference, 1917</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postponement of Empire Reorganization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Imperial War Conference, 1916</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Consultation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Imperial War Cabinet, 1918</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Armistice Period</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparations for Conference</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Canadian Delegation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separate Dominion Representation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borden's Leadership</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Foreign Policy at War's End</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full Sovereignty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglo-American Cooperation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter  

III. BORDEN AND CONFERENCE ORGANIZATION . . . . . 45

The Supreme War Council
The Council of Ten
Dominion Representation
  Separate Dominion Representation
The British Empire Delegation
Borden Leads the Smaller Powers
The Creation of Commissions
  The Panel System
  Borden and the Greek Commission
The Failure of the Council of Ten
  The Council of Four
  The Council of Five
  The Drafting Committee

IV. BORDEN AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS . . . . . 63

Early Drafts of League Ideas
The Mandates Question
  Dominion Claims vs. Wilson
  Borden's position
  The Smuts Compromise
Borden's Criticisms of the League Covenant
  Article X
The Struggle for Dominion Equality
  The League Council
  A signed Safeguard from the Big Three
The Japanese Quest for Equality
  Borden's Attempted Compromise

V. BORDEN AND THE I.L.O. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

Labor's Plans for the Peace Conference
The International Labor Commission
  The Problem of Federal States
  The Canadian Opinion
Dominion Opposition to the Labor Charter
  Point 8---Equality of Foreign Workman
  Borden's Plight
The Struggle for Dominion Equality
  Articles 7 and 35 of the Labor Convention
Borden Leadership
### Chapter

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Compromise on Point 8</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Compromise on Articles 7 and 35</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Dominions Win Equal Privileges</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization of the I.L.O.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### VI. THE AFTERMATH

- Separate or Identical Membership
- Borden's Amendment of Article 35
- Criticism of Borden's Changes to Charter
- Wilson Explains Borden's Position
- Signing the Peace Treaties
- Ratification by Dominion Parliaments

#### VII. CONCLUSION

- BIBLIOGRAPHY

- 129  
- 133
CHAPTER I

THE IMPERIAL POLICY OF ROBERT BORDEN TO 1917

Born in 1854, Robert Borden was reared on Grand Pre Farm, the family holding in Nova Scotia. His first profession was teaching. Later, he moved on to law studies and law practice, rising to the forefront of the Canadian legal profession. He did not seek the fame and fortune of political life, but politicians sought him out. Several prominent members of the Conservative party in Nova Scotia asked Borden to stand for a parliamentary post. At first, he refused, citing his political inexperience and lack of political ambition, but finally yielded to the continued pressure of party leaders and agreed to stand for one term. In 1895, Borden won a seat from Halifax County, in an election his party lost to the Liberals led by Sir Wilfrid Laurier.

Borden's original intention of serving for one term only was changed when Sir Charles Tupper, the

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1 There is little unknown or controversial about the early period of Borden's career. Unless otherwise cited, biographical information on Borden may be found in Henry Borden (ed.), Robert Borden: His Memoirs (2 vols; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1935). Cited hereafter as Borden Memoirs.

2 For views of the leading Liberal of the period, see O. D. Skelton, The Life and Letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier (New York: Century Co., 1922).
Conservative Party Leader, convinced him to stand for re-election in 1900. Again Borden was elected, while his party suffered defeat at the hands of the Liberals. With the defeat Tupper resigned the party leadership, and Borden became the new leader of the Conservative party.  

Borden accepted the party leadership for one year and, feeling that his position was only temporary, made no long-range policy plans. He believed that his role was to rebuild the Conservative party and, on the request of the party, remained at the helm when the one year period expired. Laurier and the Liberals were at the height of their popularity and power, but Borden retained the Conservative leadership despite party defeats in 1904 and 1908 and continued a program designed to reconstruct and revitalize the languishing Conservative party.

The general election of 1911 was fought on the issue of a trade reciprocity treaty with the United States. The whole question of future relations between

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3 Borden was a relatively inexperienced politician to become party leader, but Sir George Foster, the intended successor, lost his seat in the 1900 election.

Canada and the other members of the British Empire was the underlying issue for the campaign. The Conservative party won a majority, and the new Prime Minister interpreted the 1911 victory as a rejection of American influence and as a mandate for closer imperial ties with Great Britain. How far Borden would tend toward closer imperial cooperation was questionable.

In 1911, Borden's views on imperial policy were little known. Laurier had moved toward greater and greater autonomy in Canada's constitutional relationship with Great Britain. The traditional Conservative approach was toward closer ties with the mother country. The growing world crisis made the question of imperial defense of primary importance in the development of Borden's imperial policy, and his response to that question revealed his future policy toward imperial cooperation.  

The Canadian naval issue had been one of the most important problems of imperial defense since the turn of the century. Canadians held divergent opinions on Canada's role in the defense of the Empire. Many believed that

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Canada should share the burden of Empire defense by making direct contributions in the form of money or ships. Others, including Laurier, believed that Canada should construct her own naval force to act in cooperation with the Imperial Navy.  

In early 1909, Laurier had introduced a bill for the creation of a separate Canadian Navy. Borden, as leader of the opposition, agreed on the desirability of a separate Canadian Navy but demanded a direct defense contribution if a world crisis arose. A Liberal pledge to support the Empire in time of crisis had satisfied the Conservatives, and the Laurier naval bill was passed.

Borden cancelled the Laurier naval program when he came to power in 1911. Once in power, his imperial policy began to take shape. He upheld the imperial connection but warned that if Canada was to share in imperial defense, Canadians must certainly share in policy direction. The Conservative platform of 1911, written by Borden himself, pledged that his party would maintain the

8Wilson, "Imperial Policy," p. 13.
9Ibid.
10Ibid., p. 36.
imperial tie. At the same time, however, he advocated the autonomous development of Canada within the Empire.\textsuperscript{11}

Borden felt that his two pledges—closer imperial ties and autonomous development—could be reconciled if the dominions were to share in the determination of empire policies and envisioned some sort of defense committee which would have some voice in planning for imperial defense. He suggested that the committee consist of a bipartisan group of British Members of Parliament and representatives from the self-governing dominions of the British Empire. The resulting consultation would provide the dominions some voice in and control of imperial policy. Borden, thus, announced his terms for dominion aid. If the dominions were to share in the permanent defense of the empire, they must have some voice in these matters.\textsuperscript{12}

Borden journeyed to England in the summer of 1912 to plead his views for a dominion share in the determination of imperial policy. He also hoped to receive information which would help him develop a Conservative naval program. Upon arrival in England, the Canadian Prime Minister met with First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill. Churchill reviewed the critical naval

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{11} Borden (ed.), \textit{Borden Memoirs}, I, 325.
\textsuperscript{12} Wilson, "Imperial Policy," p. 17.
\end{flushleft}
situation and seemed willing to accept almost any condi-
tions to gain a Canadian naval commitment. Borden and
Churchill both agreed that the world situation warranted
a direct Canadian naval contribution for imperial defense.\footnote{13}

The Canadian Prime Minister demanded certain con-
cessions from the imperial government in return for his
country's naval support. Possibly, Borden thought, naval
support was the price which Canada must pay for a share
in the direction of imperial affairs.\footnote{14} In an audience
with the British Prime Minister, Herbert Asquith, Borden
obtained the concession that a Canadian minister, resident
in London, would be named as a member of the Committee of
Imperial Defense.\footnote{15} Borden made it known, however, that
this was only a temporary arrangement until a more care-
fully prepared plan could be worked out with the other
dominions.\footnote{16} Asquith told Parliament on 12 July 1912,

\footnote{13}{Borden (ed.), \textit{Borden Memoirs}, I, 355-58.}
\footnote{14}{Wilson, "Imperial Policy," p. 46.}
\footnote{15}{In 1895, a Defense Committee of the Cabinet was
created to consider the defense requirements of the Empire.
By 1904, that body was surplanted by the Committee of
Imperial Defense. The new committee consisted of the
British Prime Minister and such members as he chose to
assist him. The heads of the various military and intell-
gegence staffs soon became regular members. Representa-
tives from the self-governing dominions might be invited
to attend when certain matters concerning them were dis-
cussed. The dominion prime ministers were invited to
attend for the first time in 1911. \textit{Ibid.}, p. 47.}
\footnote{16}{Tucker, \textit{Canadian Historical Review}, XXVIII, p. 3.}
the same day that Churchill announced Canada's promised naval support, that some kind of arrangement was being considered which would give the dominions a share in the determination of imperial policy.\(^{17}\)

While in England, Borden attended a number of sessions of the Committee of Imperial Defense. Asquith opened the 1 August session with a statement that dominion commissioners could be present at meetings of the committee whenever matters concerning the dominions were discussed. Borden wasn't satisfied, as he expected more of a concession, and told Asquith so.\(^{18}\) The Canadian did not confine his criticism and demands to private ears alone. In a speech to the London "1900" Club, Borden warned that the people of Canada would not long remain silent partners in the Empire. Further imperial cooperation, he said, must be based on a fair and reasonable dominion voice in imperial policy-making.\(^{19}\)

Asquith was startled by Borden's aggressiveness but could not refuse the Canadian demands because of the naval aid offered, and the British government conceded Borden's claim for permanent dominion membership on the

\(^{17}\)Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), XL (1912), 858, 872.

\(^{18}\)Wilson, "Imperial Policy," p. 49.

\(^{19}\)Borden (ed.), Borden Memoirs, I, 364.
Committee of Imperial Defense. It was agreed that dominion ministers had the right to attend every session of the Committee of Imperial Defense, regardless of the topic discussed. Thus, Robert Borden was successful in achieving the primary aim of his prewar imperial policy. 20

The Canadian Prime Minister returned home on 8 September 1912 to face one of the bitterest parliamentary debates in Canadian history. His naval bill asked for an immediate contribution of $35,000,000 for the building of three dreadnoughts of the latest design, built in England and placed at the disposal of the British Admiralty. Canada retained, however, the right to recall, at any time, the ships to form the nucleus of a Canadian Navy. 21

Borden defended his naval bill in Commons by calling attention to the critical world situation and justified his position by pointing to the greater share in imperial questions which Canada received because of such support of the Empire. Summing up, Borden stated that the policy of consultation, established by the provision for appointment of a permanent Canadian minister in London, with a seat on the Committee of Imperial Defense, was a marked advance for Canada. 22

20 Wilson, "Imperial Policy," pp. 49-51.
21 Ibid., p. 59.
22 Ibid., p. 61.
A British newspaper accurately described Borden's defense of his naval program--actually a microcosm of his imperial policy--as follows:

'It contains . . . no facile assurances that the day of danger will make the Empire one. It does contain a splendid offer of immediate participation in the burden of defense and a deeply reassured statement on the only conditions on which that burden can in the future be supported and shared. 23

Thus, Borden set the conditions upon which he felt that Canada would contribute to imperial defense in the future. Any future contribution had to be accompanied by a correspondingly greater voice in imperial policy--especially in the area of foreign affairs.

Borden failed to get his naval bill through the Liberal-appointed Senate, but his imperial policy was clearly stated and defined during the controversy. The tragedy of Borden's defeat over the naval arrangements was that Canada was left without a constructive naval policy in the critical prewar period. 24

The outbreak of the war in 1914 took most Canadians by surprise. They were primarily interested in the development of their still infant nation and, thus, not well informed on international questions. 25
was only slightly better prepared. A Canadian minister had been installed in London to attend meetings of the Committee of Imperial Defense and to serve as a liaison for the Canadian ministry, but the process of imperial consultation was still far from developed. The Canadians had no real share in the decisions that drew Great Britain into the conflict, but Borden watched the coming crisis carefully during the summer preceding the war. When, information from Europe indicated that war was imminent, he returned to Ottawa on 30 July 1914 and called the Cabinet together. Three days before Britain declared war, the dominion government cabled London their firm assurance that Canada and the Canadian people would make every sacrifice necessary to uphold the integrity and honor of the Empire. At the same time Borden asked for suggestions as to the form which Canadian aid should take.

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The announcement of war arrived on the evening of 4 August 1914 while the Cabinet was in session.\(^3\)

As a part of the British Empire, Canada found herself automatically at war. However, Canadians did not have to take an active part in the fighting but did so wholeheartedly. The dominion's loyalty to the Empire was strengthened by a belief, prevalent in most of the western nations, that the war was a struggle against militarism and one to assure the continuance of a peaceful civilization.\(^3\) Canadians held an intense conviction that their honor was at stake and that every sacrifice should be made to maintain that honor before the world.\(^3\) Doubts about imperial unity were dispelled by the Empire response to Britain's need for assistance. The Germans had miscalculated on the depth of Empire discontent, while even the British were astonished at the enthusiastic support of their war activity by the dominions and India.\(^3\) As a result of the crisis and during the war years, Canada attained a place among the nations of the world which

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\(^3\)Skelton, The Canadian Dominion, p. 258; Burt, A Short History, p. 236.

\(^3\)Ibid.

would have scarcely been possible in a short period of normal years.

Canada was militarily ill-equipped to fight a major war, but the country was not altogether lacking in preparation. Borden had familiarized himself with the program of the Committee of Imperial Defense and had prepared a plan to meet the possibilities of war. Canada was thus able to move concurrently with the Imperial government when the war situation arose. The Canadian Parliament met in special session and, without a dissenting vote, voted the war credits requested by the government. Special war powers were conferred upon the Borden ministry, and the country then set about providing men, money, and munitions for the war.

The Government at Ottawa, supported by the opposition, decided to send a division of twenty-five thousand soldiers and called for volunteers. Ten thousand extra recruits applied and on 1 October 1914, thirty-three thousand Canadian troops sailed for England. The Canadian Parliament authorized the recruitment of another division even before the first Canadian troops arrived in

35 Skelton, The Canadian Dominion, p. 259.
England and, in addition, placed the small Canadian coastal fleet under the control of the British Admiralty.37

The fighting in Western Europe had already settled down to trench warfare when the first Canadian forces arrived in Europe. They received their baptism of fire on 15 March 1915 and experienced the first gas attack of the war on 12 April 1915. When they continued to hold their line in spite of the attack, Canada's men proved that they could fight and were ranked among the best Allied troops on the fighting line.38 Throughout the war, they were in the forefront of many battles and when the fighting ended they were spearheading the Allied penetration of the German lines.39 There was much written in a laudatory manner about the Canadian contribution to the war effort, but Canada, in fact, with her four divisions played a relatively small part in the total war. They did, however, give a good account of themselves wherever they participated. Probably the highest compliment paid the Canadian forces, came on the last day of the war when

37Temperley, Peace Conference, VI, 340.


King Albert of Belgium publically declared them to be "unsurpassed by any corps in Europe." 40

The burden placed upon Canada by World War I also reflected itself at home. National unity was strained to the breaking point by the necessity of conscription. Until 1917, the Canadian forces were raised by voluntary enlistment. Then, as Canadians realized that the two races were not supplying equal proportions of volunteers and French Canada fell behind in supplying volunteers, a growing animosity toward the French elements of the population was evident. By 1917, when Canadian casualties in Europe were greater than numbers being recruited at home, definite action was needed to keep faith with the boys at the front and to uphold the country's honor. 41 Borden discussed the problem with the Cabinet which decided that conscription was necessary. He was also convinced that a coalition government was necessary if such an extreme measure was forced upon the country. Laurier, realizing that such a move would lessen his influence in French Canada, refused to join in a Union government in which both parties would be represented equally. 42

42 Ibid., p. 239.
refused, the Liberal party split. The English-speaking Liberals supported Borden and conscription.\footnote{Ibid., p. 240; Skelton, \textit{The Canadian Dominion}, pp. 260-62.} With the passage of a Wartime Election Act, which enfranchised women who were next of kin to servicemen,\footnote{Lemieux, \textit{The Governors-General}, p. 296. Wartime Election Act: Any wife, daughter, sister, or widow of any service person, whether it be in the Canadian or British ranks, received the right to vote for Parliament.} victory for the Borden government appeared certain; and leading. English-speaking Liberals, especially those from the West, accepted Borden's offer to cooperate in a coalition government.\footnote{Skelton, \textit{The Canadian Dominion}, p. 264.} The Liberals who joined the Union government believed that conscription was necessary and that party differences had to be disregarded.\footnote{Lemieux, \textit{The Governors-General}, p. 300.}

Borden dissolved his government in October 1917, and the general election of December, perhaps the bitterest in Canadian history, followed. The issues were conscription and a coalition government. With many women voting for the first time under the Wartime Election Act\footnote{Ibid.} and the British and French elements split as they had not been for a half century, passions and tempers flared. The Unionists, supported by nearly all the English-speaking
population of Canada, gained an overwhelming majority in Parliament. The Canadian Army was sustained for the remainder of the war by compulsory military service, but so far as the war was concerned, it was fought and won by volunteers.

Canada paid a tremendous price for her participation in the war. When the war began, Canada had a military force of 3,000 permanent and 10,000 active militia; by the end of the war Canada had sent over 400,000 men abroad. Two out of every three soldiers reaching the front were wounded. Canadian loss of life almost equaled that of the United States. Of the total dead—35,684 were killed in action and 12,437 died of wounds. Canada's debt was multiplied seven times and her taxes rose proportionately. National unity was so strained by the necessity of conscription that most of the work of Laurier, designed to bring a reconciliation between the two races, was lost.

Imperial unity was likewise threatened by the war atmosphere. Borden and the Canadians resented the haughty

48 Burt, A Short History, p. 240.
49 Skelton, The Canadian Dominion, p. 265.
51 Burt, A Short History, p. 238.
and high handed treatment shown them by the country for whom they were sacrificing. Britain's failure to consider Canadian views and interests in the determination of imperial economic and military policy set the state for Borden's new imperial demands. The failure of the Imperial government to heed Canadian demands jeopardized imperial unity and even the existence of the imperial connection.  

Many Canadians hoped that the war would assure economic prosperity and result in the rapid industrial growth of Canada. However, the hope for wartime boom failed to materialize and unemployment and factory shutdowns occurred. Meanwhile, Britain placed huge orders for war supplies and materials in the United States. Borden had realized, as early as November 1914, that Canada could not wage war unless the country's faltering economy was bolstered. He cabled George Perley, the Canadian High Commissioner in London, that dominion public opinion was aroused. Men in Canada were going hungry while British war orders boomed the United States economy. The Canadian Prime Minister directed the minister in London to warn the British government of the seriousness of the situation.  


The role that the dominions should play in the determination of the imperial war policy was another point of serious discontent between Canada and the mother country. Early in the war, Borden had warned the British government that it would be dangerous to think that Canada would continue her support of the war if given no voice in its management. If the war was an empire fight, why did the imperial government seek to retain sole control over the direction of the fighting units sent from the dominions? In 1914, Canadians were happy to have their troops as part of the British forces under an imperial status. As the war progressed, Canadian nationalism and the desire for Canadian control of her own fighting forces grew stronger. The British reluctantly acquiesced to the Canadian desires. It had been accepted as a principle, early in the war, that the Canadian divisions should always fight together as a unified corps. The Canadian government controlled the composition and organization of the Canadian Corps, but had no voice in determining how they should be used. In addition, Borden discovered that the Canadian government

54 Keenleyside, External Affairs, p. 45; Trotter, The British Empire-Commonwealth, p. 78.


had no real part in the decisions on general military policy; in fact, he often failed to receive enough information to know how or where Canadian troops were being employed.57

Sir Edward Alderson, a British officer, was picked to command the Canadian troops, but the relationship soon soured. Alderson thought of the Canadians as colonial rabble needing iron-handed discipline. He replaced Canadian officers with British ones, and Canadians blamed the sickening toll of casualties and the endless blunders on the British commanders.58

The imperial unity that had been so gloriously expressed in 1914 slowly slipped away. Borden soon realized that the situation was critical and that Canadian public opinion would not stand for the continued ignoring of Canada's wishes and feelings. Borden's protests were answered with expressions of sympathy, but since the British government did not know what to do, London merely hoped that Borden would not embarrass the Imperial government.59

Borden in the summer of 1915, convinced that correspondence was inadequate, decided to go to England himself. He hoped to personally present the economic case for Canadian

57 Keenleyside, External Affairs, pp. 45-46.
58 McInnis, Canada, p. 416.
preference in the war materials trade, to obtain a systematic understanding of the British war effort, and to visit the Canadian troops. The regularly scheduled Imperial Conference that was to meet in 1915 had been cancelled, but Borden was determined to make the journey. He arrived in England on 9 July 1915. Borden first visited the King and discussed with him the war and the constitutional problems which it posed for the Empire. Following the audience he recorded his belief that the King shared his views.

Borden spent much of his time visiting the Canadian troops in England and France. The visits, especially to Canadian hospitals, were profoundly moving and gave the Canadian Prime Minister a grasp of the war situation.

Wilson, "Imperial Policy," p. 98.

A series of conferences attended by representatives of the colonial powers were held in London beginning in 1887 to discuss imperial cooperation. Additional sessions were held in 1894, 1897, and 1902. When the Colonial Conference met in 1907, the representatives decided in favor of transforming the body into an Imperial Conference. The Imperial Conference had a permanent secretariat and was to meet at four year intervals. The Imperial Conference was to be a meeting place for the dominion prime ministers and the Prime Minister of Great Britain. The Imperial Conference was a more important body than the old Colonial Conference which was merely a meeting of dominion representatives, called together by the Colonial Secretary. McInnis, Canada, pp. 390-94; Trotter, The British Empire-Commonwealth, pp. 56-58, 76.


Ibid., pp. 502-03.

Ibid., I, 500.
Borden's attendance at a British Cabinet meeting was of more significance in that it set a new precedent in the constitutional relations of the Empire. Even Asquith, usually noncommittal, stated that it was a day for making new precedents. 65

Borden's early hopes of success were quickly dampened, however, and after six weeks in England, he felt he knew little more about the economic and military situation than when he arrived. On the eve of his departure for Canada, he bluntly declared:

_Unless I obtain this reasonable information which is due to me as Prime Minister of Canada, I shall not advise my countrymen to put further effort into the winning of the War._ 66

The threat of Canadian withdrawal was effective. The Imperial government hurriedly arranged for Borden to meet with the Minister of Munitions, David Lloyd George. The conference began in gloomy circumstances, but marked the beginning of a relationship of real growing rapport with Lloyd George that was to develop steadily until 1919.

As Borden and Lloyd George talked, reinforcing each other's opinions about the weakness of the British war effort, they agreed on the necessity of increased dominion participation in the determination of imperial policy. Before the meeting

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65 _Ibid.,_ I, p. 508.
66 _Keenleyside, External Affairs_, p. 41.
was over, Borden had dropped the threat of Canadian withdrawal.67

The Canadian Prime Minister returned home armed with assurances from Lloyd George and confident that Canada's case for economic preference was won. He had also received promises from Andrew Bonar Law that there would be increased dominion participation in the direction of the war effort. His trip seemed a marked success. By autumn of 1915, Lloyd George began to make good the pledges he had made. The summer of 1915 had seen Canadian wartime economy drop to its low point. Soon Canada was attracting all the business that her economy could handle, and the financing of the war was becoming a tremendous burden on the Canadian economy. The Borden government managed to finance the war effort through the sale of war bonds, by increased import duties, an income tax, and foreign loans. However Canada became, by the war's end, a creditor rather than a debtor of Great Britain.69

All was not so cheerful and bright for Canada. Borden was forced to review his entire imperial policy when Bonar Law's promises of increased dominion consultation failed to materialize. The Canadian government was disappointed over

67Ibid., pp. 39-42.
69Wilson, "Imperial Policy," pp. 103-04.
the amount of war information that it received. More than ever, the Canadian war effort looked like blind sacrifice. The Committee of Imperial Defense, the organ which Borden had hoped would provide the dominions with a greater degree of consultation and a larger voice in imperial affairs, was almost defunct. Most of its war functions were usurped by subcommittees of the Imperial General Staff. Borden, as a result, grew very angry over British indifference to the Canadian war effort, and the fact that he felt that London's promises were unfulfilled did not discourage his anger. 70

The tempo of Borden's efforts to gain a greater voice in imperial military policy quickened in November and December of 1915. Borden wrote Perley, in real anger, that the Canadian government received more information from the daily newspapers than from the British government. He threatened that the Canadian people could not be expected to keep 400,000 men in the field without having some voice in military policy. The Canadian Prime Minister asked whether the war was being fought by the Empire or by Great Britain alone, and charged:

Procrastination, indecision, inertia, doubt, hesitation and many other undesirable qualities have made themselves entirely too conspicuous in this war. A very able Cabinet Minister spoke of the

70Ibid., p. 107.
shortage of guns, rifles, ammunitions, etc.71
but declared the chief shortage was brains.71

Borden's tirades, though unsuccessful in increasing
dominion participation in imperial war policy, succeeded in
bringing about a major reorganization of the Canadian fight-
ing forces. Sir Max Aiken, a Canadian-born member of the
British Parliament, became Canada's official representative
in England in 1915. He served effectively and was largely
instrumental in the dismissal of Alderson, the disliked and
unpopular British Commander, in 1916. Later in the same
year, Borden reformed the Canadian military chain of com-
mand. He created a Ministry of Overseas Forces in London,
with Perley as its head, which helped to end the feeling
of frustration and helplessness that was so common in the
earlier years of the war.72

Thus, by the end of 1916, Borden was partially suc-
cessful in gaining for the dominions some voice in the
economic and military direction of the war effort and in
imperial affairs. However, Borden had to wait for a new
British Prime Minister and the creation of a new instru-
ment for cooperation before he, and statesmen of the other
dominions, could feel that their place was one of reasonable

71 Keanleyside, External Affairs, pp. 6-7. In
June 1917, a Canadian, General Sir Arthur Currie, was
appointed Commander of the Canadian Corps.

72 McInnis, Canada, p. 407.
equality in the determination of the imperial policy and the guidance of the war effort of the British Empire.
CHAPTER II

A VOICE IN THE EMPIRE

In December 1916, David Lloyd George assumed leadership of the United Kingdom. He had long advocated an all-out war effort, and his popularity indicated that the people of Britain were in agreement.\(^1\) It was obvious as the war progressed that the traditional Cabinet, consisting of ministers of all the departments meeting under the Prime Minister, could not cope with the wartime situation. The regular Cabinet proved too cumbersome for the centralized direction and organization of the war effort. Therefore, soon after taking office, Lloyd George revolutionized the traditional British Cabinet system establishing a five member War Cabinet. The War Cabinet members were: the British Prime Minister; Lord George Curzon; Viscount Alfred Milner; Arthur Henderson; and Andrew Bonar Law. The purpose of the War Cabinet was to initiate general war policy and to coordinate the action of other governmental departments.\(^2\)

When Lloyd George first announced the creation of a War Cabinet, the dominions feared that their share in the

\(^1\)Wilson, "Imperial Policy," p. 30.

determination of war policy might be lessened still further. The Colonial Secretary, Walter Long, however, assured Borden that the War Cabinet was not intended to isolate the dominions from a share in the determination of war policy.³ Lloyd George, convinced that the dominions should be invited to participate in the British councils to an extent even greater than before, decided to go even further than his Colonial Secretary indicated. Lloyd George justified his decision to consult the dominions on the grounds that Great Britain would need even more and greater dominion support to pass the crisis. He believed that the dominions must feel that they were sharing in the decisions as well as in the burdens of war.⁴ A few days later, Borden received from the Colonial Secretary an invitation to attend meetings of the War Cabinet for the purpose of discussing the prosecution of the war and the possibilities of peace.⁵

Lloyd George originally intended that the dominion prime ministers would sit as members of an enlarged British War Cabinet, but the 1917 military situation caused him to modify his plans. The sessions with the dominion ministers

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occurred as planned, but the regular sessions of the British War Cabinet continued to meet separately to handle domestic matters and the important war business of the United Kingdom. The sessions with the dominion prime ministers and the Indian representative therefore became distinguished as the Imperial War Cabinet.  

The Imperial War Cabinet consisted of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and such colleagues as he chose, the prime ministers of the dominions or an alternate with equal authority, and a representative of the Indian people appointed by the Governor for India. Members were to have equal access to all information available to the Imperial government, and the Imperial War Cabinet occupied a status equal to, or greater than, the British War Cabinet. The Imperial War Cabinet discussed problems affecting imperial policy and made decisions determining the course of imperial military action.

Borden described the work of the Imperial War Cabinet with an air of secrecy and importance. He stated that the ministers discussed almost every question connected

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6 "New Developments in the Constitution of the Empire," *The Round Table*, VII (June, 1917), 443.

7 General Jan Christian Smuts often substituted for the Prime Minister of South Africa, Louis Botha.

with the prosecution of the war. War policy, Allied cooperation, peace terms, and reconstruction—these were the vital topics under discussion in the Imperial War Cabinet. The information received in these meetings allowed Borden, for the first time, to construct an overall view of the imperial war effort.

Traditionalists criticized the use of the term "Cabinet" for Lloyd George's new creation. The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom was the head of the Imperial War Cabinet only in a complimentary sense. There was no direct executive authority as each of the ministers was responsible to his own parliament; the ministers could not resign nor could they be coerced to bow to the majority. Majority decisions were impossible as was collective responsibility.

Lloyd George explained the constitutional significance of the Imperial War Cabinet to the House of Commons on 17 May 1917 in the following words:

The essence of it [Imperial War Cabinet] is that the responsible heads of the Governments of the Empire, with those Ministers who are specially entrusted with the conduct of Imperial policy, should meet together at regular intervals to confer about foreign policy and matters connected

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10 Kénneyside, External Affairs, p. 49.
11 Temperley, Peace Conference, VI, 341.
therewith, and come to decisions in regard to them which, subject to the control of their own Parliaments, they will then severally execute.\textsuperscript{12}

The British Prime Minister mirrored Borden's own conception of the Imperial War Cabinet and of future imperial relations. Each nation of the Empire had its own voice in questions of common imperial concern, but retained perfect autonomy and responsibility to its own electorate.\textsuperscript{13} Thus, Borden saw his cherished dream come true. The Imperial War Cabinet, a new council of the Empire, brought with it a dominion voice in the direction of the Empire.\textsuperscript{14} Borden seemed confident that the Imperial War Cabinet would lead to the birth of a new and greater Imperial Commonwealth.\textsuperscript{15}

While in London, Borden also attended meetings of the Imperial War Conference, an outgrowth of the old Imperial Conference which had not met since 1911.\textsuperscript{16} Meetings were held on days alternate to meeting days of the Imperial War Cabinet. The Colonial Secretary presided over these meetings, and the membership included a number of British Cabinet ministers and representatives from the

\textsuperscript{12}Great Britain, \textit{Parliamentary Debates} (Commons), XCVII (1917), 1791.

\textsuperscript{13}Borden (ed.), \textit{Borden Memoirs}, II, 689-90.

\textsuperscript{14}Wilson, "Imperial Policy," p. 176.

\textsuperscript{15}Borden (ed.), \textit{Borden Memoirs}, II, 693.

\textsuperscript{16}See page 20, footnote 61.
overseas dominions and possessions. The Conference ministers spent much time discussing new ideas for the reorganization of the Empire, but Borden and William M. Hughes, Prime Minister of Australia, continually argued against projects for imperial parliamentary federation. On 16 April 1917, Borden, with the support of the British Prime Minister and the other dominion ministers, moved a resolution dealing with the constitutional relationship between Great Britain and the dominions. The Canadian did not want a misunderstanding over imperial relations after the war; he wanted the dominion constitutional advances recognized in writing. Borden's resolution read:

The Imperial War Conference are of the opinion that the readjustment of the constitutional relations of component parts of the Empire is too important and intricate a subject to be dealt with during the War, and that it should form the subject of a special Imperial Conference to be summoned as soon as possible after the cessation of hostilities.

They deem it their duty, however, to place on record their view that any such readjustment,

17 Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1917, Extracts from the Minutes of the Proceedings of the Imperial War Conference, 1917, Cmd. 8566, 40. One of the most serious problems facing the Empire since before the turn of the century was the future of the imperial ties. Advocates of imperial parliamentary federation believed that an Imperial Parliament in some form of federal system could draw the Empire together again into a closely knit unit. Trotter, British Empire-Commonwealth, p. 53.

18 Skelton, The Dominion of Canada, pp. 271-72.

while thoroughly preserving all existing powers of self-government and complete control of domestic affairs, should be based upon a full recognition of the Dominions as autonomous nations of an Imperial Commonwealth, and of India as an important portion of the same, should recognize the right of the Dominions and India to an adequate voice in foreign policy and in foreign relations, and should provide effective arrangements for continuous consultation in all important matters of common Imperial concern, and for such necessary concerted action, founded on consultation, as the several Governments may determine.  

The acceptance of the resolution definitely defeated the projects of the imperial federationists.  

The year 1918 opened disastrously for the Allied troops in Europe. The imperial war effort had stalled, and the Germans were massing an all-out offensive to win the war on the Western Front. By April 1918, the situation was critical, and Lloyd George called another series of Imperial War Cabinet and Conference meetings. Borden arrived in London on 8 June 1918 to discuss ways of meeting the new crisis. The Imperial War Conference met concurrently with the Imperial War Cabinet as in 1917 but was overshadowed by the seriousness of the war crisis. Of most importance was a Hughes resolution that established

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20 Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1917, Extracts from the Minutes of the Proceedings of the Imperial War Conference, 1917, Cmd. 8566, 40-42.

21 Trotter, British Empire-Commonwealth, p. 79.

22 Wilson, "Imperial Policy," p. 179.
direct consultation. The resolution as adopted had the effect of by-passing the Colonial Secretary and the Governors-General in communication between dominion prime ministers and the British Prime Minister.23

The more important body, the Imperial War Cabinet, convened on 11 June and met almost daily until August. Lloyd George's opening speech about the war conditions shocked the dominion prime ministers, and Borden immediately consulted the Canadian Commander, General Arthur Currie, to discover the truth. At the second meeting of the Imperial War Cabinet on 13 June, Borden delivered a stinging attack on the British High Command24 which supported Lloyd George in his struggle against the military leaders. The British Prime Minister set up a special subcommittee, consisting of himself and the dominion prime ministers, to gather all the available information and to decide what must be done to win the war. Actually, the subcommittee was created to plot imperial strategy for the remainder of the war.25

Borden, in a speech at the Royal Gallery of the

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25 Ibid., p. 814; Keenleyside, External Affairs, pp. 56-57.
House of Lords on 21 June, reaffirmed his faith in the Imperial War Cabinet. He described it as "a Cabinet of Governments" and expressed his belief that the Imperial War Cabinet was the "germ of a development in the constitutional relations of the Empire which will form the basis of its unity in years to come." The Canadian returned home on 17 August 1918, unaware that the collapse of Germany was so near.

The cessation of hostilities seemed imminent when Germany asked President Woodrow Wilson of the United States to prepare peace terms on the basis of his Fourteen Points. Wilson complied and sent his proposals to Paris where the Allies met on 29 October 1918 to consider and discuss the President's plan. The same day, Borden sent Lloyd George a letter raising the question of dominion representation at the Peace Conference. He reminded the British leader of the numerous wartime promises granting the dominions a role in the determination of peace terms and further warned that the Canadian people expected representation

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26 Wilson, "Imperial Policy," p. 194.


28 As early as 1915, the government of the United Kingdom had guaranteed dominion consultation as to the peace terms. The promise was reaffirmed in both 1917 and 1918. Wilson, "Imperial Policy," p. 195.
at the Peace Conference. Lloyd George replied that the question could only be solved by direct consultation and in November 1918 summoned Borden to England.

The Canadian Prime Minister had been in Canada only two months when Lloyd George's summons arrived. The Canadian had realized that he might be summoned at any time, but there was still endless preparations to be completed. In the short time available, the Canadian Cabinet discussed home problems and decided to continue the wartime coalition government. There was little discussion of the peace itself as representatives to the Peace Conference had to be chosen. Borden, as Prime Minister and Secretary for External Affairs, headed the delegation. Sir George Foster, Minister of Trade and Commerce, and A. L. Sifton, Minister of Customs, accompanied the Prime Minister. Minister of Justice, C. J. Doherty, was to follow. A staff of other officials and representatives accompanied the ministers.

Newton W. Rowell, the most important of the Canadian delegation not mentioned above, was as interested


31 Glazebrook, Canada at Conference, p. 34.

in Canada's international status as was Borden. Rowell's idealism complemented Borden's more pragmatic approach to the problem. Another important figure, Loring C. Christie, accompanied Borden as his legal adviser and personal secretary. Always at Borden's side, Christie was invaluable and, by himself, acted as Borden's foreign office, often drafting key memoranda which helped set the tone of Canadian policy. The Canadian delegation represented both major parties of the coalition government. Borden chose a delegation who, like himself, desired to establish Canada's international status, but his desire to leave a strong team at home was of considerable importance in his choice. Sir Thomas White was left in charge of the coalition government as acting Prime Minister.

The Canadian party sailed for England on 10 November 1918 and received news of the Armistice the next day. Upon arrival in London on 17 November, the Canadians received a cordial welcome, and then Borden went immediately into conference with Lloyd George. The British Prime Minister proposed that Borden should be one of the five British

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33 Keenleyside, External Affairs, p. 54.
34 Ibid., pp. 47-48.
35 Glazebrook, Canada at Conference, pp. 34-35.
Empire representatives to the Peace Conference along with himself, A. J. Balfour, Andrew Bonar Law, and George Barnes. Borden declined the special status as representative for the dominions and emphasized that Canadian status should be identical with the other dominions. The discussion was dropped, and when the Imperial War Cabinet convened on 20 November 1918, the routine of everyday business was quickly adopted.

There seemed to have been a lack of specific peace preparation by the Canadians, but they took a pragmatic and flexible position throughout the Conference and suffered no ill effects from that fact. However, Canadian statesmen had developed a sort of foreign policy by the end of the war which rested on two cornerstones—a realization that Canada must sooner or later assume full sovereignty, and an advocacy of full cooperation between Britain and the United States on all essential issues. In addition, Canadian foreign policy, which had matured tremendously during the war, stood for some kind of League of Nations, rigorous but not crippling peace

37 Ibid.
38 Ibid., p. 872.
39 Glazebrook, Canada at Conference, p. 35.
40 Keenleyside, External Affairs, pp. 57-58.
41 Shotwell, At Conference, p. 165.
terms, and the immediate liquidation of intervention in Russia.  

The key to the first cornerstone of Canadian foreign policy—full Canadian sovereignty—was revealed by Borden during the Armistice period. The Canadian Prime Minister recorded his true thoughts on the future of the Empire in his diary:

I am beginning to feel that in the end and perhaps sooner than later, Canada must assume full sovereignty. She can give better service to Great Britain and the United States and to the world in that way.

Full sovereignty, the recognition of Canada's separate international status, was the foundation of Canadian foreign policy at war's end, and Borden was well on his way to achieving it by his insistence that the dominions have separate representation at the Peace Conference.

The question of prime importance to Borden and the other dominion ministers was how the separate dominion representation at the Peace Conference could be secured. That question dictated the actions of Borden and the other dominion ministers until their departure for Paris in

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42 Keenleyside, External Affairs, p. 58.
43 Ibid., p. 57.
44 Ibid., pp. 57-58.
45 Glazebrook, Canada at Conference, pp. 40-41.
January 1919. The struggle for separate dominion representation was a difficult one, but Borden, as Prime Minister of the senior dominion, led the fight. Admittedly, he received full cooperation and support from Lloyd George and his dominion colleagues.\textsuperscript{46}

In previous discussions among the Allies, the British Empire was awarded five places at the Peace Conference; however, since the British government was a coalition, the dominions could only hope to share one of the five seats. The dominion prime ministers rejected a panel system by which a day-to-day rotation of dominion ministers would fill the fifth British Empire seat at the Conference. Borden was under extreme pressure from home as evidenced by a communique from the Canadian Cabinet which stated that separate Canadian representation at the Peace Conference was imperative.\textsuperscript{47}

On 2 December 1919, French, British, and Italian representatives met in London for preliminary talks. Much to the surprise of the Canadians, the dominions were not invited to attend. Delegates at that meeting decided that the small powers would be invited to attend only those

\textsuperscript{46}Borden (ed.), \textit{Borden Memoirs}, II, 892.

\textsuperscript{47}Canada and Newfoundland (The Cambridge History of the British Empire, Vol. VI; Cambridge: The University Press, 1930), 731. Hereafter cited as \textit{Canada and Newfoundland}. 
sessions of the Conference in which questions concerning them were to be discussed. If that decision were allowed to stand, the dominions, as small powers, would receive only token membership at the Conference. Therefore, Borden pressed for the special representation urged by the home government—that of equality with the small powers combined with a place on the British Empire delegation. Borden met with Lloyd George who personally promised that Canada would receive satisfactory representation.

During the month of December 1918, Borden kept the dominion ministers informed as to his proposed action, and on 30 December, they agreed to his strong proposals regarding representation. The following day at a meeting of the Imperial War Cabinet, Borden threatened that unless Canadian aspirations regarding representation were satisfied, he could not be responsible for the consequences.

Borden proposed the following solution:

First, Canada and the other Dominions shall each have the same representation as Belgium and other allied nations at the Peace Conference.

Second, as it is proposed to admit representatives of Belgium and other small allied nations only when their special interests are under

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48 Glazebrook, Canada at Conference, p. 41.
50 Ibid., p. 890.
consideration; I urged that some of the representatives of the British Empire should be drawn from a panel on which each Dominion Prime Minister shall have a place.51

Dominion participation through the panel system filled the void caused by the limitation which allowed the small powers representation only when questions concerning them were discussed. India was to be represented in the same manner as the dominions, and the Imperial War Cabinet accepted the Borden solution.52

The second cornerstone of Canadian foreign policy was the strenuous advocacy of full cooperation between Britain and the United States on all essential issues. Canadian statesmen announced that Canada reserved the right to be disassociated from any policy which placed that cooperation in jeopardy.53 The Armistice period provided clear examples to illustrate Canadian advocacy of full Anglo-American cooperation. The first example of Anglo-American discord—the question of former German territories—demonstrated the conflict of interest facing Canada. Borden opposed a peace settlement that would


53 Keenleyside, External Affairs, p. 58.
bring territorial gains to Great Britain if the United States did not assume any new territorial responsibility. At an Imperial War Cabinet meeting, Lloyd George reported Borden's concern over the acquisition of territory by the Empire and acknowledged Borden's sound judgment of American public opinion. Borden stated that "one of the most important assets that the Empire could get out of the war would be the assured goodwill and a clear understanding between Great Britain and the United States." He further stated that Canada did not enter the war to add territory to the Empire and would not support any dominion claims to conquered German territory unless they were essential to the future security of the Empire.

Another example of Canada's advocacy of Anglo-American cooperation could be seen in the struggle over continued intervention in Russia. Canada had supported the British attempt at intervention in Siberia while the United States had rejected the scheme. However, by the time details were worked out and troops sent, the war was nearly over and United States troops had entered the war. With the war

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54 Ibid.
55 Lloyd George, War Memoirs, I, 117.
56 Ibid.
57 Keenleyside, External Affairs, p. 55.
over, the anti-German argument for intervention disappeared, and Britain and Japan came into conflict with the United States over continued intervention in Russia. Canadian ministers were embarrassed, but sided with the United States against continued intervention. Borden was under extreme pressure from home to end the Canadian intervention and was forced to reconsider his earlier position. On 30 December 1918, Borden clarified Canada's position toward Russian intervention when he told the Imperial War Cabinet that Canada would not support a British policy that meant working in cooperation with another power (Japan in this case) against the United States. The Canadian Prime Minister considered continued intervention useless and believed that "the only thing to do was to have a conference with all Russian factions, including the Bolsheviks."

In accordance with home urging and American sentiment, Borden was ready to recall the Canadian force in

58 Ibid., p. 58.

59 Ibid. Borden's solution to the problem ultimately developed into the Prinkipo proposal whereby all the Russian factions, including the Bolsheviks, were invited to attend a conference with the Allies. Borden was nominated for the chairmanship of the Prinkipo Conference, but the effort to reconcile the Russian factions failed and the conference never took place. For an interesting interpretation on Borden's role in the Prinkipo proposal, see Ross Charles Horning, Jr., "Winston Churchill and British Policy Towards Russia, 1918-1919" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. of History, George Washington University, 1958).
Siberia. He denied a British request to keep Canadian troops in Russia, and, for the first time outside the North Atlantic Sphere, Canada exercised independent action over her foreign policy. Canada was no longer a passive partner to Great Britain in world politics. Thus stood the progress of the dominion's fight for an international status as the year ended and the British Empire delegation prepared to leave for Paris. Borden's diary concludes: "So ends this day and this most eventful year which has brought cessation of [the] war effort but not peace."62

60 The North Atlantic Sphere pertains to the relations between Britain, the United States, and Canada. Canada, by evolutionary development, had come to have a degree of independence over foreign policy in that area before the war.

61 Keenleyside, External Affairs, p. 56.

CHAPTER III

BORDEN AND THE CONFERENCE ORGANIZATION

The British Empire delegation and its staff that embarked for Paris on 11 January 1919 consisted of 207 persons, of whom the dominions accounted for 75.\(^1\) Borden's principle of separate dominion representation had been adopted by the British Empire delegation while in London,\(^2\) but the desired dominion status could not be achieved unless the Allied and Associated Powers accepted that principle.\(^3\) When the Allied and Associated Powers met in Paris, the whole question of participation and representation was still tentative. Contrary to the preliminary action taken by the Allies to gather information for the Peace Conference, there was surprisingly little thought given to the question of organization until late in the war.\(^4\) In fact,

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\(^2\)See pp. 41-42.

\(^3\)Glazebrook, *Canada at Conference*, p. 49.

there was no previously agreed upon decision regarding repre-
sentation except for an agreement by the five Great Powers—
Great Britain, France, the United States, Italy, and Japan—
that each of them would be allotted five delegates to the
Peace Conference. 5

As the statesmen arrived in Paris, they were faced
with a number of vital issues upon which rapid decisions
were necessary. Therefore, the wartime machinery and pro-
cedure already established was continued and determined to
a great extent the early organization of the Peace Conference.
The Peace Conference machinery was then, in reality, an
evolutionary institution rather than an innovation or
original creation. 6 One close observer commented:

... the real origins of the Peace Conference
organization took shape not from any formal
schemes of previous planning, either French or
British, but from the developing needs of the
negotiators, and resulted in a compromise be-
tween foreign office proposals and the still
existing war-time organization of the Allied
and Associated Powers. 7

The Supreme War Council, center of the wartime
machinery, met on 12 January 1919 and, arbitrarily, inaugu-
rated the general proceedings for the Paris Peace Conference.

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5 The term Great Powers will be used throughout
this work to designate these five nations.

6 Marston, Organization, p. 53.

7 Shotwell, At Conference, p. 35.
After preliminary military discussions, the military advisers were dismissed and the Supreme War Council meeting adjourned after the ministers declared themselves the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference. This body, thus, was an outgrowth of the political conferences of the Allies held throughout the war years and during the weeks since the signing of the Armistice.

The Supreme Council assumed many forms during the Paris discussions, but for the first two and a half months, met as the Council of Ten. The Council of Ten consisted of the Heads of the five Great Powers and their Foreign Ministers. Recognized as the official source of authority, the Council of Ten initiated and regulated the activities of the Peace Conference. It decided which questions would be discussed by the Conference delegates in plenary sessions, reserving some of them specifically to itself and referring others to commissions and committees.

During the first week of its existence, the main task facing the Council of Ten was that of making final

8 Marston, Organization, pp. 1, 54-55.
9 Ibid., p. 55.
arrangements for the Peace Conference. It had to define the relationship between the five Great Powers and the other Allied and Associated Powers, deciding which nations could attend and how each should be represented. The Council of Ten agreed that the main duty of drafting the treaties should remain in its hands; therefore, the rules of procedure adopted by the Council, and ultimately by the Peace Conference, provided that not all of the Allied and Associated Powers were to play an equal role in the determination of peace terms.\footnote{Lloyd George, \textit{The Truth}, I, 214-17; Marston, \textit{Organization}, p. 56.} The full Peace Conference consisted of representatives of all of the Allied and Associated Powers, but these powers were divided into four groups according to their influence and participation in the war. The four groups were:

1. Belligerent powers with \textbf{General} interests \cite{Great Powers} who attended all sessions of the Conference.

2. Belligerent powers with \textbf{Special} interests who attended sessions at which questions concerning them were discussed.

3. Powers breaking off diplomatic relations with the enemy who received the same rights as those with \textbf{Special} interests.

4. Neutral powers and states in the process of
formation who attended sessions at the summons of the Great Powers. 

All of the Allied and Associated Powers were given the privilege of attending the plenary sessions of the Conference, but the number of representatives for each was again based on a four category scale. The number of plenary representatives for each power was determined as follows:

1. Five representatives each for the five Great Powers.

2. Three representatives each for the special powers of Belgium, Brazil, and Serbia.

3. Two representatives each for the lesser or smaller powers.

4. One representative each for the other assorted powers, eleven in number.

The dominions were awarded the right to be treated as a special category. 

Thus, the Peace Conference of Paris was attended by delegates representing twenty-seven states and the five

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13_Marston, Organization, pp. 264-65.
British dominions. Seventy plenipotentiaries played the leading roles at the Conference, but there were more than one thousand other delegates present in Paris to assist them. 14

The rules adopted by the Council of Ten, and ultimately by the Peace Conference, guaranteed the British dominions special representation along the lines of Borden's London proposal. It was, however, only after a long struggle that the other powers recognized the special nature and organization of the British Empire.

On 12 January 1919, Lloyd George had presented the Borden proposal for separate dominion representation to the Council of Ten, but the proposal that ten additional delegates from the British Empire attend the Conference caused much concern among the representatives of the Great Powers. Woodrow Wilson was afraid of public reaction in the United States, but Lloyd George countered by reviewing the dominion war record. 15 The argument that "the Dominions had put one million men into the field" won the support of French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau. 16 Still unconvinced,


Wilson put forth a proposal which allowed each dominion and India one representative to the Peace Conference. Lloyd George explained that the dominions wanted equal representation with the other lesser powers and would not agree to Wilson's proposal without dominion consultation.

The following morning, Lloyd George conveyed the Wilsonian proposal of single representation to the dominion ministers. When Borden found that the dominions would receive no voting rights under the Wilsonian system, he pointed out that the American fear of extra British Empire votes would be eliminated and that Wilson's argument was largely one of sentiment. The other dominion ministers weakened though, and the Wilsonian proposal of single representation was accepted by the British Empire delegation. Borden, however, was not ready to give in and, at lunch, complained to Lloyd George about only half representation with the other lesser powers in attendance.

The Canadian Prime Minister denounced as unjust any limitations which would keep the dominions "outside the council of the Conference, while nations that had taken no

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19 Glazebrook, Canada at Conference, p. 50.
direct or active part in the struggle stood within and determined the conditions of Peace.\textsuperscript{20}

Later that same day, Lloyd George voiced the Canadian disappointment over Wilson's proposal and again reviewed the dominion war record. The British Prime Minister reported that Borden had assured him that Canada would feel mistreated if she received only half representation,\textsuperscript{21} and since Wilson did not want to appear personally opposed to the dominion desires, he proposed a compromise. The proposal provided for two representatives each from Canada, Australia, South Africa, and India; one from New Zealand, and none from Newfoundland. The right of the dominion and Indian representatives to serve as members of the British Empire delegation through the panel system was also reaffirmed, and the compromise was accepted by both the dominions and the Council of Ten.\textsuperscript{22}

Thus, the British Empire delegation at Paris consisted of six separate delegations, with five Peace Conference delegates from the United Kingdom, seven from the dominions, and two from India. The British Empire delegation met almost every day,\textsuperscript{23} and the views that Lloyd

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{20}Borden (ed.), \textit{Borden Memoirs}, II, 893.
\item \textsuperscript{21}U. S., \textit{Foreign Relations, 1919, Paris}, III, 532.
\item \textsuperscript{22}Glazebrook, \textit{Canada at Conference}, p. 50.
\end{itemize}
George took to the Council of Ten were usually the views of the whole British Empire as decided in these meetings. Although the Great Powers never met as a Council of Twenty-five in which the British Empire panel system would have given the dominions, as the fifth member, of the British delegation, a direct voice in the decisions of the Great Powers, the panel right allowed the dominions to place men for selection on the commissions and committees later created by the Council of Ten. Every major dominion representative served on one commission or committee during the Conference.

With the representation struggle seemingly decided in a favorable manner in the Council of Ten, Borden and the other dominion ministers relaxed while waiting for the first plenary session of the Conference on 18 January 1919. On the eve of the first plenary session, the Council of Ten announced that Belgium, Brazil, and Serbia were to receive additional representation at the Conference. Borden had promised the Canadian people equal representation with the lesser powers such as Belgium and quickly organized dominion opposition to the change. When the initial

25Temperley, Peace Conference, VI, 345; Glazebrook, Canada at Conference, p. 56.
26Ibid., pp. 50-51.
plenary session met, the dominions received the previously agreed upon representation, but Belgium, Brazil, and Serbia each received one additional delegate.  

Of greater importance to Borden was the trend that the Peace Conference seemed to be following. It appeared that the Conference was to be a sham and dominion representation useless if all important decisions continued to be determined arbitrarily in closed meetings of representatives of the Great Powers. Borden warned Lloyd George of this dangerous trend in a letter dated 21 January:

> I hope that it is not proposed to continue these conversations for the purpose of settling questions which are proper to be determined in the Conference itself. Otherwise there seems little occasion for the Canadian representatives to remain longer in attendance. . . . You will agree that it is both inappropriate and undesirable that we should remain in Paris for the mere purpose of receiving daily a proces verbal announcing conclusions in the determination of which we have taken no part.

The Great Powers were determined to keep control over the Conference, and the plenary sessions proved to be mere formality.

At the second plenary session held on 25 January, the Council of Ten arbitrarily announced its decision on the appointment of committees and commissions and the

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28 Clazebrook, Canada at Conference, pp. 51-52.
membership of such groups. The announcement resulted in strong resentment on the part of the unconsulted representatives of the lesser powers who believed that the commission representation assigned them was not adequate. According to the Council of Ten plan, each commission or committee would consist of two or three representatives from each of the Great Powers, and a lesser number of elected representatives from the other states at the Conference. Borden's concern over the representation on committees was minimal because the dominions would be eligible through the panel system, but he led the lesser powers' opposition as an assertion of dominion independence and individuality. He challenged the Great Powers over the duality of the Conference, implying that there were in reality two conferences in session—a smaller one making all the decisions, and the full conference meeting to appease public opinion.

Clemenceau, the Conference President, reproached Borden and reminded representatives of the less influential states that they were invited only because of a sense of fair play exhibited by the Great Powers. Delegates of the lesser powers were dissatisfied but thoroughly disciplined.

29Temperley, Peace Conference, VI, 346; Marston, Organization, p. 77; and Shotwell, At Conference, p. 147.
30Borden (ed.), Borden Memoirs, II, 905; Glazebrook, Canada at Conference, pp. 54-56.
by the "spanking" they received at the hands of Clemenceau. The Peace Conference met in plenary sessions only six times before the treaty was signed, and then only to ratify the conclusions reached in the Council of Ten and its fact-finding commissions. The Conference President rigidly controlled the plenary sessions and the program was thoroughly planned in advance by the Council of Ten. The lesser powers, however, had to be content with stating their special cases before the Great Powers, except for their partial representation on some of the commissions which were created by the Conference.

Representatives of the Great Powers, however, soon found that it would be impossible to keep entire control of the Conference in their hands. The Council of Ten met almost daily, but each special interest or nationality was given a chance to come before the Council to state its case. The sessions grew long and progress was slow. The Council of Ten had realized its incompetence to investigate many of the problems facing it and, within a week of its creation, began setting up commissions to which it referred special

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31 Temperley, Peace Conference, I, 249; Shotwell, At Conference, pp. 36-37. For minutes of the six plenary sessions preceding the signing of the treaty, and the two following sessions, see U. S., Foreign Relations, 1919, Paris, III, 157-413.

32 Ibid., I, 249-50.

problems for preliminary study and recommendations. By March 1919, the expert work of the Conference largely had been organized into commissions. These commissions grew in number as their advantages were discovered, and according to Tardieu, 52 commissions were at work before the treaty was signed. The commissions were controlled by the Great Powers with each entitled to 2 or 3 representatives on every commission while the other nations in attendance had fewer elected representatives, depending on the problem covered by the commission. The commissions came to have much more power than anticipated, but their findings were still sent to the Great Powers for the final decision before being placed in the treaty.

Borden and the other dominion ministers became involved in the commissions through the British Empire panel system. Canada's unique representation allowed its representatives to keep a foot in both camps, the Great Powers and the smaller ones. The British Empire delegation employed either its colonial ministers or its foreign office ministers as representatives on the commissions, and under the panel system, the dominion and Indian representatives

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34 House and Seymour (eds.), What Happened, p. 25.
35 Tardieu, Treaty, pp. 93, 97.
37 Glazebrook, Canada at Conference, p. 56.
could be selected to serve on the commissions as British representatives. The dominion ministers, thus, were able to be freely appointed to act for the British Empire on the principal commissions set up by the Council of Ten to consider special aspects of the peace treaties. 38

It was in his capacity as a commission representative, chosen through the panel system, that Borden became involved in the controversial question of boundaries. He was appointed one of the three British Empire representatives to the Commission for Greek and Albanian Questions and served as Vice President of that body. Lloyd George thought highly of this group of Borden, Sir Eyre Crowe, and technical adviser, Harold Nicolson, as evidenced by his statement that "No abler, more influential or more impartial combination could have been chosen to examine the case made by the Greek leader." 39 On 6 February, the three representatives met, and Nicolson tutored Borden on the Greek situation. Borden did not think too highly of Nicolson but respected Sir Eyre Crowe. 40 The Greek Commission was to meet the next day but was delayed until 12 February. The Canadian statesman, angered by the repeated delays at the Peace Conference, wanted to create a

38 Temperley, Peace Conference, I, 259.
39 Ibid., VI, 345.
scene but was soothed by his colleagues. Once the commission began working, the other delegates generally accepted the views of the British Empire representatives. Borden did not always agree with Crowe and Nicolson but, as a representative of the Empire, did not feel at liberty to disregard previous British commitments. His attitude toward the commission was like his general Peace Conference attitude, urging speed and simplicity, and on 7 March, the commission sent its report to the Great Powers.

The establishment of commissions relieved the Council of Ten of much of its business but did not improve its capacity to deal with the big problems of the Conference. The Council suffered from the amount of administration imposed upon it by the necessity of ruling much of Europe for a time. After 65 meetings from 12 January to 24 March 1919, the Council of Ten ceased to meet. The Council worked from day to day without a definite program and failed to solve the big problems facing it. Thereafter, the Foreign Ministers of the Great Powers met as the Council of Five, and the Heads of Great Britain, France, the

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United States, and Italy met as the real authority of the
Conference, the Council of Four. 45

From about 1 April, the Council of Four met at
President Wilson's apartment. At times, outsiders were
called in, but usually the meetings were held in private.
Sir Maurice Hankey acted as informal secretary for the
group. The Supreme Council of the Peace Conference had
at last reached a form which enabled it to make rapid,
and steady progress toward a peace treaty. 46 The Council
of Four held more than 200 meetings in a little over three
months; and after Orlando's departure on 24 April, Wilson,
Lloyd George, and Clemenceau continued to meet as a Coun-
icil of Three. 47

The Council of Four still needed some organ to
handle much of the administrative and miscellaneous work
of the Conference while it acted as a steering committee.
The Council of Five was organized on 27 March, three days
after the creation of the Council of Four, to carry out
that task. It never met as regularly as the Council of
Ten had done, but the personnel was fairly constant, and
it dealt with matters referred to it by the Council of
Four. A. J. Balfour served as the connecting link between

45 Ibid., p. 166; Haskins and Lord, Problems, p. 27.
46 Ibid., pp. 27-28; Marston, Organization, p. 164.
the two organs of control. The chief functions of the Council of Five were that of discussing reports of the territorial commissions and of solving the economic problems growing out of the Allied blockade. The Council of Five maintained the procedure of the defunct Council of Ten and circulated formal minutes, but it met only 39 times as opposed to the 72 meetings of the old Council of Ten.

Conference efficiency also was increased by the appointment of a five-man Drafting Committee that turned imprecise decisions of the commissions into the concise legal form necessary for insertion into the treaty. By 7 May 1919, the Drafting Committee had a treaty to present to the Germans.

With the acceptance of separate dominion representation by the Great Powers, the dominions achieved their desired status of equality with the other lesser powers in attendance. In fact, the dominions achieved additional power and representation through the panel system adopted by the British Empire delegation. Still, however, the dominions faced discrimination from disbelievers who misunderstood the true nature of the evolving British

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48 Ibid., pp. 171-73; Temperley, Peace Conference, I, 267.
49 Temperley, Peace Conference, I, 266-69.
Empire. To insure their international status and to prove their independence and equality, the dominions had to gain membership in the two international organizations planned by the Peace Conference. Canadian aims could only be achieved if Canada was accepted in these organs as a separate and equal nation.
CHAPTER IV

BORDEN AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Once the Peace Conference was underway and representation secured, the Canadians began to press for membership in the two proposed international organizations—the League of Nations and the International Labor Organization. The dominions were not seeking special representation, but rather acceptance as international entities, deserving of equal representation. President Wilson was determined that work on the international organizations should proceed with the peace planning, and since the Canadians had no part in the pre-Conference drafting of the League idea, they played a more active role in securing their membership in the League of Nations.¹

Lord Phillimore's draft, presented to the British War Cabinet on 20 March 1918 and later circulated among the dominions and to Wilson, was one of the earliest attempts under governmental direction to formulate League suggestions into definite form.² Phillimore's plan provided that in case of a serious crisis or dispute, the diplomatic group in a particular capital would come together

¹Glazebrook, Canada at Conference, pp. 57-62.
for consultation. His League was a limited League, limited in number and in function, and rather than being permanent, it considered disputes only in time of crisis in the hope of averting war. No provisions were made for other international cooperation, and such a system of diplomatic consultation left the dominions out entirely.  

On 8 June, the French submitted a statement of League principles. While not concrete proposals, the French principles were sufficiently close to the ideas expressed by Lord Phillimore as to make an exchange of views useful.  

Earlier in the year on 8 January, Wilson had advocated some kind of League as the last of his Fourteen Points. The Fourteenth Point stated:

A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.  

President Wilson's first League draft, completed in the late summer of 1918, differed from the British and French plans in that it provided for organized meetings, a permanent secretariat, positive territorial and political guarantees, and obligatory arbitration.  His advisers warned him about

3Ibid., pp. 9-10.  
4Ibid., p. 11.  
5Ibid., p. 12.  
6Ibid., p. 17.
Article X of his first draft which called for positive guarantees to preserve the integrity and political independence of any member of the League. David Hunter Miller, Wilson's chief aid on the League question, feared public opinion toward Article X both in the United States and Canada. He reported that "the false and fantastic vision of American (or Canadian or Brazilian) mothers praying for their sons in the Balkans was as real to many uninformed minds as a movie."\(^7\)

There appeared on 16 December an important contribution to the pre-Conference plans for a League of Nations Covenant. South Africa's Jan Christian Smuts, one of the most influential of the dominion statesmen, revealed his League ideas in a pamphlet entitled *The League of Nations: A Practical Suggestion*. The Smuts proposal introduced two important ideas later incorporated into the League—the mandate system and a proposal for League organization. He believed that the Constitution of the League should be based on a separation of powers into legislative, executive, and judicial functions. His League would consist of a General Conference or Assembly, a Council, and Courts of Arbitration and Conciliation. Since the legislative body would be too large for any real work, Smuts provided for a Council that would serve as the executive committee

\(^7\)Ibid., pp. 31-32.
of the League. The council would be composed of representatives of the five Great Powers, together with four other representatives drawn in rotation from a panel of intermediary powers and a panel of smaller powers. Smuts suggested that the Great Powers should have a majority of one in the Council and explained:

The advantages of this constitution is that the Great Powers obtain a majority—although only a bare majority—representation on the council and could not therefore complain that their interests run the risk of being swamped by the multiplicity of small states. On the other hand the intermediate and minor states received a very substantial representation on the league, and could not complain that they are at the mercy of the Great Powers.

The official British draft for the Conference, Lord Robert Cecil's draft, introduced on 1 January 1919, envisioned a League Council composed of the Great Powers only. Wilson, by accepting the Smuts ideas on Council organization in his second draft of 10 January, countered Cecil's plan. The second Wilson draft also adopted the Smuts ideas on mandates but, much to the consternation of the dominions, added the former German colonies to the mandate system. Wilson continued to advocate a League composed of representatives of ambassador rank, but the

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8 Ibid., pp. 34-39.
9 Ibid., II, 41.
10 Ibid., I, 38-40.
British would not agree because the dominions and India had no ambassadors. Miller recorded that the British representatives meeting with him began spending more and more of each session discussing dominion representation. 11

Cecil's second draft appeared on 18 January, Wilson's third draft two days later, 12 and by 27 January, a Cecil-Miller draft achieved substantial Anglo-American agreement. The Cecil-Miller draft omitted the reference to ambassador representation, 13 and it stated that the dominions and India would be separately represented in the League of Nations. Although tentative in language, the principle of separate dominion representation in the League was assured. 14

Hurst, Lord Cecil's aide, and Miller then met and a redraft was completed by 2 February. This draft, an Anglo-American one, became the working draft for the League of Nations Commission which had been authorized at the second plenary session. 15

11 Ibid., pp. 53-54.
12 Ibid., pp. 45, 49.
13 Ibid., p. 57.
14 Ibid., p. 65.
15 Ibid., pp. 54, 75. Wilson introduced a fourth draft on 2 February, but the League Commission chose to use the Hurst-Miller draft as their principal working model.
As Anglo-American cooperation on the League proposals was progressing rapidly during the last week of January, it was almost shattered by dissension over the former German colonies. Wilson's second League draft had placed the German colonies under the mandates system, but the dominions already had designs on those areas. On 23 January, Lloyd George proposed to the Council of Ten that the Conference give precedence to oriental and colonial questions because the European problems were more complicated and would take more time to prepare. His real aim was to establish dominion claims for the former German colonies before a fully developed League could restrict them. When Wilson saw that he could not defeat Lloyd George's argument, he successfully moved a resolution requiring all powers to present their territorial claims within ten days. His resolution, however, failed to thwart the dominions who had had their claims ready for several months, and they were invited to present their territorial claims to the Council of Ten the next day.

Before introducing the dominion ministers to the Council of Ten, Lloyd George made a strong speech in behalf


of the dominion claims in which he indicated Britain's position on the matter. His speech stressed three main points. First, he reminded the Council that they were in unanimous agreement that Germany was unfit to rule its colonies and that they should not be returned. Secondly, Lloyd George accepted the mandate principle on England's behalf, adding that the British Empire had long administered its colonies as a kind of mandate. Finally, he asked that the dominions be excused from the mandate principle because each had an irrefutable claim for annexation of the former German colonies. South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand then made individual claims for annexation based on the right of conquest and on the need for future security.

Wilson fought against the dominion claims and demanded that the mandate principle be universally applied, but he fought alone. England, of course, wanted to keep peace in the Imperial family. French and Japanese representatives supported the dominion claims, but Wilson stubbornly held out for universal application of the mandates.

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18_Ibid., pp. 60-61._
20_Ibid., pp. 740-43._
21_Miller, _Drafting._ 1, 103.
principle. The demands of the dominions for annexation of the conquered German colonies conflicted with the Wilsonian desire to place them under international control, and the battle was still raging on 28 January. Canadian participation in the war was limited chiefly to Europe, but the other dominions were active in their own spheres of influence conquering nearby German possessions which they fully expected to retain at the Peace Conference. Borden stated before the war ended that "if the chief result of this war was merely a scramble for territory by the allied nations, it would merely be a prelude to further wars." However, he realized the necessity of British Empire unity and was willing to support the dominion claims if they could be justified. Since Canadian representatives had no territorial ambitions and were in a particularly favorable position to mediate the issue, Borden assumed the role of peacemaker and attempted to secure a compromise.

22 Birdsall, Versailles, p. 63.
25 Glazebrook, Canada at Conference, p. 39.
Borden believed that he had found a solution with his proposal that the appointment of mandatories need not wait until the League was functioning. The powers were actually a League of Nations, Borden said, and there was no reason why they should not distribute the mandates at once. Borden's plan, approved by Lloyd George, would allow the dominions to accept the mandates principle while still safeguarding their interests in the former German colonies. Wilson insisted upon international control of these areas and held out for the immediate acceptance on the mandates principle by all powers with colonial claims. He felt that the choice of mandatory powers and the details of its application should be worked out later by the League in its first session.27

The dominions refused to yield, as did Wilson. On 29 January, Smuts introduced a plan that incorporated the mandates principle into the League Covenant. The first seven clauses of the proposal were a genuine embodiment of the Wilsonian ideals; however, clause eight which instituted Class C Mandates read:

Finally they consider that there are territories, such as Southwest Africa and certain islands of the South Pacific, which owing to

27Birdsall, Versailles, pp. 63-64.
28Seymour, Colonel House, IV, 319-20; Lloyd George, The Truth, I, 538-41.
the sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centers of civilization, or their geographical contiguity to the mandatory State, and other circumstances, can best be administered under the laws of the mandatory State as integral portions thereof, subject of the safeguards above-mentioned in the interests of the indigenous population. 29

This clause, obvious in intent, would allow the dominions to accept the mandates principles while safeguarding what they felt to be their special interests.

Later in the day, the British Empire delegation met to discuss the compromise presented by Smuts. General Louis-Botha, Prime Minister of South Africa, and Borden attempted to appease Hughes and Massey, Prime Minister of New Zealand, but the two representatives from the South Pacific dominions insisted that the former German colonies be transferred outright. Lloyd George complained to Borden that "Hughes wanted to stretch Australia from island to island across the Pacific, . . ." but thought that he had achieved agreement on the Smuts proposal. 30

When the Council of Ten met on 30 January, Borden was called upon to voice his views on the mandates controversy. He favored the Smuts proposal but warned against placing too great a responsibility upon the infant

29 Miller, Drafting, II, 41.

30 Lloyd, The Truth, I, 538; Seymour, Colonel House, IV, 298; Drafting Versailles, p. 60.
League. Much to the disgust of Borden and Lloyd George, Hughes and Massey again expressed their opposition to the mandates system. After long arguments, threatening empire unity as well as Anglo-American relations, the Council of Ten accepted the Smuts compromise on mandates. Wilson succeeded in defeating the dominion annexation attempts and in blocking the immediate distribution of mandates, but the language of clause eight of the Smuts proposal indicated that the Great Powers had tacitly agreed to grant to the dominions the areas which they desired. Borden could breathe easier when Anglo-American accord was restored.

The dominions found themselves in a favorable position regarding membership in the League when the League of Nations Commission presented its proposals to the plenary session on 14 February. Previous Anglo-American discussions had removed all specific limitations on individual dominion membership in the League. David Hunter Miller had presented a draft on 27 January which specifically admitted the dominions into the League; but the wording seemed ambiguous and the dominions on 4 February

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32 Lloyd George, The Truth, i, 59-69; Birdsall, Versailles, pp. 71-73.
33 Ibid., p. 67; Miller, Drafting, i, 114. The mandates were parcelled out on 7 May 1919.
requested clarification. Cecil asked that the question be deferred until a later date, and since the future discussions never occurred, the dominions assumed that they were eligible for separate membership. Thus, by the meeting of the 14 February plenary session, individual dominion membership in the League was assured.

Opposition to dominion membership in the League was relatively light. Colonel Edward House, Wilson's chief associate, realized that the dominion membership might later cause dissension when it was discovered that the British Empire would have six votes in the League Assembly but offered no protest because "if Great Britain can stand giving her Dominions representation in the League, no one else should object." The question of eligibility on the Council of the League was a different matter. Early plans for the League Council restricted membership to the five Great Powers, but the Council of Ten adopted the Smuts suggestion making four non-permanent Council seats available to the lesser powers through election. On 13 February, the League Commission agreed upon Article 4 of the Covenant which set up the procedure by which the four non-

34 Glazebrook, Canada at Conference, pp. 59-63.
35 Seymour, Colonel House, IV, 311.
36 Glazebrook, Canada at Conference, pp. 63-64.
permanent seats would be filled. 37 Canadian representatives took for granted that Canada would be eligible as one of the four if elected. 38

The text of the Covenant, as agreed upon by the League Commission, was introduced to the plenary session on 14 February. The League Commission did not meet between that date and 14 March as Wilson was absent because of his journey to America. The interregnum was looked upon as a time for presenting the Covenant to the world for comment and reaction. While Wilson was encountering difficulty in America, the dominion ministers were closely scrutinizing the Commission draft, and Borden prepared criticisms and amendments for the Commission draft which were circulated on 13 March. 39

The Borden statement began with a warm expression of appreciation for the work done by the Commission but continued with the warning that the provisions must be practical and not encroach upon the sovereignty of any nation. The Canadian Prime Minister then proceeded to discuss the Covenant article by article, offering his criticisms and suggestions. 40 Always mindful of European

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37 Miller, Drafting, I, 227.
38 Glazebrook, Canada at Conference, p. 65.
39 Miller, Drafting, I, 362.
40 Ibid., pp. 354-55.
commitments, Borden attacked Article X, the mutual guarantee clause, as an infringement of national sovereignty. He pointed out that any undertaking to preserve the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all League members was not practical. No one could foretell the future, Borden said, and all the territorial delimitations of the treaty might not do justice to national aspirations of the future. He ended with the assumption that the dominions were entitled to become signatories to the treaties and that each signatory state would be subject to the approval of its own parliament. Hughes of Australia also circulated some criticisms, but they were mainly hostile and unconstructive. However, both Borden and Hughes expressed displeasure over the term "Executive Council" as used throughout the Covenant draft, believing that the term should be simply Council. They charged that the term "Executive" implied a power that technically did not exist, and the term was subsequently changed to their wishes.

When the Great Power members of the League Commission met privately on 18 March, Cecil expressed Borden's

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41 Glazebrook, Canada at Conference, p. 68.
42 Miller, Drafting, I, 358.
43 Ibid., p. 362.
44 Ibid., p. 354.
view of Article X and the Canadian fear of being dragged into another European war. Cecil also initiated a wording change in the Covenant draft which had great implications for the dominions. He wanted Germany bound by the League Covenant even though the defeated nation was excluded from League membership for an indefinite period. Cecil asked that the terms “High Contracting Parties” be used in the Covenant preamble while "States Members of the League" be used elsewhere throughout the League Covenant. Germany upon signing the treaty as a "High Contracting Party" would be bound by the provisions of the Covenant but would not receive any of the privileges of the members. The use of the term "States Members of the League" was to cause the dominions undue trouble, especially as it was used in Article 4 of the Covenant regarding membership on the League Council.

Borden, the Canadian delegation, and the other dominion ministers did not recognize that the use of the term "States Members of the League" was a threat to their status. In his criticism memorandum, Borden failed to realize that Article 4 specifically excluded the dominions from eligibility to serve on the League Council.

46 Ibid., p. 284.
47 Glazebrook, Canada at Conference, p. 65.
The Council shall consist of the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan, together with the representatives of four other States Members of the League to be selected by the Body of Delegates.\textsuperscript{48}

The term "States Members of the League" excluded Canada and the other dominions because they were not technically or strictly States. If changed to simple Members of the League, the dominions and India would be as eligible as the rest of the countries.\textsuperscript{49} Clifford Sifton, in reviewing Cecil's action of 18 March, first noticed and pointed out the dangerous wording in Article 4 which made the dominions ineligible for membership on the Council. He informed Borden who quickly obtained the assurance of Robert Cecil that the wording was not intended to discriminate against the dominions.\textsuperscript{50}

On 1 April 1919, Cecil told the Americans that the British Empire Delegation wanted the word "States" dropped, inserting instead just "Members of the League." Cecil attempted to make the change without recalling the League Commission, but the Americans would not agree. In fact, Miller said that he thought the wording was deliberate to exclude the dominions and colonies from the League Council.

\textsuperscript{48} Miller, Drafting, I, 355-56.

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., pp. 477-78.

\textsuperscript{50} Glazebrook, Canada at Conference, p. 65.
The dominions felt discriminated against, and Cecil appealed to Wilson and House. On 23 April, a Cecil draft with the wording change was circulated among the League Commission members and Miller, upon Wilson's orders, did not oppose the British.51

In a letter to Lloyd George on 2 May 1919, Borden pointed out the possible argument over future interpretation of Article 4 of the League Covenant determining Council Membership. He asked Lloyd George to discuss the matter with the Great Powers which he subsequently did, and the Great Powers agreed that no change was necessary as the dominions were safeguarded by a fair construction of its terms. Borden, however, demanded that the Great Powers' view be expressed in writing and prepared a memorandum for that purpose.52 The memorandum prepared by Borden read:

The question having been raised as to the meaning of Article IV of the League of Nations Covenant, we have been requested by Sir Robert Borden to state whether we concur with his view, that upon the true construction of the first and second paragraphs of that Article, representatives of the self-governing Dominions of the British Empire may be selected or named as members of the Council. We have no hesitation in expressing our entire concurrence in this view. If there were any doubt it would be entirely removed by the fact that the

51 Miller, Drafting, I, 478-82.
Articles of the Covenant are not subject to a narrow or technical construction.

Dated at the Quai D'Orsay, Paris, the sixth day of May, 1919.

(signed) G. Clemenceau  
Woodrow Wilson  
David Lloyd George

With a signed declaration safeguarding their status, the dominions were satisfied that their rights were secure.

The dominion representatives were not the only conference delegates concerned with their national status. The Japanese delegate, Baron Makino, moved an amendment to the League Covenant "which would establish complete equality of status amongst all races which belonged to nations who were members of the League." Such a declaration was unacceptable to Canada, Australia, and even the United States as the federal nature of these governments allowed their member parts great freedom in immigration restrictions. The Japanese ministers realized that their proposals would not be accepted, but they hoped that their effort would pacify public opinion in Japan.

53 Lloyd George, The Truth, II, 636.
54 Glazebrook, Canada at Conference, p. 72. Birdsell claims that the Japanese were looking for something to trade for Shantung concessions. Birdsell, Versailles, pp. 89-90.
55 Borden (ed.), Borden Memoirs, II, 927; Seymour, Colonel House, IV, 313.
On 25 March 1919, the dominion ministers met to discuss the Japanese proposal. Borden offered an amendment which he hoped would fulfill the Japanese desire for status while not alienating the dominions, but Hughes of Australia remained irreconcilable. Undaunted, the Japanese delegate proposed another clause for insertion into the League Covenant. Baron Makino asked that the League Commission add to the Preamble the clause "by the endorsement of the principles of equality of nations and the just treatment of their nations." Public opinion in Japan was quite aroused by the continual denial of equality so the Allies searched for another solution. Cecil, Smuts, and Borden introduced substitute clauses into the League Covenant Preamble, but all efforts at compromise failed because of Hughes of Australia. The failure to appease the Japanese desire for equality divided the East and West more decidedly than ever.

56 Tillman, Anglo-American Relations, p. 303.
57 Ibid., p. 304.
CHAPTER V

BORDEN AND THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION

The proposal that another world body be established—an International Labor Organization, designed to deal specifically with labor problems—raised further difficulties for Canada as she sought recognition as a major power. Although universally recognized as one of the leading industrial powers, Canada's right to equal representation in the International Labor Organization was seriously challenged.

The concept of an international brotherhood of laboring men had been developing since the early nineteenth century, and several prewar international congresses were held that sought to advance the interests of labor through international cooperation. World War I, however, interrupted the movement and revealed the shortcomings of international protective labor legislation to safeguard during wartime, the interests of the workers. International labor, as a result, was interested in halting the war and sought ways to protect its interests through assuring a lasting peace.¹

During the war, labor organizations throughout the world were concerned about possible peace terms.

National and international conferences were called in an effort to determine the part international labor should play in the peace negotiations. As early as 1914, the American Federation of Labor resolved to "call a meeting of representatives of organized labor of the different nations to meet at the same time and place as the general peace conference . . . at the end of the war." The resolution was endorsed by labor organizations in many other countries, such as the Canadian Trades Union Congress.  

In 1915 and 1916, Socialists held international conferences to decide what action the working classes should take in behalf of peace. The International Labor Office, established in 1901, requested that it be a part of the proposed League of Nations and suggested that a specific labor guarantee be incorporated in the Peace Treaty. Trade-unionists held their most important wartime conference at Berne, Switzerland, in 1917; and the

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3Lowe, Protection of Labor, p. xxiii.

4Ibid., p. xxvii.

Inter-allied Labor Conference, held in London in September 1918, adopted Wilson's Fourteen Points. 6

A survey conducted by the British Ministry of Labor near the end of the war revealed that in almost every country, labor organizations expected the Peace Conference delegates to take some sort of international action regarding labor affairs. 7 Labor would not be denied the important new role thrust upon it by the requirements of modern warfare, and its demands continued throughout the Peace Conference.

Labor representatives had already petitioned the heads of government in their respective countries for representation and authority at the coming Peace Conference. President Wilson appointed Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labor, to the American Peace Delegation; Britain and France made similar arrangements to give labor interests representation at the Conference. 8

6 A. F. of L, Labor and the War, pp. 264-86.


During the Armistice period, labor leaders had agreed to attend a conference in February 1919, at Berne, Switzerland. Representatives from twenty-five countries, including Canada, attended. Chief among topics discussed was the proposed League of Nations. Representatives also demanded that a labor section be inserted into the Peace Treaty. In March 1919, discontented socialists assembled in Moscow and formed the Third International. Thus, several labor congresses were held while the Peace Conference was in session, and international labor was able to advise and to bring pressure upon the peace delegates in the field of labor affairs. The peace delegates discovered that

The movements for the maintenance of peace and for the international protection of labor are so interdependent that any league for the peaceful control of international activities would be foredoomed to failure if it alienated a large proportion of the working classes of the earth by omitting an adequate program for the international conservation of proper labor standards.10

Two possible solutions to the problems of international labor emerged from pre-Conference discussions. The first approach was a Labor Charter which included a number of specific reforms advocating such innovations as

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10. Ibid., p. 105.
the eight-hour day. These reforms, embodied in the Peace Treaty, would become effective upon ratification, and any country that signed the Peace Treaty would be bound to accept the Labor Charter reforms. The second approach was a Labor Convention, also embodied in the treaty, which would establish a permanent International Labor Organization with machinery to deal with the labor problems of its members. The Labor Convention would not obligate signatories of the Peace Treaty to accept any specific or immediate labor reforms; rather, their signatures would merely admit them as members to the Labor Organization. Delegates of the Continental Powers preferred the first solution, a Labor Charter, because of the immediacy of its international reforms. The British delegation preferred the alternative and instructed its labor experts to hammer out a draft of the machinery necessary for a permanent International Labor Organization. The British labor section complied, and by 18 January 1919, the opening date of the Peace Conference, the British Delegation possessed a very complete labor scheme.

Possessing the only completed labor scheme, Britain took the lead in bringing the labor question before the Peace Conference. On 25 January 1919, Lloyd George

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introduced a proposal for the creation of a commission to study labor problems. The most important aspects of the proposal were the seemingly implied consent of the Great Powers to the creation of an International Labor Organization, and the specific restriction that the Labor Organization be under the direction of the League.\footnote{Ibid., I, 125-26.}

The Great Powers set up the Commission for International Labor Legislation with remarkable speed. This seeming deviation from the bickering and disorganization which characterized most of the early Conference led several authorities to question the motives of the Great Powers. James T. Shotwell, American labor expert, expressed two possible motives for the early creation of the Commission on Labor:

The first was that the real masters of policy, the Great Powers, had not reached an agreement as to how they were to proceed in the settlement of the larger issues before the Conference, and that as there was need to give some outer indications of activity in the meantime, the public and the smaller powers were being put off with something of general interest to keep them occupied.

Shotwell continued:

The other was that the governments of Europe were nervous in the face of a rising industrial unrest, with unknown Bolshevistic possibilities, and had therefore to offer to labor a definite and formal recognition at the very opening of the
conference, both to justify themselves with reference to the war in the past, and to hold forth the hope of a larger measure of international agreements in the future.14

The British Delegation hoped that the newly formed Labor Commission would adopt their scheme which would set up an International Labor Organization. British delegates had planned to consult the dominion representatives separately, but there was insufficient time since the Commission was created so quickly. Instead, they held joint meetings with the dominion peace delegates and Empire labor representatives. Borden and government labor agent, P. M. Draper, represented Canada at the first of these joint meetings on 27 January 1919.15 The preamble of the British labor draft was slightly modified at the suggestion of

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14 James T. Shotwell, "The Historical Significance of the International Labor Conference," Labor as an International Problem, ed. by E. J. Solano (London: The Macmillan Company, 1920, Chapter II, 43). William L. Tayler, former Executive Secretary for the National Committee of the International Labor Organization, supported Shotwell's first contention that the commission was set up as a diversionary tactic. Tayler, Federal States, p. 25. H. W. V. Temperley believed that the Commission was set up primarily to counteract the prevailing labor conferences, both trade-unionists and socialist. Temperley, Peace Conference, II, 32.

15 Glazebrook, Canada at Conference, pp. 73-74. As an industrial country, Canada carefully studied the wartime proposals of the various labor conferences. When peace came, the Trades and Labor Congress sent its vice-president, Gustav Francq, and the Canadian government sent P. M. Draper to Europe where their duties were to consult with other labor representatives, to advise the Conference delegates, and to attend the forthcoming conference at Berne in February 1919.
Borden and Hughes of Australia. Borden questioned how federal states such as Canada, Australia, and the United States could be dealt with under the present labor scheme but believed that the difficulty could be overcome.\textsuperscript{16} The British Empire representatives did not discuss the question further, but it later became the stumbling block of the Labor Commission.

The dominions approved the British draft on 31 January, the day before the Labor Commission held its first session. This draft specified that the dominions would have the right to separate representation in the General Conference of the proposed Labor Organization, but excluded them from the opportunity to sit on the governing Council.\textsuperscript{17}

On 1 February, the International Labor Commission met for the first time; Samuel Gompers was elected president. The Commission held thirty-five meetings, spanning a period from 1 February to 24 March, and its delegates hoped to prepare a plan suitable to both the governments and the labor organizations of the world.\textsuperscript{18}

As a starting point, the Commission adopted the

\textsuperscript{17} Glazebrook, \textit{Canada at Conference}, p. 74.
\textsuperscript{18} Taylor, \textit{Federal States}, pp. 29-30.
British labor draft. This draft, which became the primary working draft of the Labor Commission, dropped the idea of a Labor Charter in favor of the International Labor Organization solution. The Labor Charter, however, was reintroduced in the Commission and became the most important amendment to the British draft. Both the Labor Charter, a statement of demands by labor, and the Labor Convention, which set up the machinery for a Labor Organization, were subsequently embodied in the Peace Treaty.

Normal Commission procedure called for reviewing the draft article by article, amending and passing upon each article separately. The most controversial and time consuming section of the Labor Convention was Article 19, dealing with the unique power arrangements of a federal state in regard to international agreements. The troublesome article contained the provision that proposals of the International Labor Organization could be presented in the form of an international contract. Upon receiving two-thirds of the General Conference vote, the proposal would be regarded as passed. Unless a member state expressed its disapproval within one year, an international labor contract would then become obligatory.\(^\text{19}\) Thus, each state

was left with the right of veto, but to invoke that power would be to court disaster among world opinion.

The Commission agreed upon most of the British draft except Article 19 which they postponed time and again. The Italian delegation hoped for a much stronger obligation than expressed in the British draft of Article 19 and enlisted French support. The American delegation, on the other hand, feared such an obligation and stressed the constitutional limitations of a federal state. Henry Robinson, the American delegate, suggested that where constitutional limitations existed, those member states should treat international labor contracts as recommendations only. The only obligation on such a member state would be the moral responsibility of its government to use its utmost efforts to bring about legislation to implement international labor contracts. 20 The American proposal seemed without obligation and ineffective. When further discussion got nowhere, Barnes, the British delegate and acting President of the Commission, proposed that Article 19 be placed in moratorium until the rest of the draft articles were studied. He also appealed to the delegates to use the intervening time to work out a solution. 21

20Tayler, Federal States, p. 40.
During the six day moratorium on Article 19, American and British delegates each worked out a compromise proposal. The British proposal, introduced on 27 February, suggested that the constituent states of a federal state adhere separately to international labor contracts. Under that system, a federal state such as Canada might be faced with a divided country, half favoring the labor legislation and half rejecting it. In such a case, the federal power would be powerless to intervene. Robinson then submitted a redraft of his earlier proposal, but the British plan was adopted. The controversy over Article 19, however, was far from settled. According to a prearranged plan, the Commission adjourned so representatives could consult their delegations before final passage of the Commission draft.22

The recess lasted from 28 February until 11 March 1919, in which time British and American delegates worked toward agreement. In an attempt to shed more light on the difficulty posed by a federal state in regard to international obligations, Sir Malcolm Delvinge, a British delegate to the Commission, asked Borden for aid. The dominion statesman referred the question to C. J. Doherty, the Canadian Minister of Justice who, unlike the United States legal experts, had no doubts as to the power

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of the federal government to ratify labor agreements. Justice Doherty replied that Canada would have no trouble in dealing with international labor agreements even though she was a federal state. He conceded that normally such matters as labor legislation were within the powers of the legislatures of the provinces but held that Article 132 of the British North America Act seemed wide enough to confer upon the Parliament of Canada all the legislative power necessary or proper for performing the obligations of Canada or of any province under such international labor agreements.  

Doherty's report showed that the Canadian delegates were under the illusion that even though a federal state, Canada would be confronted with no problems due to Article 19. This explains their apparent lack of concern over Article 19. Justice Doherty's views, however, were never realized in Canada, and Article 132 of the British North America Act was never used to ratify an international labor contract against the wishes of the Canadian provinces.

The views of Justice Doherty served to point out the

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23 Shotwell, Origins, I, 155. Article 132, British North America Act: "The Parliament and Government of Canada shall have all powers necessary or proper for performing the obligations of Canada or of any Province thereof as part of the British Empire, towards Foreign Countries, arising under Treaties between the Empire and such Foreign Countries." Glazebrook, Canada at Conference, p. 75.
prevailing opinion of the Canadian delegation with regard to federal authority. Perhaps this climate of opinion stemmed from the Canadian preoccupation with the "question of Canada's international status and her right to exercise her own treaty-making power." 24

The Canadian Constitution, the British North America Act, did not mention the word "labor" in either the enumerated subjects granted exclusively to the provinces or in those granted to the federal government. A search for terms corresponding to the word "labor" revealed that sometimes the federal government and sometimes the provincial governments had jurisdiction over labor legislation. Therefore, it became necessary to examine each case separately in order to determine constitutional jurisdiction. The first cases arising from the International Labor Conference, held in Washington in October 1919, set the precedent of submitting international labor contracts to the Minister of Justice for determination of the extent of Canada's obligation under treaty commitments. 25 Canadian policy, officially adopted in 1920, stated that treaty obligations incurred by membership in the Labor Organization did not obligate the federal

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24 Shotwell, Origins, I, 155.

25 Tayler, Federal States, pp. 107-08.
government to enact labor contracts into law without the consent of the provinces.26

The Labor Commission recess ended on 11 March, and six days later, another American delegate, James T. Shotwell, presented a compromise proposal on Article 19. His compromise made two changes in the previously accepted British draft. First, the International Labor Organization could submit recommendations rather than international labor contracts to the member states for consideration, without any further obligation being placed on the governments of the states. This idea was much like the one earlier advocated by Robinson, the other American delegate. The second modification allowed federal states which were constitutionally limited to treat all international labor contracts as recommendations only.27 There was still some dissension in the Commission, but the general consensus of opinion seemed to be that it was better to have the United States in a weakened labor scheme than not to have her adhere at all.28 On 19 March, the Commission adopted its completed draft with Shotwell's compromise on Article 19. The completed draft contained both a Labor Charter and a Labor

27 Taylor, Federal States, pp. 51-54.
Convention. On 24 March, after preparing a report for the plenary session embodying the results of its labor, the Commission adjourned.

All that seemed necessary when the Commission adjourned was to have its results placed on the agenda of the next plenary session. While Barnes, acting Commission President, worked to secure a plenary session, dissension grew among several delegations, threatening to destroy the work of the Labor Commission. Surprisingly, the most difficult opposition came from the British Empire delegation itself. First, the Labor Charter had not been a part of the original British draft agreed to by the dominions. Also, the Labor Convention, with its seeming inequalities, had failed to keep pace with the evolution of dominion status at the Conference. Dominion opposition to the Labor Charter was concentrated on Point 8 which provided for equality of status and treatment for foreign workers.

Point 8 of the Labor Charter read:

In all matters concerning their status as workers and social insurance foreign workmen lawfully admitted to any country and their families should be ensured the same treatment as the nationals of that country.

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29 Tayler, Federal States, p. 60.  
30 Lloyd George, The Truth, I, 655-56.  
31 Shotwell, Origins, I, 200.  
32 Ibid., II, 412.
This clause posed a most difficult dilemma for Borden and his colleagues. The Canadian nation, young and developing, accepted and favored immigration with the exception of Orientals. The western provinces especially feared that a flood of Japanese and Chinese immigrants would lower their standard of living. Provinces such as British Columbia barred Orientals from many occupations and discriminated against them in numerous other ways. These provinces would not permit a strong declaration in the Peace Treaty favoring the equality of foreign workers.

The Canadian delegates also objected to two articles in the Labor Convention which provided for the machinery for an International Labor Organization. The dominions were granted membership by Article 35, but only in such a manner that their equality was certainly questioned. The objectionable clause of Article 35 read: "The British Dominions and India shall have the same rights and obligations under this Convention as if they were separate High Contracting Parties." The wording "as if they were separate High Contracting Parties" seemed to imply inequality. The dominions felt that they were High Contracting Parties, and the implication of inequality was added to by Article 7 which excluded

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33 Glazebrook, Canada at Conference, p. 77.
34 Shotwell, Origins, I, 410.
the dominions from the Governing Council. Article 7, which set down requirements for membership on the Governing Council, stated that "no High Contracting Party, together with its Dominions and Colonies, whether self-governing or not, shall be entitled to nominate more than one member." Since Britain unquestionably would be represented on the Governing Council of the Labor Organization, the objectionable clause would deny the dominions the right to representation on that body.

After failing in several attempts to amend the wording of Articles 7 and 35, Borden decided that "the membership of the Dominions was to be the same as the League Covenant in respect of eligibility. . . ." Under Borden's leadership, the dominions had succeeded in gaining full equality as international states in the League; if successful, his proposal would have the same effect in the Labor Organization. The other dominion ministers agreed with Borden and decided to bring the matter before the British Empire delegation.

Opposition to Point 8 of the Labor Charter and similar objections to articles in the Labor Convention

36Glazebrook, Canada at Conference, p. 78.
37Ibid., p. 77.
resulted in a complete reexamination of the entire labor scheme. When the British Empire delegation met, many new questions arose. The question over the relationship between the Labor Organization and the League was particularly acute. Hughes of Australia, suspicious by nature of any real or supposed Japanese advantage, feared that the racial equality argument in the League might keep Japan out. If Labor Organization membership was dependent on League membership, Japan would in that case belong to neither. Her industrial competition, without the international labor regulations binding the member nations, might then become dangerous to Australia. Hughes, Massey, and Botha favored separate membership in the League and the Labor Organization. Barnes, however, remained firm in his belief that identical membership was essential and what was implied in the Labor Convention and the League Covenant.\(^{38}\)

Borden played the role of mediator in the British Empire delegation and arranged for a thorough discussion of the Labor Commission report. Two meetings under the chairmanship of Mr. Barnes on 29 March produced only the realization that several articles of the proposed labor program would require amendment. The Canadian statesman then suggested the appointment of a subcommittee to consider

amendments to the Labor Convention and Charter. He did not attend the subcommittee meeting, but A. L. Sifton represented Canada and reported:

I may say that the representatives of the Dominions and India were practically unanimous, first, in the idea that membership on an International Labor Organization should be separate and distinct from membership of a League of Nations; second, that Section 35 should be amended so as to allow Dominions to accept or reject membership in an International Labor Organization separately from each other or Great Britain. . . . 39

Sifton then expressed his fear that Barnes and the British delegation would attempt to rush the Labor Commission draft through the plenary session without amendment or discussion. He further cautioned:

As this is probably the most serious problem so far as our domestic matters are concerned, it requires very thorough examination before receiving the assent, either by inference or otherwise, of the Government of Canada. 40

On 3 April, Lloyd George presided over a full meeting of the British Empire delegation. It is significant that Lloyd George took the time to preside at this meeting when he was involved in some of the most critical difficulties of the Conference. He agreed to preside for the following reasons. Mr. Barnes argued that the labor proposal was originally a British one and that the

39 Glazebrook, Canada at Conference, p. 76.
40 Ibid.
British delegates had spearheaded the scheme in the Labor Commission. Dissension in the British Empire delegation, he thought, would undoubtedly have a deleterious effect on British prestige at the Conference. The dominions, as evidenced by Sifton's report, were in close agreement on several points of the labor issue and stood on their principles. Lloyd George, realizing the gravity of the situation, agreed to preside. The meeting failed to achieve agreement, but many points of dissension were clarified.41

Balfour then took the chair for two further meetings on 8 and 9 April. The whole labor scheme was reviewed at these meetings under Balfour's chairmanship, and some agreement was reached. The dominions agreed to the Labor Convention after the British delegation accepted the Borden amendment of Article 35, and Barnes consented to print up a new draft of the Labor Convention containing that amendment.42

However, the dominions stood firm in their opposition to the Labor Charter. They were especially concerned over Point 8. Any international legislation that might tend to lower provincial legislative barriers against foreign workmen, the Canadians felt, would cause a serious

41 Shotwell, Origins, I, 200-01.
crisis at home. Since the Labor Charter was expected to be an integral part of the Peace Treaty, the other ministers agreed to the Canadian demands for further discussion and agreement. Therefore, only the Labor Convention, with Article 35 as amended by Borden, was to be discussed at the 11 April plenary session. 43

Other delegations were also reexamining the labor proposals with great interest. The Japanese, aware of the disagreement in the British Empire delegation, sought to make an alliance with the dominions. Japan felt that some provision should be made for countries which had not reached the stage of industrial development achieved in the Western nations. Japanese delegates believed that it was impossible for their country to achieve immediately the same standards as in the West, and her case was strengthened by the fact that India was in a similar position. The Japanese proposal, however, was hindered by the suspicious Australian delegates who feared giving any special advantages to Japan. The resulting compromise, which satisfied both Japan and India, was the addition of a clause to the Labor Convention obligating the Labor Organization to take into account a country's stage of industrial

development when making its international contracts.\textsuperscript{44}

Thus, the April meetings of the British Empire delegation were pregnant with results: the dominions stood firm against the pressure of Barnes and the British delegation to pass the Labor Commission draft without modification; Article 35 of the Labor Convention was amended by Borden so that the dominions would achieve equal rights and representation in the Labor Organization; the Labor Charter, containing the particularly objectionable Point 8, was postponed until a suitable compromise could be worked out; and India had been appeased with the stipulation that the Labor Organization, when making its proposals, would take into account the stage of industrial development of its members. Dominion solidarity proved itself a mighty weapon in the destruction of British domination of the British Empire delegation.

When the plenary session of 11 April convened, an unaltered text of the Commission's Labor Convention draft was distributed to the delegates. Through some misunderstanding, the agreement secured by Borden in the British Empire delegation meeting of 9 April had not been included. Borden realized that Article 35 was not changed to his specifications and immediately conferred with Lloyd

\textsuperscript{44} Shotwell, Origins, I, 202-27.
George, Wilson, and Clemenceau. The group agreed that an amendment was in order, and it was with their approval that Borden proposed his Article 35 amendment to the Conference.\(^45\)

The dominions were also alarmed to learn that the entire Commission draft was to be presented for passage. Balfour, on 9 April, had specifically promised the dominions that the Labor Charter would not be discussed at this plenary session. Wilson, however, insisted on passage of the entire Labor Commission draft because he feared that failure to do so would cause bad effects in Europe. Borden countered with the argument that the "inclusion of the clause \(\text{Point 8 of the Labor Charter}\) might lead to great disorder, possibly rebellion on the Pacific coast of the United States and of Canada."\(^46\) Against stiff opposition, Borden, Balfour, and the other dominion ministers managed to table the Labor Charter.\(^47\)

Barnes submitted a resolution to the plenary session asking it to approve the Labor Convention as drafted by the Commission. He also asked that immediate steps be taken to start the Labor Organization machinery functioning.


\(^{47}\)Borden (ed.), Borden Memoirs, II, 933.
The Barnes resolution was limited to the approval of the Labor Convention and did not include the controversial Labor Charter still under discussion.\(^{48}\)

At this point, Borden introduced his amendment of Article 35 with a short speech in which he said:

\begin{quote}
This Convention is linked in many ways by its terms to the Covenant of the League of Nations, and I think it desirable to make it perfectly plain that the character of its membership and the method of adherence should be the same in the one case as in the other.\(^{49}\)
\end{quote}

To insure that view, Borden then moved his amendment.

The Conference authorizes the Drafting Committee to make such amendments as may be necessary to have the Labor Convention conform to the Covenant of the League of Nations in the character of its membership and in the method of adherence.\(^{50}\)

Both the original motion and Borden's amendment were unanimously accepted.\(^{51}\)

The Borden amendment for Article 35 directed the Drafting Committee to take the necessary steps to give the dominions the equal rights and privileges they enjoyed in the League. Borden contended that his amendment of Article 35 would also necessitate the elimination of that part of Article 7 which specifically barred the dominions from

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\(^{48}\)Shotwell, Origins, I, 209.

\(^{49}\)Ibid., II, 406.

\(^{50}\)Ibid., I, 209.

\(^{51}\)Borden (ed.), Canada in Commonwealth, p. 104.
membership on the Governing Council. Sifton, ever vigilant in Canada's behalf, added:

It is probably not a question of special importance whether Canada or Australia or the other Dominions should have representatives on the Governing Body or not, ... but it is important that they should at least have the right in common with the other members to nominate a representative for the consideration of the Conference. Anything that hints at inequality in connection with an international body would immensely detract from the likelihood of its acceptance.

The Drafting Committee, however, denied Borden's interpretation and refused to eliminate Article 7. The main opposition came from the United States, and Borden spent the rest of the Conference attempting to persuade the Drafting Committee to accept his interpretation of Articles 7 and 35.

Borden and the other dominion ministers had barely managed to table the objectionable Labor Charter at the 11 April plenary session. The Canadian statesman realized that further opposition would be futile unless an alternate draft could be worked out. Again he played the diplomat and initiated discussions for a compromise.

The nine-point Labor Charter, perhaps the most often discussed part of the labor issue, was no easy matter to

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52 Tillman, Anglo-American Relations, p. 309.
53 Glazebrook, Canada at Conference, p. 78.
54 Ibid., p. 80.
settle. Canadian objections to Point 8, dealing with the extension of equal status and working conditions to immigrant workers, were deep seated. Australia was even more venomously opposed than Canada, and it appeared that the United States faced similar difficulties. Barnes, however, in his role as acting President of the Labor Commission, felt himself duty bound to defend the Commission draft of the Labor Charter. He was supported by the Japanese, who were searching for equality for its nationals, and most of the Continental Powers.55

Balfour redrafted the Labor Charter and asked Borden to secure its approval from the American, Italian, and Belgian representatives. The Canadian Prime Minister met with Vandervelde (Belgium) and Colonel House (United States) but failed to achieve agreement on the Balfour redraft. Balfour then asked Borden to present a draft of his own, which he did. On 27 April, Borden presented his Labor Charter draft to a meeting attended by Barnes, Vandervelde, Robinson, and Otachiai of the Japanese delegation. The Borden draft was adopted, and the way cleared for its presentation to the plenary session the next day.56

Throughout the negotiations, Borden worked on terms of

friendly cooperation with Balfour and Barnes.\textsuperscript{57} His accomplishments in the Labor Charter again illustrated his ability to get along with the other representatives, and that ability was perhaps his most valuable diplomatic trait.

When the 28 April plenary session opened, Barnes reintroduced the original Labor Commission draft of the Labor Charter. The Labor Charter had been presented at the previous session but had been tabled.\textsuperscript{58} Barnes announced that difficulties had arisen since then and that changes had to be made. He stated that he had unsuccessfully attempted a redraft of the Labor Commission draft but added that "Sir Robert Borden was more successful than I have been in getting agreement upon a redraft..."\textsuperscript{59} For duty's sake, Barnes then introduced the original Labor Commission draft of the Charter.

Borden then read his amended draft of the nine-point Labor Charter. He explained:

I may say ..., as President Wilson said of the new draft of the League of Nations, that there are no alterations in substance as I understand it. There is, however, a new arrangement, and the phraseology has been somewhat altered... . . .

\textsuperscript{57}Glazebrook, \textit{Canada at Conference}, p. 80.
\textsuperscript{58}Shotwell, \textit{Origins}, I, 216.
\textsuperscript{59}\textit{Ibid.}, II, 414.
Further, as it is manifestly impossible to establish at once a code which shall be permanent or enduring, emphasis is laid in the new draft upon the consideration that these methods and principles are not to be regarded as complete or final. It is quite impossible for us to foresee all developments and all ideals which may arise in the future and, therefore, this is put forward as no more than a tentative enumeration of principles which, if they are observed and carried out as they should be, will result in a vast improvement of labour conditions throughout the world.  

Borden credited his success in securing Charter revision to a cooperative effort on the part of representatives of all the leading industrial countries. Vandervelde, one of the most influential men at the Conference, followed Borden and said:

The text proposed by the Commission was more precise, . . . However, . . . we have convinced ourselves that in order to secure unanimity between the representatives of the 32 nations, situated in every corner of the globe, a little scrumbling, if I may use the phrase, was indispensable.

We have, therefore, slightly scrambled the text, and I give my complete adhesion to the final text proposed by Sir Robert Borden.  

The Borden amendment of the Labor Charter was unanimously adopted by the Conference. In his draft, the objectionable Point 8 read:

The standard set by law in each country with respect to the conditions of labour should have

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60 Ibid., pp. 414-15.
61 Ibid., p. 416.
due regard to the equitable economic treatment of all workers lawfully resident therein.\textsuperscript{62}

The words "due regard" made the statement seem rather ineffective, but it was the general type of statement Canada and many of the other governments wanted. This general statement committed them to nothing; yet, as pointed out in Borden's introductory speech, if followed, a statement of this kind could accomplish untold good.

Although the Labor Charter problem was solved at the 28 April plenary session, Borden was still unable to convince the Drafting Committee to accept his interpretation of Articles 7 and 35 of the Labor Convention. According to the Drafting Committee, the Borden amendment did not apply to Article 7.\textsuperscript{63} If the interpretation of the Drafting Committee remained unchanged, the dominions would be denied the right of election to the Governing Council of the Labor Organization.

At a meeting of the Big Three on the morning of the 28 April plenary session, Lloyd George secured an agreement with Wilson and Clemenceau regarding Borden's interpretation of Article 35. The agreement, however, stipulated that Borden must secure the consent of American, French, and British representatives of the Labor Commission.

\textsuperscript{62}Ibid., I, 217.

\textsuperscript{63}Glazebrook, Canada at Conference, p. 81.
Wilson suggested that Borden see Mr. Robinson, the American representative. 64

The next day, Borden met with Robinson to discuss Articles 7 and 35. Robinson acknowledged the Borden demands but said that public opinion in the United States prevented him from agreeing. Ignorance of the real structure of the British Empire and a renewed fear of "six votes" for the British kept public opinion aroused in the United States. 65

In disgust, Borden sent a letter to Lloyd George pointing out the differences between British and dominion labor problems and the control over Latin America exercised by the United States. Borden stated:

The Dominions have maintained their place before the world during the past five years through sacrifices which no nation outside of Europe has known. I am confident that the people of Canada will not tamely submit to a dictation which declares that Liberia or Cuba, Panama or Hedjaz, Haiti or Equador must have a higher place in the International Labor Organization than can be accorded to their country which is probably the seventh industrial nation in the world, if Germany is excluded from consideration.66

After a meeting of the Big Three on 1 May, Borden met with Lloyd George and Wilson and insisted that the

66 Ibid., II, 951.
Labor Convention be modified. The next day, he wrote Lloyd George regarding representation on the Council of the Labor Organization. He informed Lloyd George that Wilson was favorable to Canadian representation, but hesitant about the other dominions and India. Borden continued:

As our position has been conceded with respect to the League of Nations, there is a far weightier reason why it should apply also to the Labor Convention, having regard to three principal considerations: (a) the essential and striking differences in labour conditions, (b) our great industrial development, and (c) the larger representation of the governing body under the Labour Convention (twenty-four) as compared with that on the League of Nations Council (nine).

Borden further threatened that

Unless the offending paragraph in the Labour Convention is suppressed, I shall be obliged to make a public reservation when the Peace Treaty is presented to the plenary conference. The motion that I proposed and which was unanimously accepted at the second-last plenary conference [April 11, 1919] affords ample ground, in my judgment, for its suppression. A directive from the Council of Four to the Drafting Committee would effect its suppression.

At the 5 May meeting of the British Empire delegation, Borden repeated his threat to Lloyd George. He intimated that he would raise the issue of Article 7 at the next plenary session. The Canadian statesman then prepared a

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67 Riddell, Documents, p. 36.
68 Ibid., pp. 32-33.
memorandum for Lloyd George indicating the exact position of the dominions. 69

Lloyd George, with the memorandum prepared by Borden, attended a meeting of the Big Three prior to the afternoon plenary session on 6 May. Using the arguments prepared by Borden the British Prime Minister took up the case for Canada and the other dominions. After initial resistance, the Big Three agreed that the necessary alternatives should be inserted in the Labour Convention, to place the Dominion(s) in the same position as regards representatives on the governing body of the Labour Convention as they already are in as regards representation on the Council of the League of Nations. 70

The Drafting Committee was ordered to make the necessary changes in Article 7, omitting the restrictive phrase, "No member together with its dominions and colonies, whether self-governing or not, shall be entitled to nominate more than one member." 71 Thus, the struggle for equal status and representation in the International Labor Organization was successful. The Dominions won full and equal privileges and responsibilities, just as they had in the League of Nations.

The completed text of the Peace Treaty was passed by the representatives at the 6 May plenary session and submitted to the German delegation the next day. The Peace Treaty, consisting of fifteen parts, had as Part I the League of Nations Covenant. Article 23 of that Covenant called for the establishment of an international organization to "secure and maintain fair and humane conditions of labor..." throughout the world. Part XIII of the Treaty set up the machinery for that International Labor Organization. It consisted of a General Conference which met at least once each year, an International Labor Office that functioned continually as a secretariat, and a Governing Council that controlled the Labor Organization. Every member state sent four delegates to the General Conference, two representing the government, one labor and one employers. Each of the four delegates had one equal vote in the General Conference. The Governing Council consisted of Twenty-four persons, eight of whom represented the nations of chief industrial importance. The remaining delegates, four representing the governments of the rest of the member

\[72\textit{Ibid.}, p. 960.\]

\[73\textit{Lowe, Protection of Labor, p. 104.}\]
states, and six each representing labor and employers, were chosen by the General Conference.74

74Ibid., pp. 104-07.
CHAPTER VI

THE AFTERMATH

At the 6 May plenary session, the text of the treaty, which became known as the Treaty of Versailles, was discussed, accepted, and, the next day, presented to the Germans for study. Borden felt that the peace terms were too severe and criticized the requirement that all Allied-German communication be conducted in writing. Conference delegates did not know how long the Germans would require to amend and sign the treaty, but Borden felt that he could not wait in Europe for their action. He earlier had expressed his desire to return to Canada but had stayed on in Europe at Lloyd George's request. The British Prime Minister, unsure of the German reaction to the treaty, wanted all the British Empire leaders present in case rapid decisions were necessary. On 10 May, however, Borden's return home became imperative, and four days later, he and Sifton left for Canada.

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2Ibid.
3Ibid., p. 961.
4Ibid., pp. 962-63.
5Ibid., p. 964.
The German delegation was to study the Peace Treaty, to make recommendations, and to propose amendments. As a result of their review of the labor clauses of the treaty and their reply of 10 May to this portion of the text, the Germans revived the unsettled question of membership in the two proposed international organizations. The German reply stated that it was essential that all states, whether members of the League or not, participate in the Labor Organization.

Clemenceau, as President of the Peace Conference, replied on 14 May that Germany would belong to the Labor Organization as soon as she was admitted into the League. Therefore, the Conference reply appeared to set a precedent for identical membership in both organizations. The Peace Treaty specifically indicated that membership in the League would automatically entail membership in the Labor Organization; however, due to lack of agreement, the Labor Commission had left its intentions vague. The Commission draft did not specify that only members of the League would be eligible for membership in the Labor Organization, and the meaning of the Borden amendment of Article 35 again became a topic of discussion.

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6 Shotwell, Origins, I, 259.
7 Ibid., p. 260.
Borden's amendment required that the Labor Convention conform to the League Covenant in the character of its membership and in the method of adherence, but this statement permitted a much wider interpretation. Barnes, an advocate of identical membership, felt that the League of Nations would be strengthened by having the Labor Organization as a part of it and under its jurisdiction. Those opposed to identical membership and favoring separate membership wanted continued labor cooperation even if the League failed. They advocated a Labor Organization equal to, and separate from, the League of Nations.

The reasoning behind the Borden amendment has often been misunderstood, but its terms supplied Barnes and those who advocated identical membership with a powerful weapon in support of their argument. Critical examination of the motives of Borden revealed that the sole reason for his amendment of Article 35 was to attain complete equality of status for the dominions in the Labor Organization. The scheme for the International Labor Organization as proposed by the Labor Commission was unsatisfactory to the dominions because of the inequality of status implied. The position relegated to the dominions was distasteful both in the method of adherence and in the restrictions placed on them. As the great preoccupation of the dominion representatives at the Conference was the recognition of
their international status, they could not accept an inferior position in the Labor Organization.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 260-62.}

Borden's amendment grew out of his desire that the dominions should hold the same position of equality in the Labor Organization as in the League. Since the dominions were eligible for both membership and election to the governing Council in the League, Borden felt entitled to the same under the Labor Convention. The Canadian statesman repeatedly said that "what they wanted was separate and equal membership with no excuses and no restrictions."\footnote{Glazebrook, \textit{Canada at Conference}, p. 78.}

As previously pointed out, on the advice of Barnes and the "rump" Labor Commission, Clemenceau had replied to the German proposal with a declaration favoring identical membership in the two international organizations.\footnote{Shotwell, \textit{Origins}, I, 262.} However, later in the same day, the Big Four met and agreed that Germany should become a member of the Labor Organization as soon as possible, even though her entry into the League might be postponed indefinitely. Barnes reconvened his Labor Commission on 15 May, and, pressured by the Big Four's decision, the Commission agreed that Germany's early entry into the Labor Organization would be planned.
at the Washington Conference scheduled for October 1919. The Central Powers, subsequently, were admitted to the Labor Organization before they became members of the League, and the Labor Organization adopted the policy of admitting new members regardless of their League affiliation.¹¹

The controversy over identical or separate membership continued to exist, however, and critics of the Labor Organization policies cited Borden's amendment of Article 35 as evidence that the action taken by the Labor Organization was in fundamental contradiction to the intentions of its founders.¹² One such critic was the Canadian representative to the Washington Conference held in October 1919, Newton W. Rowell, Chairman of the Committee on New Members. In his minority report for that committee, Rowell presented a wholly legalistic argument based upon Borden's amendment of Article 35 in favor of identical membership. But, as evidenced by the fact that it was a minority report, the temper of the International Labor Organization clearly favored separate membership and as great an autonomy as possible from the League.¹³

¹¹Ibid., pp. 262-68.
¹²Ibid., p. xxiv.
¹³Ibid., II, 500-01.
While preparations were being made for the Washington Conference, discussions on the labor parts of the Peace Treaty were frequent. One of the bitterest of these discussions occurred in June 1919 at the Annual Convention of the American Federation of Labor. Sir Robert Borden’s name was mentioned a number of times in connection with the labor clauses of the treaty. In a stinging attack on the Labor Charter, Andrew Furuseth charged:

Then when all of us had left Paris, when there were no more Americans there, they changed the proposition that "Labor is not a commodity or an article of commerce"—you know that expression from the Clayton Act. And what does the constitution-making body do when it is called together again? Upon the motion of Mr. Borden, of Canada, they make that to read: "the labor power of a human being is not 'merely' a commodity or an article of commerce," changing an absolute negative to an equally absolute positive. In order that you may understand the absolute meaning of it, I will draw a parallel. Someone says Andrew Furuseth is a scab; somebody else doesn't like that and proposes a resolution that he is not a scab; somebody amends it to read that he is not "merely" a scab; and that is what you get and that is what you are asked to indorse.14

The next day, Samuel Gompers, President of the A. F. of L., defended the labor clauses of the treaty, stating that the wording changes made by Borden and others were not of critical importance to the overall scheme. The A. F. of L. Convention delegates chose to accept Gompers's judgment and, consequently, endorsed the labor clauses of the treaty.15

14Ibid., p. 425.
15Ibid., p. 443.
Later that day, but too late to use in his speech, Gompers received a cable from Wilson assuring him that the real purpose of the Borden amendment of Article 35 was to secure equality for the dominions and India in the Labor Organization. Wilson attempted to quell the American fear of "six British votes" by appealing to Gompers to bear in mind the following considerations:

One: that Borden could not go back to the Canadian people who occupy a position of considerable importance in the industrial world, and tell them they were not entitled to representation on the Governing Body of the Organization.

Two: that the changes did, in fact, bring the Labor Covenant into harmony with the League of Nations Covenant.

Three: that the changes are not substantially important, inasmuch as every Labor Convention adopted by the Conference must be submitted to our Government for ratification. Thus the choice of acceptance or rejection lies in our hands irrespective of the constitution of the General Conference.

Four: that the problems of the chief British Colonies and Dominions are much more like our own than like Great Britain's so that their representation will be a source of strength to our point of view rather than an embarrassment.

Five: that, in my opinion, the changes do not introduce any new weakness into the Labor provisions.16

The Washington Conference in October 1919 was the final step necessary to set in motion the machinery for the International Labor Organization.17 Canada's success

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16 Ibid., I, 285.
17 Ibid.
there was reported to the Canadian House of Commons on 11 March 1920 in a report by Newton Rowell. He stated that

the House, I think, will be gratified to know that by a vote of the representatives of nations of the world assembled in Washington, Canada was one of the four nations elected to the governing council.

Nothing could have spoken better for the new international position of Canada.

However, Canada's new international status was buttressed in yet another way when the dominions separately signed the peace treaties, thereby becoming original members of the League of Nations. Borden's return to Canada denied him the final triumph of the Peace Conference, signing the Versailles Treaty on 23 June 1919, but he had led the struggle for the dominions' right to become signatories. It was a logical consequence of the status allotted to them in the peace negotiations that the dominions and India should sign the treaties separately. Early in the Conference, Borden had conferred with Lloyd George and the other dominion ministers as to the dominions being parties and signatories to the peace treaties. On 12 March, the Canadian Prime Minister circulated a

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18 Riddell, Documents, p. 38.
19 Glazebrook, Canada at Conference, p. 111.
20 Temperley, Peace Conference, VI, 361.
memorandum which suggested that the dominions be given that right, along with the procedure with which they could exercise it. The memorandum read:

(1) The Dominion Prime Ministers, after careful consideration, have reached the conclusion that all the treaties and conventions resulting from the Peace Conference should be so drafted as to enable the Dominions to become Parties and Signatories thereto. This procedure will give suitable recognition to the part played at the Peace Table by the British Commonwealth as a whole and will at the same time record the status attained there by the Dominions.

He continued:

(2) The procedure is in consonance with the principles of constitutional government that obtain throughout the Empire and in all the Dominions, but it acts on the advice of different Ministers within different constitutional units; and under Resolution IX of the Imperial War Conference, 1917, the organization of the Empire is to be based upon equality of nationhood.21

The memorandum also outlined a procedure, satisfactory to the dominions, which could be used in the signing of the treaties. Under the general heading The British Empire would be listed The United Kingdom, The Dominion of Canada, etc.; the signing would then follow the manner of the listing.22

As requested in his 12 March memorandum, Borden and the other dominion plenipotentiaries were given "Full

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21 Lowell and Hall, British Commonwealth, pp. 624-25.
22 Ibid., p. 625.
Powers" by King George V. As to the signing of the treaties, however, the method as proposed by Borden was not followed. The Treaty of Versailles, as presented to the Germans, called for the United Kingdom representatives to sign for the whole British Empire. Beneath the British Empire signature, however, the dominion ministers would sign for their respective nations. The names of the five countries were slightly indented in the print; the difference between the dominions and India and the other signatories of the treaty was thus symbolized by a quarter of an inch in type alignment.

More important was the policy put forth by Borden in his 12 March memorandum which pertained specifically to ratification of the treaties by the dominion parliaments. Borden had promised that the treaty would be submitted to the Canadian Parliament for ratification, but the process was complicated by the fact that ratification of treaties in England was an executive function of the King and not Parliament. Therefore, the Canadian Members of Parliament felt that in order to achieve the desired precedent, they must approve the treaty and issue an order-

23 Glazebrook, Canada at Conference, p. 111.

in-council requesting the King to ratify the treaty in the name of Canada. 25

On 4 July, the British Colonial Secretary, Lord Milner, cabled the Canadian Government that he hoped that the treaty would be ratified by the end of the month. 26 The treaty had not yet been received by the Canadian government, Borden reported, "Kindly advise how you expect to accomplish ratification on behalf of the whole Empire before the end of July." 27 Subsequent communication took place, with British ministers justifying the necessity of speed and the Canadian statesmen threatening open opposition if the treaty was ratified without Canadian approval. Finally, on 1 September, Borden called a special session of the Canadian Parliament and introduced the Versailles Treaty with the admission that

Canada, and probably every other signatory was not satisfied with every clause of it. Certainly the treaty was not perfect, but it represented the agreement of thirty-two nations, and was sincerely designed to assure the future peace of the world. 28

After a short debate over Article X, the mutual guarantee clause, the Treaty of Versailles was ratified by both

25 Glazebrook, Canada at Conference, pp. 113-14.
26 Lowell and Hall, British Commonwealth, p. 628.
27 Ibid.
28 Glazebrook, Canada at Conference, p. 115.
Houses of Parliament by 12 September 1919. On the same
day, an order-in-council was submitted to the Governor
General who stated that he was

pleased to order and doth hereby order that His
Majesty the King be humbly moved to approve,
accept, confirm, and ratify the said treaty of
Peace, for and in respect of the Dominion of
Canada.²⁹

As a signatory of the peace treaties, Canada became
one of the original members of the League of Nations which
came into being in 1920. As early as 1925, a Canadian
representative was elected President of the Assembly of
the League, and, two years later, Canada was elected to
fill one of the non-permanent seats in the Council. Canada
and the other dominions demonstrated to the world that they
could voice their own opinions and were not merely pawns of
the Downing Street government. The dominions and Great
Britain members often conferred on matters of mutual in-
terest but voted independently and often not in harmony.³⁰

Thus ended an important chapter in the history of
the Dominion of Canada. The Canadian war effort earned
the genuine respect of the world, and the work of her states-
men, during and immediately following the war, earned Canada
a place in the councils of the leading nations of the world.

²⁹Lowell and Hall, British Commonwealth, p. 630.
³⁰Trotter, British Empire-Commonwealth, p. 81.
Sir Hubert Borden directed both of these tasks with vision, and, therefore, must be recognized as having a place among the great statesmen of the British Empire in the Twentieth Century.
CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

Sir Robert Borden emerged from the Paris Peace Conference with a reputation as a diplomat of the first rank. His work at the Conference seems to reflect, at least in part, the work of the leading delegates to the Conference. Borden displayed much of the idealism of Wilson, the political acumen of Lloyd George, and the stubborn determination of Clemenceau. Throughout the Paris negotiations the other participants, especially Wilson and Lloyd George, showed great respect for his ability. In fact, using Canada's geographical position and political heritage to advantage, Borden tended to become the champion of Anglo-American cooperation. He used his advantageous position to gain concessions from both sides and did much during the months of discussion to ease the conflict between the two leading democracies of the West.

Borden was a person who understood the art of diplomatic and political compromise. He allowed neither unfounded idealism or impractical schemes to stalemate the progress of the Conference. Likewise, he was strongly opposed whenever reactionary nationalism tended to run rampant. Whether or not he was successful in his attempts at compromise, Borden retained a pragmatic and flexible position as a
From the first, the Canadian Prime Minister had made it known that the representatives of the British dominions would not allow their countries to be left out of the inner councils of the Conference. Borden believed that the dominion sacrifices in the great war from 1914 to 1918 had earned them a commensurate place at the table where the peace terms would be worked out. He made it clear that the dominion representatives would not remain at the Conference solely for the purpose of giving assent to a Peace Treaty dictated by the Great Powers. In this regard, Borden led the small nations in their challenge to Great Power domination of the Conference. His challenge was sounded at the plenary session of 25 January, and, although not fully successful, the Great Powers were forced to recognize that the smaller nations had a role at the Conference and in the determination of the terms of the treaty settlement.

The change in British imperial practice that developed during the war and the Peace Conference was, essentially, an extension of Borden's prewar imperial policy. More than any other dominion leader, Borden was responsible for forcing the British government to make the concessions granted during the war, and he spearheaded the demands that resulted in the promise that the dominions would be consulted on the peace terms. Harold Wilson has
If there was a year in which a revolution occurred within the British Empire, it was in the year 1919. Within that year the dominions gained separate membership at the Peace Conference, became separate signatories to the Peace Treaty, received admittance to the League of Nations and the International Labor Organization, ratified the Peace Treaty in their own parliaments, and finally secured the right of separate diplomatic representation in a foreign capital.

In the fight for each of the dominion gains listed above, Borden took the initiative and led the way.

Before the Conference came to an end, Borden had gone far beyond his prewar demands for changes in imperial policy and had put the dominions well on the road to achieving equality among the nations of the world. He was one of the first of the imperial statesmen to have a clear vision of the possibilities of a commonwealth of fully sovereign nations, bound together only by the tie of a common monarch. His 1917 declaration to the Imperial War Conference, regarding the future role and status of the dominions, can be considered as a first definite step in the development of the idea of the British Commonwealth of Nations as it exists today. Throughout the Peace Conference Borden labored for the attainment of Canada's interests which he felt could best be realized.

1Wilson, "Imperial Policy," p. 273.
within the framework of a greater political organization—a world organization of free and equal states bound together by a common political heritage.
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A sympathetic study of Wilson's role at the Conference based on his papers and documents. This work offers a collection of valuable documents, but the author's interpretations have been attached by more recent Peace Conference historians.


Study of the movement for international labor legislation and its connection with the origins of the International Labor Organization.


History of Canada's first two years in the war. Typical of wartime histories in its patriotism and dramatization.


A revisionist look at the Paris Peace Conference which suggests that it was a struggle between the new world order of Wilsonian ideals and the old world of reactionary nationalism.


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Helpful in tracing the growing role of the dominions in the war effort, and especially Borden's role in bringing about direct communication between the dominion prime ministers and Lloyd George.

A series of lectures by two American delegates to the Peace Conference which is especially helpful on Conference organization.

A record of the heroism and achievement of the Canadian troops from 1914-1918.

Interesting account of the dominion claims on former German colonies.


Offers interesting theory on Borden and the Prinkipo Conference.


A series of public lectures given by various experts who had attended the Conference. The questions asked by the public and the responses given by the experts give an interesting insight into the feelings of many of the Conference delegates.


Excellent study of the beginning of the Canadian Foreign Office and its effects on the evolution of Canadian external affairs.


Discusses the question of imperial federation and the effect of the war on the Empire.

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A study of the governmental changes brought about in the dominions as a result of the stresses and strain of war.


Controversial treatment of the economic aspects of the treaty, especially the reparations clauses. A classic work.


A report of the wartime labor action taken by the A.F. of L.

The author attempts to separate himself from many of Wilson's policies and thereby vindicates his own role at Paris.


Biographical sketches of the Governors-General of Canada with a short comment on Borden's bypassing the office in his communications to Lloyd George.


The author's personal recollections of the Peace Conference and the resulting treaties. It is an especially good source on Borden and the dominion role as a part of the British Empire delegation.


Contains a record of the Empire at war with some interesting details about dominion participation in the councils of war. Together with *The Truth,* these volumes form a history of the war and peace efforts from 1914 to 1923.


A comprehensive study of the origins and development of the movement for international labor legislation to 1920.


Traces the procedure by which the dominion ministers became signatories to the treaty and their parliaments ratified it. Documents a great aid.


Indispensable account of the contributions of the dominions to the war effort.
Stresses the growing international outlook and importance of Canada.

A must for understanding the origins of the organization and procedure of the Conference. The author traces the wartime machinery of command into Peace Conference organization.

An up-to-date survey of Canadian history containing good chapters on the Canadian war effort, both domestic and abroad.

An indispensable work for any student of the League of Nations.

Miller's personal diary and a collection of valuable documents found only in this source. A tremendous aid to understanding the Conference.

The diary and reflections of a young and ambitious member of the British peace delegation. He places little merit on the Canadian delegation, but he is practically the only source of information on Borden's role on the Greek Commission.

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   Contains an introduction by Robert Borden, personal reminiscences with useful comments on Borden's early career.

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