An inquiry into the Far Eastern provisions of the Yalta agreement and a consideration of some of their later interpretations

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AN INQUIRY
INTO THE FAR EASTERN PROVISIONS OF THE YALTA AGREEMENT
AND A CONSIDERATION
OF SOME OF THEIR LATER INTERPRETATIONS

by
Leonard Boasberg

A Thesis
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: THE MYTH OF "BETRAYAL"

"It is startling to realize," the longshoremen philosopher Eric Hoffer observes, "how much unbelief is necessary to make belief possible." So it is with the myth of Yalta—the "Yalta Betrayal" in which, as a result of the "stupidity, treason, and rottenness[which] had penetrated the core of the American government," this country allegedly sold out its principles, its vital interests, and its friends, notably the Chinese Nationalist Government.¹ At the wartime Crimean Conference with Stalin and Churchill, according to former Ambassador to Russia William C. Bullitt, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, "secretly, behind the back of China," signed "an agreement by which vital rights of China in Manchuria were sacrificed to Soviet imperialism," unnecessarily bought Soviet entry into the war against Japan, and "paved the way for war in the Far East."² At Yalta, declared Gen. Patrick J. Hurley, who had served a year as Roosevelt's Ambassador to China, "American diplomats . . . wrote the blueprint for the Communist conquest of China," and Gen. Douglas MacArthur observed that "one of the gravest mistakes that was ever made was to permit the Soviet to come down into China at


Port Arthur, Dairen, and other places of that sort." At Yalta, Sen. Joe McCarthy charged, China was "sold out" to the Russian Communists and "the stage was set" for the war in Korea: "No need to point out that at Yalta a dying President had at his right hand as his guiding genius, the traitor, Alger Hiss."

To believe in the myth of the "Yalta betrayal"--and men do, or say they do--one must disbelieve in historical facts, in logical deductions from those facts, and, ultimately, in the possibility of logic itself. ("The true reason for Yalta remains an inscrutable mystery," eight Republican Senators declared, after weeks of hearings on our Far Eastern policies after President Truman's dismissal of Gen. MacArthur.5) One must disbelieve not only in Roosevelt's integrity and intelligence but in the integrity and intelligence of most of his top military and political advisors, including some who, in later years, conveniently disbelieved that they themselves had given the advice which the historical record shows they gave. One must disbelieve at bottom in the American system itself--or at least entertain some doubts about it--for a system.


5MacArthur Hearings, Part 5, p. 3591.
be an iniquitous system, or at best precarious and feeble.

That many do so disbelieve is a tribute, perhaps, to the power of myth over man. "It is a piece of idle sentimentality," wrote John Stuart Mill, "that truth, merely as truth, has any inherent power denied to error of prevailing against the dungeon and the stake," or against, one might add, the demagogue, the public lust for demonology, and the mass-circulation magazine.

The myth of the "Yalta betrayal" has been useful. It has fulfilled what must be one of the most deep-seated of human needs -- the need for a scapegoat. To blame is, at least for many, easier than to act; to criticize, easier than to analyze; to complain, easier than to construct. To the frustrated the Yalta myth has provided a reason for frustration, but no solace, for it is the essence of the true believer to find consolation only in the articulated proof that his worst fears are true. Yalta has been a convenience, a target, a symbol for those who prefer belief in what Beard called "the devil theory of history" to the study of history's complex interactions -- those who find it more comforting or convincing to assert, as one newspaper put it not long ago, that "the greatest mistakes made by this Republic in the Twentieth Century have been made by one man, or perhaps one roomful of men, in Washington," than to examine the past, in von Ranke's ideal, "wie es eigentlich gewesen ist."

Yalta has been useful to those who would make policy -- or rather, those who would obstruct the making of policy. The Eisenhower Administration inherited a myth as well as a "mess." For

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years critics of American foreign policy, mostly but not entirely Republican, had attacked the "Yalta sell-out." Then, after 20 years in the desert, the Republican Party swept into the White House. Nearly two years later Howard K. Smith summed up what it had to contend with:

There is a myth that half a dozen men in the State Department caused the Chinese Communist revolution—diplomats therefore are not to be trusted. There is the myth that areas of Europe and Asia, Smith might have added were given to the Reds at the Yalta conference—therefore negotiation at a conference equals appeasement, and should not be permitted... These myths are made the stuff of U. S. policy by intimidating, purging, and dishonoring officials who might utter an independent or questioning thought. Thus Mr. Dulles, who is probably as capable a Secretary of State as we have had, is not permitted... to negotiate. Nor is he trusted to create any other policy but one of words and bluff.7

John Foster Dulles and Gen. Eisenhower had been, of course, accessories during the fact in the creation of their own later difficulties. Dulles had been a principle author of the 1952 Republican foreign-policy plank which promised to "repudiate all commitments contained in secret understanding such as those of Yalta which aid Communist enslavements."8 Eisenhower, in the heat of the campaign, had smote the Democrats hip and thigh over the issue. Neither Eisenhower nor Dulles had invented the subject, but they had pursued it. Now the subject was pursuing them. It had served and served well in its main function—as one crowbar to help pry the Democrats out of the White House. Instead of put-

ting it quietly away, however, Republicans in Congress began
swinging the crowbar about and swinging it dangerously close to
the President's head. The attempt to "repudiate" Yalta came a
dropper after several weeks of ceremony at the opening of the
83rd Congress, as did the attempt to repudiate one of the "Yalta
men," Charles E. Bohlen, but the Bricker Amendment, in its various
manifestations and with the interminable haggling accompanying it,
haunted President Eisenhower for years. The Bricker Amendment
stemmed directly from the conviction that at Yalta Roosevelt had
betrayed American interests and had done so without the advice and
consent of the Senate. The only way to prevent a future President
from doing the same thing, possibly with the advice and consent of
the Senate; the only way to prevent a President from wickedly su-
perseding the Constitution by treaty or executive agreement was—
so Sen. John W. Bricker and his allies argued—to cripple the
President in his power to negotiate with foreign governments. It
was a radical change in the traditional Executive-Legislative
balance of powers, to meet a hypothetical situation. To Eisen-
hower it was an irritating distraction from the more important
international and domestic business at hand. Later, it became
more than merely irritating. It became, in Eisenhower's words,
"a damned thorn in our side." Political pressures built up behind
it, and the Administration had its hands full beating down what
it regarded as a dangerous attempt to shakele the Executive's
powers in the conduct of foreign affairs.⁹

⁹Ibid., pp. 231-43; Eisenhower quoted by Emmet John Hughes,
With the passage of time, with new problems replacing old vendettas, the Yalta myth mellowed, so to speak, but it did not vanish. Old legends never die; they just fade away—but slowly. If Yalta ceased to evoke the passionate controversy it once evoked, it remained a cooled, hardened memory to be trotted out, not to be re-argued, but to be cited as a cautionary lesson from the past. It became most versatile. The Great Crusade gave way to the New Frontier, and Yalta could again be cited as proof that what the heirs of Roosevelt and Truman were doing, or proposed to do, or might do, was fraught with danger. Its function remained primarily negative. Thus, in a colloquy on the Senate floor in May, 1961, Republican Sen. Homer Capehart of Indiana denounced the proposal to trade tractors for Cubans captured in the aborted Bay of Pigs invasion, and demanded rhetorically:

When will we get to the point where we will quit listening to those who have been appeasers over the years; those who made the Yalta and Teheran Agreement sit; and those who were responsible for recognizing Soviet Russia in 1933, as President Roosevelt did?

In July, 1961, Republican Rep. Earl Wilson of Indiana, after listening to President Kennedy's report of his Vienna meeting with Premier Nikita Khrushchev, warned against what might come out of negotiations with the Soviet Union: "We want no more Yaltas. We want no more Potsdams. We want no more Viennas." In August, 1961, Republican Rep. James R. Utt of California urged "a declaration of war against the 96 Communist Parties which constitute the International Communist conspiracy," by which he did not seem to mean military action against the Soviet Union but rather a crackdown on Communist propaganda, infiltration, "violence
and murder," and the like: "America and the Free World are absolutely unprepared to meet this onslaught." One of Utt's targets was the Defense Department, which had recently restricted right-wing political activities by high-ranking military personnel.

America, said Utt, had never lost a war because of the lack of weapons: "Let's look at our losses and place the blame where it belongs"—and the name of Yalta led all the rest. A Californian urged support of the House Un-American Activities Committee and its film, "Operation Abolition": "...consider also the disasters of Yalta and the Korean war..."10

Professor Lev Dobriansky of Georgetown considered the lessons to be learned from the recent past: "The colossal naiveté of our leaders was displayed in the Yalta agreements and other unnecessary concessions..." and he urged a "declaration of independence" for Communist satellites and denounced the "Russophilic and other elements in our Department of State" who allegedly resisted the "policy of liberation." In the spring of 1962 the Chicago Tribune recalled Roosevelt's "surrender at Yalta" and hoped that if President Kennedy met Khrushchev again he would "save himself from some of the worst errors of his dotty party predecessor."

In June, 1962, columnist Constantine Brown, denouncing the "somewhat confused leader of the free world," President Kennedy, and the "utopian theoreticians" surrounding him, quoted an unnamed "representative of a minor NATO member" as saying: "The mistakes of your ailing President at Teheran and Yalta have cost you tens

10.S. Cong., 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 1961, CVII, No. 37, 8199; No. 126, 12312; No. 133, 6090; No. 158, A7074-75.
of billions of dollars, and may result in the reshaping of the world on the Communist pattern.\textsuperscript{11}

In the summer of 1963 Sen. Strom Thurmond (Dem., S. C.) opposed a détente with the Soviet Union--America's "no-win foreign policy"--with the argument that "war cannot be prevented by respecting the tragic errors of Munich and Yalta," and opponents of the nuclear test ban treaty warned of "another Yalta" on the near horizon. Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam proved, wrote Dan Smoot, "that it is disastrous for our leaders to make agreements with Communists." Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam proved, wrote Morris Ryskind in the fall, "that, when it comes to Russia, 'All we have to fear is negotiations.'\textsuperscript{12}

What strikes one about all these references is not only the uses to which they are put but the way they are put, as facts of history, like Columbus' discovery of America in 1492. A \textit{Wall Street Journal} editorial illustrates the approach. Here it is, \textit{in toto}:

\begin{quote}
We see where the Sacred Cow, the plane used to carry President Roosevelt to Yalta, is going to be added to the National Air Museum of the Smithsonian Institution. It will be presented by the Air Force on December 4.

We hope it will be done with due ceremony. It is always good for a country to keep on display the relics of its past. And as the visitors to Washington file past the Sacred Cow, perhaps it will remind them of all we owe to that journey to Yalta.\textsuperscript{13}

What do we owe to that journey? The purpose of this paper
\end{quote}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{11}\textit{Ibid., 87th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1962, CVIII, No. 33, 3255-56; No. 52, A2631; No. 103, A4728-29.}

\textsuperscript{12}\textit{Ibid., 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 1963, CIX, No. 99, 10211; No. 106, A4129; No. 131, A5401; No. 127, 14346; \textit{Evening World-Herald} (Omaha), October 17, 1963, p. 38.}

\textsuperscript{13}\textit{Wall Street Journal}, November 23, 1961, p. 16.}
\end{flushright}
is to describe the Far Eastern sections of the Yalta Agreement, the conditions and expectations of the time, and the subsequent development of a myth surrounding the agreement. (To keep the matter manageable this paper focuses on the Far East, although Roosevelt's "betrayal" of Eastern Europe is, of course, part of the generally accepted legend.) The next chapter is a brief discussion of the background to Yalta and to its Far Eastern provisions. Chapter III is a fuller development of the military background to the past, with special emphasis on the desire of American war planners for Soviet participation in the war against the Japanese. Chapter IV discusses American opinion on Soviet intervention and on Soviet aspirations in Northeast Asia. Chapter V recounts Chiang Kai-shek's hopes for a Sino-Soviet understanding as a counterpoise to the growing power of the Chinese Communists; Chapter V also discusses Chiang's negotiations with the Soviet Union culminating in the Sino-Soviet Treaty of August, 1945. The period between February, 1945, when the Yalta pact was signed, and February, 1946, when the secret provisions were made public, is the subject of Chapter VI. Chapter VII discusses the period between February, 1946, and August, 1949, when the State Department released its famous White Paper on China. Chapter VIII carries the story through the election of November, 1952, and the Republican attempt to "repeal" Yalta in the winter of 1953.

A note on the expression, "Yalta myth," is perhaps in order here. The Yalta Agreement was, in reality, an imperfect attempt by imperfect men to resolve complex, agonizing problems in the midst of war—to plan strategy for military victory and strategy
for postwar peace. It can be criticized; why not? The men who
made it, Roosevelt in particular, can be accused of having operated
under false premises, inadequate information, and all-too-sanguine
assumptions. But to go several steps further—to find, on the one
hand, a cause-and-effect relationship between Yalta and the fall of
Chiang, and, on the other, Yalta and the rise of communism in China;
to attack, explicitly or implicitly, the patriotism of Roosevelt
and his advisors; to make Yalta a symbol of what it was not—can-
not be justified by the facts of history, and the historian is ob-
liged, if he be true to history and to himself, to say so.

The Yalta myth is called a myth because it is a myth. Ob-
jectivity is incumbent on the historian, but objectivity does not
require him to weigh the claims of truth and falsehood in the ba-
 lance and arrive at a happy compromise. In the words of Gaetano
Salvemini:

"we cannot be impartial, we can only be intellectually
honest—that is, aware of our own passions, on our

guard against them, and prepared to warn the readers
of the dangers into which our partial views may lead
them. Impartiality is a dream, and honesty a duty.

Scarecrowing is easy, deceptive, dangerous; truth is diffi-
cult, complex, evasive. This writer's bias is, or so he hopes,
against the former and in favor of the latter.

This, then, is the story of a time, of an event, and of
how men came to believe in something that was not so."
CHAPTER II

THE YALTA AGREEMENTS

"The whole controversy," one historian asserts, "hinges on two basic questions... The first: Was Russian entry into the war against Japan necessary? The second: Did Roosevelt and Churchill willfully and lightly sacrifice the interests of a third power and friend, China?" A more reasonable formulation, one might suggest, would ask, in the first instance: Was Russian entry into the war against Japan believed necessary? The answer is, as far as American military authorities and public opinion were concerned, yes—almost unanimously.

In the second instance, the question is: Were the Chinese Nationalists prepared to pay a "price" for Soviet friendship and support, and were they, in a generally unsatisfactory situation, reasonably satisfied with the "price" decided at Yalta (but not enforced by Yalta, or, for that matter, by the United States and Britain)? This writer's interpretation of the historical record suggests that the answer to this question is also yes, although more tentatively. Oddly enough, this second question is seldom asked, even by Roosevelt's defenders—crucial as it obviously is.

Before examining these questions in detail, it may be well to touch upon the Yalta agreements made in the first six days of the conference. Yalta was not merely a place to which Roosevelt

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and Churchill repaired for the purpose of giving away Eastern Europe and China. If that had been their intention, they could have done so, with much less inconvenience to themselves, by remaining at home. There were vital matters to discuss with Stalin—matters involving the conclusion of the war against Nazi Germany and the configuration of the postwar world. Defenders of the Yalta agreements—no one, of course, defends Stalin's subsequent repudiation of his pledged word—claim that Stalin actually made "greater concessions" to the United States and Britain than they made to him. Stalin accepted the American formula for voting in the United Nations Security Council; he withdrew his request for sixteen votes for the Soviet Union in the Assembly; he withdrew his request that the United States and Britain agree, at Yalta, to invite the Ukraine and White Russia to the forthcoming San Francisco conference. Roosevelt and Churchill, in turn, agreed to support admission of the two when the San Francisco conference voted on the matter. Stalin also agreed to support two additional votes for the United States if the United States wanted them (Roosevelt later decided he did not). Stalin agreed to the American definition of the nations which should be invited to the San Francisco conference—all those which had declared war against the Axis by March 1, 1945, and as a result a number of Latin American countries, of which most could be relied upon to vote with the United States, were able to participate as original members of the United Nations.

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Stalin agreed to closer coordination of military activities in Europe. He yielded to American and British insistence that France be given a zone of occupation in Germany. The Russians had insisted on $20 billion in reparations from Germany; they settled for the $20 billion as a basis for discussion, which was quite a different thing. What to do about Poland was perhaps the knottiest question at the conference. Here Stalin appeared firm but not inflexible. Russian armies controlled nearly the whole of Poland at the time, and the Western allies were in no position to insist on anything. Yet Stalin, at their insistence, agreed to "reorganize" the Polish government and withdrew his own insistence that his puppet Lublin government merely be "enlarged." He held fast to the Curzon Line as Poland's eastern border, arguing that he could hardly be expected to be less Russian than Lord Curzon and Clemenceau on the matter, but he drew back from his extreme demands for Poland's western frontier and agreed to let that problem be settled at the peace conference. Stalin also accepted the American draft of the "Declaration on Liberated Europe" wherein the three Powers pledged themselves to assist "the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsible to the will of the people."

No one knows whether Stalin changed his mind after the conference or whether he was cynically signing promissory notes he had no intention of honoring. Parts of Yalta were self-enforcing--the French zone in Germany and the composition of the San Francisco

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5Stettinius, pp. 154-55, 295-303, 336; Rosenman, pp. 543-44.
Conference, for example. Other parts—such as free elections in Eastern Europe—could not be enforced except by a United States prepared to resort to arms against Russia before or immediately after the defeat of Japan.

One may concede that Roosevelt was too sanguine in his appraisal of Stalin's good faith, and too confident of his own ability to handle "Uncle Joe," but one can hardly prove—thereby that an attitude of greater suspicion would have produced a better agreement—or, for that matter, that a better agreement could not have been broken just as easily. "Was it suggested," Charles E. Bohlen, during the 1953 hearings on his nomination as Eisenhower's Ambassador to the Soviet Union, asked Sen. Homer Ferguson of Michigan, "that it would have been preferable to have had no treaty between the Soviet Union and China, to have left that a wide-open breach"—and the same reasoning applies to the Roosevelt-Churchill-Stalin pact at Yalta—"or is it meant that the treaty could have been better than it is?

Everything could be better, Senator, but it seems to me that every country must learn through its own mistakes, and I think the first task is to identify those mistakes correctly.4

In retrospect, Roosevelt's mistake does not seem to be that he made an agreement with Stalin on the Far East but that he neglected to obtain advance concurrence from Chiang Kai-shek. To have consulted with Chiang, however, would have meant informing him not only of the political agreements, the "concessions," but

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of Soviet plans for attacking Japan. This, in turn, would have been tantamount to informing the Japanese. Security was notoriously flimsy in Chungking. As Roosevelt remarked to Stalin at Yalta, one difficulty in discussing things with the Chinese was that what one discussed was known to the world within 24 hours. One of Roosevelt’s supreme objectives was to shorten the war and thus save American lives. If the Japanese learned about the intended Russian attack, they might strike first, before the Russians were ready. This would mean an even longer war and even greater casualties. Roosevelt felt the Allies could not take the risk. He thought he could work things out with the Chinese when the time came. Possibly he might have, but six weeks after the conference he was dead.

Roosevelt and Stalin signed the Far Eastern section of the agreement on the final day of the conference, February 11, 1945. Churchill, who throughout the war had scorned the “American obsession” with China and left Roosevelt “to do the needful with the Russians,” joined on behalf of Britain but took no part, he writes, in the preceding negotiations concerning the Far East. It could be said more accurately that he took little part. At Teheran, in November-December, 1943, Stalin had asked what could be done to provide Russia with a warm-water port in the Far East, and Chur-

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Churchill had replied that he "wished to meet the Russian grievance, because the government of the world must be entrusted to satisfied nations..."\(^8\) At Yalta, Churchill told Stalin privately that "we would welcome the appearance of Russian ships in the Pacific, and were in favour of Russia's losses in the Russo-Japanese War being made good." But, essentially, he regarded the Far East as an American show: "To us the problem was remote and secondary. It would have been wrong for us to get in their way unless we had some very solid reason."\(^9\)

The secret agreement nailed down, for the first time, Soviet participation in the Far Eastern war. Stalin agreed to attack Japan "within two or three months" after the German surrender.\(^10\) As early as August, 1942, Stalin had told U. S. Ambassador to Russia Averill Harriman that the Soviet Union would enter the Pacific war as soon as it felt in a position to do so,\(^11\) and in October, 1943, he informed Secretary of State Cordell Hull "clearly and unequivocally" that the Russians would intervene after the defeat of Germany, news which "astonished and delighted" the Secretary.\(^12\) But as the war progressed Stalin became, at least on the surface, less eager. In October, 1944, he referred rather vaguely, in a talk with Harriman, to certain political aspects which would have to be considered in connection with a Soviet move in the Far East. In December, he


\(^9\)Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, pp. 589-90.

\(^10\)Yalta Papers, p. 984.

\(^11\)MacArthur Hearings, Part 5, p. 3329.

spelled them out to Harriman in greater detail. At Yalta he told Roosevelt that unless his political conditions in the Far East were met it would be difficult for him and Molotov to explain to the Soviet people why the Soviet Union was entering the war against Japan. It was the kind of negotiating tactic that Roosevelt himself was wont to use.

Most of Stalin's conditions were met, although Roosevelt succeeded in scaling them down. They probably seemed as reasonable to Roosevelt as they apparently seemed to Churchill. The final agreement provided for (1) the preservation of the status quo in Outer Mongolia, which meant, in effect, continued Soviet domination over an area which had been out of the Chinese sphere of influence since the 19th Century; (2) the restoration of "the former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904"—the return of Southern Sakhalin to the Soviet; internationalization of "the commercial port of Dairen" (Stalin wanted a Soviet lease), with "the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded"; the lease of Port Arthur as a Soviet naval base; and joint operation by China and the Soviet Union of the Chinese-Eastern and South Manchurian railroads, "it being understood that China shall retain full sovereignty in Manchuria"; and (3) Soviet acquisition of the Kuriles.

For its part the Soviet Union expresses its readiness to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the U.S.S.R.

13 Yalta Papers, pp. 565, 573.
14 Ibid., p. 768.
15See, for example, Ibid., p. 677.
and China in order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke. 17

Roosevelt thought he had done well. 18 He had obtained a firm Soviet commitment to enter the Japanese war in time to save American lives. 19 He had obtained Stalin's pledge of support for the Nationalist Government and Stalin's recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria—a sovereignty which, it might be added, had never been exercised in fact by Chiang. In return he had conceded nothing, except the Kuriles, that Stalin's armies were not in a position to take, as Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson pointed out the following May in a memorandum to Acting Secretary of State Joseph Crew. 20

Stalin, as events showed, was scarcely reticent about taking whatever he could. Even if there had been no agreement at all, or even if Stalin had agreed on paper to surrender all his ambitions in the Far East, it seems hardly conceivable that, when the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, he would ever have held his armies back at the Amur and trusted in God's grace and Chiang's goodwill. As Lensen points out:

17 Ibid., p. 984.
18 Sherwood, pp. 869-70.
19 "The crucial issue was not whether the Soviet Union would enter the Pacific War, but whether it would do so in time to be of help in the carrying out of the plans of the Joint Chiefs for an invasion of the Japanese home islands. The great danger existed that the Soviet Union would stand by until we had brought Japan to her knees at great cost in American lives, and then the Red Army could march into Manchuria and large areas of Northern China. It would then have been a simple matter for the Soviets to give expression to 'popular demand' by establishing People's Republics of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia." Harriman testimony in MacArthur Hearings, p. 3332.
20 U.S., Department of Defense, The Entry of the Soviet
The conditional entry, negotiated at Yalta, put at least a paper restraint on Russian ambitions, which was the only restraint anyone could have put on Stalin in February, 1945.21

As for Alger Hiss ("It is significant," wrote Sen. Robert A. Taft, "that Alger Hiss was also at the conference and evidently made his influence felt . . . "), he attended as a technician primarily involved in United Nations affairs, and as advisor to the Secretary of State, not to the President; he had nothing to do with negotiations on the Far East and he was present at none of the meetings with Stalin in which the Far East was discussed.22 To argue that Hiss' very presence at the conference proves that he must have exerted a beneficent influence on the proceedings is untenable logically, and one can refute it by referring to the conference record, to which the answer may well be George Crocker's—that (as of 1959) Hiss' notes "are still suppressed."23 This is equivalent to saying that Eisenhower and Dulles, under whom the Yalta papers were prepared and published, were part of the great conspiracy to deceive the American people and betray this nation. There are people who believe it, but it seems to be impossible to provide such people with satisfactory proof to the contrary.


21Snell, et al., p. 155.


CHAPTER III

AMERICA'S WAR PLANNERS' HOPE FOR SOVIET ENTRY

One of the Great Mistakes of the War, according to Hanson W. Baldwin, military and naval analyst of the New York Times, was America's overestimation of Japanese capabilities and intentions. This faulty military estimate, says Baldwin, was the dominant factor in our even more grievous overestimation of the necessity of getting the Russians into the war against Japan.

The political misconception, no obvious now, should have been apparent then: it was not to our interest, or the interests of China or of the world, to make Russia a Pacific power; it was not to our interest to beg or better for Russia's entry into the Pacific war.¹

Undoubtedly, Baldwin is right. Our war planners should have known better. (Churchill, perhaps, should have known better too.²)

Unfortunately, however, they did not. To American war planners, Soviet participation in the war against Japan was a matter of military necessity. They had hoped for it and expected it from Pearl

¹Hanson W. Baldwin, Great Mistakes of the War (New York: Harper & Bros., 1949), pp. 77-79. William C. Bullitt, who regarded the Far Eastern arrangements at Yalta as "entirely dishonorable," put the case in even stronger words: "... anyone who understood the depth of Stalin's desire to seize Manchuria and Korea and to communize China, knew that no power on earth could have prevented him from declaring war on Japan at the last minute, when she was about to go down for the count under our blows. It was not only unnecessary to pay Stalin a price for making war on Japan but it would have been greatly to our political advantage to have prevented him from doing so." Ambassador Bullitt's criticism can be abbreviated, for the sake of clarity, as follows: "... it would have been greatly to our political advantage to have prevented" what "no power on earth could have prevented..." William C. Bullitt, "How We Won the War and Lost the Peace," Part 2, Life, September 6, 1948, p. 88.

²Ibid, pp. 15-16.
Harbor on. On December 10, 1941, for example, Gen. Douglas MacArthur had regarded immediate Russian entry into the Far Eastern struggle as a "golden opportunity . . . for a master stroke while the enemy is engaged in over-extended initial air efforts." But to the American and British Chiefs of Staff early in the war Germany was "still the prime enemy" and German defeat "the key to victory." The Russians had stripped their Far Eastern armies to meet the fury of the Nazi attack on Stalingrad, and Japan's powerful and well-organized Kwantung Army could have slashed into Siberia against but feeble opposition. Soviet-Japanese hostilities, then, would have imperilled, not assisted, the over-all Allied war effort.

The hope remained, however, and from the Tehran Conference, in late 1943, to the Potsdam Conference, in July, 1945, much of American policy was dominated by "eagerness . . . to secure a firm Russian commitment to enter the Pacific war." A few days before the Yalta Conference the Joint Chiefs, believing, as Gen. George C. Marshall put it several years later, that "nothing less than a terrific shock" would produce a Japanese surrender, had been unanimous in desiring "Russian entry at the earliest possible date." Admiral William D. Leahy, President Roosevelt's senior advisor, was one of the few—and perhaps the only—top-ranking military men

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3Louis Morton, "The Military Background of the Yalta Agreement," The Reporter, April 7, 1955, p. 19

4Defense Mimeo, pp. 1, 4.


who, at this time and even before, doubted the desirability of Soviet aid in the Pacific, but he offered no objections to the decision to seek it.\textsuperscript{7}

Fighting in Europe, in early February, 1945, was far from over. Allied troops were poised on the Rhine, but the Remagen bridgehead was yet to come. Soviet troops had tried and failed to cross the Oder. In the Pacific, as Harriman pointed out, MacArthur entered Manila only on the second day of the Yalta Conference; Okinawa and Iwo Jima lay ahead; and the first experimental atomic explosion was five months in the future.\textsuperscript{8} In China, a Japanese offensive had come perilously close to capturing the key city of Kwangyang only two months before the opening of the Crimea talks. Chiang's analysis of the Japanese decision to halt was correct: the essay "had insufficient strength and was running out of time, anticipating Allied landings on the Asiatic mainland at any moment." It was equally correct, however, that the Chinese had insufficient strength to stop the offensive if it had continued.\textsuperscript{9}

\textsuperscript{7}Defense Himea, p. 43; William D. Lecky, I Was There (New York: Whittlesey House, 1950), pp. 2, 148, 293, 318. The "mis-named 'concessions'" to Stalin at Yalta seemed, the admiral wrote, "reasonable to me . . . no one was more surprised than I to see these conditions agreed to at Yalta labeled as some horrendous concessions made by President Roosevelt to an enemy." Ibid., p. 318.

\textsuperscript{8}MacArthur Hearings, p. 3332.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff reported to Roosevelt and Churchill at Yalta that the end of the war in Europe could be expected by July 1 at the earliest and recommended "that the planning date for the end of the war against Japan should be set at 18 months after the defeat of Germany."\(^{10}\)

In these circumstances, with the atomic bomb, in Stettinius' words, "still an unknown quantity," American military leaders were putting "immense pressure" on Roosevelt to bring the Soviet Union into the Far Eastern war.\(^{11}\) The unanimity of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff just before the Yalta Conference was neither the first nor the last time they had expressed an opinion on the matter. In September, 1943, they had emphasized the "great importance to the United States of Russia's full participation in the war against Japan as essential to the prompt and crushing defeat of Japan at far less cost to the United States and Great Britain." In December, 1943, they urged that "every effort" be made to bring the Soviets in "at the earliest practicable date." In April, 1945, with Nazi Germany collapsing and the Western Allies increasingly suspicious of the Soviet Union's moves and motives, the Joint Chiefs began reconsidering the value of a Russian contribution to the surrender of Japan, but they did not change their minds.\(^{12}\) In fact, at a top-level policy meeting at the White House on

\(^{10}\) *Yalta Papers*, p. 830.

\(^{11}\) *Stettinius*, p. 90.

\(^{12}\) *Defense Memo*, pp. 43, 21, 27, 53.
April 25, the military representatives "pleaded for patience with the Soviet Union because they feared that a crack-down would endanger Russian entry into the Far Eastern war." 13 A month later, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, in a memorandum to Acting Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew, reaffirmed the War Department belief that early Soviet intervention would "materially shorten the war and thus save American lives." Roosevelt's concessions on the Far East, he noted, were, except for the Kuriles, "within the military power of Russia to obtain regardless of U. S. military action short of war." To attempt to forestall the Russians in the Kuriles, however "would be at the direct expense of the commission to defeat Japan and would involve an unacceptable cost in American lives":

Furthermore, the Russians can, if they choose, within the time when U. S. efforts will have practically completed the destruction of Japanese military power and can then seize the objectives they desire at a cost to them relatively much less than would be occasioned by their entry into the war at an early date. . . it appears we can bring little, if any, military leverage to bear on the Russians in so far as the Far East is concerned, unless we choose to use force. From the military point of view it would be desirable to have a complete understanding and agreement with the Russians concerning the Far East. If it is believed that the reconsideration of the Yalta agreement will assist such a complete understanding and agreement, then the War Department would favor it, but it is not believed that much good will come of a rediscussion at this time.

Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal concurred. 14 A week later President Truman was "reassured" to learn from Harry Hopkins in Moscow "that Stalin had confirmed the understanding reached at Yalta about Russia's entry into the war against Japan." 15 To get

13 Stettinius, p. 97.
14 Defense Minutes, pp. 70-71
a further "personal re-affirmation" of that pledge from Stalin was to Truman, "the most urgent" of his many reasons for going to Potsdam in July. On June 18, a month before the Potsdam Conference, the Joint Chiefs advised Truman:

With reference to clean-up of the Asiatic mainland, our objective should be to get the Russians to deal with the Japs in Manchuria (and Korea if necessary) and to vitalize the Chinese to a point where, with assistance of American air power and some supplies, they can mop out their own country... the impact of Russian entry on the already hopeless Japanese may well be the decisive action levering them into capitulation at that time or shortly thereafter if we land in Japan.

American field commanders were in accord with this judgment. One of them, in a conversation with a War Department Operations officer on February 13, 1945, expressed his apprehension that the Japanese might move the bulk of their forces in China to the homeland to meet the projected U. S. invasion.

He emphatically stated that we must not invade Japan proper unless the Russian army is previously committed to action in Manchuria. He said that this was

\[16\]Ibid., p. 411. James F. Byrnes, Truman's Secretary of State at the time, has expressed two versions of a different view. In 1958 he wrote that at Potsdam he encouraged the Chinese Government to continue negotiations in Moscow with the Russians, who were insisting on concessions greatly exceeding the Yalta arrangements. "I had some fear that if they did not, Stalin might immediately enter the war, knowing full well that he could take not only what Roosevelt and Churchill, and subsequently Chiang, had agreed to at Yalta, but—with China divided and Chiang seeking Soviet support against Chinese Communists—whatever else he wanted. On the other hand, if Stalin and Chiang were still negotiating, it might delay Soviet entrance and the Japanese might surrender. The President was in accord with that view." James F. Byrnes, All in One Lifetime (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958), p. 291. Eleven years earlier he wrote that in view of Soviet actions in East Germany and Soviet violations of Yalta in East Europe, "I would have been satisfied had the Russians determined not to enter the war"; he did not indicate that Truman agreed. James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947), p. 208.

\[17\]Defense Mimeo, pp. 78-79.
essential, and that it should be done without the three months' delay upon the conclusions of the defeat of Germany as intimated by Marshall Stalin to the President. He said that it was only necessary for action to commence in Manchuria to contain that force of Japanese in order to make possible our invasion of Japan and the rapid conclusion of the war. He understands Russia's aims; that they would want all of Manchuria, Korea and possibly part of North China. This seizure of territory was inevitable; but the United States must insist that Russia pay her way by invading Manchuria at the earliest possible date after the defeat of Germany.13

The commander who revealed this realistic grasp of the power situation in Asia and this cool acceptance of its implications was Gen. Douglas MacArthur. Several days later, in a talk with another War Department officer, Gen. MacArthur re-emphasized the impracticability of denying the Russians a warm-water port such as Port Arthur "because of their great military power":

Therefore, it was only right they should share the cost in blood in defeating Japan. From the military standpoint we should make every effort to get Russia into the Japanese war before we go into Japan, otherwise we will take the impact of the Jap divisions and reap the losses, while the Russians in due time advance into an area free of major resistance. General MacArthur stated he considered the President should start putting pressure on the Russians now.19

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13 Ibid., pp. 51-52.

19 Ibid., p. 51. MacArthur's statement upon the release of the Defense Department document is interesting. "The attempt to interpret any statements I may have made in the course of such post-Yalta discussions as reflecting my pre-Yalta views and convictions is wholly unwarranted" (author's italics). New York Times, October 21, 1955, p. 10. MacArthur did not deny that he made the statements attributed to him by Gen. Lincoln and Col. Freeman (the War Department representatives); he implied, however, that a month before—or ten minutes before—the Yalta meeting he would not have "emphatically stated that we must not invade Japan proper unless the Russian army is previously committed to action in Manchuria," and that he would not have so calmly accepted the prospect of Russian territorial gains. "There is not the slightest hint of documentation over my signature in the entire Defense Department report which even remotely suggests my support of these territorial
In a conversation at his headquarters in the Philippines shortly afterwards, MacArthur repeated these views to Secretary of the Navy Forrestal.

He felt Forrestal confided to his diary that we should secure the commitment of the Russians to active and vigorous prosecution of a campaign against the Japanese in Manchukuo . . . ; that once this campaign was engaged we should then launch an attack on the home islands, giving, as he expressed it, the coup de main from the rear while substantial portions of the military power of Japan were engaged on the mainland of Asia.\[20\]

Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, commander of American forces in China and Chiang's Chief of Staff, also urged that the Russians be brought into active participation in the Far Eastern war. Six years later this dedicated friend of Chiang Kai-shek confessed his error:

concessions which so adversely altered the course of future events in Asia; or that after my initial recommendation in 1941 I advocated prior to Yalta that Russia enter the Pacific war. To hold the contrary is to prevaricate the truth and the record" (author's italics). This implies that Gen. Lincoln and Col. Freeman, who had no reason at the time to lie about the Pacific commander's views, were liars—unless MacArthur was simply quibbling about dates, which perhaps he was. It is true that the interviews occurred within a fortnight after the conference, and after MacArthur had been apprised of the Yalta military agreements. Defense Min. p. 50. It is also true that MacArthur has revealed no documentary evidence showing that he objected to those agreements at the time. On June 18, 1945, Gen. Marshall read a telegram, at a meeting of the Joint Chiefs and President Truman, from MacArthur, declaring that "the hazard and loss of the invasion of Japan will be greatly lessened if an attack is launched from Siberia sufficiently ahead of our target date to commit the enemy to major combat." Ibid., p. 50. "If General MacArthur had felt so strongly that it was not necessary to make concessions to the Soviet Union at that 'late date,' why had he not expressed his feelings to that effect in his telegram read June 18?" Milton Brecker in the New York Times, October 21, 1955, p. 10.

I made a mistake, an error in judgment, strategic judgment there, sir; and when I was home in February the Chief of Staff, General Marshall, asked me if I thought the Soviet should be brought into the war against Japan . . . and I said "Yes, sir," because it was my conviction then that the Japanese would hole in, in what I called the Shantung industrial crescent and up in Manchuria, where they had industrial effort, and I was afraid the war would go on for a long time, and we would lose a lot of allied lives; whereas, if the Soviet would come in, it would precipitate our final victory.

Then I was wrong about that, my judgment was wrong . . . I made a grievous error . . . I want to emphasize that point, sir, because the thing is--all of us are critical of men who are in the field of strategy and where there are so many imponderables and intangibles that we can make errors of the mind, certainly not of the heart . . .

At Potsdam the Combined Chiefs recommended, and Truman and Churchill agreed, that "the planning date for the end of organized resistance by Japan should be 15 November 1945" and that Russian entry . . . should be encouraged."22 And when, exactly three months after the Nazi surrender, the Russians did declare war on Japan, the news was welcomed from the headquarters of Chiang Kai-shek to the headquarters of Henry Luce, and even higher. "I welcome the news of the declaration," said Secretary Byrnes. "We welcome Russia as a powerful partner in the war against Japan," said Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz. "I am delighted at the Russian declaration of war against Japan," said Gen. MacArthur. "This will make possible a greatenders movement that cannot fail to end in the destruction of the enemy."23

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22Truman, Memoirs, pp. 391-32.
CHAPTER IV

AMERICAN OPINION ON SOVIET ENTRY AND ASPIRATIONS

Six years and some months after the Yalta Conference at which Stalin agreed to participate in the war against Japan within two or three months after Germany's surrender, eight Republican Senators, with retrospective prescience, scoffed at the very idea. The eight, members of the joint committee which heard testimony on and around President Truman's dismissal of Gen. MacArthur, concluded in a minority report:

This myth, that the Russian participation in the Japanese War was a military necessity, has been refuted adequately. History will record that at Yalta the United States repudiated some of its solemn obligations, yielded to Russian imperialism, and gave way to appeasement which will be regretted for decades and all for mythical reasons. The true reason for Yalta remains an inscrutable mystery.

One of the eight was Sen. Alexander Wiley of Wisconsin, whose credentials as a seer were somewhat tarnished by the historical record. For it was Wiley himself who, on July 25, 1945, barely two weeks before the Russians declared war on Japan, had demanded that "we tell them that we want them to carry their load in the Far East." Wiley said: "We have every right to speak bluntly and plainly, the only language the Russians understand anyway." And he did:

There has been widespread spineless reluctance to express American opinion that Russia should enter the war against Japan. This reluctance--this hush-hush

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1McArthur Hearings, Part 5, p. 3591.
policy of relating our deepest convictions is ridiculous. It does not involve any military secrets to state our intense feelings in this matter. In millions of American homes, mothers, fathers, and sweethearts are awaiting anxiously for news of Russia's intentions. Hundreds of thousands of our brave soldiers, sailors, and marines are poised for the tough and bitter invasion of Japan. They know and we know that if Russia declared war, if her bombing fleets roared out from Vladivostok over to Japan, these acts might be the final ones to force a quick surrender of the Japs. Thus, countless American lives are at stake in Russia's decision . . . . Why then should we pussyfoot with our Russian ally . . . ?

It may be that Wiley's distinguished colleagues disagreed with his "intense feelings" of that earlier time, but there is no evidence, so far as this writer can determine, that they made their disagreement public. Most Americans at the time, despite the sound judgment of future historians looking backward, did in fact agree that Soviet intervention was a consummation devoutly to be wished. "Do you think Russia owes it to the United States to continue fighting and help us beat Japan?" a public opinion survey asked Americans in the early spring of 1945. "Yes," replied 86 per cent of those polled. Only 11 per cent said "No" (and only 4 per cent did not know). As late as mid-July, 1945, 77 per cent of Americans surveyed by Gallup said they did want to see Russia join us in the Far Eastern war, and only 14 per cent said they did not. (Nine per cent had no opinion.) It seems possible, moreover (although there is no way of telling),

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4Ibid., IX: 3 (Fall, 1945), p. 386.
that some of the comparative few who opposed Soviet participa-
tion may have done so out of sympathy for the Soviet Union.

Those engaged on the battlefields of Congress were ge-
nerally in accord with prevailing public sentiment. During a
House lend-lease debate in mid-March, 1945, a Kentucky Republi-
can complained that "while we have been pouring supplies into
Russia, she has not so much as raised her hand in our behalf
against the Japs." Two days later a Democratic colleague from
Washington declared: "As the bloody battle against Japan con-
tinues, let us hope that Mr. Crew [then Under Secretary of State]
is seeking to persuade war-weary Soviet Russia, despite the loss
of millions of lives, to help us defeat Japan."\(^5\)

When, on April 5, the Soviet Union denounced its neutrality
past with Japan, Congressmen greeted the action with enthusiasm.
Sen. Walter F. George "never had any doubt but that Russia would
denounce the treaty and actually become a participant in the war
against Japan." Sen. Arthur H. Vandenberg said: "This is un-
doubtedly a preview of vitally important things to come." Sen.
Alben Barkley, the Democratic floor leader, thought it "a very
interesting and great development." Sen. Edwin C. Johnson said:
"That's what we have been waiting two years for." Sen. Taft,
characteristically, accentuated the negative. "It is signifi-
cant but not conclusive," he said. "It does not clear up the re-
cent impression of Russia's non-cooperation in international mat-
ters. This thing can be done for her own interests." Probably few

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\(^5\) U. S., Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945,
Appendix, A1251.

\(^6\) Ibid., A1206.
people doubted it, but, like Vice President Harry S. Truman, most
people were probably "very happy" about the Russian move and hoped
that it would "shorten the war."7

But the Office of Censorship in Washington, apparently
fearful that this drumfire of hopeful comment, as reported in
American newspapers, might lead the Japanese to suspect that the
Russians had something in mind, clamped the lid on the next day.
A memorandum from Director Byron Price cautioned against

published or broadcast speculation or statements re-
garding the probable intentions of Soviet Russia toward
Japan . . . Whether such speculation or prediction
were true or false, the military interests of the
United States would be damaged and the war's sacri-
fice of American life might be prolonged.8

The Price memorandum, however, did not prevent other coun-
tries' views from being published in the U. S., and Americans
opening their April 8th Times could read the following sanguine
observation by the semi-official Ta Kung Peo of Chungking:

This Soviet step is the harbinger of a declaration
of war on Japan. If there is still anyone insist-
ing on the necessity of the Soviet's waiting for one
year before taking any action, as is provided in
the pact, he is deceived.9

The sensors' sensitivity did put a quietus on published (al-
though not private) speculation about Soviet plans, but occasional-
ly someone would daringly speculate about speculation. Thus,
Newsweek observed ambiguously: "Russia's role in the Pacific war,
if any, is still so uncertain or so secret as to be outside the
realm of permissible speculation."10 And the Times editorialized:

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7 New York Times, April 6, 1945, p. 3.
8 Ibid., April 7, 1945, p. 6.
9 Ibid., April 8, 1945, p. 3.
10 Newsweek, May 21, 1945, p. 30.
the entry of Russia on our side in the Japanese war would greatly shorten the struggle. Until such time as some definite indication of her intentions is given, however, it is a waste of time to speculate on her possible actions. 11

From this distance one may perhaps safely speculate that, as Time had observed in mid-April, most Americans (and Britons) "assumed that Russia was as good as in the Pacific war, and generally liked the idea." 12 The dominant forces in Congress still liked it in late June. When Leo T. Crowley, chief of the Foreign Economic Administration, told the House Appropriations Committee that, with the approval of America's top military officials, U. S. lend-lease war materials were still being sent to the Russians in Siberia, the news (Arthur Krock noted) seemed to be received in Washington "with the greatest satisfaction" and the committee "approved the strategy by voting the money required." 13

The fact that the people may want a thing does not necessarily excuse their leaders for giving it to them. But on the other hand one can hardly sever the diplomatic decisions of a time, any time, from the frame of reference in which they were or are made. Those who, with the advantages of hindsight, choose to scrutinize our wartime military and diplomatic strategy, would be well advised to recall, it seems fair to suggest, that the problems were no easier then than now and the future no less opaque. As Churchill put it in his summing-up of the Yalta negotiations:

It is not permitted to those charged with dealing with events in times of war or crisis to confine themselves purely to the statement of broad general principles on which good people agree. They have to take definite

12 Time, April 16, 1945, p. 25.
decisions from day to day . . . . It is easy, after
the Germans are beaten, to condemn those who did their
best to hearten the Russian military effort and to keep
in harmonious contact with our great ally, who had suf-
f ered so frightfully. What would have happened if we
had quarreled with Russia while the Germans still had
three or four hundred divisions on the fighting front?
Our hopeful assumptions were soon to be falsified.
Still, they were the only ones possible at the time.14

There were, indeed, plenty of political misconceptions
floating about in that uneasy yet hopeful spring and summer of
1945, but there was a certain clarity of conception too. At
least the idea that the Soviet Union had legitimate interests
in the Far East and could be expected to pursue them did not seem
so unnatural and indecent as later observers thought it should
have seemed. “With Japan eliminated, the western part of the
North Pacific is under Russian control, and the eastern part
under American,” Walter Lippmann had written in 1953.15 William
Henry Chamberlin, whose insight into the future was curiously
more acute than his hindsight into the past, wrote in early 1945:

Stalin cannot be indifferent to the fate of Manchuria,
Korea, and even of Japan proper. This is probably the
strongest reason for anticipating that the Soviet dic-
tator will not sit out the entire course of the Far
Eastern war . . . . As the price of an intervention
that is likely to come when Japan is already reeling
and tottering under the blows of American air power,
Stalin will almost certainly demand a free hand in Man-
churia and Korea. Very possibly he will also want a
voice in the disposition of Japan . . . . The Soviet
Government may be expected to carry on the historic
Russian policy of asserting a paramount interest in
the Chinese borderlands which adjoin the Soviet Union
. . . . A nominally independent Korea will also find
itself, for obvious political and geographical rea-
sions, under pretty complete Soviet domination.

China’s "shadowy claim to sovereignty" over Outer Mongolia,


15Walter Lippmann, U. S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the
he continued, "will gradually fade away." All in all:

Any American blueprint for the future of the Far
East will scarcely be worth the paper it is drawn
on unless Soviet views and ambitions are carefully
taken into account.16

When Stalin denounced his pact with Japan, Time pointed
out that "Russia would have her say in an Asiatic peace" whether
she came into the war or not:

... Russia's historic urge toward both Manchuria and
Korea is inescapable. At the least, Russia will al-
most certainly demand economic (which also means poli-
tical) priority in Manchuria; at the most outright
possession. In either case, Russia would then be the
great Asiatic and Pacific power, in a position to
dominate China as well.

But, Time explained ex cathedra, the rumblings of conflict
among the Big Three "did not mean that Big Three relations were al-
ready cracking up, but rather that some statesmen were alive to both
the difficulty and the urgency of maintaining these relations."17

An article in Life pointed out that the Cairo Conference
pledge that China would regain Manchuria from Japan
does not exclude the possibility that Russia might
regain control over the Manchukuo railways and Port

16 William Henry Chamberlin, America: Partner in World Rule
(New York: The Vanguard Press, 1945), pp. 198-200. Eight years
later Chamberlin wrote: "Was there anything inevitable about
the Soviet domination of Manchuria and North Korea. It is a rea-
sensible assumption that a peace treaty could have been concluded
with Japan months before the end of the war if there had been
enough far-sighted statesmanship... Had this been done before the
Soviet Government was able to intervene in the Far Eastern war the
Korean-Manchurian door could have been bolted against Soviet intru-
sion," Chamberlin, Beyond Containment (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co.,
1953), p. 46. It seems a pity that we could not have had the bene-
fit of Chamberlin's foresight at an earlier date. One might add
that in an article written perhaps six weeks before V-J Day Cham-
berlin did not suggest that Russia be encouraged to remain at peace
with Japan. Chamberlin, "Can We Do Business with Stalin?" The

Arthur. Nor is it unnatural to suppose that the Russians may look to a return of the other conditions that existed prior to the Russo-Japanese war. They may be expected to want to lease the Liaotung Peninsula and to demand the return of the southern half of Sakhalin Island, which the Japanese have used as a military base threatening northern Sakhalin and outflanking eastern Siberia. They may also demand the return of the Chinese Eastern railway, which they ostensibly sold to the Japanese in 1934 for a trifling sum of 140,000,000 yen under a threat of war. They can certainly claim their hand was forced.\(^1\)

The Washington Times-Herald implied that if the Russians wanted Manchuria they had better fight for it. Manchuria was "a nice prize," the paper observed: "But it will require a bit of taking." And it asked rhetorically: "Do our boys take Manchuria away from the Japs and give it to Russia free of charge...?"

The answer, clearly, was no. "Do we let our allies do most of their own fighting to get their Far East empires back?" The answer, clearly, was yes.\(^1\)

Rep. Mike Mansfield of Montana, a former professor of Far Eastern history, accepted the likelihood that the Soviet Union would pursue its "practical interests" in the area and pointed out that "Russia, as a matter of necessity, has an interest in China comparable to no other country in the world."\(^2\) Historian Herbert Feis thought it wise to recognize that Russia had legiti-

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1. Wilfred Fleisher, "What To Do with Japan," Life, April 16, 1945, pp. 91-92. The Cairo pledge had been made, wrote the realistic William Henry Chamberlin in 1945, "perhaps a little rashly." He added: "This promise might be likened to a check that is in need of Stalin's endorsement. So far, this endorsement has not been granted in any public fashion." Chamberlin, America: Partner in World Rule, p. 197.


3. Ibid., XLI, Part 4, 4902-3.
mote interests in bordering countries; Old China Hand Harold
Issacs expected Russia to dominate Sinkiang, Mongolia, and Man-
churia, "an area vital to Russian security"; and Sen. Wiley, in
his exasperated Senate statement demanding that the Russians
"carry their load in the Far East," observed:

We know how she has bled in the war with Germany . . .
but we know, too, that her security demands that the
Japs be licked. We know that whether or not Russia
enters the war she will make her postwar demands re-
garding Asia at the peace table.21

To the New York Times it was "unthinkable" that Russia
"should not insist on participating in the reorganization of
Asia."22 As the Times' military and naval expert, Hanson W.
Baldwin, reviewed the outlook:

To achieve her anticipated aims on the Asiatic main-
land—security for her Eastern frontiers, access to
warm-water ports, control over the Manchurian railway
and at least a "sphere of interest" in Sinkiang, Man-
churis and Korea—and all of Sakhalin—Russia does not
have to fight Japan, at least on a major scale. Rus-
sia's geographical proximity to the areas in which
she is vitally interested, and the political influence
she can wield in Asiatic affairs, at least indirectly,
through the Chinese Communist Government, are two
cards which might make actual armed intervention
except as a large mooring-up operation unnecessary.23

In sum, to American public opinion and to those who formed
it (or were formed by it), Soviet intervention in the Far Eastern

21Herbert Feis, "Political Aspects of Foreign Loans," Foreign Affairs, XXIII: 4 (July, 1945), p. 615; Harold Issacs,
"Russia Casts Its Shadow Over Asia," Newsweek, May 28, 1945, p. 50; J. C., Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945,
XCI, Part 6, 8007.


23New York Times, July 1, 1945, p. E5. The Russian denun-
ciation of their neutrality pact with Japan, Baldwin wrote, was
"bad news for the Japanese," but not, apparently, bad news for
us. New York Times, April 6, 1945, p. 7. As late as mid-July, 1945,
war was necessary, and, for the most part, desirable; Soviet participation in the Far Eastern peace was inevitable. As Time had pointed out in April:

Now, whether she goes to the lengths of actual war with Japan or not, Russia will have a direct and powerful hand in the shaping of that peace. The U. S., Britain and their Asiatic ally, China, must face the real probabilities...24

If Chungking and Moscow could come to an understanding on a basis of "mutual respect and permanent friendship," these real probabilities might be made palatable. At Yalta, Roosevelt had tried to lay the foundations for such an arrangement, get the Russians into the Far Eastern war in time to save American lives, and place some limits on the Russian appetite for expansion.25 The historian cannot know, he can only guess, what Roosevelt's later critics would have done in the same circumstances. But looking back at what those critics—and most of their fellow-Americans—were saying at the time, one can surmise, perhaps justly, that this is not such an "inscrutable mystery" as it might appear to be.

he held the opinion "that invasion of the Japanese islands will be necessary, or at the very least, must be prepared for carefully unless the war with Japan is to drag on for many weary months," and he greeted Russian entry into the war as "another sledge-hammer blow to the enemy's will to resist." Ibid., July 14, 1945, p. 16, and August 9, 1945, p. 2. Nowhere, so far as the present writer can ascertain, did Baldwin counsel against Russian participation in the Pacific war or regret it when it happened. For Baldwin's wartime analyses of Japanese military capabilities, see, for example, Baldwin, "America at War: The End in Sight," Foreign Affairs, XXIII (January, 1945), pp. 157-61; "America at War: The Winter Months," Ibid., April, 1945, pp. 368-405; "America at War: Victory in Europe," Ibid., July, 1945, pp. 527-42. For his postwar analysis of Japanese wartime military capabilities and the Allied "political misconception" that "should have been apparent then," supra, p. 20.

24Time, April 15, 1945, p. 25.

25Relations With China, p. 92; MacArthur Hearings, Part 5, p. 3332.
CHAPTER V

CHIANG'S HOPES

If getting the Russians into the Pacific war was, to Roosevelt, a matter of military necessity, to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek some kind of Sino-Soviet settlement was a matter of political survival. Buffeted by the Japanese, his people demoralized, and his economy on the brink of collapse, Chiang was obsessed by the growing power of the Chinese Communists and deeply suspicious of Soviet intentions. Possibly Chiang lacked the power to democratize his government, to whip his armies into an effective fighting force, and to halt inflation; possibly he lacked the will; in any case, his efforts along these lines were considerably less than adequate.\(^1\) American Foreign Service officers in China, as early as 1943, could foresee that the Soviet Union would pursue policies aimed at satisfying its own Far Eastern ambitions. What they feared was that Chiang, unwittingly perhaps, was pursuing policies diametrically opposed to his own self-interest, and to our own.\(^2\)

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Chiang, who had sporadically fought and parlayed with the Chinese Communists since 1927, anticipated a new outbreak of civil war, more probably sooner than later. To win it, to unify China under his own leadership, he knew he would need American assistance and he would have to persuade the Russians not to aid their ideological comrades in North China. But what did Stalin want in the Far East? Influence? Territory? Satellite governments in North China? A Communist China? On this subject the Kremlin was more than usually inscrutable. The USSR had signed a non-aggression treaty with the Nationalist Government in 1937; it had supplied China with some $250 million in material aid, in 1938 and 1939, for China's struggle against Japan; it had supported China's cause in the League of Nations. On December 8, 1941, Chiang had urged Russia to enter the Pacific war. But as time went on Sino-Soviet relations gradually deteriorated. Chiang, on several occasions, turned to America, hoping that this country might intervene with the Kremlin on his behalf. High-ranking Chinese officials, in private conversations with American diplomats in the fall of 1942, expressed hopes that a "satisfactory understanding" between Russia and China could be achieved, and they indicated, the wish perhaps being father to the thought, that they had no fear of Soviet territorial ambitions. They hoped, too, that America and perhaps Britain would exert influence on the Russians to bring about a Sino-Soviet understanding.3

At Cairo in November, 1943, Chiang told Roosevelt that he was willing to give the Soviet Union access to the port of Dairen, provided that the Russians cooperated with his government and that this access in no way impinged upon Chinese sovereignty. In June, 1944, Vice President Henry Wallace arrived in Chungking as Roosevelt's special emissary, and Chiang told him, repeatedly, of China's wish to avoid hostilities with the USSR. Chiang recalled what he had told Roosevelt about Dairen. He said he would seek an early opportunity to open discussions with the Russians and he asked Wallace to convey the following message to Roosevelt:

If the United States can bring about better relations between the USSR and China and can bring about a meeting between Chinese and Soviet representatives, President Chiang would very much welcome such friendly assistance.

Chiang said, as the report of the Wallace-Chiang conversations put it, that he would "go more than halfway" to achieve an understanding with the Soviet Union. Some years later Joseph Alsop testified that a Sino-Soviet understanding was "one of the two or three first points in Chinese policy" at the time. The Chinese desire, Alsop said, had reached the stage a little earlier where they tried very hard to go around behind the back of the American Government and make it a Sino-Soviet understanding independently and on their own without telling their people they were having negotiations with the Soviet Union.

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5Relations With China, op. cit., p. 550-55.

But Stalin could wait, and Stalin did wait.

On February 5, 1945, the second day of the Yalta Conference, Acting Secretary of State Joseph Grew sent the following top secret cable to Secretary Stettinius:

Chiang Kai-shek and Soong have informed Hurley that the Soviet Government has agreed to receive Soong as a personal representative of the Generalissimo either late in February or early in March. Discussions will cover establishment of closer relations, Soviet participation in the war against Japan, Soviet-Chinese relations in Korea and Manchuria, postwar economic matters and the Sino-Soviet border. Hurley invites suggestions regarding this agenda for Chiang who desires full cooperation.7

What Chiang meant by "full cooperation," what he had meant in the Wallace talks by "more than halfway," and how he interpreted the concept of "sovereignty"—as a flexible theory or an immutable principle—are questions to which no one can give absolute answers. The record indicates, however, that the Chinese reaction to the Yalta arrangements, as Bohlen later testified, "was not one that they had been sold, as it were, down the river."8 Gen. Hurley, the American Ambassador to China, discussed with Chiang "all of the problems decided"—with the exception of the Soviet pledge to fight Japan and "without reference to the Yalta decisions as such"—shortly after the Crimean meeting. Chiang had given Hurley an "aide memoire summarizing his position on some of the problems."9

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7Yalta Papers, pp. 952-55.

8Bohien Hearings, p. 12.

9The writer has been unable to obtain a copy of this aide memoire, if one exists. The State Department says the document cannot be found in its records. Letter, Edwin W. Martin, former Director for Chinese Affairs, to Leonard Boassberg, June 1, 1960. Hurley's secretary referred the writer to Don Lohbeck, Patrick J. Hurley (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1956), pp. 390-91, which quotes Hurley's cable but not the aide memoire itself. Letter, Barbara Funtlist to Leonard Boassberg, June 29, 1960. Both letters are in the writer's files.
Hurley reported to Truman in May, and they continued their discussion of "the problems that would be involved in promoting future friendship and peace with Russia" when Hurley returned to Chungking from a trip to Washington, London, and Moscow. Hurley said he was convinced that Chiang "will agree to every one of the requirements" but would object to the use of the words "preeminent" and "lease," which, Hurley noted, had "bad connotations in Chinese" and seemed to impinge on China's sovereignty. This might suggest that the problem was, in part at least, one of finding a face-saving verbal formula. Hurley's message also contains the following:

I went to emphasize to you that, prior to my recent visit to Washington, I had discussed with Chiang Kai-shek all phases of the Chinese-Russian problem before we knew what was contained in the Yalta Agreement. And since coming back to Chungking, we have again thoroughly covered the same subjects without alluding to the primary subject. We are, therefore, in a position to proceed with dispatch on the Yalta Agreement when we are authorized to submit the particulars thereof to the Generalissimo.

When Foreign Minister T. V. Soong (now back in favor with

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11. On this point Harriman testified that "neither Roosevelt nor Stalin intended that the phrase 'preeminent interests' should go beyond Soviet interests in the free transit of exports to and imports from the Soviet Union... As to the lease on Port Arthur, Roosevelt looked upon this as an arrangement similar to privileges which the United States had negotiated with other countries for the mutual security of two friendly nations." *Ibid.* It may be noted that Cuban employees of the American naval base at Guantanamo were subject, while on the base, to U.S. laws and regulations. *New York Times*, March 26, 1960, p. 10. Was this an infringement upon Cuban sovereignty? It would seem to depend, again, on interpretation.

Chiang) learned of the Yalta arrangements from President Truman, his reaction was of uneasy hope. On the one hand, he expressed his gratification for Stalin's assurances with respect to China's sovereignty. On the other hand, he wondered what Stalin really meant. But he observed—knowing, now, what the United States expected China to contribute to postwar peace—“that there was no nation in the world that China regarded more as a friend than the United States,” as Truman recalled ten years later. Bohlen testified in 1953:

I was present with President Truman at the beginning of June, 1945, when T. V. Soong was informed of the contents of these agreements, and it is my recollection that he did not feel that it placed China in a very difficult position.

Soong proceeded to Moscow. He faced a condition, not a theory. There was Russian power. There was Chinese weakness. There was Stalin's implacable determination to make the most of the situation. Soong made concessions going far beyond the American interpretation of the Yalta understanding. "What choice," demands Felix Wittmer, "did Chiang Kai-shek have?"

Was his country, geopolitically, anything but a power vacuum? As his sole alternatives lay between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., was it not slightly better to obey the orders of the American President (even though the latter was baffled and ill-prepared to


14 Bohlen Hearings, p. 46.

understand Communism or world affairs) rather than embrace Joe Stalin spontaneously.

No doubt inadvertently, Wittmer answers his own question and destroys his own argument. The fact that Chiang had no choice is precisely why, if he was betrayed, he was betrayed by circumstances, not by Roosevelt. If the Crimean Conference had never occurred, or if at the conference Stalin had asked for no concessions at all from China, Soong would still have gone to Moscow when he did and Stalin would still have been there; or Soong would not have gone to Moscow and China would not have had even a paper pact limiting Russian aspirations. Legally, the Yalta Agreement did not bind China. If China had repudiated it, as Bohlen suggested, the United States could not have enforced it, except for the parts dealing with Japan. There had been, indeed, a recent precedent for a Chinese repudiation, if the Chinese had been so minded.

Four years earlier, commenting on the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact, the Chinese Foreign Minister had declared:

Wittmer, p. 81. Admiral Leahy recalls Soong telling him privately that China could not accept the degree of Russian control in Manchuria possible under Yalta. "He said China would prefer to settle the controversy by military action when forces should become available. 'When do you think you would be in a position to do that?' I asked, having in mind the existing despicable state of Chiang's armies. 'Well,' replied Soong reflectively, 'that might be any time in the next five hundred years.'" Leahy added: "The Chinese take a long-term view of both the past and the future." The Admiral, chief of staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, then wrote that he still had had "no qualms" about the "so-called 'concessions' to Russia." Leahy, p. 581.


Bohlen Hearings, p. 48.
The Chinese Government and people cannot recognize any engagements entered into between third parties which are derogatory to China's territorial and administrative integrity, and wish to state that the Soviet-Japanese declaration just announced has no binding force whatsoever on China. 19

No such statement emanated from Chungking in June, 1945, and, in fact, there is no documentary evidence—known, at least, to the present writer—that any member of Chiang's government, including the Generalissimo himself, ever formally protested the specific provisions, as such, of the Yalta Agreement. 20 Chiang did, of course, protest the Soviet interpretation and the additional demands Stalin made, and so did the United States. "I asked that you carry out the Yalta agreement, but I had not asked that you make any concession in excess of that agreement," Truman telegraphed Chiang from Potsdam. 21

Harriman, in Moscow, told the Russians their demands were unjustified, and he warned Soong that Chinese concessions exceeding the American interpretation of Yalta would be made on Soong's own responsibility. Soong "accepted the correctness of this position" and later told Harriman that "he was gratified at the results obtained and expressed his gratitude for the active support the United States had given him in his negotiations." The Treaty of


20. It is difficult, of course, to document the absence of documentation, but the enterprising reader is invited to refer to the sources, cited herein, which might be expected to contain evidence supporting the "Yalta betrayal" myth, e. g., Wittmer, Hurley's testimony during the MacArthur hearings, Lockhead, and the Yalta Papers. The MacArthur hearings combed the China tangle thoroughly; all five volumes of testimony might also be consulted.

21. Truman, Memoirs, pp. 315-20; Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p. 203; MacArthur Hearings, p. 2359; Relations With China, pp. 116-120.
Friendship and Alliance between the Republic of China and the U.S.S.R. was duly signed, and on August 16 Ambassador Hurley reported to the State Department that Chiang was "generally satisfied" with it. The Generalissimo, he said,

has always doubted the Soviet's position in regard to relations with the Chinese Communists. Yesterday he thanked me for the basis that I had helped him to lay for rapprochement with the Soviets. 22

Madame Chiang complimented Truman for the results obtained in Moscow and thanked him for U.S. assistance in the negotiations. The new Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Shih-chieh, who had signed the treaty, said he was "particularly happy" because of "the desire, equally strong on both sides, for the closest cooperation, and an enduring mutual regard." Sun Fo, President of the Legislative Yuan, declared that the treaty marked "the beginning of a new era in Chinese-Russian relations." 23

When the treaty was made public two weeks later Chungking officials thought it strengthened Chiang's hand against the Red Chinese. The latter, in their turn, began to treat Chiang with greater respect, and Hurley escorted Mao Tse-tung, the Yenan leader, to Chungking for renewed talks on Chinese unity. 24

American publications hailed the treaty. The New York Times called it "a victory for peace as great as any scored on the battlefield." Raymond Moley, in the Wall Street Journal.

22MacArthur Hearings, p. 3540; Relations with China, pp. 120-21.


after "careful examination" decided that Chiang "gained far more than he conceded." The Christian Science Monitor said "the Chinese Government has obtained Russian support at what seems to be a very reasonable price." Life, seeing this without drama the Chinese concessions, announced enthusiastically that the agreement "was as great a victory for commonsense as the defeat of Japan was for armed might."25

Here were the Chinese concessions—going far beyond Yalta—laid out, as it were, in Macly's window, and presumably informed American opinion found them good. It seems fair to ask how it is that the Yalta Agreement, in Life in 1947, was a "disgraceful document," while the Sino-Soviet Agreement, in Life in 1945, contained "less ammunition for pessimists than any diplomatic event of the last 20 years."26

The final irony is that, in ensuing years, the Chinese based their protests against Soviet misconduct upon Soviet violations of the Sino-Soviet pact, while, as one Chinese Government protest (dated August 6, 1949) put it:

the Chinese Government, desiring to maintain and promote the traditional friendship between the two countries, had done its very best to fulfill the obligations under the Treaty.27

"In fine," Plutarch wrote of the battle on Thermopylae, "it

25 Robert Heilbroner, pp. 96, 93, 93; "Peace in Asia (editorial), Life, September 10, 1945, p. 42.


is not easy to determine what is the truth." One can, however, in the case of Yalta, determine with some accuracy what is not the truth. The evidence would seem to substantiate Harriman's summing-up:

Nothing that was done at Yalta contributed to the loss of control over China by Chiang Kai-shek. Some people claim that we "sold out" to the Soviet Union at Yalta. If this were true, it is difficult to understand why the Soviet Union has gone to such lengths to violate the Yalta understandings. The fact is that these violations have been the basis of our protests against Soviet actions since the end of the war. There would have been a sell-out if Roosevelt and Churchill had failed to bend every effort to come to an understanding with the Soviet Union and had permitted the Red Army to occupy vast areas, without attempting to protect the interests of the people in those areas.30

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CHAPTER VI
THE GENERAL GOES TO CHINA

By 1951 the Yalta myth—that hodge-podge of half-truths and whole cloth according to which Roosevelt "sold out" Chiang Kai-shek at the Big Three Criscean conference and thereby "lost China" to the Communists—had become firmly ensconced in American demonology, and that spring, during the protracted Senate Joint Committee hearings on Truman's dismissal of MacArthur, various participants in events connected with Yalta and the Far East told their conflicting versions of what had happened and why.¹

One of the witnesses was Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley of Oklahoma, who had played a leading role on the 1944-45 diplomatic and political stage. This chapter, which brings our story to the release of the secret provisions of Yalta in February, 1946, focuses on that role.

Pat Hurley, in a long, flamboyant, and variegated life, had risen from obscurity as a coal-miner and cowhand to eminence and wealth as an attorney, banker, oilman, Republican politician, and occasional office-seeker. He had been President Herbert Hoover's Secretary of War during the bonus march in 1932, and in World War II he served Roosevelt as a trouble-shooting diplomat. Roosevelt sent him to China in August, 1944, to mediate between Chiang and the then-commander of the China-Burma-India Theatre, Gen. Joseph W. "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell, and he remained there most of that fateful period in Far Eastern history until September,

¹MacArthur Hearings.
1945. Roosevelt named him Ambassador to China in November, 1944. Hostilities broke out almost immediately between the new Ambassador and many of the professional Foreign Service officers in his sector.² Hurley himself had not attended the Yalta Conference, but he had participated in the diplomatic efforts accompanying it. He testified:

Our diplomats surrendered the territorial integrity and the political independence of China in a secret agreement at Yalta. We surrendered . . . the objectives for which we had told the American people we were fighting . . . Beginning at Yalta in February 1945 our foreign policy changed from the support of the principles of the Atlantic Charter to a policy based on concessions to communism and imperialism, and fear of Russia, rather than on confidence in America.³

Twenty-two months earlier, in "A Few Comments About One Thousand Pages of White Paper," a press release issued at the time of the State Department's publication of its famous White Paper on China,⁴ Hurley made substantially the same criticism:

²Lohbeck, passim. Hurley came to believe that State Department personnel, in China and in Washington, were sabotaging his mission, himself, and the government to which he was accredited. The feud is fascinating, in many ways tragic, but for the most part peripheral to the purposes of the present study.

³Yalta Papers, pp. 553-58.

⁴MacArthur Hearings, Part 4, p. 2829. Hurley's version of the "surrender" differed in one important respect from that of other right-wing critics. He specifically absolved Roosevelt, with whom he testified, his "personal relations had always been close," of blame. Roosevelt, he said, "was already a sick man at Yalta." "I feel certain not only from the record at Yalta but in subsequent conversations with him that he was not to Blame for the Yalta surrender." Ibid., pp. 2884, 2889, and 2976. According to Lohbeck, Roosevelt was not only sick but "frequently incoherent." Lohbeck, p. 358.

⁵Relations With China.
The Yalta secret agreement is the blueprint for Communist conquest of China. The surrender of all these rights to Russia in China was legally and morally unjustified, and no white paper will ever be able to change the history of America’s diplomatic failure in China. 8

Several questions naturally arise. Was Hurley aware of the Yalta secret provisions in 1945 and did he then consider them a “surrender”? Did he protest this “surrender,” and if so, how? The record, so far as it has been released, 7 and so far as this writer has been able to investigate it, suggests that the former Ambassador to China arrived at his conclusions about a Yalta “surrender” as late as anyone else. We have only his word for it that these were not afterthoughts. There is much evidence on the other hand, to support the conclusion that Hurley himself had been a vigorous proponent, both in public and in private, of that other legend for which lesser men have been pilloried—the legend that the Chinese Communists were, in his own words, “not in fact Communists”—and that he had been a missionary for that widespread faith, so soon to be shattered by events, in Soviet desires for peace and cooperation in the postwar world.

Hurley’s job in China, as he understood it, was

(1) To prevent the collapse of the National Government,
(2) to sustain Chiang Kai-shek as President of the Republic and Generalissimo of the Armies, (3) to harmonize relations between the Generalissimo and the American commander, (4) to promote production of war supplies in China and prevent economic collapse, and (5) to

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6MacArthur Hearings, Part 5, p. 3257.
7The State Department series, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, ends with the year 1945. Hurley’s own records have been studied by scholars but have not yet been published.
8Relations with China, p. 86.
unify all the military forces in China for the purpose of defeating Japan.9

Military unification, whose battle effect in Hurley's estimation would have been equal to at least one fully-equipped American division,10 implied political unification, and Hurley undertook the task of mediating between the Nationalists and the Communists with characteristic enthusiasm, flying direct to Red headquarters in Yanan and greeting the astonished Communist leaders with Comanche war whoops and Oklahoma anecdotes.11 By mid-November he had secured Mao Tse-tung's signature to a five-point draft agreement which, if implemented, would have led to a coalition government in which democratic freedoms, including "freedom from fear and freedom from want," would be assured.12 He reported to Secretary of State Stettinius:

At the time I came here Chiang Kai-shek believed that the Communist Party in China was an instrument of the Soviet Government of Russia. He is now convinced that the Russian Government does not recognize the Chinese Communist Party as Communists at all and that (1) Russia is not supporting the Communist Party in China; (2) Russia does not repeat not want dimensions or civil war in China; and (3) Russia desires more harmonious relations with China.13

9Ibid., p. 71.
10State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation, pp. 2087-88.
11White and Jacoby, p. 253. Lohbeck follows the White-Jacoby account with uncanny accuracy but without citing them (or anyone else). White and Jacoby: "They piled out pell-mell and ran across the field to meet Hurley . . . . It was a joyful ride, and everyone became friendly at once as they jounced over the ruts in a welter of dust." Lohbeck: "Piling out of the car, they ran pell-mell, coat-tails flying, across the airstrip . . . . It was a joyful ride, with a nervous camaraderie, as they jounced along over the bumpy road through clouds of dust." Lohbeck, pp. 212-13.
12State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation, pp. 2087-88.
13MacArthur Hearings, Part 4, p. 2909.
Chiang, he said, was now convinced that an agreement with the Chinese Communists was possible and that he could avoid the civil war, which he had previously believed to be inevitable, by such an agreement. Chiang had also requested the Soviet Government to confer with his personal representative, and the Russians had agreed to receive him. Hurley added that there was "little difference, if any, between the avowed principles of the National Government, the Kuomintang and the avowed principles of the Chinese Communist Party." Chiang did not accept the five-point program, however. He countered with a three-point program of his own, which the Chicomns rejected in their turn. Negotiations dragged on, and off, thenceforward.

Hurley had first heard "rumors of secret deals" in February, shortly after the Crimean Conference had adjourned. His conviction that important arrangements about the Far East had been made at Yalta, according to his biographer, or his desire for a clari-

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14 Ibid., p. 2910.
15 State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation, pp. 2089-89. A sidelight on the controversy over wartime concessions to Communists is provided by Hurley's observation, in his report to Stettinius, that in December, 1944, the Chiang regime "then had an opportunity to make a settlement with the Communists. They neglected or did not choose to do so at that time . . . . I have persuaded Chiang Kai-shek and others in the National Government that in order to unite the military forces of China and prevent civil conflict it will be necessary for him and the Kuomintang and the National Government to make liberal political concessions to the Communist Party and to give them adequate representation in the National Government." MacArthur Hearings, Part 4, p. 2910. One may wonder whether later events would have turned out other-

16 Lohbeck, p. 366.
17 Ibid.
fication of his mission, according to his own cable of February 18, led him to return to Washington late that month. First he asked at the State Department; no one there, he testified, knew of any secret Yalta arrangements. Hurley then went to the White House, "with my ears back and my teeth skinned, to have a fight about what had been done," although, for all he actually knew, nothing had been done. Roosevelt, he said, at first denied that any "surrender" had occurred, but in the face of Hurley's persistence Roosevelt sent for him the next morning and showed him a copy of the secret Yalta provisions. Later, in March, apparently convinced by Hurley's arguments, Roosevelt admitted to him that there were certain features of the agreement that justified his envoy's fears and asked him to visit Churchill in London and Stalin in Moscow "to ameliorate that agreement." All this is Hurley's version of the background to his April journey to London and Moscow; there is, to this writer's present knowledge, no documentary evidence supporting it.

Before leaving Washington the Ambassador held a press conference in which he made the following contribution to public understanding of the complex Chinese political situation:

You gentlemen should know, though—I believe you all do know that it is a matter of common knowledge that the Communist Party of China supports the principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. . . . The three principles are government of the people, by the people, and for the people. All the demands that the Communist Party has been making have been on a democratic basis. That has led to the statement

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18 *Relations with China*, p. 94.
20 By Soviet Foreign Minister Vyscheslav Molotov, for example, in a conversation with Hurley and Donald Nelson seven months before, in Moscow. *Relations with China*, pp. 71-72.
that the Communist Party in China are not, in fact, real Communists. The Communist Party of China is supporting exactly the same principles as those promulgated by the National Government of China... 21

The next day Hurley flew to London. What efforts he made with Churchill "to ameliorate that agreement" I do not know. Churchill, in his history of the period, is silent on the subject. 22 Herbert Feis, basing his account on a Hurley cable to President Truman, dated April 13, 1945, writes as follows:

The conversation became lively when Churchill called the American long-range policy in regard to China "the great American illusion." It erupted into argument when Hurley remarked that if the British failed to observe the principles of the Atlantic Charter and continued to hold Hong Kong, Russia might well make demands in regard to areas in North China. To which Churchill answered, first, that Britain was not bound by the Atlantic Charter in regard to its colonies, and, second, that Hong Kong would be taken out of the British Empire only over his dead body. Only a few unsystematic remarks seem to have been exchanged about the terms of the Yalta Accord for the Pacific. 23

In Moscow on the 15th Hurley conferred with Stalin and Molotov. He asked (as he reported to State two days later) if the Russians still upheld the policies toward China outlined to him by Molotov the preceding summer, when Molotov had asserted that the Chinese Communists were not in fact Communists, that Russia did not support them or desire civil war in China, and that the Soviet Union desired improved relations with China. Molotov said this was still his government's position. Hurley then described his attempts

21 MacArthur Hearings, Part 4, p. 2896.
22 Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy.
23 Feis, The China Tangle, p. 284. The cable is in the Hurley files. Lohbeck's uncited account of the incident follows Feis almost word for word, but omits the final sentence. Lohbeck, p. 370.
to bring the two Chinese sections together and emphasized that American policy still endorsed "Chinese aspirations to establish for herself a united, free, and democratic government and for the unification of all armed forces in China in order to bring about the defeat of Japan." The U.S., said Hurley, supported Chiang's government; Stalin said he did too, and "spoke favorably" of Chiang. "In short," Hurley reported, "Stalin agreed unqualifiedly to America's policy in China as outlined to him during the conversation."24

During the MacArthur hearings Hurley conceded that he had been "overenthusiastic"25 about the results of these talks. The American chargé d'affaires in Moscow, Russian-speaking George Kennan, who had sat in on the talks, thought so at the time. He cabled Averill Harriman, the U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union (who had also participated in the conversations but had left immediately thereafter for Washington), that Hurley's message to the State Department "caused me some concern."

There was, of course, nothing in Ambassador Hurley's account of what he told Stalin to which Stalin could not honestly subscribe, it being understood that to the Russian words meant different things than they do to us. Stalin is of course prepared to affirm the principle of unifying the armed forces of China. He knows that unification is feasible in a practical sense only under conditions which are acceptable to the Chinese Communist party . . . .

It would be tragic if our natural anxiety for the support of the Soviet Union at this juncture, coupled with Stalin's use of words which mean all things to all people and his cautious affability, were to lead us into an undue reliance on Soviet aid or even Soviet acquiescence in the achievement of our long term objectives in China.26


26 *Relations with China*, pp. 96-97.
Berrimen agreed. He doubted that Stalin would cooperate indefinitely with Chiang and suggested that if and when the Russians entered the Far Eastern war Stalin would pursue his own interests, not ours. He thought Hurley ought to be warned "not to arouse unfounded expectations" in Chungking, and on April 23 Stettinius instructed Hurley to impresse upon Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek the necessity for early military and political unification in order not only to bring about the successful conclusion of the Japanese war but also to establish a basis upon which relations between China and the Soviet Union may eventually become one of mutual respect and permanent friendship.

Stettinius also emphasized the importance of "facing the probability that Marshall Stalin's offer is given in direct relation to circumstances that are existing now and may not long continue."27

In any case, there is no documentary evidence that Hurley pressured Stalin to "amplify" Yalta.28 His April 17 cable

27 Ibid., p. 98.

28 Hurley's 1951 testimony is somewhat confused. At one point Senators asked him what he had said to Stalin about modifying Yalta, and what Stalin's attitude had been. Hurley seemed to think he had already answered the question. If he had, said Chairman Richard Russell, "I didn't get it and I was sitting here all morning . . ." Hurley dubiously conceded that Russell might be right, adding: "But what I said I discussed with Marshall Stalin has been written in The Saturday Evening Post, and I don't mind reiterating it." This is, presumably, a reference to an article by Edgar Snow which Hurley had earlier characterized as "spurce." (Snow wrote that Hurley had gone to the Kremlin "and in the course of exchanging pleasanteries he asked Stalin what he would 'settle for' in China." Edgar Snow, "Why We Don't Understand Russia," The Saturday Evening Post, February 15, 1947, p. 38. When the committee pursued the subject a little later Hurley admitted that in his talks with Churchill and Stalin "I didn't make the discussion of the Yalta secret agreement the paramount objective" and said his handling of the question "might be considered . . . as an oblique attack on Yalta . . ." MacArthur Hearings, Part 4, pp. 2937, 2931-32, 2942.
concludes with the following rather cryptic paragraph:

Also instructed by Roosevelt to discuss another subject with Stalin. Asked by Stalin if I was acquainted with subject, I stated yes. Stalin then inquired if I had advised Chiang Kai-shek. I said no. Stalin then said that he and Roosevelt had agreed that when it was time for discussions with Chiang I was to institute such discussions. There followed a full talk on this subject as to which Harriman, who is now on his way to Washington, can give you the details. Harriman's general helpfulness and cooperation in the meeting with Molotov and Stalin and in all other matters were of great value. 29

Six years later Harriman helpfully contradicted Hurley's recollection of the event. Hurley stayed at the American Embassy during his Moscow sojourn, said Harriman, but "at no time did he indicate to me that President Roosevelt was disturbed about Yalta nor that Roosevelt wanted the agreement "amplified."

On the contrary, the purpose of Ambassador Hurley's visit to Moscow, as he stated it to me and to Stalin, was to find out from Stalin when Chiang could be told about the Yalta understanding and to help further cement the relations between the Soviet Union and the Chinese National Government. 30

Harriman submitted Hurley's May 10 cable to Truman discussing his China mission and observed that nothing therein indicated that Roosevelt had asked Hurley to try to modify the Yalta pact. There are, however, hints in this cable that although Chiang was still officially ignorant of the secret provisions he was not entirely unaware of what they might be, and not entirely negative about them. 31 Hurley said Chiang had received a somewhat garbled account, from the Chinese Ambassador in Washington, of the Yalta decisions, and the Chungking government had concluded on the basis of information from various sources that Russia was about to enter

29 Ibid., Part 5, p. 3336.
30 Ibid., p. 3335.
31 supra, pp. 46-48.
the conflict with Japan. Hurley recommended that Chiang be informed officially "in an appropriate straightforward manner"—but of what? The wording is ambiguous and suggests that he meant only that Chiang be told of Soviet military intentions.32

On June 15 Hurley, accompanied by Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, the American commander in China who replaced Stilwell, gave Chiang the Yalta information he probably knew already.33 Chiang asked no questions, Wedemeyer testified later, but "he could not believe what he heard," as Wedemeyer read his mind. He asked that it be repeated to him, and it was. "And then he just said that he was terribly disappointed, or words to that effect."34 Neither Hurley nor Wedemeyer indicated in testimony, however, that at that time they reported Chiang's reaction to Truman or to State.35

Hurley continued trying to mediate between the contending Chinese, and in early July he cabled Truman that the chief ob-

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32 _MacArthur Hearings_, Part 5, pp. 3337-38. There is an interesting contradiction within Hurley's cable. "Stalin said he would give me carte blanche and let me use my own judgment as to when and how to present the subject," he told Truman, referring to "the Yalta decision." But later: "It now appears desirable that you discuss this situation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of State to determine when you should direct me to ask Stalin for his approval of the time when I am to officially inform Chiang Kai-shek."


34 _Ibid._, Part 3, pp. 2421, 2431. Lohbeck's uncited account of the incident is lifted from Wedemeyer's testimony. Lohbeck: "Then, softly, Chiang said that he was terribly disappointed." Lohbeck, p. 396.

35 _MacArthur Hearings_, Part 3, pp. 2294-2567; Part 4, pp. 2527-2946. "From the Generalissimo's reaction it was apparent that the Russians had already made the Yalta Agreement known to him." _Relations With China_, p. 116. No source is given for this statement.
The Moscow conference to which Hurley alluded was the oft-postponed and lengthy negotiations between Chinese Foreign Minister Soong and Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov, in which Soong was attempting to buy Soviet emity and favor at minimum cost to China.

On August 5 the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima; on August 9 the Soviet Union declared war on Japan; on August 10 the Japanese sued for peace; and on August 14 the Sino-Soviet Treaty and related agreements, wherein the Russians forced the Chinese to make concessions far exceeding the Yalta arrangements, was signed in Moscow. Hurley accepted Chiang's thanks for his help in laying the groundwork for the Sino-Soviet rapprochement 37 and on September 22 he reported to state that the rapprochement between the Nation-

36 Ibid., p. 99 (author's italics). Lohbeck includes lengthy excerpts from this Hurley message, but omits the paragraph quoted above. He also omits, significantly, the following Hurley remarks: "Before the Yalta Conference, I suggested to President Roosevelt a plan to force the National Government to make more liberal political concessions in order to make possible a settlement with the Communists. The President did not approve the suggestion." And he omits: "I believe the Soviet's attitude toward the Chinese Communists is as I related it to the President in September last year and have reported many times since." Lohbeck, p. 402 (my italics).

37 Relations With China, p. 120-21. Chiang "admitted" Hurley said, that the treaty indicated Soviet intentions of supporting Chinese military and political unification under the segis of the Kuomintang.
elists and Communists "seems to be progressing, and the discussion and rumors of civil war recede as the conference continues."

On August 26 Hurley personally escorted Chinese Red leader Mao Tse-tung from Yanan to Chungking, but while Chiang and Mao conferred Nationalist and Communist troops were engaged in a desperate race for position in North China and Manchuria, with the Soviet Army obstructing the entry of Nationalist troops while permitting the Communists to infiltrate at will. Thousands of Japanese soldiers remained under arms; the Communists, aided by the Russians, obtained a generous share of Japanese military equipment.

At this critical juncture Ambassador Hurley elected to return to the United States, for reasons which are still obscure. Perhaps, as he later explained, he was simply exhausted and in bad health, suspecting he would soon be replaced anyway by a "deserving Democrat" and convinced that subordinate State Department officials were doing their best to subvert him, Chiang, and American foreign policy as he understood it.

Two months later, in a blaze of headlines and confusion, Hurley resigned. In a public letter to Truman he charged that "career men in the State Department" had sabotaged U.S. Far Eastern policy:

The professional foreign service men sided with the Chinese Communist armed party and the imperialist bloc of nations whose policy it was to keep China divided against herself. Our professional diplomats continuous-

33 Lohbeck, p. 409.
40 White and Jacoby, pp. 279-88.
ly advised the Communists that my efforts in preventing the collapse of the National Government did not represent the policy of the United States.

It is needless, for the purposes of this study, to examine the bases of Hurley's charges. Suffice it to say that nowhere in his letter is there any indication that Yalta was in the forefront or background of his consciousness. On the contrary, Hurley again congratulated himself for his own diplomatic achievements ending in the Sino-Soviet agreements which, it might be re-emphasized, embodied the Yalta "surrender" and then some. He said it was "a source of gratification" that he had always had Truman's support along with that of Roosevelt and Secretaries Hull, Stettinius, and Byrnes, and he added: "In the higher echelon of our policy-making officials American objectives were nearly always clearly defined," a remark that seemed to conflict with his later insistence that while he had had the private support of Roosevelt and Truman and their Secretaries of State he could never get a "public statement" from them.

Next day, in a speech to the National Press Club in Washington, Hurley repeated his charges, but again there is no indication that Yalta was on his mind. He did make the following interesting remark, however, which, in the context of the times,

43Lohbeck, p. 430.
44I am purposely omitting from this short paper a discussion of my negotiations with Britain and Russia for the recognition of the territorial integrity and independent sovereignty of China and the procurement from both of these nations of an agreement to support the aspirations of the Chinese people to establish for themselves a free, united, democratic government. These negotiations as you know were successful and so far as Russia is concerned were solemnized in a treaty and exchange of letters." Lohbeck, p. 451.
was not taken as an indication of "softness toward communism":

We are striving for the stabilization of Asia around the Chinese Republic and in my opinion the Chinese Communists and the Kuomintang party are seeking the same objectives. Both believe in a government of the people, for the people and by the people."46

Hurley's resignation, coming as it did within hours of a White House conference with Truman in which the Ambassador had agreed to return quickly to China, took the Administration completely by surprise. To Truman, it was "an utterly inexplicable about-face."47 It was all the Cabinet talked of that day.48 Byrnes telephoned Hurley and said he "just did not believe" Hurley had authorized the release of the letter. Hurley said he had indeed, that he had changed his mind about returning because of a speech criticizing him made the day before in the House of Representatives. But he offered to go back to China anyway: "Jim, if you say so, I'll go back," Byrnes quoted him as saying. Byrnes reflected, but didn't say to Hurley, that if everyone resigned because of criticism "we will have wholesale resignations around here."49

Hurley's purpose in resigning so dramatically was, accord-

46 New York Times, November 29, 1945, p. 3. The context of the times was such that a Republican Senator from Indiana could demand on the Senate floor that the State Department be compelled to answer why U.S. armed forces were "being kept in China," why goods and materials "are being flown by American pilots to supply the Nationalist Government and why American lives being sacrificed in this endeavor," and "what possible stake has the average American in the outcome of China's civil war." New York Times, December 1, 1945, p. 3.


48 Millis, The Forrestal Diaries, p. 113.

ing to Lohbeck, to force "a thorough investigation and cleansing of the State Department" and "a public discussion of the Yalta Agreement."50 The Senate Foreign Relations Committee did hold hearings on the Ambassador's charges, but a study of the transcript reveals little if any effort on Hurley's part toward the latter objective. Hurley renewed his accusations against subordinate department officials and demanded that certain "top secret documents" be produced so that he could prove his case, but there is no indication from the context that one of the documents was the still-secret Yalta Agreement.51 He touched on his March conversations with Roosevelt but said nothing of his attempts to "ameliorate" Yalta, simply adding that he "continued the Russian policy as of before."52 Late on the second day of the hearings Republican Sen. Styles Bridges of New Hampshire, possibly primed by someone, possibly just fishing, asked if Hurley knew of any agreements regarding China made at Yalta. Hurley replied:

I was not at Yalta, and I would prefer, sir, that you establish that from the record, rather than from hearsay evidence from me. I do know what transpired in regard to China at Yalta, but I am not the best evidence on that subject.

Bridges then asked who would be the best authority, and Hurley advised him to ask the Secretary of State. That ended the

50 Lohbeck, p. 458, 472.
51 Investigation of Far Eastern Policy, p. 34-35 (the single page bears two page numbers). During the MacArthur hearings Hurley said the secret agreement was one of the documents he had demanded. MacArthur Hearings, Part 4, p. 2826. In his discussion of the 1945 hearings, Lohbeck, pp. 442-45, does not specifically single out the secret agreement as one of the documents Hurley called for.
52 Investigation of Far Eastern Policy, pp. 52, 55.
matter, so far as Hurley was concerned, but the next day Bridges did take up the question with Byrnes, who dodged behind a fog of ambiguities and lapses of memory.

Hurley still maintained his vested faith in Stalin's and Molotov's repeated reassurances:

... all of this time Marshall Stalin and Commissar Molotov had been telling me, and throughout the entire period of the vicissitudes through which we passed so far as I know they have kept their word to me, that, as I stated yesterday, Russia—and this is my own analysis, it is not a quotation—does not recognize the Chinese armed Communist party as Communist at all. Russia is not supporting the Chinese Communist Party. Russia does not desire civil war in China. Russia does not desire the division of China and the setting up of two governments. Russia desires closer and more harmonious relations with China. Since these conversations with Mr. Molotov and Generalissimo Stalin, Russia has concluded with China the Sino-Soviet Pact and has exchanged letters solemnizing every one of these agreements.

I have read that the Soviet has transgressed certain matters that involve the territorial integrity and the independent sovereignty of China, but frankly I have no evidence that would convince me that that is true.

I believe that the United States and Russia are still together on policy in China.

The hearings ended on December 11. The committee came to no conclusions, and made no recommendations, and the transcript was never published.


54 Ibid., pp. 130-31. These are my own italics. Lohbeck omits this part of Hurley's testimony. Compare the testimony, and the omission, with Lohbeck's estimation of Truman, Gen. George C. Marshall, and Byrnes. They were, he writes, "all equally uninformed about the Far East—and not one of the three of them, by their record, had given any evidence whatsoever of being even slightly aware of the irreconcilable opposition between the interests of the Soviet Union and the interests of the United States." Lohbeck, p. 449.

Why, if Yalta had been such an unmitigated disaster, and
if, as Hurley insisted in his letter of resignation, the American
people were entitled to all the facts about our diplomacy, did
he not blow the lid off at this point? One might surmise that,
in view of his "own analysis" of Soviet intentions, it had not
yet occurred to him that Yalta had been "the blueprint for the
Communist conquest of China." In 1951 Hurley testified that his
"late friend" Sen. Vandenberg of Michigan had talked him out of
revealing the secret Yalta context with the argument that to do
so would "really cut the ground from under Byrnes and the rest
of us" at the forthcoming Moscow Conference of foreign ministers.

Lohbeck, in his curiously footnoted and extraordinarily biased
account, asserts that Vandenberg had "insisted . . . 'that it
would be detrimental to negotiations in Moscow if Hurley should
make public to the American people the fact that they were bound
by a secret agreement made at Yalta' . . . .\" Hurley

had placed his trust in the patriotism of the Senator
from Michigan, and discarded his most potent weapon at
Vandenberg's request. But when Secretary Byrnes returned
from the Moscow Conference . . . no mention had been
made of seeking changes in the Yalta agreement . . . .

Felt Hurley has remarked presumably to Lohbeck, since no
source is given that while he can now look back on
most of the events of these trying days with detachment,
it is still painful to recall the way Senator Vandenberg deceived him . . . .\n
"failed to find the matter worth a published report," wrote Act-
ing Secretary of State Dean Acheson in April, 1947. IPR Hearings,
Part 13, p. 4542.

56 Lohbeck, p. 431.
57 Supra, p. 1.
58 MacArthur Hearings, Part 4, p. 2836.
59 Lohbeck, pp. 439-40, does not make clear whom he is
quoting—Vandenberg, Hurley, or himself, and no citation is given.
60!=bd., p. 440.
This explanation, however, does not seem to satisfy Lohbeck himself, for he returns to the subject a little later, with (to the present writer) equally unsatisfactory results. In a long passage of what can only be called apologetics, Lohbeck explains that Hurley was indeed a patriotic citizen, admits that when the war ended "there was no longer the excuse of military necessity to prevent his making a public disclosure," and declares, in an unnoticed contradiction of his previous remarks, that by the time of the Foreign Relations Committee hearings Hurley "was beginning to realize . . . that he was being betrayed by Arthur Vandenberg" and that his decision to keep silent "was not reached on the basis of faith in the promises of the Michigan Senator."\\61 The reasons why Hurley answered Sen. Bridges question as he did, Lohbeck concludes lamely, were two:

First, he was ill with the recurring stomach trouble that had affected him since his youth, and miserable with a serious case of sinus trouble contracted in China—and was, therefore, not as alert as he would normally have been to the web of conspiracy being spun around him to make his protest ineffective. Second, he did seriously believe that his resignation had set into motion a public curiosity that would end in an irrefutable public clamor for an end of secret diplomacy, and a public pressure that would force the administration to expose and denounce the tragic terms of the Yalta Agreement.

The fact is that Pat Hurley was blocked by his own idealism; his greatest strength proved to be, also, his major weakness.\\62

The public clamor and pressure did not materialize, however,

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\\62Lohbeck, p. 473.
but when, about a month later, Hurley "belatedly" concluded that
--"regardless of consequences"--he must reveal the depths of the
Yalta "treachery," he found that "the propaganda machinery of the
administration and the pro-Communist and pro-imperialist cliques"
had done their work all too well:

Pat Hurley's charges had been transformed, in the
public mind, into personal complaints--even those
who knew him, doubted. His statements to the press
were disregarded; unprinted.

What unprinted statements Hurley may have made in late De-

cember or in January Lohbeck leaves to the reader's imagination.
If they had anything to do with Yalta one might suppose Lohbeck
would have inserted them in his book, for the public record.

In final, italicized explanation, or extenuation, Lohbeck
declares that, with the advantages of hindsight, it is now possible
to answer the question:

If Pat Hurley had revealed the provisions of the secret
Yalta Agreement, what would have happened? The answer
is: Nothing.

In April, 1946, the Yalta Agreement was made public--by
the government--and scarcely a ripple of disturbance
appeared. The American people just didn't care.64

In point of fact, the secret provisions had been revealed
two months before, on February 11, 1946,65 but as Lohbeck points
out there was "scarcely a ripple of disturbance." On February 12
Herbert Hoover delivered an address on "The Obligation of the Re-
publican Party," but he apparently felt no obligation then to com-

63 Ibid., p. 475.
64 Ibid.
ment on the disclosures. On the 13th a Congressional investigating committee took further testimony on who was to blame for Pearl Harbor. On the 16th a New York Times correspondent reported that Chungking reaction to the Yalta news was "marked by pained restraint." He added: "The whole Yalta deal is resented as another international bargain at China's expense." On the 15th eight of ten Republican Senators on the Appropriations Committee demanded information on American commitments "in the role of world's banker." On the 16th Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley asserted that the leakage of American atomic secrets to the Russians had been known abroad before the end of the war. Nearly a year later, in fact, when the U.S. announced an end to its attempts at mediation between the contending Chinese parties, Hurley commented:

Our trouble is we fought two world wars for the recognition of certain principles and objectives to which all the United Nations agreed. We have surrendered these principles and objectives since the war. What we're doing now in China is in keeping with the give-away-and-surrender policy of America.

But if he was referring to Yalta as the root of our "give-away-and-surrender policy," the Times did not report it.**

In the six months from the Crimean Conference to the end of the Japanese war, and in the six months from the end of the Japanese war to the publication of Yalta's secret protocols, there is no record, other than Hurley's own unsupported testimony, that he protested against the Yalta "surrender" or that he was even

persuaded that it was a "surrender." It is possible that he did, in fact, argue with Roosevelt about the subject; it is possible that Roosevelt asked him to "ameliorate" the agreement, and that in his talks with Churchill and Stalin he tried; nothing in the historical record, however, shows it. There was nothing to prevent him from making a protest in written form, or simply by way of conversation, during this period. The record, again, is silent. There were several occasions, furthermore, upon which he might have been expected to reveal his doubts, if any, about the Yalta secret records—in his April 12, 1945, cable to Truman, for example, or in his April 17 report to the State Department, or in his May 10 message to Truman, or on June 15, when he revealed the secret terms to Chiang, or in his early July cable to Truman. The available texts of the cables do not reveal such doubts. Nor is there any record, except by far-fetched implication, that he ever demanded publication of the secret provisions during the period under study.

The record does show, however, that Hurley expressed enthusiasm for the Sino-Soviet Treaty, which embodied the Yalta Agreement but went far beyond it in terms of forced Chinese concessions. The record also shows that, at the time of his unprecedented blast of a resignation and during the stormy hearings that followed it, he delivered no adverse comment on the Yalta proceedings, and that at that late date he believed that the U.S. and Russia were "still together on policy in China." One might conclude that Hurley's actions and opinions during the crucial year between February, 1945, and February, 1946, differed in considerable degree from his later recollection of them.
CHAPTER VII

1946-1949

Republicans as well as Democrats acclaimed the Yalta communiques in February, 1945. Herbert Hoover said the agreement would "offer a great hope to the world." Senate Minority Leader Wallace White joined Majority Leader Alben Barkley in commending the results of the conference.¹ Sen. Burton K. Wheeler, that old isolationist from Montana, struck the only sour note. He denounced the wartime parley for having been held in secret and called the agreement "our first betrayal of one of our allies"—meaning Poland. His mail showed, he said, that the American people could not be stampeded into unconditional surrender to the results by "the posts of the State Department."² Wheeler was sounding themes that were to be sounded again and again in later years—secrecy, betrayal, State Department sissies. It is safe to say, however, that Wheeler's sour note did not echo very far. The American people had more important things on their minds—the imminent defeat of Germany, the defeat of Japan which must follow, the hope of Russian intervention in the Far East, the boys coming home, the problems of re-tooling for peace, the vision of a peaceful postwar world. Roosevelt reported to Congress: "Never before have the major Allies been more closely united—not only in their war aims but also in their peace aims." His report received a warm bipartisan response, although there were murmurings of dis-

satisfaction over his observation that it was not then possible to announce the voting arrangements in the proposed World Security Council. These arrangements, arrived at so painfully at the conference, were simply that the United States and Britain would uphold the Russian request for three votes in what was to become the United Nations General Assembly, and in return the Russians would uphold three votes for the United States if the United States wanted them. Why Roosevelt withheld the information is difficult to understand. It was an "uncharacteristic" mistake, wrote Robert Sherwood, and it turned into "one of the worst all-around bungles of the war and a seemingly unnecessary one." Obviously, the scheme conflicted with the American-backed principle of absolute equality in Assembly voting, but, as Sherwood observed, the news was bound to come out anyway at San Francisco a month later; Roosevelt would have done better to have gotten it over with immediately. As it happened, the news leaked toward the end of March, the press clamored to know if there were any other secret understandings arrived at by the conference, and as a result "the very word 'Yalta' came to be associated in the public's mind with secret and somehow shameful agreements." 3

When Byrnes announced Yalta's secret protocols the following February he noted that the Chinese Government had not been a party to the agreement and that Sino-Soviet relations were "in no way controlled by this memorandum" but rather by the Sino-Soviet Treaty of the previous August. A few days later a spokesman of the Chinese Government also declared that China was not bound by

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3 Sherwood, pp. 375-77.
Yalta. Both were right. Although the heads of the three Great Powers had agreed that Soviet claims were to be "uncionessably fulfilled," they could hardly bind a non-signer, legally or morally. Both were wrong, however, in one important respect. What actually governed Sino-Soviet relations, at Yalta, before, and afterwards, was power, not paper. At the time of the announcement of the secret protocols Chiang Kai-shek was "informally" discussing further economic concessions to the Soviet Union going beyond the Sino-Soviet Treaty. Stalin, whose armies had already liberated from Manchuria vast quantities of machinery and material for shipment to the Soviet Union, was now reportedly demanding even more war booty and control or part-control of a considerable number of establishments on what he had recognized as Chinese territory. The Chinese Government, backed by the United States, was resisting, but Chiang, although emphasizing Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria, was also publicly emphasizing the need for Sino-Soviet cooperation "not only for our two countries but for world peace as well."

The chief of the New York Times Washington bureau, Arthur Krock, looked at the record of Yalta and said it revealed that the pact could not have been disclosed when it was made without endangering the war effort. Its present release, he suggested, "might serve to discourage future critics of the heads of em-

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5 *Yalta Papers*, p. 984.

battled democracies for not publishing all their compacts contemporaneously. That," he added, with what turned out to be magnificent understatement, "probably will not be the effect."  

The Chicago Tribune struck the betrayal theme immediately. Two weeks before the Byrnes announcement, on hearing from the Russians of the Kurile Islands and South Sakhalin concessions, it editorialized that what made the revelations important was "the light they throw on the moral character of Mr. Roosevelt," who "deliberately sought to deceive his countrymen." The "world's greatest newspaper" concluded on a characteristic note: "And the American taxpayers may also thank Mr. Roosevelt for the loan to Britain and the other loans that no doubt will follow." The "Trib" viewed with alarm the "decay of moral principle in government" and it was particularly incensed over the way FDR had "contemptuously ignored the Senate." A few days later the Tribune noted Republican preparations for cutting into the Polish-American vote, "the backbone of the Democratic string of election victories in Cook County." An estimated 90 per cent of the votes of Cook County's 375,000 citizens of Polish descent had been going to the Democrats in recent years. If the GOP could boost its share by a mere 5 per cent the GOP could win, said Frank Pesak, 35th ward committeeman. "Americans of Polish descent are disgusted by the betrayal of Poland by the Democratic Administration," Pesak declared. At the moment he did not seem concerned with the Chinese vote.

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7Ibid., February 13, 1946, p. 24.

Sen. Wheeler called Yalta "just another example of how the American people have been bunkoed and deceived," and Rep. Karl E. Mundt (Rep., S. Dak.) asserted that "the policy of appeasement" from Yalta to date was "the surest way to get involved in war with Russia," but for the most part the revelations made little stir. The Chicago Tribune itself was preoccupied with the Pearl Harbor investigation in Congress and Roosevelt's part in the betrayal of Pearl Harbor to Japanese bombers in 1941.9 The Wall Street Journal reported the publication of the secret protocols in four paragraphs, and, in its editorial columns, continued to inveigh against price controls. One of its writers, William Henry Chamberlin, wrote in late February that it seemed "increasingly doubtful whether China will obtain more than a very shadowy acknowledgement of its sovereignty in Manchuria and other northern border areas," but he did not connect the current situation with the Yalta pact.10

All Time had to say about the Kuriles deal was that it "gave added ammunition" to American proponents of annexation (rather than U.S. trusteeship) of certain former Japanese bases in the Pacific. Time reported the Byrnes announcement in four paragraphs. Like the Chicago Tribune, Time criticized "the loss to the U.S. moral position from secret diplomacy." In early March a Time-piece reported rumors of other secret agreements at Yalta, unverified, possibly false, but, as Time concluded: "The world would long and painfully bear the cross of Yalta's secrecy." The next week it reported still another unverified secret Yalta agreement:

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9Ibid., February 12, 1946, p. 7; February 22, 1946, p. 6; at passim.

10Wall Street Journal, February 12, 1946, p. 1; February 23, 1946, p. 3; at passim.
Every day brought a new one. An international rumor not ascribed to Yalta was no more respectable than a resident of Boston's BackBay whose ancestors had not come over in the Mayflower.

Then Time dropped the subject and went on to more timely matters.11 Its sister-in-Luce, Life, which was later to bring the news of the Yalta "betrayal" to the attention of its millions of readers, was even less interested. In its February 11 issue it editorialized on the subject of inflation. It was against it. Its February 18 editorial discussed the lack of a long-range economic policy for Japan. On February 25 it turned to the subject of China, in a picture story of a 66-year-old Chinese gentleman named Yu Tang-shen who was an expert ice-skater. Finally, on March 18, Life ran a long article by Joseph P. Kennedy in which the former Ambassador to Britain noted (uncritically) that the Russians had obtained Chinese recognition of the independence of Outer Mongolia, "which has long been actually a Soviet state," and added:

Russia considers Sakhalin and the Kuriles as reannexed territory and she has obtained a considerable voice in the control of Japan. [Actually, the Russian voice in Japan was loud enough, but its control was miniscule.] She has formally recognized the sovereignty of the Chinese National Government in Manchuria and North China and has promised nonintervention in Chinese internal affairs, retaining for herself certain rights at Port Arthur and Dairen and on the Manchurian railways. Although their occupation of the northern zone of Korea has been characterized by exploitation and uncooperativeness similar to that in the Balkans, so

for the Russians have abided by their Asiatic commitments for better than in Europe. 12

Kennedy's calm, almost sanguine appraisal of the situation makes interesting reading beside the appraisals of his erstwhile colleague in diplomacy, ex-ambassador Bullitt, in Life in 1947 and 1948. 13 The Yalta secret had been out a month (six weeks, if one dates from the Russian disclosures in January) when the Kennedy article appeared, so it may be presumed that if he or Life's editors had regarded it as important they would have mentioned it, but they did not. Life, it may be noted, disagreed to a certain extent with its distinguished contributor. Where Kennedy advocated a policy of firmness toward Russia, Life, commending his article in general, suggested editorially that Kennedy did not give "sufficient weight to the practical need for American idealism in American foreign policy." Life's editorial also ignored Yalta. On March 25 Life reported the Russian stripping of Manchurian industry but still made no mention of Yalta. 14

But if the Yalta revelations were largely passed over by the American press, one fiercely pro-Nationalist spokesman maintained a steady drumfire of criticism. To the China Monthly, supported by Chinese and Americans doing business in or with China and (it seems probable) by Chinese Government funds, everything was black and white. There were the forces of virtue on the one


13 Bullitt, Life, October 15, 1947, p. 56; Bullitt, Life, September 6, 1948, p. 82.

side—Chiang and those who supported him to the hilt; and, on the other, the forces of evil, or, at best, of naivete—those who did not regard Chiang as purity incarnate or who dared commend an American policy that differed from Chiang's. The second was a motley group which at one time or another included Herbert Hoover, the Hearst newspapers, the New York Daily News, the Saturday Evening Post, Colliers, the New York Herald-Tribune, Winston Churchill, and, of course, the American State Department and Franklin Roosevelt.  

The ink was hardly dry on the Yalta Agreement before the China Monthly opened fire, although the target was, for the time being, still obscured by wartime secrecy. One of its principal objections seemed to be that Chiang had not been invited to the Crimea, and it already smelled betrayal in the air. The China Monthly denounced the idea, expressed (in this instance) by the Republican-oriented New York Herald-Tribune, that no Far Eastern settlement could last which did not take Russian interests into account, that whether or not the Russians entered the war against Japan "the tremendous strength and wide interests of the Russians cannot be ignored if we desire world peace." Such words might as well have been written in Moscow. The China Monthly posed the stark alternatives: "Russian security, or a just and acceptable peace!" There could be no compromise between these irreconcilable goals. Compromise was, in fact, appeasement:

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The agreements and undertakings reached by the Big Three at the Crimean Conference gave us the impression that they are now approving and glorifying the very crimes of Munich of 1939 [sic], which we unreservedly condemned. 16

The spirit of appeasement hovered over the San Francisco Conference of the United Nations. It pervaded Owen Lattimore's new book, "Solution in Asia." But it was missing, oddly enough, in the Sino-Soviet Treaty of August, 1945, which, it bears repeating, embodied the Yalta accords and went far beyond them.

Internationally [wrote editor Mark Tsej], the Russo-Chinese Pact . . . which clearly declared that material and moral support will be given exclusively to the National Government of China was a big blow to the Chinese Communists.

Writing in the China Monthly, Alfred Kohlberg, a founding father of what was later to be known as the "China Lobby" and a main source of information for Sen. Joe McCarthy in the Wisconsin Republican's crusade against subversion in the State Department, hailed the 30-year treaty of Sino-Soviet friendship and its accompanying agreements as

the tangible results of the efforts of President Truman and his advisors at Potsdam to induce the Russians to greatly reduce their original demands on China. The success of our Administration officials is deserving of every possible praise . . . .

A few months later Kohlberg, apparently uneasy about his unreserved praise for Administration policy, explained that in his original article he had "hedged" about Russian intentions, but he still refrained from criticizing or even analyzing the Yalta secret protocols, except to remark that Secretary Byrnes had given them out only "in part." The following month he off-

16 "The San Francisco Security Conference," Ibid., VI, No. 6, p. 5.
handedly supplied some of the missing parts. The United States, he wrote, agreed at Teheran and Yalta to give the Russians the Baltic States without protest, to let them do what they wished in Finland, and gave them Eastern Poland outright and the rest of Poland through their puppet "Liberation Committee," and then threw part of Austria, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, Yugoslavia and Hungary in as a bonus.17

There was no evidence available at the time to substantiate this statement and none ever appeared, but Kohlberg's attitude toward evidence was always rather breezy. As he later remarked about Sen. McCarthy: "He doesn't go far enough. He's too cautious about using his information."18 Kohlberg himself went further in the summer of 1947, after the Chinese Nationalist situation had taken several turns for the worse. Now he accused Roosevelt at Yalta of having acted out of petty vengefulness for a "rebuff" by Chiang: "... he offered Stalin, who had not requested it, control of the Manchurian railroads and possession of Port Arthur and Dairen." Kohlberg, like others who interpreted Yalta as the great betrayal, was not above contradicting himself. In the same article he dated our "abandonment" of China at December, 1946, ten months after the Crimean talks. This was one of the great conveniences of the Yalta myth: it provided an infinite field for the inventive powers of the human mind, and if the interpreters contradicted


themselves, all right—to paraphrase Walt Whitman—so they did. Two issues after Kohlberg said Stalin "had not requested it," another China Monthly contributor said Russia had so requested it as its "price" for coming into the Japanese war. We "forced" the Sino-Soviet Treaty on China; but it was also "a blow to native Communist morale." The China Monthly could denounce Communist Party chairman William Z. Foster for denouncing "his own president in most irreverent terms"; it could accuse Roosevelt and Churchill of "playing the part of traitors." (The China Monthly also accused Churchill of having advocated "an appeasement policy entirely his own" in his famous "Iron Curtain" speech at Fulton, Mo., in March, 1946. It was an unusual interpretation.)

In late 1946 Kohlberg began contributing finances and articles to Plain Talk, a monthly magazine whose first issue's lead article struck at alleged State Department subversion and whose ensuing issues were imbued with the same conspiratorial theory of history and politics. Plain Talk took frequent pot-shots at the Yalta Conference, but always with allegation, never with evi-


lasis. As Kohlberg put it in one of his own articles: "This is not the place to analyze the enormity of the crime committed towards our tested ally, China, for the sake of our adventurous courtship of the dubious Soviet power . . . ." Why it was not the place he did not make clear, but there seemed to be something about the Yalta myth that compelled its carriers to postpone analysis for a more propitious moment. 21 On one occasion editor Isaac Don Levine even accused Sen. Taft of being an appeaser who spoke "in a voice reminiscent of Neville Chamberlain." Taft, it appears, was prepared to accept the "gigantic swindle at Yalta" on the ground that nothing could be done about it any more. Levine let fly:

A foreign policy based upon the acceptance of swindles and betrayals is a policy which is just as welcome to Stalin as that advocated by the crypto-Communist Wallace. Is it possible that when Mr. Wallace dropped his remark in Buffalo some time ago—that he would prefer Taft to Truman as President—he struck the same chord of appeasement?

Like other Yalta critics, Levine followed the contradictory line of alternately condemning the Yalta "betrayal" and insisting that the Russians be forced to live up to the agreements they made at Yalta. Kohlberg went on denouncing the "sell-out," denouncing the Russians for their flagrant violations of it, and seeing the abandonment of China as commencing after Roosevelt's death. 22

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21 Kohlberg, "The Lie Marches On," Plain Talk, II: 7 (April, 1947), p. 45; "If time permitted," said Joe McCarthy on February 9, 1950, "it might be well to go into detail about the fact that Kiss was Roosevelt's chief advisor at Yalta," etc. State Department Loyalty Investigation, Part 2, p. 1762.

In 1946, for the most part, Congress paid as little attention to Yalta as it did to American China policy itself. The great traumatic experience of the United States—the "loss" of China—had not yet occurred; neither had the great traumatic experience of the Republican Party—the loss of the 1948 election. Chiang seemed to be gradually gaining control of China, despite his difficulties with the Russians in Manchuria and with his domestic Communist opposition. Gen. George C. Marshall was in China, trying to make peace between the contending Chinese. The war was over; the boys—most of them, anyway—were home; and American politicians had plenty of domestic problems to quarrel about.

There were a few sporadic outbursts about Yalta. They had little impact. In late March Rep. Charles Halleck (Rep., Ind.), after a House debate on who was responsible for the Pearl Harbor disaster, declared off the floor, with standard operating politicsmanship, that his party stood to gain from "recent developments, such as the disclosure of the secret agreements at Yalta and what has come out in the Pearl Harbor investigation." Two weeks later the newly-elected GOP National Chairman, B. Carroll Reece of Tennessee, opened his party's Congressional campaign with a 2,000-word letter to his Democratic counterpart. Far down the list of complaints was a reference to Democratic secret agreements, of which the last was the agreement giving Russia sovereignty over the Kuriles.23

On May 15, 62 prominent American citizens—including GOP Reps. Clare Boothe Luce of Connecticut and Walter Judd of Minne-
sota; Admiral Harry E. Yarnell, ret., former commander of the U. S. Asiatic Fleet; Oswald Garrison Villard; Norman Thomas; William Green, president of the American Federation of Labor; Emily Hahn; Max Eastman; and Sidney Hook—issued a "Manchurian Manifesto" which pointed to the Soviet Union's "direct violations" of the Yalta Agreement and demanded, therefore, that the U. S. support a "complete revision" of it. How the Russians could be persuaded to revise an agreement they were systematically violating anyway, and what good it would do to try—and what good it would do, under the circumstances, even to succeed—were not made clear. Three months after Yalta's secret provisions had been placed on the public record, and nine months after the announcement of the Sino-Soviet accords, the signers said China's faith in American honor had been "rudely shaken" by what they called the "sudden revelations of the secret provisions of the Yalta Agreement." They called for a return to America's traditional "Open Door" policy:

At the Cairo Conference . . . it was decided to restore to China all territories which Japan had taken by force, including Manchuria. Despite this promise, however, it is now apparent that China was forced to negotiate the treaty with Russia, which conceded vital rights in Manchuria and which abandoned all China's rights in Mongolia, under duress not only from Russia but from the United States.24

The same day, on Capitol Hill, Sen. Claude Pepper graciously yielded the floor to Sen. Henrik Shipstead, who proceeded to attack, in extravagant language, the foreign policies of the Florida Democrat's favorite President, Franklin Roosevelt. Shipstead condemned the "despicable and war-breeding methods of secret diplomacy and secret agreements which betray our fellow men into the hands of

violence and slavery." The GOP isolationist from Minnesota arraigned "the sordid, secret agreements of Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam" as "commitments which are a disgrace and an outrage to the Christian conscience." After which, the Congressional Record noted, "The Senate resumed consideration of the bill (H. R. 4908) to provide additional facilities for the mediation of labor disputes," and the "outrage to the Christian conscience" was relegated to Congressional limbo for another six weeks.25

Late on the afternoon of July 31, with Congress looking forward to adjournment and the resumption of autumn's biennial party battles, Sen. Kenneth Wherry unloosed a bitter, partisan attack on the foreign policies of the Truman and Roosevelt Administrations. The Nebraska Republican laid before the Senate his Resolution 197 to study (among other things) the extent to which State Department personnel were Communist sympathizers. He struck at Under Secretary Dean Acheson, against whose confirmation Wherry's had been the only opposing vote, and, like Shipstead, he condemned the "war-breeding secret commitments" of Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam. He added another: Moscow.

The "plain fact," he said

is that up until this very moment Russia has only been doing in her own way what our policy makers agreed to permit her to do in conformity with those secret agreements of Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam.

And again:

We need not go back any further than the Yalta Agreement to find a convincing picture of the way in which our policies are selling out the Chinese to the Communists and betraying our own most vital interests in the Far East.

Only two Senators responded. Tom Connally of Texas, for the Democrats, urged that America's non-partisan foreign policy be continued, to which Wherry replied blandly: "My criticism was constructive, and not inspired in any way by political considerations." Arthur Vandenberg, the GOP's chief foreign policy spokesman, in a mild, implied rebuke of his Nebraska colleague, said he did not care to go into "ancient history" and although he shared some of Wherry's views on previous American attitudes, particularly regarding Yalta--

I hasten to add that I realize the late President of the United States was operating under the exigencies of war, and perhaps under what he considered to be a dire necessity to maintain unity of foreign policy at any price. Happily, we are under no such repugnant compulsions now. I agree, and so does Secretary Byrnes, that appeasement days are over.26

Wherry's sparks lit no fires. Two days later, as one investigator noted, when Bridges took a few moments to "comment briefly," in nine columns of fine print in the Congressional Record, on the GOP's achievements in the 79th Congress, the New Hampshire Republican not only ignored his own and Wherry's major role in the investigation of Hurley's resignation, not only failed to cite any instance of GOP opposition to the Administration's China policy, but ignored the subject of China completely.27

On August 5 Nebraska's other Republican Senator, Hugh Butler, demanded that the United States get out of China, which he regarded as a hopeless situation. "We have no business in China,"

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26ibid., Part 8, 10526-25.

he declared. "... I wish some one could explain why our troops are there." Three days later the New York state convention of the pro-Communist American Labor Party agreed with Butler, urging the immediate withdrawal of U. S. troops from China. 28

The 1946 mid-term election was fought primarily on domestic issues, and, for the first time since 1928, the Republicans captured both the House and the Senate. In January, 1947, after a year of fruitless efforts at mediation, Gen. Marshall quit China, blaming the failure of his mission on the "dominant, reactionary group in the Government and the irreconcilable Communists." 29 China became increasingly a subject of partisan dispute, although the stepped-up denunciations of Yalta, of the State Department, and of Roosevelt, were accompanied by what could only be described as paltry programs of action. Attacking the past, instead of understanding the past and planning for the future, provided the illusion of personal and political virility, and it was also cheaper, of course, to blame previous misconduct for the mess in China than to appropriate the large sums and raise the large armies that might have helped resolve the mess.

Thus, Bridges, who the previous August had ignored the Far East in his recitation of Republican accomplishments, in February hailed retiring Secretary Byrnes for having operated successfully "within the onerous terms of what historians will probably call the great American surrender at Yalta." Bridges demanded that "we put the whole leverage of our prestige, our

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29 Ibid., January 8, 1947, p. 3.
economic might, and our technological strength behind our diplomacy," but as chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee he presided over the appropriation of funds for China whose leverage might have seemed quite brittle beside the weight and mass of the problem, and so proved in the event. 30

On March 19, 1947, Nationalist troops captured the former Communist capital city, Yenan. In July President Truman commissioned Gen. Wedemeyer to go to China and make "an appraisal of the over-all situation." In September Chiang estimated that it would "probably take from six months to a year" to suppress the Reds. In November a man who planned to be elected President of the United States one year hence, Gov. Thomas E. Dewey of New York, speaking "dispassionately," blasted the Administration's "bankrupt" China policy and demanded aid to China before it was too late, adding that "a comparatively small expenditure by our country should produce enormous results." He suggested that even $75 million to $100 million "would change the entire situation psychologically."

Rep. Judd, in hearings on emergency aid to China, said that in August 1945, as part of the bargain at Yalta, we got the Russians to sign an agreement with China, in which they too promised to support the Central Government of China . . . . As a result of Russia signing that agreement the Communists knew that their hopes were shattered. There was nothing Mao-Tse-tung could do but come to terms . . . . Up to that point we had kept first things first in Asia. 31


Some Congressmen opposed even paltry sums for China. Rep. George Bender, a conservative Republican from Ohio, in arguing against Truman's request for funds to help Greece and Turkey fight communism, charged that the Chinese had had "the arrogance" to tell the State Department that the Truman Doctrine committed this country "to all-out support of the present Fascist Chinese Government."

A sinister conspiracy exists, he said, to draw us into open warfare on the side of every reactionary and Fascist element and in every civil war everywhere in the world. . . . Mr. Chairman, what is going on in the State Department?

Rep. Howard Buffett joined in. If the Greek-Turkish loan passed, the Nebraska Republican declared with specific reference to China, "ruling politicians everywhere" would be spending their time "devising ways and means of using the threat of communism to blackmail America for continuous handouts." Congress, in December, appropriated $540 million to help fight communism abroad; the comparatively small sum of $18 million, generally regarded as a "gesture," was handed out to China. In February, 1948, during Foreign Affairs Committee hearings, Rep. Judd blamed Yalta for "the mess we are in now." The committee recommended $150 million in military aid and $420 million in economic aid to China. The Administration had recommended $570 million in economic aid. The final China Aid Act cut the economic provisions to $388 million, the military provisions to $125 million.32


Nationalist armies entered 1948 with a near 5-to-1 numerical superiority over the Communists;\textsuperscript{34} Republicans entered 1948 smelling Democratic blood. During the Presidential campaign Candidate Dewey flailed away at Democratic foreign policy. To the student of history, as well as to the student of political prose, his language was at times quite fascinating:

It wouldn't serve any useful purpose to recall tonight how the Soviet has conquered millions of people as a result of the failures of statesmanship. It does not advance our purpose to discuss the manner in which the Soviet has been able to pick the fruits of diplomatic victories that were yielded up at that long series of secret conferences culminating in Potsdam. . . . It serves no purpose to review the concessions made by our own Government to the Soviet in Manchuria and in Northern China at the expense of the Chinese people and without consulting them.

Dewey promised to end “the tragic neglect” of China, although he was vague on details. “Speaking entirely without partisanship on a subject which is above partisanship,” Dewey, one week before the day on which his residence for the next four years was to be decided, blasted the Democrats for their “tragic concessions” which, by implication, had permitted the Russians to swallow up the Baltic states, Hungary, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and “our noble allies, the Polish people.”

The same process, with variations, has operated to extend the power of the Soviet into Manchuria, Northern and Central China, Outer Mongolia, Northern Korea and to Port Arthur and Dairen. By consent of our Government, the Soviet has reached far out into the Pacific into the Kurile Islands near our own Aleutians . . . \textsuperscript{35}

\textsuperscript{34} MacArthur Hearings, Part 5, p. 1855.

In November, 1948, the month in which Gov. Dewey plucked defeat out of the jaws of victory, the Nationalists announced another of their own "unprecedented" victories, this one east of Suchow, in which the Reds allegedly suffered 130,000 casualties against only 40,000 Nationalist losses. The announcement seems to have been as premature as the Chicago Tribune’s early edition headline: "Dewey Wins!" The same day’s New York Times which reported the Defense Ministry announcement also reported that Chiang had written Truman urging more American assistance to his embattled armies and asserting that China’s current predicament stemmed from the Sino-Soviet Agreement of 1945 which, said Chiang, China signed on the basis of American diplomacy. 26 Meanwhile, Rep. Judd now blamed the deteriorating situation in China on "the one man responsible," Secretary of State Marshall, and an ambitious young Congressman from Massachusetts named John F. Kennedy reviewed, to a Salem audience, "the tragic story of China" where "what our young men had saved, our diplomats and our President have frittered away." By February, 1949, the Communists outnumbered the Nationalists by better than 2-to-1 in combat effectives. In April the Reds opened a million-man offensive along the Yangtse from the China Sea to the Szechuan gorges; Knowland blamed Acheson for having "pulled the rug out from under" the Nationalists; Chiang’s troops abandoned Nanking. In May Red soldiers entered Shanghai almost unopposed. The end was

26 New York Times, November 19, 1948, pp. 1, 5; cf., for Chiang’s earlier opinion of the Sino-Soviet Agreement, and for the opinions of the China Monthly, Alfred Kohlberg, and Walter Judd, supra, pp. 47, 80, 89.
That summer of 1949 a number of proposals for aid to China were advanced. Sen. William Jenner (Rep., Ind.) castigated the "criminal betrayal of China" at Yalta and demanded an investigation of how the "Chinese catastrophe" had come about. He also demanded that "further squandering of American financial, economic, and military resources" be ended. Sen. Owen Brewster (Rep., Me.), a leading "China Lobby" spokesman, had another suggestion which he advanced in a colloquy with Sen. Connally. The Texas Democrat had observed that this country had sent $2 billion in aid to China since the end of the war and had asked: "What else would the Senator have wanted us to do?" Brewster replied: "I can tell the Senator what I should have liked to do. I should have liked to read the Wedemeyer Report a long time ago." Brewster's "constructive suggestion was that Gen. Wedemeyer be sent as U. S. ambassador to China "as a symbol of a far keener and clearer understanding of the issues there," Gov. Dewey, noting the "seemingly carefree abandon" with which the allied nations had reversed their Cairo pledge to maintain China's territorial and political integrity, laid down a two-point program of positive action, of which Point No. 1 was that we proclaim our faith in free China and Point No. 2 was that we give aid to China: How much aid should America then give to the various non-Communist forces? That is a matter as to which the most widely different opinions can be found. Any aid, given immediately, right

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now, this summer, would create a great return of confidence. If supported with a vigorous official position it would make a radical change in the Chinese picture. 38

Sen. Knowland, like Brewster, rejected the idea of sending American armed forces to China but thought a military mission, along the lines of our mission in Greece, would be helpful, in addition to "a relatively small amount of small arms, and perhaps mortars and light mountain artillery." Sen. Homer Ferguson (Rep., Mich.) doubted the need of "subsidizing a vast military operation" and suggested that "an offer of America's good will to the Chinese" would disintegrate communism in China. Sen. H. Alexander Smith (Rep., N. J.) also doubted that "exceedingly great military aid" was the only thing the United States could do in China; he seemed to want to export "ideas" and the "western tradition" to China. This, he said, was the neglected area in American foreign policy. "Alex Smith," as Vandenberg observed, "... has a strong concern about doing something for China... He doesn't know what—and neither do I, because Chinese aid at the moment is like sticking your finger in the lake and looking for the hole..." 39

Vandenberg himself had objected from the beginning to Yalta's Polish provisions and to the voting formula which gave the Soviet Union three votes in the U. N. General Assembly, but in the interest of the nonpartisan foreign policy (of which he became a principal symbol), and aware of the wartime exigencies

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38 U. S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, XCIX, Part 5, 6390-93; Part 6, 8296-98; Part 15, A4684.
39 Ibid., Part 7, 8322, 9367, 9193; Vandenberg Papers, p. 536.
under which Roosevelt had had to operate, he preferred to dampen controversy over Yalta rather than to fan it. If he believed that Yalta was partially responsible for the Nationalist decline and fall, he was also aware that China was "a maze of imponderables" and that the Nationalists had had much to do with their own fate: "When practically all of our American-trained and American-equipped Chinese divisions surrender without firing a shot--where do we go from here?" In the summer of 1949, arguing on the Senate floor with Brewster, Vandenberg "disassociated" himself from the Administration's China policy, as he had done publicly before, but he added:

It is a very easy, simple matter to disassociate one's self from a policy. It is not quite so easy to assert what an alternative policy might have been. I concede that it is far easier to be critical than to be correct.

The release of the State Department White Paper on China lit the fuse to charge and countercharge on the subject of China, but Vandenberg still sought to "find the facts," not to find scapegoats; to "deal with the realities," not with emotions and prejudices. But by then there was little left of whatever non-partisanship had ever existed on China. The role of statesman increasingly resembled the role of Canute.40

CHAPTER VIII

WHO "LOST" CHINA?

What had happened at Yalta was obvious enough. There had been drinking. The Russians had pried American officials with vodka. No wonder our diplomats made so many concessions to Stalin. Thus did Mrs. D. Leigh Colvin, president of the Women's Christian Temperance Union, react to the State Department's White Paper on China. Others also reacted according to their bent. The White Paper was a "fumbling, 1,054-page alibi." It was "an apology for an apology." It was a "whitewash . . . . a mealy mouthed effort to excuse what is inexcusable." The State Department must have hoped that putting its version of the facts on record would answer the critics and mute the criticism of America's previous Far Eastern policies. Instead, criticism crescendoed, and Yalta was, of course, a prime target. "Yalta, Yalta, Yalta--what a crime was committed there under the guise of liberty and freedom," said Rep. Lawrence H. Smith (Rep., Wis.). Typical was the comment of columnist Dorothy Thompson. It had been unjustifiable, she wrote, to base American policy on the objective of getting Russia into the war against Japan in time to be of some help.

Anyone with knowledge of Russian Far Eastern policy should have known that Russia would never permit a Chinese solution to which she was not a party, and that therefore, at the appropriate moment for her own interests, Russia would certainly enter the Far Eastern war to protect those interests.


3Ibid., Part 15, A5089.
Since State Department policies were responsible for what happened in China, the subordinates who, she said, were responsible for those policies should be fired, and, in fact, if they had "a feeling of honor they would resign." 5 Arthur Kroek, who, in February, 1946, had defended the Yelts concessions and belittled critics who "speak after the fact and without ever having been faced with such a choice," now criticized Johnson for his "expedient, after-the-fact reasoning" in defending the same concessions. 5

Meanwhile, Nationalist representatives continued their own efforts to influence American policy and politics. "Our country should keep completely out of American internal politics," a Chinese diplomat (probably Chen Chih-mei, Minister Counselor at the Embassy in Washington) reported to Generalissimo Chiang. What he meant by that may be subject to more than one interpretation. The cabled reports sent from the Embassy to Chiang reveal a pattern of Chinese intervention in American domestic affairs:

At present [just after publication of the White Paper], those friendly to us feel that we must seize the opportunity to counterattack ... Since the White Paper is now receiving everyone's devoted attention, we must take this opportunity to immediately begin our itemized refutations ...

Stilwell, Laughlin Currie, Owen Lattimore, Marshall, the American pressure on the Nationalists to make concessions to the Chinese Communists, "and the promises made by the United States at the Cairo Conference and its subsequent violations": these, Chen suggested, should be brought up at the rate of "one point each week in order to keep the unbroken attention of the Ameri-

"Chinese diplomats conferred frequently with American politi-
cians who favored their point of view:

I, Chih-Mai, yesterday had a long talk with Knowland and Judd. They both think that Johnson is much pre-
judiced and cannot be reasoned with. President Truman
is limited in ability and has been influenced by John-
son. Therefore, if Johnson remains there is no possi-
bility of a change of policy toward China . . .

The McCarthy investigation is an internal political
struggle. We naturally should not be involved in it.
But Lattimore has been very critical of our govern-
ment in recent years. He is opposed to aid for China
and he has been disrespectful to you [Chiang] . . . .

Last night Representative Judd intended to call the
House by telephone and hopes that I can say something
so that the American public will not be fooled by
Lattimore . . . . How if we keep silent it will be
disadvantageous to us and he asked me to consider
the matter.

In the United States we are not short of sympathi-
izers and friends. We should intensify our liaison
and publicity work.

We should, during this 1950 election, try to report
on facts, but we should not give so much publicity to
the Republican attack on the administration's China
policy that the administration will be irritated.

Chih-mai saw Ambassador Bullitt yesterday . . .

We have been patient and tolerant to the extreme with
General Marshall for years, but he hasn't changed in
the least regarding his attitude toward us . . . .
However, in order to avoid direct conflict with the
administration, we should not have a head-on collision
with that man. So, we suggest it would be better not
to attack him openly.

Your humble subordinate, Chen Chih-mai, gave Taft the
following idea which . . . . will be used by Taft
either in his forthcoming speech which will in turn sell
the same idea to the United States authorities [sic].

For the most part, and for obvious reasons, the Chinese
preferred to work behind the scenes, through the "China Lobby,"

69 cong., Congr. Rec., 82nd Con., 2nd Sess., 1952, 57VIII, Part 5, 6758, 6748, 6751, 6754, 6755; 57XIII,
Part 3, 5970, 5971.
an amorphous group of Americans and Chinese who supported the Nationalist Government for ideological, partisan, economic, or religious reasons, or for a combination of some or all the reasons. The Chinese supplied the Americans with ideas, and vice-versa.

Minister Counselor Chen reportedly gave Senators Knowland, Bridges, Wherry, and Pat McCarran (Dem., Nev.) ammunition for their attacks on the White Paper. William J. Goodwin, the former Christian Fronter whom the Chinese Government had hired as a paid lobbyist, said he had "helped materially" to provide Senator McCarthy with information for the latter's onslaught on the State Department. Alfred Kohlberg supplied McCarthy with reams of material. Ambassador Bullitt wrote his Life articles after conferring, as a Luce reporter, with Chinese officials in Nanking.

No instance can be found in which Bullitt had protested American policy prior to his China assignment. . . . He was not reporting on events which had taken place in 1947 but was passing on to this American readers a story about past events which had been created in Nanking for Bullitt's American audience. He had no direct contact with, or official responsibility for, the events on which he was reporting. 7

The aims of the Nationalist Government and the "China Lobby" were essentially the same. As the Minister Counselor noted in a secret cable to the Generalissimo on January 12, 1950:

. . . there is no hope that the White House, Department of State, and the Democratic Party will consider further assistance to China in order to save the precarious situation. The only way for the Chinese Nationalists is to excite popular opinion in an effort to make the authorities change their attitude. 8


8 8, Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1952, XCVIII, Part 8, 6748.
Or, better yet, change the authorities. It was necessary to absolve Chiang of blame for the Chinese catastrophe. And it was necessary to find someone else to blame. Roosevelt was a natural—although a difficult and dangerous—target. Rightly or wrongly, many Americans felt eternally indebted to the man who had given them food, and jobs, and hope, and would be repelled by attacks on his memory. That left the State Department, a far more logical—if logical is quite the word—scapegoat. The State Department has never been one of America's more popular institutions. It deals with foreign affairs, which, when they come before the public eye, are apt to be messy, costly, and unpleasant; and when they do not, remote and rather tedious. Attacking State had an added convenience in that one could strike at men who, by the nature of their work as well as their training, could not strike back. In the 'thirties left-wingers had accused the State Department of being "soft" on fascism; now right-wingers accused it not only of being "soft" on communism but of being infiltrated, right up to the top, by Communists. One could hit Roosevelt indirectly: he was too sick to know what was going on at Yalta. Or, if one detested "that man" and all his works enough, one could accuse him of knowing perfectly well what was going on—nay, of being the prime instigator. How else could China have been "lost" but by American subversion? How else could the Russians have taken over Eastern Europe? What other explanation could there possibly be? And remember, Alger Hiss was at Yalta. The Democrats under Roosevelt had welded a coalition the strength of which depended, in large part, on blocs of first- and second-generation voters whose sentimental bonds to their mother-countries
remained unbroken by time. The Republicans might not be able to "liberate" those countries, as they began to promise, but it seems a safe assumption that the idea of liberating large blocs of voters from their sentimental bonds to the Democrats, by hammering on the "betrayal" issue in its various manifestations, had occurred to Republican party strategists.

On February 9, 1950, in a speech to a Wheeling, W. Va., women's Republican club which had assembled to honor the memory of Abraham Lincoln ("with malice toward none; with charity for all"), Sen. Joe McCarthy announced that he had in his hand a list of 205, or 61, or 57—what number he had actually used itself became a subject of contention—Communists in the State Department who were "still helping to shape our foreign policy." For the next nearly five years McCarthy and his accusations dominated the headlines. McCarthy's previous interest in China had been, at best, desultory, and in the Wheeling speech he only touched in passing on the subject—and on Yalta. He noted that Alger Hiss had been at Yalta—"Roosevelt's chief advisor"—and cited former Secretary of State Stettinius as authority for the statement that Hiss had helped to decide, among other things, "(?) China—here's where we gave away Manchuria." 9

A subcommittee under Sen. Millard E. Tydings (Dem., Md.) investigated McCarthy's charges and concluded that they had stemmed, in the main, from three sources: distortions of Gen.

9State Department Employees Loyalty Investigation, pp. 2-4; Jack Anderson and Ronald Hey, Mccarthy: The Man, the Senator, the "Ien" (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1952), pp. 172-85; Mccarthy Speeches, p. 14.
Hurley's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in December, 1949, after Hurley's resignation as Ambassador to China; Alfred Kohlberg, New York City importer with close ties to the Nationalist Government, American China Policy Association activist, and founder and financial backer of the magazine Plain Talk; and the Plain Talk article, "The State Department Espionage Case," signed by Emmanuel S. Larsen but repudiated by Larsen during the hearings. The Tydings subcommittee labelled McCarthy's allegations against the State Department "perhaps the most nefarious campaign of untruth in the history of our Republic." It found no evidence to support McCarthy's charge that Owen Lattimore was the "architect of our Far Eastern policy" and the "top Russian spy." In sum, McCarthy had perpetrated "a fraud and a hoax," the result of which had been "to confuse and divide the American people, at a time when they should be strong in their unity, to a degree far beyond the hopes of the Communists themselves ..."¹⁰

The Tydings report had no more success in braking McCarthy's "nefarious campaign" than the State Department White Paper had had in braking China policy critics. McCarthy replied: "whitewash." He smote those who had perpetrated the "foul betrayal" at Yalta, the "perfumed, dilettante diplomats," "the Yalta crowd in the State Department," the "Acheson-Hiss-Yalta crowd."¹¹ In December, 1950, six months after the outbreak of the Korean War, McCarthy urged Gen. Marshall to resign as Defense Secretary--"particularly

¹¹Ibid., p. 149; McCarthy Speeches, pp. 180, 206, 221.
since he, too, has been heavily involved in the erroneous China policy—and make his talents available as needed, "as are those of our other fine elderly statesmen." On June 14, 1951, as the controversies over Korean strategy, MacArthur's involuntary return to America, traitors in government and past China policy boiled in acrimony, McCarthy embarked on the "head-on collision" with Marshall that, a few months before, Minister Counselor Chen Chih-mai had thought it expedient to avoid. He called his Senate speech "America's Retreat From Victory; the Story of Gen. George C. Marshall," and he hinted that at least some of his material came from Chinese sources. Marshall, he declared, was one of the leading figures in "a conspiracy of infamy so black that, when it is finally exposed, its principals shall be forever deserving of the meediations of all honest men." McCarthy reviewed Gen. Marshall's wartime and postwar career, especially his role as Chief of Staff and as Truman's mediator in China, and found therein a pattern of stubborn, skilful subservience to the Kremlin.

What can be made of this unbroken series of decisions and acts contributing to the strategy of defeat? They cannot be attributed to incompetence. If Marshall were merely stupid, the laws of probability would dictate that part of his decisions would serve this country's interest.

Marshall's activities before, during, and after the Yalta Conference proved his part in the "great conspiracy." Before Yalta he had pressed for a pro-Soviet military strategy; at Yalta he had "stood at Roosevelt's elbow" and urged "the grim necessity

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12 Ibid., p. 160.
13 Ibid., pp. 215, 266, 305.
of bribing Stalin to get into the war" and suppressed intelligence estimates which would have disproved his arguments; after Yalta he went to China to restrain the Chinese Nationalists, to deny them American assistance, to force them into a coalition government with the Communists: "The surrender of Yalta had to be concluded and perfected."

This is not the place (if one may borrow a device favored by McCarthy, Kohlberg, and Dewey) to examine the bases for McCarthy's various accusations. One example, bearing on our subject, may illustrate at least one of his techniques. "How did our difficulties arise in the Far East?" McCarthy asked, and he quoted from the 1947 report of Gen. Wedemeyer to President Truman:

Indirectly the United States facilitated the Soviet program in the Far East by agreeing at the Yalta Conference to Russian reentry into Manchuria and later by withholding aid from the Nationalist Government.

End of quote. But the Wedemeyer Report went on to declare:

There were justifiable reasons for these policies. In the one case we were concentrating maximum Allied strength against Japanese in order to accelerate crushing defeat and thus save Allied lives. In the other, we were withholding unqualified support from a government within which corruption and incompetence were so prevalent that it was losing the support of its own people.

The Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services joint committee which, in the spring of 1951, investigated Truman's dismissal of MacArthur, heard over 2,000,000 words of testimony. As far as Yalta was concerned, the Democratic majority and Republican minority could find only one "area of agreement." It was

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15 Ibid., p. 296; Relations With China, p. 766.
that Gen. Hurley had "left the firm impression" that, in 1945, the United States had had the "unquestionable power to make Russia respect her solemn agreements, but that we surrendered that power in the secret Yalta Agreement." Eight of the 11 Republican members turned in a scorching minority report which emphasized Yalta as the "turning point" of American Far Eastern policy, "a triumph for Communist diplomacy." One non-signer was Oregon's Sen. Wayne Morse, who was then a Republican. Morse regretted that his colleagues had seen fit to submit such a "very highly partisan and biased report." Another Republican non-signer, Sen. Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. of Massachusetts, ignored Yalta, as had Morse, and abstained from criticizing the State Department, but rather ambiguously called for "a new birth of public confidence" in the Department and thought it tragic that "some of the most essential steps to create that confidence have not been taken." What those steps should be--to fire Acheson, perhaps, to cease firing at State, or something else--he left unspecified. Sen. Leverett Saltonstall of Massachusetts also submitted his own views. He conceded that "tragic mistakes" had been made at our wartime conferences but thought our present task was to deal with the present and look to the future, "rather than to look backward in anger and with recriminations."16

But Lodge, Saltonstall, and Morse were outnumbered and outshouted. Yalta had become a leading Republican issue, an emotion-packed symbol of all that had gone wrong with American foreign policies under the Democrats. The 1948 Republican platform had

not even mentioned Yalta. A February, 1950, Republican National Committee "statement of principles and objectives" had deplored Yalta's "tragic consequences" but had not enlarged upon them. The 1952 Republican platform, whose foreign policy plank was carefully constructed by John Foster Dulles so that both Eisenhower and Taft could stand on it, lambasted Yalta and promised to repudiate it, or seemed to:

The Government of the United States, under Republican leadership, will repudiate all commitments contained in secret understandings such as those of Yalta which aid Communist enslavements. 17

Sen. Taft, campaigning for the Republican nomination, and Gen. Eisenhower, who got it, demanded again and again that the United States formally denounce the Yalta Agreement—especially when they spoke before audiences of Eastern European extraction. 18

Elected by a landslide, President Eisenhower declared in his first State of the Union message:

We shall never acquiesce in the enslavement of any people in order to purchase fancied gain for ourselves. I shall ask the Congress at a later date to join in an appropriate resolution making clear that this Government recognizes no kind of commitment contained in secret understandings of the past with foreign Governments which permit this kind of enslavement. 19

Eisenhower soon learned, as other Presidents have learned


before and since, that pledges in campaigns can be plagues in office. The Yalta issue launched the Eisenhower Administration in an atmosphere of bickering and bitterness, between Republicans and Republicans as much as between Democrats and Republicans. It provided the Democrats with cause for no little sardonic mirth. There was, for one, the Yalta resolution submitted by the Administration. For another, there was President Eisenhower's nomination of Charles E. "Chip" Bohlen as Ambassador to Moscow.

In the first instance, the anti-Yalta resolution that Eisenhower submitted to Congress was considerably at variance with the general Republican understanding of their platform, their promises, and the President's State of the Union intention. Eisenhower suggested a concurrent resolution whereby both Houses would

Join with the President in declaring that the United States rejects any interpretations or applications of any international agreements or understandings made during the course of World War II, which have been perverted to bring about the subjugation of free peoples, and further

Join in proclaiming the hope that the people who have been subjected to the captivity of Soviet despotism shall again enjoy the right of self-determination within a framework which will sustain the peace; that they shall again have the right to choose the form of government under which they will live, and that sovereign rights of self-government shall be restored to them all in accordance with the pledge of the Atlantic Charter.20

This did not repudiate Yalta. This did not even mention Yalta. This did not condemn Roosevelt and the Democrats. This merely condemned the Russians for having "perverted" our wartime agreements, which was precisely what the Democrats had been contending all along. There seemed to be a new "betrayal" in the

air, this one a "betrayal" by the newly-elected Republican Administration of a Republican article of faith. The Democrats were perfectly willing to support a resolution condemning the Soviet Union, but, as Senate Minority Leader Lyndon Johnson made plain, they would fight any attempt to "harden" the resolution into a condemnation of Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman. To the Administration, a partisan split on the issue would destroy whatever value the Yalta resolution would have as an American foreign policy gambit—a value which Secretary of State John Foster Dulles did not underestimate. In an eloquent plea before the House Foreign Affairs Committee he urged Congress to pass the resolution as written and with "virtual unanimity." The resolution would, he said, "make totally clear the integrity of this nation's purpose in relation to the millions of enslaved peoples in Europe and Asia." It would inspire them with hope of freedom. It would help disintegrate the Soviet Union's "over-extended despotism." It would be, he declared, an act "that will resound through the ages and eventually will attain a dignity in history comparable to that of the Declaration of Independence or the Monroe Doctrine." The committee was so impressed that it accepted the Administration's every jot and tittle by a 22-0 vote.21

Sen. Taft, however, was not so impressed. The Administration had a real—and painful—problem. Congressional Democrats were prepared to give more nonpartisan foreign policy support to the Republican Administration than were many or even most Republicans. The Administration wanted that support and needed it.

21Ibid., February 24, 1953, p. 1; February 25, 1953, p. 1; February 27, 1953, pp. 1, 4; February 28, 1953, p. 1.
Taft was unconcerned with the problem; he was part of it. Eisenhower could suggest that there was nothing to be gained by raking the ashes of the dead past; Dulles, that it was time to "move on to mold the future"; Taft believed that promises were made to be kept and especially the Republicans' Yalta promise. 22 "Mr. Republican," now Senate Majority Leader, introduced a rider to the Administration's resolution providing that its adoption "does not constitute any determination by Congress as to the validity or invalidity of any of the provisions of the said agreements or understandings." The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, of which the chairman was now Wiley of Wisconsin, accepted the rider by an 8-6 vote, with committee Republicans unanimously in favor and committee Democrats—with one defection, Gillette of Iowa—unanimously opposed. Minority Leader Johnson promptly accused the Taft Republicans of introducing "partisan considerations" that would "divide us in the face of the enemy" and "jeopardize the President's prestige before the country and the world." Sen. Walter George of Georgia, from the heights of his ancient prestige, thundered that the rider was "entirely ridiculous": "It is difficult to see how an intelligent group of men could subscribe to it." George pointed out that American rights in Berlin and Austria stemmed from the Yalta and Potsdam agreements. To question the validity of those agreements would be to question our own rights. The Senate Republican Policy Committee, headed by Knowland of California, agreed with Taft. The Senate Democrats

Policy Committee agreed with Dulles, that to repudiate Yalta would give the Soviet Union an excuse for their past violations and a pretext for future violations.\textsuperscript{23}

The impasse, so embarrassing to the Republicans if not to the United States itself, was resolved—ironically enough—by a leading participant in the Yalta Conference, Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin, who chose this moment to go into his final illness. With Russia so much in flux it seemed inopportune to rock the boat, and the act which was to "resound through the ages" never came to a vote in the United States Senate.\textsuperscript{24}

The intraparty and interparty squabbling over the Yalta Resolution was at a climax in late February when Eisenhower added to Republican miseries by nominating "Chip" Bohlen as U. S. Ambassador to Moscow. Bohlen, who spoke Russian fluently and had served in the Soviet Union for some five years, was widely regarded as one of our most experienced diplomats, but he carried the stamp of one defeat: he had been at Yalta (as well as at a number of other wartime and postwar conferences with the Russians, including Teheran and Potsdam). In fact, he had served as interpreter at the very meeting between Stalin and Roosevelt at which the American President had "betrayed" China. To the anti-Yalta bitter-enders, this meant only one thing. Bohlen was, at best, a symbol of the Yalta "betrayal"; at worst, an active participant in it. McCarthy, however, could go further, and did. He publicly questioned Bohlen's loyalty, asserted that secret FBI files con-

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., March 4, 1953, pp. 1, 4, and March 5, 1953, pp. 1, 7.

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., March 5, 1953, p. 1.
tained proof of Bohlen's guilt, and suggested that the nominee voluntarily undergo a lie-detector test to prove his innocence.25

Bohlen himself would neither condemn nor criticize Roosevelt and Yalta, nor would he hedge. He testified to the Foreign Relations Committee that, in his opinion, Stettinius' book defending Yalta was "a scrupulously accurate account of what actually transpired." Harriman's statement to the joint committee investigating MacArthur's removal gave "a very full story." The Chinese were not sold down the river and, at the time, did not think they were. If the Chinese had refused to abide by Roosevelt's Yalta commitment, "there would have been no way in which the United States could have possibly enforced this measure, except in regard to the parts dealing with Japan." If the Chinese had had to negotiate with the Soviet Union without the Yalta Agreement to back them up, "with the whole of Manchuria in the hands of the Red army, I think they would have had a tough time getting as good a treaty as they did, despite its imperfections." The Chinese were not forced to surrender anything to the Russians: "The question did not arise because it was not necessary to use any force or pressure on them. In fact, quite the contrary." Hiss had had nothing to do with the discussions on the Far East. Yalta had had nothing to do with the "loss" of China; Bohlen thought it was a help to Chiang rather than a hindrance.26

These, Bohlen emphasized, were his personal opinions. He

26 Bohlen Hearings, pp. 6, 8, 15, 17, 20, 26, 48, 89-90, 94.
conceded that the Yalta agreements were not perfect, but he insisted that they were better than nothing:

I would like to say this: A great deal of the moral position of the United States in the leadership accepted by the free world is due to the fact that an honest attempt was made to see if any form of arrangement with the Soviet Union could be arrived at that would have any value for the future of the world. Without that attempt, it would seem to me you would have a much more divided opinion through the free world as to who was to blame.

People would say, "How do you know? You didn't try it." These things are all very complicated. History will deal with it and I would not undertake to say that these agreements couldn't have been done better, but I do know this much: that if there had been no Yalta Conference, I sincerely doubt very much if the map of the world would look very different.²⁷

Taft was unhappy about the Bohlen nomination, but he fought for it. He felt the President had the right to choose his own envoy, and he regarded McCarthy's challenge as a threat to an orderly Republican Administration. Dulles had testified that there was "no derogatory material whatsoever" that questioned Bohlen's loyalty or indicated that he was not a good security risk. McCarthy accused Dulles of having overruled the negative judgment of the State Department's newly-appointed security chief, R. Scott McLeod, a McCarthy man, and demanded that Dulles testify under oath as to his part in the proceeding, which implied that Dulles was a liar. Taft dismissed this proposition with contempt: "I think it is a ridiculous suggestion. Mr. Dulles' statement not under oath is just as good as Mr. Dulles' statement under oath, as far as I am concerned."²⁸

²⁷Ibid., p. 95.
To McCarthy's demand that Bohlen submit "voluntarily" to a lie-detector, Taft replied that even J. Edgar Hoover was "absolutely opposed to the polygraph, and regards it as of no possible use whatever."

The Senate finally, toward the end of March, took the unprecedented step of sending two of its members, Taft and John Sparkman (Dem., Ala.), to examine personally the FBI summary of its Bohlen file. FBI chief Hoover took "full responsibility" that the summary omitted no material fact, and Taft reported back that Bohlen had "at times entertained in his home persons who are considered by the investigators of the Department as bad security risks"—Eisenhower pointed out at a press conference that he himself had had the pleasure of visiting the Bohlen family—but that the only derogatory information he and Sparkman could find amounted to nothing more than "statements of political differences with Mr. Bohlen."  

Taft's (and Sparkman's) security clearance of Bohlen did not end the matter. The Senate still had to advise and consent, and the big issue in the floor debate over confirmation was Yalta. "It seems necessary to review what went on at Yalta to put this nomination in focus," etc., said Bridges. McCarthy, Mundt, and Welker joined in. "One of the Yalta architects," said Mundt, "is not going to be sent to Moscow because he is in the penitentiary." He hastened to add that he made "no association" between Bohlen and Alger Hiss. At one point even Knowland flushed in rage.

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when McCarthy questioned his veracity. Sen. Everett McKinley Dirksen, who was one day to succeed Taft as Republican Senate leader, wrestled with his conscience; his conscience lost:

Mr. President, I am one of those who traveled over the country and addressed great gatherings of people in the interest of party victory, belabored the Yalta Agreement, addressed myself assiduously to the 1,000-page document known as the China white paper, and sought always to gain authentic information for the edification and persuasion of the people of the United States in an hour of political contest . . . . I think it is unfortunate that this controversy should have arisen. I have no doubt that our friends on the other side of the aisle are enjoying it hugely. (Laughter.)

Dirksen finally decided that "the tail has to go with the hide. I reject Yalta, so I reject Yalta men." 32 Despite the bitterness of the controversy, however, the Senate approved the nomination by a top-heavy vote, 74-13. Thirty-nine Democrats, 34 Republicans, and one independent (Morse) voted in favor; 13 Republicans and only two Democrats voted against. But it had been a bloody fight. "No more Yaltas" had been a Republican war-cry for years. Now Taft passed the word to the White House: "No more Bohlens." 35

Meanwhile, Sen. Bricker had introduced, on behalf of himself and 61 colleagues, a revised edition of his amendment to

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33 Ibid., March 28, 1953, p. 11; White, The Taft Story, p. 239. Republicans opposed were Bricker, Bridges, Dirksen, Dwork, Goldwater, Hickenlooper, Malone, McCarthy, Mundt, Schoeppe, and Welker; Democrats, McCarran and Edvin C. Johnson (Colo.).
the Constitution at the opening of the 63rd Congress. The Bricker Amendment was founded in the fear that at some future Yalta an American President would consign away American liberties and deceive two-thirds of the Senate into consenting. Opponents charged that it represented a radical shift in treaty-making powers, not only from the Executive to the Legislative branch but from the Federal Government to the states. This, they said, was the inescapable significance of the famous "which" clause in Section 2: "A treaty shall become effective as internal law in the United States only through legislation which would be valid in the absence of treaty." Eisenhower seems to have favored the principle of curbing the Executive's treaty-making powers until he came to understand the Bricker Amendment's implications. Then he became a vigorous, and ultimately successful, opponent (although by the narrowest of margins, one vote in the Senate). 34

This much of the Yalta story may be brought to a close by noting the argument in favor of the Bricker Amendment advanced by one of its proponents. If the Eisenhower Administration failed to "do something to safeguard our Constitutional rights," declared Mrs. William D. Leetoh, secretary of the American Coalition of Patriotic and Civic Organizations, "you won't be here four years from now." 35

Happily, Mrs. Leetoh's prophecy turned out to be premature.


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