O.S.S. Operation RYPE: Cutting the Nordland Rail Line in Occupied Norway at Two Points in the North Töndelag Area, April, 1945

Bruce Heimark
University of Nebraska at Omaha

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/studentwork

Recommended Citation
Heimark, Bruce, "O.S.S. Operation RYPE: Cutting the Nordland Rail Line in Occupied Norway at Two Points in the North Töndelag Area, April, 1945" (1990). Student Work. 378.
https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/studentwork/378
O.S.S. Operation RYPE: Cutting the Nordland Rail Line in Occupied Norway at Two Points in the North Trøndelag Area, April, 1945

A Thesis
Presented to the
Department of History
and the
Faculty of the Graduate College
University of Nebraska

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts
University of Nebraska at Omaha

by
Bruce Heimark
May, 1990
THESIS ACCEPTANCE

Accepted for the faculty of the Graduate College, University of Nebraska, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts, University of Nebraska at Omaha.

Committee

Name Department

Andrea Raman Music, UNL
Karl A. Peterson History, UN-O

Chairman

Date April 12, 1990
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER I</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER II</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER III</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER IV</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER V</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER VI</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER VII</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix I</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix II</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix III</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to acknowledge the wonderful people and organizations that supported me in my work toward a Master of Arts degree in history at the University of Nebraska at Omaha. Operation RYPE is the subject of my thesis submitted in partial completion of that work.

A hearty thanks should go to the U.S. Air Force, to which I would gladly return if it chooses to recall me out of retirement to active duty. This retirement has given me the opportunity to complete many projects that had been on the "back burner" for years. I am eternally grateful to those in Congress who designed the best scholarship of them all, the Vietnam Era G.I. Bill, which expired on December 31, 1989. Thanks to this scholarship, I was able to complete my thesis on Operation RYPE.

The faculty of the Department of History at the University of Nebraska at Omaha have been very supportive. Specific thanks to Professors Harl A. Dalstrom, Dale A. Gaeddert, Bruce M. Garver, Richard A. Overfield, Oliver Pollak, Jacqueline D. St. John, Michael L. Tate, and Tommy R. Thompson for helping me write acceptable graduate school academic papers.
A special thanks to my wife, Nancy, for typing those papers, and tolerating the clutter of reference materials in the "office" and on the dining room table for the past few years. A more wonderful and understanding partner in life cannot be found.

My thesis committee consisted of professors Bruce M. Garver, Harl A. Dalstrom at UNO, and Audun Ravnan of the Department of Music at the University of Nebraska - Lincoln. I wanted to do a thesis on the Norwegian Resistance Movement, as I found no full accounting in English in any writings on World War II. Dr. Garver thought that subject would be more appropriate for a doctoral dissertation, and suggested my narrowing my topic. Dr. Dalstrom agreed to become a member of my committee as he knew of my interest in a Scandinavian topic. Dr. Ravnan was born in Bergen, Norway: he experienced the German occupation years during World War II. He was my "Norwegian reader." My grateful thanks to these people to helping me turn out a scholarly product.

In his Secret War Report of the O.S.S., Anthony Cave-Brown tipped me off about Operation RYPE, the only American-sponsored sabotage operation in German-occupied Norway during World War II. The O.S.S. Papers were on microfiche in our library, as well as the NORSO (Norwegian Special Operations) activities covering Operation RYPE. In
the belief that some of its participants were still alive to be interviewed, I called the Public Relations Department for the Central Intelligence Agency at Langley, Virginia. The C.I.A. referred me to Geoffrey Jones of the Veterans of the O.S.S. in New York City, who forwarded my letter to William E. Colby, a former director of the C.I.A., who was the leader of Operation RYPE. Mr. Colby called me the next evening to invite me to the forthcoming O.S.S. NORSO Group Reunion in El Paso, Texas during February 3-6, 1989.

The O.S.S. NORSO Group took me under their wing: what a great bunch of old soldiers to work with! I want to thank William Lee (Tex) and Florence Coulehan, Adolph Hogfoss, Borge Langeland, Leif Öistad, William E. Colby, Kai Johansen, Harold Nipe, Alf Paulsen, Morten A. Tuftedal and C. Carlmark Larson for their meaningful inputs to my thesis on Operation RYPE.

Also thanks should go to my typist, Patricia Hamilton, who also helped straighten out my English prose. Also thanks to Gaelyn Beal, Editor of the Sons of Norway Viking magazine, for taking an interest in my thesis. If I have overlooked anyone, it was not intentional.

Bruce H. Heimark
ABSTRACT

This thesis investigates the conduct of unconventional warfare as performed by one of the many teams of Allied saboteurs parachuted deep behind enemy lines in German-occupied countries during World War II. The team studied as an example of this type of warfare was the Office of Strategic Services Norwegian Special Operations Group (O.S.S. NORSO Group) in Operation RYPE. Its mission was to disrupt German troop movements in Norway. Its effectiveness will be judged tactically and also in the strategic environment of the Allied war effort, of which it was a part.

British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, after the fall of France to Nazi Germany in June, 1940, established the Special Operations Executive (S.O.E.) to train refugees from German-occupied nations how to conduct sabotage so they could return to their homelands, "to set Europe ablaze." In the U.S.A., William "Wild Bill" Donovan established the office of Coordinator of Information in 1941 (later to become the Office of Strategic Services in 1943), along with Special Operations (S.O.) equivalent to
the British S.O.E.) to train both Americans and European refugees in the United States in unconventional warfare.

The O.S.S. NORSO Group was composed of eighty men, including stranded Norwegian mariners, as well as Americans of Scandinavian descent. They trained in the United States and Great Britain in guerrilla warfare before flying from Scotland in March, 1945, to parachute into northern Norway.

The air support for Operation RYPE got off to a very bad start. Of the eighty men trained for the mission, thirty-six were chosen to parachute into Norway. Of these, five were accidentally dropped into neutral Sweden! Ten paratroopers and fourteen airmen were killed trying to get into Norway.

The field operations of the RYPE mission went quite well. On April 14, 1945, RYPE destroyed the Nordland Railway bridge at Tangen in the North Tröndelag District. Ten days later, RYPE destroyed two-and-one half kilometers in a remote area in the Luru Valley. Upon completion of these sabotage operations, the men successfully outskied the pursuing German ski patrols. The RYPE mission was an unqualified success. In conjunction with other Allied sponsored teams in the area, it helped prevent 150,000 German S.S. mountain troops, then retreating in the face of Russian attacks, from returning to a beleaguered fatherland where Nazi Germany was about to collapse.
Important lessons were learned by the O.S.S. from the RYPE mission as to its composition for future operations and they are still evident in special forces doctrine as we move into the 1990s. The planners of Operation RYPE did not take Murphy's Law into consideration: if something can go wrong, it will. Planners of future special forces operations must anticipate the worst in difficult missions and be cautious in assigning brave men to them.
INTRODUCTION

GENERAL SUMMARY OF OPERATION RYPE

Operation RYPE was one of many successful sabotage actions conducted by Allied teams against the Axis powers during World War II. RYPE (named for the white grouse that would change its color to brown in summer) was no isolated case of sabotage. It was part of a grand Allied scheme of unconventional military actions against the Axis, all of which were carefully orchestrated by Allied Joint Commanders from London and Washington. The RYPE team began training in 1943 at Camp Hale, Colorado and completed its missions in Norway in June, 1945.

The RYPE party of twenty-four blew up the Tangen Railroad Bridge in German-occupied northern Norway on April 15, 1945. Eight days later, RYPE destroyed 2-1/2 kilometers of nearby railways with 240 charges of plastic explosives. These actions slowed the redeployment of 150,000 German troops from northern Norway southward to Germany to reinforce German lines on the Eastern and Western Fronts of a beleaguered fatherland. Even at this time, the Allies remained concerned that the Germans might make Norway the battleground in a last stand by their war machine. RYPE had orders, should that happen, to train and
supply local resistance groups. In the event of total German capitulation, RYPE had orders to restore order in northern Norway and to accept the surrender of German forces there.

On May 6, 1945, Germany capitulated. On May 11, 1945, RYPE personnel took the surrender of German commanders in northern Norway. The RYPE party participated in several local victory parades to demonstrate to both Norwegian and Germans alike the early Allied presence there. Their mission done, the RYPE units returned to London on June 28, 1945 to begin a well-deserved furlough.

The objectives of this thesis are: (1) to appreciate by a study of RYPE the craft of unconventional warfare against one of the strongest conventional armies of its time, the German Wehrmacht; (2) to demonstrate that during World War II, unconventional warfare was part of a grand Allied scheme of unconventional military strategy; (3) to understand RYPE as part of an Allied worldwide scenario of deception and how RYPE's mission changed with the German capitulation in May 1945; and (4) to analyze the long and short term problems of resuppling RYPE and the cost in lives and materials involved in operations like RYPE.

During World War II, the Allies trained fugitives from German-occupied countries in Europe to return to their homelands by parachute to conduct sabotage behind enemy lines. The NORSO Group of the O.S.S. (Office of Strategic
Services and forerunner of the C.I.A.) resembled the later Green Berets and Delta Forces. It drew eighty-four members from the U.S. Army 99th Infantry Battalion (Separate), a unit forty percent composed of Norwegian merchant mariners stranded without a home port in North America after the German occupation of Norway began on April 9, 1940. The rest of the 99th were American volunteers of Scandinavian descent.

In 1943, while in training at Camp Hale, members of the 99th were interviewed by the O.S.S. and asked if they would volunteer for "extra hazardous duty behind enemy lines in Norway." Out of one thousand men of the 99th, eighty-four volunteers were chosen for the Norwegian Special Operations of the O.S.S. (O.S.S. NORSO Group) and began vigorous training in commando tactics in American and British military facilities.

After "D" Day, the O.S.S. NORSO Group teams dropped behind enemy lines in France to disrupt German troop movements. These teams, augmented by French-speaking personnel, were to radio back to Allied commanders where the Germans were and were not, and to help marshall the French Maquis to fight the retreating German forces. NORSO distinguished itself in France, and returned to Great Britain in June, 1944, to begin ski endurance training and to prepare for action in Norway.

Operation RYPE was able to drop only sixteen of the
remaining eighty-four O.S.S. NORSO Group members into Norway on March 25, 1945, due to bad weather, aircraft maintenance problems, and the inability of aircrews to locate drop areas in the swirling mountain snows of northern Norway. In spite of the harsh winter environment and the problem of resupply, Operation RYPE was able to accomplish its principal mission of interdicting the Nordland Railway. This highly-successful operation, in concert with other teams in northern Norway, effectively slowed down the movement of crack German mountain troops south towards Germany.

Operation RYPE was unique in having been the only Norwegian-American operation to "invade" Norway. The O.S.S. NORSO Group was the only paratrooper-ski unit in the U.S. Army. The RYPE operation was highly-classified until declassified by the Freedom of Information Act in 1975. Some articles, chapters, and manuscripts have been written on Operation RYPE, but not from a standpoint of the strategic environment within which the RYPE mission developed.

In the world of "Secret Intelligence," only the failures of special operations, such as Iran's Desert One (President Jimmy Carter's ill-fated rescue effort of American hostages in April, 1980) make the headlines, and the successful ones remain hidden. This is a story of a highly successful one, for a change.
Historical Background

During 1940-1945, Norway had a population of about 3.3 million people and an area of 125,181 square miles of which only three percent is arable land, two percent pasture, and twenty-three percent productive forest.

Norway, a constitutional monarchy since 1805, had not known war since 1814 when, as a part of Denmark, it had participated in the Napoleonic Wars. The Treaty of Kiel (1814) obliged Norway to accept union with Sweden. In 1905, Norway successfully achieved its independence from Sweden. All three Scandinavian countries managed to stay out of World War I by closely adhering to a policy of "strict neutrality." On the eve of World War II, Norway thought this policy would again work. But, Norway was in the contingency plans of both Nazi Germany and Great Britain for military occupation, as both were interested in Norway's harbors and airfields and each desired to deny the other use of Norway as a conduit for Swedish exports.

The German armed forces invaded Norway on April 9, 1940. Their secretive and simultaneous strikes on Norway's major ports caught the Norwegians completely by surprise and found them ill-equipped militarily to defend themselves. Nonetheless, Norwegians, aided by the British, took a heavy toll of German naval forces and inflicted casualties on German ground forces before succumbing in June, 1940, to German occupation. During five bitter years
thereafter, Norwegians successfully resisted German attempts to nazify them. MILORG (Military Organization), the military resistance group within Norway, was virtually shut down by the Germans in 1942: it had proved vulnerable to a successful campaign of infiltration by the Gestapo. The harsh reprisals by the Gestapo on MILORG members convinced many Norwegians to become more passive. Allied suspicions of whether "Norwegians could keep a secret" resulted in a penchant for covert operations carried on in Norway by commando teams from without.

The Allied Plan Jupiter, a proposed attack on northern Norway, was changed to a carefully-orchestrated scenario of deception called Fortitude North in August, 1942, at the insistence of Winston Churchill. He wanted Hitler to remain convinced that the Allies would launch a flank attack on Norway at anytime, even up to the demise of the Third Reich in May, 1945. This deception forced Hitler to transfer practically all of his remaining German naval units to Norway. He also gave high priority to the task of turning the Norwegian coast into an impregnable fortress. In 1944 and 1945, the Germans had the notion that, should the Fatherland fall to the Allies, 350,000 German troops would make a last stand in "Festung Norwegen."

After "D" Day, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) wanted to sabotage the railroads in northern Norway to prevent massive German
troop movements to the south. The Germans were retreating from the Russian Army through the northern province of Finnmark. The Allies held back on this action because the expected collapse of German lines on the continent itself had not taken place. In November, 1944, Allied policy changed. German reinforcements from northern Norway would only prolong the war if they could reach the continental fronts. In northern Norway, MILORG was virtually non-existent. Operation RYPE's primary mission was to cut the Nordland rail line at two points in the North Tröndelag area. Its secondary objective, given the Allied policy of "unconditional surrender," was to disarm overwhelmingly superior German forces in an orderly manner, should such a surrender occur.

Sources

The Office of Strategic Services Papers, NORSO Section, are the primary sources of information about Operation RYPE. American, British, and Norwegian books and articles were consulted to present a general account of the conditions in occupied Norway during 1940-1945.

The Freedom of Information Act and the first O.S.S. NORSO Group Reunion in Minneapolis, Minnesota in 1975, provided participants with their first opportunity to document the previously highly-classified history of the exploits of this unit. Adolph Hogfoss, of New Ulm, Minnesota, Leif Eide of Minneapolis, Karl Hoffman of
Irvine, California, Clifford Kyllo of Larimore, North Dakota, and Morris Syrstad of Minneapolis, worked very hard to organize the first reunion. Their first problem was to locate people who had not been in contact with each other for over thirty years. Hoffman spent considerable time locating these veterans of the O.S.S. in both the United States and Norway. The second problem was to compile some sort of a unit history in time for the reunion. Adolph and Dee Hogfoss requested that unit members send them memorabilia and current news. The response was overwhelming: pictures from then and now, with many stories included, came in the mail. The result was a manuscript titled: "RYPE Norwegian Special Operations Group, October 10, 11, 12, 1975," that Adolph and Dee Hogfoss compiled and had printed in Willmar, Minnesota. Over one hundred copies were distributed to unit members at the reunion.

Meanwhile, Borge Langeland, the radio operator for Operation RYPE, had decided to write about the mission based primarily on information to be found in the messages he received from and sent to London during the operation. On October 27, 1971, the Office of the Director, Strategic Services Unit, Washington, D.C. denied Langeland access to his own messages. On August 4, 1975, the Central Intelligence Agency declassified the Operation RYPE materials. Langeland had submitted his manuscript called:
"RYPE: Norwegian Special Operations Group, O.S.S." to the C.I.A. for classification review. The C.I.A. determined his manuscript to be unclassified. It was printed in Willmar, Minnesota by Adolph and Dee Hogfoss in time for distribution to unit members at the 1975 reunion in Minneapolis. Up to this point, the only public news of RYPE's exploits was in the November, 1945 issue of the National Geographic which described the liberation in Norway in general; in the December, 1946 issue of True Comics and in Bernt Balchen's Come North With Me, published in 1958. Balchen's account was from the perspective of one of many aviators who provided air support to groups behind enemy lines in Norway.

In the mid 1970s, William E. Colby, upon retiring from the C.I.A., wrote Honorable Men: My Life with the C.I.A., in which he discussed Operation RYPE and his work as its leader. His was the first detailed published account of Operation RYPE. In Norway in 1981, Gerd Nyquist wrote Bataljon 99, in which she devoted four pages to the RYPE mission, relying heavily on Langeland's manuscript. Her book, not yet translated into English, is an excellent account of the 99th Infantry Battalion (Separate) out of which Operation RYPE evolved.

The O.S.S. NORSO Group in El Paso, Texas is responsible for the unit's publicity prior to its reunions, held every two years at various locations throughout the
United States and overseas in Scotland and Norway. The newspaper and magazine articles present the O.S.S. NORSO Group as a still mysterious unit and include a photo of William Colby prominently. These articles attract reporters who at NORSO reunions ask questions of reluctant members about what they did during World War II. The answers of the veterans always fall short of what inquisitive reporters want to hear, and reinforce the mystery of the O.S.S. NORSO Group.

The O.S.S. Papers are on microfiche at the University of Nebraska at Omaha. The originals are stored at the National Archives in Washington, D.C. The original O.S.S. maps that Operation RYPE used are also in the National Archives, but copies are not at UNO. I could not locate points of interest on modern maps of Norway using the O.S.S. grid coordinate system, because contemporary mapmakers and users employ the Universal Transverse Mercator Grid Coordinate System (UTM). Mr. Colby was made aware of my dilemma: he took time from his busy law practice to xerox copies of the O.S.S. maps for me at the National Archives and then mail them to me so that I could make transpositions of the points of interest to modern maps. It is not every day that a former Director of the C.I.A. helps a humble graduate student to obtain primary materials for research.

Official Histories of the British and American
intelligence communities help explain how operations such as RYPE evolved. Of these, the most useful were F.H. Hinsley's *British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence as Strategy and Operations* in three 9 volumes and Thomas F. Troy's *Donovan and the Central 10 Intelligence Agency*.

The historiography of Norwegian reaction to German occupation during 1940-1945 is difficult to assess. Accounts written either during or immediately after World War II are today suspected by a later generation of historians of being too charged with emotionalism or partisanship. Contemporary Norwegian historians, Olaf Riste, Berit Nokleby, Johs. Andenaes and M. Skodvin have recently reviewed the war years for Norway. Andenaes, Riste and Skodvin in 1983 published *Norway and the Second World War*. Riste and Nokleby in 1986 published *Norway 12 1940-1945: The Resistance Movement*. Both books are surveys that provide both the context and points of departure for future research on specific topics about the German occupation in Norway.

Norway's Resistance Museum in Oslo was opened to the public by H.R.H. Crown Prince Harald on May 8, 1970. It also has a historical research department that is still in the process of gathering primary sources about the war years. It inspired Odd Bergfald to write *Gestapo i Norge 13* in 1978. The museum houses a large amount of Gestapo
"memorabilia." A little known campaign in northern Norway in the province of Finnmark, liberated by the Red Army, is also featured at the museum. Its display prompted Kjell Fjørtoft to write Vi Har Vaar Frihet: Finnmark Høsten 1944 in 1984.

British historian T.K. Derry in A History of Modern Norway 1814-1972, published in 1973, presents a brief but objective assessment of the occupation years. Richard Petrow, an American historian and journalist, did extensive research and interviews before publishing in 1974, his The Bitter Years: The Invasion and Occupation of Denmark and Norway, April 1940 - May 1945, and providing what is to date the best and most complete English language account.

Anthony Cave-Brown discusses the British and American intelligence communities in World War II in Bodyguard of Lies (1975) and Secret War Report of the O.S.S. (1976). A reading of the latter work led this writer to the O.S.S. Papers, NORSO Section and the American covert operation therein described. The perception that Allied clandestine activities in Norway was completely a British show was not true. The Americans provided the personnel trained by the O.S.S. in the United States and later in Great Britain, the supplies, and the long-range transportation to deliver the RYPE mission. The British provided the explosives.

As noted before, in October, 1975, Borge Langeland,
the radio operator for Operation RYPE, compiled a chronology of the actions of his group based primarily on messages sent and received between RYPE and London. This writer understands that Langeland's report was not published and was written only for distribution to members of the O.S.S. NORSO Group. Langeland was kind enough to let this writer have access to this report.

Langeland used a British B-Mark 2 radio transceiver powered by a 6-volt wetcell battery that could fit into a small suitcase and was easy to carry. It had five to six crystal-controlled frequencies, which were altered for each scheduled transmission. "Eureka" was the transmitter on the ground and "Rebecca" was the receiver in the plane. The Rebecca was a small direction-finding unit. The Eureka operator could press a key to transmit a letter in Morse Code over the air. This signal could be received by the aircraft within a fifty-mile range of the RYPE group.

During World War II, the British Broadcasting Corporation (B.B.C.) broadcast news to all of the occupied countries, both in English and in the native language. After the news was completed, certain meaningless messages were read, which would have meaning only to agents operating within that particular country. For Bernt Balchen's unit of B-24 Liberators, certain messages instructed it to drop men and supplies to certain underground parties that night. For example, "the finch"
has laid three eggs" meant that the Finch reception party was to expect three drops that night. The message: "Two seagulls are flying" meant that Project Sea Gull should expect two planes that night. To trigger actions for Operation RYPE Langeland offered the following message and explanation:

Four planes coming tonight. NE corner of Lake "P" for Peter. Listen to B.B.C. Six of thirty.

"Listen to B.B.C." meant that if the planes were coming that night, the following prearranged message would be read after the Norwegian news over B.B.C.:

Foxtrott 1 Mastetoppen
(Foxtrot [dance] on top of the mast)

If the message was not read, it meant that the flight had been cancelled at the last minute due to weather conditions.

In addition to transmitting the letter "P", the Eureka operator had a visual procedure that was mandatory. Langeland continued:

Flash the letter "P", one short, two long and one short flash by flashlight as identification to the plane and to indicate that the reception area was clear of Germans. Without the proper signal, no drop should [be] made.

Bonfires also helped the aircrews visually locate the reception area. In the case of RYPE, four large stacks of ignited dry wood, three of which were laid out in a straight line with the fourth placed to the left, like an inverted "L", would visually aid the pilots.
In February, 1945, the RYPE mission prepared to parachute into Norway from Scotland. Meanwhile in Germany, only 300 miles separated Russian and Anglo-American forces closing in on the Reich. Yet SHAEF, witnessing the collapse of Nazi Germany, still committed brave men to the herculean task of keeping German forces on Scandinavian soils. The following chapters describe how missions such as RYPE evolved and explain the Allied strategic environment of which it was a part.
ENDNOTES

1 Letter to Borge Langeland, P.O. Box 204, Gamboa, C.Z., from A.C. Rosner, Jr., Executive Secretary, Office of the Director, Strategic Services Unit, P.O. Box 4437, Brookland Station, Washington, D.C., October 27, 1971. Copy donated to author by Borge Langeland, 1232 St. Mary St., New Orleans, Louisiana.

2 Letter to John William Cavendish Manners, 1850 Sharon Avenue, Davis, California 95616, with copy and enclosure of manuscript to Borge Langeland, 1232 St. Mary Street, New Orleans, LA 70130, from Robert S. Young, Freedom of Information Coordinator, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C. 20505, August 4, 1975. Copy donated to author by Borge Langeland.

3 Letter to Bruce H. Heimark, 5146 No. 105th St., Omaha, NE 68134 from Adolph Hogfoss, 703 NE Hostmark, Apt. 87, Poulsbo, WA 98370, November 30, 1989.


13 Odd Bergfald, Gestapo i Norge (Oslo: Hjemmes Forlag, 1978).


Borge Langeland, "RYPE: Norwegian Special Operations Group, O.S.S." (Willmar: unpublished, October, 1975), p. 5., Hereafter referred to as: Langeland, RYPE.

Ibid., p. 11.

Ibid., p. 4.

Ibid., p. 10.

Bernt, Balchen, Come North, p. 273.

Langeland, RYPE, p. 10.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 3.
CHAPTER 1

THE CAMPAIGN IN NORWAY, APRIL-JUNE 1940

INTRODUCTION

To understand RYPE and other Norwegian and Allied operations against the Germans in Norway, one is obliged to have some knowledge of the German occupation of Norway and the Norwegian resistance to it. This chapter briefly surveys that occupation and points out some of the many books and articles that discuss that subject in considerable detail. The third chapter will describe the Norwegian resistance at greater length because very few English-language works do so.

Whereas Sweden alone among the Scandinavian countries succeeded in staying out of World War II, all Scandinavian countries had kept out of World War I by maintaining policies of "strict neutrality." During the Russo-Finnish War in the winter of 1939-40, Britain and France requested of Norway and Sweden permission to use their transportation networks to send aid to Finland. But Norway and Sweden refused to comply. After defeating Poland in 1939, Nazi Germany, appreciating the strategic importance of Norway and Denmark, attacked them on April 9, 1940, as a first step toward an assault on France through the low countries.
Operation Weser
Norway's Foreign Policy 1814-1940

Until 1940, Norway had not known war since 1814, when after two weeks of fighting, she had to accept union with Sweden in the post-Napoleonic area. In 1905, Norway peacefully became independent of Sweden. In 1907, in the Treaty of Integrity, France, Germany, Great Britain and Russia agreed to respect Norwegian independence and neutrality.

Subsequent attempts of Norway, Sweden, and Denmark to coordinate their foreign policies did not meet with much success. On the eve of World War I, Denmark had to be on good terms with Germany; Sweden had to please Russia, and Norway was on its best behavior with Great Britain, Norwegians remembering how they had suffered under the British blockade during the Napoleonic Wars.

All three Scandinavian countries had managed to stay out of World War I, but the "strict neutrality" policy had cost the Norwegians another British blockade. In 1919, Norway joined the League of Nations, despite concern that such membership might compromise her neutrality in the event of League sanctions against aggressor nations. Norway became an active League member, and under the leadership of Fridtjof Nansen, put consistent emphasis on the League's humanitarian activities. In 1936, Norway joined her Scandinavian neighbors in declaring that they would no longer feel obligated to implement economic
sanctions under the League Covenant because of the failures and the ambiguous policies of the western powers towards aggressive nations. Norway, on the eve of World War II, maintained her policy of "strict neutrality."

Norwegians read with interest and anxiety about European events beginning with the Munich Pact of September 30, 1938, after which the Oslo Aftenposten's headline declared: JEG TROR DET ER FRED FOR HELE VAAR LEVETID (peace in our time). On September 3, 1939, the Stavanger Aftenblad's headline announced: STORBRITANNIA OG FRANKRIKE ER I KRIK MED TYSKLAND (Britain and France declare war on Germany). Norway continued to try to maintain its policy of "strict neutrality." The Russo-Finnish War of 1939 alarmed Norway, as had Russian seizing of three Baltic states after Germany and Russia partitioned Poland.

Norway figured in German war plans: Admiral Erich Raeder and Field Marshall Hermann Goering saw the advantages to Germany seizing Scandinavian naval and air bases. The admiral took the lead in convincing Adolf Hitler that force must be used to insure Germany's continued access to Swedish iron ore on which the Third Reich depended for 11,000,000 tons of iron ore consumption. He argued that most of the iron ore was shipped by rail via Kiruna from Swedish mines to Narvik and other Norwegian warm-water ports and thence through Norwegian territorial waters to the Baltic. If Great
Britain should first take these ports, warned Raeder, she could not only stop the vital flow of ore but also blockade the Baltic and the North Sea. Hitler put the suggestion aside because his mind was focused on plans for invading France and the low countries.

On December 10, 1939, a former Norwegian Minister of Defense, Vidkun Quisling, came to Berlin to warn Admiral Raeder that Britain was about to invade Norway. Quisling was the leader of the Nasjonal Samling (National Unification), a party sympathetic to the Nazi cause. Raeder arranged a meeting on December 14, 1939, between Quisling and Hitler, in which Hitler was impressed with Quisling and promised him "help." Quisling told Hitler that he could deliver Norway to German hands through a coup. He also had in his confidence the military commander at Narvik, Colonel Konrad Sundlo, who would surrender his forces to Germany. The iron ore port of Narvik was the expected target of any British invasion of Norway. On the same day, Hitler ordered the German High Command to study how to invade Norway and Denmark. He did not tell Quisling about such planning, wishing it to be done in strict confidence.

When the Russo-Finnish War began in 1939, the French suggested that an Anglo-French expeditionary force be sent through Norway and Sweden to aid Finland, but British and French overtures to this end were rejected by the Swedish
and Norwegian Governments, who reaffirmed "strict neutrality." As late as February 5, 1940, the Allied War council in Paris considered sending a joint expeditionary force to Scandinavia anyway.

The Altmark Affair finally convinced Hitler that Norway must be seized and that he could not wait for Quisling to deliver her in a coup. On February 16, 1940, the German troopship Altmark, with British prisoners on board, had been captured by a British Naval force in Norwegian waters. Hitler fumed when Norwegian gunboats did not resist this violation of Norwegian neutrality by the British.

By March 1, 1940, Hitler had completed his plans for occupying both Denmark and Norway. On March 9, 1940, Raeder told Hitler that implementation of Weserübung (the code-name for the operation) was urgent because he was convinced that an Allied invasion of Scandinavia would have to occur while Finland was still in the war, or not at all. Three days later, Finland accepted the Russian terms, and was out of the war. Hitler gave the green light to Lieutenant General Nikolaus von Falkenhorst, in charge of Weserübung, to begin operations.

On March 28, 1940, Winston Churchill (who would become Prime Minister of Great Britain replacing Neville Chamberlain on May 11, 1940) proposed that the British Navy mine the passage through the Norwegian Leads (coastal
waters) so as to deny their use to Germany. If Germany could be cut off from all Swedish ore supplies until the end of 1940, a severe blow would be struck at her war-making capacity.

On April 8, 1940, the Allies announced the mining of three Norwegian harbors. The Norwegian Government sent a terse protest to Great Britain saying this action was a flagrant violation of the neutrality of Norway. Norwegian attention was on Great Britain and not on Germany. That afternoon, the Polish sub Orzel sank the German transport Rio de Janeiro off the southern coast of Norway. The few survivors were Wehrmacht soldiers in combat dress. They told their rescuers that they were on their way to Bergen to aid Norway against the British. The rescuers did not alert the Norwegian Admiralty.

On April 8, 1940, at 11:23 p.m., the Oslo forts came under German fire, and at midnight the Norwegians sounded an air alarm. Lieutenant Colonel R. Rosher Nielsen, Chief of the Operations Section, was awakened by the Army Chief of Staff on the evening of 8-9 April to be told that Germans had attacked fortresses at the mouth of Oslo Fjord. Oslo began a blackout at 1:58 a.m. and anticipated air raids. The Army was caught napping. At 1:30 a.m., on April 9, 1940, the cabinet learned that the Germans had seized Narvik, Trondheim, Bergen, Stavanger, and Kristiansand, including all the important airfields.
2:30 a.m., the Norwegian Government still debated whether or not to mobilize four reserve divisions.

At 9:30 a.m., on April 9, 1940, a special train left for Hamar with King Haakon VII and his family and members of the government and Storting (the Norwegian Parliament). At the same time, twenty trucks transported the gold of the Bank of Norway and the secret papers of the Foreign Office to Hamar. Dr. Kurt Bräuer, the German minister to Norway, delivered an ultimatum to the Norwegian Government in Hamar demanding immediate surrender; the Norwegians rejected it, even though Bräuer's message suggested that the Germans came as friends. A handful of Norwegian army and navy personnel kept the German fleet out of Oslo for most of the day and made the King's escape possible. Norwegian torpedoes sank the cruiser Blücher that carried Gestapo and civilian personnel designated to take over the Norwegian Government. German troops were not able to enter Oslo until 2:00 p.m. The first German troops entered Norwegian cities with white flags tied to their bayonets to announce they had come as friends. When German parachutists jumped into Fornebu Airport outside of Oslo, Norwegian unarmed policemen on horseback escorted them into Norway's capital of Oslo.

The southern half of Norway quickly fell under German occupation. A contingent of British, French, and Polish forces rushed to Narvik and began to retake it on April 14,
1940. Two companies of the British Scots Guards landed at Harstad, north of Narvik, and joined forces with the Norwegian Army. Germany reinforced Narvik by air. Ten Junkers 52s landed on a frozen lake nearby; and a battery of mountain artillery crossed the Swedish border, ten miles east of Narvik after having passed through Sweden with Swedish permission. On April 24, 1940, the British fleet bombarded German positions around Narvik. Four Norwegian battalions were north of Narvik: one-half had been killed in action. British troops under the command of Major General P.J. MacKesy landed, but were stalled by four feet of snow. In late April, three battalions of French Chasseurs Alpins arrived. In early May, two battalions of French Foreign Legionnaires and four battalions of Polish troops arrived.

The final Allied attack was May 28, 1940. The exhausted German troops withdrew eastward on the railway into Sweden. The residents of Narvik made coffins for the Allied dead. A colonel bade farewell to the fallen with a salute of respect. A pastor followed with a bucket of earth and a spade, uttering a prayer with a sprinkle of dirt.

Allied efforts had not been in vain: Germany lost one-fourth to one-third of its surface navy in the invasion of Norway. Because the western front was in a crisis after the Germans had overrun the low countries and invaded
France, all Allied forces withdrew from Norway on June 11, 1940, to go to France. King Haakon sailed from Tromsö to London, to carry on Norway's fight from there.

The Norwegians had been at peace for 126 years and were unprepared for war. They had skimped on arms and had an army of only 9,000 men, a navy of only 57 small ships, and an air force of 100 planes. The main reasons why Germany won a stunning victory in Norway were: (1) its immense technological superiority; (2) the total Norwegian unreadiness, and (3) the inability of the French and British to render sufficient and timely military aid.
ENDNOTES


5. Ibid.


8. Stavanger Aftenblad, September 3, 1939. Also: Oslo Dagbladet, April 8, 1940. The Norwegian policy of "strict neutrality" had been violated by Great Britain and Germany. Special Note: These newspapers and others are displayed at the Norges Hjemmefrontmuseum (Norway's Resistance Museum). It is on the grounds of Akershus Castle, Oslo, in an old building. It adjoins a memorial at the spot where Norwegian patriots were executed by the Germans during World War II.


11 Derry, Scandinavia, p. 329.


13 Hart, History, p. 54. Nasjonal Samling (NS) was founded in 1933. Also: Petrow, *The Bitter Years*, p. 15. Also see Oddvar K. Hoidal, Quisling: A Study in Treason (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). At long last a complete political biography of Vidkun Quisling is available.

14 Hart, History, p. 54.

15 Derry, Scandinavia, pp. 328-329.

16 Richard Petrow, *The Bitter Years*, p. 15.

17 Ibid., pp. 14-17.

18 Ibid. It was merely a question which side would strike first. Russian troops breached the Mannerheim Line in Finland on February 1, 1940. Finland sued for peace. The Treaty of Moscow was signed on March 12, 1940. The Allied case for intervention in Finland collapsed. Also: Derry, Scandinavia, p. 333. Also: Petrow, *The Bitter Years*, pp. 17, 3. The Supreme War Council met in Paris to plan British-French expeditionary force landings in Scandinavia. They were to be a thrust to the Swedish ore fields, using three to four "volunteer" Allied divisions. The British 42nd and 44th Divisions, originally slated for France, were to go to Norway. France would contribute an Alpine Brigade, a Polish Brigade, and two French Foreign Legion battalions. Landings were planned in the third week of March at Narvik and Trondheim.
Hart, History, p. 55. Also: Hinsley, British Intelligence, Vol. I, pp. 105-106; 115. Also: Petrow, The Bitter Years, pp. 18-31. Also: Tidens Tegn, February 16, 1940 (Newspaper on display at the Resistance Museum). The German pocketship Admiral Graf Spee had secret orders to prey on allied merchant ships. The tanker Altmark rendezvoused with Spee in the South Atlantic Ocean. Spee sank British ships and took the surviving crew members as prisoners. The British had detected Spee and Altmark took the British prisoners on board. Spee eventually was bottled up in Montevideo, Uruguay by the British. Altmark penetrated the Norwegian Leads near Trondheim to quietly sneak down back to Germany. The British Navy bottled Altmark into Jossing Fjord, boarded it, and rescued the British prisoners. This was a major international incident. Hitler knew that the British would not honor neutrality. He had to make his move on Norway as soon as possible.

Derry, Scandinavia, p. 329.

Petrow, The Bitter Years, pp. 35-36. It was almost as if the German High Command had a direct line of communication to the British Cabinet and the British High Command. The Allied case for invasion of Scandinavia collapsed with Finland out of the war.


William L. Shirer, The Challenge of Scandinavia (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1955), pp. 28-34. Hereafter referred to as: Shirer, Challenge. Shirer argued that if Norway would have mobilized its 200,000 military and naval reserves, the outcome of April 9, 1940 could have been different. On April 6, 1940, Dr. Halvdan Koht, the Norwegian Foreign Minister, and Colonel Birger Ljungberg, Minister of Defense, received intelligence reports from Berlin that there might be possible German landings on Norway's southern coast. Both were skeptical: the report was kept from the public. Also: Petrow, The Bitter Years, pp. 38-42. In late March, 1940, Oslo received many cables about German concentrations of troops in northern Germany near German ports, and heavy naval
activity in the Baltic and North Seas. The Government in Oslo also received a warning from its Berlin sources that the Wehrmacht was going to strike in northern Norway. Also: Petrow said that Churchill was ready by April 5, 1940 to land British and French troops in Norway, no matter what the German reaction. Five battalions were earmarked for Bergen, Trondheim, and Stavanger, one brigade and one battery for Narvik, p. 37.

25 *Oslo Dagbladet*, April 8, 1940. See also: Petrow, *The Bitter Years*, pp. 44-45, and also: Shirer, *Challenge*, p. 36. On April 7, the offensive timetables of both Britain and Germany both became meshed, unaware of one another.

26 Shirer, *Challenge*, p. 35.


28 Shirer, *Challenge*, p. 35.

29 Petrow, *The Bitter Years*, pp. 44-45. It did not do so until April 11, 1940. It did it by mail.

30 Shirer, *Challenge*, p. 36. Also see Dorothy Baden-Powell, *Pimpernel Gold: How Norway Foiled the Nazis* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978.) Contingency planning for removal of the gold was accomplished as early as 1936. The King and his Government did have a "clean getaway," and set up the Norwegian Government-in-Exile in London.

31 Shirer, *Challenge*, p. 35. On April 6, 1940, Dr. Bräuer showed a film to numerous Norwegian dignitary dinner guests on the German invasion of Poland. As to Poland's destruction, he commented, "one could only thank Great Britain and France for it." The purpose of the film was to intimidate countries into immediate capitulation to German forces. Bräuer was stunned when Norway rejected his ultimatum on April 9, 1940.

32 Shirer, *Challenge*, p. 36. See also Petrow, *The Bitter Years*, p. 51. Nikolas von Falkenhorst, the commander of the German forces for Norway, expected to land his troops in Oslo. He did not know the potential
combat effectiveness of the Norwegians. Timing was critical for his operation to be successful. He also feared that the British Navy would arrive and land British troops.

33


34

Shirer, *Challenge*, p. 40. Also see Petrow, *The Bitter Years*, p. 16. Because the Germans had no intelligence estimates on Norway, Major General Alfred Jodi, Chief of OKW Operations staff (Oberkommando des Heeres) (High Command of the German Army) had to rely on travel guides, tourist brochures and hydrographic charts for basic information. Also see Ibid, pp. 31-33. Lieutenant General Nikolas von Falkenhorst bought a Baedeker travel book on Norway. It aided him and his mechanized forces to sweep through southern Norway along Norwegian major roads.

35


36

Petrow, *The Bitter Years*, p. 94. Hitler demanded that neutral Sweden provide him a transportation network so that his troops could be resupplied with rations and medical supplies. Sweden and Germany had done business with each other for many years. Sweden depended on German coal, Germany depended on Swedish iron ore. There were also prominent intermarriages. Sweden buckled under to Hitler's pressure. Radio technicians, 230 specialists, 800 German merchant seamen and others injured in the fighting in the Narvik area of northern Norway were evacuated on the single railroad to and through Sweden to Baltic ports, then to Germany. Also, Interview with Agneta Gains, 2506 S. 95th St., Omaha, NE 68124, May 12, 1989. She was born and raised in Sweden near the above railroad. She remembers well the trains full of German wounded passing by her home, headed for Baltic ports.

37

Petrow, *The Bitter Years*, p. 95.

38

Ibid.

Myklebost, Friends, p. 9.


Shirer, Challenge, p. 28.

Ibid, p. 34. See also Petrow, The Bitter Years, pp. 38-39. The Norwegian High Command had assigned full divisions for the defense of the country's six most important military and civilian centers: Oslo; Kristiansand; Bergen; Trondheim; Stavanger; and Narvik. All divisions were understrength, poorly equipped, inactive and neglected.
CHAPTER II

BRITISH AND AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE REORGANIZE

INTRODUCTION

This chapter surveys some of the extensive bibliography on intelligence in World War II. If the reader is well-schooled in the inner workings of the British and American intelligence communities at that time, the author would not be offended if this chapter were bypassed. The main aim of this chapter is to describe the larger context of Allied intelligence operations out of which Allied saboteur missions like RYPE developed.

Before World War II, there were no British or American central clearing houses to interpret intelligence gathered on aggressor nations. The attempt by visionaries to establish them were met with considerable resistance by self-serving organizations who were reluctant to share their information with a coordinating unit designed to interpret it. The result was that Allied nations were surprised when Germany invaded Poland in 1939 and Denmark and Norway in 1940, even though fragmented Allied agencies had received indications that Germany would do so. The British reorganized their intelligence community in 1940 and it promptly began covert operations behind enemy lines.
The Americans took longer to reorganize, chiefly because of the resistance by the F.B.I., and of the popularity of the notion that covert activities were not the American way to do business. The British had a two-year head start on the American intelligence community and by 1941 usually knew what would work and what would not work. As a result, American intelligence organizations patterned themselves after their British counterparts for a joint effort to outwit Germany during World War II.

A. BRITISH INTELLIGENCE SERVICES REORGANIZE

F.H. Hinsley, author of *British Intelligence in the Second World War*, defined intelligence as follows:

> Intelligence is an activity which consists, essentially of three functions. Information has to be acquired; it has to be analyzed and interpreted; and it has to be put into the hands of those who can use it.

Once this circle of activity is interrupted, intelligence is dead. That was the case with British intelligence after World War I as the United Kingdom retreated into "splendid isolation," separated from the intrigues of Continental Europe.

Between the two World Wars, there was no lack of anxiety by the Foreign Office and the Government Code and Cypher School for more and better intelligence. The Foreign Office had an overriding interest in the conduct of diplomacy and was reluctant to participate in the Joint Intelligence Subcommittee (J.I.C.) of the Chiefs of
Staff (C.O.S.). Consequently, the Joint Intelligence Subcommittee was ineffective.

British embassies abroad had military attaches attached to them. Whatever intelligence attaches gathered was sent to the military agencies in London by diplomatic courier. The embassies simply acted as a "postal drop" for the attaches, forwarding both "information" and "intelligence" to the appropriate military agency for interpretation. (For example, the numbers of ships in a foreign port were simply "information." Why they were there was "intelligence." ) High-tech "information" was pigeonholed into "someone's military bailiwick" in London. Oceans of data were housed in London. Intelligence budgets were so low that too few people were around to even categorize the data they had; analysis and interpretation 2 were seldom possible.

Perhaps the greatest Allied intelligence achievement was the breaking of enciphered German "Enigma" messages. The Enigma was an electro-mechanical enciphering machine of great complexity.

The German Navy adopted enigma for use in 1926 and the German Army and the German Air Force followed suit in 1929 and 1934. The military branches then made modifications to ENIGMA that would so complicate the task of deciphering by unwelcome cryptanalysts that the Germans thought they had a totally secure system of communication.
The French Intelligence Service got wind of Enigma from a German called "Asche" in 1932 and began work towards its penetration. The British Government Code and Cypher School did not show much interest in General Gustave Bertrand's coup, as British policy towards France was to share everything with her except cryptology. But that changed when Marian Rejewski, a mathematician from Poznan University in Poland, developed several models of Enigma to find a total solution to deciphering intercepts of German communications. In 1937 he and cryptanalysts Jerzy Rozycki and Henry Zygalsky produced the "cryptographic Bombe," a machine devised for "finding" enigma keys (settings). By 1939, Polish cryptanalysts could break Enigma messages in 110 minutes.

Bertrand called a Franco-British-Polish conference of cryptologists to discuss Enigma in Paris on January 7-9, 1939 and again in Warsaw on July 24-25, 1939, where the Allies agreed to collaborate fully to exploit what they knew about Enigma. In the meantime, the Germans added more "new wheels" to Enigma to complicate it even more. The Allied penetration of the German Enigma came as "manna in a desert." Whitehall was surprised when Italy invaded Albania on April 7, 1939, even though it had Secret Intelligence Service reports stating this was a possibility. The
Foreign Office picked up on this, and gave the green light to the Chiefs of Staff (C.O.S.) to create the Situation Report Center. The Foreign Office welcomed its participation in Whitehall's Joint Intelligence Subcommittee and assumed its directorship in July, 1939. Thus was born the national mechanism to interpret and analyze all intelligence "under one roof".

Whitehall still had to learn how to translate policy into practice. The joint venture into intelligence assessments had not had much of a chance to "wring itself out" as an efficient machine from July to September 1, 1939, when Adolf Hitler began his "Blitzkrieg" invasion of Poland. British hierarchies did not know what intelligence to ask for and subordinate entities were slow to respond even when told what to provide.

The War Cabinet needed information on which to base its forecast of Hitler's next move in the spring of 1940. It received numerous summaries, including intelligence summaries. The Ministry of Economic Warfare (M.E.W.) reported assessments of the German economy. The Political Warfare Executive (P.W.E.) reported trends in German propaganda. The Foreign Office reported political intelligence. The Joint Intelligence Subcommittee made daily and weekly situation reports.

M.I. (Military Intelligence, a branch of the War Office), was responsible for collecting and classifying all
military information on foreign armies. M.I.1(b) was responsible for the security of British codes and cyphers. M.I.1(c), responsible for screening spies in its Home Office and for counterespionage on foreign soil, had been split in 1921 into the Secret Service Bureau and the Secret Intelligence Service. The former became the Security Service (M.I.5) and the latter after 1940 was also known as M.I.6. M.I.8 became responsible for intercepting German wireless transmissions. M.I.9, also known as the Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Center, was responsible for interrogating prisoners-of-war.

After the fall of France in June, 1940, Prime Minister Winston Churchill decided to consolidate all British sabotage activities against Germany into one organization with "dictatorial powers." On July 16, 1940, Churchill instructed the Special Operations Executive (S.O.E.) to "set Europe ablaze" by training in Britain foreign nationals of German-occupied countries in subversion and sabotage and then returning them to the continent to rouse their fellow countrymen against German occupation.

Whitehall received warnings of the impending occupation of Norway by German forces. By March 26, 1940, all intelligence heretofore gathered confirmed that Norway and Denmark were next on Hitler's "Blitzkrieg" agenda. But the British did not anticipate how soon thereafter the
Germans would invade Norway. Because the various intelligence branches were as yet unaccustomed to collating information from different sources, the Allied intelligence debacle was confirmed on April 9, 1940, when Germany invaded Norway and Denmark.

B. AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE REORGANIZES

Knowing that the United States would inevitably enter World War II, William J. "Wild Bill" Donovan successfully championed his idea of an intelligence central clearing house for America when President Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed him the Coordinator of Information (C.O.I.) on July 11, 1941. Washington, D.C. had burgeoned with "alphabet soup" agencies, all trying to solve problems which the Depression presented and to respond to the threats from abroad. More often than not, agency franchises overlapped, organizations became "empire builders" and self-serving. Roosevelt's tack was that, if one agency could not do its job, another one could take its place, a "survival of the fittest" in the "political firestorm" in America to solve the problems at home and abroad. What troubled Roosevelt were those agencies that had intelligence arms. The Rumrich Case, an espionage episode, angered Roosevelt and he saw the need for coordination of intelligence matters and the definition of operating boundaries.

Other government agencies perceived Donovan's small
organization to be one that interpreted the confusing reports by these agencies to Roosevelt. Donovan had other plans; by July 30, 1941, Coordinator of Information moved into thirty-two rooms in the Apex Building. Donovan's budget came out of the President's "Emergency Fund" of $100,000,000. In two months, Donovan had already requested $10,000,000. He shuttled between his law offices in New York and his home in Georgetown. He drew no pay.

Donovan had no time to build his organization with reliable people in the normal way, and he went to friends and colleagues for recruitment of the immediately-needed talent. Archibald ("Archie") MacLeish, who headed the Library of Congress, helped Donovan organize the scholars for the new American worldwide intelligence service. Historians, political scientists, economists, and other social scientists were hired for research in the Library of Congress.

Donovan thought that the best way to beat the Germans was at their own game. He wanted as much information as possible on the German war machine. His new organization was to house a strategic studies center filled with reports and analyses of political, economic, psychological, and financial data. The world faced the most modern conventional army to date, the German Wehrmacht. Until the United States could match the German strength, unconventional methods had to be developed and
implemented to combat the awesome German forces. Commandos would have to be trained and high technology in explosives and unconventional weaponry would have to be devised. Agents would have to parachute deep behind enemy lines, and nationals from the occupied countries would have to be trained in the ungentlemanly arts of spying, killing and sabotage. All stops had to be pulled, as the world was on the brink of disaster. By December 15, 1941, eight days after the United States had entered World War II, Coordinator of Information had 596 persons on its payroll.

Donovan received British advice and assistance in building up the Coordinator of Intelligence. The notion to place Donovan's Coordinator of Information under the Joint Chiefs of Staff stemmed from ARCADIA, the Washington War Conference, or the U.S.-British Staff Conference, held in the nation's capital from December 22, 1941, to January 14, 1942. The British called for the American High Command to join an integrated Allied Joint High Command that would be able to function well. These ideas had been taken up again at the ARGENTIA Conference in August, which produced the Atlantic Charter, and also produced a British-American Grand Strategy.

On June 13, 1942, Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the Military Order creating the Office of Strategic Services (O.S.S.). Donovan ceased being Coordinator of Information
and became Director of the O.S.S., reporting directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On June 16, 1942, Donovan briefed the British War Cabinet on the Office of Strategic Services organization, parallel at all levels to the British Secret Intelligence Service.

The U.S. Army and Navy wanted to know how the O.S.S. spent its appropriations. Brigadier General Thomas T. Handy of the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee pointed out in a memorandum to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General George C. Marshall, that over fifty million dollars in the O.S.S. budget was unexplained and Donovan might be planning large guerrilla groups. The "little memorandum" was sent to Marshall on July 11, 1942. On August 17, 1942, Donovan did the accounting. Over 2,000 Greeks, Poles, Yugoslavs, and other foreign nationals were being trained into guerrilla groups at two camps: Quantico, Virginia and Hagerstown, Maryland. Two hundred thirty-six Army, Navy and Marine personnel were instructing them.

Stanley Lovell, a chemist and inventor was busy at the O.S.S. Research and Development Branch inventing plastic explosives. One new devise was the "Casey Jones" explosive box of explosives attached by permanent magnet to the frames of railroad cars, a silent and flashless pistol -- and also a machine gun. Another explosive devise was to be affixed to the sides of ships by O.S.S. Frogmen.
Every member of an O.S.S. operation carried some "L" tablets to be taken should he be captured by the enemy. He thus could kill himself in seconds to avoid the brutal torture by Nazi interrogators and pointedly "spilling the beans" on O.S.S. operations. In March, 1942, "Area B" was established by O.S.S. in the Catoctin Mountains of Maryland, sixty-five miles northwest of Washington, D.C. to train recruits. By July, 1943, an O.S.S. psychological testing program became more sophisticated, to better identify recruits who could handle the stress of guerrilla warfare.

O.S.S. had the jobs of "secret intelligence," the contact of underground movements, and organizing revolts. O.S.S. also had a paramilitary role in which it was to report directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the field it would be under the direction of theatre commanders. O.S.S. would use covert communications, ciphers, secret inks, small arms, and hand-to-hand combat to achieve its objectives. On October 26, 1943, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 155/11/D was approved and published, affirming the above role of the O.S.S. The Directive broadened the geographical area in which the O.S.S. could conduct secret intelligence (S.I.), secret operations (S.O.) and research and development (R & A) activities. The Field Manual for O.S.S. operations was published on December 1, 1943.
ENDNOTES

1 F.H. Hinsley, British Intelligence, Vol. 1, p. 4
F.H. Hinsley along with E.E. Thomas, C.F.E. Ransom, and
R.C. Knight, were given free access to official documents
to write the official history of British Intelligence.
They were restricted by the Official Secrets Act which
restricted full disclosures of certain highly-classified
materials.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid., p. 487. Dutchman Hugo Alexander invented
Enigma but a German manufacturer put it on the commercial
market. Hinsley is an excellent source for the full story
of Enigma.

4 Ibid., pp. 487-495. In truth, "Asche" was Hans-Thilo
Schmidt who worked in the German Air Force as a
cryptologist. He was a "playboy who spied for money." The
French received 303 documents which included instructions
on setting Army Enigma keys for 1932, 1933, and the first
half of 1934.

5 Ibid. The British were assigned to solve the keys
and the Polish to continue more theoretical work. On
August 16, 1939, Bertrand handed "C" (in truth, Stewart
Menzies) a copy of the Bombe at Victoria Station in London.
On October 28, 1939, "Green" (a key) was introduced by the
Germans. The Government Code and Cypher School broke it at
the beginning of January, 1940. During this period, GC and
GS broke 83 percent of the keys used by German
cryptanalysts. An Enigma machine is on display at the
National Security Agency near Langley, Virginia. It still
is a closely-held asset within the intelligence
communities.
6 Ibid. But, not until 1940 had the Allies reacted in a timely manner to thwart new aggressive moves by Nazi Germany, using their interceptions of German signal transmissions. During the summer of 1939, the Secret Intelligence Service (S.I.S.) came under heavy criticism from the Foreign Office for not knowing about Germany's strength and intentions: the S.I.S., however, could not confirm its interceptions of German signal transmissions from other sources. Enigma had provided the Allies with plentiful intelligence about German's plans. However, it was no easy task to distinguish reliable information from alarmist warnings. As late summer approached in 1939, the problem for the British Government was not whether or not Hitler would make expansionist moves, but what Britain's reaction should be to them. The S.I.S. suffered the gravest of effects of lack of funding. Upon the outbreak of war, it had to hastily establish "stay-behind networks" in the occupied countries. It had to come up with funds to support the resistance groups and devise ways of communicating with them. There was also a shortage of wireless transmissions (W/T) operators which would plague Britain throughout the war.

7 Ibid., pp. 45-85. Whitehall in London housed a war room beneath it. It was the source of Churchill's "Midnight Follies" where he would meet with the "London Control Society" (L.C.S.) to plot the grand strategies of war.

8 Ibid., pp. 89-111. On April 10, 1940, "Code Yellow" was intercepted from the Norwegian campaign. By then it was too late to prevent German troops from occupying Norway, their landings having been made the day before.

9 Ibid., p. 7.

10 Ibid., p. 20.

General Hans Oster of the German Abwehr (Intelligence) was no fan of Adolf Hitler. Oster fed very reliable information to the British Secret Intelligence Service throughout the first two years of the war on Hitler's plans (Hinsley, p. 58). It was Oster who warned the Dutch and the Vatican that the invasion of Norway and Denmark would come on April 9, 1940 (Andrew, p. 476; Hinsley, p. 278).

Troy, Donovan and the C.I.A., pp. 36-42. This book is the official history of the C.I.A. Much as been written on William J. "Wild Bill" Donovan. Also see Richard Dunlop, Donovan: America's Master Spy (Chicago, New York, and San Francisco: Rand McNally & Company, 1982). Hereafter referred to as Dunlop, Donovan. See also A.W. Dulles The Secret Surrender (London: Harper & Row, 1967). Hereafter referred to as Dulles, The Secret Surrender. Donovan gained national notoriety when he returned from World War I a hero (he was decorated with the Distinguished Service Cross, the Distinguished Service Medal and Medal of Honor). He kept a meticulous diary, even in combat. He became a polished bureaucrat in Washington, D.C., and a highly-competent lawyer who argued complex corporate and government litigation. Donovan had the ears of several Presidents, from Woodrow Wilson down through Franklin D. Roosevelt, as to how American foreign policy should be conducted. He visited countries and statesmen worldwide, often at his own expense, then returned directly to the Executive Office to report precisely how the world was reacting to the aggressive actions of Japan, Germany and Italy. When World War II broke out, Donovan helped Roosevelt tell isolationist America that it was in its best interest to prop up a beleaguered Great Britain, all alone in its struggle with Nazi Germany.
17 Troy, Donovan and the C.I.A., pp. 5-11. In 1938, the F.B.I., G-2 (Military Intelligence), State Department security officers, American and British postal authorities, and the New York police all became involved in the detection and apprehension of eighteen people involved in the biggest espionage ring to date. Fourteen managed to escape.

18 Dunlop, Donovan, pp. 306-318.

19 Ibid.

20 Troy, Donovan and the C.I.A., pp. 73-74. Also see Dulles, The Secret Surrender, p. 10.

21 Troy, Donovan and the C.I.A., pp. 74-80. During 1941, Ian Fleming (of later James Bond fame) was an able tutor. Captain E.G.G. Hastings, RN, chaired the British Joint Intelligence Committee in Washington. Admiral John H. Godfrey pressed Roosevelt to create an American Joint Intelligence Committee along British lines, to shore down the multiple lines of communication between London and Washington. William "Little Bill" Stevenson also gave valuable British advice. In September, 1941, he arranged for Lieutenant Colonel Robert A. Solberg, one of Donovan's new recruits, to attend a Special Operations Executive training establishment in England so that he could head up Coordinator of Intelligence's Special Operations (S.O.) training and operational branch. Stevenson also opened an S.O. school in Canada. Americans were introduced to British "dirty tricks" and the science of unconventional warfare.

22 Ibid, pp. 120-128. The idea of a Joint Chiefs of Staff was new to the United States, as the separate military organizations had heretofore pursued their own strategies. In the early months of 1942, the JCS sprang up "almost accidentally." The British-American counterparts became the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

23 Ibid. The Joint Chiefs of Staff was not sure whether it wanted Coordination of Information, and talked about scuttling it if it was absorbed by the JCS. Yet they were interested in Donovan in a military role. The notion of "commando warfare" was difficult to fathom for most Americans. The Federal Bureau of Investigation under J.
Edgar Hoover had taken on South America in 1940 as an operating area to station agents there to counter subversion. Hoover was threatened by Donovan's agency and felt that agency should have been under the F.B.I. all along.

Ibid., pp. 129-152. Major General George V. Strong, G-2 (Army Intelligence) also felt threatened by Donovan's agency and saw no reason for it to exist in the first place. Both Donovan and Strong were members of the Joint Intelligence Committee under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Strong would have a suffocating affect on the O.S.S. throughout the war. Strong wanted even tighter controls over the new O.S.S. and that could be done through the budget.

Ibid., pp. 162-172.

Dunlop, Donovan, p. 377.

Ibid., pp. 378-381.

Ibid., p. 381.

Ibid., pp. 381-399.

Troy, Donovan and the C.I.A., pp. 174-207. See also Dunlop, Donovan, p. 364. The British Special Operations Executive was responsible for most of Europe. The American Special Operations (S.O.) was in charge of North Africa, Finland, Bulgaria, Rumania, and the northern part of Norway (above 62 degrees north latitude). All O.S.S. recruits were volunteers for "extra hazardous duties deep behind enemy lines." All had to have language qualifications for a particular operation, basic military training, and high mental and physical standards. Some would be members of old-line American families; others would be recent immigrants to America from Europe.

CHAPTER III
EVOLUTION OF THE NORWEGIAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT

INTRODUCTION

Little is known in the United States about the German-occupation years in Norway, April, 1940 – May, 1945. This chapter generalizes about those years and offers readers unfamiliar with how a resistance organization evolves against foreign oppression the opportunity to study the development of one of the most effective ones created during World War II. It was absolutely essential for the Norwegian resistance to keep the RYPE mission there undetected by German forces. In short, it helped insure the success of Operation RYPE.

Although less than two-percent of the population in the United States claimed Norwegian heritages, President Franklin D. Roosevelt championed their small country of origin after German-occupying forces arrived in Norway on April 9, 1940. He also inspired the people in Norway to fight on, with the promise that one day, Allied forces would liberate Norway from its foreign oppressor. Roosevelt then told the world: "look to Norway."

American Reaction to German Occupation of Norway

Sonner av Norge (Sons of Norway), a prominent
group of Norwegian-Americans, immediately declared that there was no legitimate reason for Hitler's invasion of the nation of their ancestors. Norway was a "victim of big powers imperialism." France, Great Britain, and Germany should have respected Norway's policy of "strict neutrality." In an open letter to the Sons of Norway, the German-American Society stated that, in no way did it approve of Adolf Hitler's Nazi Germany, nor of its action in Norway. The German-American Society wanted to maintain its close ties to the Sons of Norway and to continue to be good friends with it, saying "we are all Americans."  

A Norwegian Relief Fund began; however, no monies or supplies would go to Vidkun Quisling's regime. The Sons of Norway would sponsor a visit to America by Dr. Halvdan Koht, Foreign Minister of the Norwegian Government-in-Exile in London. His message was to be that Norway was fully committed to fight on.

On April 14, 1940, five days after Germany occupied Norway, President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued the following statement:

Force and military aggression are once more on the march against small nations, in this instance through the invasion of Denmark and Norway. . . . If civilization is to survive, the rights of the smaller nations to independence, to their territorial integrity, and to the unimpeded opportunity for self-government must be respected by their more powerful neighbors.
The President arranged with the British and German governments to send American transport to Petsamo in Finland to pick up stranded Americans in the area and in northern Norway. Included on the list to sail to America was the Crown Princess of Norway and her family. They were to be guests of the President at Hyde Park, New York, where his estate was located. German diplomats clearly knew that Roosevelt had sent a strong statement to them about where his sympathies lay.

Nobody to Negotiate

On April 9, 1940, Dr. Kurt Bräuer, the German Minister to Norway, was the only Third Reich representative in Oslo. Adolf Hitler assumed that Norway would capitulate quickly to Germany: Bräuer had no instructions telling him what to do if the Norwegian Government refused to cooperate. Bräuer approached the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to arrange for Norway's surrender. He was rebuffed. On the evening of April 9, 1940, Vidkun Quisling, leader of the Nasjonal Samling (NS), a Nazi-like party in Norway, made a broadcast on Radio Oslo at 7:32 p.m. He announced that he had taken over the reins of government and declared resistance to German troops to be a crime. The broadcast backfired: this was treason. The broadcast became a rallying point to begin the Norwegian resistance. Bräuer had no instructions on Quisling, and Germans and Norwegians alike were confused.
Bräuer consulted with Berlin: Hitler instructed him to support Quisling.

At 3:00 p.m. on April 10, 1940, Dr. Bräuer demanded that King Haakon VII appoint a Quisling Government. The King refused: the Nazi diplomat was stunned. Bräuer was going to run afoul of Hitler over Quisling. Vidkun Quisling was rebuffed by intellectuals and labor leaders alike. His NS party had no posts in the Norwegian Government. Quisling had no sympathetic press in the Norwegian newspapers. With the King going into exile in Great Britain, Bräuer had no Norwegian Government with which to negotiate. On April 14, 1940, an angered Hitler demanded Quisling chair a "nothing" political position. Quisling's self-appointed six-day reign as Prime Minister was over.

**Despair and the Threat of Reprisals**

Through the spring of 1940, Norwegians were in deep despair. Their armed forces were crushed in sixty days and German military commanders gained control of their country. Norway experienced invasion, treason, war, and defeat. Norwegians were bewildered by the German invasion, and they believed that their leaders had been remiss in not keeping Norway out of war. Norwegians felt so alone when the King and Government fled to London, perhaps never to return.

On April 13, 1940, the Lysaker Bridge from Oslo to
Fornebu Airport was sabotaged. It was the first act by any resistance group against Nazi occupation. Germans were quick to threaten reprisals: prominent citizens told their people not to do more destruction. The lines began to be drawn between resistance and collaboration.

German intentions were to conquer Norwegian governmental hierarchies from within, replacing the leaders with collaborators, and to keep Norway quiet. Failing this, they threatened Norway with a harsh military regime.

The Gauleiter from Essen

On April 24, 1940, Hitler appointed Josef Terboven as Reichskommissar for Norway. He was a youthful thug: with partnership of the Gestapo, he would coordinate the administration of Norway. A few days before, Dr. Kurt Bräuer had sold Hitler on a "government council" to keep the governmental machinery going. Hitler saw through Bräuer's deception: there was no government at all. Bräuer was recalled by Hitler and was dismissed from the Foreign Service of Germany.

Terboven was determined that King Haakon abdicate, the Cabinet should resign, the Supreme Court follow his orders, and Norwegian political leaders form a national and more permanent form of government, a "Council of the Realm." He was to be frustrated at every turn.

On June 27, 1940, he forced Parliament to ask the King in London to abdicate. The King declined: in a
broadcast over B.B.C., he clarified the political issue for Norwegians. Haakon's words spread quickly through Norway by word of mouth. His message became a rallying point for those who dispaired at collaboration with the Germans. In September, 1940, Terboven made the same "request." On September 25, 1940, Terboven decided to rule his conquered province with an iron hand. He dissolved all of the political parties except Quisling's NS, and ruled that the Norwegian Royal Family had forfeited its right to return.

**Birth of the Resistance**

In the churches, chainletters began with the ten political commandments . . . obey Haakon . . . hate Hitler . . . do not collaborate. Terboven told the Lutheran Church that he wanted reports on confessions and he wanted sermons sympathetic to Nazism. In November, 1940, Terboven attacked the Norwegian legal system: all members of the Supreme Court resigned in protest. Twenty-two professional organizations banded together in anti-Nazi solidarity. Terboven directed the Gestapo to march the leaders of all major national organizations to Oslo. The message was clear: either cooperate or be replaced by pro-Germans. The Norwegians did not and they were replaced, but the organizations simply went underground. They became known as "B," or illegal groups. Norway had no recent tradition of illegal political activity on which to base a resistance movement, but one was evolving.
Vidkun Quisling

Vidkun Quisling became "Ministerpresident" on February 1, 1942. He did not receive any new re-distribution of power. The German Reichs-kommisariat still had full control, leaving to the NS only such functions as seemed expedient. There was no room for Quisling in Josef Terboven's plan.

Quisling's problem was that his NS Party did not have much of a following and was virtually nonexistent on the eve of war. Terboven made it clear to Quisling that the NS membership rolls would have to swell before it could be a potent political force.

Quisling's attempt to place NS leadership into all the associations was thwarted at every turn. The Norwegian resistance went underground, but without the associations changing their basic structures. The medical association wrote howls of protest over NS positions; sports associations refused to compete under NS banners; teachers refused to sign loyalty oaths to "nazify" classroom instruction. Quisling was, sociologically, not a Norwegian: he was in his own dream world.

Quisling induced some young Norwegians to serve on the eastern front to fight with Germany against the Russians. In Berlin, Heinrich Himmler picked up on Quisling's Pan-Germanic idea for Norwegians to volunteer in a common fight against Imperial Great Britain and the
Bolsheviks in Russia. The call for volunteers came on January 12, 1941. As a purely military contribution, these units did not carry much weight. Only 2,000 Norwegians volunteered to be led by German officers into the maelstrom of the Battle of Leningrad; 1,000 were killed in action. Very few people in America were aware of such activities, but Norwegians knew. The units were disbanded in 1943, when the attrition rates became known and the lack of volunteers became evident.

Silent Resistance

According to Tor Mykebost, the German soldiers conducted themselves correctly, but the people looked upon them with icy disdain. Any Norwegian women who had gone to bed with German soldiers suddenly found themselves with all of their hair cut off -- a visible sign of collaboration.

There was no free press in Norway. Newspapers were to publish only positive reports about Nazism. The pro-Nazi newspaper, Fritt Folk, was the party organ. The people looked forward to the Norwegian B.B.C. broadcasts, as the German-controlled Radio Oslo was of no account. Norwegian patrons would boycott a shopkeeper if he sold too much to the Germans. To wear wire paperclips on lapels meant "stick together." Lables stating "100% Norwegian" were cut from milk cartons and worn. A match placed in a buttonhole meant "flaming hate." Norwegian flags fluttered every day: before the occupation, they were only displayed
on Sundays and holidays. A Stavanger editorial boldly stated that "no Norwegian was for sale," and those responsible for it were arrested by the Gestapo.

**The Home Front and MILORG**

During the winter months of 1940 the Home Front resistance was organized. It was a cellular structure: nobody knew more than a few colleagues. In order to test the effectiveness of Home Front communications, all Norwegians remained off the streets to remember April 9th, for a designated two-hour period. The Home Front objectives were to halt NS efforts to gain control of the social machinery and to retard German war activity as much as possible.

The Home Front was organized with many links to a central command. The MILORG was the military organization: it was aided by Special Operations Executive (SOE)/Norwegian Section in London, which smuggled in instructors and weapons for sabotage and to prepare for the day of Allied invasion or to take German surrender should Germany lose the war. At the beginning, the link with Britain was weak: not until February 1942, did the Norwegian Section of the British SOE successfully link up with the Norwegian High Command and MILORG.

**Towards Closer Coordination**

On June 10, 1941, MILORG wrote a letter to King Haakon VII in London that was couriered through Stockholm.
In it were plans to prepare cadres for a secret army in Norway that would be activated when the expected Allied invasion came. The British intercepted it: they were not in close coordination with Norwegian authorities in London. The exchange of letters between SOE and MILORG aggravated the distrust of each other. The Norwegian Government-in-Exile in London was suspicious of both groups. In October, 1941, two MILORG leaders reached London to discuss the misunderstandings. The result was that MILORG was recognized as an extension of the Norwegian Armed Forces. The Norwegian Government demanded a "meeting of the minds" with SOE. The result was a joint memo called "The Anglo-Norwegian Collaboration Regarding the Military Organization in Norway," and pledged to work towards harmony. The year ended on a sad note when the Norwegian Government was not told of another SOE-trained Norwegian "Company Linge" raid on the Lofoten Islands. However, the Norwegian Government had its way when a special Norwegian Section of SOE was established in early 1942. Lt. Col. J.S. Wilson, its chief, would work closely with the Norwegian High Command. MILORG would report directly to F.O.IV (Forsvarets Overkommando) (The Defense High Command) of the Norwegian High Command in London.

The "Shetland Bus"

A clandestine traffic between Norway and the Shetland Islands was conducted by seamen, descendants of Vikings,
who were then, one-thousand years later, sailing the same seas with the same size boats. This time their missions were to rescue refugees and to land men and cargo in Norway without the knowledge of the Germans. The journeys were made mostly in the winter because there was too much light in the summertime. The "Shetland Bus" would regularly transport British and Norwegian-trained radio operators and saboteurs and weapons to Norway. It was 180 miles to Bergen from Lunna in the Shetlands. There were forty Norwegian civilian seamen who were provided free room and board and paid four British Pounds weekly and a ten Pound bonus if they made a trip to Norway. German aircraft were a constant threat and German patrols heavily guarded the shores of Norway out to a fifty-mile limit. That is why the "Shetland Bus" had to sail at the worst time of the year and in the worst weather. Lunna was remote from civilization and ideal operationally: the main office was in Lerwick which had communications.

Leif Larsen was a magnet of enthusiasm for the successes of the "Bus." He was awarded Great Britain's Conspicuous Gallantry Medal, Distinguished Service Medal and Bar, Distinguished Service Cross, Distinguished Service Order, and also Norwegian decorations. No other man, neither British nor foreign, had ever received all of these. The "Bus" was moved to Scalloway, near Lerwick, when its activity increased. It carried on making regular
crossings until the end of the war, hauling over 400 tons of arms to Norway.

**A Week of Terror**

Terboven dismissed the leader of the Farmer's Association and replaced him with a Norwegian Nazi sympathizer. All members of the Farmers Association resigned in disgust and the organization ceased to exist (it simply went underground). In turn, the National Labor Federation followed suit. This was the last straw for Terboven: on August 1, 1941, he instituted a state of civil emergency. All radios were to be turned in by 4:00 p.m. on August 7th. At the same time, Reinhard Heydrich, chief of Germany's SS Intelligence Services, arrived in Oslo from Berlin. Two thousand people, representing all classes and all groups, were arrested in a week of terror. The Gestapo not only arrested people; it tortured and shot some of them. The prisons and camps were filled by those who escaped death. Physical punishment was the norm and the firing squad came to stay. Now the Gestapo was in charge: it would decide which Norwegians were directly interfering with the German war effort. Heydrich boarded the plane back to Berlin. His trip had ended the unsuccessful Nazi program to win over the Norwegians: their invitation to participate in the "New Order" as "Aryan" cousins was withdrawn.
The Problem of Food

Most people realize that Norway came very close to mass starvation. Helen Astrup had to feed her daughter, Kirsti, on the black market. She received German rations from the resistance for distributing its newsletters and the B.B.C. summaries. The German war machine gorged itself on Norwegian food. Norwegians obtained no meats nor eggs; even potatoes and fish were taken in mass confiscations. The Germans closed the very best restaurants to Norwegians. Inside they ate as many as ten eggs at one sitting. After the German assault on Russia in June, 1941, no vegetables, milk, berries, or fruit reached Norwegian homes and even fish was rationed. The Germans would even take turnips if they found them.

German Disruption of Norwegian Resistance

The Schutzstaffel (SS) Gestapo was an unholy alliance of bullies, sadists, murderers, and spies. They were uniformed and subject to discipline. The Gestapo was completely independent of the German Wehrmacht. In Norway, a "Nacht und Nebel" order would mean abducting a wayward citizen in the middle of a foggy night, and the citizen would be slain and buried in an unmarked grave. In addition, there was Quisling's National State Police (Stapo).

Many people were brave and were not broken by the physical interrogations of the Gestapo, but these brave
people were more the exception, not the rule. As a result, traitors often wormed their way into resistance organizations. These groups faced disasters from Norwegian collaborators, and the resistance organizations were undermined from within. One such individual was Henry Oliver Rinnan, the "Devil's Apprentice" in Trondheim, recruited by Ernst Parow, a German automobile dealer there in June, 1940. A patriotic group was infiltrated by Rinnan in the Fall of 1941. It resulted in fifty-six persons being arrested, thirty-six of whom were sent to concentration camps. Rinnan's compensation was $100 per month for his work: at the time of Germany's collapse, there were seventy male and female agents on his payroll and Rinnan had an expense budget of $75,000 per year.

Rumors, Security Breeches, and Disaster

Because of joint British-Norwegian raids and rumors of Allied invasion, in December, 1941, Hitler turned Norway into a military fortress. Hitler increased German troop garrisons in Norway in 1942 from 100,000 to 250,000. However, the Allies chose North Africa as the "second front," not Norway. The diversion of German troops helped the Allies make a successful invasion of North Africa.

The lack of coordination between the Allied High Command and MILORG early in the occupation manifested itself with the disaster on Sotra Island at Televaag in April, 1942. Televaag, off the coast of Bergen, was the
haven for two British-trained men. Someone "gave their show away;" the SS came and destroyed 300 houses, slaughtered the cattle, and deported eighty of the adult males to Germany. Televaag was a morale disaster to the Norwegian people because the reprisals were harsh beyond anyone's imagination. Most of the Norwegians wanted to help in the resistance, but after Televaag, the risks to do this became tremendous. Operation Anklet also ended on a sad note: on the second raid in the Lofoten Islands, Major Martin Linge was killed. He was one of sixteen Norwegians in a 450-man British Commando raid which was very successful and inflicted heavy casualties on the Germans on Maaløy. One resident thought the unit was there to stay: it was not and he expected harsher Nazi reprisals after the second raid. He begged the unit to stay -- or never to come back.

**Sabotaging the Nazi Nuclear Bomb**

There was an urgency in the Roosevelt–Churchill meeting on June 17, 1942: the German physicist, Otto Hahn, had discovered that atomic fission could cause super-explosions. The Manhattan Project was working on this aspect also to produce a nuclear bomb. The Germans were procuring "heavy water" -- ten times heavier than normal water -- necessary to control the fission process. The implication if Germany built the bomb first was awesome: the Allies had to have it first. There was only one heavy
water plant. It was in southcentral Norway in the Telemark District, in Vemork, and it had to be sabotaged at all costs.

The time was October, 1942. The target was the heavily guarded, virtually impregnable strategic material plant at Vemork, in Nazi-occupied Norway. The purpose was to destroy the critical supplies and to cripple the key production facilities. The assault force was four Norwegians from Great Britain and six other Norwegians in place who were vigorously trained by British Intelligence in Scotland and landed by parachute on desolate, forbidding terrain. Colonel Leif Tronstad of the Royal Norwegian Army said that if this mission were successful, it would live in Norway's memory for a hundred years.

The target was the high concentration room in which the heavy explosive charges would be secured around the conic cells of heavy water production. The explosion sounded astonishingly feeble and innocent. When the raiding party was 300 feet away, the Germans still did not know what was taking place. The explosion was, in fact, significant and tremendous: the concrete building was strong enough to muffle the sounds. Bjarne Nilssen, Director of Norsk Hydro, called it perfect sabotage. The Reich scientists had suffered a delay of many months, a delay they could not afford. General Niklaus von Falkenhorst called the sabotage "Britain's finest coup."
Rebuilding MILORG

At the beginning of 1943, MILORG leaders were either under arrest or in hiding to avoid labor conscription by German authorities. The districts and central leadership had to start afresh. The British SOE, the Norwegian High Command, and MILORG had to work together. The long range policy was that Norway should not expect an Allied invasion until others took place elsewhere: lie low, go slow. There was to be no contact with the enemy until the time was ripe.

MILORG itself was split: the younger members wanted a heroic, active resistance, while the older members wanted to use caution. Justice Paal Berg, the guide of the Home Front within the "inner cabinet" (a.k.a. "the Circle") rejected MILORG notions of sabotage and violent actions against the Germans. That, and also Allied bombing, would destroy Norway's industrial base. MILORG said the Allies' policy was to bomb Germany into submission, and occupied countries were not exempt: Norway had to be pushed into sabotage.

Jens Christian Hauge, a young lawyer, reorganized MILORG to establish a military preparedness at home which the Norwegian High Command could use for purposes in connection with the reconquest of Norway. Hauge believed that sabotage done and not authorized by London was irresponsible because the Norwegian people no longer could
take the pressure of German terror and reprisals. On November 15, 1943, the MILORG council, the clandestine Police Organization and the CIVORG (Civilian Organization, publishers and distributors of underground newspapers) leadership reinforced Hauge's notion into a joint memorandum.

MILORG military districts were formed and operating procedures were standardized. Each member was assigned a number and a specific job to do. Members were given "contact cards," which listed other members he knew: if the member was arrested by the Gestapo, he was to remain silent for twenty-four hours until the others listed on the card had a chance to escape to Sweden.

**Labor Registrations and MILORG Recruitment**

On February 22, 1943, Vidkun Quisling said that all able-bodied Norwegians were to register to be a part of a labor reserve. In reality, it was to be a labor reserve to be used on German military installations. By this time, the program to "nazify" Norway had failed. Quisling would provide ration cards to the labor force. Norwegians not registering would not eat. Quisling was foiled when the Labor Card Offices were blown up and the ration cards scattered.

In the Autumn of 1943, only 2,000 Norwegians had volunteered for service on the eastern front. In January, 1944, Quisling called again for a "labor force." A woman
in the Ministry of Justice intercepted Quisling's order and sent a copy to the Resistance, who, in turn sent it to London. The B.B.C. broadcast to Norway was: "No one to report for labor service." In May, 1944, Quisling tried again. This time, the intelligence networks quickly spread the word throughout Norway. Thousands of Norwegians fled to the hills to join the "underground." By the end of the war, MILORG had 40,000 recruits.

Throughout 1944, there were frustrations within MILORG. There were directives and not tasks; only papers, not guns. Peter Furubotn, the Communist MILORG leader in Bergen, threatened activity. There was a danger of active elements breaking away from MILORG.

**Bernt Balchen Given Chance to Aid Resistance**

On July 3, 1941, a meeting of American, British, and Norwegian Air Force officers was held at the office of Henry "Hap" Arnold, the Commanding General, United States Army Air Corps. It was located in the Munitions Building on Constitution Avenue in Washington, D.C. In attendance were General Arnold in the chair, Royal Air Force Group Captain Deboulay from the British Attache's Office, Major Gene Beebe, General "Hap" Arnold's aid, and Flight Lieutenant Bernt Balchen, Royal Norwegian Air Force. Balchen was a Norwegian-born arctic explorer. He had been working with the British and French since he was caught in Washington, D.C. when he heard the news that
German forces occupied Norway on April 9, 1940. Balchen knew Arnold from the 1930s, as both had been aviation pioneers.

General Arnold came right to the point of the meeting: he had an assignment for Balchen, should Balchen join the USAAF. Arnold said it was more exciting than being a ferry pilot for the British. When Bernt Balchen agreed to do so, he was commissioned on the spot as a Captain in the United States Army Air Force. Arnold then directed him to the office of the Brigadier General Carl (Tooey) Spaatz. Spaatz proposed that Balchen set up a secret American air base on the west coast of Greenland. When Balchen observed that the United States was not at war, Spaatz agreed, but suggested that it soon would be.

From 1941 to 1943, Bernt Balchen's Task Force Eight set up staging bases on Newfoundland, Baffin Island, Iceland and Narsasuak and Sondre Stromfjord in Greenland.

On September 7, 1943, Bernt Balchen met with General Arnold at Keflavik Air Base in Iceland. Balchen said that now that his work was done, he wanted to help the Norwegian Resistance Movement. Arnold said that the best way for him to do so was to go see William (Wild Bill) Donovan of the O.S.S. in Washington, D.C. Balchen caught the next plane to Washington.

Donovan told Balchen that the Norwegian Government-
in Exile in London needed Norwegians in the war to fight the Nazis. Norway had purchased two Lockheed Lodestars, but the trickle of flights between Stockholm and London provided very few Norwegians. In 1942, Sweden was becoming more sympathetic to the Allies because of the evidence of Gestapo atrocities in the occupied countries, and expectation that Germany might lose the war. By early 1943, Donovan said that Sweden had declared itself willing to defy Berlin. Donovan's orders were to set up an adequate air transport service to bring 2,000 Norwegians from Stockholm to London. The American program, Operation SONNIE, was born.

In January, 1944, during a working dinner at Widewing, a London suburb that housed the Headquarters, United States Strategic Air Force, General Spaatz asked Major General Fredrick Anderson, Air Transportation Commander, where aircraft for Balchen could be found for Operation SONNIE. Anderson said it was difficult because there would be a push on France soon. Major General James (Jimmy) Doolittle, Commander 8th Air Force, said that Colonel Clifford J. Heflin's 482nd Bomb Group at Northhampton in England (unit nickname: "Carpetbaggers") was already under orders of the O.S.S. to deliver personnel and supplies behind enemy lines. He told Balchen to obtain aircrews and aircraft from Heflin's resources. Balchen said, "sure, we do it." On January 27, 1944, Balchen as
special representative of the Commanding General, United States Strategic Air Force, requested from Anderson, five B-24 Liberators from Colonel Heflin's group. The crews would have civilian clothing. The Liberators were painted dark green and without insignia. They came equipped with "Gee Boxes," an accurate radar navigational aid for flying in blind weather.

Balchen encountered red tape with the British military and civilian authorities as they denied him permission to use Leuchars Air Base in Scotland for his Scandinavian operation. Their excuse was that Americans had no business in that area. Their opposition was overcome by mid-March, 1944 after Balchen explained the problem to Trygve Lie, Norwegian Foreign Minister, at the Kingston House where the Norwegian Government-in-Exile was conducting its business. Lie told Balchen that he would address the Leuchars issue at lunch the next day with King Haakon VII, Crown Prince Olaf, Anthony Eden, and Winston Churchill. At this lunch, the King asked Churchill why the British had turned down American requests to use Leuchars as a staging base to Stockholm to fly men out of Sweden to help with the war effort. Churchill said he had no idea why it was turned down, but he would solve the problem.

Two days later, Balchen deployed five Liberators to Leuchars. Operation SONNIE began on March 27, 1944, with a flight from Leuchars to Bromma Airport near Stockholm.
Future flights to penetrate enemy airspace would vary from Trondheim in the north to Kristiansand on the southern coast of Norway to avoid the flak from German aircraft batteries.

The Swedish Connection to the Norwegian Resistance

Neutral Sweden found itself surrounded by World War II. The capital, Stockholm, was a favorite "listening post" for Allied intelligence and Axis agents alike. In March, 1942, Bruce Hopper went to Stockholm to establish the O.S.S. mission there. He immediately met resistance from the American Ambassador, Hershel Johnson, who thought clandestine operations were "satanic." Johnson refused to provide cover for the O.S.S. station. Even the Passport Division required Hopper and his team to have "O.S.S." clearly embossed on their passports. For purposes of cover, the Special Forces Headquarters had to be separated into British and American entities, although the cooperation of a joint command still existed -- most of the time.

Hopper arrived in Stockholm in 1942 on an RAF twin-engine Mosquito from London. It was a very dependable shuttle between London and Stockholm, even though it flew over enemy territory. The Norwegian Resistance Movement provided London with daily German Orders of Battle.

Hopper's own penchant was spying on the Russians. This changed in the autumn of 1943 when Wilho Tokander, a
Chicago lawyer of Finnish extraction, took over from Hopper as O.S.S. Station Chief at Stockholm. As the fortunes of war began to reverse for Germany on the Eastern Front in 1943, Tokander concentrated on Allied and Axis Orders of Battle. The State Department finally came under tow, but the British became suspicious of American intentions in Norway, as they thought it was entirely their show. Not until Joseph Haskell took over the O.S.S. desk at London did British and American feathers become unruffled. In mid-1944, it was obvious to all Swedes that Germany was losing the war; both American and Swedish State Departments arranged for direct meeting between the O.S.S. and the Swedish State Police.

On March 31, 1944, Bernt Balchen flew the first B-24 from Leuchars Air Base in Scotland to Bromma Airport near Stockholm. The penetration of enemy airspace by Operation SONNIE was made over Kristiansand, Balchen's home town. The night fog over the town prevented German flak from disrupting the Liberator's flight. Tailwinds helped the crew to an early morning landing at Bromma. The dark green-painted B-24, with no insignia on it, was marshalled by a Swedish groundcrewman to a parking spot next to a camouflage-painted two-engine DC-3. On closer inspection, Balchen found a small swastika painted on the tail: the German courier from Berlin also had arrived early. The German crew was wearing civilian clothing, as was Balchen's
crew. The Germans were quite curious about the B-24. Both crews were transported to the Grand Hotel. Balchen took a hot bath, then went to a breakfast of steak and eggs -- a real banquet! The dining room was full of foreign agents.

After breakfast, Balchen and his crew were enroute to the American Embassy when they discovered they were being followed. It turned out to be Dr. Gressman of German Intelligence, who Balchen knew as a press attache in Oslo. Balchen greeted him pleasantly: Dr. Gressman was stunned when Balchen saw right through his false whiskers. Gressman said a nervous goodbye and disappeared into a store.

While at the Embassy, Minister Hershel Johnson was briefed on the evacuation of 2,000 Norwegians to Britain. Dr. Harry Soederman, Chief of the Criminal Institute in Sweden -- and a great friend of Norway -- reported that 12,500 Norwegian youths were being trained as "police soldiers." He also said that 40,000 young men had fled to the mountains in Norway to escape German conscription and asked if the United States could resupply them. Balchen contacted General Carl Spaaz in London, saying "Ve can do it." Spaatz responded: "You're the Ve Do Its."

Balchen was provided office space at Bromma by British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC) Chief Douglas Grey. Balchen contacted the O.S.S. in Stockholm as well
as the Norwegian Underground there. Balchen received secret radio codes, call letters for direct contact with underground stations in Norway, as well as a current air order of battle for Norway.

On June 22, 1944, King Haakon VII and Crown Prince Olaf arrived at Leuchars Air Base in Scotland, as well as Admiral Riiser-Larsen, head of the Royal Norwegian Air Force (RNAF), to give the King's personal guidon to the RNAF unit there. They were also there to inspect the American aircraft and personnel prior to their takeoff and drop on Herdla Island in Norway, code-named Fetlock I. One-half of the ten Liberators were painted dark green, the other one-half, recent arrivals, were painted black. The King inspected the exhaust pipes with their dampeners to conceal the red glow of engines at night. Also he inspected the flame arrestors on the machine gun muzzles. The King found that the bottom turret had been removed so that personnel and equipment could be dropped from there. It was called the "Joe Hole." A plexiglass greenhouse had replaced the nose turret.

Balchen told the packaging stations in Birmingham to get busy providing containers of everything. Some packages went to Leuchars for air drops over Norway; others were flown to Stockholm, where they were trucked to Norway in hollowed-out logs. Cigarettes, liquor, magazines, and current newspapers were added as personal items. The
newspapers were on Oslo hotel tables for the Nazis to see: they were calling cards of the American Air Force. During the winter of 1944-1945, "Ve Do It" flew 1,442 men and 2,456,000 tons of equipment to the far north.

After a slow start, with some early setbacks caused by infiltrations by Nazi sympathizers, the Norwegian resistance movement consolidated into one of the most effective organizations in all of German-occupied Europe. From late 1942 to June, 1944, the Norwegian resistance movement thwarted the Nazis at every turn.
ENDNOTES

1 Sønner av Norge, Mai, 1940, Vol. 37, No. 5, p. 151. This magazine was the forerunner of the Sons of Norway Viking magazine now published in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Hereafter referred to as: Sons of Norway. The organization had launched a Finnish war relief drive as soon as the Russo-Finnish War broke out. Norwegians were concerned that Russia wanted Norwegian warm water ports (Jan. 1940). Also: Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1940, Vol. I, General (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1959), pp. 138-139. Hereafter referred to as: Foreign Relations. Wilhelm Munthe de Morgenstierne, Norwegian Ambassador to the United States, made daily visits to our Department of State in Washington, D.C., as early as March 25, 1940, to voice his concern that Norway would be swept into war. The British Fleet was in Norwegian waters controlling commerce. Germany observed that Norway was not protecting its neutrality in not turning away the British Fleet. The American position was to encourage the big powers to follow international law.

2 Sons of Norway, May, 1940, Vol. 37, No. 5, p. 151.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid., August, 1940, Vol. 37, No. 8, p. 265.


6 Ibid, pp. 177-178. The warship American Legion sailed to pick up the Norwegian Crown Princess and her family on August 5, 1940.

7 Andenaes, Norway, p. 57.

8 Ibid., p. 59.

Andenaes, Norway, p. 59. Also: the displays at NORGES HJEMMEFRONTMUSEUM (Norway's Resistance Museum), located on the grounds of Akershus Castle in Oslo, vividly portray the confusion on April 9, 1940. Photos show German troops on Karl Johan, Oslo's main avenue, parading before stunned Norwegians. Another photo taken on April 10, 1940, vividly portrayed "The Panic Day." Norwegians were leaving Oslo because of rumors of imminent Allied bombing.

Shirer, Challenge, p. 37. Also: Displays in the museum. The thirteen-point German ultimatum, handed to the Norwegian Government on the night of April 9, 1940, when the German invasion was a "fait accompli," was stuck on the point of a bayonet in the museum display. Bräuer was shown leaving his meeting with the King at Elverum on April 10, 1940, where he again demanded Norway's capitulation. The reply was a resolute "no" from both King and Government.

Petrow, The Bitter Years, pp. 99-100. Bräuer must have known that Quisling did not have much of a following in Norway. Quisling had told Hitler in 1939 that he could deliver Norway in an NS "coup." Perhaps Hitler believed this on April 9, 1940, but not six days later. King Haakon did not want a Quisling Government because it would not represent the majority of Norwegians. The King thought it correct constitutionally to run a Norwegian Government-in-exile in London because he still represented the majority of Norwegians. Hitler had plans to "nazify" Norwegians, and Quisling could better be used to "reeducate" them in the "new order."

Petrow, The Bitter Years, pp. 97-100. Scandinavians vote once per year, for two people, whereas Americans can vote for many representatives in frequent elections. Local and District representatives are expected to do their jobs well. Norwegians perceived that their representatives in London could not do their jobs while away from their desks in Norway. Norwegians perceived their preinvasion military officers as arrogant elitests who were not doing their jobs. (Scandinavians preferred that most monies go to social programs; thus defense budgets were very low. Norwegian officers had no combat experience.)
14 Riste, Resistance, pp. 1415.

15 Ibid., p. 11.

16 Shirer, Challenge, pp. 44-45.

17 Petrow, The Bitter Years, p. 96. Terboven, 41, was an old-line Nazi who had flown in World War I. He joined the Nazi party in 1920. In 1933, he became Gauleiter of Essen where he served until Hitler's Norway appointment. Paal Berg, the Chief Justice of Norway's Supreme Court, and Bishop Eivind Berggrav, leader of the Lutheran Church in Norway, were part of the "government council" to keep Norway running on a daily basis, and provide practical solutions to day-to-day problems.

18 Josef Terboven, Nyordningen & Norge (Oslo: J.M. Stenersen, 1940). Also: Josef Terboven, Bekantmachung, Oslo, den 23 März 1941. (Oslo: 1941). Terboven wanted complete control and obedience from Norwegians. Newspapers were only to publish German victories and British losses. There was to be no coverage of Haakon nor his Government-in Exile. There were to be no pictures of the King. There was to be only a "German spirit."

19 Shirer, Challenge, pp. 44-45.

20 Petrow, The Bitter Years, p. 104.

21 Shirer, Challenge, pp. 44-45.

22 Petrow, The Bitter Years, p. 104. Also: Norway's Fighting Church (Washington: The Royal Norwegian Government's Press Representative in the U.S.A., 1941), pp. 1-7. In Norway, the King is not only the head of government, he is also the head of the state church. Lutheran pastors are paid as civil servants. When Terboven put restrictions on the church, pastors simply resigned and conducted underground services. Visible church services were not attended. The notion was that pastors simply could not put the Ten Commandments aside. In January, 1941, the church made detailed protests to Terboven about the activities of the Gestapo, the Hird (a Norwegian Gestapo secret police agency), the NS and the injustice of
the occupation. Over 50,000 chain letters of protest were printed. 20,000 were confiscated, but 30,000 were clandestinely distributed to Norwegians.

23
Ibid., p. 105. Svere Riisnaes, the new Minister of Justice, declared that he alone could appoint or dismiss jury members and court officials. He also could force judges into early retirement. The Reichskommissar said that he was "the boss." All the judges resigned, which shocked many Norwegians. Terboven replaced them with collaborators. Terboven's takeover of the judicial system was complete.

24
Ibid., p. 106-108. Norwegians have a highly-structured society and there are organizations for everyone. In May, 1940, many did begin to go underground starting the whole process. Forty-three national organizations, 750,000 strong (one-fourth of the Norwegian population) filed massive written reports to Terboven protesting nazification. Terboven heard about the reports on B.B.C. before they appeared on his desk.

25
T. Derry, Modern Norway, p. 391.

26
Andenaes, Norway, WW II, pp. 6465. Quisling was made "Ministerpresident" at an elaborate ceremony at Akershus Castle, attended by many dignitaries from Berlin in a "show of support." Terboven had immediately sized Quisling up as a vague and inefficient theoretician.

27
Ibid., p. 72. A recruiting drive in the latter half of 1941 netted only 3.55% of Norway's population. The NS could not rally its members around the idea of a "Norwegian national-socialism."

28
Ibid., p. 69-73. The Norwegian people, like Terboven, considered Quisling as a "clown."

29
Fritt Folk, Oslo, January 13, 1941. This newspaper was the NS Party organ. Quisling called for volunteers over Radio Oslo the day before.
Andenaes, Norway, WW II, pp. 73-76. Quisling required the State Police, Members of the Hird (Norwegian equivalent of the German SS), and labor volunteers to swear allegiance to Adolph Hitler.

Tor Myklebost, They Came as Friends, translated by Trygve M. Ager (Garden City: Doubleday, Doran and Company, 1943), pp. 26-27. Hereafter referred to as: Myklebost, Friends. Copies of Fritt Folk are on display at the Norwegian Resistance Museum in Oslo. So are many underground newspapers, which provided the truth to Norwegians as to what was going on in the world and in Norway. As many as sixty underground newspapers existed in Norway by the end of World War II. Also: see bibliography for the Royal Norwegian Government Information Service in Washington, D.C. These particular publications are housed in the archives of Rolvaag Memorial Library, at St. Olaf College in Northfield, Minnesota. The Norwegian-American communities in North America were given timely information as to exactly what was going on in German-occupied Norway.

Ibid.

Myklebost, Friends, pp. 130-140. Also: Riste, Resistance, p. 19. There were not enough loyal supporters of NS to serve the interests of Quisling and the Third Reich. In early 1942, there were only 20,000 NS members for the Norwegian population of 3.3 million, less than one-percent representation. NS penetration of local governments was not successful. Open demonstrations by the people were met by "Quisling's bullies," but their heavy-handed reactions only stiffened the resistance. In the Spring of 1942, a concerted effort by the NS to control the classrooms was made. Many teachers were placed into Grini, a concentration camp near Oslo. They then were taken by ship to hard labor in Kirkenes in northern Norway. Quisling finally gave up the idea of "classroom nazification," but not until many teachers suffered. For news of events, see Norway's Teachers Stand Firm (Washington: The Royal Norwegian Government's Press Representatives, 1942). America was informed rapidly of the plight of the teachers.

Hans Christian Adamson and Per Klem, Blood on the Midnight Sun (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc.), pp. 185-186. X-U was the military information service. It conducted clandestine radio transmissions to the British SIS of German land, air and sea movements. CIVORG was the
civil organization: it would print illegal newspapers to foster opposition to the Quisling's and the Nazi philosophies. Also: Riste, Resistance, p. 39. The central civilian resistance leadership evolved by the end of 1942. The Kretsen (the Circle,) the focal point of the Home Front, was composed of former members of the Supreme Court, the Administrative Councils and Labor leaders who coordinated policy with the Norwegian Government-in-Exile in London.

35
Derry, Modern Norway, p. 398. Also: Gunnar Fridtjof Thurmann Sonsteby, Report from No: 24, translated by Maurice Michael Stuart (New York: Lyle Stuart (New: Lyle Stuart, Inc., 1965), pp. 42-43. Since it was a crime after September, 1941 for Norwegians to own radios and wireless sets, radio operators had to parachute into Norway where resistance members would arrange for radio dispersal and to report on troop movements. One of the first radio transmitters was in use as early as the summer of 1940. Author's comment: It is on display at the Resistance Museum in Oslo.

36
Riste, Resistance, pp. 30-32.

37
Petrow, The Bitter Years, pp. 124-128. The British wanted it both ways. The "Company Linge" raids (March 4, December 26, 1941) were highly successful in destroying fish oil factories and in recruitment of patriots. This prompted Hitler to increase his military garrison in Norway from 150,000 to 350,000, for he thought that "second front" of the Allies was to be an invasion of northern Norway. Germans and Norwegians alike fell for the "Fortitude North" deception, later in 1942 called "Jupiter" when the Allies nominated French North Africa instead as the "second front." The British did not tell Haakon VII of the raids because "Norwegians could not keep a secret." The Lofotens were bombed by the Luftwaffe on December 28, 1941. Afterwards, the SS began reprisals on the people, many going to concentration camps. MILORG was angry because the raids appeared to do more harm than good. Major Haneborg Hansen, an early leader of MILORG did not want a major arms buildup; instead, he wanted massive drops of weapons only upon invasion. Discoveries by Germans of weapons caches only brought more reprisals. The British SOE wanted full control to direct selective sabotages, coordinated with overall Allied raids. "Invasion rumors" persisted, MILORG was careless in recruitment, and was virtually shut down in 1942.
Petrow, The Bitter Years, pp. 128-129.


Ibid., pp. 101, 156-277. The British were bent on sinking the German battleship Tirpitz. They did not succeed until 1944. One of Larsen's assignments was to carry a British Chariot, a two-man British submarine into the fjord at Trondheim, where the Tirpitz hid from the British Fleet. Larsen closed to a five mile range in heavy waters to the Tirpitz, where the chariot dislodged and sank. In 1943, the "Shetland Bus" lost over half of its "fishing" boats. The O.S.S. gave the operation three subchasers which made 105 trips across the North Sea without a loss.

Myklebost, Friends, pp. 196-200. Also see: Odd Bergfald, Gestapo i Norge (Oslo: Hjemmes Forlag, 1978). This is available in the archives of St. Olaf College in Northfield, Minnesota. Also: Finn Dyngvold, Krigen og Austevoll, 1940-1945 (Bergen: Bladet Sunnhordland, 1980), p. 109. "Den 27 juni, Olaf Drønen var arrestert av Gestapo og sett i fengsel." (On June 27th, Olaf Drønen was arrested by the Gestapo and thrown in jail). (Author's holding). Drønen was trained in British "dirty tricks" and worked with Leif Larsen's "Shetland Bus." The Gestapo really did not have proof of his activities and he was released after five days of "interrogation." Also: Display at the Resistance Museum: A coffee kettle with a hole in the bottom illustrates the "Chinese" torture method. A clamp, applied to arms and legs, is also shown.


Germany invaded Russia in 1941 for oil and wheat fields. Norway was obliged to provide fish oil, sulfur, and food to fuel the venture into Russia. Norwegian cod and salmon were favorites in German field rations. Also: Riste, Resistance, pp. 33-34. Terboven had not disturbed the Norwegian trade unions until Germany invaded Russia. Now tight control was necessary with a rule by fear. On September 9, 1941, Oslo workers engaged in a spontaneous strike because of the cessation of special milk rations to the workers in the factories. On September 10th, the Gestapo stepped in and executed two trade unionists during six days of terror.


45 Sonsteby, No. 24, p. 51.

46 Adamson, Blood, pp. 221-230.

47 Riste, Resistance, pp. 47-48. By 1942, there were sixteen Secret Intelligence Service radio stations, manned by British-trained Norwegians in Norway, reporting German naval and troop movements back to London. In 1942, "Company Linge" conducted twenty-one sabotages and recruited a "secret army." They were sent in by the "Shetland Bus."

48 Ibid., p. 52. A Norwegian "too honest to lie" pointed the NS Sheriff towards the Linge arms dump destined for MILORG. The two Linge men were tortured, then shot. For a full account, consult: Konrad Birkhaug, Televaag: Fiskevaeret som Tyskene Slettet Ut 1942 (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1946). The Gestapo did its homework and arrested others in western Norway. Infiltration and Norwegian carelessness led to a virtual shutdown of MILORG in 1942. (This book is housed in the archives at St. Olaf College.)

49 Petrow, The Bitter Years, pp. 123-128. Major Martin Linge, a Norwegian actor, and his company of Norwegians underwent special forces training by SOE in Great Britain. A New York Times headline bannered that King Haakon VII was rumored to be a participant of the two raids on the Lofotens. He was not, but he was fuming because the British did not tell him in advance about the raids.

Gallagher, Bomb, pp. 15-83.

Ibid., pp. 136-163. The sabotage team left behind British unit shoulder patches. Also: Riste, Resistance, pp. 59-60. Also: Petrow, The Bitter Years, pp. 138-150. The conical cells are on display at the Resistance Museum. All authors conclude that the raid was the most successful of all the operations undertaken in Norway. The authors have gone into considerable detail on the planning and execution of the raid. They also tell of parachuting on the hostile Hardangervidda, survival, the physical demands, difficulty in rendezvous with those in place, and also the hardships of descent and ascent of the only route possible to the target, and the escape to fight again. It definitely determined the value of sabotage instead of Allied bombing, which would take needless civilian casualties. Unfortunately, the plant was bombed by the Eighth Air Force in 1943, because the Allies underestimated the plant's heavy water production. The bombing raid was a disaster: very little production was stopped and there were civilian casualties. Norwegians howled to the Allies: "Stop the bombing."

Petrow, The Bitter Years, p. 230.

Riste, Resistance, p. 58.

Petrow, The Bitter Years, p. 230.

Riste, Resistance, pp. 67-69. The Communists in MILORG wanted a very active resistance.

Petrow, The Bitter Years, p. 232. Permanent MILORG groups were set up in the woods and mountains. At the dropping zones, the "boys in the forest" received instructors, weapons and food from Britain. At the Resistance Museum, two maps from the High Command define and identify the military districts and the "safe areas." All twenty-three self-contained districts had radio contact with England. In north Norway groups were able to operate
from bases with radio stations established on the Swedish side of the border, thanks to Swedish special dispensation (SEPALS).

58  Kiste, Resistance, p. 72. Also: Sonsteby, No. 24, pp. 107-116. Sonsteby placed charges in the buildings, then walked into the offices and calmly told the workers to evacuate immediately—the place was going to blow up. They did and the explosions scattered everything. It was a real morale boost for Norwegians.

59  Riste, Resistance, p. 73.

60  Ibid., pp. 74-75.

61  Petrow, The Bitter Years, p. 233. Furubotn reasoned since Russia was entering Norwegian soil, this was to be the turning point to lead a general insurrection. The British refused to arm the Communist elements because of this. A June, 1944 directive from General Dwight D. Eisenhower, SHAEF Commander (Riste, Resistance, pp. 75-76): "No Allied military offenses were planned for Norway. Don't encourage the Resistance to make overt moves." The SHAEF policy was to use the Resistance to prevent the Germans from using "scorched earth" tactics on Norway's power stations, communications and public utilities.

62  Balchen, Come North, p. 212.

63  Cave-Brown, Secret Wars, p. 312.

64  Balchen, Come North, p. 213

65  Ibid., p. 214.

66  Ibid., p. 216.

67  Ibid., p. 256.

68  Ibid., pp. 260-261.
Balchen, Come North, pp. 264-265. Also see the comic opera with Germans in Stockholm on page 267. On a subsequent flight, Balchen's B-24 cracked a cylinder head on one of its engines. It had to be replaced before it could return to Scotland. Balchen checked with his friend, Carl Florman of the Swedish Air Line, to see if he could get a cylinder head or a new engine. Florman said that nothing was available, but he would check with the German Lufthansa representative to see if he had stock on hand at Bromma. Lufthansa said nothing was on hand, but an engine would be on board the DC-3 courier from Berlin the next day. The engine from a shot-down B-24 arrived the next day from Berlin. The Lufthansa representative gave it to Florman, who in turn, gave it to Balchen. After its installation by mechanics, the B-24 returned to Scotland, courtesy of Nazi Germany.
Ibid., p. 287.
CHAPTER IV
THE FORMATION AND OPERATIONS OF NORSO

This chapter discusses the evolution of the O.S.S. Norso Group and describes its training in guerrilla warfare in both the United States and Great Britain in preparation for its eventual role in Norway.

The Struggle to Volunteer

Leif Öistad found himself on a Norwegian tanker in the middle of the Atlantic when German troops occupied Norway on April 9, 1940, and he could not return to his beloved country to check up on his parents. He left his ship in New York City in September, 1940, and struggled to enlist in the U.S. Army. Since America was not yet in the war, he was classified as an alien and could not enlist. What prompted his desire to enlist was not only a sense of adventure, but a desire to help liberate his homeland.

Not until September, 1942, could Leif Öistad enlist in the Army. He took his basic training at Fort Lee, Virginia; on Christmas, 1942, he was transferred to Camp Hale, Colorado. The 99th Infantry Brigade was undergoing vigorous mountain training there. Tom Sather was stranded on a Norwegian vessel on April 9, 1940, in the harbor of Long Beach, California, with the same ambition to
enlist. The Immigration authorities were reluctant to give him a "green card" so he could not even find work in the United States, let alone gain permission to enlist. In late 1942, the Army permitted Sather to enlist, commissioning him as a second lieutenant in early 1943.

Another stranded Norwegian merchant mariner, Harold Nipe, finally was given the option to enlist at Fort Snelling, Minnesota, then went to the 99th at Camp Hale. Leif Eide of Minneapolis, Minnesota, a U.S. citizen, corresponded with his brother, Olav, who was in the 99th, to find out that the 99th had good food. Eide immediately requested a transfer from his Jacksonville, Florida Infantry Regiment to the 99th, and it was approved—no problem for this U.S. citizen! Karl Hoffman (a.k.a. Matti Raivio) fled Finland at age sixteen to escape the debacle of the Russo-Finnish War in 1939. He spoke many languages and he was an experienced skier: Hoffman enlisted into the U.S. Army and then was sent directly to the O.S.S.

Formation of the 99th Infantry Battalion (Separate)

On July 10, 1942, the War Department activated the 99th Infantry Battalion (Separate) at Camp Ripley, Minnesota. It was intended by the War Department that this unit eventually would consist only of Norwegian nationals (aliens or aliens with first papers).

The authorized strength was to be 931 enlisted men. The infantry battalion would consist of 884 enlisted men;
the medical detachment, 36; the transportation platoon, 11. Officers of Norwegian extraction who could speak Norwegian would be chosen from Second Army personnel. They would be eventually replaced by Norwegian nationals graduated from officer candidate schools.

The Commanding Generals of the First, Third and, Fourth Armies and the VI, VII, and IX Army Corps would collect all requests for transfer to the 99th Infantry Battalion from Norwegian nationals serving in the Army in this country. If sufficient aliens were not procured to form a complete battalion, Norwegian-speaking soldiers who were U.S. citizens would be voluntarily transferred to the unit.

Life at Camp Hale

Almost 1,000 Norwegians, mostly exiles and merchant seamen and Americans of Scandinavian descent, gathered at Camp Hale, Colorado, to train in mountain warfare. Their unit, the 99th Infantry Battalion (Separate), was earmarked for Norway's liberation from German occupation. They were to become experts in skiing. The American Government assumed that everyone of Scandinavian descent was an excellent skier, but that was not always the case. Leif Oïstad, an excellent skier, taught many officers how to ski well: "If you can't out-ski the Germans, you will not return." In late 1942, training began in earnest in mountain climbing, forging rivers and canyons—and the
arduous task of hauling supplies and weapons.

The 99th had its own newspaper from which its members could read news from Norway, courtesy of the Norwegian underground in Oslo. They were also informed that the National Service Life Insurance (NSLI) provided benefits of $10,000 and were encouraged to sign up for this package. On May 23, 1943, the Viking reported on President Franklin D. Roosevelt's secret inspection of the unit: the Chief Executive was very warm in his praise of the husky Norwegians who paraded before him.

**Recruitment into the O.S.S.**

In the summer of 1943, two high-ranking Norwegian officers, Oberstløytnant Munthe-Kass and Oberstløytnant A.H. Dahl, visited Camp Hale, Colorado. So did representatives of the American Office of Strategic Services (O.S.S.). They were there to recruit select candidates for their organization out of the ranks of the 99th Infantry Battalion. Rumors had it that the O.S.S. planned to parachute sabotage teams into occupied Europe and "raise hell" with the Nazis. Since the 99th was mostly Norwegian (with a few Finns and Swedes thrown in), the O.S.S. must have had plans for Norway.

The interviews began, with the interviewing team statement that the O.S.S. "was looking for men to volunteer for extra hazardous duty behind enemy lines in Norway." The men were interviewed in Norwegian. The interviews...
were also the first to assess the psychological profiles of the candidates to go on "suicide missions." Leif Eide was told that he would have to take parachute training if he volunteered: he said yes.

Finn Hoff was the first soldier to volunteer for the O.S.S.

Selections made, the O.S.S. sent the following men to Washington, D.C. from Camp Hale in July, 1943, for Operational Group training:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Serial Number (ASN)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Harold Larson</td>
<td>0-408800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Lt.</td>
<td>William F. Larsen</td>
<td>01292011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Lt.</td>
<td>Harry L. Solberg</td>
<td>01294032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Lt.</td>
<td>Erik J. Andersen</td>
<td>01295649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Lt.</td>
<td>Birger Berg</td>
<td>01317260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Lt.</td>
<td>Ralph N. Elsmo</td>
<td>01552483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Lt.</td>
<td>Reider J. Grunseth</td>
<td>01308635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Lt.</td>
<td>Melvin J. Hjeltness</td>
<td>01291641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Lt.</td>
<td>Adolf Lieum</td>
<td>01310732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Lt.</td>
<td>Tom Sather</td>
<td>01305655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/Sgt.</td>
<td>Einar A. Eliassen</td>
<td>6871912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/Sgt.</td>
<td>Alvin Toso</td>
<td>37081378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sgt.</td>
<td>Alf G. Amesen</td>
<td>20285570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sgt.</td>
<td>Kenneth R. Johnson</td>
<td>37271917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sgt.</td>
<td>Edward E. Kjelness</td>
<td>39230883</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T/4th</td>
<td>Sigurd T. Gilbertson</td>
<td>32109847</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T/4th</td>
<td>Einar Kristiansen</td>
<td>13143869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T/4th</td>
<td>Curtis Olson</td>
<td>17011137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cpl.</td>
<td>Sigurd M. Baro</td>
<td>32424096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cpl.</td>
<td>Trygve Berge</td>
<td>39031393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cpl.</td>
<td>John I. Halvorsen</td>
<td>32172154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cpl.</td>
<td>Kai O.C. Johansen</td>
<td>32624833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cpl.</td>
<td>Karl Larsen</td>
<td>31157147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cpl.</td>
<td>Lars Motland</td>
<td>32312707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cpl.</td>
<td>Erling Olsen</td>
<td>32597128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cpl.</td>
<td>Olav S. Reinholdtsen</td>
<td>32423629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cpl.</td>
<td>John Sunde</td>
<td>32497497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T/5th</td>
<td>Marinus D. Myrland</td>
<td>32708477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T/5th</td>
<td>Johannes S. Rorvick</td>
<td>37311880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T/5th</td>
<td>Morris A. Syrstad</td>
<td>17017008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T/5th</td>
<td>Otto Twingley</td>
<td>37272189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T/5th</td>
<td>Arthur J. Westgard</td>
<td>37168513</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Their new station was known as "Area F," the ground of the Congressional Country Club, where Major W.E. Fairbairn, Major Joe Alderdyce and Captain Al Cox taught the candidates hand-to-hand combat.
Alf Paulsen, a farmer from Crosby, North Dakota, was also interviewed by the O.S.S. (He was stationed in Louisiana, and was never a member of the 99th Infantry Battalion.) He was proficient in Norwegian. Paulsen was asked by his interviewers if he was a volunteer for hazardous duty. Paulsen said that the whole U.S. Army was hazardous duty. He was put down as a volunteer and sent directly to the Congressional Country Club for commando training by the O.S.S.. Paulsen had never seen a country club and he was curious about how the elite lived. "Some country club!"

Tents were pitched around the clubhouse. The fairways of the golf course provided an excellent commando training course. The thickets on the sides were more dense than many jungles. It was difficult to sneak up on opponents without being detected: booby traps were everywhere. Major Fairbairn trained the men in the art of the underworld Oriental warfare.

Cadres of young officers were recruited from Fort Benning, Georgia, with the aid of General Donovan, head of the O.S.S.. Parachuting was a key to the success of O.S.S. operations: the officers, in turn, were to train others. When the Norwegian detachment arrived, W.E. Fairbairn, Joe Alderdice, Al Cox, and Major Serge Obolensky took them smartly in hand. They took them out at seven in the morning and
they did not return until midnight. A small Marine raider unit acted as the Germans. The Norwegian Operational Group (O.S.S. NORSO Group) then trained at Area "B" (now Camp David), and then went to Martha's Vineyard to make an amphibious assault on a "secret" radar installation.

Esprit de Corps Too High

Detachments of Greeks, French, and Italians also arrived in late 1943 to undergo commando training. All were quite good, but the groups became too homogeneous. Joint operations began: the Italian-Norwegian effort was highly-successful because it was well-coordinated. French officers, older than the men, relentlessly led the field operations. This would provide rich dividends for the O.S.S. in France in 1944, as there was no imminent mission to jump into Norway.

The esprit de corps became too high for these ethnic detachments: by then they were honed in their skills and they knew it. The men worked hard and played hard. On liberty, they would get into fights with the Military Police (M.P.s). At least half of the men ended their liberties in the stockade. The officers had to "sign for them on a hand receipt." Then the men were thrown into early-morning field exercises, as if nothing had happened the night before.

One time the M.P.s conducted tank operations near the O.S.S. training area and that was a serious mistake made by
the M.P.s, for the men of the O.S.S. had no love for them. Hidden and undetected, the men suddenly pounced upon the M.P.s and gave them the business until Serge Obolensky intervened.

Martha's Vineyard

In late 1943, the O.S.S. NORSO Group "invaded" Martha's Vineyard for an exercise in amphibious training. The object was to penetrate a highly-secured radar station, "chalk" targets, then disappear into the night, undetected. That station was guarded by Marines who knew the "assault" was coming, but did not know when. The exercise provided everybody with an excellent field problem.

The men were transported by submarine and came ashore in rubber rafts to Gay Head on the western side of Martha's Vineyard. Once beached, the men proceeded to the radar station. They found that the installation had a high electrical fence surrounding it; something the O.S.S. did not brief the assault group about. The men began to ponder.

The installation had only one entrance through which, as the men observed, truck traffic moved in and cut, using special headlight signals to gain entrance. Tom Sather thought that by this means, the NORSO Group could also get inside. This would involve hijacking the trucks farther up the main road, out of vision of the installation, and then driving in like everybody else did.
Soon a truck came along. The NORSO Group attacked the driver and passengers and unceremoniously tied them up, leaving them behind in the thickets. They convoyed to the gate of the radar installation, were given permission to enter, they quietly "chalked" their targets, and drove out. Mission completed: the NORSO Group "passed the course," then left for Fort Hamilton in Brooklyn, New York.

More Training—More Rowdy—in Great Britain

Eighty-four men and twelve officers sailed to Wales in December, 1943 where the O.S.S. NORSO Group was to continue its training. They landed at Swansea and they took the train to a place named after Lord Lovat for further commando training, this time conducted by the British. After Northland Lodge near Inverness, Scotland, the group left for Stonelairig Castle near Loch Ness in Scotland for six months of ski and demolitions training; then to Weeden, England in Brock Hall, then to Ringway near Northhampton for parachute training.

The training was hard and monotonous. That, however, did not distract the Norwegians from partying:

. . . those Norwegians are different from everybody else, especially those merchant marines. In the evening they went out to have fun, they got arrested, boy—they got them worked so tired, you wouldn't think they'd have enough pep to go on, but that didn't stop them . . . the fights with other outfits . . . that's the Viking blood in them. 42

Karl Hoffman said half the boys were in the stockade every Monday: "Pappy" Boyington's outfit "could not even
serve an apprenticeship in ours." Clifford Kyllo observed "We didn't salute General Donovan, so why should we salute a goddam second lieutenant?" Kyllo said the O.S.S. NORSO Group had a "secret telephone number" to call in order to get out of trouble and avoid court martials.

The "Practice" Jumps into France

The NORSO Group dropped into occupied France after "D" Day, behind German lines, rendezvoused with the French underground "and then waited for General George S. Patton to catch up with them."

One such action was Operation LINDSEY. James C. Larson's citation to accompany his Bronze Star read as follows:

Captain James C. Larson performed meritorious service in France from August 17 through September 1944. He parachuted behind enemy lines with a small group of men and organized with the Maquis. This group took and held a hydro-electric plant and captured many German prisoners. Setting up a defense about the important installation, he then led his small band, still behind enemy lines, to harass German troop concentrations, moving columns, and other enemy formations. Operating behind the lines for thirty-four days, hiding in patriots' homes and wooded areas, Captain Larson demonstrated leadership and a fighting spirit that reflect great credit upon himself and the military service.

Operation LINDSEY involved a night parachute jump by thirteen men into the Reuyre River basin off southern France. Five casualties occurred on landing. Seventeen engagements with the enemy were made and the operation was one of constant fighting. Other O.S.S. NORSO Group members
have similar stories.

"Bones and Guts"

A Fort Benning graduate, Major William E. Colby took over command of the O.S.S. NORSO Group in late 1944. The Norwegians had been led by Lt. Col. Serge Obolensky in their drops behind enemy lines in France. He had learned his military craft in St. Petersburg's Imperial Guards and had met "Wild Bill" Donovan in New York society circles and was recruited by Donovan into the O.S.S.. Colby was Irish and Catholic and he was dubious about his new command. Colby's only link with this homogeneous group was that he was born and raised in Minnesota, surrounded by Scandinavians.

Colby was on the ski team during his high school years at Burlington, Vermont, before chairlifts were built in the surrounding hills, so he was well-acquainted with the situation he and the NORSO Group would face in the mountains in northern Norway. They were to drop in six foot snows to disrupt German troop movements along the Nordland Railway, retreating from Finland to fight again in Germany.

Colby visited Lt. Glen Farnsworth, in a hospital in England in October, 1944, to convince him to join the NORSO Group, because of his experience in demolitions. Farnsworth doubted his skiing abilities, but agreed to join the NORSO Group to give it a try. Colby moved the NORSO
Group to the Grampian Mountains in Scotland in December, 1944, with the main object of building the unit's endurance in skiing.

Farnsworth was not able to join the group until January, 1945, at Blairgowrie, Perthshire. He was met by Lt. William Lee Coulehan and his GM6x6 baggage detail. Welcoming toasts to each other at the Angus Hotel was first on the agenda. (The Scots were amazed at the huge consumption of alcohol by the "Yanks" in their midst.)

Farnsworth was amazed at Colby's stamina while skiing: Colby was five-foot, eight inches, and was 130 pounds of "screaming dynamite." "How can that little . . . take it?" (Colby was then dubbed with the nickname "Bones and Guts"). John W.C. Manners, who stood five feet five and one-half inches tall, was issued ski poles meant for a six-foot, two inch-tall person. This slowed him down and he had to catch up with the others when they took breaks. Once he did catch up with the others, the break was over and they skied away. The snow was wet and it was difficult to maintain balance. The men prepared hard, for they knew they would join other operating groups to conduct sabotage carefully orchestrated by the Allied High Command.

The Staff from London

In early February, 1945, the O.S.S. Staff from London paid a visit to the O.S.S. NORSO Group in Scotland. They
told Colby and his men that the drop into North Tröndelag was on, and to prepare for it. The new moon was approaching and made a night drop possible. This meant rosters had to be made up and loads of equipment, weapons, and supplies identified. The men were given liberty in Dundee and Perth, where they had their last chance to imbibe a quart or two of spirits for what was to become quite a while before they could do so again.

Not everyone was going to Norway this time: only the best skiers. The others would follow when spring in Norway would not require skiing to get around. Farnsworth still was an inexperienced skier, and he knew it: he wanted his name scratched from the roster. The others pleaded for him to go, because his demolition expertise was needed. He finally agreed to be placed on the roster again.

Other Norwegian Operating Groups in Norway

The "bang and boom" sabotage raids on Norwegian railroads were not new to Norway. Between 1941 and 1942, saboteurs, refugees from Norway trained in Great Britain, quietly entered Norway to begin their operations. The groups were stationed between Grong and Mo i Rana and had code names of ARCHER and HERON. FALCON arrived in January and February, 1944.

Between October 1, 1943 and March, 1944, Special Forces Headquarters (SFHQ) sent more groups to Norway to wreak more havoc on the railways, this time, on the lines
between Trondheim and Oslo. Their code names were GREBE, LAPWING, and WOODPECKER. These groups consisted of from three to six men each and were closely controlled by F.O. IV of the Norwegian High Command-in-exile in London through its station in Stockholm in neutral Sweden. Communications by radio, direct to London, or by relays to or from other groups, were made; however, the messages had to be brief for fear that German direction finding (DF) equipment might pinpoint the locations of these operating groups. The quality of reception varied with the atmospheric conditions of the day or night. For detailed reports, the groups depended on couriers from Stockholm.

Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) in London closely coordinated these groups, to the chagrin of MILORG, who wanted more "coup de main" sabotages, while SHAEF wanted only selective operations and to preserve assets necessary to reestablish the Norwegian economy after its liberation.

Between December 9, 1944 and April 29, 1945, other Norwegian operating groups were placed in Norway by SHAEF. They were: WOODPECKER, LAPWING, GREBE, FIELDFARE, and WOODLARK, FREETHORP, LARK, CRAMLINGTON, WAXWING, and COTON. Their missions were to slow the retreat of 150,000 of Germany's best troops to the beleaguered fatherland. Operation CONCRETE MIXER, run by MILORG, concentrated on both sides of the Oslo harbor, to disrupt German
transportation there. CONCRETE MIXER had 1500 participants.

The highly-trained O.S.S. NORSO Group jumped into France after "D" Day when there was no imminent mission for Norway. Augmented by French-speaking personnel, NORSO cadres rallied the Free French of the Interior (F.F.I.) to disrupt retreating German troop movements there. Its mission done, the O.S.S. NORSO Group returned to Scotland to undergo vigorous ski training for the pending Norwegian operation. In early February, 1945, the O.S.S. Staff from London told the O.S.S. NORSO Group that the drop into North Tröndelag in Norway was on, and to prepare for it.
ENDNOTES

1
New Orleans Times-Picayune, August 24, 1969. The Roto Section carried a fine article on Leif Öistad. Copy of clipping donated to author by Leif Öistad, 1312 Orange Avenue, Nederland, Texas.

2
Interview by telephone, Leif Öistad, 1312 Orange Avenue, Nederland, Texas.

3
Interview with Tom Sather, O.S.S. NORSO Reunion, Sheraton Park West Hotel, El Paso, Texas, February 3-6, 1989.

4
Interview with Harold Nipe, O.S.S. NORSO Reunion, Sheraton Park West Hotel, El Paso, Texas, February 3-6, 1989.

5
Gerd Nyquist, Bataljon 99 (Oslo: H. Aschehoug & Co. (W. Nygaard), 1981), pp. 75-76. Hereafter referred to as Nyquist, Bataljon 99. The book is in the process of being translated from Norwegian to English; however, the publisher has restricted its distribution to 99th alumni only, according to Morten A. Tuftedal. Leif Eide's main qualification to join the 99th was his ability to ski. "Jeg snakket litt norsk, menjeg har problemer med Oslo-dialekten" (I spoke a little Norwegian, but I had problems with the Oslo dialect).

6
See 4: Öistad said that Hoffman always led the way while skiing.

7

8
Ibid.
9  Ibid.

10  Aftenposten, Oslo, October 10, 1981. Copy of clipping donated to author by Leif Öistad, 1312 Orange Avenue, Nederland, Texas.

11  Minneapolis Tribune, October 11, 1975. Copy of clipping donated to author by Leif Öistad, 1312 Orange Avenue, Nederland, Texas.

12  New Orleans Times-Picayune, August 24, 1969. Copy of clipping donated to author by Leif Öistad, 1312 Orange Avenue, Nederland, Texas.

13  Nyquist, Bataljon 99, p. 15.

14  The Viking, Camp Hale, Colorado. Copy of clipping donated to author by Leif Öistad, 1312 Orange Avenue, Nederland, Texas.

15  Ibid.

16  Nyquist, Bataljon 99, p. 74.

17  Oakland Tribune, April 3, 1978. Copy of clipping donated to author by Leif Öistad, 1312 Orange Avenue, Nederland, Texas.

18  San Francisco Sunday Examiner & Chronicle, April 1, 1978. Copy of clipping donated to author by Leif Öistad, 1312 Orange Avenue, Nederland, Texas.

19  Interview with Morten A. Tuftedal, O.S.S. NORSO Group Reunion, Sheraton Park West Hotel, El Paso, Texas, February 3-6, 1989.

20  Nyquist, Bataljon 99, p. 74.

21  Interview with Alf Paulsen, Westside Community Center, 108th and Grover, Omaha, Nebraska, March 1, 1989.
22
Nyquist, Bataljon 99, p. 75.

23
Ibid.

24

25
RYPE: Norwegian Special Operations Group, October 10, 11, 12, 1975," Manuscript of Memorabilia compiled by Adolph and Dee Hogfoss, p. 22. Hereafter referred to as: Hogfoss, "NORSO Memorabilia." The 99th Infantry Battalion distinguished itself in France, Belgium, and Germany, June 1944-May 1945. The 99th was trained for armed conflict in Norway, but it never got there in time. For a full account, see Gerd Nyquist, Bataljon 99 (Oslo: H. Aschehoug & Co. (W. Nygaard), 1981). For those who can read Norwegian, the book can be ordered through the Sons of Norway in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Also: (p. 13) Major H.P. Larson was the first O.S.S. NORSO Group Commander.

26
Interview with Alf Paulsen, Westside Community Center, 108th and Grover, Omaha, Nebraska, March 1, 1989.

27
Serge Obolensky, One Man in His Time (New York: McDowell, Obolensky, 1961), p. 348. Obolensky was a colorful character of Russian aristocracy and who commanded the O.S.S. NORSO Group when it was dropped behind enemy lines in France in 1944 to disrupt German troop movements. Hereafter referred to as: Obolensky, One Man. Also see: Aaron Banks, From O.S.S. to Green Berets (Novotny, California: Presidio Press, 1986). The author went into greater detail on O.S.S. training, e.g. capturing a three-story building, a railroad curve as the best to destroy (harder to replace) and how to commandeer and drive a train.

28
Ibid. One learned how to keep bound prisoners without putting a guard on them. One seats them straddling the bases of small trees so that they cannot get up unless lifted off by two people.
Ibid., p. 349. It was rough training. Two more groups of Norwegians came in, recruited from ski battalions in California.

Hogfoss, "NORSO Memorabilia," p. 22. Area "B" was an excellent place for demolitions training (the "bang and boom" operations.)

Obolensky, One Man, pp. 348-349.

Ibid., p. 350.

Ibid.

Nyquist, Bataljon 99, p. 76. Leif Eide's account.

Hogfoss, "NORSO Memorabilia," p. 5.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid. Adolph Hogfoss observed that the Marines were very angry about being left behind in the thickets. For all he knows, they might still be there. Also: Obolensky, One Man, pp. 350-351. The authorities at the installation panicked. Sirens blew, searchlights were turned on, and telephone calls were made to Washington.

Hogfoss, "NORSO Memorabilia," p. 22.


Hogfoss, "NORSO Memorabilia," p. 22.

43 The Daily Review, (Hayward, California), April 3, 1978. Also: Minneapolis Tribune, October 11, 1975. Also: Oakland Tribune, April 3, 1978. Note: "Pappy" Boyington was a Marine fighter pilot who became an ace in World War II in the Pacific. His "Black Sheep Squadron" served with distinction even though it got the "undisciplinable pilots": the Navy saw to that! Note: the "secret telephone number" was that to commanding officers, who had the responsibility to look after their men. They want to keep their men productive, not in the stockade. Copies of clippings donated to author by Leif Öistad, 1312 Orange Avenue, Nederland, Texas.

44 The Daily Review, (Hayward, California), April 3, 1978. Also: Interview by telephone with Leif Öistad, 1312 Orange Avenue, Nederland, Texas, June 28, 1989. Öistad said that Patton was not a fan of the O.S.S.. Patton claimed that the O.S.S. did not shorten the war by even one minute. Öistad argues that the teams fed Patton intelligence on German locations and Patton used this knowledge well. Copy of clipping donated to author by Leif Öistad, 1312 Orange Avenue, Nederland, Texas.


46 Letter to Bruce H. Heimark, from E. Carlmark Larson, Georgetown, June 12, 1989. James C. Larson died two weeks before the O.S.S. NORSO Reunion in El Paso, Texas in February, 1989. Mrs. Larson was going through her husband's debriefing papers from Lindsey and kindly offered to share this information with me. I thought the timing was right, not only to typify the French operations, but also to pay tribute to a fallen comrade so loved by the O.S.S. NORSO Group.

47 Colby, Honorable Men, pp. 44-45. Also see letter to Bruce H. Heimark from Adolph Hogfoss, 703 NE Hostmark #87, Poulsbo, Washington, January 2, 1990. NORSO could not recruit additional personnel from the 99th, non-Norwegians "infiltrated" the ethnicity of NORSO to keep it up to strength.

48 Ibid.
Hogfoss, "NORSO Memorabilia," p. 26. Farnsworth's wife provided his unfinished writings on Operation RYPE. Farnsworth died before the thirty-year reunion in Minneapolis in 1975. Our thanks to Viola Farnsworth for sharing his words with us.

Ibid

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 3.


Ibid.

Nyquist, Bataljon 99, pp. 164-165.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid. WOODLARK blew up the bridge at Jorstad on January 13, 1945. FIELDFARE blew up the bridge at Rauma on January 5, 1945. Traffic on the railroads was stopped for three weeks.
Declassifying the O.S.S. Papers in 1975, prompted by the Freedom of Information Act, was the responsibility of Kermit Roosevelt of the O.S.S.. Five percent of the information escaped declassification: most instances involved the deletion of names.

This chapter describes the planning of the RYPE mission in a shroud of secrecy. The reader is forewarned that Norwegians used "dekkenavn" (a code name) for fear that if their true names were made known to German agents, Gestapo reprisals on relatives in Norway followed. Allied intelligence staffs used "office symbols" (e.g. "C" in truth, Stewart Menzies) (the symbols themselves classified to some degree) to identify people and their roles. The notion was that if the enemy intercepted correspondence, the subject was compromised, but its participants were not.

The author apologizes to readers if the "clutter of alphabet soup" distracts them from the topic of this chapter. It is the only unclassified information available on planning the RYPE mission.
SHAESF's Directive to SFHQ in July, 1944 for Norway

The Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAESF) sent a directive to Special Forces Headquarters (SFHQ) in July, 1944 to develop plans for selective sabotage in Norway. The Russian Army was attacking units of the German Army Group and was driving them back west across the northern Dvina River. The liberation of northern Norway was near. SFHQ was to prepare for a counter-scorch effort to preserve Norwegian installations. SFHQ was also told to plan to sabotage Norwegian transportation networks to delay German troop movement southward.

SFHQ planned the requested sabotage operations, but had no authorization to implement them until October, 1944. The Finnish Government concluded an armistice with Russia in September, 1944, by which time the German Wehrmacht was everywhere in retreat. The German High Command brought back 200,000 German troops to the northernmost part of Finland to protect the Finnish nickel mines Germany so desperately needed to continue its warmaking efforts. Fresh Russian troops arrived in the Kola Peninsula from Siberia. General Lothar Rendulic, Commander in Chief of the German 20th Mountain Army had his units retreat to Kirkenes in Norway and to Pechenga, across the border in the Soviet Union, to dig in. Hitler intervened: he ordered that Rendulic destroy every
building, hut, and any equipment in Norway's northern province of Finnmark. Stores of food and livestock were to be removed. If the livestock could not be removed, they were to be slaughtered. Josef Terboven, the German Reichskommisar of Norway, ordered the evacuation of the civilian population en masse to areas where the Wehrmacht could protect it. The Norwegian Quisling Police Chief Jonas Lie, accompanied by the Norwegian Nazi organization of Hird, rushed to Finnmark in northern Norway. Lie believed that the Russians would rape and pillage the area: Norway must not fall to the invading Russian forces. On November 1, 1944, the German 20th Mountain Division began its retreat. Special army demolition squads, assisted by the Hird, burned and levelled Hammerfest on November 3 and 4, 1944. The Russians would find nothing but scorched earth. The civilian population had departed either on fishing boats or by following the retreating Wehrmacht south on Riksvei 50, the only main road in northern Norway.

In the meantime, the Russian IC Assault Corps led four divisions of artillery, air, and armour on October 7, 1944, in levelling the town of Kirkenes. On October 14th, the Russians, after reaching the Tana River, sixty-five miles northwest of Kirkenes, stopped to dig in for the cold winter.

SHAEF closely monitored the situation in northern Norway. Heretofore it had held back action to avoid German
reprisals against Norwegians and the useless waste of lives. By December, 1944, the Allied advance on the Western Front slowed to a halt. SHAEF requested that SFHQ undertake the strongest delaying action possible against German troops in Norway so as to prevent or retard their travel south to reinforce German defenses. SHAEF also authorized extensive railroad damage west of the Rhine.

Reconnaissance for Potential Attacks Against Norwegian Railroads, Tunnels, and Bridges

During the period October 6-17, 1944, Gunnar Steen and Alf Bromstad arrived in Norway to reconnoiter the railroad from north of Grong to Snaasa in the North Tröndelag District. Steen, who had lived in Namdalen and Bromstad, had been a fireman on the railroad between Trondheim and Grong. Steen and Bromstad recommended that Grana Bridge would be an excellent target because its destruction would cause a longer delay in enemy troop movements and a more significant derailing to repair. Tommeraas Tunnel and Maalasaeter were situated in lonely places and the same was true with the tunnels north and south of Snaasa.

Steen and Bromstad travelled on October 7 by bicycle, by foot after the bicycles broke down, and then by train and by bus to meet their contact, Per Strand, in Goundalen. Steen and Bromstad rang Strand's doorbell, but nobody
answered. Both were soaked by the steady rain. They returned to the railway station, where posing as lumberjacks, they told the stationmaster they were on their way to Nordli and asked him if he would permit them to sleep in the waiting room, and he gave his permission.

When a three-man German patrol entered the waiting room, Steen and Bromstad did nothing. The patrol departed shortly afterwards.

When Steen and Bromstad woke up the next morning, the stationmaster told them that there was no transportation to Nordli that day. Steen was successful in meeting the contact, Per Strand, who gave them a car and a chauffeur, who had with him a sick boy and his sister who were to go to the hospital in Namsos. This provided excellent cover for Steen and Bromstad. Strand also provided Steen and Bromstad information concerning the district, current passes, and ration cards.

On October 9, 1944, Steen and Bromstad did a reconnaissance of one bridge and two tunnels north of Bunes Bridge. About 200 meters north of Bunes Bridge was another bridge approximately 150 meters long, with four spans, and pillars of iron construction. About 150 meters north of this bridge were two short tunnels, one after the other. The one farthest north was the largest, about seventy to eighty meters long. The terrain was very steep on both sides of the track.
On October 10th, Steen and Bromstad reconnoitered the railroad points between Lurudal and Formofoss. About two kilometers south from Formofoss was a stone bridge about twenty-two meters long and twelve meters high. Fifty meters to the south was a tunnel 120 steps long. They concluded that it was an excellent place for an attack for both approach and for retreat because of the terrain. They then traveled seven kilometers south from the Hurmofoss Station to a farm where there was a tunnel about 472 steps long. The railroad tunnel curved making it an excellent target because saboteurs could approach and escape undetected. Steen and Bromstad returned to Formofoss Station, 500 meters to the south, where there was a one-span bridge over the Sandda River, fifty meters long, twelve meters high. They travelled to the Grong Station late in the afternoon to see, 450 meters to the southwest, the roundhouse from which four tracks led to a turntable (swing platform).

On October 11th, Steen and Bromstad did reconnaissance of the Tommeraas Tunnel and Bunes Bridge. The bridge was of steel construction and rested on five pillars. One German guarded the bridge. Tommeraas Tunnel was 3,000 meters long located between Grong Station and the Bunes Bridge. They returned to Formofoss, then drove to about three kilometers south to the Snaasa Station, near which, as it was quite late, they slept in a summer barn.
On October 12th, they travelled to the railroad bridge over the Grana, four kilometers south from Snaasa Station. The bridge was 100 meters long, twenty meters high, and included seven spans resting on pillars of steel. A German installation was located on the east side of the bridge. Barbed wire surrounded the bridge and a German patrolled its approaches.

Steen and Bromstad walked 400 meters north of Snaasa to examine a tunnel 350 meters long. Hilly and steep terrain rose on the southeast side of the tracks. On the northwest side the ground was level with woods and big moors. They then walked down the west side of the Snaasa Lake and stayed overnight in a barn.

On October 13th, Steen and Bromstad went to their contact in Goundalen. Per Strand hosted them until October 17th. On October 18th, Steen and Bromstad vanished into the mountains to their safe area. The details they gathered were couriered by ski to MILORG in Stockholm in Sweden, then flown to SFHQ in London.

Requirements for Air Drops-Scandinavia

In a memorandum dated October 18, 1944, Commander Lester Armour, USNR (United States Naval Reserve). O.S.S.E.T.O. (Office of Strategic Services, European Theater of Operations) requested that Major General F. Anderson of the American Transportation Command increase the fleet of B-24 Liberators for Colonel Bernt Balchen's
Detachment stationed in Leuchars Air Base in Scotland. The memorandum requested an increase of four aircraft to bring the inventory to ten.

Armour pointed out that Balchen's aircraft were used exclusively for operations over Norway. Between July 17, 1944 and September 28, 1944, sixty-three sorties were attempted and thirty-three were successful, which resulted in an aggregate of fifty-two tons of material dropped to twenty-seven organizations. Approximately sixty percent of these flights were made during the daylight or non-moon periods. The British Air Ministry restricted the R.A.F. (Royal Air Force) from flying during the daylight or non-moon periods. British Sterling aircraft could not fly above sixty-two degrees north latitude in the Trondheim area due to range limitations, whereas the American Liberator could.

The O.S.S. was planning to undertake 100 successful sorties from this date until December 31, 1944, as the O.S.S. presumed that there would be no change in the internal situation in Norway. Should a general uprising take place in Norway, O.S.S. anticipated a need for 2,400 successful sorties to supply the Special Forces Groups, Norwegian Military Organizations there, as well as the civilian population. This would mean that more Liberators would be needed, and the O.S.S. would need and welcome support from the 492nd Group.
There were twenty-seven S.O.E. (Special Operations Executive) (British) and S.O. (Special Operations) (American) personnel in the field in Norway. Eleven were operating above sixty-two degrees north latitude. Fifty-nine separate requests from the field organizations were waiting to be filled by air.

Transmittal of Appreciation

On January 1, 1945, Major H.P. Larson of Force 134, S.F. Det. (Special Forces Detachment) located at the Riccarton House in Currie, Midlothian, Scotland, submitted a list of railroads, bridges, and tunnels north of Trondheim as potential targets for sabotage to Lieutenant Commander G. Unger Vetlesen, USNR (United States Naval Reserve), Chief, Scandinavian Section, S.O. (Special Operations) in London. Larson told Vetlesen that an O.S.S. successful operation in this area would please SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces) because it would force the Germans to use the sea routes in their evacuation from north to south. There was only one railway out of Trondheim that ran as far north as Nevernes. The roads in that area were in poor condition in winter so that movement of troops, supplies, and equipment, in the absence of rail communications, would be difficult. If the railway were cut between Mosjøen and Mo, the Germans would have to make a longer sea haul from the port of Narvik, north of Mosjøen and Mo. By cutting the railway between Trondheim
and Mosjøen and south of Grong, the Germans would have to come to Trondheim by sea, well within range of the British Royal Navy and the Coastal Command.

Larson understood that because the area was in close proximity to Sweden, a neutral country, Sweden could provide field operations an excellent escape route. The area was within range of American aircraft for dropping personnel and resupplying them. The terrain was harsh and especially so in winter, a feature that would be more of an advantage than a hindrance to the party undertaking the operation. Larson included an appendix of vulnerable railway sites between Ågle and Formofoss.

**Use of Parachute Troops**

In a letter dated January 15, 1945, Major J.E. Nordlie briefed General Hanstoen of the Norwegian High Command in London about the proposed use of parachute troops to hinder the enemy's overland evacuation of troops from northern Norway. A troop would be placed in Norway to destroy the railroad between Grong and Majavatn. The troop was to be released in the course of two moon periods. The leader, a party of ten and one radio operator would be sent in the January period, the remainder of the troop, twenty-four men, would come in the February period. The tasks for the first party were to establish communications with the United Kingdom, reconnoiter a base for the full troop, identify an area to receive the second party, and
reconnoiter and lay plans for sabotage against the railroad. When the full troop was assembled, the attack was to be undertaken with the goal of making at least one large break on the road and railway that would halt traffic for the longest time.

The troop was to remain in the operational area for as long as possible in order to retard railway repair work and bring about new breaks. The troop's base would be resupplied insofar as possible from Sweden, the biggest supply problem being food.

**WOODLARK and the Advance Party for RYPE**

On January 30, 1945, Lieutenant Hans H. Skabo, Section Chief, O.S.S. NORSO Operation, sent a memorandum to VAUDEVILLE (in truth, Lt. Cmdr. G. Unger Vetlesen, USNR) in Stockholm, Sweden about the great haste in laying out Operation RYPE. SHAEF was contacted about O.S.S. plans. SHAEF not only endorsed them, it urged VAUDEVILLE to do everything possible to get the operation through.

Skabo knew that WOODLARK had a mission to perform in the same area as that selected for the American O.G.'s (Operating Group) operation. But because the WOODLARK party was small, O.S.S. believed that American O.G. augmentation by WOODLARK would provide more personnel for RYPE resulting in more damage to the railways. The Swedes had been uneasy with WOODLARK on their border, and it was not possible to expect WOODLARK to be a reception committee
for RYPE to act as its guides. The advance party for RYPE, First Lieutenant Tom Sather and Sergeants Borge Langeland and Arne Listeid, may have expected to drop blind and were waiting in Scotland for the weather to break.

On February 2, 1945, VAUDEVILLE sent a reply from Stockholm to Skabo in London about the anticipated difficulties in connection with Operation RYPE. WOODLARK, a British-sponsored operation, had been set up in Sweden without Swedish permission. Sooner or later, the Swedish authorities were bound to discover its true purpose. Its cover story was to be that it was a "weather station," when in fact, it was a "little Gibraltar" of men, supplies, and explosives meant for sabotage operations in Norway. Through a series of sabotage actions in Norway, WOODLARK emerged. Sweden was irritated by the highhanded British proceedings. Through recently completed negotiations, WOODLARK was recognized by Sweden with Swedish protection. This would be important as a precedent for establishing other bases in the future. WOODLARK would not be available to RYPE until such time as the British thought it possible to release WOODLARK from its inactivity. Until then, supplies and couriers would come directly to RYPE from Stockholm.

Norwegian Railway Operation – Top Secret Meeting

On February 2, 1945, a technical planning meeting was held at 88 Chittern Court in London. Present were: E/D
The target discussed was a segment of railway in northern Norway that contained a number of tunnels. One or more of them were to be attacked with explosives. Extensive rail cutting was also to be accomplished. A seven-span steel bridge was to be an additional objective if circumstances permitted it.

The operation was to be carried out by the O.S.S. with its personnel and stores. The Special Operations Executive had the task of advising the O.S.S. on the technical plan. They also had been asked to provide the explosives. An advance party of one officer and two enlisted men were due to leave immediately to reconnoiter the target area and report back by wireless transmission and courier through Sweden. The main party of two officers and thirty enlisted men were to leave on or about February 19th. The party had received demolition training in Scotland and would in three nights carry 3,000 pounds of explosives to the target area from the dropping ground. The type of explosives to be used was discussed at the meeting. E/D.5 strongly advocated plastic explosives as Station XII was accustomed to handling them. No one at the meeting knew whether or not a sufficient amount of that explosive was available. If enough plastic explosives were not available, Explosive "C" (cordite) would be
substituted.

Lt. Thorn, a civil engineer who had worked on the designated stretch of railway, produced drawings of typical tunnel construction in the target area. The tunnel arches were of masonry with stone drainage channels not less than 4" x 4" cross sectional area at approximately the level of the springing of the arch. These channels were open at the face of the arch.

Those present at the meeting agreed that SOE would prepare round or square section charges, complete with primers and threaded on cordev (cordite). The ends of some of the charges would be fitted with wooden farings to make it easier to insert them by means of drain rods into the drainage channels. The charges to be supplied would be in units of four or five pounds, for a total amount of 2,000 pounds for each channel. These charges would also be suitable for the alternate target, the steel bridge at Grana. The rail cutting charges would be single French rail charges to be fused by the operators with either a two-minute Bickford or by time pencil.

The office of MG/G would arrange for the release of the following stores to Station XII: 2000 pounds - plastic explosives or cordite for the main charges; 1600 pounds - plastic explosives or cordite for subsidiary charges, and 500 rail cutting charges to be modified at Stn. XII. E/D would have a dummy charge available for the operators to
study and to practice with. The operational charges would be ready for packing on February 15th. Rucksacks would be provided by the O.S.S.

Field Order No. 1

On January 19, 1945, Major William E. Colby signed Field Order No. 1, which set forth the parameters of operations for the advance party of Operation RYPE. In it, the Special Operations Branch, Scandinavian Section estimated that enemy units were passing from north Norway to south Norway along a single railway line at a rate of one battalion (500 men) per day. Enemy troops were believed to be garrisoned along the route. The towns of Namsos had 700, Grong 150, and Ekker and Formo, fewer men. Formofoss had a guarded ammunition dump. Nordli housed a patrol of twenty-three men. Agle had hutments (makeshift dwellings). Krogsgard (Snaasa) had a camp of 500 men and an ammunition dump. Mælester Tunnel had a railway guard. There were bicycle patrols twice daily along the railway line. There were also Allied troops in the target area, the WOODLARK party of eight men living at Jakghytta. They were facing some difficulty with the Swedish Government. WOODLARK had a courier service to and from Stockholm.

The advance party's mission was to reconnoiter a dropping zone for the main party that was to arrive during the next moon period to reconnoiter targets along the railway line between Formofoss and Lurudal and to remain in
hiding afterwards until the reception of the main party.

The WOODLARK party would contact the RYPE advance party at the Gauptjern Seter, a summer dairy on the prominent point of Gauptjern, one-half mile south of the dropping zone. Written reports by RYPE would be passed to WOODLARK to be taken by courier to Stockholm. They were to be addressed to VAUDEVILLE, Stockholm.

Reception of the main party was planned by the field order for February 22, 1945 or any night thereafter. The B.B.C. (British Broadcasting Corporation) message to indicate that the reception would be for that night would be: "Foxtrot i mastetopp" (Foxtrot on the top of the mast). B.B.C. times for these messages would be 1400 and 1700 GMT (Greenwich Mean Time).

The advance party was to operate in uniforms only. If captured, the men would give only their name, rank, and serial number. The Geneva Convention entitled the men to treatment as Prisoners of War. If in uniform and forced by the enemy into Sweden, the men should expect detention. They were to tell Swedish authorities that they had escaped enemy capture and they were to request internment in neutral Sweden. When the men went into Sweden to resupply, they were to wear civilian clothing obtained by WOODLARK. They were to appear unimportant.

Additional Targets for First and Second NORSO Groups

On February 3, 1945, Lt. Col. Hans H. Skabo, Section
Chief, NORSO Operations, wrote a memorandum to Lt. Col. Charles E. Brogger, Executive Officer, Special Operations Branch, in which a meeting on February 1 detailed additional targets for the First NORSO Group and the targets for the Second NORSO Group.

The following officers were present: Norwegian Army: Major Nordlie, Capt. Kristensen, Lt. Roeness; British Special Operations Executive: Major Douglas, Capt. Cochrane, Capt. Fraser-Campbell; American: Lt. Col. Skabo, Special Operations.

All agreed that the stretch of railway between Lurudal and Formofoss was the most vital and logical target for the First NORSO Group. Skabo suggested an alternate target for this group, the stretch of line north of Grong to Majavatn. Both Major Nordlie and Major Douglas pointed out that a Norwegian paratroop unit of thirty-six men had been laid on for operations on that stretch of line and they did not believe that NORSO augmentation was necessary. They said that additional targets were available south of the Agle Station.

The destruction of Grana Bridge south of Agle was the original mission of the WOODLARK party. After reconnaissance of the bridge, this group had found it too well-guarded for a small party of eight to attempt sabotage. The party had then chosen a target farther south, the bridge south of Jörstad. It had destroyed the
bridge in January, stopping rail traffic for over two weeks. By now, the Germans had completed repairs on the bridge. Meanwhile, the WOODLARK party was lying quietly on the Swedish side of the border, with no immediate operations pending.

The Grana Bridge would be an excellent target for the First NORSO Group (three officers and thirty-two enlisted men), but the terrain was very difficult: in order to get away from the target, the men would have to be excellent skiers. If, upon reconnaissance, Grana would be better guarded by German troops than what WOODLARK encountered, alternate targets to be demolished were the rail lines between Snaasa and Angle.

Major Douglas and Capt. Fraser-Campbell said that no targets were yet available south of Trondheim for the Second NORSO Group. Since they were not first-class skiers, they were ordered to continue training in Scotland. Should spring provide less snow cover and more target opportunities, the Second NORSO Group could then be used.

**Operation RYPE High Points**

On February 3, 1945, Hans H. Skabo, Section Chief of NORSO Operations, enumerated the high spots of Operation RYPE to Captain A.W. Brogger, the Acting Chief, Scandinavian Section, S.O.. Skabo stated that the advance party was to be dropped at Gauptjernet. MILORG in Stockholm was notified that the reception party should
flash "F" for Fred. The B.B.C. message to alert the reception party would be: "Kaalabiren er lekker" (the Swedish turnips are delicious). This would also apply to a non-moon drop. Skabo also told Brogger that if the advanced party could not drop during this moon period, he should assume that the next moon period would be considered.

MILORG must send an experienced Eureka operator with the two men who were to depart from Stockholm to Gauptjernet, so that a non-moon drop could be made possible. (Eureka was a ground radio transmitter used by the reception party to send direction signals to the aircraft's receiver called a Rebecca. Upon receiving the Eureka signal, the aircraft could "home in" on the reception party.)

The RYPE advance party had been told to wait at Gauptjernet until the two men from Stockholm could contact it. RYPE would not contact WOODLARK. If the advance party was forced over the border, it would surrender to Swedish authorities, as American paratroopers on the run from capture by the Germans. Skabo told Brogger that the advance party would reconnoiter a dropping zone for the main party; reconnoiter targets on the railway line between Formofoss and Lurudal; provide the reception for the main party; and remain in hiding after its reconnaissance until the reception of the main party. The advance party would report often to Headquarters in London by wireless transmitter and if possible by written report in code.
through VAUDEVILLE to London.

The advance party would have the following equipment: one container of gasoline; one container of K Rations; nine containers of British Mountain Rations (forty rations per container); one container of miscellaneous equipment for base (shotgun, axe, saw, hand grenades, lathe, etc.); two packages containing Eurekas; one package of B-2 radio set; one package gasoline generator; three packages of rucksacks; two packages of skis (three per package). The password of the reception party to the advance party would be: "Hvordan staar det til paa den andre siden av dammen?" (How is it on the other side of the pond?). The reply would be: "Vi ser lyst paa fremtiden." (We look at the future positively).

Skabo told Brogger that the main party would be comprised of two officers and thirty enlisted men. They would be dropped by B-24s in the next moon period which began February 20th. The O.S.S. and MILORG in Stockholm would give the details before the drop.

Field Order No. II

On February 12, 1945, Hans H. Skabo, Section Chief of the NORSO Group, identified in Field Order No. II the plane loadings, departure and reception procedures, resupply, and code words for Operation RYPE's main party. Special explosive containers would house: forty-10 pound drainage channel charges; 700-one pound rail charges; 100-ten pound
Cramlingon blocks (standard charges); 1500 pounds of bulk explosives and ancillaries (all special explosive containers contain plastic explosives); sixteen extra sets of skis; four extra rucksacks; one Nichols radio set; miscellaneous equipment for the base; uniforms and personnel equipment would also be included. Included within the individual escape kits was 100 Swedish Kroner. The unit kit would contain 50,000 Norwegian Kroner and 400 Swedish Kroner.

The group would emplane at Leuchars Air Base, Scotland on or after February 22nd. The group would drop to the reception with Eureka under command of Lt. Tom Sather. The signal letter for the reception and the Eureka would be "P" for Peter. Resupply would be flown on request of the RYPE commander to DZ's (drop zones) chosen by him. The reception with a Eureka would be used. The following names, letters, and B.B.C. messages would be assigned these fields when chosen:

1. AREA : B Sterk Som Gress (strong as grass)
2. MARS : C Full av Sol (full of sun)
3. JUPITER : R Mere Stillhet (more silence)
4. ZEUS : F Taus Som Telefonen (silent like the telephone)
5. DIANA : G Solem Fikk en Sonn (Solem got a son)
6. ASTARTE:  : J  Rev Bak Oiet  
              (tongue in cheek)

7. HERMES    : K  Hallomannen var Stum  
              (the radio announcer was mute)

8. MERKUR    : L  Blekkhuset Blev  
              (the inkwell remained)

9. ATHENE     : W  Monster Uten Kant  
              (monster without form)

10. VESTA     : X  Hold ilden vedlike  
               (keep the fire going)

11. HYGEA     : Y  Gaa til Legen  
               (go to the doctor)

12. JUNO      : Q  Mannen Med to Ansikter  
               (the man with two faces)

The RYPE safe arrival would be reported to Special Forces
Headquarters immediately. The phrase "From Henrik to RYPE" 
on B.B.C. would be used to prefix messages passed by
B.B.C.. The cyphers and radio would be with the advanced
party.

Rendezvous Procedures and the Difficulties in Norway

Reception committees for the B-24s commonly used as
visual aid the "C" system of (three torches, usually red,
in a row, with a white signal-flashing light set up at the
downwind end of the line). The B-24s would come in upwind
for drops. The signal lights would not come on until the
first plane was heard. Sometimes the B-24s were asked to
give an identifying signal if the reception committee
thought that there was danger of discovery by the enemy.

The containers and packages were dropped in train
over a target 400 feet absolute altitude (the altitude
above the terrain) at an indicated airspeed (IAS) of 135 miles per hour at a flap setting of one-half. Although this was near stall speed, this procedure reduced the scattering of equipment and gave the container chutes more probability of opening so the equipment would not be destroyed.

The personnel (or "Joes," as they were called—and sometimes "Josephines" or women), were dropped at 600 feet absolute altitude at 125 miles per hour at a flap setting of one-half.

Most missions were flown during the moon period so that aircrew members could visually locate their targets. An initial point (IP) was chosen by the pilot at 1500 feet absolute altitude downwind of the target. If the target was not spotted on the first pass, the B-24 would return to the IP and make the descent and run in again.

The missions of Norway would encounter primarily three large problems: (1) the terrain was mountainous and changed abruptly between the hills and valleys; (2) up and down drafts could cause an unwelcome encounter with the terrain, and (3) all of Norway could look the same because of the snowcover in the winter, making the location of targets difficult.

Northampton in England was the home base for the 492nd Bomb Group. Its main mission, called "Carpetbagger," was to drop personnel deep behind enemy lines. Its
Carpetbagger detachments, such as the ones at Leuchars and Kindloss, faced the lack of special heavy equipment for maintaining the B-24s and, as always, the shortage of adequately-trained personnel to service the B-24s.

**Drop of Norwegian Special Forces**

On 2 March, 1945, Hans H. Skabo informed RYPE that a Norwegian Group would be dropped north of the RYPE operational area. Skabo defined the conditions to govern the actions of the RYPE Group in relation to the Norwegian Group.

RYPE could communicate with this group in emergencies if urgent and could join it for such a defensive action. RYPE was not to join it in a "coup de main" sabotage operation unless SFHQ authorized it. RYPE was not authorized to join in a common action to seize and hold a populated area. Finally, recruiting of volunteers was limited to necessary guides and laborers.
ENDNOTES

1 Cave Brown, Secret Wars, pp. 311-312.

2 Petrow, The Bitter Years, p. 259.

3 Cave-Brown, Secret Wars, p. 312.

4 Ibid.

5 Petrow, The Bitter Years, pp. 259-263.

6 Ibid., pp. 260-162. Rendulic planned a last stand at Narvik.

7 Cave-Brown, Secret Wars, pp. 311-312.


The library at the University of Nebraska at Omaha is a federal depository and houses the above. In the Index Tables, the Call Number is J83D29 pt.1 v.1. See Table of Contents, p. iii: Office of Strategic Services begins on p. 307. The supporting abstracts and microfiche are in the microforms area with the following call number: J83D29. The NORSO Group microfiche Call Number is: J83D249 O.S.S. 311F-314C. Locate the fiche containing Item "311F" and go directly to the text of the document which begins on the next frame after the eye-catching "311F" frame in the body of the fiche. The viewed document may be only one page or several, and will be cited with a page number.

Subsequent endnotes will be identified as: "O.S.S. NORSO Group, 311F, p. 1." This endnote is: O.S.S. NORSO Group, 312C, pp. 1-5.


O.S.S. NORSO Group 312A, pp. 1-5.


Cave-Brown, *Secret Wars*, p. 311. For purposes of cover, Special Forces Headquarters/Stockholm, Special Operations and Special Operations Executive had to be separated. Swedish permission was needed to establish "weather stations" on Sweden's border with Norway. They were in reality, "little Gibraltars" that housed MILORG personnel, weapons and supplies to be used in operations against the enemy in Norway.


F.O. IV (Forsvarets Overkommando) was the arm of the Norwegian High Command in England which controlled MILORG (Military organization) sabotage activities against the enemy in occupied Norway during World War II. The writer suspects that this practice of "dekkenavn" still exists in modern day Norwegian defense planning: one of William E. Colby's first assignments after World War II was to visit Scandinavian intelligence officials to coordinate "stay-behind networks," i.e., caches and operatives, should Scandinavia be occupied again at a later date.


O.S.S. NORSO Group 314B, Appendix: Field Order No. 1, pp. 1-4. Also: Cave-Brown, *Secret Wars*, pp. 312-313. Three Allied supply and communications bases existed in Sweden by 1944. Also: O.S.S. NORSO Group Reunion, February 3-6, 1989, Sheraton Park North Hotel, 325 North Kansas Street, El Paso, Texas (hereafter referred to as Reunion. Tom Sather carried papers that identified him as "Ole Olsen." His father was a prominent man in Tromso, Norway and he represented the British Consulate there prior to the war. Had Tom Sather used his real name and then been captured by the enemy, German reprisals against his father would have been certain.
18

19

20

21
Parnell, Carpetbaggers, p. 28.

22
Ibid., p. 117.

23
Ibid., p. 133.

24
Ibid., p. 129.

25
O.S.S. NORSO Group 314B, Appendix to Field Order No. II, para III, X.
CHAPTER VI
DEPLOYMENT OF OPERATION RYPE: OFF TO A BAD START

INTRODUCTION

The air support for Operation RYPE got off to a very bad start. Of the eighty men trained for the mission, thirty-six were chosen to parachute into Norway. Of these, five were accidentally dropped into neutral Sweden! Ten paratroopers and fourteen airmen were killed trying to get into Norway. Due to the foul winter, resupply and reinforcement by air were unsuccessful: this eliminated, as the RYPE mission’s primary target for destruction, the formidable railroad bridge over the Grana River.

The Aborted Drop of the Advanced Party

In January, 1945, the advanced Operation RYPE party traveled by air from Scotland to the target area. On board were: Lieutenant Tom Sather, Technical Sergeant Borge Langeland, Staff Sergeant Arne Listeid, and a Norwegian liaison officer with the code name (dekkenavn) Hoel (Lieutenant Herbert Helgesen from Trondheim). The B-24 Liberator arrived over Trondheim and so did the weather. The blowing snow obscured the drop zone at Gauptjernet and the reception party could not see the aircraft. Sather decided not to drop: the weather was not getting better
and the fuel reserve on the Liberator was low. The B-24 returned to Scotland and landed with only fuel fumes left. Everything that was not a part of the aircraft had been jettisoned to conserve fuel on the way back.

The advance party was fortunate it did not drop. The Norwegian-in-exile newspapers had reported heavy German troop activity in the target area. This was the first of many "leaks" to the public that William E. Colby was to experience during his career in intelligence: the Germans must have been aware of Operation RYPE. A large German ski party was dispatched from Steinkjaer to Gauptjernet that night. Lieutenant Harold Larsen of the Norwegian underground had observed the patrol. Because he was a superb skier, he quickly distanced himself from the group and arrived at Gauptjernet in time to warn the reception party to disperse and disappear.

**A Close Call for the Reception Committee**

Kjell Sørlie was a member of MILORG Military Forsvarets Overkommando Fire (F.O.IV) Organization in occupied Norway controlled by FOIV of the Norwegian High Command in London) and a resident in North Tröndelag. He had acted as a military courier for MILORG's Stockholm office for over six months. He would depart Stockholm by rail, go as far as the train could take him toward the Norwegian frontier, then ski the rest of the way to MILORG contacts in Norway. In the process, he had to avoid both
Swedish and German ski patrols.

His brother, Odd, was Chief of MILORG for Tröndelag and had asked Kjell to receive Operation RYPE on the Gauptjernet mountain. He was twenty-one years old, adventurous, and said yes, but he wanted Erik Gaundal, another MILORG courier, to join him in the reception of RYPE. Odd consented, and he and Gaundal proceeded to North Tröndelag in December, 1944, to make contact with Hans Leirmo there. Gaundal and Sörlie were equipped with American items: white overclothes, two Colt 7.65 pistols and one radio receiver. The phrase: "Kaalrabien er lekker" ("The turnips are delicious") was to be broadcast by the B.B.C.'s Norwegian News: it would mean to Sörlie and Gaundal to expect RYPE the night of the broadcast.

Leirmo was keeping a close watch on German ski patrol activity. He overheard talk in Steinkjaer that a group of twenty Germans were to inspect Gauptjernet that night and that was where Gaundal and Sörlie were bivouacked. Leirmo got on his skis, outdistanced the German patrol, and warned Gaundal and Sörlie to leave Gauptjernet and ski to Sweden for safe haven.

Once in Sweden, Kjell Sörlie headed for the nearest telephone to call his brother, Odd, in Stockholm. Fortunately, Odd Sörlie answered. Kjell warned: "Do not send those turnips—they are not delicious." Odd Sörlie then called his contact in the American Embassy. RYPE was
stopped. Kjell Sørlie suggested that frozen Jaevsjo (a lake) be the reception location for RYPE; it had snow on it to provide a soft landing by parachute.

**The Drop on Jaevsjo (a lake)**

Five Norwegian skiers clad in battle clothing, wearing white parkas, were the reception committee for Operation RYPE. They had been smuggled in from Stockholm to perform the reception on March 24, 1945. The four woodpiles in an upside-down "L" configuration were ready to be torched so that the lumbering B-24 Liberators could see the drop point on the northeast side of Jaevsjo. One man was stationed at the short end of the inverted "L" with a flashlight, ready to give the correct identification signal to the plane. The radio operator was also ready to transmit his identification signal. They all waited in great anticipation, as this was to be the first reception of American forces in Norway. They thought hopefully that the liberation of Norway from German occupation was near. The reception committee had beforehand scouted for German patrols and found none. All was in readiness.

Hans Leirmo sighted a black spot to the south in the sky over the mountains. As it grew larger, the reception committee heard the drone of a four-engine bomber. As Leirmo lit the woodpiles and transmitted signals, the midnight rendezvous was on. Suddenly the lead aircraft veered from its course, indicating that it had found the
drop zone. Out of nine aircraft scheduled to come, only four came. They followed a circular orbit, then rolled out at 600 feet absolute altitude on a northerly course to the drop zone. They would repeat this procedure to drop equipment after the men were on the lake.

Lt. Tom Sather had injured four vertebræ in his back on a previous parachute jump, but did not tell anybody, for fear that he would miss the drop in his beloved Norway. Fortunately for him, there was snow covering the hard-frozen lake that cushioned his landing. He carried forged papers identifying himself as "Ole Olsen." If he carried his correct identity and if a German patrol were to capture him, the Gestapo would take reprisals on his family in Tromso. His father was prominent there and had represented the British Consulate there prior to the war.

Flying to Norway inside the Liberator was drafty with a temperature of fifty degrees below zero. The men put on face masks prior to the drop. This was to protect them from the sub-zero prop blast. The bottom hatch was removed. Static lines were checked by the jumpmaster. Without these attached to the aircraft, the attached parachute would not open. Four O.S.S. personnel then sat on the edge of the hatch. When the jump light came on, the jumpmaster shouted, "go." Egress from the Liberator came with a kick, all in turn: the men literally jumped on each
other's shoulders. The canopies opened thirty feet below the aircraft and provided for a very short trip to the lake.

By the time Kai Johansen hit the ground, where the temperature was twenty below, he felt like he had encountered a heat wave. Karl Hoffman (a.k.a. Matti Raivio) jumped late from his aircraft. He saw Major William E. Colby land next to one of the fires. Alf Paulsen was not far behind. Hoffman landed softly and rolled down to the snow. He stood up to collapse and gather in his canopy. He was aware that he was not near the drop zone. Hoffman then took bearings off the terrain with his button compass. He discovered he was just across the border. Three-quarters of the lake was in Sweden, one-quarter in Norway. He sped to the reception fires in the distance. He was determined not to be captured by a Swedish patrol and face internment: he wanted to be on the winning side in this war for once!

A question and answer password, agreed upon by MILORG through Stockholm for the final recognition between RYPE and the reception party, RYPE would ask: "Er fiskeriet godt her?" The answer would come from the reception party: "Ja, saerlig i vinter." Hans Leirmo of the reception party, was either too excited to see RYPE, either forgot, or exercised Scandinavian humor with his answer: "Nei, Fan! Det er daarlig fiskeriet her!" Question: "Is the fishing
good here?" Proper answer: "Yes, especially in the winter." Leirmo's answer: "No, it's no damned good." A stunned First Lieutenant Glenn Farnsworth, who was the only member of RYPE who could not speak much Norwegian, drew his pistol, then asked: "Hans?" Leirmo responded: "Me Hans." Farnsworth knew that the leader of the reception party's first name would be Hans. That password would be good enough for Farnsworth. It was daylight before all the men reached the rendezvous. The sixteen men who managed to 15 drop on the target were:

- Sverre Aanonsen
- Odd Anderson
- William E. Colby
- Einar Eliassen
- Glen Farnsworth
- Asmund Gravdal
- Karl Hoffman
- Kai Johansen
- Fred Johnanson
- Borge Langeland
- Arne Listeid
- Marinius Myrland
- Halvor Nipe
- Alf Paulsen
- Tom Sather
- Odd Stiansen

Cleanup and Establishing Radio Communications

The group had landed just before the Easter Holidays. In Norway, there are four Easter Holidays: Holy Thursday, Good Friday, Easter Sunday, and Monday. The city people would be descending upon the wilderness for holiday outings. They must not stumble into Operation RYPE. Nobody was to get any sleep on Palm Sunday. The scattered equipment dropped from the Liberators had to be retrieved
and concealed from any German spotter planes that may have been curious about the night's noisy activities. Parachutes helped conceal the base camp on shore from the planes. The radio transmitter and battery had been dropped without their parachutes opening, but were found only slightly damaged in a deep snowdrift.

Communication with England was not easy due to atmospheric conditions, yet RYPE enjoyed almost daily contact with the young girls of the Female Auxilliary Nursing Yeomanry (F.A.N.Y.), who had been too quickly trained in telegraphy and some of whom had been graduated too soon. RYPE's radio operations began on the frozen lake before being moved to a pup tent in the woods, where a fir tree housed the antenna: when a Jaevsjö farm house was acquired, radio operations moved there.

Langeland tried to establish contact with England on March 25, 1945. London heard him, but Langeland was not aware of that. On March 26th, Langeland sent the following message:

Planes Bill, Saether, Glenn, Einer arrived STOP others not reported STOP equipment badly scattered and much will be lost STOP details later STOP correct with Eureka STOP must have at least two more plane loads before attacking objective STOP conditions favorable for reception tonight.21

London replied, and Langeland heard:

We hear you STOP three planes returned, one dropped Sweden near border STOP report your condition STOP two of two six.22
RYPE consisted of only sixteen of the thirty-six men who had left Scotland, not enough to blow the Grana Bridge as planned. The three planes that returned to Scotland would try again: RYPE would just have to wait.

RYPE sent its condition report to London on March 27th. Langeland had to decode and encode messages by hand: he had no machine to do it for him:

Staying at Jaevsjo repeat Jaevsjo Farm STOP establishing dumps around lake STOP request food be sent to Swedish side of lake as arranged in Stockholm STOP many packages lost STOP drop was scattered over eight kilometers STOP send two containers Brens, one container Garand Mane rifles, one container Springfield Rifles, gasoline generator Baker Mark two radio and battery, medical kit, twelve pair skis and sleeping bags, spare clothing STOP send Sgt. Kyllo, Sgt. Ausen and Harold Andersen to operate base STOP Rpt. Kyllo, Ausen, Andersen need more men for bridge job STOP will receive other planes on northeast corner of Jaevsjo Rpt Jaevsjo Lake STOP wonderful weather STOP no alarm by Germans yet but are moving to woods to avoid vacationists until Monday STOP hope to leave for bridge then STOP send salt, pepper, and condensed milk.24

A young group of vacationers arrived at the farm during the holiday period. Lt. Hoel convinced them that there was nothing going on at the farm. The group skied away.

The radio traffic between London and RYPE was routine business and weather reports during the period March 28-29, 1945, with the exception of the message from London about the fate of PLANE LEIF in the drop over Sweden.
PLANE LEIF'S Drop into Sweden

The five men who were dropped by one of Col. Clifford Heflin's "Carpetbagger" B-24s in Sweden due to a navigational error were: Technical Sergeant Leif Oistad, Corporal Knut Andreassen, Technician Five Tom Rusdal, Technician Five Sivert Windh, and Technician Five Eddie Hovland. They arrived about 2:00 a.m. on March 25, 1945, on frozen Landosjöen (a lake) in Sweden.

The men found no reception committee. Their equipment was scattered all over the area. Because there were lights on the far side of the lake, the group concluded that they would meet the reception committee by morning. Morning came and also a man on a bicycle on the frozen lake. Sivert Windh greeted him as he approached. Windh asked him, where in Norway were they? The man chuckled and told them they were in Sweden, Norway being sixty kilometers west! Shortly thereafter, a company of Swedish ski troopers arrived to investigate the noise of a low-flying aircraft over the lake a few hours before.

The Swedes were more than curious about why American paratroopers were so deep in Sweden. Interrogation immediately began: was this drop the beginning of a large-scale invasion? The men responded with only their name, rank, and serial number. Stockholm was immediately notified: Sweden did not want to be drawn into war with the United States. Rumors spread about the bizarre
incident of the five American paratroopers being dropped in Sweden. O.S.S. Special Operations in Stockholm picked up on the rumors and knew it had to act swiftly.

In the meantime, the men went through the embarrassing ordeal of delousing done by three hefty Swedish women. After that hard scrubbing, they were given clothing and transported to Falun, thirty-five miles northwest of Stockholm, where there was a permanent internment camp. The men were given $300.00 to buy clothing. They also began receiving $5.00 per diem. The men were happy about this, but not happy about sitting out the war in Sweden. The only thing they could be thankful for was their having been captured by Swedish and not German troops.

APOLLO's Report to London

APOLLO, (true name unknown) an O.S.S. courier between London and Stockholm, sent a message from Stockholm to London on March 28, 1945, to the DS/US (author's assumption is that this was the ranking American within Special Forces Headquarters) and Lt. Col. Hans Skabo to report on the drop of Operation RYPE in Norway. In the message, APOLLO said that he had just interviewed a member of the RYPE reception committee: four planes made a successful drop on March 25, 1945, between 0130 hours and 0200 hours and the men were safe at Jaevsjö.

The RYPE party believed that it had recovered most of
its equipment but could not be sure because of the last-minute reshuffle of aircraft in Scotland. One radio was lost and that was why immediate radio contact was not made with London. One radio was slightly damaged. The RYPE party did not know that the fifth group had dropped into Sweden and been interned: it should be told because as the Germans may have been alerted by this news from Sweden, and as a consequence send patrols to nearby Norwegian areas to investigate. The reception committee was to scout the area for possible German patrols.

Colby reported that two of the planes did not have Rebeccas, a receiving direction finding radio, and may have contributed to the scattering of equipment. In addition, there was a haze up to one-hundred meters from above the terrain. Colby also requested that the men still in Scotland should be dropped as soon as possible.

VAUDEVILLE (in truth, G. Unger Vetlesen) was to return to Stockholm on March 28, 1945 after his interview of the men dropped into Sweden.

VAUDEVILLE'S Report to London

On March 28, 1945, VAUDEVILLE reported to the DS/US in London from Stockholm that the men accidentally dropped into Sweden were being interned in Falun, thirty-five miles northwest of Stockholm. VAUDEVILLE said that all the men were well, but unhappy about having to sit out the war.

Their drop took place at Landoesjöen (a lake), about
sixty-six kilometers southeast of the target. All the equipment was in Swedish hands. The Swedes did not recover the secret plans, codes and crystals intended for the operation. VAUDEVILLE recovered them and took them back to Stockholm with him. The men were to be commended for their high degree of security.

The men said that the pilot had the Eureka contact and that the signal letter "F" was received. That was when the men were ordered to jump.

The damaged radio set was sent to Stockholm for repair and had been already returned to Jaevsjö for operation by RYPE.

Unsuccessful Resupply of RYPE by Air

On March 30, 1945, RYPE received a message that four planes were coming from Scotland to it that night to resupply the operation with men and equipment. The weather did not cooperate, as clouds and snow moved into the reception area. The reception committee was frustrated to hear the Liberators overhead and not be able to see them. RYPE was not given the means to have two-way radio contact with the Liberators, but had the pilots known that their planes were directly above RYPE, they could have dropped their men and equipment. The planes loitered overhead for as long as they could, but the clouds would not lift. They were heard droning away, and the men of RYPE knew the planes were returning to Scotland: the drop
was cancelled.

Borge Langeland sent a message to London on April 2, 1945, advising Special Force Headquarters that the lake was too soft for the reception of men and equipment. Lillefjell (Little Mountain) was to be used instead. Headquarters planned to conduct dawn drops after the moon period.

William E. Colby wanted to go ahead with sabotage using the resources RYPE then possessed. On April 4, 1945, Langeland sent the following message to London:

Dawns drop agreed STOP but bridge must be blown soon to be effective STOP rumors that Germans to guard for three more weeks only as traffic from north cease STOP if remainder of party not here wish to do bridge with present group plus Norwegian friends STOP could not receive at same time STOP have found sufficient weapons and explosives STOP full report has left via Stockholm, send crystals and communication plan with Norwegian group.35

On April 4, 1945, London radioed RYPE that the Second NORSO Group would be dropped in the next moon period. RYPE was to assess its present and future needs of food and equipment. PLANE JONES and seven men were standing by for a dawn drop. The weather still did not lift. London authorized the bridge job with what RYPE had. On April 6, 1945, RYPE received word that four planes would arrive for a dawn drop on the 7th. Three planes were heard, but not seen by RYPE. Again, the cloud cover prevented a drop. RYPE reported a possible plane crash
fifteen miles west of its base. (A reindeer herder later confirmed that PLANE JONES had crashed, immediately killing everybody on board.)

**Message Relays to London from Norwegian Resistance Forces**

Communications to London from the field in Norway were not usually the best either, because of poor Norwegian locations or atmospheric disturbances. However, RYPE enjoyed almost a daily contact with England. As a result, some Norwegian Resistance messages were relayed through RYPE, as well as messages from London to other units in the field. RYPE received the following message from London on March 30, 1945:

To X-38 STOP message received STOP action taken STOP if equipment not dropped this period will send soonest via Sweden STOP greetings STOP eight of thirty.

X-38 was the Norwegian liaison officer, Lieutenant Hans Hoel, who was attached to the RYPE party. On March 31, 1945, the following message was received by RYPE:

To M-20 STOP Hope X-38 has cleared misunderstanding STOP considered useful that you take care of Swedish connections but always bear in mind you must not be caught by enemy STOP best greetings STOP nine of three one.41

M-20 was also a Norwegian Resistance operator.

**The Courier from Stockholm**

The courier from Stockholm Kjell Sørlie, a member of RYPE, was a member of the Norwegian Military Resistance Group (MILORG) who used Stockholm in neutral Sweden as his home base. He regularly departed on missions from
Stockholm by rail to the northwest as far as the train would go. Then he would ski to RYPE's camp, avoiding Swedish and German ski patrols in the process. The approaches to the mountains were desolate. Had he broken a leg in this region, there would be little chance of someone coming to his aid. The sub-zero ever-changing weather and the need to carry little food to be as mobile as possible, made this a very dangerous run indeed. The courier run was essential to the passing back and forth of detailed reports. RYPE's radio transmissions had to be brief and rapid because otherwise German signal intelligence might be able to pinpoint RYPE's location. RYPE's written reports and incoming correspondence were flown back and forth between London and Stockholm.

Progress Report from Colby to Skabo, April 1, 1945

On April 1, 1945, Major Colby reported in detail on RYPE's progress to date to Lieutenant Colonel Hans H. Skabo, Section Chief, NORSO Group, Scandinavian Section, S.O. Branch of the O.S.S. in London.

RYPE was dropped on Jaevsjo between midnight and 1:30 a.m. on March 25, 1945, by PLANES GLENN, BILL, EINAR, and TRYGVE. A ground mist and slow dispatch of equipment and personnel from the planes caused difficulties. Losses were: one container through the ice; another container came apart in the air and was scattered; three packages with four rucksacks; one radio and batteries; one
generator; one container Bren guns; one package skis; two packages of rucksacks for Colby and F. Johnson, and one package of stemming rods.

**PLANE LEIF** dropped in Sweden, but **RYPE** did not know where. In Colby's report to Skabo on April 1, he sent a copy of a Swedish newspaper provided by the MILORG courier that covered the account of the event. Colby commended those men for not breeching the security of Operation **RYPE**.

The reception committee provided a horse and a sled to the **RYPE** group to aid in gathering its equipment. Container dumps were placed in the woods, and covered with white chutes, then with snow, to avoid detection from the air. A guard was at the Jaevsjo farm house. The camp was comfortable and very well hidden. Signals were arranged with Alfred Andersen, the owner of the farm, who placed his farm at **RYPE**'s disposal.

Because the men spent most of the day cooking, **RYPE** requested that a cooking compliment be obtained. Sergeant Clifford Kyllo, Sergeant Otis Ausen, and Technician Five Harold Andersen came via Stockholm to be that compliment. Lieutenant Odd Sörlie came from Stockholm to the reception. He wanted to be retained to enable the safe passage of food and equipment through the Swedish transportation system.

Lieutenant Hoel, who dropped with **RYPE**, found friends in Thoralf Lian, Bjarne Alhus, Jens Leksvik (in truth, Jon Moan), Andreas Andersen, and Kjell Sörlie: they were hired
by RYPE to aid them in the transport of resupply items from the nearest roads on the Swedish side of the border. They had the necessary Swedish permits to move freely. Hans Leirmo of Snaasa joined the unit. All the men were familiar with the local terrain.

A guard post was on Lillefjellet (Little Mountain). From this point the probable routes of approach of German patrols were: Holden; Langlake; Seisjöen; and Sörlie.

A system of signalling was agreed upon to warn the guard at the camp, should strangers come.

Alfred Andersen, owner of the Jaevsjö Farm, and his family were evacuated from the farm and taken to Sweden for refuge. Andersen would rejoin RYPE for his hunting abilities.

On March 30, 1945, the reception committee set itself up on the northeast corner of the lake near the Swedish border. The RYPE group heard three planes, but no drop took place because of a sleet storm. If no more men and equipment would be forthcoming, RYPE would blow the Grana Bridge with its current resources. On April 1, 1945, Larsen of the WOODLARK party visited the RYPE group to give some tips on how WOODLARK had been so successful in blowing up the bridge at Jörstad in February.

Hans Leirmo reconnoitered the bridge. There were twenty German guards, three on duty, one at each end and one at the bottom. The main guardhouse was on the south
and a smaller one to the north also existed. Andreas Andersen had been an engineer on this very line a year earlier. RYPE's plan was to capture an empty train approaching from the south, and while in the target areas, drop and plant explosives, then they would climb back on the train while Andersen began to back it up slowly. Then the RYPE party would drop from the train as Andersen began to move it forward. After he could jump from the train, it would plummet into the Grana River. This procedure would provide a better escape for RYPE, as it could rapidly distance itself from the explosions and the German guards.

Colby also sent a letter with his report addressed to VAUDEVILLE. In the letter, Colby requested certain supplies to replace those lost in the drop on March 25, 1945 and also at least a two-week supply of food. The melting snows in the days to come would make travel difficult for resupply. Colby assumed that his requests could be obtained in Sweden.

Colby reported that RYPE had befriended a Lapp named Jama, who would provide one reindeer per week to supplement the party's food supply. Jama would also report on German troop movements. Colby also desired a weekly mail service from Stockholm to keep RYPE's morale high.

Colby also reported that Borge Langeland, the radio operator, kept his messages as brief as possible, and sent them as quickly as possible. He had heard interference,
which indicated that German signal intelligence was trying to pinpoint RYPE's location.

**Progress Report--Colby to Skabo--April 5, 1945**

Colby submitted a second progress report to Skabo in London couried through Stockholm. In this memorandum dated April 5, 1945, Colby reported that most of the equipment from the March 25th drop had been found with the exception of one container from PLANE TRYGVE, one each ski containers from both PLANES SATHER and BILL, and the one container scattered in midair.

Colby also reported that Lieutenant Glen Farnsworth had planned the charges to maximize the damages to the Grana Bridge. RYPE planned to blow the bridge with or without additional men. The men had moved from their tents to the Jaevsjö farm house, as it was drier there. Another fifteen Norwegian locals could be absorbed by RYPE because they had demolition training in England.

The Lierne Plan was a contingency plan that, if the German Wehrmacht were to use Norway in a last stand, extended training could be given Norwegian Resistance Forces recruited by RYPE in a desolated area (called Lierne) next to Sweden. Colby commented that the spring thaw would make the Lierne area inaccessible to German forces during the training exercises. Swedish trainees of Norwegian origin could also be moved in. However, Field Order Number Two would not permit the Lierne Plan and Colby
would want Skabo's concurrence before its implementation.

Upon destruction of the Grana Bridge, Colby planned rail sabotage to be done by small groups. He requested container drops in the next moon period closer to the targets. Jeeps should also be dropped after the spring thaw to replace skiing as a mode of transportation. He also had a special request for canned pineapple, as the locals had not enjoyed eating any for many years. Colby perceived the availability of pineapple would be a tremendous morale booster for the Norwegians.

The Second NORSO Group should be better armed than RYPE had been when it was dropped. Each man should have an M-1 Rifle, with every third rifle having a grenade launcher. Mortars and cannons should also follow in resupply.

Colby finished his report with a complaint. Rations were missing items such as cigarettes, candy, and soap. He suspected that there was theft at the assembly points for the rations, and he wanted it stopped.

Dispatch of NORSO Group on Operational Missions

The planners of Operation RYPE did not take Murphy's Law into consideration (if something can go wrong, it will): an alarmed Special Forces higher echelon staff member demanded from the Scandinavian Section a recapitulation of events, the status of the RYPE mission to date, what things did go wrong in the dispatch of the NORSO
Group, and for the Scandinavian Section to propose solutions to recover the operation. On 10 April, 1945, Lieutenant Colonel Hans H. Skabo and Lieutenant Colonel Gerhard L. Bolland provided a chronological report on the dispatch of the NORSO Operational Group to the target area for Special Forces Headquarters in London.

Out of sixteen sorties flown, only four were successful. Aircrews were not sufficiently experienced in flying in northern latitudes. Aircraft maintenance was substandard. Of thirty-five men standing by for the mission, three officers and thirteen men were at the target. Six men were killed and four were missing.

Skabo and Bolland recommended that the Army Air Force not fly the remaining personnel to Norway until suitable aircraft and personnel were made available.

It Was Time To "Do Something"

On April 8, 1945, Langeland sent the following message to London from Jaevsjö:

STOP Will you drop in next six days? If so will leave four men reception. STOP Answer today STOP bridge too much for present force STOP attacking bridges Jörstad to Valøy.

Major Colby was getting impatient and wanted to strike at least alternate targets, but if London was to resupply RYPE soon, he would provide a reception committee. He was not aware of Skabo's and Bolland's second thoughts on aerial support of RYPE. On the same day, Colby received his answer:
Attack bridges Jörstad to Valøy STOP no drops until next moon our last chance then STOP Plane Jones failed to return to base may explain crash heard STOP want Olmsted mobile STOP are skis necessary in fortnight STOP advise us on ration, weapons, food containers immediately STOP consider yourself Olmsted and friends STOP will station close during attack STOP.

Borge Langeland encoded Colby's reply, but atmospheric conditions prevented RYPE's transmission of it that night. Colby decided to attack the bridges between Jörstad and Valøy. The message would not be transmitted until RYPE returned from its mission. In the message, RYPE said that the station would be closed; that skis would be necessary until the first week of May; that there were no Germans within twenty miles, and that RYPE wanted its containers as requested by Colby's letter to VAUDEVILLE. In addition, Odd Stiansen would go to Stockholm posing as a Norwegian refugee, and RYPE wanted to be sure that he could be sent back.

**Plans for Training Norwegian Resistance**

On April 9, 1945, VAUDEVILLE in Stockholm sent a message to the DS/US in London on RYPE's situation and the question about seizing the Lierne area to begin training of the Norwegian Resistance personnel there. VAUDEVILLE reported that Major Colby had planned the bridge operation and that he was going to carry it out with the men he had. Colby was nonetheless most anxious for the men left behind in Scotland to join his group.
Colby's plans to seize the Lierne area were in violation of Field Order II, and he knew that DS/US must approve them before implementation. The roads to the area were blocked by snow so it would be safe to train Norwegian patriots there. The spring thaws would change the ability of the defense to defend the area, so approval should come from DS/US as soon as possible. Large-scale resupply could come from Fortress Operations in England. Colby also wanted to communicate with the WAXWING party to coordinate the seizing of Lierne. Native scouting parties could then make distant reconnaissance of the area.

Colby planned rail cutting by small parties east of Lurudal and southeast of Snaasa Lake which would occur after the bridge was blown. Colby wanted containers at these points, as well as jeeps as soon as roads became clear.
ENDNOTES

1 Langeland, "RYPE", p. 2.

2 Colby, Honorable Men, p. 45.

3 Langeland, "RYPE", p. 2.


5 Hans Leirmo was a "Snaasa Gubbene" (one of the Snaasa boys).

6 Oppdal, Valdresavisen, July 11, 1977. The German ski patrols would not pursue other adversaries into neutral Sweden.

7 Ibid. Also: Oslo Aftenposten, July 6, 1977.

8 Langeland, "RYPE", pp. 3-5.

9 Ibid.

10 Interview with Tom Sather, Reunion, February 3-6, 1989.

11 Langeland, "RYPE", pp. 3-5.

12 Interview with Kai Johansen, Reunion, February 3-6, 1989.

13 Interview with Karl Hoffman, Reunion, February 3-6, 1989.
14
Ibid.
15
16
17
Colby, Honorable Men, p. 46.
18
Langeland, "RYPE", p. 5.
19
William E. Colby said that Borge Langeland was the best radio operator in the NORSO Group. Writer's observation: Langeland could be dastardly enough to "bait" the girls with his slow transmissions, then speed them up so that a supervisor would have to copy his messages.
20
Langeland, "RYPE", pp. 5-6.
21
OSS NORSO Group 314B, Appendix IX, Telegrams to and from "RYPE" pp. 1-6.
22
Ibid.
23
Colby, Honorable Men, p. 46.
24
OSS NORSO Group 314B, Appendix IX, Telegrams to and from "RYPE" pp. 1-6.
25
26
27
Langeland, "RYPE", p. 9. Also: Hogfoss, "Memorabilia", p. 5, Leif Øistad account: The man who approached wore a blue uniform. Still thinking they were in Norway, Øistad thought the man was Gestapo. "Don't shoot" he said, "You're in Sweden." Ron Windh, Swedish
himself, said that no German could speak Swedish that well, so it must be true that they were, in fact, in Sweden. Öistad said that plastic explosives were scattered all over. The leader of the Swedish ski patrol asked, what were they? Öistad answered, "hamburgers." The leader then asked, "All that to feed five people?" Öistad said, "we're expecting company." That was the wrong thing to say because it touched off an international incident. Also: Östersundposten, Östersund, Sweden, March 25, 1945. It was quite clear to the Swedes that the five men were Allied saboteurs meant for Norway. It made national news in Sweden and Öistad was sure the German Gestapo would pick up on it and discover Operation "RYPE." Öistad said, "We might just as well as sent a telegram to Adolf Hitler." According to the Foreign Relations of the U.S., March-April, 1945, no diplomatic protest was made by Sweden.


29 O.S.S. NORSO Group 313B, Message No. 784.

30 O.S.S. NORSO Group 314B, Appendix IX, Telegrams to and from "RYPE" pp. 1-6.

31 Langeland, "RYPE", p. 11.


33 Colby, Honorable Men, p. 47.

34 O.S.S. NORSO Group 314B, Appendix IX, Telegrams to and from "RYPE" pp. 1-6.

35 See Colby's report to Skabo on April 1, 1945. The courier was a member of MILORG who was based in Stockholm. To reach "RYPE" he took the railroad as far as he could, then skied the rest of the way. He had to avoid both Swedish and German ski patrols (Langeland, p. 12).

36 O.S.S. NORSO Group 314B, Appendix IX, Telegrams to and from "RYPE" pp. 1-6.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Langeland, "RYPE", p. 16.
41 Ibid, p. 10. Also: O.S.S. NORSO Group 314B, Appendix IX, Telegrams to and from "RYPE" pp. 1-6.
42 Langeland, "RYPE", p. 12.
46 O.S.S. NORSO Group 314B, Appendix IX. Telegrams to and from "RYPE" pp. 1-6.
48 O.S.S. NORSO Group 314B, Appendix IX. Telegrams to and from "RYPE" pp. 1-6.
49 Ibid. Also: Langeland, "RYPE", pp. 16-19.
CHAPTER VII
CARRYING OUT OPERATION RYPE

INTRODUCTION

The RYPE mission destroyed the railroad bridge at Tangen along the Nordland Railway on April 14, 1945. On April 24, 1945, RYPE destroyed two and one-half kilometers of railways in a remote area in the Lurudal Valley. Both highly successful operations, RYPE thus slowed down German troop movements along the Nordland Railway from one battalion a week to one battalion a month.

On May 6, 1945, German forces capitulated in Norway. On May 11, 1945, SFHQ radioed RYPE to come down from the hills, report to MILORG leaders, and begin to take the orderly surrender of 4,000 German troops, as American and British occupying forces did not arrive in the North Tröndelag area until June.

A Brutal Journey to the Target Area

On April 9, 1945, the unit departed the Jaevsjo farm to trek to the target area between Tangen and Jörstad.

The men were (their true names):

Agnar Andersen
Robert Andersen
Odd Anderson
William Colby
Einar Eliassen
Glen Farnsworth
Leif Öistad and his four men were still in Sweden, and Odd Stiansen was on his way to Stockholm. Lieutenant Herbert Helgesen, the Norwegian Liaison Officer, recruited four members of the local Military Resistance to participate in RYPE's mission. Three men were left behind to guard the farm. The unit set out on a hundred-mile, six-day cross-country ski trip.

Every man carried on his back a heavy rucksack weighing sixty pounds with explosives and provisions. The men took turns pulling a toboggan carrying sixty pounds of explosives, three men to a toboggan. The provisions were very small and sleeping bags, not tents, were carried.

The first day's march was made in rain against a strong wind. Pulling toboggans was not difficult on level land or downhill, but climbing the mountains on skis and pulling the toboggans was most physically exhausting. Daytime skiing in sticky snow was dangerous; nighttime was better for skiing. One of Colby's concerns was that, if one
should break a leg, medical attention was not close by. He told his men to sit on their skis should they lose control. Nobody received not even a sprain using this undignified tactic.

In the two days following, a wet and sticky snowstorm with a strong westerly wind hindered progress. On April 12, 1945, the storm abated, but the wind did not. The unit climbed past Imsdals Mountain, went south of Flat Mountain to avoid a German observation post on the next mountain to the north, and camped for the night. On April 13, 1945, the unit moved down the Rok Valley, traversing extremely broken terrain to Öiingen Lake. Major Colby, Lieutenant Hoel, and three men went around Bjornli Mountain along the tree line to the north to observe Jörstad Bridge from a distance.

On April 13, 1945, Colby and Sather picked a smaller bridge off the map; it was at Tangen. That was to be the target for sabotage. Reconnaissance of other bridges proved that they were heavily guarded and RYPE did not have enough men to attack those targets with any prospect of success. If the German engineers were worth their salt, they would have the bridge reconstructed within a matter of days at Tangen: therefore, rail damage would also have to be done.

Reconnaissance and the Laying of Charges at Tangen

The German guards apparently had observed Lieutenant
Sather, Lieutenant Larsen, and Sergeant Langeland while they were reconnoitering the station at Valøy on April 13th. They skied away in great haste as the German guards rushed out of their quarters while putting on their clothes. The Germans did not go very far, as they were observed by Sather, Larsen, and Langeland to have encountered some Norwegian woodcutters during their chase. Colby had miscalculated the needed time to travel from Øiingen to Valøy, because he had no way of anticipating that the terrain would be rougher than what the maps indicated. Because of being observed by the Germans at Valøy, Tangen was to be the target, the unit moved out at 2100 hours on April 13th. The unit went to Øiingheia, Raus Lake, Kvern Lake, then north to the village of Tangen, as the maps indicated this would be the best route. It was not, as skis had to be frequently removed and boulders climbed over enroute in the wooded areas. Even cliffs had to be descended. The men did not arrive on the cliffs overlooking Tangen until 0430 hours on April 14, 1945. Major Colby and Sergeant Langeland then went out on reconnaissance with the rest of their unit close behind.

Colby and Langeland stumbled on to a house. There was no evidence of ski tracks there. They entered the house and found a family that had been evacuated from Finnmark. They said that frequent German patrols passed through Tangen, but the bridge itself was not guarded.
While Langeland visited with the family, Colby inspected the bridge. The rest of the unit moved into the house. Telephone wires were cut, isolating the community from the outside world. Four teams converged on the bridge. Lieutenant Farnsworth led the demolition team, the three other teams approached from three directions. It was daylight, and the snow was glossy enough to alert the community to ski and foot movements. Once everybody was in position, Lieutenant Farnsworth and his team set their demolition charges of eighty pounds of plastic explosives on the bridge. The bridge was twelve meters long and had four I-beam stringers of one-inch metal. The men then redeployed on the heights overlooking the bridge to await a train.

**The Destruction of Tangen Bridge and the Grueling Escape**

The bravado plan of destroying a bridge and dropping a train into the river below was not going to take place at Tangen. Major Colby posted lookouts with walkie-talkies and binoculars to insure that a southbound train heard in the distance did not carry Norwegian civilians. The group wanted to catch a German troop train right on top of the bridge at Tangen so that both could be blown up at the same time. An hour passed and no train came towards Tangen. Colby gave the order to blow the bridge at 0630 hours, April 14, 1945. American shoulder patches were left behind so that the Germans would not take reprisals
against the people at Tangen.

Then the adrenalin began to pump: all the men knew that the Germans would definitely be in hot pursuit of them this time. RYPE had to outski German troop-carrying trucks. Some of the inland roads to Sweden had already been cleared of snow. Although they left their toboggans behind and lightened their escape loads, it would be a grueling return. There was little food left. German patrols were sighted, but no contact was made. Hans Leirmo, a champion cross-country skier, set the fast pace. Because the men were already tired, a short rest stop was made at Öiingen again. A spotting plane was heard overhead, but not seen. At 2400 hours, the unit departed Öiingen and went via Langrasheia, Brandheia, and to Flaa Lake, where a short rest stop and breakfast was made at 0900 hours. At 1200 hours, April 15, 1945, the unit departed and went via Dal Lake, Aasvas Lake to Gommelien, arriving about 2200 hours. A substantial rest was planned, but Lieutenant Hoel spotted a twenty-five man German ski patrol on the prominent point of Tjoklien, and motivated the unit to move on instead. At 0600 hours, the unit moved on to Gronhaugen, a steep hill that was later named Benzadrine Hill, (because the stimulant was needed to climb it), Fiskelosbokn, Nyamocokka, to the WOODLARK base in Sweden. The eight men at WOODLARK welcomed the men of RYPE, who were exhausted and had had little food in three
days, with a wonderful dinner of Swedish fishballs in white sauce and boiled potatoes. Elk was also on the menu. Colby, Hoel, Langeland, and Larsen left on Wednesday to return to Jaevsjo to get the radio in operation again. The rest of the unit under Lieutenant Sather returned to Jaevsjo via a more leisurely route through Sweden. On April 18, 1945, RYPE was back at Jaevsjo. So were Sergeant Öistad and his four men who were mistakenly dropped in Sweden. Swedish Intelligence, with a wink, had spirited them out of the internment camp at Falun.

Infiltration of NORSO Group to Target

In a memorandum on April 16, 1945, Lieutenant Colonel Hans H. Skabo, Section Chief, NORSO Operations, outlined the gradual infiltration of the Second Group into Norway from Sweden to the Chief of Special Operations (SO) at Special Force Headquarters in London. He stated that three officers and thirteen enlisted men were in Norway. The five in Sweden were to infiltrate back into Norway, as appropriate arrangements had been made with the Swedish State Police. Four men of Major Colby's original group were still in the United Kingdom. They were:

T/Sgt. Knut Joa
T/5 Otto Twingley
Cpl. Vernon L. Austreng
T/5 Wilton M. Rasmussen

These men were to be provided passports and clothing for their infiltration to the original group. The following men were to follow:
The DS/US, a top-ranking American officer at Special Forc

es Headquarters in London, was to arrange for the infiltration of the following men upon his visit to Stockholm:

T/Sgt. Clifford G. Kyllo
1st Lt. Roger W. Hall
S/Sgt. John T. Halvorsen
T/5 Morris A. Syrstad
T/5 Jorgen F. Andersen
T/5 Delphis L. Bonin
T/5 Bernard W. Tallaksen
T/5 Torleif S. Johansen
T/5 Rolf Lilleby
Maj. John M. Olmsted
Cpl. Karl Larsen
S/Sgt. George G. Boosalis
Cpt. Otto N. Feher
T/5 Demetrius Frangis
S/Sgt Boris Spiroff
T/5 Olav J. Eide
T/5 Elmer Kvasager
T/5 Harold E. Ness
S/Sgt. Erling E. Olsen
T/5 Albert Nordang
T/5 Erling R. Salvesen
T/5 Paul N. Frangas
T/5 Gus L. Palans
1st Sgt. Theophanes G. Strimenos
Cpl. John Sunde
T/5 Steve P. Marthiakas
Cpl. William Johnson
Pvt. Bernard F. Brady
Pvt. Mike Mountouris
PFC Nolan R. Cooper

Non-Norwegians would supplement the group because the primary source of Norwegian volunteers, the 99th Infantry Battalion (separate) was understrength. The men would be
moved in small groups in the order listed. The men listed above were to be given refresher training as radio operators so that they could be in contact with London.

Colonel Gerhard Bolland would be the commander of the augmented group in the field. He had been assistant to the Chief of NORSO Group, Special Forces Headquarters since its inception and would be qualified to command the combined Group Command for NORSO Operations. Lieutenant John Kroona would familiarize himself with the supply procedure and its movement to Sweden from the United Kingdom, then join Captain Dammen’s organization in Sweden.

RYPE and London had not been in radio contact for ten days when on April 18, 1945, RYPE reported that the bridge at Tangen had been destroyed without casualties. RYPE also reported that Öistad’s group, which was briefly detained in Sweden, was with RYPE. The unit also requested drops of food and demolitions at Field Names ARES and MARS. Major Colby asked to meet APOLLO, an unidentified staff member at Special Forces Headquarters, about supply of the Lierne area as a possible location for training Norwegian patriots in this remote area and also with the WAXWING (British) party to make plans to reconnoiter Lierne for possible German activity. RYPE was planning to blow the rails in the vicinity of Lurudal next week.

On April 20, 1945, London transmitted a message of congratulations for a job well done: (1) Seizing the
Lierne area needed SHAEF approval; (2) Air resupply was impossible: supplies would have to come through Sweden; and (3) RYPE was to proceed on the Lurudal job.

On April 21, 1945, RYPE contacted London, asking: (1) why Bernt Balchen could not supply it by air; (2) RYPE understood that it was not to sweep the Lierne area of German activity, but planning for it should proceed, and; (3) RYPE asked if large daylight drops from the United Kingdom would be possible later on, assuming the Lierne 32 area was secured.

Memorandum of Details from Colby to Skabo

On April 19, 1945, Major Colby wrote a memorandum to Lieutenant Colonel Hans Skabo in which Colby detailed the situation to date for Operation RYPE. Colby opened by thanking Skabo for his role in getting T/Sgt. Leif Öistad's group out of Sweden and to Jaevsjo. Because they only had one uniform among them, Colby wanted Sgt. Clifford Kyllo, the NORSO Procurement Sergeant, to supply them with more uniforms and military equipment. Colby remarked that the men who came from Sweden had some pretty classy civilian clothing on them. Colby fell short of asking who their tailor was.

Colby observed that a German attack on Jaevsjo was always a possibility. There were rumors in Snaasa that Allied paratroopers were in the area. With all of the aborted drops by our planes, the Germans would most likely
think that a larger group was in place. In turn, the Germans might send a large group to attack Jaevsjoë.

Colby stated that he needed the Second NORSO Group badly. It could live on the Swedish side of the border until the snow melted. Colby still wanted to tackle the Grana Bridge.

Colby was aggravated about the WOODLARK question. His O.S.S. instructions were that since WOODLARK was a British show, WOODLARK and RYPE could not participate in joint operations. Despite this, Colby had borrowed three men from WOODLARK to destroy the bridge at Tangen. The more people that were used, the more damage could be inflicted on the enemy. Colby stated that British Special Operations Executive politics had no place in the mountains of Norway. Americans were in Norway whether Britain liked it or not: let us work together.

The next project for RYPE was to blow the rails in the vicinity of Lurudal. Colby planned on using small groups of men to conduct a simultaneous strike. Colby suggested that since the U.S. Army Air Force would not fly from the United Kingdom after the next moon period, why not make the drop from Stockholm? (Colby assumed that Sweden was about to abandon its neutrality and would join the Allies against Germany.) Colby thought that Bernt Balchen's Fortresses could do the job. Colby had identified forward bases for drops of containers to be
hidden until used for sabotage operations, closer to the targets.

Colby also suggested that all the packaging of supplies be done in Stockholm so that no duplication of orders would exist.

The Lurudal Caper

On April 23, 1945, a reinforced RYPE party proceeded to the Skartnes Seter (a summer dairy) via Lillefjellet, Fisklosa Lake, Seisjöen Lake, Andorsjöen Lake, Gaos Lake, Skjorstohaugen, Agle Seter, and Berg Seter. On April 25, 1945, the Skartnes Seter was used as a marshalling point. The men were as follows (their true names):

Agnar Andersen
Robert Andersen
Odd Anderson
Knut Andreasen
William Colby
Einar Eliassen
Glen Farnsworth
Asmund Gravdal
Jørgen Havik
Herbert Helgesen
Ed Hovland
Fred Johansen
Kai Johansen
Borge Langeland
Harald Larsen
Hans Leirmo
Toralf Lian
Arne Listeid
Jon Moan
Marinus Myrland
Halvor Nipe
Leif Øistad
Alf Paulsen
Matti Raivio
Tom Rusdal
Tom Sather
Bertie Westgöte
Sivert Windh
The loads carried by the men during this operation were much lighter and the distance to the target area was shorter than to Tangen. The objective was to take out as many rails possible with small charges on isolated portions of the Nordland Railway. Scouts found that a German guardhouse was right in the middle of the mile and a half segment of railway to be destroyed. There was no moon that would aid the escape.

The men were divided into eight teams. Hans Leirmo, the local guide, joined Sergeant Alf Paulsen's team as its fourth member. The teams left Skartnes at staggered times to arrive on the tracks simultaneously at 2330 hours. The men prepared the charges in advance. They were designed to wrap around the rails at the fish plates where they were joined. That would damage the rails up to two feet on each side of the joint. Every team carried thirty rail chargers joined in pairs and had instructions to place them over alternate fish plates. Two men were to affix the charge, the third to set the fuse. The fuse could be activated by pulling a small wire: detonation would come ten seconds later. One could pull one wire, run down the track and pull another, until all the charges were activated and exploded. The rails were twelve meters long. Each team was responsible for 200 meters of track.

The men were to ignite the charges at 2345 hours on a green signal flare from Colby. The teams were then to
PLANE JONES Crash Site and the LURUDAL CAPER
withdraw to Skartness and try to escape as a unit. If the flare was not fired, the explosions on the rails would begin at 2350 hours. This did happen: Colby's team was too close to the German guardhouse. A crescendo of explosions followed. The Germans were completely caught by surprise. The explosions sounded like a heavy bombardment. A German flare went off fifty yards from Colby's team. A bullet kicked a pebble into Colby's face. He instructed Sergeant Sivert Windh not to return fire with his Browning automatic rifle: he did not want to tell the Germans that a regular unit was in the area. One hundred ninety double charges destroyed 218 rails, for a distance of two and one-half kilometers. The mission was a complete success. RYPE's escape was next on the agenda.

The Escape Back to Jaevsjo

In the darkness that same night, a German tunnel guard had shot several volleys from his rifle towards Major Colby's group. German machine gun fire was shot at Lieutenant Sather's group. The Germans were firing flares to try to illuminate their attackers. The Americans assembled to check for casualties before moving to escape. The rendezvous at the Skartness Seter (summer dairy building) proved that RYPE had no casualties. One RYPE optimist boiled some water for coffee to enjoy at the hut after the attack, but there would be no time to drink it. A report of men moving up the trail motivated RYPE's quick
departure. The same route was to be used again, except that the unit passed to the east of Seisjoen Lake. The unit took a roundabout route to point the German patrols in the wrong direction until a snowstorm covered RYPE's tracks in the direction they took toward Sweden.

The snow was crisp and the skiing was good. When daybreak came, RYPE took a break and ate some British field rations. The pemican inside them was nourishing but not very tasty. They spent the rest of the day putting as much distance as possible between them and German ski patrols. Five-minute breaks were the norm. On one of these breaks, one man fell asleep on his ski poles.

To slow down the Germans, live explosives were left behind on the trail. These were not powerful enough to do serious harm in the event they were detonated by a casual Norwegian skier. Hills had to be climbed; there being no way around them. The men were exhausted, but Benzadrine Hill was still ahead. With the aid of benzadrine, the unit made it to the top. This was the last mountain on the way to camp. On April 26, 1945, the unit arrived at Jaevsjo after a roundabout tour through Sweden. The men had trekked through difficult terrain, had quietly approached and damaged the target areas, and after the natural strain of an attack, trekked their fifty kilometer return without a whimper.

At Jaevsjo, a Lapp who was tending his reindeer,
reported that he had discovered a plane wreckage on Plukketjern Fjell, a mountain nearby. The unit planned a night’s rest before searching for PLANE JONES.

Memorandum to Major Colby from SN/NOR

On April 25, 1945, SN/NOR, (author assumes that he was the ranking Norwegian officer at Special Forces Headquarters in London) sent a memorandum through VAUDEVILLE, Westfield Mission, (Special Forces Headquarters identification for its Scandinavian operations) to Major Colby. It covered the results so far of Operation RYPE and also the thinking to date of higher headquarters toward RYPE. He thanked Colby for his excellent written reports and praised Borge Langeland for his superior radio reports.

SN/NOR learned that PLANE BERGE had crashed in the Orkney Islands. The bodies had been flown into Harrington and buried at Cambridge Cemetery on April 6, 1945. That was the same date for the dispatch of the last three planes, two of which carried personnel. T/Sgt. Knute Joa and three men and the supply plane returned. PLANE JONES, the third, did not return. Lieutenant Blane E. Jones, Bernard N. Iverson, Knute J. Falck, and Robert N. Anderson were still missing. The message that RYPE heard a plane crash fifteen miles west of RYPE’s position suggested to Special Forces Headquarters that this may have been PLANE JONES. SFHQ contended that no more men should have to be put to such high risk of death. SFHQ made the decision to
halt all air supplies: they would come to RYPE via MILORG in Stockholm only.

MILORG in Stockholm indicated that all men to be infiltrated into Norway must have Norwegian cover names and Norwegian passports. Headquarters could then send in the Norwegian-speaking men in teams of six. Other arrangements would have to be made with MILORG in Stockholm to infiltrate non-Norwegian speaking men, such as the Greeks and the Italians.

SN/NOR congratulated Colby for the fine job at Tangen. The SN/NOR thought that there were three officers and thirteen enlisted men, but Colby reported that there were twenty-four. In the forthcoming report Colby was to identify how many Norwegian locals had been recruited and whether they were in uniform or not. MILORG had a role for these men. SN/NOR said that the locals should not be recruited for RYPE because of possible German reprisals against these men and their families. Colby should not violate SHAEF policy.

SN/NOR said the Lierne Plan, to train new recruits for MILORG should be dormant because RYPE and WOODLARK were too small in the number of men to defend Lierne, should the Germans have a notion to take it. Sweden was the linchpin for Norway at the moment: Colby was not to embarrass the Swedish Government in front of German officials with blatant operations against Norway that appeared to come
from Sweden.

SN/NOR ordered First Lieutenant John Kroona to proceed to Stockholm to assist Captain Dammen in the MILORG supply area and to be in charge of resupplying RYPE. RYPE's mission was to continue harassing the Nordland Railway. Again, SN/NOR congratulated Operation RYPE, and also wished the group the best of luck.

**Report on RYPE by APOLLO**

On April 27, 1945, APOLLO of the Westfield Mission sent a memorandum to Skabo, SN/US and Miller in which he summed up VAUDEVILLE'S field visit to Operation RYPE on April 23, 1945. VAUDEVILLE returned to Stockholm on April 27, 1945, and reported that he was impressed with the morale and organization of Operation RYPE, whose party then consisted of twenty Americans and ten Norwegians. The topics of discussion with Major Colby were mostly of resupply and future operations. There was a question of amending the present Field Orders, which only provided for attacks on the Nordland Railway.

APOLLO asked in his message whether or not the Nordland Railway remained an important target for SHAEF. SHAEF appeared to favor a more passive policy of keeping transportation networks intact for the liberation of Norway. VAUDEVILLE thought that RYPE's franchise would be terminated should SHAEF follow this new policy.

VAUDEVILLE thought that RYPE's Field Orders should be
amended to include the Lierne contingency plan so that local Norwegians could be recruited to eventually drive the Germans out of central Norway. The area in question was west to Steinkjaer, north to Namsos, and east to the Swedish border. Colby would refrain from guerilla warfare until authorized by SHAEF. Colby said Lieutenant Hans Hoel had the wherewithal to recruit the locals. Resupply by air for such an expanded operation could be done during the forthcoming summer. APOLLO wanted London's thoughts on the matter.

Colby's Reaction to the Higher Headquarters Rebuff

Major Colby parried with the hierarchies in both Stockholm and London over his Lierne Plan. In a series of messages after the rail demolition job, Colby was congratulated for a job well done, yet told to heed to the game plan of higher headquarters or be disciplined. In a message dated April 25, 1945, and received on the next day, London wanted to know the names of the men Colby sent out on an organization mission: M20 of MILORG preferred them to go elsewhere. In another message dated April 25, 1945, and received by RYPE the next day, MILORG ordered the WOODLARK men to go back to their base. In addition, Colby was told not to enlist MILORG members. WOODLARK was to begin as a MILORG protection party.

On April 28, 1945, London radioed congratulations on the successful rail destruction and that its decision on
the Lierne Plan was to come next week. On May 1, 1945, London radioed that RYPE's mission was to make small and frequent attacks on the railroad, but not to tackle the Grana Bridge. WOODLARK received orders to proceed on MILORG's original orders. The Lierne Plan could not be authorized for obvious reasons. Colby radioed back that he did not understand what was meant by "obvious reasons." On May 2, 1945, he pleaded his case to London contending that RYPE had the wherewithal to organize a guerrilla force.

What Colby did not know was that SHAPE was conducting a very delicate negotiations with the German High Command over the disposition of its troops in Norway. The Allies, had they given carte blanche to Colby, would have reneged on their promise that German troops would be allowed to make an orderly withdrawal from Norway. A flamboyant action in Lierne would be damaging and inappropriate. Colby was then not in a position to know how policy was formulated at the highest level of commands.

Burial of the Men of PLANE JONES

On April 28, 1945, RYPE found PLANE JONES. It appeared to have hit the top of the mountain, then slid down the western slope. All indications were that all crewmen and passengers had been killed instantly. The bodies were identified and removed from the scattered wreckage. RYPE members wrapped the bodies in parachutes and buried them in a rock cave overlooking Lang Lake.
Norwegian Invasion

Behind Enemy Lines, U.S. Para Troops Fire A Salute To 13 Comrades In A Rocky Tomb.

Near a Norwegian lake, their parachute rendezvous in a flight from Scotland, these Office of Strategic Services men found their companions killed in the crash of a plane. Snow-white parkas protected them from 20 below zero cold. Somewhere in the snow, they hid their explosives. With them they blew up bridges and rails in the spring of 1945. Outnumbered 16 to 1, they outran Nazi pursuers in a 50 mile ski chase. (Photo published with the permission of the Central Intelligence Agency). First published in Thomas R. Henry, "The White War in Norway," National Geographic Magazine (Washington, D.C.: National Geographic Society, November, 1945), p. 638. Copy of photo donated to author by Leif Øistad, 1312 Orang eAvenue, Nederland, Texas.
Placed over the grave was an American flag. A short service included three rifle volleys. The men took pictures of the scene for the next of kin. Buried in the grave in the following order from south to north:

1st Lt.   Blane E. Jones  
Cpl.     Knut J. Falck  
T/5     Bernard N. Iverson  
T/3   Robert N. Anderson  
      Jack H. Spyker 36453523  
F/O   Richard A. Bosch 0-783238  
Unidentified air crewman  
Unidentified Bombardier  
Unidentified Air Crewmember  
Unidentified Officer  
Angelo Santini 42003373  
William H. Hudson 0-829029

Identified afterwards were:

Leon G. Dibble  
Arthur H. Bardknecht  
Gilbert L. Magruder  
Fayette Shelledy

A mailbag found nearby was intact and contained mail to RYPE from loved ones. Usually it was fun to receive mail in the Norwegian wilderness, but not much fun in this instance.

The Encounter With a German Patrol

The locals who reported to RYPE about German activity warned that a fifty-man German ski patrol was looking for the unit. Special Forces Headquarters said that MILORG had other uses for the Norwegians recruited by RYPE, and demanded that Colby release them, while at the same time, not explaining why. With the release of men to WOODLARK and to WAXWING, RYPE was down to twenty effective fighting
men. It was only a question of time before RYPE would be discovered.

On May 2, 1945, Sergeant Marinus Myrland was on guard duty. A five-man German patrol slid down the hill and went immediately to the farm. Myrdal walked around the farm house and found himself face to face to the patrol who had drawn their machine pistols. Myrland told them calmly that they could shoot him, but there were thirty American paratroopers inside who were quite capable of killing the five intruders. Several members of RYPE surrounded the Germans. The German Feldweber (Sergeant) agreed to surrender. Suddenly, a member of the Norwegian Resistance came flying out of the house with a drawn pistol. A startled Feldweber fired at him, wounding him in the stomach. The Feldweber fired only one shot as it was discovered later that his machine pistol had jammed. The five armed Germans were killed on the spot, RYPE using its Thompson sub-machine guns. The Norwegian Resistance member, Karle Berre, was given penicillin by Fren Johansen, then evacuated by sled to Sweden on a forty-kilometer trip to Swedish transportation.

In World War II both sides understood that guerilla operations could not be encumbered with prisoners. The captured Germans, therefore, had to be killed on the spot. On May 3, 1945, RYPE radioed London about the firefight.
VAUDEVILLE'S Letter to Colby on May 3, 1945

VAUDEVILLE'S letter to Colby on May 3, 1945 stated that T/5 Sivert Windh had arrived in Stockholm the day before. Windh thought he had appendicitis, but the doctor found a blocked intestine instead caused by drinking too much ice water in the mountains. Windh would return to Jaevsjö with the next courier.

Erik Gaundal reported to MILORG early in May that transportation of supplies to RYPE was impossible because of the spring thaws. The supplies that London could furnish had been ordered. VAUDEVILLE was working on airdrops to Jaevsjö from Stockholm. As soon as Norwegian passports were made available, the rest of the NORSO Group would join RYPE.

VAUDEVILLE had discussed the Lierne Plan with the Special Force Headquarters but got nowhere with it. London wanted to sit on it for now. VAUDEVILLE sensed that the decision came from the highest command and that something was going on that both he and Colby were not privy to know. Lt. Col. Hans Skabo, chief of the Scandinavian section, could not come to Stockholm because he seemed to be swept up in all the end of war-in-Europe decision-making process.

VAUDEVILLE told Colby to radio London if there were food shortages at Jaevsjö. Large-scale airlift would not be available for about a month. The Stockholm radio operator was overloaded, and the American Legation was
monitoring the O.S.S. transmissions. VAUDEVILLE suggested Colby contact London directly. New codes and crystals were forthcoming.

VAUDEVILLE wrote that, if there should be a complete German capitulation in Norway, Colby might be instructed to encourage German prisoners to cross the border into Sweden and claim to be deserters. (VAUDEVILLE knew that RYPE could not feed them.)

Something Big Was in the Offing

The Norwegian Forsvarets Overkommando Fire (F.O.IV) (Norwegian High Command) which controlled MILORG in Norway, sent a three-part message to Norway. The message also would apply to RYPE.

F.O.IV said that should there be a complete German capitulation, everyone should remain calm. No harsh actions were to be taken against German Army personnel nor against German and Norwegian Nazis. Discipline was to be the first order of business. Communications between subordinates and superiors alike would be maintained to the highest degree possible.

All units in the field were to remain in place. Should Germany opt to use Norway as a place for a last stand, MILORG would have to remain invisible in order to fight on.

RYPE Kept in the Dark

On May 4, 1945, RYPE twice radioed London. The first
message acknowledged that RYPE would do nothing until further orders. RYPE also observed that German troops were walking south; that only three to four trains a day passed carrying material only, and that the RYPE party was running out of food. In the second message, Colby complained that RYPE had been promised answers to many questions to be sent via courier, but none had been received. RYPE had been completely kept in the dark about the status of the war.

It was apparent to RYPE from the news broadcasts that the war was soon to be over and that SHAPE had no more use for RYPE. The men wanted to get in their last licks before a German surrender.

The next day's message brought an immediate response: RYPE wanted Colby and Langeland to go into Steinkjar with a white flag to negotiate with the local German commander. London replied that RYPE was to stay in place, not make any contact with the Germans, and not make contact with MILORD, either. Disciplinary action would result if RYPE did not follow orders.

Message traffic got heavier on May 6, 1945. RYPE said the courier arrived without answers. RYPE sent a long message requesting a long list of clothing material and food needs. RYPE observed tired and hungry Austrian mountain troops walking south. However, a German grenadier regiment that followed them appeared to be well-disciplined and healthy. RYPE also relayed messages to and from
WOODLARK. London was curious about the German activity in the Snaasa area.

RYPE also reported on May 6, 1945 that the Gestapo had made a mass arrest of thirty to forty MILORG personnel in Verdal: eleven had escaped and wanted to join RYPE and not go to Sweden. Norwegian Border Policeman Jon Albertsen assisted the Gestapo in the whippings of the MILORG members and RYPE requested that the B.B.C. broadcast his name so that would not happen again. Also, the message "Stormvarsel Paa Kysten" (storm warnings along the coast) must not be broadcast from the B.B.C. in London as the MILORG group in Verdal was destroyed. (Once its true meaning is known, the message might cause Nazi infiltration of other MILORG groups).

The War Up North

On May 17, 1944, Norwegian, British, American, and Russian negotiations concluded an agreement for Operation Jupiter, the deception plan of invasion of northern Norway. Along with the Russian invasion of Finnmark, a cadre of 250 Norwegian troops, the Independent Mountain Company #2 under the command of Colonel Arne Dahl, would also participate. The Norwegians would include civilian administration teams to restore order in Finnmark and show the flag of a strong Norwegian military presence. Dahl's unit arrived in Murmansk on November 7, 1944. On November 11, 1944, Dahl's unit was assigned reconnaissance duty along the Tana River
in Finnmark. The Russians gave Dahl complete authority in Finnmark.

Dahl went into the No Man's Land not knowing where the Wehrmacht was. There were no communications nor intelligence to aid his unit. In the meantime, two companies of Norwegian "police" troops, trained in Sweden, were flown into Kirkenes in American planes by Bernt Balchen's crews from Stockholm. Other units in Sweden crossed Finnish territory to join Dahl, whose force by early 1945 consisted of 3,000 men.

Dahl's frequent and deeper patrols found much devastation caused by the retreating German Wehrmacht. In Vadsö, eighty percent of the buildings had been destroyed. In Berlevaag there were no houses left. Seventy people were left searching in the ruins for tins of food and lumber. Diphtheria was present as people were living in caves and mud huts. In Gamvik, no houses were left, nor were there any people.

Dahl made deeper reconnaissance throughout the winter. Dahl's unit came upon a major Luftwaffe base at Skoganvarre. The field was undefended, but heavily booby-trapped. In April, 1945, the Norwegians reached Lyngenfjord where they clashed with German troops. By the first week of May, 1945, all of Finnmark was under Norwegian control. The German 20th Mountain Army dug in at Lyngenfjord for a defensive stand. Dahl could not advance
any further. On May 6, 1945, the Russians mysteriously began to withdraw their 40,000 troops from eastern Finnmark. The Norwegians were surprised: they were not aware of the Allied secret negotiations not to partition Norway after Germany's surrender.

Do Not Provoke the Germans: Keep Norway Intact

In the Autumn, 1944, SOE-trained Norwegian agents arrived in Norway to prepare for the day of liberation and to help MILORG organize its units. The Resistance also became prepared to take over industries, power plants, and transportation lines. The members were ordered not to engage in combat. MILORG established a series of military bases in the mountains, such as Elg in south central Norway, Björnwest, north of Bergen, and Vaag, north of Kristiansand. The idea was not to provoke the Germans and to keep Norway intact.

Unfortunately, MILORG had a horrible incident in April 1945, as 150 German troops swept through Elg and stumbled upon ninety Norwegian soldiers. The Norwegians stood their ground. By the time the firefight was over, fifty German soldiers were killed or wounded. The Norwegians lost seven men. F.O. in London, who controlled MILORG, was furious over the useless bloodshed. Peter Holst, Commander of Elg, had some questions to answer. Holst, however, had no other choice but to fight.
High Commands Also Kept in the Dark

After Adolf Hitler committed suicide in his Berlin bunker on April 30, 1945, the German High Command was more than ready to surrender to the Allies. On May 4, 1945, it surrendered all troops in northwest Germany, Denmark, Holland and Norway to Field Marshall Bernard L. Montgomery.

Lieutenant General Franz Böehm, who had replaced General Niklaus von Falkenhorst as Commander of the German Wehrmacht in Norway in January, 1945, was hesitant. On May 5, 1945, he still expected to establish the notion of a "Festung Norwegen," a Fortress Norway, where German forces would make a last stand.

The Allies had tried to reach Böehm by wireless on May 6 and 7, 1945. Even after unconditional surrender on May 8, 1945, General Dwight D. Eisenhower on May 7, 1945, could not even get a direct contact by radio to Böehm. The German High Command reemphasized to Böehm that he was to surrender his forces. Böehm went on Oslo Radio and told his German troops to obey their new superiors.

On the afternoon of May 8, 1945, a SHAEF mission arrived in Oslo headed by a British Brigadier (a general officer). This team proceeded immediately to Böehm's headquarters near Lillehammer, eighty miles north of Oslo. The team told Böehm to assemble his troops at key points and demobilize. This would be a complete capitulation of
all German forces in Norway.

Balchen's Reception at Bodo Airfield

On May 8, 1945, Bernt Balchen commanded a flight of ten American C-47s from Kirkenes to the airfield at Bodø. The German in the tower radioed Balchen permission to land. A Luftwaffe "follow me" truck met the C-47s upon their landing to marshall them to their parking area. While taxiing, the aircrews observed German JU88s and Me104s all neatly lined up on another taxiway. Upon shutting down his engine, Balchen was met by a Luftwaffe staff car driven by the German Base Commander. He saluted Balchen and Balchen returned the salute. After messing and quarters arrangements were made, the German commander turned his fleet of staff cars over to the aircrews for their use.

On May 7, 1945, London radioed RYPE the following message:

Enemy will under surrender terms be ordered to concentrate in several places in lower Namdal area at Grong, Ekker, Snaasa, Steinkjaer, Verdal, Rinnleiret, Levanger Hutment camps STOP important avoid any contact with enemy STOP to avoid clashes if he sticks to terms STOP you are not to disarm enemy STOP.

On May 8, 1945, RYPE sent the following message to London:

Give precise orders STOP can we go to valley STOP if so we must contact German commanders for our security STOP have we any further mission? STOP please get us out of hills.

The radio broadcasts indicated that the war was over. The men were anxious to participate in the festivities in
Steinkjaer. The most immediate problem was food as people had joined the RYPE party and also had to be fed. Livestock on the Jaevsjö Farm were slaughtered to feed the men, but this would hurt the Andersens when they would return to the farm from Sweden. The radio operator tried alternate times of transmissions to London and different frequencies to arouse London, but to no avail. Major Colby tried a different approach: food. On May 10, 1945, the following message was sent to London:

We are extremely short of food and reduced rations STOP we absolutely must move to a food supply STOP can we leave contact here to meet Bolland while we go to valley or can we meet him in Norway at Snaasa or Verdal or Hell wherever you say STOP please answer today as food is serious problem STOP why can't instructions be sent by radio STOP.

RYPE perceived that the people manning the radios in London were partying, as well as the high commanders who could make the decisions. In a message to London on May 11, 1945, Colby complained that arriving Allied troops to Norway would win the hearts of Norwegians and those in the hills who worked hard would be overlooked. On the same date, RYPE received the following message:

Move all RYPE personnel except rear detail to Steinkjaer where you should report to MILORG Leader STOP his name is Torberg Johansen STOP password to him is quote: "Oftenaasen Er Bratt" unquote STOP he is living at Nordsida close to trunkroad to Trondheim STOP rear detail to receive Bolland and party to follow STOP upon arrival at Steinkjaer RYPE is placed under Commander Hans Reidar Holterman STOP S.F.H.Q. officer is Major Thompson STOP.
All but the four men who had to wait for Bolland at Jaevsjö were elated to go to Steinkjaer!

To the Snaasa Valley

On May 11, 1945, the message ordered RYPE down from Jaevsjö to the Snaasa Valley. It did not take long to pack for the trip. Four members of the Norwegian Home Forces were left behind by RYPE to wait for Colonel Bolland's arrival through Sweden. He would take command of the combined NORSO Group. The men of the RYPE party did not get much sleep that night. On May 12, 1945, the men began their journey.

Late in the afternoon the men approached Steinkjaer. As they approached the coast of Snaasa Lake, they discarded their skis, for the snow was gone. Major Colby chose two six foot sergeants to escort him to make contact with the local German commander. They were Sergeant Odd Andersen and Corporal Kai Johansen. Their military bearing was above reproach, even after six weeks in the field of attack and survival conditions.

There was still the chance that the local German garrison might be uncooperative, so only the three men approached it. The rest of the party was left behind in case something happened to Colby, Andersen, and Johansen. Major Colby met the German commander. Colby observed that the commander was more nervous than he was. The commander assured Major Colby that he and the rest of the garrison
would have perfect discipline and remain confined to camp.

We Are Happy to See You

After the military contact with German forces, the RYPE party moved to Steinkjaer. On the outskirts of town they were met by a brass band whose members apparently had not played together since the war began. In town there was a short welcoming ceremony. The RYPE party members were tired and hungry and the mayor assigned them quarters formally used by Germans.

On May 13, 1945, Borge Langeland, by then a Second Lieutenant by battlefield commission, sent a message to London in which he reported that all the Americans were in place at Steinkjaer; that the German commander had been contacted and was cooperative; that the Home Front forces were in contact with RYPE, and that Major Colby was going to Trondheim. Langeland also told London that the RYPE party had received a sensational welcome in Steinkjaer and to please send coffee, cigarettes, candy, and American flags. He also said that the estimated 6,000 garrisoned German troops were under perfect discipline. On May 14, 1945, Langeland sent another message to London to report that there were thirty-two in the RYPE party including Lieutenant Hoel and that morale was high: the Jaevsjø base had just been closed.

Lieutenant Colonel Gerhard L. Bolland arrived in
Steinkjaer and was informed by the group that Major Colby had gone to Trondheim to report to the District Commander-Trondheim (DK/T), a Colonel Hans Reidar Holtermann. Colby returned on May 15, 1945 and briefed Bolland that he had made arrangements to participate in the Syttende Mai (seventeenth of May) parade. Bolland then instructed Colby to be Commander of Troops and march the group through the towns of Verdal, Levanger and Stordal on the way to Trondheim. The group received a tremendous ovation from Norwegians from both sides of the street, from windows, and from the rooftops. Norwegians would not show much emotion, but the quick Allied presence in North Tröndelag changed all of that. Norwegians that day cried with tears of joy. The noise of the crowds could be heard all the way to Oslo. Some chanted the mating call "reepah-reepah" in honor of RYPE, who had chosen the white grouse— that changed color to brown in the summertime—as its code name. The marching men of RYPE wore silk scarves made out of parachutes. That trick really left an impression on the crowds. Crown Prince Olav was in the reviewing stands in Oslo. He had flown in from London to take command of the Norwegian Forces. The RYPE Group had taken the surrender of thousands of German troops garrisoned at nearby Vaernes airport.

Trouble in the Old Norse City of Kings

The First Sergeant of RYPE and a Norwegian citizen
attached to the group celebrated a little too much: on the morning of May 17th in Trondheim, they fired their weapons into the air—or so they thought, as a tire went flat on a nearby automobile. Lieutenant Colonel Gerhard Bolland did not get wind of the incident until the next day. He was furious: alcohol was the culprit and it could possibly reflect very badly on his group. He approached the Norwegian Court with statements from the men and the complaining party. Although the incident was quickly resolved and hushed up, Bolland reported it to London.

RYPE also was housed in one of the best hotels in Trondheim, to the consternation of the British, who were in command of the area and who themselves thought they should have the better quarters. An excuse was found by the British to send the RYPE party to some remote village to control the Germans in that area. British officers quickly filled the vacuum caused by RYPE's departure from Trondheim.

A Final "Sieg Heil"

On May 20, 1945 the rest of the NORSO Group had arrived in Trondheim. The group landed at Vaernes Airport, coming from Scotland. Colby and the group were on their way to Namsos, sixty miles up the coast from Trondheim for garrison duty. The slow Allied buildup of occupation troops in the North Trøndelag area and Norwegians there perceived that proud German army and navy personnel could provide problems: Namsos wanted visible evidence that the
war was over. The date for complete German disarmament there was set for May 23, 1945.

Ten thousand German troops were in the area, and thirty members of the NORSO Group were going to supervise them. On the way to Namsos, the group rode over the very rails it destroyed. Russian forced labor had quickly repaired them (thousands of Russian prisoners were in the area.) The Germans were to disarm themselves. The Germans disarmed very slowly at first. The German Navy was more reluctant to do so than the German Army.

Major Colby was instructed to "inspect at will," but not to detain nor arrest German personnel. The RYPE men had reported brushes with German troops on narrow streets. It culminated with five German ships cruising the harbor with their crews chanting "Sieg Heil." The next morning Colby called the German commander to say that he would be inspecting the ships at 0900. Reluctant crews were silent as Colby's inspections were made. The German crews received word from Colby that the war was over.

The Mission is Over

On May 24, 1945, Commander G. Unger Vetlesen radioed to Borge Langeland at Namsos to close down Langeland's station. That was the last transmission Operation RYPE received. RYPE then turned its equipment over to MILORG. On May 28, 1945, Hans Skabo and Colonel Hans Reidar Holterman had a meeting in Trondheim and decided
that Major Colby's role in Namsos was over and his group of thirty men should join NORSO Operations at Vaernes Airport. On June 1, 1945, the Namsos group sailed to Trondheim, then was trucked to Vaernes to begin garrison duty. Major Colby was placed in charge of the NORSO Group, which was split into three units. On June 2, 1945, the first contingent of Allied Occupation Forces arrived in Trondheim under the command of a British Brigadier (a British general officer). On June 9, 1945, the O.S.S. NORSO Group acted as an honor guard for Crown Prince Olav of Norway. The Crown Prince found a standing ovation and a warm reception by his subjects.

The mission was over and all the men of NORSO Operations took leave to visit relatives in Norway. One visit ended on a sad note: one of the members of RYPE found that his family had collaborated with the enemy, and they were under arrest. Crushed by this, he became an American citizen, never to return to Norway.
ENDNOTES


2 Langeland, "RYPE", pp. 16-19.

3 Colby, Honorable Men, p. 47.


5 Colby, Honorable Men, p. 47.

6 Langeland, "RYPE", pp. 16-19.


8 Langeland, "RYPE", pp. 16-19.

9 Colby, Honorable Men, p. 47.


11 Colby, Honorable Men, p. 47.


13 Interview with Alf Paulsen, Westside Community center, 108th and Grover, Omaha, Nebraska, March 1, 1989.


23. Ibid.


31 O.S.S. Norso Group 313D, pp. 1-3.

32 O.S.S. Norso Group 314B, Appendix IX, Messages to and from "RYPE" pp. 1-6.

33 O.S.S. Norso Group 313E, pp. 1-2.


40 Langeland, "RYPE", p. 21.


42 Langeland, "RYPE", p. 21.


45  Langeland, "RYPE", p. 22.
46  Colby, Honorable Men, p. 48.
49  Langeland, "RYPE", p. 22.
51  Colby, Honorable Men, p. 48.
52  Langeland, "RYPE", p. 22.
54  Langeland, "RYPE", p. 22.
57  O.S.S. Norso Group 314B, Appendix IX, Telegrams to and from "RYPE" pp. 1-6.
58  Ibid.
59  Colby, Honorable Men, p. 49.
60  O.S.S. Norso Group 313H, pp. 1-2.


Colby, Honorable Men, p. 49.


O.S.S. Norso Group 314B, Appendix IX, Telegrams to and from "RYPE" pp. 1-6.


O.S.S. Norso Group 314B, Appendix IX, Telegrams to and from "RYPE" pp. 1-6.

O.S.S. Norso Group 314B, Appendix IX, Messages to and from "RYPE" pp. 1-6.

76 O.S.S. Norso Group 314B, Appendix IX, Messages to and from "RYPE" pp. 1-6.

77 Ibid.

78 Ibid.

79 Petrow, The Bitter Years, pp. 264-265.

80 Ibid., p. 266.

81 Ibid.

82 Ibid., pp. 266-267.

83 Petrow, The Bitter Years, pp. 313-314.

84 Ibid., 315.

85 Petrow, The Bitter Years, p. 331.

86 Ibid., p. 337.

87 Ibid.

88 Ibid., p. 338.

89 O.S.S. Norso Group 314B, Appendix IX, Telegrams to and from "RYPE" pp. 1-6.

90 Ibid.

91 Langeland, "RYPE", p. 31.

92 Colby, Honorable Men, p. 49.
Reunion, Chapel Service at Fort Bliss, Texas, William E. Colby, February 5, 1989. Andersen, who died the month before the reunion, was reimbursed for his livestock by the United States.

Langeland, "RYPE", p. 31.

O.S.S. Norso Group 314B, Appendix IX, Telegrams to and from "RYPE" pp. 1-6.

Ibid.

"Oftenaasen is steep." Holterman's response was to be: "Fra den ser man syv kirker" (From there one can see seven churches).

Langeland, "RYPE", p. 34.

Colby, Honorable Men, p. 49.

Langeland, "RYPE", p. 34.

Ibid.

Colby, Honorable Men, pp. 49-50.

Langeland, "RYPE", p. 34.

Colby, Honorable Men, p. 50.

Ibid.

Langeland, "RYPE", p. 34.

O.S.S. Norso Group 314B, Appendix IX, Telegrams to and from "RYPE" pp. 1-6.
Interview, Borge Langeland, Reunion, Feb. 4, 1989.

O.S.S. Norso Group 314B, Appendix IX, Telegrams to and from "RYPE" pp. 1-6.

Interview, Kai Johnson, Reunion, Feb. 4, 1989.

Ibid.

Langeland, "RYPE", p. 35.

O.S.S. Norso Group 314A, pp. 1-5.

Langeland, "RYPE", p. 35.

O.S.S. Norso Group 314A, pp. 1-5.

Colby, Honorable Men, p. 50.

O.S.S. Norso Group 314A, pp. 1-5.

Colby, Honorable Men, p. 50.

O.S.S. Norso Group 314A, pp. 1-5.

Colby, Honorable Men, pp. 50-51.

Langeland, "RYPE", p. 34.


Interview, Anonymous, Reunion, Feb. 4, 1945.
CONCLUSION

In the conduct of unconventional warfare deep behind enemy lines, the RYPE mission serves as a classic example to military planners as to its unqualified success, yet it points to the unacceptably high costs involved in order to deliver and support it.

On March 24, 1945, the air support for Operation RYPE got off to a very bad start. Of the eighty men trained for the mission, thirty-six were chosen to parachute into Norway. Of these, five were accidentally dropped into neutral Sweden. Ten paratroopers and fourteen airmen were killed trying to get into Norway. B-24 Liberators were used to delivering O.S.S. teams at night by moonlight behind enemy lines at very low altitudes. This type of aircraft was especially suitable for use in Norway because its range exceeded that of any bomber in the European theatre. Unfortunately, many engines malfunctioned during flights and the level of maintenance which the B-24 required placed an excessive burden on repair crews. Aircrews had little experience in flying the far north, and in winter operations over Scandinavia, they encountered unfamiliar misty and cloudy obstructions over the drop zones. Besides, they discovered that from an aircraft over
Norway in wintertime, "everything on the ground looks the same."

The field operations of the RYPE mission went quite well. The drop on the snow-covered frozen Lake Jaevsjö in a remote area near the Swedish frontier in the North Tröndelag District was accomplished as planned on March 24, 1945. Although broken ankles and legs were typically a part of O.S.S. drops behind enemy lines, sixteen members of RYPE parachuted down to the lake without major injuries. Due to the foul winter, resupply and reinforcement by air were unsuccessful: this eliminated, as the RYPE mission's primary target for destruction, the formidable railroad bridge over the Grana River. Instead on April 14, 1945, RYPE destroyed the Nordland Railway bridge at Tangen. To reach Tangen, the men had to ski as far as seventy-five miles to their target, each taking turns pulling sixty pounds of plastic explosives on toboggans. On April 25, 1945, RYPE destroyed two-and-one-half kilometers of railways in a remote area in the Lurudal Valley. Upon completion of these sabotage operations, the men had to outski the pursuing German ski patrols. The RYPE mission was an unqualified success in meeting O.S.S. criteria for a successful strike: (1) approach the target undetected; (2) destroy the target; (3) incur no casualties, and; (4) escape capture by the pursuing enemy. RYPE thus slowed down German troop movements along the Nordland Railway from
one battalion a week to one battalion a month.

Upon further study of the RYPE mission, one discovers that the railroad bridge at Tangen was not very big and its repair would require no engineering genius. Also, as it turned out, Russian forced labor quickly repaired the railways at Luradal. One may thus wonder how the sabotage operations conducted by RYPE arguably helped the Allies end the war in Europe.

To understand why RYPE's achievements were important, one must study the strategic environment of which it was a part. After the Allies won the Battle of the Bulge from December, 1944, through January, 1945, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) perceived that Nazi Germany was about to collapse. SHAEF was nonetheless concerned that the German High Command might decide to bring back to Germany from northern Norway, 150,000 crack German S.S. mountain troops, then retreating in the face of Russian attacks. In this event, impassable snow-covered roads in northern Norway, and British control of the high seas would dictate German use of the Nordland Railway to transport its mountain Divisions southward. SHAEF consequently ordered missions like RYPE repeatedly to damage this and other railways. In one night alone, Allied saboteurs damaged Norwegian transportation networks in 750 places. The teams of saboteurs had radios and wireless contact with Special Forces Headquarters (SGHQ) in London.
to report their accomplishments and pinpoint the locations of German units.

Because Norwegians, from 1940 on, pleaded with the Allies to stop the bombing in Norway, sabotage was the only allowed alternative. Within SFHQ, the British Special Operations Executive (S.O.E.), the American O.S.S. Special operations (S.O.), and the Forsvarets Overkommando Fire (F.O.IV) (The Norwegian High Command) coordinated the sabotage activities for Norway. F.O.IV controlled the Military Organization (MILORG), the Norwegian Armed Forces in hiding in Norway and Sweden.

Neutral Sweden's role during World War II should also be considered. When Norway and Denmark were occupied by German troops on April 9, 1940, Sweden feared that she might also be occupied. Sweden behaved cautiously, and its policy to Norway was of unfriendliness. Norway and Sweden shared a long frontier across which many Norwegians fled the Gestapo. When the tide of war in 1943 turned against Nazi Germany, Swedish fears of German occupation subsided. The Norwegian Government-in Exile in London, with the approval of Swedish Authorities, established "health camps" for Norwegians in Sweden, of military age, to give them two to three weeks of military training. These evolved into "police reserves" and eventually into regular MILORG units. In 1944, the British made an agreement with Sweden and MILORG to establish "weather
stations" in Sweden next to the northern frontier of Norway. They were in reality, "little Gibraltars" that housed MILORG personnel, weapons and supplies to be used in operations against the enemy in Norway. The WOODLARK party, located in Jagthytta in Sweden near Lake Jaevsjö in Norway, aided in the reception of the RYPE party on March 24, 1945. MILORG couriers carrying written correspondence that could not be transmitted by wireless, shuttled between Stockholm and Lake Jaevsjö for the RYPE mission. This form of communication with MILORG in Stockholm and eventually with SFHQ in London was excellent: no mail was intercepted by alien agents.

On May 6, 1945, German forces capitulated in Norway. On May 11, 1945, SFHQ radioed RYPE to come down from the hills, report to MILORG leaders, and begin to take the orderly surrender of 4,000 German troops, as American and British occupying forces did not arrive in the North Tröndelag area until June.

By itself, the RYPE mission did not win nor very much hasten the winning of World War II. But, along with other Allied operations in Norway, such as WOOD PECKER, LAPWING, GREBE, FIELDFARE, WOODLARK, FREETHORPE, LARK, CRAMLINGTON, WAXWING, COTON, and CONCRETE MIXER, it took the surrender of 150,000 German troops, who were transported home, by the Allies to a Germany, capitulated and in ruin.

On May 24, 1945, Major William E. Colby, the RYPE
team leader (and a future director of the Central Intelligence Agency) wrote a memorandum to O.S.S. Headquarters in Washington, D.C., in which he asserted that the RYPE experience could teach the O.S.S. some valuable lessons. As we move into the 1990's, Colby's influence is still evident in American Special Forces doctrine.

For example, most members of the Free French of the Interior (F.F.I.) did not have the luxury of training in Great Britain. Colby parachuted into France after "D" Day to immediately encounter German forces in continuous fighting. Two officers did not have the time to train his F.F.I. force in the use of modern weapons. What Colby found was a large and enthusiastic group, but no leadership nor concepts of military strategy within it. The actual leadership of the partisans should be exercised by men chosen from their ranks.

By contrast, the O.S.S. intended the RYPE operation to be independent of local Norwegian resistance forces. Because reinforcements from Scotland did not arrive, the RYPE party, to achieve its objectives, had to recruit from MILORG sources, men who were already trained in unconventional warfare.

Each unit of partisans was to be organized as a company with three platoons, each with an American officer and sergeant as advisors. Each platoon had three squads, each with an American sergeant as advisor (the
present Team "A", "B", "C" concept) and interpreters were assigned at all levels of command. Had RYPE been at full strength, Colby concluded, smaller groups in rotation could have kept the Nordland railways completely out of service.

Operation RYPE taught the O.S.S. that air support must be delivered accurately and on time, in spite of the elements. Less than a fifty-percent delivery rate was unacceptable to the O.S.S.: new navigational technologies, aircrew training procedures, and maintenance support systems had to be developed for future O.S.S. activities by the Army Air Force.

Fortunately, resupply by land from a neighboring neutral country was possible. But, resupply procedures from Sweden should have been developed by the O.S.S., even before the RYPE party dropped into Norway: for RYPE, the biggest problem was food. The advantage of resupply from a neighboring country became most obvious to the O.S.S., only after the RYPE mission air support failed.

In short, the planners of Operation RYPE did not take Murphy's Law into consideration: if something can go wrong, it will. Without the counsel of an engineer nor of one from a representative of the Army Air Force, hastily planned, shrouded in secrecy, the RYPE mission became vulnerable to the oldest law on the books. Planners of future special forces operations must anticipate the worst in difficult missions and be cautious in committing brave men to them.
ENDNOTES

1 Cave-Brown, Secret Wars, pp. 311-318. Also see Petrow, The Bitter Years. Also see letter to author from Jon Moan, 7120 Leksvik, Norway, January 30, 1990. Also see Trondheim, Norway VG, March 25, 1989. Moan was a member of the WOODLARK Party.


APPENDIX I

William E. Colby letter to O.S.S.
SUBJECT: Recommended Special Operations.

TO: Chief, Special Branch, Office of Strategic Services, Washington, D.C.

THROUGH: Chief, Special Operations Branch, OSS Detachment (Malta) European Theater of Operations, APO 413.

1. The undersigned has taken part in the Jedburgh operation in France as a member of team BRUCE, organizing and assisting the French Forces of the Interior of the Department of the Tonne. He has also taken part in Operation Rype, leading a small force of American soldiers, who were formerly under Operational Group Command, in a sabotage mission against the Nordland Railway in North Trondelag, Norway. The following recommendations are a result of the experiences gained during these two operations. It is hoped that they can be of some use in planning and prosecuting the war in the Pacific theater.

2. The Jedburgh operation was intended to furnish military advice, leadership, a means of providing arms, and a connection with the overall strategic plan to forces which were large and enthusiastic, though untrained, disorganized, and without experienced leaders. It was limited by the fact that only two officers were available to do all this work. They were often swamped with work and had to forego doing certain useful work because more important things arose which took all their time. In this manner the opportunity was lost to instruct all personnel in all modern weapons and battle technique. Considerable dependence, also, had to be placed on the knowledge and leadership of men who had had no military work in four years and who used the techniques which had lost the last campaign they had seen. When many separate attacks were being conducted, many of the untrained men and leaders had no choice but to conduct them unassisted, relying more on enthusiasm and courage than on military knowledge.

3. The Rype operation was intended to stop the German railway communications passing through its area. It was intended to be independent of any resistance forces and to hinder the enemy only through what its members could do directly. Each man thus applied his ability and training directly to the enemy and did not extend their effect by operating indirectly through many men whom he had trained in new methods of fighting and whom he then led.
Due to the small number of men involved in the operation it was necessary for security's sake to keep them together and operate only as one unit, attacking the objective on separate occasions and leaving it undisturbed during the intervals. Had the men been able each to lead small parties there could have been continuous attacks against the objective, and it could have been kept out of operation completely.

4. It is realized that the men used in work involving leadership and training of resistance forces should have special training and qualifications for the job, and that all men who could serve as ordinary soldiers in operations such as Rype would not necessarily work out in that character. Men could be found, however, and the language barrier should not be insurmountable, provided interpreters were available to transmit advice.

5. As a result of these experiences, recommend for future special operations the despatching of a party consisting of one field officer, four company grade officers, radio personnel and approximately fifteen sergeants. With this party guerrilla force of one hundred and fifty men could be organized and brought to a high degree of training and could be used on separate simultaneous attacks. In this manner, with the same cost and effort involved in the Rype operation, the effect would be that of about one hundred and fifty men instead of twenty. The actual leadership of the partisans should be done by men chosen from amongst themselves and the Americans should function as advisors. The overall leader could be American, as, on a higher level, command can be carried through interpreters while leadership in the field at the NCO level cannot, though advice can be passed to one leader. In coordinating the activities of the force with the larger strategic plan, it would be better if the commander were of the same nationality as his headquarters so that he would understand its working and it would know with whom it was dealing. The unit would be organized as a company, with three platoons, each with an American officer and sergeant as advisors. Each platoon would have three squads, each with an American sergeant as advisor. There would then remain one extra officer and three sergeants to operate a headquarters and take care of any administrative arrangements necessary.

6. The present NORSO GROUP is available as a pool from which to draw the men necessary to carry out this plan, should it be adopted.

WILLIAM E. COLBY
Major, FA
Commanding
APPENDIX II

O.S.S. Comics
TRUTH is stranger and a thousand times more thrilling than FICTION
CHAPTER III IN OCTOBER, 1944, THE OCCUPYING FORCE OF A HALF-MILLION GERMANS IN NORWAY WAS A SERIOUS MENACE TO THE ALLIED CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN EUROPE UNTIL THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES STEPPED IN.

SOON, IN SCOTLAND, UNDER THE COMMAND OF MAJOR WILLIAM COLEY...

AT OSS HEADQUARTERS IN WASHINGTON...

IT'S OUR JOB TO TRAP FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND GERMANS IN NORWAY BEFORE THEY REACH THE WESTERN FRONT FOR THEIR EXPECTED SPRING OFFENSIVE.

TRAINING OPERATIONS MUST BEGIN AT ONCE.

THE SECRET WARRIORS

CHAPTER III IN OCTOBER, 1944, THE OCCUPYING FORCE OF A HALF-MILLION GERMANS IN NORWAY WAS A SERIOUS MENACE TO THE ALLIED CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN EUROPE UNTIL THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES STEPPED IN.

SOON, IN SCOTLAND, UNDER THE COMMAND OF MAJOR WILLIAM COLEY...

AT OSS HEADQUARTERS IN WASHINGTON...

IT'S OUR JOB TO TRAP FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND GERMANS IN NORWAY BEFORE THEY REACH THE WESTERN FRONT FOR THEIR EXPECTED SPRING OFFENSIVE.

TRAINING OPERATIONS MUST BEGIN AT ONCE.
FINALLY, IN JANUARY, 1945...

TAKE IT EASY, BILL.

YOU'LL BE HEARING FROM US.

BUT...

WE CAN'T MAKE IT THROUGH THIS BLIZZARD.

GUESS WE'LL HAVE TO TURN BACK.

IN FEBRUARY THEY WERE FORCED BACK AGAIN. THEN ON APRIL 1, FORTY-TWO MEN MADE A THIRD TRY.

WEATHERMAN REPORTS A SEVERE BLIZZARD AHEAD, BILL.

WE'RE TOO FAR TO TURN BACK NOW.

WE'RE TOO FAR TO TURN BACK NOW.

TWO TRANSPORTS CRASHED INTO A MOUNTAIN KILLING TWENTY-ONE MEN. FIVE MEN OF THE GROUP WERE FORCED TO LAND IN NEUTRAL SWEDEN. COBLY AND FIFTEEN MEN PARACHUTED SAFELY DOWN.
GUESS YOU'LL HAVE TO TURN BACK.

SCATTERED, AFRAID OF BEING CAUGHT, IT WAS HOURS LATER BEFORE THEY ALL REUNITED.

A RENDEZVOUS WITH NORWEGIAN UNDERGROUND LEADERS HAD BEEN ARRANGED, AS THEY NEARED THE MEETING PLACE....

FRIEND - FROM BROOKLYN.

IS THE FISHING GOOD IN THIS LAKE?

HANDS UP! FRIEND OR FOE?

FOR A MOMENT, THE NORWEGIAN, AN ARDENT FISHERMAN, FORGOT THE PREARRANGED CODE.

TO TELL YOU THE TRUTH, IT'S NOT GOOD AT ALL.

YES, THE FISHING IS GOOD, PARTICULARLY IN WINTER.

THEN...

QUICKLY THE COMBINED GROUPS ORGANIZED FOR ACTION.

UNDERGROUND REPORTS ENEMY CONCENTRATIONS AT POINTS CX, SX, WX - MOVEMENT TOWARD BOD-OBJETIVE A UP COMING.

THE NORTHLAND RAILWAY, THE SOLE LINK CONNECTING NORTH AND SOUTH NORWAY, WAS THE FIRST OBJECTIVE.

WE'VE COME TWENTY-FIVE MILES. ABOUT SEVENTY-FIVE TO GO.

HOW MUCH FARTHER?
YOU KNOW THE MISSION—THAT BRIDGE MUST BE DESTROYED. GOOD LUCK!

Glad it's Sunday—guess the Nazis just don't guard on Sunday. Here's the time fuse.

That worked perfectly.

Look! They've discovered us.

After hours of skiing...

I think we've lost the Germans.

Yes, but those quislings are still on our trail.

For four days the chase continued through a steady blizzard.

One night...

Hey, Bill, look!

Quislings!
The next objective was a mile and a half of railway track at a key junction. Chuck, as soon as it starts to snow, take three men and sneak through that stand of spruce. Plant dynamite sticks all along the side of the track. We'll wait for you here.

That's the last of those traitors!

Later... A train! Quick down the embankment!

A few minutes later...

The steady flow of German troops to the south was halted.
THE FOUR MEN RETURNED TO THEIR GROUP, BUT THE GERMAN'S BEAK NEEDED TREATMENT. NO, YOU TWO, SEE IF YOU CAN GET HIM TO THE SWEDISH BORDER, BE SURE TO DISPARE YOUR INSIGNIA.

FIFTEEN HOURS LATER...

THE NORWEGIAN WAS LEFT IN AN ACCIDENT, CAN YOU GET HIM TO A HOSPITAL?

MEANTIME, THE NAZIS SKIED NON-STOP FOR FORTY MILES; FINALLY THEY TOOK THE GERMAN'S BUT... IT'S CHECKED, THE SUPPLIES. ALL WE HAVE LEFT IS ONE BAG OF FLOUR.

DAYB, LATER...

BARELY SKIED IN prospect, PARIS, BROOKLYN. ONLY THEN WE HAD HAMBURGERS.

AGGARD, BUT TRiumphant, AFTER JAMMING GERMAN PLANS, THE OSS TEAM HOUND UP ITS ACTIVITIES, BY ACCEPTING THE SURRENDER OF 4,000 NAZIS.

NEXT MONTH THE STORY OF AN OSS MAN AND HOW HE KEPT SILENT TO THE END.
APPENDIX III

TAPS

as of May, 1990

O.S.S. Norso Group
Killed in Action:

Bernard Hoagland
Lt. Blane E. Jones
Knut J. Falck
Robert N. Anderson
Bernard N. Iverson
Edward E. Kjelnes
Eddie O. Sondeno
Leif E. Meland
Trygve Berge
Johannes S. Rorvick
Gerard Ottersland
Lt. Walter "Mo" Larsen
Capt. William Larson

Deceased Since the War

Vernon L. Austreng
Sigurd M. Baro
Alf Arneson
Nolan Cooper
Lt. Glenn Farnsworth
Lawrence Fiskum
Herbert Helgensen
Arne I. Herstad
Clifford G. Kyllo
James C. Larson
Marinus Myrland
Albert Nordang
Col. Serge Obolensky
Tom Sather
Capt. Harry L. Solberg
Arnold E. Tvinnerheim
Capt. Melvin J. Hjeltness
Eddie M. Hovland
Lt. James C. Larson
Sievert Dymoe
Tom Gilbertsen
John Sunde
Delphis L. Bonin
Olaf Hall
Bernhard Tallakson
Kenneth Johnson
Ralph Lilleby
H. "Bud" Wehberg
Dr. Fred B. Agee, Jr.
Arne Harstad
Knut Joa
Asmund Gravdal
Alfred Anderson
BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

Exhibits, Maps, and Photos

Norge M1:50,000 - Serie M71: Topografisk Hovedkartserie.
1723 II Snasavatnet (Author's Holdings)
1823 I Andorsjoen
1823 III Snasa
1823 IV Grong
1923 I Murusjoen
1923 II Sorli
1923 III Blafjellhatten
1923 IV Nordu


Photos, Exhibits and Archives, Norges Hjemmefrontmuseum, Bygn. 21, Oslo mil/Akershus Festning, 0015 Oslo 1, Norge (tlf. 02/40 3137, Reidar Torp, Direktor).

Official Histories


Official Documents


SECONDARY WORKS

Books in English


Books in Norwegian


Manuscripts in English


Newspapers in English. Copies of clippings donated to author by Leif Öistad, 1312 Orange Avenue, Nederland, Texas.

Minneapolis Tribune, October 11, 1975.
Sunday Examiner and Chronicle, (San Francisco), April 12, 1978.
The Viking, (Camp Hale, CO), May 23, 1943.

Newspapers in Swedish. Copy of clipping donated to author by Leif Oistad, 1312 Orange Avenue, Nederland, Texas.
Östersundposten, (Östersund, Sweden), March 27, 1945.

Newspapers in Norwegian
Aftenblad, (Stavanger), September 3, 1939.
Aftenposten. (Oslo), September 29-30, 1938.
Aftenpost, (Oslo), October 10, 1981.
Dagbladet, (Oslo), April 8, 1940.
Fritt Folk, (Oslo), January 13, 1941.
Tidens Tegn, (Oslo), February 16, 1940.
VG, (Trondheim), March 25, 1989.
Magazines in Norwegian

Sonner av Norge, Duluth, Minnesota, May, 1940.

Edict in German


Royal Norwegian Government Information in English


Visual Presentations


Letters


Letter to Bruce H. Heimark, 5146 No. 105th St., Omaha, Nebraska 68134 from E. Carlmark Larson, 253 Belle Isle Villas, Georgetown, South Carolina 29440, June 12, 1989.

Interviews

Interview, Agneta Gaines, 2506 So. 95th St., Omaha, Nebraska 68124, May 12, 1989.

Interview, Harold Nipe, O.S.S. Norso Reunion, Sheraton Park West Hotel, El Paso, Texas, February 3-6, 1989.

Interview by telephone, Leif Öistad, 1312 Orange Avenue, Nederland, Texas 77627, June 21, 1989.
Interview by telephone, Leif Öistad, 1312 Orange Avenue, Nederland, Texas 77627, June 28, 1989.

Interview, Alf Paulsen, Westside Community Center, 108th and Grover Streets, Omaha, Nebraska, March 1, 1989.

Interview, Tom Sather, O.S.S. Norso Reunion, Sheraton Park West Hotel, El Paso, Texas, February 3-6, 1989.