The evolution and change of allied war-time policy and diplomacy as revealed through a study of postwar four power arrangements for dealing with the city of Berlin

Carola Erika Bergfeld
University of Nebraska at Omaha

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THE EVOLUTION AND CHANGE OF ALLIED WARTIME POLICY AND
DIPLOMACY AS REVEALED THROUGH A STUDY OF POSTWAR
FOUR POWER ARRANGEMENTS FOR DEALING WITH
THE CITY OF BERLIN

A Thesis

Presented to the
Department of History
and the
Faculty of the College of Graduate Studies
University of Omaha

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

by
Carola Erika Bergfeld
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Accepted for the faculty of the College of Graduate Studies of the University of Omaha, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts.

Chairman

Department

Graduate Committee

Frederick W. Adkins - History

Name

Department

Paul L. Beck - History

Amy P. Choy, Representative of Graduate School
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INTRODUCTION

In 1941, for the second time in the twentieth century, much of the world was at war. Once again, it was a struggle of life and death, a fight for survival of democracy directed against a dictatorial aggressor, Germany. In World War I, it had been the aim of the United States as expressed by President T. Woodrow Wilson "to make the world safe for democracy." This failed. During World War II, the United Nations fought for a similar goal, attempting to assure a better outcome by means of conferences in which they set forth their aims. The disastrous results of the Paris Peace Settlement had taught a lesson. It was thought that definite plans for postwar actions had to be agreed upon prior to the end of the fighting, if chaos was to be avoided and a reasonably stable future assured. Thus, to achieve the highly idealistic goal of a democratic world, it was determined to deal with postwar planning in a realistic manner at a series of Allied conferences.

In the subsequent Allied conferences, realism would again conflict with idealism. If the Western Allies alone could have negotiated, the outcome might have been promising for a workable solution. To coordinate their plans,
the Big Three had to find a common denominator for their discussions. The military task provided sufficient cohesiveness to bind the three together; yet, they neglected their different past. The Soviet Union was heir to the ancient Eastern cultures of the Assyroians and the Persians; the United States and Great Britain represented the old Western culture which had originated in Greece. Traditions, customs and philosophies were different.

When the Big Three were joined by France after the end of the war, the Four Powers were still separated by their ideologies, governments, methods of striving for a goal, and, most important, in their policies. This was a decisive barrier between them. To administer Germany according to the Four Power arrangements, agreed upon in the Allied conferences, required a similar approach from all parties involved. Since this commonality was lacking, Germany fell victim to the inter-Allied discord.

Berlin, as an embattled city between the Eastern and the Western forms of civilization, became the symbol of differing and changing ideas. The "hot war" that had been fought at Marathon, broke out anew in the form of a "cold war" in Berlin. The facade of accord erected at the Allied conferences crumbled and became manifested by the Berlin blockade, which once again divided the world along ancient political lines.
CHAPTER I
FROM THE ATLANTIC MEETING TO THE TEHERAN CONFERENCE
1941 - 1943

The Atlantic Meeting:
August 14, 1941

From the very outset of World War II, the United States, though officially neutral, had assumed a rather benevolent attitude toward countries at war with Germany. This was manifested in the help extended to Great Britain under the cash-and-carry program and later through lend-lease arrangements.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt skillfully steered the nation toward the day when the United States actively entered the war as a belligerent for the western cause.¹ By August, 1941, his intentions became quite evident. In the middle of this month, under the cover of secrecy, the President met with British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill on a battleship off the Newfoundland coast to discuss the situation. The result of their talks was announced to the world

in the form of the Atlantic Charter of August 14, 1941.\textsuperscript{2}

A week after the Atlantic Charter was signed, Roosevelt sent a message to Congress, explaining that at the meeting with Churchill definite plans had been developed to safeguard the world from Hitler's aggression.\textsuperscript{3} The President failed to elaborate on this point. Instead, the message included the text of the Atlantic Charter.

The Atlantic Declaration was an expression of common ideas rather than a clear statement as to the strategy to be pursued in the effort to defeat the Axis powers. The most important points of the Charter read as follows:

"First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other;
"Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned;
"Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them;
"Forth, they will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment of all states, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity;

.....

"Sixth, after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which


\textsuperscript{3}\textit{Ibid., p. 718.}
will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want; . . ."

The President concluded his message to Congress by stating that the principles set forth in the Atlantic Charter would have to be accepted by all nations, unless they wanted to be associated with nazism. 5

Certainly, the Charter enunciated democratic ideals. Although Roosevelt's closing remarks were somewhat limited, it might have been better had he instead referred to totalitarian systems in general. At this point, though, he seemed well justified; the men in the Kremlin, reading the signs of the time, played the tune the West wished to hear. The Soviet Union was one of the fifteen anti-Axis nations that had endorsed the Atlantic Declaration by September 24, 1941. 6

World reaction differed. The Charter undoubtedly stirred hope in the hearts of the people conquered by Germany, encouraging them to resist German aggression by the promise of a better future. Thus, the Declaration may have served a propaganda purpose. In Great Britain, however, it came as an anti-climax to the exciting tension that had developed when the Roosevelt-Churchill meeting was announced. From the first report Englishmen had hoped that the confer-

4Ibid., pp. 718-719. 5Ibid., p. 719.
ence would result in the entry of America into the war, and, thus, a mere enunciation of a set of common principles was a grave disappointment.\footnote{H. V. Morton, \textit{Atlantic Meeting} (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1944), p. 127.}

In spite of the inconclusiveness of the Atlantic Declaration, the importance of other events of 1941 cannot be overestimated. The wartime alliance of Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States of America, a reality by the end of the year, sprang from two costly blunders of the Axis powers during 1941. They were the German decision to invade Russia and the Japanese attack upon Pearl Harbor. While the war would continue for longer than three more years, the alliance of the Big Three, as the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R., and the U.S.A. were henceforth labeled, which came into being largely because of these actions, was to prove more than a match for the conquering German armies and the forces of Imperial Japan and their lesser allies.

If peacetime politics make for strange bedfellows, then war diplomacy seems to set aside most previously adhered to guidelines for the paramount issue at hand—the defeat of the enemy. Only in this light can the help, friendship, and confidence that the United States showered upon the Soviet Union be understood. Roosevelt and his staff felt quite sure they could cope with the Russian communists. Yet, their confidence was somewhat surprising considering...
that the United States had withheld recognition of the U.S.S.R. for fifteen years. Diplomatic relations were not established until 1933; therefore, America lacked crucial, extensive knowledge about the formative years of development of the Soviet giant.

Flashback: The Hitler-Stalin Pact

On August 23, 1939, the world was startled by the Hitler-Stalin Pact of non-aggression. A week later, World War II was triggered off when German troops marched into Poland. The correlation between these two events was obvious: Two dictators, whose political ideologies were diametrically opposed, shrewdly weighing the risks involved, had come to the conclusion that they had made a good deal—at least for the time being. Both had bought time. Hitler had avoided the danger of a two front war; Stalin had gained a vital break that enabled him frantically to increase and to speed up the Russian armament program. The West had to swallow the insult, since both England and France had wooed the Soviet Union in an effort to make her join them in a military


9Ibid.

entente against Germany. As a ruthless though astute statesman, Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin had viewed the Western approaches with extreme suspicion. He believed that it was the concealed aim of the West to push Russia into war with Germany in order to divert the impending German attack from their own frontiers. Interpreting Western promises for military aid in this light, he rejected those proposals. Once the German attack on Russia had become a reality, the Soviet Union, maneuvering in best Leninist tradition among conflicting interests, belatedly joined the Allies—and got all the Western help she needed. By Western standards, Stalin's actions were unprincipled, but they served the purpose.

The man in the White House forgave it all. Fifteen years of non-recognition were forgotten just as much as Russia's indirect part in the start of the war, when she sold out Poland by signing the Hitler-Stalin Pact. Not all Americans were so naive, though, in their attitude toward the U.S.S.R. Republican Senator Vandenberg continued to distrust the newly acquired ally for the democratic cause. In 1942, he was already alarmed that America would succumb to

11 Ibid.
Soviet wishes. The issue at hand was the top-secret visit of Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov to Washington in June of that year. Molotov demanded U.S. declarations of war against Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania, satellites of Germany, countries which were at war with Russia.\footnote{14} Senator Vandenberg felt that the request was legitimate enough, but by like token America could ask for a Russian declaration of war on Japan. Of course, none was forthcoming,\footnote{15} and the American request for airbases in Russia remained equally unanswered.\footnote{16}

Very little attention was paid to Senator Vandenberg's doubts about Soviet trustworthiness and suspicions of Russian designs. The minority opinion was swept aside by the growing crescendo of war. The turning point was 1943. Russia's victory in the Battle of Stalingrad turned out to be the beginning of the end. Actions on the various battlefronts naturally dominated the minds of the people immediately involved. For the statesmen, however, the time


\footnote{15}{Russia finally did declare war on Japan--on August 9, 1945, five days after the first atomic bomb fell on Hiroshima, in a last minute effort to get in on the spoils of the Japanese defeat. For reference to this episode see: Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. I: Year of Decisions (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1955), p. 425. Hereafter cited as Truman, Year of Decisions.}

\footnote{16}{Vandenberg Papers, pp. 31-32.}
for conferences had arrived. While the soldiers had to finish their jobs, diplomacy took over behind the scene to make plans for the postwar world.

The Casablanca Conference: January 14-24, 1943

Roosevelt and Churchill met frequently during the war to coordinate their plans. The last of their conferences to be dominated by military discussions of strategy was held in Casablanca from January 14 to January 24, 1943. If the Casablanca meeting would have been confined to purely military talks, its meaning in history would be obscure, today. It was the spectacular joint Roosevelt-Churchill press conference that guaranteed Casablanca a distinguished place in the annals of the Second World War. For the first time, Roosevelt publicly announced his policy of "Unconditional Surrender." In his closing remarks to the press, he said:

Another point. I think we all had it in our hearts and heads before, but I don’t think it has been put down on paper by the Prime Minister or myself, and that is the determination that peace can come to the world only by the total elimination of German and Japanese war power.

... The elimination of German, Japanese, and Italian war power means the unconditional surrender by Germany, Italy, and Japan.17

Unconditional Surrender has since become a matter of much speculation as to the effect on the war. Roosevelt quali-

fied his statement by going on to say:

... it [Unconditional Surrender] does mean the
destruction of the philosophies in those countries
which are based on conquest and the subjugation of
other people. 18

This latter part of his announcement would indicate that the
President talked about the destruction of philosophies, not
of people, but this qualification was to no avail.

Roosevelt had added fuel to the German propaganda
machine. German propaganda Minister Dr. Joseph Goebbels
used Unconditional Surrender as an appeal to the Germans to
rally behind the government, calling for absolute resistance
and the total war effort. 19 Whether Unconditional Surrender
prolonged the war or whether Germany would have fought to
the gruesome end anyway, can be a matter of speculation, on­
ly.

The majority of writers, in an attempt to estimate
the impact of Roosevelt's unforgettable utterance, wished the
words would have never crossed his lips. 20 Unconditional
Surrender was under discussion at Casablanca, but the Presi­
dent and the Prime Minister had reached no conclusion on
this subject. The communiqué, issued on January 26, 1943,

18 Ibid.

19 This was confirmed by a letter from Mrs. Liese-Lotte

20 The writer of this paper did not find a single
source indicating approval of the enunciation of Uncondi­
tional Surrender.
did not mention the fateful clause.\footsup{21}

The State Department Subcommittee on Security Problems, under the chairmanship of Norman Davis, had toiled with the problem of the end of the war.\footsup{22} Having been haunted by the "dagger legend,"\footsup{23} and in an effort to avoid the birth of another myth of this kind, the Subcommittee had recommended that:

On the assumption that the victory of the United Nations will be conclusive, unconditional surrender rather than an armistice should be sought from the principal enemy states. . . \footsup{24}

This recommendation was approved on May 21, 1942, more than six months before the Casablanca announcement. While in Casablanca, Churchill cabled the War Cabinet about Roosevelt's suggestion of Unconditional Surrender. The Cabinet


\footsup{23}The "dagger legend" sprang up after World War I, when an armistice was unconditionally accepted by the civilian head of the German delegation, Matthias Erzberger, before the German armies were actually defeated in the field. The Versailles Peace Treaty was the disastrous result. The idea developed that the military had been "stabbed in the back" by the civilians and that Germany would not have necessarily lost the war. For details see: Gebhardt (ed.), Handbuch der Deutschen Geschichte, Vol. IV, pp. 118-119.

\footsup{24}Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, p. 108.
did not challenge the idea.\textsuperscript{25}

The Prime Minister was reportedly appalled\textsuperscript{26} when the President blurted out his thoughts on this subject, but he immediately adjusted to the situation and, at least in public, supported Roosevelt.\textsuperscript{27} Privately, to his Foreign Minister, he confided that he doubted the wisdom of fusing the Germans "in a solid desperate block for whom there is no hope."\textsuperscript{28} Churchill further maintained that the announcement of Unconditional Surrender was probably meant as an act of defiance, since the war was not yet won.\textsuperscript{29} The victory of Stalingrad was gained the following week.\textsuperscript{30} Roosevelt himself stated later that he had had no intention of mentioning Unconditional Surrender until suddenly "the thought popped


\textsuperscript{26}Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, p. 110. See also Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, p. 686.


\textsuperscript{29}U.S. Senator Vandenberg shared Churchill's misgivings. See: Vandenberg Papers, p. 91.

\textsuperscript{30}Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 696.
into . . . [his] mind."\(^{31}\) Trying to determine how deeply the President's poor health affected his actions, is again a matter of pure speculation. Harry Hopkins, his closest personal adviser, noted that Roosevelt suffered from a fever during the days immediately following the Casablanca Conference.\(^{32}\)

As is so often the case with a big bureaucratic machinery, U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull seemed uninformed on the subject of Unconditional Surrender, as prepared by the State Department's Subcommittee on Security Problems. He shared Churchill's fears that the statement was rather premature, and that it would spur on the Germans to endless resistance.\(^{33}\) Aside of this point, Hull grasped the idea that Unconditional Surrender would necessitate an elaborate program in order to enable the conquering powers to administer the defeated nations down to the lowest local level. The Secretary felt the Allies were not prepared to take the overwhelming obligations that such a program would entail.\(^{34}\) It was the purpose of the following conferences to work out a plan—providing for Allied unity—that would

\(^{31}\) Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, p. 110.

\(^{32}\) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 695.


\(^{34}\) Ibid.
assure just such measures.

The Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers

The first Big Three meeting of any consequence was the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers which was held from October 19 to October 30, 1943. U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull and British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden were the guests of Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov. The primary subject of discussion was the postwar treatment of Germany. Although it was still too early in the war to advance any definite proposals, the foundation for the future postwar Europe was laid at this first tripartite conference. This was done when the foreign ministers, acting upon a motion introduced by Eden, established the European Advisory Commission (EAC), with headquarters in London. The EAC was to serve as a sounding board for Allied ideas; more specifically, it was designated to draw up detailed suggestions as to the postwar treatment of Germany. After emphasizing the warm atmosphere of confidence which characterized the meeting, the official communiqué, issued on November 1, 1943, made a rather hazy reference to initial steps

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36 Hull, Memoirs, p. 1283.
that had been taken in regard to the future of Germany.\textsuperscript{37} For the first time at this conference, the dismemberment of Germany was being considered. The idea, first developed in the U.S. State Department, had found subsequent approval by President Roosevelt; and although Secretary Hull personally did not favor the plan, he presented the suggestion to his Allied colleagues.\textsuperscript{38} Molotov reported it to Stalin. At the following conference meeting, the Soviet Foreign Minister gave his enthusiastic support to the proposal. The Russians liked the idea so much that, with the consent of Hull, they resolved to make dismemberment a Soviet plan.\textsuperscript{39}

This first tripartite conference was concluded in such good spirits, probably because the foreign ministers stayed on rather general ground. The hard bargaining sessions when drafts would have to be hammered out in detail were still hidden in the future. General agreement was reached that Germany, with the exception of East Prussia which was to be completely detached from Germany, should be reduced to her borders of 1937. All other questions were referred to the EAC for detailed study.\textsuperscript{40}

\textsuperscript{37}\textit{Basic American Documents, 1941-49}, pp. 10-11.
\textsuperscript{38}\textit{Hull, Memoirs}, pp. 1284-1287.
\textsuperscript{39}\textit{Ibid.}
Encouraged by the harmony that characterized the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, the Big Three were now anxious to meet in person. Roosevelt and Churchill, of course, were old acquaintances; neither one of them had yet encountered Stalin. The trio convened for their first summit meeting in the Persian capital of Teheran, from November 28 to December 1, 1943. These days set the pattern for what was to follow. Stalin, showing his jovial side as long as things were going his way, completely charmed Roosevelt, managing at the same time never to concede on a point of importance. "Roosevelt felt sure that... Stalin was 'getable,' despite his bludgeoning tactics and his attitude of cynicism toward such matters as the rights of small nations." The President was certain that Russia, her wishes being granted, would be "cooperative in maintaining the peace of the postwar world." It might have been a bles-

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Note: Two ways of spelling the name of the Persian capital, Teheran and/or Tehran, are correct. Different authors vary.

42 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 798-799.

43 Ibid., p. 799.
singing that he died before becoming utterly disillusioned.  

During the Teheran Conference, harmony prevailed between Roosevelt and Stalin with only a minor discordant point arising. The Soviet leader casually questioned the astuteness of Unconditional Surrender as long as the implications were not clearly defined to the Germans. The subject was dropped, since more important topics were on the agenda. But Roosevelt did not forget Stalin's criticism; this was the President's brainchild with which he did not wish to be harassed. He expressed his irritation in a memorandum to Cordell Hull.

The most important military decision, to be reached at Teheran, was the issue of the opening of the Second Front. OVERLORD (the code name for the Atlantic invasion), had been a matter of Anglo-American-Russian concern since the very outset of their alliance. Prior to Stalingrad, the Soviets had continually pressed for the Second Front, with the intent to gain some relief for their beleaguered nation. Although plans were in the making, the West had so

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45 Foreign Relations: Tehran, p. 513.


47 Alexander Werth, Russia at War: 1941-1945 (New York:
far been unable to respond with action. Allied forces were
tied in the Mediterranean and the Pacific. Toward the end
of 1943, the tide had turned. Russia's confidence increased
daily due to the rapid westward advance of the Red Army.
Even though tremendous sacrifices lay still ahead, the Sovi­
et Union was confident of final victory. Future political
considerations, therefore, could again assume a more promi­
nent role in the minds of the Kremlin leaders; and they did.
Soviet Foreign Vice-Commissar Alexander Korneichuk was preoc­
cupied with political implications of the Russian offensive.
During the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, he indis­
creethly revealed to British war correspondent Werth:

Things are going so well on our front that it might be even better not to have the Second Front till next spring. If there were a Second Front right now, the Germans might allow Germany to be occupied by the Anglo-Americans. It would make us look pretty silly. Better to go on bombing them for another winter; and also let their army freeze another winter in Russia; then get the Red Army right up to Germany, and then start the Second Front. 49

The Russian's wish became reality; by D-Day, June 6, 1944, the Red Army penetration into Eastern Europe was under way.
At Teheran, the launching date for OVERLORD was set for May, 1944. 50 Preceding discussions at the conference were sometimes stormy. Churchill's political instinct did

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not give in to Russian geniality. Suspecting possible Soviet schemes, he suggested to support OVERLORD by simultaneously launching minor Allied invasions in Italy and through the Eastern Mediterranean. Stalin objected. Since the President failed to support the Prime Minister, this strategy was abandoned. Roosevelt later recalled:

Whenever the P.M. argued for our invasion through the Balkans . . . it was quite obvious to everyone in the room what he really meant. That he was above all anxious to knife up into central Europe, in order to keep the Red Army out of Austria and Romania, even Hungary, if possible. Stalin knew it, I knew it, everybody knew it.53

Then he went on to say: "Trouble is, the P.M. is thinking too much of the postwar, and where England will be. He's scared of letting the Russians get too strong." Considering that America, in spite of isolationist tendencies at home, had got embroiled in two world wars, originating in Europe, the President's lack of concern as to "the postwar" was both appalling and tragic. This attitude endeared him to the Russians who became deeply suspicious of Churchill. Roosevelt was spared when, only two months after Teheran, the Soviet Press embarked upon its first anti-Western campaign. They charged the Prime Minister with conducting se-

51 Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 345.
52 Foreign Relations: Tehran, p. 490 and p. 537.
54 Ibid.
cret peace negotiations with the Germans, the very thing of which they had been guilty at the end of World War I.

At the dinner meeting, following the days dispute over the Atlantic invasion, Stalin used every opportunity "to get a dig in at Mr. Churchill." Obviously, the Soviet Premier believed offense to be the best defense. He must have worried about the Prime Minister's political perceptiveness concerning Soviet schemes.

Another problem, discussed at Teheran, was the fateful question of Polish frontiers. Although there still was a Polish government, functioning from exile in London, it had no administrative powers. Officially, the State of Poland had ceased to exist once the German armies had swept the country in September, 1939. She had been annexed to provide German Lebensraum. What had been Poland was divided between Germany and the Soviet Union in accordance with the secret clause of the Hitler-Stalin Pact.

It was up to the Big Three to reconstitute the Polish territory. Churchill agreed with Stalin's suggestion that the Poles would not be included in the preliminary

55 Werth, Russia at War, p. 755.
56 Foreign Relations: Tehran, p. 553.
57 It is interesting to note that Germany suffered a somewhat similar fate after World War II, although the situation was reversed—Germany, as a country, retained her territory (at least part of it), but she had lost her sovereignty, since there was no German government. Sovereignty was not restored until May 5, 1955.
talks, but that they might be asked to join the discussions at a later stage. At this crucial stage, people whose future was about to be determined, were denied the right to voice their opinion—in direct contradiction to the Atlantic Charter.

At the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, tentative agreement had been reached to reinstate Germany's borders as of 1937. At Teheran, the Allies deviated for the first time from this plan. Stalin was interested in retaining the Polish territory which the Soviet Union had gained as her share of the Hitler-Stalin Pact. In order to win the Western Allies over to the Russian viewpoint, he suggested to compensate Poland at Germany's expense. Poland was to move westward all the way to the Oder River. Roosevelt withheld his opinion while Churchill, inspired by the idea, compared the proposed border movement to soldiers' "left close" drill exercise. To give even more color to his comparison, he "illustrated his point with three matches representing the Soviet Union, Poland and Germany." The Prime Minister's response indicated his understanding of the Soviet plan, but not his agreement. Foreign Minister Eden

58 Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 362.
59 Supra, p. 16.
60 Foreign Relations: Tehran, p. 510.
61 Ibid., p. 512. 62 Ibid.
scornfully told the Russians that border they were proposing coincided with the "Molotov-Ribbentrop Line."\(^{63}\) Molotov countered that it was the Curzon Line.\(^ {64}\) The Americans stayed out of this dispute, probably preferring to treat this intricate question as a matter of purely European concern. For the time being, the problem was shelved. During the Yalta Conference, the plan would move again into the center of discussion.

The last important matter, briefly discussed at Tehran, was Germany. Since the EAC had been established to work out detailed plans,\(^ {65}\) Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin were not under pressure to reach conclusive decisions. They were free to toss up whatever ideas they had in mind. Dismemberment was repeatedly mentioned until the talks were postponed for later consideration.\(^ {66}\) Stalin suggested the

\(^{63}\) Ibid., pp. 599-600. Ribbentrop was the German Foreign Minister who negotiated with Molotov the Hitler-Stalin Pact of 1939.

\(^{64}\) The territory under discussion east of those lines of demarkation had long been a source of dispute between Russia and Poland. The U.S.S.R. claimed it as part of White Russia and the Ukraine; Poland countered that the area was primarily inhabited by Poles. To settle the century old conflict, the Curzon line was drawn up by the Allies in 1919. The Poles felt cheated. During the 1920's, they regained parts of the territory east of the Curzon line by armed raids, when the newly established Soviet Union was too weak to resist. For details see Gebhardt (ed.), Handbuch der Deutschen Geschichte, Vol. IV, p. 104.

\(^{65}\) Supra, p. 15.

\(^{66}\) Foreign Relations: Tehran, pp. 600-603.
execution of the entire German officer's corps as a precaution to prevent a rebirth of German aggression. Churchill was shocked; Roosevelt took it as a joke. Macabre remarks of this nature made it obvious that the Big Three had run out of valid topics demanding immediate, combined deliberations.

Before final adjournment of the Teheran Conference, they issued the "Declaration of the Three Powers." The declaration, reinforcing the Atlantic Charter, also gave ringing endorsement to Allied unity. To the public the Allied leaders conveyed the illusion that they were: "friends in fact, in spirit and in purpose."

Presenting the enemy with a united front has always been one of the most effective propaganda tricks. Therefore, public criticism of the President's war policies by members of the U.S. Congress might have been interpreted by constituents as unpatriotic. On the surface it appeared as if Roosevelt's policies found full approval, since critics of his administration were helpless. Roosevelt failed to inform Congress about plans developed at the Allied confer-

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68 Foreign Relations: Tehran, pp. 640-641.

69 Ibid., p. 641.
ences.\textsuperscript{70} Secrecy, necessitated by war security measures, provided him with a convenient excuse. Senator Vandenberg, distrusting the President, noted in March, 1944: "I deeply fear that there are many sad and tragic disillusionments ahead."\textsuperscript{71} Vandenberg's pessimism, however prophetic, was an exception to the general prevailing mood. As 1943 changed to 1944, most people felt that they had sound reasons to be optimistic. The chain of Allied military victories appeared to be unending; and, according to the news releases, the intensified diplomatic activities seemed to forge the alliance into genuine international friendship.

\textsuperscript{70}\textit{Vandenberg Papers}, pp. 91-92.
\textsuperscript{71}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 92.
CHAPTER II

FROM THE SECOND QUEBEC CONFERENCE TO THE YALTA CONFERENCE
1944 - 1945

The Second Quebec Conference:
September 11-17, 1944

During 1944, the war entered the final stage. As the armed forces of the United Nations came dangerously close to her borders, defeat of Germany became inevitable. The Red Army threatened from the East; the Anglo-American forces, after the successful European invasion through Normandy, pushed on from the West. Germany's final collapse was only a matter of time. Therefore, the issue of a postwar settlement became more pressing. Diplomatic activities had to increase in order to keep up with the rapid military advances. On the national and international scene, postwar plans for Germany entered a more definite stage. It became evident in the subsequent conferences that national interests became more pronounced, yet the Big Three continued to strive for cooperation.

Roosevelt and Churchill met at Quebec in September 1944, to reconsider and coordinate Anglo-American policy. The treatment to be accorded postwar Germany was the main
topic on the agenda. The Second Quebec Conference gained a prominent place in history, because the Morgenthau Plan, which aimed at reducing Germany to a predominantly pastoral society, though later rejected, was tentatively approved at this meeting.²

Serious divergencies had previously arisen among the members of the U.S. Cabinet. The plan, contrary to the usual assumption, had not been developed by Henry Morgenthau, Jr., the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, but rather had its origin in the lower echelon of the War Department, where a Colonel Bernstein, disregarding usual Army channels, forwarded a copy to Secretary Morgenthau.³ The latter picked up the idea and presented it to the President, in August 1944. At this time, only two-and-a-half months after the United States had suffered heavy casualties in operation OVERLORD, Roosevelt was in no mood to show mercy toward the enemy. He adopted Morgenthau's plan and, in a memorandum to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, reprimanded the War De-


²Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People, p. 760.

partment for being too "soft" on Germany." Roosevelt thought that:

the Germans . . . should be stripped clean and should not have a level of subsistence above the lowest level of the people they had conquered.5 U.S. Army soup kitchens could supply the Germans well enough to keep them alive.6 In the memorandum to Stimson, the President further stated:

The German people as a whole must have it driven home to them that the whole nation has been engaged in a lawless conspiracy against the decencies of modern civilization.7

This statement was in contradiction to Roosevelt's qualifying remarks at the Casablanca press conference, when he announced his policy of Unconditional Surrender, explaining that it would not mean the destruction of people but of philosophies.8 But it expressed his line of thoughts just prior to his meeting with Churchill at Quebec. It was in this mood that Roosevelt appointed Morgenthau to head a committee dealing with German affairs, much to the dismay of both Hull and Stimson.9

Probably the most amazing aspect in the Morgenthau

4 Hull, Memoirs, p. 1602.
5 Forrestal Diaries, p. 10.
6 Ibid. See also Hull, Memoirs, p. 1602.
7 Hull, Memoirs, p. 1602.
8 Supra, p. 11.
9 Forrestal Diaries, p. 11.
Plan episode was the fact that the Secretary of State was hardly consulted on the issue. Hull learned of the adoption of the plan when he got a copy of Roosevelt's memorandum to Stimson of August 26, 1944.\(^{10}\) Because diplomacy and strategy intermingled during the war, the Departments of State and War worked along similar though separate lines toward a peace settlement. The Department of the Treasury, however, had hitherto not been considered to be responsible for the task of forming or advancing postwar policies concerning Germany. At Quebec, Churchill was surprised to see Morgenthau in the capacity of presidential adviser rather than Hull, who had been left behind in Washington.\(^{11}\) In spite of the Prime Minister's strong opposition to the plan, the President and his Secretary of the Treasury eventually got Churchill to give it a chance by agreeing to serious, joint consideration.\(^{12}\) Correlating Germany's industrial power with her war potential, they argued that her industry had to be eliminated in order to prevent a rebirth of the German threat.\(^{13}\)

Once back in England, after having escaped the persuasive powers of his American counterpart, Churchill felt

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\(^{10}\)Hull, Memoirs, p. 1602.


\(^{12}\)Ibid.

\(^{13}\)Ibid.
that the Morgenthau Plan would carry the idea of subjecting Germany "to an ultralogical conclusion." He agreed with his War Cabinet that the proposal should not be adopted.

American Cabinet members reacted in a similar way, when Morgenthau's seeming success became known. Secretary of State Hull was furious; he resigned two months later. Secretary of War Stimson had been opposed to the Plan from the beginning. He implored the President to abandon the idea of "a peace of vengeance." It was the fear of the War Department, as expressed by Assistant Secretary John J. McCloy, that the Morgenthau Plan would throw Germany into poverty, disorder, and chaos. This would immensely increase the difficulties of the American Army whose job it would be to restore order, following the anticipated total collapse of the Third Reich. Faced with opposition at home and abroad, Roosevelt dropped the Plan. The President mentioned to Secretary Stimson that he could not recall how it had come to this Quebec agreement. "It must have been

\[14\] Ibid., p. 157.  
\[15\] Ibid.  
\[16\] Forrestal Diaries, p. 11.  
\[17\] Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People, p. 911.  
\[19\] Forrestal Diaries, pp. 11-12.
done . . . without much thought," Roosevelt said. Remnants of the Morgenthau Plan survived, and were to haunt American efforts for the first two postwar years.

The only other important plan concerning postwar Germany, under consideration at the Second Quebec Conference, was the matter of Allied zones of occupation in Germany. The Combined Chiefs of Staff presented a report which was unanimously approved. The combined chiefs suggested to award northwestern Germany to Great Britain; southwestern Germany was to go to the United States. Additionally, the United States would receive the port cities of Bremen and Bremerhaven so as to get direct access to the North Sea. This area would constitute an American enclave within the British occupation zone. American passage to and from the enclave through the British zone was guaranteed. As it turned out, the latter point had no particular importance, since the United States and the United Kingdom continued to cooperate even after the end of the war. In view of the work of the European Advisory Commission and the later Soviet challenge of free access to Berlin, it invited comparison.

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20 Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p. 186.
21 Infra, pp. 92-93.
23 Ibid.
The Work of the EAC

The EAC, formed to develop detailed plans for the Big Three occupation of Germany, had reached a draft agreement at the same time that Roosevelt and Churchill met in Quebec. A protocol on the zones of occupation and on the status of Berlin had been signed by the Big Three representatives to the EAC on September 12, 1944.\textsuperscript{24} The draft was subject to ratification by the Allied governments; it was approved by the United Kingdom in December 1944, followed by the approval of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. at the time of the Yalta Conference in February 1945.\textsuperscript{25} Germany, within her 1937 borders, was partitioned into three zones of occupation, of which the Soviet Union secured about two-thirds—all of central and eastern Germany. Berlin, lying ca. 150 miles deep within the Soviet Zone, was equally split up into occupation sectors. The pattern of division corresponded to the rest of Germany: The eastern portion was given to the Soviets, the British got the northwestern section of town, and the Americans took the southern part of the city.\textsuperscript{26} Free access to Berlin was not mentioned in the document.

This and subsequent fateful omissions were caused by...

\textsuperscript{25} ibid., p. 20, 21.
\textsuperscript{26} ibid., p. 19, 21.
split authority. Too many groups worked on the solution to the German problem; frustration was bound to be the result. Apart from the difficulty of reaching agreement with the Russians, American endeavors were overshadowed by divergent opinions, expressed by representatives of the Departments of State, of War, and by personal envoys of the President. The only unifying directive was Roosevelt's expressed desire to get along with the Russians and to convince the Soviets of the sincere American wish to cooperate with them.  

Different Americans believed in different approaches of how to best impress this upon the Soviet leaders. John C. Winant, U.S. Representative on the European Advisory Commission, thought that agreement had been reached because he had managed to gain the confidence of his Russian counterpart, F. T. Gousev. As a close personal friend of Roosevelt, Winant, although officially a member of the State Department, completely bypassed this channel of communication, feeling responsible to the President, only. James Riddleberger, a career diplomat and a member of the American EAC delegation, envisioned the dangerous pitfall of an American sector in a Berlin, surrounded by the Soviet Zone. Since free access from the Western zones to the Western sectors

28 Ibid., p. 232.  
29 Ibid.
had not been secured, Riddleberger developed a drastically new plan. Presenting his idea to Winant, Riddleberger collided head-on with his superior:

Winant accused me [Riddleberger] of not having any faith in Soviet intentions and I replied that on this he was exactly right. . . . I then suggested that the three zones should converge upon Berlin as the center of a pie, but this idea got nowhere because Winant was very much opposed to it.*5

Ambassador Robert D. Murphy, who had just been appointed political adviser on German affairs31 and who was to further distinguish himself in the first postwar years in Berlin working hand in hand with the later American Military Governor, General Lucius D. Clay,32 arrived in London in September 1944, when the tide of emotions over the EAC protocol was still running high. Feeling as uncomfortable as Riddleberger about the lack of guaranteed access routes to Berlin, Murphy showed his perceptiveness of Russian shrewdness in remarking to Winant that "[the Soviets] were sharp bargain- ers who expected other people to be the same."33 Sensing the implication and resenting it, Winant sharply reprimanded the Ambassador:

You [Murphy] have no right to come along at this late date and make such a proposal just after we have agreed upon a draft!34

*5 Ibid., p. 231. 31 Ibid., p. 226.
32 Infra, p. 60.
33 Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, p. 231.
34 Ibid.
Winant's anxiety that his accomplishment could possibly be frustrated by career diplomats was unfounded. Riddleberger's suggestion was never taken into serious consideration, and Murphy had no authority over Winant. The issue remained unsettled.

Toiling with the question of Allied administration of Germany, the EAC continued to work out details. The next agreement was reached on November 14, 1944. Upon the unconditional Surrender of Germany, an Allied Control Council was to assume supreme governing authority. The Control Council would consist of the Allied Military Governors and their staffs. The Control Council was to ensure uniformity of actions in regard to questions concerning Germany as a whole. Decisions would have to be unanimous. In this time of happy Anglo-American-Soviet unity, the latter provision might have appeared harmless. However, once the Russians saw fit to drop the mask, the veto power became their favorite tool to torpedo Western attempts in cooperative Allied administration.

While the Military Governors would have supreme authority in their respective zones, and the Control Council would only be used as an instrument for over-all policy, the constitutional make-up of the German capital was to be

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36 Ibid., p. 22. See also Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, pp. 359-360.
different. Berlin, it was planned, would be under joint Allied administration, constituting a separate entity from the rest of Germany. 37 The city would be governed by an inter-Allied Kommandatura, constituted by the Allied Commandants, that is the commanders of the different Berlin sectors and their staffs. The Kommandatura would be subordinate to the Control Council. 38 The November 14 EAC agreement was subsequently approved by the Big Three. 39 With the acceptance of those suggestions, the EAC had served its purpose; and since EAC plans were instrumental in shaping the postwar world, the institution gained fame.

The Moscow Conference: October 8-18, 1944.

High level deliberations concerning the postwar period were neither confined to Quebec nor to London. The spectacular advance of the Red Army enabled the Kremlin leaders to cast their horizons of foreign policy beyond the limits of the Soviet Union. Mother Russia's victory would allow a return to the over-all Communist goal—world domination. Germany had always been central to Soviet thinking. Her geographic position in the center of Europe was largely responsible for her importance in world power factors. Lenin had recognized this and had advocated the conversion of

37 Berlin Documents, p. 23.
38 Ibid.
Germany to communism, but the previous attempts of a take-over had failed.\textsuperscript{40} Events of July 20, 1944, when German resistance fighters had vainly tried to assassinate Hitler, had indicated that the chances to establish communism in Germany had not improved over the years. German underground fighters tended toward the democratic West.\textsuperscript{41} Therefore, the Soviet Union could not expect to look toward Germany as a potential ally against the Western capitalists. Stalin imagined instead the creation of a strong Communist Poland to serve as a buffer,\textsuperscript{42} and the incorporation into the realm of Soviet influence of as much of Europe as possible.

Churchill, meanwhile, as a seasoned veteran in power politics, had made a realistic appraisal of the situation. Since his plan to cut into the "soft under-belly" of Europe by launching a second invasion from the Balkans had not been approved at Teheran,\textsuperscript{43} Eastern Europe was open to Red Army conquest. The Prime Minister went to Moscow to confer with the Soviet Premier one month after the Quebec meeting. Churchill wanted to arrive at a compromise with Stalin in an

\textsuperscript{40} After World War I, the Communist inspired Spartacus Group attempted to cause a revolt but was defeated. For details see: Gebhardt (ed.), \textit{Handbuch der Deutschen Geschichte}, Vol. IV, p. 99.

\textsuperscript{41} Boris Meissner, \textit{Russland, die Westmächte und Deutschland; Die Sowjetische Deutschlandpolitik: 1943-1953} (Hamburg: H. H. Nolke Verlag, 1953), p. 96. Hereafter cited as Meissner, \textit{Russland, die Westmächte und Deutschland}.

\textsuperscript{42} \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{43} \textit{Supra}, pp. 19-20.
effort to save as much of Europe as possible. The issue was
settled among them at their first Kremlin meeting. At Chur-
chill's suggestion, Rumania and Bulgaria were to be domi-
nated by Russia; in Hungary and Yugoslavia, Russian and
Western predominance were to be equally shared; and Greece
was to come under British influence. Realizing that the
whole deal had taken only a few minutes, Churchill felt a
pang of conscience:

Might it not be thought rather cynical if it seemed
we disposed of these issues, so fateful to millions
of people, in such an offhand manner?

Stalin reassured him.

In contrast to their encounter at Teheran, the Mos-
cow meeting of the two leaders was characterized by harmony.
Churchill commended "the great chief of the Russian
State" in glowing terms at a Moscow press conference.
The Prime Minister's main purpose in conferring with the So-
viet Premier seems to have been guided by the desire to ap-
pease Stalin. Privately, Churchill never condoned the Geor-
gian's tactics.

Soviet schemes became quite evident, again, when the
topic of discussion centered on the Polish question. Stalin
kept insisting on the Curzon line as the future border be-

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46 Werth, Russia at War, p. 915.
tween the U.S.S.R. and Poland. Under the cover of wishing to fully compensate Poland, Stalin suggested for the first time to move Poland not only as far west as the Oder River but instead all the way to the Neisse River, and also to include the German cities of Breslau and Stettin in the future Poland. The Polish Premier of the government-in-exile, Stanislaw Mikolajczyke, was present in Moscow. He refused to accept the Curzon line, angering Churchill who wanted him to come to terms with both the Kremlin and its so-called Lubin Polish National Committee. Compromise, the British Prime Minister felt, was better than the total loss of Poland to the democratic cause. No settlement was reached.

Leaving Moscow, Churchill was more justified than ever before in his suspicion toward Soviet intentions. The Lubin Poles "were mere pawns of Russia." They gave Churchill a foretaste of what was to plague Europe in the post-war world.

The Yalta Conference:
February 4-11, 1945

The Crimean Conference, better known as the Yalta Conference, came to be regarded as the most controversial of

47 Meissner, Russland die Weltmächte und Deutschland. p. 36.
49 Ibid.
the Big Three meetings. Based on Roosevelt's idealistic concept of an indivisible world, Yalta was hailed as proof that the Soviets and Western powers could peacefully work together. When the strife of the first postwar years brought about disillusionment, Western leaders attempted to justify the Yalta decisions, arguing that they were necessitated by the still most important aim of the United Nations at the time— the defeat of Germany. At Yalta, the Soviet Union was in a comfortable position. Since the victory at Stalingrad, the Red Army had steadily advanced and was well within the eastern part of Germany, when the Conference convened. Russia's imperial ambitions increased with every additional mile penetrated by the Red Army. Accordingly, she became more demanding toward her Allies, attempting to cloud her intentions with slogans calling for guarantees of Russian zones of security. Due to the military development, Great Britain and the United States were faced with a new balance of power among the Allies. The Yalta decisions resulted from this new East-West balance. This changed

50 Meissner, Russland, die Welthäkte und Deutschland, p. 53.
51 Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 402.
52 Letter from Mrs. Liese - Lotte Grosse, German housewife, Essen, Germany, April 20, 1967.
54 John L. Snell, et al., The Meaning of Yalta: Big Three Diplomacy and the New Balance of Power (Baton Rouge:
relationship of the distribution of power allowed the Soviet Union to return to the Marxist-Leninist guideline which projected two opposing world camps. In accordance with these traditional Communist beliefs, the U.S.S.R. attempted to secure as many satellite states as possible, in preparation of the future fight for the predominance in Europe and Asia.55

Thus, the stage for the Yalta Conference was set. The Soviets arrived intent on furthering their plans. Churchill, though well aware of the Russian danger, would again, as at the Teheran Conference, have to resign to the fact that he was unable to prevent Communist gains, as long as President Roosevelt was unwilling to give up his idealistic concept of the Russians. This did not happen. Only half-a-year before the Yalta meeting, Roosevelt had said in a conversation with Mikolajczyk:

Stalin is a realist, . . . and we mustn't forget when we judge Russian actions that the Soviet regime has had only few years of experience in international relations. But of one thing I'm certain: Stalin is not an imperialist.56

Keeping in mind the differing attitudes of the Big Three

55 Meissner, Russland, die Weltmächte und Deutschland, p. 54.

leaders toward one another, the outcome of Yalta was in no way amazing.

The Polish question demanded again a prominent place on the agenda. Since the Red Army had occupied the Polish territory, the West was confronted with a \textit{fait accompli} and had no choice but to accept it. For the sake of Allied unity, the United States and Great Britain agreed to grant recognition to the Provisional Government of Poland,\footnote{U.S. Department of State, \textit{Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers: The Conferences at Malta and Yalta: 1945}, Department of State Publication No. 6199 (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1955), p. 973. Hereafter cited as \textit{Foreign Relations: Yalta}.} basically made up of Lublin Poles. Recognition was withdrawn from the Polish government-in-exile, when they refused to abide by the Yalta decision which was regarded by the Poles as a verdict "in absentia."\footnote{Jan Ciechanowski, \textit{Defeat in Victory} (Garden City: New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1947), p. 396.} After the Soviets had secured recognition of their Polish government, agreement was reached to consider the Curzon line as the Polish-Russian border.\footnote{\textit{Foreign Relations: Yalta}, p. 974.} To compensate Poland at Germany's expense, was not a new idea. It had first found expression at the Teheran Conference,\footnote{\textit{Supra}, p. 22.} and had been brought up in the Stalin-Churchill Moscow talks.\footnote{\textit{Supra}, p. 39.} As at Moscow, when Churchill had remained uncommitted, Stalin again asked for the Oder-Neisse

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Line at Yalta. This time, the Prime Minister objected, stating that he did not want to "stuff the Polish goose until it dies of German indigestion." He was conscious of the fact that England would not favorably react to the forced deportation of millions of people. Although Stalin maintained that no Germans were left in the territory under discussion, having presumably all fled from the Red Army, Churchill would not have it. The matter was dropped and referred to the Peace Conference for a final decision.

Essentially, the Big Three meeting at Yalta followed the pattern first established at Teheran—and not only in matters of procedure. As at Teheran, Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt met at Yalta with the intention of adopting definite measures. Again, agreement could only be reached on general subjects. Specific plans would be discussed but decisions would be postponed to a later, unspecified time.

One such issue was the question of German reparations. Stalin suggested to set the bill at twenty billion dollars, demanding fifty percent of the total for the U.S.S.R. The United States, Great Britain, and all other

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63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid., p. 974. Up to this date, there has been no Peace Treaty for Germany. The German territories east of the Oder-Neisse line have been de facto under Polish administration since the end of World War II. They make up about one-third of Germany of 1937. De jure, recognition has never been granted to the Oder-Neisse Line by the West.
countries with a rightful claim were to share the other half of the reparations. At this point, President Roosevelt recalled the situation which had arisen after World War I, when the United States had made loans to Germany to enable her to pay her reparations. Roosevelt thought that the United States would not want to finance another such program. He dropped his punitive idea of feeding Germany by "Army soup kitchens" and declared instead:

I envision a Germany that is self-sustaining but not starving. There will be no lending of money ... leave Germany enough industry and work to keep her from starving.

Roosevelt also recommended the creation of a reparation commission to work out details. Such a commission was constituted with the seat in Moscow. Twenty billion dollars were adopted "as a basis for discussion," and the Big Three agreed to allot fifty percent to the U.S.S.R.

By the time the Big Three convened at Yalta, the EAC drafts for the occupation and control of Germany had been

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68 Supra, p. 28.
70 Ibid.
71 Foreign Relations: *Yalta*, p. 983.
72 Ibid.
approved by their governments.\textsuperscript{73} The question of Anglo-American access to Berlin had been considered a minor point which could be settled later by the zone commanders.\textsuperscript{74} The point was left in suspension at this Big Three Conference.\textsuperscript{75} Unconditional Surrender, though, in connection with intentions to dismember and to occupy Germany, became an issue once again. The British Prime Minister maintained that German resistance to the Allied war effort would increase if they were told about the dismemberment plans.\textsuperscript{76} The President agreed with the Soviet Premier that it should be included in the terms of surrender.\textsuperscript{77} Roosevelt thought that because of German suffering in the war, "... psychological warfare would [not] affect them any longer..."\textsuperscript{78} The Up-

\textsuperscript{73} Supra. pp. 32, 36.
\textsuperscript{74} Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, p. 533.
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid. Roosevelt was quite right. Germans, especially Berliners, had other things on their minds. Only one day before the opening of the Yalta Conference, the Allies had staged another super air attack on the city. As a result, Berliners were concerned with more pressing problems— to bury their dead. Due to the many casualties in the Allied raid of February 3, 1945, coffins were extremely scarce. It took some people three days of search to locate one. Reference to this episode was taken from a letter from Mrs. Liese-Lotte Grosse, German housewife, Essen, Germany, April 20, 1967.
shot of the discussion was a compromise. When the communi-
quée of the Yalta Conference was released to the press on
February 12, 1945, reference was made to the projected Al-
lied zones of occupation; but the exact terms for Uncondi-
tional Surrender were to be withheld until after the capit-
ulation of Germany. 79

Another matter concerning Germany was the admission
of France to the "extremely exclusive club" of the Big
Three. 80 Stalin raised some objections but in the end it
was agreed to carve a French zone and sector out of the Am-
erican and British zones and sectors respectively. An in-
vitation to France granting her membership on the Allied
Control Council was postponed to a later time. 81

79 Foreign Relations: Yalta, p. 970. Actually, Big
Three concern in this matter was unfounded, although they
did not know it. The German Armed Forces High Command (OKW)
was familiar with Allied plans of occupation. A complete
copy of "Operation Eclipse" [the plan's code name] had been
captured from the British during the German Ardennes offen-
sive, in January, 1945. For the complete story see: Corne-
lius Ryan, The Last Battle (New York: Simon and Schuster,
Battle.

On the whole, Germans were better informed than
might have been expected. Although their knowledge about
"Operation Eclipse" was not as detailed as that of their
leaders, the official NSDAP newspaper Völkischer Beobachter
made a first reference to the impending Yalta Conference on
February 2, 1945. On February 12, 1945, a long report sum-
med up what had become known of the conference, cited the
Swiss newspaper Züricher Zeitung as its source. See: Letter
from Mrs. Liese - Lotte Grosse, April 20, 1967.

80 Stettinius, Roosevelt and the Russians, p. 128.

81 Ibid., pp. 126-128. See also: Foreign Relations:
Just like the conference at Teheran, the Yalta Conference gave reinforcement to the Atlantic Charter. With the Declaration on Liberated Europe, the Allies pledged their

... determination to build in cooperation with other peace-loving nations a world order under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and the general well-being of all mankind.\textsuperscript{82}

This did not ring true to some critics of the Roosevelt administration in the United States. When questioned at a press conference, held aboard U.S.S. \textit{Quincy} en route from Yalta, about his interpretation of the Atlantic Charter and the application of its ideas to Poland, the President evaded the issue. He called the Atlantic Charter "a beautiful idea" that had been drawn up to boost England's morale in her darkest hour of need.\textsuperscript{83}

On March 1, 1945, President Roosevelt reported to Congress on the Yalta Conference.\textsuperscript{84} Senator Vandenberg, as a long-time critic of the administration, came away unconvinced that progress had been achieved. Because of the treatment accorded to Poland, he considered publicly to denounce the Yalta agreements, but then decided to abide by

\[82\text{Foreign Relations: Yalta, p. 972.}\]
\[84\text{Ibid., pp. 572-574.}\]
the Roosevelt-Churchill "stamp of approval."\textsuperscript{85}

The Big Three themselves seemed to have sensed that the road to continued cooperation in the postwar world would be filled with obstacles. As if to remind themselves, Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin declared:

Only with continuing and growing co-operation and understanding among our three countries and among all the peace-loving nations can the highest aspiration of humanity be realized—a secure and lasting peace which will, in the words of the Atlantic Charter, "afford assurance that all men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want."\textsuperscript{86}

The Yalta Conference—so-called high tide of Allied unity—closed on this note.

\textsuperscript{85}Vandenberg Papers, p. 155-156.

\textsuperscript{86}Foreign Relations: Yalta, p. 975.
FROM THE LAST WEEKS OF THE WAR TO THE POTS DAM CONFERENCE
MARCH TO AUGUST 1945

SHAEP'S Berlin Decision

After the adjournment of the Yalta Conference, the responsibility fell on the military for the concluding operations of World War II. The familiar pattern of statesmen and politicians issuing military directives of strategic importance was reversed when General Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander in the European Theater of War, decided against an Allied drive toward Berlin. This fateful decision was to be of lasting consequence in the ensuing political struggle between East and West.

Eisenhower's judgment was based upon military evidence, fact as well as fiction. The fact was that during the last week of March, 1945, the Allied Expeditionary Forces had crossed the Rhine River and had encircled the Ruhr pocket, Germany's most important industrial area.1 So far, the Anglo-American armies had advanced with breath-taking

speed. Looking toward Berlin, still approximately three hundred miles to the east, Eisenhower feared the logistic problem which would result from outrunning his supplies, should he venture to thrust a major spearhead toward the German capital. Since the Red Army had reached the Oder River, only about thirty miles east of Berlin, he reasoned that a race for Berlin was senseless. The Soviet forces were in a better position to capture the city.2

The fictitious basis for Eisenhower's decision, in comparison to these sober facts, was much more intriguing. American intelligence had supplied the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) with reports of Nazi planning for a so-called "National Redoubt" in the Bavarian Alps.3 As a result of German propaganda calling for ceaseless resistance, it was feared that after the defeat of the German armed forces, Nazi elite troops would retreat to the stronghold in an effort to prevent the inevitable—the end of the Third Reich. Eisenhower's opinion in this matter coincided with the assumption of American intelligence that prolonged guerilla fighting could result.4 A fantastic intelligence account, dated March 11, 1945, stated the fol-

2Ibid.


4Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 397.
Here [in the Bavarian mountains], defended by nature and by the most efficient secret weapons yet invented, the powers that have hitherto guided Germany will survive to reorganize her resurrection; here armaments will be manufactured in bomb-proof factories, food and equipment will be stored in vast underground caverns and specially selected corps of young men will be trained in guerilla warfare, so that a whole underground army can be fitted and directed to liberate Germany from occupying forces.  

The Supreme Allied Commander decided to spoil Germany's attempt at harassing Allied efforts. Captured German officers denied any knowledge of the "National Redoubt" which in turn strengthened SHAES's belief in the existence of this stronghold. Under these circumstances, Eisenhower "felt it to be more than unwise, it . . . [would be] stupid" to go for Berlin. He decided instead to thrust his major drive toward the south and to halt the Allied advance at the Elbe River. There, he would join forces with the Russians.

To correlate his strategy with that of the Red Army, Eisenhower informed Stalin of his plan. The Soviet Premier cabled back agreeing with the General that Berlin had lost its former strategic importance, and that he, too, would di-

6Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 397.
7Smith, Defense of Berlin, p. 37.
8Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 396.
9Ibid., p. 398.
vert his forces toward the South. The answer was a typical example of Communist deceit; the Kremlin leaders never trusted their Western Allies. As an expert in clouding the Soviet Union's postwar intentions but keeping these goals always uppermost in mind, Stalin assumed the Allies adhered to similar tactics. He believed that Eisenhower's message was an attempt to divert the Red Army from its ultimate goal of capturing Berlin, luring it southward instead. The Soviet Marshals Georgi K. Zhukov and Ivan Stepanovich Koniev were hastily recalled from the front for a Kremlin conference. Playin the personal rivalry between the two, Stalin ordered them to race their armies to Berlin.

Stalin was not completely wrong in his disbelief of Western blindness as to the importance of Berlin. Eisenhower's decision was viewed with mingled feelings not only among SHAEF's staff but also at the highest governmental levels in London and Washington. His correspondence with Stalin caused quite a stir. While Eisenhower maintained that his action had been within the range of his responsibility, British Prime Minister Churchill felt that the supreme Allied Commander had overstepped the limits of his responsibility.

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Churchill viewed the Red Army's advance with deep concern. He recognized the need of checking Soviet imperial aims. The European map was a strategic chess board. To come out at least at par with the U.S.S.R. after the cessation of hostilities, Churchill advocated to push as far east as possible, making Berlin "the prime and true objective of the Anglo-American armies."\(^\text{14}\)

In an effort to win his American Allies over to his viewpoint, Churchill sent a telegram to the American Chiefs of Staff, emphasizing the political and psychological significance of Berlin.\(^\text{15}\) But Washington stood firmly behind Eisenhower. President Roosevelt was half-amused, half-annoyed by Churchill's pessimistic interpretation of Russian intentions.\(^\text{16}\)

British Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery, serving under Eisenhower, shared Churchill's opinion. Montgomery was ready to march on Berlin when the SHAEF order to stop at the Elbe halted his drive. To Eisenhower, Berlin had become a mere "geographical location" in which he was disinterested.\(^\text{17}\) The German capital was now devoid of par-

\(^{\text{13}}\) Churchill, _Triumph and Tragedy_, p. 458.
\(^{\text{14}}\) Ibid., p. 456.
\(^{\text{15}}\) Ibid., p. 461.
\(^{\text{16}}\) Forrestal Diaries, pp. 36-37.
\(^{\text{17}}\) Toland, _The Last 100 Days_, p. 325.
ticular importance, Eisenhower wrote in a message to General George C. Marshall, and in a private conversation with Lieutenant General George S. Patton, Jr., Eisenhower asked the laconic question: "Well, who wants it [Berlin]?" Patton replied: "I think history will answer that question for you." He was right.

However, at this stage of the discussion Eisenhower won with his well-founded arguments that the Big Three, in accepting the EAC draft of September 12, 1944, had fixed the Allied zones of occupation. No matter how far the Anglo-American forces would advance eastward, they would have to retreat to the zonal demarkation lines in order to honor the agreement. The Supreme Allied Commander "was prepared to make an issue of it," due to his belief in the "military soundness" of his strategy. The plan was adopted. With

18 Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 401.
19 Toland, The Last 100 Days, p. 371.
20 Supra, p. 32.
21 Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 399.
22 Ibid., p. 403.
23 Re-evaluating this fateful decision with the advantage of hindsight, both Churchill and U.S. Ambassador Murphy came to a similar conclusion. The Prime Minister's political arguments for a drive toward Berlin fell on unfertile ground in Washington, since American foreign policy advisers were paralyzed and without a leader, as a result of President Roosevelt's rapidly failing strength. Therefore, the military leaders had to make the decision. They looked at the problem from the point of view of the professional soldier, failing to grasp the political issue at stake. See:
that the Soviets came an undreamed-of step closer to the realization of their goal—the transformation of Germany into another Russian satellite.

The Fall of Berlin and the Soviet Interpretation of Unconditional Surrender

The Battle of Berlin was launched by the Russians in the middle of April, 1945. On May 2, the German armed forces, defending the city, surrendered to the Russians. Thus, the fierce struggle which had been characterized by savage street fighting, ended.24

With the capture of the German capital, the Soviet Union had achieved her primary objective—to be omnipotent in the conquered territory. Lenin's dream of a Communist revolution in Germany had never come true. His heirs were eager to tackle the task of fashioning her according to his will.25 Defeated, her cities smoking rubble piles, her people numbed by the horrors of war and of conquest, Germany seemed to be a ripe fruit ready to be picked and to be put into the Soviet basket.

24For the most detailed and most vivid account of the Battle of Berlin to date see: Ryan, The Last Battle.

Preparations for the Communist take-over had been elaborate. The Soviet Military Administration (SMA) arrived with detailed plans of how to rebuild Germany according to the communist pattern. The mighty Red Army was considered to be one of the most effective Soviet tools; propaganda was another one. Persuasive slogans such as "Hitlers come and Hitlers go—the German people lives forever, J. V. Stalin," were plastered all over Russian occupied German territory. In order to appeal to the German national pride, the posters were appropriately printed in black-white-red letters—the traditional Prussian colors.

Even more effective than the SMA was a group of German Communists who had fled to the U.S.S.R. when Hitler came to power. In the Soviet Union, these German emigrants had graduated from the toughest schools of Communist subversion. Now, a selected group of ten under the guidance of Walter Ulbricht slipped back into Berlin. It was their task to start organizing a communist administration for the city.

"Group Ulbricht," as they were labeled, began its task the

26Ibid.  27Ibid., p. 13.  28Ibid.  29Ulbricht is the infamous leader of Moscow's puppet regime of the Soviet Zone in Germany. To date, he is the only remaining Stalinist among the leaders of the Soviet satellite states.  30Wolfgang Leonhard, Die Revolution entlässt ihre Kinder (Koln, Berlin: Kiepenhauer & Witsch, 1955), p. 332. Hereafter cited as Leonhard, Die Revolution entlässt ihre
day of the Berlin surrender—on May 2, 1945. Backed by the SMA and Marshal Zhukov's order which called for the creation of "anti-fascist" parties, Group Ulbricht located old Communist comrades who were drafted for the cause. Thus, adding members, the circle increased and "anti-fascist" cells developed in all of Berlin's twenty boroughs.

Moscow had issued definite instructions concerning the make-up of "anti-fascist" borough administrations. Ulbricht's directive advocated political patterns similar to those during the time of the Weimar Republic. This would give a democratic appearance to the administrations. However, the departments of personnel, education, and interior (police), and the first deputy mayor of every borough were to be, in each instance, reliable communists. The scheme was simple: It would seem to be democratic, yet all power would be in Communist hands. Group Ulbricht accomplished their task.

Kinder.

Ibid., p. 348.


Leonhard, Die Revolution entlässt ihre Kinder, pp. 352-353.

Ibid., p. 355. Ibid., pp. 356-357.

Ibid., p. 357. Ibid., p. 358.
The First Soviet-Anglo-American
Encounters in Berlin: An
Exercise in Big Three
Cooperation

The fall of Berlin signified the end of World War II. Six days later, on May 8, 1945, the Chiefs of Staff of the German Armed Forces High Command (OKW) signed the capitulation document, thereby accepting Unconditional Surrender. Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, Admiral Hans-Georg Friedeburg, and Colonel General Hans Jürgen Stumpff signed for the vanquished. The United Nations were represented by Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov and Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Arthur Tedder, Eisenhower's deputy at SHAEF.

A conflict arose among the victors at this first inter-Allied ceremony. General Charles de Gaulle decided that only Eisenhower could properly represent all of the West. Since he had not come to Berlin, the French leader instructed General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny to sign for France. This in turn caused U.S. General Carl Spaatz, who was also present, to demand the right to sign the document for the United States. The Russians stalled. Not until after

38 Walter Anger (ed.), Das Dritte Reich in Dokumenten (Frankfurt am Main: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1957), p. 204.
39 Ibid.
40 Toland, The Last 100 Days, p. 587.
41 Ibid., p. 588.
Marshal Zhukov had cleared the matter with Soviet Deputy Foreign Commissar Andrei Vishinsky, could the document of surrender be signed.42

Thus, World War II had come to an end—at least in Europe. With the defeat of Germany, the issue which had caused the East-West Alliance had ceased to exist. Although the disagreement prior to the signing of the Unconditional Surrender of Germany had been only minor, it cast foreboding shadows on the future.

Nearly another month passed until the Allies officially assumed responsibility for the government of Germany.43 A meeting of the Allied Commanders was held in Berlin on June 5, 1945, to sign the "Declaration Regarding [the] Assumption of Supreme Authority by [the] Allied Powers."44 At the same meeting, the "Statement on Zones of Occupation in Germany"45 and the "Statement on Control Machinery in Germany"46 which were omitted from the Yalta communique,47

42 Ibid.
44 Basic American Documents, 1941-49, pp. 506-507.
46 Berlin Documents, pp. 30-31.
47 Supra, p. 46.
were released to the press.48

The treatment accorded to Western zonal commanders upon their arrival in Berlin for the June 5 meeting revealed a typical Soviet trait—unpoliteness. To their annoyance, the generals had to wait for hours to sign these documents; the Soviets failed to explain the delay.49 Eventually, Eisenhower and Montgomery lost their patience. They notified Zhukov that they would leave Berlin unless the meeting was immediately convened. This action produced a startling result: Without further postponement the conference began,50 and the documents were signed.51

Having completed the ceremony, Eisenhower suggested to Zhukov to initiate proceedings leading toward the establishment of the Control Council. Eisenhower intended to leave his deputy, General Lucius D. Clay and his political adviser, Ambassador Robert D. Murphy, in Berlin, along with a small staff who could prepare the American entry into the

48The zones of occupation were those projected by the EAC draft agreement of September 12, 1944. Supra, p. 32. The control machinery, i.e. Control Council and Kommandatur, were adopted as planned by the EAC draft agreement of November 14, 1944. Supra, p. 35.


51Clay, Decision in Germany, p. 22.
Zhukov did not approve of the proposal. Obviously, the Soviet Military Governor was not authorized to make a decision without specific instructions from Moscow. Supported by Vishinsky, his political adviser, Zhukov argued that American withdrawal to the zonal lines of demarkation would be a prerequisite to Western entry into Berlin. Eisenhower did not insist on his proposal. He agreed to arranging the Western entry into Berlin simultaneously to the withdrawal from the Soviet zone.

In this first meeting of the Allied military governors, the Western leaders gained nothing but a foretaste of what peacetime cooperation with the Soviets would be like. The U.S.S.R. by contrast, boosted her prestige. From now on, the SMA could refer to inter-Allied documents as the basis for its claim to unlimited power; yet, as long as they were the sole occupation force in Berlin, the Soviets could openly pursue their policy of communist subversion.

The first American military party leaving for the German capital, was a reconnaissance force led by Colonel

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52 Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, p. 258. See also Clay, Decision in Germany, p. 22.

53 Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, p. 258. See also Clay, Decision in Germany, p. 23.

About one third of the Soviet zone, large portions of Thuringia, Saxony and Mecklenburg, had been overrun by Anglo-American forces, before the drive was halted. At this point, they still held the territory.

54 Clay, Decision in Germany, p. 23.
Frank L. Howley, who was to gain fame as the American commandant of Berlin. Starting from the city of Halle at daybreak of June 17, 1945, the Americans had to cover approximately 120 miles. Their journey was not over until long after dark, and they did not reach their destination. When Howley set out, he commanded a column of about 500 officers and men and 120 vehicles; upon arrival, his force had dwindled to exactly 37 officers, 50 vehicles, and 175 men.

Just six weeks before, the Americans and the Russians had been fighting a common enemy. Now, the Soviets saw fit to harass the mighty Western Ally. They caused the failure of Colonel Howley's reconnaissance mission. Being the first U.S. troops to plunge into territory held by the Red Army, they were ready to expect the unexpected. Nevertheless, the Russians held a surprise for them.

Hardly had the Americans crossed into Red Army territory, when their convoy was stopped by a road block. This was the beginning of the endless delay. At first, the Russians camouflaged their intentions by inviting Howley to a victory celebration. When the latter grew restive, anxious to go on with his mission, his Soviet counterpart dropped the friendly mask. Resorting to a favorite Soviet tech-

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56 Ibid., pp. 27, 34. 57 Ibid., pp. 27, 30-32.
58 Ibid., p. 29.
nique, the Russian alluded to "formalities" which had to be taken care of. He cited an obscure agreement that supposedly limited an American force to 37 officers, 50 vehicles, and 175 men. Helplessly exposed to Soviet whimsy, Howley had no choice but to cut down the number of his force accordingly. Then he was given permission to proceed. A Russian guided the convoy. But instead of using the four-lane Autobahn, leading directly to Berlin, the Russian guide followed cobble-stoned, secondary country roads.

In Babelsberg, a little town about ten miles southwest of Berlin, the trip ended. The Americans were brought to a compound near Potsdam which was readied for the soon to be held last Big Three conference. Kept "virtual prisoners" in this restricted environment, they were supposed to assist in the renovation of the compound. Since reconnaissance men were not of much use in this particular enterprise, Howley arranged to have them replaced by housekeeping troops. When the exchange of personnel was completed, Howley left for Halle to rejoin his unit. His first encounter with the Russians had been unpleasant, although it had been indicative of the Soviet attitude toward the Western Allies.

If it appeared for a while as if the Soviet Union

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59 Ibid., pp. 29-30. 60 Ibid., pp. 30-32.
61 Ibid., p. 32. 62 Ibid., p. 34.
63 Ibid., p. 36. 64 Ibid., p. 41.
was unwilling to embark upon the stormy sea of inter-Allied administration, then this interpretation of Soviet thinking was wrong. The U.S.S.R. could have chosen to consolidate her conquered eastern European empire by clamping down the "iron curtain" at the western-most point of Red Army advance. To honor, at least outwardly, the Big Three agreements meant to leave a loophole in the otherwise perfectly tight Communist grip on the overrun territories. Weighing the issues at stake, the Kremlin leaders' imperial ambitions won out. The Soviets wanted to add the rich German provinces of Saxony and Thuringia to their occupation zone. In exchange for them, the Russians were willing to admit the West to Berlin.

For the same reason that the Soviets decided in favor of adhering to the agreements, Churchill was against it. He argued that to withdraw the American Army to the zonal lines of demarkation would be equivalent to handing over to the communists an additional 120 mile deep strip on a 400 mile long front.\(^6\) He wrote to British Foreign Secretary Sir Anthony Eden:

Thus the territories under Russian control would include the Baltic provinces, all of Germany to the occupational line, all Czechoslovakia, a large part of Austria, the whole of Yugoslavia, Hungary, Rumania, [and] Bulgaria. . . . It would include all the great capitals of Middle Europe, including Berlin, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest, and

Urging U. S. President Harry S. Truman to re-evaluate the situation and not to withdraw the American troops, Churchill made a last attempt to stem the Soviet tide. The new President decided to abide by the Three Power agreements which had, after all, been negotiated under the auspices of his predecessor and the British Prime Minister.

The issue was settled in mid-June 1945, when Truman and Stalin exchanged telegrams on this subject. American withdrawal from the Soviet zone of occupation was to be concurrent to the movement of the Western forces to Berlin.

Truman also asked for "provision of free access for United States Forces by air, road and rail to Berlin from Frankfurt and Bremen." Truman's telegram to Stalin was the only written evidence of the Western powers' claim to the right of free access to and from the city. Stalin did not mention the point in his answer, but since the troop re-

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66 Ibid., pp. 502-503.
67 Truman succeeded to the presidency, when Roosevelt died on April 12, 1945. See Leahy, *I Was There*, p. 4.
68 *Truman, Year of Decisions*, p. 301.
69 Ibid., p. 303.
71 Ibid., p. 245. See also *Truman, Year of Decisions*, p. 303.
alignment was the result of these Soviet-American cables, his consent was implied.

To make final arrangements for the troop transfer, General Clay and his British colleague Lieutenant General Sir Ronald Weeks flew to Berlin for a conference with Marshal Zhukov. It was agreed to begin the transfer on July 1, which would permit the Americans to enter the German capital on Independence Day. Verbal agreement was reached on free Western access to Berlin. One railroad line, one major highway (Autobahn), and two air corridors were allocated to the Western Allies.

On July 4, 1945, Colonel Howley, as deputy of the first commandant of the U.S. sector, Major General Floyd Parks, was ready to take over the American sector of Berlin. Friction developed with the Soviets. In an attempt to delay action, Zhukov sent the following note to General Parks:

In view of the fact that Berlin is to be ruled by an Allied Kommandatur and that Kommandatur is not yet set up, your sector will not be turned over to you until the Kommandatur is set up.

Parks and Howley decided to ignore the Soviet breach of the Truman-Stalin agreement and to go ahead and to take over

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72 Clay, Decision in Germany, p. 24.
73 Ibid., p. 25.
74 Ibid., p. 26. See also Truman, Year of Decisions, p. 307.
their sector, anyway. The commandant cautioned his deputy: "Don't get into too much trouble. After all, the occupation is just beginning."\textsuperscript{76} Moving in at daybreak, Howley and his men set up the Office of American Military Government, United States (OMGUS).\textsuperscript{77} The Russians were faced with a fait accompli.\textsuperscript{78}

On July 7, 1945, the Allied military governors had another session. At this meeting, the Inter-Allied Military Kommandatura was formally established.\textsuperscript{79} Thereafter, inter-Allied accord was temporarily exhausted.

A dispute developed over the problem of supplying Berlin with food and coal. The capital had always drawn its major food supply from the surrounding farm belt and the east German provinces. Therefore, SHAEF had assumed that the task of feeding Berlin would be a Soviet responsibility. Now, Clay and Weeks were confronted with Zhukov's categorical refusal to bring in food for the Western sectors. As far as coal was concerned, the Soviet Marshal demanded that the city be supplied by Ruhr coal.\textsuperscript{80}

Bound by the clause of the EAC agreement that Con-

\textsuperscript{76}Ibid., pp. 48-49. See also Clay, Decision in Germany, p. 31.
\textsuperscript{77}Ibid., p. 49. \textsuperscript{78}Ibid., p. 50.
\textsuperscript{79}Documents on Germany under Occupation, p. 39.
\textsuperscript{80}Clay, Decision in Germany, pp. 27-28. See also Howley, Berlin Command, pp. 57-59.
trol Council decisions would have to be unanimous, the military governors had to reach a compromise. They did. Clay agreed to bringing in the food for the American sector, Weeks promised coal from the Ruhr, and Zhukov gratiously consented to furnish "some brown coal and hydroelectric power . . . from eastern Germany." Having scored a major victory, Zhukov adjourned the meeting.

The next meeting with the Russians took place on July 11, 1948. As it turned out, it was the first session of the Kommandatura; the commandants signed their first order. With this document, the Western governments indirectly consented to Soviet action in Berlin. These were the most important parts of the order:

Until special notice, all existing regulations and ordinances issued by the Commander of the Soviet Army Garrison and Military Commandant of . . . Berlin and by the German administration under Allied control . . . shall remain in force.

Unknowingly, the Western powers had approved of subversive elements such as Group Ulbricht and the likes.

The first proclamation of the Control Council, is-

81 Supra, p. 35.
82 Clay, Decision in Germany, pp. 28-29.
84 Ibid., p. 61.
85 Berlin Documents, p. 46.
86 Ibid. See also Howley, Berlin Command, p. 61.
sued after the opening session on July 30, 1945, was less
dramatic. It merely reiterated the points of the State-
ment on Control Machinery in Germany of June 5, 1945.

Four days before the first formal meeting of the
Control Council, France had finally been admitted to the ex-
tremely exclusive Allied club. The EAC protocol of Septem-
ber 12, 1944, had been amended to include France in the
agreement. Already at Yalta, a zone and a sector of occu-
pation had been allotted to her; with the EAC amendment of
July 26, 1945, France became a full-fledged member of the
Control Council and of the Kommandatura. Thus, nearly three
months after V-E Day, the Four Powers were set jointly to
administer Germany.

The Potsdam Conference:
July 16-August 2, 1945

Mounting friction among the Allies had increased ev-
er since the last weeks of the war in Europe. President
Truman was faced with the tremendous task of familiarizing
himself not only with his new job as President of the United
States but also with the problems of international arrange-
ments, inherited from his predecessor. Soon it became evi-

87 Berlin Documents, p. 47.
88 Supra, p. 59.
89 Berlin Documents, pp. 33-34.
90 Supra, p. 46.
dent that the impending break could only be avoided if the
Big Three could work out agreements at another top-level
conference.

To sound out the Allies and to prepare for this me­
eting, Truman appointed Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt's personal
adviser, and former American ambassador to the U.S.S.R. Jo­
seph E. Davies, as presidential emissaries to Moscow and
London, respectively. Hopkins and Davies went on their
missions during the last week of May, 1945.

The primary purpose of Hopkins' mission to Moscow
was to impress upon Stalin the fact that the change in U.S.
presidents did not entail a revision of American attitude
toward the Soviet Union. Truman intended to adhere to Roo­
sevelt's policies. Hopkins was a good choice for talks
with the Soviet dictator. As the late president's personal
friend, Hopkins was able to create a warm atmosphere in his
conversations with Stalin. Hopkins mentioned Roosevelt's
confidence after Yalta "that the United States and the Sovi­
et Union could work together in peace as they had in war." Turning to the sticky problem of Poland, where the Soviet­
backed Lublin government was rapidly erasing the last rem­
nants of democracy, Stalin and Hopkins expressed differing

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91 Truman, Year of Decisions, pp. 110, 258-259.
92 Ibid., pp. 259-260. 93 Ibid., p. 258.
94 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 888.
opinions. Hopkins outlined the American principle of the four freedoms. To Stalin, these were abstract ideas which could not be realized as long as the situation warranted absolute peace. But the Soviet Premier agreed to a Big Three Conference to settle the East-West problems. He insisted upon the area of Berlin as a meeting place for the proposed conference. July 15, 1945, was accepted by both the Soviet Union and the United States as the target date. The meeting was to be held in Potsdam, a suburb of Berlin.

The purpose of Davies' mission to London was to smooth the ruffled feathers of the British Prime Minister. Churchill's suspicions of Soviet intentions had increased over the years. With the end of the war in Europe, he felt that the common denominator between the Soviet Union on the one side and the United States and Great Britain on the other had vanished. To make the bill come out right, he advocated a radical revision of Western policy toward the U.S.S.R. Most important, he thought, was the maintenance of the Western armed forces in Europe. Demobilization should not set in before differences with the Soviet Union

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95 Ibid., p. 906. See also Truman, Year of Decisions, pp. 262-263.

96 Leahy, I Was There, p. 382. See also Truman, Year of Decisions, p. 263. Potsdam had a special historical and symbolic meaning. In a more glorious time of German history, it had been the residence of famous Prussian kings, such as Frederick the Great.
had been settled.\textsuperscript{97} Churchill specifically opposed a Western retreat to the projected zones of occupation.\textsuperscript{98}

Davies disagreed with Churchill. The American envoy insisted that strict adherence to the Yalta and EAC agreements provided the only possible road to cooperation with the Soviets and hence a peace settlement for the postwar world.\textsuperscript{99} The Prime Minister retained his pessimistic attitude. Passionately, he argued for his point-of-view; he was most disturbed by Russia's application of police state tactics in the submission of countries under Red Army occupation.\textsuperscript{100} Davies was frustrated with Churchill's continued opposition to America's expressed wish to get along with the Russians. In an effort to convert Churchill to a more lenient view of the U.S.S.R., he told him:

\begin{quote}
I [Davies] said that frankly, as I had listened to him [Churchill] inveigh so violently against the threat of Soviet domination and the spread of Communism in Europe, and disclose such a lack of confidence in the professions of good faith in Soviet leadership, I had wondered whether he, the Prime Minister, was now willing to declare to the world that he and Britain had made a mistake in not supporting
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[99]Truman, \textit{Year of Decisions}, p. 261.
\item[100]Leahy, \textit{I Was There}, p. 378.
\end{footnotes}
Hitler, for as I understood him, he was now expressing the doctrine which Hitler and Goebbels had been proclaiming and reiterating for the past four years in an effort to break up allied unity and 'divide and conquer.' Exactly the same conditions which he described and the same deductions were drawn from them as he now appeared to assert.¹⁰¹

Churchill, aware of the fact that England's position as a world power was subordinate to that of the United States, relented. In spite of maintaining that he pursued a harder line toward the U.S.S.R., he promised to support the United States in her effort to seek a solution to the differences which beset the Big Three alliance.¹⁰²

The Potsdam Conference, last of the Big Three meetings, took place from July 16 to August 2, 1945.¹⁰³ Prime Minister Churchill had suggested the code name TERMINAL,¹⁰⁴ meant to symbolize the successful conclusion of the war in Europe. It came to reach a much deeper meaning, for the Potsdam Conference represented the end of one era and the beginning of another. Most obvious was the change in lead-

¹⁰¹*Foreign Relations: Potsdam,* p. 73. See also *Leahy, I Was There,* pp. 378-379. Not only in the light of postwar developments but also in view of Western reaction to the outbreak of World War II, Davies' statement was stunning. Great Britain, after all, had been the first to declare war on Germany. While the Soviets made the Hitler-Stalin pact, the United States waited until after Pearl Harbor to get into the war.

¹⁰²*Leahy, I Was There,* p. 380.


¹⁰⁴*Truman, Year of Decisions,* p. 333. See also *Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors,* p. 279.
ership. President Truman occupied Roosevelt's chair; Clement R. Attlee replaced Churchill as British Prime Minister midway through the conference, following the latter's defeat in the general elections.\footnote{105} TERMINAL also signified the end of naziism and fascism and the beginning of a new order.\footnote{106} Finally, the Conference symbolized the end of the Big Three Alliance. Completing the hot war they had fought together, they initiated the cold war fighting one another.\footnote{107} Churchill later redubbed the Conference's code name; he called it FRUSTRATION.\footnote{108}

The Prime Minister's disillusionment was understandable. No progress was made. In order to come up with some results, agreements had to be so much watered down by compromise that they became utterly ineffective. Truman left

\footnote{105}Truman, Year of Decisions, p. 395. See also Leahy, I Was There, p. 417. Although there was no perceptible change in British policies at Potsdam, the excitement that had characterized the Stalin-Churchill exchanges was missing. The Soviets were cool and condescending in their treatment of Attlee and his party. See Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, pp. 275-276; and Leahy, I Was There, p. 419.

\footnote{106}Unfortunately, this new order failed to bring peace to the world. Soviet subversive actions were in full swing, while the Potsdam Conference was in session. The SNA ordered the confiscation of private property and initiated the land reform leading to the establishment of the collective farm system in the Soviet zone of Germany. See: Klimov, The Terror Machine, p. 125. At the same time, Communist indoctrination courses were held weekly, all over the Soviet zone. See: Leonhard, Die Revolution entlässt ihre Kinder, p. 417.

\footnote{107}Smith, The Defense of Berlin, p. 90.

\footnote{108}Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 668.
Potsdam resolved never again to expose himself to the annoying Soviet tactics at the conference table. 109

The first controversial subject to be discussed at Potsdam was Poland. At Yalta, the Western leaders had no choice but to accept the Soviet-backed Polish Provisional Government; at Potsdam the Western Allies were confronted with another Soviet fait accompli—the extension of Poland to the Oder-Neisse Line. 110 Truman charged the Russians with violating the Yalta agreement by setting up a separate Polish zone of occupation. Stalin defended the action by maintaining that the Poles were only helping the Red Army to administer the territory. 111 Although the Soviet dictator insisted that all Germans had fled the area, the President and the Prime Minister were concerned with the fate of the nine million Germans who had inhabited the land. 112 Since an agreement was impossible, the three heads of government reverted to the Yalta decision: "Final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should await the peace settle-

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109 Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, p. 279.


111 Truman, Year of Decisions, pp. 367-368.

112 Ibid., p. 369. See also Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, pp. 658-659.
ment." Indirectly, the Western Allies consented to the annexation of the German land east of the Oder-Neisse Line. The Potsdam protocol provided for the "orderly and humane" transfer of Germans from those territories to the four Allied zones of occupation. 114

Following Yalta, the idea to dismember Germany had been dropped. 115 The plan jointly to administer Germany in matters affecting the whole country was adopted instead. Reiterating the Yalta proposal, the Control Council was designated to govern. 116 Thus, the Potsdam protocol was merely a repetition of Allied principles, a guide for the Control Council to be used as a basis for their deliberations. No specific mention was made of the status of Berlin. Obviously, this had been considered unnecessary. The EAC agreements were quite specific. 117

Opposition to the dismemberment of Germany was welcomed by the Kremlin leaders for a number of reasons. For one thing, the propaganda value was not to be underestima-

113 Berlin Documents, p. 40. See also Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p. 81.

114 Ibid., p. 41.


116 Berlin Documents, p. 38.

117 Joachim Rottmann, Der Viermächte--Status Berlins (Bonn, Berlin: Bundesministerium für gesamtdoische Fragen, 1959), p. 16.
ted. The Soviets knew that the Germans feared dismemberment. Mixing truth with lies, Stalin declared in his victory speech that the Soviet Union had no intention "to dismember or to destroy Germany." A more important reason for Russian opposition to dismemberment was of economic nature. Soviet reparation claims and participation in the anticapped international administration of the Ruhr's industrial area had a better chance to be realized if Germany was governed as a unit.

The Soviet Union ran into unexpected strong opposition when the discussion turned to the question of reparations. Basing their claim for ten billion dollars on the Yalta protocol, the Soviet leaders had to be reminded that this sum had been accepted as a basis for discussion only. The problem could not be solved. It was referred to the Control Council for deliberation.

Probably the most important Potsdam decision was the agreement to treat Germany "as a single economic unit." Since the heads of government could not agree at Potsdam, their representatives on the Control Council could hardly be

119 Meissner, Russland, die Weltmächte und Deutschland, p. 70.
120 Clay, Decision in Germany, p. 39.
121 Berlin Documents, p. 39.
122 Ibid., p. 38.
expected to be more successful. Yet, this provision bound the military governors to the often exasperating, always futile attempt to act in unison—an impossible task.

Realizing that the Big Three could not reach agreements at Potsdam, they reverted to their favorite method—postponement. For this purpose, the Council of Foreign Ministers was set up with a permanent seat in London. The foreign ministers were to continue the negotiations for a peace settlement. France and China were invited to join. Together the nations might work out their outstanding differences.

The Potsdam Protocol was held in general terms, for there was no agreement on specific issues. A poor guide for Allied policy, it failed to look toward the future, but instead was based upon the assumption that Allied unity was a reality. But this had become a dream of the past by the time the Big Three met at Potsdam. Subsequent events in Berlin were an outgrowth of the East-West split. The Big Three leaders had not been able to bridge the gap.

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123 Berlin Documents, p. 34.
124 Ibid., p. 35.
125 Ratchford and Ross, Berlin Reparations Assignment, p. 44.
CHAPTER IV

BERLIN--MICROCOSM OF POSTWAR DEVELOPMENTS.

1945 - 1949

The Inter-Allied Administration of Berlin: 1945-1947

World War II had brought Germany to the brink of oblivion. Not since the Napoleonic Wars had battles scorched her soil. Now, the devastation was worse than anything ever experienced before.¹ The degree of destruction in Berlin was particularly high, partly as a result of Allied bombings, and partly due to heavy Soviet artillery shelling during the Battle of Berlin.² Troops of the Western Allies on their arrival in the German capital were stunned by the extent of the destruction. To remove the rubble, it was estimated, would take sixteen years, using "ten trains a day,


of fifty wagons each." The appearance was misleading. Life emerged from underneath the smoking ruins. Yet, long before the outer destruction scarred, Berlin underwent a spiritual rebirth which restored to the Germans an honorable place among the peoples of the world. In the ensuing East-West struggle, Berlin came to symbolize man's eternal quest for freedom.

It was only when the Western powers took over their sectors of occupation, that the Berliners began to recover from the shock of the Soviet conquest. At first, they were fascinated observers of the drama of inter-Allied administration. Soon, they themselves entered the stage and like the chorus in a Greek tragedy, added substance to the play making their appraisal of the principal actors. The Western nations assumed the role of the underdog. The Soviets had prepared the basis for the division of Germany while they

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3 McInnis et al., The Shaping of Postwar Germany, p. 103.
4 Infra, p. 111.
6 Completing the analogy to a Greek tragedy, Aristotle's definition of a hero is noteworthy. According to the philosopher, the hero's misfortune is brought down upon him by himself due to an "error in judgment," also known as the "tragic flaw." The tragedy is an unexpected result of the "error in judgment."
were sole rulers of Berlin. During this time, communications with the Western powers concerning joint Allied control were practically non-existent. Once the inter-Allied machinery had been set up, it became evident that the separately developed plans were so divergent that combined administration was vitally hampered from the very beginning. Subsequent developments resulted not so much from the policy of any one of the Allies toward Germany but were conditioned by the inter-Allied character of the occupation.

The quadripartite adventure of inter-Allied administration lacked harmony from the very outset. The forms of disagreement ranged from verbal battles to physical fights. At the top level, the military governors fought verbally; the disputes were more pronounced in the Kommandatura; bullets settled many arguments among the soldiers during a period of adjustment. After the Americans had first taken over their sector, they got an alarming number of German calls, asking for help. Russian soldiers, not quite realizing that the days when Berlin was completely at their mercy were over, returned frequently to the Western sectors for their fa-

7 Supra, pp. 55-57.
9 Ibid.
vorite pastime—looting, raping, and killing at will. To stop them, Americans, failing to get the message across in any other way, occasionally had to make use of their weapons. These incidents raised a furor with the SMA, but the violence did not cease until the Russians ordered their soldiers to remain within the Soviet sector of Berlin.11

In spite of these disturbances, the first year of inter-Allied administration was relatively successful. Owing to increasing Western needs of access routes to Berlin, the Control Council reached agreement on November 30, 1945, to allot another air corridor to the West, thus raising the number to three.12 Previous agreements regarding Franco-Anglo-American access rights to and from the capital had failed to produce a written guarantee from the Soviets.13 Therefore, the Control Council amendment was of tremendous importance. It stated specifically: "Flight over these routes will be conducted without previous notice being given, by aircraft of the nations governing Germany."14 The Soviets had made their first major mistake. With the air


13 Supra, pp. 32, 66.

14 Tondel, Jr. (ed.), The Issues in the Berlin-German Crisis, p. 7.
corridor amendment they provided the West with the means to combat communist strangulation attempts.

Berlin represented the first stage in the Soviets' political plan to create a central communist government for Germany. In establishing city and borough administrations before the Western powers arrived, they hoped to gain the support of the population.\(^{15}\) This chance was irreparably damaged by the behavior of the Red Army soldiers after the fall of the city. The German Communist Party (KPD) was associated in people's minds with the SMA, and all the horrors that Russian rule brought to Berlin.\(^{16}\)

Evaluating the situation, the Soviets realized that drastic action had to be taken in order to sway events in their favor.\(^{17}\) The Moscow-trained German communists, in collaboration with the SMA, decided to eliminate the KPD's strongest competitor—the Social Democratic Party (SPD).\(^{18}\) The forceful merger of the two labor parties into one, the so-called Socialist Unity Party (SED), was to ensure Commu-


\(^{17}\) Brant, *The East German Rising*, p. 15.

\(^{18}\) Ibid.
nist predominance at the polls. Social Democrats recognized that the merger would mean annihilation. Having secured Kommandatura permission to hold a referendum, they inflicted a crushing defeat on the Communists. In spite of the unanimous Kommandatura decision to allow party members to vote on the issue, the SMA saw fit to bar voters from the polls in the Soviet sector. Threats and arrests in East Berlin only helped to highlight the result of the referendum in West Berlin: Over eighty percent of the Social Democrats rejected the amalgamation with the Communists. Stubbornly pursuing their policy, the Communists held a convention, in April 1946, joining the SPD turncoats and the KPD into a new Communist Party--the SED.

Subsequently, both the SPD splinter group and the newly created SED asked for Inter-Allied recognition without which they were not permitted to operate. A major struggle rocked the Kommandatura. The Soviet commandant, General Alexander Kotikov, opposed the recognition of the rump-SPD on grounds that the party was now a part of the SED. The

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19 Litchfield et al., Governing Postwar Germany, p. 154.
21 Litchfield et al., Governing Postwar Germany, p. 155.
22 Ibid.
Western commandants refused to go along with this concept. Hopelessly deadlocked, the commandants referred the question to the military governors. The Control Council sent it straight back to the Kommandatura. In the end, after prolonged dispute, the commandants decided to acknowledge both parties. 23

A similar procedure was followed when the Kommandatura failed to agree on a date for the first city-wide, free elections to be held in postwar Berlin. Ever since March 1946, Colonel Howley had pleaded for municipal elections. Just as consistently, the proposal had been rejected by General Kotikov. After the question had been referred to the Control Council for action, the idea was adopted by the Soviets. 24 General of the Army Vassily Sokolovsky, Zhukov’s successor as Soviet military governor, was better informed on the political trends of the Kremlin. Apparently, the Soviets were not yet prepared to completely abandon Western principles. 25 On August 13, 1946, the Kommandatura approved a temporary constitution for the City of Berlin. 26 It returned to its citizens the basic democratic right of political self-determination. The constitution was to become ef-

24 Ibid., pp. 119-121.
25 Litchfield et al., Governing Postwar Germany, p. 157.
26 Berlin Documents, pp. 48-50.
fective after the October elections. 27

The elections were a unique experience. Internal politics were unimportant, since a more significant issue was at stake—communism versus democracy. 28 Only seventeen months after the defeat of Germany, the vanquished had the opportunity to pass judgment on the victors. 29 The result of the voting would clearly reflect the attitude of the Berliners toward the occupying powers. Both sides were aware of the implications.

Having lost prestige in the SPD referendum, the Communists were particularly anxious to score a victory. All their endeavors were supported by the SMA. Their vast propaganda machine was set in motion, displaying the full range from persuasion to intimidation. Food and electricity were used as political means; 30 the Americans were accused of

27 Ibid., p. 48.
30 The Soviets distributed extra food rations to the Soviet sector in an attempt to convey the image of Communist generosity as compared to the regular, low rations in the Western sectors. Berliners got their first taste of Russian tactics when the Soviet sporadically shut off the electricity—fifty percent originated in the Soviet zone—in order to blame the Western Allies of inefficiency in supplying their sectors with energy. See Howley, Berlin Command, pp. 122-123.
looting their zone;\textsuperscript{31} and the parties which tended toward the West were subdued in the Soviet sector.\textsuperscript{32} The Soviets forgot only one thing: Too much propaganda made the Germans suspicious. Their dismal situation was a result of their belief in the wrong leaders; they would not make the same mistake twice.\textsuperscript{33}

Up to this point, the United States had maintained a detached attitude. American leaders had been reluctant to get involved in what they considered matters of purely German concern. Now, exactly fourteen months after the American entry into Berlin, the time for counter-measures had come. On September 4, 1946, RIAS (Radio in the American Sector) began broadcasting from Berlin, providing an alternative to the Soviet-controlled Radio Berlin.\textsuperscript{34} Two days later, Soviet propaganda received another blow. Striking fear in German hearts, they repeatedly announced the expected withdrawal of American troops.\textsuperscript{35} The rumor was dispersed

\textsuperscript{31}Ibid., p. 126. Blaming their own crimes on others has always been a favorite Soviet technique.

\textsuperscript{32}Litchfield et al., Governing Postwar Germany, p. 157.

\textsuperscript{33}Grosser, The Colossus Again, p. 70.


\textsuperscript{35}Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p. 187. The Soviet-spread rumor was based on Roosevelt's remark at Yalta. There, the
when U.S. Secretary of State James P. Byrnes responded to General Clay's appeal to invalidate communist propaganda. Addressing a German audience at Stuttgart, he "sounded the first constructive note which had come from the Western occupying powers." Secretary Byrnes boosted German morale, assuring them that American armed forces would stay as long as the situation demanded it, "probably . . . for a long period."

The result of the Berlin municipal elections of October 30, 1946, has made history. Berliners inflicted a devastating defeat upon the Communists. The SED trailed the two major democratic parties, the SPD and the CDU (Christian Democratic Union). Only the relatively minor LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) gained fewer votes than the Communists. The utter defeat was caused by their close association with the Russians; all SMA measures had been supported

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President limited the maintenance of U.S. armed forces in Europe to two years after the defeat of Germany. See Stettinius, Roosevelt and the Russians, p. 127.

36 Clay, Decision in Germany, p. 78.

37 Ibid., p. 80. For the complete speech see Basic American Documents, 1941-49, pp. 522-527.

38 Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p. 190.

and defended by the SED. Encouraging the Germans during the election campaign had borne rich fruit for the Americans—a vote of confidence. With this development, the Western powers came to realize that the future held a realignment in store. Former enemies, the Western Allies and Germany, would face the new menace to world peace, the Soviet Union, together.

Soviet policies adjusted rapidly to the changed situation. Since they had been repudiated by the electorate, their dream of eventually gaining control of all of Germany by first winning Berlin had dissolved. The idea to consolidate the area under their immediate control replaced the outdated strategy. Berlin remained a tempting prize, seemingly within Soviet reach.

To postpone and possibly to prevent the start of a truly democratic city administration, the SMA exerted its power in the inter-Allied Kommandatura. German city officials were subject to Kommandatura approval. Stalling the process of an orderly transfer of power from the Soviet appointees to the duly elected officials, Kotikov filibustered every other motion.

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40 Leonhard, Die Revolution entlässt ihre Kinder, p. 452.
41 Windsor, City on Leave, p. 50.
42 Howley, Berlin Command, p. 139.
The new Lord Mayor Dr. Otto Ostrowski (SPD) was not elected by the municipal deputies until December 5, 1946. Ostrowski cut a pitiful figure. A weak man, he was unable to cope with the situation. Intimidated by the NKVD (people's commissariat of internal affairs, that is the Soviet secret police), he agreed to support the SED. As a result, he was impeached by the SPD and he resigned in mid-April 1947.

New trouble emerged for the Kommandatura. After the NKVD had put a lot of effort into "converting" Ostrowski to their side, Kotikov was unwilling to accept his resignation. Once again, the commandants deadlocked and had to send the problem to the military governors for a solution. The Control Council accepted Ostrowski's resignation along with Kotikov's demand for inter-Allied approval of an elected official in advance to an election. Democracy had been dealt another blow.

The effects of the new directive became immediately apparent. Dr. Ernst Reuter (SPD) was nominated by the municipal deputies to be the new Lord Mayor of Berlin. In his

46 Ibid., pp. 146-147.
youth he had been a member of the KPD. Becoming disillusioned, he forswore communism and joined the SPD. Therefore, the Soviets considered him an arch-enemy. Kotikov used his veto, thereby preventing Reuter from assuming office. Mrs. Louise Schroeder (SPD) took over as Acting Lord Mayor; Dr. Ferdinand Friedensburg became her deputy. Under the circumstances, it was a satisfactory solution. Reuter did not become mayor until after the split of the city.

Struggles in the inter-Allied Kommandatura showed the rapid deterioration of the wartime Alliance. The relationship suffered so sharp a decline within the first two postwar years that the world was soon faced with another abyss—the prospect of World War III.

Inter-Allied Policies in Germany

Opposing interests of the Four Powers had proven detrimental to the exercise of inter-Allied administration of Berlin. A similar situation developed on the national level. However, clashes among the occupying powers were not as violent, since they had unlimited authority within their zones. The Allied agreements provided for a joint policy in matters affecting Germany as a whole, a directive which al-

allowed varied interpretations. The Control Council, created to enforce the joint policy, was paralyzed most of the time, since the Allies were unable to coordinate their aims.

U.S. policy in Germany was guided initially by a memorandum issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. JCS/1067 was designed to ensure the enforcement of "programs of reparation and restitution." The controversial document had been worked out by an interdepartmental committee, which reflected the conflicting views of Secretaries Hull, Stimson, and Morgenthau. Rejecting the idea to partition Germany, it limited the powers of OMGUS by ordering to carry out a punitive program. Apart from the policy of denazification, demilitarization, decentralization, and non-fraternization, JCS/1067 projected a remodeled Morgenthau Plan—the denuding of industry and the maximum pastoralization of Germany.

49 Berlin, by contrast, was to be administered jointly. The path left to the commandants was too narrow to steer away from a collision course. See Rudolf R. Legien, *The Four Power Agreements on Berlin: Alternative Solutions to the Status Quo?*, trans. Trevor Davies (Berlin: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 1961), pp. 13, 15, 27.


52 Clay, *Decision in Germany*, pp. 17-18. President Truman disliked the Morgenthau Plan and opposed the Secretary's mingling in foreign policy. When Morgenthau threatened to resign if he would not be included in the U.S. delegation to Potsdam, Truman immediately accepted his resignation. See Murphy, *Diplomat among Warriors*, p. 270. Considering that JCS/1067 was issued only two weeks after Roose-
General Clay, as military governor responsible for the proper execution of the directive, was shocked by "its failure to grasp the realities of the financial and economic conditions which confronted" OMGUS.\textsuperscript{53} JCS/1067, he said, "contemplated [a] Carthaginian peace."\textsuperscript{54}

Washington did not react to Clay's plea for a policy revision until July 15, 1947.\textsuperscript{55} Based on Secretary Byrnes' 1946 Stuttgart speech, the new directive, JCS/1779, aimed at "the creation of those political, economic and moral conditions in Germany which will contribute most effectively to a stable and prosperous Europe."\textsuperscript{56} The right of the Germans to "higher standards of living," was also acknowledged.\textsuperscript{57}

The British generally supported U.S. policies. JCS/1067 was one of the few exceptions. They considered the directive too impractical to follow it.\textsuperscript{58} Going along with Churchill's negative attitude toward the Soviet Union, the Labor government instructed its representative on the Control Council, General Sir Brian Robertson, to remain suspi-

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\textsuperscript{53} Clay, Decision in Germany, p. 18. \\
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., p. 19. \\
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., p. 237. \\
\textsuperscript{56} Opie et al., The Search for Peace Settlements, p. 233. \\
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{58} Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, p. 285.
\end{flushright}
cious of Soviet intentions, and to oppose their designs. Although SHAEF had been dissolved on July 13, 1945, Anglo-American relations remained excellent. Most of the time, especially when democratic principles were involved, the British seconded American motions. A Soviet representative on the Allied Control Commission, Major Gregory Klimov, characterized the British attitude as follows:

Great Britain had played out her role, and now, with a pride born of self-confidence, was surrendering her place to the younger and stronger as befitted a gentleman.

France, snubbed at Potsdam by the Big Three who failed to invite her to the Conference, stayed aloof. Turning the rebuff into an asset, the French frequently vetoed the Potsdam Protocol. The policy, pursued by France was inspired by the wish to weaken Germany permanently. She had no confidence in the democratization of Germany. Therefore, the French advocated a radical decentralization of all political institutions. France was not free from territorial ambitions, since she wished to sever the heavily industrialized Saar area from Germany as part of her repara-

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59Clay, Decision in Germany, p. 441.
60Klimov, The Terror Machine, p. 441.
61Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, pp. 286-287.
62Clay, Decision in Germany, p. 105.
63Ibid., p. 110.
Often, France's national interests were a hindrance to the execution of Anglo-American plans. The Soviet Union benefitted from the disharmony among the Western Allies. Major Klimov's characterization was fitting:

France was the reflection of all the greatness to be found in European culture. But only the reflection. Her representatives were the successors to Bonaparte and Voltaire, the contemporaries of Pierre Pétain and Jean-Paul Sartre. Existentialism. How to keep one's head above the water.

The aims of the Soviet Union were clear. Her action in Berlin and in the Soviet zone gave a direct indication of her policy. The communists wanted to gain as much as possible, politically as well as economically. The desire for reparations, along with an iron will to further their aims—if necessary by force—were the gist of Soviet policies. They acted accordingly.

Considering the divergent attitudes of the Allies, subsequent events seemed to follow a logical pattern. At Potsdam, the heads of government had delegated their authority to the military governors, presenting them with the task to work out a joint policy. The Potsdam Protocol asked the

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64 France enforced her will. But the Saar area was returned in 1957 after the issue was put to a vote. In the referendum, the local inhabitants elected to be rejoined with Germany.

65 Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, p. 287.

66 Klimov, The Terror Machine, p. 149.
Control Council "to perform the impossible." 67

One reason for the inefficiency of the Control Council was its very nature: There was nothing under its control. The military governors who headed the Council remained first and always the representatives of their countries. Each was all-powerful in his zone, but they completely lacked authority in the others. If the Control Council reached agreement, there was absolutely no way to check its enforcement. 68 Everything depended upon good will from all parts—a poor insurance in world power politics.

Another reason for the failure of the Control Council was embodied in its charter. The requirement for unanimous decisions, left that body at the mercy of the U.S.S.R., 69 who made frequent use of the veto power. Thus, the Soviets and the French shared the dubious distinction to have effectively blocked Anglo-American attempts at creating the rudiments for a workable arrangement.

When the Control Council first assumed authority, the prospects for success had not yet disappeared. Before too long, measures providing for denazification, demilitar-

67 Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, p. 283.


zation, and the punishment of war criminals had been adopted. But these were minor programs. The Allies failed to come to terms on the significant issues.

Friction developed over the question of reparations. Both the Potsdam Protocol and JCS/1067 directed the military governors to extract an appropriate amount from Germany to help restore the European economy. After prolonged disputes in the Control Council, it was decided to pass the problem to the Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM), which met three times in 1946. The outcome of the conferences corresponded to that of the Control Council—no agreement was reached. Attempts to adopt measures leading to the creation of central super-zonal institutions met with the same result.

Barely a year after V-E Day, the Soviets and the Western powers embarked upon their different courses, one trying to outsmart the other. In Berlin, the SMA proceeded

70. Clay, Decision in Germany, pp. 107, 109.
72. For a detailed account of the CMF meetings see Clay, Decision in Germany, pp. 123-131, 140-141. Due to the deadlock in the negotiations, resulting from the U.S.S.R.'s demands and the West's refusal to meet them, the Four Powers took reparations from their own zones, leaving the amount up to the discretion of the individual power. See Feis, The Potsdam Conference, pp. 255, 257.
73. Clay, Decision in Germany, pp. 123-124, 131, 141.
to interfere in local affairs;\textsuperscript{74} at the Paris CFM meeting, Secretary of State Byrnes stood godfather to Bizonia which was to develop into the Federal Republic of Germany. Indicating American determination to overcome the inter-Allied deadlock, he proposed a merger of occupation zones:

\begin{quote}
The United States will join with any other occupying government or governments in Germany for the treatment of our respective zones as an economic unit.\textsuperscript{75}
\end{quote}

Resolved to ease the burden for both the United States and Germany, Byrnes intended to advance this plan "with or without the Soviet Union."\textsuperscript{76} France and the U.S.S.R. were disinterested, but Great Britain was favorably disposed toward the idea. She anticipated another SHAEF type of arrangement. On July 30, 1946, the British officially accepted the proposal.\textsuperscript{77} By September 17, 1946, Anglo-American preparations were completed. Bizonia was born.\textsuperscript{78}

The CFM meeting held in Moscow during March and April 1947, accomplished nothing but to widen the East-West gap. Violent Soviet opposition to the bizonal merger revealed the Kremlin's sinister schemes to thwart Western

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{74} Supra, pp. 83-84.
\textsuperscript{75} Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p. 195.
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{77} Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, pp. 303-304.
\textsuperscript{78} Clay, Decision in Germany, p. 169.
\end{footnotes}
plans. In a conversation with U.S. Secretary of State George C. Marshall, Stalin remarked that present difficulties were "only the first skirmishes of reconnaissance forces on the German question."\(^7^9\)

Instead of frightening the West, the Soviet threats backfired. Secretary Marshall recognized that to agree to Soviet plans would be equivalent to handing Germany and Europe over to communist dictatorship.\(^8^1\) He knew that immediate actions had to be taken to meet the Soviet danger. To acquaint the American public with the changed Russo-American relationship, the Secretary appeared on radio and reported on the Moscow conference. Urging the adoption of measures to counter the communist threat, Marshall concluded: "The patient is sinking while the doctors deliberate."\(^8^2\) Secretary Marshall found the perfect remedy for the ailing European countries when he envisioned the European Recovery Program (ERP). First mentioning his idea in a commencement speech at Harvard in June 1947,\(^8^3\) the Western

\(^7^9\)Walter Bedell Smith, My Three Years in Moscow (Philadelphia and New York: J. B. Lippencott Company, 1950), pp. 211-212. Hereafter cited as Bedell Smith, My Three Years in Moscow. See also Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, p. 306.

\(^8^0\)Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, p. 307. See also Bedell Smith, My Three Years in Moscow, p. 221.

\(^8^1\)Bedell Smith, My Three Years in Moscow, p. 221.

\(^8^2\)Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, p. 307.

\(^8^3\)Clay, Decision in Germany, p. 160.
European states, meeting in Paris from July 12 to September 22, willingly endorsed the plan. The Soviet Union commanded her Eastern European satellites to reject it.

The Marshall Plan, as the ERP was popularly called, offered financial aid to nations that were willing to help themselves. Its implementation caused the upheaval of the established trend of thinking. The most obvious result was the complete reversal of Soviet-Western relations from what they had been during the Second World War. Some Washington officials feared to be drawn into an armed conflict against the U.S.S.R. Asking U.S. Ambassador W. Bedell Smith whether the Soviets steered toward war, the ambassador answered: "Stalin said, we do not want war but the Americans want it even less than we do, and that makes our position stronger."

In November 1947, before the last CFM conference took place in London, the West was put to the verbal test. Confusing rhetoric with polemics, the Soviets hurled fantastic, trumped-up charges at the Western representatives, blaming them specifically with the destruction of quadripar-

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84 Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, p. 308.
85 Clay, Decision in Germany, p. 160.
86 For a critical, contemporary analysis of the Marshall Plan see Seymore E. Harris, The European Recovery Program (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press), 1948.
87 Forrestal Diaries, p. 327.
tite administration. Secretary Marshall replied with a calm statement which explained the American point-of-view. He repeatedly reiterated that viewpoint at the London meeting.

In Western Europe, the ERP caused a more positive change; it opened the way to economic integration. In January 1948, British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin suggested in a speech to Parliament "a union of Western European countries." Germany was to be invited to participate. With the acceptance of Germany (Bizonia) as a full-fledged member of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in early 1948, her lot as an outcast neared the end. It was the purpose of the OEEC to appropriate ERP funds to member states. Thus, Western Europe including West Germany looked forward to reconstruction.

The creation of Bizonia proved to be of mutual value to all parties involved—American, British, and German. In the beginning, economic aspects overshadowed all others. Germany's industrial center, the Ruhr area, was part of the

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88 Clay, Decision in Germany, pp. 161-162, 348.
89 Basic American Documents, p. 571.
91 Ibid.
92 Clay, Decision in Germany, pp. 215-217.
British zone; the U.S. zone was primarily agricultural. Supplementing one another, they eased the British-American administrative task and the fiscal burden of their governments.

Once the United States and Great Britain had recognized the Soviet threat to future world peace, Bizonia's significance increased. The communist onslaught had to be halted. If Germany, because of her central location in Europe should serve as a buffer, then the Germans would have to be won over to the Western cause. To continue the punitive policy of JCS/1067 would have been detrimental to Allied interests. The new directive, JCS/1779, issued by Washington in 1947, after the abortive Moscow meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, reflected the changed attitude.

The West Germans benefited from the situation. Economically, they got their share of ERP funds, enabling them to rise from the debris of the war to new prosperity. Politically, they were restored to an honorable place among the nations.

To further the Anglo-American objective, German local administrations which had been developed in the different states under American tutelage, were promoted to the bizonal level. On February 9, 1948, the Military Governors Generals Clay and Robertson established a German Executive

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Committee and a High Court. Combined with a legislative branch—the Economic Council which had been constituted in May 1947—those German administrative agencies represented the essence of a democratic government. Supreme authority was still vested in the military governors, but the responsibility of the German officials increased steadily. When the time came for German self-government, a new crop of politicians had been raised. The British-American policy of the democratization of Germany paid off well.

The Breakup

While the Western Allies were preoccupied with the development of Bizonia and the ERP, the Soviets planned their counterattacks. The rejection in the Berlin city elections of 1946, the violent verbal battles in the Kommandatura, the paralysis of the Control Council, and the impossibility to reach agreement at the CFM conferences had convinced the Kremlin leaders that communism could not be extended beyond the present lines of demarkation—at least for the time being. Smarting from Western contempt for Soviet

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94 Ibid., pp. 180-181. 95 Ibid., p. 168.
96 A letter from Lucius D. Clay, General, Retired, U.S. Army, New York, N.Y., April 14, 1967, gave ample evidence of the strategy's success. Evaluating Germany's development since the time under discussion, Clay wrote: "I think the German people have proved their willingness to support a democratic government, and to accept some responsibility for the government they put into power. I am glad to have them as friends and allies in the common defense of free countries."
plans and unable to check the British-American influence in West Germany, the Soviets were determined to fight back. They decided to force the West out of the German capital by blockading Berlin. Nearly all aspects seemed to favor the Soviet plan. The most obvious advantage was the city's location. Surrounded by Russian occupied territory, the West hardly stood a chance to escape the trap. The U.S.S.R. was sure of victory.

The Soviets were not guided by the thought of vengeance alone. More important reasons formed the basis of their plans. Since the experiment in inter-Allied administration had turned out to be a dismal failure, the Soviet Union ventured to lose her influence on the satellite countries. Her recent loss of prestige, she feared, might result in an uprising. In order to consolidate her empire undisturbed, the U.S.S.R. intended to get rid of the Western observers. Soviet methods were not conducive to the promotion of her image.

Paving the way for the intended blockade, the Soviets resumed their verbal attack. On February 13, and March 6, 1948, the Soviet Union sent identical notes to the United States, Great Britain and France, accusing them in both

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98 Nettl, The Eastern Zone, p. 108.

99 For the complete text of the notes see U.S.S.R., The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Soviet Union and the Berlin
instances of violating the Potsdam Protocol. The Soviets objected to the unilateral actions of the Western Allies in matters of economic and political recovery of the Western zones of Germany. 100

On March 20, 1948, Marshal Sokolovsky walked out of the Control Council without setting the date for the next meeting. This signified the end of the highest inter-Allied agency. 101 Thus, the only Allied institution responsible for Germany as a whole had ceased to exist. 102 Only two days later, the Soviets suspended all subordinate agencies except the Kommandatura. 103

The commandants continued to meet until the Soviet staged the next walk-out. Lacking sound reasons, the SMA had to turn to imagination to explain the breakup of all inter-Allied administrative agencies. On June 16, 1948, the Kommandatura met for the last time. For thirteen hours, the Western commandants listened to Soviet abuse. Then, U.S. Commandant Howley decided to go home leaving his deputy to sit in for him. The Soviets considered Howley's action an


100 Ibid.
101 Clay, Decision in Germany, pp. 355-357.
102 Meissner, Russland, die Weltmächte und Deutschland, p. 73.
103 Opie et al., The Search for Peace Settlements, p. 252.
intolerable affront. They walked out.\textsuperscript{104}

Only two days later, the Russians "found themselves in the unenviable position of the hunter who shoots his gun in the air and watches the deer run by."\textsuperscript{105} The Western powers announced a currency reform for their zones of occupation to become effective on June 20, 1948.\textsuperscript{106}

Sokolovsky responded with a proclamation to the German people.\textsuperscript{107} Denouncing the Western Allies and charging them with violating the Four Power agreements, in particular the Potsdam Protocol, the Russians became guilty of the very same thing. He violated both the EAC agreements and the Yalta decisions when he declared:

Currency issued in the Western zones of occupation in Germany will not be permitted to circulate in the Soviet zone of occupation and in the area of Greater Berlin which comes within the Soviet Zone of occupation and is economically part of the Soviet Zone.\textsuperscript{108}

The latter portion of the statement aimed at providing the

\textsuperscript{104}Howley, Berlin Command, pp. 179-181.

\textsuperscript{105}Ibid., p. 184.

\textsuperscript{106}Clay, Decision in Germany, p. 362. The Western powers did not decide to introduce a new currency until after the breakup of the Control Council. June 1, was the target date for Bizonia to start circulating the new money. Owing to sudden French interest in trizonal arrangements, the measure was postponed until June 20, 1948. Ibid., p. 212. See also Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, p. 313.


\textsuperscript{108}Ibid., p. 24.
new Soviet policy toward Berlin with an appearance of legality. Included in a proclamation, it assumed the character of an order. Legal finesse, however, did not concern the Soviets. The proclamation stated with blunt authority: "These regulations have the force of law."\textsuperscript{109}

Fortunately, the Western Allies were by now used to Soviet tactics. Russian threats had lost their effectiveness. Both sides were set on their different courses. The outcome of the crisis could have been expected: The Soviets decreed a currency reform for the Soviet zone and all Berlin;\textsuperscript{110} the Western powers countered by introducing the new West German currency in the three Western sectors.\textsuperscript{111} Both orders were issued on June 23, 1948.\textsuperscript{112}

The Berlin Blockade

On June 24, 1948, the Soviets quit talking and started to act. A "technical interruption" induced the SMA to stop all rail traffic leading to and from the Western sectors of Berlin.\textsuperscript{113} Since roads and waterways were already

\textsuperscript{109}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{110}Ibid., pp. 28-29.
\textsuperscript{112}Berlin Documents, pp. 62-63.
\textsuperscript{113}Ibid., p. 63.
closed, West Berlin was completely isolated. The iron curtain had clamped down; 2,500,000 people were caught in the middle of the East-West struggle. Their fate hung literally in the air.

OMGUS was prepared for the emergency. As the U.S.S.R. gradually tightened her grip around Berlin, the Allies had stocked up a small supply—enough to last for about a month, distributing minimum rations. To avoid a decrease in stocks, General Clay called Air Commander Lieutenant General Curtis S. LeMay, ordering the entire C-47 fleet on the Berlin run. The first planes arrived in the blockaded city on the next morning, June 25, 1948. It was the birth of the airlift.

While General Clay as military governor of the U.S. zone had to keep the over-all situation in mind, Colonel Howley as U.S. commandant of Berlin was more concerned with local problems. The most urgent task was to boost the morale of the frightened population. Berliners were isolated from the world, threatened with starvation, and their electricity had been cut off. Not yet satisfied with the phys-

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114 Beginning in March 1948, the Soviets imposed more and more restrictions on traffic to and from Berlin. The SMA harassed the Western Allies just as much as the Germans. For a chronological enumeration of the process of strangulation see Brit. Foreign Office, The Berlin Question, pp. 15-19.

115 Clay, Decision in Germany, p. 365.

116 Ibid., pp. 365-366.
cal hardships of the blockade, the Soviets pulled every trick of psychological warfare they knew. They threatened to cut off the water too. But more enervating than anything else was the rumor that the savage Mongolian hordes, who had sacked the city after the defeat, would return. To add color to the rumors, Soviet armed forces held maneuvers just beyond the city limits.  

Colonel Howley decided to address the Berliners over RIAS. Without informing General Clay beforehand, Howley assured the Germans of American support. He promised that the United States would stay in Berlin and that they would face the crisis together. After Howley's radio announcement, Berliners regained their courage.

Clay's and Howley's independent actions were probably the most amazing aspects of the first day of the blockade. Before Washington had recovered from the Soviet blow, the men on the spot had taken care of the most urgent problems. For once, the right men were in the right place at the right time.

118 Letter from Frank L. Howley, Brigadier General, Retired, U.S. Army, New York, N.Y., April 10, 1967. Howley explained: "It wasn't a time for conferences—it was a time for action and quick."
120 Who influenced who cannot properly be established. Howley wrote: "Our [Clay's and Howley's] actions in Berlin
Both Clay and Howley had shown courage and foresight. Their measures were endorsed by President Truman. Clay's idea of the airlift was revolutionary. Obviously, it took a layman to envision it. The experts, especially Air Force Chief of Staff, General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, saw many obstacles and opposed the plan. Vandenberg argued that U.S. bases around the world would have to be denuded, weakening the U.S.A. in too many spots, in order to ensure the success of the project. 121

Truman preferred the airlift to the more dangerous task of sending an armed convoy to Berlin. 122 In the beginning, the airlift was considered a short, temporary means that would allow the Allies to overcome the diplomatic deadlock without having to negotiate under pressure. With this thought in mind, Truman ordered every available plane on the Berlin run. 123 By June 28, 1948, President Truman had adopted Howley's attitude: The United States would not give in to Soviet pressure. 124


122 Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, pp. 125-126.

123 Ibid., p. 123. See also Forrestal Diaries, p. 452.

124 Forrestal Diaries, p. 455.
The two World Wars had put the United States in the uncontested position as leader of the Western world. Truman's decision to stay in Berlin and to face the Soviet threat acknowledged this fact. With it, the United States departed decisively from the old idea of isolationism. Responsibility and risks that go with leadership were accepted instead.  

"Operation Vittles," as the airlift was nicknamed, reflected the attitude of the Western nations toward one another. The British were true partners of the U.S., making every effort to serve the common purpose. The French, by contrast, could not yet warm up to an enterprise which strained national resources for the sake of Germans. France did not participate in the airlift, but she stayed in Berlin along with the others.  

Instead of driving a wedge between the Western Allies and the Germans— the hesitant rapport, exemplified in extending ERP help to Germany, was still quite new— the Soviet blockade of Berlin helped to raise the German cause beyond the purely pragmatic approach to a symbolic level. The quest for freedom and the rights of man were threatened. The challenge was met. Ernst Reuter, the Berlin mayor who


126 Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, p. 318.
had been prevented from assuming office by a Soviet veto in the Kommandatura, stated in a Berlin mass demonstration:

We appeal to the people throughout the world! In America, in Great Britain, in France and Italy—wherever you may be—gaze on this city and realize that Berlin and its people cannot be abandoned. They must not be abandoned!

The appeal was heard and Berlin was saved.

During the eleven months long blockade, the airlift brought 1,736,781 tons of goods into the city. It took 212,621 flights to accomplish the task. So life went on in the beleaguered city. Export goods produced during this time bore the proud stamp "Made in Blockaded Berlin."

In spite of the tremendous hardship and sacrifices, the SMA preferred to deny the very existence of the blockade, and to ridicule the airlift as a Western propagan-

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129 Ibid.

130 Lowell Bennett, Berlin Bastion: The Epic of Post-War Berlin (Frankfurt am Main: Fred Rudl Publisher, 1951), p. 155.

131 Seventy-four American and British fliers lost their life. See Schmidt Verlag (ed.), Hauptstadt Berlin, p. 8.
da device. According to Sokolovsky, the Soviets never intended to force the Western powers out of Berlin, nor did they want to starve the Berliners into submission. Fortunately, the Soviets were unable to do either one or the other. The only thing they achieved was the deepening of the East-West split. Berlin truly became a divided city. As a result of communist pressure in East Berlin, the duly elected deputies transferred their offices and their meeting place to West Berlin. The SED retaliated by proclaiming the set-up of a separate East Berlin city government.

The Settlement

The airlift had been initially started to prevent the Western powers from losing ground before the crisis could be settled on the diplomatic level. It continued until the Soviets realized that their blockade was a failure and that the Western Allies could not be forced out of Berlin. While world attention centered on the dramatic events in Berlin, the wheels of diplomacy were set in motion.

On July 6, 1948, the United States and Great Britain delivered identical notes to the Soviet Union. The notes protested the Soviet blockade and reasserted Western rights.


in Berlin as based on the Four Power agreements. The Soviet note of July 14, 1948, rejected the Western interpretation of the agreements. Instead, the U.S.S.R. charged that the Western Allies had lost their rights to be in Berlin as a result of their preparations for the establishment of a West German Government. The currency reform was mentioned as a particular example.

Although the two views were diametrically opposed, Truman, hoping that a compromise might be reached, instructed Ambassador Smith to confer with Stalin. The Moscow discussions seemed promising. Stalin dropped his demand that the Western powers should delay any further preparations for a West German government. He insisted, however, that the East German currency should be introduced in all Berlin. With the understanding that the currency would be controlled by the Four Powers, Ambassador Smith and British and French colleagues, agreed to the proposal. Attempts to work out a formal statement failed. Molotov asserted that

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135 U.S.S.R., The Soviet Union and the Berlin Question, pp. 42-46. See also Bedell Smith, My Three Years in Moscow, p. 238., and Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, p. 123.

136 Bedell Smith, My Three Years in Moscow, p. 238.
the Western Allies were in Berlin not by legal rights but by Soviet sufference only. There was no meeting of the minds. After a month of negotiations, it was decided to refer the currency question to the military governors in Berlin. They were directed to work out an arrangement that would make the Eastern currency the only legal tender in Berlin.

The first Control Council meeting since the Russian walk-out was an exercise in frustration. Refusing to even consider Four Power control of the East German currency, Sokolovsky added new Soviet demands—the complete control of the Berlin trade and restrictions on air traffic. Obviously, the Soviets were so sure of the effectiveness of the blockade that they saw no reason to come to terms with the Western Allies. After seven meetings of the Control Council, the talks were abandoned. The military governors were hopelessly deadlocked.

In October 1948, the problem was put before the United Nations' Security Council. The Soviet Union de-

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137 Ibid., pp. 243-247, 249-250. See also Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, pp. 126-127.


139 Clay, Decision in Germany, pp. 370-371.

140 Brit. Foreign Office, The Berlin Question, p. 84.
nied the competence of the Security Council. She refused to participate in the United Nations deliberations. Throughout the winter of 1948-1949, the U.N. continued to discuss the problem, but was unable to settle the dispute. This was an impossible task as long as any one of the principal parties was unwilling to come to terms.

Finally, after eleven months, the Soviets recognized the futility of the blockade. Throughout the winter they had hoped that the airlift would break down under inclement weather conditions. When, contrary to the experts' estimations, the constant drone of the planes—heartbeat of Berlin—remained steady, the Soviet dream turned into a nightmare. They gained nothing, but they lost more prestige than they could afford. They gave up. In May 1949, the Four Powers came to an agreement. Effective May 12, 1949, the blockade was lifted, and relations among the Four Powers were restored to the status quo ante.

It seemed on the surface as if the year-long struggle had been useless for either side. In reality it caused changes of world importance. The Berlin blockade terminated

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142 Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, p. 129.
144 Documents on Germany: 1947-1949, p. 274.
the war-time Alliance. The airlift was the beginning of a new world realignment. The Western Allies recognized the need to accept Germany as an equal partner in their midst. To initiate the process, the administration of the Western zones was returned to German rule in the form of the Occupation Statute of May 14, 1949. Full sovereignty was not yet given to the Germans, since the Allies reserved the right to resume authority at any given time. On May 23, 1949, the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany was enacted, providing her with a constitution. West Berlin was made a state of the Federal Republic. Countering the Western move, the Soviets proclaimed the establishment of the so-called German Democratic Republic on October 7, 1949. East Berlin was made the capital of the "German Democratic Republic." Thus, the East-West split was complete. Germany and Berlin gave physical evidence of the end of the World War II alliance—a divided city in a divided country. The cold war had started.

146 Complete sovereignty was restored to Germany on May 5, 1955, simultaneous to German entry into NATO.
CONCLUSION

After ten years of upheaval, the world returned, in 1945, to a system of balance of power. Although much of the war had been fought on European soil, and major crises would rock the continent in the future, Europe's role as a result of the war, was not to be as decisive as before. The centers of powers were shifted to the United States and the Soviet Union. Henceforth, world policies would largely be directed from Washington and Moscow. This trend had begun during the war; but while the two had been Allies in World War II, they were antagonists in the cold war which followed and seemingly resulted from the wartime struggle.

The hastily arranged "war marriage" between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union, drawn together for the purpose of defeating a common enemy, lasted for the duration of the war only. The "divorce proceedings" were initiated immediately after the capitulation of Germany, and the nearer the world came to the final end of the war, the further the Soviet-Anglo-American Alliance drifted apart. Conflicting aims regarding postwar policies caused the split. Considering that the principles of democracy and dictatorship are diametrically opposed, this development
was not surprising. As long as a united military effort was essential to assure the defeat of Germany, the U.S.S.R.'s political make-up was conveniently overlooked by the Western Allies, and she was welcomed as a slightly "radical" state within the fold of the nations opposed to Hitler and his allies.

The Soviet Union's different intentions first became apparent to the Western leaders as a result of the Russian treatment of the Polish problem. Some Western leaders, (Churchill), quickly seemed to sense the difference in views; others, (including Roosevelt and his closest advisers), were slower to accept the situation as changed. The fact that the U.S.S.R. had, during the war, joined the Western Allies sentiments anticipating a peaceful, democratically organized, world—by endorsing the Atlantic Charter, and by signing the Teheran Declaration of the Three Powers and the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe—gave the appearance of trustworthiness to the Soviets. Unfortunately, Big Three unity as presented to the world in these declarations was more of a mirage than a reality. Mistaken for reality by a war-weary world, anxious for peace and with feverish dreams of a future ideal society, it tended to block the more objective appraisals which might have been made.

The anxiously awaited day of final peace, which it
was hoped would herald the beginning of a new utopian age, instead was marked by a growing awareness that the Soviet Union's plan was the forceful incorporation of all eastern Europe into Moscow's realm of influence.

In the first short half-decade after the war, the conflicts that developed between the former Allies in Germany led to a sharp revision of Western policies. While the admission of France to the nearly exclusive Anglo-American alliance probably did more to hinder than help in the achievement of Western aims, it did no permanent damage. It may have, in fact, hurried the process of Western European integration, and thus may have been a blessing, since it forced France and Germany to "bury the old hatchet" and help to recognize the benefits to be gained by genuine cooperation. Soviet intentions, by contrast, created the stumbling block to joint inter-Allied administration of Germany. As a result, the United States, Great Britain, and France, guided by realistic as well as idealistic concepts, reluctantly accepted the fact that the future could not be jeopardized any longer, and decided to take separate actions. Therefore, Bizonia was created. JCS/1067 was revised, preparations for a German administration were made, and, ultimately, Germany was included among the Western European nations that were to benefit from Marshall Plan aid.
Berlin, finally, was destined to play a special role. Events in Western Europe might have developed along similar lines, even if the historic capital of modern Germany had never come under joint inter-Allied administration. As it was, the direct East-West confrontation in the German capital helped to speed the exposure of the Soviet Union's true aims and her methods of achieving them. The Soviet threat to the freedom of Berlin, especially during the 1948/49 blockade, resulted in the development of a wave of sympathy that encompassed the whole of the free world. Not only the German people but people throughout the free world became emotionally involved. To "hate" the Germans became an attitude of the past. Conversely, the Western response to the blockade--the airlift--demonstrated to the German people that Western devotion to the ideas of freedom and democracy went beyond idle talk. The Atlantic Charter and the Declaration on Liberated Europe had appeared to some as "mere words;" now it was demonstrated that the West would support such sentiments by action. Thus, the foundations of the German-Western alliance of the years after 1950 were forged during the blockade, when Berlin served as a symbol of man's determination to preserve freedom.
APPENDIX

List of Abbreviations and Codes

CDU Christian Democratic Union
CFM Council of Foreign Ministers
EAC European Advisory Commission
ERP European Recovery Program
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
KPD Communist Party of Germany
LDP Liberal Democratic Party
NKVD Soviet Secret Police
NSDAP National Socialist German Labor Party (Nazi)
OEEC Organization of European Economic Cooperation
OKW German Armed Forces High Command
OMGUS Office of Military Government, United States
OVERLORD Code name for the Atlantic invasion
RIAS Radio in the American Sector
SED Socialist Unity Party
SHAEP Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Forces
SMA Soviet Military Administration
SPD Social Democratic Party
TERMINAL Code name for the Potsdam Conference
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Public Documents

A useful collection of statistics.

Dramatic events in postwar Berlin are highlighted in words and pictures.


The booklet includes a brief summary of the first postwar years.

Released for publication in 1961, the documents are the most important source for the Tehran Conference.

Released for publication in 1955.


Documents dealing with the Berlin blockade.

A propaganda pamphlet.

Document Collections

The Communist version of the Berlin problem.

Documents on Germany from 1933 to 1945.

Contains United Nations documents, primarily from the United States and the British Commonwealth but also from the U.S.S.R., the American republics, and countries occupied by Germany.

An extremely useful volume including the most important documents pertaining to the Berlin question.

Includes the official documents of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers.


Includes President Roosevelt's address to the press at the end of the Casablanca Conference.


Includes President Roosevelt's speeches following the Yalta Conference.


Contains important records of the Allied Control Council.


Statistics on politics, economy, and cultural data of Berlin.

Diaries and Memoirs


A critical account by the first chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany.


A very valuable insight to the events when Byrnes was U.S. Secretary of State: From the Potsdam Conference to January 1947.


The volume includes the Prime Minister's account of the Casablanca Conference.


This volume includes Churchill's account of the
Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers and the Big Three Conference at Teheran.


Berlin from 1945 to 1947.


Leahy was the only high ranking U.S. official who was present at all Big Three conferences.


Includes Montgomery's appraisal of the Soviets after his first encounter with the Soviets at the surrender ceremony in Berlin.


The personal account of the Roosevelt-Churchill meeting off Newfoundland by the representative of the British press.


Ambassador Murphy's memoirs; the fascinating inside story of diplomatic deals of world importance.


An interesting account of the first year of postwar Berlin as seen by the joint authors, then minor officers with OMGUS.


Quotations of President Roosevelt as recollected by his son.
Ambassador Bedell Smith's account of his years (1946-1949) in the Soviet Union, including his version of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers of 1947, and the diplomatic aspects of the blockade.

The important story of the U.S. Secretary of State who was present at Yalta. Leaning toward the Rooseveltian point-of-view in its interpretation.

The President's account of 1945.

Includes Truman's account of the Berlin blockade, the airlift, the Moscow discussions and the settlement.

A very valuable insight into the thoughts of the late Senator from Michigan (Republican), during the stormy years of World War II and the developing cold war.

An excellent, well documented account by a native Russian. As a naturalized Englishman he spent the war in the Soviet Union as a correspondent for the *Sunday Times* and BBC.

Secondary Books

A good general survey.

The moving story of daily life in blockaded Berlin.


Three lectures on the East-West conflict delivered by the Mayor of West Berlin at Harvard in 1962.


An account of the events leading up to the German rising, including the early developments in postwar Berlin.


A useful summary of events.


A very readable but non-scholarly book of the blockade.


A discussion of the Berlin problem based on lectures delivered in Chicago in 1962.

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Contemporary views on the European situation. Based on lectures delivered in Wiesbaden, Germany in 1963. Frank L. Howley's paper "Berlin and the Western Cause" is valuable.


A study of Soviet foreign relations with Germany and with the Western Allies, aimed at evaluating the World War II alliances. An updated appraisal.

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An evaluation of the political aims of the Big Three. An outdated appraisal.


The authoritative study on the blockade and the airlift.


An appraisal of the Berlin character, past and present.


An evaluation of Soviet-American relations, indicating the strong stand against communism by President Eisenhower's future Secretary of State.


One of the best evaluations of the Potsdam Conference available.


An excellent, detailed study on the Big Three alliance.


An appraisal of Berlin's role in the world, by the former first deputy mayor of Berlin of 1946-7.


A comparative study of Germany under Four Power occupation.


An encyclopedia of German history.
A French evaluation of the postwar development. Title of the original: *L'Allemagne de l'Occident*.

A contemporary, critical analysis of the Marshall Plan.

Dealing with the problem of the status quo in Europe, the author advocates a policy of withdrawal.

A valuable account of the organization and early operation of the military government.

A general history of Berlin.

An analysis of the Four Power agreements.

A series of articles on Germany under occupation.

An interpretation of the German problem by three Canadian scholars.

A well documented account of Soviet-German relations, particularly useful because of the many Russian sources used.

   The author presents the modern day "get-along-with-the-Soviets-at-any-cost" view. Convinced of Soviet sincerity, he distrusts the Germans, and, at times, distorts the facts, using newspaper editorials to make his point.

   An evaluation of Soviet aims in Europe from an economic point of view. The authoritative study on this topic.

   A valuable study on the change in world alliances; from World War II partners to the East-West split.

   A study of the international conferences from 1945 to 1949.

   The book presents a series of lectures delivered at the Otto Suhr Institute (Department of Political Science) of the Free University of Berlin.

   An analysis of the Four Power status of Berlin as manifested in the Allied agreements and subsequently interpreted by the occupation forces. Published by the Federal Department for All-German Affairs, the book represents the official West German point of view.

   The most detailed study on the Battle of Berlin, well researched and fascinating to read.
The most important biography of Harry Hopkins on the market.

An excellent history of postwar Berlin.

An interpretation of Yalta in which the importance of the Conference decisions are minimized.

An analysis of the division of Germany.

The fascinating story of the final days of World War II. A well researched book.

An interpretation of the Four Power administration of Germany.

Too general to be of specific use for this paper, but the book makes for good background reading.

A valuable survey.

An extremely biased, nevertheless very interesting account, well documented, to show Roosevelt's blunders in the relationship with the Soviet Union.
A contemporary analysis of the problems confronting Military Government in Germany. An outdated appraisal, in retrospect often unfair.

The United States in Germany: 1944-1955.
An updated evaluation of the history of Germany under occupation by the former chief historian of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany.

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