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The psychological ideas of Edmund Burke as analyzed from his writings

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THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IDEAS OF EDMUND BURKE AS ANALYZED FROM HIS WRITINGS.

A Thesis
Presented to
the Faculty of the Department of Psychology
University of Omaha

In Partial fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

by
Miriam Marjorie Robine
June 1960
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CHAPTER I

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IDEAS OF EDMUND BURKE

AS ANALYZED FROM HIS WRITINGS

I. INTRODUCTION

Investigation of ideas basic to democratic forms of government have usually followed the historical approach. It is believed in some quarters\(^1\) that the principles of government in the different state-systems are based on distinct conceptions of the nature of man.

Edmund Burke, the leading eighteenth-century political exponent of English and American liberty, is thought by many to have made an analysis of human behavior in regard to the British system of government. These psychological concepts have remained almost entirely unexplored.

Statement of the problem. It was the purpose of this study (1) to use Edmund Burke's political philosophy as the direct data for investigating the nature of the democratic personality, (2) to analyze Burke's ideas for their possible psychological and philosophical assumptions, and (3) to systematize these ideas by relating them to a wide range of topics which concern human behavior: the basic assumptions concerning the world and man, the nature of the personality, social motives, and personal attitudes and beliefs.

Validation of the problem. The study is valid in the following ways: (1) Psychological concepts make a difference in the personal, social, and political aspects of human behavior. As William H. Thompson said in his lecture on psychological concepts in 1958, "people behave to other people on the basis of their ideas on the nature of human behavior." (2) Burke's ideas had wide influence. His various roles as statesman, political philosopher, orator, and writer, brought his political doctrines to the attention of large groups of people. A modern authority on Burke has commented on this fact. "No statesman or writer of the past two centuries has more profoundly affected the spirit of the age than did Burke," (3) Burke also seems to have reported accurately the age in which he lived, for fifty years after Burke's demise, the political commentator, E. J. Payne, wrote, "The works of Burke will be to future ages what the works of Cicero are to us—we can reconstruct from them alone...the social and political scene in which their author lived." (4) Burke's political doctrine seems to contain implicit theoretical, as well as practical observations on human relations "that deserve to be considered additions to our slender stock of cumulative knowledge in the social sciences."

Limitations. This thesis has been limited to Burke's psychological.


and philosophical assumptions, rather than a political, historical, or ethical study. In the scope of this inquiry, it has not been considered necessary to trace the sources or descents of Burke’s ideas on either American or British institutions. It has not been considered a departure from this general outline to include a brief survey, in the section, "Historical background", of a few of the events which led up to the formulation of most of Burke’s principles.

The philosophical and psychological comparisons which have been made in this thesis have merely been intended for exposition and clarification of Burke’s concepts.

**Organization of the thesis.** Investigation of Burke’s ideas on human behavior begins in Chapter II with a frame of reference, which includes some of Burke’s fundamental ideas about the universe and man. Consideration is given to man’s existence in relation to the laws of the universe, the nature of God; and it presents some basic assumptions on the nature of man.

Chapter III establishes the concept of the personality and brings into sharper view, the instincts, emotions, learning, and variability of human behavior. Chapter IV is devoted to a consideration of the individual in relation to the English state. The individual is studied through the selected social motives of group identification, security, and status. In Chapter V, a consideration of the attitudes and beliefs of the individual, rounds out a picture of social and political rights, economic, and religious values. Chapter VI contains the over-all view of Burke’s assumptions, and presents the general conclusions of this research. At the end of each chapter there is a summary of the particular findings. Chapter VII lists
the bibliography used in this study, and other selected works which have been found helpful.

**Historical background.** Edmund Burke (1729-1797) was born at Dublin, Ireland. He was one of four children of Richard Burke, an attorney in good standing. He was graduated from Dublin College in Ireland, and in 1750 arrived in London to study for the law. He did not pursue this profession, but instead became a writer of literature, history, and political problems. In 1756, the year his first book was published, he was married to Alice Nugent, the daughter of an Irish physician. He had one son, Richard, who died while still a young man.

Burke's political career got its start in 1760, when Burke became private secretary to the Marquess of Rockingham, who became a Prime Minister of England. Soon afterwards, Burke began his career in Parliament, as a Member of the House of Commons. His rise to power was rapid. From 1766 to 1790, Burke became the chief guide and political genius of the powerful Rockingham Whig party.

The Enlightenment provided the background to many of Burke's ideas. The nature and purpose of this thesis precludes any thorough investigation of the fundamental ideas behind the Enlightenment. Mention may merely be made that Burke opposed the basic beliefs of the Enlightenment in three separate attacks upon rationalism, romantic sentimentalism, and utilitarianism. As Russell Kirk suggests, "Burke perceived the necessity for opposing ideas with ideas."

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The understanding of Burke's ideas must also take into account the American Revolution in 1775 and the French Revolution, with the storming of the Bastille in 1789. These events have been cited as additional stimuli to Burke's thought. In his speeches in Parliament and in a series of books, Burke predicted the outcome of the French Revolution and lived to see his predictions come true, in the emergence of Napoleon in 1795. In passing, it ought to be mentioned, that Burke's defense of the American Revolution and his attack on the French Revolution, have been the object of a debate over the subject of Burke's consistency; and this argument has existed to the present time.

No review of the literature is intended here, as so much has been written on Burke's political philosophy, that this examination might interfere with the expressed purposes of this thesis. The bibliography contains many worth-while books on this subject.

Related Studies. Podrebarac's study on the "Psychological Assumptions of National Socialism" might be considered a related study of the type attempted in this thesis. In so far as is known, no investigation of Burke's psychological assumptions in regard to the British state and human behavior has been made, in the various aspects


7 Hildegard Born Podrebarac, "The Psychological Assumptions of National Socialism."
considered here.

**Materials and Techniques.** The main source of information employed in this research was a set of Works of Edmund Burke which contained his published writings and speeches. The twelve volume American edition of these works, published by Little, Brown and Company of Boston in 1865-1867, was more easily obtainable than other editions, and contained modern language usage. All references have been to this edition unless otherwise specified. A few references have been made to selections of Burke's Correspondence compiled by Copeland, 1958; and to Burke's Correspondence compiled by Fitzwilliam, 1844. References to these works include the editor's name for clarification. The titles have been shortened when this did not seem to interfere with a clear understanding.

Secondary sources included histories, books on political science, philosophical works, biographies, and psychological source material. The results of this selection appear in the bibliography.

Selections of Burke's quotations were made in all cases from his direct works. Quotations were selected carefully for their psychological significance to the study as a whole, and for the subject-matter of each chapter. Care was taken to observe the context of the quotation, in order to eliminate possible errors. Discussion of these quotations depended upon the method of interpretation and analysis for psychological and theoretical assumptions. Complete quotations were used as the general guide to Burke's ideas, with frequent supporting evidence when this seemed to summarize Burke's views. In this manner, a system of psychological assumptions presented a variety of ideas on each topic.
CHAPTER II

FUNDAMENTAL BELIEFS

This chapter signifies an attempt at systematic exposition and interpretation of the main philosophical and psychological assumptions of Edmund Burke. It represents a specific endeavor to distill from Burke's writings and speeches, his system of ideas concerning the natural and the human universe.

In this sense, it serves as a frame of reference, not only for Burke's views on the universe, and man's relationship to it, but also; and in a general way, this chapter previews Edmund Burke's psychological insights in the field of human behavior.

The area under discussion is organized and divided into the following sections: (1) Existence, (2) The Nature of God, and (3) The Nature of Man.

I. EXISTENCE

Burke would seem to be describing human existence, when he perceives a world in which:

Individuals are physical beings, subject to laws universal and invariable. The immediate cause acting in these laws may be obscure; the general results are subjects of certain calculation.¹

The terms of human existence imply that man be governed by certain 
laws, which affect all "individual beings." While Burke believes that it 
may be difficult to trace out a causal chain in one of these laws, he im-
plies that it is quite possible to study the effects of a law. This pro-
cess would seem to result in the "certain calculation" that an "immediate" 
or first cause exists. If this is so, then the means of arriving at a 
first cause would appear to be proof of God's existence, in the tradition 
of St. Thomas Aquinas.

St. Thomas attempted to prove God's existence by means of five 
famous arguments. Burke's reasonings suggest St. Thomas' second proof: 
reasoning by efficient causation to imply the existence of a first cause. 
It would seem that Burke traces a causal chain through a "chain of causes, 
which, linking one to another," links "to the throne of God himself." Burke 
thus led to the belief in the Supreme being, one who may be known by 
his "results."

The certainty that God exists seems to stem in part then, from 
a consciousness of a power which both limits and conditions human beings 
through inexorable laws which thus affect human existence. It would seem 
that Burke accepts this high authority, for he acknowledges the universal 
laws, which is not in the power of man to resist. Thus a Divine Determinism 
seems to rule in this unalterable constitution of things.

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2 Redolav A. Tanneff, The Great Philosophers, New York: Harper 

3 Edmund Burke, A Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of our 
Burke's reference to "physical beings" must not be misconstrued into meaning that man is determined by his physical nature only. If that were true, a mechanistic interpretation of man's behavior would obviate Burke's belief in an ultimate cause. Burke seems to think more highly of man than this, for he rejects the doctrine which "the Cartesians argue" regarding non-human life. Therefore, he cannot be expected to believe in a theory that a "mechanism of their parts" is the final key to causation. While it is true that "physical beings" are subjected to the fixed and unalterable laws of the universe, "Men are made of two parts,—the physical part, and the moral." These distinctions between the 'two parts' would seem to point to a dualism between mind and body. According to Burke, mind and body interact, for "affections of the mind produce certain emotions of the body"; and "qualities of the body...produce certain determinate passions in the mind."

Burke would feel that man's physical nature would be similar to that of other living creatures, to the extent that inner physiological necessities would relate them. But if man has a 'moral' nature also, this might mean that man may rise above his physical nature; that he might be capable of transcending to higher levels than the physical. If man

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possesses this "moral" nature, he would seem to have the freedom to choose between good and evil, or between right and wrong. If man may make these ethical judgments, then the will is free.

How can these two opposing philosophies, Divine Determinism and Free Will, both be true? How is one to reconcile the thought in these two assumptions, when in the one a Divine Determinism seems to rule over men, and in the other man's moral nature implies that the will is free? These are questions which Burke, himself, seems to weigh, for he says:

In all speculations upon men and human affairs, it is of no small moment to distinguish things of accident from permanent causes, and from effects that cannot be altered.6

Burke seems to recognize the difficulties in a situation which means a choice between two alternatives. If one must distinguish things of "accident" from things having no "permanent" cause, then this is virtually the choice between Voluntarism and Determinism.

If this is essentially the problem, it may be that Burke is not entirely satisfied with either alternative. To be specific, in Determinism Burke evidently sees that existence "cannot be altered" in as much as man is subject to "universal and invariable laws". Thus absolute determinism would imply a fixed radius of locomotion, leaving no area for man's free will. On the other hand, if Burke chooses Voluntarism, there would be no meaning to the observable laws of existence without "that chain of causes leading to God."

It is no wonder that this is a decision of no small"moment"! It is not to be solved apparently, through "speculations", but rather

in a more practical and precise way; for Burke would resolve this conflict through a "computing" principle, "adding, subtracting, multiplying, and dividing, morally". Burke balances this moral ledger, he discovers that the "the rights of men are in a sort of middle". Burke has made a compromise choice between determinism and free will, choosing the "middle" course between two alternatives. Burke puts it concisely when he says, "We compensate, we reconcile, we balance." Burke does not try to define the exact areas in which free will operates, as these things are "incapable of definition", but that is not the same as saying they are "impossible to be discerned." Thus Burke would seem to feel that although man is strictly subject to universal laws, he still may operate with a degree of freedom. In this connection, Burke has said, "It is better to cherish virtue and humanity, by leaving much to free will, even with some loss to the object." Thus by leaving "much" of man's existence to be shaped by human hands, man may become in a great measure a creature of his own destiny. Although the course of human existence would not describe perfection, regard for man's ethical judgments would be a sign of faith in man

8Ibid.
9Ibid., p. 457
10Ibid., p. 513
11Ibid., pp. 368-9.
and man's ability to make wise decisions.

The general results of Burke's compromise between Determinism and Voluntarism seem to have had enormous effects on his principles and laws regarding human existence and human behavior.

Three such laws may have a bearing on the problems of human existence; the laws of order, change, and justice. Burke describes the first law of order:

I know there is an order that keeps things fast in their place: it is made to us, and we are made to it.\(^{12}\)

The universe is not confusion; it is an ordered arrangement of symmetrical parts. Man has his "place" in the general scheme, and it is a safe harbor of security. Man is "made" to the universe, apparently experiencing a sense of belonging to it; he finds his identity within this large frame of reference. He is one with the whole fabric of the universe, for the entire structure is also "made" to man. Thus the universe appears to contain all that man requires to fulfill his needs and to insure his dignity.

The evidence of order in the universe seems to express a design and purpose. Everything in its place and each part fitted to the whole would thus seem to reinforce Burke's thesis on final causation. Knowledge of the Creator appears to be predominantly an act of faith for Burke says, "I assume that the awful Author of our being is the Author of our place in the order of existence."\(^{13}\)

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But the harmony of man's existence with the rest of the universe would also seem to be based on the enlightened observation that "good order is the foundation of all good things." Thus faith and reason appear to point to the same general plan.

It might be of interest to determine whether change is part of this Divine Plan, or whether rearrangement of basic order is possible. Burke's second law of change may provide an answer:

We must all obey the great law of change. It is the most powerful law of Nature, and the means perhaps of its conservation. All we can do, and that human wisdom can do, is to provide that the change shall proceed by insensible degrees.

Burke recognizes that change is inevitable in Nature, and therefore must be obeyed as a part of God's plan. It seems to be a living order rather than a mechanical level of change. It is likely that Burke's law of change is the recognition of the biological or evolutionary developments in nature. If this is so, then these changes may be the "most powerful" method nature possesses for maintaining and guarding previously established forms from absolute destruction. If this is Burke's interpretation, it is possible that he views the whole universe as an open structure, for in his provision for change there are implications of flexibility in a gradually changing order.


15 This is similar to some of the concepts in Aristotle's philosophy. See Radoev A. Tsanoff, on Aristotle, The Great Philosophers, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953, pp. 67-95.
Since nature's method of change is gradual, "human wisdom" would seem to dictate the same methods in the affairs of men. Only negligible amounts of innovation seem to be permitted to man, for all that man can do is to allow for change to transpire by "insensible degrees". To Burke "change is novelty" but "reform is not a change in the substance". Thus he distinguishes between the two methods, and implies that "reform" is well within man's domain. The significant difference lies in the fact that, as Burke adds, "We have taken care not to inoculate any scion alien to the nature of the original plant." This analogy with nature seems to reveal his high regard for the durable arrangements of all existing forms. He seems to imply that it is foolhardy to introduce something wholly new. Apparently, Burke admires the conservation of nature and would urge men to apply himself to its lessons.

Burke has made it clear that man is not the final cause, that is to say, a Creator; nor is he to be, evidently, a destroyer. "I do not like to see anything destroyed," Burke has said. For him, apparently, man's role is mostly maintainer, or at best gradual improver. Rearrangement or destruction of the institutions in the social structure would seem to be denied.

How then can Burke account for the great changes that sometimes appear in the affairs of men? To let him speak for himself:


18Burke, Reflections, p. 272.

19Ibid., p. 416.
When "Providence" is preparing some enormous change, "the minds of men will be fitted to it, the general opinions and feelings will draw that way"; implying that change is a Divine Plan; only a presumptuous mortal would attempt to usurp a Divine Prerogative. If the same omnipotent "Providence" which in some mysterious fashion predisposes men toward change, is also directing the laws of nature, then the world of nature is not in itself divine; it, too, appears to be dependent upon the will of God.

Burke does not try to explain the mystery in change, as it seems that this cannot ever be clearly comprehended. "When we go but one step beyond the immediate sensible qualities of things, we go out of our depth." The orderly continuity is revealed as the product of the Divine Mind, conditioning men to a state of readiness for the subsequent changes that are to transpire.

While the pattern of evolutionary developments in the field of nature is, for the most part, a source of guidance, Burke would not imitate nature in his third law of justice. Burke says:

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There is one thing, and one thing only, which defies all mutation, I mean justice—that justice which emanating from the Divinity, has a place in the breast of every one of us, given us for our guide with regard to ourselves and with regard to others.\(^\text{22}\)

Only the outward "fabric of the world alters, and nature is only the externally revealed part of God's plan. There is also an inner world which is never allowed to change, and which in fact "defies all mutation". Justice is posited as that law, and it holds the unique property of "defying" all mutation. This may mean that while the laws of order and change rule the external physical world, justice takes precedence in the moral world. Moral justice is thus God's special gift to mankind, implanted as an instinct so that man might have an inner law to guide him.

Justice, linked with the Divine concept of infinity and rooted in the "breast", apparently makes it flower in the hearts of all mankind. This implies that the Divine aim is through the affections; namely, the emotion of love. If this is so, it would seem that the heart has been considered a worthier instrument than the head. Burke seems convinced that this is the best possible plan for he says, "Whenever the wisdom of our Creator intended for man to be deeply moved by anything, He did not confide the execution of his design to the languid and precarious operation of our reason."\(^\text{23}\)

Love, evidently, unlocks the very door of justice, which


flows in its unchanged course through the whole of human existence.

The narrow rationality of the mind is then not considered a safe vault because it has a way of "seizing upon the senses and imagination"; it has a tendency to "captivate the soul before the understanding is ready either to join with them, or to oppose them." It becomes clear that there is danger that mankind would construct a false antithesis between reason and faith, because human nature is subject to illusions. When man uses only his individual reason unaided by his moral instincts, then the way may not be prepared for truth and knowledge. This would mean that man's moral guidance, that is his conscience, is essentially inborn in him; and that revelation through Divine intent rules the conscience.

But revelation must also be in reference to what is to be found in reason and experience, if man's intuitive "understanding" joins or opposes the "senses and imagination." Burke would seem to broaden the gulf that must be bridged through revelation, if the internal conditions are basically referable to man's reason and sense perceptions.

It would seem that all of the laws have some impact on man's behavior. Man has an environment of order and change beyond which he cannot go. But within its framework, he knows and he perceives. He has the ability to make ethical judgments, to formulate a set of principles and rules, and he has an emotional nature designed for loving.

God has decreed these basic circumstances of man's existence.

\(^{24}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 184-5.\)
Man seems to orient himself within this broad frame of reference in humble submission to all laws, conceiving that they are but the earthly manifestation of a higher and unique spiritual form.

II. GOD AND MAN

—Burke's principle of a higher eternal law may be investigated for the purpose of determining man's connection with Divine Law. In a clear statement defining this connection, Burke says:

We are all born in subjection—all born equally, high and low, governors and governed, in subjection to one great immutable, pre-existent law, prior to all our devices, and prior to all contrivances,...by which we are knit and connected in the eternal frame of the universe, out of which we cannot stir.25

Man is thus "knit" to the universe by a supreme power whose law is "pre-existent" to the law of man. This law is further described by Burke as "paramount to all our ideas and all our sensations, antecedent to our very existence",26 which implies a law prior to and independent of the perceiving individual. This appears to be a supra-rational law which would take precedence over the law of man.

It would seem that this law is the Divine law of eternal justice, if both "high and low" are equally submissive to it. In this connection Burke has said, "The great rule of equality, which is grounded upon our common nature,...Philo...calls the mother of justice."27 Man's laws seem

26 Ibid.
27 Burke, Fragments of a Tract Relative to the Laws Against Poverty in Ireland., Vol. VI, p. 325.
directly based on this pre-existent Divine law of justice. For Burke, the Divine law guarantees that all men are equal in the sight of God.

Man must live, apparently, within the fixed pattern of law decreed for him, in an eternal plan fully set out by God. If this seems to be the case, then man's will is directed toward an end which can be none other than the one which is determined by God. Underlying this idea is Burke's avowal of God's will: "Having disposed and marshalled us by a divine tactic, not according to our will, but according to His, He has... subjected us to act that part which belongs to the place assigned us."28

Here is the deep assurance that an omnipotent Providence orders the affairs of human society. The justification of each man's life on earth is the will of God, each individual's place decreed by a "Divine tactic".

Burke's respect for this "Divine Tactic" in the affairs of men becomes even more evident in the following passage:

Every good gift is of God; all power is of God; and He who has given the power and from whom alone it originates, will never suffer the exercise of it to be practised upon any less solid foundation than the power itself. If, then, all dominion of man over man is the effect of the Divine disposition, it is bound by the eternal laws of Him that gave it, with which no human authority can dispense.29

It would seem that the effect of God is imminent in the world at the same time that His power transcends the world. The effect of God is the panorama of earthly rewards and achievements, goals made possible only through God's will. Each "good gift" is a symbol of God's benevolence.


Burke sees that among these abundant gifts are men's abiding rules, God's justice, and all the "eternal laws". The inequality or seeming injustice of man's "dominion" over man appears to be adequate assurance for Burke that a "Divine Disposition" does exist by this manifestation of power.

Since "all power is of God", man is disqualified from the encroaching upon this Divine Quality. Power is delegated to man in a "Divine Tactic" which proceeds in a subtle fashion in the workings of men's institutions. Burke assumes that "our political system is placed in a just correspondence and symmetry with the order of the world...by the disposition of a stupendous wisdom".30 This implies that the Divine wisdom has so ordered man's institutions that they are separate from, but in harmony with, the order of the world. If this is so, then dominion of "man over man" may be marked by a precise divine law. Burke says that "although government certainly is an institution of divine authority, yet its forms, and the persons who administer it, all originate from the people".31 It would seem that the "Divine Tactic" has been to fashion man that he might govern himself in accord with God's plan for mankind. This is the extension of God's power, its manifestation, and not the power itself.

This idea of power may be clarified by Burke's warning:

All persons possessing any portion of power ought to be strongly and awfully impressed with an idea that they act in trust, and that they are to account for their conduct in that trust to the one great Master, Author, and Founder of society.32

The idea of acting in "trust" is apparently based upon a concept of all-pervasive authority which is God's alone. Supreme power is therefore

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30 Burke, Reflections, p. 275.
32 Burke, Reflections, p. 354.
not considered a human quality, and only portions of power are to be invested in men to be used for God's will. This plan seems to be an explanation of Burke's dictum that "arbitrary power is treason in the law,—that to mention it will law is to commit a contradiction in terms." Absolute power is a betrayal of God's trust and it is diametrically opposed to the spiritual standards of conduct established by Divine authority. Strictly speaking, all power derives from God, and the manifestations of the power are then earthly instruments of the Divine Being. Those who obtain power are evidently considered the rightful rulers in the society of men, since they appear to perform their functions with God's blessing.

A significant feature of Burke's beliefs on legal government might be the doctrine of man's submission to a human hierarchy of authority. This notion may be a derivation of Burke's other assumption that all authority on earth must yield to an eternal authority and "account" to God the "master, Author, and Founder of Society." If this is so, Divine law would therefore become the source of Burke's social structure, the final sanction and justification for social class.

It becomes clear that the supreme authority must emanate from God, that human power and government are merely declaratory forms of the Divine authority. Man's ability to rule symbolizes this God-given power, which must never be allowed to retrogress into "arbitrary" rule, for it would then be a debasement of God's trust. It seems to be Burke's conviction that lust for power exhibits an evil side of man's nature.

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III. THE NATURE OF MAN

Burke attempts to explain the element of evil in the world for he says that:

He (God) has mixed in His cup a number of natural evils, (in spite of the boasts of stoicism they are evils,) and every endeavor which the art and policy of mankind has used from the beginning of the world to this day, in order to alleviate or cure them, has only served to introduce new mischiefs, or to aggravate and inflame the old.34

This rather Machiavellian justification for the problem of evil points up the noxious elements strewn along man's path. For Burke, man's existence is not to be made easy; and life, evidently, is beset with difficulties.

Burke admittedly rejects the Stoic belief that evil can be something man only thinks is evil. The problem of evil is a reality to Burke, to be dealt with accordingly. It would seem that Burke's belief is in original sin if the imperfections in man's nature have been ordained as part of God's plan for mankind. "You would not cure the evil by resolving that there should be no more monarchs, nor ministers of state, nor of the Gospel," Burke says. "You might change the names," he adds, "the things in some shape must remain."35

Since this element of evil has introduced "mischiefs" into the

35 Burke, Reflections, p. 419.
world and nothing can seem to "alleviate" it, then it would appear that man is not entirely happy. On this point Burke has said, "I have sometimes been in a good deal more than doubt, whether the Creator did ever really intend man for a state of happiness." Thus it appears that perfection is not to be found in man, in whom God has implanted basic imperfections; mixing evil elements in man's nature along with the good.

The double-dimension of life has every chance for man to choose the good for:

Every sort of moral, every sort of civil, every sort of political institution, aiding the rational and natural ties that connect the human understanding and affections to the divine, are not more than necessary, in order to build up that wonderful structure, Man.

Human love and understanding may be reinforced through various links with God, through ethical standards, customs, and the moral and social forms. All of these institutions appear to enhance the "rational and natural" rapport which unites man with God. Both mind and feelings point man toward the right path while his institutional forms "aid" him in his quest towards growth and maturity.

With proper emotional and social conditioning, it would appear that man is uplifted and is brought closer to God. Man's true development would seem to be a result of his cultural and political institutions


which are designed to reinforce his innate capacity to learn and to improve. According to Burke, man appears to have the capacity for real achievement since he says, "There is nothing that God has judged good for us that He has not given us the means to accomplish, both in the natural and the moral world." This implies that man is encouraged to develop and expand his original nature and that he has been equipped with the necessary tools to improve his environment and to enrich his mind. Burke's conclusion, that it is man's prerogative "to be in a great degree a creature of his own making", implies the possibility of individual differences in taking advantage of, and using the products of social living. Man is free to make the most of all the ties which bind him to God and the social structure; ties which help to mold and to modify that "wonderful structure", which is man at his best development. There is thus an idea of a flexible growing "structure" in the concept of the human personality. Burke's doctrine seems one that urges man to reach toward higher goals, implying that man will be successful, for when man is "made as he ought to be made", he is "destined to hold no trivial place in the creation".

When Burke takes a long look at the human scene, his final judgment on man seems to be a doctrine of hope:

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40 Ibid.
Never expecting to find perfection in men, and not looking for divine attributes in created beings, in my commerce with my contemporaries I have found much human virtue.\footnote{41}{Burke, Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol, 1777, Vol. II, p. 240.}

Man's general capacity for "virtue" is sufficient reason for Burke to pin his ultimate hopes for mankind. "I have seen...a real subordination of interest to duty," he says, a "regulated sensibility to honest fame and reputation."\footnote{42}{Ibid.} Personal ambitions thus are not devaluated, as they seem important to the development of the individual.

While moral perfection may not be open to "created" beings, Burke has seen "much" selfish interest redirected into altruism. He has seen a humble devotion to the well-being of others. This seems to man's fullest expression of his capacity to choose the good that Burke sees as human "virtue".

These seem to be the fundamental principles upon which Burke bases his pride in man's performance; they also seem to be the principles upon which the society rests.
SUMMARY OF ASSUMPTIONS OF THE CHAPTER FUNDAMENTAL BELIEFS

Existence

1. Divine Determinism rules the universe. Within its limiting confines, man's will is free.

2. The laws of man's existence are the proofs of God's existence.

3. The laws of order, change, and justice rule the universe.

4. The universe is a pattern of harmony; it is orderly, safe; and it is made to man.

5. Man is made to the universe; his nature has two parts; mind and body. Each part interacts, one to the other.

6. All change in the universe is evolutionary change; it represents conservation. Man's pattern must conform to the general pattern of maintaining and improving.

7. Man's law of justice is the supernatural law of God. Man's reason is a poor guide to justice; justice is an instinct which man feels. It guides man through his conscience.

8. The instinct of justice; and faith in the Supreme Being cannot be denied by reason and experience.

The Nature of God

1. God is just and benevolent; His laws are His gifts to mankind.

2. Man's laws are a derivation from the pre-existing laws of God. Man's political system is part of God's plan for man to rule himself.

3. All power is God's. Government is a declaratory form of that power.

4. An eternal law of justice rules; men are equal in the sight of God.

The Nature of Man

1. God and evil are mixed in and amongst men.

2. Man has the capacity for virtue; he is a flexible organism capable of development.

3. Man's basic nature can be modified and improved through his social forms, his feelings, his moral nature.
CHAPTER III

PERSONALITY

This chapter represents an analysis of Edmund Burke's psychological assumptions on the individual human personality, in respect to the English state-system.

Discussions in this chapter develop ideas, on the nature of man, which were initiated in the preceding chapter. The nature of man is traced through the concept of "Personality," which may be considered as "the general characterization, or pattern, of an individual's total behavior."¹

The personality is discussed from the following points of view: (1) Instinct, (2) Emotion, (3) Reasoning and Learning, and (4) Variability.

I. Instinct.

Burke seems to recognize the personality as a unified system, when he describes the nature of man. He says:

"...Men are made of two parts,—the physical part, and the moral. The former he has in common with the brute creation... Man, in his moral nature becomes, in his progress through life, a creature of prejudice, a creature of opinions, a creature of habits, and of sentiments growing out of them. These form our second nature, as inhabitants of the country and members of the society in which Providence has placed us."²


Thus Burke appears to give form and content to the personality with his interpretation of the total nature of man. It is likely that Burke perceives the human personality in all its biological, social, and spiritual aspects. Although Burke seems to recognize man as a unity of these diverse "parts," he appears to separate the functions and to assign a higher place to the developing social and spiritual qualities.

Thus while acknowledging the individual's physical nature, Burke is inclined to minimize this side of the personality, and to concentrate upon the mind as the emergent self. This pervasive dualism is expressed by a comparison of man's physical nature with the "brute" nature; an identification which apparently stresses these similarities between men and beasts. But this ends the similarities with physical animal life; for man's "moral" nature evidently transcends these boundaries, and cloaks the individual with a distinctive human personality.

Man's social environment appears to provide him with the chance to develop his human potentialities, if Burke would believe that man's "second nature" is conditioned as an "inhabitant" of a social group. Thus Burke takes into account man's interactions with man. This concept of man as a social creature, evidently has a deep significance for Burke, since he frequently refers to the individual as the "civil social man." Burke's ideas of the emerging personality seem to point to "Providence."

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which has apparently created the basic conditions of man's social life. Thus in reaffirming his fundamental concept of Divine Determinism, Burke indicates a supreme power which controls human life. However, the inference that man is molded and is able to develop sentiments in the society in which he functions and the "country" in which he lives, appears to present the possibility of change through human achievement. If this would be so, then the underlying psychological basis for this idea, would be that human capacities are not absolutely and forever fixed. The individual is evidently shaped also by the complex and myriad institutions which form his total social milieu.

Burke has mentioned "prejudice" as one of the qualities of the personality. It might be well to examine in some detail this quality of the "civil social" man, for prejudice seems to be a basic principle in Burke's theory of the nature of man. He writes:

...we are generally men of untaught feelings: that, instead of casting away all our old prejudices, we cherish them to a very considerable degree;...because prejudice, with its reason, has a motive to give action to that reason, and an affection which will give it permanence.4

It would seem that a prejudice is an "untaught feeling," and as such, it would appear to serve as a powerful instinct. The dominant characteristic of the instinct has been cited as "a faculty or endowment of living beings which enables them to act in an adaptive manner apart

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from experience and learning." With this understanding of the instinct, it might be possible to clarify Burke's thought, and to discover why an individual might cling to an inborn prejudice.

Prejudice appears to be a method of behavior, which enables an untaught man to manifest an inherent wisdom, and to put this wisdom to use, in achieving harmony between himself and his environment. This "adaptive" activity (that is, this prejudice-instinct) may enable the individual to find solutions to the problems of living.

Burke believes that "man is by nature reasonable," and that he possesses instincts distinct and apart from experience and learning. These instincts are always in accord with knowledge, for "never, no, never, did Nature say one thing and Wisdom say another." The individual is thus well-advised to attend an instinct which is never irrational, and which seems to be wisdom without reflection. By thus accepting the validity of innate wisdom, Burke diverges from the teachings of Locke, the traditional Whig philosopher, who believes that "the mind is 'white paper, void of characters, without any ideas.'"

Burke makes two basic distinctions between the 'wisdom' of an inborn prejudice and that which is a result of knowledge of experience:

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(1) Prejudice has a "motive" to give it action, and (2) an "affection" to give it "permanence." Through being impelled to give action to this wisdom, the prejudice "engages the mind in a steady course of wisdom and virtue," and through "just prejudice," a man's "duty becomes a part of his nature."

Here, it seems, is Burke's justification for his curious defense of "prejudice." Burke evidently believes that man has the capacity for a "just" or righteous prejudice. If this is so, it would be manifested not only by wisdom, but by virtue, as well. In this sense, Burke may believe that prejudice serves as the true guide to "duty." Since Burke believes that a "man acts from adequate motives relative to his interest," he might also believe that in 'just prejudice,' a man is fulfilling this 'duty' to himself. It is possible that Burke takes this point of view, for he has said that, "A tender conscience," must be "tenderly handled," otherwise "the whole moral frame and constitution is injured," which implies that the individual experiences pain when he does not conform his actions to his instincts.

Thus while it seems that a man's inner authority justifies the use of his prejudices, Burke points out that outer authority defends them.

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Many of our men of speculation, instead of exploding general prejudices, employ their sagacity to discover the latent wisdom which prevails in them. If they find what they seek, they think it more wise to continue the prejudice, with the reason involved, than to cast away the cost of prejudice, and to leave nothing but the naked reason.¹²

Thus Burke's defense of prejudice includes this appeal to the authority of recognized men of wisdom, for when they "seek" and "discover" the real substance of the prejudice, they, too, concur that "under the direction of reason, instinct is always in the right."¹³

Since the balance of "sagacity" appears to be on the side of the instincts, it is probably that the state-system recognizes the instincts as true guides to conduct. In this connection, Burke has said, "Politics ought to be adjusted, not to human reasonings, but to human nature; of which the reason is but a part, and by no means the greatest part."¹⁴

Thus if the state-system were to conform its practices to this "latent wisdom" prevailing in human nature, it would not seem necessary to impose force as a means of control, in order to produce desirable conduct. It would also seem that if the conscience were to be recognized as an important inner mechanism of control, then this might imply that the individual is free to direct himself. Therefore, since politics is to harmonize

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with "human nature," then a state-system might advance and promote the development of this type of personality. Burke's description of the state's cultivation of the best in human nature, leads one to believe that this may be the goal. He writes:

In England we have not yet been completely embowelled of our natural entails: we still feel within us, and we cherish and cultivate, those inbred sentiments which are the faithful guardians, the active monitors of our duty, the true supporters of all liberal and manly morals...We preserve the whole of our feelings still native and entire, unsophisticated by pedantry and infidelity.\[15\]

Thus it appears that the English state-system does attempt to "preserve" all instincts, for the leaders "cherish" all of those "inbred" sentiments. Regard for the instincts in human nature is further demonstrated when Burke says that the function of the state is "to follow, not to force, the public inclination."\[16\]

Thus authority, itself, seems to appeal to the standards and principles of the individual. If this is the case, then the state would conform its practices to the particular prejudices and feelings abiding in the minds of its people. Burke would seem to find such a foundation both efficient and sound, for in this way, "prescription of government" is not "formed upon blind, unmeaning prejudices."\[17\] Specifically, what are these prejudices which government holds so dear? Burke would answer,


"Next to the love of parents for their children, the strongest instinct...
that exists in man, is the love of his country."18

So it seems that the state is based on love. It is the inner spring of action which gives meaning to the patriotic feelings; those "manly morals," which are second only to the family instinct. Burke's idea of cultivating these patriotic feelings might be a method of "improving instinct into morals,...grafting the virtues on the stock of the natural affections."19 Thus by maintaining the "inbred" sentiments, the flavor of original virtues seem to be enhanced and improved.

Such are Burke's views on prejudice. It is possible that his use of the term "prejudice" is ill-advised, for it becomes increasingly evident that in "prejudice," Burke is referring to the conscience, the ethical attitudes, the sentiments, the principles, and in fact everything that can be translated into instinct. Burke would see these things as not the results of empirical attitudes, but as the native and unreasoned wisdom to be employed as the right and reasonable guide to individual behavior.

II. The Emotions

It might be of interest to determine the emotional basis for human relationships in the state-system.

Erich Fromm describes an emotional state of love as: "an attitude, an orientation of character which determines the relatedness of a person to

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the world as a whole not toward one object of love."\(^{20}\)

This definition might serve as a guide for considering the love needs of the individual. Burke begins by describing these needs:

To be attached to the subdivision, to love the little platoon we belong to in society, is the first principle (the germ, as it were) of public affections.\(^{21}\)

It appears that the family, "the little platoon," is the unit in which love is first expressed. Since the "germ" of love begins in the family, it would seem very likely that the state-system would regard marriage and the family with deep approval. Under ordinary circumstances, marriage may be considered as the basic means for satisfaction of the love needs. If the state itself, is based on love, then the state would normally encourage the individual to enrich his emotional life, through marriage. Burke's views on marriage seem consistent with this idea, and he points out that "it is a great mistake to think that mere animal propagation is the sole end of matrimony."\(^{22}\) Burke would feel, then, that marriage is not an emotional incubator in which to breed future citizens for the state. Marriage, apparently, has other merits; for Burke says that marriage fulfills "all the purposes of a rational and moral being."\(^{23}\) Love would thus seem

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\(^{23}\)Ibid., p. 152.
to mean enrichment; and growth of mind and spirit. This ideal is far different from a conception of marriage which confounds man's physical nature, and the all insistent desires, with the greater spiritual strivings for satisfaction. The essence of love might be described as rational and moral production, and not just physical reproduction. As Burke has said, "It is not the duty of the community to consider alone of how many, but how useful citizens it shall be composed."24

Since Burke seems to consider marriage as personal growth and nourishment, his idea on the emotional life of the individual would seem to have broad horizons. He would believe that this dynamic relationship established in the family would spread to the state, for he is convinced that "we begin our public affections in our families," and he adds, "No cold relation is a zealous citizen."25

Since Burke has mentioned parental love, and love of country, as two of the strongest instincts in men, it would seem that these instincts are to be linked. If a state system pairs these natural instincts, then the patriotic feelings might be expected to possess increased strength. Burke seems to note an emotional identification from the reinforcing effects of pairing love of family with love of country. He says that the State becomes the "image of a relation in blood." 26 And the object of those

24 Ibid.
26 Ibid., p. 275.
affections would seem to be conducive to the development of that love, for Burke believes that in order "to make us love our country, our country ought to be lovely." Thus a warm climate in which to expand, would seem to insure a broad range to the affections. This emotional pattern is further revealed when Burke says:

"...We fear God; we look up with awe to kings, with affection to Parliaments, with duty to magistrates, with reverence to priests, and with respect to nobility. Why? Because, when such ideas are brought before our minds, it is natural to be so affected."

There is much for the individual to love! Burke says that these objects of affection are "natural": God, magistrates, and nobility. It would appear that the individual loves all expressions of eminence and authority in his life. In these concerns, Burke emphasizes that the individual does not form deliberate endorsements, he is committed through his natural feelings.

A "natural" love of God and regard for religion seems to imply an inherent faith and belief in God in God's existence. The power of this belief is expressed by Burke in its fullness, when he says, "Man is by his constitution a religious animal; that atheism is against, not only our reason, but our instinct," which seems to convey the idea of a

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27 Ibid., p. 354.


29 Ibid., p. 351.
transcendent devotion to God, dominating the individual's spiritual life. Love of God is an instinct and the knowledge of God is therefore not the product of abstract thought.

Burke's dictum that "Ministers are not only our natural rulers but our natural guides,"³⁰ maybe the expression of a natural and submissive feeling which the individual feels for the authority of God. That is to say, that if the individual has been intrinsically determined to value rules and laws, then respect for the ministers of the law might seem to be the expected consequence of this value system. Thus Burke may have a conception of God-given authority which operates in "natural" ways in the affairs of men.

In respect to man's emotions, Burke says that the king is held in "awe". If this is so, then the king must be the object of an unusual reverence. In the following statement, Burke makes a significant contribution towards explaining this relationship. He says:

No experience has taught us that in any other course or method than that of an hereditary crown our liberties can be regularly perpetuated and preserved sacred as our hereditary right.⁵¹

If the crown may be thought of as a symbol for the king, then it seems that the king and the individual's sense of freedom are closely associated in the mind.

If liberties, then, are capable of bequeathing, and the

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hereditary crown, along with "right" are transferred from one generation to another, these things would appear to be stable. To the extent that these two factors appear together, they may reveal the distinguishing characteristics of the individual personality.

Since Burke has maintained that no one believes "that the crown is held by divine, hereditary, and indefeasible right," it would seem that reverence for the king is not based on lines of divine right. But both crown and liberties are evidently considered the products of heredity, for they would seem to be completely independent of anyone's effort to control or modify them. In this sense, they may be closely associated, immutable, and the basic characteristics of the whole personality. If the monarchy, in the past, has been the form of government in which liberties have been realized, then a man might love his kind because he loves his liberties and they are both an organic part of existence. Together they complete the pattern of personality.

Burke has listed "respect for nobility" as last in the hierarchy of the individual affections. This position may be significant, for Burke says of the nobility, "I hold their order in cold and decent respect." His explanation for this qualified respect may be based on mixed feelings,

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for Burke would "cut short the overgrown branches of the feudal service," at the same time that he would conserve its strength. "I hold them [the Peers] to be of an absolute necessity in the Constitution," Burke says, in defending an aristocratic order. He would thus point out that his regard for nobility is based on an objective appraisal of performance; and that the nobility as a whole has benefited the state. In this sense, Burke would seem to emphasize the practical considerations of an aristocratic social order, which is kept within certain bounds.

But Burke's respect is not wholly utilitarian, for he also admires the nobility for their "graceful ornament to the civil order." In thus directing attention to the ornamental value of an aristocracy, Burke is expressing the personal need to admire all the pleasant draperies of life, over and above the essential requirements and common routines of daily living. The balance between these two tendencies, seems to embrace a distinctive style of life, in which both empirical and aesthetic values may find a place.

One cannot assume that love or respect are the only emotions. A strong preoccupation with love may also have as its polar opposite, the emotion of hate. Fromm says, "To say that man is capable of developing his

primary potentiality for love and reason does not imply the naive belief in man's goodness. An interesting illustration of this thesis may be found in Burke's writings. He says:

A kind Providence has placed in our breasts a hatred of the unjust and cruel, in order that we may preserve ourselves from cruelty and injustice. They who bear cruelty are accomplices in it...They will never love where they ought to love, who do not hate where they ought to hate.

It appears that hate along with love is a natural feeling in the individual. If a man can thus afford to feel and express his hatred, then the state-system recognizes that a man threatened in his very existence will normally react with hatred. Thus, if the individual is intrinsically constituted to demand fair and humane treatment, then this emotion of hate may act as a self-preservation or safety device. And Burke might feel also, that moral indignation against cruelty to others is the righteous hatred of the individual. If a man stands for cruelty to others then this reflects his own cruel nature: he is an "accomplice" to the cruelty. In order not to seem cruel, it would appear that interference would be necessary when injustice is perpetrated on others. If this is so, then the right of rebellion would be justified. Burke comments on the oppression of India with this significant statement:


The subjects of this unfortunate prince did what we should have done,—what all who love their country, who love their liberty, who love their laws, who love their property, who love their sovereign, would have done on such an occasion... The whole country rose up in rebellion, and surely in justifiable rebellion. 40

It would seem that a man has not only the right but he is even urged to protect himself and others by rebellion against oppression. If this is so, then it seems that the individual is more than an agent of his own interests; he also acts with reference to the community and its welfare. This implies that secular power is not justified because of its mere existence, if it contradicts moral principles.

If the individual identifies himself with the moral order in existence, a hate would arise against an oppressor wherever injustice is found. The forming of an integrated personality appears to be following the demands of the whole self. Burke does not appear to have a 'naive belief' in man's goodness. For him, God has "mixed in his cup a number of natural evils," 41 and these noxious elements of cruelty and injustice are as much a part of God's plan for mankind, as benevolence and justice.

III. REASONING AND LEARNING

In preceding studies of personality, reasoning has been contrasted with instinct and emotion. A more thorough investigation of reasoning, in connection with learning, may provide other important insights into the

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total personality structure.

For purposes of identification with Burke's point of view, the following definition of reasoning has been adopted:

Reasoning is a process of thinking, the end terms of which are tested by their logical necessity rather than by their concurrence with observed fact. 42

Reasoning is a thought process based on logic rather than on experience. A major stream of Burke's thought is devoted to the process of reasoning. Burke begins by describing the individual's intellectual capacities as follows:

...man is a most unwise and a most wise being. The individual is foolish; the multitude, for the moment, is foolish, when they act without deliberation; but the species is wise, and, when time is given to it, as a species it almost always acts right. 43

This seeming paradox of man being both wise and unwise, is resolved in the explanation that it is the "individual" who is foolish. Apparently, the individual is thought capable of independent action and thinking, but Burke says that when he acts without "deliberation," he does not act very wisely. If this is so, then considered and careful thought determines the wisdom of an action.

This seems to hold true even for the mass of men, the "multitude," who must evidently reach decisions through consideration and close study with others. As Burke has said elsewhere, "Mind must conspire with

which seems to imply group thinking and action rather than independent thought.

Since wisdom can be found only in the species "when time is given to it," it would appear that this deliberation is a long-time process and that wisdom is to be gained only gradually. If the individual and the multitude depend on this gradual accumulation of knowledge stored up by the species, there must be a distrust of decisions made independently. This assumption is further supported by Burke's declaration that "a conscientious person would rather doubt his own judgment than condemn his species."

So it appears that there is a mental output in the species which establishes certain norms for individual and group decisions. Evidently a form of racial wisdom is embodied in the species which is considered of greater value than any knowledge that one man may obtain in his lifetime. Thus it would seem that this store of knowledge would be esteemed by the individual; and that his habits, prejudices, and instincts might incline him toward "deliberation."

The following statement by Burke continues the development of this line of thought:

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44 Burke, Reflections, p. 456.

We are afraid to put men to live and trade each on his own private stock of reason; because we suspect that the stock in each man is small, and that the individuals would do better to avail themselves of the general bank and capital of nations and of ages.\(^6\)

It is thus supposed that a man cannot be guided by an independent reason if he is unable to "live and trade" on the small amount of reasoning powers he possesses. The individual may however, augment his feeble reason by proven habits of past ages. Apparently the integrative factor in deliberation lies in the store of communal values and traditions accepted by the individuals. That is to say, that the folk-wisdom of the "nations and the ages" provides convenient lessons which influence judgments and would seem to minimize trial and error efforts.

This continuity with the past ages, and the assimilation of the past society would tend to enrich the life space of the individual, producing more variety in thought processes and greater possibilities in personality development.

The assumption that there is much to be learned from the past, seems to put the folk wisdom of the species in the same category as the history of the nations. Thus history may be regarded as a form of learning. Burke's comments appear to corroborate this notion. He says:

> It \(\text{history}\) is a great improver of the understanding...From this source much political wisdom may be learned, --that is, may be learned as habit, not as precept,--and as an exercise to strengthen the mind, as furnishing materials to enlarge and enrich it.\(^7\)

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\(^7\)Burke, Remarks on the Policy of the Allies, October 1793, Vol. IV, p. 468.
The study of history may reveal much of human nature in the sense that it provides rich and varied examples of the ways in which men have solved their problems in the past. Burke would not underestimate this source of wisdom, for "Is, then, example nothing?" he asks. It would seem to be a great deal to Burke, for as the history of the nations is unrolled, "a great volume," containing the materials of the "past errors and infirmities of mankind," passes in review. Subsequent generations may profit from a study of the entire past in human behavior. There are apparently moral lessons to be learned from history, for it should "teach a civilized posterity to abhor the misdeeds of...barbarous ages." Thus, in a sense, history may point to the paths which ought to be abandoned, by a study of the data on human experience. If it can accomplish this objective, history can eliminate many of these patterns which have been found inadequate and wanting.

But the study of history, alone, cannot be the sole guide to behavior, because an individual might tend to become a creature of "habit," if he would seek to build his knowledge only from the past. History can accomplish much if it can reveal the basic patterns of mankind, but "to act in the same manner in all cases is turning necessity into a law."
Burke points out. Burke sees theorizing from history as a habit of assuming principles, without regard for the present circumstances. This would seem to Burke to be denial of any progress or advancement in the species. Burke's method of learning would seem to imply both a "looking backward as well as forward."\(^52\) This forward look is evident from the following statement.

> I must see with my own eyes, I must in a manner, touch with my own hands, not only the fixed, but the momentary circumstances, before I could venture to suggest any political project whatsoever...I must see the things; I must see the mon...Plans must be made for men.\(^53\)

Thus it seems that the wisdom and the habits of history cannot be drawn upon sufficiently to guide the present. Historical events, while teaching moral rules of prudence, cannot provide actual principles in a world of particular circumstances.

In order to augment man's instincts, his feelings, and traditions, both research and diagnosis are indicated. If plans are to be "made for men," one must also draw upon the present conditions of human nature.

For a proper diagnosis, Burke would not appeal to abstract rationality, for "The science of constructing a commonwealth...is not to be taught a priori."\(^54\) Rules, then, are not to be created on the basis of an individual and visionary reason. Burke clearly establishes this when he declares, "I never govern myself, no rational man ever did govern himself by abstractions and universals."\(^55\) Burke would direct his investigations

\(^{52}\)Burke, Appeal From the New to the Old Whigs, Vol. IV, p. 215.

\(^{53}\)Burke, Letter to a Member of the National Assembly, 1791 Vol. IV, p. 43.

\(^{54}\)Burke, Reflections, Vol. III, p. 311.

\(^{55}\)Burke, Speech on the Petition of the Unitarians, May 11, 1792, Vol. VIII, p. 61.
to the particular date of experience.

In denying that truths are a priori reasonings, Burke would tend toward the empirical method of learning. Abstract reasoning can do nothing on the ground of particular circumstances, when prescribing for human nature. But Burke would not rule out all abstractions, for he recognizes that "without the guide and light of sound, well-understood principles," all reasonings would be only a "confused jumble".56 Thus while Burke points up the imperfections of man's intelligence, he admits that reason has its place, in reconciling practical and obvious conclusions.

Since reason for Burke, is generally a corporate reason, it is of great value. Both reason and experience, may teach man an objective reality. Thus there is a basic dualism in the theory of knowledge. It is evidently a balance between the wisdom of tradition, and the evolutionary novelty of each new situation. This balance is like the constitution, standing on a "nice equipoise, with steep precipices and deep waters upon all sides of it,"57 which may be interpreted as a prudent willingness to be guided by tradition tempered by the circumstances of each case.

IV. VARIABILITY

Variability implies the character of uniquenesses and individual differences in personality. Differences in ability, interests and needs, have been cited by Ross and Stanley as problems of human variability; with

56Ibid.

with the fact of variability itself being "one of the best established facts about human beings." Burke's ideas seem to follow a similar pattern, for he too, finds sufficient evidence for a "real inequality" in human ability, which "never can remove." Government selection needs to be based on these known differences existing between individuals. In the following statement, Burke outlines the basic qualifications for public authority:

"There is no qualification for government but virtue and wisdom, actual or presumptive... Everything ought to be open, --but not indifferently to every man." Burke would thus imply that special personality traits are desirable, and that opportunities for leadership will be offered only to individuals who possess these distinctive traits. Burke says that men of "virtue and wisdom" are to be preferred over those who are without these qualities. Virtue and wisdom, apparently, characterize the leaders, whether their ability is found to be "presumptive" or "actual."

In defining "presumptive" ability, Burke has described "a true

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natural aristocracy," with honors and privileges"growing out of the preju-
dices of ages." 61 The nobility, apparently, are selected on the basis of
these prejudices, which are "formed out of a class of legitimate presump-
tions." These presumptions, Burke continues, "must be admitted for actual
truths." 62

Burke has listed many of these "presumptions" in favor of a no-
bility. The most predominant ones have been classified as follows:

Hereditary property and hereditary distinction...are
the natural securities...to the perpetuation of society it-
self...Some preference...given to birth,...to take a large
view...to have leisure...These are the circumstances of men
that form what I should call a natural aristocracy, without
which there is no nation.63

Thus Burke describes and actively defends the chief merits of
"natural aristocracy." Evidently, the virtues which are the distinguishing
features of this order, are: property, noble birth and breeding, information, and leisure. These are the "presumptive" qualifications for govern-
ment service. As Burke has said, "The voice of this grand chorus...ought
to have a mighty and decisive influence."64 So it seems that preference is
to be made on the basis of many of these qualities.

Distinctions based on property, apparently, have the most sig-
nificance for Burke, as he says, "To preserve possession of what he has

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61 Ibid., p. 415.
62 Burke, Appeal From the New to the Old Whigs, Vol. IV, pp. 174-5
63 Burke, Appeal, Vol. IV, p. 175; See also Reflections, Vol. III,
pp. 298-9 and P. 415.
64 Burke, Appeal From the New to the Old Whigs, Vol. IV, p. 176.
found to belong to him... is one of the securities against injustice and despotism, implanted in our nature."65 Burke implies that property, which has been unequally distributed would not constitute any danger to anyone, but would preserve and insure a personal liberty. Apparently, property makes a man both virtuous and wise. "He feels no ennobling principle in his own heart, who wishes to level all the artificial institutions which have been adopted..."66 Burke says. In this sense, guarding property rights is an intrinsic part of the duties enunciated on aristocracy, whose order points to a hierarchy of established privileges. The qualifications for leadership are thus in accord with the fabric of society itself: the assurance that property is the right of the individual.

But Burke would feel that "nothing is a due and adequate representation of a state that does not represent its ability as well as its property."67 It would seem that real ability is to be found outside the presumptive claims of an aristocracy. There are then other individuals who may possess different qualifications. Burke describes the selection process in which these actual abilities have been recognized:

I do not hesitate to say that the road to eminence and power from obscure position, ought not to be made too easy, nor a thing too much of course. If rare merit be the rarest of rare things, it ought to pass through some sort of probation.68

66Ibid., p. 416
67Ibid., pp.297-8
68Ibid., p. 297.
Apparently those with actual ability should not find it too easy to reach eminence. If such an individual reaches for a position of authority, he would be expected to pass some rather rigorous tests to prove his ability. The presumptive leaders, on the other hand, have not had to be screened, for family and property distinctions have evidently earned them the right to eminence.

But Burke has said, "You do not imagine that I wish to confine power, authority, and distinction to blood and names, and titles." So apparently, no individual with real ability is to be barred from public authority, even though he does not possess the family and property distinctions of nobility. How is this selection to be made? Specifically, what are the "rare merits" of those individuals, which give them a stake in the country? Perhaps the answer may be provided by an examination of Burke's statement that "the wiser, the more expert, and the more opulent conduct," in the affairs of the state. If this is the case, then wealth might be an indication of ability, since it has been paired with wisdom. Perhaps wealth is to take its rightful place alongside of property. Burke seems to support this notion when he says:

...Rich traders, who from their success are presumed to have sharp and vigorous understandings, and to possess the virtues of diligence, order, constancy, and regularity, and to have cultivated an habitual regard to commutative justice... form what I should call a natural aristocracy..."


70 Burke, Appeal From the New to the Old Whigs, Vol. IV, p. 174.

Thus money seems to be placed in the same category with the other qualifications for leadership. Apparently, part of the process of differentiation is to be carried out according to economic class. Apparently, Burke believes that the amassed wealth indicates the possession of some special skills, which have, perhaps, contributed to the accumulation of that wealth. In this connection, Burke has said, "Independence of mind will ever be more or less influenced by independence of fortune." This implies that creative thought might be singled out for leadership and that, perhaps, in pursuing independent endeavors, these individuals have developed their capacities.

This idea seems also, to reflect the economic field, for if personal liberty to secure wealth, enhances and sharpens man's mind, then the independent efforts which denote this achievement, might be valuable to a state. That is to say, that the personal habits of mind, the virtues of "diligence, order, constancy, and regularity," would seem to have resulted from a personal economic liberty. It is, perhaps, for this reason, that Burke says, "Wealth, in reason and good policy, ought to bestow... rank and estimation." This actual ability is not to be represented equally with presumptive ability, for, "Ability is a vigorous and active principle... property is sluggish, inert... it can never be safe from the invasions." So it seems that if the novility is to continue in its leadership status, it must be given preference, or those with actual ability may prove a serious threat.

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to their positions. Those holding landed estates could not hope to withstand such active ability, and soon the scheme of government might be upset. Thus by limiting selections and checking the quotas, actual ability may be automatically rendered a minority.

In summing up his views on the inequalities between human beings, Burke says, "no power...can make the men, of whom any system of authority is composed, any other than God, and Nature, and education, and their habits of life have made them." Thus Burke would feel that individual differences must be recognized between men; and that preference is not given arbitrarily, but is based on the results of many inherited and acquired factors. These special qualities have been Divinely determined; but man, through his 'habits' of life, may greatly contribute to his own advancement.

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Ibid., p. 284.
SUMMARY OF ASSUMPTIONS OF THE CHAPTER "PERSONALITY"

Instinct
1. The human personality is a total organism; its aspects are biological, social, and spiritual.
2. Social institutions develop man's potentials; they help to enrich man's mind.
3. Man is a creature of instinct and feeling. His prejudices control and guide his behavior; they help a man find wisdom without reflection.
4. Through "just" prejudice, a man's duty becomes a part of his nature.
5. The state improves human nature by cultivating the instincts; by modifying them into morals. The state is in harmony with human nature.
6. The state does not need to use force; it attempts to instill desirable conduct by cherishing the individual; by emotional appeals through the affections.
7. Parental love and patriotic love are the two strongest instincts of man.

Emotion
1. Marriage is not designed for the breeding of numbers of citizens. The state approves of marriage and the family as the means of satisfying the love needs; and as the means to mental and spiritual growth.
2. Emotional identification links family instincts to the state; and the state becomes the image of a beloved relative.
3. The individual's affections are transferred to God, magistrates, and nobility.
4. Reverence for authority, and respect for the law derive from a feeling
of reverence for the Supreme Being.

5. The concept of "king" and the concept of "liberties" are closely associated in the mind. Both crown and liberties are inherited structures in the English personality pattern.

6. Respect for nobility is a result of two important values to the individual: an empirical way of life, and an aesthetic quality, which the nobility represent.

7. The state recognizes that hate is a natural feeling to have for the wickedness in man's nature.

8. Rebellion on grounds of cruelty is justified; the state's laws must be subordinant to the moral laws of God.

Reasoning and Learning.

1. Learning is a process which results in behavior changes as a result of experience.

2. Experience can be vicarious. The individual utilizes the experience of the species to solve his immediate problems.

3. Knowledge depends on the transfer of communal values and traditions to new situations.

4. The study of history is advocated as a method of revealing the total behavior patterns of the species.

5. Learning results in improvement when moral prudence is added to the study of history. Insight is gained and the avoidance of trial and error methods.

6. Moral prudence is a matter of perception; the examination of both the fixed and the momentary circumstances before problems are solved.
7. Problems are not solved through intuition or a priori reasoning.
8. Reasoning is a product of group thinking; it is not the product of independent thought.

Variability
1. Selection of public leaders is based on inequality; it is the nature of human ability to be unequal.
2. Desirable leadership traits are virtue and wisdom. The nobility have presumptive claims to these traits.
3. Inherited property rights insure individual rights. This is the nobility's chief claim to leadership in the nation.
4. Actual ability indicates special skills, rather than family name, and rank. Wealth is associated with actual ability, and developed mind with wealth.
5. Actual ability must be in the minority in the state; it is so active a capacity that it would make inroads on presumptive ability.
6. All preferences in the state-system are based on the Divinely Determined factors of heredity and natural environment.
CHAPTER IV
SOCIAL MOTIVES

It is held by some writers that "man, growing up within a culture, acquires strong needs relating to his social environment." The present chapter is concerned with these needs or 'social motives' of the individuals who are exposed to the Eighteenth-century English culture.

A network of psychological assumptions is derived by selecting Edmund Burke's quotations to portray the concept of man as a socially motivated being.

Three social motives have been selected according to their relevance for the general topic, and for their importance in Burke's system of ideas. These motives are classified and discussed in the chapter as follows: (1) Group Identification, (2) Security, and (3) Status.

I. Group Identification

Group identification has been described as a phenomenon in which "the individual thinks of the group as an extension of himself and feels benefited by whatever benefits the group." This idea seems to express a desire for group-oneness; to become a member of a group, and to integrate individual desires with group goals.

Edmund Burke seems to recognize this motive to identify with the group when he perceives "the great mysterious incorporation of the human

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2Ibid., p. 122
In this connection, it might be advisable to consider Burke's definition of the people who are associated with this "mysterious incorporation". Burke begins by explaining his idea of a "people":

In a state of rude Nature there is no such thing as a people. A number of men in themselves have no collective capacity. The idea of a people is the idea of a corporation. It is wholly artificial, and made, like all legal fictions, by common agreement.

Evidently, the "people" is not merely the population, for Burke seems to discern a "collective" capacity greater than the sum of its individual units, when he refers to a "people". This might mean that the people act in reference to one another; that they have some common purpose which their oneness can achieve. Their behavior reveals a "true political personality." It seems that only civil society can provide the satisfactions for this "personality" since "rude" Nature offers no such names of incorporation.

Evidently this desire to incorporate is basic, since Burke points out that "men are never in a state of total independence of each other. It is not the condition of our nature." Thus while the civil association has been described as "artificial", the corporate character of the people appears to be natural. Burke seems to find no antithesis between the "natural" and

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5Ibid., p. 170.

the "artificial", for he says, "Man is by nature reasonable." And he adds, "He is never perfectly in his natural state, but when he is placed where reason may be best cultivated and most predominates." Thus Burke implies that the social instincts point men toward a political life; but the bond of union which holds them together is a product of their social culture. Burke would consider as nonsense the point of view which Rousseau advocated. Heidbreder writes, "Rousseau believed in the 'noble savage' and a 'return to nature', and regarded civilization as synonymous with slavery." Burke would feel that man is not ruined but saved through the civilizing influences of his political structure. Burke summarizes this point of view when he says, "Thus far nature went and succeeded; but man would go farther." From this one might infer that men's natural instincts are supplemented by rational and purposeful efforts to improve his existence. Human beings form "specific conventions in each corporation," Burke says, to "determine what it is that constitutes the people." Thus men's political arrangements are not all the same, but are dependent on the 'conventions' which have been adopted to suit the particular needs. A "people" can not be an abstraction for Burke; for this group cannot be detached from the conventional forms in which the political society has been cast.

7Burke, Appeal, p. 176.
If the state is the necessary means through which the individual can best realize his civil nature and become an integral part of the people, some bond must hold the people together. Burke has identified a "common agreement" as the means by which the individuals are brought to their group association and their civil institutions. In the following quotation Burke expresses his view of this agreement:

Men without their choice derive benefits from that association; without their choice they are subjected to duties in consequence of these benefits; and without their choice they enter into a virtual obligation as binding as any that is actual.11

There appears to be no external voluntary agreement, in the sense that this means a social contract explicitly sanctioned by the people. Burke seems to adhere to the language of a social contract as a useful principle; perhaps, to describe the pattern of the constitution of the country.

This pattern infers a "virtual" but compulsory pledge to promote the welfare of the group entity, by adherence to the civil laws and practices. This obligation seems to rest on all individuals 'without their choice'. Burke has repeatedly said, "Duties are all compulsive."12 The individuals appear to derive "benefits" from their duties, so the two acts appear to be dynamic. That is, one act seems to influence or balance the other. Thus the "agreement", or constitution, which demands individual obedience and conformity to the ideals of the political structure, also sets a value of a "benefit" which is derived from the established

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11 Ibid., p. 165.
12 Ibid., p. 166.
pattern. In the following statement, Burke describes the benefits of the constitutional civil society:

Society is, indeed, a contract. Subordinate contracts for objects of mere occasional interest may be dissolved at pleasure... The state is to be looked on with other reverence; because it is not a partnership in things subservient only to the gross animal existence of a temporary and perishable nature. It is a partnership in all science, a partnership in all art, a partnership in every virtue and in all perfection.13

The contract, or constitution, explicitly transcends any ordinary agreements of superficial nature, which can be made or broken "at pleasure". The notion to which the people are pledged must be recognized as an enduring and fixed order; an enterprise worthy of "reverence".

Burke's contract is evidently no ordinary contract, for the partnership arises not only "from the relation of man to man," but the "relation of man to God."14 Alfred Cobban points out that both Locke and Burke appeal to law in the contract, but that Locke "invokes the Law of Nature" and that he bases his ideas on this conception of the contract.15 Burke, on the other hand, feels that the contract is even more binding on the individuals, for their reverence is an acknowledgment of the Divine

Contract. To support this notion, Burke has said, "If no Supreme Ruler exists, wise to form, and potent to enforce, the moral law, there is no sanction to any contract, virtual or even actual." Thus the Divine ordinance is fulfilled through the constitutional instrument of the state, and the state is the means by which man lives according to God's law. Burke would feel that the validity of every human contract depends upon the divinely established moral law which all men are obliged to obey. Locke's belief "that each separate generation and individual has to decide anew whether or not to accept the compact already in existence," is not asserted by Burke. Burke says, "Without any stipulation on our own part, are we bound by that relation called our country?" Men are born into their duties and obligations.

Through artificial institutions, the Divine Will is capable of instilling ideals and lofty purposes in an infinite variety of methods.

Some of the greatest values which are fulfilled within the conventions of civil society are "science," "art," and "virtue." These are among the many benefits to the individual for his willing adherence to the just rules of his civil society. The "partnership" seems to promise that the individual can develop his personality along cultural and moral planes.

Individual genius would stifle, without the partnership and the wisdom imbedded in man's corporate nature. Even the "greatest talents

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are wholly unserviceable to the public,\(^{19}\) without the benefits of a civil order. The degree to which an individual identifies with the state and its values, so much closer does he seem to approach the "perfection which society has achieved appears to be long-time process of the ages. Burke says:

As the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in many generations, it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born.\(^{20}\)

Thus all of life merges into one society for Burke, as the larger life appears to contain the greater benefits. Behind and beyond the present, Burke sees a society which appears somewhat mystic. The partnership consists in a long and continuous chain of "living", "dead" and "unborn". Burke writes that the contract "is but a clause in the great primeval contract of eternal society,"\(^{21}\) thus connecting the generations of people, and binding them together forever.

"eternal" society, with roots going deep into the past, and with tentacles reaching into the future, provides a lasting life for the constitution. Each generation seems to leave some mark upon the whole, but the "temporary possessers and life-renters" are not to "act as if they were the entire masters."\(^{22}\) For an individual to stand alone and to oppose the great chain of traditions and obligations, would seem to deny the


\(^{21}\)Ibid.

\(^{22}\)Ibid., pp. 556-7.
spirit of a "true humility, the basis of the Christian system," and an ideal to which Burke is evidently pledged.

Burke's scrutiny of the "people" reveals his belief and faith in the corporate will as a practical means to sound political action. "This is a choice not of one day or one set of people," Burke says of the constitution. "It is made by the...moral, civil, and social habits of the people..." The bond which holds the people to their civil society is not confined to the 'one set of people', and the present time or space. The corporate will extends past these boundaries and freely elects to preserve the civil institutions. This "deliberate election" is for Burke "ten thousand times better than choice." It is better to Burke, because it is based on principles of moral prudence, on the corporate, social nature of man, and on the modes of human behavior.

II. Security

Since Burke seems to believe that the political structure, the moral, and "social habits" of a people bring them into harmony with one another, it might be useful to consider those influences in relation to security.

\[\text{Burke, } A\ \text{Letter To A Member of the National Assembly, In Answer to Some Objections to His Book On French Affairs, 1791, Vol. IV, p. 26.}\]

\[\text{Burke, Speech on a Motion For A Committee To Inquire Into The State of the Representation of the Commons in Parliament, 1762, Vol. VII,}\]

\[\text{Ibid.}\]
Burke describes a secure political structure as follows:

As long as the British monarchy...shall oversee and guard the subjected land, --- as long as our sovereign lord the king, and his faithful subjects, the lords and commons of this realm, --- the triple cord which no man can break,...the firm guaranties of each other's being and each other's rights, ---the joint and several securities, each in its place and order, --- as long as these endure, so long the Duke of Bedford is safe, and we are all safe together. 26

The "triple cord" which "no man can break" appears to be an organized system of cooperation. The king, council, and the people, as the separate parts of the political structure, represent the whole fabric of society. Burke would believe that as long as this fundamental structure is maintained, with each part in its proper "place and order," the government is made secure, without violating any of the rights of its individuals. Thus the safety of the individual seems to be dependent upon the stability of this system; and security is proportionate to the balancing of power and authority.

Effective functioning of the "triple cord" appears to promote confidence in the system. Burke has said that a balance of these parts "interpose a salutary check to all precipitate resolutions," 27 implying that deliberative thought is cautious and by its very nature proceeds carefully. The Government must take into account that it is dealing with human beings, for "the nature of man is intricate; the objects of society

26 Burke, A Letter to a Noble Lord on The Attacks Made Upon Mr. Burke and His Pension, 1796, Vol. V, pp 210-11.

are of the greatest possible complexity." No simple form of government would seem to be suitable for complex human beings living in a complex society. Burke would feel that the British monarchy with its checks and balances, is far from simple. Its decentralized powers would evidently be infinitely capable of understanding the complicated needs of all of its individuals. Burke sets forth this view of the British state:

The British state is, without question, that which pursues the greatest variety of ends, and is the least disposed to sacrifice any one of them to another or to the whole. It aims at taking in the entire circle of human desires, and securing for them their fair enjoyment.

Burke's idea of man's complexity is further demonstrated by his notion that there exists not merely one basic need but an "entire circle" of desires to be satisfied. The British state evidently attempts to provide for the "greatest variety of ends" which is represented by the diverse needs of its population.

The close response of the state to individual needs of its citizens is confirmed by Burke when he writes, "Government is a contrivance of human wisdom to provide for human wants," Burke thus recognizes that civil government is the most practical means of administering to these needs. It might also mean that the state would harmonize its purposes in accordance with individual perspectives. In other words, the state would exist for the individual. Burke's respect for the individual is evident.

28Ibid., p. 312.


when he says, "Things in common life, are variously mixed and modified,
enjoyed in very different degrees," so he would not force people into
uniformity when differences amongst them are so noticeable. Burke seems to
believe that there is a great variety of dimensions into which human perso-
nality can fit; and that variety, is in fact, the norm of life.

Burke would feel that there is no security for human beings when
there is no regard for human personality. This becomes evident when Burke
compares both equalitarian and totalitarian forms of government with that
of Britain. He says:

To them [those governments] the will, the wish, the want,
the liberty, the toil, the blood of individuals, is as nothing.
Individuality is left out of their scheme of government. The
state is all in all. Everything is referred to the production
of force; afterwards, everything is trusted to the use of it. ²²

Although Burke has described, in the foregoing sketch, the ex-
treme French Revolutionists of his time; this quotation might serve equal-
ly well as a prediction of things to come in the modern world, when "in-
dividuality" is left out of government.

Podroberac ³³ has pointed to the same moral disintegration which
Burke describes in the National Socialism of the twentieth century, when
individuals are not treated as ends in themselves, but are used as means

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³¹Burke, A Letter To The Sheriffs Of The City of Bristol, On The


³³Hildegard Dorn Podroberac, "The Psychological Assumptions Of
National Socialism In Methods Of The Control of Human Behavior," (Unpub-
for state purposes. From Pufendorf's analysis, one might infer that Burke's fears for mankind are well-founded. That is to say, that when a state is "all in all", human dignity and security are destroyed. Burke distrusts totalitarian forms of government; they attempt to advance themselves at the cost of private liberties and basic human needs.

He points out that to ignore personal identity, a state must resort to force. Coercion extends to the humiliating control over mind and body, implicit in "dominion over minds by proselytism, over bodies by arms." 54

Thus the whole concept of the "individual" is supplanted by an infra-human mechanized unit in the gigantic machinery of the state. Such a state would attempt to invalidate any urge connected with the self and would seek to condense human life into a sheep-like social mass.

To Burke, men are more than mere molecules, for "to take away from men their lives, their liberty, or their property, those things for the protection of which society was introduced," 55 would be misconduct of the worst order. To omit individuality in the scheme of government, therefore, abrogates a benevolent function of society and reduces human life or death to a meaningless substance. Burke also does not favor equalitarian forms of government. He observes that "in a democracy the majority of the citizens is capable of exercising the most cruel oppressions upon the

Thus Burke seems to feel that only balanced proportions of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy may provide the basic conditions for human security.

But security is also dependent on an inner balance. Burke says:

"Our physical well-being, our moral worth, our social happiness, our political tranquility, all depend on that control of all our appetites and passions which the ancients designed by the cardinal virtue of temperance."

The ancient Greek idea of temperance seems the way of life for a well-structured society. Burke believes that self-control must be inevitable, for every individual desire must be balanced against the desires of others. Burke writes that "society requires...that...the inclinations of men should frequently be thwarted, their will controlled, and their passions brought into subjection." These are the necessary adjustments if the individual is to live in harmony with his society. Burke says, "Men are qualified for civil liberty in exact proportion to their disposition to put moral chains upon their own appetites."

Thus Burke seems to have solved the opposition between individual freedom and the social order by implying an equal respect for supremacy of the law and of human personality. Society cannot exist without some control, and the individual's personal liking for law and order will mean less external control. The inner control of will and appetite is seen in

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58 Op. Cit., p. 310
59 Burke, Letter to Member of the National Assembly, 1791, Vol. IV, p.51.
the individual's respect for the principles on which human society is based, viz., the series of "prejudices" and conformities which regulate the life of his society. This type of personality responds with a sense of reality and expediency to the social order. In this way the individuals are made responsible for their own actions.

Burke has noted that manners play an important part in helping to regulate conduct. He says:

"Manners are of more importance than law. Upon them, in a great measure, the laws depend...Manners are what vex or soothe, corrupt or purify, exalt or debase, barbarize or refine us, by a constant, steady, uniform, insensible operation, like that of the air we breathe in. They give their whole form and color to our lives."40

Manners appear to have immense power and authority in the control of human behavior, if the roads to both honor and infamy must be dependent upon them. An analysis of good manners seems to reveal certain insights into the social patterns. Friendliness is shown in manners which reflect "generosity, humanity, and dignity."41 When these personality traits are lacking, it can only mean "hostility to the human race."42 The basic concepts of the social order are thus undermined when manners are abolished.

Good manners may be a universal expression of humane feelings toward mankind, expressed in kindly acts and gestures. They also seem to

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describe a subtle perception of the feelings of others. Since good man-
ners are the rules of social intercourse, they also seem to reveal the smal-
ler virtues, such as tact, politeness, or courtesy. If these are the usual
ways of behaving, it is no small wonder that manners give 'form and colour'
to life; that they are the "unbought grace of life." 43

Burke would feel that manners assume an even greater "importance"
than laws in regulating man's behavior. "Whilst manners remain entire,"
Burke says, "they will correct the vices of law." 44 Good manners are
decisive because they appear to be part of the conventional social forms;
they are the approved ways of behaving which seem to "purify" man's nature.

Thus manners, along with morals, seem to shelter man from a
brutal barbarism. All the virtues seem to be those connected with the
civil institutions of a balanced government. These institutions seem
capable of molding and subduing the violent passions without violating
the dignity and security of the individual.

III. STATUS

The concept of status as a human motive may be construed as the
relative standing of the individual in a society as compared with other
people. Burke's notions on status seem bound to the leadership organi-
zation in the state-system. Burke describes this class structure in the
following statements:


You separate, very properly, the sober, rational, and substantial part of their description from the rest. You give, as you ought to do, weight only to the former... the most poor, illiterate, and uninformed creatures upon earth are judges of a practical oppression. It is a matter of feeling.

With this formula, Burke makes it clear that society is based on classes of people. Two rather sharply defined groups of people emerge: (1) "the sober, rational, and substantial" class, and (2) the "poor, illiterate and uninformed" group of people.

The function of the second class is to judge "oppression"; and this skill is evidently dependent upon "feeling". Burke does not appear to disparage the members of this class, for he says, "the most inconsiderable man, by adding to the weight of the whole has his value, and his use." Thus the feeling class is accorded status in the social organization when the members combine as a distinctive group.

Burke defines the rank and function of this group when he says, "It is very rare indeed for men to be wrong in their feelings concerning public misconduct; as rare to be right in their speculation upon the cause of it." This might mean that those who act mainly from their feelings cannot be expected to achieve any level beyond this capacity. To be able

\[45\] Burke, Letter to Sir Hercules Langrishe, On the Subject of the Roman Catholics of Ireland, 1792, Vol. IV, p. 281.


\[47\] Burke, Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontente, Vol. I, p. 442.
to achieve this one objective (sensing injustice in their leaders) is evidently no unworthy accomplishment. There is no blow to self-esteem or mark of inferiority in this process, for To be instructed is not to be degraded or enslaved. Apparenty, those with the kind of judgment necessary to a state-system are to protect and guide those who are without this ability.

To "separate" the two classes on the basis of their special abilities may seem practical to Burke, for in this scheme he prevents the second class from going too far. He says, "Leave a man to his passions, and you leave a wild beast to a savage and capricious nature." Feeling, as the guide to right behavior, can become capable of error. When emotion and reason are integrated, they seem to form a safe guide to conduct.

Burke believes that "a great empire and little minds go ill together." Believing this, Burke might also believe that a society must give added "weight" or greater deference to a class, whose sound judgment, can not only get at the cause of a malady, but evidently treat it.

Burke's basic concern is with the "weight of the whole". Even though the classes may be accorded status of unequal value, Burke observes that "these two sorts of men move in the same direction, though in a different place.

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They both move with the order of the universe." Burke thus implies that there is class consciousness but that class distinctions do not lead to class struggles in the comfortable harmony of English society.

In the following discussion, Burke expands this idea and further clarifies the roles which the two classes assume in relation to one another.

He says:

The King is the representative of the people; so are the lords; so are the judges. They are all trustees for the people, as well as the common; because no power is given for the sole sake of the holder. Burke recognizes that inequality in prerogative might well lead to oppression, and he says that "disfranchised men will not be perfectly satisfied to remain always in that state. If they are not satisfied, you have two millions of subjects in your bosom full of uneasiness." Burke would seek to avoid any conflict by building prestige drawn from admiration, rather than from envy; and directing attention to the benefits

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52 Burke, Thoughts on Discontents, Vol. I, p. 492.
of representative authority. To underline this inference, Burke says the people are "presumed to consent to whatever the legislature ordains for their benefit." He adds, "This they owe as...just deference to a reason which the necessity of government has made superior to their own." In praising the ability to be found in the upper classes rather than the man, Burke thus points to the use of these abilities, and the gains made possible for the individuals and the society. Burke's belief in a hierarchical structure with class distinctions, may therefore be based on the solid foundation of a proven ability growing out of expediency.

The dominant role enacted by those who guide the society, while appearing to call for appropriate skills, also seems to call for appropriate restraints. "The people are the natural control on authority," Burke says. Thus a definite sense of role seems to be established when duties and powers are divided and relationships clarified. If an individual is thus helped to locate himself within the social structure, he seems to be provided with a secure and ready made pattern of behavior.

Burke's general assumptions on order and change have previously been discussed from the theological viewpoint. The social aspects of order and change are principles which Burke now applies to the class structure. This hierarchy in the class structure is a fixed pattern. Burke writes:

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It is continuance is under a permanent standing covenant, coexisting with the society; and it attaches upon every individual of that society, without any formal act of his own.\textsuperscript{56}

Secure status for the individual seems to be a result of enacting the role to which he has been especially adapted, in a class to which he rightfully belongs. If this is so, then an individual may be intrinsically determined to a hierarchical social life as well as to a political life. "Men come into that manner into a community with the social state of their parents, endowed with all the benefits, loaded with all the duties of their situation,"\textsuperscript{57} Burke states. Men's status seems to be settled by a "permanent" stipulation that he remain in the station in which he has been settled.

Burke apparently believes that this status is conferred at birth, if the individual through no "act of his own," becomes a part of the class which will dominate his life. Evidently to exchange the class privileges in his settled civil society, for what a man thinks may be increased privileges is to get rid of all their essential good as well as of all the accidental evil annexed to them.\textsuperscript{58} This may be the reason why Burke fears change in the social order; it may be a fear of the distressing moral consequences associated with change. Burke appears to question the logic of tearing down a social structure which is workable just to get at the cause of the trouble. Once the social fabric has been destroyed then the slate is wiped clean, for in Burke's eyes, with good and evil both subtrated,

\textsuperscript{56}Ibid., p. 165.

\textsuperscript{57}Ibid., p. 166.

nothing could remain.

To have to begin all over to reconstruct a new social order would not seem to be Burke's method, for he says it is the "pitch of presumption" for a man "to consider his country as nothing but sarte blanche, upon which he may scribble whatever he pleases." This implies that a man has no right to interfere with the authority of tradition, and to reconstruct a new order. In fact, Burke seems to infer that the words, "new" and "order" are even contradictory terms.

Burke would seem to rest his case "on the solid rock of prescription,—the soundest, the most general, and the most recognized title between man and man." It is "prescription" which woulde with a greater precision than any regulative principle known to men, for Burke implies that the comfortable regulation embodied in tradition form the "title" to a men's rights and privileges in his society.

Prescription itself appears to conform to the elements Burke finds in human nature, for Burke says:

Art is man's nature. We are as much, at least, in a state of Nature in formed manhood as in immature and helpless infancy. Men...form in Nature, as she operates in the common modification of society, the leading, guiding, and governing part. It is the soul to the body, without which the man does not exist.

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If Burke is to be driven back from the necessity of government, to prescriptions and traditions, to the state of Nature itself, it seems that "modification of society" touches man even in Nature. With this assumption, Burke dispels forever any notion that inequalities are based on forms of control dictated by abstract theories, or that inequalities are "unnatural." The crucial line, "Art is man's nature," is Burke's final defense of a social system based on class. Armed with this principle, Burke would feel that it is only natural for man to follow his instincts when they lead him to his proper place in society. The impulse the classify the social structure and to arrange it according to a submissive and a dominant element, springs from the nature of man.

The analogy of the leaders as the "soul" and the people as the "body" reaffirms Burke's basic dualism of individual man; and this concept is applied to groups of men. Both "body" and "soul" are necessary parts to the state organization. But through the powers of the "soul", man can realize his true purposes.
SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER "SOCIAL MOTIVES"

Group Identification

1. "People" are not separate individuals; they have a group nature, which is expressed through a civil society.
2. The political personality is a result of natural and rational drives. There is no antithesis between the "natural" and the artificial.
5. The people obey the constitution without question. They inherit the duties and benefits; they are bound by its laws.
6. The people are assimilated into an enduring society. The Constitution links them with the dead and the unborn.
7. Each individual shares in the benefits of an eternal society.
8. Man's corporate achievements are science, art, and virtue.
9. Only through his political personality, can an individual develop his talents.

Security

1. The security of the nation and the individual is dependent upon a balance of power; prudent amounts of monarchy, democracy, and aristocracy.
2. Society and man are complex. Governments must apply policy cautiously; no simple form of government is adequate for man's needs.
3. The government exists for the individual; and not the individual for
4. Government must act with reference to the mixed wants and needs of a whole people.
5. Both autocracy and absolute democracy are oppressive. They deny human personality and individuality.
6. A secure government does not resort to force. Personal dignity and individuality are respected.
7. Civil institutions mold and subdue the violent passions.
8. Social security is built on manners and morals.
9. Social freedom is dependent on self-imposed restraints.

Status

1. Society is an established order based on class distinctions.
2. Status is conferred as result of natural selection. This produces ready made roles and patterns of behavior.
3. The classes are divided according to the personality traits of wisdom and emotion.
4. There is a wealth, "thinking" class and a poor, "feeling" class.
5. The two classes are necessary to one another; and to an orderly society. Wisdom alone cannot define justice; Emotion alone is subject to error.
6. Deference is accorded to wisdom. It is the product of a higher development.
7. Change in the social structure denies natural distinctions and traditional privileges.
CHAPTER V

POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND RELIGIOUS, VALUES

This chapter considers a set of Burke's values on the political, economic, and religious aspects of man's life. These values are examined in respect to the psychological assumptions which underlie the theories of human rights, material needs, and spiritual satisfactions of the English people.

Quotations from Burke's writings and speeches are selected for their significance to this general topic. These ideas are discussed under the following main headings: (1) The Rights of Man, (2) Economic values, and (3) Religious values.

I. The Rights of Man

The exposition of political attitudes and beliefs in the English state would seem to be advanced by an examination of Burke's theory on "the rights of man". In the following quotation, Burke defends the "real rights" of man from those which he terms "false claims of right".1 He says:

...It is a moral and virgous discretion, and not any abstract theory of right, which keeps governments faithful to their ends. Crude, unconnected truths are in the world of practice what falsehoods are in theory.2

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Government does not conform to notions of man's rights which are based on abstractions or personal ideologies. Rules of rights infer "moral discretion" or ethical judgments which have been tested by human conduct. If this is so, then human rights are founded on ethical norms and established tradition. In Burke's view the ethical basis of rights is derived from "the will of Him who gave us our nature, and in giving impressed an invariable law upon it." This implies that man is born with a certain moral tendency which determines the direction of behavior. But the inner springs of action are "unconnected truths", until they are studied in relation to other factors. Burke points out that "things are right or wrong, morally speaking, only by their relation and connection with other things." It would appear that rights are based on the natural law of God, which works through the processes of human nature, events, and circumstances. Burke seems to support this notion when he says, "The true touchstone of all theories which regard man and the affairs of men,—Does it suit his nature in general?—does it suit his nature as modified by his habits?" These factors would seem to imply that the "real" rights of man are principles of human behavior. In order to know what is "right or wrong" for man, it is therefore necessary to know the nature of man and the nature of his environment.

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5Burke, TREAT ON THE POPERY LAWS, Vol. VI, p. 522.
4Burke, OP. CIT., p. 95.
In approaching his theory of rights from the impact of environment, Burke says:

The pretended rights of man...cannot be the rights of the people...The one supposes the presence, the other the absence, of a state of civil society.6

The "pretended" rights of man is Burke's reference to the theory of Thomas Paine which is opposed to Burke's "real" rights of man. According to Thomas Paine, it is "the error of those who reason by precedents drawn from antiquity, respecting the rights of man...They do not go far enough into antiquity."7 Paine implies that rights begin with the Creation, but "upstart governments," thrusting themselves between, and presumptuously working to "un-make men," deprives man of his natural rights.8

This is the direct antithesis of Burke's belief. Rights, for Burke, are based on the "presence" of a civil order, and not its "absence". For him, there are no other valid rights than the known civil rights which are a part of civil society and therefore civilization itself. "Government is not made in virtue of natural rights, which may and do exist in total independence of it,"9 Burke argues. Man is not a creature of some hypo-

8Ibid., p. 54.
ethical state of nature and the circumstances of his environment cannot
be disregarded. It would seem that man cannot live in a state of civil
society, and appeal to a state of nature. Only metaphysical reasoners
could suppose that man's rights would remain in a primitive state, for
"In the gross and complicated mass of human passions and concerns, the
primitive rights of men undergo...a variety of refractions and reflections."\textsuperscript{10}

An important basis for rights is thus established from the interests and
the emotions of a people. Burke seems to believe that these mental traits
are modified in civil society and that they differ from culture to culture,
for he says, "Every nation has formed to itself some favorite point, which
by way of eminence becomes the criterion of their happiness."\textsuperscript{11}
This could mean that an integrated system of rights evolves from the experiences of
social living in the course of a long period of time.

In the following statement Burke examines the 'favorite' principle
of the English people:

England, Sir, is a nation which still, I hope, respects,
and formerly adored, her freedom. The colonists emigrated
from you when this part of your character was most predomi-
nant; and they took this bias and direction.\textsuperscript{12}

The spirit of freedom is the distinguishing principle in the
British pattern of life. Freedom predominates in the minds of those

\textsuperscript{10}Ibid., p. 512.
\textsuperscript{11}Burke, \textit{Speech on Moving Resolutions for Conciliation with the}
\textit{Colonies}, 1775, Vol. II, p. 120.
\textsuperscript{12}Ibid.:
who leave the home-shores; and they take this principle with them.

This free-form in which the British culture has been cast seems to have been produced by long-standing customs, for Burke believes that the principle of "the direct original rights of man in civil society...is a thing to be settled by convention." Both custom and personal "bias" agree; to form a "nation in whose veins the blood of freedom circulates." Thus the idea of freedom is not incompatible with the pre-established order or the fixed beliefs of the individual. Rights are not formed to fit into a culture; a culture has grown up which reflects a set of beliefs. The conventions thus reveal the characteristic patterns of behavior. There seems to be a dynamic harmony between prejudice and convention, creating in the people of the English state, the habit of freedom which circulates as the life-blood of the whole nation. This dualism, which is posed by both a rational and an empirical attitude toward life, would seem to be expressed in a cultural climate of balance and compromise. Burke has said, in fact, that "all government, indeed every human benefit and enjoyment, every virtue and every prudent act, is founded on compromise and barter." The series of compromises and balances between various factors has resulted in a united structure of human rights. In the following statement, Burke outlines those rights:

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They have a right to the fruits of their industry, and to the means of making their industry fruitful. They have a right to the acquisitions of their parents, to the nourishment and improvement of their offspring, to instruction in life and to consolation in death.  

This nexus of rights seems to be a recognition of various freedoms. The first of these is the right to the "fruits of their industry"; seems to guarantee that men may keep what they earn. This implies that the state will not interfere with the material rewards of personal effort; nor will the state encroach upon inherited fortune. These things belong to individuals; and the state apparently acknowledges individual ownership. The conviction that men have the "means" of improving their lot, seems to rest on the idea that individual ability and initiative should be encouraged.

The state will not deny men the right to educate their children. The decisions for their "improvement" seem to be entirely the concern of parents and not the business of the state. Burke concludes this list of rights with a recognition of the spiritual life of religion which is both men's authority and his comfort. Burke rejoices in all of these rights. "In that Constitution", Burke says, "I know, and exultingly I feel, both that I am free, and that I am not free dangerously to myself or to others."  

Man is free and this knowledge means faith in oneself and faith in one's fellow-man.


In the following quotation, Burke describes man's freedom in respect to others:

Whatever each man can separately do, without trespassing upon others, he has a right to do for himself; and he has a right to a fair portion of all which society, with all its combinations of skill and force, can do in his favor. In this partnership all men have equal rights, but not to equal things.18

An individual's rights include the security from trespass, but the power to trespass is not his right. Individuals may pursue their separate interests with the full knowledge that they proceed with freedom, so long as they do not impose on the freedom of others. Burke explains that liberty is "social" freedom. It is that state of things in which liberty is secured by the equality of social restraint.19 It is a constitution of freedom within a well-defined pattern of restraint, which must be consistent and fair to all.

Men "have a right to justice,"20 which appears to be their natural right; but equal dividends in the partnership is no right at all. Burke would not grant political rights to the individual as a natural right, for "The right of the people" is not to be "sophistically confounded


20Burke, op. cit., p. 508.
with their power."\(^{21}\) This implies that political power is not naturally equalitarian. It is not a direct civil right; and rights are not identical with power. Burke sums up his views on political rights with "Men have no right to what is not reasonable, and to what is not for their benefit."\(^{22}\) Political equality is not in accordance with what is natural, reasonable, or practical. Men must be governed in the way which is of most benefit to them. Burke would seem to imply that desire must not be confounded with right, and that, "In our politics, as in our common conduct, we shall be worse than infants, if we do not put our senses under the tuition of our judgment."\(^{23}\)

Burke would defend his system of rights by concluding that they are "sacred rights", for they are the "principles of government and even of society itself."\(^{24}\)

II. Economic Values

The spirit of freedom seems to be reflected by the economic pattern of life. In the following quotation, Burke discusses the influence of free economic notion on the total life of the state-system. He says:


\(^{22}\)Ibid.


The desire of acquisition is always a passion of long view. Confining a man to momentary possession, and you at once cut off that laudable avarice which every wise state has cherished as one of the first principles of its greatness. 25

An individualised economic order seems to be highly regarded by the state; and economic freedom is part of this style of life. The acquisitive-need, to Burke, is an essential part of the personality and an integral aspect of the social structure.

Evidently, Burke believes that in a free economy, an individual may express a "laudable avarice" by advancing his own interests. As Burke says, "The happiness of the animal man...goes somewhere towards the happiness of the rational man," 26 so he would believe that the material satisfactions are not necessarily at variance with other satisfactions. Therefore Burke would not seem to place any special restraint or control over a motive to acquire wealth or personal property.

Individual enterprise and personal endeavor are not devalued, for "it is the interest of the commercial world that wealth should be found everywhere." 27 If Burke believes that wealth is not exclusive but may be distributed everywhere, then the whole social structure is dominated


26Burke, Thoughts and Details on Scarcity, Vol. V, p. 135.

by this spirit of free enterprise. All seem to share in a system in which the individual is the operational unit. Burke appears to support this notion when he says that the "wise Disposer of all things, who obliges men...in pursuing their own selfish interests, to connect the general good with their own individual success." A system of self-interest thus leads to a system of identity of interests. A wise state "cherishes" the desire for acquisition, for individual wealth would seem to perform a necessary and beneficial service to society. Burke implies that a state-system attains its own purposes more readily with the recognition that individuals are economically motivated; and that the wealth of the nation belongs to its people. Burke infers that the democratic principle underlying the theory of individual enterprise has proven itself; for "long views" seem to bear out its continued practice. Greater insight into Burke's attitude towards free trade is provided by the following quotation:

Trade is not a limited thing: as if the objects of mutual demand and consumption could not stretch beyond the bounds of our jealousies. God has given the earth to the children of men, and He has undoubtedly, in giving it to them, given them what is abundantly sufficient for all their exigencies.

Economic liberty rests upon a belief in justice and a Divine power which directs the affairs of men. To Burke, wealth is unlimited, and God has provided "not a scanty, but a most liberal provision for them

28Burke, op. cit., p. 141.

Burke would thus seem to have faith in the providential nature of God, if God has supplied man's environment with infinite resources. For this reason, it is possible that Burke believes that great wealth is not acquired at the expense of another's poverty. "Everything which is got by another is not taken from ourselves," he says. The expansion of wealth should not be a source of jealousy and dissension among men, for its quantity is infinite, having been fixed by the laws of God.

Burke would feel that the distribution of that wealth has also been determined, for he says that "the laws of commerce...are the laws of Nature, and consequently the laws of God." It would seem that the ultimate foundation for Burke's economic theory is the natural law, for no human ability can attempt to break the "laws of commerce" in the hope of "softening the Divine displeasure to remove any calamity under which we suffer." Free enterprise is not the cause of inequalities in wealth; it is rather the effect of a Divine justice. If this is so, then man's part in fulfilling a sound economy is subordinated to the natural law. The powers of man's reason and will cannot be expected to accomplish

30Ibid.
31Burke, Two Letters to Gentlemen in Bristol, Vol. II, p. 266.
33Ibid.
what the physical and moral laws have not ordained. Therefore, if man is economically determined to his place in society, there would seem to be not a great deal that man can do to "soften" the Divine justice. The strong pessimism which underlies this idea seems to be clearly represented by Burke's notions of the state's function in regard to economic affairs.

He says:

To provide for us in our necessities is not in the power of government. It would be a vain presumption in statesmen to think they can do...It is in the power of government to prevent much evil; it can do very little good in this, or perhaps in anything else.34

Government cannot relieve economic distresses; it is "vain presumption" to think the state is an instrument of public welfare. Government is strongly circumscribed, if a Divine Will has established the nature of things. "God is the distributor of his own blessings," says Burke, "I will not impiously attempt to usurp His throne."35 Man's institutions thus play a secondary role in the determination of economic happiness or misery. In the final analysis, man's worldly effects are ordained by God, and man's will cannot be placed above the Divine will.

In the light of this belief, an individual's personal property could never be seized by the state; and at the same time, wealth would not be equalized or redistributed to the masses. Whatever the economic order that God has established must become the predetermined order. Burke says that if a man "can claim nothing according to the rules of commerce

34 Burke, Thoughts and Details on Scarcity, Vol. V, pp. 133-4
and the principles of justice, he...comes within the jurisdiction of mercy." Thus the state's non-interference is a matter of economic utility conforming to the natural law. "Charity to the poor" is an obligatory "duty upon all Christians," says Burke, but "in that province the magistrate has nothing at all to do." Government may do much, but it is not its function or power to provide the "necessities". That is a matter, evidently of individual benevolence.

Those who do not share in the wealth and property are to be taught that "the characteristic essence of property" is in its very nature unequal." The attitude of the laboring poor towards this inequality in wealth is the basis of the following discussion, in which Burke says:

"They must respect that property of which they cannot partake. They must labor to obtain what by labour can be obtained; and when they find, as they commonly do, the success disproportioned to the endeavor, they must be taught their consolation in the final proportions of eternal justice." The laboring poor are to be taught that their consolation is not to be found in this world but in the next. "Civil or vulgar happiness is to want much and to enjoy much." But Burke would feel that

36 Burke, Thoughts and Details on Scarcity, Vol. V, p. 146.
37 Ibid.
39 Ibid., p. 558.
40 Burke, Thoughts and Details on Scarcity, Vol. V, p. 135.
man is more than a mere instrument in a profit-making enterprise. As Burke points out, "Philosophical happiness is to want little." This Stoicism elevates the spiritual above the physical. In this world the rewards are not always equal to the endeavors, but spiritual proportions change when all will be recognized in the sight of God.

The essence of Burke's belief in the economic misfortunes which overtake man, seems to be man's freedom to transcend the empirical conditions of life and to link himself to the transcendent world. Burke would disparate the "sort of people who think that nothing exists but what is gross and material." In Burke's double dimension of life, the individual can project an ideal value in opposition to the empirical conditions of life. Thus the stern realitics may compromise with faith in the fundamental order of God's plan for mankind.

III. Religious Values

According to Burke, spiritual values are an integral part of English life. He says:

The combined and mutually reflected charities of our state, our hearths, our sepulchres, must be inseparable, interwoven in the national life.

Religion appears to be a part of the immediate personal life of the individual, for the church is "interwoven" into all the institutional

41Burke, Thoughts and Details on Scarcity, Vol. V, p. 155.


forms of civilized life. Burke points out that religion is "mixed throughout the whole mass of life, and blended with all the classes of society." This craving for a deeper life is universal, for "man is by his constitution a religious animal," and he therefore possesses a spiritual nature which cannot be denied. An emotionally reinforced attitude toward religion seems to be a part of the culture. Ideas of church and state are rooted deeply in the mental patterns; inseparable in the minds, "and scarcely is the one ever mentioned without mentioning the other." This free association implies that there are basic relations which state and church bear to one another. For Burke, this fusion would seem to support the Divine intent for he says:

The conceive that He who gave our nature to be perfected by our virtue willed also the necessary means of its perfection; He willed, therefore, the state: He willed its connection with the source and original archetype of all perfection.

Man is determined to his double structure of political and spiritual parts. The state seems to be elevated and ennobled by the Divine powers which are imparted to it; and the church is reinforced through its connection to the state, through which God's principles work. It must not be supposed, however, that Burke believes in an "alliance between church and state," for this is "fanciful speculation." He says, "The

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\(^{44}\text{Ibid.}, \text{ p. 368}\)

\(^{45}\text{Ibid.}, \text{ p. 351}\).

\(^{46}\text{Ibid.}, \text{ p. 363}\).

\(^{47}\text{Burke, Reflections}, \text{ Vol. III, p. 361}\).

\(^{48}\text{Burke, Speech on the Petition of the Unitarians, Vol. VII, p. 45}\).
church and the state are one and the same thing, being different integral parts of the same whole. The qualities of each are not, then, distinct and independent in the minds of individuals; for they look upon them as closely knit, national, corporate, social bodies, possessing parallel parts of the same function. Evidently church and state combine their functions to instill in the individual the desire to realize his highest divine and civil potentials. The state in its sanctified moral capacity would seem to advance religion. In the following quotation, Burke develops this line of thought:

Religion is so far, in my opinion, from being out of the province or the duty of a Christian magistrate, that it is, and it ought to be, not only his care, but the principal thing in his care; because it is one of the great bonds of human society, and its object the supreme good, the ultimate end and object of man himself.

The form of religion nowhere comes into conflict with the state. "In the great chain of society," Burke says, the principle links are "sympathy, imitation, and ambition." It is in the interest of a state to develop these qualities, as satisfactory outlets for an emotional nature which may be improved by concern for one's fellow creatures and emulation of the virtuous. Ambition encourages the individual to gain satisfaction from "excelling his fellows in something deemed valuable amongst them."

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49Ibid.


52Ibid., p. 124.
In this way religion seems to develop in man in order to transcend man's basic imperfections.

Burke has said, "The Constitution is made by those things...our humanity, our manners, our morals, our religion." Thus religion has helped to mold the constitution; and the moral or religious personality has been a dominant factor in its humanitarian development. Both church and state, as the chief institutions of society, would seem to share a single goal; the fulfillment and perfection of man's nature. This may be the reason why a compromise between political and religious authority is acceptable. Statesmen are furthering the "ultimate end and object" of man himself. Burke says, "We are resolved to keep an established church, an established monarchy, an established aristocracy, and an established democracy, each in the degree it exists, and in no greater." Each part of the national life is an effective complement for man's spiritual needs, and the whole society is a guarantee that man's religion, his spiritual style of life, will never be rooted out by an arbitrary means.

All men need religion, but it fulfills a special function for the poor. Burke says:

It is the public ornament. It is the public consolation. It nourishes the public hope. The poorest man finds his own importance and dignity in it...

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55Ibid., pp. 561-2
Religion brings solace and hope, especially for the underprivileged. As Burke says, when "the man in humble life" can contemplate "a state in which the privileges of opulence will cease, when he will be equal by nature, and may be more than equal by virtue," then the painful side of life may be powerless to disturb him. Burke seems to believe that this world is relative and religion bridges the gap to the perfect spiritual world. This points up the element of Christianity in Burke, through which he perceives, a transcendent and an immanent order.

Since religion fulfills man's need for a unifying and sustaining system of ideas, Burke would condemn a state which denies God's existence. "I call it Atheism by Establishment, when any state, as such, shall not acknowledge the existence of God as a moral governor of the world," Burke says. Atheism would seem to eliminate every natural urge that calls for reverence. Burke believes that "atheism is against, not only our reason, but our instincts." Religion is not just belief; it is instinctive and intellectual acceptance. The good life for Burke must express the spiritual and religious values consistent with the human need for reverence. Burke summarizes this idea, when he says, "We know and we feel inwardly, that religion is the basis...of all good, and of all comfort."

59 Ibid., p. 350.
SUMMARY OF ASSUMPTIONS OF THE CHAPTER "BELIEFS AND ATTITUDES"

The Rights of Man

1. The rights of man are sacred. They are founded on Divine law.

2. Divine law is obeyed, not in human abstractions, but in human nature.
   God's law is interpreted on the basis of the known interests, emotions, and mental traits of human beings.

3. Man's system of rights is determined in part, by moral tendencies, and in part by the customs of civil society.

4. Civil society is the only environment in which man's rights are valid.

5. Rights differ in time and space; from one age to another and from culture to culture. They follow the patterns of human experience.

6. The right to freedom is the life-blood of British society. Custom and prejudice both harmonize with this right.

7. Rights are the result of the dualism between the rational and the empirical ideas.

8. The social rights to: (1) personal and material rewards for endeavor, (2) inheritance of property, (3) private education, and (4) religion; presume a fundamental right to self-preservation.

9. Social rights demand faith in oneself and faith in mankind.

10. All rights must provide restraints and freedom within certain boundaries.

11. Political rights guarantee equal justice but not equal power.

12. Political equality is not natural, reasonable, or practical. Judgment, rather than emotion, is a necessary guide to politics.
Economic Attitudes

1. Economic freedom is the style of life. The individual is the operational unit in the economic order.

2. An economic motive is important to the individual personality and important to society. Self-interest leads to identity of interests.

3. Free enterprise is the effect of Divine justice. Unlimited resources and distribution of wealth are Divinely determined.

4. Wealth and poverty are pre-determined; man and his institutions can do little to change this order. Man is limited through his reason and will; the state through its prescribed function.

5. Material satisfactions are animal satisfactions; the poor must find philosophical happiness.

6. Empirical values must be balanced by ideal values. Spiritual faith is required in contemplating the equality in Divine justice.

Religious Beliefs

1. Man is reverent by nature. Atheism is against his instinct and his reason.

2. The Church is interwoven into the national life. Church and state possess parallel parts of the same function.

3. State and church complement one another; they both share the single goal of perfecting man's nature.

4. The state has encouraged religious ideals; religion has influenced the development of a civilized and humane institution.
CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Summary. One way conclude from the previous chapters and summaries that there is a specific type of personality associated with the democratic system of government in eighteenth-century England. Edmund Burke's philosophical and psychological assumptions concerning this personality, may be summarized as follows:

The fundamental trait of balance appears to be a distinctive characteristic of the democratic personality, dominating personal, social, and political aspects of life. It appears in the individual personality as moderation, temperance, and prudence. The emotional life is characterized by love of authority, but it is balanced by hate of oppression. The individual is opposed to unbridled liberty and uniformity; his drives toward freedom and differentiation are moderate. He controls his own behavior through an instinctive wisdom balanced by a corporate wisdom. His pride in himself and his country is balanced by humility for the Divine wisdom, and the realization of his own imperfections.

On the social plane, this balance is seen as harmony and order. His interactions with others are friendly; his class distinctions do not disturb these relationships. His emotional identification with state and religious aims is an expression of spiritual continuity with the past. The mundane affairs of this world are balanced by religious values.

The political climate seems to have a distinct pattern; the principle of balance is carried directly into the political life. All power must act constitutionally, in a system of checks and balances. A
benevolent and paternal government determines the policies which are set by human nature.

The principle of balance may sometimes be seen as compromise. The government is an expression of the Divine will, but human wisdom shapes its policies. The individual is important in himself, but he is not placed above his fellows in Divine justice.

Compromise does not always imply the middle ground: a belief in Divine Determinism rests side by side with complete economic freedom. Emotion may be inferior to judgment in political decisions, but the state depends upon feeling, when it is expressed as love and nationalism. Individual differences are recognized in mental and emotional development, in political inequality, and in character.

Change in existing conditions must be balanced by a set of circumstances on one side, and instinct, experience, and prejudice, on the other. No change may be allowed, if it is not in accord with the criteria of justice and constitutional liberties.

Conclusions. Burke's assumptions cannot be classified into any particular psychological school of thought. However, Burke seems to have made many observations which correspond with several psychological theories. A motivational theory of man is implicit in Burke's approach to the individual. His ideas on the emotions and instincts (which are considered as inner drives to behavior) have a modern quality, and suggest McDougai, James, and Freudian theories. But Burke differs from these theories on several major points. Burke's conviction that society improves the instincts and emotions into morals and virtues, is one of the main differences. This
difference in views was reflected in Burke's belief that civilization was necessary to perfect man's nature. It also stemmed from the fact that Burke believed that man was made of two parts: the physical and the mental. Man had the choice of developing his moral and mental nature or sinking to his physical level. Burke accepted love as an instinct, and he believed that love was capable of playing a dynamic role in life; but he did not believe in giving a free reign to all emotions. There were base emotions, also, which could turn man into a wild beast, if they were not controlled and sublimated. Burke's concept of the conscience seems to suggest Jung, Adler, and Proudhian theories; but it retained a distinctive Burkian flavor.

To Burke, the conscience was man's moral governor, similar to the superego, however it was not the product of man's environment. Burke's "conscience" was implanted by God; it guided man in his duty, and it was man's ethical standard of justice.

Burke's theory of society was based on the idea of mind conspiring with mind.¹ This idea seems to suggest the group mind theory of McDougal. Burke, like McDougal, Wundt, and Titchener, viewed man as a part of a group entity. Burke also conceived man in another dimension: as an individual, with differences in his nature and behavior.² This recognition of individual differences seems to suggest the ideas of Galton, Cattell, and related contemporary psychological theories.

Most of Burke's psychology is contained in the various schools of psychological theory. Burke studied man's basic nature; and man's nature

¹ Supra, Chap. IV, Sec. 1.
² Supra. Chap. III, Sec. 4. See also, Chap. IV, Sec. 1.
as it was modified through experience. This emphasis on observation of behavior suggests central ideas in Functionalism, Behaviorism, and Gestalt schools of thought. Burke also advocated a large view when studying man. This idea seems to suggest Berkeley and central Gestalt theories of perception and patterns. The most significant feature in Burke's theory of society, is his conception of the eternal contract, which links the dead, the living, and the unborn. Burke's belief that it was necessary to give more weight and importance to the "whole" pattern of society, than to concentrate on the component individuals making up that society, is in striking similarity to the Gestalt theory, of the whole being greater than the sum of its parts.

There is a consistency in most of Burke's main principles, but an inconsistency threads some of his conclusions. Burke cherished enduring values: a scrupulous respect for the rights and dignities of all human beings; a balanced constitutional government; public power utilized in conformity with needs and interests; religious ideals; and faith in man. He did not change these principles; this was always his philosophy. It was never organized into a coherent system, but it was scattered in all of his works; and it was implied in everything he ever said.

Whereas Burke's recognition of individual differences does him credit, he seems to have ignored education for the masses. He ruled out superior individual capacities amongst the poor, by making wealth the criterion for leadership. Burke's idea that wealth and noble family automatically guaranteed intelligence, also seems to be a rather thin disguise to cover up his admiration for aristocracy. The tendency to maintain the
status quo would seem to be inconsistent with a flexible economic society. In wishing to yield little of the past to changing conditions of the present, Burke's doctrine, in fact, permits very little change.

Although Burke abhorred absolutes in personal, social, and political areas of life, his economic theories seem diametrically opposed. Burke was a champion of absolute freedom in all economic enterprises.

Burke states that government exists to provide for human wants, but he does not prove this with examples. Government is actually an authority which restrains the individual, and it can do nothing positive to relieve economic wants; nor can it provide man with the necessities.

The individual's highest values must be of the spirit, but he is expected to revere wealth and to respect property. This philosophy would seem to place the fruits of reward for the masses past the boundaries of this world. It offers very little hope to the underprivileged.

Burke professed not to believe in a priori knowledge, but he regarded the instincts and many of the emotions with great favor; they were man's intuitive guides to conduct.

Burke's theories on life and human behavior seem to reveal his influence on English and American thought. Many of these psychological assumptions have been found to be inconsistent and based on a priori concepts and logical reasonings therefrom. Fundamental ideas, which thus stem from the influence of Edmund Burke, are not necessarily beliefs or attitudes formed from logical and careful analysis; they have been adopted on faith. Some of these ideas might also reveal psychological and philosophical assumptions expressed by Burke in his basic compromise between Determinism
and Voluntarism. The mingled elements in these ideas might reflect Burke's notions of the Divine character of the law, and his conception of civil liberty as it affects human behavior.

Burke's psychological and a priori assumptions of the democratic personality as balanced, friendly, and flexible, suggest the contemporary California research studies of the non-authoritarian personality. This personality is opposed in its main traits to the rigid, repressed, and conforming personality-pattern classified as authoritarian behavior. On the other hand, Burke's theory suggests authoritarianism, when it is expressed in the inequalities of a hierarchical society. Burke's ideas also suggest various personality sub-types, such as the "politically pacificistic liberal", who fears concentrated power; and the conventional, or "true conservative", who supports the status quo. In general, it might be said, that the personality-pattern described by Burke, supports many of the democratic ideals cited in the California study; mainly, love, freedom, and individuality.

Further similarities reveal submission to authority which is rooted in cooperation and ability, rather than a fear of weakness. These traits would

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4Ibid. p. 476.


seem to indicate that the democratically-oriented individual is in rather sharp contrast to the authoritarian personality, whose dominant trait is fear.

Summary of conclusions.

1. Edmund Burke's philosophy of life, government, and society, is based on psychological assumptions about human behavior and arguments from a priori assumptions.

2. Burke presents an inconsistency in ideas and no logical psychological system.

3. Burke was an opportunist, in order to present his a priori ideas.

4. Burke's great effect on political thinking came from his logical defense of the social ideas of the times.

5. Burke's ideas on liberty stemmed from his treatment of individual differences and a priori assumptions of Divine rights.

Further Research. There would seem to be other aspects to Burke's philosophy which might prove rewarding to further research. A similar analysis of Burke's international philosophy, his concept of law, and his ideas of religious tolerance might give a wider scope to Burke's psychological assumptions. Other studies which penetrate deeper into the political sovereignty, the theory of rights, Burke's dualism, his consistence, and his ideas of monarchy, might extend assumptions made in this study.

Other research which might be considered as a follow-up of these
findings, might trace Burke's psychological assumptions in its various manifestations in other democratic forms of government, and as it appears interpreted by his ideological heirs. The impact of Burke's thought on American government might be explored. It might also be significant to present contrasting studies of other political doctrines, social movements, or theoretical psychologies. The fundamental assumptions basic to these concepts would add to a knowledge of the behavior of man.
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