11-1-1968

The need for reform: A study of the British Army, 1815-1854

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THE NEED FOR REFORM
A STUDY OF THE BRITISH ARMY 1815-1854

A Thesis
Presented to the
Department of History
and the
Faculty of The Graduate College
University of Nebraska at Omaha

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

by
Carter Morey
November 1968
Accepted for the faculty of The Graduate College of the University of Nebraska at Omaha in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts.

Chairman

Graduate Committee

Name

Department

Representative of the Graduate Faculty
Armies uphold civilization and it is only at civilization's expense that they can be neglected.

Colonel John Mitchell
PREFACE

The Battle of Waterloo brought to an end the Napoleonic Wars and to its zenith the British army; forty years later the Crimean War was to bring it to its nadir. One is led to ask what happened? Traditional English antimilitarism, which had followed all great wars, provoked a hurried demobilization. British distrust of the military, evident since the days of Cromwell's major generals, reacted immediately as the organization of a united services military club, singularly proposed in 1816 for social exchange and military intercourse, was prevented, because "Such a vast extension of military association ... wears an unconstitutional aspect."¹ For over a century, the regular passage of the Mutiny Bill, and the civilian domination of the defense offices had constitutionally checked any undue military influence through the control of the purse and administration of the army. Despite the extensive augmentation of the military forces during the Napoleonic

struggle, the army had never attempted to assume adminis-
trative control of the government nor political control
of the War Office. Nevertheless, the British wanted no
more war, and they desired a minimal military establish-
ment. They got both.

The decades following 1815 are marked by political
and social reform of milestone significance. Liberalism,
hampered from its long fast, fed frenetically on the new
diet of Bobbies, Bentham and "the Bill, the whole Bill
and nothing but the Bill." As reform encompassed the
Lancashire mill towns and the factories of the Black
Country, spread from Old Sarum to Liverpool, involved
the Cooperative Societies and the Trade Unions, and
became concerned with everything from the Combination
Acts to the Corn Laws, the question arises, how did it
miss the British army? While conservatism, an ideology
the army leaders had long found most comfortable, held
that a strong standing army was necessary to protect
the liberties of English subjects, the rising political
philosophy of the period professed the traditional
liberal view that English liberties thrived best when
the standing army was smallest. Reduced more than
two-thirds to 110,000 men, the army after 1815 was

\[ \text{Strength figures are approximated from the author's research in Hansard's Parliamentary Debates,}\]

\[ \text{the British Sessional Papers, Charles M. Clode, The}\]
still larger than the peacetime force before 1793. Unable
to understand that a greater empire required additional
troops, Parliament steadily chipped away at army requests
for appropriations, and this parsimony kept from the army
the means by which it could progress.

During the long peace the armies of Europe studied
Napoleonic warfare. Their officers analyzed and imbibed
it, their soldiers were trained in it, yet, the British
army looked the other way. Why? The British people
believed, after the Congress of Vienna, that the last

Military Forces of the Crown (2 vols.; London: John
Murray, 1869), hereinafter cited as Cloke, J. H.
Stocqueler, several works cited throughout this paper,
and J. W. Fortesque, A History of the British Army
(13 vols.; London: Macmillan and Co. Limited, 1923),
hereinafter cited as Fortesque, History. Hansard's
Debates and the Sessional Papers must be used with care
as strength figures vary from introduction of army esti-
mates to the debates thereon to the passage or final
resolution. Throughout the period the army's strength
was generally maintained at 110,000, reductions, at
times, decreasing the number to 90,000, augmentations,
principally in the colonies, raising it to as high as
140,000. At least fifty percent of the army was always
stationed in Great Britain and Ireland, and because
conditions of army life were better at home than abroad,
and because when reform finally did come, the units at
home experienced it first, they are the central concern
of this study. Troop units overseas are referred to only
for purposes of comparison or when they directly effected
army affairs in Great Britain.

3The period from the Battle of Waterloo, 1815, to
the Crimean War, 1854, is often termed the "long peace."
This, of course excludes the many frontier wars that took
place during that time, the history, of which, is recorded
elsewhere. The term is also used, in a broader sense (in
other writings), to mean the entire century from 1815 to
1914.
great war had been fought. For those Englishmen who had suffered and survived, that belief was remarkably accurate; their great-great-grandchildren would be the next generation to fight a world war. And in the meantime, the Duke of Wellington, perhaps the most popular man of his times, ruled the army. Except as influenced by the Crown, an institution to which he was utterly loyal, and Parliament to which he was irrevocably subject, Wellington determined what kind of an army Great Britain would have. His actions shade the entire period, they overshadow the army. After all, he had kept Napoleon from Iberia and had beaten him at Waterloo, and if ever a blueprint for victory was drafted, it was on those Flemish fields round Hugumont that June day in 1815. Or so Wellington, and therefore most of the British nation, believed.

Today's armies are highly trained, technologically sophisticated, professionally led forces. The British army of 1815-1854 was the antithesis of all this. Again, why? What happened? This paper is an inquiry into those questions. Generalizations, however, are like windows, they allow one to see but not feel. The telescope must now be lengthened and the details of the British army during the long peace brought into view.

My interest in this subject was stimulated by Professor A. Stanley Trickett, to whom I am indebted for
counsel and advice. I wish also to express my gratitude to Miss Ella Jane Dougherty who obtained through inter-library loan services much of the material needed to investigate this topic. Lastly, if there is any truth in the quotation on the front page of this paper, let us strive, civilian and soldier alike, to make it as obsolete as the longbow was to the soldiers of the long peace.
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CHAPTER I

THE SOLDIER

The British have expatriated the Poles, Spaniards, Portuguese and freed the Negroes, but have taken little notice of the soldier's lot. Colonel John Mitchell

The British soldier's lot throughout the period from the Battle of Waterloo to the Crimean War changed little. The general conditions of army life were execrable. Barracks were incredibly overcrowded and dangerously unsanitary.¹ In the years following 1815,

soldiers in the barracks slept "... huddled together by fours in wooden cribs..."² By 1827, Lord Hardinge, master general of ordnance, reported that the cribs had been replaced and that each soldier had his own iron bedstead.³ Yet, in 1832, while inspecting the barracks at Knightbridge, Mr. Kennedy, a Member of Parliament, found that 7 and 8 men were pent up in rooms not 7 feet in height, and during the debate in the House of Commons on the subject, it was disclosed that of 1,726 Foot Guards kept in London, whose living conditions were strikingly better than most others in the army, there was adequate barracks space for only 754.⁴ Space between beds was about five inches and less than one foot separated the end of the beds from the eating table.⁵

The soldier's meals were prepared in the barracks in two large, copper, cooking kettles, one for meat, the


³Ibid.

⁴Great Britain, Parliament, Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, 3rd ser., Vol. 13 (1832), p. 1254. Hereinafter cited as 3 Hansard. Mr. Kennedy's speech, July 2. The figure excludes those Foot Guards assigned to London Tower. The 972 men not billeted in the barracks were boarded in civilian abodes at considerable cost to the tax payer. Barracks were being rapidly built throughout England to relieve the populous of this burden.

⁵Fortesque, History, XI, p. 10.
other for potatoes. Potatoes were not a regular part of his diet, the ration having been set in 1813 at one pound of bread and three-fourths pound of meat per day. Brown bread was the usual provision, a fact which allowed paupers and felons, who received white, wheaten bread, to sneer at the redcoats for faring worse. Thus, boiled beef, its broth and bread, was the soldier's unalterable diet for most of his army career. He ate two meals a day, one at seven-thirty in the morning, the other at twelve-thirty noon. Any refreshment during the afternoon and evening was in the form of spiritous liquors.

The conditions of the barracks were not conducive to good health. Drainless tubs were used for urinals, then, when emptied, for bathing. Cesspools were open and frequently located so close to the water wells that contamination was unavoidable. The sewage soaked soil served as a ready vehicle for the transmission of disease when the men crowded around the wells and tubs to bathe and


7Fortesque, History, XI, p. 444. The author suggests the prejudice against brown bread stemmed from the common production of black bread during the lean years, 1793-1815.

8Salted pork was an occasional luxury, usually given to the troops because it would spoil if not consumed, rather than as a variant to their diet.

9Woodward, p. 267. It was not until after the Crimean War that a third meal was available.
void. In 1849, a cholera epidemic broke out among the Horse Guards assigned to the Tower of London. Medical investigators were quick to discern the cause—an open ditch that had been kept wet for defense had become so ridden with filth and choleric putridity that, upon drainage, the fever diminished at once. 10

Air was as rampant a carrier of disease as water and neither the advantage nor necessity of ventilation was appreciated. Recruits from the vilest of environments in civilian life were, in some cases, opposed to fresh air and would patch up any hole or opening in their barracks, thus, producing a foul, fuliginous air and contributing to the spread of pulmonary disease. 11 Convict cells in the new mid-century prisons allotted 1,000 cubic feet of air per man, whereas the soldier had an average of 400 cubic feet in the barracks, and, in many cases, as little as 300 feet! 12

The number of wives allowed to live in the barracks was limited to 6 per company (approximately 6 per 100 men); they and their children ate, slept and washed alongside their husbands in the crowded rooms, and unfortunately,

10 Fortesque, History, XI, pp. 10-11. See chaps. i and ii for numerous examples of unhealthy conditions.

11 Ibid., p. 11.

12 Woodward, p. 266.
shared the mortality rate which from tuberculosis was five times that for civilians and overall nearly three times as high.\textsuperscript{13}

The soldier's miserable living conditions were complimented by his routine activities. Recreational facilities were nonexistent. The barracks and what furniture they contained were unattractive, no reading rooms were available until after 1838, and less than thirty volumes were authorized entrance into the barracks during the half-century after 1825.\textsuperscript{14} It is generally estimated that two out of three soldiers were illiterate, and for those who could read it was difficult, indeed. On dark days (all except summer) two tallow dips were issued for every twelve men, making it doubtful that the light produced was often used for the perusal of print.\textsuperscript{15}

The only games commonly known were contemporary forms of traditional gambling, a type of entertainment frequently precluded by the soldier's insolvency.


\textsuperscript{14}De Watteville, p. 142. The volumes "allowed" to enter the barracks were approved by the bishops. Pulp literature was as common then as now.

\textsuperscript{15}Fortesque, History, XI, p. 16.
Football, though played, had yet to gain widespread attraction.  

Because of the limited available outlet for the soldier's energy, and for whatever other reasons the reader is wont to endorse, most soldiers spent most of their free time drinking alcoholic beverages. The government's subsidizing of canteens where the soldier could purchase spirits cheaply was partially responsible. The system of letting canteens yielded an average annual income to the government of £50,000. This rather modest amount was one effect of the soldier's daily use of the canteens, another was chronic drunkenness.  

Drinking

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17 J. W. Fortesque, The Empire and the Army (London: Cassell and Company, Ltd., 1928), p. 223. Hereinafter cited as Fortesque, Empire. It was argued that the canteens prevented the soldiers from smuggling drink into the barracks, an interesting post facto justification.

18 Hansard, Vol. 90 (1847), p. 952. Colonel Lindsay's speech, March 5. The amount in 1846 was £53,752.

bouts increased after 1815, until by 1820 staggered
paydays were initiated for neighboring units to prevent
large group drinking.\textsuperscript{20}

Related to his drinking as well as to other facets
of the soldier's existence was his pay. There had been
no pay raise for the soldier since the reign of Charles
II until the war years, 1793-1815, during which, the
Dukes of York and Wellington secured raises up to 7 pence

cause of extreme drinking. Another contributing factor
was the length of overseas duty. The government had fixed
the rotation rate at ten years abroad for five years at
home, but some units spent as long as twenty-seven years
overseas before reassignment. \textsuperscript{3} Hansard, Vol. 91 (1847),
pp. 663-69. Fox-Maule's speech, March 30. United
Service Magazine and Military and Naval Journal (3 parts;
cited as United Service. The environment and conditions
abroad were, in most cases, abominable. The mortality
rate was, except for the Cape (Africa) which was the
same as that in Great Britain, extremely high: 13 to
15 per 1,000 in Great Britain, 55 per 1,000 in India,
75 to 80 per 1,000 in West Africa, 84 per 1,000 in
British Guiana, 121 per 1,000 in Jamaica and 152 per
1,000 in Tobago were the average death rates from 1816-
1840. \textsuperscript{1} Hansard, Vol. 36 (1817), p. 525, Sir R.
Ferguson's speech, May 12. Many regiments abroad
became "condemned battalions" or penal units (the York
Rangers, the 60th (African) Corps) in which discipline
was either nonexistent or of the extreme reflected at
Fort Charles, Jamaica, where 54,000 lashes were given
to 300 men in 2 years! These conditions, given an
ample supply of rum and wine, probably made drinking
unavoidable. When regiments were rotated home they
seldom spent five years in England before reassign-
ment abroad, thus, gaining little respite in their
drinking habits and more than likely perpetuating them.
This had to have an influence on home regiments as con-
tact between units was frequent.

\textsuperscript{20} de Watteville, p. 140.
per day. After 1815, the rate dropped slightly, then rose and levelled around 12 pence where it remained for more than fifty years.

The soldier's financial lot did improve over the years as fewer and lesser stoppages were put on his pay for food and essentials. This was the only method for augmenting the soldier's take-home pay since regimental pay officers were notoriously corrupt and almost all pay raises were absorbed by comparable deductions. For example, in 1833, the infantry soldier's annual pay was £19.15.5. The deductions from his pay totaled £18.10.2, leaving him an annual net income of £1.5.3, less than 1 penny per day. The Poor Law Commission of 1834 revealed the soldier to be ill-paid compared to any


22 Dubs, p. 127. In 1867, shortly after Cardwell's assignment to the War Office, the soldier received a substantial pay raise.

23 Clode, I, p. 106.

24 Forbes, I, Appendix XII, pp. 312-13. See also J. H. Stocqueler, A Familiar History of the British Army (London: Edward Stanford, 1871), pp. 206-07. Hereinafter cited as Stocqueler, History. Until 1824 the soldier was paid either weekly or monthly. This often caused disorder in his financial arrangements and in that year daily pay was begun which lasted throughout the period.
other class in Great Britain.\textsuperscript{25} By 1854, the soldier's net daily pay was 1 penny, halfpenny plus 1 penny per day beer money.\textsuperscript{26} Since the men had little to do and no place to go but the canteens, their net pay was spent largely on alcohol. This, of course, produced habitual drunkenness, which, in turn, led to crime and discipline problems.\textsuperscript{27} Such a circular set of evils was repeatedly used by those who argued against pay raises, claiming that more money in the soldiers' hands meant more drunk soldiers.\textsuperscript{28}

Recruiting the soldier into the army had long been a profitable business. Recruiters received fifteen shillings "bringing money" for each man.\textsuperscript{29} Because there were no disqualifying criteria for enlistment, the

\begin{flushright}

\textsuperscript{26}De Watteville, p. 139.

\textsuperscript{27}Fortesque, History, XI, p. 23. A soldier could get drunk, depending on the quality of the spirits and where he was stationed for as little as one penny.

\textsuperscript{28}Clode, I, pp. 106-07. Wellington and Windham opposed a pay raise in 1828 for this reason. Harding, who believed the soldier had always been inadequately paid and therefore favored all pay raises, thought commanders should resolve their discipline problems without recourse to the pecuniary benefits of the soldier.

\textsuperscript{29}Fortesque, History, XI, p. 8.
recruiter's sole concern was live, countable bodies. As a result, many recruits were criminals or mentally deficient. G. M. Trevelyan said: "The principal causes of enlistment were drink, unemployment, and personal trouble with a woman or with the laws of the land."30

Once in the army and committed for twenty-one years (or life)31 the soldier could look forward to sparing

30George Macaulay Trevelyan, British History in the Nineteenth Century and After 1782-1919 (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 500. Hereinafter cited as Trevelyan, British History. Stocqueler, History, p. 216. Recruiters and magistrates were regularly pressured to impress by "beat of the drum," a method designed to fulfill a quota with anyone and making enlistment of incorrigibles inevitable. Glode, II, pp. 12-19. Magistrates had long had special powers to compel the enlistment of undesirable and criminal persons, Wellington Speeches, I, p. 169. Wellington objected to those convicted of crime being allowed to serve in the army. He feared that magistrates and judges used the military service as punishment for wrongdoing. United Service, 1832, iii, pp. 551-52. To improve recruiting practices, it was suggested that officers be assigned to recruit for their own branches, thus providing a personal interest in obtaining good men.

31Lieut.-General W. H. Goodenough and Lieut.-Colonel J. C. Dalton, The Army Book for the British Empire (London: Harrison and Sons, 1893), pp. 18-23. Hereinafter cited as Army Book. See also Hampden Gordon, The War Office (London: Putnam, 1935), p. 126. Hereinafter cited as Gordon, and Captain Owen Wheeler, The War Officer Past and Present (London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1914), p. 96. Hereinafter cited as Wheeler. Limited short-term enlistment was tried after Burke's Act, 1783, but did not prove lasting. Windham introduced, in 1806, enlistments of 7 years for infantry, 10 years for cavalry, 12 for artillery, with a reenlistment option and for the first time, a pension after 21 years. Castlereagh modified this plan in 1808 with shorter enlistment options. In 1829 all options were dropped and "life" remained the only contract until 1847 when Castlereagh's plan was essentially re instituted. Throughout the period when options were available most soldiers enlisted for life. One reason
gratitude upon retirement. Until 1829 the pension entitlements were illogical and irregular. In that year Lord Hardinge revamped the pension system by complicatedly graduating the retirement income to the number of years a man had served. By 1833 it was simplified; the soldier got 6 pence per day upon retirement after 21 years of good service (no pending or present punishment in effect), and 1 halfpenny per day more for each additional year. This system, which has lasted in principle to this day, was harshly criticized by Hardinge and Wellington for not providing enough money to attract good men.

Parliament's penuriousness pervades nearly all aspects of this period, particularly in the appropriations for retirement. In 1831 Parliament offered to commute pensions and attempted to encourage emigration (stem overseas desertion) by promising a tract of land and a lump sum, which, on the average, equalled about four years of retirement pay, to pensioners who would

was that upon enlisting the soldier immediately became indebted by using his enlistment bounty (16 shillings to 1 guinea) to purchase drink. He was encouraged to do this by the older soldiers, and thus introduced to both alcohol and indebtedness, he became a "lifer" if he was not already one.

32Army Book, p. 26. Discharges prior to retirement were granted for good conduct and invalidism, and ordered for extreme cases of misconduct. See also Fortesque, History, XI, pp. 437-43.

settle in Canada. The scheme failed miserably because the pensioners converted the lump sum to drink and sold the land for additional whiskey money, ironically resulting in an increased demand on the poor rates. The whole plan was cancelled within two years. Not until the Cardwellian reforms was a reasonably adequate pension system devised.

To typecast the soldier is difficult. His general character was, by contemporary standards, low. Recruitment procedure was partly the cause. The demobilization after Waterloo produced a large and hungry labor force. Women began to work in factories, and contrary to belief in some quarters, the years after 1815 were, economically, good ones for the working man. This meant an attraction for civilian employment that drew heavily on the bulk of England's manpower, leaving the least desirable segments to the army. Wellington described them as the "scum of

34 3 HANSARD, Vol. II (1832), pp. 1188-90ff. Hardinge's speech, April 2. 3 HANSARD, Vol. 91 (1847), p. 710. Sir de Lacy Evan's speech, quoting Lord Durham's Report, April 12. UNITED SERVICE, 1832, II, p. 560. The pensioners were generally quite old. 3,000 men, in all, were involved. Not one-sixth of them ever settled on the allotted land.

35 supra, p. 10, footnote 30.

36 Trevelyan, British History, pp. 484-85, 488-89 (quoting Clapham).
the earth,"\(^{37}\) though his most thorough biographer argues that the outlawing of corporal punishment eventually proved the soldier was of better stuff than "scum."\(^{38}\) There is some evidence that the recruits were drawn from a cross section of society, not just the lower classes.\(^{39}\) Certainly, among the noncommissioned officer corps the quality was high; Wellington more than once expressed confidence in his men because the noncommissioned officers could and did all the work that commissioned officers of the line were expected to do.\(^{40}\)

Civilian attitude toward the soldier wavered. The army was never more popular than after Waterloo. On a


\(^{40}\) Maxwell, II, p. 125. Also Wellington Supp. Despatches, XII, p. 826.
tour of England in 1819, Charles Dupin, a French journalist, related: "... I have seen companies marching in file on the footpath, move towards the middle of the street, to give to the inhabitants coming in an opposite direction." At the same time, officers riding in the streets accompanied by a soldier acting as a liveried groom caused resentment from civilian onlookers. Lords in London had to obey a private of the Guards when the soldier was acting as a policeman, hardly endearing the army to either Parliament, its constituents or the rest of the populous. Yet, acting as a policeman was the soldier's primary and single duty in England from Waterloo to 1829. Units were continually called out to squelch the rioters and perhaps because the people feared the army

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42 Hansard, Vol. 32 (1816), pp. 966-67. Law's speech, February 28. See also Dupin, p. 108; "The sergeant has generally so strong a sense of propriety, that there is hardly an instance on record of his perverting the use of his arms to spill the blood of defenceless citizens." This was written before Peterloo.

43 Fortesque, History, XI, p. 49.

44 Forbes, I, p. 162. After 1815 "... the troops became little more than an armed police." Peterloo, 1819, Bristol, 1831, Rochdale, 1840 are some of the more famous incidents. Note that the latter two occurred after Peel's Metropolitan Police Act of 1829. Troops were also used extensively on the coast to check smuggling.
ever siding with the rioters they were more favorably disposed toward the troops. An untrustable police force would have been worse than the army.\textsuperscript{45}

The soldier's lot then was bad, his popularity mixed, his duty that of a policeman.

\textsuperscript{45}Forbes, I, p. 150.
CHAPTER II
THE OFFICER

'Tis a shame to the Army that men of such spirit
Should never obtain the reward of their merit
For the Captain's as honest a man, I'll be sworn
And as gallant a fellow as ever was born
After so many hardships and dangers incurred
He himself thinks he ought to be better preferred.

New Bath Guide

The British army officer had long come from the aristocratic classes of society. The nonmerchant rich dominated the army because of wealth, connection and an English belief that military leadership was more naturally developed in the landed families. Life on an estate, large or small, where the art of hunting and caring for

1 Colonel Clifford Walton, History of the British Standing Army (London: Harrison and Sons, 1894). Hereinafter cited as Walton. An unstated disclosure of the author is the similarity in the class level of the medieval feudal army chiefs and the regimental colonels of the latter half of the seventeenth century. This continuity had weakened only slightly by the first half of the nineteenth century.

2 The European Nobility in the Eighteenth Century, ed. by A. Goodwin (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1953), pp. 12-13; "... and if no sons of merchants are to be found among our generals, it is primarily due, not to social exclusiveness, but to the feeling, by no means confined to the landed families or to the eighteenth century, that by upbringing and aptitude the sons of landed families were likely to make the best military leaders."
a fowling piece was taught as sport, was probably closer to the contemporary notion of army life than any other. For the officer, the army had never been a primary means of earning a living; rather, it was a way of traveling abroad, seeing more of life, and indulging in the sport of arms. ³

England's aristocracy derived its wealth from the land and not the government. ⁴ The army, therefore, was not a contestant for national power, only a part-time occupation of the aristocracy. Consequently, after Waterloo and a precipitous demobilization, most officers went home to their estates and the pleasures of country life. Those who did not remained to occupy Paris and the long peace began with a way of life hardly contributory toward maintaining a professional army. Lieutenant

³Howard, Studies, pp. 78-79. The author describes the British officers' attitude toward a "military campaign" as little more than an "extension of the fox hunt." See also G. M. Trevelyan, English Social History A Survey of Six Centuries Chaucer to Queen Victoria (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1943), pp. 500-01. Hereinafter cited as Trevelyan, Social History. The author makes the same point by citing the incident at Quatre Bras where certain dandies of the Guards put up umbrellas to keep out of the rain in the midst of the battle; he also mentions the officers' anxiousness to don mufti on their off-duty time as a general reflection of their regard for the "profession."

⁴For a discussion on English nobility, its economic base in landed wealth (not in the government) and consequent sporting interest in the army, see Goodwin, chap. 1.
Colonel John Leach found little in his memory to record of Paris in the years after 1815 but parties, parades, races and champagne.\(^5\) The Duke of Wellington and, the then, Lieutenant Colonel Harry Smith divided Cambrai between them with their hounds and hunting. Smith, an aide-de-camp of the Duke, kept two packs of hounds always ready to support the frequency of the chase.\(^6\)

When the occupation army returned from France in 1818, only the grandeur of debauchery subsided, not the degree. The turf and gaming tables became the habitue of the officers. Excessive drinking and irresponsibility


\(^6\) Fortesque, History, XI, p. 54. The living was high and about the only two things Wellington disapproved of during the occupation of Paris were the officers dueling with pistols instead of rapiers, an understandable arrangement since Englishmen lacked comparable skill with the blade (Wellington Supp. Despatches, XIII, p. 141), and the original plan to occupy Paris for five years. Wellington was the main influence in convincing Parliament to bring the troops home after only three years in 1818; the burden of the occupation army on the French, who were paying for it, was too great. The reader will also find in Vol. I of Smith's autobiography numerous examples of his own profligacy as well as that of the officers in general. One can detect a sense of regret in Smith's words for having wasted a potential fortune in the sybaritic days of Parisian life following Waterloo.
were common.\textsuperscript{7} In 1816, Colonel John Quentin, commanding officer of the 10th Hussars was tried by court-martial and convicted for laxity of command and discipline. In the same year, Lieutenant August Stanhope of the 12th Dragoon Guards was tried and cashiered from the service for gambling. In 1820, Lieutenant Colonel St. George French of the 6th Dragoon Guards was tried for, in addition to overpunishing his men, keeping a woman in the barracks and illegally betting on and trading in horses.\textsuperscript{8} Similar incidents are recorded throughout the period\textsuperscript{9} in spite of the effort made to not disclose an officer's indiscretion. Wellington's influence was effectual, for though he accepted laziness in an officer, he was unable to comprehend improbity in him.\textsuperscript{10}

\textsuperscript{7} J. H. Stocqueler, A Personal History of the Horse Guards (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1873), p. 103. Hereinafter cited as Stocqueler, Guards. "There was much gambling in the barracks and clubs\textsuperscript{7} . . . philandering . . . horseracing . . . drinking . . . dressing . . . flirtation . . . betting . . . undue familiarity between ranks and serious indifference to discipline."

\textsuperscript{8} Stocqueler, History, pp. 190-200. French was found guilty of the first two charges only.

\textsuperscript{9} United Service. The end of part iii contains a summary of court-martials for each year.

\textsuperscript{10} Howard, Studies, p. 79. Quoting Wellington: "Nobody in the British Army . . . ever reads a regulation or an order . . . and every gentleman proceeds according to his own fancy." Gordon B. Turner, A History of Military Affairs in Western Society Since the Eighteenth Century (3 vols.; Ann Arbor: Edwards Brothers Inc.,
Saturnalia notwithstanding, the officer's incentive to advance professionally was stunted. To become an officer or gain promotion within the officer ranks, one had to purchase a commission.\textsuperscript{11} Although the history of purchasing commissions is somewhat obscure, by 1815, the British had developed it into a luxuriating system of corruption. Collusion between buyer and seller was pandemic, perverting the established prices and giving impetus to those with "influence" and "contacts."\textsuperscript{12} A

\textsuperscript{11}Other means of obtaining a commission were through the military academies, Sandhurst and Woolwich, entering "through the back door," a derogatory description of commissioning militia officers in the regular army and by the Sovereign's pleasure which commissioned a few persons for one's father's special service or as a reward for being a good page to the king. For details the reader should consult, Soldiers and Governments, ed. by Michael Howard (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1959), p. 177, hereinafter cited as Howard, Soldiers, and J. H. Stocqueler, The British Officer (London: Smith, Elder and Co., 1851), pp. 30-31. Hereinafter cited as Stocqueler, Officer.

\textsuperscript{12}Stocqueler, Guards, pp. 12-13. The author cites an eighteenth century (1759) Army Circular Memorandum which specifies collusion as a problem in the Horse Guards. Also Wheeler, p. 96. The Duke of York attempted to reduce collusion by his powerful influence, and by the gratis issuance of commissions to those deserving, but this was only partially compensatory at best.
well known example is that of the Duke of York's mistress, Mrs. Mary Ann Clark, who in 1809 was found to be overly influential in the dispensing of commissions. York was exonerated by an investigation because he was adjudged to have been ignorant of what was going on under his nose, but the corruption was little altered. Even had the system operated free of irregularities, the legal procedures were subject to unfair pressures, for by 1815, Cox and Greenwood, a brokerage firm dealing in commissions, was the agent for 176 of 284 battalions, and the Duke of York, who as Commander in Chief had "influence" over promotions, was substantially in debt to Cox and Greenwood.

The system of purchase was replete with inequity. The prices of commissions were extremely high, the net salaries of the respective ranks so low that an officer was rarely afforded in a career of twenty to thirty years the solvency to cover his initial investment.

14 Wheeler, p. 106.
15 Hansard, Vol. 109 (1850), p. 650. Fox-Maule's speech, March 11. On an average since Waterloo, a lieutenant colonel had paid £4,540 for his commission. His annual salary was £365. Minus required deductions and interest of £258, he was left with a yearly net income of £107. It would take over forty years service, if he spent not a shilling of his annual net income, to accumulate his initial expenditure. Similar calculations determined a major's net annual salary to have been £93.15, a captain's £108, a lieutenant's £85 and an ensign's £73.5.10.
were dependent on the availability of commissions for sale, and since the army was seldom augmented during the period, retirement, resignation or death provided the only opportunity for purchase. As a result, it was not uncommon for men to have been in grade at the same rank for more than ten or twenty years. One captain, in 1857, had forty-seven years service and had been a captain since Waterloo. Major George Wood, who had supreme command of the artillery at Waterloo, was still a major in 1836. In 1846, a father and son were both captains; the father's first chance to obtain a majority came when his son was killed in action.

Promotion by merit and recommendation was difficult to integrate into the system of purchase. Early in the war, in 1794, Sir Henry Calvert, the adjutant general, said, "We want a total stop put to that pernicious mode of bestowing rank on officers without even the form of recommendation. . . ." The Duke of York, during his


17 De Watteville, p. 176. The father had purchased a majority for his son, then received it upon the son's death.

18 Wheeler, p. 105. Calvert was referring to the promotion of men as a reward for having raised a regiment or sizable number of recruits. This was often done by
long assignment as commander in chief, improved the promotion system by discouraging the appointment of young men to command, though it should be remembered that he was commissioned a major general and given command of an army in the Netherlands at the age of nineteen. When the Duke of Wellington succeeded York in 1827, he insisted that merit be recognized and he promoted few men to command positions without demonstrated combat competence.

The leadership of York and Wellington had specific results. In 1825, York got the half-pay and full-pay

"crimps" i.e., impressing by force, threat or entrapment. See also Sir George Arthur, From Wellington to Wavell (London: Hutchinson and Co., Ltd., n.d.), pp. 58-69. Hereinafter cited as Arthur. The author relates the story of an officer who had lived his entire adult life on half-pay for having recruited a regiment that was summarily disbanded.

19Wheeler, p. 68.

20Ibid., pp. 112-14. See also Brevet-Major A. R. Godwin-Austen, The Staff and Staff College (London: Constable and Company Ltd., 1927), p. 6. Hereinafter cited as Godwin-Austen. The author points out that York had begun the trend: "... the Duke of York took care that his protégés had proved their worth in the field before promoting them to influential billets." The best example was York's capable Quartermaster General, Brownrigg, who had served several overseas troop missions before assuming his post at the Horse Guards. See also Maxwell, II, p. 122; "Wellington recognized and even approved the recognized effect of family influence upon promotion ... but he claimed vehemently that military character and service should count for something also."

21See infra, p. 24.
lists arranged so that when a commission became available for purchase, the commander in chief would select from the list the most senior man with the required qualifications. This reduced collusion between buyer and seller for higher than authorized prices and allowed for the promotion of many whose service long overwarranted it.\textsuperscript{22}

Promotion to colonel and general was by brevet and occurred normally every six years or at the Sovereign's pleasure which was usually occasioned by the birth of an heir, a coronation or great military victory in the field.\textsuperscript{23} Brevetcy carried no emolument, consequently, promotion to the higher ranks was financially disadvantageous, and most general officers coveted a regimental colonelcy.\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{22}Stocqueler, \textit{History}, p. 211. The reason for the 1825 warrant was the augmentation of two companies per regiment to suppress insurrections in the West Indies, and it resulted in many long overdue promotions: 15 majors were promoted to lieutenant colonel, 22 captains to major, over 100 lieutenants were given command of companies. Collusion was reduced by regulating the time-in-service requirement for selling commissions. Lieutenant colonels, majors and captains had to have 15 to 20 years service before they could put their commissions up for sale, lieutenants 12 to 15, ensigns 10 to 12. If one was over 60 years old he could no longer sell a commission.

\textsuperscript{23}Stocqueler, \textit{Officer}, p. 31. A depletion in the ranks at a certain grade, as might occur after a battle at which a large number of casualties were taken, would also occasion a promotion warrant.

\textsuperscript{24}Fortesque, \textit{History}, XI, p. 41; "... even in the most favourable circumstances a general, under the purchase system, was bound to lose money by his service." A regimental colonelcy was worth about £1,000 per year. The position approximated ownership in its control of the
The advantages of star rank were eligibility for the highest staff positions, prestige and political connections.

Half-pay was the standard retirement stipend. It was misnamed because it seldom amounted to more than twenty percent of an officer's active duty pay and was really intended to serve only as a retaining fee for future service. Half-pay sums had not been changed since 1714 and for comparison, an officer with thirty years service whose pay was £600 annually, retired on half-pay of £146, while the civilian government clerk of comparable position and pay retired at £450. It is true that officers on half-pay could hold civil offices and draw both salaries up until 1828 but in that year the arrangement was discontinued. It can be fairly said

financial affairs of the regiment. United Service, 1832, iii, pp. 411-13, lists regimental colonels in the army. Almost all are general officers. The interested reader should also see Stocqueleur, Officer, chaps. i, ii and iii.


26 Hansard, Vol. 8 (1831), pp. 348-50. Hardinge's speech, Oct. 7. Hansard, Vol. 14 (1832), pp. 1247-48. Hobhouse's speech, Aug. 8. Fortesque, History, XI, p. 434. The author cites the case of Sir Henry Fane who was drawing £1,200 per year as the Surveyor General of Ordnance. He had 40 years service and had spent £10,000 purchasing his commissions. When finally rewarded with a colonelcy of the King's Dragoon Guards he was forced to forfeit one of the salaries.
that the retirement provisions provided little incentive to the officer during his career. An example of the inadequacy at the highest rank is that of Field Marshal John Fox Burgoyne who upon retirement after an illustrious career requested a pension of 10 shillings per day. Though it was known that his financial status was insecure, he was forced to "show cause" before a board of officers and substantiate his reasons.27

Certain advantages were claimed by those who favored the purchase system. By it, they argued, an army was maintained without the taxpayers having to provide for officer retirements. The system was also defended on the grounds that "... it made impossible the emergence of a military caste ... officers who had a derisory pay and who could gain promotion only at large expense were very unlikely to constitute a separate army 'interest,' which might conflict with the other elements in society."28 Wellington, of course, preferred the system but as Arthur says, it is important to remember that the Duke "... was rising through the ranks in the midst of such corruption."29

27 Lieutenant-colonel George Wrottesley, Life and Correspondence of Field Marshal Sir John Burgoyne (2 vols.; London: Richard Bentley and Son, 1873), I, pp. 333-35. Hereinafter cited as Burgoyne. He was granted the pension.

28 Howard, Soldiers, p. 27.

29 Arthur, pp. 68-69.
with it would give every soldier a chance and therefore republicanize the army, and to do that would "... republicanize the government; for the army is the principal support of the aristocratic form of our government." General John Mitchell, reform's *vox clamantis en deserto*, expressed the opposition's opinion most dramatically when he wrote: "On what principle ... can reasoning men defend the system of selling ... the ... awful power of leading ... soldiers into battle." The often colorful Fortesque perhaps summed it up the best. "The system," he said, "being utterly illogical, iniquitous and indefensible, commended itself to the British public."

Army pay originated as an outgrowth of recruiting men to fight by offering them a portion of the spoils after victory in battle. This led to enlisting men to fight by guaranteeing them a pittance through commissioned officers who had bought their way to a position of rank. Officers profited considerably from the development. In the late seventeenth century, Walton wrote:

The whole system of military finance ... was one of vast entanglement of fraud. Not only did the officers defraud the soldiers, but they defrauded

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30 Luvaas, pp. 36-37.  
31 Ibid., p. 55.  
the Government also, while the Government in turn defrauded both the officers and soldiers.33

By the nineteenth century fraud had taken the form of padded pay roles, listing of fictitious men on the roles and finagling with the prices and deductions for clothing and supplies.34 This allowed officers to benefit at the expense of the soldiers. The reasons were twofold; one, regulations for the accountability of appropriated funds were loose, two, officers' pay was inadequate for, what had become regarded by them as, their proper station in life.

Officers' pay, except for periodic raises during the Napoleonic wars, was essentially the same in 1815 as it had been in 1714.35 The Duke of Wellington had contended in 1806, that an ensign's pay was far from adequate and that the minimum he could subsist on was 5s. 8d. per day, or a net annual income of £104.36 In 1849, the net annual pay for an ensign was £73.5.10,37 yet the cost of living

33Wheeler, p. 102.

34These practices were weakly justified as compensation for deserters, deceased and their widows.

35Fortesque, History, XI, p. 41. Pay raises produced no significant net increase because deductions increased almost equally with raises. See supra, p. 21, footnote 15 for a breakdown of net pay.

36Wellington Speeches, I, p. 34.

had more than doubled in the forty-three year interim. The pay for other ranks was comparably bad. General officers were granted no pay except in special instances. In the extreme, Wellington received a grant of £200,000 after the Battle of Waterloo, but normally, general officers were paid nothing and for the reasons previously mentioned, sought a regimental colonelcy.

The officer's morale was seldom better than his men's. Internal conditions were aggravating, living quarters less than comfortable and pay not commensurate with their expenses. Overseas assignments were long, often totaling two-thirds of a man's career. Prior to 1851, the usual rotation of units abroad was to Australia, the West Indies or the Cape, and then to India, a most illogical sequence considering many men desired to retire and settle in the colonies.

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38Clode, I, p. 347. In 1814, because generalcies had become so numerous, York obtained a special pay for generals who did not hold colonelcies which amounted to £700 for lieutenant colonels, £600 for majors and £450 for captains. A regimental colonelcy, it is remembered, was worth about £1,000.

39United Service, 1832, i, pp. 111, 188-96. The memoirs of a subaltern of Foot reveal incidents of senior officers taking unfair advantage of their subordinates, unprofessional discipline at all ranks and a dangerous disinterest in military preparedness.

40Luvaa, pp. 3-5.

413 Hansard, Vol. 37 (1837), pp. 786-88. Howick's speech, April 5. For some units, particularly those which had been abroad over ten years, the West Indies was followed
Related to all areas in need of reform was the education of an officer. Woefully lacking, education was sadly neglected since "No special standard was demanded of gentlemen aspiring to his Majesty's Commission."42 The subaltern's library at the time of Waterloo consisted of four volumes: Hoyle's Games, The Articles of War, Dundas' Eighteen Maneuvers and The Sporting Calendar.43 The officer learned his military knowledge from experience and unfortunately those officers who did attend schooling of any sort were looked down upon.44 To persuade the army that improvement in education was necessary and compatible with the accepted idea of beau sabreur would have taken a reformer with an extraordinary personality.45 Wellington inadvertently exacerbated the problem when he

by Canada and then home. Stocqueler, Officer, p. 24. After 1851, units were generally assigned to India first, experienced combat, then rotated to the colonies where the men could plan a retirement.

42 Godwin-Austen, p. 5.
43 De Watteville, p. 179.
44 Ibid., pp. 180-81.
45 Godwin-Austen, pp. 6-7. York, Brownrigg and Calvert were convinced of the need for officer education, but it was difficult to initiate. "Though many of its army officers were of the finest type, true sportsmen, and brave fighters, most of these regarded education as unnecessary and inappropriate in a soldier . . . of such as were well educated, some were priggish, lacking in soldierly qualities, and therefore a bad advertisement for education. . . ."
professed that the education of an officer should be basic and liberal and not fill one's head but form it. As late as 1848, the United Service Magazine, never reluctant to recommend reform, described the British officer as talented and possessing ability that alone would motivate him to study and imbibe whatever knowledge was needed.

The lack of military education was not the officer's fault. In 1800, England was the only leading European nation without a military education system. In the same year, Lieutenant Colonel John Gaspard Le Marchant, the young Kentian rebel, with the help of the Prussian, General Francis Jarry, started England's first staff college at Wycombe. It progressed satisfactorily and in 1811, the King approved an extension at Sandhurst. During the long peace the military schools struggled. Lack of competent instructors, failure to use uniformly what manuals existed and the fact that the quartermaster generals did the bulk of the work at division level, made it difficult to utilize the staff college properly.


47 United Service, 1848, iii, pp. 290-96. It was just "too bad" for those officers who did not seek out the necessary knowledge and instead " lingered over a cigar and brandy."


49 Ibid., passim, pp. 27-60. Several graduates (Douglas, Langton, Gomm, Harding) attained high rank during the peninsular wars, and thus enhanced the
In summation, the British officer's life was not availing of the attitudes and endeavors, nor was it motivated or guided to acquire the characteristics necessary in the various leadership levels of a competent, professional army.

reputation of the college. Eighty-eight graduates from the Military Staff College served on the Quartermaster General Staff during the wars, but by 1820 and until 1854, the college got minimal support from Parliament—it had become expensive, £30,000 to £40,000 per year. Officers found ways to pass exams early, take extended leave and so use the school as an easy assignment. As a result, the Military Staff College declined in quality and importance.
CHAPTER III

ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

No more confusing or dislocated system could well have been devised.
Sir David Lindsay Keir

Soldiers, like lawyers, by the nature of their avocation, are conservative. The British army had developed with a dogged adherence to tradition, seldom changed except during periods of crisis. The Interregnum, 1649-1660, was such a period. The army and government of major generals that served England during the Protectorate formed, in large part, both the organizational structure and nomenclature of the army for the next two centuries. Though Englishmen and their historians describe the Cromwellian years as an interruption in the glorious continuity of English history, it is interesting that the Restoration also reconstructed most of Cromwell's army.

1Walton. In this excellent work, Colonel Walton accounts for the birth of the standing army in the years following 1660. Cromwell had refined and consolidated many of the practices and institutions already in existence. Most of this solidification was incorporated in the army created under Charles II.
The contractual arrangement between the Crown and the colonel was based on the regimental system.\textsuperscript{2} The Board of Ordnance, which administratively ran the army under Cromwell, was reconstituted in the Master General of Ordnance, who, in addition, commanded the Artillery and Engineers. The office of the Secretary at War was revived, included in the ministry of the Crown, and charged with the issuance of monies to the Paymaster of the Forces. The Secretaries of State and Treasury were linked directly to the army through the Master General of Ordnance with whom they were to coordinate.\textsuperscript{3} These and other offices,\textsuperscript{4} which had been created or streamlined under Cromwell's auspices, acquired routines and responsibilities rather independently of one another until by the end of the seventeenth century, decentralization of army control was

\textsuperscript{2}Ibid., chaps. 1, ii, iii and iv.

\textsuperscript{3}Clode, I, pp. 71-78.

no longer a trend, but a confusing fact. Professor Keir says:

No more confusing or dislocated system could well have been devised. It was hard to induce coherence or unity of direction among so many intermixed authorities or to fit army organisations into a co-ordinated executive system, and still more so to subordinate it to control by any other department.\footnote{Keir, p. 306.}

This development continued in the eighteenth century as the army endured over one hundred years of intermittent war. By the end of the American War for Independence in 1783, British army administration was under the Secretaries of State, Commander in Chief, Secretary at War, two Paymasters General and the Master General of Ordnance.\footnote{Wheeler, p. 86.} Decentralization had reached its disastrous dénouement and consolidation and disentanglement began. In that year, Burke's Act of Economical Reform transferred the responsibility for all financial and civil business of the army from the Paymasters General to the Secretary at War.\footnote{Army Book, p. 15; "Virtually, for the hundred years before Mr. Burke's Act, the regiment was recruited, paid, and kept up by a sort of contract between the Crown and the colonel." Burke's Act placed control and direction of army finances firmly in the government—a major step in centralized control of the army. See also Omand, pp. 62, 72, and Wheeler, p. 67.} Though not a cabinet minister, the Secretary henceforth prepared the army
estimates, thus providing a definitive check upon the Commander in Chief, while the Paymasters General functioned as the disbursers of funds. In 1801, the Secretary at War assumed responsibility for the colonies, a wartime measure provoked by the action in the West Indies, which, although furthering centralization, proved a burdensome overlap administratively when peace finally came. This enlarged sphere of duty made the Secretary the civilian link between the Sovereign and the army, an important structural connection in preserving civilian control.

The appointment of the Duke of York as Commander in Chief in 1795 and the threat of French invasion in 1803 probably did more than anything else to advance army centralization; the former because of the take-charge leadership of York and his creation of a headquarters staff (see Appendix I), the latter because the theater

8 Omand, p. 64. By the end of the war the Secretary for War and the Colonies (the Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs), usually referred to as the Secretary for War, had supplanted the Secretary at War, who assumed peacetime duties of organization and supply. Howard, Soldiers, pp. 27-28. These positions continued in their confusing state until after the Crimean War.

9 The importance of this office is often overlooked in maintaining civilian control of the army because of traditional English antimilitarism in government and the well established constitutional principle of parliamentary control of the purse strings.

10 Omand, pp. 66-67. York's leadership was demonstrated in his assumption of responsibility for all matters of discipline, personally acting on the affairs
of war was no longer the exclusive interest of a commander abroad with whom the military and civil departments might correspond, rather, it was the immediate concern of the departments themselves.\footnote{Ward, pp. 13, 15-17, 32-33. In spite of the increased centralization, the author points out that as the war progressed, the civil departments proved an interference in many routine military matters, such as the assignment of units and the routing of transportation. Also major commanders abroad were appointed by the War Office and Wellington was forced, of course, to accept the generals and department heads approved by the cabinet.}

Yet, as the war years were, on the one hand, forming a more centralized army to meet the changing exigencies of war, they were, on the other, producing complexities and overlappings that wrought administrative havoc during the long peace. By 1815, the problems solved and created left the army in an imbroglio with thirteen distinct military headquarters offices (see Appendix II) and the system or nonsystem of coordination and cooperation burdened the Commander in Chief with complications so involved that the transaction of army business was often impeded.\footnote{Wheeler, p. 88.}

Conflicts of authority unavoidably occurred. A Minute of

of high ranking officers, thus, removing the Secretary at War from any back door politicking. Wheeler, p. 87. The creation of a headquarters staff led to the development of the Staff Corps, a kind of independent Board of Ordnance which controlled materiel for the entire army and personnel for the Artillery and Engineers.
the Prince Regent in Council in May, 1812, ordered the Secretary of War and the Commander in Chief to realize respective positions in which the Secretary of War was superior to the Commander in Chief, but that all communications to the army from the Secretary of War had to be coordinated with the Commander in Chief.14

This resulted, at the end of the war, in a gradation of authority with the Secretary of War the highest military level of authority, the Master General of Ordnance next, followed by the Secretary of the Treasury. The Commander in Chief's position in the hierarchy of military power was rather loosely prescribed. As the army representative of the Sovereign he had plenary authority in some respects, yet, he was subordinate to the Secretary of War and subject to many decisions of both the Master General of Ordnance and the Secretary of the Treasury.15 To confuse administration worse, the Commander in Chief, as commander of the Infantry and Cavalry, had as his second-in-command, the Master General of Ordnance. Furthermore,

13 The Secretary of War had assumed, by this time, the wartime duties of the Secretary at War. Supra, p. 36, footnote 8.

14 Omand, p. 70, 172. The Secretary at War retained control of army estimates.

15 For a detailed explanation of this relationship, see Ward, pp. 8-10.
all domestic civil affairs involving the militia, the
volunteers or the regulars, had to be coordinated with
the Secretary of State for Home Affairs. It should be
remembered that the army's primary duty at home after 1815
was the reaction to and suppressing of civil disturbances.

This plexus of high level authority made it diffi-
cult, indeed, on the regimental colonel. He was respon-
sible to the Commander in Chief for discipline and promo-
tion (in the Artillery and Engineers to the Master General
of Ordnance), to the Secretary at War for expenses, to a
commingling of the Secretary at War, the Master General of
Ordnance and the Secretary of the Treasury for feeding,
transport and supply, to the Secretary of War (Secretary
of State for War and the Colonies) for his troops abroad,
and to the Militia for his troops at home. Thus, the
long peace began with a war organization that was far too
extensive and complex for a drastically reduced army.

The hasty demobilization, in addition to causing
serious problems for English society, left the army
skeleton awkwardly unbalanced with a Brobdingnagian head
and a Liliputian body. By 1817, the army was reduced

16Fortescue, History, XI, pp. 43-44. Additionally,
the Commander in Chief was subject to the Treasury for
feeding of the troops (supra, p. 34, footnote 4) and
discipline had logically spilled over, in part, to the
Judge Advocate General.

17Ward, p. 79.
more than two-thirds of its pre-Waterloo strength,18 and despite the disbandment or consolidation of part of the wartime administrative organization, all but three of the thirteen previously mentioned principal offices of authority continued to exist until after the Crimean War.19

The system, being nearly unworkable, rapidly decentralized itself and began to rot. Nonuse and noncoordination were embarrassingly revealed in 1826 when troops dispatched to Portugal were unable to organize their own movement or field feeding procedures:

It is really almost incredible that, within eleven years of Waterloo . . . five thousand British troops could not proceed on active service without a memorandum from the greatest soldier in Europe to explain how they should be fed and made mobile in the field.20


19Clode, I, p. 277, Forbes, p. 188. Disbanded were the wartime ancillary services, the most important of which were the Staff Corps, the Royal Waggon Train and the Ordnance Field Train. The corps of artillery drivers was integrated into the regiments, the Barrackmaster General, the Storekeeper General and the Commissariat were consolidated in the Board of Ordnance. Sheppard, p. 206. These adjustments, though countermanding the trend toward decentralization were detrimental to the military preparedness of the army. The abolition of the Staff Corps and Waggon Train, "... practically crippled it for campaign purposes..." The three offices no longer in existence were the Commissary in Chief, the Commissary General of Musters and the Commissioners of Barracks.

20Fortesque, History, XI, p. 92.
This is somewhat ironic when it is considered that Wellington's successful peninsular campaigns and victory at Waterloo were accomplished, in no slight degree, by his staff and administration.

Wellington served as Master General of Ordnance upon his return from France in 1818 until he was appointed Commander in Chief in 1827. During that time his active participation in both army and governmental affairs and the augmentations of 1824-2521 engendered a feeling that the impetus for reform was, at least, possible. But when Wellington left the Ordnance post in 1827, the office "...drifted back into its old habit of leaving everything to subordinate permanent officials."22 Sinecures, conspicuously absent, increased. Well known was that of the Ordnance of Treasurer, worth £600 per year and held by the noted Tory critic, Thomas Creevey.23

At the regimental level, organizational and administrative reform was neither considered nor needed. During the decade after Waterloo, York partially instituted the twin-battalion concept,24 a practice that

21 Supra, p. 8, footnote 22.
22 Forbes, p. 193.
23 Ibid., p. 72. The position was abolished in 1836.
24 Fortesque, Empire, p. 224. The twin-battalion concept was an arrangement in which a battalion abroad had a counterpart second battalion at home, a third and
did not become standard operating procedure until over a half-century later.

The major problems were at higher levels. After the parliamentary reform of 1832, army organizational refurbishing was openly and frequently discussed. United Service Magazine devoted increasingly more space to articles on the consolidation of army departments. The offices of the Secretary of War, the Commander in Chief and the Master General of Ordnance had become semi-autonomous bureaucratic kingdoms, warring over money, men and missions. In 1834, John Fox Burgoyne proposed that the three be united in the office of a Minister of War, made a cabinet post and responsible to the House of Commons.25 Though it would increase costs, he believed it would reduce inefficiency. Burgoyne also favored full command residing in the Sovereign, i.e., the Commander in Chief, a difficult arrangement if a Minister of War was to be made so powerful and completely responsible to the Parliament.

Despite the fact that a commission in 1833 had recommended the amalgamation of high army posts,26 conflict

sometimes fourth battalion in the militia. This provided better replacement support and depth for mobilization or shipment overseas.

26Omand, p. 75.
over the Commander in Chief's position hardened. Harding believed the Commander in Chief was nonpolitical and constitutionally duty bound solely to the Sovereign. Palmerston feared that if the power were transferred from the Crown to Commons it would be a "... death blow to the Constitution." Macaulay, as Secretary of War, 1839-41, said that military matters ought not to be submitted "... to large assemblies of men, who are apt to be influenced by party and factious impulse. ..." With both civilian and military leadership concerned and without a crisis to resolve it, an investigative commission was appointed to consider the consolidation of army departments. After months of probing and exhaustive testimony, the commission made the following recommendations:

1) the Secretary at War be given more authority, and made a cabinet member, and, thus, the government's link between Sovereign and Parliament and between Parliament and the Commander in Chief,

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27 Stocqueler, History, p. 224.
29 Ibid.
30 Sessional Papers, 1837, Vol. XXXIV, "Report of the Commissioners on the Practicability and Expediency of Consolidating the Different Departments connected with the Civil Administration of the Army," part 1. The session lasted from Jan. 31 to July 17, 1837. Information from this report and the evidence included is hereinafter cited as Commission, 1837.
2) the Commander in Chief be left completely independent of the executive and retain full disciplinary control of the army,

3) the Board of Ordnance be split into military and civilian divisions allowing for a separation between military and nonmilitary responsibilities.31

None of the recommendations were carried out—again, until after the Crimean War. Argument was most intense over the third recommendation. Sir James Kempt, a past Master General of Ordnance, thought that the Board of Ordnance should not be split because a civilian would not have the personal contact necessary to support even the nonmilitary aspects of the army.32 Hardinge was convinced it was impossible to clearly distinguish between the military and nonmilitary responsibility. He cited, as examples, the Artillery and Engineer academy at Woolwich where the military subjects of laboratory, gun carriage and foundry were under civil auspices, while the Board of Ordnance

31 Commission, 1837, pp. 9-11. Other major recommendations included the Treasury handling only monies and the removal of both Secretaries of State from army matters. More than likely, the commission's recommendations would have meant the Secretary at War becoming omnipotent over all army affairs, the Commander in Chief would have become merely an instrumentality for carrying out the Secretary's orders and the Board of Ordnance would have been reduced to an auxiliary service furnishing logistical support in both military and nonmilitary categories.

32 Ibid., pp. 26-27. In addition he believed the assumption of such multifarious activities by the Secretary at War would lead to extreme bureaucratization. Gordon, p. 45. Wellington feared the consolidated war office would create a "new leviathan."
supervised food and clothing, which were certainly civil matters. Hardinge concluded that creating two Ordnance chiefs would be like having two heads with indistinct responsibilities. At the other extreme was the Duke of Richmond, under whom the commission in 1833 had recommended similar changes, who believed the office of Master General of Ordnance should be abolished as it was no more than a position of honor and merit.

Many held that inherent in the commission's first and second recommendations was the eventual complete subordination of the Commander in Chief to the Secretary at War. They were probably correct and not surprisingly, the Duke of Wellington fiercely objected. He considered the Commander in Chief the direct army extension of the Crown and to subordinate him to another would be to render the check and balance feature of the traditional constitutional arrangement ineffective. He could live with the fact that the "... Commander in Chief cannot at this moment move a corporal's guard from London to Windsor without going to the civil authority, ..." but at the same time he demanded that patronage rest

33 Commission, 1837, p. 39.
34 Ibid., pp. 30-31.
35 Gordon, p. 149, Omand, p. 77.
with the Commander in Chief:

Patronage and discipline were in the hands of the Commander in Chief, an arrangement which afforded some measure of protection against political influence.36

The conflict was one of centralization versus decentralization and Wellington preferred the checks of the latter. An important aspect apparently overlooked by the commission and those writers who have examined it was Wellington's design to preserve control of loyalty in the Commander in Chief. Divided loyalty is dangerous and inevitable with civilian cabinet officials in charge of the army. Wellington had purged the army of the harmful aspects of double allegiance of civil heads during the Napoleonic Wars, yet, "In the Crimea forty years later the divided loyalty of the civil staff was one of the principal causes of the notorious maladministration."37

Why were not the recommendations of the commission implemented? Certainly Wellington's enormous influence was reason enough. A fuller answer is offered, in part, by this study; another writer has opined:

On the one side was the feeling that it was wrong to farm out the administration of the army to its regimental colonels, on the other the growth of the free trade movement with its policy of non-interference by the State in any manner capable of management by private enterprise. When it is

36Omand, p. 79.
37Ward, p. 160.
added that the great tide of reform in British political institutions set in only after Waterloo, during a time when the Army was utterly neglected, and that the military authorities were determined to die in the last ditch sooner than surrender their perquisites and prerogatives, it will be evident that no root and branch scheme of army administrative reform had much chance of success. 38

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38 Forbes, p. 169.
CHAPTER IV

PUNISHMENTS AND REWARDS

My object all sublime, I shall achieve in time
to make the punishment fit the crime.

W. S. Gilbert

The history of English judicial punishments is horrid and fortunately, well known. Man's methods for taking an eye for an eye had, in actuality, often meant taking two fingers for a mere loaf of bread. During the long peace two forms of capital punishment still existed, shooting and hanging. Corporal punishment was carried out by branding, lashing and extended drilling, and of the three, lashing was the most often and most brutally used.  

The cat-o'-nine-tails had replaced the rod early in the eighteenth century and had received its senseless initiation under Marlborough running the gantlet. In the next hundred years "the cat" became the regular sentence for convicted offenders and by the Napoleonic

1Dupin, pp. 103-04. During his travels in England in 1819, Dupin reports personally observing branding, lashing, drill and confinement.

2For a brief history of the lash and its use during the eighteenth century, see de Watteville, pp. 109-22.
wars men were frequently flogged in barbaric fashion. Instances of several hundred lashes, as many as one thousand, in one case, were not unusual, and because no man could endure such a whipping, the spectacle was halted when the convicted neared coma, allowing him to recover from his wounds before the punishment was resumed—an interesting example of double or multiple punishments.\(^3\) de Watteville records that men elected death in some cases to escape the lash and in 1811, one regiment had thirty-two men in the hospital at one time recovering from "the cat's" wounds.\(^4\)

The physical maiming inflicted by the lash began to cut into the minds of army leaders before Waterloo. In 1812, York promulgated an order forbidding a regimental court awarding over 300 lashes to any one man.\(^5\) The Duke of Wellington, by 1815, was intervening to lessen and prevent extensive flogging, but the Duke, his immense influence nearly all pervasive, believed corporal punishment necessary, either by threat or application, to hold the "scum of the earth" in line.\(^6\)

\(^3\) For an all too thorough description of flogging, see United Service, 1844, 1, pp. 242-55.
\(^4\) De Watteville, p. 120.
Even the troops accepted flogging as an effective and "tolerable" means of punishment. They conducted unauthorized barrack-room or company court-martials at which the sentence was administered with a rifle or musket sling, the metal buckle serving in place of the knotted cat. It is not surprising that "... there were few, if any, that came up for sentence by company court-martial twice over." Charles Dupin, during his travels in 1820, observed "drum-head trials" where a unit, while on the march, would halt and summarily try a man with officers seated around a drum-head. They would pronounce sentence, rig up the triangular A-frame that held a man erect during flogging, execute the sentence and continue marching. Particularly painful was the injustice witnessed by regimental doctors attending floggings where it was evident that before the sentence was finished, the man might die if not

punishments for courageous combat action, too severe a penalty or unsubstantiated charges. Howard, Soldiers, p. 82. G. R. Gleig, Wellington's Chaplain General and close friend recorded that the Duke favored an aristocratic class of officers, and "scum" for soldiers and therefore favored the lash and hard punishment. Stanhope, p. 18. The elite Horse Guards, seldom subjected to the lash, were usually punished by "billing up" or extended confinement to the barracks. Wellington believed they never would have submitted to lengthy "billings up" had the alternative, the threat of the "cat," not been worse.

7 Fortescue, History, XI, p. 28.
8 Dupin, pp. 104-05.
cut down and cared for. The conflict was almost insufferable for the doctor who had sat on the court-martial and, sworn to uphold justice, participated in the determination of the sentence; then, while witnessing the execution of the sentence, realized that fully carrying it out would hardly square with his and the court's sworn intention. 

To reform flogging was difficult. Military leadership generally advocated its retention and few alternatives were proposed to make it unnecessary, as for example, rewards for good behavior. Sir Charles Napier defended the army's use of the lash, pointing out that civilian justice (flogging) was often carried out in private whereas the army, at least, aired its lashings in public. English magistrates could and did render longer, harsher and more brutal punishments than their military counterparts. Regardless, the army was, in

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9 United Service, 1844, ii, pp. 82-84.
10 Luvaas, p. 36.
11 United Service, 1832, ii, pp. 450-60. Civil magistrates could summarily adjudge hard labor up to four months and public whipping. Military commanding officers could adjudge forty-eight hours confinement in the black hole or seven days to the barracks with drill. Civilian courts could sentence "flogging three distinct times;" military tribunals could sentence only one flogging, however, as has been indicated previously, many single floggings resulted in multiple sessions with the lash because a man was unable to endure the full punishment at one time.
one sense, a penal institution after the war.  "Discharges were permitted as a reward for good conduct, and were ordered by court-martial in extreme cases of misconduct...there was no middle ground and thus, the discipline was severe."  

As reform reverberated throughout English society, at least some faint echoes were heard in army quarters. Joseph Hume, the Scottish radical forever critical of the army, called for the abolition of flogging in 1826. Though many probably supported Hume in thought, few did in word or deed. General James Duff, the Talavera hero, expressed a common sentiment of the day when he said it was as "...easy to chain the northwind as to manage the British soldier without the aid of corporal punishment." Most men of the time believed, with empirical justification, that the lash was necessary until education and a betterment of morals could bring about its abrogation. That belief was, of course, hardly comprehensive, but every generation in attempting to determine the direction of

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14 Stocqueler, History, p. 213.

15 Ibid.
change is confronted with the conflict of what people
think is right and what they believe to be accomplishable. Perhaps because the two are seldom in harmony it is that
we continue on.

Though the army leaders were in favor of the con-
cept of corporal punishment, fortunately, they were
responsive to the injustice of its extreme use. Until
1830, there was no limit on the number of lashes that
could be adjudged by a general court-martial. In 1831
the number was limited to 500, in 1838 to 200 and in
1840 to 50.16 This trend had developed despite an
alarming increase in crime and desertions which, unfor-
tunately, reinforced the advocates of corporal whipping.17
The reformers, nonetheless, were strengthened by a Royal
Commission on Criminal Law in 1833 which discovered that
capital and corporal punishment were not very effective
in deterring crime: "... the severity of punishment
had only the effect of deterring prosecutions."18

16 The other courts, district and regimental,
comparable to the American army's present special and
summary courts, were delimited proportionately. For
a breakdown, see Army Book, pp. 25-26.

17 Stocqueler, Guards, p. 161. From 1830 to 1833,
floggings decreased from 655 to 376; court-martials
increased from 2,684 to 5,472. This trend continued
well into the 1840's. For details on the increasing
desertion rate, see United Service, 1832, iii, pp. 550-51.

18 And not the commission of offenses. The Annual
Register, 1837, part ii, p. 229, explains the reluctance
Although the commission did not recommend the abolition of flogging, the military arguments and their statistics were overwhelming, it did succor the reductions of floggings. In 1835, 246 floggings took place in the British army at home, in 1836 only 163. The commission's findings did provoke a series of civil acts which reduced crimes punishable by death and heinous methods. This had no more than a subsidiary effect on the army for corporal punishment was not completely abolished until 1881.

One form of requital was suppressed, dueling. Brandishing pistols at twenty-four paces to appease one's offended honor was still in vogue after Waterloo. Practiced by officers of every rank, dueling remained relatively common and widely accepted until the years 1840 to 1843, when numerous duels were fought in which one

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20 The Annual Register, 1837, part ii, pp. 240-42. Included is a listing of the host of acts passed in 1837 in order to make the "punishment fit the crime."
man was killed and another seriously wounded.\footnote{Stoqueler, History, pp. 232-33. The fact that the wounded man was hit by Lord Cardigan made the duel well known. Duels during the period involving well known persons seldom resulted in either party getting hit, much less seriously wounded. Wellington's duel with Lord Winchelsea is a case in point.} Since few parties to a duel were ever hit by their honor slighted foe, it is not surprising that these incidents incited a demand to outlaw dueling. A Society for the Suppression of Dueling was founded in 1843 and included among its 416 members, 35 generals and admirals and 200 other officers.\footnote{Turner, p. 142.}

The pressure from such activity was persuasive and it resulted first, in the Queen approving of officers who avoided duels or aided in discouraging them, and second, in the army ordering commanding officers to arbitrate disputes.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 21-22. If a party to the dispute did not abide by the arbitration, he was subject to court-martial.} As with corporal punishment, dueling was not to be legally expunged from the Mutiny Act until 1881,\footnote{Ibid., p. 42.} yet, it can be said, with few exceptions, that concerning this obtuse but serious practice, reason and reform triumphed by mid-century.

Reason, however, had not embraced corporal punishment. The alternatives that were considered—dismissal

\footnote{Ibid., p. 42.}
from the service (impractical), deportation to penal companies (Africa and the West Indies had proved this futile), and capital punishment (unjust)--had all been discarded. 26 Again the familiar arguments resounded. United Service Magazine ran a series of articles on punishments and described in chilling detail the horror of execution by shooting and the nauseous spectacle of flogging. 27 Lord Hardinge gathered and presented further documentation that corporal punishment did not serve as a deterrent to crime, citing the 60th Rangers as having both the severest record of punishments and the most offenses committed. 28 But towering over all was the magnificent hero of Waterloo making it indisputedly clear that the "scum" could only be kept in tow by the use of the "cat." Wellington braced his belief by pointing out that in 1846, Hardinge, while Governor General of India, had abolished corporal punishment

26 Fortesque, History, XI, p. 452. The French army during this time averaged about one execution per month and the English tended to regard such a practice as a barbaric way to maintain discipline. Apparently, it made more sense to shred the skin of a man's back.

27 United Service, 1844, i, pp. 242-56. In particular, this article describes the frequent occurrence of firing squads failing to complete their mission after one volley, thus, requiring two, three or several more to be fired. Also included is Henry Marshall's description of insanely brutal flogging.

28 United Service, 1844, i, pp. 72-73. A convincing argument for the abolition of corporal punishment is stated on pp. 70-76.
in the army, only to reinstate it the following year in order to reestablish discipline.29

The substance of the Wellingtonian argument lay not inherently in the argument itself, but in the incredible fact that no substitute for corporal punishment had been adopted to change the soldier's values, his moral character, his way of life. Well into the 1830's there was no education for the soldier, no incentive not to drink and waste away, in short, no program of rewards or recognition for good or better behavior.

The soldier had long been considered canaille before Wellington's "scum" description. In Charles II's reign soldiers were excluded from parks and gardens because of their ill-fitness for public exposure.30 Their station in life was equated with that of beggars and thieves, for in the "Golden Age" of the eighteenth century one advantage of a poor family not in want was that "... the family feels it ... and as they grow, they do not run away to be footmen and soldiers--thieves and beggars..."31 Prosperity reinforced that feeling, swelling the dogmatic ranks of those that believed it was

30 Fortesque, History, XI, pp. 16-17.
impossible to change the soldier and, therefore, his station in society.

Prior to 1815, some awards had been given to officers, none to soldiers. The "100 day campaign" culminating in the Battle of Waterloo reignited the Order of the Bath, bestowing lavish honors on many officers, and, for the first time, awarding a medal to all veterans of the battle. The reaction to this incipient program of awards and decorations was mixed. It galled the peninsula veterans, some with eight years service in Spain and Portugal, who were prevented by a set of circumstances from being with Wellington at Waterloo, that those who had no other combat experience should be the ones rewarded. The veterans, of course, had been sent to America after 1812 and upon their return were recuperating and had not been reequipped or retrained. Lieutenant Colonel Surtees said:

But at length the news of the memorable battle of Waterloo arrived, and we had no share in it ... I think there were few of my companions in the late expedition [to America] but felt somewhat disappointed and rather vexed, that this decisive

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32 Dupin, p. 102. The following awards were given to officers: Knights of Grand Crosses, 80 (12 civilian), Knights Commander, 196, and Companions, 520.

33 Leach, pp. 402-03. Stocqueler, History, p. 181. The spoils from the Battle of Waterloo were: a silver medal to the veterans of the battle, two for one in computing the year 1815 for longevity, and a "Waterloo" emblazoned color for all units that fought there.
action should have taken place so early after they returned from America... it was most unfortunate to those of my friends, who had been undergoing probably as severe and hazardous a service as any our army had lately been engaged in, and that all that should be looked upon as hardly worse than nothing, while some young fellows, who had never before seen an enemy, should be covered with honours and distinctions which were so amply lavished on them, merely because they had the good fortune to share in that brilliant and decisive victory.34

On the other hand, Dupin got the impression the Waterloo medal was given out so freely that it cheapened the distinction.35 Sir Charles Napier opposed all awards and military crosses as unnecessary and needless waste, the few high ranking officers that received recognition from the Monarch being enough.36 Thus, uncertainty and bitterness helped to postpone the day when incentive by awards would be integrated into the ranks of the army.

Positive discipline through an incentives program could not go untested forever. The Prussians had awarded badges to all soldiers for simply serving during the war.37 Napoleon's use of medals was well known, and no doubt encouraged the British not to accept the practice--after all, it was the ribbonless English soldiers who had defeated

34Surtees, pp. 407-08.
35Dupin, p. 103.
36Luvaas, pp. 36-37.
37Leach, p. 404.
the bemedaled Frenchmen at Waterloo. Nevertheless, with
the passage of time, emotions mellow, memories fade and
prejudice settles in the everlengthening past. After
1830, United Service Magazine argued louder and more
frequently for a standard policy of awarding decorations
for meritorious achievement and service.

At the same time, certain corps abroad began
granting medals for good service for a designated period
of years. "Desirous" suggested the idea be adopted army
wide as an excellent means of inducing "good soldiery" in
the young troops. 38 In 1836, the Howick Commission, after
investigating the possible advantages and costs of an
awards program, recommended that badges be issued for
good conduct and additional pay for good service. 39 Two
years later, a Commission on Rewards and Punishments
replaced additional pay with good conduct pay 40 and thus,

38 United Service, 1832, iii, p. 408. Also Fortesque,
History, XI, p. 29. The author cites regiments abroad
that had begun awarding medals and badges for faithful
service and good conduct and in some instances had lessened
punishments as a result.

39 Hansard, Vol. 37 (1837), pp. 778-80ff. See
particularly Howick's speech, April 5. A royal warrant
of Sept. 1, 1836 established a Good Conduct Medal and
additional pay of 1 pence per day for 7 years good
service, an additional penny after 14 years, another
penny and a cluster to the medal after 21 years.

40 Sessional Papers, 1838, Vol. XXXVII, "Rewards and
Punishments," p. 145. Men who were able to keep their
names from the pages of the Regimental Defaulters Book
for the first time in the history of the British army, a method was being tried to raise the soldier and improve his worth by positive (reward) rather than negative (punishment) means.

During the years 1841-1844, Lord Ellenborough, governor general of India, decorated his men with medals as a result of the campaigns in northeast India, and Charles Napier, his adjutant general, stressed that they had been awarded, not for foolhardy strength, but for:

1) firing only upon orders (discipline);
2) firing low to get an enemy (skill);
3) because the soldier's station is the highest in the world (recognition).

In 1846, medals were given out for participation in the Afghan War and finally, some thirty years later, to those veterans, still alive, of the Peninsular campaigns. Thus, it had taken over fifteen years for some and three decades for most to realize the abject truth in the popular story about Napoleon Bonaparte that circulated for two years were awarded a Good Conduct Medal. This same concept is used today in the American army, the period being three years.


after his incarceration on the Bellerophon. After surrendering himself and boarding the ship, Napoleon inspected the troops on board and remarked to the captain that they looked good but wondered why none had seen battle. The English captain replied that they had but that it was not his government's practice to award medals except to high ranking officers. Whereupon Napoleon is said to have commented that such is not the way to "excite or cherish the military virtues."\textsuperscript{43}

Though Wellington naturally favored the Peninsula medal, he argued for the engraving of each recipient's name on it at 2 shillings, 4 pence per person,\textsuperscript{44} the Duke still opposed the general idea. He believed that distinctions should be preserved as a very special privilege of the Crown.\textsuperscript{45} And as Maxwell points out, the Duke's steadfastness in preserving medals for the command of the Sovereign only probably delayed the creation of an army decorations system for nearly half a century.\textsuperscript{46}

\textsuperscript{43}United Service, 1832, 1, pp. 114-15.

\textsuperscript{44}Wellington Speeches, II, p. 714.

\textsuperscript{45}Ibid., pp. 706-07. Wellington was definite about not awarding medals for wounds (as today's Purple Heart does) because of the thousands that had gone before and because the sheer numbers would lessen the meaning of the award even though the Duke was particularly sensitive to combat casualties.

\textsuperscript{46}Maxwell, II, pp. 134-35.
CHAPTER V

MILITARY PREPAREDNESS

We have never, up to this moment, maintained a proper peace establishment. . . .

Duke of Wellington

Successful armies seldom feel the need to reform, they tend to rest on the laurels won in recent victories. Waterloo allowed the British army to rest for forty years until the disastrous episodes of the Crimean War. During that long peace the army all but ignored training, tactics, weapons and other essentials necessary to maintain a ready military force. While continental armies, particularly that of Prussia, were studying and assimilating the lessons of Napoleonic warfare, and producing military scientists who were preaching and publishing, the British, in general, neglected the entire subject.

An exception was Lieutenant Colonel John Mitchell, veteran of the peninsular campaigns, linguist, writer, and one of Great Britain's few outspoken exponents of army reform. Englishmen had always treated war as an art, "... Mitchell studied it as a science. . . ." In

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1Luvaas, pp. 42, 60-61. Strategy and tactics, nevertheless, were almost universally disregarded by the British military during the period.
his analysis of mass, he exposed the square as miserably unsatisfactory. Mass armies and mass maneuvers had been used to defend and defeat an empire without detailed consideration of mass as an isolated military tactic, yet the campaigns of the Napoleonic wars provided many examples which revealed the inadequacy of the square when employed against infantry. Against cavalry, the square was frighteningly vulnerable, a fact which certainly should have provoked closer scrutiny of the tactic. The square's proponents argued for its use in large mass formations several ranks in depth. Mitchell suggested extended lines and celerity instead.

The problem with the square was not just its shape as a tactical formation, its movements involved a series

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2Lieutenant-colonel J. Mitchell, Thoughts on Tactics (London: Longman, Orme, Brown, Green and Longmans, 1838), pp. 44-45, 116, 158-60. Hereinafter cited as Mitchell. In 1807, the Albanians surrounded three British companies, and maintaining a safe distance, picked the Englishmen off one at a time when they ran out of ammunition. The square in this instance was disastrous. Another weakness of the square was that it produced large firing machines that caused confusion and chaos as the smoke-engulfed men, their wounded comrades jamming up the formation, tried to get their shot off without concern for aim. One of the best examples of the square's success was the Battle of Fuentes d'Onoro where Wellington ended Massena's Portuguese campaign.

3United Service, 1832, 1, pp. 289-306. Also Mitchell, pp. 49-51. The author is of the opinion that the square is useless against well trained cavalry.

4Mitchell, p. 158.
of countermarches to change flank to front that were perilously time consuming. One contemporary writer, resigned to the square, proposed a set of maneuvers to form the square from either file or column insuring that any rank could serve as the front.\(^5\) The solution, of course, was marching to the oblique which was not suggested until 1844 nor adopted until after the Crimean War.\(^6\)

Cavalry tactics remained as demonstrated in the Napoleonic wars, fully supported by Napier's writings on the history of the peninsular campaigns and ardently defended by most officers against any adverse criticism.\(^7\) The British clung to their traditional two-line concept of cavalry employment, one charging, the other in the rear preparing a second charge, despite the tested "rank entire" which had proved highly successful in Spain in 1835.\(^8\) Cavalry maneuvers, like the infantry, were also complicated and had to be streamlined. Lieutenant Colonel

\(^{5}\)United Service, 1848, i, pp. 372-83. This proposal of Captain W. T. B. Mountstevven was similar to Napoleon's "bataillon carre" or lozenge formation.

\(^{6}\)Ibid., 1844, i, pp. 582-90. Marching to the oblique largely eliminated the countermarch movements.

\(^{7}\)Ibid., 1832, ii, pp. 392-94. "Old Soldier" articulates a strong defense of British cavalry.

\(^{8}\)Stocqeler, History, p. 223. The "rank entire" was a fully extended skirmish line, committed with the intention of breaking the enemy in one charge, rather than risking failure with two half-strength charges.
G. William Russell believed British cavalry to be inferior to French and Prussian cavalry only because of the time and motion wasted in battlefield maneuvering. And Mitchell, who believed that battles were seldom conclusive because the enemy was always allowed to retreat, regroup and fight again, advocated the refinement of cavalry maneuvers so that both infantry and cavalry could pursue and destroy the enemy, convinced it would result in fewer battles and lesser casualties.

Victory also caused the British army to rest on its arms. As the longbow had been retained for two centuries after the invention of firearms, the smooth bore musket remained the army's basic weapon nearly a half-century after the introduction of rifling. In 1830, "... the arms issued in the British army ... were of the same

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9Wellington Supp. Despatches, XIV, pp. 714-30. Communications between Wellington and Russell indicate that many officers were critical of Sir David Dundas as the long established authority on tactical maneuvers.

10Mitchell, pp. 60-65.

11Men in Arms, pp. 93, 100-02. See also United Service, 1832, III, pp. 26-33 for an account of the longbow, its superiority over the musket, the difficulty in training archers and other factors that need be considered in understanding why the British waited until 1595 to declare the longbow, officially, obsolete. Gordon, p. 183 and Forbes, I, p. 243. The Rifle Corps was created in 1806 and used a large, smooth bore musket which came to be called "Brown Bess" and although rifling was introduced by Napoleon in the same year, the British refused to adopt it.
model and in many cases the same vintage as those provided in 1800. . . ."12 Many attempts were made to improve "Brown Bess," but to no avail, as Wellington was convinced that since the large smooth bore had won at Waterloo, it was the best.13

However, "Brown Bess" was not without criticism, nor proof of her inadequacies. Surtees, while on active duty with the Rifle Brigade, admitted that during one battle he fired over 200 shots to no effect.14 Brigades training at Brighton during William IV's reign proved that only one man in sixty could hit the target.15 It was conservatively estimated that it took 100 shots to hit one enemy.16 The fault was not entirely the weapon's; the soldier did not receive sufficient training or practice in the use of his musket, a serious deficiency in military preparedness that is discussed later in this chapter.

12Luvaas, p. 21.

13Forbes, I, p. 246. The large bore allowed the British to use enemy ammunition, a fact which influenced those who supported the retention of "Brown Bess."


15Ibid., pp. 138-40, 169. The musket sight was large and heavy, making it difficult to aim, the trigger was hard to squeeze and the recoil intense, thus, jerking was common.

16Ibid., p. 42.
In the middle years of the long peace scientific progress burgeoned so rapidly the British could not look aside. After the adoption of fulminating powder in 1836, "Brown Bess" was converted from flint-lock to percussion cap firing in the 1840's.\(^1\) This adjustment alone reduced misfires from 411 per 1,000 to 4.5 per 1,000 and increased the accuracy of target hits per 1,000 from 270 to 385.\(^2\) The caliber and charge of ammunition was standardized during the same time and in 1846, the German chemist, Christian Friedrich Schönbein discovered gun cotton, a residueless explosive that immeasurably improved the maintenance of weapons.\(^3\)

Scientific articles abounded in the *United Service Magazine* in the years just preceding the Crimean War.\(^4\) Discussions of gun powder and its expanding force, the shape and charge of bullets, and diagrams of muskets and cannon all contributed to the creation of widespread interest in weaponry and its capabilities. The Minie

\(^{17}\)Forbes, I, p. 247. Also Gordon, p. 183.


\(^{19}\)Stocqueler, History, p. 237. On maintenance of the soldier's musket, see *United Service*, 1852, I, p. 98, which includes the couplet: "Sponge me well and keep me clean / and I'll carry a ball to Calais green." Even today's advanced technology has yet to render that advice obsolete.

\(^{20}\)For example, *United Service*, 1852, I, includes several articles on weapons and ammunition, their penetration, force and accuracy.
rifle, which refined the conical bullet to take better advantage of rifling was steadfastly refused by the British. Major General George Anson, clerk under Lord John Russell, the Master General of Ordnance, believed neither the Minie nor the breech loader should be adopted as "... it is ridiculous to suppose that two armies could fight at a distance of 500 to 600 yards."\(^21\) Fox-Maule said that "Brown Bess" in British hands was "... better than all the inventions that could be discovered."\(^22\) Nevertheless, the evidence finally overcame even Wellington and the Minie was adopted on the eve of the Crimean War. Shortly before the outbreak of fighting in 1854, rifles were able to fire with some accuracy up to 900 yards, which caused a reporter to comment that the weapon would "... smote the enemy like a destroying angel."\(^23\) The smooth bore was, at last, doomed and the British began the adjustment to the new techniques of industrialized warfare, the last of the great European powers to do so.\(^24\)

\(^{21}\) Stocqueler, History, pp. 248-49.

\(^{22}\) Ibid.

\(^{23}\) Gordon, p. 183.

In place of military competence the army displayed garishness in dress unequalled in British history. One writer has said, "... there has never been a period when the uniform was so resplendent as in the years that followed Waterloo, none when it was less workman-like." The uniforms worn at the coronation of George IV were ludicrous wrappings of ornate excess. Bedazzlement had begun during the war when York initiated japanned helmets in the cavalry. The idea flourished in peacetime with polished steel cuirasses, bearskin caps, shabraque, plumes, seven inch high shakos and gewgaws of all kinds to decorate the uniform. King George IV was credited with saying that in a military uniform, a wrinkle is unpardonable, though a crease admissible. The cavalry was the most peacockish in their glittering trappings; the nouveau riche, after all, enjoyed seeing their sons on beautiful horses outshining the older

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26 Ibid.

27 Stocqueler, Guards, p. 95.

28 Fortesque, History, XI, pp. 32-33. The embellishment was frequently changed annually, sometimes quarterly annually. Forbes, I, p. 223. Infantry shakos were 7-1/2 inches high, 11 inches in diameter. See also Stocqueler, History, p. 195.

29 Forbes, I, p. 220. Officer uniforms exuberated in frilly lace, dazzling plumage, gigantic helmets and tight tailoring.
established families.  When William IV ascended the throne tinseled attire abated, yet in 1832, one soldier still complained that uniforms were so flashy they provided an easy to hit target in combat.

The ostentatiousness of the uniform was matched by its impracticality. The soldier's pack was quadrangular and strapped across his back and chest in a fashion that arrested proper circulation and impeded respiration causing considerable discomfort and requiring continual adjustment while marching. Combat ready, the soldier carried sixty to eighty pounds of clothing and equipment on his person. His standard issue of ammunition was sixty-four rounds, all of which were carried on his left shoulder, distribution of weight notwithstanding. Greatcoats, coatees and trousers were of inferior material and offered slight protection from either

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30 Ibid.
31 United Service, 1832, i, pp. 542-43. Also Forbes, i, p. 221.
33 Wheeler, p. 95. For a breakdown of the weight, see Forbes, I, appendix XIII, pp. 314-15. Stocqueler, Guards, p. 106, describes the soldier's knapsack as containing, in addition to essentials, brickdust, pipe-clay, blacking, sticks and brushes; and his shako, belt and boots as absurdly heavy.
34 Lüvaas, p. 55. Also Stocqueler, Guards, p. 106.
rain or cold. The soldier's uniform and accouterments were badly designed for soldiering: "Altogether ... the human anatomy received much less attention than that of the horse."  

Some changes were made to the soldier's advantage. In 1823, breeches, leggings and shoes were replaced by gray cloth trousers and half-boots. Shortly thereafter, noncommissioned officers discarded the grays for white linen, certainly more pretentious, but more comfortable and sensible for hot weather. The sword and bayonet were worn separately, both heavy and awkward instruments, until 1850 when they were combined into one and made attachable to the musket. Yet, throughout the period a leathern stock was worn around the neck, fashionable indeed—and rendering the head nearly immobile!

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36 Forbes, I, p. 240.
37 Stocqueler, History, p. 220, and Gordon, p. 200. Also Stocqueler, Guards, p. 106. It is important to remember that the soldier's clothing issue was the same whether he was assigned to India or the Arctic.
38 Forbes, I, p. 232. Mitchell, p. 233. The author also suggests round helmets, modeled after the Roman design, which would protect the head and back of the neck from sun as well as provide ventilation for the head. This idea was not applied to military head-gear until the twentieth century.
Uniforms were a vulgar reflection of the British regard for the army as an art and not a science; military writing was also. Fiction, based on thinly disguised fact, glorified war and made popular Rifleman Harris, Jack Hinton the Guardsman, The Hussar and others. Histories, memoirs, sketches and biographies appeared after Waterloo, yet, in 1835, there was "... not in the English language a single work on military science." Mitchell saw the need for military science, for when the battle began he said: "... the general of the nineteenth century must, like his predecessors of the eighteenth, hand the reins to fortune." He believed the past should be studied with the intention of formulating laws and concepts to improve the future conduct of war. But to get men to study and write was difficult. The Prussian, Baron Dietrich von Bülow said that military writers never go anywhere, their writings, "... exclude them from all promotions..."
True or not, this feeling was prevalent in the British army and did not encourage men to take up the pen. Motivation, in the field of writing, as in so many other areas, was lacking. The problem was accurately described by Mitchell, one of the few partially successful writers of the period, when he said, in 1835, that victories perpetuated the system and defeats were not analyzed for improvement. 44

No other aspect of military preparedness is more important than training. Prior to the Napoleonic wars military exercises were frequently conducted, during the wars training and drill were continual. 45 Sir John Moore was widely known for his regular scheduled training. He drilled his officers with their men and recruits and insisted upon serious attention to the details of military preparation. 46 After the wars, "The machinery for training fell out of gear..." 47 It was not reset for forty years.

Sir David Dundas' manual of maneuvers and drill, with slight revisions by Sir Henry Torrens, was the

when out of favor. Clausewitz and Von Kanitz are obvious exceptions.

44 Mitchell, p. 28.
46 Howard, Studies, p. 84.
guiding standard on tactics during the Napoleonic wars. After 1815, criticism was frequently raised that drill was burdened with numerous unnecessary movements and "tellings off" (preparatory commands and commands of execution). Moving by threes and fours wasted time and caused confusion, rear movements were often a duplication of effort. In 1825, York consented to Torrens' newly proposed field training exercises and maneuvers were conducted, one of the few instances in the entire period, thus, it is not surprising that drill and maneuvers throughout the long peace went unchanged.

Although unit training was rare, the individual received some attention in the latter years before the Crimean War. In 1843, "Fusil" proposed that soldiers be taught to aim and fire at selected targets at different levels and not necessarily in unison. Mitchell stressed the need to instill in the individual confidence in his equipment and weapon and thereby develop an esprit de corps. "H. B. H." suggested that officers and

48 United Service, 1832, 11, pp. 105-06.
50 United Service, 1844, 1, p. 125. Mitchell, pp. 141-42. Soldiers needed to be trained to do more than just "... pull a trigger at (the enemy)."
51 Mitchell, pp. 30-41. The author argues that esprit de corps will enable the soldier to gain maximum "tactical" advantage. He does not believe the soldier
noncommissioned officers train and study with the intention of teaching their young men and recruits the skills and knowledge they had learned. United Service Magazine urged the use of chalk boards, practical exercises and alerts as well as scheduled relaxation in clubs where officers and men could enjoy cricket and the theater instead of gambling and drinking. Morale of all ranks and most units needed consideration. The protracted campaigns and pitifully high casualty rates of the frontier wars had to be reduced or prevented. But new ideas take time to gain acceptance and, "Conservatism suspected and condemned everything in the nature of scientific training save in the Corps of Engineers . . . . Bravery, boldness, and dash, with no damned scientific nonsense, were the qualities required." was taught the "skillful use of arms" (p. 30), "... the men have no skill in the use of the clumsy weapons placed in their hands; they are not trained to individual exertion . . . have no confidence in their individual power, and only look to the mass for results . . . ." (p. 40).

Ibid., p. 28. The "... drill-sergeant remains to this day the only official instructor in military science."

United Service, 1838, i, pp. 228-33.

Mitchell, pp. 58-59. The effective strength of field armies was seldom more than two-thirds of their assigned numerical strength due to sickness, wounds and hospitalization.

Godwin-Austen, p. 33.
Great Britain's army was thus badly prepared to carry out its raison d'etre. Napier often railed "... against the inadequate or total lack of peace-time military preparations in England."56 Mitchell said: "... troops are dressed, armed and trained in a manner singularly at variance with the purpose for which they are raised..."57 Of the period, another writer has said: "The country was glad to be rid of military questions, no care for future wars was taken..."58

The French invasion threat in 1847 produced a war scare. The reaction was interesting. Sir Robert Peel said that industry could not support a large army, the labor market could not lose its workers to soldiering, and so recommended that £1,000,000 be appropriated to fortify the arsenals and dockyards.59 Wellington guardedly appraised the army as bad and lamented having to rely on the militia.60 Five years later, in 1852, Wellington said: "We have never, up to this moment, maintained a proper peace establishment... in the

56 Luvaas, p. 21.
57 Mitchell, p. v.
58 Anderson, p. 27.
59 Turner, p. 133.
last 10 years there have never been more than enough
tag{troops} to just relieve the sentries on duty."\textsuperscript{61} Crimea
was two years away!

\textsuperscript{61}\textit{Wellington Speeches}, II, p. 734.
CHAPTER VI

REFORM

There is a time for all things: there is even a time for change; and that is when it can no longer be resisted.

Duke of Cambridge

In addition to the reforms previously mentioned, certain innovations during the long peace, that appeared insignificant then, were to have lasting impact. In 1819, Sir Robert Peel formed the Royal Irish Constabulary because of the army's inability to effectively police Ireland. Although the army had 1,900 soldiers at 441 stations in Ireland, coordination, control and discipline were difficult to maintain when the troops were called upon to react to multiple disturbances in the towns and throughout the countryside.¹ The Royal Irish Constabulary and the ensuing interest in police forces--at least £1.5 million was spent between 1818 and 1824 in organizing local civilian forces to aid the army in quelling riots²--led to the creation, supplemented by

¹³ Hansard, Vol. 32 (1816), pp. 922-929. Peel's speech, Feb. 27. From 1816 to 1819 the army had one cavalry regiment destroyed and four others reduced to ineffectiveness in reacting to civil uprisings in Ireland.

in 1829, of the London Metropolitan Police, an establishment which gradually relieved the army of its policeman duties.

In 1821, King George IV ordered a record of all army accomplishments to be compiled by the adjutant general. Major military campaigns, their battles and outstanding unit and individual actions were recorded, forming an army history of achievements.\(^3\) The purpose was consistent with the King's interest in military regalia for this "official" history exalted the army and glorified war. It also presaged the "achievements and traditions" training of modern armies, a necessary ingredient in developing esprit de corps.

Due to Lord Hardinge's insistence, the Articles of War, in 1829, included a regulation requiring the soldier to keep a small handbook, commonly called a "Tommy Atkins," which recorded his vital statistics, pay and enlistment data. Verified by an officer monthly, these individual records reduced corruption and helped the soldier to complete a change in assignment without his records being "lost."\(^4\) In time, identification cards and duplicate field records replaced the "Tommy Atkins."

\(^3\)Stocqueler, History, p. 192.

\(^4\)Ibid., p. 217.
During Lord Hill's tenure as commander in chief, 1828-1842, garrison libraries were established, stimulating troop interest in education and providing better recreation. Religious instruction was made available to all units at regimental level, improving the troops' morale and increasing the effectiveness of chaplains. The severity of degrading punishments in military prisons was reduced and in some cases labor was substituted for corporal punishment.

The only surge of reform, however, came in the years near mid-century after Wellington's return to the Horse Guards for his second assignment as commander in chief. The hero of Waterloo is held responsible by nearly every student of the period for preventing military reform, yet the last years of his life seem to belie that criticism. In 1846, Wellington spoke in favor of limiting enlistment commitments and providing reenlistment options.

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6Ibid., and Stocqueler, History, p. 232. For an account of how the purchase system effected the caliber of chaplains, Wellington's attempt to improve the chaplains when his men began to preach to one another, the creation of a Chaplains Corps in 1796 and the gradual improvement of the corps, see Stocqueler, History, p. 216, Fortesque, History, XI, p. 43, Fortesque, Empire, p. 228, and Dupin, p. 101.


8Wellington Speeches, II, pp. 647-77. Wellington favored enlistment options because they would provide for both young aggressive soldiers as well as older, experienced noncommissioned officers.
The following year an act was passed providing for ten and twelve year enlistments, with options to extend for twenty-one years of service. Wellington's belief in the reduction of corporal punishment had been known since before Waterloo. In 1846 he urged education as a means of eliminating discipline by punishment. He believed education would raise the soldier to where his conduct could be rewarded rather than punished and his treatment decent instead of degrading. Before his death in 1852, schooling for noncommissioned officers was proclaimed helpful for professional advancement, and soldiers who could read and write were made clerks and given sergeant's pay and privileges. Wellington's encouragement led to an increased demand for widespread education at least commensurate with civilian facilities.

The Middle classes have got their Merchant Taylors, their Charter House, their Blue Coat Schools, and other establishments of renown. Every class, however humble, reads the daily papers ... Dickens

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9Gordon, p. 126 and Stocqueler, History, p. 240. This was a reinstitution of the Castlereagh system of 1808.

10See supra, pp. 49-50, footnote 6.


12United Service, 1848, i11, pp. 19-26. Brevet-Major James E. Alexander proposed educational facilities be available at regimental level, convinced that the soldiers should not be deprived of something the officers believed to be so important.
... and has highly interesting and instructive publications. ...\textsuperscript{13}

The army could make no such claim, but, at least, it was becoming aware of the fact.

Substantive advancement in education was made in the officer ranks. In 1849, Wellington initiated academic examinations for all officers assigned to the Horse Guards. They were required to show proficiency in history, geography, mathematics, Latin, French and field fortifications.\textsuperscript{14} The tests devised to examine the officers in these subjects became the objectives of cram courses and ways were found to pass them without fully imbibing the knowledge, yet the importance of setting some educational standard for officers cannot be overlooked—and, at last, the army was dissolving its water-colored beau sabreur ideal of an officer.

Once begun, reform spread. Women were provided private quarters in the barracks, previously only a curtain had separated them from the other men. Appropriations for married soldiers' accommodations were nearly doubled. Lighting and ventilation in the

\textsuperscript{13}Ibid., 1852, ii, pp. 580-91. It was also recommended in this anonymous article that the soldier learn, in addition to maneuvers, administrative and legal procedures that might concern him.

\textsuperscript{14}Stocqueler, History, p. 243. Specifically, the officer was to know three books of Euclid, algebra, logarithms, Caesar, Virgil and how to translate French.
barracks were started, and reason once more triumphed as the British made the connection between drinking and degeneracy and discontinued the sale of alcohol in the canteens.\textsuperscript{15} Furthermore, commanding officers were pressured to improve the soldier's social and personal character by exhibiting high standards themselves.\textsuperscript{16}

The impetus for reform was carried to other areas. Fairer recruiting practices were advocated so that men might be given a chance to decide upon enlistment when sober. More attention was directed toward revising the pension system to provide the incentive to choose the army as a career and to insure security upon retirement.\textsuperscript{17} In addition to the awards mentioned in chapter IV, medals for all major battles in India since 1803 were struck and the Order of the Bath was augmented for a variety of good deeds. In 1846, a savings bank for soldiers was established and by 1850 it serviced 7,859 depositors with a capital of £94,961.\textsuperscript{18}

Hardinge succeeded Wellington as commander in chief in 1852 and for a brief moment hastened the reform begun in his predecessor's last years. The artillery was

\textsuperscript{15}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 240, 247-48.

\textsuperscript{16}\textit{United Service}, 1849, i, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{17}\textit{Ibid.}, 1844, i, pp. 202-13.

strengthened, the Enfield rifle introduced, field maneuvers ordered, marksmanship training begun, and even the soldier's anatomy was given attention as more practical uniform designs were considered. The Royal Engineers produced a staff study, "Aide-Memoire to the Military Services," a situation and status report on the entire army in 1852. Influenced by John Fox Burgoyne, who had pressed for reform throughout the period, this report detailed the deficiencies and sounded clearly the need for reform. But it was too late. Within two years the British would be involved in a foreign war and the desire to return to the tested ways of the past would be too strong to move on with the winds of change. Two years in mid-Victorian times was not long enough for the British to implement so many new ideas.

While the foregoing may appear to have achieved extensive reform, it, in fact, was only a beginning—a beginning that was, unfortunately interrupted by the Crimean War. That war interrupted reform in two ways;

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19Ibid., p. 254.

20Luvaas, p. 96. See also J. D. Hittle, The Military Staff Its History and Development (Harrisburg: Stackpole Company, Military Services Division, 1961), pp. 149-50. Burgoyne had spoken out for reform throughout the period, particularly in the technological fields of engineering, for which he deserves credit as one of the initiators of the phenomenal advances made by the Royal Engineers in the last half of the nineteenth century.
it suspended the continuation of a reform minded military leadership because an army had to be fielded, made ready for war and transported a continent away, and to do that the firmly established methods of the past were relied on, and secondly, the war brought to the attention of the British nation the severe inadequacies of even the nascent reform begun in the years under Wellington and Hardinge. However, one must record that the Crimean War did not, as might be expected, immediately reheat the winds of further reform. The successful suppression of the Sepoy Mutiny in 1857 ameliorated the Crimea's failures and redeemed the glorious army of the past. The late years of the long peace were not forgotten, though, and a decade later when Edward Cardwell assumed the duties of the War Office, army reform recorded its first great chapter.21

The period, 1815-1854, was not without its accomplishments. Two were outstanding and significantly effected the army, the development of police forces throughout the land, and the reduction of corporal punishment. The former created, rather ironically, what the British had opposed for two centuries--a standing army. And a standing army

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of police allowed a military army to exist with no other purpose than to prepare for war. Though it took over twenty-five years for the police forces to fully assume the maintenance of civil peace and for the army to shoulder the sole responsibility of protecting the empire, the balance was eventually found. The latter made possible the birth of positive rather than negative discipline in the British army and that concept when translated into action raised the soldier's lot, improved his moral character and opened his eyes to education, with all of its yet untold benefits.
CONCLUSION

Reform is wrought when need and knowledge coincide. That coincidence seldom occurred during the long peace. While the need was clearly there, it was not conseqently felt and though the knowledge existed, it was not often grasped. As a result, the need for reform went unfulfilled and the British army was in wretched condition.

The recruiting system may have relieved the British of the "blood tax"\(^1\) of conscription, but the substitute filled the army's ranks with England's worst citizens. Peel's police force eventually enabled a professional army to develop; in the meantime, soldiers got their training on the streets and fields suppressing civilian unrest. Military men, from top rank to bottom, were generally lacking in the soldierly qualities necessary to improve the army and few men found encouragement to better their lot, their proficiency, or their ideas. The purchase system prevented progress and perpetuated all the problems that it had created. And worse, no one worried about the soldier. De Watteville described him

\(^1\)Ropp, p. 129.
thus: "The absurd uniforms, the resistance to the abolition of flogging, the drunkenness of the soldier, the futility of training, everything, in short, combined to mark the soldier as an anachronism in the body politic." ² Professor Trevelyan found the reason at Crimea, where the army was, "... ill led, ill fed and ill organized...."³

To somewhat the contrary, leading, feeding and organization were investigated during the period, and the last years of the long peace are marked by an inchoate movement for reform. Although the Duke of Wellington may have been responsible for delaying that movement, he must, at least, be given credit for administering its life breath. Nevertheless, during the years 1815-1854, when ideas were being challenged throughout English society, the army looked the other way, a pitiful stance for soldiers to assume. It is vital for the military mind to be fully integrated with the social and intellectual milieu of the national community and the times. If not, it becomes separated from the mainstream of the nation's life, and thus, unprepared to absorb new ideas, it fails to adapt them to the military profession and so change with and not

²De Watteville, p. 152.
³Trevelyan, Social History, p. 549.
after the rest of society. The British army during the long peace was separated from its nation's society, and as an uninterested observer had no chance to change with it.

Some explanation can be found in the answer the army might have received to the query of modern professional armies: "Tell us for what purposes you keep an army," asks the soldier of the politician, "and we'll tell you what strength it should be and in what manner it should be trained." The British politicians after 1815 would likely have responded, "Well, none particularly, at the moment." Such was the plight of the British army.

The British were fortunate that they had no major war to fight during the period. Had they, army reform, of necessity, would have come earlier. Perhaps, they were also fortunate because the nineteenth century still permitted armies to enjoy the comfortable luxuries of the halcyon days that always follow war. In the years since World War II, the demand for a high degree of military readiness has begun a new era of peacetime military history, and if any lesson can be gleaned from this study, it is the danger in neglecting an army during a period of military and civilian unconcern. A current writer has said:

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4Turner, p. 136.
Whether a democratic government will have the foresight, the keen sensitiveness to national position and credit, the willingness to ensure its prosperity by the adequate outpouring of money in times of peace, all of which are necessary for military preparation, is yet an open question. Popular governments are not generally favorable to military expenditure, however necessary, and there are signs that England tends to drop behind.\(^5\)

Those signs have been posted for well over a century.

APPENDIX I

HEADQUARTERS STAFF¹

Disregarding the civil offices the field army commander maintained a headquarters staff comprised of the following officers:

1) The Adjutant General (issued all personnel orders)
2) The Quartermaster General (issued all other orders)
3) The Military Secretary (internal finances and officer appointments)
4) The Commissary General
5) The Commanding Officer of the Royal Artillery
6) The Engineer General
7) The Inspector General of Hospitals

¹Ward, pp. 33-34.
APPENDIX II

MILITARY HEADQUARTERS OFFICES

1) Secretary of State for Colonies and War
2) Commander in Chief
3) Secretary at War
4) Superintendent of Military Accounts
5) Board of General Officers
6) Commissary in Chief
7) Judge Advocate General
8) Army Medical Board
9) Commissioners of Barracks
10) Commissary General of Musters
11) Paymasters General (two)
12) Board of Ordnance
13) Commissioners of Chelsea Hospital

1Army Book, p. 88.
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Primary Works


Astute observations of a French journalist with no apparent ax to grind. Valuable for the personal descriptions of military facilities and conditions.

Sympathetic to both conservative principles and liberal progress and therefore a rather objective commentary on the period. Useful for political and social background.


Remarkably revealing of Wellington's consistently logical thinking over the span of half a century.


A Tory and therefore favorable critic of the army. Useful for political and social background.


Comments of a line officer who served twenty-one years with his regiment. The reader gains a personal feel of the "professional" officer after Waterloo.


A Whig and therefore unfavorable critic of the army. Good social and political commentary of the period.


An indictment of the army for severe unpreparedness. Though Mitchell is intensely critical of tactics, weapons and training he is immensely confident in the British soldier's natural and, in his opinion, superior ability.


Though Napier spent most of his life on the continent or in India, his letters reflect the attitudes of army officers toward those in high office.
Renders an acute insight into the mind and personality of the Duke of Wellington.

A reference for the officer during the period containing information about the internal workings of the army. Probably the best book a young officer could read on his "profession." Similar to today's Officers Guide.

The author's account of his own times provides valuable contemporary history. One of the more complete works on the long peace.

A dictionary of military terms, army regulations and information pertinent to the soldier and officer of the period. Most helpful to the student in understanding the terminology and military jargon of the day.

The Old Field Officer. 2 vols. Edinburgh: Adam and Charles Black, 1853.
A fictitious account of a battalion commander's career in the British army. Based on the author's experience, it reveals an interesting contrast between the way things were supposed to be and the way they were.

A Personal History of The Horse Guards from 1750 to 1872. London: Hurst and Blackett, Publishers, 1873.
Scattered account of the author's personal interests and experiences at the higher echelons of army staff.

Personal account of the Paris occupation and subsequent assignments in the Netherlands and Ireland. Helpful for the years immediately after Waterloo.

Invaluable for any student of the period.


Invaluable.


Although his letters are organized to glorify Burgoyne, they contain valuable commentary on both the army and civilian leaders of the times.

Secondary Works


Brief personal reflections on political development during the period by a Headmaster at Eton.


A chronological highlighting of the army to 1914. The statistics are helpful.


General survey of the army, its problems and changes since 1815.


Includes references to governmental and military patronage in the nineteenth century. Good background for organization and administration.


A study of the second great army reforms, and later results of the conditions described in this paper.
A study of the first great army reforms. A manifest result of the conditions described in this paper.

General survey of social and political background of the period.

A standard work, particularly helpful for details on organization and the constitutional position and power of military offices in the government.

Curtis, Edward E. *The Organization of the British Army in the American Revolution.* Yale University Press, 1926.
Good background for understanding the centralization of army organization that took place during the Napoleonic wars.

A chronicle of Graham's regiment and revealing of the officer's life after 1815.

A study of the first great army reforms with concentration on the organizational restructuring.

Excellent treatment of army organization and administration. Also contains helpful details on the soldier's pay and living conditions.

A standard work. Though tainted with the author's political bias, the detail and insight are invaluable.

*Introductory survey to highlights of British army history. Brief.*


*Essay on eighteenth century economic life. Good description of the soldier's station in English society.*


*Contrast and comparison of European and English nobilities. Connection between the army and the aristocratic classes and their power through influence and not hereditary right is made.*


*Explanation of high level organization and senior officer schooling.*


*Contains listings of significant offices and other statistical data.*


*Excellent treatment of the civilian dominated defense offices.*


*Brief explanation of staff organization.*


*A series of excellent essays on Wellington, his strengths and weaknesses and how they effected the British army after 1815.*


*Discussion of England's civil-military conflict from 1854-1920. References to the long peace are useful.*
Explanation of the modern British army staff.

Brief treatment of the Mutiny Acts and their constitutional significance to the army.

A representative selection of military writers on the changes of tactics and administration since 1815.

Brief comments on several of Napoleon's marshals. Descriptive, opinionated and somewhat useful for comparison.

The premier work on the Guards. Good detail up to 1832.

Contains valuable information on martial law and military punishments.

The most thorough account of Wellington's life after 1815.

Discussion of Parliament's actions that effected the army and the inevitable civil-military conflict that arose.

Statistical data.

General survey of the history of tactics, weapons and military strategy.


General survey. Good background.


Brief account of the significant battles and army commanders. Detail sparse.


Descriptive account of the upper echelons of army life during and after the Napoleonic wars.


Invaluable.


A survey of British power and influence. Sketchy for the period under study.


An excellent study of the attitude changes of the working peoples and aristocratic classes as influenced by the forces of technology, peace and religion.


General economic and social background of the period.


A general statement of an army's place and role in European societies. The author compares civilian and governmental attitudes towards armies of European countries with that of Great Britain.

A most thorough study and disclosure of the inception and formation of the modern standing army. Necessary for any student of British military history.


Comparison of the army under York in 1794 with that under Wellington in 1814. Staff detail is good.


Best one volume work on the soldier's life and habits.


Discussion of the offices and responsibilities of high level civilian and military leaders.


General social and political background.


A sound explanation but weak attempt at justification for the Crimean War.


Political and social background.

Periodicals

*The United Service Journal and Naval and Military Magazine.*

London: Henry Colburn, 1832 to 1855. (After 1844 the title is, *The United Service Magazine and Military and Naval Journal,* and after 1849, the publisher is H. Hurst or Hurst and Blackett, Publishers.)

The only regular publication concerned exclusively with military subjects during the period.