French diplomacy at the Congress of Vienna, 1814-1815

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FRENCH DIPLOMACY AT THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA
1814-1815

A Thesis
Presented to the
Department of History
and the
Graduate College
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In Partial Fulfillment
of the requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

by
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Accepted for the faculty of the College of Graduate Studies of the University of Omaha, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts.

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France, a defeated power in the middle of 1814, became a responsible first class power during the Congress of Vienna. French diplomacy, with Talleyrand as the chief negotiator for France, helped to re-create the European system. This paper will attempt to examine the French role at the Congress of Vienna and to illustrate how France was able to occupy again an important role in European diplomacy.

One word of explanation is necessary. I have chosen the Correspondence of Prince Talleyrand and Louis XVIII During the Congress of Vienna, edited by M. G. Fallain, for the letters during this period. Talleyrand's Memoirs, edited by the Duc de Broglie, contain essentially the same thing. Actually there were two lines of communications from Vienna to Paris. Talleyrand's letters to Louis XVIII contain gossip and stories about the participants which he thought would amuse Louis XVIII in addition to the important issues being discussed. Another line of communication was the official correspondence to the Foreign Ministry prepared by the other plenipotentiaries which contained only the official work of the committees at the Congress.
When writing a paper such as this, one is indebted to many people. It would be impossible for me to list all to whom I owe my deepest appreciation. However, there are a few I would like to name.

I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Ert J. Gum, for his helpfulness, his many long hours, and his unusual patience during the work on my thesis, but most of all, my deepest gratitude to Dr. Gum for the opportunity to work with someone who has helped me to have a greater appreciation of history and a better understanding of my subject. I would also like to express my gratitude to Dr. A. Stanley Trickett and the Graduate Faculty at Omaha University who provided many interesting hours and were always available for help. One cannot forget Miss Ella Jane Dougherty, Inter-Library Loan Librarian, whose helpfulness made the paper possible. Her readiness to locate books and to assist at all times were of great help to me. I would like to thank my mother who has always given me encouragement, and my husband, Steve, who was always encouraging and ready to assist. Nevertheless, any mistakes in fact or interpretation are entirely my own.
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CHAPTER I

THE RESTORATION

The French Revolution unleashed two powerful forces which can be compared to two parallel lines: each a thread which was a part of the Revolution; each never meeting; and in the end, each having a different effect. The Revolution secularized western civilization and spread the ideas of liberty and justice to western Europe and America. It destroyed the wealth and political power of the Catholic Church, allowing the Church to concentrate on a spiritual role instead. On the other hand, the Revolution legitimized dictatorship, conscription, and total war, in short, chaos and panic.¹

Napoleon's defeat in 1814 and the dissolution of the Napoleonic Empire brought the need to reestablish the European system and to redistribute the former Napoleonic possessions. The statesmen assembled in 1814 at the Congress of Vienna had the task of creating a new European system, one which would not allow the establishment of one

preponderant power such as France had been, to occur again. Not by any means perfect, the Congress of Vienna enabled European statesmen to check the liabilities of the Revolution and to enjoy a period in which they could maintain stability and order.\(^2\) The Congress allowed some of the principles of the Revolution to emerge. The latent energies and new ideas unleashed by the Revolution could not be halted. However, the Congress also provided a system to minimize and restrain the Revolutionary spirit.\(^3\) Most important of all, the system created by the Congress of Vienna checked and localized war. For one hundred years the tenuous strings that formed the foundation of the European system were able to hold the panic in check. Not until 1914 did they break.\(^4\)

The Congress, in establishing an order which guaranteed peace among nations and legitimate governments, dealt with a fundamental problem of nations: that of the distribution of power.\(^5\) Talleyrand, as head of the French delegation to the Congress of Vienna, understood best, perhaps, the problem of constructing a new order to

\(^2\)Ibid., 334-38.
\(^3\)Ibid., 335-37.
\(^4\)Ibid., 336-38.
\(^5\)Ibid., 341-42.
replace the general chaos of revolutionary Europe, and by his diplomatic skill gained a place for France at the Congress which other European statesmen had sought to deny her. Using the principle of legitimacy, Talleyrand worked for the reestablishment of a balance of power. The stability and maintenance of such a balance thus became the cornerstone of French foreign policy; and Talleyrand, a longtime advocate of the balance of power theory, intended to make it the cornerstone of the European system. The most important element in securing the establishment of such a balance was his influence on Robert Stewart, Viscount Castlereagh, British Foreign Minister, and Prince Clement Wenceslaus Lothaire Nepomucène Metternich, Chancellor of Austria, which led to the negotiation of a secret treaty signed on 3 January 1815, against Prussia and Russia. The treaty provided for concerted Austrian, British, and French military action in the event Prussia and Russia demanded enough of the spoils of war to destroy, in effect, a balance before it was created. A close

6 Ibid., 344-45.


examination of Talleyrand's instructions for the French representatives at the Congress shows the importance he gave to the establishment of an equilibrium and the inter-relationship between legitimacy and the balance of power as he saw it. Legitimacy was the means by which the greater principle of balance could be obtained. 9

France, in 1812, was the predominant power in Europe. The Napoleonic Empire extended from the Baltic to the Mediterranean, from the Atlantic to the Vistula, and within France itself was a compact centralized state with able leaders and an army of more than 600,000. 10 The preponderance of one power was a threat to the balance of power system which sought to prevent one state becoming "... so powerful as to be able to coerce all the rest

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put together. The theory itself implied a system of independent states, relative homogeneity, and some rational system of estimating power. Its aims were the survival of the independent states and the prevention of any one state gaining a predominance so as to destroy the system. To achieve these ends vigilance, alliances, mobilization, reciprocal compensation, intervention, and the coalition were used. The balance of power theorists did not insist on equality of forces. In fact Talleyrand said that absolute equality was not possible and, in some cases, would be harmful.

Before examining the French role in helping to establish an equilibrium at the Congress of Vienna, an investigation of the alliances, treaties, and the Restoration must be made for a better understanding of the French policies as well as those of England, Russia, Austria, and Prussia.

The Restoration

With the Treaty of Chaumont, the restoration of the European balance of power became the main objective of the

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12 Gulick, Balance of Power, 3-91 gives a very thorough treatment of the theory.

13 Broglie, Memoirs, II, 173.
coalition.\textsuperscript{14} Prior to Chaumont, the Allies did not have a unified coalition. The treaties of Toeplitz, in September and October of 1813, mentioned unofficially the establishment of an equilibrium among the states, and hereafter this became the chief aim of the coalition. The 3 October treaty of Toeplitz officially linked Austria and England to Prussia and Russia, filling an important gap in the coalition.\textsuperscript{15} However Castlereagh wanted changes in the coalition; and since there were many treaties, he desired a unified effort against France. Castlereagh's plans for a permanent settlement called the Project of a Treaty Alliance Offensive and Defensive Against\textsuperscript{15} and the Project of Secret Articles outlined the proposals for a European equilibrium.\textsuperscript{16} The Project of a Treaty Alliance \ldots provided for a permanent coalition of the Allies with no separate peace, and the Project of Secret Articles outlined specific territorial

\textsuperscript{14}Gulick, Balance of Power, 301.

\textsuperscript{15}Ibid., 127-31.

arrangements that would be made. The Project of Secret Articles called for the dissolution of the Duchy of Warsaw and the Confederation of the Rhine; the independence of Germany; the separation of Holland from France; and the restoration of the Spanish Bourbons, the House of Hanover, and the Kingdom of Naples. It also contained a plan by which Sweden would receive Norway; the arrangements which would keep France out of Italy; and the establishment of Austria, Spain, Prussia, and Portugal as barriers to maintain the equilibrium. Metternich and Alexander I both showed support for a united alliance, and Castlereagh acquiesced to their wishes for a four power treaty instead of eight as Castlereagh had proposed. Prussia indicated a willingness to proceed with negotiations without Austria and Russia, but this would have been useless for it would have added to the existing alliances instead of creating a unified coalition. Castlereagh, at this time, was not able to secure a general agreement since both Russia and Austria wanted British concessions regarding colonies and subsidies which he knew Parliament would not approve.

The so-called Frankfort Proposals made by Metternich were another impediment to Castlereagh's projects.

17 Ibid.
18 Gulick, Balance of Power, 136.
19 Ibid., 136-37; Webster, British Diplomacy, Letter XXVII, Castlereagh to Cathcart, 30 November 1814, 45.
Metternich, in November of 1813, wanted negotiations with Napoleon for a settlement. Metternich offered Napoleon the natural frontiers of France and inferred that the British would make colonial concessions. Prince Charles August von Hardenburg, Chancellor of Prussia, and Baron Wilhelm von Humboldt, assistant to Hardenburg since the latter was almost totally deaf, agreed; and the British representative, Lord Aberdeen, who did not understand French well, gave his consent.\(^{20}\) The offer of the left bank of the Rhine was not part of the British plan, since it would have left Napoleon in possession of the southwest half of the Rhenish Provinces which contained Antwerp on the Scheldt; and Castlereagh, on hearing about the offer, instructed Aberdeen to make a formal protest.\(^{21}\) Nothing came of the Frankfort Proposals except the evidence of a change in Napoleon's tone. He did not accept the balance of power theory; but he, at least, gave it lip-service.


\(^{21}\) Webster, British Diplomacy, Letter LXVI, Castle- reagh to Aberdeen, 7 December 1813, 116-17. For all correspondence concerning these proposals see Webster, British Diplomacy, Letters LXI-LXXIX, 107-20. Aberdeen thought that he had stated the British position to Saint Aignan, French minister at Weimar who had been imprisoned.
during subsequent negotiations to be held by the Allies at Châtillon-sur-Seine.\textsuperscript{22}

Before the Conference of Châtillon-sur-Seine met, Castlereagh left for the Continent. He brought with him a Memorandum of the Cabinet of 26 December 1813, which was the text of the English instructions.\textsuperscript{23} In these instructions, Castlereagh sought recognition of English interests on the Continent. He wanted France excluded from naval activity on the Scheldt, Holland strengthened against France, an alliance which would have provisions for mutual support for the powers previously attacked by France, complete freedom for Spain and Portugal, and he said that England would use her extensive colonial gains as bargaining tools.\textsuperscript{24} The Memorandum on the Maritime

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\textsuperscript{22}Dulick, Balance of Power, 139-40.

\textsuperscript{23}Webster, British Diplomacy, Letter LXX, Memorandum of Cabinet, 26 December 1813, 123-28. This gives the text of the Instructions; also, Pitt's Draft to Varontsov, Appendix I, 389-94. Additional material may be found in Charles Kingsley Webster, The Congress of Vienna 1814-15 (London: O. Bell and Sons, Ltd., 1950), 14-19. Hereafter cited as Webster, Congress of Vienna. See also Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 193-97.

\textsuperscript{24}Webster, British Diplomacy, Letter LXX, Memorandum of Cabinet, 26 December 1813, 125-26; Webster, Congress of Vienna, 15-16. Britain was prepared to bargain with colonial conquests except Malta, Mauritius, the Cape, Bourbon, Les Saintes, and Guadeloupe were to remain British. If France refused to give Holland a barrier then Britain would not give France concessions. See also Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 196.
Peace which was closely related, though not of the same date, sought the establishment of a maritime balance of power. It is important to note that Castlereagh's instructions provided for an alliance that was to continue after the war and not merely one created for the present situation.

Castlereagh felt the need to confer with the Allies previous to holding the Conference with Napoleon's representative and met the Allied ministers at Langres. Great Britain disposed of some of the misunderstandings that had taken place during the Frankfort Proposals; and on 29 January 1814, the Allies issued the so-called Langres Protocol which provided the basis of the Allied agreement for negotiations with Napoleon and suggested terms for the negotiations. Metternich drafted the instructions which gave France her 1792 limits, offered France no part in

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25 Webster, British Diplomacy, Letter LXX, Memorandum of Cabinet, 26 December 1813, 125-28; Webster, Congress of Vienna, 18. The British would restore French colonies if France were reduced to her 1792 limits.

26 Gulick, Balance of Power, 141-42; Webster, Congress of Vienna, 17-18.

27 Webster, Congress of Vienna, 19-24; Gulick, Balance of Power, 146-47; Webster, British Diplomacy, Letter LXXVIII, Castlereagh to Liverpool, 29 January 1814, 141-44; Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 205-06.

28 Ibid.
the reconstruction of Europe, proposed a sovereign and confederated Germany, divided Italy into several independent states, restored Spain to the Bourbons, and proposed an enlarged and independent Holland.29

The Conference at Châtillon which began in February of 1814 was ineffective and gained nothing for the Allies. Military operations continued while the Congress was in session, and the deliberations fluctuated because of victory or defeat for either side. The Conference may be divided conveniently into three phases. The Allies had been victorious at Rothière on 1 February, and during the first period 5-10 February offered France her 1792 boundaries on 7 February.30 Armand Augustine Louis, Marquis de Caulaincourt, the French representative, using the Frankfort proposals as the basis for the French cause, now found the 1792 limits offered.31 During the second phase, 10-17 February, the French victories at Chalmpeaubert, Montmirail, and Château Thierry on 10-12 February changed Napoleon's instructions accepting the offer, and he refused the proposals


30Nicholson, Congress of Vienna, 24-25.

31Gulick, Balance of Power, 147.
for the ancient limits.\textsuperscript{32} The French victories brought the Allies to Troyes, and the subsequent treaty called the bases de Troyes, offered France her boundaries of 1792, sovereignty and independence for all states, and a confederation for Germany. It also made proposals for the transferal of Holland with additional territory to the House of Orange, for a free Switzerland with a guarantee of independence by the Powers, and for the return of the Bourbons to the Spanish throne. The Allies sent these proposals to the French on 17 February; and, thus, concluded the second phase.\textsuperscript{33}

Before Napoleon's reply arrived, there was evidence of internal disagreement among the Allies. Metternich and Alexander I distrusted each other and almost broke up the discussions at Châlillon.\textsuperscript{34} The third and final phase brought the French answer, sent on 10 March, in the form of a memorandum by la Besnardièrè, Counselor of State to Caulaincourt, which argued that the Allies planned for their own aggrandizement and offered France only her ancient boundaries. The memorandum fell on

\textsuperscript{32}Ibid., 147-50.

\textsuperscript{33}Ibid., 148-50.

\textsuperscript{34}Webster, British Diplomacy, Letter LXXXV, Castle-reagh to Liverpool, 26 February 1814, 160. See also Gulick, Balance of Power, 149-50; Webster, Congress of Vienna, 28-30.
deaf ears, and the Allies refused to answer Napoleon's counterproposals. On 19 March 1814, the Congress adjourned.\footnote{Gulick, Balance of Power, 159-60.}

Learning the position of the Allies had been one of Talleyrand's major problems. In March of 1814, Eugène d'Arnauld, Baron de Vitrolles arrived at Allied headquarters with instructions to determine if the Allies would continue to negotiate with Napoleon, to find out if they (the Allies) would impose a government on the French or allow the French to choose their own, and to discover what the Allies were doing.\footnote{Broglie, Memoirs, II, 111-13.} Talleyrand said that he did not know the Baron de Vitrolles but recognized him as the author of a pamphlet and thought that he was trustworthy since he was a friend of Comte de Faucon Nicholas Mollien and Alexandre-Maurice Blane de Lanautte d'Hauterive. Vitrolles arrived on 10 March 1814, the day Napoleon's reply to the Allied proposals of 17 February was due. Caulaincourt delayed discussions and presented Napoleon's counteroffer on 15 March. Vitrolles' message to the Allies was written in invisible ink and said, "You are walking on crutches. Make use of your legs and be willing to do what you can."\footnote{Ibid., 112. See also Broglie, Memoirs, II, Appendix I, 186-89, which gives the text of Vitrolles' instructions.} Vitrolles
had conversations with Metternich, Alexander, and Castlereagh and did not find them openly encouraging at that time. Metternich said that Napoleon was the head of the French government, and that the Allies would deal with him. As to the future government of France, the Allies would accept the Government that the French people chose. Alexander favored the establishment of Prince Bernadotte or Eugène de Beauharnais as an executive head for a government, but Castlereagh favored the Bourbons and added that the English people would not accept either Beauharnais or Bernadotte.\(^{38}\) Talleyrand realized that the Allies could succeed only if they broke negotiations with Napoleon. Understanding what the Allies failed to understand, Talleyrand was convinced that dealing with a government based not on the laws of nations, but force, would bring more war.\(^{39}\)

The Bourbons, Talleyrand thought, would be the most advantageous solution for France since peace with Napoleon would be dangerous, and a regency under Marie Louise would

\(^{38}\)Ferrero, *Reconstruction of Europe*, 66-67. See also Broglie, *Memoirs*, II, 113-15 and Brinton, *Lives*, 157-59. Brinton says the Allies were encouraging; Ferrero says the meeting was a failure. See also Webster, *British Diplomacy*, Letter XCIII, Castlereagh to Liverpool, 22 March 1814, 168-70 and Webster, *Foreign Policy of Castlereagh*, 241-42.

be too weak and a possibility only if Napoleon were dead. The Bourbons were the only ones who could compensate the French for their defeats, remove the foreign troops, and under the Bourbons, France would "... not be gigantic but great." It was strange, Talleyrand wrote, that the people of Europe were not against the usurpation but the usurper. Usurpation was the worst thing for Europe, and Europe should do away with usurpation and give sanction to legitimacy. Legitimacy would be the "safeguard of all nations," not just monarchy, but all lawful governments. Legitimacy stems from "... the ancient status of possession." Different consequences occurred after the violation of legitimacy. A hereditary monarchy must die out if there was usurpation. In a republic the institutions had to be destroyed. 

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41Broglie, Memoirs, II, 116-17.

42Ibid., 117-18.
could not be restored, but the monarchy could, by calling the legitimate sovereign to the throne. Talleyrand said that Napoleon realized this when he said that only the Bourbons could accept a peace on the old limits. Napoleon's statement to the French was, "Seek another ruler I am too great for you!"  

The Allies, at this time, were completing their plans for the remainder of the war. Even before the dissolution of the Conference of Châtillon, the Allied ministers met on 9 March 1814, at Chaumont, located on the Marne, and signed the Treaty of Chaumont. By that treaty the Allies pledged to continue the war until they achieved their objectives and to strive for "... reestablishment of a just equilibrium." Castlereagh, Hardenberg, Charles Robert von Nesselrode (Foreign Minister of Alexander I), and Metternich each pledged 150,000 men for the army and promised the continuation of the coalition for twenty years. England would pay an additional £500,000 for the support of the troops. Therefore, in men and supplies Great Britain's contribution would be double that of any other.

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44 Gulick, Balance of Power, 151.
The secret articles reaffirmed the previous arrangements concerning Germany, Switzerland, Italy, Spain, and Holland; and invited Spain, Portugal, and Holland to agree to the treaty. The Allies also pledged that the armies would be kept in the field for one year after the cessation of hostilities. This coalition represented nothing new from a military standpoint. The new feature was the equilibrium guarantee by which the coalition promised to maintain itself after the war and to safeguard the balance of power.

The coalition with 600,000 men was double the size of Napoleon's armies. The military victories achieved by the French during the Conference of Châtillon

Ibid., 151-52; Webster, Congress of Vienna, 31-32; Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 227-28.

Webster, British Diplomacy, Letter LXXXIX, 31-32; Castlereagh to Liverpool, 10 March 1814, 165; Gulick, Balance of Power, 151-52; Webster, Congress of Vienna 31-32. For the text of the secret articles see Jakob Leonhard Boryko Chodzko Comte d'Angeberg, Le Congrès de Vienne et les traités de 1815 (4 vols.; Paris: Amyot, Éditeur des archives diplomatiques, 1864), II, 120. Hereafter cited as d'Angeberg, Congrès de Vienne. See Also Gulick, Balance of Power, 153-55 for Articles V thru XVI.

Gulick, Balance of Power, 155-56.

Webster, British Diplomacy, Letter LXXXIV, Castlereagh to Metternich, 18 February 1814, 159.

Gulick, Balance of Power, 161.
Allies entered France late in March of 1814. During the last week of March, 1814, the Allies avoided Napoleon and marched toward Paris. They occupied the city on 31 March 1814. With the Allies at Paris and Napoleon at Fontainbleau, Talleyrand, not knowing if Louis XVIII supported him or not, undertook the most decisive step in his career, one which ended in twenty-four hours the war which had lasted twenty-five years.

Virtually a prisoner in his own palace, Talleyrand could do nothing while the Allies still considered making peace with Napoleon. Talleyrand said that the French people wanted the benefits of the Revolution, but Napoleon put his own despotic will above the people and pushed the political system to the top, forcing the people to seek peace outside the system. In 1807, he said, Napoleon could have established an equilibrium. Talleyrand wrote, "That man was endowed with very great intellectual forces, but he has not understood veritable glory." With the Russian campaign of 1812, Talleyrand saw the future of the "vanquished usurpers." He thought that
Napoleon could have had an advantageous peace at Prague in 1813, and even the offer made at Châlillon would have been beneficial for France. Not revealing his plans, Talleyrand was in contact with those not connected with the Empire. He had contacts with Baron Joseph-Dominique Louis, the financier of the Restoration; Moninique de Lourt, L'abbé de Pradt; and the Duc Emmerich de Dalberg, a nobleman from south Germany who had acquired a dukedom from Napoleon. He also had contacts with the Bourbons through his uncle, the Archbishop at Rheims, and with Hartwell House, the court of Louis XVIII; but Napoleon's informers watched Talleyrand closely. Talleyrand, as late as 20 March 1814, considered three possibilities: a peace with Napoleon, the Bourbons, or a regency under Marie Louise. He knew of the conversations of Czar Alexander I with the Grand Duchess Stephanie of Baden and also of Alexander I's desires for either Bernadotte or Eugène de Beauharnais to be ruler of France.

55Ibid., 103-05.
57Broglie, Memoirs, II, 101-03.
58At a meeting with Baron Louis, M. de Pradt and M. de Dalberg in Talleyrand’s house, the Minister of general police accused Talleyrand of conspiracy.
Talleyrand was also aware of Joseph Fouché's plot with Queen Caroline, the wife of Murat; (Joachim, King of Naples) and from English sources, he knew that the Duc de Angoulême was at the Duke of Wellington's headquarters and that the Comte d' Artois was in Switzerland on the French border. It was then that he had sent the message with Baron Vitrolles to sound out the Allies. However, the Allies did not have a unified plan for the government of France; and until they stopped negotiations with Napoleon, Talleyrand had to delay any plans he might have.

The Allies, divided in their opinions, considered various proposals for the future government of France. Castlereagh supported the possibility of a Bourbon restoration as early as January, 1814; Metternich, as late as the Conference of Châtillon, still considered Napoleon a possibility, and Alexander I favored a third possibility, the establishment of Bernadotte on the throne of France. Convinced of the feasibility of restoring the Bourbons, Castlereagh gained Metternich's

60 Ibid., 111-12.
support but Alexander, still supporting Bernadotte, gave his consent only if the people of France indicated they wanted the Bourbons. 62

Waiting for some indication of French desires, the Allies received the news they wanted. The city of Bordeaux had raised the royal standard on 12 March 1814. 63 The Allied sovereigns, on 26 March, at dinner in Dijon, in their only overt act, toasted Louis XVIII. 64

With the news of the royal support from the town of Bordeaux, the failure of the negotiations at Châtillon, and the Allied advance on Paris, Talleyrand could carry out his plans for the restoration of the Bourbons. 65 He defied Napoleon's orders and remained in Paris. 66


63 Gulick, Balance of Power, 167. See also Webster, British Diplomacy, Letter XCV, Bathurst to Castlereagh, 22 March 1814, 171-72.

64 Nicholson, Congress of Vienna, 89-90; Gulick, Balance of Power, 167; Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, Footnote No. 7, 91-92.

65 Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 71-73.

66 Ibid., 77. For an interesting account of Talleyrand's actions see Nicholson, Congress of Vienna, 84; Brinton, Lives, 159-60. Talleyrand was to leave Paris
On 30 March 1814, Talleyrand gave Count Orloff, one of the Russian emissaries, a message conveying his respects to Alexander I; and on 31 March, Nesselrode brought Talleyrand a message from Czar Alexander I, arranging a meeting in the afternoon. Hearing rumors that the Elysée Palace was mined, Nesselrode accepted Talleyrand's invitation for the Czar to stay with him. Alexander I arrived in Paris on the 31st of March and established himself in Talleyrand's house. The same afternoon Alexander I, the King of Prussia, Nesselrode, General Pozzo di Borgo, Dalberg, Talleyrand and others met and discussed the future government of France. Talleyrand convinced Alexander I that a legitimate government would be the best for France; and although the Allies could not establish for France a new dynasty, the Bourbons could be restored and Napoleon's own senate would call for the return of Louis XVIII. Alexander I signed a declaration written by Nesselrode, with Marie Louise and her son. By providing himself with an excuse for not going, he was in a safe position. His friend M. de Remusat, Commander of the National Guard, stopped Talleyrand at the gates of the city. According to a pre-arranged plan, Remusat created a disturbance so it would be necessary for Talleyrand to stay.

67 Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 74-80.
68 Nicholson, Congress of Vienna, 84.
69 Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 81-82. See also Saint-Aulaise, Talleyrand, 207-12; Broglie, Memoirs, II, 121-24; Gulick, Balance of Power, 161-65.
Dalberg, Talleyrand, and others which declared that the Allies would no longer make peace with Napoleon and that the French would have a new constitution. The Allies wanted some indication of French desires for a government, and the French, through Talleyrand’s manipulations, soon revealed their choice.

Events now moved with amazing speed. Talleyrand convened the senate on 1 April (63 out of 140 were present), and secured their approval for the establishment of a provisional government. Talleyrand was chosen president; and Bouronville, Jaucourt, Dalberg, and the Abbé de Montesquieu were the other members of the provisional government. The provisional government had as its task the drafting of the constitution and carrying out the present administration. The senate on 2 April, deposed Napoleon and on 6 April, approved the Charter calling Louis XVIII to the throne of France. Marshal Auguste Marmont, Duke of Ragusa, to whom Napoleon had given the defense of Paris, joined the provisional government on 4 April, and, thus terminated any chance of success for Napoleon if he attempted to drive the Allies out of Paris. Napoleon, at Fontainbleau, sent

70Guillick, Balance of Power, 168; Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 90-91.

71Duff Cooper, Talleyrand (London: Jonathan Cape, 1954), 224-25; 227. Talleyrand said the Bourbons needed the support of the army.
Marshal Michel Ney; Caulaincourt; and Marshall Etienne-Jacques Joseph Alexandre MacDonald, Duke of Taranto, to Alexander with his offer of abdication in favor of Marie Louise and his son. The delegation arrived on 5 April; and Talleyrand, knowing that Alexander would be sympathetic to Napoleon, delayed sending a letter calling the Comte d’Artois to Paris until the Czar reached a decision. Alexander, willing to accept Napoleon’s offer, changed his mind after hearing the news of Marmont’s defection and after talking with Talleyrand. Talleyrand, in his discussions with the Czar, denounced Napoleon’s offer and persuaded Alexander I that the Bourbons would be the best choice for France. Napoleon, his offer rejected, abdicated on 6 April 1814 (the same day the senate called Louis XVIII to the throne of France); and on 11 April 1814, he signed the Treaty of Fontainebleau. The Count d’Artois as Lieutenant General entered Paris on 12 April 1814. He assumed and exercised power until May when Louis XVIII arrived.

The important decisions concerning the Restoration were, in fact, worked out in Paris on 30 and 31 March 1814. Talleyrand, by his meeting with Alexander on 31 March, played a vital part in the Bourbon Restoration, since

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72Oulick, Balance of Power, 167-70; Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 92-93; Saint-Aulaire, Talleyrand, 214-30; Nicholson, Congress of Vienna, 84-97; Erinton, Lives, 161-62; Broglio, Memoirs, II, 121-28; Cooper, Talleyrand, 226-31; Webster, Foreign Policy of Castle-reagh, 244-52.
Allied policy, though supporting the possibility of the Bourbon restoration, had not been decided at this time. To Castlereagh belongs either credit or blame for the Bourbon restoration since he convinced Metternich using the balance of power argument. The Bourbons, Castlereagh thought, would be the best for France since they would be weak and would be unable to upset the balance once it was established. Alexander leaning more toward a condition of Russian preponderance was steered away by Metternich, Castlereagh, and Pozzo di Borgo, his own advisor. Talleyrand, by remaining in Paris, became the chief executor of the policy. His adherence to the balance of power theory is plainly seen.

The Restoration, Talleyrand realized, would allow France her ancient limits, eliminate "French dynamism," 91-92. For another analysis see Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 243, who says that the Allies decided on the Bourbons at Dijon and Gulick, Balance of Power, 168, who says that Talleyrand carried out a policy which had already been decided.

Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 233-34; British Diplomacy, Letter LXXV, Castlereagh to Liverpool, 22 January 1814, 136-37; Letter LXXVI; Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 233-34; British Diplomacy, Letter LXXV, Castlereagh to Liverpool, 22 January 1814, 136-37; Letter LXXVI, Castlereagh to Liverpool, 22 January 1814, 137-38; Letter LXXVII, Castlereagh to Liverpool, 29 January 1814, 138-40.

Gulick, Balance of Power, 170-71.

Ibid., 171. See Knapton, "Some Aspects," who says that the Bourbon restoration was caused more by a coincidence of events than anything done by Talleyrand.
and establish a stable government. The most important result would be the elimination of French dynamism. The Revolution had unleashed new energies which before had been denied expression. Talleyrand understood the need for France to suppress some of these energies so that France could fit into a larger spectrum, that of a European state system.77

Even before negotiations for the formal treaty began, Talleyrand, to the advantage of France, had succeeded in making the government of Louis XVIII secure. As head of the provisional government, he signed a preliminary peace with the Allies on 23 April 1814. By the preliminaries, all hostilities ceased. France promised to evacuate all fortresses beyond her 1792 boundaries, and the Allies promised to abandon all French territory. The preliminaries included arrangements for an exchange of prisoners and plans for a formal peace settlement.78

Talleyrand, as Foreign Minister of France in the new government of Louis XVIII, had the task of making a treaty with the Allies, which was, in effect, the task of giving

77Gulick, Balance of Power, 172-73.

78Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 101-02; Gulick, Balance of Power, 173; Broglie, Memoirs, II, 129-35; Webster, British Diplomacy, Letter XVIII, Castlereagh to Liverpool, 19 April 1814, 177-78; Webster, Congress of Vienna, 40.
half of Europe new governments. Castlereagh wanted the settlement free of any cause for suspicion and desired that the Allies follow a liberal line. Very little record is left of the discussions, but there is some evidence that Russia and Prussia prevented a settlement on the European territorial arrangements because of their demands. Consequently, since the Allies could not agree, very little of the European settlement to be made appeared in the First Treaty of Paris. Hardenberg had drafted a document outlining the Prussian demands which would have given Prussia a large share in the territorial arrangements. Alexander had made even more exorbitant demands, and the discussions ended without any decision. The Allies concentrated on making peace with France and delayed any decisions about future territorial arrangements. Castlereagh followed a liberal policy toward France concerning the French boundary.

79 Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 108.

80 Webster, British Diplomacy, Letter XCVIII, Castlereagh to Liverpool, 19 April 1814, 177-78.

81 Gulick, Balance of Power, 174; Webster, Congress of Vienna, 42-44 gives a summary of the proposals made during this time.


83 Gulick, Balance of Power, 174; Webster, Congress of Vienna, 44.
increases beyond the 1792 frontiers, the question of monetary indemnity, and the stolen art works. However, he resented Talleyrand's attempt to avoid mentioning the abolition of the slave trade. Castlereagh refused to allow France any increase in territory on the Belgian frontier or possession of St. Lucia and Tobago. The Allies on 30 May 1814, signed the First Peace of Paris.

The First Peace of Paris was a generous and moderate document. France retained her 1792 boundaries with some minor adjustments which allowed her to keep some of her revolutionary conquests, including territory on both sides of the Meuse and part of western Savoy. The main articles of the treaty stipulated that navigation on the Rhine would be free; Holland would be placed under the House of Orange, and her size increased; the German states would be federated and free; Switzerland would be independent; Italy would be controlled, in part, by Austria, and the remainder would be independent states; France would receive her colonies which had been seized during the war, although Tobago, St. Lucia, the Cape, Mauritius

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84 Webser, Congress of Vienna, 41; Webster, British Diplomacy, Letter CV, Castlereagh to Liverpool, 19 May 1814, 183-85; Gulick, Balance of Power, 174; Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 265-72.

85 Webster, British Diplomacy, Letter CV, Castlereagh to Liverpool, 23 May 1814, 185-86; Webster, Congress of Vienna, 42.
and Malta would go to Great Britain, and Santo Domingo
would be returned to Spain; and within two months all
powers on either side in the war would send delegates to
Vienna for completion of the Treaty. France did not pay
a war indemnity, and she kept the art treasures Napoleon
had brought to Paris during the war. The secret articles
were an important part of the peace settlement. The first
article provided that the Congress would make arrangements
"... to establish a real and permanent balance ..." and
that the lands taken from France would be disposed "... in
accordance with the principles agreed upon by the Allied
powers ..." Talleyrand consented to, but did not
sign the secret articles. The other secret articles out-
lined some of the territorial arrangements. Holland would
have most of the Austrian Netherlands, so she would be
strong enough to maintain her independence; the navigation
of the Scheldt would be free; and the German lands on the

86 Nicholson, Congress of Vienna, 100-101; Ferrero,
Reconstruction of Europe, 116-14; Gulick, Balance of
Power, 175-76; Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh,
272-76; Sir Edward Hertslet, The Map of Europe by Treaty
(4 vols.; London: Butterworths, 1875), I, 1-28. Here-
after cited as Hertslet, Map of Europe. See also Broglie,
Memoirs, II, 135-48; Saint-Aulaires, Talleyrand, 24-41.

87 Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 116. This
article was used later in an attempt to exclude France
from the deliberations of the Congress. See also
Gulick, Balance of Power, 176; Broglie, Memoirs, II,
150-51.
left bank of the Rhine would be used for Holland and as compensation to Prussia and Germany.88

The First Treaty of Paris is one of the best examples of the balance of power concept. Both the conqueror and the conquered established a peace based on moderation, one which did not exclude France from the European system. Talleyrand, by signing the First Peace of Paris, accepted, for France, the basis which would determine a larger European settlement, and placed himself in a position to have some influence on future negotiations. The Allies, by being lenient, destroyed the chaos and distrust that follow defeat and gave some stability, instead of resentment, to the new government.89

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88Gulick, Balance of Power, 176-77; see Broglie, Memoirs, II, 148-49.

89Gulick, Balance of Power, 177-79. For other references to the Peace of Paris see Brinton, Talleyrand, 162-65; Cooper, Talleyrand, 237; Broglie, Memoirs, II, 150-51.
CHAPTER II

PRELUDE TO VIENNA

Castlereagh extended invitations to the three other Allied powers to visit England after the completion of the First Peace of Paris. During the summer of 1814, Austria, Russia and Prussia accepted Castlereagh's invitation. Earlier in Paris the Allies had attempted to form some kind of agreement for the distribution of the European territory. However, these attempts were futile and the Treaty of 30 May contained very little of the proposed arrangements. Castlereagh hoped that the meetings in England would produce some agreements on the European settlement to be made in Vienna. In London a general agreement was not reached for the Czar was adamant in his demands for Poland, and he alienated the British by his actions; he snubbed the Prince Regent and cultivated the opposition. Metternich, of whom the British had been suspicious at first, emerged in a more favorable light. The only arrangements they accomplished were the postponement of the Congress until 1 October, and the transferal of the administration of Belgium to the House of Orange. The statesmen returned home to engage
in domestic problems and to gain support for their own private plans for the distribution of territory.¹

Talleyrand, during this time, prepared the Instructions for the King's Ambassadors to the Congress, a document which outlined French policy.² This thorough balance of power paper, drafted by Jean-Baptiste de Gouyla Basnardièrè, outlined Talleyrand's concept of the balance of power and explained the basic principles which the French delegation at the Congress should use as a guide.³

Talleyrand, a long time advocate of the balance of power, in 1792 had proposed a foreign policy for the Revolution in his Memoirs on the Present Relations of France with the Other States of Europe. In the Memoir of 1792, Talleyrand wrote that France should abandon all thoughts of aggrandizement and remain within her own borders. Usurpation of power and territorial aggrandizement accomplished under an arbitrary government would, he thought, subordinate the safety and happiness of the governed to the capriciousness of those who govern.

¹Gulick, Balance of Power, 180-83; Webster, Congress of Vienna, 46-51; Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 120-37.

²Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 139.

³Gulick, Balance of Power, 127-29. See Webster, Congress of Vienna, 51 who says that Talleyrand based the settlement on the principle of legitimacy. The statement is misleading. The principle of legitimacy was the vehicle for the greater principle, balance of power.
France, he said, should sign mutual defensive alliances with small powers and later, with the same powers, alliances of friendship to provide a common defense. Talleyrand condemned the pre-Revolutionary wars and offered an alternative, improvement of the state within its own territories.4

Even when serving under the Revolutionary regime which disavowed his proposals, Talleyrand still suggested and supported the principle of balance. It is evident in his note to the Directory after the signing of the Treaty of Campo Formio. He said then that the Treaty of Campo Formio and every other treaty signed were military capitulations, and that regimes based on force could never succeed for the hatred generated by war lived on. This was the key which revealed why the Revolutionary wars would, in the end, be unsuccessful. Though his ideas received no acceptance, Talleyrand served the Revolution for ten years under the Directory, the Consulate, and the Empire as the foreign minister who disagreed with the foreign policy of the Directory and as a counterrevolutionary whose new role in the Consulate and the Empire was not in accordance with his views.5

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4Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 18-20.
5Ibid., 22-23.
He remained a contradiction while serving the Empire; and, yet, after examining his writings, the same principles emerge. He urged Napoleon, in 1807, to restore the equilibrium of Europe, to remove Austria from Italy and to compensate Austria in the east. In his report preceding the Continental Blockade, Talleyrand reminded Napoleon of the fundamental law of nations and at Erfurt, he encouraged Alexander I to resist Napoleon's demands to disarm Austria. Talleyrand, then, realized that the Empire which seemed so solidly built contained the seeds of ruin. In his reading, he had studied the writings of the philosophers and jurists on the laws of nations and understood the futile results of usurpation. To keep the benefits of the Revolution and to diminish the destructive forces within it were his policy and explain his reluctance to adhere to the mistakes of the Revolution, Campo Formio, Pressburg, the Continental Blockade, the Treaty of Tilsit and the Congress of Erfurt.

The Congress, Talleyrand said, should decide which countries were to send plenipotentiaries, what subjects were to be discussed, how the votes were to be taken,

6Broglie, Memoirs, II, 97-98; Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 26.


8Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 31-45; Brinton, Lives, 101-04.
and what the forms of decision and execution were to be. Article XXXII of the First Treaty of Paris called for a general assembly of all powers engaged in the war. France did not want to exclude the small states. States such as those of Germany were the smallest; and because the German states wanted to form a Confederation, it was impossible to exclude them. Their interests and the mutual desire to preserve their existence gave France and the small states a mutual understanding, and France would not support any move to exclude them from the Congress.  

With regard to the powers of such a Congress, Talleyrand said, "... the Congress must be legitimate." Nations, he said, are under public law which is that law established by written conventions or mutual consent of established practices. Sovereignty cannot be acquired by conquest nor pass to the conqueror unless ceded. A country can have cession if it has a sovereign or there can be countries that have been conquered but are without a sovereign because the sovereign has renounced the right or the ruling family has died. In a republic sovereignty does not exist if it has been conquered, and it cannot be ceded; for as Talleyrand put it, "Sovereignty is, in the

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10 Gulick, Balance of Power, 227.
general society of Europe, what private property is in civil society." The sovereignty would not sanction conquest. If a country or state was under conquest and sovereignty could not be ceded, the Congress should provide some means for it to be ceded, and this could only be done with the sanction of Europe. For example, Talleyrand said that the King of Saxony should have representatives at the Congress since the Congress was to dispose of his possessions and it could not so act unless the sovereign ceded his authority. Further he drew a distinction between "legitimate" and "illegitimate" sovereigns. The Instructions established that France considered the Electors of Hanover, Hesse, the Prince of Nassau-Orange, and the Dukes of Brunswick and Oldenburg who were sovereigns before the dissolution of the German Empire as "legitimate," and those princes and counts who became sovereigns under Napoleon's aegis as "illegitimate." The former were legitimate and could have representatives; the latter could not. Countries not occupied by foreign troops and those not governed by foreign authority could have representatives; the others could not.

11 Broglie, Memoirs, II, 158-60.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid., 160-62.
Even if a prince assumed sovereignty of a country which had no sovereign, he was guilty of usurpation if the country had not been ceded. Therefore, the country near Modena, which had been given up before the war, could not be represented since the sovereign's claim had terminated. On the other hand, Tuscany which was ceded by France and was without a sovereign could be represented since the conditions which ceded Tuscany to France were not carried out, and the Queen of Etruria was the legitimate sovereign. Therefore, sovereigns whose lands were not ceded nor recognized as belonging to another and who had taken part in the last war could have representatives. Other states which were free during the last war could have representatives. The others could not.

The Congress was to dispose not only of French territory that once belonged to Napoleon and France had renounced, but other territory seized by conquest. The decisions must be "durable" and Talleyrand wrote "... The order of succession in each state ought to enter as a necessary element in the calculation of the equilibrium, not so as to be changed, if it is certain, but in such a manner as to be rendered certain if it is uncertain." Only thus could the Congress establish anything like equilibrium for he

\[14\] Ibid., 164.

\[15\] Ibid., 165.
felt a fixed order of succession would remove any uncertainty. Therefore, the Congress should decide the order of succession in Sardinia whose ruling House of Savoy was divided into two reigning lines with hereditary male succession. The reigning line had no male heirs; and since the succession denied the rule to females, Austria would use this as a pretext for securing northern Italy by the marriage of the Archduke Francis with the eldest daughter of the present king. The Congress should, Talleyrand directed, establish the House of Carignan as the legitimate successor. The public law which voided the sovereignty that was not recognized also applied to the methods of acquiring sovereignty.

France wanted the Congress to guarantee the neutrality of Switzerland so that France would not have to protect her frontiers along Switzerland's border. The French would also support the guarantee of the existence of the Ottoman Porte since it was necessary for the balance of power.

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16 Ibid., 165-66.

17 The present King Victor Emmanuel had only daughters and the Duc de Genevis, Charles Felix, brother of Victor Emmanuel, had no children. The old King Charles Emmanuel II was the brother-in-law of Louis XVIII.

18 Ibid., 166-67.

19 Ibid., 167-68.

20 Ibid., 168.
The Congress would have to decide the future arrangements of states under conquest and states not vacant. Talleyrand divided these into two classes; those in which sovereignty was recognized by different powers to different persons, for example, Naples and Tuscany; and those in which the sovereigns had lost possession, had not ceded, and were therefore unclaimed. The Congress would also decide the rights of succession in countries where this was unclear, and finally, the Congress would decide the sovereignty of those countries in which the sovereign had renounced and not ceded and those in which there was not a sovereign and whose future was to be declared with the consent of Europe. The latter could be divided into two categories, those designated by the 30 May Treaty which included (1) the part of the old states of Savoy and Nice and the part of Genoa ceded to France which were to go to the King of Sardinia, (2) the Illyrian provinces, and that part of Italy left of the Po and east of Lake Maggiore which were to go to Austria, (3) the frontier on the left of the Meuse which was to go to Holland, and (4) the countries between the Meuse and the French frontiers and the Rhine which were to go to Prussia and the German states; and the other classes of vacant countries which included the part of Genoa not designated for the King of Sardinia, a portion of Italy not designated to Austria,
and Lucca, Piombino, the Ionian Isles, the Grand Duchy of
Berg as it existed before 1 January 1811, the former
Prussian provinces which had formed part of the Kingdom
of Westphalia, Erfurt, Danzig, and the future of Elba
after Napoleon's death.21

In deciding the method of making decisions, Talleyrand said that the Congress could not remove the right of
a state or create an obligation without the consent of
the state. In reaching a decision in the cases of states
in dispute and the rights of succession, there must be
unanimous consent. In the case of vacant states, the
decision must also be unanimous but the vote of the
claimant states would not count. Decisions regarding
tolls on the Rhine should demand only a simple majority.
Other questions would be considered and be handled by
negotiations. In the case of states not vacant and not
in litigation, the consent of the sovereign would be
necessary. The organization of the German confederation
would need the consent of its members.22

The Instructions also discussed the method of voting.
All states would not have an equal share in the voting.
Of the 170,000,000 people of Europe, more than two-thirds
lived in the countries that signed the First Treaty of

21Ibid., 169-70.
22Ibid., 170-71.
Paris. Of the other one-third, one-half enjoyed no representation and the other one-half represented the population of forty or more small states, which if considered together would not equal one of the great powers. Therefore, since the small states could never decide on a unified policy and vote together, it would be difficult to decide which ones deserved representation and those to be excluded. Talleyrand's plan called for the small states to vote on questions concerning them. Thus the small states of Italy would vote on questions concerning the Italian settlement, and those of Germany on those concerning the German settlement. The balance of power theory does not demand absolute equality of states. Talleyrand recognized this when he wrote, "Absolute equality of forces among all the States, aside from the fact that it can never exist is not necessary to the political equilibrium and would perhaps in some respects be harmful to it." The large states could contribute to the equilibrium by displaying moderation and justice.

France thus exposed the fact that she demanded nothing more than self-preservation and the establishment of equilibrium. In outlining specific arrangements for which

\[23\text{Ibid.}, 171-72.\]

\[24\text{Ibid.}, 173.\]

\[25\text{Ibid.}\]
France would work, Talleyrand illustrated how, by giving Austria the largest northern extremity of Italy, by allowing her princes control of Tuscany and the three smallest states, and by allowing Joachim Murat's rule in Naples, all of Italy would be under Austrian influence. France would work for the division of Italy into several states to prevent Austrian control of the Peninsula. To accomplish that it was necessary that Naples be returned to her legitimate sovereign, Ferdinand IV; for Tuscany to be given to the Queen of Etruria; for the provinces of the Adriatic, and the Legations of Ravenna and Bologna to be given to the Holy See; for the mines of Elba to be returned to the former prince, the family of Bucompagni; for the successor of the King of Sardinia to be the House of Carignan; and for Sardinia to be increased. He argued if Murat were allowed to remain ruler of the Kingdom of Naples, then Europe would be giving sanction to force. Instead Naples should go to the legitimate ruler Ferdinand IV. Knowing that Austria might object to the arrangements since the treaty of 11 January 1814 guaranteed Murat his lands and England had signed a similar treaty, Talleyrand argued that these treaties were void for they guaranteed Murat lands which did not belong to him. France thought it would be best if Murat

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26 Ibid., 174-75.
did not receive anything, but she would allow some compensation as long as the territory suggested did not belong to someone else.  

In other Italian arrangements, France would support papal opposition to Murat's increase in territory on the Adriatic (former provinces of the Holy See) and would also support the Pope's attempts to regain the Legations of Ravenna and Bologna, as well as any arrangements which would not produce difficulties for the return of territory to the Holy See. France would work for an increase in territory for the King of Sardinia and the succession of the House of Carignan.

Prussia, Talleyrand said, should be restrained. If not, she would assume an important position and destroy the balance. It was Prussia that agitated the Germans by spreading rumors that France planned an invasion and that only Prussia could help the Germans. Prussia had in the last sixty-three years increased her population from four to ten million. She wanted Belgium and all the land between the French Meuse and the Rhine. If Prussia was not checked by opposing other influences against her, she would soon have twenty million people and control all of Germany. To prevent this, France would support a federal

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27 Ibid., 175.
28 Ibid.
organization for Germany and would oppose giving the Kingdom of Saxony to Prussia. France would support the King of Saxony, but if he would take another kingdom, then Saxony should pass to the ducal branch whose heir was a brother-in-law of Alexander I, thereby placating the Russians. Neither Mayence nor any territory on the left bank of the Moselle should go to Prussia. France wanted Holland extended as far as possible along the right bank of the Meuse as a barrier against Prussia; and France would support the requests of Bavaria, Hesse, Brunswick, and Hanover for any increase in vacant territory so as to diminish Prussian claims. Any plans to include Mayence and Luxembourg in the German Confederation would receive French support. France thought that the German Confederation should be a republic and that it should prevent oppression and domination by the larger states. To accomplish this, power should be concentrated in the small states and the Confederation should allow power to pass through as many hands as possible.

Poland should be restored to the extent of territory she had held at her last division. It would not be possible to establish an independent Poland with a strong constitution. Russia wanted Poland and if Poland were reestablished

29 Ibid., 177-78.
30 Ibid., 178-79.
and given to Russia, then Russia would become a European power with forty-four million subjects in Europe and a frontier on the Oder. Austria and Prussia would demand territory as compensation for their losses in Poland; Austria would push her demands in Italy and Prussia, in Saxony. An independent Poland with a hereditary monarch would bring anarchy, Talleyrand thought. The last division kept the Poles united by language and customs though divided politically; and, Talleyrand argued, by continuing the division of Poland, she would continue to exist under the same conditions. France would support the King of Saxony as King of Poland if Russia relinquished her claims. If Poland became independent, France wanted Danzig to be free; but if Poland returned to the old division then France wanted Prussia to have Danzig. On other questions France would support giving the Ionian Isles which were vacant to Murat, feeling that neither Corfu nor the Ionian Isles should go to England, Russia or Austria, for each would be able to dominate the oceans if they received the islands. France would support giving Corfu to the Order of Saint John as compensation for their loss of Malta. Elba, upon Napoleon's death, should be returned to her previous rulers, Tuscany and Naples, or just Naples.

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31Ibid., 179-81.
32Ibid., 181-82.
France would support free navigation of the Rhine and the Scheldt with moderate tolls. She would also help England obtain the abolition of the slave trade since France looked to England for support.\textsuperscript{33}

The most important points for France were that Austria should not receive the territory of the King of Sardinia, that Naples should go to the legitimate ruler, Ferdinand IV, that Russia should not get all of Poland, and that Prussia should not get all of Saxony or Mayence. France, by being moderate, would be strong and would exert a moderating influence on the discussions. France would not make any concessions on obligation since this would be renouncing her principles.\textsuperscript{34}

By these instructions, Talleyrand attempted an assault on the first secret article of the First Treaty of Paris by which France renounced her claims to former territories and pledged support of the decisions made by the Allied powers. Since France renounced her rights to the lands now vacated, the Allies, never possessing these lands, could not distribute what they did not have. Talleyrand wanted the rulers of these lands chosen and sanctioned by the Congress,\textsuperscript{33, 34}

\textsuperscript{33}Ibid., 182-83.

\textsuperscript{34}Ibid., 183. For other discussions of Talleyrand's Instructions see Gulick, \textit{Balance of Power}, 226-30; Cooper, \textit{Talleyrand}, 241-42; Ferrero, \textit{Reconstruction of Europe}, 138-44.
and he wanted European adherence to an even higher law, the principle of legitimacy which would justify the intervention of France and the other states of Europe in the decisions the Allies were about to make.\(^{35}\)

He was also establishing the basis for a balance of power. France, he felt, could become great within her own borders. Austria, Prussia, and Russia should be held in check by the division of territory and each could be prevented from obtaining dominant influence. Prussia checked by the German Confederation and Holland; Russia, defeated in her attempts to regain all of Poland; and Austrian influence diluted by independent states in Italy, could not destroy the balance. Free navigation of the Rhine and the Scheldt would gain for France the same benefits that would occur if France ruled the rivers. Usurpation was guarded against by the establishment of legitimate sovereigns and the rights of succession.

Prior to the opening of the Congress, Talleyrand also used other means to make French influence felt. He was unsuccessful with Metternich and Alexander I for Metternich gave the French a cool reception and Alexander's failure to negotiate plans for the marriage of his sister, Anne, to the Duc de Berry, did not make him very cooperative. Castlereagh's visit to Paris on his way to Vienna was more

\(^{35}\)Ferrero, *Reconstruction of Europe*, 142-44.
promising. Finding the French almost too ready to cooperate, Castlereagh, though he did not commit himself to any single policy, did succeed in explaining the preliminary meetings in such a way that France did not object. Castlereagh's meeting and his attitude toward the French, therefore, placed him in a different position than that of his allies.36

The role of the French at the Congress "... was singularly difficult."37 Realizing this Talleyrand sought recognition of France as a responsible first class power by making it known that France desired nothing more than what she now had, that she repudiated her revolutionary conquests and that she had no plans of territorial aggrandizement.38 He considered, while he appointed the various members of the French delegation, the various interests in Paris that he must please and his own needs. From the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he chose La Besnardière, an efficient worker whom Talleyrand described as the most distinguished man in that ministry. He added three young men whom he thought young and well-qualified and who would

36Webster, Congress of Vienna, 52-53; Webster, British Diplomacy, Letter CVII, Wellington to Castlereagh, 18 August 1814, 190-91; Letter CVIII, Castlereagh to Liverpool, 3 September 1814, 191-93.

37Cooper, Talleyrand, 240.

38Ibid.
profit from the Congress by their experience. For two other members of his delegation, Talleyrand looked to the Tuileries so that the Court would be informed. He chose the Comte Louis-Joseph-Alexis de Noailles, an informer of the Count d'Artois and the Marquis de la Tour du Pin Gouvernet, who "would do to sign passports." Another choice was the Duc Emmerich-Joseph de Dalberg whose important connections with the German Court would be valuable, although he was not always discreet. Since the French delegation should eliminate any hostile feelings toward it, Talleyrand chose his niece, the Comtesse de Férigord, as his hostess. Dorothea de Férigord, twenty-one when at the Congress, was beautiful and intelligent and had important connections with the royal houses of Europe. Talleyrand hoped that in her role as hostess, Dorothea would help France create a different impression. She was far more suitable than his wife who had neither

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39 Challaye, Formond and Perry were the younger members. Formond was a cipher in the Department of Seal Office.


41 Ibid., 153; Ziegler, Duchess of Dino, 105-107; Nicholson, Congress of Vienna, 130. Dorothea de Férigord had three sisters at Vienna: the Duchess of Sagan who wanted to become Metternich's mistress; the Princess of Hohenzollern-Hechingen, whose husband was a ruling prince; and the Duchess of Acerinza who was flirting with Friederich von Gentz. Dorothea, unhappy in her married life and tired of Paris society, was glad to accompany Talleyrand to Vienna.
youth nor beauty to cover her lack of intelligence. Considering culinary talents an important part of the image he was about to create, Talleyrand chose, as his chef, Carême, a master at his work.

At Vienna in the autumn of 1814, assembled the largest social gathering in Europe since the days before the Revolution. Vienna hosted all classes of society. Kings, ambassadors, courtiers as well as spies, conspirators, and pickpockets were present. Amid the glittering festivities of balls, masquerades, and countless other events, the Congress accomplished its task. The hospitality of Francis I was extravagant. The total cost was estimated at approximately 30,000,000 gulden or about 500,000 ($240,000) gulden per day. Horses and carriages were available for all the important and secondary lords and every sovereign had the comforts of his own court. The entertainment committee of the host never ceased in the planning of events and the other courts followed suit. Nevertheless amid the pomp

42 Ziegler, Duchess de Dino, 105-107. For an analysis of the relationship between Dorothea and Talleyrand see 118-24. Talleyrand invited Dorothea not as a lover, but as someone he valued. Talleyrand had married his mistress Catherine-Noel Worlie, Madame Grand, in a civil ceremony in 1802.

43 Saint-Aulaire, Talleyrand, 256; Ziegler, Duchess of Dino, 105.

and ceremony of the Old Regime, some social changes were taking place. Talleyrand wrote and expressed displeasure that it was not uncommon to see kings and princes mixing with ordinary citizens. Accompanying the hospitality of the Court of Vienna was a network of secret agents and spies. Nothing went unnoticed and they reported everything daily. Even Sigismond Neukomm, Talleyrand's pianist who had served him since 1809, was a suspect. Every piece of paper found by the chambermaid, doorkeeper, or any other servant found its way into the hands of the secret police. Talleyrand was careful, but the Duc de Dalberg threw a letter suggesting the possibility of kidnapping Napoleon into the wastebasket. The letter soon found its way into the hands of the secret police. The Congress is often remembered by the remarks of the Prince de Ligne: "The Congress dances but accomplishes nothing." 

Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 172-73. For a description of the balls and activities see Ferrero "The Congress at Play" in Reconstruction of Europe, 242-58.

45 Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 246, 257.


47 Ziegler, Duchess of Dino, 112-15; Nicholson, Congress of Vienna, 204-05. Nothing in Weil indicates, however, that the secret police obtained any information of the 3 January 1815 treaty.

48 Preksa, Congress of Intrigue, 5.
might be added: the Congress, though slowed by social activities, did produce a peace worthy of praise.\textsuperscript{49}

\footnote{Gulick, \textit{Balance of Power}, 187-88.}
CHAPTER III

THE OPENING CONTROVERSY: THE POLISH-SAXON PROBLEM

Talleyrand and the French delegation arrived in Vienna on 23 September 1814, and set up headquarters at the Hôtel Kaunitz.1 Talleyrand brought with him the thirty pages of Instructions which outlined French policies.2 The four Allies had arrived previously and began on 15 September 1814, the discussions on the European territorial problems to be solved. The Allies made plans by which they could keep the authority to make decisions in their hands.3 They agreed upon the 22 September Protocol which reserved to themselves the right to make decisions concerning the territorial questions. The decisions would be communicated, first to France and Spain, and then to the Congress as a whole.4 Although Castlereagh had supported the

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1Brinton, Lives, 166-67; Cooper, Talleyrand, 248; Broglie, Mémoires, II, 199.

2Cooper, Talleyrand, 241; Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 139; d'Angeberg, Congrès de Vienne, II, 215-38.

3Webster, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 336-37.

4Webster, Congress of Vienna, 64; Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 338; Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 144-46; Gulick, Balance of Power, 188-89; Broglie,
proposals, he thought that they too openly disclosed the intentions of the four powers, and had drawn up his own. The Allies, however, rejected Castlereagh's proposals and accepted Humboldt's counter-proposals as the basis for Allied action. They planned to meet with Talleyrand and to present him with the protocol. They also planned to propose the postponement of the Congress until the four powers concluded "confidential" talks among themselves. Since the Allies were undecided about the calling of a general session of the Congress and planned to postpone the opening date, Talleyrand took advantage of the opportunity.

Metternich, on 30 September 1814 sent Talleyrand a note inviting him to a preliminary conference at 2:00 o'clock P.M. on the same day. The Austrian representative also sent similar notes to the other Allied

Memoirs, II, 201; Webster, British Diplomacy, Letter CIX, Castlereagh to Liverpool 24 September 1814, 193-95. See also D'Angeberg, Congrès de Vienne, II, 249-52 for a copy of the Protocol.

5Webster, Congress of Vienna, 63; Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 338.

6Ibid., 64; 338-39. For Castlereagh's proposals see Webster, Congress of Vienna, Appendices II, III, 151-55. Humboldt's proposals appear in Webster, Congress of Vienna, Appendices IV, V, VI, 155-64; and Treitschke, History of Germany, II, 26-29.

7Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 338.
representatives and the representative of Spain.\(^8\) Talleyrand arrived at the appointed time. The ministers of the four allied courts and Spain were already present.\(^9\) The purpose of the meeting was to present the 22 September Protocol to France and Spain and have them accept the resolutions as a basis for negotiations.\(^10\)

Talleyrand questioned the presence of Sr. de Labrador. The Allies answered that the Spanish secretary was not in Vienna. Talleyrand then questioned the presence of Humboldt. The Allies said that Hardenberg was hard of hearing. Talleyrand replied, "If only infirmities were in question, each might have his own, and an equal right to make use of them." He had made his point. The Allies agreed that the Foreign Minister could bring another with him.\(^11\)

The Portuguese ambassador, the Count of Palmella, who was not invited, had written a letter of protest. Talleyrand and Labrador both supported his argument which said that the eight signatories of the Treaty of Paris instead

\(^8\)Ferrero, *Reconstruction of Europe*, 151.

\(^9\)Don Pedro Gomez Labrador represented Spain.


of six should be members of the preparatory committee of the Congress.\textsuperscript{12} Shortly afterwards the Allies presented Talleyrand a copy of the 22 September Protocol signed by Nesselrode, Castlereagh, Metternich, and Hardenberg. He immediately noticed the word, "Allies," used throughout the paper. Talleyrand asked "where the Allies were, whether they were at Chaumont or at Laon, whether peace had been made, whether there was any quarrel and with whom."\textsuperscript{13} The signatories of the protocol said that the word had been used for "brevity's sake."\textsuperscript{14} Talleyrand replied that "... however expedient brevity may be, it should not take the place of accuracy."\textsuperscript{15} The protocol provided an attempt at enforcement of the domination of the Four Powers by referring to secret treaties among themselves. Talleyrand said, "I do not understand any the more."\textsuperscript{16} He objected and said that he considered only two dates ". . . that of May 30 \textit{[sic]} - May 31\textsuperscript{17} . . .

\textsuperscript{12}Talleyrand, Correspondence, I, Letter III, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 4 October 1814, 14; Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 152.

\textsuperscript{13}Talleyrand, Correspondence, I, Letter III, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 4 October 1814, 14-15.

\textsuperscript{14}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{15}Ibid., 15; See also Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 153.

\textsuperscript{16}Talleyrand, Correspondence, I, Letter III, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 4 October 1814, 16.
and that of October 1 . . . . 17 Realizing that they were making no progress, the Four Powers withdrew the 22 September Protocol and presented another which they asked Talleyrand and Labrador to sign. 18 Under the second protocol the Allies established two committees to consider the questions before the Congress and stated that, upon completion of the work by the committees, the Congress would convene. Talleyrand saw that the Allied Powers would control the committees; since even if France and Spain agreed on every question, the Four Powers would always be in the majority. He asked for time to study the document which seemed, he reported, "... that they proposed to finish where I thought it would be necessary to begin." 19

Talleyrand thought that the Congress should convene and that the Congress should grant the powers delegated to the six countries. Castlereagh disagreed and a conversation followed. 20 During the discussion someone brought up the name of Murat, the King of Naples. Talleyrand

17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.; See also Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 153. Talleyrand sent copies to Louis XVIII; see Talleyrand, Correspondence, II, Letters LXX, LXXI, Talleyrand to Louis, Appendix to No. 36, 97-105.
19 Talleyrand, Correspondence, I, Letter III, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 4 October 1814, 17-18.
20 Ibid., 18; See also Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 154; Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 338-39.
replied, "What King of Naples is referred to? We do not know the man in question." Humboldt answered that some of the powers had guaranteed Murat's territory (Austria had guaranteed Murat's lands by a treaty on 11 January 1814). Talleyrand replied that the powers could not and should not have done this. The meeting adjourned until the following day.

Talleyrand did not wait until the second meeting to make his opinions known. On 1 October 1814, he sent a memorandum to the five powers stating that the eight countries which had signed the treaty in May were the only ones qualified to present the questions at the Congress. The Four Powers were not happy about Talleyrand's note. He had made France the protector of the small states. On 4 October a new declaration claimed that the first secret article of the Peace Treaty gave the Four Powers authority to direct the negotiations. Talleyrand answered the declaration in a long letter to

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21Talleyrand, Correspondence, I, Letter III, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 4 October 1814, 18.
22Ibid., 18-19.
23Ibid., 19.
24Ibid., 19-21; Ferrero, reconstruction of Europe, 155.
25Talleyrand, Correspondence, I, Letter III, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 4 October 1814, 25.
Caatlereagh who communicated Talleyrand's answer to the delegates on 5 October. Talleyrand argued that all of Europe must consent to the establishment of a new order, for if the four Allied powers made the decisions, their wishes would become the law of Europe. The six delegates assembled on 5 October and asked Talleyrand to withdraw his memorandum. He refused since Labrador had already sent a copy to the Spanish court. Talleyrand agreed to the postponement of the Congress for two or three weeks if the Allies would give a specific date for the convocation and established rules of admittance.  

Metternich, on 8 October, called a meeting for adopting plans for convening the Congress. Talleyrand and Metternich had drawn up similar proposals except Talleyrand's proposals set up rules of admittance which would exclude Murat. Metternich's proposals postponed the opening of the Congress until 1 November 1814 and did not mention the admission or exclusion of Murat. Talleyrand arrived at the meeting early and conversed with Metternich. In the conversation, Talleyrand mentioned the "Allies." Metternich replied,

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26Ibid., Letter IV, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 9 October 1814, 28-34; Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 159-60. See also Webster, Congress of Vienna, 57; d'Angeberg, Congrès de Vienne, II, 270-72.

27Talleyrand, Correspondence, I, Letter IV, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 9 October 1814, 36; Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 164.
"Do not talk of allies, there are no longer any." Talleyrand commented that "There are people here who ought to be allies in the sense of being of the same way of thinking and desiring the same things . . . ." Talleyrand asked Metternich how Austria could allow Russia to surround important Austrian possessions and allow Prussia to have Saxony, and declared that France desired nothing. He added that France would not object to the divisions of territory as long as Prussia did not get Saxony and Russia did not cross the Vistula. Metternich replied that France and Austria were very near in their terms. However, Metternich again mentioned the need to postpone the Congress since the other Allies wanted a delay and Austria needed time to detain Murat.

After the conversation, the two ministers went to the meeting. At the meeting, the delegates accepted Metternich's proposals. Talleyrand consented, but only on the condition that an additional phrase would be added to the declaration postponing the Congress. He wanted the statement, "and shall be done according to the principles of the law of nations," added to the declaration announcing

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28 Talleyrand, Correspondence, I, Letter IV, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 9 October 1814, 36.

29 Ibid., 37. See also Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 162-63.
the adjournment of the Congress until 1 November 1814. The delegates, after a lengthy and heated discussion, agreed to add the statement. Friedrich von Gentz, Secretary General of Congress, drafted the declaration which named the eight signatories of the First Treaty of Paris as participants and announced the adjournment of the Congress until 1 November 1814. The results of the decisions to be made, the declaration said, must be in accordance with the principles of the law of nations. Thus, Talleyrand forced the other powers to recognize the principle of the law of nations as a basis for their negotiations. Each nation had reason to fear the principle which could thwart her plans for the division of territory, but France, too, had interests to protect. Talleyrand combined the principle of the law of nations with the interests of France and successfully stated to the Congress a way by which the statesmen at Vienna could solve the problems of Europe. The law of nations would preserve legitimate governments and would eliminate the illegal ones.

30 Talleyrand, Correspondence, I, Letter IV, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 2 October 1814, 36-42. See also Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 164-65; d'Angeberg, Congrès de Vienne, II, 272-73. For a sketch of Friedrich von Gentz at the Congress of Vienna see Golo Mann, Secretary of Europe, The Life of Friedrich Gentz, Enemy of Napoleon, trans. by William K. Woglon (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1946), 207-27. Hereafter cited as Secretary of Europe.

31 Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 166-68.
Talleyrand succeeded in October "... in getting, as it were, his foot into the door of the European council chamber... leaving his former supporters in the passage," and became champion of the small states. He prevented the exclusion of France from the Congress, and by demanding "public law" and "legitimacy" he established the principles which the Congress would follow. France, however, was not formally admitted to the important Council of Four until 9 January 1815. Using the Statistical Committee as a stepping stone, she became an unofficial member of the Big Four and during the critical period in January she gained official entry into the Council. The Four changed to Five and recognized France as a responsible first-class power.

Talleyrand found at Vienna in October hostility, not the moderation displayed earlier in Paris. People had been displeased with the First Treaty of Paris the Allies told him. Now every court came with secret plans for

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32 Cooper, Talleyrand, 252.

33 Nicholson, Congress of Vienna, 144.

34 Ibid., 145-47; Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 239-40. The Statistical Committee, established 24 December 1814, was to verify the populations of the disputed territories.
their own aggrandizement.35 Talleyrand wrote that the Allies wanted France to be weak. The Allies planned discussions arranging for the disposal of territory without France. France was there for appearance only; and by the 22 September Protocol, the Allies had attempted to exclude France from the deliberations of the Congress.36 Talleyrand said in a letter to Louis XVIII that "... the language of the plenipotentiaries is not yet that of reason and moderation."37 Some of the Allied courts, Talleyrand wrote after the postponement, did not think France had the power to act and Prussia spread rumors that the French representative had two sets of instructions, one prescribed the language France was to use and the other instructed the delegates to promise nothing.38 France was not in a very strategic position to deal with the demands of the Allies. Russia insisted on adding Poland to her territory and Prussia was only too ready to exchange her Polish provinces for the German territories on the Rhine.39 It was these

35Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 149-50.
36Broglie, Memoire, II, 199-201.
37Talleyrand, Correspondence, I, Letter I, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 25 September 1814, 2.
38Ibid., Letter VI, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 13 October 1814, 50; Letter VIII, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 17 October 1814, 64.
demands which produced the dissension and nearly caused the dissolution of the Congress. Talleyrand's duty was to carry out the French instructions and to see that neither of the demands became answered.

The Polish-Saxony Problem

The main problem centered around Alexander I and his plans for the Duchy of Warsaw. Coupled with the problem of Poland which brought Austrian and English opposition was that of Saxony. Alexander I, inconsistent in his support of the balance of power theory, demanded all of the Duchy of Warsaw. Nesselrode's instructions set forth the Russian claims thusly: "The Duchy of Warsaw is mine by right of conquest from Napoleon's Empire." Alexander I, in 1810, had nearly signed an agreement with Napoleon which would have prevented the resurrection of the Kingdom of Poland. In 1811, after the change in Napoleon's policy toward Austria, Alexander I changed his position. Russian policy proposed a Kingdom of Poland in union with Russia, and the 1813 Treaty of Kalisch promised restoration of Prussia to her former power though not her former territory. This policy changed, however, since by the 27 June 1813, Treaty of Reichenback, Russia, Prussia, and Austria

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40 Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 147.
41 Ibid.; Gulick, Balance of Power, 189-92.
promised to divide the Duchy of Warsaw among themselves; and by the October 1813 treaty of Toeplitz, the three allies promised to reach an amicable decision.\textsuperscript{42} The secret meetings in Paris in May 1814 revealed some of Alexander's demands. Now at the Congress Alexander I made his proposals clear. Russia would receive most of the Duchy of Warsaw. Prussia, as compensation for her loss of territory, would receive Posen, Kulm, and most of Saxony. Austria would receive compensations in Italy, the south German lands, the Illyrian Provinces, and Dalmatia.\textsuperscript{43}

Metternich, supporter of the balance of power theory, could tolerate only half of the Russian plans. He was willing to support Castlereagh's project for enlarging Holland, and he was willing to extend Prussia westward as guardian of the Rhine. Nevertheless, he wanted Russia stopped in Poland, since Russian acquisition of Poland would put Russia within 175 miles of Vienna; and he wanted Prussia kept out of Saxony since a Prussian Saxony would give Prussia an additional 250 miles of common boundary with Austria. At Vienna, Metternich was prepared to make compromises on the

\textsuperscript{42}Gulick, Balance of Power, 191.

\textsuperscript{43}Ibid., 191-92. For a good explanation of the History of the Duchy of Warsaw see Gulick, Balance of Power, 193-97. See also Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 147-48.
Saxon problem but not the Polish, and promised he would give Prussia Saxony provided that Prussia joined English and Austrian opposition to Russia.

Castlereagh made his policy very clear. His main objective was "... the establishment of a just equilibrium in Europe." To achieve this objective, he wanted Holland enlarged and Prussia strengthened in the west as a barrier against France. Russian expansion to the west, Castlereagh thought, would be a threat to the equilibrium. He wanted, therefore, to break the Prusso-Russian bloc and to substitute an Austro-Prussian bond in its place. Castlereagh, then, was prepared to sacrifice Saxony since he regarded Prussian defense of the Rhine as a desirable objective.

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45 Webster, British Diplomacy, Letter CXXVIII, Castlereagh to Liverpool, 11 November 1814, 232.

46 Ibid., Letter CX, Castlereagh to Wellington, 1 October 1814, 195-96.

47 Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 282, 343, 386. See also Webster, British Diplomacy, Letter CXXII, Castlereagh to Liverpool, 2 October 1814, 200.

48 Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 343. See also Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 177-78; Webster, British Diplomacy, Letter CXXII, Castlereagh to Wellington, 25 October 1814, 217-18. Castlereagh suggested two
Talleyrand objected to the Russian plans for Poland and Prussian claims to Saxony. He was not prepared to sacrifice Saxony. His aim in creating an equilibrium, though not dissimilar from Castlereagh's, sought, by different methods, to achieve the same end. He wanted to stop Russian westward expansion and to prevent Prussian acquisition of Saxony. This represented no change in Talleyrand's policy for once when the Czar accused the King of Saxony of being a traitor, Talleyrand replied, "That Sire, is a question of dates."\(^{49}\)

All of Europe, for the past twenty-five years, had recognized usurpers, and he argued that now it was necessary for Europe to recognize legitimacy. He intended by this to place France in the role as defender of the principle.\(^{50}\) Castlereagh thought Talleyrand obstinate since the latter directed his energies against Prussia

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49. Talleyrand, Correspondence, I, Letter III, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 4 October 1814, 24. Talleyrand was referring to the actions of Alexander I who, in 1807, signed the Treaty of Tilsit.

instead of the larger problem of Poland. Talleyrand, however, feared Prussian aggrandizement. Prussia, Talleyrand warned, instead of ten million subjects promised by the Allies would soon have twenty million and all of Germany. Talleyrand, recognizing the principle of legitimacy as his strongest weapon, became the defender of the King of Saxony. Talleyrand realized the need for the King of Saxony to make some sacrifices; but, he said, France would never allow Prussia to receive Luxembourg or Mayence or allow Russia to pass the Vistula. If these objections were upheld, Talleyrand was prepared to make some compromises on his Saxon position. Talleyrand, therefore, concentrated his efforts against the coalition which was still in effect against France.

He approached Metternich for his support at the beginning of the Congress. On 8 October 1814, at a

53 Nicholson, Congress of Vienna, 157. The King of Saxony, Frederick Augustus I, had remained faithful to the Napoleonic Empire to the end.
54 Talleyrand, Correspondence, I, Letter IV, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 9 October 1814, 38. For the letter from the King of Saxony to Louis XVIII see Talleyrand, Correspondence, II, Appendix, Letter V, Note 2, 280. Louis XVIII and the King of Saxony were cousins.
55 Gulick, Balance of Power, 211; Talleyrand, Correspondence, I, Letter IX, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 19 October 1814, 70-71.
meeting with Metternich, he asked the latter how Austria could allow Prussian acquisition of Saxony and how Austria could allow Russian encirclement of Hungary and Bohemia, two of Austria's most important possessions. Talleyrand told Metternich that France desired three things, the containment of Russia at the Vistula, the transferral of Luxembourg to Holland, and the transferral of Mayence to Belgium. Talleyrand's attempts to discuss matters with Alexander I were less successful. Alexander, in his first interview with Talleyrand, declared that he would not relinquish what was his, meaning Poland; and that he would rather have war than withdraw his demands.

England, who supported Prussian demands, sought to win France to her side. Castlereagh attempted to induce Talleyrand to change his objections to Saxony by inferring that certain questions would be decided in such a way as to make them desirable to France. Talleyrand refused to yield. He said that Congress needed to reestablish the rules which would allow Europe to prevent the recurrence of previous events. Still the Allied Powers, by delaying

56Talleyrand, Correspondence, I, Letter IV, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 9 October 1814, 37-39.
57Ibid., Letter III, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 4 October 1814, 23-24.
58Ibid., Letter IV, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 9 October 1814, 33-34.
the Congress, had means to control the negotiations for
the distribution of territory.

The Congress, during the three weeks from 8 October-1 November 1814, was only a series of secret meetings and confidential talks. This "confidential approach," devised by Metternich instructed the delegates to use the time to reach preliminary agreements on the important questions. Instead of formal meetings, the delegates met in small groups, using the social activities as a vehicle for their negotiations. Amid the extravaganzas of European society, the diplomats met and discussed the problems of Europe. The plenipotentiaries used the small salons off the ballroom of the Court of Austria as a meeting place for their negotiations. The job of greeting a sovereign and detaining him as he was going to the salon became an important part of the diplomatic game. It became evident, however, that these informal secret meetings were an attempt by the Four Allied Powers to exclude France from the negotiations concerning Poland and Saxony.

The Polish-Saxony discussions involved three major phases. During the first phase Castlereagh and Metternich

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60 Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 173-74.
became the chief negotiators and concentrated on the estab-
lishment of a united opposition with Prussia against Russia.
The second phase brought Prussian cooperation with Russia
and a complete break in the attempt for a united opposition.
During the third phase, Talleyrand, taking advantage of
the situation, successfully combined France with Great
Britain and Austria in the attempts for a settlement.

The first phase of the Polish Saxony problem began in
September and lasted until the end of November. Secretly
Castlereagh began negotiations with the Czar. Not
having any success, he sent, on 14 October 1814, a
memorandum to Alexander I denouncing Russian claims.
Then instead of concentrating his efforts on the Czar,
he turned his attention to the establishment of a unified
opposition of Prussia, Austria, and England against Russia.
Hardenberg had joined the negotiations on 9 October.
Hardenberg's plans for the re-creation of the European
state system called for Prussian aggrandizement. He
wanted Prussia placed in the position as defender of

61 Webster, British Diplomacy, Letter CXVI, Castle-
reagh to Liverpool, 14 October 1814, 206.

62 Ibid., 207-10. See also Talleyrand, Correspondence,
I, Letter VIII, Talleyrand to Louis, 17 October 1814,
58-61; d'Angeberg, Congrès de Vienne, II, 291-93; Webster,
Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 346-47.

the Rhine and his policy supported Russian claims for Prussian acquisition of Saxony.\(^6^4\) Secretly on 9 October 1814, Hardenberg wrote Metternich that Prussia wanted a closer alliance with Austria and England if Austria would guarantee Prussian claims to Saxony.\(^6^5\) Metternich and Castlereagh were suspicious. Metternich would have refused; but hoping to help Austria and Prussia together, Castlereagh favored acceptance.\(^6^6\) Castlereagh gave his support to the demands for a Prussian Saxony. Prussia, he said, should be as strong as possible. He gave his consent for Prussian acquisition of Saxony if Prussia would oppose Russia’s plans.\(^6^7\)

Discussions with the Czar continued and Metternich became the chief negotiator, but had no more success than Castlereagh. In fact, during an interview with Metternich,

\(^6^4\)Ibid.; see also Treitschke, *History of Germany*, II, 44-47. Humboldt was less enthusiastic over the Russo-Prussian alliance and more equilibrist in his outlook than Hardenberg. Golo Mann, *Secretary of Europe*, 216-217, gives Prussian plans.


\(^6^7\)Ferrero, *Reconstruction of Europe*, 177-78; See Webster, *British Diplomacy*, Letter CXIX, Castlereagh to Liverpool, 24 October 1814, 212-13. For the Memorandum on Handling the Polish Question.
the Czar, Talleyrand wrote, used language "... such as might have appeared extraordinary even if applied to one's own servants." 68

Metternich conditionally accepted, by a secret note on 22 October 1814, Hardenberg's 9 October proposals which offered Prussian support against Russia if Austria would guarantee the cessation of Saxony to Prussia. The climax of the plan for a united opposition to Russia came on 24 October when Austria, Prussia and England agreed to oppose Alexander. 69 Following the detente thus created, Prussia, Great Britain, and Austria presented a memorandum denouncing Russian claims to Alexander I late in October at Buda. The Czar refused to yield in his demands. He won Frederick William III, King of Prussia, to his side. This attempt for a united opposition failed for Alexander I refused to yield. 70 In a memorandum dated 30 October 1814, he told Castlereagh that Russia would not renounce her claims. 71

68 Talleyrand, Correspondence, I, Letter XIV, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 31 October 1814, 99.

69 Gulick, Balance of Power, 216; Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 346-47; Webster, Congress of Vienna, 102; Metternich, Memoirs, II, 579; d'Angeberg, Congrès de Vienne, II, 316.

70 Gulick, Balance of Power, 216; Webster, British Diplomacy, Letter CXXVIII, Castlereagh to Liverpool, 11 November 1814, 229-33.

71 Webster, British Diplomacy, Letter CXXV, Castlereagh to Liverpool, 5 November 1814, 222-24. The Czar's
Talleyrand during this period wrote one of his most alarming letters to Louis XVIII. He wrote, "The revolutionary ferment has spread all over Germany; Jacobinism is reigning there, not as it did five and twenty years ago in France, in the middle and lower classes, but among the highest and wealthiest nobility." In short, Talleyrand feared another general war. He closed the letter by asking for further instructions if Austria asked for cooperation against Prussia. Talleyrand could accept Castlereagh's ideas on Poland but not Saxony. Talleyrand said that Castlereagh induced Austria to consent to relinquishing Saxony and that Castlereagh was preparing a memorandum to the British government to excuse the memorandum is in Webster, British Diplomacy, 224-25. See also Talleyrand, Correspondence, I, Letter IX, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 19 October 1814, Note 3, 78; d'Angeberg, Congrès de Vienne, II, Alexander to Castlereagh, 30 October 1814, 350-52.

72Talleyrand, Correspondence, I, Letter VIII, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 17 October 1814, 62; Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 180-82.

73Talleyrand, Correspondence, I, Letter VIII, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 17 October 1814, 61-65.

74Ibid., 66-67. Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 182. See also Webster, British Diplomacy, Letter CXXIV, Liverpool to Castlereagh, 2 November 1814, 221-22 and Letter CXXVI, Wellington to Castlereagh, 5 November 1814, 227 for England's concern over talk of war preparations.

75Talleyrand, Correspondence, I, Letter VIII, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 17 October 1814, 61.
abandonment of Saxony. France, Talleyrand wrote, should be prepared to offer assistance if Austria decided to preserve Saxony, for he did not think Prussia and Russia would fight for the territories. Talleyrand planned to make it known that France did not oppose Russia's acquisition of any part of Poland given to her provided that Russia did not expand her frontiers and provided that all of Saxony did not go to Prussia. By embarrassing Austria and England, both of whom were prepared to sacrifice Saxony, Talleyrand thought that the two countries would have to alter their positions.

Talleyrand continued with his plans. He told Prince Adam Czartoryski, advisor to Alexander I on Polish affairs, that the first concern of France was the preservation of Saxony and that France did not oppose Russia's plans for the government of the part of Poland that Alexander I would receive. In an interview with the Czar on 23 October 1814, Talleyrand again heard the Czar's demands. Alexander I said that the King of Prussia would become the King of Saxony and Alexander I, King of Poland. He did not listen to Talleyrand's proposal which would have given Prussia the nine to ten million "souls" promised her without taking

76 Ibid., Letter IX, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 19 October 1814, 71-72.
77 Ibid., 75-76.
all of Saxony. Alexander said that the King of Saxony was a traitor; and as for public law and principle, they did not concern him. Russia, Alexander I said, had 200,000 men in Warsaw and would use them. He did not acknowledge Talleyrand's reminder that Austria, Prussia, and Russia had, by a treaty, agreed to divide the Duchy of Warsaw.78

Castlereagh, Talleyrand thought, was pursuing an impossible course. England sought to ally the courts of Austria and Prussia. The two were incompatible. Long time enemies they could not be united. Castlereagh, Talleyrand reported, had instructions from his court to keep France weak. England wanted Prussia to be like Holland. She wanted Prussia increased; and though this was inconsistent with her opposition to Russian demands, she sought Austro-Prussian cooperation to achieve her aims. Talleyrand thought that Castlereagh and Metternich, by concentrating on Alexander I and readily sacrificing Saxony, had made their own problems. Even from the beginning, Talleyrand said, the two powers, England and Austria, could have prevented the problems faced by the Congress.79 Talleyrand thought that if the

78Ibid., Letter XI, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 25 October 1814, 83-88. The treaty referred to was the October 1814 treaty of Toeplitz. See also Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 183-85.

Allies had convened the Congress as planned, Alexander I would not be in such a strong position. Castlereagh agreed and proposed that he and Talleyrand prepare a plan for the opening of the Congress.

On 30 October 1814, the eight powers which had signed the First Treaty of Paris met and established a committee of three to examine the credentials of the delegates. After the approval of credentials, the Congress would convene. Talleyrand proposed that a general committee and three special committees be formed when the Congress convened. The delegates did not reach a decision and the meeting adjourned. On 5 November after Castlereagh had received the 30 October memorandum of Alexander I, Metternich, Castlereagh, and Nesselrode asked Talleyrand for aid in reaching a solution. Talleyrand replied that the solution would be the convening of the Congress. Castlereagh agreed but pointed out that the Prussians feared even the word "Congress." Metternich offered an answer. The Congress would convene when the Allies agreed on the important questions. Talleyrand gave his consent; and as a return of the favor, Metternich proposed that

80 Ibid., 191.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid., Letter XIV, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 31 October 1814, 108 and Letter XV, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 6 November 1814, 111-12.
France join the committee on the affairs of Switzerland.\textsuperscript{83} Talleyrand could write Louis XVIII that the French had made some improvement in their situation in Vienna although they (the French) should consider more than just outward appearances.\textsuperscript{84}

The French position was indeed better. Metternich told Talleyrand that Castlereagh would not allow Russia beyond the Vistula and that he would offer Prussia a portion of Saxony with 400-500,000 population.\textsuperscript{85} Even Talleyrand and Dalberg's visit to Castlereagh, although before the Russian memorandum of 30 October, was somewhat successful. The French plenipotentiaries pointed out Bohemia's vulnerability if Saxony and Silesia belonged to the same power. Talleyrand gave Castlereagh the facts about Prussia for the past sixty years and pointed out her crimes and iniquities. Talleyrand then inquired how England could give up Leipzig and not worry about her commercial interests.\textsuperscript{86} Talleyrand in his conferences

\textsuperscript{83}Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 195-96. See also Talleyrand, Correspondence, I, Letter XV, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 6 November 1814, 115-16 who incorrectly referred to the committee on the affairs of Sweden.

\textsuperscript{84}Talleyrand, Correspondence, I, Letter XV, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 6 November 1814, 119.

\textsuperscript{85}\textit{Ibid.}, 112-13.

\textsuperscript{86}\textit{Ibid.}, Letter XIV, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 31 October 1814, 103-6.
had succeeded in adding some prestige to the French delegation. The King supported his actions. Louis XVIII wrote that preparations were under way for calling the army, and on 2 November 1814, the Count de Noailles arrived with supplementary instructions authorizing French support to Austria and Bavaria if they asked for aid.

Alexander, at the beginning of November, began to draw Prussia back into the Russian orbit. The Allies, thinking that Prussia still might join them were very soon disillusioned. Alexander I invited Frederick William III to dinner and won his support. The Czar informed Hardenberg of the King's acceptance of the Russian plans and ordered him to carry out the King's wishes. In a memorandum to Castlereagh, on 7 November, Prussia withdrew from English and Austrian opposition to Russia.

Alexander, even before he had maneuvered Prussia to his side, sought French support. Alexander invited

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87Ibid., Letter X, Louis XVIII to Talleyrand, 21 October 1814, 80, and Letter XII, Louis XVIII to Talleyrand, 27 October 1814, 96.

88Ibid., Letter XV, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 6 November 1814, 111. See note 1, 120 to Letter XV for instructions.

89Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 203-204; Talleyrand, Correspondence, I, Letter XVIII, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 12 November 1814, 126-28; d'Angeberg, Congrès de Vienne, II, Hardenberg to Castlereagh, 7 November 1814, 406-408.
Talleyrand to visit him. Talleyrand accepted, but made certain that both Austria and Great Britain knew of the visit. The Czar's main purpose was to determine if France was preparing for war; if France would, at some future date, sign an alliance with Russia; and if France would alter her determination about Saxony. Alexander I offered Talleyrand Russian support for the French position on Naples if France would support Russia on Saxony. Talleyrand replied that the two countries had the same desires for Naples. Then Alexander I suggested that Talleyrand persuade Prussia to release Russia from her promise to support Prussia on Saxony. Talleyrand said that he could not do this, but the Czar could, by offering Prussia territory in Saxony. 

Talleyrand found the Czar less adamant in his demands for a Prussian Saxony and he thought that Russia secretly desired some way out of the entanglement without losing her position. He saw an attempt, in the Czar's plan, to break up the Allies and Russia leaned to France. However, Metternich too, since Hardenberg's defection, sought French support and approached Talleyrand

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90 Talleyrand, Correspondence, I, Letter XX, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 17 September 1814, 137-46. The date is obviously a mistake since Talleyrand's letter refers to Prussia's withdrawal from the united British-Austrian opposition. The date should read 17 November.

91 Ibid., 146; Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 212.
after a meeting on 11 November. He showed the French Minister the secret note of 22 October by which Austria had promised Prussia all of Saxony if certain conditions were fulfilled. Then he promised Talleyrand that he would not give up Saxony. However, Metternich's next statement was less encouraging. He said that Austria would yield a large part of Poland which, Talleyrand said, meant everything if Alexander did not diminish his demands. France was now in a strategic position if negotiations failed, and hopes for success seemed dim as all sides prepared for war.

Talleyrand wrote Louis XVIII that the Grand Duke Constantine, brother to Alexander I, had left Vienna for Warsaw and that Prussian generals had left Berlin for Saxony. At the same time Austria moved her troops into Galicia, and began talks of an alliance with Bavaria. Talleyrand, in early November, received a protest from the King of Saxony. The Governor General for the Russians, Prince Repnin, had ordered the transferal of the administration of Saxony to the representative of the King of Prussia. The Governor General

92Talleyrand, Correspondence, I, Letter XVIII, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 12 November 1814, 132-33.
93Ibid., 128-29.
94Ibid., Letter XX, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 17 September 1814, 149.
announced that the decision was a result of Prussian, British and Austrian agreement, much to the dismay of the latter two. Both Austria and Great Britain protested since their acceptance was conditional. The French position steadily began to improve. The Czar sought French support although Talleyrand did not commit himself and Metternich's actions, Talleyrand thought, were encouraging. However, Talleyrand was still critical of Castlereagh.

Castlereagh wanted Prussia to have Saxony to increase her power while Metternich wanted Saxony as compensation for Prussia. Talleyrand thought that Castlereagh wanted Prussia to receive Saxony for the wrong reasons. However, Castlereagh was displeased with Talleyrand. He protested against Talleyrand's behavior in Vienna. He was displeased with Talleyrand's stubbornness about the convocation of the Congress and his insistence on the rights of the King of Saxony. Talleyrand, on the other hand, thought England had only her own interests as her

95Ibid., Letter XX, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 17 September [sic November] 1814, 149-50.
96Ibid., 150.
97Ibid., 151.
98Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 352; Webster, British Diplomacy, Letter CXXI, Castlereagh to Liverpool, 25 October 1814, 216-17.
principles. Castlereagh feared a Russian-French agreement late in October and protested to Wellington who appealed to Count Aulps d'Blacas for some changes in the French position. Wellington told Blacas that England was upset with Talleyrand's conduct since he concentrated on the problem of Saxony instead of Poland, and that England would begin hostilities if a change did not occur. Blacas wrote Talleyrand instructions to cooperate more fully with England, because Blacas wrote, Castlereagh had exceeded the instructions of his court, for Great Britain desired an independent Poland; and if Talleyrand stressed this point, Castlereagh could not use Poland as an excuse to sacrifice Saxony. While relations between Talleyrand and Castlereagh remained somewhat cool, the communications helped for Castlereagh reported some improvement in Talleyrand's behavior. The latter did not press his demands for the opening of the Congress and delayed publication of French views on the

99Talleyrand, Correspondence, I, Letter IX, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 19 October 1814, 70-71.

100Webster, British Diplomacy, Letter CXXXVI, Wellington to Castlereagh, 5 November 1814, 227-28. Count Blacas, one of the King's favorites, disliked Talleyrand.

101bid., Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 353.

102Talleyrand, Correspondence, I, Letter XVII, Blacas to Talleyrand, 9 November 1814, 122-25.
Saxon problem. By mid-November Castlereagh could report that Talleyrand's actions were desirable. By this time, too, Talleyrand was aware that the coalition was dissolving unless the Allies reached an agreement. The second phase of negotiations, however, only made matters worse.

The second period began in the last week of November and lasted until mid-December. Hardenberg presented the Czar's proposals. He offered Cracow and Thorn as free cities if Austria would let Prussia have all of Saxony; and Mainz, the proposal said, would be a joint fortress. Metternich worried about the possibility of the Russian advance to Austrian boundaries. Castlereagh feared war. Austria in a note sent on 10 December yielded on the Polish settlement with reservations but refused Prussia all of Saxony. Austria agreed that Prussia could have Lusatia, half of Upper Lusatia, and both sides of

103 Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 353.
104 Webster, British Diplomacy, Letter CXXXIV, Castlereagh to Wellington, 21 November 1814, 241.
105 Talleyrand, Correspondence, I, Letter XX, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 17 September [sic November] 1814, 149.
106 Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 260; Gulick, Balance of Power, 220; Webster, British Diplomacy, Letter CXL, Castlereagh to Liverpool, 5 December 1814, 251-52; Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 356-57; Talleyrand, Correspondence, I, Letter XIII, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 25 November 1814, 166-68.
the Elbe. Prussia rejected Austria’s offer and claimed all of Saxony.107

Alexander, recognizing a possible Austro-French alliance sent Prince Czartoryski to seek French support. Alexander said he would not demand the sacrifice of all of Saxony and again offered Russian support to France on Italy. Prince Czartoryski asked Talleyrand if France would make any alliances if the Allies did not reach an agreement. Talleyrand replied, “I would be grieved at that.”108 Hardenberg, angry at Austria’s offer, sent parts of the Prussian correspondence with Metternich to Alexander I. The Czar became angry; but Metternich showed Alexander the Austrian correspondence with Hardenberg and dismissed the accusations.109 More complications followed. The German states took sides and thus delayed any settlement on the Confederation.

107 Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 262-64; Metternich, Memoirs, II, 571-72; d’Angeberg, Congrès de Vienne, II, Metternich to Hardenberg, 10 December 1814, 505-510; Webster, British Diplomacy, Letter CXXXIX, Castlereagh to Liverpool, 5 December 1814, 248-51 and Letter CXLI, Castlereagh to Liverpool, 7 December 1814, 255-57.

108 Talleyrand, Correspondence, I, Letter XXIX, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 15 December 1814, 206-07.

109 Gulick, Balance of Power, 222-23. See also Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 264-65, who says that Alexander I challenged Metternich to a duel.
until the Congress solved the Polish-Saxony problem. 110
The second period ended without any progress having been
made. Talleyrand again had denied Russia support and the
coalition had begun to crack.

Talleyrand was optimistic. In a letter to Louis
XVIII on 7 December 1814, he reported that the English
representative had orders to support Saxony. 111 Austria
had refused Prussia all of Saxony, 112 and the way was
open for French influence to affect the outcome. Talley­
rand was correct. The English government had sent
instructions to Castlereagh to be more cooperative with
France. However, he had previously mentioned the possi­
ability of war and suggested French and British mediation
after hostilities began. 113 Castlereagh withdrew British
consent of the transferral of Saxony, 114 and quoted from

110 Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 265.

111 Talleyrand, Correspondence, I, Letter XXVII,
Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 7 December 1814, 191-97.

112 Ibid., Letter XXIX, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII,
15 December 1814, 205-06.

113 Webster, British Diplomacy, Letter CXXXIX,
Castlereagh to Liverpool, 5 December 1814, 243-51 and
Letter CXL, Castlereagh to Liverpool 5 December 1814,
251-55. Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 357-60.

114 Webster, British Diplomacy, Letter CXLII,
Castlereagh to Liverpool, 7 December 1814, 255-57.
Liverpool's letter of 18 November to prove the strong feeling in England against Prussian acquisition. 115

With Austria and England both supporting Saxony, Talleyrand held a more important position. Metternich, hoping for some rapprochement with France approached Talleyrand and showed him the contents of the secret 10 December note to Hardenberg on Saxony. 116 This marked the beginning of the first split in the coalition. 117 Talleyrand wasted no time and, on 19 December, wrote Metternich a long letter thanking him for revealing the contents of the secret note and reiterating French views on Saxony. He explained in clear and precise language, the interrelationship between the balance of power and legitimacy. The states of Europe, he wrote, were governed by principles and those principles, even though the states could violate them, were sacred,

115 Ibid., Letter CXXX, Liverpool to Castlereagh, 18 November 1814, 235-36; Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 360-61. Webster says that the instructions from London had very little influence on Castlereagh who had already made up his mind.

116 Talleyrand, Correspondence, I, Letter XXIX, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 15 December 1814, 205-09; Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 267-68.

117 Ibid.
because they were human limitations which alone could halt the excesses of force.\textsuperscript{118}

Castlereagh, not thoroughly committed to the Austrian and French position, thought that every possible means should be tried before he gave up his plans for a settlement with Prussia.\textsuperscript{119} He visited Talleyrand to discuss the formation of a committee to study and verify the population statistics of the various disputed territories.\textsuperscript{120} Talleyrand used this opportunity to show Castlereagh a copy of the 19 December letter to Metternich. Castlereagh read the letter and returned it to Talleyrand without comment.\textsuperscript{121} Castlereagh, at this point, proposed the formation of a statistical committee and Talleyrand supported the idea. Talleyrand added that the committee should establish basic principles if it

\textsuperscript{118}Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 68-74. See also Freksa, Congress of Intrigue, 401-03; Metternich, Memoirs, II, No. 194, Talleyrand to Metternich, 12 December 1814, 592-99; d'Angeberg, Congrès de Vienne, II, Talleyrand to Metternich, 19 December 1814, 546-44. Metternich's Memoirs date the letter 12 December which is a mistake.

\textsuperscript{119}Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 368.

\textsuperscript{120}Talleyrand, Correspondence, I, Letter XXXIV, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 28 December 1814, 228; Gulick, Balance of Power, 235.

\textsuperscript{121}Talleyrand, Correspondence, I, Letter XXXIV, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 28 December 1814, 228.
wanted anything accomplished. Talleyrand mentioned the possibility of a French, British, and Austrian agreement recognizing the rights of the King of Saxony. Castlereagh did not give his consent, replying that an agreement was not necessary at this time.123

Castlereagh sent Lord Charles Stewart, his half-brother, to inform Talleyrand that the Allies agreed to the formation of a Statistical Committee but resented the inclusion of France. Talleyrand protested and said that if the Powers insisted on acting as if they were at Chaumont, France would withdraw from the Congress.124 The threat worked because the same day Talleyrand received a note inviting France to be a member of the committee.125 The Statistical Committee began work on 24 December and included some of the best workers at the Congress.126 The committee, considering all territory conquered by France, based the estimates on population. Talleyrand protested. He wanted qualitative considerations used in

122 Ibid., 228-29; Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 273.
123 Talleyrand, Correspondence, I, Letter XXXIV, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 28 December 1814, 228-30.
125 Ibid., 231.
126 Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 369; Talleyrand, Correspondence, I, Letter XXXIV, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 28 December 1814, 232.
addition to population. He thought that a Polish peasant would not be worth the same as a man from the left bank of the Rhine, and therefore the committee should consider this in addition to population.127 Though the committee used no other means of measuring except population, Talleyrand's suggestion had some influence on the members of the Congress.128

Since the Allies had reached no agreement on Poland and Saxony, Alexander I asked for official discussions concerning the problem.129 Castlereagh had received instructions which urged British rapprochement with France,130 and on 27 December he wrote Talleyrand asking his support for the British position on the question. In a meeting of the Four Powers on 29 December, Metternich and Castlereagh supported French admission to the discussions.131 Hardenberg and Nesselrode protested and Talleyrand was still not a member of the all important group, but the way was open since Metternich and Castlereagh

127Ibid., 231-32.
128Gulick, Balance of Power, 236.
129Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 319; Gulick, Balance of Power, 237.
130Webster, British Diplomacy, Letter CXLVII, Liverpool to Castlereagh, 23 December 1814, 267-68.
131Gulick, Balance of Power, 237; Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 370.
were cooperating with France. On 30 December, the Russians asked for all of the Duchy of Warsaw except Gnesen, Posen, and the former provinces of western Prussia which she reserved for Prussia, and the land on the right bank of the Vistula and Tarnopol which she proposed to give to Austria. Hardenberg threatened war if the proposal was not accepted, and Castlereagh ended the negotiations. On 31 December Castlereagh visited Talleyrand and protested against Russia. Again Talleyrand brought up the subject of an alliance and Castlereagh said that he would draft the proposal. On 1 January 1815, Castlereagh submitted his proposals to France and Austria; and on 3 January 1815, Great Britain, France, and Austria signed the secret Triple Alliance.

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132 Webster, British Diplomacy, Letter CLIV, Castlereagh to Liverpool, 1 January 1815, 276; Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 370.

133 Perrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 275.

134 Webster, British Diplomacy, Letter CLV, Castlereagh to Liverpool, 1 January 1815, 277-78; Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 370.

135 Webster, British Diplomacy, Letter CLVI, Castlereagh to Liverpool, 1 January 1815, 279; Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 275-76. See also Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 370.

136 Gulick, Balance of Power, 238-39; Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 370.
By the treaty the three powers secretly pledged mutual support in case any one of the three were attacked. France and Austria each promised 150,000 troops, and Great Britain promised the same in mercenaries or subsidies. The three would ask Bavaria, Hanover, and the Netherlands to join the alliance, and they would draw up a military plan of operations.¹³⁷ Talleyrand was elated. He wrote Louis XVIII: "... the coalition is dissolved and forever."¹³⁸ France was no longer alone, he declared, but "... in concert with two of the greatest Powers and three States of the second order, and will soon be in concert with all the States which are guided by other than revolutionary principles and maxims."¹³⁹ Talleyrand then listed all the deeds he performed and the events which contributed to the success of the alliance.¹⁴⁰

Adhering to the policy he had supported for twenty-five years, Talleyrand, in signing the alliance with Austria and Great Britain, helped establish a balance,

¹³⁷Gulick, Balance of Power, 238-39; Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 276; d'Angeberg, Congrès de Vienne, II, 589-91.

¹³⁸Talleyrand, Correspondence, I, Letter XXXVI, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 4 January 1815, 242.

¹³⁹Ibid.

¹⁴⁰Ibid., 242-43.
which, he said, was the guarantee that one of the powers could not obtain dominance and rupture the established order. If Prussia obtained Saxony then she would dominate all of Germany. France, by the treaty of 3 January, kept her position safe and divided the coalition formed against her. Talleyrand, in supporting Prussian claims, would have relinquished the principle of legitimacy which he had so cleverly brought back from the past and used for the future safety of Europe.¹⁴¹

Though he might have done so, he did not use his position to bargain for the extension of the French frontiers. The alliance guaranteed the French frontiers as established by the First Treaty of Paris, and Talleyrand expressed satisfaction with this arrangement. He thought France, after her defeat, would become great only if she remained within the territorial limitations of her former boundaries.¹⁴²

¹⁴¹Talleyrand, Correspondence, I, iv-xx; Cooper, Talleyrand, 257; Brinton, Lives, 178-79.

¹⁴²Gulick, Balance of Power, 240-42; Talleyrand, Correspondence, I, x; Broglie, Memoirs, II, 117-18; Webster, British Diplomacy, Letter CLX, Castlereagh to Liverpool, 5 January 1815, 282. See also Louis Adolphe Thiers, History of the Consulate and the Empire of France under Napoleon, trans. by D. Forbes Campbell and John Stebbing (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1895), XI, 20-22 who says France should not have signed the First Treaty of Paris and should have used her position to bargain for territory. Hereafter cited as Thiers, History of the Empire.
Due to Talleyrand's successful diplomacy, war did not take place. Early in January Metternich and Castlereagh accepted Russian plans for Poland. Russia received most of the Duchy of Warsaw which was later proclaimed the Kingdom of Poland under the Czar of Russia. Russia gave Poland a constitution and promises of independence. However, independence was a dead letter and the Congress Kingdom of Poland was never what Alexander I had promised.\(^\text{143}\) Since Russia received what she wanted, the alliance, it would seem, was not necessary.\(^\text{144}\) Besides, it is doubtful whether France or Great Britain, or Austria could have fulfilled their pledges, and Prussia and Russia were not prepared for war.\(^\text{145}\) Nevertheless, in concluding the alliance, Austria and Britain had a partner in restraining Russia from increasing her territory in the future.\(^\text{146}\) The way was now open for a compromise in Saxony.

On 3 January 1815, Metternich supported French admission to the meeting held on that day. Hardenberg, 

\(^{143}\)Nicholson, \textit{Congress of Vienna}, 179-80; Ferrero, \textit{Reconstruction of Europe}, 277; Gulick, \textit{Balance of Power}, 244-46; Webster, \textit{Foreign Policy of Castlereagh}, 380-82.

\(^{144}\)Ferrero, \textit{Reconstruction of Europe}, 278.


\(^{146}\)Ferrero, \textit{Reconstruction of Europe}, 278.
Humboldt and Capo d'Istria, not knowing of the secret treaty, opposed, thinking that they could work out a solution before France entered into the picture. On 9 January Castlereagh wrote a memorandum on French admission. The Powers accepted; and France, recognized as a first class power, came to a meeting the same day. Rumors had been circulating about the alliance since early December, and at the meeting of 9 January, British, Austrian, and French joint action was obvious.

Alexander, now that his Polish plans were satisfied, was ready to make concessions concerning Saxony. On 12 January, Prussia asked for all of Saxony. Austria and Great Britain opposed the plans. Discussions began for a settlement of the Prussian demands with some difficulties over the proposed numerical arrangements and differences of opinion about the proposed territorial arrangements. Castlereagh favored giving

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147 Webster, *British Diplomacy*, Letter CLXII, Castlereagh to Liverpool, 11 January 1815, 285-86.


Prussia a large part of Saxony and the city of Torgau. Metternich and Talleyrand opposed because of the potential military threat to Austria. On 29 January, Austria and England proposed a settlement which offered Prussia 800,000 "subjects" in Saxony. The Prussians refused because Leipzig was not included in the offer. Castlereagh, recalled by the English government during the last part of January, wanted a settlement on Saxony before he left. Inducing Russia and others to make concessions, on 8 February, the parties reached an agreement and divided Saxony. Prussia received more than half of territorial Saxony but less than half of the population. As compensation for the exclusion of Leipzig, she received Thorn from Russia, an area with 50,000 population from Hanover, and 100,000 "souls" from Holland. Saxony received less than the 1,500,000 population that France desired. Nevertheless, Saxony would still be a second class power and France consented to the agreement.

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151 Talleyrand, Correspondence, I, Letter XLV, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 25 January 1815, 277-78, and Letter XLIX, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 1 February 1815, 294-97 for proposals and plans. See also d'Angeberg, Congrès de Vienne, II, 644-60 for the Statistical Committee report.

152 Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 283.

153 Talleyrand, Correspondence, II, Letter LII, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 8 February 1815, 2-5; Gulick, Balance of Power, 247.
1,200,000 people with Dresden, Leipzig, Bautzen, and territory on the Bohemian frontier. Cracow would be a free city.\textsuperscript{154} At the conclusion of the settlement, Saxony emerged, considerably reduced in size, and Prussia, with her rewards gained from Saxony, Poland, and west German territory became the chief defender of the Rhine.\textsuperscript{155} The only remaining problem would be to obtain the consent of the King of Saxony.

After the news of Napoleon's escape from Elba reached the Congress,\textsuperscript{156} everyone was anxious to conclude the deliberations and unfinished business. Metternich, Talleyrand, and Wellington, who had replaced Castlereagh in mid-February, left for Pressburg on 9 March to present the King of Saxony with the decisions made regarding Saxon lands.\textsuperscript{157} Each minister talked separately with the King who refused to agree to the arrangements. Talleyrand, however, thought the King's refusal to be more of a protest performed for the

\textsuperscript{154}Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 286; Talleyrand, Correspondence, II, Letter LII, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 6 February 1815, 2-5; Gulick, Balance of Power, 247-48; Webster, British Diplomacy, Letter CLXXII, Castlereagh to Liverpool, 6 February 1815, 299-302.

\textsuperscript{155}Gulick, Balance of Power, 248.

\textsuperscript{156}Talleyrand, Correspondence, II, Letter LXIV, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 7 March 1815, 71.

\textsuperscript{157}Ibid., 71-75.
benefit of the Saxon people, since the King wanted to give the impression of yielding under pressure. At the same time Russia asked for the establishment of civil administration in that part of Saxony awarded to her. The Congress therefore ceded the lands without Saxon consent. The King of Saxony, nevertheless, agreed to the arrangements on 20 May 1815 and concluded the Polish-Saxony problem.

Thus, Talleyrand had succeeded in keeping Prussia from obtaining all of Saxony, allowing her only the vacant ecclesiastical provinces which were largely Catholic and would be harder to assimilate. The parts of the Rhenish provinces she received were not contiguous with Prussia and made her less of a threat to Austria. However, the acquisition of the Rhineland promoted Prussia to the leading power in Northern Germany, but her ability to dominate was balanced by Austria. His support of Saxony, using the principle of legitimacy to establish the equilibrium, guaranteed French security and the balance of

158 Ibid., Letter LXVI, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 12 March 1815, 78-79.
159 Ibid.
161 Ibid., Note 2, 83, d'Angeberg, Congrès de Vienne, III, 1206.
power. Also, by preventing Prussian seizure of Luxem-
bourg and Mayence, the Prussian border was not contiguous
with France in any place. Talleyrand's conduct during
the Polish-Saxon problem illustrates the state interest
effect on the balance of power theory. Talleyrand, in
concentrating on Saxony, presented a more French nationalist
view than Metternich and Castlereagh who concentrated on
Poland. Both Metternich and Castlereagh thought that
French support would force Prussia to back down since
Prussia was willing to receive compensation elsewhere and
Alexander I was not. However, Talleyrand in concen-
trating on Saxony was able to achieve the elevation of

162 Sainte-Aulaire, Talleyrand, 272-78; Talleyrand,
Correspondence, II, Letter C, Report Presented to the
King During His Journey from Ghent to Paris, June 1815,
224-29; Brinton, Lives, 178-79; Nicholson, Congress of
Vienna, 180-81; Hannah Alice Straus, The Attitude of the
Congress of Vienna toward Nationalism in Germany, Italy,
and Poland (New York: Columbia University Press, 1949),
57-69, hereafter cited as Straus, Nationalism; See also
Golo Mann, Secretary of Europe, 220-26.

163 Talleyrand, Correspondence, II, Letter C, Report
Presented to the King During His Journey to Ghent, June
1815, 229; Broglie, Memoirs, II, 208-09.

164 Gulick, Balance of Power, 232; See also Ferrero,
Reconstruction of Europe, 168, who says Talleyrand suc-
cessfully combined the principle of the law of nations
and the interests of the French and Gulick, Balance of
Power, 233, who speculates that if Talleyrand had joined
the Allies before 24 October a four power bloc against
Alexander would have been successful.

165 Webster, British Diplomacy, Letter CXXXII, Castlereagh to Liverpool, 21 November 1814, 239-40.
France to a responsible first class power and to dissolve the coalition that was still in effect against her.
CHAPTER IV

THE ITALIAN SOLUTION

The Italian settlement became another problem for the French delegation at Vienna. Talleyrand's policy favored the expulsion of Murat and the prevention of Austrian domination of the Peninsula. To achieve these ends, he desired Italy divided into several states and under several influences. If Austria became the dominant power, Talleyrand feared that Italy would break away and become independent. France wanted Ferdinand IV restored as the legitimate ruler of the Kingdom of Naples. Tuscany France desired returned to the legitimate ruler, the Queen of Etruria.¹ In supporting the Queen of Etruria, Talleyrand brought up the question of all legitimacies, living and dead, which tried to regain the claims they had lost. These dead and dying legitimacies, some of them mere pieces of parchment, disappeared in the Revolution. Their reincarnation was impossible, but sometimes another problem arose. The

¹Broglie, Memoirs, II, 173-75.
different forms of legitimacy collided. Such was the case of Tuscany.²

France recognized the Queen of Etruria as the legitimate sovereign of Tuscany and she was. Tuscany, ceded to Napoleon in 1801, was in turn ceded to the Duke of Parma as indemnification for the cessation of the Duchy of Parma and became the Kingdom of Etruria. Charles IV, King of Spain and father-in-law of the Duke of Parma, paid for the Duchy with Louisiana and a large amount of money. In 1807, however, Napoleon transformed the Kingdom of Etruria into a département of France and promised the Queen of Etruria, widow of the Duke of Parma who had become regent after her husband's death, the Kingdom of Lusitania which he planned to create in Portugal. The promise was never fulfilled and Talleyrand's Instructions supported the return of Tuscany to the Queen.³ However, complications arose. Tuscany had two legitimate sovereigns.

Ferdinand III, the former Grand Duke of Tuscany, ceded Tuscany to Napoleon in 1801 in return for the Duchy of Wurzburg in Germany. The Grand Duke returned to Tuscany in September 1814 and assumed the position of ruler. The Grand Duke Ferdinand, brother of the Austrian Emperor was also a legitimate ruler, and the people of Tuscany

²Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 199-200.
³Broglie, Memoirs, II, 175-76; Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 198-200.
recognized him as their sovereign. Since Ferdinand was
the brother of the Austrian Emperor, the removal of
Ferdinand and the restoration of the Queen of Etruria
was a difficult task. The Austrian court would consider
it an insult if the Congress removed Ferdinand. The
Instructions realized the delicate situation and said
that if the restoration of the Queen of Etruria proved
too difficult, France would persuade her to accept the
duchies of Parma, Piacenza, and Guastalla as compensation.
The latter, however, were promised by the Treaty of
Fontainbleau to Marie Louise and her son, the King of
Rome. 4

From the beginning Murat presented a problem.
Austria, by a treaty on 11 January 1814, guaranteed
Murat's lands and an increase of territory with 400,000
population. The increase was to be obtained from lands
taken from the Pope. Murat, in return for the guarantee,
had switched sides and attacked the French armies in
Italy under Eugène de Beauharnais. Lord William Bentick,
British minister at Palermo, landed at Leghorn, and on
9 March 1814, issued a proclamation calling for Italians
to rise up in defense of their liberties and promised
British support to the Sicilian Bourbons. Murat, con-
sidering a possible treaty of neutrality with Eugène,

4Ibid.
resumed negotiations with the French commander upon hearing about the declaration. The situation remained the same until the abdication of Napoleon. Then, by a convention between the French commander and Austria, Eugène left Italy and Murat returned to Naples. England, too, had approved the treaty guaranteeing Murat his lands, and at Vienna Castlereagh was prepared to adapt his Italian policy to that of Metternich.

The Italian settlement at the Congress centered around Murat since the outcome of the other territories in Italy ultimately depended on the expulsion of the King of Naples. The question of Murat, however, was never directly approached. Metternich, at the beginning of the Congress proposed rules of admittance which neither admitted nor excluded Murat's representative. Talleyrand's proposals, on the other hand, would exclude Murat's representative from the Congress. The delegates accepted Metternich's proposals. Metternich's actions are clear. He feared that Murat would use force if the Congress

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5Nicholson, Congress of Vienna, 191-92; Metternich, Memoirs, II, 582; Gulick, Balance of Power, 254; Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 201.

6Metternich, Memoirs, II, 582; Nicholson, Congress of Vienna, 188-89; Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 397.

7Talleyrand, Correspondence, I, Letter IV, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 9 October 1814, 39-40.
excluded his plenipotentiary and Austria was not prepared
to fight in Italy.8 Talleyrand argued that the treaty
Austria had signed with Murat was void since it guaranteed
lands which did not belong to him.9 Metternich, realizing
force was necessary to expel Murat, who had placed himself
at the head of the discontent and revolutionary forces in
Italy, wanted a delay. Austria was not prepared to fight
in Italy and not under any circumstances did she want
France to go into Italy again.10 As a result, Metternich
on 11 November, in the first discussions on the Italian
problem, proposed that the Congress consider the problems
of Italy in order of their geographical positions from
north to south. He wanted to delay the subject of Murat.
Metternich told Talleyrand, "The force of circumstances
will necessarily bring back the House of Bourbon to the
throne of Naples."11 Talleyrand replied, "The force of
circumstances appears to me to be now at its full height;
it is at the Congress that this question must end."12

8Ibid., Murat's plenipotentiary at Vienna was Campo-
Chairo.

9Supra., Chapter II, p. 42.

10Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 201; Metternich,
Memoirs, II, 584.

11Talleyrand, Correspondence, I, Letter XV, Talley-
rand to Louis XVIII, 5 November 1814, 117; Ferrero,
Reconstruction of Europe, 201-202.

12Ibid.
Talleyrand consented to the geographical order for discussions; but when Metternich mentioned Murat's supporters in Italy, Talleyrand answered, "Organize Italy, and he will no longer have any. Put an end to a provisional situation which is detestable." Metternich, Talleyrand wrote Louis XVIII, continually used the word "complications" in describing the affairs of Italy "... so as to keep up the vagueness which his weak policy requires ..." Metternich, therefore, circumvented the problem by the geographical arrangement of discussion. The Congress first would consider Sardinia. These first negotiations concerning Italy (November) become important when viewed as part of the basic principle of legitimacy. Talleyrand could not support a unified Italy because there was no one legitimate sovereign. On the other hand, he could not recognize Murat's kingdom side by side with legitimate governments. Murat, seeking legitimacy, would use force and involve all of Europe in war.

The only official settlement made concerning Italy during the last part of 1814 was the incorporation of Genoa in Piedmont, for the second article of the First

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13Talleyrand, Correspondence, I, Letter XV, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 6 November 1814, 118.
14Ibid., 117.
15Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 202-03.
Treaty of Paris promised the King of Sardinia an increase in territory there. The port of Genoa, the article stipulated, would remain free. Thus, the first meeting of Italian affairs on 11 November began with a proposal to give Genoa to the King of Sardinia by a treaty guaranteeing her institutions and privileges. Castlereagh argued for a free port at Genoa and low transit rates through Piedmont. The Spanish delegate, Labrador, objected and argued that the Congress was the only one who could decide the fate of Genoa. He wanted the Congress to appoint a committee on Italian affairs. Metternich, seeking a delay, wanted geographical consideration for the Italian problems and he said that the First Treaty of Paris had already decided the matter. Talleyrand, since he did not wish any kind of revision to the Treaty, supported Metternich. At the next meeting Talleyrand, Nesselrode, and Castlereagh agreed to the union of Genoa and Piedmont and agreed to communicate a protocol to that effect to the deputy from Genoa.

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16Talleyrand, Correspondence, I, Letter XVIII, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 12 November 1814, 130; Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 206-07.

17Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 206-07.

18Ibid., 207.

19Talleyrand, Correspondence, I, Letter XVIII, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 12 November 1814, 133.
occasion to bring up the question of succession to
the kingship of Sardinia. The French instructions
supported the accession of the Savoy-Carignan branch to
the Sardinian throne after the death of the present King,
Victor Emmanuel I. Since neither Victor Emmanuel I nor
his brother, Charles Felix, had any sons and the reigning
dynastic order prevented female succession. France, in
order to thwart a possible Austrian acquisition of the
House of Savoy, wished to assure the order of succes­sion. The outcome of the affairs of Genoa corresponded
with French wishes. The Committee prepared the articles
which incorporated Genoa into Piedmont. By 7 December
1814, Talleyrand could report that the Genoa discussions
were complete and granted everything France wished.
Talleyrand, nevertheless, instructed Noailles not to
accept the arrangements of Piedmont except as part of
the settlement made for the whole of Italy. The next

20 Ibid.
21 Supra., Chapter II, p. 38.
22 Broglie, Memoirs, II, 165-67; Talleyrand, Correspondence, I, Letter XV, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 6 November 1814, 120, Note 4.
23 Talleyrand, Correspondence, I, Letter XXVII, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 7 December 1814, 196. See also Great Britain, Cobbett's Parliamentary Debates, XXIX (7 April 1815), 403-15. Hereafter cited as Great Britain, Debates.
24 Talleyrand, Correspondence, I, Letter XXII, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 25 November 1814, 169.
questions, Tuscany and Parma, however, depended on Murat, and therefore, the Congress reached no decision until the completion of the affairs of Naples.

Thus, Naples became the major problem, and Metternich, by delaying the decisions, bought time for Austria. Talleyrand protested against Metternich's actions concerning Naples, for he received news that Austria had sold Murat twenty-five thousand muskets. He protested and asked Metternich, who denied the charges, how Austria could fear Murat and at the same time sell him guns.25

Various reports of Murat's activities reached Vienna. From the beginning, Murat's representative attempted to influence British opinion in favor of Murat, although Castlereagh and Wellington, as early as September 1814, were considering a way to overthrow him. However, British opinions at home supported Murat, and the many British visitors at the court in Naples, whom Murat entertained, gave the latter encouragement. Castlereagh looked for evidence and hoped that the papers of the Earl of Oxford, seized in Paris, would provide a way for England to oppose Murat.26 However, the papers seized revealed none of

25Ibid., 164.

26Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 397-98; Talleyrand, Correspondence, I, Letter XXVI, Blacas to Talleyrand, 4 December 1814, 185-86 and Note 1, 88. See also Arnauil-François de Jaucourt, Correspondence du Comte de Jaucourt, Minister Intérimaire des Affaires
Murat's activities, but other reports of the affairs in Italy continued to circulate in Vienna.

The French consul at Leghorn reported revolutionary activity in Italy and informed Talleyrand that Napoleon, from Elba, was recruiting officers. Talleyrand was convinced and the letter supported his convictions that Italy would not remain peaceful long unless the Congress disposed of Napoleon and Murat. Talleyrand communicated the information indirectly to Castlereagh who seemed concerned and went to Metternich. Metternich remained obstinate. He supported the opposite view, Talleyrand reported.

However, the need for French cooperation during the Polish-Saxon discussions brought more concrete action from Castlereagh. He instructed Lord Bentinck, now commander-in-chief in Italy, who was only too happy to


27Talleyrand, Correspondence, I, Letter XXX, Louis XVIII to Talleyrand, 18 December 1814, 215.

28Ibid., Letter XXVII, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 7 December 1814, 195-96. See Talleyrand, Correspondence, I, Letter XXVII, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 7 December 1814, Note 3, 198-99 for a copy of the letter.

29Talleyrand, Correspondence, I, Letter XXVII, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 7 December 1814, 195-96.
assist, to seek evidence of Murat's treasonable activity in late 1813 and early 1814. Talleyrand, to appease Castlereagh, proposed the formation of a commission to deal with the slave trade and hoped for English action with France on Italian affairs. Castlereagh showed Talleyrand the correspondence with Lord Bentinck and asked Talleyrand for his opinions on the Napolitan question. Talleyrand thought that England would cooperate with France on the Napolitan question except that she had made certain promises which were difficult to break. Talleyrand, somewhat encouraged, promised to look for evidence against Murat. He also provided Castlereagh with a letter explaining French views on Naples.

Metternich worried about the effect of Murat on the rest of Italy and Austrian efforts for a rapprochement with France during the Polish-Saxony negotiations.

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30 Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 399.
31 Talleyrand, Correspondence, I, Letter XXIX, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 15 December 1814, 211; Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 399.
32 Talleyrand, Correspondence, I, Letter XXIX, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 15 December 1814, 211-12.
33 Ibid., 211; Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 399; d'Angeberg, Congrès de Vienne, II, Talleyrand to Castlereagh, 13 December 1814, 525-26; Great Britain, Debates, XXX (14 April 1815), 615. For proof of Murat's communication with Napoleon see Talleyrand, Correspondence, I, Letter XXIX, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 15 December 1814, Note 3, 214.
in December, altered his opinion about Murat. He, however, wanted concessions from France in return for Austrian support to overthrow Murat, and went behind Talleyrand's back to Louis XVIII and Blacas in Paris late in December 1814. He wanted Talleyrand instructed not to resist Austrian claims that the Congress should not consider the affairs of Naples. By the end of January the King finally agreed, probably because the English promised not to join the expedition against Murat.

Talleyrand, in the meantime, not knowing of the talks in Paris, continued negotiations. Shortly after the secret alliance, he began to press for a settlement on the other Italian affairs. He helped propose a plan which gave the Queen of Etruria Parma, Piacenza and Guastalla; the Pope would receive the Legations; and the Grand Duke of Tuscany, Lucca, Presidi and sovereignty over Piombino and Elba after Napoleon's death. The plan offered Marie Louise a pension and certain fiefs in Bohemia belonging to the Grand Duke of Tuscany. Austria held up negotiations for a month. "The Italian affairs make no progress; they all

34 Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 402.
35 Ibid.
stop in the bureau of Prince Metternich" reported the French
plenipotentiaries in a letter of 24 January 1815.36

Austria finally sent a counter proposal which would
give the Queen of Etruria the duchies, with the exception
of Piacenza and offer Lucca to the Archduchess, Marie
Louise, for life. The proposal also made provisions for
Marie Louise to receive two pensions, one from France and
one from Austria. Austria would receive Piacenza, the
Valtelline, Lucca after the death of Marie Louise, a
portion of Mantua on the right bank of the Po and the
imperial fiefs. France protested against the pension,
the reversion of Lucca, and Austrian acquisition of the
imperial fiefs. Metternich discussed the Austrian counter
proposals with Talleyrand and seemed ready to work out a
compromise. However, he had not consulted Marie Louise.
She refused her consent; and argued that although she was
willing to accept something other than Parma, she wanted
the equivalent. As an alternative the Legations, Talley-
rand said, could compensate the Queen of Etruria, but the
papal representative would not relinquish what belonged
to the Holy See and the Queen of Etruria refused to

36Talleyrand, Correspondence, II, Letter LIII,
Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 15 February 1815, 16-17;
Note 6, 32.
accept them. Metternich asked for more time to consider the proposals. More than likely he sought a delay until he worked out arrangements with Louis XVIII.

Talleyrand, at the same time continued to press Castlereagh for support in Italy. He promised Castlereagh that France would agree to the abolition of the slave trade if England acted with France on the question of Naples and he thought that Castlereagh wanted the expulsion of Murat and would convince his government. Castlereagh promised to send Talleyrand the reply of the English government by letter after they reached a decision. Talleyrand wanted the English government to recognize Ferdinand IV as the legitimate sovereign of Naples. He thought England reluctant because of the promises she had made to Murat and because of the desire to insure some means for the success of his removal.

England, Talleyrand reported, became more agreeable during the latter part of Castlereagh's stay in Vienna. Castlereagh approached Alexander I and he told Metternich

37 Talleyrand, Correspondence, II, Letter LIII, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 15 February 1815, 18-19; Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 200, 282; Metternich, Memoirs, II, 581.

38 Talleyrand, Correspondence, II, Letter LIII, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 15 February 1815, 19; Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 402-403.
to take the necessary steps in Italy. However, Talleyrand did not think either Castlereagh or Wellington, who was in Vienna at this time, considered the question of legitimacy. They (Castlereagh and Wellington) detest the man and not the principle. "The principles on which the English act in India prevent their having any exact ideas as to legitimacy," Talleyrand wrote Louis XVIII. Nevertheless, Talleyrand continued to press his demands.

He approached the Czar on the question of Naples and reminded Alexander of his promises to support France during the Polish-Saxon negotiations. Alexander I, after bringing up several other subjects, told Talleyrand that Russia would give France support in favor of the Sicilian Bourbons. However, Alexander's promises, Talleyrand wrote the department on 27 February 1815, were not the same as his talks with others close to him. He feared that the Czar would support Murat. Nevertheless, Talleyrand had another proposal for his King to consider.

\[340\text{Ibid.}, \text{Correspondence, II, Letter LIII, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 15 February 1815, 20-22.}\]
\[40\text{Ibid.}, 22-23.\]
\[41\text{Ibid.}, 23.\]
\[42\text{Ibid.}, 24.\]
\[43\text{Ibid.}, 28; Note 24, Talleyrand to the Department, 27 February 1815, 39.\]
England, in exchange for the abolition of the slave trade, proposed to offer an indemnity to Murat. Talleyrand asked Louis XVIII to consider the alternatives. He did not know that Louis XVIII in Paris was about to make an agreement on the Napolitan question and would ultimately concede to Austria.

Louis XVIII's consent to his minister's arrangements with Austria reached Vienna before Castlereagh left for England, and he stopped in Paris and negotiated an agreement on the Italian question. Essentially Metternich obtained all of his desires. Austria gave in about Murat and France consented to Austrian wishes in northern Italy. Louis XVIII consented and said he would allow Marie Louise to have the duchies of Parma, Piacenza and Guastalla if the Queen of Etruria received Lucca and the State of Presidi; and that after the Archduchess's death, Parma would revert to the Queen of Etruria and Lucca and the State of Presidi to Tuscany. Castlereagh seemed agreeable but they did not work out the details. Louis XVIII instructed Talleyrand to negotiate with Metternich and

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44 Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 403.

45 Talleyrand, Correspondence, II, Letter LX, Louis XVIII to Talleyrand, 3 March 1815, 56-57; Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 403; Webster, British Diplomacy, Letter CLXXVIII, Castlereagh to Wellington, 28 February, 1815, 308-09.
Wellington for French objectives, but French influence, ultimately, had little effect at Vienna since the return of Napoleon made French attempts for a settlement almost void.\textsuperscript{46}

Castlereagh and Metternich, therefore, agreed on the question of Murat as decided by the negotiations with Louis XVIII. Unless Murat consented, even before Napoleon's return, they knew that an uprising would take place in Italy.\textsuperscript{47} Austria sent troops into Italy,\textsuperscript{48} and Murat after the news of Napoleon's return took advantage of the confusion and moved his troops north to meet the Austrian armies.\textsuperscript{49} Murat advanced north and reached the Legations on 30 March. The Austrian army fought and retreated on 8 April 1814.\textsuperscript{50} Murat made one last attempt and sent a note, on 8 April by his representative, to Vienna. He claimed adherence to the alliance but on 7 April Austria had annexed Lombardy and the Venetian provinces; and on

\textsuperscript{46}Talleyrand, Correspondence, II, Letter LXII, Louis XVIII to Talleyrand, 5 March 1814, 66-67.

\textsuperscript{47}Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 404; Webster, British Diplomacy, Letter CLXXX, Castlereagh to Wellington, 12 March 1815, 310.

\textsuperscript{48}Talleyrand, Correspondence, II, Letter LXI, Talleyrand to Louis, 3 March 1815, 64.

\textsuperscript{49}Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 404-405.

\textsuperscript{50}Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 301; Talleyrand, Correspondence, II, Letter XXXIII, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 3 April 1815, 135.
10 April 1815, Metternich answered that Austria considered Murat's actions a declaration of war. Austria declared war on 12 April 1815, and Austrian troops pushed southward. By 2 May 1815 they were in Naples. Previously, on 29 April 1815, Austria signed a treaty with Ferdinand IV by which the latter secretly promised a sum of twenty-five million francs for the restoration of his throne. Murat went to France and offered his services to Napoleon who refused. Then, on 20 May, Murat signed the Treaty of Casalanza and relinquished his throne.

Murat's downfall, therefore, came about by his own actions rather than anything done by Talleyrand or Louis XVIII. The news of Napoleon's escape and the Hundred Days, nevertheless, lessened any influence Talleyrand might have had on the Italian settlement. The Congress

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51 Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 301-02. For the declaration see Talleyrand, Correspondence, II, Letter LXXXVIII, Appendix to No. 51, Letter LXXXVII, Declaration against Murat, 156-60; d'Angeberg, Congrès de Vienne, III, 1061-62.

52 d'Angeberg, Congrès de Vienne, III, 1065-68.

53 Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 406; Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 302; d'Angeberg, Congrès de Vienne, III, 1126-28; Talleyrand, Correspondence, II, Letter XCII, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 1 May 1815, 190.

54 Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 302; Gulick, Balance of Power, 254-55; Nicholson, Congress of Vienna, Appendix, Chapter IV, No. 4, 286-87.

55 Webster, Congress of Vienna, 126; Brinton, Lives, 179.
agreed to the establishment of Ferdinand IV as the King of Naples and insured the succession of the House of Carignan in Savoy. Other agreements were in accordance with the wishes of Austria, and Talleyrand did not object. The duchies of Parma, Piacenza and Guastalla went to Marie Louise for life although the succession was left for a later date. Lucca, revertible to Tuscany, went to the Queen of Etruria and her descendants, and the Pope regained the Legations of Ravenna, Bologna, and Ferrara. Tuscany went to the former Grand Duke of Tuscany, Ferdinand III.\footnote{Webster, Congress of Vienna, 127-28; Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 303-04; Gulich, Balance of Power, 255; Talleyrand, Correspondence, II, Letter C, Report Presented to the King During His Journey from Ghent to Paris, June 1815, 228-29, 245.} France obtained what she wanted in Italy. Whether by Talleyrand actions or luck the Italian settlement accomplished what the Instructions stipulated. The expulsion of Murat, the restoration of the Sicilian Bourbons, the increase to the House of Savoy with the succession of the House of Carignan were all part of the French instructions. The settlement was not unpleasing to Talleyrand. He wanted to prevent Austrian domination of the Peninsula which he felt would cause Italy to break away and become independent. Therefore, by insuring the House of Carignan as successor in Sardinia and the Bourbon
restoration in Naples, France could diminish Austrian influence and at the same time secure her own interests.\textsuperscript{57}

CHAPTER V

OTHER SETTLEMENTS AT THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA

France, as a member of other committees concerned with questions such as the abolition of the slave trade, the regulation of navigation on the rivers, and the new system of diplomatic precedence, could exert her influence on other decisions made at Vienna; and as a member of the Committee on the Affairs of Switzerland, she was able to help establish a Swiss Confederation of twenty-two cantons with a constitution and ultimately a guarantee of neutrality. France, at first excluded from the Swiss Committee, became a member in return for French consent to the delay of the opening of the Congress. Metternich, in early November, proposed a delay of the Congress until the Allies reached an agreement on certain problems. Talleyrand consented; and in return, Metternich proposed French membership on the Swiss Committee.¹ Talleyrand nominated Dalberg as the French representative.

Switzerland, in the fall of 1814, was a confusing situation. Napoleon, by the Act of Mediation in 1802,
gave Switzerland a perpetual alliance with France, recognized the sovereignty of the cantons, and restored the Diet. The government of mediation, at the same time, allowed some revolutionary ideas to spread in Switzerland. It allowed the liberation of Vaud and Aargau and the democratization of several cantons. The government was not an outright imposed government, since, although the aristocratic cantons had opposed the mediation government, the more liberal ones who supported the ideas of liberty and more equality had accepted it. Then, on 21 December 1813, the Allies violated the neutrality of Switzerland and the aristocratic group began to demand the restoration of the Old Regime. The aristocratic and democratic cantons each set up a Diet and refused to agree. The Allies promised to uphold the territorial integrity of the nineteen existing cantons if the Diet drew up and approved a constitution. On 12 September 1815 the Diet approved the Federal Pact which provided for a confederation. However the two opposing forces remained unsatisfied.2

2Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 208-09; Nicholson, Congress of Vienna, Appendix I, Chapter XII, No. 4, 294-95. The aristocratic cantons were Berne, Lucerne, Fribourg, and Soleure; the democratic cantons, Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden; the guild cantons, Basle, Zürich, and Schaffhausen.
Berne threatened the Confederation as presented by the Federal Pact. She wanted the territories of Vaud and Aargau which, she said, were hers. Berne claimed that these territories, never ceded to any one, belonged to her. She demanded Aargau and said that she would accept indemnities from the Canton of Vaud. As an argument for her claims, she reinforced the principle of legitimacy. The Congress could not support Berne's claims against a government not imposed by force. The new government supported by the Allies named Aargau and Vaud as two of the nineteen cantons and the Congress, to uphold Berne's claims, would have to use force or allow a civil war. On the other hand, the Congress, by denying Berne's claims, would cease to uphold the principle of legitimacy.\(^3\)

France, in the *Instructions*, wanted Switzerland's neutrality guaranteed.\(^4\) She would support Berne and help persuade her to accept compensation.

Perhaps the problem was best explained by a Russian note of 16 November 1814. Freiherr vorn and zum Heinrich Stein and Capo d'Istria declared that the Act of Mediation, though abolished by the Diet's decree of 29 December 1813, was not entirely worthless and, therefore, not

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\(^3\)Ferrero, *Reconstruction of Europe*, 210-11.

retroactive. The Federal Pact guaranteed the integrity of the existing cantons and the claimant power, Berne, could not abolish the two cantons, Aargau and Vaud, by claiming the negation of the Act of Mediation or the desire of the powers.5

Berne wanted the part of Aargau she formerly controlled and Geneva offered her approval only if Berne received a part of the territory. Geneva wanted, from France in return, a portion of Gex on Lake Geneva with a population of 10-12,000.6 Geneva, in return, offered France an area with two times the population from the Bishopric of Basle.7 Louis XVIII consented to the transfer if it proved impossible to prevent the spoilation of the Prince Bishop of Basle. Louis XVIII wanted the King of Sardinia to receive what belonged to him, the restitution of Aargau to Berne, free Catholic religion in that portion of Gex given to Geneva,8 and free navigation for France on Lake Geneva.9 Talleyrand

5Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 214-15.
6Broglie, Memoirs, II, No. 11A, The King's Ambassadors to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 6 November 1814, 298-300.
7Ibid., 300.
8Gex was bounded by Lake Geneva, and the chief town was Versoix.
9Talleyrand, Correspondence, I, Letter XIX, Louis XVIII to Talleyrand, 15 November 1814, 135-36.
received the authorization and approved of the arrangements which exchanged a portion of Gex for Porentruy, of which the bishop of Basle had assumed spiritual administration. He could not regain what he had lost since he lost the territory by conquest, and because of the general consolidation of the German ecclesiastical states in 1803. The Prince Bishop would present no problems, but the King's insistence on the restitution of Aargau to Berne might become an obstacle. Talleyrand suggested giving a few bailiwicks of Aargau and a part of the Bishopric of Basle to Berne to satisfy her. However, the committee reached no decision.

Talleyrand complained of the delays in the Swiss affairs. He claimed that the Allies tried to draw the Swiss away from France, but the Swiss remained friendly. The cantons supported the Bourbons and the previous Allied plan to unite Switzerland with Germany failed. Talleyrand was confident that France would receive what she wanted in Switzerland. He wanted some plan acceptable to Berne and to France. Louis XVIII agreed to Talleyrand's proposals. He said he wanted Switzerland to exist as before, but, since that was impossible, he

10Ibid., Letter XXIV, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 30 November 1814, 174-75.

11Ibid., 175-76.
would be happy as long as the arrangements satisfied Berne. However, British and Russian maneuvers made the French proposals unacceptable in their present form.

England, anxious for France to cede the territory in Gex, supported Geneva. England showed the Genevese representatives a French report which considered destroying the nineteen cantons in favor of Berne, and the Geneva representative presented a counterproposal which would deprive the King of Sardinia of territory. France disapproved; and England, although she wished to strengthen the Swiss southern frontiers, could not support the Genevese plan to deprive Piedmont of Genoa. France refused the exchange of Gex since the King of Sardinia would lose territory. However, later the British were more successful; and after the Second Treaty of Paris, Geneva received Versoix. Another problem was the Valtelline. England and Russia both supported giving the Valtelline to Switzerland while France did not object to Austrian claims to the area. In an interview between the Czar and Talleyrand, Alexander I asked Talleyrand how France could allow Austria to receive the Valtelline. Talleyrand

12 Ibid., Letter XXVIII, Louis XVIII to Talleyrand, 10 December 1814, 200-201.

13 Broglie, Memoirs, II, The King’s Ambassadors to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 14 December 1814, 358-61; Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 394-95.
said that the Valtelline, separated from Switzerland for seventeen years, was not really a part of Switzerland, and, therefore, France would support Austria since she had sacrificed in the war.\textsuperscript{14} Despite these disagreements, the Swiss Committee prepared its report and by March was ready to present a declaration to the Congress.

Berne would receive Porrentruy and the rest of the Bishopric of Basle. The committee did not reach a decision on the Valtelline at this time, although later Austria received this area.\textsuperscript{15} Alexander, influenced by LaHarpe who supported the democratic cantons, made an attempt to exclude Berne from the Confederation. He sent his minister to offer Ferdinand IV Russian support if Ferdinand would influence France; and, at the same time, Russia promised Metternich support for Murat if Austria would support Russia. Both Metternich and Ferdinand IV refused.\textsuperscript{16} On 20 March 1815, the Congress accepted the declaration of the Swiss committee. The declaration acknowledged the existence of twenty-two cantons and recommended acceptance of the declaration

\textsuperscript{14} Talleyrand, Correspondence, II, Letter LIII, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 15 February 1815, 25-26; Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 395.

\textsuperscript{15} Talleyrand, Correspondence, II, Letter LXI, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 3 March 1814, 60.

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 60-61.
by the Diet. Switzerland received a promise for the guarantee of her neutrality upon acceptance. The guarantee of neutrality proved to be one of the most important results of the Congress of Vienna. The Powers recognized that the exclusion of the small states of Europe in major conflicts was in the interests of both parties.\textsuperscript{17} By the 20 March agreement Berne received the Bishopric of Basle and the town of Bienne. France guaranteed communications between Geneva and Switzerland by way of Versoix and the declaration suggested compromises as a means for settlement of disputed territory among the Cantons.\textsuperscript{18}

The Swiss Diet, in May 1815, sent a proclamation to the Congress. By the proclamation Switzerland consented

\textsuperscript{17}Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 295-96; Webster, Congress of Vienna, 134; Talleyrand, Correspondence, II, Letter LXXIV, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 19 March 1815, 114; Nicholson, Congress of Vienna, 196; Gulick, Balance of Power, 255-56. See also Herteleer, Map of Europe, I, 254-56; George Frédéric de Martens, Nouveau recueil de traites d'alliance, de paix, de trève, de neutralité, de commerce, de limites, d'échange etc. et de plusieurs autres actes servant à la connaissance des relations étrangères des puissances et états de l'Europe tant dans leur rapport mutuel que dans celui envers les puissances et états dans d'autres parties du globe depuis 1818 jusqu'à présent (15 vols.; Gottingen: Dans La Librairie de Bieterich, 1817-42), II, 157-62. Hereafter cited as Martens, Nouveau recueil.

\textsuperscript{18}Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 295-96; Martens, Nouveau recueil, 157-62. D'Angeberg, Congrès de Vienne, III, 934-49. The three new cantons were Geneva, Valais and Neuchâtel.
to allow the Allied troops, if necessary, to pass through Swiss territory. Switzerland, not renouncing her desire for the proclamation of neutrality, maintained that she wanted to help Europe. Talleyrand credited Baron Auguste de Talleyrand, whom he had sent to Switzerland for talks, with this accomplishment. Switzerland's consent was necessary at this time since after Napoleon's escape, the Allies would need Swiss approval if Allied troops were to pass through Switzerland.19

One of the questions dear to the English was the abolition of the slave trade. Castlereagh, in Paris on his way to Vienna in September 1814, obtained a promise from Louis XVIII and Talleyrand that France would give up the trade north of the equator in five years and would work for the abolition of the slave trade at the Congress. Talleyrand and Louis XVIII, probably sincere in their promise, met opposition from French public opinion.20 Talleyrand suggested some British concession of money or a colony for total abolition and England planned to offer Trinidad but Talleyrand had already left for Vienna and Castlereagh resumed negotiations with him there. The Duke of Wellington handled the

19Talleyrand, Correspondence, II, Letter XCVIII, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 27 May 1815, 204-05.

20Nicholson, Congress of Vienna, 213; Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 417.
negotiations in Paris. Wellington in Paris had proposed rights of visit for the British in African waters but this proved too difficult to attain and he sought other objectives. At Vienna Castlereagh offered Talleyrand a colony. He refused and Castlereagh hoped that France, since the troubles in Santo Domingo diminished French needs for slaves, would cooperate. Meanwhile, by December, Talleyrand, in order to receive British support against Murat, prepared to offer assistance against abolition of the slave trade, and proposed a committee on the slave trade on 14 December. Spain and Portugal objected since both required compensation and awaited offers from Castlereagh. France refused to abolish the trade in three years; although seeking British cooperation in Italy, Talleyrand considered the complete abolition. He seriously considered Castlereagh's offer of pension

21 Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 418.

Ibid., 418-19; Nicholson, Congress of Vienna, 214.

23 Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 419-21; Talleyrand, Correspondence, I, Letter XXIX, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 15 December 1815, 211. See also Webster, British Diplomacy, Letter CXXIX, Castlereagh to Liverpool, 21 November 1814, 233-35 for Castlereagh's plans for negotiations at Vienna for the abolition of the slave trade. Castlereagh planned to pressure France, Spain and Portugal to end the slave trade in three or five years. If this did not work he considered using an economic boycott of colonial produce to bring about the abolition.

24 Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 422, 424.
for Murat if France abolished the slave trade, and sent
the proposal to Louis XVIII. France did not accept the
proposal, but Napoleon's decree of abolition made it
impossible for Louis XVIII upon his return to Paris after
Napoleon's defeat not to do the same.26 At Vienna, how-
ever, Castlereagh was not able to get a general agreement
on the abolition of the slave trade, although the final
treaty contained a declaration denouncing the inhumane
traffic and the Powers promised their determination to
abolish it.27

As a member of other committees concerned with
secondary but important matters, France helped secure
other arrangements beneficial to the European state
system. She worked for the principles of free naviga-
tion and moderate regulations as a member of the Committee
on the navigation of rivers. The committee established
free navigation on rivers serving several contiguous
countries. France would have free navigation on the
Rhine and the Scheldt. Detailed regulations established
the rules of navigation on the Rhine, the Moselle, the

25Talleyrand, Correspondence, II, Letter LIII, Talley-
rand to Louis XVIII, 15 February 1815, 29-30.

26Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 424.

27Nicholson, Congress of Vienna, 211-16 gives a
summary of efforts to abolish the slave trade and Webster,
Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 413-24 explains British
policy concerning abolition.
Necker, and the Meuse. France profited from the work of the committee. She obtained the same advantages that she would have gained if the rivers had remained under French control. France also took part in negotiations concerning diplomatic precedence. Despite the formidable task, the committee did settle some of the major precedence problems. The report of the committee adopted the official date of arrival of diplomatic representatives as the determinant for diplomatic precedence, and solved the problem of signatures on treaties, a long-time problem since each representative before had insisted that he receive a copy and his name be first on at least one copy. The committee proposed that order be determined by lot although this changed in 1818 when the Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle substituted alphabetical order for the names on treaties.

The news of Napoleon's escape from Elba reached Vienna on 7 March 1815, and Talleyrand received the news

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28 Nicholson, Congress of Vienna; Talleyrand, Correspondence, II, Letter LIII, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 15 February 1815, 19-20; Letter C, Report to the King on His Journey to Ghent, June, 1815, 230. See also Hertslet, Map of Europe, I, 75-93 for regulations; d'Angeberg, Congrès de Vienne, III, 957-69.

in a note from Metternich. Talleyrand thought he would go to Italy while Metternich said that Napoleon would go to France. The Congress, nevertheless, continued its work since the members were eager to put the finishing touches on the settlements and to sign the final act. When it became evident that Napoleon planned to return to France, the Congress, on 13 March, issued a declaration against him. The declaration signed by Austria, Great Britain, France, Prussia, Russia, Spain, Portugal, and Sweden, offered assistance to Louis XVIII and his people for the reestablishment of peace and denounced Napoleon as an outlaw beyond the scope of civil and social relations. Thus Talleyrand worked for the declaration against Napoleon but not one against France. He made the distinction between an usurper and a conqueror.

30 Talleyrand, Correspondence, II, Letter LXIV, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 7 March 1815, 71; Cooper, Talleyrand, 258-59; Le Moniteur Universal, 20 March 1815, 519; Great Britain, Debates, XXX (20 April 1815), 746-50.

31 Talleyrand, Correspondence, II, Letter LXIV, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 7 March 1815, Note 1, 75-76; Nicholson, Congress of Vienna, 227-28; Cooper, Talleyrand, 258-59.

32 Cooper, Talleyrand, 259.

33 Nicholson, Congress of Vienna, 227; Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 295; Thiers, History of the Empire, XI, 336. For a copy of the declaration see d'Angeberg, Congrès de Vienne, III, 912-13; Martens, Nouveau recueil, II, 110-11.
Earlier Napoleon was a conqueror and his brothers, the usurpers. Now, after his escape, Napoleon was the usurper. 34 Talleyrand thought the declaration would produce a good effect and he urged Louis XVIII to support the declaration and, if possible, to remain in Paris. 35 Military operations began, and even before the news of Louis XVIII's flight to Ghent reached the Congress, the Allies on 25 March renewed the Treaty of Chaumont. 36 Nevertheless, the renewal of Chaumont was a difficult task since the Russians and others wanted British subsidies in return for their support. 37 By the treaty the four Allies pledged "to apply to that important circumstance, the principle consecrated by the Treaty of Chaumont . . . ." 38 Each pledged 150,000 troops.

34 Broglie, Memoirs, II, 217-18; Cooper, Talleyrand, 260.

35 Talleyrand, Correspondence, II, Letter LXIX, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 14 March 1815, 90-92.

36 Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 441; Gulick, Balance of Power, 263-65; Webster, British Diplomacy, Letter CLXXX, Castlereagh to Wellington, 12 March 1815, 310-11; Great Britain, Debates, XXX (24 April 1815), 792-93. For military plans of the Allies see Webster, British Diplomacy, Letter CLXXXI, Wellington to Castlereagh, 12 March 1815, 312-13.

37 Gulick, Balance of Power, 264; Webster, British Diplomacy, Letter CLXXXIV, Wellington to Castlereagh, 25 March 1815, 316-17; Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 441.

38 Gulick, Balance of Power, 264.
promised no separate peace, recognized the treaty effective for the present war only, and invited the small states to join.39 Two days later, on 27 March 1815, Talleyrand signed the treaty for France.40 Since the Allies signed the treaty before the news of Louis XVIII's departure, no provision in the treaty supported the restoration of the Bourbons. Great Britain, desiring some kind of declaration since Napoleon now occupied the throne of France could not obtain the necessary support for the Bourbons and the only publication was a report of the Council of Eight which said that the Allies did not need a declaration against Napoleon since the Allies had not changed their attitude toward Napoleon or France. Alexander was hostile toward the Bourbons and Talleyrand, although faithful to the King, did not think he could compete with the King's advisors.41

39 Ibid.; Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 441; d'Angeberg, Congrès de Vienne, III, 971-76.

40 Talleyrand, Correspondence, II, Letter LXXXI, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 29 March 1815, 131-32; Le Moniteur Universel, 16 April 1815, 451.

41 Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 450-52; Talleyrand, Correspondence, II, Letter LXXXVI, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 13 April 1815, 143-45; Letter XCI, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 23 April 1815, 170-81. See also Webster, British Diplomacy, Letter CLXXXVIII, Castlereagh to Wellington, 8 April 1815, 319-20; Letter CLXXXIX, Castlereagh to Clancarty, 8 April 1815, 320; Letter CXCIII, Clancarty to Castlereagh, 15 April 1815; 325-30; Letter CXCV, Castlereagh to Wellington, 16 April 1815, 330-31; Letter CXCV, Clancarty to Castlereagh, 6 May 1815, 331-32.
By May the situation for Bourbon support was no better and Castlereagh urged Louis XVIII to gain Talleyrand's cooperation and support by offering Talleyrand power and persuading Talleyrand to join him at Ghent.  

Meanwhile, Napoleon, aware that the 13 March declaration declared him an outlaw, sought support from different quarters. The French, in their hasty departure from Paris, had left the official records and correspondence behind. Napoleon, hoping to split the Allies, sent Alexander I a copy of the 3 January 1815 treaty, but, although the latter expressed displeasure, he did not refuse to cooperate with the Allies. Napoleon sent Casimir de Montrond and Charles de Flauhaut to Vienna, hoping to gain Talleyrand's support and this too proved unsuccessful.

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42 Webster, *Foreign Policy of Castlereagh*, 452-53.

43 Talleyrand, *Correspondence*, II, Letter LXXXI, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 29 March 1815, 131-32; Note 4, 133-34.

44 Webster, *Foreign Policy of Castlereagh*, 441; Gulick, *Balance of Power*, 266.

The Congress hurriedly finished its business. On 20 March, the Congress accepted the report of the Swiss Committee. Earlier in March, Talleyrand, Metternich and Wellington went to Pressburg for the King of Saxony's consent to the arrangements in Saxony. By May, Italian affairs were complete, and on 8 June, the German committee presented its report.46

Talleyrand, in another of his capacities as the French representative, ended the possibility of a marriage alliance between France and Russia. Talleyrand was to negotiate the marriage between the Grand Duchess Anne, sister of Alexander I, and the Duc de Berry, son of the Comte de Artois. Religious considerations hampered the negotiations and Talleyrand suggested that the marriage would not be politically advantageous to France since France did not agree with the Czar's liberal tendencies. Talleyrand wrote Louis XVIII that by the 3 January treaty, France had gained even stronger allies and he advised against the marriage.47

By early May, Louis XVIII wrote Talleyrand and urged that Talleyrand join him as soon as possible, but the

46 Ferrero, Reconstruction of Europe, 313-14; Gulick, Balance of Power, 256-57. See also Treitschke, History of Germany, II, 92-136; Schwarz, Coachman of Europe, 50-76.

47 Talleyrand, Correspondence, I, XLVI, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII (Private), 25 January 1815, 280-87; Theirs, History of the Empire, XI, 126-28.
minister felt it would be wrong if he left before the Congress adjourned, thinking it would be best for France if her signature was on the final act.\textsuperscript{48} On 9 June 1815, Talleyrand, as one of the seven powers (Spain refused) who had signed the First Treaty of Paris, signed the Final Act of the Congress.\textsuperscript{49} He had forced the Congress to accept the principle of legitimacy and to accept France as a responsible first class power. He had even planned a special memorial service for Louis XVI in January and all the delegates had attended.\textsuperscript{50} The settlements France desired were all part of the agreements made at Vienna. Prussia did not get all of Saxony and she did not get Luxembourg or Mayence. Even the Italian settlement, though not directly accomplished through French efforts, was agreeable to France. The Congress restored

\textsuperscript{48}Talleyrand, Correspondence, II, Letter XCIII, Louis XVIII to Talleyrand, 5 May 1815, 192-93; Letter XCVII, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 23 May 1815, 204-05; Jaucourt, Correspondence, Talleyrand to Jaucourt, 13 May 1815, 346-47.

\textsuperscript{49}d'Angeberg, Congrès de Vienne, III, 1386-1433; Martens, Nouveau recueil, II, 379-431; Hertslet, Map of Europe, I, 208-77 and map following page 274 for specific arrangements.

\textsuperscript{50}Talleyrand, Correspondence, I, Letter XLIV, Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 21 January 1815, 273-75. See Jaucourt, Correspondence, Jaucourt to Talleyrand, 25 January 1815, 167, for praise of Talleyrand and Freksa, Peace Conference of Intrigue, 132-33 who says the service was a "poor piece of theatrical decoration." See also Le Moniteur Universal, 21 January 1815, 81; 30 January 1815, 117.
and recognized Ferdinand IV as the legitimate sovereign of the Kingdom of Two Sicilies. The Queen of Etruria received some compensation and Murat no longer ruled at Naples. Switzerland received a guarantee of neutrality by the powers; and on the question of the abolition of the slave trade, France gave up no more than the other powers. Navigation on the Rhine and the Scheldt was free and even during the Hundred Days, though French prestige was diminished, Talleyrand signed and joined France in the alliance against Napoleon. French diplomacy did more than just secure the interests of France. France helped create a balance of power. France did not use her position during the Polish Saxony crisis to bargain for more territory. Talleyrand thought that France would become great if restrained. He did, by the 3 January 1815 treaty, his most significant act, join France to Great Britain and Austria against Russia and Prussia to help secure the balance. Great Britain strengthened in the north, Prussia in the center, Austria in the south and France in the west were in positions to prevent the future predominance of any one power. By using the principle of legitimacy, Talleyrand forced the Congress to recognize legitimate rulers and not those whose acquisition of territory depended on force. By insisting on legitimacy and rights of succession he gave some stability to the new
order. Europe, for the past twenty-five years, had recognized governments imposed by force. Talleyrand in achieving recognition of a higher principle, legitimacy, helped establish a new order which would protect the future safety of Europe.
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