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AMERICAN REACTION TO EVENTS
WITHIN GREECE: 1944-1947

A Thesis
Presented to the
Department of History
and the
Faculty of the Graduate College
University of Nebraska at Omaha

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

by
Sue Willard Olivier
January 1975

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THESIS ACCEPTANCE

Accepted for the faculty of The Graduate College of
the University of Nebraska at Omaha, in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts.

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PREFACE

Following World War II the interests of great nations converged in the Mediterranean. Seemingly a small and insignificant country, Greece became the center of British and American policies which created conditions that have almost obscured actual events. Contemporary Americans knew and responded to the Greek situation as evidenced in Presidential correspondence for the period. These messages reflect both the British and American postwar role, and successfully place a small nation's people in deserved perspective. In Greece, a portion of the population desired active participation in government. But their nationalist leaders expressed ideas and employed rhetoric associated with accepted versions of Soviet communism, and at the same time they pleaded for "Laocratia," or true democracy. Intentions became increasingly misunderstood, and the EAM movement, in the minds of British and American policy makers, was tied to the Soviet Union's desire to dominate Greece. Responding to believed Soviet intentions and their own national interests, Britain and the United States came to support a reactionary and royalist Greek government, which in its effort to maintain the status quo repressed civil liberties and thwarted democratic change.

Within Greece the EAM was mainly supported by common people whose aim was to achieve representative government. To gain the viewpoint of ordinary American citizens, correspon-

dence including letters and telegrams to Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman were chosen for study. These messages from obscure and influential individuals as well as organizations, offer new insight and knowledge on changing American opinion as this nation adopted an increasingly international role. Also, research incorporating Presidential correspondence against a background of foreign relations, provides valuable information on the relation of opinion and policy in a democracy. The study begins in 1944, when mail to Roosevelt expressed concern over British actions in Greece, and the violation of the principle of self-determination for liberated nations. But postwar events in the Balkans obscured and confused liberal beliefs, and in addition, Greek-Americans increasingly petitioned their government to support the aspirations of a royalist Greek government. As a result ethnic opinion influenced that of prominent Americans, and created a climate sympathetic to economic assistance to Greece when Truman made such a request. The following chapters offer some insight on what Americans thought concerning British and American relations with Greece, and how they reacted to the announced Truman plan.

At the outset, a caveat is in order. It is hoped this paper will not be judged on ideological grounds. Certain necessary words invoke inescapable images for the twentieth century reader. Communism is such a word, but like democracy, in actual practice it may take many forms. A word or a polit-

ical system is not at issue here, but the efforts of a people of one country to achieve representative government and the response of another people as they expressed their views to their President.

I am indebted to Philip D. Lagerquist and the archivists of the Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri whose kindness and professional acumen aided my studies in August 1974. Additional assistance was rendered in phone conversations and by correspondence with William E. Emerson, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York. Providing suggestions for research were Professors L. S. Stavrianos, Northwestern University; Melvin Small, Wayne State University and Monroe Billington, New Mexico State University, who promptly and kindly answered correspondence requesting their opinion on aspects of this study. I would also like to thank the members of the Department of History, University of Nebraska at Omaha, especially Doctor William C. Pratt, as well as my husband and family for their patience and encouragement.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: REVELANCE OF PRESIDENTIAL MAIL AND POST WAR REALITIES

The President of the United States receives countless letters and telegrams each day concerning domestic and foreign policy. Communications concerning Greece and written to the White House from 1944 to 1947 are the subject of this paper.¹ Greek internal politics and that country's relations with Britain and the United States dominated these messages as citizens wrote to express approval, disapproval or alternative policies. Therefore, a background summarizing Greek conditions and Anglo-American interests is included.

The volume of mail addressed to the President of the United States has increased dramatically since the early years of President Roosevelt's administration indicating a growing literacy and awareness on the part of the American people. This trend reflected President Roosevelt's penchant for inviting the public's views.² Available statistical evidence

¹The manuscript sources for this paper are the Roosevelt Papers (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York) and the Truman Papers (Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri).

²Leila A. Sussmann, "FDR and the White House Mail," Public Opinion Quarterly, XX (Spring 1956), 5-6, 10.

has been compiled to reflect this increase and proves that while the volume of mail leveled following the Roosevelt presidency, it did not decline significantly. The following statistics also mark crisis periods during which White House mail peaked numerically. These figures are based on a ratio of annual correspondence "per 10,000 literate adults:"³

<u>President</u>	<u>Period</u>	<u>Annual Ratio per 10,000</u>
Lincoln	Civil War	44
McKinley	1900	4.7
Wilson	World War I	47
Hoover	Prior to 1929	11.8
Roosevelt	Midst of Depression	160
Roosevelt	Late 1930's	111
Truman	1948	104
Eisenhower	1952	103

Two crisis periods were examined in this study: the Greek Civil War which began December 3, 1944, and ended in February 1945, and the initial stage of the Truman Doctrine when it was introduced March 12, 1947, until it was implemented in May, 1947.

³Leilla A. Sussmann, "Mass Political Letter Writing in America: The Growth of an Institution," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXIII (Summer 1959), 204; for a recent study based on White House mail, see Monroe Billington, "Civil Rights, President Truman and the South," The Journal of Negro History, LVIII (April 1973), 127-39.

Only a small portion of White House mail is actually seen by the President. Concise reports are made of the contents of incoming mail and sent to the Executive's secretary. Occasionally, individual letters are included. Letters are referred to the President when they represent a powerful individual or group, or when they indicate a genuine feeling for an event of interest to the President. The mail room staff is adept at recognizing pressure mail such as large batches of mail instigated by one organization. This mail is not granted the respect accorded individual's correspondence, unless the group represented is politically powerful. After records are made of the contents, mail is carefully sorted and sent to whatever executive department might best handle the answer.⁴

In comparing the results of polls and White House correspondence it must be stressed that no generalization can be made on total correspondence received. Representative messages are retained, either in the original, or referred to by memorandum. Messages or petitions from organizations present an unknown numbers of concurring or dissenting individuals. Memoranda refer to several letters, or in the case of one memo during December, a petition with "thousands of signatures." Therefore, conclusions can be drawn only on an evaluation of

⁴Ira R. T. Smith and Joe Alex Morris, "Dear Mr. President" . . . The Story of Fifty Years in the White House Mail Room (New York: Julian Messener Inc., 1949), pp. 4, 13-14, 209-11; (Hereinafter cited as Smith, Dear Mr. President).

type of mail retained, not overall totals, or totals of individuals represented.⁵

Since 1943 the Department of State has maintained a separate desk to sort, tabulate, and respond to correspondence concerning a foreign country. Correspondence, along with public opinion polls, and accounts of the news media are carefully compiled in statistical form to represent the public opinion on developing policy toward an area.⁶ Evidence cannot support a proposition that public opinion influenced the development of United States foreign policy toward the Eastern Mediterranean. While there is some evidence that public opinion imposes a limit to the extent of foreign policy, it only briefly limited legislative or executive policy toward

⁵Smith, Dear Mr. President, pp. 187-91. Total correspondence evaluated in this study is 247 documents which include letters, telegrams, memoranda and petitions. It should be noted that the significance to be attached to each item varies. Obviously, a memorandum summarizing a number of letters not retained or a telegram from an organization of interest group may have more significance than a communication from one individual.

⁶H. Schuyler Foster, "American Public Opinion and Foreign Policy," The Department of State Bulletin, XLI (November 30, 1959), 796-97; (Hereinafter cited as Foster, "American Public Opinion"); see Barnard C. Cohen, "The Relationship Between Public Opinion and the Foreign Policy Maker," Public Opinion and Historians: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, ed. Melvin Small (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1970), pp. 70-79; (Hereinafter cited as Small, Public Opinion and Historians); English historian A. V. Dicey found the American policy-making process in the nineteenth century uninfluenced by American public opinion, see A. V. Dicey, Lectures on the Relation Between Law and Public Opinion in England During the Nineteenth Century (London: MacMillan and Co., Ltd., 1930), pp. 7-9, 60-61.

Greece.⁷

It is necessary to recognize that the effect of public opinion on the policy-making process is difficult to measure. At the same time correspondence to a President represents only one segment of that opinion. Of what value then is White House mail? The correspondence considered for this paper reflects changing American attitudes during a period when American foreign policy took a radically divergent course from any previous period in its history.⁸ One must assume that those writing these letters were influenced by strong feeling, and were also to some extent informed.⁹ According to Gabriel A. Almond, only a small portion of the United States public was informed on foreign affairs following World War II.¹⁰

⁷Small discusses the limits imposed by public opinion in Melvin Small, "Historians Look at Public Opinion," Small, Public Opinion and Historians, p. 15; see also Foster, "American Public Opinion." The author contends public opinion imposed no limits on the Greek-Turkish Aid Bill, ibid., p. 798.

⁸Richard C. Snyder and Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., American Foreign Policy: Formulation, Principles, and Programs (Rinehart and Co., Inc., 1954), pp. 664-701; (Hereinafter cited as Snyder, American Foreign Policy); see also Joseph Marion Jones, The Fifteen Weeks (February 21 - June 5, 1947) (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1955), pp. 187-88; (Hereinafter cited as Jones, Fifteen Weeks).

⁹This writer read all retained correspondence concerning Greece from the Roosevelt and Truman Libraries for the period October 1944 through 1952. These letters displayed a high degree of emotional, if not always intellectual, commitment.

¹⁰Gabriel A. Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co. 1950), p. 87; (Hereinafter cited as Almond, American People).

If one accepts his conclusion, the letters initially considered here are atypical. A second consideration is that correspondence concerning Greece reflects a changing image of first Britain and later a more marked change in regard to Soviet-American relations.¹¹

The origins of an image one people may have of another country are intangible and difficult to measure.¹² The American people were presented with the image of the Soviet Union and Britain as allies during World War II.¹³ These images were easily changed by subsequent events. This change might have been wrought by any of the following three arguments or a combination of these forces. The acceptance of a wartime ally was based on immediate need, not any permanent commitment.¹⁴ The American public has commonly viewed foreigners with a distrust that on occasion may be easily aroused.¹⁵

¹¹For a discussion of changing American attitudes regarding Britain and Russia, see Almond, American People, pp. 96-97.

¹²Harold R. Issacs, "Sources for Images of Foreign Countries," Small, Public Opinion and Historians, pp. 91-105; see also Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (2d ed.; New York: The Free Press, 1949), pp. 3-20, 155-62.

¹³Melvin Small "How We Learned to Love the Russians: America Media and the Soviet Union During World War II," The Historian, XXXVI (May 1974), 455-78; (Hereinafter cited as Small, "How We Learned to Love the Russians"); see also Almond, American People, p. 96.

¹⁴Almond, American People, pp. 87-99.

¹⁵Melvin Small, "Historians Look at Public Opinion," Small, Public Opinion and Historians, p. 22.

Reinforced with the above two conditions the policy-maker exercises tremendous influence simply by initiating proposals.¹⁶ These factors must be considered in evaluating the changing mood of correspondence concerning Greece.

The news media are an additional impetus to opinion formation. Radio, as well as reports of columnists and news correspondents are included by the executive officials as indicators of public opinion. These news stories are not considered representative of mass public opinion, but are a reflection of elite opinion. The State Department includes news stories as part of what constitutes the views of ordinary citizens. State Department tabulation of all known opinion suggests that the purpose is to influence public reaction to a previously desired course.¹⁷

Correspondents of Greek origin are evaluated separately where recognition is possible. Where sentiment toward Greece existed among Americans of other origins, it was generally romanticized. Greece was seen as the birthplace of democracy and a veritable museum of the antiquities of western civiliza-

¹⁶Theodore J. Lowie, "Making Democracy Safe for the World: National Politics and Foreign Policy," Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy, ed. James N. Rosenau (New York: The Free Press, 1967), pp. 315-23.

¹⁷This course is suggested in Jones, Fifteen Weeks, pp. 174-76; see also Barnard C. Cohen, The Press and Foreign Policy (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 133; Snyder, American Foreign Policy pp. 525-26.

tion. Rarely was it viewed in its modern context.¹⁸ The Greek-American incorporated this sentiment, with that of the "Megali Idea" or the dream of a "Greater Greece." This "Greater Greece" would include territories once incorporated in the Byzantine Empire. The "Megali Idea" of territorial achievement has had a tremendous emotional appeal to Greeks; those that immigrated to America kept its ideals before succeeding generations both by means of the Greek Orthodox Church and in such Greek schools as were established. As will be seen, the "Megali Idea" was probably the one belief capable of unifying people of Greek Origin, and subjugated rational evaluation of the Greek national situation.¹⁹

To avoid oversimplification it has been necessary to qualify the importance of public opinion and that portion of opinion represented here. This correspondence may only be safely taken as a reflection of changing American attitudes, while remembering that those attitudes were shaped by multiple forces. Some of these forces, such as news reports, executive initiative, and ethnic origins may be measured. Other impetus to opinion and its effect remain subjects of

¹⁸L. S. Stavrianos, "'The Best Damn Government Since Pericles,'" The Nation, 217 (October 22, 1973), 405-6.

¹⁹Recent events regarding Greek and Turkish attempts to control Cyprus demonstrates the appeal of the "Megali Idea;" for historic evaluation see Theodore Saloutos, "The Greeks in the United States," The South Atlantic Quarterly, XLIV (January 1945), 73; (Hereinafter cited as Saloutos, "Greeks in the United States.")

speculation.

Presidential correspondence can only be understood against the background of political realities which opposed the avowed sentiment stated in the Atlantic Charter. As World War II came to a close Greece was a country torn by political factions. This reality would complicate the Greek people's attempt to determine their own form of government. Parliamentary politicians excluded from government since the Metaxas dictatorship of 1936 were determined to exercise power in postwar Greece. The most influential of the prewar political parties were the Liberals and the Populists. Greece also had an active extreme left represented by the Greek Communist Party or the KKE. Driven underground by the Metaxas dictatorship, the KKE emerged in 1941 after the German occupation as the only organized Greek political group and joined with the Agrarian party to form the National Liberation Front or the EAM. The EAM and its military arm, the ELAS, had two stated aims: to drive the Nazis from Greece, and establish a government representative of the Greek people. Unique in its national appeal, the EAM became a coalition of the Communist Party, the Agrarian Party, the Socialist Party, the Union of Popular Democracy, and the trade unions. The other two resistance groups of any importance developed during the war years and were regional in character and based on the personal popularity of their leaders. They were the EDES, led by General

Napoleon Zervas, and the EKKA, under Colonel Demetrios Psarros.²⁰

Greece represented a classic example of Barrington Moore's thesis of a people's attempt to achieve true democratic government in the twentieth century.²¹ The Populists were completely reactionary and represented a ruling elite. Liberals represented the merchantilist and some intellectual interests, and, by 1944 were engrossed in their own attempts to create a political hegemony. A Liberal-Populist coalition formed when the two were threatened by the emerging political power of the EAM. This coalition was determined to create an "authoritarian semi-parliamentary government."²² The EAM failed to create representative government in Greece, because both Britain and the United States repressed nationalist aims in the years 1944 to 1949, with the acquiescence of a right wing government. Moore also contends a threat of foreign intervention serves to maintain a government semi-

²⁰L. S. Stavrianos, "The Greek National Liberation Front (EAM): A Study in Resistance Organization and Administration," Journal of Modern History, XXIV (December 1952), 42-43; see also "Greek Political Parties," The Economist, CXLVII (December 23, 1944), 837-38; Stephen G. Xydis, Greece and The Great Powers 1944-1947: Prelude to the "Truman Doctrine" (Thessoloniki, Greece: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1963), p. 32; (Hereinafter cited as Xydis, Greece and The Great Powers.)

²¹Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), pp. 432-52, 438 fn. 4; (Hereinafter cited as Moore, Social Origins).

²²Quoted in ibid., p. 438.

democratic in form.²³ That threat was represented in Greece by international communism. Churchill referred to the EAM/ELAS as "Communist [s], rebels" and "mutineers" in his speech before the House of Commons, December 8, 1944.²⁴ His views reflected the constant cry of the Greek right both during the years of exile, and in Greece's postwar period. These views were eventually adopted by the United States.²⁵

Motivated by her interest in India, Britain as early as 1815 determined to contain Russia and block that country's influence in the Mediterranean and Asia.²⁶ In 1944 Britain retained her historic fear of Russian control of the Mediterranean by way of the Turkish Straits. A British-controlled

²³ Moore, Social Origins, p. 439.

²⁴ Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: Triumph and Tragedy (6 Vols.; Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1953), VI, 293-95; (Hereinafter cited as Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy); for a text that takes the view that international Communism was suppressed in Greece, see Edgar O'Ballance, The Greek Civil War: 1944-1949 (London: Faber and Faber, 1966), p. 15; (Hereinafter cited as O'Ballance, Greek Civil War).

²⁵ L. S. Stavrianos, "Greece's Other History," New York Review, XVI (July 17, 1971), 13; see also L. S. Stavrianos, Greece: American Dilemma and Opportunity (Chicago: Henry Regenery Co., 1952), pp. 113-15, 120, 122; (Hereinafter cited as Stavrianos, Greece: American Dilemma); Leland Stowe, While Time Remains (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946), pp. 43, 244-47; (Hereinafter cited as Stowe, While Time Remains).

²⁶ G. D. Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question: Missolonghi to Gallipoli (London: University of London Press, Ltd., 1971), pp. 33-35, 244; see also J. A. R. Marriott, The Eastern Question: An Historical Study in European Diplomacy (3d ed., rev; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924), pp. 209, 218-19.

India was still a reality, and the Suez route to India was paramount to British interests.²⁷ Equally important, Middle Eastern oil was a necessity to British industry and for the maintenance of the British Navy. The English historian, John Strachey, calls this "The Empire of Oil," and considers it Britain's last and most financially successful acquisition. It consisted of areas in Iraq, Palestine, Syria, and Jordan which came under British control at the end of World War I. British influence in Iran preceded these gains.²⁸ Bordering the Mediterranean Sea, Greece became crucial as a result of the proximity of that country to the Turkish Straits and the Middle East. Britain's historic interests in India and the modern need for Middle Eastern oil intensified her desire to contain Russia in the twentieth century, and provided the impetus to involvement in Greece.²⁹

On October 9, 1944, Churchill and Stalin agreed to a temporary division of the Balkans. By this agreement, Britain was allowed a free hand in Greece. Churchill's expressed fear

²⁷ John Howes Gleason, The Genesis of Russophobia in Great Britain: A Study of the Interaction of Policy and Opinion (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950), pp. 62-64, 71-76, 268-69.

²⁸ John Strachey, The End of Empire (New York: Random House, 1959), pp. 154-55; Strachey suggests the Soviet Union and the United States inherited the British Empire, see ibid., pp. 277, 293.

²⁹ Xydis, Greece and The Great Powers, pp. 26-28; Xydis makes clear the Greek government in exile (1941-1944) realized its country's geographic importance to British interests.

was that Soviet troops would come to dominate all Eastern Europe upon liberation of that area. Thus an Anglo-Soviet agreement was initially made at Churchill's request.³⁰ British actions in Greece during December 1944, offered Stalin a pretext for his country's subsequent Balkan policy.³¹ While the Soviet Union cannot be absolved from violating the principle of self-determination for nations, initial Balkan intervention was British-instigated, and created a postwar Anglo-Soviet spheres of influence policy which inaugurated postwar unilateral action. Franklin Roosevelt acquiesced when Royal Hellenic and British troops imposed a British dominated government in Greece in December 1944.³² A number of factors motivated the acquiescence. They include his desire to maintain friendly terms with Britain and his determination to protect the United States from Balkan involvement. Perhaps

³⁰ Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, pp. 226-27; Herbert Feis, Churchill Roosevelt Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 339-40; (Hereinafter cited as Feis, Churchill Roosevelt Stalin.)

³¹ Churchill acknowledged that he could not condemn Soviet intervention in Rumania and Bulgaria because the Soviet Union had allowed him a free hand in Greece by the Anglo-Soviet Agreement of October 9, 1944, see Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 420.

³² The Greek government supported by Britain in the Civil War of December, 1944, was British-instigated in May, 1944, see William Hardy McNeill, American, Britain and Russia: Their Cooperation and Conflict 1941-46 (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 422.

even his lack of physical vigor should be considered.³³ Roosevelt allowed Greece's future to be decided long before the Yalta Conference met in February 1945 to consider among other topics the status of small nations.³⁴

Between the liberation of Greece and the passage of the Greek-Turkish Aid Bill, the United States almost completely revised its foreign policy. In 1944 the principles of the Atlantic Charter, agreed to by Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill in 1941, proclaiming belief in the self-determination of liberated nations were accepted by many Americans. These Americans hoped an effective world organization would become a reality.³⁵ Following World War II, the Atlantic Charter principles and a strong United Nations were shattered within three years, as officials of the United States came to believe in the necessity for unilateral action. Joseph Jones, writing of the events leading to United States intervention in Greece, stated: "what we had thought were British chestnuts were in fact our own."³⁶ World War II made the necessity for a con-

³³Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), p. 838, 841-42; (Hereinafter cited as Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins); see also "FDR's Conspiracy of Silence," Time, 104 (September 16, 1974), 22-23.

³⁴Xydis, Greece and The Great Powers, pp. 64-73.

³⁵Snyder, American Foreign Policy, pp. 51-52, 789, 793-94.

³⁶Quoted in Jones, Fifteen Weeks, p. 188.

stant source of petroleum a reality to the American government. According to government studies based on domestic industrial and general public consumption, known oil reserves were considered inadequate to maintain a large Navy or provide adequate petroleum in case of war. By the wars end, reserves were expected to last less than two decades.³⁷ As early as February 5, 1944, Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes maintained that the United States would necessarily have to develop an active naval interest in the Mediterranean in order to protect access to the termination point of Middle East pipelines.³⁸ James Forrestal as Secretary of the Navy, and later as Secretary of Defense, concurred with this view.³⁹ Throughout 1946, the United States naval presence in the Mediterranean increased, until by September 1946 a permanent Mediterranean fleet became a reality. This naval growth was to protect oil supplies and the United States European interests.⁴⁰ The

³⁷Xydis, Greece and The Great Powers, p. 578, fn. 24; Halford L. Hoskins, Middle East Oil in United States Foreign Policy, Public Affairs Bulletin No. 89 (Washington, D. C.: The Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service, December 1950), p. 36; (Hereinafter cited as Hoskins, Middle East Oil).

³⁸Ickes as quoted in Hoskins, Middle East Oil, p. 94.

³⁹Ibid., p. 36, fn. 41; see also Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York: The Viking Press, 1951), p. 357; (Hereinafter cited as Millis, Forrestal Diaries).

⁴⁰Xydis, Greece and The Great Powers, p. 159; see also Millis, Forrestal Diaries, pp. 144, 171, 187, 211.

Trans-Arabian oil line proposed in 1946 further intensified United States interest in the Mid-East and Mediterranean, which dated from the first United States oil company concessions in 1927.⁴¹

Postwar Soviet activities concerning control of the Turkish Straits further increased United States interests.⁴² The United States felt reasonably safe as long as the British navy dominated the Mediterranean Sea, but as Britain's post-war power waned, officials found control of the Mediterranean crucial. British "chestnuts" had indeed become those of the United States. American policy became that of Britain; to contain the Soviet Union and develop a naval hegemony in the Mediterranean. Friendly governments in Greece and Turkey were crucial to this interest, but partially as a result, Soviet-American relations polarized leading to cold war.

Truman's memoirs indicate sympathy for the small nations of Europe. Both he and his close advisor, Chief of Staff Admiral William D. Leahy, felt Soviet intransigence at the 1945 Potsdam Conference initiated cold war conflict, and made United States protection of small nations such as Greece and Turkey inevitable. Their chief criticism of Stalin at

⁴¹Hoskins, Middle East Oil, pp. 76, 94.

⁴²Harry S. Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman, Vol Two: Years of Trial and Hope (2 Vols.; Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1956), II, 96-97, 99-100; (Herein-after cited as Truman, Years of Trial); see also D. F. Fleming, The Cold War and Its Origins: 1917-1960 (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1961,) pp. 440-42

that time was based on his nation's activities in Poland, Rumania and Bulgaria.⁴³ In both Rumania and Bulgaria, Stalin was exercising authority granted the Soviet Union by the Anglo-Soviet agreement of October 1944. Sentiment clouded the realities of the internal Greek political situation, as it equally clouded the pragmatics of British and United States involvement in Greece.

⁴³Margaret Truman, Harry S. Truman (New York: William Morrow and Co., Inc., 1973), p. 343; (Hereinafter cited as Truman, Harry S. Truman); see also William D. Leahy, I Was There: The Personal Story of the Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman Based on His Notes and Diaries Made at the Time, forward by President Truman (New York: Whittlesey House McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1950), pp. 428-29; Truman, Years of Trial, p. 106; Robert G. Kaiser, Cold Winter, Cold War (New York: Stein and Day Publishers, 1974), p. 11; (Hereinafter cited as Kaiser, Cold Winter); American revisionist historians take an opposing view, see Small, "How We Learned to Love the Russians;" Professor Small identifies the leading revisionist historians as William A. Williams, Gar Alperovitz, Gabriel Kolko, Walter LaFaber, Lloyd Gardner, and Barton J. Bernstein in ibid., p. 455, fn. 1.

CHAPTER II

AMERICAN REACTION TO BRITISH INTERVENTION IN GREECE

Press reports of Allied troops firing on Greek civilians astonished Americans in December of 1944. Greece was a popular wartime ally, but events rooted in the Greek political past and a British effort to create a sympathetic government in the Mediterranean coincided to create a dismaying situation. Because of wartime censorship, few Americans were aware of relations between the exiled Greek government and Great Britain, but news accounts favorable to the resistance fighters in Greece were common. In the coming confrontation between the chief resistance group, the EAM, and British supported royalist Greek forces, Americans favored the EAM, as evidenced in correspondence to President Roosevelt.¹

Expressing exceptional knowledge of the British, the Royal Hellenic and the EAM triangle, Basil J. Vlavianos, publisher and editor of The National Herald, a Greek newspaper located in New York City, wrote Roosevelt that he feared an "unpopular government" would be imposed on the Greek people by the "fascist methods" of those unable to retain political power.

¹All unpublished manuscripts in this chapter are from Roosevelt Papers (The Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York); (Hereinafter cited by description, date and file number only).

Vlavianos asked for a definitive American policy which objected to any British-imposed political system, and also requested that the true background of British actions respecting Greece be published.²

The National Herald and its editor were considered of sufficient importance to warrant a Presidential reply. Democratic National Committee member Charles Olson requested a Presidential Statement for publication in The National Herald. In referring to that paper he states: "his paper represents the liberal group . . . and carries the majority of Greek Americans with it."³ President Roosevelt wrote Mr. Vlavianos for publication:

It is the further desire of our government that the Greek people who have fought so valiantly for democratic ideals will be able to exercise, as soon as possible, the right of all democratic people and choose freely for themselves the form of government under which they will live. 4

Roosevelt's phrase that the Greek people should be able to choose their own government "as soon as possible," had little

²Letter, Basil J. Vlavianos to Roosevelt, OF 4675-Z, October 14, 1944.

³Quoted from memorandum to James Barnes from Charles Olson, PPF 772, October 17, 1944. It should be noted that both ethnic groups and organized labor are considered to have more influence on the policy-making process than their numerical numbers might warrant, see Bernard C. Cohen, The Influence of Non-Governmental Groups on Foreign Policy Making, forward by Max F. Millikan (World Peace Foundation, Center of International Studies: Princeton University, 1959), II, 6-8.

⁴Quoted from letter, Roosevelt to Basil J. Vlavianos, PPF 772, October 19, 1944.

relation to British wartime policies or the impending political crisis.

A crisis developed because Winston Churchill was determined to return King George II to the Greek throne, which was apparently contrary to the wishes of a majority of the Greek people who viewed with suspicion the King's past actions.⁵ George II, fearing the demands of an emerging democratic movement within Greece, had allowed John Metaxas to assume dictatorial powers in 1936. Under the Metaxas dictatorship there was no meeting of Parliament, civil liberties were curtailed, and dissenters were imprisoned or exiled. Public works were introduced similar to those instigated in Nazi Germany, but the fascist-oriented regime was unpopular with the Greek people. Italy invaded Greece in October of 1940. Violent Greek resistance collapsed with the subsequent invasion by German forces in April 1941. Metaxas died in January 1941. The newly formed government fleeing the Nazi invasion was accompanied by a King formally associated with an unpopular dictatorship.⁶

⁵Howard K. Smith, The State of Europe (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), p. 232; (Hereinafter cited as Smith, State of Europe); for a study reflecting official British opinion see Sir Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1971), 383-439; (Hereinafter cited as Woodward, British Foreign Policy.)

⁶Edward S. Forster, A Short History of Modern Greece: 1821-1956, rev. and enl. by Douglas Dakin (3d ed.; New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957), pp. 190, 196-97, 214; see also L. S. Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1958), pp. 670-76.

A proposed American visit by George II in 1942 illustrates that Roosevelt felt Greek-Americans disliked the Greek King. In a memorandum to acting Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, which in turn would be presented to the Greek Minister, Roosevelt advised that George II should dress as Commander-in-Chief of the Greek Army and avoid the appearance of a head of state by wearing a plain army uniform. Because of its resistance to Mussolini and Hitler, the Greek Army was popular in the United States. Roosevelt believed that George II was not.⁷

The Royal Hellenic government spent the war years in exile in Cairo, Egypt, while George II divided his time between Egypt and London. Meanwhile in Greece, the EAM which had become a strong nationalistic movement spent the war years in active resistance against the Nazis.⁸ In 1944, the United States Ambassador to Greece, Lincoln MacVeagh, described the EAM as a coalition of Greek forces which opposed the King's return.⁹ An Office of Strategic Services report made soon

⁷Elliott Roosevelt, F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, 1928-1945, forward by Eleanor Roosevelt (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1950), II, 1308.

⁸Churchill admitted the effectiveness of the guerrilla resistance in July 1943; see Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: Closing The Ring (6 Vols.; Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1951), V, 464; (Hereinafter cited as Churchill, Closing The Ring); see also L. S. Stavrianos, Greece: American Dilemma, pp. 65, 92-93.

⁹United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (1944), Vol. V, "The Near East, South Asia, and Africa; The Far East," Pubn. 7859 (1965), p. 145; (Hereinafter cited as FRUS (1944), V).

after liberation recognized the EAM as a purely nationalistic movement.¹⁰ Yet, Churchill maintained that a Communist controlled EAM would seize power in Greece.¹¹ To the contrary, there is documentary evidence to prove that the EAM, which had welcomed the British landing, was dismayed when open warfare broke out. Records of the KKE Central Committee were obtained by British Intelligence in Athens in December 1944, and prove the EAM had no plan for armed revolution.¹²

British determination to establish a right wing government in Greece predated liberation by at least a year. In the fall of 1943, a New Zealander, Captain Donald Scott of the British Armed Forces, made contact with the German authorities in Athens. His exact orders are unknown but his mission was an apparent attempt to enlist German support in establishing an anti-left wing government in Athens in the event of German withdrawal.¹³

¹⁰ John O. Iatrides, Revolt in Athens: The Greek Communist "Second Round," 1944-1945 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1972), App. F, 324-19; (Hereinafter cited as Iatrides, Revolt in Athens).

¹¹ Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 287.

¹² Iatrides, Revolt in Athens, pp. 149-51; the originals of these records are on file at the British Embassy, Athens, see ibid., p. 151, fn. 27; see also George D. Kousoulas, Revolution and Defeat: The Story of the Greek Communist Party (London: Oxford University Press, 1965); Kousoulas' thesis is that the EAM was the tool of the KKE, and was determined to establish a Communist dictatorship by revolution; he admits the lack of documentary evidence to support his contentions, see ibid., p. 201.

¹³ Iatrides, Revolt In Athens, pp. 41-43.

In April 1944, the armed forces stationed with the Greek government in exile in Cairo, Egypt, demanded a more democratic government by asking that the resistance forces within Greece be represented in the government in exile. The British troops ruthlessly suppressed what they considered a "mutiny." An estimated 15,000 soldiers and sailors involved were still imprisoned in the fall of 1945. Due to rigid British censorship the "Cairo Mutiny" was not publicized in either the United States or Britain. Cairo troops were hand-picked for royalist sympathies and from this group the Greek Mountain Brigade was formed.¹⁴ The royalist Mountain Brigade was assigned to Athens by British order and arrived November 8, 1944. The Mountain Brigade's presence was to be the primary cause of the outbreak of the Greek Civil War the following December.¹⁵

In the beginning of May 1944, the first overtures for a spheres of influence policy in the Balkans were made by the British Ambassador to Moscow who approached the Soviet authorities with the suggestion that Britain be given a free hand in Greece. In exchange the Soviet Union could direct the affairs of Rumania. The Soviet government would agree only if the United States would approve. When informed of the British

¹⁴Stowe, While Time Remains, pp. 248-49, 264; see also National Liberation Front (EAM) White Book: May 1944 - March 1945 (New York: Greek American Council, 1945), p. 17; (Hereinafter cited as EAM White Book).

¹⁵EAM White Book, pp. 17, 22-26.

plan, United States Secretary of State Cordell Hull rejected it as a spheres of influence policy in the Balkans.¹⁶ Churchill finally won Roosevelt's approval for a trial period to last three months, not to exceed the war period, and informed the Soviet Union of this acquiescence.¹⁷ To insure his position, Churchill requested a conference with Stalin to be held in October 1944. Arriving in Moscow on October 9, Churchill sealed Greece's future political structure that same evening. In reference to the Balkans he said to Stalin: "Don't let us get at cross purposes in small ways," and offered Soviet domination in Rumania in exchange for Greece. Stalin immediately agreed, but Churchill's reply indicates his moral qualifications to what had been decided:

At length I said, "Might it not be thought rather cynical if it seemed we had disposed of these issues, so fateful to millions of people, in such an offhand manner? Let us burn the paper." "No, you keep it," said Stalin. 18

Churchill reported that the United States Ambassador to Moscow, Averell Harriman, was present at this meeting. He was not, nor did he have a clear understanding of the agree-

¹⁶Basil Collier, The Lion and The Eagle: British and Anglo-American Strategy, 1900-1950 (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1972), p. 353; see also Churchill, Closing The Ring, p. 708; Feis, Churchill Roosevelt Stalin, pp. 339-40.

¹⁷Feis, Churchill Roosevelt Stalin, pp. 341-43.

¹⁸Quoted from Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, pp. 227-28.

ment.¹⁹ An official communique to Roosevelt, October 10, made scant reference to the Balkans merely stating: "We have to consider the best way of reaching an agreed policy about the Balkan countries, including Hungary and Turkey."²⁰ The Anglo-Russian arrangement was not known to the EAM, nor is it clear at what point the Royal Hellenic government was informed.²¹

Prior to liberation, delegates from the resistance forces within Greece met in Lebanon with representatives of the exiled Greek government. George Papandreou, who was selected conference chairman by the British, and the British Ambassador Sir Reginald Leeper dominated the meeting. All twenty-eight delegates signed the Lebanon Agreement which provided for a coalition government of right and left. Yet, Papandreou had no intention of adhering to the Lebanon agreement, which included EAM representation in the government.

¹⁹Feis, Churchill Roosevelt Stalin, p. 448, fn. 7; for Harriman's report of the Moscow Conference, see U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (1944), Vol. IV, "Europe," Pubn. 8067 (1966), pp. 1009-1010; (Hereinafter cited as FRUS (1944), IV).

²⁰Stalin's Correspondence With Churchill, Attlee, Roosevelt and Truman 1941-1945 (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc., 1958). There is no reference in this volume to the Anglo-Soviet percentage agreement of October 9, 1944.

²¹Dominique Eudes, The Kapetanos: Partisan and Civil War In Greece, 1934-1949, trans. by John Howe (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1972), p. 167; (Hereinafter cited as Eudes, Kapetanos); see also Xydis, Greece and The Great Powers. As the most exhaustive study of relations between the Royal Hellenic government and Great Britain, this study does not mention when the Greek government was informed of the Anglo-Soviet agreement. Xydis remarks that Churchill armed with this agreement was in a position to suppress revolt, see ibid., p. 62.

During the Lebanon Conference he asked the EDES delegate if his forces could destroy the EAM; if not, Papandreou implied that the British would.²² These were the political realities that preceded Greek liberation.

In October 1944, as German forces withdrew from Greece, British troops landed to guarantee the survival of a British formed Greek government under the leadership of Papandreou.²³ Unsure of British intentions, the EAM which controlled Athens, welcomed the British landing.²⁴ A young American lieutenant witnessed the Greek liberation and his letter describing events was sent by his mother to Roosevelt. This message provides a vivid description of the economic and political situation:

Try to imagine Cincinnati with no lights, gas, or water, or no telephone or street cars, nine out of ten shops closed and empty - and the dollar bill worth about three for a penny. In addition - all railroads, shipping, and factories at a standstill and - almost full unemployment. . . .

In reference to the political situation, the "right" referred to is the government of George Papandreou and the "left" is the EAM:

the "left" has a definite economic and social program,

²²Iatrides, Revolt in Athens, pp. 63-64; Xydis, Greece and The Great Powers, p. 56; Eudes, Kapetanios, pp. 130-37; for MacVeagh's report on British direction of the Conference see FRUS (1944), V, 106-7.

²³Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, pp. 283-85.

²⁴Eudes, Kapetanios, pp. 171-73.

the only program of the "right" is to attack the "left" and bemoan any possible material sacrifice. . . . The tragedy is that the local Communist program is slightly less radical than the New Deal, but the damned fools call themselves "Communists". . . . 25

As reported by American news correspondents such as Leland Stowe, George Weller, and Richard Mowrer, the EAM cooperated with the British from liberation to December 3. Stowe reported that the EAM welcomed the British and removed its armed forces from the Athens area at British Commander General Ronald Scobies's request.²⁶ George Weller traveled throughout central Greece and the Peloponnesos in November and interviewed British military commanders in a majority of major cities. Every commander praised the EAM for its aid in the administration of the countryside. At the same time, George Weller also reported fascists and former German collaborators remained at large in Athens, and were incorporated in the Royal Hellenic army.²⁷ Richard Mowrer wrote of his disgust for the rich of Athens, describing constant parties which were held in the Psyhico and Kolonaki sections of the city. Mowrer attended one of these gatherings and reported the people and

²⁵Quote from memorandum to Grace Tully, OF 4847, January 11, 1945. The attached letter is dated October 26, 1944 and describes the preceding two weeks in Greece.

²⁶Stowe, While Time Remains, pp. 250-51. Panos Morphopoulos reported EAM/ELAS was peaceful and cooperating with the British, see "Greece The Struggle For Power," The New Republic, III (November 6, 1944), p. 590.

²⁷Chicago Daily News, November 9, 1944, p. 2; November 24, 1944, p. 2; November 27, 1944, p. 2.

the areas were untouched by war. Yet these same people complained heatedly of their hardships and the threat of Communism. Mowrer believed that 85 percent of the Greek people supported the EAM.²⁸ Mowrer also commented on the activities of extreme right wing groups called X-ites, which operated under the leadership of Colonel George Grivas, and were made up of former Nazi collaborators and ardent monarchists. The X-ites operated freely in Athens from the time of the British landing.²⁹

Howard K. Smith, in writing of these events between October 4 and December 3, 1944, stated: "One is forced to conclude that the British were determined to break EAM and install in power the discredited monarchy and its blindly vengeful rightist supporters."³⁰ The following sequence of events supports Smith's contention. On November 8, 1944, Churchill advised his military commander in the Mediterranean to reinforce Athens, as a Communist take-over was imminent.³¹ On that same day, the royalist Mountain Brigade arrived in Athens. On December 1, Scobie ordered that the EAM be immediately disarmed. This order was refused by the EAM unless the Mountain

²⁸Chicago Daily News, October 30, 1944, p. 4.

²⁹Ibid., November 4, 1944, p. 2.

³⁰Smith, State of Europe, p. 232.

³¹Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 287.

Brigade was also demobilized. Greek Premier Papandreou originally agreed, but then withdrew this agreement under British direction. As a result, the EAM Cabinet Ministers resigned in protest to British intervention in the internal affairs of Greece.³² This resignation precipitated a government crisis, but not a civil war as the EAM continued to act within the law. On December 1, the EAM announced it would disband when the Mountain Brigade was demobilized. This announcement also asked why former German collaborators were not brought to trial, and expressed the fear that George II would be restored to the throne by the Greek right. Following the announcement, the EAM asked for and was granted a civil permit for a peaceful demonstration to be held Sunday, December 3, in Syntagma Square, Athens.³³

An abundance of historical data proves the EAM did not start the actual fighting on December 3, at the Syntagma demonstration. Roosevelt's correspondence files contain as accurate and poignant an account as can be found in this eyewitness report sent to the White House:

The main square was covered with police armed with tommy guns and a few British armored cars strategically placed.

³²EAM White Book, pp. 34, 36-37; see also Stowe, While Time Remains, p. 249.

³³EAM White Book, p. 37, 41. The permit to demonstrate was withdrawn by Papandreou, under orders from British General Ronald M. Scobie late on December 2, too late for the Athens people to be told, see also Stowe, While Time Remains, p. 252.

Promptly at 11, the parade appeared several thousand strong, unarmed, and led by women and children carrying United Nations flags crying "freedom and Democracy," It was perfectly orderly. The police tried to hold them back at first with fists and rifle butts, but they broke thru and reformed the parade. I was sure that trouble had been averted when - suddenly - evidently by prearranged signal - the police dropped back in a line and opened fire. The crowd went down like a pack of cards. As soon as they started to get up, the police fired again. Finally the foremost of the crowd managed to crawl into a sunken garden, - that is, all but about fifteen, - chiefly women and kids under fifteen who didn't get up - and the flags lay in the gutter. . . .

A few minutes later British tanks appeared and maneuvered in such a way as to protect - police quarters! I was almost actively sick - at what I'd seen and the implications of what was to come I can't - so won't go into the whole story, but it's the first instance I know of a counter revolution being started when there was no revolution to counter. 34

In addressing Parliament, Churchill described the beginning of the Greek Civil War as "a well-organized plot by which ELAS should march down to Athens and seize it by armed force and establish a reign of terror."³⁵ John Menard, of Detroit, Michigan disagreed with Churchill's views, and his letter placed a different interpretation on British actions

³⁴Memorandum to Grace Tully, OF 4847, attached letter dated January 11, 1945. For other accounts on the outbreak of the Civil War, see EAM White Book, p. 41; FRUS (1944), V, 148; Stowe, While Time Remains, p. 253-54. Dimitri Kessel of Life took pictures proving unarmed men, women and children were fired upon, see "Civil War Breaks Out in Greece," Life, Vol. 17 (December 25, 1944), 20-23; see also Stavrianos, Greece: American Dilemma. The author quotes the eyewitness report of the December 3 events as reported by British officer, A. Byford Jones. Jones witnessed an unarmed crowd being fired upon point blank. The fire was not returned, see ibid., pp. 131-32.

³⁵Winston Churchill as quoted in Stowe, While Time Remains, p. 250.

in Greece:

Some of those my neighbors brought me the news paper this morning dealing with Mr. Churchill, his bankers mixed up with the Greek government and the same banks are the main cause for the shooting of our faithful allies in Greece who for FOUR LONG YEARS fought Hitler's armies and when they had them annihilated then Churchill sends his army there to tell the Greek people who he wants for their leader and who for their king. . . . 36

The British and Royal Hellenic armies were unable to achieve military victory. The savage street fighting provoked on December 3 continued for thirty-three days. Heavy artillery, mortars, and planes were employed which almost demolished the poorer sections of Athens.³⁷ While the British enjoyed strategic superiority in their control of the Athens Airport, and the port of Piraeus, they encountered great difficulty keeping the roads open into the center of the city, where their control was never more than a few blocks surrounding the Hotel Grand Bretagne, including Syntagma Square, and the nearby British Embassy.³⁸ General Scobie's forces were British, Indian, and Royalist Greek Troops.³⁹ In addition, known Nazi

³⁶ Letter, John Menard to Roosevelt, OF 206-A, December 13, 1944.

³⁷ EAM White Book, pp. 68-69.

³⁸ FRUS (1944), V, 146; see also Harold Macmillian, The Blast of War 1939-1945 (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1967), p. 505.

³⁹ Iatrides, Revolt in Athens, p. 176, fn. 68, gives the forces as of December 3: Greek 13,000; British 13,000; ELAS 50,000. ELAS reported its forces were 70,000, EAM White Book, p. 55; this figure is supported by Smith, State of Europe, p. 229.

collaborators were allowed to fight with the Royal Hellenic Army against the EAM.⁴⁰ The British originally planned to utilize 10,000 men in Athens. But it became necessary to bring additional troops from the Italian front until by the end of December the British forces had grown to 60,000 men with another 18,000 on standby.⁴¹ Yet, at the war's end the EAM remained in control of the majority of the Greek mainland and Greek Islands.⁴²

During the war, private American citizens, labor groups, and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People joined in writing and wiring Roosevelt expressing dismay that accepted principles for the postwar world could so easily be crushed. These messages contained a recurring theme, that of support for a future United Nations. The International Woodworkers of America wired Roosevelt:

It is evident that Great Britain has erred from the path charted in the Atlantic Charter, which in article No. 3 states; "They respect the right of all people to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them." . . . We urge that immediate action be taken to alleviate the critical situation that is now in Greece before reactionary elements in this country and Britain

⁴⁰Smith, State of Europe, p. 233; see also O'Ballance, Greek Civil War, pp. 93-94.

⁴¹Woodward, British Foreign Policy, pp. 421-23; see also Feis, Churchill Roosevelt Stalin, p. 541, fn. 58.

⁴²Smith, State of Europe, p. 231.

use it for the purpose of dividing the United Nations. 43

Americans protested British treatment of the EAM as well. Telegrams and letters referred to the resistance group as war heroes and questioned the failure of the American government in coming to the aid of the former resistance fighters. A California chapter of the NAACP reminded the President that the war was against fascism, not an allied people:

It is a well established fact the ELAS in Greece represents the coalition of democratic forces which drove the Nazis out of Greece. All freedom loving people deplore the unfortunate policy of the British government in Greece. . . . We protest the use of American made instruments of war against the Greek people. We urge President Roosevelt to use the influence of the United States to put an end to the unnecessary conflict in Greece. . . . 44

In answer to those requesting Roosevelt's support in ending the Greek Civil War was a stated policy of United States neutrality. Secretary of State E. R. Stettinius declared on December 5 that the United States policy was non-interference in the internal affairs of liberated countries. He added: "The American people have naturally viewed with sympathy the aspirations of the resistance movements and the anti-Fascist elements in liberated countries."⁴⁵ This statement was re-

⁴³Memorandum to Stettinius, OF 206-A, December 14, 1944; attached telegram from International Woodworkers of America, Everett, Washington; memorandum to The State Department, Blake to Hughes, OF 206-A, December 13, 1944.

⁴⁴Quoted from memorandum to Daniels, OF 93, January 10, 1945, with attached telegram from California NAACP.

⁴⁵Quoted from FRUS (1944), V, 148

leased to the Voice of America to be broadcast throughout Europe.⁴⁶ This announcement invoked a heated response from Churchill, and resulted in the first split in Allied relations.⁴⁷ In a conciliatory letter to Prime Minister Churchill on December 13, 1944, Roosevelt recommended that a regency be created until such time as a plebiscite could be held and he suggested demobilizing the Mountain Brigade as well as the resistance forces.⁴⁸ Despite the practicality of the President's advice, many would die before Churchill heeded it.

Both British and American news commentators were present in Athens during the period. Their reports affected public opinion in both countries. Edward P. Morgan reported from London that both The Times and Manchester Guardian opposed Churchill's policies. A summary of British press opinion carried in the Chicago Daily News December 7, was unanimously critical. The Times said the government had created a "disastrous predicament" that would draw criticism from across Europe. The Manchester Guardian called for an end to interference in the affairs of liberated countries. The Daily Herald asked that the Greek people be allowed to choose their own government. The News Chronicle called for an end to sup-

⁴⁶FRUS (1944), V, 148.

⁴⁷Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 836-37.

⁴⁸Roosevelt to Churchill as quoted in Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, pp. 299-301.

porting a monarch with arms.⁴⁹ George Weller represented the Chicago Daily News in Athens and his articles accused the British of doing more damage to the city than the Germans did during their occupation. He charged the British and the British-supported Greek government were making war, with American-made lend-lease weapons, on women and children.⁵⁰ One of Weller's reports concerned United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration packages which were 70 percent American supplied. Weller charged that General Scobie would not allow food distribution to a starving population. The supplies were stacked in Piraeus's warehouses to be sold by the Greek right on the black market.⁵¹ Richard Mowrer's reports were also carried in the Chicago Daily News. He accused the British of fighting alongside former Nazi collaborators and Metaxas regime fascists to defeat the Greek people.⁵² A Stars and Stripes editorial claimed Britain showed more preoccupation with insuring a route to India than defeating the Germans.⁵³ One reference to a report supporting Churchill's

⁴⁹Chicago Daily News, December 7, 1944, p. 2; December 14, 1944, p. 2; December 22, 1944, p. 6.

⁵⁰Ibid., December 15, 1944, p. 2; December 30, 1944, p. 1; December 22, 1944, p. 4.

⁵¹Ibid., December 23, 1944, p. 1, 2; December 26, 1944, p. 5.

⁵²Ibid., December 21, 1944, p. 3.

⁵³Ibid., December 19, 1944, p. 2.

policies was found in the conservative Chicago Daily News from October 1944 through the spring of 1945. Emphasizing her objections to British policies, Dorothy Thompson noted in her column on December 11 that Herman Goebbels, in a German radio broadcast, had supported the British effort. Goebbels called for joint British-German action to defeat European Communism.⁵⁴

Greek-American Societies registered protest to the reported events. The largest and most influential, the American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association (AHEPA), with an estimated membership of fifty thousand issued a press statement on December 5 calling British intervention, "the application of imperialistic and power politics." This announcement continued: "Only an aroused American public opinion can force Colonel Blimps and other imperialists of Great Britain to discontinue . . . this blatant rape of Greece."⁵⁵

In the midst of a deteriorating military situation, Churchill and Anthony Eden visited Athens on December 15, 1944. At last the British Prime Minister agreed to the establishment of a regency under the leadership of the Archbishop of Athens, Damaskinos, and returned to London to convince George II to agree to this arrangement. This regency provided

⁵⁴Chicago Daily News, December 11, 1944, p. 6.

⁵⁵Press release, statement of George C. Vournas, OF 206-A, December 5, 1944. For information on Greek American Societies see Saloutos, "The Greeks in the United States," pp. 79-80. Saloutos estimated that there were 500,000 Greeks in the United States in 1945, see ibid., p. 69.

the foundation for political arbitration which produced an uneasy peace agreed to at Varkiza, Greece, on February 3, 1945.⁵⁶

George C. Vournas, Supreme President of AHEPA, wrote concerning Churchill's Athens visit: "I assume that you, too, have read in the papers that the mighty Churchill and the sly Eden are in Athens in order to assist the Greeks to compose their differences."⁵⁷ Mr. Vournas also asked that President Roosevelt make a public statement on events in Greece "so that he may preserve his moral influence on a global basis."⁵⁸ William D. Hassett, Secretary to the President, replied by wire for Roosevelt: "It will not be possible for him to make a formal statement at this time."⁵⁹

On December 16, Harry Hopkins, Special Assistant to President Roosevelt, cabled Churchill in reference to the hostility of American public opinion toward British actions in Greece.⁶⁰ This hostility and disillusionment was reflected in a public opinion poll dated December 30, 1944. This poll

⁵⁶Woodward, British Foreign Policy, pp. 424-35.

⁵⁷Quoted from letter, George C. Vournas to Roosevelt, PPF 1242, December 27, 1944.

⁵⁸Ibid.

⁵⁹Quoted from telegram, William D. Hassett to Vournas, PPF 1242, January 8, 1945.

⁶⁰Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 842.

found Britain the culprit in disrupting Big Three relations:

Of those 'dissatisfied' with Big Three Cooperation (about one-third of the public), 54% now blame England as compared with 33% in April. On the other hand, 18% now blame Russia as compared with 44% in April. 61

Churchill's Athens visit was reported to have improved the public attitude, "but suspicion remains that Churchill seeks to dominate the Greek government against the will of the Greek people."⁶² Of those polled 56 percent stated liberated countries should be allowed to create their own governments, with no intervention from Britain, Russia, or the United States, even if civil strife were the result.⁶³

Retained White House mail was divided into categories representing two month periods and in turn separated as to those expressing political or non-political opinions. Table I illustrates that the mail for December and January was overwhelmingly political and expressed opposition to British intervention. Correspondence was again evaluated as to whether it represented; an ethnic group; influential or non-influential individuals; labor groups; or other organizations.⁶⁴

⁶¹Quoted from memorandum for President, PSF Stettinius, December 30, 1944; "Public Opinion," December 1944.

⁶²Ibid.

⁶³Ibid.

⁶⁴Evaluated correspondence is located in the following Official Files or Personal Presidential Files: OF 206-A, OF 48, OF 93, OF 4847, OF 48-A, PPF 50-M, PPF 772, PPF 1242.

TABLE I

OPINION AND SOURCES OF WHITE HOUSE MAIL
CONCERNING GREECE: OCTOBER 1944 - MARCH 1945

	1944 Oct/Nov	1944-45 Dec/Jan	1945 Feb/Mar
OPINIONS			
Non-political Liberation of Greece	10(83.3%)	0	1(33.3%)
Political: opposed to British presence in Greece	2(16.7%)	14(87.5%)	1(33.3%)
Requests for U.S. action in Greece that omit reference to Britain	0	2(12.5%)	1(33.3%)
SOURCES			
Ethnic Origin	7(58.3%)	4(25%)	1(33.3%)
Non-influential individuals	1(8.3%)	5(31.3%)	0
Influential individuals	4(33.3%)	2(12.5%)	2(66.7%)
Labor Groups	0	3(18.8%)	0
Other Groups (Non-Ethnic, Non-Labor)	0	2(12.5%)	0
Total Retained Correspondence*	<u>12(38.7%)</u>	<u>16(51.6%)</u>	<u>3(9.7%)</u>

*These totals represent an unknown number of individuals, as petitions and memoranda which refer to several or hundreds of individuals were evaluated as one. Also, it is not known how many individuals are represented by organizational mail.

Correspondence for December and January was much higher in its condemnation of Britain than the December 30 poll previously mentioned. Almost 88 percent of this correspondence opposed British action in Greece. An additional 12.5 percent was political in nature but made no mention of Britain, while requesting United States aid in solving the Greek dilemma. This correspondence came from more diversified sources than either of the two other periods. It also had the highest incidence of mail expressing political views. Not one retained message supported British policy in Greece.

Public opinion as reported in a poll of January 6, 1945 indicated approval of a United States policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of liberated countries. This poll indicated a majority disapproved of unilateral action on the part of Britain and the Soviet Union, but also illustrated a surprising degree of public apathy on foreign policy as only 43 percent had heard of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference.⁶⁵ While the Dumbarton Oaks Conference had no direct bearing on correspondence concerning Greece, lack of knowledge concerning its proposals would indicate the small number of Americans interested in foreign policy. Correspondence of a political nature could be expected to come from this group.

Two polls dated January 16, 1945 concur with those of December 30, 1944, and January 6, 1945, in condemning British

⁶⁵Stettinius to Roosevelt, PSF State Department, January 6, 1945; "Public Opinion," January 1945.

policy in Greece. These polls also express the fear that a successful United Nations would be an impossibility in the face of the unilateral actions on the part of Britain and Russia.⁶⁶

On January 16, 57 percent of those polled desired active interest on the part of the United States in the affairs of liberated countries. The impetus to this interest were the activities of Great Britain and Russia.⁶⁷ Political correspondence is much higher in the percentage requesting active American interest. Where correspondence condemned British policies in Greece, it also called for some positive American action. The request for positive action took two forms: a declaration on the part of President Roosevelt condemning British interference; or the presence of American military to act in a police capacity.⁶⁸

The volume of White House mail concerning Greece is insignificant during February and March 1945. The Varkiza Agreement of February 3, 1945 ended open hostilities in Greece. and that country was no longer one of the main concerns of the American press. A State Department poll on February 23, 1945

⁶⁶Two memos for President, PSF State Department, January 16, 1945; "British Interference in Regard Greece and Italy;" "Russian Interference in Poland."

⁶⁷Ibid.

⁶⁸Supra, fn. 64.

reflected a similar conclusion:

'Dissatisfaction' with Allied cooperation dropped from 43% to 25%, press and radio criticism of both Britain and Russia having sharply declined since the slackening of attention to the Greek crisis and the focus of headlines on the Russian offensive. 69

However, a majority of the discontented group continued to blame Britain, not the Soviet Union, for disrupting the Allied cause. The poll continued: "An overwhelming majority of Americans feel that the United States should have 'as much to say' as our British and Russian Allies in the settlement of various European problems growing out of the war." 70

On the basis of those represented in the four polls cited, American opinion shifted from non-interference to a belief if Britain and the Soviet Union could intervene, the United States should. This view is reflected in correspondence as early as October and November of 1944. It would indicate where concerned Americans found a nation's policy distasteful they expected their government to take some action, even if that action were unilateral.

Table II illustrates conclusions drawn from correspondence of October 1944 to March 1945.⁷¹ These percentages are

⁶⁹Grew to Roosevelt, PSF State Department, February 24, 1945; "Public Opinion," February 1945.

⁷⁰Ibid.

⁷¹These percentages will be different from those previously cited as they are based on a six-month total, while previous percentages are figured on a two-month period.

based on a total for the entire six month period. The volume of retained White House mail relating to Greece increased from less than 39 percent in October and November to over 51 percent in December and January. It then dropped dramatically in February and March. The October to January totals reflected the crisis period of liberation followed by the Greek Civil War. From October to November mail concerned the liberation of Greece and a majority was Greek American in origin. The overwhelming majority of all political mail received was in the period of the active Greek Civil War, from December to January. As has been stated, it was diversified in origin, and unanimous in its condemnation of British interference. In February and March, the cessation of active hostilities and constant press coverage concerning Greece, is reflected in the decline of correspondence.

In summary, White House mail reflects the opinion of interested or informed individuals and organizations, and it is sufficiently diversified when established principles are involved, in this case those of the Atlantic Charter. The mail for this period, October 1944 to March 1945, overwhelmingly condemned the initial British policy of unilateral action, and resented infringement of the accepted principle of respecting the rights of individual countries. The polls consulted reached the same conclusion, but not by as great a majority. Both polls and correspondence indicated a growing belief the United States should take positive action in lib-

TABLE II


INCREASE AND DECREASE OF WHITE HOUSE MAIL
CONCERNING GREECE

October 1944 to March 1945

Oct/Nov 44

Dec 44/Jan 45

Feb/Mar 45



Legend:

- Percent of retained mail in a six month period in time period indicated.
- - - - - Letters of a political nature by time period indicated.
- Percent of letters from Greek American Societies by time period indicated.

erated countries. The initial post World War II public impetus toward United States intervention in the affairs of other nations was the unilateral action of Great Britain in Greece.

TERRITORY CLAIMED BY THE GREEK GOVERNMENT INCLUDED
AREAS IN SOUTHERN ALBANIA, MACEDONIA, AND BULGARIA + *Dodecanese*



GREECE

CHAPTER III

THE "MEGALI IDEA" AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

1945-1947

The student of history can very easily project what is presently significant upon the value systems of the past. In the years 1945 to 1947, within Greece, there was continuing demand for a liberalized social system. This effort was thwarted by conservative Greek politicians with the aid of a sympathetic Britain. Those who wished to retain traditional practices and perogatives caused constant conflict within a country whose economy and people were devastated by World War II.¹ Yet internal political strife and economic hardship is not the theme of the major portion of correspondence to President Truman during this period. Messages concerning Greece reflect territorial demands of the Greek government, confirming the conclusion of Gabriel A. Almond regarding ethnic groups:

The influence of foreign ethnic and linguistic groups on American foreign policy generally takes the form of efforts to enlist American support for policies affecting their homelands. Historically such influence was mainly directed toward traditional national aims such as the preservation or return of national territory. ²

¹For an account of the devastation imposed on the Greek economy and population by the Germans, see George Exintaris, "The Position in Greece," International Affairs, Vol. 20 (April 1944), pp. 204-11.

²Almond, American People, p. 183.

Within the two year period following the death of Franklin Roosevelt, and President Truman's announcement of the "Truman Doctrine" on March 12, 1947, almost 85 percent of the total retained correspondence concerning Greece was political in nature.³ Of this political mail, over 72 percent supported Greek territorial and reparation claims and less than 28 percent concerned the political conflict in Greece. The minority of the political messages dealt with the continued presence of British forces, abuses by the right wing government, and the Greek elections in March and September of 1946.

The Greek government had as its primary foreign policy territorial claims and reparation for war damages. Work toward this end was begun by the government while still in exile, and intensified between 1945 and 1947. In addition, financial assistance in the form of loans and grants was continually requested from both Britain and the United States. The primary use of loans was to be for maintaining a military force, not reconstruction.⁴

Territorial aggrandizement in Greek is called the

³This correspondence is retained OF 206-M, Box 778, "Truman Doctrine" (Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri). All unpublished manuscripts in this chapter are from this source, unless otherwise designated, and hereinafter will be cited by description, file number, and date only.

⁴Xydis, Greece and The Great Powers, pp. xiii, 96, 99, 228, 256; see also United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (1945), Vol. VIII, "The Near East and Africa," Pubn. 8427 (1969), pp. 193-300; (Hereinafter cited as FRUS (1945), VIII).

"Megali Idea" or the "Great Idea." The "Megali Idea" has been of paramount importance in Greek politics since 1864. ^{7 BEFORE} Its emotional appeal has succeeded in subjugating any political issue throughout this century. This dream of a "Greater Greece" incorporated all territories once part of Byzantium, and includes all areas where Greek-speaking peoples form a majority of the population. Greek-Americans retained this desire and successfully supported it among non-Greek-Americans. The "Megali Idea" has captured the Greek imagination to the extent that no national issue seems to have equaled or submerged its attraction.⁵

Within Greece, the "Megali Idea" was used by right wing politicians during 1945 and 1946 to further their own interests. Greek territorial claims successfully submerged domestic economic and social problems. The Populists, who favored the return of the King, maintained they must be elected or the United States and Great Britain would not support Greek territorial claims. These claims, many dating from 1912, centered on territories along the northern Greek borders: North Epirus or Southern Albania; an extension of the Greek border into Bulgaria; and Macedonia which included territory claimed by Yugoslavia. In addition, the Dodecanese Islands, which were Italian controlled, and located in the Aegean, were claimed. Bulgaria, Albania, and Yugoslavia, of course, did

⁵Forster, Short History, pp. 20, 32; see also Saloutos, "The Greeks in the United States," p. 73.

not accept the righteousness of the Greek cause, and Greek territorial claims caused constant friction with these Balkan countries. In addition, leftist groups within Greece found sanctuary in Yugoslavia and Albania, thus adding to political friction. The Greek government used fears of foreign intervention from its northern neighbors as well as territorial claims to distract the Greek people. The issue created a gordian knot, as Greece aggravated its Balkan neighbors by claiming their territory, and these countries in return offered sanctuary to political elements in opposition to the Greek government and claimed Greece instigated border incidents to get British and United States support. The Greek left became associated by some Americans and Greeks with the international designs of the Soviet Union. As the Soviet Union supported Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia rather than Greece, both the Greek leftist movement, and the Soviet Union suffered in popularity.⁶ In addition, the implications of Greek territorial claims were to broaden the growing conflict between the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union in 1945 and 1946. The Soviet Union supported the Balkan governments as opposed to Britain and the United States which aided Greece.

⁶ Stavrianos, Greece: American Dilemma, p. 170; William Hardy McNeill, The Greek Dilemma: War and Aftermath (New York: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1947), pp. 244-52; (Hereinafter cited as McNeill, Greek Dilemma); Xydis, Greece and The Great Powers, pp. 15-16, 100-101, 294-95; see also Kousoulas, Revolution and Defeat, forward by C. M. Woodhouse, p. vi.

Greek territorial demands had tremendous appeal and support in the United States. Greek-American societies, as well as a non-ethnic society, the "Justice for Greece Committee," were active in petitioning the United States government to further Greek claims. The Justice for Greece Committee was organized in the United States in October, 1945. Initially it was sponsored by Greek American societies, such as AHEPA and the Panepirotic Society, but many non-Greeks became members and served on the advisory board. Among its influential leaders were Mrs. Calvin Coolidge, Honorary Chairman; Sumner Welles, Chairman, Advisory Board; Edwin L. James of the New York Times; James Truslow Adams, American historian; and U. S. Senators Robert Taft and Arthur Vandenberg. Eventually more than 33 percent of the United States Senate belonged to this organization. Because of this committee's work, the Senate passed Resolution 82 in the spring of 1946. Initially sponsored by Senator Claude D. Pepper of Florida, this resolution was in support of Greek territorial claims. Literature from the Justice for Greece Committee stressed the strategic importance of Greece, and declared that its political difficulties were the result of the confrontation between communist and democratic beliefs. This literature also emphasized Greek ties to Western democratic nations, as Greece had given birth to democracy.⁷

⁷Xydis, Greece and The Great Powers, Annex VI, "The Justice for Greece Committee," pp. 711-13.

In voicing the demands of the Greek government, the Justice for Greece Committee and the Greek-American societies were furthering the aims of right wing elements within Greece. The leftist EAM and KKE publically acceded to the popular appeal of the "Megali Idea," but originally stressed reconstructing Greek political and economic conditions, not territorial claims. Had the left obtained power, it is unlikely they would have pushed these claims, certainly not in the Balkans. The left, however, publicly included British controlled Cyprus within its territorial demands. This was a rather pointed reminder that the right had dropped the issue of Cyprus since acquiring British military support.⁸

A Democratic National Committee memorandum of October 17, 1944 refers to the majority of the Greek-American community as "liberal."⁹ Within a two year period the "Megali Idea" successfully attracted Greek-American sympathies to the aspirations of a right wing Greek government, and significantly attracted United States government leaders to sympathize with the Greek cause. This "cause" increasingly aggravated tensions between the British, the United States and the Soviet Union as the small nations involved elicited support

⁸Eudes, Kapetanios, pp. 245-46; McNeill, The Greek Dilemma, p. 256.

⁹Memorandum, Charles Olson to James Barnes, OF 772, October 17, 1944 (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York).

from these more powerful countries.¹⁰ In addition the Justice for Greece Committee distributed literature among U. S. government officials. Of the correspondence to President Truman in 1946, over 59 percent represented influential individual sources, (e.g. newspaper editors, church leaders, state and government officials). A majority of that correspondence was from members of Congress. Literature made available by the Justice for Greece Committee, and distributed to congressmen stressed that a conflict of "ideologies" centered in Greece, and portrayed Greece as a bulwark of democracy in the Mediterranean. As early as 1945, the Justice for Greece Committee proclaimed the United States would inevitably have to intervene on the side of democracy.¹¹ An example of the many messages to President Truman from this organization, stressing Greece's strategic location and her significance as a constant American ally stated:

Trieste, Dardanelles and Suez without Greece are useless to the westerners . . . Mr. President we appeal to you to make your great influence felt on the subject. Please use vision and fight to save the imperiled little nation which is the best and most dependable friend of America. Respectfully "The Justice for Greece Committee," Mrs. Calvin Coolidge honorary Chairman, Chauncy Hamlin Chairman, Sumner Welles.¹²

¹⁰James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York and London: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1947), pp. 73, 100-101, 115-17; (Hereinafter cited as Byrnes, Speaking Frankly.)

¹¹Xydis, Greece and The Great Powers, p. 711; see correspondence concerning Greece, OF 206-M, Box 778.

¹²Telegram, "The Justice For Greece Committee," to Truman: for other examples, see OF 206-M, Box 778, October 9, 1946.

Both AHEPA and the Justice for Greece Committee were active in supporting all Greek territorial gains to North Epirus, the Dodecanese Islands, and ratification of Greek claims on the Bulgarian frontier.¹³ The Panepirotic Federation of America, whose headquarters were in Worcester, Massachusetts, was devoted exclusively to Greek acquisition of North Epirus. This society wrote many letters to President Truman throughout 1945 and 1946. Letters concerning North Epirus were submitted to delegates to the San Francisco Conference, and to President Truman, Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Marshall Joseph Stalin at Potsdam in 1945. North Epirus was represented as historically belonging to Greece, with a majority population of Greek-speaking peoples. As to its present condition as part of Albania, the Potsdam letter stated a recurring theme:

It has been forced to become a part of Albania, under whose yoke it has suffered grievously, and now is faced with the extermination of its martyred inhabitants by Enver Hoxha's orders, whose manifest purpose is to change the Greek character of this region through persecution and expulsion. 14

Greece claimed atrocities were constantly committed against the Greek population of Albania, and also opposed Albanian

¹³Telegram, "The Justice For Greece Committee," to Truman, March 9, 1946, April 22, 1946; letter, AHEPA to Truman, June 12, 1946, July 16, 1946.

¹⁴Letter, the National Committee of the Panepirotic Federation of American, Inc., to Truman, Churchill and Stalin, OF 206-M, Box 778, August 1945.

membership in the United Nations. The United States supported this opposition and the issue of North Epirus caused constant conflict at the Paris Peace Conference, from July to October 1946. Both Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union supported Albania, in opposition to Greece and her patrons, Britain and the United States.¹⁵ Simultaneous with these disagreements, Yugoslavia accused the United States of violating Yugoslavian air space. In August 1945, two American transports were forced down by the Yugoslavian Air Force. As an unprovoked incident, this caused widespread resentment and tension within the United States.¹⁶ These actions of Yugoslavia, should be viewed in a wider context of Balkan border disputes and the resulting big nation alignment on the side of the participants.

Records of the United States Department of State do not reveal sentimental attachment to Greek claims. These records reveal a clear knowledge of events within Greece, and a realistic assessment of the Greek government and its claims.¹⁷

Greece did not receive North Epirus, or an extension of the Greek northern border into Bulgaria. The issue served

¹⁵Xydis, Greece and The Great Powers, pp. 271, 277, 293-95; Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p. 142.

¹⁶Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, pp. 144-46.

¹⁷FRUS (1945), VIII, 300-58; United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (1946), Vol. VII, "The Near East and Africa," Pubn. 8490 (1969), pp. 135-36, 139-43, 145-47; (Hereinafter cited as FRUS (1946), VII).

no purpose but that of creating friction within the Balkans and between Anglo-American and Soviet interests.¹⁸ Greece was awarded the Dodecanese Islands. These Aegean Islands were recognized as an important access to the Dardanelles and Black Sea by the United States Department of State, which originally requested, on April 17, 1945, that they be put under British military control. The Dodecanese were awarded to Greece by the Council of Foreign Ministers in June 1946.¹⁹ Greek control of the Dodecanese would further intensify that country's strategic interest to the United States.²⁰

During 1945 and 1946, almost 28 percent of White House mail which was political in nature, reflected the internal situation in Greece, rather than territorial or reparation claims. This correspondence mirrored a worsening political situation that would make free Greek elections difficult, and an increasing resentment over the continued presence of British forces. A series of right wing governments entrenched conservative power within the Greek military, the gendarmerie,

¹⁸Xydis, Greece and The Great Powers, pp. 205, 318-35; McNeill, Greek Dilemma, pp. 259-60.

¹⁹FRUS (1945), VIII, 307-8. U. S. Ambassador Lincoln MacVeagh reported on the return of the Dodecanese: "Contrasting with officialdom and the party press, general public has shown little enthusiasm. . . ." See also FRUS (1946), VII, 173.

²⁰For Greece's strategic significance, see George Fielding Eliot, "Why We Have Military Missions in 17 Nations," Readers Digest, Vol. 53 (October 1948), pp. 132-35.

local police, and the government bureaucracy. The British did not allow open press censorship, but the Greek government restricted the paper allotment to the leftist press, and raised rates on left wing periodicals to curtail their activities. British military authorities would not allow officers with royalist sympathies to be removed from the Greek armed forces. These monarchist officers controlled the Royal Hellenic troops. Members of the anti-monarchist Liberal party and of the leftist parties were forced to forego military careers, or join the increasing bands of guerrilla forces. Both university professors and civil servants were replaced if their records indicated liberal or leftist sympathies. These right wing activities were in clear violation of the Varkiza Agreement made on February 12, 1945 which guaranteed no reprisals against EAM members or any liberal group, and promised the creation of a Greek government incorporating both left and right.²¹

Greek Archbishop Damaskinos served as Regent from January 1945 to September 1946. The Greek premiers during 1945 were liberal General Nicholas Plastiras, who was forced

²¹News release by Greek American Committee for National Unity, OF 206-A, March 29, 1945 (Roosevelt Library); see the following from OF 206-M, Box 778 (Truman Library); letter, Harry Anton, President, Hellenic-American Fraternal Society, Detroit, Michigan, to Edward Stettinius (copy to Senator Vandenberg), May 17, 1945; cablegram, Demetris Partsalides, EAM, to Truman, June 18, 1945; petition requesting Greek government representative of right and left to United States, Soviet Union and British supervision of Greek elections, August 1945; letter, Spyros P. Skouras to Truman, September 4, 1945; letter, George P. Skouras to Judge Samuel Rosenman, November 20, 1945.

to resign by royalists, and replaced by the ultra-monarchist Admiral Petros Voulgaris in April; Voulgaris resigned in October as his government was accused of right wing terror and repression of all Greek liberal elements. Archbishop Damaskinos served as Premier and Regent until a short-lived government was created under Premier Panayiotis Kanellopoulos the last of October; finally a British-instigated government was formed under aging Liberal, Themistoclis Sofoulis in November.²² On March 31, 1946 the first postwar Greek election returned a Populist majority thus creating a royalist government. Constantine Tsaldaris became Prime Minister, and on September 1, 1946 a plebiscite returned George II to the Greek throne.²³ As Premier followed Premier and King followed

²²FRUS (1945), VIII, 122-25, 169, 182-84. Information sent to the White House by George P. Skouras, included Constantine Poulas, "Greek Tragedy, 1945," The Nation (November 3, 1945) OF 206-M, Box 778, November 20, 1945; see also address by Andre Michalopoulos to The Forum of the Cooperative Committee, Washington, D. C., March 19, 1947, concerning conditions within Greece, 1945-1946 in OF 206-M, Box 778.

²³Cablegram, John Sophianopoulos, Elo Svolos, Hadjibeis Agrarian Gavrilides, Kyrkos, Kritikas to Truman, OF 206-M, Box 778, April 8, 1946. Other accounts that question the honesty of the March 31, 1946, election and September 1, 1946, plebiscite are: George de Santillana, "The Greek Elections," The New Republic, Vol. 114 (April 8, 1946), pp. 496-97; Basil Vlavianos, "Greece and Its Allies," The Nation, Vol. 163 (September 28, 1946), pp. 344-46. Basil Vlavianos was the liberal publisher and editor of the National Herald a New York Greek language newspaper. His correspondence to President Roosevelt has been quoted, see supra, Chapter 11; "Greece Ballots in Chaos," Newsweek, Vol. 27 (April 1, 1946), pp. 45-46; "Greece: Battle Royal," Newsweek, Vol. 17 (April 22, 1946), pp. 46-47; Smith, State of Europe, pp. 234-35.

Regent, there was little significant improvement in the condition of the Greek people, or the inflation ridden Greek economy. The Greek government devoted itself to territorial and reparation claims, and increasing the military. No adequate program or budget for reconstruction was attempted, as a result the Greek population suffered a lack of food, shelter, and jobs. Relief supplies provided by UNRRA and such agencies as American Relief for Greek Democracy were poorly distributed, and in many cases were the subject of profiteering.²⁴ Meanwhile, the Greek countryside was torn with civil strife, as right battled left across the provinces of Greece. Two years of rightist suppression forced liberal and leftist Greeks to join the outlawed guerrilla forces and Greece was to experience continual civil war until the fall of 1949.²⁵

²⁴Letter, Robert St. John to Truman, OF 206-M, Box 778, December 18, 1946; see also Ernest O. Hauser, "Europe's Most Frightened Country," Saturday Evening Post, Vol. 218, (December 29, 1945), pp. 9-11, 44, 47; Hal Lehrman "Athens Calling," The Nation, Vol. 160 (May 5, 1945), pp. 515-17; "The Shape of Things," The Nation, Vol. 163 (December 28, 1946), p. 741.

²⁵Heinz Eulau, "Counter-Revolution in Greece," The New Republic, Vol. 113 (July 30, 1945), pp. 121-22; "Bad Faith in Greece," The New Republic, Vol. 112 (May 28, 1945), p. 727; L. S. Stavrianos, "Vacuum in Greece," The New Republic, Vol. 113 (December 24, 1945), pp. 863-65; Major J. A. Whitely, "Ourselves and Greece," The Nineteenth Century, Vol. 139 (March 1946), pp. 101-105. Civil War ended in Greece in the summer of 1949. The Greek National Army was directed and supplied by the United States. Napalm was first used at this time, see O'Ballance, Greek Civil War, pp. 198-99. For a Greek author's fictionalized, but true picture of Greek civil strife, see Nikos Kazantzakis, The Fratricides, trans. by Athena Gianakas Dallas (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1964).

The Greek American Council in New York City was the most active American based agency supporting the Greek left and liberal forces. This group published the EAM account of British intervention and subsequent Civil War. Entitled, National Liberation Front E.A.M. White Book, and first published in Trikkala, Greece in February 1945, this text was sent to President Truman by George P. Skouras.²⁶ In November 1945, the Greek American Council released copies of a British document dated August 12, 1943 to the American press. This document, a confidential report to British Middle East Headquarters, was the report of a British agent's work within Greece to undermine EAM, and turn its members over to German forces. The report also contained evidence of active British support for conservative resistance organizations such as EKKA which had pronounced royalist sympathies.²⁷ Throughout 1945 and 1946, the Greek American Council wrote President Truman protesting conditions within Greece, and requesting United States action that would end royalist suppression, and create a coalition government incorporating both left and right.

In September of 1945, the United States announced its intention of participating in an Allied mission to oversee

²⁶EAM White Book forwarded to White House by George Skouras, OF 206-M, Box 778, October 26, 1945.

²⁷New York Post, November 9, 1945, p. 2; OF 206-M, Box 778, This account is supported by research for this study supra, Chapter II.

Greek elections. This election mission was originally proposed at Potsdam and was to include representatives from the United States, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union declined on the grounds such a mission constituted interference in the internal affairs of Greece. Composed of British, French, and American members, the mission arrived in Athens, in December 1945. Few of the American group, which was mainly composed of military officers under the leadership of Henry F. Grady, spoke Greek.²⁸ Both liberal and leftist groups within Greece feared early elections. It was felt royalist control of the local and national government agencies, plus the activities of the royalist bands of X-ites would make any attempt at open elections meaningless.²⁹

The Greek American Council petitioned President Truman to delay elections until conditions could be improved:

Honest elections March 31 in Greece impossible under present conditions of fraud and violence imprisonment of anti-fascist and determination all democratic parties to abstain from fake elections. Greek democratic press and even Greek cabinet members have declared honest elections impossible March 31 and calls for postponement. . . . Yet Great Britain intervenes to insist elections be held. We urge American government and State Department sharply disassociate United States from this intervention on side Greek reactionary. . . . 30

²⁸FRUS (1945), VIII, 98-147.

²⁹Report of The Allied Mission to Observe Greek Elections, 1946, OF 206-F, Box 779, pp. 22-23.

³⁰Telegram, Greek American Council to Truman, OF 206-M, Box 778, March 4, 1946.

The Greek American Council, which also was known as the American Council For a Democratic Greece, was later placed on the Attorney General's list of subversive societies.³¹ Yet the correspondence from this society reflected the views of respected American correspondents who witnessed events within Greece. George Weller of The Chicago Daily News; Leland Stowe, New York Post Syndicate; and Howard K. Smith all reported their findings in the American press. In addition, the works of American historian, L. S. Stavrianos, supported the conclusions of the Greek American Council on these conditions.³²

George P. Skouras, New York City, was the most vocal of the individual correspondents in opposition to British intervention, the Greek right wing government, and the decision of holding elections in March. Skouras and his brother, Spyros P. Skouras, national President of the Greek War Relief Association, Inc., visited Greece and reported on their findings to Truman.³³ George Skouras was in Athens in November and

³¹Xydis, Greece and The Great Powers, p. 713; "Armed Forces Security Questionnaire: Organizations Designated by the Attorney General, Pursuant to Executive Order 10450," lists the Council of Greek Americans "as having significance in connection with the National Security."

³²George Weller, "Rightest Rule Stays in Greece," Chicago Daily News, April 9, 1945, p. 2; Leland Stowe's reports are included in Stowe, While Time Remains, pp. 242-70; Howard K. Smith, The State of Europe and L. S. Stavrianos, Greek Dilemma.

³³Letter, Spyros P. Skouras to Truman, OF 206-M, Box 778, September 4, 1945; letter, George P. Skouras to Judge Rosenman, OF 206-M, Box 778, November 12, 1945.

December 1944 and interviewed Greek leaders of the left and right. The report of this visit supports evidence that the revolt resulted from British and Greek right wing intransigence. Skouras witnessed the events of December 3, and reported the crowd was fired on by police with no provocation. He found Greek politicians:

. . . too excited and inclined to find . . . , that though the opposition pretended to be democratic and liberals, down in their hearts they were all 'Communists' and they were taking their orders from Moscow and acting in Greece in the same manner as everywhere else in Europe, the whole idea being a general uprising of the 'Communists' all over Europe in order to upset the Anglo-American policy. 34

In March 1946, Mr. Skouras wrote President Truman, as "the only hope of 7,000,000 people" and requested that the Greek elections set for March 31, be delayed.³⁵ His letter included recommendations that the Greek army and police force be broadened to include men of all political persuasions, and a new Greek voter registration be made under the supervision of an Allied mission composed of representatives from Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union. Of considerable value in understanding the future political climate in Greece were Skouras's listed objections to why elections should be postponed. His objections emphasized the easy accessibility

³⁴Letter and report, George P. Skouras, OF 206-M, Box 778, January 3, 1945.

³⁵Letter, George P. Skouras to Truman, OF 206-M, Box 778, March 22, 1946.

of voter registration books, claiming American Embassy officials had received authorizations to vote and further charged Monarchist sympathizers were furnished registration certificates that represented dead and non-existent individuals. Conditions were so unfavorable that even Premier Sophoulis recommended elections be delayed. But more important, the British director of elections, Colonel C. M. Woodhouse, "the man above all others distrusted by Greeks who fought the resistance because of what they considered his Machiavellian role in their Civil War," had complete charge of the election mission, including the American delegation.³⁶

The Allied mission reported that in spite of voter registration lists which were ten years old and some evidence of intimidation, the Greek elections of March 31, 1946 reflected the wishes of a majority of the Greek people. The report recommended that a Greek census be taken, and new voter registration lists be compiled before the plebiscite on the

³⁶Letter, George P. Skouras to Truman, OF 206-M, Box 778, March 22, 1946; Skouras's report on Greek conditions is supported by sources, supra, fn. 23; see also Stavrianos, Greece: American Dilemma, pp. 174-75. C. M. Woodhouse served as Commander of the British Military operating with the Greek resistance during World War II. In 1946, he was Secretary-General of the Allied Mission to observe elections. He was anti-EAM/ELAS. For an account of his experiences and views, see C. M. Woodhouse, Apple of Discord: A Survey of Recent Greek Politics in Their International Setting, forward by the Rt. Hon. Lord Altrincham (London: Hutchinson and Co., Ltd., 1948); (Hereinafter cited as Woodhouse, Apple of Discord).

King's return.³⁷ A British Parliamentary Delegation which visited Greece in August 1946 also recommended an updating of voter registration lists and new elections.³⁸

During the months of 1945 and 1946, United States and Soviet relations steadily worsened. It is not the purpose of this paper to examine the rights or wrongs of that conflict. But, just as British policy found a friendly Greece imperative in 1944, the United States discovered a similar need by 1947. The United States and the Soviet Union began to clash over the Balkans at the Potsdam Conference. Throughout 1945 and 1946, the Soviet Union was determined to maintain the Anglo-Soviet agreement of October 1944. The United States was equally determined to support the principles of the Declaration on Liberated Europe made at the Yalta Conference in February 1945. This Declaration, based on the Atlantic Charter, stated the principle of self-determination for liberated nations.³⁹ Truman felt this principle was infringed upon by

³⁷ Report of The Allied Mission to Observe Greek Elections, 1946, OF 206-F, Box 779, pp. 22, 26-27. EAM boycotted the election. This practice is considered a valid form of political expression within Greece. Liberal parties originally threatened to boycott, but were persuaded to take part, ibid., pp. 25-26.

³⁸ Stavrianos, Greece: American Dilemma, p. 181.

³⁹ Feis, Churchill Roosevelt Stalin, pp. 562-63; see also Robert Lee Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956), pp. 264-67.

the Soviet Union in its relations with smaller nations.⁴⁰ The Soviet Union countered charges against Soviet control in the Balkans, by referring to undemocratic conditions within Greece.⁴¹ That there is validity in these charges may be found in the number of instances the British Labor government sought a broadening of the Greek government to include all parties, and the British government's attempts to curtail right wing repression.⁴² In its turn, the United States responded to Greek requests for financial assistance by recommending more democratic institutions and a national program of reconstruction. Illustrative of American views on Greek aid was a Treasury Department memorandum in October 1946 which asserted that: "The Greeks must tackle their own internal problems seriously before expecting substantial monetary assistance from the United States."⁴³

The Greek internal situation became incidental within the larger context of United States interest in the Near East

⁴⁰Truman, Harry S. Truman, p. 343.

⁴¹Charles E. Bohlen, Witness To History: 1929-1969 (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1973), p. 234; (Hereinafter cited as Bohlen, Witness To History.)

⁴²Xydis, Greece and The Great Powers, pp. 130, 137, 151, 211, 233, 247, 254, 276, 300.

⁴³William H. Taylor to Treasury Secretary Snyder, "Information on Greek Delegation," Snyder File, Box 19 (October, 1946; see also Xydis, Greece and The Great Powers, pp. 146, 259, 263; FRUS (1945), VIII, 213-15, 237; FRUS (1946), VII, 170, 187-88.

and Mediterranean. That interest opposed Soviet influence in Iran, Turkey, and the Eastern Mediterranean.⁴⁴ Greece's geographic location and control of the Dodecanese Islands negated the importance of a "dirty gray" government within that country.⁴⁵ In addition, Truman's advisors such as Averell Harriman, Ambassador, to the Soviet Union; George F. Kennan and Charles E. Bohlen of the Embassy in Moscow; Secretary of State James F. Byrnes; Chief of Staff William D. Leahy; Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal; and Presidential aide Clark Clifford came to feel threatened by the actions of the Soviet Union. They felt containment of that country's influence offered the only protection for the United States.⁴⁶ Through the efforts of these men, and the decisions of President Truman, the United States adopted Britain's historic role in the Mediterranean: contain Russia.

Secretary of State James F. Byrnes adhered to a bipartisan foreign policy principle. Byrnes maintained the

⁴⁴Truman, Years of Trial, pp. 93, 96, 98.

⁴⁵Jones, Fifteen Weeks. Jones describes the Greek government in 1947, as "undemocratic, corrupt, and reactionary." He concludes that this type of government might be described as "a rather dirty gray," ibid., pp. 184-85.

⁴⁶Kaiser, Cold Winter, pp. 126-27; Xydis, Greece and The Great Powers, Annex V, "G. F. Kennan's Dispatch of February 22, 1946," pp. 699-709; Bohlen, Witness To History, pp. 260-63; Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, pp. 282-97; Frank Gervasi, "Watchdog in the White House," Colliers, Vol. 122 (October 9, 1948), pp. 18, 76-77; Millis, Forrestal Diaries, pp. 172-73; Leigh White, "Truman's One-Man Brain Trust," Saturday Evening Post, Vol. 220 (October 4, 1947), p. 113.

righteousness of open diplomacy, but at the same time expected acceptance of all State Department decisions.⁴⁷ Those knowledgeable of official policy were automatically to agree with that policy's implementation. On September 12, 1946, Secretary of Commerce Henry A. Wallace, publicly disagreed with the evolving United States policy toward the Soviet Union. This speech resulted in a furor in the American press, and in government circles. Wallace was forced to resign that same month.⁴⁸ Henry Wallace had his Greek counterpart, John Sophianopoulos. Sophianopoulos had served in the Greek Cabinet as Foreign Minister and as Greece's delegate to the San Francisco Conference. As Greece's delegate to the first meeting of the Security Council of the United Nations, he refused his government's instructions to repudiate Soviet charges against the presence of British troops in Greece. The Soviet Union had charged the British troops in Greece "were an instrument of political pressure."⁴⁹ Sophianopoulos was recalled by his government in January 1946. Historian S. G. Xydis has referred to Sophianopoulos as "a small-state Wallace" who

⁴⁷Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, pp. 233-35.

⁴⁸Chicago Daily News, September 13, 1946, p. 9; September 14, 1946, p. 1, 6; September 20, 1946, p. 1: headline, "Truman Fires Wallace;" see also John Morton Blum, ed., The Price of Vision: Diary of Henry A. Wallace, 1942-1946 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1973), pp. 609-32.

⁴⁹Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 260.

desired Greece to serve as a "bridge" in British and Soviet relations.⁵⁰ When Sophianopoulos visited the United States in January 1947, Demetrius N. Protopapas of New York City advised President Truman to "seize him and send him back to Tito."⁵¹ Against this background of strained international relations and intolerance of opposing views, President Truman, himself now a member of AHEPA, announced the "Truman Doctrine," March 12, 1947.⁵²

These international events were not expressed to any extent in Presidential correspondence. The theme of the mail in the period 1945 to 1947 centered on the issue of the "Megali Idea" of territorial acquisition. A breakdown of correspondence by year indicates to what extent the "Megali Idea" dominated White House mail. The increase in mail from influential sources in 1946 reflects the increasing pressure placed on United States legislators to support Greek territorial claims. Mail protesting Greek internal conditions decreases in 1946 from that of 1945. This may reflect emerging communist hegemony in the Balkans or the political climate previously mentioned. While overall political mail declined from 1945 to

⁵⁰Xydis, Greece and The Great Powers, p. 165.

⁵¹Letter, Demetrius N. Protopapas to Truman, OF 106-M, Box 778, January 17, 1947.

⁵²Truman became a member of AHEPA, June, 1946; letter, Marie L. Zaharakos to Truman, OF 206-M, Box 778, June 19, 1946.

to 1946, the percentage of political mail reflecting the "Megali Idea" increased. Table III illustrates the preponderance of mail supporting Greek territorial claims. These figures suggest Greece would elicit considerable sympathetic support when President Truman requested aid to that country in March 1947.⁵³

An evaluation of White House correspondence from April 1945, to March 11, 1947, suggests a curious contradiction. The volume of mail by month is higher in correspondence political in nature than that in the months evaluated for 1944 and 1945, but most striking, retained political mail in 1945 and 1946 reflected views of a right wing Greek government. Political mail for October 1944 through March 1945, reflected views opposed to the establishment of that government. This contrast may be explained by a historic evaluation of the emotional appeal of the "Megali Idea" on Americans of Greek heritage. In addition, the creation of communist governments in Yugoslavia, Albania, Rumania, and Bulgaria lent credence to the Greek government's claims of "communist" designs on that country. Territorial claims by the Greek government created a political climate almost impossible to evaluate. A United Nations Commission found evidence to support Greek charges that Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria were aiding Greek

⁵³ Evaluated correspondence is located OF 206-M, Box 778, "Truman Doctrine," Truman Library.

TABLE III

WHITE HOUSE MAIL CONCERNING GREECE

1945 - March 1947

	1945	1946	Jan-Mar 47
OPINIONS			
Non Political	4(4.88%)	16(25.0%)	3(75.0%)
Political	78(95.12%)	48(75.0%)	1(25.0%)
"Megali Idea"	49(62.82%)	42(87.5%)	1(100.0%)
Opposed Internal conditions in Greece; Actions of Greek government; Presence of British; Validity of elections	29(37.18%)	6(12.5%)	0
SOURCES			
Greek American Societies	66(80.48%)	17(26.56%)	1(25.0%)
The Justice For Greece Committee	5(6.10%)	7(10.94%)	0
Influential Individuals	9(10.98%)	38(59.38%)	1(25.0%)
Non-Influential Individuals	2(2.44%)	2(3.13%)	2(50.0%)
Organized Labor	0	0	0
Total Retained mail by year	<u>82(54.67%)</u>	<u>64(42.67%)</u>	<u>4(2.67%)</u>

leftist guerrillas.⁵⁴ But it is almost impossible to determine to what extent this aid was provoked by the actions of the Greek government in claiming territory within these areas. What is evident is that the "Megali Idea" attracted tremendous support from Greek-Americans, and gained widespread support from United States legislators.⁵⁵ Although there was considerable political mail protesting conditions in Greece, it was not as great a percentage as a knowledge of Greek conditions would warrant. These conditions were publicized in the United States, as evidenced by the representative articles from periodicals of the period cited in this chapter. One must conclude that Americans were engrossed in their own post-war affairs, but what is also suggested is there was a developing political climate that would accept any form of government in Greece as long as it could not be labeled communist.

⁵⁴U. S. Department of State, The United Nations and The Problem of Greece, Near Eastern Series 9, Pubn. 2909, (September 1947), p. 23-16.

⁵⁵The following is a partial list of legislators who wrote Truman supporting the "Megali Idea," 1945-46; Vincent F. Kilborn, Alabama; Pat McCarran, Nevada; W. Scott Lucus, Illinois; Claude Pepper, Florida; Hugh D. Scott, Jr. Pennsylvania; Hardie Scott, Pennsylvania; James Gallagher, Pennsylvania; James O. Eastland, Mississippi; W. J. Bryan Dorn, South Carolina; Edith Nourse Rogers, Massachusetts. In addition, governors, mayors, postmasters, V.F.W. organizations, and church officials of the Greek Orthodox and Episcopal Churches are represented in mail supporting Greek territorial claims, OF 206-M, Box 778.

CHAPTER IV

AMERICAN REACTION TO THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE

Britain, having re-established a monarchist government in Greece, attempted to broaden that government and restrain right wing activities in 1945 and 1946. Yet, Greece made minimal social and economic progress during these years. By 1947 the majority of the population remained almost as destitute as in the days following liberation. Greek officials failed to institute reconstruction programs; they instead utilized the appeal of a "Greater Greece" to distract the population. When criticized for the lack of improvements, the Greek government charged harassment by its Balkan neighbors, and claimed that this disrupted reconstruction.¹

Following World War II, many Americans expressed sympathy for the EAM - led nationalist movement within Greece.² However, from 1945 to 1947 opposition to British intervention and the Greek monarchy gave way to an increasing support for the royalist government. As has been seen, the historic appeal

¹Stavrianos, Greece: American Dilemma, pp. 176-79; see also Richard J. Barnett, Intervention and Revolution: The United States in The Third World (New York: The World Publishing Co., 1968), p. 109; (Hereinafter cited as Barnett, Intervention and Revolution).

²McNeill, Greek Dilemma, p. 248, maintains Greek insurgents led a nationalist movement.

of a "Greater Greece" and the fear of communism frequently altered liberal sympathy. Soviet intransigence became associated in the minds of many Americans with a communistic political system, and both were rejected and feared. Confronted with British intervention in Greece and Soviet intervention in the rest of the Balkans, Americans indicated a readiness to accept unilateral action on the part of the United States, but Americans in 1947 also retained hope for an effective United Nations. This hope diminished as United States officials came to feel this nation's interests were threatened in the Mediterranean. The repressive nature of the Greek government lost its importance when an alternative government might prove communist and Soviet-influenced.

On February 24, 1947, Britain, claiming economic hardship, informed the United States government of its inability to maintain troops in Greece after March 31. The House of Commons had been advised four months previously, and both Britain and Greece expected the United States to come to Greece's aid. This expectation was based on a realistic assessment of United States interest in the Near East, and its growing naval hegemony in the Mediterranean. From the time of Greek liberation, the United States had contributed approximately \$435,500,000 to Greece. In addition to this aid, Secretary of State James Byrnes had agreed to continued aid to Greece in his conversations with British Foreign Minister

Ernest Bevin in October 1946.³ Two additional factors influenced the decision to request Greek aid and fill the breach created by British withdrawal: the need for economic aid to bolster Europe's economy, and a desire to formalize an anti-Soviet policy.

In a State Department memorandum dated February 26, 1947, Joseph Jones referred to the economic crisis in France, China, Greece and the British Empire. Imminent economic collapse would cause these countries to adopt "independent nationalistic" policies or "swing into the Russian orbit." Financially isolated, the United States would then suffer economic depression, and excessive taxation. Jones felt Congress and the public were unaware of the implications involved in failing to rebuild friendly nations' economies.⁴ No reference to a fear of spreading communism is found in this statement of economic realities; aid must be immediate or United States markets will disappear. Jones was advocating haste, but not

³Barnett, Intervention and Revolution, p. 114; Xydis, Greece and The Great Powers, pp. 407, 476; Harold L. Ickes, "Truman Accused of Withholding Greek Aid Issue Till Last Minute," Washington Evening Star, April 2, 1947; Thomas L. Stokes, "Moral Force Dormant?" Washington News, March 20, 1947; for U. S. Financial contributions, see New York Times, March 21, 1947, all in the Democratic National Committee Clipping File; (Hereinafter cited as Democratic Committee File).

⁴Memorandum for the File, Jones to Benton, Joseph M. Jones Papers, February 26, 1947; (Hereinafter cited as Jones Papers); Truman Library, all unpublished material is located Harry S. Truman Library (Independence, Missouri, and will hereinafter be cited by description only).

to preserve the existing Greek government. However, such economic emphasis disappeared in his book, The Fifteen Weeks, which dealt with the background of the Truman request for Greek aid. Jones emphasized postwar disagreements with the Soviet Union, and a Greece threatened by communism.⁵

Official interest in announcing an anti-Soviet policy is reflected in Presidential aide George Elsey's letter to Clark Clifford on March 7. Elsey recommended delaying the President's proposal. Greece did not warrant immediate attention, and action might affect the forthcoming Moscow Foreign Ministers Conference. In addition, time must be had to insure a receptive public, but of greater importance, in Elsey's view, was: "There has been no overt action in the immediate past by the U.S.S.R. which serves as an adequate pretext for the 'All-Out' speech."⁶ The expression "All-Out speech" is not explained, suggesting that Elsey and Clifford had previously discussed and agreed on the need for such a speech defining policy toward the Soviet Union.

State Department officials worked with feverish haste,

⁵Jones, Fifteen Weeks, pp. 11, 135. For texts that find economic motivation for the Truman plan, see William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy rev. and enl. (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1962), pp. 269-70. Woodhouse charges American interest in southern Europe was for the purpose of a "bridgehead for northern expansion of economic imperialism," Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, p. 289.

⁶Letter, Elsey to Clifford, Clifford Files, March 7, 1947.

not entirely due to the international situation, to prepare a speech to be given before a joint session of Congress. In his memoirs, Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson, remarked: "Everyone knew that the State Department was facing its last clear chance to get a job done."⁷ Jones, who wrote the accepted speech draft, also conveyed a personal commitment to place the State Department in the center of the decision making process.⁸ These men were working to regain a pre-eminence the Department had lost during the Roosevelt Administration, when its duties were relegated to White House aides, military chiefs, and President Roosevelt's decisions.⁹ The resulting request conveyed a sense of crisis in international affairs, but the record also indicates a corresponding sense of crisis in professional careers of the involved officials. Converging self and national interest, and suspicions of the Soviet Union resulted in acceptance of a definitive policy by Secretary of the Navy Forrestal, Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson, as well as White House and State Depart-

⁷Dean Acheson, Present At The Creation: My Years in The State Department (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1969), p. 220; (Hereinafter cited as Acheson, Present At The Creation).

⁸Jones, Fifteen Weeks, p. 147.

⁹Lisle A. Rose, Dubious Victory: The United States and the End of World War II (Oberlin: The Kent State University Press, 1973), pp. 245-47.

ment executives.¹⁰ Convincing Congress and the American people remained the only obstacle.

The problems of Greece and the spread of communism dominated the President's request on March 12, 1947, to grant aid. Greek conditions were expressed in broad terms: "There is no other country to which democratic Greece can turn," and "assistance is imperative if Greece is to survive as a free nation."¹¹ These generalities cloaked undemocratic institutions, and neglected to explore previous Greek failure to utilize aid. The statement avoids specifics, but there are obvious contradictions. In reference to the civil war, Truman stated: "The Greek government is unable to cope with the situation. The Greek army is small and poorly equipped" and in danger of a "totalitarian" system being established by "aggressive" external "movements."¹² (Aid critic Senator Glen H. Taylor would charge that Truman's implication of outside pressure on a poorly equipped Greek army was subterfuge. Taylor maintained the 13,000 guerrillas had but scant assistance from neighboring countries, and that in addition the Greek army

¹⁰For further information why Greek-Turkish aid gained acceptance, see Eric F. Goldman, The Crucial Decade: America, 1945-1955 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), p. 57-62; (Hereinafter cited as Goldman, Crucial Decade).

¹¹"Text of President Truman's Speech on New Foreign Policy," The New York Times, March 13, 1947, in the Jones Papers; (Hereinafter cited as "Truman Speech").

¹²Ibid.

consisted of 120,000 troops aided by 10,000 British.¹³

Introducing the inevitability of an ideological clash, Truman's speech continued: "every nation must choose between alternative ways of life." Further implying that if the choice were left to chance, peace would be threatened, and also "the security of the United States," thus linking aid to peace and national security. This causative pyramid continued with the introduction of Turkish aid. Were Greece to succumb, "the effect upon its neighbor, Turkey, would be immediate and serious. Confusion and disorder might well spread throughout the entire Middle East."¹⁴ The tone of the speech is crisis oriented. Britain's role in Greece, the United Nations, Greek politics, and even the request for Turkish aid are under-emphasized. Barely mentioned is the issue of military personnel and assistance. These omissions were considered necessary to win public approval and legislation to implement the request.¹⁵

American press coverage illustrated mixed European reaction to Truman's proposal; such conflicting headlines as

¹³F. Ross Peterson, Prophet Without Honour: Glen H. Taylor and The Fight for American Liberalism (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1974), p. 88.

¹⁴"Truman Speech."

¹⁵Thomas G. Paterson, Soviet American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and The Origins of the Cold War (Baltimore: Hohn Hopkins University Press, 1973), p. 197; (Hereinafter cited as Paterson, Soviet American Confrontation); Jones, Fifteen Weeks, pp. 163, 168.

"London Gratified By New U.S. Stand," and "Trumans Speech Leaves Britons Gaping" made simultaneous appearance. Fearing Soviet-American confrontation, British officials were quoted as shocked at unexpected military aid to Greece. The conservative Times (London) typically interpreted the speech as an attack on communism and a radically new foreign policy, while Greek "pledges" to preserve domestic civil liberties were recommended in the pro-labor Daily Herald. From Paris, American journalist Harold Callender reported French officials were surprised at a plan to extend American "frontiers" to the accepted British sphere in the Mediterranean. Speculating on Russian reaction, French officials expected a new Soviet "line," disrupting the French Communist party cooperation; while Swedish press reports feared world polarization and possible military conflict. A Soviet Tass dispatch charged suppression of Greek democracy, but failed to find the policy Soviet-directed. Speculation and amazement summarize known European feelings.¹⁶

Two days prior to Truman's speech of March 12, the New York Times had speculated that Congress would not act to

¹⁶"London Gratified By New U.S. Stand," New York Times, March 13, 1947; "Truman Speech Leaves Britons Gaping," Washington Daily News, March 13, 1947; "Europe is Amazed By Blunt Warning," New York Times, March 13, 1947; Harold Callender, "French See Perils In New U.S. Policy," New York Times, March 14, 1947; "Scandinavia Aroused: Truman Speech Seen Harmful to East-West Relations," New York Times, March 14, 1947; "Moscow Sees Aim To 'Control' Greece," New York Times, March 14, 1947; all in Jones Papers.

establish an American "frontier" in royalist Greece or appropriate funds to aid the British Empire.¹⁷ Subsequent arguments against the Truman Doctrine included these points, but debate centered on the bypassing of the United Nations and the Soviet Union's intentions in Europe. The speech did not mention the Soviet Union by name and thus only indirectly alluded to that nation's intentions.¹⁸ Yet, an examination of March news releases filed in the Truman Papers, Truman Library, indicates that the issue of United Nations and Soviet intentions dominated public response.¹⁹

A consensus of radio comments following Truman's declaration interpreted the speech as a new United States policy to contain the Soviet Union. Among those finding the plan a challenge to Soviet effort for world leadership were Leif Eid, NBC; Gabriel Heatter and Albert Warner, MBS; John Daly, Winston Burdette, and Eric Sevried of CBS; and Earl Godwin of ABC. Initial radio reports practically ignored the Greek political situation and the United Nations. Exceptions were Elmer Davis,

¹⁷New York Times, March 10, 1947, in the Democratic Committee File.

¹⁸"Truman Speech"

¹⁹Office of Government Reports: Division of Press Intelligence. Radio, editorial and column comment concerning Truman's Speech were tabulated daily based on major network and key newspapers selected for evaluation, located in the Conway Files. (Hereinafter cited as "Radio Comment," "Editorial Comment" or "Column Comment" with appropriate date; see Appendix A and B for newspapers and columns surveyed.)

who stressed Greek corruption; Cecil Brown and Ray Henle, who called for United Nations action and questioned America's ability to bear the cost if aid were extended to other countries.²⁰ Opinion extremes are found in comparing the views of Lowell Thomas and Henry Wallace. Thomas described the speech as an attempt "to save the American way."²¹ Former Vice President Wallace, commenting on NBC, denounced unilateral action to aid a corrupt monarchy as a "betraying" of the American "tradition," and suggested that United States aid to reactionary governments would force liberal people to reject such democracy and turn to communism.²²

During March, radio comments became increasingly critical. Winston Burdette raised the issue of ideological conflict, cautioning that preoccupation with communism would counter opposition to fascism.²³ Yet the main issues remained; speculation as to Congressional approval, United Nations rather than unilateral action, possible war with the Soviet Union, and the nature of the Greek government. Reports of early Congressional approval were dimmed by the United Nations issue.

²⁰"Radio Comment," March 12, 1947; March 13, 1947.

²¹Lowell Thomas, N.B.C., "Radio Comment," March 12, 1947.

²²Henry A. Wallace, N.B.C., "Radio Comment," March 13, 1947.

²³Winston Burdette, C.B.S., "Radio Comment," March 14, 1947.

Dissenting views of Senators Claude Pepper and Glen H. Taylor centered on bypassing the United Nations. Pepper found contradiction in the offering of funds to Greece and Turkey, while at the same time maintaining a United Nations which was financially unable to act.²⁴ In an interview on Radio Forum of The Air, Taylor insisted no crisis existed, and the situation called for United Nations action, not United States intervention.²⁵ Countering these arguments were commentators such as Fulton Lewis Jr. and Wellman Hellman who maintained that the United Nations was ineffectual, and felt implementing aid to threatened nations would strengthen world unity.²⁶ Drew Pearson proved the chief Greek critic among radio commentators charging political corruption and accusing White House aide General Harry Vaughn of removing from White House files records damaging to George II. According to Pearson, Arabian oil accounted for United States intervention.²⁷ In reference to criticism, Martin Agronsky reported: "Those who criticize are automatically labeled wild-eyed dreamers, Wallace school lib-

²⁴"Radio Comment," March 13 through March 31, 1947; Claude Pepper, "Radio Comment," March 13, 1947.

²⁵Glenn H. Taylor, M.B.S., "American Forum of The Air," "Radio Comment," March 20, 1947.

²⁶Fulton Lewis, Jr., M.B.S., "Radio Comment," March 28, 1947; Wellman Hellman, M.B.S., "Radio Comment," March 31, 1947.

²⁷Drew Pearson, A.B.C., "Radio Comment," March 17, 1947, March 24, 1947.

erals, or just plain communists."²⁸

Similar considerations were raised in March editorials which approved immediate Congressional passage of the Truman plan. Favorable editorial comments ranged from the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, which advocated aid to stabilize the Middle East only in the event that the United Nations could not act, to the extreme position of the Philadelphia Inquirer which asked Americans to choose between "Godless communism" or "genuine democracy."²⁹ Dissent followed a similar pattern. The San Francisco Chronicle asked for sufficient time to consider all alternatives and implications, while the communist New York Daily Worker charged Truman "wiped his feet" on Roosevelt's attempt to create an American-Soviet alliance.³⁰ During March, more editorials than either radio commentators or columnists continued to approve the Truman plan. Table IV compares key newspaper editorials, by region, registering support or opposition.³¹

²⁸ Martin Agronsky, A.B.C., "Radio Comment," March 17, 1947.

²⁹ "Editorial Comment," Pittsburgh Post Gazette, March 21, 1947; "Editorial Comment," Philadelphia Inquirer, March 17, 1947.

³⁰ "Editorial Comment," San Francisco Chronicle, March 24, 1947; "Editorial Comment," Daily Worker, March 17, 1947.

³¹ "Editorial Comment," evaluation from March 13, 1947 to March 31, 1947.

TABLE IV

REGIONAL EDITORIAL OPINION
CONCERNING GREEK-TURKISH AID: MARCH 13-31, 1947

AREA	NUMBER EVALUATED	FAVORABLE	UNFAVORABLE
Washington, D.C.	2	2	0
North East	17	13	4
North Central	9	6	3
Middle West	8	5	3
South	13	9	4
West	10	9	1
TOTAL	<u>59(100%)</u>	<u>44(75%)</u>	<u>15(25%)</u>

Four black papers were also surveyed and were unani-
mously opposed to any type of foreign aid. W.E.B. DuBois in
the Chicago Defender expressed apprehension that America would
grow increasingly militaristic. The Baltimore Afro-American,
the Pittsburgh Courier and the New York Amsterdam Star News
questioned aid to Greece at a time when American health care,
education, and housing needed support. These papers further
suggested money might better be spent to improve the American
electoral process. Domestic need, bypassing the United Na-
tions, and provoking war with the Soviet Union were key issues

in these representative papers.³²

Columnist opinion divided almost evenly over the new policy. Syndicated columnists Walter Lippmann, Eleanor Roosevelt, Arthur Krock and Thomas L. Stokes counseled delay or caution against implementation. Fiorello H. LaGuardia, writing for the New York PM, was a constant critic, as was New York Herald Tribune columnist William L. Shirer, but less well known columnists also attacked the Truman plan. John W. Owens foresaw a world divided into two hostile camps and eventual Soviet-American military confrontation. Clif Stratton charged the United States sought to preserve an Empire no longer of interest to the British, while George Rothwell Brown questioned the government's creating a crisis situation to achieve approval.³³ Supporting columnists ran the gamut from Dorothy Thompson's plea for European regeneration based on a "supreme act of conversion on the part of the United States," to Sylvia F. Porter's claim that economic aid would provide American employment. Acquiescence often paralleled Hamilton Butler's conclusion that although painful, the United

³²"Editorial Comment," Negro Weeklies, March 14, 1947; March 15, 1947; March 21, 1947.

³³"Column Comment," March 13, 1947 through March 31, 1947; for a leading columnist's criticisms, see also Walter Lippmann, The Cold War: A Study in United States Foreign Policy, introduction by Ronald Steel (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1972), pp. 5-52.

States could not escape a world role.³⁴ As Table V indicates, column reading Americans faced a difficult choice in evaluating conflicting opinions.³⁵

TABLE V

REGIONAL COLUMN COMMENT

CONCERNING GREEK-TURKISH AID: MARCH 13-31, 1947*

AREA	TOTAL	FAVORABLE	UNFAVORABLE	AMBIVALENT
		Newspaper Columnist	Newspaper Columnist	Newspaper Columnist
Washington, D. C.	9/19	4/6	2/5	3/8
North East	13/22	5/9	7/12	1/1
North Central	6/9	3/4	2/4	1/1
Middle West	2/3	0/0	2/3	0/0
South	3/3	3/3	0/0	0/0
West	2/2	0/0	1/1	1/1
TOTAL	<u>35/58(100%)</u>	<u>15/22(38%)</u>	<u>14/25(43%)</u>	<u>6/11(19%)</u>

*As a newspaper carries several bylines, the number of newspapers precedes the number of columnists.

³⁴"Column Comment," March 15, 1947; Dorothy Thompson, "Column Comment," Washington Star, March 14, 1947.

³⁵"Column Comment," evaluation from March 13, 1947 through March 31, 1947.

On March 15, the New York Herald Tribune reported the White House received over twelve hundred messages registering "overwhelming approval" for Truman's speech.³⁶ Only sixty-six letters and telegrams were retained concerning aid to Greece and Turkey for the period March through May 1947. Assuming these messages are representative, "overwhelming approval" is an overstatement; thirty-three approved, twenty-six objected, and seven were ambivalent.³⁷ Greek corruption and an effective United Nations were frequently discussed, but Wallace's influence as a major policy critic was obvious. Correspondents expressing approval cited dislike for Wallace as sufficient reason, while those rejecting the President's plan exclaimed, "Thank God for Henry A. Wallace."³⁸ Greek American societies approved, except the American Council for a Democratic Greece, which was joined in opposition by divergent groups such as the National Farmers Union and the United Christian Missionary Society: Disciples of Christ. Ambivalent messages requested

³⁶New York Herald Tribune, March 15, 1947 in the Democratic Committee File.

³⁷OFF 426, "Aid to Greece and Turkey," OF 1170, Wallace File.

³⁸Letter Muriel Rutman to Truman, OF 1170, March 14, 1947; on Wallace's opposition to Greek-Turkish aid, see Alonzo L. Hamby, Beyond The New Deal: Harry S. Truman and American Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), p. 192, 197. Wallace's speeches against the Truman Doctrine provoked an anti-Wallace response, see Norman D. Markowitz, The Rise and Fall of the People's Century: Henry A. Wallace and American Liberalism, 1941-1948 (New York: The Free Press, 1973), pp. 225-26, 235-41.

economic aid, but denounced military assistance. Those messages mentioning communism are insignificant. Table VI illustrates the division in attitude.³⁹ These evaluated figures concerning correspondence prove a poor substitute for feelings expressed similar to those of Evangelos Halikiopoulos, who wrote describing the pathetic plight of the Greek people and thanked "the American people for the great aid."⁴⁰ Pledging support while taking a different tone, B. R. Williams suggested Truman might quell criticism were he "to publicly castigate that Sonofabitch Wallace."⁴¹ Disapproval also invoked extreme prose, one message charging "double-talk," compared Truman to a "comedian" and further declared "the Greek people aren't free except to starve and pay taxes."⁴² Opposition embraced both conservative and liberal Americans; liberals objected to unilateral action, while conservatives attacked cost. H. M. Meyer summarized right wing opposition: "We are asked to

³⁹Correspondence concerning Greece is located OF 426, "Aid to Greece and Turkey," OF 1170, Wallace File.

⁴⁰Letter, Evangelos Halikiopoulos to Truman, OF 426, May 19, 1947.

⁴¹Letter, B. R. Williams to Truman, OF 1170, April 24, 1947.

⁴²Letter, Marcelle Shubert to Truman, OF 426, April 13, 1947.

TABLE VI

OPINION EXPRESSED IN WHITE HOUSE MAIL
CONCERNING GREEK-TURKISH AID: MARCH-MAY 1947

FAVORABLE		UNFAVORABLE		AMBIVALENT	
Humanitarian	6	Neglected United Nations and favored Wallace	10	Economic aid; no military	5
Opposition to Wallace	3	Greek corruption	8		
Plan would encourage peace	2	Domestic need	3		
Good for trade	1	Cost	3	Provided Greek government improved	2
Unqualified approval	21	Endanger peace	2		
Individuals	30	Individuals	21	Individuals	7
Organizations AHEPA Greek Orthodox Church Adelphotis Arahovition/Karyae	3	Organizations Congress of American Women National Farmers Union American Council For a Democratic Greece United Christian Missionary Society: Disciple of Christ	5		
TOTAL: <u>33(50%)</u>		<u>26(39%)</u>		<u>7(11%)</u>	

send our money to another sink hole--Greece."⁴³ Admittedly overstated, the pathos and passion of these letters reflected the issues that confronted America.

White House assistant press secretary Eben Ayers described dissenting mail originating in New York and Brooklyn as "clearly inspired" and "propaganda."⁴⁴ An article appearing in the New York Herald Tribune, entitled "Red Tinge Seen in the White House Mail on Truman," interpreted Ayer's remarks as inferring that communist sympathies inspired opposition. Explaining that a difference exists between spontaneous expression and pressure mail, the article suggested that names be published to distinguish those who write "to follow a 'line.'"⁴⁵

Also written from New York was a letter from Eleanor Roosevelt. This message to Truman objected to an ideological crusade and stated:

. . . I do not believe that the Democratic party can win by going the Republican party one better in conservatism on the home front. Nor do I believe that taking over Mr. Churchill's policies in the Near East, in the name of democracy is the way to really create a barrier to

⁴³Letter, H. M. Meyer to Truman, OF 426, April 7, 1947. On critics see Paterson, Soviet American Confrontation, p. 201; see also Walter Lippmann, "Seeing it Through," Washington Post, March 15, 1947.

⁴⁴Eben Ayers as quoted by Bert Andrews, "Red Tinge Seen In White House Mail on Truman," New York Herald Tribune, March 15, 1947 in the Democratic Committee File.

⁴⁵Ibid.

communism or promote democracy. . . . 46

Recent Truman critics find an anti-communist stance adopted by the Democrats in 1947, and explain that this was a result of the Republican Congressional victory in the 1946 elections. Communism did serve as an issue in that election, thus, the charge of Mrs. Roosevelt that the Democratic party did not need attempt to outdo the Republican party on this issue.⁴⁷

A series of opinion polls are included in Joseph Jones's papers concerning reaction to the Truman Doctrine. These documents, which are marked "Confidential," and only were declassified in August 1973, illustrate the Government's preoccupation with public response.⁴⁸ White House statements expressing "overwhelming approval" offer one explanation for secrecy. By a "majority of nearly five to three" Americans objected to foreign military aid. Seventy-five percent had

⁴⁶Letter, Eleanor Roosevelt to Truman, OF 426, April 7, 1947.

⁴⁷Bert Cochran, Harry Truman and The Crisis Presidency (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1973), p. 186; David Horowitz, The Free World Colossus: A Critique of American Foreign Policy in the Cold War (New York: Hill and Wang, 1965), pp. 99-100.

⁴⁸Memorandum for the File; Department of State, Division of Public Studies, "Evaluation of the Current Opinion Situation on Greek-Turkish Problem," March 27, 1947; U. S. Public Opinion on President Truman's Proposals for Aid to Greece and Turkey, March 12-March 17; (Hereinafter cited as "Public Opinion"); Memorandum for the File, "Confidential Gallup Results: Greece and Turkey," March 27, 1947, in the Jones Papers.

knowledge of Truman's proposal, but interpreted the plan as economic aid to a Soviet and communist-threatened Greece; in addition, more than "two to one" believed the United Nations should resolve the problem. These polls indicate that press, radio, and influential political leaders supported the Truman plan.⁴⁹ As previously stated, this study found press and radio responses were actually divided on this issue, excepting editorial comment which remained favorable. Based on legislators' initial public remarks, Congress did not spontaneously approve the Greek-Turkish aid plan. Of seventy-five interviewed by the media twenty-seven approved, twenty-two disapproved, and twenty-six either refused comment or suggested alternatives (eighteen congressmen made no comment; eight offered objections to such provisions as military aid). Jones, reporting in The Fifteen Weeks, stated that thirty-five congressmen "indicated support." He has added those congressmen who qualified their support to those who completely supported the measure.⁵⁰ Evidence based on government documents, newspaper files, and correspondence suggest that both

⁴⁹Memorandum for the File; Department of State, Division of Public Studies, "Confidential Gallup Results: Greece and Turkey," March 27, 1947, "Public Opinion," Jones Papers.

⁵⁰"Congressional Statements on President Truman's Address Asking Aid For Greece and Turkey," March 12, 1947, March 14, 1947, "Public Opinion," pp. 1-20, Jones Papers; Jones, Fifteen Weeks, pp. 173-74; "Truman's Plan for Greece Gets Mixed Reaction in Congress," Washington Star, March 12, 1947, Jones Papers.

Jones and historian Thomas G. Paterson erred in assuming widespread support for the Truman proposal. Paterson stated:

With business, labor, and newspaper support, with a Gallup poll shortly after the president's speech indicating that about seventy-five percent of the population had heard of the aid program and that most applauded it, the bill passed. . . . 51

In March 1947, most Americans reacted with alarm and confusion to Truman's speech. Ambiguous and crisis-oriented, it achieved undeserved success. Government officials hastened legislative action, as congressmen and ordinary citizens expressed reservations or failed to understand the implications. Sufficient time and knowledge may have altered the course.

On April 22, the bill implementing aid to Greece and Turkey easily passed the Senate by a vote of sixty-seven to twenty-three. Sponsorship by Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg and the issue of communism facilitated passage. Conservative Republican Vandenberg perceived "Communism on-the-march," and felt the Truman plan represented the "lesser of evils."⁵² Compromising on the United Nations issue, Vandenberg sponsored provisions which suggested eventual United Nations participa-

⁵¹Jones, Fifteen Weeks, pp. 173-74; Paterson, Soviet American Confrontation, p. 201; also assuming public approval see Goldman, Crucial Decade, p. 60.

⁵²Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg, ed. with Jo Alex Morris (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1952), pp. 342-43; (Hereinafter cited as Vandenberg Papers).

tion.⁵³

Leading Senate critics were Senators Robert Taft, Claude Pepper, and Glen H. Taylor who objected because they felt the plan might lead to Soviet-American war, and that unilateral action threatened the United Nations.⁵⁴ A less known critic, Senator Albert W. Hawkes of New Jersey, raised the issue of the absence of public support. Hawkes claimed Congressional mail proved "Americans do not understand" the issues.⁵⁵ Yet, these objections were overridden by a Senate majority which became convinced that the Soviet Union and communism threatened the Mediterranean and this in turn threatened the United States.⁵⁶

Following the Senate's lead, the House approved the bill on May 9 by a 180 vote margin. Francis Case presided as House Chairman of the Committee which considered the Greek

⁵³Vandenberg Papers, pp. 345-46; New York Times, April 23, 1947 in the Democratic Committee File.

⁵⁴Henry W. Berger, "Senator Robert A. Taft Dissents from Military Esculation," in Thomas G. Paterson, ed., Cold War Critics: Alternatives to American Foreign Policy in The Truman Years (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971), pp. 167-95; (Hereinafter cited as Paterson, Cold War Critics); Thomas G. Paterson, "The Dissent of Senator Claude Pepper," pp. 114-34; William C. Pratt, "Senator Glen H. Taylor" Questioning American Unilateralism," pp. 140-61.

⁵⁵"Vandenberg Hits at Critics of Greek Aid," Washington Post, April 9, 1947, in Democratic Committee File.

⁵⁶Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., Bipartisan Foreign Policy: Myth or Reality? (New York: Row, Peterson and Co., 1957), p. 68. For anti-communist hysteria, see Lisle A. Rose, After Yalta, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973), pp. 181-85.

aid bill. Discounting communism, Francis Case, a Republican of South Dakota, explained in a letter to Truman that House acceptance rested on two provisions: that the Greek and Turkish governments consented, and the United Nations could invalidate aid at will.⁵⁷ Middle East oil motivated some votes, as did conflicting desires for peace or war, but Case made it obvious that "support was reluctant." Summarizing his feelings, Case defined the measure as "stop-gap," adding "The people of the United States are weary of 'government by crisis.'" Every man must realize that no country . . . , is wise enough or rich enough or just plain big enough to run the rest of the world."⁵⁸

Greece became an uneasy testing ground for the new United States foreign policy. Revealing disillusionment, Truman recalled in his Memoirs that "even as we undertook to bolster the economy of Greece . . . we were faced with her desire to use our aid to further partisan political, rather

⁵⁷ Letter, Francis Case to Truman, OF 426, May 10, 1947. Greek aid requests originated in the United States Department of State, see Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 221. Acheson describes the United Nations provision as "window dressing," ibid., p. 224; on legislative passage, see U. S. Congress, Senate, 80th Cong. 1st sess., April-May, 1947, Congressional Record, XCIII, 3758-3793; U.S., Congress, House, 80th Cong., 1st sess., April-May, 1947, Congressional Record, XCIII, 4908-4975.

⁵⁸ Francis Case to Truman. Case discusses oil and peace and war motives. On war hysteria see, "'Some Congressmen Advocate Immediate War With Russia,'" Omaha World Herald, March 13, 1947, p. 1.

than national aims."⁵⁹ From 1947 to 1949, despite gigantic United States expenditures, Greek officials failed to eliminate tax evasion, black marketeering, or repressive measures.⁶⁰ The Truman files contain many messages asserting suppression of the Greek labor movement, arrests, executions, and corruption. Government officials, labor organizations, Jewish fraternities, and ordinary citizens joined earlier Truman Doctrine critics in protest.⁶¹ Preoccupied with Greek civil strife, the American Mission failed to take effective measures.

Proving a sad commentary on efforts to aid "democratic Greece," United States officials joined royalists in purging press, strikes, and the KKE.⁶² Commenting on these events in February 1948, Congressman George Bender, Republican of Ohio, wrote Truman expressing "revulsion" at "atrocities" committed

⁵⁹Truman, Years of Trial, p. 109.

⁶⁰Total military and economic aid was \$758,655,056.63 from March 1947 to March 1949. These calculations are based on stated figures in "Status of Appropriation Under Public Laws 271 and 793, 80th Congress, as of March 31, 1949," OF 206-M, Box 778. On misuse of funds see also "U. S. Wasting Aid on Greece Report Revealed," Chicago Daily Tribune, April 7, 1949. This article refers to a report on Greece "suppressed by Democratic leaders," Democratic Committee File. Also critical see "Memorandum for the Files Regarding Greek Conditions," OF 426, Box 1278, July 17, 1947.

⁶¹Correspondence concerning Greece may be found OF 426, OF 206-M, Box 1278.

⁶²O'Ballance, Greek Civil War, p. 155.

in the presence of American military.⁶³ Conditions remained unchanged and United States efforts at supervision were answered by claims from the Greek left and right of American intervention in the internal affairs of Greece.⁶⁴ Investigating the Greek situation, CBS correspondent George Polk was murdered in May 1948. His death occasioned charges and countercharges in the American press. Columnist Drew Pearson claimed that right wing terrorists murdered Polk, while Greek courts convicted leftist guerrillas.⁶⁵ The United States, as Britain, was unable to alter internal conditions or the nature of the Greek government. By October, 1949, the Greek army with American military assistance successfully defeated the leftist insurgents and the civil war was over. Succeeding governments proved increasingly right wing and repressive until George Papandreou appeared liberal in comparison. Maurice Goldbloom wrote of the Papandreou premiership of the mid-1960's that "Greeks were freer under the Papandreou government than

⁶³Letter, George H. Bender to Truman, Of 206-M, February 17, 1948.

⁶⁴Barnet, Intervention and Revolution, p. 28.

⁶⁵Drew Pearson, "Dead Men Tell No Tales in Greece," Washington Post, May 22, 1948; "Lippmann Heads Group to Probe Death of Polk," Washington Post, May 22, 1948; "Newsmen Inquire Into Polk Slaying," New York Times, May 22, 1948; "Greek Gets Life in Polk Slaying, Salonika Trial is Pronounced Fair," New York Times, April 22, 1949; Democratic Committee File. Harry Martin, President American Newspaper Guild, wrote President Truman requesting Polk's death be investigated; Harry Martin to Truman, OF 206-M, May 29, 1948.

they had been at any previous time."⁶⁶ On April 21, 1967, a right wing coup led to a Metaxas-style dictatorship under George Papadopoulos. This regime remained in power for over six years, giving way to another dictatorship, under the leadership of Dimitrios Ioannidis. Dictatorial government ended when Constantine Karamanlis, right wing Greek Premier from 1955 to 1963, was invited to form a new government. Karamanlis recently won a parliamentary majority in the first elections held in ten years.⁶⁷

Had the Greeks been left to settle their own affairs from 1944 to 1947, it is likely that a native communist government similar to that of Yugoslavia would have been created. The Karamanlis government now faces a curious dilemma. As has been seen, the "Megali Idea" of territorial achievement had tremendous emotional appeal to Greeks. During the decade of the 1950s, the conflict over "Enosis" or union with Cyprus almost severed friendly relations between the right wing Greek government and its former benefactor, Britain. Cyprus is again an issue and it will be interesting to see if the Karamanlis government feels itself strong enough to cut

⁶⁶Maurice Goldbloom, "What Happened in Greece," Commentary, XLIV (December 1967), p. 71.

⁶⁷For accounts of Greek politics since 1946 and the American maintenance of a Greek right wing government, see also Maurice Goldbloom, "What Happened in Greece," pp. 68-74; "Greece, The Colonel Musters Out," Time, Vol. 104 (November 4, 1974), p. 42.

United States aid and support, and if it does so, how long it can retain power.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

During the years 1944 to 1947, first Britain and then the United States intervened in the political affairs of Greece. Complex motivation of national and personal interest resulted in Anglo-American leaders initiating policies contrary to views accepted by many Americans. Initial British intervention in 1944 violated the Atlantic Charter of 1941 which announced the principle of self-determination for liberated nations. Unilateral action of the United States in 1947 usurped a possible United Nations role. Many Americans, when confronted with postwar Anglo-American involvement in the Mediterranean, reacted with concern and dismay. White House correspondence supported by opinion polls for the period provide evidence of public interest and concern. These documents indicate Americans were prepared to accept a far different postwar world than national rivalries in Greece, supported by Anglo-American policies, helped create.

Presidential correspondence and polls reflect the views of a small number of concerned individuals and organizations. Assuming that these views are representative of those Americans knowledgeable of foreign affairs, sentiment in 1944 and 1945 supported the EAM nationalist movement. Paralleling the views found in White House mail are those of press corre-

spondents such as George Weller, Richard Mowrer, Leland Stowe and Howard K. Smith, as well as the historical research of L. S. Stavrianos. These sources suggest that there might be evidence that Britain in its battle against the EAM following World War II repressed a majority effort on the part of the Greek people to create representative government. Stavrianos charges that histories which present Churchill's policies as furthering liberty in postwar Greece should be evaluated as the result of "cold war mythology."¹ Historical interpretation based on royalist sympathies or national interest fail to cloud the record when viewed through the perspective of White House correspondence.² Messages and telegrams almost unanimously condemned British policy, and praised the former resistance fighters, the EAM/ELAS.

What is often termed national policy is more often the policy of a very few men.³ Americans writing Roosevelt re-

¹ L. S. Stavrianos, "Greece's Other History," p. 12; for a similar conclusion see Todd Gitlin, "Counter-Insurgency; Myth and Reality in Greece," in Containment and Revolution, ed. David Horowitz (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), pp. 140-81.

² For an example of a history reflecting monarchist sympathy, see Kousoulas, Revolution and Defeat; reflecting views representing British national interest is Woodward, British Foreign Policy; for EAM/ELAS role in Greek liberation, see Eudes, The Kapetanos; for official United States policy, see Winifred N. Hadsel, "American Policy Toward Greece," Foreign Policy Reports, XXIII (September 1, 1947), pp. 146-60.

³ English historian G. D. Clayton warns the student of foreign affairs that what is often termed national policy is more often the policy of a few national leaders, see Clayton, Britain and The Eastern Question, pp. 244-47.

requested that their President act to curtail the policies of Winston Churchill who, in the view of Lord Moran, "seems to be alone in his grasp of the danger to the liberty of the Greeks."⁴ Churchill was almost "alone" if American correspondence and polls reflected the amount of support generated by his nation's actions. Moran, as Churchill's personal physician, referred to the Prime Minister's vacillating moods of first conciliation and then antagonism toward Stalin, and found Churchill's feelings in regard to communism "an obsession."⁵ Yet Churchill's success in initiating repressive policies toward what he believed to be a communist movement in Greece cannot be entirely explained by his position of leadership or his personal idiosyncrasies. Britain's historic interest in the Mediterranean, resulting from her control of India and possessions in the oil rich Middle East, reinforced any reservations Churchill may have had on the desirability of the creation of partisan communist governments. In seeking to protect Britain's traditional interests, the Prime Minister failed to recognize or respect an emerging postwar democratic movement.

Roosevelt failed to act to prevent the implementation of Churchill's Mediterranean policies. In answer to

⁴C. N. Moran, Churchill Taken From the Diaries of Lord Moran: The Struggle for Survival 1940-1965 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1966), p.222; (Hereinafter cited as Moran, Churchill).

⁵Ibid., pp. 185, 221.

critical American opinion, he publically declared that self-determination for liberated nations was a desired ideal difficult to implement, and further informed the American people that there was no actual Atlantic Charter, but only a series of unsigned memoranda sent to Washington and London for press release. The Chicago Daily News printed Roosevelt's statements which were made at the previous day's press conference and in addition the newspaper declared editorially that the Charter was unrealistic and an unfortunate display of "politicians enraptured by their own rhetoric."⁶ Presidential correspondence and public opinion polls reflect an American public equally "enraptured" by a supposed document that they believed supported the right of liberated people to choose their own form of government. The consensus of this opinion condemned British action, but significantly requested United States action to counteract British designs. Where opinion is evaluated it indicates Americans were unprepared for political action which violated principles designed to create an effective world organization of cooperating, self-governing nations.

A right wing, monarchist government was successfully established in Greece. The creation of this government by

⁶Chicago Daily News, December 20, 1944, p. 5, 10. Roosevelt expected an Anglo-Soviet policy creating spheres of influence, but indicated slight concern over December events, see James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1970), pp. 537-39.

military force preceded similar action by the Soviet Union elsewhere. Stalin readily agreed to Churchill's request of October 9, 1944 to divide the Balkans. At that time and in the future, Stalin displayed slight interest in the Greek nationalist movement led by the EAM. Although Churchill and the Greek right labeled the former resistance fighters efforts as communist-inspired, Stalin displayed scant interest in the EAM or the Greek Communist party. His postwar intentions for the remainder of the Balkans are at best surmised, but the creation of communist political systems in Rumania and Bulgaria followed the British establishment of a right wing Greek government.⁷ Prior British policies toward Greece offered Stalin an excuse and pretext for his postwar efforts to establish a Soviet hegemony in the Balkans.⁸

From 1945 to 1947, the Soviet Union and the United States moved toward an eventual cold war confrontation. The

⁷Milovan Djilas, Conversations With Stalin, trans. by Michael B. Petrovich (New York: Harcourt Brace and World, Inc., 1962), pp. 131-32, 181-82, 114; see also Hugh Seton-Watson, The New Imperialism: A Background Book (Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1971). Seton-Watson lists Eastern European countries to come under Soviet controlled communist domination as Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria. This control was effected between 1945 and 1948, see ibid., pp. 78-81; Barnet, Intervention and Revolution; Barnet quotes Stalin as saying in April, 1945: "Everyone imposes his own system as far as his army can reach," see ibid., p. 102. The British army had been in Greece seven months by April 1945.

⁸Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 420; Bohlen, Witness to History, p. 234.

origins of this cold war are increasingly reexamined in American historiography, and some historians find that Soviet-American conflict was not a result of Soviet imperialism or a desire to further communist ideology. These scholars conclude that the cold war resulted from American efforts to further United States postwar interests, and that the United States and not the Soviet Union precipitated initial conflict, thus polarizing the postwar world.⁹ However, this study finds British intervention in Greece an equal impetus to the impending cold war conflict, because the United States refused to recognize Soviet preeminence in Bulgaria and Rumania, while at the same time ignoring or supporting British activities in Greece. A reassessment of postwar actions is necessary, but one must consider initial British unilateral policies, and the effect of these policies on subsequent Soviet activities which in turn alarmed the American leadership.

Following Roosevelt's death, Truman and his advisors came to view with alarm the creation of communist governments in the Balkans, and further seemed to fail to differentiate between the partisan communist governments of Yugoslavia and Albania and the Soviet-instigated governments of Rumania and Bulgaria. As early as the Potsdam Conference in 1945, Truman insisted that free elections be held in the Balkans and condemned Soviet policies within those countries. Yet, within

⁹Supra, fn. 43, Chapter I.

a year, Truman accepted the results of two dubious Greek elections. At the same time, the Greek government's territorial claims in Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria had international repercussions. As Greece aggravated its Balkan neighbors, Anglo-American diplomats lent their support; at the same time the Soviet Union supported the Balkan governments. Thus, Balkan politics aided in the deterioration of Soviet-American relations.¹⁰

Coupled with simplistic views of communism and national divisions created in part by Balkan politics, were economic realities. The United States needed international markets at a time the European economy threatened collapse. The economic drain of World War II and the devastation to agriculture caused by the severe weather of 1946-47 rendered the economies of Britain and France insignificant as future recipients of American industrial output. In addition the United States Navy enjoyed unprecedented growth under Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal who recognized that naval hegemony required a constant source of petroleum. Domestic sources of oil were unreliable, necessitating use of Middle East supplies which in turn required supervision of pipe line termination points in the Mediterranean. Further complicating the political situation was the personal motivation of State Department offi-

¹⁰Truman, Harry S. Truman, p. 343; Leahy, I Was There, pp. 428-29; Kaiser, Cold Winter, p. 11; supra, fn. 46, Chapter III.

cials whose department loyalties precluded any effort or desire to create an effective world organization that would preempt their importance in policy formation.¹¹ These multiple factors from 1945 to 1947 created an explosive political climate, and suggest the inevitability of a definitive United States foreign policy aimed at containing the Soviet Union and furthering United States interests.

Simultaneous with worsening Soviet-American relations was a change in many Americans' concern for developing Greek democracy. Sympathy for liberal elements in Greece was supplemented by support for Greek territorial gains. In 1945 to 1947, a series of right wing Greek governments promoted the ideal of a "Greater Greece" perhaps to distract the Greek population from continuing internal economic problems and political abuses. As other Balkan countries established communist political systems, the Greek government used fear of communism as an additional political crutch. White House correspondence reflects the views of Greek-American societies as well as the "Justice For Greece Committee" which distributed literature throughout the departments of government in order to acquire support for Greek territorial gains. The considerable support and sympathy for a "Greater Greece" is evidenced in the number of messages located in the Truman files, from

¹¹Supra, fn. 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, Chapter I; fn. 7, 8, 9, Chapter IV; Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 224; Jones, Fifteen Weeks, p. 9-10.

judges, postal officials, state and national legislators as well as such organizations as the Veterans of Foreign Wars. Sympathy for Greece compounded by fears of Soviet intentions predisposed prominent Americans as well as obscure individuals toward policies which would favor Greece.¹² Equally significant were efforts of one ethnic organization, the Greek American Council, to attract Presidential attention to Greece's internal political and economic conditions. Representing a minority of the White House mail, these messages describe the repression of all liberal political elements in Greece by a reactionary oligarchy, which used available economic assistance to enrich its adherents and at the same time avoided taxation, while levying prohibitive taxes against the remainder of the population. The Greek American Council was placed on the Attorney General's list of subversive societies and described "as having significance in connection with the National Security."¹³ A study of the postwar Greek conditions verifies the Greek American Council's description of conditions as portrayed in the White House mail. Walter Lippmann expressed

¹²The Department of State recognized that Greece had acquired considerable public sympathy. Jones verifies the statement made during hearings on the Greek-Turkish aid proposal that "Turkey was slipped into the oven with Greece because that seemed to be the surest way to cook a tough bird," see Jones, Fifteen Weeks, pp. 162-63.

¹³Armed Forces Security Questionnaire: Organizations designated by the Attorney General, pursuant to Executive Order 10450."

similar conclusions in a Washington Post column following Truman's request for Greek aid.¹⁴ On the basis of available evidence, it is difficult to conclude how these views signified a threat to the security of the United States. Perhaps a more logical conclusion may be that they represented opinion contrary to Anglo-American support of the right wing political factions in Greece. Perhaps the Greek American Council being listed as a possible subversive society heralded an era of coming intolerance for opposing views. Presidential mail for the intervening years between Greek liberation and the announcement of the Truman Doctrine illustrates that Greek territorial claims and a growing intolerance for opposing views would confuse intelligible evaluation of the true Greek internal situation when Truman requested economic and military aid to the Mediterranean.

In a recent study of the Truman era, historian Robert H. Ferrell introduces a valid point concerning historical interpretations of the cold war. In his essay, Ferrell advises that historical conclusions regarding the causes of the cold war are impossible until such time as the involved nation's re-

¹⁴Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," Washington Post, April 1, 1947, Democratic Committee File. Lippmann stated: "We have selected Turkey and Greece not because they are specially in need of relief, not because they are shining examples of democracy and the Four Freedoms, but because they are the strategic gateway to the Black Sea and the heart of the Soviet Union."

cords are available for complete research and evaluation.¹⁵ Incorporated in this study are evaluations of Presidential correspondence, news releases, and opinion polls located in the Truman Papers, Truman Library. Public opinion polls, recently declassified in 1973 and White House mail refute historical interpretations suggesting Americans were prepared for peacetime United States involvement in the internal affairs of other nations. Available documents indicate that Truman's speech of March 12, 1947 defining such a policy confused and divided American opinion. Many of those supporting aid to Greece and Turkey misinterpreted the implication of military assistance; others gave reluctant support because the speech implied that an unfriendly political system sought Balkan domination, and that this in turn endangered the national security of the United States.¹⁶ Presidential correspondence and polls as early as 1945 indicate some American readiness for United States unilateral action if Britain or the Soviet

¹⁵ Robert H. Ferrell, "Truman Foreign Policy: A Traditionalist View," The Truman Period As A Research Field: A Reappraisal, 1972, ed. by Richard S. Kirkendall (Columbia Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1974), pp. 21-22. Ferrell also suggests Stalin instigated the cold war for personal and political motives, see ibid., pp. 26-27.

¹⁶ Department of State, Division of Public Studies, Office of Public Affairs, "U. S. Public Opinion on President Truman's Proposals for Aid to Greece and Turkey," March 28, 1947. Summary, point 3 states: "Most support is based on the view that the program put forward by the President is necessary to halt Soviet or communist expansion. But this course is accepted with reluctance or misgiving."

Union took such action in regard to other nations. By implying the Soviet Union planned to dominate Greece and the Dardanelles, the Truman plan successfully attracted support, and hinted that valid criticism was seemingly unpatriotic.

The Department of State, in its divisions of press intelligence and public studies, collected all available information concerning public response to the Truman speech. As previously mentioned these documents are contained in the Truman files. Included in these files is a confidential memorandum dated March 16, 1947 and declassified August 9, 1973. This memorandum suggests the executive department utilized all available sources of opinion in order to "sell the public" on the Truman Doctrine.¹⁷ In reference to conclusions of available public sentiment concerning aid to Greece and Turkey the public opinion memorandum states that the "observations seem pertinent as a background to further information activities."¹⁸ These "information activities" included press releases stressing ideological conflict between communism and democracy and also emphasized that the United States must act to protect its political future by aiding resistance to com-

¹⁷ Jones uses the phrase "sell the public" reporting State Department discussions in Fifteen Weeks, p. 151; see also Confidential Memorandum for the file "Evaluation of the Current Opinion Situation on the Greek-Turkish Problem" (March 16, 1947).

¹⁸ "Evaluation of the Current Opinion Situation on the Greek-Turkish Problem," March 26, 1947.

munism in democratic nations.¹⁹ This study found slight relation in the public reception of the Truman plan and its subsequent adoption. Executive appraisal of public opinion was for the purpose of releasing information believed necessary to contrive favorable public response. Therefore, in the case of aid to Greece and Turkey, public opinion had an insignificant role in shaping foreign policy. The executive department responded to public opinion regarding one issue, that of the United Nations. Adverse reaction to the Truman Doctrine centered on bypassing the world organization, thus the need for provisions implying eventual United Nations participation. Realizing that this issue might defeat the Greek-Turkish aid bill, almost meaningless legislative provisions concerning the United Nations were included.²⁰

What may be learned from the White House Mail? These messages reveal that in the years preceding implementation of the Truman plan, Americans were unprepared for the coming cold war confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States. On the contrary, available opinion indicated a readiness to accept future international cooperation based on an

¹⁹ Jones, Fifteen Weeks, pp. 150-53.

²⁰ Ibid., pp. 180-81; see also Vandenberg Papers, pp. 345-46; Acheson, Present at The Creation, p. 224.

effective world organization.²¹ Unilateral United States intervention in Greece resulted from actions taken by policymakers and elected officials for a variety of reasons which successfully circumvented the apparent public will. Americans were prepared to accept the United States initiating policies which would strengthen the United Nations, and were also prepared for their government to grant economic assistance to nations in actual need. They were not prepared for the realities of postwar "realpolitik" which circumvented the principles of the Atlantic Charter and an effective world organization.

Presidential correspondence included many references to the EAM and its role in postwar Greece. Research for this study verifies that portion of White House mail which represented the EAM as a nationalist movement attempting to create a democratic government.²² British repression of that movement which was followed in time by the Truman plan to support "democracy" led to years of successive right wing governments and

²¹Melvin Small arrives at a similar conclusion in his recent statement, ". . . had the Russians been perceived as conciliatory, most Americans would have approved," see Small, "How We Learned to Love the Russians," p. 478.

²²The works of L. S. Stavrianos support the view that EAM was a nationalist and not international communist-inspired movement; see also the record of William Hardy McNeill, postwar U. S. Assistant Military Attaché in Athens, Greek Dilemma, p. 248; McNeill further concluded the Greek right would establish a dictatorship were its political power threatened by the left, see also ibid., p. 271-72.

scant economic or social gains within Greece. On April 21, 1967, a military dictatorship paralleling that of 1936 was established. When confronted with an apparently successful attempt of the Greek left and center political parties to gain an elective parliamentary majority, right wing military officers seized control of the Greek government. As the coup forestalled election, it is impossible to know what changes may have been wrought. But, just as the formerly British-supported George Papandreou was labeled a communist sympathizer in the years preceding the coup, liberal politicians were charged with communism and the elective process halted.²³

From 1947 to the present, the United States paralleling the British policy of 1944 to 1947, has granted aid to a succession of right wing Greek governments. Faced with right wing intransigence which refuses to relinquish political prerogatives by incorporating a political left or center, the United States has been forced to support those political parties favoring this nation's military presence in Greece.²⁴ Unfortunately, if the Greek political oligarchy fails to retain power, beneficial results of United States aid may be

²³ Stephen Rousseas, with the collaboration of Herman Starobin and Gertrud Lenzes, The Death of A Democracy: Greece and the American Conscience (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1967), pp. 54-70, 73-98; John A. Katris, Eyewitness in Greece: The Colonels Come to Power (St. Louis, Missouri: New Critics Press, Inc., 1971), pp. 87-107; (Hereinafter cited as Katris, Eyewitness in Greece).

²⁴ Katris, Eyewitness in Greece, pp. 11-16.

forgotten in the resulting resentment of American support of
reactionary governments.

APPENDIX A

"EDITORIAL COMMENT" EVALUATED

CONCERNING GREEK-TURKISH AID MARCH 13-31, 1947

FAVORABLE

<u>Albuquerque Journal</u>	<u>Manchester New Hampshire Union</u>
<u>Atlanta Constitution</u>	<u>Nashville Tennessean</u>
<u>Baltimore Sun</u>	<u>Newark News</u>
<u>Boise Statesman</u>	<u>New Orleans Times-Picayune</u>
<u>Buffalo Courier-Express</u>	<u>New York Herald Tribune</u>
<u>Burlington Vermont Free Press</u>	<u>New York Mirror</u>
<u>Charleston South Carolina</u>	<u>New York Times</u>
<u>News & Courier</u>	<u>New York World Herald</u>
<u>Cheyenne Wyoming State Tribune</u>	<u>Oklahoma City Oklahoman</u>
<u>Chicago Times</u>	<u>Omaha World-Herald</u>
<u>Christian Science Monitor</u>	<u>Philadelphia Inquirer</u>
<u>Cincinnati Enquirer</u>	<u>Phoenix Arizona Republic</u>
<u>Cleveland Plain Dealer</u>	<u>Pittsburgh Post-Gazette</u>
<u>Dallas News</u>	<u>Portland Maine Press Herald</u>
<u>Des Moines Register</u>	<u>Portland Oregonian</u>
<u>Denver Post</u>	<u>Reno Gazette</u>
<u>Fargo Forum</u>	<u>Providence Journal</u>
<u>Hartford Courant</u>	<u>Salt Lake City Tribune</u>
<u>Indianapolis Star</u>	<u>St. Louis Post Dispatch</u>
<u>Jacksonville Florida</u>	<u>Sioux Falls Argus-Leader</u>
<u>Times-Union</u>	<u>Washington Post</u>
<u>Little Rock Arkansas Gazette</u>	<u>Washington Star</u>
<u>Louisville Courier-Journal</u>	<u>Wilmington News</u>

UNFAVORABLE

<u>Baltimore Afro-American</u>	<u>New York Daily Worker</u>
<u>Birmingham Age-Herald</u>	<u>New York PM</u>
<u>Chicago Defender</u>	<u>Norfolk Journal and Guide</u>
<u>Chicago Sun</u>	<u>Pittsburgh Courier</u>
<u>Chicago Tribune</u>	<u>Raleigh News and Observer</u>
<u>Detroit Free Press</u>	<u>Richmond-Times Dispatch</u>
<u>Minneapolis Tribune</u>	<u>San Francisco Chronicle</u>
<u>New York Amsterdam Star News</u>	

APPENDIX B

"COLUMN COMMENT" EVALUATED
CONCERNING GREEK-TURKISH AID MARCH 13-31, 1947

FAVORABLE

<u>Dallas News</u>	Lynn W. Landrum
<u>Detroit Free Press</u>	Hamilton Butler
<u>Jacksonville Florida Times-Union</u>	John Temple Graves
<u>Minneapolis Tribune</u>	Arthur Upgren
<u>New York Herald Tribune</u>	George Fielding Eliot
<u>New York Journal-American</u>	M/Gen. David P. Barrows Lewis Haney Merryle S. Rukeyser
<u>New York Post</u>	Edgar Ansel Mowrer Van Devander and Player Sylvia F. Porter
<u>New York Times</u>	Anne O'Hare McCormick
<u>New York World-Telegram</u>	Lawrence Fertig
<u>Philadelphia Bulletin</u>	Dewitt MacKenzie Ralph W. Page
<u>Richmond Times Dispatch</u>	Thomas Lomax Hunter
<u>Washington News</u>	William Philip Simms
<u>Washington Post</u>	Stewart Alsop Mark Sullivan
<u>Washington Star</u>	Gould Lincoln Dorothy Thompson
<u>Washington Times-Herald</u>	Westbrook Pegler

UNFAVORABLE

<u>Baltimore Sun</u>	John W. Owens
<u>Chicago Sun</u>	Kenesaw M. Landis II Gerry Robichaud
<u>Cleveland Plain Dealer</u>	Jay Franklin Spencer D. Irwin Russell Weismann
<u>Detroit Free Press</u>	Royce Howes
<u>New York Daily Worker</u>	James S. Allen Joseph Clark Mike Gold
<u>New York Herald Tribune</u>	William L. Shirer
<u>New York Journal American</u>	George Rothwell Brown
<u>New York PM</u>	Fiorello H. LaGuardia Max Lerner Jennings Perry
<u>New York Post</u>	Samuel Grafton Harold Ickes
<u>New York Times</u>	James Reston
<u>San Francisco Chronicle</u>	Royce Brier
<u>Topeka Capital</u>	Clif Stratton
<u>Washington News</u>	Thomas L. Stokes
<u>Washington Post</u>	Marquis Childs Walter Lippmann Barnet Nover Eleanor Roosevelt

AMBIVALENT

Cleveland Plain Dealer

William F. McDermott

Denver Post

M. W. Fodor

New York Times

Arthur Krock

Washington Times-HeraldJohn O'Donnell
George E. SokolskyWashington PostDrew Pearson
Mark SullivanWashington StarDoris Fleeson
Frank R. Kent
David Lawrence
Lowell Mellett

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