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RENAISSANCE, REFORM AND REVOLUTION:
A STUDY OF THE EFFECTS OF THE MAY 4 PROTEST
ON THESE MOVEMENTS IN CHINA
1919-1921

by
Marie-Louise Gebhardt

A Thesis
Presented to
the Graduate Faculty of the Department of History
University of Omaha

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

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PREFACE

People ask, "Why do you choose to write on China?" My answer has always been, "because I was born there."

There is no profound reason for my liking China other than my interest in it which is, no doubt, created by my having been born there. This interest has grown to the point where I find any and all study of China, the Chinese and things Chinese fascinating.

I first became interested in the Shantung Decision because it seemed so unfair to the Chinese. (That was when I was new to the formal study of history.) But the more I read about the Decision and the more I studied the events which immediately followed it, the more interested and intrigued I became. As a writer, I found myself particularly interested in the impetus the Decision gave to literature, education and public opinion (some would call it nationalism) in China. Prior to 1919, the ordinary Chinese could not read or write, received little or no formal education. He knew little of national affairs, almost nothing of foreign affairs. The story is told of a Chinese peasant who, in the 1880s, asked the equivalent of "What's going on here?" when he saw some soldiers marching across the land. (It so happened there was fighting between the Chinese and the French -- the "undeclared war.") The peasant was told to go about his business as the war did not concern him! Governmental affairs were not considered to be the business of the people. The ordinary field of interest of the average Chinese was bounded by the extent of his

family. Should it go beyond that (and family includes quite a lot -- children, father, mother, grandparents, as well as aunts, uncles and distant relatives) the peasant may have occasionally shown interest in his village. If beyond that, possibly in his province.

But the student demonstrations which followed the Shantung Decision, and the movements these demonstrations ignited or encouraged, changed all that. The general use of bei wha (or Mandarin) in place of the classical wen li made reading skills accessible even to the most lowly peasant. And the battle of ideas was taken right into the local village by students skilled in teaching and speaking techniques. It is not wrong to say that within a few years it became almost impossible for an ordinary Chinese not to know at least something about what was going on. My decision to write on this subject was assured when I discovered that my father, who lived in China during this period, had saved books, magazines, newspapers and news items (Chinese Recorders, morgue files of the North China Star, curriculum reports, etc.) from the years during and following the Decision.

I owe many people thanks for encouraging me to prepare this paper. Among them are Prof. Paul Peterson of the University of Omaha, who urged me on to graduate work; Dr. A. Stanley Trickett of the same university, who taught some of the finest classes it has ever been my privilege to attend (and who worked with me on this paper), and to my father, Arnold H. Gebhardt, who not only always encourages me in whatever I do but who also saves things.

Marie-Louise Gebhardt

November, 1963

CHAPTER ONE

THE REASONS

Mention has been made of a partition of China. Such a partition will not be brought about by us at any rate. All that we have done is to provide that, come what may, we ourselves shall not go empty-handed. The traveller cannot decide when the train is to start, but he can be sure not to miss it when it does start.¹

INTRODUCTION

What was there about the Shantung Decision to stir the Chinese people so? Why did this particular diplomatic defeat incur such wrath? Who would have thought that the carefree Chinese felt so strongly about his country? For that matter, when had the Chinese begun to take an interest in his country? Where had he learned about international affairs? How had this all come about? Many were the foreigners in China who puzzled over these questions. China was changing before their eyes and they didn't know what to make of it. The Shantung Decision started it all, some of them said. But that was not quite true, news of the Decision did not "start it all". Its significance rather is found in this that it occurred at a most opportune time in Chinese history.

Language reform was discussed and experimented with before 1919; after Shantung a simplified written language swept the nation. Education was undergoing reform in China; after Shantung it was revolution-

¹ Minister von Buelow to the Reichstag. Quoted by Paul S. Reinsch World Politics At The End Of The Nineteenth Century As Influenced By The Oriental Situation. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1900) p. 164.

ized. That great mass of Chinese, unlettered, unschooled and largely not caring before Shantung, after Shantung took up the cry of their student teachers, "China for the Chinese". A divided nation before Shantung, after Shantung discovered anew the appeal of the san min principles. In short, the Shantung Decision was the catalyst for a number of movements which struggled along individually until the demonstrating students -- protesting the Decision -- welded these separate movements together into one gigantic movement which swept across China and brought the country into the twentieth century at last.

Certain events, however, took place which precipitated the growth of Chinese national unity and made what was merely a civilization, a nation.

The first of these events was the Treaty of Versailles, which gave an international sanction to the Japanese banditry in Shantung and virtually recognized the validity of Japan's Twenty-one Demands.

The Treaty of Versailles, then, became the turning point in the international history of China.²

SHANTUNG

"Shantung Decision" refers to the decision of the Paris Peace Conference, whose delegates declared (in the Treaty of Versailles) that Germany's rights in China's Shantung Province were not to be returned to China, but were to be given to Japan instead. These German "rights" included control of the port city of Tsingtao, Kiaochow Bay and railroad privileges in the province. Control of port, bay and rail facilities

² Tang Leang-li, China In Revolt. (London: Noel Douglas, 1927) p. 106. Emphasis is Tang's. And from the North China Star, July 19, 1919, "... Japan snatched away from us Shantung, the most precious and sacred of the eighteen provinces. This may be compared to the action of a pig-poacher who after selling the pig and pocketing the money, sneakily cuts off for himself a huge slice of flesh from off the live animal. Is it to be wondered that bitter indeed are China's feelings toward Japan?" Hereafter the North China Star is cited as The Star.

meant virtual economic control of the entire province.

The Chinese people were incensed at this decision. Shantung Province was their "Holy Land" -- the cradle of their civilization, the home of Tai-shan, the holy mountain, often worshipped as a god. The province contained both the birthplaces and tombs of Confucius and Mencius. Thousands of pilgrims visited these shrines every year.³

But not only was Shantung Province historically important to the Chinese, it was also economically important. At the time of the Decision (1919), Shantung Province was the most heavily populated Chinese Province. It was also the home of pongee silk manufacturing (silk shantung, for example) and was rich in mineral resources.

"THE LAST STRAW"

The Shantung Decision was not the first political reversal the Chinese government had suffered. To many sympathetic observers it was simply one more humiliation the Chinese government would have to absorb. From the earliest formal diplomatic contacts with European powers China's government had come out second best. In the Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689), China's first formal agreement with a European power (Russia) she had allowed another nation commercial rights in her territory. Not quite two centuries later she signed the first of many modern-day treaties, conces-

³ One such visitor was Mao Tse-tung who considered the trip one of the "high marks" of his first trip north. "En route to Nanking I stopped at Ch'u Fou and visited Confucius' grave. I saw the small stream where Confucius' disciples bathed their feet and the little town where the sage lived as a child. He is supposed to have planted a famous tree near the historic temple dedicated to him, and I saw that. I also stopped by the river where Yen Hui, one of Confucius' famous disciples had once lived, and I saw the birthplace of Mencius. On this trip I climbed T'ai Shan, the sacred mountain of Shantung, where General Feng Yu-hsiang retired and wrote his patriotic scrolls." Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China. (New York: Grove Press, Inc., Black Cat Edition, 1961) p. 151-2.

sions, leaseholds and agreements which ate away at her independence, integrity and sovereignty. The Treaty of Nanking (1842), opened China to foreign powers. One year later a supplementary agreement added the "most favored nation" clause which was later extended to other powers. This clause virtually guaranteed equal rights and privileges in China to all foreign states.

There followed rebellions (e.g., Tai-ping, 1850-64), incidents (e.g., Arrow affair, 1856), and wars, one of which ended in the Treaties of Tientsin (1858), which opened eleven more ports, permitted legations to be established in Peking and allowed both trade and missionaries into the interior. ("The real opening of China was accomplished by the second war ... Chinese isolation had now become a matter of history.")⁴ During this period the British government benefited greatly, with other countries not far behind. Russia, for example, secured its maritime province and founded Vladivostok.

The Chefoo Convention (1876) opened new ports and further improved the status of foreigners in China. From 1881 to 1885 repeated French crises in South China including an Undeclared War (1884) resulted in still another Treaty of Tientsin (1885) which recognized the French protectorate in Annam in return for a reciprocal promise to respect the southern frontier of China. In 1887 Macao was ceded to Portugal, a nation which had been in China for more than 300 years.

More internal troubles began when Sun Yat-sen⁵ organized, in 1894,

⁴ David Owen, Imperialism and Nationalism In The Far East. (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1929) p. 41-42.

⁵ Short biographies of prominent Chinese personalities involved in events discussed in this paper, may be found in the Appendix.

the first of several secret revolutionary societies (the Shing Chung Hsei) designed to overthrow the Manchus.

When Japan defeated China in a war over Korea (1894-1895), it was a shock to the entire world. No one had expected Japan to triumph. Two things were apparent: Japan was now a power and China was an almost helpless nation. In the Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895) China was forced to recognize (among other things) the independence of Korea and to cede both Formosa and the Liaotung Peninsula to Japan. Russia, Germany and France forced Japan to return the Liaotung Peninsula to China but in return all three profited. France was given extensive territorial and commercial concessions in the South; Russia, in a secret treaty (1896), was given the right to build and maintain a railway across northern Manchuria, Chinese territory. Germany occupied Kiaochow Bay (1897). This started the scramble for concessions. There followed: British opening of inland waters and the Yangtze valley (1898), Germany's 99-year lease on Kiaochow Bay, with exclusive rights in Shantung,⁶ Russia's 25-year lease of Southern

6 Germany acquired these rights and privileges as indemnity for the murder of two German missionaries. There is some question on this, as one authority, W. W. Willoughby in Foreign Rights And Interests In China. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1920) p. 228, states that the men were Jesuits and therefore members of an order excluded from Germany and not under the protection of that country. Germany would have had no right to claim an indemnity from China. On the other hand, the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. IX (New York: The Encyclopedia Press, Inc., 15 volumes and index, 1913) p. 747, says the men were members of the Congregation of Steyl, a German group with a Dutch Seminary. The Encyclopaedia Sinica (London: Oxford University Press, 1917) p. 576, confirms this. The Chinese government offered to bring the culprits to justice but Germany demanded reparation and sent armed ships to Kiaochow Bay. "It was so unexpected a movement that the populace rejoiced in the band which headed the troops and the Chinese soldiers at drill politely offered the use of the drill ground if that was what the Germans had landed for!" (Ibid.) Prince Henry of Prussia was sent to China and at the farewell banquet for him at Kiel the Kaiser made his famous reference to the "mailed fist". (Fahre darein mit gepanzerter Faust.) See T. Z. Tyau, China Awakened. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1922) p. 446 and the Encyclopaedia Sinica, op. cit., p. 576.

Liaotung Peninsula and Port Arthur, and France's 99-year lease of Kwangchow and Tonkin. Britain gained a 99-year lease on Kowloon as well as a lease on Wei-hai-wei, which was to be in effect as long as Russia had Port Arthur.

In addition to the rapid division of its land, China was plagued with internal disturbances. The 100 Days of Reform (1898) under Kang Yu-wei, which began favorably, finished in failure when Tzu Hsi, the Empress Dowager, seized the boy emperor, made a virtual prisoner of him and effectively stopped all opposition. Many of the reformers went into exile. China did stand up to Italy in 1899, and turned down, with a show of force, that country's demand for a port and concession. In that same year, the United States' Secretary of State Hay issued notes which outlined an "open door" policy. By 1900 internal affairs had erupted into the Boxer Rebellion which resulted in still further humiliation for China, along with tremendous indemnity payments.

In 1905, the exiled Dr. Sun organized still another group (the Tung Meng Hui) to overthrow the Manchus. Six years later this group succeeded in its task and China was declared a Republic. Later, the split of the government into Northern and Southern factions, the steady stream of warlords and the kowtowing to Japan by the Peking government, all became additional indignities to be borne by ever-suffering China. But when the "greatest peace conference in history" failed to recognize the claims of China to Shantung it was "the last straw," and China reacted.

CHINA'S CASE

The Chinese government felt its claims to Shantung were legitimate and the government was also reassured by President Wilson's repeated dec-

larations to the effect that right would triumph at the Conference.

China ... believed in the power of goodness. The first sentence of the first book that is put into the hands of every schoolboy in China starts with the maxim that 'the nature of man is good,' and on this doctrine Chinese society is, in fact built up.⁷

China believed its case at the Conference to be right for several reasons: 1) China had been a neutral party when Japan, a belligerent, violated Chinese neutrality by marching across Shantung to seize Kiaochow. 2) Japan had forced China (by ultimatum) to accept the Twenty-one Demands, Group I of which dealt with Shantung. 3) China, upon entering the war on the side of the Allies (in 1917), had declared that all previous agreements between Germany and China were null and void. 4) For what it was worth, China also had the assurance of observers at the Conference that China could not be bound by treaties and other agreements made with Japan during the years 1915 to 1918 because those agreements were made without parliamentary approval and were obtained by military force. 5) China relied heavily on promises and statements made by President Wilson. As Henry Hodgkin reports in China In The Family Of Nations:

I was in Paris shortly after the fateful decision had been made and heard the story of its reception by the Chinese delegation, from several who were present. The news was brought while a dinner was in progress. It came from a Press representative. So absolutely did the Chinese rely on the friendship with America and her power to see justice done that the first message was not credited and Mr. Lansing was called up and asked if he could confirm or deny it. Although it had reached the press, Mr. Lansing knew nothing about it.⁸

⁷ Tang Leang-li, op. cit., p. 21. Mencius, whose works were used as school texts, believed that human nature is innately good.

⁸ Henry Hodgkin, China In The Family Of Nations. (New York: George Doran Co., 1923) p. 131.

Popular sentiment at the conference and abroad was for the Chinese. No less a person than Secretary Lansing declared, "Morally and legally, the Chinese government was right"⁹

But the decision had been made and, "right" notwithstanding, China lost Shantung to Japan. Of all the humiliations encountered by China up to this time, none resulted in so great a protest as the Shantung Decision. In view of China's long history of generally quietly accepted humiliations, why did the country react as it did to the Shantung Decision? Why was this occasion different from the others? What had happened in China? The following chapter explores some of the reasons for China's changed attitudes.

⁹ Robert Lansing, The Peace Negotiations: A Personal Narrative (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1921) p. 250.

CHAPTER TWO

THE RENAISSANCE

In China, as in the West, language reform was only one aspect of a larger cultural transformation which itself formed part of a vast complex of economic, political, and social change. In the West the cultural phase of this transition into modern society had been given the name of the Renaissance. In China, one phase of the cultural movement has been given the same name by Chinese language reformers in order to emphasize the fact that the process of change in their country is related to that in the West. The wider context in which this movement has taken place is Chinese nationalism itself.¹

INTRODUCTION

"Renaissance" is one of several names (e.g., "New Tide", "New Culture Movement", "Cultural Revolution", "New Thought Movement") applied to that movement in China which, following May 4, 1919, contributed to the rise of public opinion, encouraged wide support for a new curriculum in education and in general, resulted in a complete awakening of the Chinese people in matters of culture, politics, education and government.

The movement is not exactly parallel to the Renaissance in Europe,² because the European Renaissance broke up culturally into its component

1 John De Francis, Nationalism and Language Reform in China (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1950) p. 10.

2 P. F. Price, writing in The Chinese Recorder, predicted that future historians would compare the Intellectual Awakening in China in the twentieth century to the Revival of Learning in Europe in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. His article contains an interesting comparison of the two Renaissance periods. See P. F. Price, "The Present Intellectual Awakening and its Bearing Upon the Christian Church," The Chinese Recorder, Vol. LII (June, 1921) p. 411-421.

national parts while the Chinese Renaissance combined its parts by establishing one common language; a language simpler than the classical medium it replaced. This new language did not appear overnight but was preceded by three distinct periods of development -- the introduction of modern schools, the flocking of students to foreign lands and the competition for supremacy of the various transplanted systems of education, especially the Japanese and American.

The problem of education became the crux of the literary renaissance. Numerous articles were written on the problem of education. These discussed the purpose of education as well as concrete methods for its improvement. The Chinese placed extraordinary emphasis on education ("...to bring up a son without education is the same as raising a pig.")³ Theoretically it was possible for every village, no matter how humble, to produce a scholar. Under this system, persons of almost every rank or class of society could become candidates for degrees. Even a man of very humble birth could, by sheer ability, rise to the highest positions in government service, provided the rigid examinations could be passed.

For many centuries Chinese education was purely literary, philosophical, and ethical in character. There was little that could be called concrete or practical in the modern sense of the words, neither was there anything requiring the knowledge of the experimental method or of inductive reasoning. Education strongly resembled the form of training which prevailed in Europe for two centuries after the revival of Greek

³ Peng Tamu, "Chinese Student Looks At The World," Asia, Vol. 28 (March, 1928) p. 189.

learning. This peculiar quality of Chinese education produced a stultifying effect on the nation and accounts for the comparatively backward condition of China at this time. It also explains why the country made little progress in the arts of modern life and modern science until after 1900.⁴

Education in the West was at one time regarded as preparation for the ministry, medicine or law: in China education was regarded as preparation for official service. It provided a mandarinship which looked backward rather than forward, and was conservative rather than inclined to innovation. The introduction of mechanical inventions of steam power and railway which came with the advent of merchants and missionaries from Western countries made the Chinese see the possibilities of a richer and fuller life. The forced contact with outside nations, the humiliations suffered, and the birth of a new nationalism, made it necessary for China to change its social, political, and educational institutions in order to withstand troubles from within and foes from without. By the early 1900s, China's education system, therefore, was due for radical change. Modern subjects were introduced and many students were sent abroad for schooling. The effects of these changes on China's national life set the country on the road toward progress and reform.

EDUCATIONAL REFORM

China's traditional educational system was geared primarily to pro-

⁴ "The literati had taken the culture as their preserve, and under their influence, said Liang, the Chinese had come to think of China as t'ien hsia, the world, in which no other high culture existed, rather than as kuo-chia, a nation, which had a great deal to learn." Joseph R. Levenson, Confucian China And Its Modern Fate. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1958) p. 104. "Liang" is Liang Chi-chao, an early reformer.

ducing scholars for the classical examination system and even though education was left largely to private efforts, literary advancement was controlled by the government through its system of competitive examinations. Almost all education began with the study of the Five Classics and Four Books⁵ and continued with the works of other classical writers. Students were expected to know these works and be able to apply principles learned therefrom to almost any situation which might arise.⁶ This system of education had been in existence for centuries and had successfully resisted almost all change. The high respect of the Chinese for the past gave the impression that the older the civilization the better, and that everything would once again be all right once the condition of antiquity was restored. Confucius and Mencius being held in such high regard -- actually worshipped -- made everything they had said something people felt they should imitate.

Not until the end of the nineteenth century was any effort successful in changing the classical system of education. Then in 1898, Kang Yu-wei, Liang Chi-chao and others⁷ presented memorials to Emperor Kuang Hsu in an attempt to end the classical examination system and in its

5 Roughly speaking, the Five Classics consist of history, poetry and ceremony; the Four Books concern Confucius and Mencius.

6 They often did. One notable example: Tseng Kuo-fan, who at the time of the Tai-ping Rebellion, was ordered by the emperor to organize a military force. Tseng was noted as a scholar and had no military background but he soon justified the Confucian theory that scholarship and virtue fit a man for any public service. He built and commanded a fine army. Li Hung-chang's career is a similar example.

7 Earlier Sun Yat-sen had presented a memorandum to Li Hung-chang pointing out what he considered to be fundamental principles of Western civilization. Rebuffed, he turned his energies toward formation of a revolutionary group. The group was the Shing Chung Hsei, forerunner of the Kuomintang.

stead inaugurate a program of modern education. Obviously, as long as the examination system existed, few students would take courses of a practical nature. The new subjects were not included in the examination and time devoted to them was time diverted from pursuit of the classics. Since there was little career opportunity in the civil sphere outside of the classical curriculum, prospective students for the new "practical education" were scarce. The reformers realized then that the classical examination system would have to be eliminated before education reform could become successful.

The reformers asked for the establishment of modern schools, abolition of classical style essays in the examinations, introduction of short, practical essays on subjects suitable to modern needs (e.g., mathematics, science) and encouragement for students studying abroad. In addition, they asked that foreign books be translated and newspapers established. Kuang Hsu so decreed. Not since the Tai-ping rebels had challenged the Confucian tradition had there been such consternation in China. True, there had been several attempts to influence changes but none of these had the far-reaching effects of the decrees of 1898. There had been Wang Tao who, in 1864, petitioned Li Hung-chang to bring about reforms which would help students acquire Western methods. There had been Kuo Sung-tao, first Chinese minister to England, who startled contemporaries by suggesting (in 1878) that self-strengthening of China might have to apply to its spirit as well as to its ships and soldiers. There were scholar-officials such as Chang Chih-tung who suggested "Chinese learning for substance, Western learning for function"⁸ in hopes of preserv-

⁸ Chu Chai and Winberg Chai, The Changing Society of China. (New York: Mentor Books, New American Library, 1962) p. 194.

ing established traditions while at the same time providing an opportunity for needed reform. These suggestions met with little enthusiasm. On the other hand, reformers were optimistic about the decrees of 1898, until the Empress Dowager interfered. The Empress Dowager imprisoned the emperor, ordered beheaded many of the reformers (the rest fled, many to live in exile for years) and brought to an abrupt end what is known today as the 100 Days of Reform. Nevertheless, 1898 marked the first time that the Chinese government officially acknowledged the necessity for change in its method of educating people.

It was a greater epoch in the history of China than any change of dynasty or form of government, for it was a complete break with an educational system based upon the theories of Confucius and Mencius⁹

Thus, under Tzu Hsi's influence, the government's first tentative experiments with educational change ended. In the early 1900s, with the disaster of the Boxer Rebellion, the Chinese government was forced to take interest in educational reform efforts. In 1901 an edict from the throne abolished one requirement in the examination for literary degrees and substituted in its place practical essays on current topics. New memorials were entertained which dealt with total abandonment of the classical examination system. These memorials pleaded for an educational system which would equip and train citizens for the problems of the day and fit people for their lives in modern civilization. Meanwhile, news of the Russian-Japanese war, with all its surprises, reached the Chinese government. The Manchu Court, analyzing the surprising results

⁹ John C. Ferguson, "Modern Education In China," The Chinese Recorder, Vol. LIII (October, 1922) p. 629.

of the war, came to the conclusion that one of the major reasons for Japan's success was its use and assimilation of Western learning.¹⁰ In 1905 the advocates of reform in China won; the classical examination system was formally abolished and a modern school system inaugurated.

Such a change had no precedent in Chinese history. In fact, traditional scholars would not have realized that inventions, research and discoveries were worthy of praise, and certainly would not have considered studying subjects which would lead to such ends. During this time China had not been completely without change but the few new ideas and projects which were entertained were always undertaken with the expectation that the end result need not be necessarily useful or practical but Chinese!

The government began encouraging young men to study abroad. Japan, especially, proved to be an attractive educational center for Chinese students; at one time there were nearly 15,000 students there.¹¹ As Chinese students flocked abroad, and then returned home, a better understanding of Western civilization was made possible. These students became the forces for further reform.

By 1911, one reform movement (the Shing Chung Hsei, renamed and reorganized in 1905 as the Tung Meng Hui and as the Kuomintang in 1911) saw success for its program with the fall of the Manchu government. The new Republic's leaders, notably Yuan Shih-kai and Sun Yat-sen continued

¹⁰ Two things had greatly impressed the Chinese about modern thinking in the West; science and nationalism.

¹¹ Ping Wen Kuo, The Chinese System of Public Education. (New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1915) p. 74.

the program of educational reform and public education grew rapidly.¹²

The Revolution of 1911 was a landmark in the history of education in China. Soon after its organization the Provisional Government turned its attention to popular education. It demanded the use of textbooks in harmony with the spirit of republicanism, emphasized manual work, military and physical exercises, eliminated the classics from the primary school, and permitted boys and girls to study together in the same lower primary schools. It also stressed social education.¹³

Although the old learning would be preserved, it would never again hold the position of authority it had held in the past.

All this was "new education" in that its ultimate aim was to train and equip the learner to take his place in society rather than to prepare him for government service by means of a rigid classical examination system. The typical school founded during this time produced changes far more revolutionary than its curriculum seemed to warrant. It did so because it was designed for everybody and was planned as education for citizenship. The dominant trend was toward Westernization. This led

¹² The growth in public education during this period can be seen from the following figures which show the increase in number of government schools. In 1905 there were 4,222; 1906, 8,477; 1907, 19,830; 1908, 35,913; 1909, 43,086, and in 1910, 52,348. By 1916 there were 129,739 schools. Figures are taken from P.W. Kuo, op. cit., p. 107 and Christian Education in China The Report of the China Educational Committee of 1921-22. (Shanghai: Commercial Press, Ltd., 1922) p. 373, hereafter cited as Christian Education. There is some question about the figure for 1916 since the same source lists 122,286 schools for 1917. Either there was a drop in the number of schools or a miscount, which is not unlikely. Nevertheless, the figures do indicate a tremendous growth. Modern school enrollment jumped from 1,274 in 1903 to 1,625,534 in 1910. (Kuo, op. cit., p. 107)

¹³ Christian Education, op. cit., p. 16. Dr. Chow, however, dates coeducation as no earlier than the formation of the Student Union in Peking, 1919. Possibly this was a difference between Christian schools and government schools. See Chow Tse-tung, The May Fourth Movement. (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1960) p. 123.

to attack on the Confucian tradition¹⁴ and a popular demand for political and social reform.

They aimed at a re-birth of the old Chinese civilisation by discovering the hidden secret of Western strength and absorbing its essence in their own philosophy in order to effect a new synthesis on an intellectual and spiritual foundation.¹⁵

The change was so rapid that "publishers, schools, and teachers have been greatly put to it"¹⁶ to make the necessary readjustments or, for that matter, even to understand more fully the implications of the movement. Traditional curriculum was pushed aside and the committees asked instead, "What it is that we want the pupils to know and do?"¹⁷ The general objectives finally decided upon were: subjects should fulfill current needs for social progress, develop a spirit of democracy and offer opportunities for individual development.¹⁸ Ethics, so much a part of the old system, were included under "civics" and all subjects were to include "moral education."¹⁹ For those who had missed their education

14 Until the advent of the New Culture Movement, the period was not fruitful in philosophic thought. The new movement's emphasis was on the destruction of the Confucian tradition. Confucianism was identified with the conservatism of the past, which, to the new intellectual's minds, at least, interfered with new ideas and the forces of progress.

15 Tang Leang-li, China In Revolt. (London: Noel Douglas, 1927) p. 103. Tang goes on to say that new ideas were welcomed for comparison and criticism, and nothing was accepted unless it could stand the test of the scientific method.

16 The Curriculum Committee of the Conference of Federated Provincial Associations of China, The Outline Standards of the New System Curriculum. (Shanghai: The Commercial Press, Ltd., 1925) p. iii, H. B. Graybill's introduction. (Hereafter cited as The Curriculum Committee.)

17 Ibid., p. iv.

18 These objectives, along with several others, were adopted and issued as a Presidential Mandate, November 11, 1922.

19 The Curriculum Committee, op. cit., p. 9.

when they were young, the planners made provision for supplementary education.

As a result of these many rapid changes several things happened in China. Students in particular, and the public in general, developed a new attitude toward the problems of life. They became critical and inquiring. New hope and courage emerged. The importance of the "scientific method" became greatly emphasized.²⁰ Old ideas were re-examined and, if found wanting, discarded.²¹ The "New Thought Movement" gave many Chinese -- particularly students -- a new philosophy of life. They became aware of the unlimited possibility of individual development and began to realize the importance of the individual to society. Students developed a social conscience and educated under the new curriculum, or abroad, had influence and power far beyond what their numbers would seem to indicate.

The smallness of their numbers, so far from rendering them an insignificant factor, in some ways heightened their influence: in a land so largely illiterate the words of even an elementary schoolboy were listened to with respect. For they had inherited the status of the old literati: these were the new scholars, and to them was given the scholar's universal veneration.

20 Where Chinese had revered literary and ethical excellencies of ancient Chinese classics they now extended their admiration to the practical realities and usefulness of western science. This was both good and bad. On the good side this admiration sped up the breakdown of conservatism and dogmatism and made the path for the many changes yet to come much easier. On the other hand sheer advocacy of a total scientific spirit was in itself unscientific in that opinions and experiences of others should have been respected or at least accepted until proven as not true. Too many students were inclined to throw out the knowledge of centuries simply because it was old.

21 "It was not half-hearted reform or partial renovation which was being advocated, but a vast and fervent attempt to dethrone the very fundamentals of the old stagnant tradition and to replace it with a completely new culture." Dr. Chow, op. cit., p. 14, in an extensively backed statement.

tion; from then would come the new officialdom; and they were to embody the ideals of the new civilization, whatever that might be.²²

The "new civilization" turned out to be a repudiation of the old, a welcome for the new and a realization that something had to be done about the country and its people. To put China in its rightful place in the family of nations meant the masses had to be welded into a unit. A writer in The Chinese Recorder, tracing the history of the "Popular Education Movement" remarked that the fundamental solution to the problem

... is the effective and rapid enlightenment of the ignorant masses, for these simple reasons: -- The danger of aggression from militaristic and unscrupulous countries comes from national weakness and national weakness comes from official corruption and public inadvertence. Our officials are the products of our defective social system. The panacea of all our social and national evils, therefore, is popular education by which a healthier public opinion may be created; and a healthy public opinion will effectively check social and political corruption and thus stabilize our governmental and national structures.²³

Education may have been the fundamental solution and obvious answer but not so obvious was how to go about educating the masses. The students led a two-pronged attack on the problem by means of a program of simplified education and simplified language.

BEI WHA

In 1915 and 1916, two young men exchanged a series of letters in a popular magazine. This apparently everyday occurrence contributed directly

²² Foster, op. cit., p. 49.

²³ T. H. Lee, "The Popular Education Movement in China," The Chinese Recorder, Vol. LI (January, 1920) p. 45.

to a radical change in Chinese life, culture and education. It also contributed to the rise of Chinese nationalism as perhaps nothing else had. The two young men were Chen Tu-hsiu and Hu Shih. They advocated the adoption of bei wha,²⁴ (the vernacular) as the written language, in place of wen-li, (the classical literary language).

There had been earlier attempts in Chinese history to replace the cumbersome wen-li for the more easily learned and managed bei wha, or a substitute, but none had succeeded. Probably the first to reach the common man through bei wha literature was the Christian missionary who published one of the pioneer vernacular books, the Bible. The mission press consistently published -- and made acceptable²⁵ -- vernacular literature. And it was the missionary opponents of language reform who first raised the question of what bearing such a step would have on Chinese nationalism.²⁶ John De Francis, who produced a special study on the language reform movement, emphasized the close relationship of language and nationalism. At one point he states, "The history of the language reform movement shows that the problem of the Chinese script is nothing less than a problem of nationalism."²⁷

The argument over which language to use always seemed to be intensified at the time of any national emergency. One of the early attempts at language reform (that is, in modern times) was made during the 100 Days

24 Variously spelled as pai-hua, pei-hua, Bai Hua, etc. In this paper it will appear as bei wha, except when spelled differently in direct quotations.

25 Some refused to listen on the grounds that anything so easy to understand could not be worth reading! See Foster, op. cit., p. 95.

26 De Francis, op. cit., p. 217.

27 Ibid., p. 208.

of Reform. Liang Chi-chao, when introducing many Western works into China, created a new style of writing as well as many new terms. His articles and books were widely read and his style of writing became very popular and was widely imitated in spite of the opposition and criticism of the old literati.²⁸ For a time there was also interest in reforming the written language by adopting an alphabetic form of script. Yuan Shih-kai lent his support to this scheme.²⁹ Neither attempt was successful. At the time of the revolution (1911), another attempt was made to reform the language. By far the most far-reaching attempt of all was that made during the May 4 period.

During the first period Liang, Lu Kan-chang, and others were active in forming new scripts.³⁰ At the time of the revolution, conferences were held to discuss unifying pronunciation.³¹ After May 4, 1919, language reform began in earnest. This time it was the culmination of work begun by Chen Tu-hsiu and Hu Shih who exchanged letters in New Youth.³²

28 Chai Hsuan Chuang, Tendencies Toward A Democratic System of Education in China. (Shanghai: Commercial Press, Ltd., 1922) p. 151.

29 De Francis, op. cit., pp. 44-45.

30 The Empress Dowager was suspicious of all such attempts and once sent her personal physician to pose as a student "in order to find out what dangerous thoughts were being hatched in the No. 1 Free School for the Mandarin Alphabet." See De Francis, op. cit., p. 43.

31 At the time the Committee on Unification of Pronunciation met in 1913 there was a sharp debate between two groups of delegates, one demanding separate romanizations in line with the slogan "Unification of Speech and Writing," and the other demanding a single standard in line with the slogan "Unification of the National Language." The latter won. The delegates then proceeded to fix a more precise standard by determining the pronunciation, by majority vote, of several thousand characters. But the Blue-Green Mandarin that resulted from this procedure was so mixed that it was later abandoned in favor of a form of Mandarin based on the speech of people in a specific area. It is this that has been accepted as the standard for the National Language. See De Francis, op. cit., p. 228. This "National Language" was bei wha.

32 La Jeunesse, or in Chinese, Hsin Ching-nien.

The correspondence began when Chen, writing in New Youth, traced the history of European literature in an article and tried to make comparisons with comparable periods in Chinese literature. He found there was no comparison; no change had been made in Chinese literature. Hu Shih, then in America, read the article and wrote to Chen to discuss the problem of bringing about a change in Chinese literature.³³ Hu's letter later became the basis for an article entitled "Suggestions for the Reform of Chinese Literature"³⁴ and was published in New Youth in January, 1917.³⁵ Hu advocated the abolition of classical allusion,³⁶ literary convention and the strict parallel structure. He attacked the custom of imitating ancient writers and argued for creating a living literature. He closed the article by discussing the historical significance of the spoken lan-

33 The following comes from Hu Shih, The Chinese Renaissance. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1934) p. 25. "Whereas cultural control in Japan has been in the hands of the ruling class, the cultural changes in China have always begun from the people, sometimes from no one knows where Even in those cases of conscious reform, the leadership has always come from private individuals who began as small minority advocates and gradually won over a larger following Such changes are necessarily slow; but sometimes they can be very rapid.... Even the use of the spoken language (pei hua) in writing both prose and poetry in place of the classical literary language, became a fashion among all young students in the course of only three or four years."

34 Chai Hsuan Chuang, op. cit., p. 151. This article is variously translated as "Some Tentative Suggestions for the Reform of Chinese Literature," (See Hu, op. cit., p. 53-54) or "A Preliminary Discussion of Literary Reform," (see Chu Chai, op. cit., p. 164). The variance in translations points up the difficulties of furnishing an exact translation of the original Chinese. The article appeared both in New Youth and the quarterly published by Chinese students in America.

35 In 1917 New Youth's circulation increased to 16,000, a considerable number considering the conditions of printing in China at that time. See Chow, op. cit., p. 73. Dr. Chow credits several sources.

36 An example: "It is as if I were to ask that your five gold pieces be to me as the sandals of Mercury to Perseus, instead of asking in so many words for the loan of a five-pound note." See Foster, op. cit., p. 92.

guage (bei wha) and championed its adoption as a fitting medium for literary expression.

An earlier writer, Huang Yuan-yung, had advocated (in 1915) bringing Chinese thought into direct contact with contemporary thought and had suggested the use of simple and simplified language and literature but his ideas did not receive wide acceptance.³⁷ It remained for Hu Shih to launch the movement by suggesting a practical program for conducting the reform. Chen Tu-hsiu rose to Hu's support by publishing an even more startling article, this one called "On Literary Revolution."³⁸ Chen's advocations closely followed the ideas expressed by Hu. These were: the creation of a fresh and sincere literature of realism, and the creation of a clear and popular literature of a living society.³⁹

Only people who are familiar with the problems of the Chinese language can understand the immensity and importance of the reforms these two men advocated. First of all, bei wha was not a new language. It was the spoken language of a large portion of China. When Hu and Chen advocated its adoption they advocated its use as a means of literary as well as of spoken communication. Previously bei wha was accepted as a suitable

³⁷ Neither, for that matter, did the original letters of Hu and Chen. Not until Hu's ideas were vigorously supported by Chen in New Youth did the movement gain wide acceptance. (See Chow, op. cit., p. 29.)

³⁸ Chuang, op. cit., p. 152, calls it "For A Revolution in Literature." Another example of the difficulty of exact translation.

³⁹ For a complete listing of Hu's original suggestions and Chen's endorsement see Chuang, op. cit., p. 151-2. This is readily accessible. Otherwise the issues of New Youth in which the letters and articles appeared are as follows: Vol. I, Nov. 15, 1915, Chen's article on European literature. Vol. II, Oct. 1, 1916, Hu to Chen. Vol. II, Oct. 1, 1916, Chen to Hu. Vol. II, Jan. 1, 1917, Hu's article. Vol. II, Feb. 1, 1917, Chen's article. Vol. III, April 1, 1917, Chen to a letter-writer. Dr. Chow also has extensive quotations from these articles. See Chow, op. cit., pp. 271-279.

written language for such things as novels but certainly not for more scholarly purposes.⁴⁰ Chen and Hu advocated the use of bei wha for all literary communication.

... we did use Bai Hua in certain kinds of writings, for example, novels, but nobody ever thought that Bai Hua could be used in any serious and polite writings. The movement has taken pains to prove that first, Bai Hua was used by the best writers of the former age; these include some of the most learned and popular and honored scholars. Second, that Bai Hua could be developed into an elegant and eloquent literature. Third, Bai Hua can be used in everything, even in writing poetry, on which the battle was the severest. Fourth, that the very fact that it is easier to learn proves that it is democratic, and because it is democratic it should be adopted rather than anything else. Fifth, the more ardent advocates of Bai Hua pointed out the fact that the old Chinese literary style₄₁ is unfit to be the tool of philosophy and science

The literary style of writing, or wen-li, was as "different from Chinese conversation as Latin is from French,"⁴² and could be acquired only by great difficulty. Wen-li's very difficulty forced national leaders to

⁴⁰ Foster, op. cit., p. 96-97, uses the following story to illustrate the problem. "Only a few weeks ago a Chinese doctor educated abroad, and ill-acquainted with the advance of modern medicine in China, told a doctor friend of mine that English would have to be used in all medical schools because Chinese was impossible as a means of scientific instruction. 'What do you find difficult to translate?' the British doctor asked. 'Why, cholecystenterostomy, for example,' said the Chinese. 'Gall-bladder-intestine-join-together-like-lips-operation,' translated my friend in simple Chinese such as any uninitiated layman could have understood. 'What's the difficulty?' The difficulty was that the Chinese doctor could not imagine a Chinese textbook escaping from the limits of classical Wenli, especially as, with our English language generally so free, our learned professions have fallen into the snare of a 'classical' jargon. And Wenli, the language of old China's professional men, is not, like Latin, fitted for exactness of expression. It gloried in a style so condensed as to leave room for a whole commentary"

⁴¹ Timothy Lew, "China's Renaissance -- the Christian Opportunity," The Chinese Recorder, Vol. LII (May, 1921) p. 305-6.

⁴² J. E. Baker, "Chinese Cult of the Long Gown," Asia, Vol. 28 (April, 1928) p. 331.

consider the use of something easier and more familiar to educate the great masses of the Chinese people. The obvious choice was bei-wha. Thus a literary revolution would be the solution many revolutionary leaders had been looking for.

The problem [of reform] was first seen by all early reformers as the problem of finding a suitable language which could serve as an effective means of educating the vast millions of children and illiterate adults.⁴³

The new leaders realized that only through a democratized education could they reach the people and such a system of universal education could come only through a democratized language -- bei wha.

The very difficulty of the Chinese classical language -- it is made up of monosyllables and in some instances one of the monosyllables may have dozens of different meanings -- was the chief factor in conserving and maintaining the old social and political order. Mastery of the language and the elegant literary style was the key to participation in governmental and political affairs and demanded long years of study and much concentration and memory work. Yet in spite of all difficulties, the classical system won general approval. Nothing had been so highly regarded in the past as the sacred characters of the classical language. Possibly that is one reason the masses did revere the scholar so highly -- the scholar achieved what to them seemed quite impossible.

In this way the language definitely marked off the nation into two groups, and rendered it impossible for the governed to rise into the ranks of the governors, once they abandoned this difficult and specialized language which alone led to the promised land. Rewards

⁴³ Hu Shih, op. cit., p. 48.

and high offices were bestowed upon those who remembered best the abstruse doctrines, the subtle allusions, and the finely polished phrases of the sages.⁴⁴

The difficult written language acted as a check on the spoken language.⁴⁵ Even though dialects varied from region to region the written language remained the same,⁴⁶ a tremendous factor in maintaining unity in the Chinese civilization. But to all intents and purposes, learning the written language meant learning a new language.

The written language was so inflexible that it caused serious problems in the translation of Western works into Chinese. Terms had to be created (e.g., "light-gas" for hydrogen and "nursing-gas" for oxygen). When such subjects as psychology and sociology were translated, ideograms for "crowd-science" and "society-science" were invented. Obviously such terms were not precise and certainly were not scholarly. Another major difficulty was that one translator never knew which terms another translator already had formed to represent certain foreign words. Consequently, a variety of newly-invented ideograms emerged which were representations for words which were impossible to translate into classical Chinese. Some books, like Thomas Huxley's Evolution and Ethics, and Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations, which were written in modern plain English, were translated into archaic Chinese!⁴⁷

⁴⁴ Lancelot Forster, The New Culture In China. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1926) p. 8.

⁴⁵ Words often appear in our own language which are not designated as acceptable for written communication until some years after their appearance. In Chinese, new words were almost never assimilated into literary use.

⁴⁶ Movements to change the written language can be traced back as far as the 12th century, however, because the style of writing was so emphasized in the examination system, and no one could pass if he disregarded the rules, change of any sort made little headway.

⁴⁷ Chow, op. cit., p. 71.

Under such a system Chinese became a language of brevity. The reader had to supply many of the links which were needed for continuity of thought. The more educated a man became the more thoughts were eliminated from the papers he wrote or received, on the grounds that the reader would already have that knowledge.⁴⁸ Written Chinese became the preserve of a special and limited class and this kind of language made education difficult, expensive and exclusive.⁴⁹ The movement to adopt the spoken language as a form of literary medium made no change in the traditional script, or characters, but simply used the characters to write a literature based more on speech than on style.

Hu Shih was the pioneer in using the vernacular language for literary purposes. At this time wen-li occupied a position in China comparable to that of Latin in medieval Europe. Before the Renaissance

⁴⁸ "The more formal and stilted, the harder to understand, and the more replete with literary allusions, the better was your style and the more complimentary to your friend's intelligence." Foster, op. cit., p. 92.

⁴⁹ Here are a few examples of Chinese characters and the meanings they are to convey. (Chinese characters are not phonetic but hieroglyphic, descendants of the old ideograms.) "Man", for example, is represented by a pair of legs, "field", by a square divided into four, "calamity", by "flood" on top of "fire", and "anger" by "woman" between two "men". (What an excellent picturization!) Another good example, also using the character for "woman" is two such characters in a vertical column to represent "quarrel". Three such characters, arranged in a triangular pattern, indicate "gossip". As John Foster says, "This may sound obvious enough, but many of the characters have developed through the centuries into weird drawings comprising nearly thirty strokes, accumulating "men" and "fields" into one veritable calamity, where ideograms are altogether lost." Foster, op. cit., p. 89. Character examples are taken from the Foster source cited and "The Chinese Language Old and New," The Literary Digest, Vol. 72 (January 21, 1922) p. 50. Mao Tse-Tung, in issuing his famous "invitation" (published in New Youth in 1917 and considered by some to be one of the first steps in organization of the Chinese Communist Party) used the pseudonym "the man of twenty-eight strokes" to sign the article since there were that many strokes in the Chinese characters forming his name.

in Europe Latin had been used for scholarly correspondence among scholars. The masses had little access to information. But just as Latin in England gave way to English, or in Germany to German,⁵⁰ wen-li in China gave way to bei wha.

Wenli is to the whole country what Latin was to Europe, but with this distinction: that it is nothing more than a literary language, and cannot be a means of spoken intercourse as Latin was -- Cantonese, Fukienese, Mandarin-speaking people and the rest, even when reading it, have each their own pronunciation.⁵¹

Hu Shih made it possible for the average person to learn to read.⁵² But he claimed little credit for himself, usually pointing out a variety of reasons for bei wha's success.

The history of all the modern national languages of the European nations has revealed that a national

⁵⁰ In both cases the Bible was in the foreground as a leading vernacular publication -- just as in China.

⁵¹ Foster, op. cit., p. 89-90.

⁵² Hu Shih is universally recognized as the man most responsible for initiating and promoting the language revolution in China. He is acknowledged as such by such varied persons as writers of fiction (Pearl Buck), researchers of language reform (John De Francis), historians (Kenneth Scott Latourette and David Owen), Chinese writers (Tang Leang-li), and newspaper columnists (Marquis Childs), to list just a few. Hu Shih's accomplishment in this regard has been compared to that of Chaucer who popularized an earlier vernacular -- English. What this change meant to the ordinary Chinese is difficult to describe. One can write of the general trends which followed its introduction but one finds it difficult to pinpoint the exact benefits to the ordinary citizen. Pearl Buck has made a valiant attempt in a story book for young people, The Young Revolutionist, which although it is a glorified propaganda piece for the Nationalist movement in China, contains a section of dialog, admittedly stilted and contrived, which does describe the effect of language changes on the ordinary person. (See pages 68-69.) The section ends, "Many of us did it, said the young captain, 'and we all help in it, demanding that the books the school children use and the newspapers and the magazines shall all be printed in the common tongue. The leader of it was one called Hu Shih and there were others with him, but now we need no leader, for the thing grows of itself. One day all common men and common women, even the women in the houses of the poor, shall read and know what they read.'" Pearl Buck, The Young Revolutionist. (New York: Friendship Press, 1932) p. 69.

language is always a dialect which, in the first place, must be the most widely spoken and most generally understood of all the dialects of the country; and which, second, must have produced a fairly large amount of literature, so that its form is more or less standardized ...⁵³

Bei wha was spread by enthusiastic students who used it in their activities following May 4. Almost all of their propaganda was written in the vernacular, both because students' appreciated the value of bei wha and because they wanted to reach as wide an audience as possible.⁵⁴ Within six months of the May 4 incident more than 400 new periodicals appeared,⁵⁵ all in the vernacular. Older magazines changed to bei wha.

⁵³ Hu Shih, op. cit., p. 58.

⁵⁴ Dr. Sun advocated the use of propaganda, saying that it should be used to inspire men to the point where they would even sacrifice their lives.

⁵⁵ Four hundred seems like a great many but several writers use this figure. Hu Shih says, "During the years 1919-20, there appeared about 400 small periodicals, almost all of them published by the students ... and all of them published in the spoken language of the people ..." (Hu Shih, op. cit., p. 56). Another writer said, "Starting in 1917 with New Youth, the number of papers and periodicals published in the vernacular reached four or five hundred by 1920." "China's Language Revolution," The Literary Digest, Vol. 92 (March 12, 1927) p. 72. Note that they give a longer time span. Somewhat more conservative was this writer "... as a result over one hundred newspapers and magazines, and original and translated books ... have been issued in this plain language of the people." "Modern Movements in China," The Missionary Review of the World, Vol XLIV (October, 1921) p. 752. H. C. Hu says, "All of a sudden more than two hundred new publications appeared." H. C. Hu, "The New Thought Movement," The Chinese Recorder, Vol. LIV (August, 1923) p. 447. The quality no doubt varied but one "old China hand", returning to China after several year's absence picked up some forty different magazines and found in them "more up-to-date things discussed and a wider range of opinions expressed ... than in any combination of forty-seven magazines picked up from American newspaper stands." ("China's Language Revolution," op. cit., p. 72). Said The International Review of Missions, "The rapidly increasing use and remoulding of the Pei-hau ... instead of the classical (Wenli), perhaps the most striking literary revolution in history -- is transforming literary usage and adding enormously to the stream of books and periodicals which are pouring the best and worst of modern thought into China." "The Year 1922 In China," The International Review of Missions, Vol. XII (April, 1923) p. 200.

The students' need for a language of national communication, plus their desire to "throw out the old and bring in the new," helped to bring bei wha into popular usage and made it generally acceptable. In fact, the only communications the students continued to produce in wen-li were their letters to the government.

Political parties, seeing the value of a press accessible to the people and favorable to their own platforms, inaugurated their own vernacular publications.⁵⁶ Many "commercial" newspapers (i.e., not student-published) continued for a time to print in "easy wen-li".⁵⁷

There was opposition, of course. The traditional scholar fought the movement, as well he might since it was a challenge to his position, and some conservative government officials also fought it, being afraid of the radical views which appeared in the bei-wha press. But most opposition was doomed to failure.

... to try to meet this movement with the traditional attitude of blackmail and bully, or even of bargaining, is to succeed only in being laughed at. Especially when the basis of China's educated democracy has been widened as the result of the elevation of the "pai-hua" to the status of the literary language, and of the activities of the Popular Education Association.⁵⁸

VERNACULAR PUBLICATIONS

One of the best known and most widely read of the new vernacular

⁵⁶ The Kuomintang began Weekly Review in June, 1919, in Shanghai. Sun Yat-sen gave his approval to the vernacular in January, 1920. Mao Tse-tung continued active in the New People's Study Society and edited a paper, the Hsiang River Review, which became well known. The Chin-putang supported the vernacular movement as far back as the spring of 1918. The Anfu Club published in the vernacular as a defense to attacks made on them. Virtually all political groups produced their propaganda in the vernacular from then on.

⁵⁷ "Easy wen-li" can be compared to an informal Latin. "... Low Latin, if you will ..." says Foster, op. cit., p. 97.

⁵⁸ Tang, op. cit., p. 150.

magazine was New Youth.⁵⁹ New Youth was begun as Youth Magazine in Shanghai, September 15, 1915. (Its Chinese name was Ching-nien-tsa-chi.) When it became New Youth (Hsin Ching-nien) it was often called La Jeunesse. Its editor was Chen Tu-hsiu and in the early years he published the magazine infrequently.⁶⁰

In 1918 New Youth acquired a committee of six editors who took turns editing the magazine. Hu Shih and Li Ta-chao were members of this board and Chou Tso-jen was a frequent contributor. From January, 1918, on most of the magazine was written in the vernacular.⁶¹ The magazine was directed to young intellectuals and criticized traditional ways while firmly supporting the New Thought Movement. Translations of Western authors (e.g. Turgenev and Wilde) were frequently published. Hu's article on language reform appeared in this magazine and a great variety of experimental Chinese literature appeared from time to time. In its early years many Kuomintang people wrote for it but shortly after the New Youth Society was formed in 1919, there was dissension and Chen organized a Socialist Youth Corps. New Youth supporters and other groups (Chen included)

59 Liang Chi-chao started a magazine (The New People) in 1903 which often carried articles encouraging the renovation of the Chinese nation by means of virtues and traits (nationalism, freedom, rights and liberties, etc.) acquired from the West. Thus New Youth was not the first advocate of change.

60 For example: There was a gap from June through November in 1919, because the editors were involved in the May 4th events.

61 "China's Language Revolution," op. cit., p. 72 uses the figure from 1917 on. Actually that's when the magazine began printing Hu's and Chen's correspondence and advocated use of bei wha. When New Youth did begin printing almost exclusively in bei wha it did so almost alone. "But shortly after June, 1919 ... there sprang up in all parts of China numerous periodicals edited in most cases by young students who had caught the new spirit" Chai Hsuan Chuang, op. cit., p. 152. Thus the impetus for further bei wha publication was the May 4 uprising. Chai's source is "Intellectual China in 1919", an article by Hu Shih which appeared in a special issue of the Peking Leader in 1920.

combined to create the Chinese Communist Party in 1920 and New Youth became their organ. The magazine ended publication in 1922 and thus brought to a close one of the most influential publications of the Chinese Renaissance.⁶² There was no other magazine with so much influence and prestige at this time as New Youth.⁶³ Possibly the closest competitor was New Tide (Hsin Chao or Renaissance), founded and published in 1918 by a group of students from Peking University. They selected the name New Tide because they recognized in the New Thought Movement several striking similarities to the European Renaissance.⁶⁴ They selected three goals for their publication -- a critical spirit, scientific thinking and reformed rhetoric. They also supported the reforms advocated by New Youth.

Chen Tu-hsiu and Li Ta-chao (who gave the group a room in the library at Peking University, for use as their office) helped arrange financial

62 "China's Language Revolution," *op. cit.*, p. 70, calls New Youth the "standard bearer of the literary revolution." T. L. Shen refers to it as "the forerunner and sometimes considered as the organ of the New Thought Movement. ... In the pages of this periodical we can find the first touch of the vital life problems of the Chinese people." T. L. Shen, "A Study of the Anti-Christian Movement," The Chinese Recorder, Vol. LVI (April, 1925) p. 229-30. Timothy Lew says of New Youth, "(it) has been recognized as the dynamo which generated the power of the movement." (Timothy Lew, *op. cit.*, p. 302).

63 "I began to read this magazine (New Youth) while I was a student in the normal college and admired the articles of Hu Shih and Chen Tu-hsiu very much. They became for a while my models, replacing Liang Ch'i-chao and Kang Yu-wei, whom I had already discarded." Mao Tse-tung as quoted by Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China. (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1938, Black Cat Edition) p. 147.

64 According to Hu Shih, *op. cit.*, p. 44, these included "a conscious movement to promote a new literature in the living language of the people," and "a movement of conscious protest against many of the ideas and institutions in the traditional culture a movement of reason versus tradition, freedom versus authority, and glorification of life and human values versus their suppression." Hu points out that the movement was also humanist in that it was led by men who knew their cultural heritage and tried to study it with the new methodology of modern historical criticism and research.

support for the new magazine and both Hu Shih and Chou Tso-jen became advisors. New Tide also had a society to support it (founded in December, 1918) and many of its members were Peking University students.⁶⁵ Both magazine and society were noted for their critical spirit, scientific thinking and use of bei wha. The society lasted only a year but the magazine continued into 1922. Like New Youth, New Tide also printed translations of Western works and devoted special issues to Marx, Dewey and the New Thought Movement. Like New Youth, it interrupted publication in 1919 (from May to October) to participate in the May 4th uprising. With editors and contributors busy with protest movements no one had time to edit and produce a magazine.

Newspapers appeared, too. The "easy wen-li" press gave way to the still easier bei-wha paper.

The fate of those which did not thus respond to popular demand is illustrated by the example of a famous Shanghai daily, Shin pao (Times). Before 1919 it was a favorite in Chinese educational circles. But after 1919 when the thought of the young intellectuals took a new turn the paper still clung to its traditional form and content. As a result its circulation dropped rapidly, and it was soon forced to cease publication.

Newspapers had existed in China for many years but most of them had a very limited circulation and in very few ways resembled the press of

⁶⁵ To all intents and purposes, Peking University was headquarters for the many reform movements of the period. Leaders of many of the movements were professors at the school. Leaders of the student movements were members of the university's study body. The university traced its history from the Society for the Strengthening of Learning, established in 1895 by Liang Chi-chow and Kang Yu-wei. In 1898 it became the Imperial University and was later closed for two years after the Boxer Rebellion. In 1912 it had become the National University of Peking and was considered the leading institution of higher learning in China. Enrollment increased at a rapid rate after Tsai Yuan-pei became chancellor.

⁶⁶ Chow, op. cit., p. 181.

today. In 1898 there had been a flurry of newspapers in experimental reformed Chinese but most of these were short-lived and never reached the people. Immediately after the Revolution of 1911 newspapers appeared again and flourished until Yuan Shih-kai began suppressing them. There had been nearly 500 daily newspapers but very few survived the campaign against them. Then came the New Thought Movement and the May 4th uprisings and bei-wha papers sprang up almost overnight.

Sixty years ago in the whole of China there existed one news-sheet, and that supposed to be the oldest in the world! China, which had her printing presses long centuries before Caxton; China, from whom the West twelve hundred years ago learned the art of making paper -- China had never felt the need of news. For all her villagers lived a little local life, and what news was there save the price of rice and the gossip of the street.⁶⁷

The new magazines and newspapers provided a channel of communication for young intellectuals and also became a means of instructing (or propagan-
dizing) the general public, some of whom were beginning to learn to read. "The 'periodical fever' during the months following the May Fourth Incident was an epoch-making event both in the development of Chinese public opinion and in the shaping of the new Chinese intellectuals."⁶⁸

The periodicals' influence was tremendous.⁶⁹ The letters-to-the-
editors columns, for example, became a public platform where nearly any-

⁶⁷ Foster, op. cit., p. 95.

⁶⁸ Chow, op. cit., p. 180.

⁶⁹ "Ignorant coolies thought the printed word was sacred. Everywhere in the cities they had stone receptacles for waste paper with words on it and someone would take the words away and burn them reverently. ... But the weirdest thing of all was that the Chinese believed anything in print had to be true." Richard McKenna, The Sand Pebbles. (New York: Harper and Row, 1962) p. 342.

thing could be discussed.⁷⁰ Every important political crisis -- especially those concerning foreign aggression -- was dutifully covered. And each crisis created new difficulties as more people learned of China's disgraceful position and learned to resent each new imposition. Nationalism continued to spread and the popular press did its share to see that public opinion was created and had an opportunity to express itself.

From 1919 onwards young China had been consciously engaged in making public opinion, or, as they themselves express it, "spreading the spirit of revolution."⁷¹

Circulation of the popular periodicals grew rapidly.⁷² As circulation rose, newspapers increased in power and influence. Chinese officials, just as officials everywhere, were not fond of public criticism and paid a great deal of attention to what the popular press had to say.

As with magazines, quality of the newspapers varied. Putnam Weale, in particular, criticized China's popular press, calling it a "yellow

⁷⁰ Hu Shih and Chen Tu-hsiu first discussed the use of bei wha in a letter exchange in New Youth.

⁷¹ Foster, op. cit., p. 51. Foster then goes on to point out that these "amateur attempts to rouse public opinion" were reinforced by the Kuomintang, "the first party to appreciate the support of this nucleus of public opinion and to make a bid for its extension." (See Foster, p. 53.) Foster also reported, "One of the greatest British authorities on China, the late Sir John Jordan, said, 'Public opinion, which was formerly nonexistent or inarticulate, is now a growing and powerful influence and the student movement is a factor which no government can afford to ignore.'" (Foster, p. 53-55).

⁷² One subscriber was Mao Tse-tung. Discussing the money available to him, Mao told Edgar Snow, "Of this amount I must have used a third for newspapers, because regular subscriptions cost me about a dollar a month, and I often bought books and journals on the newsstands. My father cursed me for this extravagance. He called it wasted money on wasted paper. But I had acquired the newspaper reading habit, and from 1911 to 1927, when I climbed up Ching-kanshan, I never stopped reading the daily papers of Peiping, Shanghai and Hunan." Snow, op. cit., p. 149. Snow's footnote explains that modern newspapers were still something of a novelty at the time, and many people, especially officials, looked on them with dismay.

press."⁷³ Weale believed many papers limited themselves to propaganda "expanding the briefest messages into vast denunciations in which verified information is conspicuous by its absence."⁷⁴ Editors going too far in what they said in print were occasionally imprisoned and a few were executed. Weale felt that, generally speaking, the Chinese editorial writer "would rank elsewhere as anything but a very second-rate writer."⁷⁵ Some of these criticisms are no doubt legitimate but there are reasons for the poor quality of much Chinese reporting. For example, many of the papers were founded to oppose the existing regime and the warlords, and to alert everyone to the activities of the pro-Japanese government in its relation to other nations. In addition, much of the news printed by the papers came through a "pool" arrangement (i.e., an "Associated Press" service). News received this way could not always be verified and the news services of that time did not have the reputation for responsibility as does the Associated Press. This "pooled

⁷³ Putnam Weale, Why China Sees Red. (New York: Dodd Mead and Company, 1925) p. 121. Later (p. 135) Weale says "... journalism is after all a mild form of blackmail with them."

⁷⁴ Weale, op. cit., p. 120. Later (p. 142) he says, "No statement in the Chinese press is ever absolutely true, but almost every categorical statement is based on a fragment or echo of something important, heard at the key-hole." Perhaps Weale was bitter about the quality of Chinese reporting because he himself was a reporter and few good reporters enjoy seeing the term "reporter" given to someone who does not equal their generally high standards. What Weale forgot is that the quality or accuracy of the story is not always under the control of the reporter. Story material often was released which could not be checked for accuracy and had to be accepted at face value. For example, there is an issue of the North China Star which carries on its front page two news releases from opposing sides in a war between tuchuns. Each side claims victory in the latest battle! The editor of the Star published the stories under this headline: "Both Sides Claim Victory In First Armed Clash So There May Have Been a Fight." (The North China Star, July 16, 1920, hereafter cited as The Star.)

⁷⁵ Weale, op. cit., p. 120.

news" is also one reason why news spread so far so fast; it was accessible to all.⁷⁶

While the new magazines and newspapers were not read by all, the news they contained was certainly understandable by all and student speakers saw to it that the people heard it. As a result the common people rapidly became able to express themselves as "public opinion." The revolution in communication spread throughout the country. In the course of a few years, the literary revolution succeeded in giving to the people a national language, and brought about a new age of literary expression. The movement made it possible for countless thousands to acquire a knowledge of things entirely unknown to the average Chinese of a quarter of a century before. Perhaps the most important sign of bei wha's success was the extensive use made of it by the Kuomintang and Nationalist forces. Dr. Sun's Three People's Principles, in bei wha translation, was probably read more widely than the Bible, in spite of the years of head start the Bible had as a vernacular publication.⁷⁷

NEW SOCIETIES AND ORGANIZATIONS

Also important at this time were the many societies and organizations which were formed (e.g., New Youth Society, New Tide Society). Some organizations were formed specifically to work with the illiteracy problem in China. One such group was the National Association for the

⁷⁶ The Chinese press was not the only news organization to suffer criticism. Said L. A. Lyall, Chinese Maritime Customs Administration, of the British press, "I would like to make a practical suggestion, that the British press in China should be published in the Russian language, and then the Soviets will get the benefit of the ill-will it creates and not the English people." T. F. Millard, "Undermining Our Chinese Policy," Asia, Vol. 27 (November, 1927) p. 893.

⁷⁷ Foster, op. cit., p. 101.

Spread of Popular Education, whose motto was "abolition of illiteracy in China within this generation."⁷⁸ Another society was the Young China Association which was dedicated to "Social Service under the guidance of the Scientific Spirit."⁷⁹ The society published a magazine called The Journal of the Young China Association, which together with New Youth was one of the few magazines to retain its original aim and publish regularly.⁸⁰

Young China Society is one of the fruitful results of the Renaissance Movement. From the beginning it stood for a scientific attitude, a progressive spirit and sacrificial acts.⁸¹

Still another society was the Shang Chih Hsueh Hui, an organization of leading men in Peking whose main objective was to introduce Western culture to China. Members generously supported the society and the group sponsored the visits of John Dewey and Bertrand Russell to China.⁸² The group also arranged for the translation of many Western works into

⁷⁸ Tang, op. cit., p. 104.

⁷⁹ H. C. Hu, op. cit., p. 450. According to Chow Tse-tung, "The initiation of the Young China Association was only one example of the save-the-nation movement which developed under the stimulus of the pro-Japanese policy of the government. The more apparent this policy became, the closer were the contacts between the advocates of the new literature and new thought movements and public anti-Japanese and patriotic groups." See Chow, op. cit., p. 80-81.

⁸⁰ H. C. Hu, op. cit., p. 450.

⁸¹ T. L. Shen, op. cit., p. 229-30.

⁸² An extraordinary degree of interest was shown in liberal and radical thought of the West. The writings of Karl Marx and Tolstoy enjoyed enormous popularity. The lectures of John Dewey and Bertrand Russell, both of whom spent many months in China, were enthusiastically received by the student classes. Dewey stayed in China two years and two months, during and after the May 4 period. His lectures were interpreted by Hu Shih and covered topics in philosophy, politics and education. The lectures were published by newspapers and magazines and later issued in book form. One book went through 14 Chinese printings, highly unusual at the time. Dewey was the first Western philosopher to make so many speeches in modern China.

Chinese (e.g., Plato's Republic; and retranslations, that is, works from wen-li and bei wha.)⁸³

Literary societies sprang up "like mushrooms,"⁸⁴ after May 4, 1919. Peking University alone had more than 100 different kinds of societies formed under student initiative.⁸⁵ Involvement in these societies was a tremendous help in training students for service. Actually, social service by students was a comparatively new idea. What little service they had rendered in previous years was rendered inside the school. Now social service both inside and outside the school became commonplace. "In nearly every one of the schools of middle grade and above, there is a poor school run by the students and some of them have done excellent work"⁸⁶ But the students not only taught their groups in schools, they also went out onto the highways and byways to teach those who were "too poor to pay even a dollar a year."⁸⁷

The introduction of a popular written language probably tripled the

⁸³ Other authors translated: Tolstoy, Kropotkin, Lenin, Ibsen, Einstein, Marx, Bergson, Wells, Russell, Dewey, Kant, Darwin, Spencer, Huxley and James.

⁸⁴ Y. T. Wu, "Modern Student Life," The Chinese Recorder, Vol. LIV (August, 1923) p. 474.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 475.

⁸⁷ Forster, op. cit., p. 148. On the previous page, Foster describes how a peasant might be taught his first lesson in reading. "The lesson starts with a picture in which a blind man is depicted asking a farmer friend to read for him a letter which he has received, but the farmer says he cannot read. "Well then," says the blind man, "you are just as badly off as I am. You are blind, too." Here are the characters meaning "blind man," and also for "the man who cannot read" -- and so the peasant is launched upon his first lesson in reading and writing his own language."

reading public in China at this time.⁸⁸ As a result of the acceptance of bei wha, the time required to learn the fundamentals of reading was reduced from several years to several months of intensive study.

Of China's four hundred million or more inhabitants only about five per cent can read at all, and no more than two per cent are real masters of the written language. It is quite possible that 375,000,000 Chinese may learn to read and write⁸⁹ within one generation, or even in the next ten years.

By 1920 the Ministry of Education had ordered that by the beginning of the fall term in 1921, textbooks for the first two grades in the primary schools should be in the vernacular language.⁹⁰ After this the vernacular soon spread to the middle and higher schools.

I cannot put too much emphasis upon the significance and the great importance of the battle which this movement has won in this regard, [the author is referring to the move of the Ministry of Education] for if anyone can point

88 P. Kuo, "Chinese Statement of the Chinese Case," Asia, Vol. 25 (December, 1925) p. 1036. Kuo goes on to say, "At the present rate of progress it is possible that, within a generation, the degree of literacy in China will be as high as in many nations of the West." Tang, op. cit., p. 105, uses figures from the Chinese mails to show how the newspapers and magazines increased in circulation. "... 97 million newspapers and magazines were carried in 1924 ... 81 millions in 1923 ... and hardly one million ten years ago"

89 H. C. Reynolds, "Turning A Leaf of the Book of Knowledge," Asia, Vol. 19 (November, 1919) p. 1146. There's quite a discrepancy in literacy figures. Foster, op. cit., p. 47, uses the figures one per cent of 400 million who can read and write but explains with a footnote that many of the figures are guesses. Dr. Chow, op. cit., p. 9 in a footnote, says that during the May Fourth Movement about 30 per cent of the Chinese people were illiterate. F. F. Liu gives as an official figure for Chinese literacy in 1925, 20.0, but this is somewhat past the period in Chinese history which we are covering in this paper. It does show, however, that the rate rose rapidly. See F. F. Liu, A Military History of Modern China 1924-1949. (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1956) p. 142.

90 By this time bei wha had acquired the more respectable name of "National Language of China." The change to bei wha was voted in spite of the fact that the Ministry was under a reactionary government. In 1922 elementary and secondary textbooks were also ordered to be prepared in the national language.

to a definite fact, indicating how and why the movement has been so successful, it is the success which the movement has achieved in making a place for Bai Hua, in spite of the thinking of the Chinese people being based on, guided by and controlled by the old literary writings. In attacking here it attacked the root of all evil -- the citadel of power of the old Chinese viewpoint in philosophy and moral and religious life⁹¹

To assist in its objectives the Ministry of Education established (in 1919) a National Language Unification Commission, one of its tasks being to supervise the use of the National Phonetic Alphabet.⁹² Progress in the language thereafter was phenomenal.

When we compare a modern Chinese dictionary with one published fifty years ago, we find that the Chinese vocabulary has increased at a greater rate than perhaps the vocabulary of any of the European languages.⁹³

Leaders in building a new China through education included many of the intellectuals who were prominent in the Renaissance and May 4 movements. Hu Shih, for example, was a member of the committee assigned the task of devising a new curriculum for China's schools. He also wrote several of the outlines for courses on the National Language (bei wha). Interestingly enough, the course outline provided for the changeover from bei wha to wen-li which was used extensively in the upper levels.⁹⁴

Supplementing the efforts of the Ministry was the Mass Education Movement. This movement had its origin during the World War when uneducated Chinese coolies were sent abroad as laborers. These men could not read or write and consequently received little news from home. James Yen of the Y.M.C.A. went to France as a volunteer and began teaching

91 Timothy Lew, op. cit., p. 306.

92 This alphabet consisted of 39 national phonetic letters originally "Phonetic Symbols." See Chu Chai, op. cit., p. 171.

93 Chai Hsuan Chuang, op. cit., p. 150.

94 Curriculum Committee, op. cit., p. 64.

coolies the basis of the Chinese written language. To everyone's amazement, the so-called "ignorant" coolies were able to learn to read and write simple phrases. The next step was to begin a simple language newspaper.

Later James Yen was put in charge of the entire education program for the 200,000 Chinese abroad. He taught others the same methods he had used and classes for Chinese laborers were formed throughout France. Yen later experimented four years with various teaching systems and the end result was a one-thousand character system divided into four readers of 24 lessons each. The average peasant learning to read and write under this system, could complete one reader a month. All four books could be covered in about 96 hours of classroom instruction per day. (A busy farmer could spare one hour's time. He could also afford the three cents each book cost.) By 1923,⁹⁵ the experiments culminated in the organization of the Chinese National Association of the Mass Education Movement. James Yen became the Association's general director. The association was formed "for the purpose of awakening, enlivening, and enlightening,"⁹⁶ the Chinese people. Through this movement the ordinary Chinese was introduced to an education aimed at giving him a fuller, richer and better life.⁹⁷

95 See T. H. Lee, op. cit. Mr. Lee refers to the Popular Education Movement as "only one of the indirect results of this student movement."

96 Forster, op. cit., p. 146. Forster estimates the common people at 85 per cent of the whole.

97 According to Foster, Ibid., p. 150, the Mass Education people gave advice and equipped the teacher with the proper techniques of teaching the basic 1,300 characters (note difference in number -- James Yen's books used 1,000 characters) and also provided the necessary literature. James Yen describes how teachers, students, school rooms and supplies were acquired in Men and Women of Far Horizons, compiled and edited by Jesse R. Wilson. (New York: Friendship Press, 1935) p. 50 ff.

NATIONALISM

As the educated public grew, interest in China as a nation grew. Nationalism spread across the country.⁹⁸

... the Literary Revolution became an important phase in the whole social and political movement which marked the upsurge of Chinese nationalism in the present century.⁹⁹

The cause of Chinese nationalism was intellectual alienation.¹⁰⁰ The thinking of Confucius, if accepted at all, was not for what he had said, but because he was Chinese! The ideal of young China was to have a strong, united and independent country. The best way to achieve this goal, they thought, was to take the best of what the west and China offered and combine them. Leaders of this plan were the intelligentsia.¹⁰¹

98 In China, this meant the process of making the nation, instead of the family, fundamental to the new civilization. Many revolutionary leaders felt that until this was done the Revolution would not be a success.

99 De Francis, op. cit., p. 219.

100 The following dialog is taken from Pearl Buck's The Young Revolutionist, op. cit., p. 101-102.

"Sir ... why is it we are not to believe what the old sage said?"

And the young captain said gravely and as one who knows all things, "These sayings are old and useless and do not serve the day. We have our cause and we must treat ruthlessly all who oppose it. Most of all we are not to believe that men in the whole world are brothers, for our enemies are men and how can we call them our brothers? No, first of all we must get up our own country and we must be against all such as are not our countrymen. This is called nationalism and Sun Yat-sen says nationalism must come first."

101 All agree that the "intelligentsia" were the core of the new culture movement. Says Foster, op. cit., p. 61 " ... the tremendous influence of the student class, the nucleus of China's nationalism" Tang, op. cit., p. 149, "The leaders of this movement are the best products of Chinese civilization: the intelligentsia, whose power, as Chinese history has shown, no amount of force can subdue." Later, (p. 152) he says, "The Chinese intelligentsia has been, in the past, the real power in the State; it is still so to-day, and it will remain so in the future." Comments T. L. Shen, op. cit., p. 227, "To deal with the present subject adequately we must not fail to appreciate the important role which the intellectual class of China have always played throughout past generations. They have created and moulded public opinion in this great and ancient land."

In the early stages there was more or less agreement among the reformers on such objectives as strengthening the country, promoting the advance of scientific studies, and welding the people more firmly together. Although there was some understanding of these objectives as related to the nationalist struggle in China, it was only after the May Fourth Movement of 1919 that the relationship began to be stated in more political terms. Sporadically in the twenties and more consistently in later years, Chinese nationalists came to speak of their goal as destroying the vestiges of "feudalism" in China.¹⁰²

Their key tools were popular education and effective communication. Bei wha played an important role in both. In fact, De Francis goes so far as to say bei wha's victory was due to its identification with the cause of Chinese nationalism.¹⁰³ China's several dialects -- with a literary language foreign to all -- was a real drawback in any attempt to unite the country. Now with China's interest in bei-wha there was a real opportunity to build a national language and thus eventually, national unity.

The political revolution, therefore, went hand in hand with a literary revolution, and, according to Mr. Low Kwong-lai, a graduate of Harvard University, the change from the classical language for literary uses into the vernacular, that is the language spoken today by the

102 De Francis, op. cit., p. 237. Chen Tu-hsiu, Hu Shih, Tsai Yuan-pei, Li Ta-chao and others had for several years advocated that the young people of China should take an interest in government affairs and policies. Thus the action of May 4, 1919, can be attributed, in part, to the influence of these literati, even though they did not directly suggest the protest, it certainly fit in with their kind of thinking. Then when the government abused both leaders and students involved in the new literature it gained the intellectuals the sympathy and support of the other students, even those who had hesitated to adopt bei wha. The very fact that the New Thought leaders aided and abetted student revolutionaries gained additional support for the renaissance. Students realized that these new literati were trying to lead young China along a brighter and more profitable intellectual path and it was a goal with which they could agree whole-heartedly. Thus, as Dewey reported in Asia, "Concretely and practically it [new culture movement] is associated with the student revolt that began on May 4, 1919." See John Dewey, "New Culture in China," Asia, Vol. 21 (July, 1921) p. 581.

103 De Francis, op. cit., p. 11.

people, is nothing short of "an intellectual and spiritual revolution which arouses the creative energy of the Chinese and awakens the dormant national consciousness of 400,000,000."¹⁰⁴

Not until the advent of the New Culture movement was there any marked change in Chinese thought. At no previous time in Chinese history had there been such a change. The entire Renaissance movement formed a new road to national development by giving up, at whatever cost, the practices of blindly copying the old and instead created an atmosphere in which one became free to assimilate and adapt the good things of all cultures as well as China's own.

SUMMARY

The intellectuals were the leaders of this "New Culture" movement.

. . . the increased consciousness and activity of Chinese intellectuals along these lines at this period must surely be recognized by historians as an event of world-wide significance."¹⁰⁵

They supported the proposal to adopt a new literary language and they were the products and promoters of a new system of education. At first this "revolt" appeared to casual observers to be simply a protest against corrupt politicians, stimulated by the failures of Chinese claims at Versailles (i.e., Shantung). But in reality it was a revolution fed by countless humiliations and ignited by the Decision.

The Renaissance movement of the last two decades differs from all the early movements in being a fully conscious and studied movement. Its leaders know what they want, and they know what they must destroy in order to achieve what they want. They

¹⁰⁴ "China's Language Revolution," *op. cit.*, p. 68. Predicted Ming Ju Cheng, *op. cit.*, p. 171, "Ultimately, all the varying sections of China's population will come to regard themselves as integral parts of the nation, and nationalism, one of Dr. Sun Yat Sen's 'Three Peoples' Principles,' will at length be realized."

¹⁰⁵ Chow, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

want a new language, a new literature, a new outlook on life and society, and a new scholarship. They want a new language, not only as an effective instrumentality for popular education, but also as the effective medium for the development of the literature of a new China. They want a literature that shall be capable of expressing the real feelings, thoughts, inspirations, and aspirations of a growing nation. They want to instil into the people a new outlook on life which shall free them from shackles of tradition and make them feel at home in the new world and its new civilization. They want a new scholarship which shall not only enable us to understand intelligently the cultural heritage of the past, but also prepare us for active participation in the work of research in the modern sciences. This, as I understand it, is the mission of the Chinese Renaissance.¹⁰⁶

Actually, the movement was unorganized, in that there was no chief officer, paid staff or central organization.¹⁰⁷ All looked toward Peking University and the intellectuals there -- especially to Hu Shih, Chen Tu-hsiu and Tsai Yuan-pei. Leaders of the new movement attacked almost everything held dear by the people, yet succeeded in winning these same people to their support. The New Thought Movement gave to China a new philosophy of life wherein the individual's importance became recognized. It made the people hungry for knowledge and gave them courage to attack reverence for tradition. The movement gave China a philosophy of life in which the individual's importance became recognized. It made the people hungry for knowledge and gave them courage which helped to unify them as a nation. It taught the people how to think critically and made them aware of themselves as a nation.

¹⁰⁶ Hu Shih, *op. cit.*, p. 46-47.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. ix. "... cultural changes of tremendous significance have taken place and are taking place in China, in spite of the absence of effective leadership and centralized control by a ruling class" And from "Modern Movements in China," *op. cit.*, p. 751-52, "The intellectualist movement is as yet unorganized, and is without formally chosen officers or members, but it stands everywhere for certain definite things."

Before our sight one-fifth of the people of the globe are moving from the middle ages into the modern day, attempting to realign their traditional mode of life with the demands of the twentieth century, and, at the same time, to gain for their country a place of dignity and respect in the family of nations.¹⁰⁸

The question now is, what did the student leaders and intellectuals do to help their country gain "a place of dignity and respect in the family of nations"?

¹⁰⁸ David Owen, Imperialism and Nationalism In The Far East. (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1929) p. 81-82.

CHAPTER THREE

THE REACTIONS

Let your many scholars plan
Let them be the vanguard of the people.¹

No sooner had news of the Shantung Decision reached China than there was loud and long protest. At first the protest came primarily from the educated classes, and from this group, principally the students. Within a short time the movement spread throughout China, and before long even ignorant peasants were involved in it.

THE STUDENTS

Few westerners realize the magnitude of the power which belongs to the student class in China. As the Lieutenant of the San Pablo explained to his men:

Chinese respect for the students was a hangover from the old Imperial days, when scholars had been the most powerful and important people. It was a kind of superstitious worship of learning.²

There is truth in what the Lieutenant says. The ability to read and write was held in high regard. The Confucian system of class division ranked the scholar highest, followed by the farmer and then the artisan.

Historian Kenneth Scott Latourette observes:

Throughout most of their recorded history the Chinese, as we have repeatedly seen, have set great store by education. Indeed they have had an almost pathetic

¹ From the Nationalist Party Song, quoted by Sun Yat-sen, p. xv, The Triple Demism, translated by Paschal M. D'Elia, (Wuchang: The Franciscan Press, 1931.)

² Richard McKenna, The Sand Pebbles. (New York: Harper & Row, 1962) p. 342.

confidence in it. The scholar has ranked higher in China than in any other major land.³

John Foster speaks of the "tremendous influence of the student class."⁴

Y. T. Wu points out "... students of China may be said to be occupying a unique place in the life of China today. Nowhere in history have students had such potent influence in a nation." He concludes:

No class of people is better qualified to talk about the salvation of China than the class whose members have time and take time to study, to think, and to see visions Whether they realize it or not the students are now holding the destiny of China in their hands⁵

The fact that the traditional black-gowned type of scholar was fast-disappearing; his place taken by enthusiastic young men, bothered no one. Student or scholar -- the bearer of either title was entitled to honor and respect by the common man.

Traditionally, education involved a lifetime spent in contemplation of the Confucian classics. A young man's progress into the highest government ranks was determined by the examinations he could pass. But in 1905, a new educational system eliminated sections of the old classical examination. Students educated under the new program were increasingly weaned away from the traditional program. By 1919, students were more widely-traveled and better read than most of their predecessors of ten or twenty years before.⁶ Students who had been abroad took a far more

³ Kenneth Scott Latourette, The Development of China. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1946) p. 316.

⁴ John Foster, Chinese Realities. (London: Edinburgh Press, 1930) p. 61.

⁵ Y. T. Wu, "Modern Student Life," The Chinese Recorder, Vol. LIV (August, 1923) p. 476-477.

⁶ Many Chinese had gone abroad to study. In 1901 there were only five Chinese students in America. By 1922, there were 2,600! "The Chinese in America," The Literary Digest, Vol. 81 (March 12, 1927) p. 79.

active interest in political and social affairs -- both at home and abroad -- than the scholars of old ever had. As the Chinese student emerged, and became more aware of the world and events in it, he saw that in many things his country was lagging far behind more advanced countries. The traditional Chinese feeling of superiority -- the "middle kingdom" idea⁷ -- could not long survive in the mind of an educated Chinese, especially when he saw and read about the repeated humiliations his government was forced to suffer at the hands of others.

Many students were aware of the effects of past student movements on Chinese history. Student demonstrations in past centuries had received the general approval of the Chinese historians. Additional encouragement came from the tradition, long held in Chinese education, that the scholar was the salvation and hope of his nation. This tradition, too, was inherited by the students.⁸

Impetus for the protest came from the returned students, students who, while overseas, had seen the contrast between conditions in their homeland and conditions abroad. Organizations of Chinese students in America, Japan, France and other countries were formed. These groups were very active and as their members returned to China, they made efforts to organize fellow students. A. J. Brown, writing in Asia, says "It is estimated that at least ninety-five per cent of those who have received part of their education in other lands become, on their return, leaders of revolutionary thought."⁹

⁷ The Chinese term for "China" is Jung-gwo, or "middle country".

⁸ Not all students were eager reformers and patriots. Some lived in luxury and corruptness. Others continued in the traditional manner, concentrating solely on studies and taking little notice of current affairs.

⁹ A. J. Brown, "Multiple Revolution in China," Asia, Vol. 27 (July, 1927) p. 612.

The "Alliance of Students in Shanghai From All Provinces", was organized in 1906 by students returning from Japan. Members of this group planned to unite student groups from all schools in hope of getting into politics in the future. The group had four primary goals -- literacy, social welfare, better government and improved industry - but the program was too ambitious, and the group gradually disappeared. What is important is the fact that this was one of the first attempts on the part of Chinese students (in modern times) to unite the nation, and to reform social, cultural, political and industrial institutions.

A year earlier, also in Shanghai, a somewhat more practical student organization had been organized. Called the "World Association of Chinese Students" this organization actually was educator-led. It did little prior to 1911 but after the Revolution opened several schools which continued to be operated during the May Fourth period. One notable member of this group was Tsao Ju-lin.

As the number of returned Chinese students increased, the unrest grew.

Young Chinese graduates of Western universities have returned, felt the shock of their own nation's shortcoming, found themselves without suitable occupation, seen the foreigner doing thoroughly what they themselves in China's present state cannot do, resented the fact, beheld the meaning of extraterritoriality and known the searing agony of their inflamed national self-consciousness. Thus we have the most dangerous fact of a thoroughly discontented intelligentsia ready for any revolt.¹⁰

Chen Tu-hsiu returned from Japan; Tsai Yuan-pei from France; Hu Shih from the United States. They were quite young -- many of them in their early twenties. Chou En-lai, for example, was twenty-three. Many of their

¹⁰ W.T.A. Barber, "Forty Years On," The Chinese Recorder, Vol. LIV (April 1925) p. 219.

schoolmates and almost all the middle school students were teenagers. Some of the professors were in their twenties or thirties. John Dewey was amazed and commented that the young people had a maturity of interest far beyond that of most European students. Teenagers, he found listened to lectures on subjects that would create nothing but bored restlessness in American schools.¹¹ "To think" he wrote, "of kids in our country from fourteen on, taking the lead in starting a big cleanup reform politics movement"¹²

Emphasis has been laid on the fact that many students contributing to the unrest in 1919 were foreign-educated. However, several authorities point out that the actual May 4 uprising was led not so much by returned students as by Chinese-educated students. For example, Tang Leang-li in discussing student organization in May, 1919, writes, "What is significant here is that these students were Chinese trained and had never, most of them, left the country."¹³ These were the young intellectuals who were in the throes of the Renaissance movement, interacting with those who had been abroad.

At this critical hour in the nation's history a national leader, however, was wanting. The masses of the people looked toward Peking, but they found there only corruption and treason. They looked toward their own enlightened young men who had studied abroad, but they found them inadequately prepared to offer a practical plan to save the country.

Leadership, however, came. The students of China¹⁴ began to organize themselves for political purposes.

John Dewey agrees on the role played by Chinese students. "The movement

¹¹ John Dewey, "New Culture in China," Asia, Vol. 21 (July 1921) p. 586.

¹² John Dewey and Alice Chipman Dewey, edited by Evelyn Dewey, Letters From China and Japan. (New York: E. P. Dutton Co., 1921) p. 247.

¹³ Tang, Leang-li, China In Revolt. (London: Noel Douglas, 1927) p. 107.

¹⁴ Ibid.

of May 4 was directly undertaken by Chinese students, not only without the instigation of returned students, but against their advice."¹⁵ Dewey had made similar comments in an earlier article in the New Republic when he referred to the returned students as a "wet blanket" on the early student movement.¹⁶

The fact remains that when the protests began the returned students were in the forefront when it came to matters of leadership and participation, just as they were leaders in the Renaissance movement.

This, then, is the background of the students in China prior to the news of the Shantung Decision. Educated under a new system -- often abroad -- and filled with new ideas, concepts and enthusiasm -- or in despair over the weakness, disgrace and continued public humiliation of their country, these young men were ripe for any event which would unite all their energies under one common cause -- the establishment of a new China. Historian Chow Tse-tung agrees: "Their prime motive had been devoted patriotism."¹⁷

15 John Dewey, "New Culture In China," op. cit., p. 582.

16 John Dewey, "Student Revolt In China," New Republic, Vol. 20, (August 6, 1919) p. 17 ff. This "wet-blanket" started immediately after the incident to organize the new intellectuals of the nation in the support of their cause. The "wet-blanket" students also tried to win over the sympathy of the general public by means of publicity, mass meetings, and demonstrations. (See Chow Tse-tung, The May Fourth Movement. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960) p. 115-117. An interesting dissenter from the view of Dewey and Tang is James Dolsen who writes: "... it was the students, particularly those that had come into contact with democratic ideas in the United States and England, who led the struggle against the Manchus and later against the Japanese in retaliation for the infamous '21 demands,' presented by Japan to China during the world war. It was their demonstrations also which influenced the Chinese delegation at Versailles not to sign the peace treaty confirming Japan's claim to Shantung." James Dolsen, The Awakening of China. (Chicago: The Daily Worker Publishing Company, 1926) p. 113. Note publisher.

17 Chow, op. cit., p. 115.

In short, China, awakened as a nation, was determined to have her own will, and refused to have her birthright sold for a mess of pottage. She followed the lead of her traditional leaders, the Chinese intelligentsia, who are the trustees of the past and the interpreters of the new spirit which has come to China. She stood by the traditional guardians of her democratic institutions in their fight against bribery and corruption, injustice and oppression.¹⁸

THE DEMONSTRATION

Then, on May 3, 1919, in Peking, at a cooperative meeting of various student groups -- the New Tide Society among them -- a group of students sat down to plan a protest parade. The parade was in "honor" of National Humiliation Day, May 7, because of the signing of the Twenty-one Demands on that date, four years earlier; an event considered humiliating by the majority of educated Chinese. As the student representatives discussed plans for the parade, news arrived of the impending Shantung Decision of the delegates at the Paris Peace Conference. Students learned that the former German rights in Shantung Province were to be awarded to the Japanese. The students' reaction was immediate.

... when the news of the Paris Peace Conference reached us we were greatly shocked ... We had nothing to do with our Government, that we knew very well, and at the same time we could no longer depend upon the principle of any so-called great leader like Woodrow Wilson

... we all agreed that the Shantung Problem was caused by corruption and injustice, and that we as students must fight to show the world that might should never be right.¹⁹

If protesting the Shantung Decision was not the immediate reason for the

¹⁸ Tang, op. cit., p. 107.

¹⁹ T. C. Wang, The Youth Movement in China (New York: New Republic, Inc., 1928) p. 162-163, quoting a Peking student's report.

demonstration it soon became so -- all demands made during the protests, and most of the placards carried, referred in some way to the Decision.²⁰

With plans for one mass demonstration already made, plans for an expanded demonstration were simple. Such a demonstration was not entirely unknown. The year before (1918) President Hsu Shu Cheng had signed a secret military pact with Japan. When this became known, students requested the government not to honor it. Students in provinces throughout the country organized parades to the various governor's offices. Peking students went to the President's palace. But in 1918 the organization had not been strong and consequently the students had little influence.²¹ A number of Peking students felt at that time that such a movement had great possibilities. H. C. Hu recorded:

In order to accomplish their purpose it was necessary to make careful preparation. They secretly organized a small group, and, lest the detectives of the Government should suppress them, announced that they were going to get out a paper. The name of the paper was 'Citizenship'. Since the publishing of a paper was not their original purpose in organizing the paper itself was of little value.²²

This was the group behind the planned May 7 protest parade and China's first permanent united student organization. It served as a pattern for subsequent organizations throughout the country.

²⁰ In discussing the demonstration, the North China Star (hereafter cited as The Star) of May 6, 1919, credited the cause as "... China's diplomatic defeat in Paris over the Kiaochow question...."

²¹ "The significance of the student demonstrations and petitions of May 1918 did not lie in any immediate effect on the government. Of prime importance is the fact that they marked the beginning of the cooperation on a significant scale of the new intellectuals with other forces in the society, and in a sense were rehearsals for the May Fourth Incident." Chow, op. cit., p.4.

²² H. C. Hu, "The Patriotic Movement", The Chinese Recorder, Vol. LIV, (August, 1923) p. 457.

At the preparation meeting May 3, more than 1,000 students attended. With such a large group in attendance student leaders felt that the government would try to stop them. Therefore, they advanced the date of the protest parade to the following day, May 4. Later, John Dewey commented on this, although he gave a different reason for the change.

I find, by the way, that I didn't do the students justice when I compared their first demonstration here to a college boys' roughhouse; the whole thing was planned carefully, it seems, and was even pulled off earlier than would otherwise have been the case, because one of the political parties was going to demonstrate soon, and they were afraid their movement (coming at the same time) would make it look as if they were an agency of the political faction, and they wanted to act independently as students.²³

At the meeting representatives from each school chose delegates for two specific assignments: 1) to take part in the city-wide union and 2) to arouse their classmates. Because time was short, the students spent the night making flags, banners and other publicity materials. Various goals were discussed and the students finally agreed on four main aims: 1) to unify the people for joint action; 2) to protest to the delegates in Paris, asking them not to sign the treaty; 3) to ask the cooperation of student organizations throughout the country; and 4) to parade en masse the following day.

²³ John and Alice Chipman Dewey, op. cit., p. 246-247.

The parade was a success. Fifteen thousand students marched in protest,²⁴ carrying white flags (white, not black, is the traditional color of mourning in China) made of cloth or paper, or bearing slogans written in Chinese, English and French. Slogans included phrases such as "Return our Tsingtao," "Abolish the Twenty-one Demands," "Refuse to Sign the Peace Treaty," "Self-determination," "Down with the traitors,"²⁵ and the like. Students also distributed a piece of literature to bystanders.²⁶

The student demonstration parade wound toward the Legation Quarter and the home of Tsao Ju-lin. There some students wrecked Tsao's home. Chang Tsung-hsiang, who was visiting Tsao, was beaten and Tsao himself

24 Most authorities agree on this figure. T. C. Wang says 15,000 as does The Star of that time and The China Mission Year Book, 1919, edited by E. C. Lobenstine and A. L. Warnshius, (Shanghai: Kwang Hsueh Publishing House, 1920.) A student document translated from the Chinese uses the figure 10,000. Some authorities use a smaller figure but in checking this seems to apply to the group which actually got into the Legation Quarter. The Star, for example, (May 5, 1919) uses the figure 3,000 for those who wrecked Tsao's house. The Chinese Recorder says 5,000. Werner Levi says three to 5,000 and The China Mission Year Book, 1919, says 3,000. It seems that perhaps the initial May 4 demonstration started with several thousand, built to a peak as others joined it and lessened as students entered the Legation Quarter. There is no question that by May 19, when the student movement broke out all over the country there were many thousands of students involved.

25 The "traitors" were Tsao Ju-lin, Chang Tsung-hsiang and Lu Tsung-ju, all three were Chinese officials and all three were considered strongly pro-Japanese.

26 Chow Tse-tung quotes Lo Chia-lun, author of the piece as saying it was the only piece distributed. (See Chow, op. cit., p. 106 fn y.) The Star (May 5, 1919) says the students distributed mimeographed copies of the proceedings in Paris, "and stirring appeals to the people to defend the country's liberties."

was forced to flee.²⁷ Many of the students involved in the raid were arrested.

The following day students in Peking called a mass meeting and agreed upon the following demands: 1) President Hsu Shu-cheng was to free the arrested students, 2) the three "traitors", Tsao, Lu and Chang, were to be punished by the government, and 3) students would strike (that is, not go to classes) until their schoolmates were freed. The government was given until May 20 to satisfy these demands. Student organizations throughout the country followed the lead of the Peking group. Strikes were set as follows: Peking, May 19 and 20; Tientsin, May 23, Tsinan, May 24, Shanghai, May 26, Nanking, May 27, Paotingfu, May 28, Hankow, Wuchang and Kaifeng, May 31. There were also strikes in Foochow, Canton, Amoy, Hangchow and other cities.²⁸

27 From The Star, May 5 and 6, 1919. "Upon the arrival of the unwelcome guests [students] the Minister is said to have made a hasty exit by a side gate. Some reports have it that in climbing over a wall he fell and broke his leg. Others say he merely sprained it. At all events he escaped and is now living at Wagons Lits Hotel, where his arrival created considerable commotion as he was helped up the stairs in the hotel." The story continues as more details became known: "His own motor-car, as well as that of Chang Chung-hsiang, having been smashed in the melee, Tsao borrowed a car from Chief of Police Wu and, with all his family aboard and soldiers on with fixed bayonets standing on both dashboards, set out for the Legation Quarter at top speed [the figure of 40 mph is given in a later article] ... Tsao and his entire family were taken to the Legation Quarter Yamen [a type of court, in this case, traffic court] by the police on the charge of speeding and carrying arms within the quarter ... the committee in charge of the affairs at the Diplomatic Quarter passed on the charges preferred against Tsao's car and decided, in view of the exceptional circumstances governing the case, to dismiss the charges ..."

28 Compiled from T. C. Wang, op. cit., The Star, May 4, 1920 and the China Mission Year Book, 1919, op. cit. The government eventually met all the demands although not before the deadline.

During each student strike, students were arrested. Jails soon were full and the schools, which had been turned into temporary detention camps, were also crowded. Such arrests and persecutions²⁹ did not seem to bother the students. In fact, Hu Shih wrote, "... such persecutions gave us a great deal of free advertising ..."³⁰ On the whole, students took the protest seriously. Ma Chun³¹ said, "It was my intention to sacrifice my life and die for the cause. As I am still living, there is yet a chance to give up my life."³² He also states, with possibly some exaggeration, "... everyone was ready to sacrifice his life at any moment."³³ Arrests notwithstanding, the strikes continued to spread. Merchants, newspaper organizations and other groups sent telegrams of protest to Peking -- not to protest the strikes, but to protest against the actions of the government.³⁴

Student unions continued to organize throughout the country. One such group was the Peking Student Union.

29 At one time the government threatened to "bamboo" some of the arrested students. See The Star, May 6, 1919.

30 Hu Shih, The Chinese Renaissance. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1934) p.55.

31 A leading student demonstrator, later a strong communist.

32 "Ma Chun, Chinese Student Leader, Jailbird, and Patriot," The Literary Digest, Vol. 63 (December 20, 1919) p. 80.

33 Ibid.

34 Students thus secured the strong and effective support of the new merchant class, industrialists and urban workers. This support would soon be effectively utilized as the students began to organize boycott movements against the Japanese commerce. Even the lawyers joined in vowing "that none of [them] would hold a brief for Tsao Ju-lin in case he sued the students, but that they would all give their services to the undergraduates free of charge." See The Star, May 10, 1919.

The school was the unit. Each school organized a student society composed of the whole student body. Every school had its steering committee which was responsible for planning the campaign within the school; there was also an executive committee for carrying out the program as planned. Each school chose four delegates to form a city-wide union. The organization was excellent ...³⁵

THE MOVEMENT GROWS

From May 4 the movement grew. By the end of the month more than seventy Chinese schools and colleges in Shanghai and its surrounding area were forced to suspend studies because students failed to appear for classes. The movement spread to Nanking, Anking and other Yangtze ports.³⁶ At Tientsin, in mid-May, 7,000 students were present at a mass meeting.³⁷ Twelve-thousand Shanghai students struck on May 29.³⁸ In addition, Peking students issued a circular telegram to various schools throughout the country, to announce the steps they took, and to invite others to join them.³⁹ An All-China Students' Union was formed, with the ultimate objective of directing and regulating all student activities. Soon student unions were established in every city and every province in the country.⁴⁰ Headlines similar to "Students by Thousands Quit Schools ..." appeared with some regularity thereafter.⁴¹

35 H. C. Hu, op. cit., p. 457.

36 The Star, May 30, 1919.

37 Ibid., May 13, 1919.

38 Ibid., May 29, 1919.

39 Ibid.

40 Chow, op. cit., p. 164, quoting his translation of Li Chien-nung's Political History of China in the Last One Hundred Years.

41 The Star, May 30, 1919.

Striking students occupied themselves in propaganda work in order to rouse public opinion among the people.⁴² Many lecturers were sent out to make patriotic addresses among the village folk.⁴³ Police arrested many of the student lecturers but to little avail.

The North China Star (May 27, 1919) commented:

But on the part of the students, they do not care about these threats of the decadent officials and they are conducting their patriotic campaigns as usual. For instance, when the police tried to arrest the lecturers in the streets yesterday the students called them 'Japanese slaves' and then quietly accompanied the police to the police stations for 'they want to see for what offense they will be tried by the court.' At the same time, the students still refuse to resume their studies so that all colleges and schools remain closed.

As soon as one student was arrested street speakers were sent out over the city to publicize the intervention of the police.⁴⁴ Printed handbills, leaflets and newspapers in the vernacular language were widely distributed.⁴⁵ Lecturers addressed people on street corners not only in the city but also in neighboring villages, a method of communication with the common people which became a characteristic of later student publicity activity. Street-speaking became a unique and important tool.

⁴² In The Literary Digest's article on Ma Chun, *op. cit.*, p. 80, we read what one such speaker, Ma Chun, has to say. "He frequently tells his friends that good speeches win people and can accomplish things where force and arms are powerless. Besides, he adds, hearts conquered by force can not stand the test of time, whereas hearts won through argument will last forever."

⁴³ A rather typical patriotic speech is reproduced by Chai Hsuan Chuang in Tendencies Towards A Democratic System of Education in China. (Shanghai: Commercial Press, Ltd., 1922) p. 51-2.

⁴⁴ At the same time leaders took good care to keep up and stimulate hostile feelings toward the Japanese by means of strikes, boycotts and demonstrations, and each such conflict was used in propaganda talks among the masses.

⁴⁵ Chen Tu-hsiu and Hu Shih "enthusiastically distributed" handbills. See Chow, *op. cit.*, p. 171

It is not easily understood by Americans who do not know China and who have never been in a country where the mass of the people can neither read nor write. The students, when they are upon these lecturing expeditions, look upon themselves not as soapbox orators, but rather as a vigorous editorial page for the illiterate.⁴⁶

Student organization was excellent. Any ten students could form a group to propagandize. Each group was responsible to the student union of its own school. This school union, in turn, was answerable to a student union of the province, and the province, to the Student Union of China, the national group.⁴⁷ In turn, each "Group of Ten" (a name they soon acquired) was carefully organized. There was a chairman trained for all the jobs, an inspector, to take inventory of Japanese goods in shops in the district assigned to his group, a publicity man to write propaganda, a disciplinarian, to impose and collect fines for infraction of the group's rules, a treasurer and five orators.⁴⁸

Some may wonder how the students managed to finance this activity and their other protest movements, especially since most of the early student groups did not charge dues or membership fees -- a common practice

⁴⁶ C. F. Remer, "The Revolt of the Chinese Students." *Asia*, Vol. 19 (September, 1919) p. 933. This is the issue which calls Shantung "The Eastern Alsace-Lorraine". It contains a very fine summary of the first few days of the student protest movement.

⁴⁷ Chow, *op. cit.*, p. 164, quotes Li Chien-nun. "I may venture to say that the then long established Kuomintang was probably not as well organized and active as the newly born Student Union of All China. Later on, the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang relied mainly upon the student unions in provinces under the control of warlords as headquarters for propagating their doctrines and securing young members. This shows how significant the so-called 'May Fourth Movement' was in Chinese political history."

⁴⁸ *The Star*, May 19, 1919. Also described in Chow, *op. cit.*, p. 141.

later on. In the beginning it was generally assumed that the necessary funds would be raised by the members.⁴⁹ Some students came from wealthy families; others had to economize throughout their school days.⁵⁰ Voluntary contributions were accepted.⁵¹ The Japanese accused the American Legation of contributing to the support of the students' anti-Japanese activities but Minister Reinsch flatly denied the charge as did the students.⁵² On the other hand, Putnam Weale,⁵³ said:

"It was freely reported on every side that Soviet Russia had commenced spending money among students

49 An example from The Star, May 8, 1919. "To raise the necessary funds to send the telegrams the students made an appropriation from their mess fund, thereby making it necessary for them to go on short rations during the next month."

50 One such was Mao Tse-tung who described his money difficulties in an interview with Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China. (New York: The Grove Press, Inc., Black Cat Edition, 1961) p. 123 ff. Mao, incidentally, became more active in the New People's Study Society (many members of which later became prominent Communists) after the May 4 incident. Mao had helped to found this group. On July 14, 1919, he founded the Hsiang River Review, a publication which was well thought of by student leaders.

51 From The Star, May 6, 1919. "At a mass meeting in the room of Law Department of the Peking Government University, 2500 Teachers and Merchants subscribed six bucketsful of money, from copper cash to ten dollar bills, for the purpose of conducting a Nation wide campaign of National Patriotism."

52 Paul S. Reinsch, An American Diplomat in China. (New York: Garden City Press, 1922) p. 376. Said an editor of The Star, May 6, 1919, concerning the possibility of foreign support for the protests, as implied by the Japanese, "So far as I can learn this innuendo is absolutely without any justification whatever. The incident came as a surprise to the whole foreign community. It is true that there were foreigners looking on, but they had as little to do with the affair as the hundreds of Japanese who were also looking on; less in fact, for there was no pointed reference to them on the thousands of white flags bearing Chinese characters carried in the procession by the students, as there was to the Japanese."

53 Mr. Weale was a well-known reporter working in China at the time of these events. His real name was Bertram Lenox Simpson. Fellow reporter and author, Aage Krarup-Nielsen, refers to him as an "experienced China specialist." See Aage Krarup-Nielsen, The Dragon Awakes. (London: John Lane, The Bodley Head Ltd., 1928) p. 46.

as a counter-offensive to the Japanese railway advance in Manchuria."⁵⁴

There may have been a little American "sympathetic" money and a little Russian "propaganda" money invested in the student movements but for the main part, the students were financially independent.

Not only were the various Groups of Ten highly organized, but they were also well organized in the manner in which they worked.

The city was districted and each school covered a certain area. Every noon these groups went out arousing public opinion on national and international questions. Crowds of listeners obstructed the streets. The government took notice of the speech-making and sent police and detectives to listen. Because half of society was being stirred up by these inflammatory speeches, the government attempted by mandate to stop the movement. On June 3rd, the first day after the order went into effect, 100 students were arrested and imprisoned in the law department of the National University. The government thought that that would frighten the students. Little did they think that on the next day many times as many students would be out lecturing. On the second day, 500 of the young lecturers were arrested. On the third day there were still more student speakers. At noon all the lecturer groups joined in a parade, went to police headquarters and asked to be imprisoned with the other 600

Here we have the outstanding patriotic movement of Chinese history."

The students fought for China. They attracted attention with their parades and strikes, yet they did little for which they could be legally arrested. They conducted classes for the village folk, lectured on street corners, printed pamphlets and newspapers. When they were arrested by angry officials, so many had to be taken that facilities were soon over-

⁵⁴ Putnam Weale, Why China Sees Red. (New York: Dodd Mead and Company, 1925) p. 21.

⁵⁵ H. C. Hu, "The New Thought Movement," The Chinese Recorder, Vol. LIV (August, 1923) p. 458.

crowded. T. Z. Tyau agrees with Mr. Hu as to the students' willingness to be arrested and imprisoned, pointing out that once, after a siege of arrests several days hand-running, thirty thousand offered to be arrested.⁵⁶ But as Hu Shih remarked, "such persecutions gave us a great deal of free advertising, and the Peking University began to be looked upon by the youth of the whole nation as the center of a new enlightenment."⁵⁷ At one time the University of Peking was turned into a temporary prison, at which point, many of the faculty resigned. They were not the only ones to protest:

The imprisonment, on June 3rd of over a thousand students in the Law School of the National University by Government troops led to a general strike of all shops in Shanghai and elsewhere, which was only called off when the Government at last yielded and dismissed three of the most notorious pro-Japanese ministers.⁵⁸

Public pressure and loss of face by the government -- a very serious thing in China -- forced the government to release the students. But ...

when the students were freed, they refused to leave and thousands of street people sympathetic with the students' cause, stood outside prison walls shouting "Long Live the Republic!" "Long Live the Students!" They all clapped their hands, the prisoners within shouting in reply.⁵⁹

Thus the government was still further embarrassed. The next steps were obvious. The students received their apology, resignations of the three

⁵⁶ T. Z. Tyau, China Awakened. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1922) p. 143.

⁵⁷ Hu Shih, op. cit., p. 55, also quoted earlier in this paper.

⁵⁸ Tang Leang-li, op. cit., p. 107. Dr. Chow discusses the immensity of the strike in Shanghai. See Chow, op. cit., p. 153.

⁵⁹ T. C. Wang, op. cit., p. 179.

"traitors" were accepted, and delegates in Paris were instructed not to sign the treaty.⁶⁰ When all the demands had been met, the students triumphantly left their "prison." As they marched out they were heard to lament, "... the government changed the guards so often they had not been able to convert more than half their jailors."⁶¹

Student strikes became a popular method of controlling the government. Less than a year later, students were able to threaten a strike of three million students, representing 14 provinces, in the face of government action in regard to direct negotiations with Japan concerning the return of Shantung.⁶²

⁶⁰ Dolsen, *op. cit.*, p. 113, says "It was their [students] demonstrations also which influenced the Chinese delegation at Versailles not to sign the peace treaty confirming Japan's claim to Shantung." Dr. Chow, *op. cit.*, p. 166, agrees, calling China's refusal to sign a "successful conclusion of the mass protest which had begun with the May Fourth Demonstration." Tang Leang-li, *op. cit.*, p. 107, points out that the delegation was "snowed under" with thousands of telegrams urging them not to sign and Dr. Chow, *op. cit.*, p. 125, says "These telegrams are significant as evidence of the Chinese merchants' active interest in the matter, and particularly of readiness to protest strongly to the government by a class which had been traditionally apathetic to political affairs and mass movements in the long course of Chinese history.

⁶¹ John Dewey, "The Student Revolt in China," *op. cit.*, p. 6. Opposition to the students failed miserably. At one time conservatives in the government tried to persuade the Anfu-controlled parliament to impeach the Minister of Education and Tsai Yuan-pei, chancellor of Peking University. The resolution failed because officials feared the students and public opinion, which seemed to be on the side of the students. Student leaders were quite worried at the time because both men mentioned as possible replacements were members of the Anfu Club, and one, at least, favored the traditional literary style.

⁶² The Star, March 15, 1920. Several students were injured while participating in the 1920 protest; one of them was Chou Er-lai, who was one of four selected to negotiate, and failing to get in the compound, crawled under the door. See The Star, January 30, 1920.

THE BOYCOTT

Strikes and protest meetings were not the only movements the students organized. An intensive, student-sponsored boycott against Japanese goods became a major weapon against both the Peking government and Japan. Economic boycotts were a most successful weapon for the Chinese students. David Owen points out "... it is more than likely that the Chinese will surprise Westerners by their capacity for making devastating use of economic weapons such as the strike and boycott."⁶³

The students put their full strength behind a boycott of Japanese goods. They pledged to each other to boycott everything Japanese, including banknotes, and to refrain from creating or inciting disturbances for which they could be arrested. In Peking, after publicly burning all Japanese goods in their cooperative store, the students declared a boycott of Japan, to last until the Shantung rights were returned. In Shanghai the students enlisted the help of the commercial bodies and were joined by the same groups in Canton and Ningpo. The movement began to spread throughout the lower Yangtze region.

... a wave of anti-Japanese feeling ran over the country. It showed itself in part in a student uprising which demanded the dismissal of some Peking officials who were accused of having sold out to Japan, and in widespread and very effective boycott of Japanese goods which began in the spring of 1919 and continued unabated for some months.⁶⁴

Two previous boycotts, one against America and one against Japan had caused losses, especially to Japanese traders, but neither was consid-

⁶³ David Owen, Imperialism And Nationalism In The Far East. (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1929) p. 116.

⁶⁴ Latourette, op. cit., p. 237.

ered successful.⁶⁵ This time, the students vowed, it would be different. They would "... boycott Japanese goods until the government will restore Kiaochow unconditionally ..."⁶⁶ This meant there had to be an effective organization. It would not be enough to have only the students boycott, the movement must reach the people; cooperation would be needed from the merchants and businessmen. In order to get maximum support the students

"... so acted as to put the issue in an anti-Japanese versus pro-Japanese contest, thus insuring that an absolute majority of the Chinese people would of course take the former side."⁶⁷

The students' success in getting public sympathy, under the banner of patriotism, brought them merchant, industrial and worker support.

PROPAGANDA

There is no doubt that there was extensive use of publicity and propaganda in the student protest movements. As a matter of fact, propaganda played an important role in Chinese history during these years, first, because the students made wide use of their popular lectures and

⁶⁵ Dolsen, op. cit., p. 113. Dolsen puts the loss at 40 per cent in Japanese imports into China during that period. The Chinese had long believed in government by the consent of the governed, and in the right of revolution. Since majority rule, balloting and legislative assemblies were unknown, the Chinese resorted to (and were often successful in) making use of boycott and outright rebellion -- their only means of expressing lack of consent.

⁶⁶ T. Z. Tyau, op. cit., p. 124. Dr. Chow, op. cit., p. 24 points out that this was the fiftieth boycott movement against foreign goods in Chinese history, but the first to reveal the power of the boycott when employed by many people. He calls Japan's loss "un-precedented" during the strongest period of the boycott.

⁶⁷ Chow, op. cit., p. 120.

second, because as the cultural movement grew, the influence of the vernacular press rose rapidly.

The Chinese and propaganda suit each other.

Skill in psychological warfare and emphasis on the art of propaganda are other Chinese traits. The Chinese were some of the earliest users of psychological tools in war. They were often dexterous in exploiting the moral and psychological weaknesses of the enemy.⁶⁸

Nor was the Peking government a stranger to propaganda. In the negotiations concerning the Twenty-one Demands, the government had adopted an unprecedented policy of using both the foreign and Chinese press for moral support.⁶⁹ Wellington V. K. Koo at one time was acknowledged to be in charge of the "policy of publicity".⁷⁰ Yuan Shih-kai, who had at times shut down newspapers of which he did not approve, occasionally found it expedient to secure the support of public opinion.⁷¹

The propaganda used by the students was crude, prepared for illiterate masses. It consisted of wall posters, pictures and placards, simple newspapers for those who could read a little and, of course, perpetual speech-making.⁷² In talking about a student parade of a later date, Richard McKenna describes such crude propaganda methods:

68 F. F. Liu, A Military History of Modern China. (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1956) p. 283.

69 Chow, op. cit., p. 21, quoting from Wang Yun-sheng.

70 Ibid., quoting the minutes of the Sino Japanese Negotiations of February 22, 1915.

71 Ibid.

72 According to The Literary Digest, "Chinese Put On A Boycott With All The Customary Frills," Vol. 62 (August 30, 1919) p. 109, (cited hereafter as the "Boycott" article), millions of boycott literature and posters were issued and posted by thousands of students and student sympathizers. The Digest quoted Millard's China National Review.

The student parade that day lasted all day and it was frenzied. They stayed on the bund opposite the gunboats screaming and shaking insulting signs. One was a crude cartoon of a sailor with a baby stuck on his bayonet.⁷³

People were kept supplied with information through the constant demonstrations and parades (nearly always political in nature), and through the consistent efforts of the lecturing students. Cheap books and papers were produced, usually in the vernacular. Political posters appeared daily on the streets, showing the eternal struggle of the masses with militarism and imperialism. If properly worded and properly illustrated these posters had the advantage of catching the imagination of the people more quickly than any other type of publication. Even remote villages received posters. The students did more than publicize only in their own country; they went so far as to organize groups to watch and report on the Chinese delegation in Paris.

But what was the effect? "Publicity is the main cause for the rapid growth of the Movement," said H. C. Hu in The Chinese Recorder.⁷⁴ Students managed to get propaganda into the armies with the result that warlords became none too sure of their men.⁷⁵ McKenna describes its overall effect: "We are up against lying as a matter of planned strategy and it forces a new counter-strategy on us. Because you cannot stick a bayonet into a lie."⁷⁶ As for its effect on the student the new intellectual or the emerging common man -- Edgar Snow quotes Mao Tse-tung:

73 McKenna, op. cit., p. 352-353.

74 H. C. Hu, "The New Thought Movement," op. cit., p. 45.

75 Chow, op. cit., p. 162.

76 McKenna, op. cit., p. 343.

In this period also I began to have a certain amount of political consciousness, especially after I read a pamphlet telling of the dismemberment of China. I remember even now that this pamphlet opened with the sentence: 'Alas, China will be subjugated!' It told of Japan's occupation of Korea and Formosa, of the loss of suzerainty in Indo-China, Burma and elsewhere. After I read this I felt depressed about the future of my country and began to realize that it was the duty of all people to help save it.⁷⁷

Propaganda became extremely important to the students and they used it extensively. On one occasion they were able to persuade beggars, thieves, prostitutes, and singsong girls to go on strike.⁷⁸ Personal servants refused to work and the American consul-general in Shanghai, getting ready to go to his office one morning, was told by his Chinese chauffeur that he was very sorry he could not take him that day because there was a strike on.⁷⁹ Ricksha coolies refused to take passengers.⁸⁰ Of course, propaganda was not the only reason these people struck; many felt sympathetic toward the students and their cause and thus were willing to help support the general strike. This strike spread to nearly every large city in Central and Northern China.⁸¹ Probably

⁷⁷ Snow, op. cit., p. 131.

⁷⁸ Chow, op. cit., p. 158. Others agree. See John Stewart Burgess, "Opinion In China," Survey, Vol. 43 (April 23, 1921) p. 108-110.

⁷⁹ Burgess, op. cit.

⁸⁰ The Star, May 19, 1919. When you consider the standard of living of the coolies, this seems almost unbelievable. A few other boycott and strike methods are described in The Literary Digest's "Boycott" article, op. cit. Prisoners refused to eat their fish course because it was Japanese fish. The strike of chauffeurs forced many prominent foreign citizens to patronize the trams or streetcars and standing room was at a premium. The strike at native laundries resulted in many a disheveled suit of summer white. The article goes on to say that the strike was unusual in the unanimity with which all Chinese merchants joined in.

⁸¹ Burgess, op. cit.

the main significance lies in the fact that

It was the first political and patriotic strike in Chinese history, one in which the aim of the workers was not to increase their wages or better their treatment. They were making a protest against the Chinese and Japanese governments.⁸²

Many people wonder how it was possible for young men in school and college to suddenly acquire so much power over the government as well as over ordinary workmen and even illiterates. The answer lies in the Chinese. As Putnam Weale pointed out:

The presentation of the same idea to large numbers of people at all hours of the day and night all over the country creates the feeling that an irresistible impulse is sweeping over the nation which it will be ill to oppose.

When the students were released, this strike ended, but the Japanese boycott movement gathered strength -- to continue until the Shantung rights were restored to China, supporters declared.

The Japanese considered China an important trade center. Figures in the China Year Book, 1919, show that the Japanese led foreigners in China with 144,492 persons. Russia was second with 51,310. There were 2,818 Japanese firms in China and it was estimated that 75 per cent of Japan's exports went to China.⁸⁴ The North China Star, May 22, 1919, reported that Japan's 1918 trade with China ran to 402 million taels,⁸⁵ a figure three times as high as America's and five times as great as that of Great Britain. The paper went on:

82 Chow, op. cit., p. 157.

83 Weale, op. cit., p. 111.

84 The Literary Digest, Vol. 62 (July 19, 1919) p. 19.

85 A tael at this time was roughly equivalent to one ounce of silver.

It is to be noted [as] a feature of the Japan-China trade that China's imports into Japan are increasing at a strikingly rapid rate Thus Japan is becoming China's great market while China is a great market for Japan's manufactures.

If the boycott movement could be organized to any extent at all, it obviously would harm Japanese business. Thus, in order to tighten the boycott, the guilds and merchants' unions issued manifestos showing how to boycott Japanese goods. Each guild took steps to prevent its members from doing business in Japanese product. No Japanese banknotes were to be accepted, even at a discount. All advertisements were to be withdrawn from the Shun Tien Shin Pao (the Japanese financed paper). All present stocks of Japanese goods were to be stamped, so that the sale of unstamped and therefore newly stocked goods could be detected. A society was to be formed to promote native industries.⁸⁶ To tie the merchants down more effectively and to enforce the boycott, each street group formed a union. When these unions united a central organization was formed known as "The Federation of Street Unions." This procedure was followed all over the country.⁸⁷

The students took an active part, particularly in promotion and education. Throughout China students burned Japanese goods, or hung samples on street gates, to show people what they should not buy.⁸⁸ The students also advocated the manufacture and use of home products, and sent delegations to stores to urge merchants not to buy or sell Japanese goods.⁸⁹

⁸⁶ The Star, May 23, 1919.

⁸⁷ China Mission Year Book, 1919, op. cit., p. 49.

⁸⁸ Foster, op. cit., p. 52.

⁸⁹ H. C. Hu, "The Patriotic Movement," op. cit., p. 458.

They recommended this list to all shops. Their work included studies of markets, prices, and possibilities for many economic reforms. Several million pamphlets and leaflets were printed and distributed.⁹⁰

Peking students printed a list of Chinese manufactured goods which could easily be substituted for Japanese. Both retailers and consumers were advised to buy directly from the manufacturers whose names were set forth in the leaflet, and to either shelve or refrain from purchasing Japanese goods of any kind.⁹¹ Home industry was encouraged and funds were set up to help start manufacture of needed goods.⁹²

Newspapers also cooperated in the boycott. The Hsing Shen Pao announced in "glaring letters" above the editorial column that it would no longer print any Japanese advertisements or reports of Japanese mails and markets.⁹³ On May 18, 1919, the North China Star announced:

The embargo on things Japanese is now complete as no Japanese goods will be given any publicity through the Chinese press.

The papers which announced the embargo were [there follows a list] Only the Yah Chow Ji Pao is left out of the fold, but as this paper is financed by Japanese, its reluctance in taking the stand of the boycotters was fully expected. The paper, however, has a very limited circulation among the Chinese.

90 Chow, op. cit., p. 148.

91 The Star, May 26, 1919.

92 John Dewey in, "The Student Revolt in China," op. cit., p. 16-17. writes: "In some of the schools the industrial department set to work to discover what Japanese goods could be made in existing shops without additional capital. As soon as models were constructed they were taken to small shops and their mode of manufacture explained. Then, to create a market, other students took these goods and hawked them through the streets, lecturing, exhorting, explaining the political situation at the same time." No doubt this policy of the students helped create some of the good will and support which the merchants gave to the boycott movement.

93 The Star, May 18, 1919. An editor of The Star commented: "The decision of the paper, it is understood, is a great sacrifice, because up to the present Japanese have been big space buyers of the publication."

Other Japanese-sponsored papers suffered.

The Tsinan Daily, published in Chinese by Japanese, which two weeks ago had by far the largest circulation of any newspaper in the province, has reduced its issue from 3,000 copies daily to 700. Hundreds of subscribers who had paid in advance, refuse to receive the paper any more, while advertisements⁹⁴ of Chinese business are almost entirely withdrawn.

Many Chinese advertisers adopted the simple expedient of inserting the following line in their advertisements: "We sell no Japanese goods."⁹⁵

The boycott movement went to great lengths. For example, bank-notes of one Japanese bank, a semi-official institution and a Chinese creditor, had been very popular. During the boycott period they were rarely seen.⁹⁶ The North China Star reported that many foreigners and Chinese who tried to use some of the notes in local shops failed. Then, too, there were some unusual boycotts:

Sunday was a sad day for the straw hat. This seasonable article of headwear sprang into marked disfavor with the demonstrators early in the day, by reason of the fact, they declared, that most of them are manufactured in Japan ... they were declared contraband and wholesale⁹⁷ package of shining new headgear was the result

A compradore of one Japanese shipping company in Shanghai reported that his entire clientele of Chinese had forsaken his company.⁹⁸ Coolies refused to pull Japanese.⁹⁹ At Ningpo, a Japanese steamer was forced to return to Nagasaki with a shipload of coal, because the local coolies

⁹⁴ The Star, May 28, 1919.

⁹⁵ The Literary Digest, (July 19, 1919) op. cit., p. 19.

⁹⁶ Tyau, op. cit., p. 133.

⁹⁷ The Star, May 22, 1919.

⁹⁸ Ibid., May 19, 1919.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

would not unload the fuel, in spite of the fact that they were tempted with handsome wages.¹⁰⁰

How effective was the boycott? "... within a year the Japanese commerce was reduced to half. If it had continued, Japan would have been forced to commit economic suicide."¹⁰¹ "... widespread and very effective boycott ..." writes Latourette,¹⁰² "... surprisingly effective ..." ¹⁰³ "During the period of the boycott [1919] Japan's trade with China showed a decrease of 70.75 per cent."¹⁰⁴ And in Current History Magazine of the New York Times: "Few persons have any conception of the thoroughness of the Chinese boycott. So efficiently is it maintained, there is no question that Japanese interests are losing vastly."¹⁰⁵

PUBLIC OPINION

The students kept up interest and enthusiasm in the boycott and strike movements by public speaking throughout the country. Their organized lecture groups continued to reach the Chinese public. Many people, for the first time in their lives, became informed on national

100 Ibid.

101 No Yong Park, Making A New China. (Boston: The Stratford Company, 1929) p. 167.

102 Latourette, op. cit., p. 237.

103 Gilbert Reid, China, Captive or Free. (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1921) p. 215.

104 P. W. Kuo, "Chinese Statement of the Chinese Case," Vol. 25, Asia (December, 1925) p. 1038.

105 "China and Japan," Current History Magazine of the New York Times, Vol. X (December, 1919) p. 529, quoting Minister Reinsch.

affairs.¹⁰⁶ Students took advantage of every opportunity. The North China Star (May 28, 1919) reported:

There was a pilgrimage gathering yesterday at the temple at Tsu Ch'eng ... and one at Feng Wu At both of these places several thousand people gathered to offer their worship to the Buddhas. The students took these opportunities to spread their propaganda among the country folk. Ten men were sent to each place and it is stated two very successful days were passed, as all those present gathered around the students and were apparently deeply moved by their speeches.

This increase in "public opinion" should be defined. As P. W. Kuo pointed out in Asia magazine, "It must be made plain that public opinion in China, throughout the past, has been altogether the opinion of the educated class."

Too often the illiterate peasant of the back country, or the coolie in the Yangtze valley had little idea of current events in his country, and as illustrated by the poem quoted by Dr. Sun, cared less. But now the situation was changing and Japan was one of the first to make note of the change:

Japan herself realized that the China with which she was dealing was different from the old. While in the War of 1894 she virtually fought the single province of Chili, she would now have to deal with the whole of the Chinese people.¹⁰⁷

106 It was common to ignore the people. To a Chinese, the family was the center of his concern, outside of that he had few interests. Sun Yat Sen quotes an ancient Chinese rhyme to illustrate the philosophy of the Chinese:

When the sun rises, I labor,
 When the sun sets, I rest.
 I drink from the well I have dug;
 I eat from the fields I have tilled,
 What matters imperial power to me?

The same rhyme, in a slightly different version, is quoted by Lancelot Forster, The New Culture in China. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1936) p. 128.

107 Tang Leang-li, op. cit., p. 102-103.

One reason for China's backwardness in matters of public opinion was her traditional attitude. Kept free from foreign influence there was little opportunity for her to exchange ideas and impressions. There was not even a traditional center for national loyalty. The ruling houses disappeared and no one dynasty was able to keep control of the country, usually being overthrown in a civil insurrection of one kind or another.

The Chinese were a proud people but there was little if any of the kind of patriotism usually found in other countries; a patriotism which is often strong enough to lead men to die for their country. Traditional Chinese loyalties applied to family, village, local prince or warlord -- not to the nation.

Notwithstanding such favoring circumstances as homogeneity of race and written language, genuine unity was prevented by the almost insuperable obstacles of size, lack of rapid communication, and a multiplicity of spoken dialects. In administration the province was the most important unit, and provincial affairs were often conducted with considerable independence of the capital. Localism was further encouraged by the strength of family and village government, for much more effective than either emperor or bureaucracy was the democratic autonomy of the village and the patriarchal family.¹⁰⁸

In spite of the centralized bureaucracy found in China, it was entirely possible for one province to be at war while a nearby province remained indifferent. Occasionally a section of the country could be found aiding the enemy. A. J. Brown called the Chinese a "people who have hitherto been a heterogeneous mass of individuals with hardly more unity than particles of sand, a people who have been proverbially conservative and slow-moving"¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁸ Owen, op. cit., p. 10-11.

¹⁰⁹ A. J. Brown, op. cit., p. 594.

Then slowly, a national consciousness began to develop. In 1905 a number of Chinese boycotted American goods to show their disapproval of the treatment shown their fellow Chinese in America. The new curriculum in education helped create a broader outlook. More and more Chinese educated abroad came home and brought with them ideas of national pride and unity. As these foreign-educated Chinese came home, and as other Chinese began to show an interest in their country's affairs, national spirit began to develop and grow. The revolution, too, contributed to the rise in national consciousness.¹¹⁰ The new national sentiment was demonstrated as early as 1915 when the Japanese, upon presentation of their notorious Twenty-one Demands to the Chinese government, found themselves the object of a vigorous boycott action.

Reasons for this growth in public opinion are many and varied. Modern progress in China, although in many respects slow, nevertheless provided the basis for a genuine national consciousness. Part of this modern progress was the popular education movement which helped create a more literate public. Another part was the new intelligentsia which spoke up and often led popular reaction movements. Japanese imperialism, related in great detail to the masses by student orators, created great public indignation. Japanese arrogance led Chinese student leaders to conclude that China's one hope lay in the adoption, by the Chinese people, of a vigorous, aggressive policy of nationalism. This was the thinking behind the student's street lectures, parades, propaganda, strike and boycott movements. In addition, the iron discipline of the

¹¹⁰ See John Dewey, "The Chinese National Sentiment," Asia, Vol. 19 (December, 1919) pp. 1237-42.

young Nationalist army, its dedicated efforts in propaganda and public relations (Whampoa Military Academy became noted for its classes in propaganda)¹¹¹ and the selfless spirit exhibited by the revolutionary fighters, proved inspiring to the people who came into contact with them. Even the warlord government in Peking contributed to the rise of public consciousness for when the government arrested the students public sentiment ran so high it seemed that the whole nation was on the side of the university students and against the notoriously pro-Japanese government.

It was inevitable that all parts of the country should be affected. First the students themselves began to watch carefully the actions of the government so that in political, foreign and education affairs the government could not play fast and loose. They created a public consciousness. From May 4th on the government knew it could not cheat the people.¹¹² It took notice of the students and of public opinion.

There was remarkable growth in national feeling. The Chinese, as Latourette pointed out, had racial coherence but lacked national consciousness.¹¹³ Slowly the Chinese people began to learn of the disgrace of their country's seemingly hopeless and helpless condition. But not until early in World War I did the Chinese public, in general, feel national humiliation. When they did it was a result of the publicity given to the policies and actions of the Japanese government toward China. At the same time the new intellectuals recognized the necessity to unite

111 Chou En-lai was at one time deputy to General Teng Yen-ta, whose special responsibilities at the academy included "political studies." See F. F. Liu, op. cit., p. 12.

112 H. C. Hu, "The Patriotic Movement," op. cit., p. 459.

113 Latourette, op. cit., p. 204.

and lead their countrymen to thorough modernization.¹¹⁴ Encouragement was also given them by the success of the Russian Revolution and European socialist revolts, but particularly by the Russian Revolution because in their thinking the Russians were considered an Oriental people. Since most of the Chinese people were still under the control of ultraconservative officials and were, as they had been for centuries, obedient to authority, to armed force and to the traditional ethical and political dogmas, the students became convinced that this backwardness had to be corrected and that vast and fundamental reforms were necessary to rejuvenate the old nation.

The unforeseen and surprising thing was that millions of Chinese -- considered one big, solid lump without any individual interest in what happened in and to their country -- suddenly began to let themselves be carried away, individually and collectively, by the fire of revolt. The unrest became so deep and so widespread that all parts of the land and all classes of Chinese were directly affected. A writer in Missionary Review of the World wondered aloud at the phenomenon:

Formerly one wondered at the way in which serious disturbances in one part of the land were regarded by the Chinese in other sections as none of their business. At the time of the Boxer Movement, the presence of foreign troops and their military operations in the north were of little interest to the people further south.¹¹⁵

114 Historian Werner Levi agrees, saying: "The student movement created a remarkably strong and united expression of public opinion." See Werner Levi, Modern China's Foreign Policy. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1953) p. 156.

115 "Unrest and Propaganda in China," The Missionary Review of the World, Vol. XLVII (September, 1924) p. 670.

It seemed obvious that the Chinese people were behind the new patriotic movement in China.

The results of the new national consciousness were remarkable. The most noticeable result was the realization of the power of the people to organize nationally and the subsequent bringing into being of all kinds of social and political organizations of a voluntary nature. One of the earliest successes after the initial victory in the May 4th demands was the inability of the Chinese government to hold open negotiations with Japan in 1920 to discuss the Shantung situation. Public opinion would not permit Peking to negotiate because the people felt such a move would be tantamount to a recognition of the Paris settlement.¹¹⁶

Chinese people, both at home and abroad, began to form organizations to discuss diplomatic problems. These groups were active in encouraging the Chinese delegation in Paris not to sign the treaty. Even in little out-of-the-way corners of the earth, Chinese nationalism made its way. Chinese abroad collected money to support the Nationalist movement at home.¹¹⁷ Military successes of the Kuomintang rested in part on a growing realization on the part of anti-Nationalists (primarily warlords and the Peking government) that it was not good to be permanently against the wishes of the people.

With the increasing literacy and elementary-level education among

¹¹⁶ Latourette, *op. cit.*, p. 237-8.

¹¹⁷ From The Star, May 17, 1919, "The movement is also being carried to the South Sea Island and Straits Settlements. The overseas Chinese at Shanghai yesterday telegraphed to their friends in the South not to buy Japanese goods. Funds were raised in Shanghai to further the propaganda work among all the organizations in the islands."

the masses, simple vernacular newspapers had the power to create new movements and problems every time they reported a new political crisis.

SUMMARY

Oddly enough, very little news of the uprising in China reached the outside world. What eventually turned out to be a major event in Chinese history received only a few paragraphs in the world press at the time.¹¹⁸ Had it not been for Dewey, Millard, Weale and a few other veteran observers -- principally missionaries -- who reported the events in interpretive magazine articles, even less would have been known.

Few people realized that the student demonstration of May 4, 1919, marked the beginning of a new era for China, or the "turning point of the Chinese Revolution."¹¹⁹ In effect, the demonstration turned out to be a declaration of war by the students and intellectual class against the warlord government.

In the weeks following the demonstration students organized themselves into well-disciplined groups, sponsored repeated demonstrations on political issues and initiated widespread student strikes in addition to the boycotts against the Japanese.

¹¹⁸ For that matter, this is what The Star had to say several days after the event -- and it was right on top of the news, being published both in Peking and Tientsin. "The general feeling here is that the incident is not serious. It was a student ebullition, indicative, it is true, of the general feeling, but quite spontaneous, unorganized and not likely to be repeated or imitated. Had there been any evidence that there was adult organization behind it, it would probably have been regarded more seriously." Dewey, too, at first thought it was merely a boyish prank but changed his mind. See John and Alice Chipman Dewey, op. cit., p. 246-247, also cited earlier in this chapter.

¹¹⁹ Anne Fremantle, Mao Tse-tung: An Anthology of His Writings. (New York: Mentor Books, The New American Library, 1962) p. xxiv.

The merchants in Shanghai and other cities closed their shops as a protest against the peace negotiations and against the government. The Chinese Delegation at the Paris Conference was warned by public bodies not to sign the treaty; and they obeyed. The government was forced by this strong demonstration of national sentiment to release the students and to dismiss from office three well-known pro-Japanese ministers.¹²⁰

The power of the students fascinated writers of the time. Putnam Weale repeatedly commented on the immensity of this power. W. T. Barber was confounded by the change.

Undoubtedly the most profound change has been in the attitude of youth to age and authority. 'Under Heaven there is nothing greater than the Teacher' used to be the phrase and the rule of boyhood, while filial piety was the basis of Confucian morality. Something of this is still to be found in the village life of uneducated China The far too sudden change from the educational and ethical modes of old China has been made by self-confident and partially educated youth.¹²¹

Y. T. Wu commented:

From the description of the student movements and activities given above, it will be seen that the students of China may be said to be occupying a unique place in the life of China to-day. No-where in history have students had such potent influence in a nation.¹²²

The students' actions were endorsed and supported by merchants and educators. Even though each group had its own interests to protect, all temporarily united to protest the actions of the pro-Japanese Chinese government. What had begun as a protest against Japanese aggression quickly became a full-scale, nationwide, organized protest movement.

120 Hu Shih, op. cit., p. 55.
121 W. T. A. Barber, op. cit., p. 218-219.
122 Y. T. Wu, op. cit., p. 477, my emphasis.

It will be remembered that the student movement came so suddenly and without any apparent premeditation that it took everybody by surprise; and the wonder of it was that its influence spread so rapidly among all classes and ranks of China, that within a week of its inception in Peking it had almost the whole of China in its grip.¹²³

The immensity of the student movement was completely unexpected. The fact that the students had won the interest, enthusiasm and support of large segments of the population helped them to gain the support of the groups which came to their aid. The students' influence on public sentiment was tremendous.

The Student Patriotic Movement ... was the first successful effort to unite our people, to direct the policy of the Government against foreign aggression. The importance of education and the creation of a strong public opinion were emphasized. The most noticeable result was of course the realization of the latent power of the people to organize nationally and the subsequent bringing into being all kinds of social and political organizations of a voluntary nature.¹²⁴

Thus, in the days and months which followed, the alliance between intellectuals, economic class groups and the people continued. Observers wondered where the movement would lead and opinion was divided. Many Britishers felt the movement would lead to Bolshevism and future terrorism. Americans seemed to feel the movement would be of great benefit to the Chinese nation.

Whatever else may be said about it, the student movement did accomplish two very important things -- it awakened a national spirit

123 T. H. Lee, "The Popular Education Movement in China," The Chinese Recorder, Vol. LI (January, 1920) p. 44.

124 T. L. Shen, "A Study of the Anti-Christian Movement," The Chinese Recorder, Vol. LVI (April, 1925) p. 228.

and promoted movements among the Chinese people for improvement in cultural, political, social and industrial affairs. No one could have foretold that the protest resulting from indignation over further humiliation to the Chinese government would have had such widespread effects. The success the students realized from the initial demonstration encouraged them to support a vast reorganization and modernization program which they hoped would help China avoid or end, once and for all, the indignities and humiliations she had borne at the hands of others.

From strikes and boycotts the students went into language reform, popular education, politics and government. A new spirit of experimentation caught their fancy and the pragmatism of the American philosophers became their ideal. The authority of Confucius was rejected for the knowledge of the West. This new, large-scale renovation and rejuvenation movement became known as the Renaissance and the political interest led to repeated governmental crises as the students flocked in large numbers to join -- or form -- politically revolutionary organizations.

CHAPTER FOUR

REFORM AND REVOLUTION

Lt. Collins steepled his fingers. 'I don't know what's coming,' he said .¹ Bordelles said, 'Bolshevism is what's coming.'¹

INTRODUCTION

Less than one year after the May demonstration, students were hard at work enlisting laboring classes to their cause. Three days before the first anniversary of the demonstration (that is, on May Day, 1920) Peking students distributed pamphlets addressed to this class. Since the students had planned a May 4 anniversary celebration the literature distributed caused some confusion as it referred neither to the Shantung issue nor to the May 4 anniversary. It was, instead, a call to arms to the workers:

'Our dearest labor colleagues. Today being the 1st of May it is the day of celebration of the union of labor Workmen the world over observe this day as a holiday. Our Chinese brethren, however, are not yet aware of the significance of the day, and we feel bound to inform them that we should all work and that we should all get bread.

'Those who eat without labor, such as: officials, politicians, capitalists, missionaries, priests, monks, robbers, beggars, people of immoral character, etc., should be deprived of existence in our society in order to avoid the harm they do to us. We should, therefore, unite and take back the lands, farms, factories, machine plants and materials in general and place them at our disposal.'²

¹ Richard McKenna, The Sand Pebbles. (New York: Harper and Row, 1962) p. 345.

² The North China Star, May 3, 1920. Hereafter cited as The Star. May 1 is better known as a Russian celebration day.

The Peking government was worried, with good reason. Organization of labor was not wanted because the government's experience with such organization in the past indicated that it was usually far too effective. In addition, labor organization had often proven to be a leading factor in nationalism. Some of the earliest labor organizations had been those of the guilds involved in the student-led boycotts and general strikes.

In the early stages of these movements, however, students had had no clear-cut convictions on labor, even though some of them read and studied Marx. As Hu Shih pointed out, "Radical social revolutions are made possible by the removal of the forces which were once the bulwark of the institutions and usages of the old society."³ The students, perhaps, had done too thorough a job in discrediting the old. The question now was, what would fill that void? Students and literati were fascinated with the ideas of the Russian writers whose works had been extensively translated during the height of the Cultural Revolution.

... communism ... appeared to be able to absorb a higher degree of anti-traditionalism than simple nationalism was able to do, and yet justify a Chinese, emotionally, or historically, in⁴breaking intellectually with his Chinese past.

Students and the intelligentsia were also impressed with the Russian Revolution. Before their eyes an Eastern power had thrown off the yoke of the West and had adopted a glorious new way of living -- or so it seemed to the Chinese. "Instead of being the laggard, following in Western footsteps, a Communist China, with Russia, could seem at the head of the queue."⁵

³ Hu Shih, The Chinese Renaissance. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1934) p. 100.

⁴ Joseph R. Levenson, Confucian China and Its Modern Fate. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1948) p. 126. The communists tried to find a synthesis to offer.

⁵ Ibid., p. 134.

Disappointed in the powers of the West, the students turned to the example of Soviet Russia for inspiration.

Of all the influence that Russia has in the minds of the Chinese people, the Russia Revolution stands out as the most potent. Not only has the Russian Revolution demonstrated their ability to destroy the most despotic of all monarchies, but it illustrated their achievement in raising the status of the nation from the abyss of half-slavedom to that of political liberation.⁶

The great majority of the Chinese people were disinterested onlookers but the scholars and students were enthusiastic partisans. They kept a close watch to see whether or not the Russian experiment would successfully do away with capitalism. Their enthusiasm for the Russian Revolution was real and genuine while the interest of others, including Europeans, was often merely simple curiosity. The Chinese intelligentsia looked toward Russia for inspiration and leadership. (Several years after the Russian revolution, as Tsai Yuan-pei welcomed Adolf Joffe to China, he said, "Please accept the hearty welcome of the pupils to the teacher."⁷)

The new Russian regime strengthened this "pupil-teacher" relationship by making extensive changes in its relationships to China. Contact between the Chinese and the Russians had always been close⁸ and within a year of the Russian Revolution the two countries began establishing friendlier relations. In 1918, Georgi Vasilyevich Chicherin, Russian Foreign Counselor, publicly renounced all the "rights and privileges"

6 T. C. Woo, The Kuomintang and the Future of the Chinese Revolution. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1928) p. 123.

7 Rodney Gilbert, "Soviet Envoy in Peking," Living Age, Vol. 315 (November 4, 1922) p. 255. The emphasis is Gilbert's.

8 The Treaty of Nerchinsk, 1689, was the first treaty China signed with a European power.

the Czars had held in China. By renouncing these Russia made a gesture of friendship toward China though, in fact, the action was politically motivated. The changes were made official September 27, 1920, when L. M. Karakhan, speaking on behalf of the Russian Government declared

'... void of force all the treaties concluded with China by the former Government, renounced all seizures of Chinese territory, without compensation and for ever, all that had been predatorily seized from her by the Tsar's Government and the Russian Bourgeoisie.'⁹

For Russia, it was a complete change of policy. The Russian Legation in Peking was elevated to an embassy in recognition of China's new status as a great power, and Karakhan became Ambassador to China.¹⁰ The Soviet Union thus became the only government to recognize China as a great power; a policy which put other powers in an embarrassing situation since it established a precedent in treating China as an equal.

China, meanwhile, had not been idle. It was the first country to recognize the new Soviet Socialist Republic.

DR. SUN

In both his writings and speeches, Sun Yat-sen expressed admiration for the Russian Revolution and he was one of the few men to believe in its ultimate success.

Dr. Sun ... managed to send a telegram of congratulations to Lenin through his countrymen in America, for all the cable facilities being under the control of Russia's enemy, he found it impossible to wire Moscow directly. This telegram arrived under circumstances where the Russian Government was besieged on all

⁹ Tang Leang-li, China in Revolt. (London: Noel Douglas, 1927) p. 127.

¹⁰ Observed P. Scheffer in Living Age, "The Soviet Government has cunningly allied itself with Chinese patriotism, which is becoming the strongest and deepest sentiment in the nation." See "Sacrificed Generation, Living Age, Vol. 329 (May 8, 1926) p. 305.

sides by its enemies. It gave the Russians much ground for joy and for a great future in the relationship between the two countries. This telegram seemed to be the first of its kind sent by Dr. Sun to Moscow after the assumption of power by the Revolutionary party in Russia.¹¹

Sun Yat-sen also greatly admired the Russian's methods. In one speech he commented:

'Russia only had her Revolution six years after the Revolution in China. But the Russian Revolutionary Party has not only destroyed the most powerful of imperialist countries, but it has gone farther in searching for a solution for the world economic and political problems. This Revolution is indeed, a thorough-going revolution. It is because their methods are good.'¹²

Dr. Sun's writings seemed to reflect communistic ideas.¹³ The third principle, min-sheng (peoples' "livelihood" or "socialism") many believed, was closely allied with Marxist ideas. However, James Dolsen, whose motives may be questioned, has this to say about Dr. Sun:

He [Sun] was neither a Communist or a Marxist. His program 'nationalism, democracy, socialism' bore all the signs of the backwardness of the social conditions of China.¹⁴

The fact remains, however, that Russia, which before 1917, had been one of China's most dangerous enemies now became her friend, both in word and deed.

11 Woo, op. cit., p. 131.

12 Ibid., p. 126.

13 From Time Magazine, Vol. 25 (March 18, 1935) p. 22. "The Will of Saint Sun has definitely Communist leaning, enjoins China to cooperate with Soviet Russia and with Germany which Saint Sun expected to continue Socialist, not foreseeing Hitler."

14 James H. Dolsen, The Awakening of China. (Chicago: The Daily Worker Publishing Company, 1926) p. 144. Chu Chai agrees saying, "... the min-sheng principle, as the Communists claim, has much in common with Marxism. Sun Yat-sen had great respect for Karl Marx, but he was never subservient to Marxism." See Chu Chai and Winberg Chai, The Changing Society of China. (New York: Mentor Books, New American Library of World Literature, Inc., 1962) p. 212.

CHINA'S INTERNAL SITUATION

With the overthrow of the Manchu Dynasty in 1911, China became a Republic. Dr. Sun, leader of the revolutionaries, did not head the government as everyone had expected (although he was temporarily provisional president), but instead, Yuan Shih-kai became president. This old-time military leader kept himself in power with the aid of military friends and cohorts -- thus firmly establishing the modern "warlord" form of government in China. Yuan later tried to establish a constitutional monarchy and failing to achieve this goal, resigned. There then began a period of warlord governments in Peking and the split between North and South widened. The North, at one time (1917), tried to restore the Manchu emperor.

The internal situation was disheartening. Yuan Shih-K'ai's attempt to become Emperor, the high-handed actions of the militarists, the attempts of traitors to sell their country, bad economic conditions, a lowering of moral standards -- all these blocked the hopes of the young enthusiasts. They were confronted with the twenty-one demands, the secret military pact between Japan and China, the failures of the Peace Conference, and the attitude of Foreign Powers to China.¹⁵

Politically, Sun's Kuomintang¹⁶ party (reorganized in 1912, this time as a political party, not necessarily a revolutionary party) functioned in the South. It was opposed by the Chinputang,¹⁷ a party powerful in the North, established by Yuan and led by Liang Chi-chao. Dr.

15 H. C. Hu, "The New Thought Movement," The Chinese Recorder, Vol. LIV (August, 1923) p. 447.

16 A result of the combination of the Hsing Chung Hui into Tung Meng Hui and finally into Kuomintang.

17 The Chinputang was the "Progressive Party" of China and was led by Liang Chi-chao. It developed from the old Monarchical Constitutional Party, founded by the leaders of the 100 Days of Reform. The Chinputang was a combination of the Democratic Party led by Liang, Yuan Shih-kai's party and the Unification Party. It was in opposition to the Kuomintang. Chinputang newspapers supported the New Thought Movement. The group was a co-sponsor of Bertrand Russell's China visit.

Sun's nationalist government at Canton was "legitimized" in 1920, and, although his was generally the more popular government (that is, among the Chinese people) the Northern government -- ridiculous though it was -- was recognized by other nations as the de jure government (1916-28).

During the height of the student demonstrations following the May 4 period, the Northern government was actually in control of a group called the Anfu Club, led by Tuan Chi-jui. At this time, the Chinese parliament consisted of a strong Chinputang minority and a large assortment of other parties which could command a majority if they worked together. The Anfu Club was formed to bring these groups together and the Anfuites, as they were called, became the most important political group in Peking.

... as soon as it was understood that every member of Parliament who became a member of the Club and voted according to the Club's decisions would receive a monthly allowance to cover expenses incidental on the residence of a patriotic member of Parliament in Peking the ¹⁸parliamentary membership began to swell visibly.

It was believed that some of the Anfuites' financial help came from Japanese sources, perhaps with the help of Tsao Ju-lin, who was an Anfu Club member.

From the time of the Club's formation it dominated Parliament and monopolized control of the government. Many Chinese believed that the Anfu group was responsible for their difficulties and they accused the Anfu-controlled government of having sold out to the Japanese. General Hsu Shu-cheng,¹⁹ Tuan's chief of staff, assumed more control of the

¹⁸ The Star, October 4, 1919.

¹⁹ Usually known as "Little Hsu", to distinguish him from Hsu Shih-cheng, the president.

group as Tuan gradually aligned more and more with the President and the liberals. The club ended in 1920 when Tuan was defeated by Tsac Kun and Chang Tso-lin.²⁰

The Northern and Southern Chinese governments were fighting for control of some four million square miles of territory and some 400 million people. Both sides had to solve the dual problem of maintaining peace and order within the realm and defending it from those without. To do so, China's 400 million needed to be well organized -- a project which would not be easy in view of the great diversity in language, customs and laws throughout the land.²¹ The big problem, therefore, was to reconcile the widely-differing viewpoints of the people and to create in all an interest in all. So long as people living in the same country remained in ignorance of each other absurd conflicts of various descriptions were bound to arise.

President of the Northern Government during this time was Hsu Shih-cheng. In Canton, which declared itself the true government of China, Dr. Sun had been elected president of the Southern Government with the

20 A price of \$50,000 was put on the head of "Little Hsu." Prices were also put on the heads of the other Anfu leaders. A second list of names was published for those to be punished and this included Tsao Ju-lin, Lu Cheng-yu and Chang Chung-hsiang. (See The Star, August 1, 1920). "Little Hsu fled to the Japanese legation for sanctuary and the Japanese notified the Chinese government of the fact. Hsu later escaped and the Chinese accused the Japanese of bad faith. Other Anfuites in the legation were the targets of an almost-successful poisoning plot. In summing up the whole affair, The Star concluded, "... he ["Little Hsu"] has given a visual demonstration that all the talk of Japanese-Anfu connections were the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth." (See The Star, December 1, 1920).

21 As Levenson (op. cit., p. 103) puts it: "In large part the intellectual history of modern China has been the process of making ku-chia of t'ien-hsia." Ku-chia is putting nation above culture; T'ien-hsia is the Confucian way.

help of Tuan Chi-jui²² and Chang Tso-lin.

It was Sun's Kuomintang group, as the Southern government, which first allied with the Communists. Sun brought student leaders into his party (Chen Tu-hsiu, for example, was made Chief of the Education Board in Canton) and these young intellectuals brought a revolutionary spirit into the Kuomintang. News of the new Russia's "kindness" to China electrified these young intellectuals and many of them believed that communism was the answer to China's problems. These were the young men who found their way to Canton.

THE KUOMINTANG

The English translation of the word "Kuomintang" helps explain the meaning of the movement. "Kuo" means country; "min", people; "tang", association, or party. Thus, "association to bring the country into the hands of her people."²³

In the late 19th century, Sun Yat-sen had made up his mind to overthrow the Manchus. Failing to convince the government of the need for reform, he organized the Shing Chung Hsei (China Revival Society) in 1894 and began armed uprisings which lasted for some ten years. Then as an exile in Japan in 1905, Sun organized the Tung Ming Hwei (Revolutionary Alliance) to advocate a nationalist revolution. This new group was

22 Which must surely set a record for switching sides. Unless, possibly, we consider the "Christian General" Feng Yu-hsiang, whose "conversion from a fervent Christian to a fiery Bolshevik came rather suddenly ..." See Aage Krarup-Nielsen, The Dragon Awakes. (London: John Lane The Bodley Head Ltd., 1928) pp. 99, 102, 136. Feng swore allegiance to the Hankow group but within two weeks demanded the instant removal of Borodin. He originally had been in command of a citizens army and had been an Anfuite.

23 "New China Revealed," The Literary Digest, Vol. 92 (March 12, 1927) p. 21.

a merger of the earlier group with other anti-Manchu factions. By 1911 the group had acquired the name Kuomintang and this name was generally used after the successful revolution. In August, 1912, this group merged with five others and officially took the name Kuomintang. Their objectives were: 1) a united China, 2) local self-government, 3) satisfactory relations with foreign governments, and 4) socialistic principles for China. The overall goal was to implant the Three People's Principles²⁴ into the minds and lives of the people. The reorganized party grew rapidly and by 1914 Sun was back in Japan where he organized the Revolutionary Party of China.²⁵ During the war, Sun's followers campaigned vigorously against the warlord government in Peking but by the end of the war the party returned to nationalism. At the same time the Renaissance was sweeping China and students were propagandizing all who would listen to come to the aid and support of their nation. The Nationalists²⁶ located at Canton, carried on continuous armed conflict.²⁷ Several "peace conferences" were

²⁴ The principles were min-tsu, people's rule or nationalism; min-chuan, people's authority or democracy; and min-sheng, people's livelihood, usually translated as "socialism."

²⁵ There was one further reorganization, that of 1924, when the decision was made to allow Communists to join as individual members.

²⁶ The Nationalist Party was the Kuomintang of Sun Yat-sen. The nationalist movement refers to the work of those interested in arousing a patriotic spirit among the people. Many people confuse the two and in the 1920s, many correspondents wrote as if they believed nationalism was confined to the Nationalist Party. The Kuomintang eventually became the political expression of the Chinese nationalist movement.

²⁷ An example. During the summer of 1919, Southern troops arrived in Hupeh Province. They remained there until the end of 1919 at which time they tried to fight their way eastward toward Hankow. They were defeated and my father and the Roman Catholic priest in Shihnan were asked to negotiate with them. They negotiated with a group about ten miles from Shihnan and that group decided to capitulate. After a delay of one or more days the troops carried out their surrender with my father as their mediator. This ended the North-South schism in Central China for that period of time. (Notes from Arnold H. Gebhardt to the writer, October, 1963)

held between the North and South. In 1920 civil war broke out once more; and there was much internal turmoil. The warlords fought numerous local battles during these years.

The history of modern China is inseparable from the history of the Kuomintang. At first the Kuomintang was not a party of the great mass of Chinese people since it drew its support chiefly from businessmen, intellectuals and soldiers. With its official platform, Sun's Three Principles, quickly shortened into "nationalism, democracy and socialism," the Kuomintang began soliciting the countryside. Kuomintang agents toured the country, organizing local groups and arousing the whole country against "foreign imperialists." Peasant, workers and soldiers were propagandized in order to create a politically conscious population.²⁸

... amateur attempts to rouse public opinion were speedily reinforced by those of the Nationalist Party (Kuo Min Tang). This party then controlled the government only in and around Canton, and even there control was often precarious owing to the vagaries of local militarists, upon whose goodwill it was at first dependent. But the nationalists were already followed by the majority of young China throughout the country, and they were the first party to appreciate the support of this nucleus of public opinion and to make a bid for its extension.²⁹

Students and scholars joined the party. Tsai Yuan-pei³⁰ was a member as

²⁸ Sun quoted Sun Tzu, "... to attack the mind is more effective than to attack a city ... a renovation of the mind is prerequisite to a revolution." See Chow Tse-tung, The May Fourth Movement. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960) p. 195.

²⁹ Foster, op. cit., p. 53.

³⁰ Many student leaders joined the Kuomintang because it appealed to their leftist tendencies. Sun supported the student and new culture movements on political grounds but never completely agreed, on nationalistic grounds, with the new literature and new thought movements. Chiang Kai-shek criticized both students and the new thought movement and rejected the whole idea of the new culture movement.

were Chien Hsung-tung and Chiang Mon-lin. These men knew the value of propaganda. In fact, it is sometimes difficult to tell where Kuomintang propaganda leaves off and student propaganda begins. In many cases they were the same thing since both students and Kuomintang had the same goals. In the struggle to consolidate and rebuild China these groups stood alone. The Northern government had the support of the world powers but the Kuomintang and sympathetic students had the goodwill of the people. Together, supported by formidable propaganda, they became a full-fledged modern revolutionary force.

THE COMMUNISTS

Communism was nothing new to China. Two earlier attempts are recorded in Chinese history -- one in 9 A.D., the other in the 1060s.³¹ The Tai-Ping Rebellion in the mid-nineteenth century had overtones of class consciousness and there is extensive Communist interest in it.³² A Kuomintang member, Chu Chih-hsin, translated into Chinese (in 1906) the ten proposals in the Communist Manifesto. The first Chinese socialist party (the Chung-kuo-she-hui-tang) was organized in 1911 and by 1918 a society for the study of Marxism had been founded in the University of Peking with Li Ta-chao, Chang Kuo-t'ao and Mao Tse-tung as members. By 1919, Chen Tu-hsiu had established contact with the Comintern.

In the first issue of New Tide, one writer said that in history every century had its tide which couldn't be stopped (e.g., Renaissance, Reformation, French Revolution, revolutions of 1848). He predicted the

³¹ For a very fine article on early communist movement in China see C. Aymard, "China's Communist Experiment in 1067," Living Age. Vol. 312 (March 18, 1922) p. 640-7.

³² Levenson, op. cit., p. 1238. The author notes that Communists have written a great deal on the Tai-Ping Rebellion, particularly in 1950, the anniversary year.

new world tide of the twentieth century would be the Russian Revolution.³³

Students had resumed some of their classes after the initial May 4 protests, primarily because they believed that education had to play a leading role in remaking China. Aside from studies, however, the students showed remarkable interest in socialistic theories. "Young China, turning if not to Marx's methods at least to his ideal, has set his heart on some degree of socialism." said John Foster.³⁴ Students became prominent in labor affairs and occasionally even headed labor organizations ("a case of the blind leading the blind," commented The Chinese Recorder.)³⁵ Many students began to lean far to the left and showed much sympathy for the struggle in Russia, a tendency which was not too popular in militarist circles. All in all, Chinese students were feeling their way -- not yet certain which way to go.³⁶

... it [the student mind] does not yet discern the goal towards which education or society should move. Yet there are constructive tendencies. National consciousness might be said to be a dominating factor in determining what holds the attention. A growing social consciousness also promises much for the future. Indeed the Student Mind has passed beyond mere protest and iconoclasm, to earnest searching for answers and solutions....³⁷

The influence of the West on Chinese thought was great, but China's nationalist impulses leaned toward Soviet Russia and sympathized with that country's defiance of the West. China's enthusiasm for socialism came

³³ Chow, op. cit., p. 60.

³⁴ Foster, op. cit., p. 79.

³⁵ "The Chinese Student Mind," The Chinese Recorder, Vol. LIII (November, 1922) p. 681.

³⁶ "... this nationalist movement is not a mere blackguardly rag of youths who have drunk too much Soviet vodka. The youths have learned their theories from us -- and from dry and democratic America ..." The Literary Digest, quoting the London New Statesman. See Vol. 86 (July 25, 1925) p.17.

³⁷ "The Chinese Student Mind," op. cit., p. 681.

partly from her liking for the Russians and their methods and partly as a result of the humiliations suffered at the hands of Western powers. For their part, the Russians denied they had anything to do with Chinese interest in themselves or their country.

'The imperialists are endeavoring to split the movement by asserting that the movement proceeds from the Communists and the Soviet Union. If it be true that the Communists are the originators of the movement, the Chinese people ought to rally all the more to the Communists who represent the interests of the whole of the Chinese people. If it be true, that the Soviet Union is supporting the movement, this would only serve to prove that the Soviet Union is the sole friend of China. Unfortunately, the Soviet Union is unable to help China immediately to shake off her imperialist yoke.'

A vigorous labor movement was begun in 1919 and by 1920 labor had initiated several strikes.

Unions of labourers and farmers are being organized or encouraged for the protection of their own interests. These organizations were practically unknown ten years ago. It was only after the Russian Revolution that working-class organization became of great importance. The first trade unions, as distinct from trade guilds, were set up at Canton in 1919, and the movement spread all over China.

The Chinese Communist Party was formally organized in May, 1921,⁴⁰ and began immediately to organize railway workers. By the following year strikes took place on all the main lines. There were other radical societies, one of which was Mao Tse-tung's Hsin Min Hsueh Hui or New People's Study Society.⁴¹ This group, organized in 1918, centered around Changsha which

³⁸ Dolsen, op. cit., p. 170, quoting an outline of the Communists' tasks.

³⁹ Tang, op. cit., p. 140.

⁴⁰ Although Li and Chen had organized a group in Shanghai in May, 1920, the 1921 date is taken as the real founding.

⁴¹ Anne Fremantle, Mao Tse-tung: An Anthology of His Writings. (New York: A Mentor Book, Published by The New American Library, 1962) p. xxii. Most of the members of this group were killed by the Kuomintang in 1927-28.

quickly became a center of socialist or communistic thinking.

I remember an episode in 1920, when the Hsin Min Hsueh Hui organized a demonstration to celebrate the third anniversary of the Russian October Revolution. It was suppressed by the police. Some of the demonstrators had attempted to raise the Red Flag at the meeting, but were prohibited from doing so by the police. They then pointed out that according to Article 12 of the (then) Constitution, the people had the right to assemble, organize and speak, but the police were not impressed. They replied that they were not there to be taught the Constitution, but to carry out the orders of the governor, Chao Heng-t'i. From this time on I became more and more convinced that only mass political power, secured through mass action,⁴² could guarantee the realization of dynamic reforms.

Later, when a branch of the Communist Party was organized in Hunan⁴³ Mao became a member.⁴⁴ In France a group was organized among the worker-students with Chou En-lai as one of the founders. Chou was also active in the organization of The Awakening Society (Chou-Wu-Hsueh-Hui) in Tientsin. A fellow founder was Ma Chun.⁴⁵

The Chinese Communist Party grew rapidly. "... in those days it was fashionable to be a Communist and nobody was very sure exactly what it meant, except that all bright young men were Communists."⁴⁶ This is

⁴² Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China. (New York: The Grove Press, Inc., Black Cat Edition, 1961) p. 155, quoting Mao.

⁴³ "... Changhsa was called the 'Eastern Moscow'!" See Peng Ta-Mu, "Chinese Student Looks At The World," Asia, Vol. 28 (March, 1928) p. 247.

⁴⁴ At one time many people believed Mao was simply leading an agrarian reform movement. See Chu Chai, op. cit., p. 224-225. The Communists consistently emphasized land reform; the Nationalists did not.

⁴⁵ Ma Chun is the student who, at the time of the student arrests following the May 4th incident, stated that since he was not yet dead he still had a life to give for his country.

⁴⁶ Snow, op. cit., p. 16. "The rise of any political party in history cannot be compared with the rapid rise of the Chinese Communist Party." See Woo, op. cit., p. 148. From twelve delegates and some fifty members in 1921, the Chinese Communists grew to more than ten million members in the early fifties. See Fremantle, op. cit., p. xxvi.

quite true. At first only students came into the party, led and inspired by some of the intellectuals. Later workmen joined and finally peasants, although in very small numbers.⁴⁷ The main strength of the Chinese Communist Party was the student, and second, the workers.⁴⁸

If one compares the comparative security of the Communists in other countries, in France and in Germany, and even in England and in the United States, and the comparative immunity from immediate danger of death of the Communists of these States, one can appreciate the spirit of the Chinese Communists ... In short, one may say that the Chinese Communists are among the best type of the Chinese Youth⁴⁹

The party regularly warned the Chinese people against relying on diplomatic negotiations and attempts at compromise. It also consistently spoke of leaders of the Northern government as "tools of the imperialists." The Communists taught that it was better to suffer defeat than to make use of the enemy as a mediator or protector.⁵⁰

The Communists, as did the Kuomintang, also made good use of propaganda. In fact, "... no political 'ism' has been so conspicuous and so widely advertised throughout the world as Bolshevism."⁵¹ There were

⁴⁷ Said V. Sheean, in "Disruption of the Kuomintang," *Asia*, Vol. 27 (August, 1927) p. 626, "... whereas the intelligentsia was already discontented, it was necessary to organize discontent in the proletariat by means of extensive propaganda."

⁴⁸ Woo, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 144.

⁵⁰ The Red Army song expresses this philosophy:
 When the enemy comes forward, we withdraw;
 When the enemy withdraws, we go forward;
 When the enemy settles down, we disturb him.
 When the enemy is exhausted, we fight him.

The song is quoted both in Chu Chai, *op. cit.*, p. 223 and by F. F. Liu, *A Military History of Modern China: 1924-1949*. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1956) p. 283. The only difference is a change of tense.

⁵¹ Gilbert, *op. cit.*, p. 257. Another author got his Bolshevist and student propaganda confused. See W. Schuler, "Is Bolshevism Possible in China?" *Living Age*, Vol. 305 (May 29, 1920) pp. 507-10, especially p. 509. Or, does this just go to show how closely related the movements really were?

several Communist magazines; New Youth after 1920, and The Guide, edited by Chen Tu-hsiu, which "uses bitter words against the present social, political and international order."⁵²

Many intelligent observers believe that one of China's chief dangers is due to the Soviet propaganda emanating from Moscow. A prominent writer called attention to a recent Agreement of far-reaching significance that will undoubtedly have tremendous effect on Eastern politics. While one of the articles of this Agreement between Russia and China states that neither contracting party shall do anything to interfere with the system of government in the other country, still the record of the Soviets for such interference in many countries is so well known (despite the fair promises) that suspicion is aroused as to their designs on China. The unrest in China, the inefficient government, the suffering people, the revolutionary spirit of the student class, all combine to form a peculiarly favorable soil for Soviet seed.⁵³

The Communists made good use of whatever propaganda opportunity presented itself and were not above "riding in on someone else's coattails" in order to accomplish their purpose. Once a Bible Society found extra leaves -- containing revolutionary propaganda -- had been inserted in some of its Bible portions!⁵⁴

RUSSIA AGAIN

Russia began sending some of its best people to China, "shrewd men like G. Maring, Adolf Joffe, L. M. Karakhan."⁵⁵ When Joffe arrived, both Tsai Yuan-pei and Hu Shih were on hand to welcome him. The men from Russia began laying the groundwork for cooperation between the Communist Party and the Kuomintang. To Russian eyes, many of the Nationalists

⁵² T. L. Shen, "A Study of the Anti-Christian Movement," The Chinese Recorder, Vol. LVI (April, 1925) p. 229.

⁵³ "Unrest and Propaganda in China," The Missionary Review of the World, Vol. XLVII (September, 1924) p. 671.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Liu, op. cit., p. 4.

looked just as "Red" as the Northern Communists. As already pointed out, Russia had seemingly treated China better than any other nation, consequently winning the admiration of men like Sun, who, while not Marxist, accepted Russian direction because "We will regard as brethren those nations who treat us as their equals."⁵⁶ Dr. Sun welcomed the October Revolution, he welcomed Russian help and he welcomed cooperation with the Chinese Communist Party. Since anything that bore Sun's imprimatur needed no other endorsement, Sun's approval of the Russians won them support in the South.

Sun needed all the help the Russians could give him and his Kuomintang. He was without an army and could hardly hope to defeat the Northern militarists without one. Bitter lessons had taught him that his Kuomintang nationalists, without an army, were powerless. A party army was indispensable and the Soviet Union was willing to supply or train one.⁵⁷ Thus,

⁵⁶ Krarup-Nielsen, op. cit., p. 30, quoting Sun's Three Principles. Tang Leang-li (op. cit., p. 27) quotes Russian Ambassador Karakhan: "It is quite natural that the question of Russian influence upon the national revolutionary movement in China should be considered of great importance. No one denies this influence, and I believe that the policy of the Soviet Government is, and will continue to be, a most important factor in the history of China.

"This influence is not the result of propaganda, but is due to the Soviet policy of justice towards China, expressed, not in words only but in deeds, and exemplified not only in the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1924, but in the whole attitude of the U.S.S.R. towards China.

"If our crime consists in our good policy, then we are proud of our crime and plead guilty of it."

⁵⁷ Whampoa Military Academy was founded in Canton in 1924. Its purpose: to train revolutionary troops. Emphasis was both political and military. The academy was staffed by Russians on leave from the Red Army. Chou En-lai was on the staff as an assistant in the department of "political education." These leaders soon built "a very powerful army and a highly disciplined party, capable of quick and sustained political action to mobilize and control the mass of the people." See Chu Chai, op. cit., p. 225. Said Tang (op. cit., p. 140-141) "... the Nationalist Army is the best organized army in China; its soldiers are citizens with a political training who know and care what they are fighting for, so that, even if a general should sell out, the rank and file would not follow him." For further reading on Whampoa and the Nationalist Army see Liu, op. cit.

with Soviet guns and Red Army organizational methods the Kuomintang built an army.⁵⁸ The next step was to suggest a union of the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists. Maring proposed such a union before leaving China but the Communists did not approval the proposal until 1923. Dr. Sun persuaded the Kuomintang to agree to the proposition and in 1924 Communists were allowed to join the Kuomintang on an individual basis. Now all was ready for a joint campaign against the Northern warlords.⁵⁹

THE ANTI-CHRISTIAN MOVEMENT⁶⁰

Christian missions had had a tremendous effect on China, "an effect that it would be difficult to overestimate."⁶¹ Christianity taught justice, Christian liberty and brotherhood, quite at odds with China's traditional way of life, where injustice and despotism were something to be expected. It was inevitable that the two philosophies should meet head on.⁶²

The traditional Chinese scholar was generally completely indifferent

58 "The founding of Whampoa was felicitious in its timing, coinciding as it did with the growing youth movement of the 1920's. Following the May 4th and May 30th movements, zealous young patriots flocked to Canton from many sections of China." F. F. Liu, op. cit., p. 9.

59 The Literary Digest picked up a comment of David Lloyd George's which appeared in the New York American, "And an alliance between the enraged Buddhists of China and the sulky Bolsheviks of Russia would result in the most formidable combination the world has ever seen" See "The Rising Spirit of Nationalism in China," The Literary Digest, Vol. 85 (June 27, 1925) p. 12.

60 An excellent short article on the Anti-Christian Movement may be found in The Chinese Recorder. See C. S. Chang, "The Anti-Religion Movement," The Chinese Recorder, Vol. LIV (August, 1923) p. 459-467.

61 A. J. Brown, "Multiple Revolution In China," Asia, Vol. 27 (July, 1927) p. 612.

62 In McKenna's The Sand Pebbles, op. cit., p. 370, the problem is discussed and the conflict between what the Christians taught and what they did is pointed out. The Christians taught brotherhood and made the Chinese feel American but the United States government, a "Christian" government, barred Chinese from entrance to America, treating the Chinese as an inferior race. Discrepancies such as these, was the inference, were all the more reason for supporting Chinese nationalism.

toward spiritual matters and consequently was tolerant of all. Lancelot Forster suggests that this easy tolerance was one reason why Bertrand Russell's lecture tour met with such success -- Russell and the Chinese intelligentsia understood each other.⁶³ Forster also discussed Hu Shih and his views, pointing out that Hu felt that too many Chinese were attracted to Christianity because they felt that in some miraculous way Christianity would solve all their problems. Hu was not the only intellectual leader to criticize Christianity. Tsai Yuan-pei, who felt religion was a "past issue," "gave courage to students to attack Christianity,"⁶⁴ which they did by attacking it from a patriotic viewpoint, saying Christianity was a capitalistic movement from the West. On the other hand, not all intellectuals were Anti-Christian, Chow Tso-jen, for example, insisted on religious freedom.

In the early days Christianity had been criticized for not being Confucian (a Chinese criticism) now it was being criticized for not being "scientific" (a Western criticism).⁶⁵ The New Thought leaders, as they turned their attention to religion, weighed Christianity and found it wanting. In addition it was "foreign" and did not fit in with nationalistic plans and programs. Supporters of nationalism tended to look at Christianity with suspicion, as they did toward any other strong movements within

⁶³ Hu Shih, while talking to Lancelot Forster, commented that Bertrand Russell, while discussing religion, had said that seamen were the most religious of people, but that as the size of the boat increased, so their religious fervor diminished; in other words, religion was merely an anodyne for pain and suffering or a prophylactic against danger. See Lancelot Forster, The New Culture in China. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Lt., 1936) p. 225.

⁶⁴ "Chinese Students and Christianity," The Missionary Review of the World, Vol. XLVI (April, 1923), p. 245.

⁶⁵ In Science and View of Life, a compilation of leading articles on the unbalanced controversy between spiritual and material conceptions of life, a severe attack was made on Christianity by Wu Sze Hwei, who disbelieved any power except that of science. See Shen, op. cit., p. 229-30.

the nation. As a general rule the nationalist supporters tended to be suspicious of any possible competition but they also rejected Christianity because it rejected a part of their heritage. John Foster in his book, Chinese Realities, speculated regarding some underlying causes for the new movement. On one point he was firmly convinced and that was that "protagonists of world revolution" were on the side of the Anti-Religion leaders. Some other writers would seem to agree:

'They do a thing which is more evil than any other,' said the young captain earnestly. "They preach a strange religion which makes our people leave their own gods and cleave to a strange god of the white people. Now we revolutionists are against every sort of god; our own or foreign, we are against them all and some day we will tear down temples and we will tear down gods. But if men in their ignorance must believe for a while in some god, let it be their own and not a foreign superstition such as these preach.'⁶⁶

Hidden purposes were sought behind every action or movement of missionaries or Christian enterprises. ("They're not fooling the students for a minute the students say Buddha came to China on a white horse and Christ came on a cannonball.")⁶⁷ Oddly enough, early day nationalists had once proposed that the Christians and nationalists unite for the salvation of the nation. Later some of the proponents of this scheme turned up as leaders in the Anti-Christian movement.⁶⁸

The students determined not only to oust the West from Chinese politics, but also to get rid of missionaries who, they thought, attempted to dominate Chinese religion. The students argued that the enlightened West

66 Pearl Buck, The Young Revolutionist. (New York: Friendship Press, 1932) p. 64.

67 McKenna, op. cit., p. 351.

68 Foster, op. cit., p. 34.

was already giving up its faith in Christianity as "intellectually absurd," and they did not want an inferior philosophy passed on to the Chinese as "divine revelation and historical truth."⁶⁹ Some missionaries agreed with these criticisms and added a few of their own. John Foster, for example, asked himself, "If I were a young Chinese, I might be intolerant of our village preacher, as behind the times and out of touch with modern needs."⁷⁰ Foster goes on to say:

... Christianity is represented here by all the different points of view, not only of British denominationalism, but also of American sects, among many of whom the 'fundamentalist' controversy still drags on. Little wonder if young China answers, What is truth?⁷¹

Christian schools were criticized; one reason being that they were good.⁷² "... they stand out from the prevailing ruin, and like everything outstanding, they are watched."⁷³ A major criticism was that they taught religion instead of Chinese nationalism.⁷⁴ "Christian schools

69 Tang, op. cit., p. 153.

70 Foster, op. cit., p. 143.

71 Ibid., p. 146.

72 Lancelot Forster and Hu Shih discussed the value of Christian schools. Forster suggested that it took three generations to make a Christian and Hu Shih countered that in his experience it took three generations to unmake one. A villager sends his child to the Christian school where he learns the rudiments of reading, writing, and arithmetic, plus religion. His training puts him out in front of his peers and he thus has an advantage and is likely to become well off. As a result his son gets an even better education, and in turn, gets a university education for his family. That is the downfall, for the Chinese university is fatal to all Christian hopes, because the Chinese spirit of scepticism is all-pervading and theological questions are of no concern. (See Forster, op. cit., p. 229.)

73 Foster, op. cit., p. 151.

74 Christian schools had very real difficulties: legislation prohibited religious instruction but enforced teaching of Sun's Three Principles. Asked Foster, "Is it any wonder that some observers, putting two and two together, say 'The Principles instead of the Bible, the Will [of Sun Yat Sen] instead of the Lord's Prayer, veneration of Sun Yat Sen instead of worship of Jesus'?" (See Foster, op. cit., p. 85.)

denationalize,"⁷⁵ was the cry of accusers. And yet these same Christian schools seemed to turn out the most violent of the Anti-Christians.

It was a great embarrassment ... that mission educated students were the most virulently anti-Christian. They were so despite considerable missionary support for Chinese independence. The business faction, which clung to the unequal treaties, enjoyed taunting the missionaries about it.⁷⁶

Christian colleges often became centers of political agitation "... arousing grave apprehension as to whether it is possible to apply so-called Christian methods to education in Asia, without bringing forth a strange new bloom of Bolchevism."⁷⁷ Some Christian students seemingly went out of their way to provoke protest. The Japanese press once bitterly protested the actions of students from Shantung Christian University when they "commemorated" National Humiliation Day, May 7, 1919.⁷⁸ The Christian students, in spite of warnings by the authorities, printed and distributed a propa-

⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 151.

⁷⁶ McKenna, op. cit., p. 132. Chou En-lai had studied at a Christian school and so had many of the other student leaders. Several writers comment on the failure of the Christian school. See Putnam Weale, Why China Sees Red. (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1925) p. 103, Krarup-Nielsen, op. cit., p. 44, and Levenson, op. cit., p. 121. A similar situation exists in Africa today. Many of the new leaders there are mission-school educated.

⁷⁷ Weale, op. cit., p. 103. Another writer, Frank Lee, said, "The appeal made by the Communists to the non-Christian Chinese will be distinctly a patriotic appeal and, therefore, extremely potent with all Chinese who feel China's humiliating position in the family of Nations and have never had an opportunity of knowing Christianity by personal contacts with Christians." See Frank Lee, "Communism and the Anti-Christian Movement," The Chinese Recorder, Vol. LVI (April, 1925) p. 235.

⁷⁸ Held in "honor" of the signing of the Twenty-one Demands four years earlier. On this occasion students carried signs reading "Die for Tsingtao," and "Love your country and save your nation." Fifteen hundred students participated in this parade. Evidently students from other colleges followed the rules set up by the authorities; only the Christian students disobeyed. The Japanese paper speculated that perhaps this was because "they are under the protection of the English and the Americans." See The Star, May 14, 1919.

ganda leaflet. Commented the Tsinan Jih Pao:

'From the beginning the Christian Church in China has been unreasonable and guilty of violence. History proves this. All of China's troubles and the loss of National sovereignty are due to the Church. It is not necessary to specify these troubles for all the Chinese know about them.

'Originally Christianity was an important religion, but to-day it is extremely corrupt. The intellectual leaders of Europe realize that that Great War was due to the decline of the Church.

'Accordingly the far-sighted men of today advocate the abolition of the Church and the re-establishment of primitive Christianity.'⁷⁹

That wasn't all, the missionaries, too, came in for their share of abuse:

'The English and American missionaries in China are very violent. They are the watch dogs of their governments. Pretending to preach the Gospel they destroy the native faiths of China. They stir up foreign-trained Chinese to upset China's social and political order. In doing this they aim at robbing China of her sovereignty⁸⁰ after the manner of the Germans and the Austrians.'

The diatribe concludes with an appeal to the students:

'... I advise you students of Shantung Christian University not to be brave slaves of a foreign race in opposing the Japanese. This can never be done! Be true descendants of Hwang Ti; be real disciples of Confucius; then will you appreciate the real morality of the Far East which will help you to support the just and to oppose the unjust. Oh it is very dangerous to listen to the teachings of foreigners!'⁸¹

The Anti-Christian Movement became more active in the spring of 1922, shortly before a meeting in Peking of the World Student Christian Federation and shortly after the publication of two important books -- The Christian Occupation of China and The Report of the China Education Com-

79 Ibid.

30 Ibid.

81 Ibid. While written by Japanese, the article reflects the views of the Anti-Christians.

mission.⁸² The books discussed various facets of Christian work in China and student leaders took alarm, seeing in these volumes, and in the meeting, concrete proof of the strength of the Christian cause. Coupled with their other fears and beliefs concerning the purpose of Christianity in China, and the probable effect on the Chinese nationalist movement, a student group in Shanghai was formed and named the Anti-Christian Students' Federation. This group stated:

We oppose the World Student Christian Federation because we wish to guard the happiness and welfare of humanity present day Christianity and the Christian Church are the vanguard of this exploitation [foreign capitalists]. What the [Christian students] intend to discuss is nothing more than such schemes as how to uphold capital and how to extend capitalism in China. We regard this a conference of robbers, humiliating and polluting our youth, cheating our people, and stealing our economic resources. Therefore, following the dictates of our hearts, we are organizing this Federation to declare war upon it.

Students! Young men! Workers! Who among us does not know the sins of the capitalist? Who among us is blind to his heartless cruelty? What can we do but rise and oppose them when we see with our own eyes these bloodhounds of the capitalist gathering to decide our fate?

Rise! Rise! Rise!⁸³

In view of the general tenor of the statement many felt there was a communist influence in the student group, especially since the paper was issued from Shanghai, then center of the labor movement.⁸⁴ "Their [the communists]

⁸² Foster, op. cit., p. 134-5. These are excellent books, both being particularly well done. The "Occupation" book, especially, is a real work of art, both artistically in its makeup and format and in its writing. The Education Commission's report is thorough and very well done. Members of the commission included P. W. Kuo, Henry B. Graybill and Edwin C. Lobenstine, and 13 others. Both volumes are in my father's library.

⁸³ Foster, op. cit., p. 135-6.

⁸⁴ A friend of Foster's attended some of the meetings. When he reported back John Foster "... began to fear: there were brains behind it, and money, an intimate knowledge of our weakest spots, a marshalling of all the nationalist forces of both East and West." See Foster, op. cit., p. 173.

theory and practice are anti-religious, specially anti-Christian," said Frank Lee.⁸⁵ The very radicalism of the initial movement probably accounts for the fact that the movement accomplished little before 1924 at which time it spread rapidly along with the general ascendancy of other leftist movements.

No longer is the point of view limited to that of Shanghai students engrossed in labour problems, no longer are the prevailing features so reminiscent of an importation from Russia. The features correspond more closely to the background of change throughout the whole of China, and the tone, happily, is more convincing of the presence of honest doubters among China's own youth.⁸⁶

SUMMARY

No matter what the movement at this time -- Kuomintang, Communist, Anti-Christian -- each agreed on two general principles: 1) the elimination of foreign influence (primarily European) and 2) the ascendancy of nationalism. The fact that some of the movements were emphatically anti-foreign was due in large part to the foreigners themselves, especially English, Americans and Japanese.

Before a radically changed China, British agents in China continue to pursue the traditional policy of blackmail and bully. Soviet Russia realized the need of change in 1919 The British policy of the Iron Hand, far from intimidating the Chinese people, has as its effect the rallying of the Chinese masses to the banner of the anti-Imperialist Chinese National Party.⁸⁷

A contributor to the China Review was blunt about America's responsibility "... the fault will not be with the Chinese leaders or with the Chinese people, but it will lie with the blind statesmanship of the West,

85 Frank Lee, op. cit., p. 221.

86 Foster, op. cit., p. 137-8.

87 Tang, op. cit., p. 156.

especially the blind statesmanship of the United States"⁸⁸ Dr. Sun looked to foreign powers for help but found them giving aid to Yuan Snih-kai instead. Some years later he declared, "We no longer look to the West. We now look to Russia."⁸⁹ Other foreigners saw China divided into two camps, Bolshevik and anti-nationalist. It was true there were two camps, but what the foreigners failed to realize was that the "Bolshevik" camp was divided into Kuomintang and Communist. A few foreigners publicly admitted their mistakes. Sir Ronald Macleay, British Minister to China, said:

'We are too prone to forget that we are in some measure responsible. It must be remembered that we foreigners originally forced the door of China's exclusiveness, and first by wringing from a reluctant Chinese government extra-territorial rights, special privileges and concessions, and then by opening up the country ... we inculcated in the younger generation the belief that our methods and ideals were superior to theirs.'⁹⁰

And a British publication, the London New Statesman, struck the heart of the matter when it said:

'It was, in fact, the War and the Peace, and not the Bolsheviks, that opened the eyes of the Far East and pushed the Chinese nationalist movement into being. We are paying now for our scurvy treatment of China at the Paris Conference in 1919, for the humiliation put upon her by the famous 'Twenty-one Demands' of Japan, for the delay in returning Kiao-chow to her.'⁹¹

⁸⁸ "What's Driving China to Sovietism," The Literary Digest, Vol. 80 (March 29, 1924) p. 22. An excellent article on the poor policy of most American diplomats to China may be found in Asia Magazine. See T. F. Millard's "Undermining Our Chinese Policy," Asia, Vol. 27 (November, 1927) p. 891-5. Millard is another "old China hand" and editor for many years of Millard's Weekly Review.

⁸⁹ Tang, op. cit., p. 141.

⁹⁰ Foster, op. cit., p. 108.

⁹¹ "Red Russia's Hand In China," The Literary Digest, Vol. 86 (July 25, 1925) p. 16-17.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE RESULTS

"The Chinese question is, the world question of the twentieth century."¹

One question leads to interesting speculation: What if there had not been a student protest parade May 4, 1919?

Education was already undergoing reform; the cultural renaissance was underway; bei wha was not new, nor for that matter was revolution. What, therefore, was significant about the student protest? The student demonstration, protesting the Shantung Decision, proved to be the catalyst for reform efforts in China. "... there is nothing in the world today -- not even Europe in the throes of reconstruction -- that equals China."² John Dewey reported in 1921. The students, incensed at yet another indignity (the loss of Shantung) to be borne by their country felt that the time had come at last when they would have to take matters into their own hands. Their protest parade in Peking drew attention to the humiliation of the Shantung Decision and widely publicized the fact that the students believed leaders of their own government to be largely responsible. As unplanned as the raid on Tsao Ju-lin's home were the results of the May 4 demonstration.

REVIEW

What the students had done on May 4, 1919, was to light the fire beneath, if you will, a huge cauldron of "Irish stew" -- a mixture of

1 James Dolsen, The Awakening of China. (Chicago: The Daily Worker Publishing Company, 1926) p. 3, quoting Putnam Weale.

2 John Dewey, "Old China And New," Asia, Vol. 21 (May, 1921) p. 445.

educational reform, language reform, enlightened students, anti-foreign and anti-Christian sentiments, new nationalism, internal strife and anti-Confucianism, so that this "stew" began to cook, mixing its ingredients together and, being stirred vigorously by the students, who at the same time vigorously fanned the flames beneath, this mixture boiled over, to engulf the entire country. The forces unleashed by the students could not be stopped. Intellectuals cooperated with economic groups to boycott Japanese products. A new written language found ready and willing users, particularly in the students who found in it an ideal medium for reaching many people. All factions, no matter how diverse, cooperated during the immediate enthusiastic public response to the protest parade. China was never to be the same after May 4, 1919, "... the old conditions can never be restored. For better or for worse China has entered upon a new era."³

During the years of intense change following May 4, (1919-1921) China changed radically. Before 1919, few common people could read. Fewer still could write the beautifully complicated Chinese characters of the Chinese literary language. After 1919, the impetus given by the student movement toward popularizing the use of bei wha completely transformed traditional Chinese education by making it possible for the common man to read. The searching into the philosophy of the West for a solution to Chinese problems brought into China countless translations of European books and Western scholars and lecturers of the caliber of Russell and Dewey. Crude propaganda exposed the most ordinary of people to reading and writing, and eager students helped the illiterate to

³ A. J. Brown, "Multiple Revolution in China," Asia, Vol. 27 (July, 1927) p. 594.

understand what they were being shown and told. The rapid rise in literacy brought new and exciting information to many who had never before been concerned with events in their country.

Prior to 1919, "students" were men who diligently studied the classics in order to pass rigid examinations which led to governmental posts -- this in spite of the fact that a new education system had been inaugurated. After the events of 1919, Chinese students -- college age and under -- began studying more Western subjects. Pragmatism prevailed. Young men became leaders of movements against the existing government. They became teachers of the ordinary Chinese. Instead of revering the classics they scorned them, turning instead to Western science and philosophy. Contrary to everything in their previous experience, members of the literati and student class met and cooperated with industrial people and merchants. Together they planned, organized and supported an efficient and thorough boycott of Japanese goods.

Under strong leadership and with improved public interest and knowledge there emerged still another movement -- a pride in nation (and, quite naturally, therefore, opposition to other nations; almost in direct proportion to those nations' past records in China). This "nationalism" was encouraged by student leaders who also began to investigate new methods of government. The Russian's new system fascinated them. In response, Russia took advantage of Young China's interest and enthusiasm. Groups of young men formed organizations dedicated to using Russian principles in China. Many of these Russian sympathizers found their way into Sun Yat-sen's Kuomintang. Avowed Communists, as individuals, were also accepted as members.

Nationalism, new knowledge, new leaders and new power (the people were behind the students), led to changes in the Chinese government. Since the Northern government was generally identified with the Japanese, anti-foreign feelings and nationalistic pride brought many young Chinese to the South. The South had their support plus the technical knowledge and skills of its Russian friends. As a result of this technical superiority and the enthusiastic well-trained young revolutionaries, the South at last was able to defeat the North.

Beginning in the early twenties various factions argued over which way was best for China -- democracy or socialism, complete separation from the West or cooperation. Nationalism and socialism outstripped all the other movements -- renaissance, mass education, anti-foreign, etc. -- of the May Fourth Period and students flocked to join the Kuomintang or Communist parties. Socially, politically and culturally the China of the twenties became a different China. The tragedy of it all was that the Western nations did not realize this. It was an irremedial and inexcusable error on their part.

It may be more convenient for the moment to acquiesce in a Shantung, but in the long run it is stupid. For the lasting friendship of a great people like the Chinese is something the American people will forfeit at their peril. The Chinese people will remain, but Japanese imperialism will pass.

Had the students not demonstrated, I venture to say the movements would have continued and may even have eventually attained the success which they did achieve so rapidly. The significance of the May 4 protest, triggered as it was by news of the Shantung Decision, is that it literally

4 "Four Major American Interests," The New Republic, Vol. XXIII (July 7, 1920) p. 158.

overnight forced a reevaluation of the old and intensive investigation of the new. An easy answer to China's problems appeared to be this: the old systems would no longer do. Therefore, the easy solution would be to adopt as rapidly as possible, everything new. And there were many new things ready and eager to be adopted -- a new written language, a new system of education, new types of government (e.g. communism), and enthusiastic young men who were ready and willing to become the new leaders. In addition, there were two easy scapegoats -- Japan and its imperialistic policies, and the Christians and Christianity.

These separate and independent movements were embraced by the students, who enthusiastically went about introducing what they could of them to the people. The battle cry became "China for the Chinese"⁵ and a nation emerged from an ancient civilization into the modern world in one of the shortest time periods known to man -- renaissance, reformation and revolution -- all in the space of a few years.

In a world struggle of today, China is a major factor. One out of every four people in the world is Chinese. What role those 600 millions will play in the₆ struggle, this book will not hazard to prophesy.

Nor will I.

THE YEARS AFTER

Time after time China's internal problems could be traced to the South -- specifically to Canton. Sun's Canton-based kuomintang govern-

⁵ "China for the Chinese" may be a good slogan but it doesn't explain which Chinese." The Memphis Commercial Appeal, as quoted in The Literary Digest, Vol. 92 (March 12, 1927) p. 98.

⁶ F. F. Liu, A Military History Of Modern China: 1924-1949. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956) p. 286. (700 million at latest estimate!)

ment rose to new prominence during the year's following the May 4 protest. The unity Dr. Sun wanted for China was finally achieved in the Great Revolution of 1925-1927. The price involved was cooperation with the Communists.

Sun was an enthusiastic supporter of the Russians and their methods. He and his Russian advisors laid plans, worked for and succeeded in arranging the eventual union and cooperation of the Communist and Kuomintang groups in China.⁷ Sun firmly believed that Russia was in sympathy with oppressed countries the world over and would help liberate China and others from "imperialistic yokes" and it was he who convinced other Kuomintang leaders to allow the Communists to join -- as individuals only, not as a group -- the Kuomintang.⁸

The cooperation between Communists and Kuomintang began when Sun Yat-sen accepted Russian help to train a military force for the Nationalists. Both military strategy and propaganda tactics were emphasized at the Academy and the new army became phenomenally successful, catapulting to fame one of its young leaders -- Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang found support on all sides -- as a close friend of Sun's, as an associate of the Russian advisors⁹ and as the model for thousands of young military men

⁷ Lenin had foreseen the possibilities involved in having a friendly China. In fact, both China and India, with their huge populations, led him to some speculative thinking. See F. F. Liu, *op. cit.*, p. 3-4.

⁸ After his death, Dr. Sun became a national hero. Pictures of him were prominent in every propaganda campaign. "... over every third bed, on an average, hangs a picture of Sun Yat-sen, and over every fourth bed, I should say, a picture of Lenin or Trotsky." Quoting Paul Scheffer, "Sacrificed Generation," *Living Age*, Vol. 329 (May 8, 1926) p. 302. Mr. Scheffer is referring to students' beds.

⁹ The size of the mission has been variously reported but during 1925 was believed to number about 1,000 military and political personnel. Russia's interest in China can be judged by the caliber of the men she placed in key positions there.

in China.¹⁰ In 1923, after a bitter struggle, the Kuomintang was reorganized again, this time to be patterned after the Russian Communist Party. Three Communists, including Li Ta-chao, were made members of the Kuomintang Executive Committee. Mao Tse-tung was a reserve member. With the help of Soviet Russia and the Chinese Communist Party, the Kuomintang was able to build a military machine capable of challenging the Northern warlords. This new army was led by Red-Army trained Whampoa graduates, filled with revolutionary zeal and Communist propaganda.

Both the Communists and the Nationalists had great respect for propaganda and its effect on the people. In an interview, Borodin said: "It has been unavoidably necessary to rouse the masses of the country for the purpose of creating a strong feeling behind the revolution."¹¹ The Propaganda Department's advisors (and many of its funds) came from Russia, just as did much of the military support.¹²

As soon as the army cleared a district of the enemy, the party organization was set up and the affairs of

10 Sun Yat-sen named Chiang Kai-shek to work out the details of Canton-Moscow military cooperation and in October, 1923, Chiang went to Moscow. That mission started him on his meteoric rise. Stalin often sided with Chiang and the dual-nationalist movement in China, while Trotsky urged the Chinese Communists to go it alone.

11 Aage Krarup-Nielsen, The Dragon Awakes. (London: John Lane The Bodley Head, Ltd., 1928) p. 143-144. Nielsen's interview with Borodin. Several writers credit Borodin with being the organizer and originator of the Chinese "Great Revolution." See V. Sheean, "Disruption of the Kuomintang," Asia, Vol. 27 (August, 1927) p. 628; A. K. Nielsen, "Borodin's Swan Song," Living Age, Vol. 33 (December 1, 1927) p. 1000; and "Hatching World Revolution in China," The Literary Digest, Vol. 92 (March 12, 1927) p. 29.

12 "Bolshevik Russians were known to be with the gearwheel [Nationalist] troops. The planes made much face for the gearwheel in Changsha. They added to the unease on the San Pablo. England and Japan and America had thousands of airplanes, but they did not have any in Hunan Province." Richard McKenna, The Sand Pebbles. (New York: Harper & Row, 1962) p. 335.

that place were put under the direction of the party. Propaganda of the principles of the party went on on a gigantic scale, carried by a vast army of party workers who followed the army or were specially sent out by the party. The cry was to reach the masses. It was a sincere and honest attempt to preach the doctrines to the workers of the town and to the peasants of the country.¹³

Not everyone was enthusiastic about the union of Russian sympathizers, Communists and Kuomintang. The conservatives of the Kuomintang, shortly after the death of Dr. Sun, called an independent conference -- a breach of party discipline in itself -- and voiced opposition to the Communists in their midst. Foreign observers, too, worried over the coalition.

... the writer has another suspicion to raise. It has been, in the international situation, that Russia stands on one side and Great Britain and America or the Anglo-Saxon on the other. All the recent anti ...'s have had something to do either with Great Britain or America. It has been practically the same group of people who were responsible for all kinds of demonstrations who celebrated the Russian National Day more than they did the October 10th. One often wonders who has been pulling the string behind the curtain after all.¹⁴

And a few missed the significance altogether:

But these Russian experts, unlike their confreres in Peking who dictate policy to the Chinese Finance Ministry, are simply there to carry out the wishes of the Nationalists; they have shaped China's progress and rendered signal services to the Chinese people, which stand out in vivid contrast to the 'assistance' given by some British and Japanese nationals¹⁵

¹³ T. C. Woo, The Kuomintang and the Future of the Chinese Revolution. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1928) p. 218-219.

¹⁴ Frank Lee, "Communism And The Anti-Christian Movement," The Chinese Recorder, Vol. LVI (April, 1925) p. 223.

¹⁵ Tang Leang-li, China In Revolt. (London: Noel Douglas, 1927) p. 159.

The Great Revolution¹⁶ extended from 1925 to 1927 and resulted in the overthrow of the Peking Government, a feat which would have been impossible for the Nationalist forces alone. Throughout the long campaign there was strife between the two factions -- Communist and Kuomintang -- in spite of the fact that both claimed to be legitimate heirs of Sun Yat-sen. For a time there was a Communist headquarters in one part of the country and a Nationalist headquarters in another. The Chinese Communists had risen to a position of great influence in a remarkably short time. At the close of the victorious campaign they could hardly be expected to steal away. Said the Wichita Eagle, "The open door in China now resolves itself into a question of which way will it swing."¹⁷ The alliance came to an abrupt end in 1927 when Chiang expelled all Communist members from the Kuomintang. At the same time Borodin and company were forced to leave.¹⁸ Many of the Communists, students and labor leaders were arrested and killed in a wholesale slaughter. Among

16 For its effect on an ordinary peasant, see Pearl Buck's "Revolutionist," in the September, 1928, issue of Asia, pp. 685-9.

17 "The Chinese In America," The Literary Digest, Vol. 92 (March 12, 1927) p. 98. In the same issue there appears an article "The New China Revealed," (p. 20) in which we read: "While nations other than the Chinese fear the Red influence in China, Chinese authorities point out that China can never become Bolshevist but will remain essentially Chinese." George Sokolsky was also misled. "There they were, frightening the whole world that the old Chinese dragon was waking from his sleep and was preparing to paint all of Asia red, while all the time, the propagandists of this idea were laughing up their sleeves at those who got so scared. For they know that it is not the nature of a Chinese to be a Communist; that Russian Bolshevism was a result of oppression such as does not exist in China" George Sokolsky, quoted in "Why Communism Will Fail In China," The Literary Digest, Vol. 89 (June 26, 1926) p. 18.

18 Along with them went Madame Sun Yat-sen, widow of his second marriage, a refined and sympathetic little woman, and an ardent believer in the doctrines of Nationalism. She came under the influence of Borodin and other Communist leaders and to this day occasionally makes public appearances at Communist functions in Mainland China. She and Madame Chiang are sisters.

them were some of Mao Tse-tung's early associates and his wife. Remaining Communists established themselves in the hills and rural areas of China to begin intensive Guerilla warfare. (A tactic Communists still find useful.) Temporary unity occurred during the thirties as both joined forces to fight the Japanese.¹⁹ After the Second World War the truce ended and, after a combination of circumstances which would make an interesting study in themselves, the Peoples' Republic of China was established in 1949. Many people wonder how long the Communist regime can stay in power. Chu Chai uses an interesting quotation from Mencius:

Chieh and Chou [the wickedest rulers] lost their empires because they lost the people; they lost the people because they lost their hearts. There is only one way to hold their hearts -- that is to get for them what they like, and not to impose on them what they dislike.²⁰

Comments Chu Chai, "History offers many examples that confirm this statement. Historical precedents do not doom the Chinese communist regime, but they cannot be dismissed as irrelevant."²¹

The greatest asset of China is not to be found in its educational, social, economic, or political movements, all of which have changed greatly in the past and may change again in the future -- but in China's one abiding asset -- the character of its people.

¹⁹ The Communists had actually captured Chiang Kai-shek. Chou En-lai agreed to release Chiang if he would promise to fight Japanese instead of Communists and would accept a united front with the Communists. Chiang was forced to agree on December 25, 1936, and was freed after promising to cooperate in Chou's plan.

²⁰ Chu Chai and Winberg Chai, The Changing Society of China. (New York: A Mentor Book, The New American Library, 1962) p. 100.

²¹ Ibid.

APPENDIX

BRIEF BIOGRAPHIES OF PROMINENT CHINESE PERSONALITIES INVOLVED IN EVENTS AT THIS TIME (1919-1921)

Chinese names are foreboding enough without having to determine whether similar appearing names possibly refer to previously identified persons. Sun Yat-sen, for example, is also known as Sun Wen; Hu Shih as Suh Hu or Hu Suh. Perhaps one of the most difficult men to identify is Chen Tu-hsiu whose name appears as Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Shen Tuh-siu, Chen Chung-fun and Ch'en Tu Hsiu. For the reader's convenience, therefore, there follows a roster of the most important Chinese mentioned in this paper. One spelling has been selected for each man's name and is used throughout the paper (except for variant spellings in direct quotations). Following each name is a brief, informal biography which outlines some of the man's activities during the period under study.

CHANG TSUN-HSIANG -- One of the three "traitors." Studied in Japan. Schoolmate of Tsao Ju-lin. Briefly taught at Peking University. Became Minister to Japan in 1916 after other government service. Was held responsible (by anti-Japanese factions) for a number of unpopular Japanese loans. Signed exchange of notes favoring Japan in Shantung situation. Dismissed in 1919 after May 4th incident. Beaten by students while at Tsao's home. Rumored involved in a plot to assassinate Tsai Yuan-pei.

CHANG TSO-LIN -- Militarist. Partner in defeat of Tuan Chi-jui and the Anfu Club. Held control of Peking for a short time as leader of the Northern warlords. Defeated by Chiang Kai-shek in 1927.

CHEN TU-HSIU -- 1879-1942. Chen had a strict classical education and passed two civil service examinations. While studying abroad (Japan) he formed the Chinese Youth Society. On return to China he founded a newspaper in Shanghai, and in 1904 experimented with a vernacular magazine. Chen founded New Youth, the key magazine in the Chinese Renaissance. Chen also helped to edit The Tiger, another break-from-the-past magazine. He was made Dean of Letters at Peking University (under Tsai Yuan-pei) and helped Peking students establish New Tide, still another "awakening" magazine. Chen consistently advocated the destruction of old traditions and the awakening of youth. "Although something may come down from the ancients," he said, "though it be approved by sages, imposed by the government, and accepted by the people -- if it is impractical it is without value and should be suppressed" (Levenson, p. 125). Chen, Hu Shih and Tsai Yuan-pei were considered the leaders of the New Thought Movement although in reality there was no one real leader of the movement. In September, 1919, Chen organized the New Youth Society and with the aid of Comintern Agent

Gregory Voitinsky, organized (in 1920) the Socialist Youth Corps. From these beginnings came the Chinese Communist Party. Chen is considered one of its founders, along with Li Ta-chao. Chen later was appointed chief of the education board in Canton. He was one of many Communist sympathizers brought into Kuomintang leadership.

CHIANG KAI-SHEK -- Chiang does not appear in the events covered in this paper because he was "in retirement" from 1917 to 1923. For a while he served under Chen Chiung-ming who later came to Dr. Sun's aid. During these years Chiang read New Youth and New Tide. He also studied English and Russian. Later Chiang became commander at Whampoa and trained -- with the help of Soviet advisors -- the very successful Kuomintang army. Chiang showed a great amount of interest in Soviet Party organization and in Red Army methods. He won initial fame as Sun's representative to Lenin and became known as the leading Chinese expert on Soviet systems.

CHIANG MON-LIN -- A liberal educator who, like Hu Shih, studied under Dewey. Very active in many of the organizations which began shortly after May 4, 1919. Chiang was a member of the Kuomintang.

CHIEN HSUAN-TUNG -- One of several "editors-in-committee" of New Youth. Left New Youth Society when it became Communist. Chien studied in Japan, experimented with publication in the vernacular and later joined the faculty of Peking University. Chien supposedly recommended Chen Tu-hsiu to Tsai Yuan-pei for a University post. He was a supporter of Hu Shih's literary reform proposals, and was also a member of the Kuomintang.

CHOU EN-LAI -- Son of a great Mandarin family. Brilliant student. Once attended a Christian mission school. Consistently won scholarships. Became a student leader and at one time was imprisoned. Went to France as a worker-student and while there became influenced by Communism and helped to organize the Chinese Communist Party -- Paris branch. Chou also studied in Japan and after the May 4th protest parade, returned to China to edit the Tientsin Student Union newspaper. As a student at Whampoa Military Academy, and later, as an assistant instructor, he helped with seminars in political training.

CHOU TSO-JEN -- Studied in Japan, later became one of the editors of New Youth. Left when society and magazine went Communist. A member of the faculty at Peking University he was the only faculty member of the New Tide Society. One of the few intellectuals to actively oppose the Anti-Christian movement. He was very active in the Literary Revolution.

HSU SHIH-CHENG -- President of China at the time of the May 4th movement. He treated protesting students roughly and for a long time

refused to accept resignations of the three "traitors." He forced the resignation of Tsai Yuan-pei, Peking University Chancellor.

HSU SHU-CHENG -- Chinese warlord, and an able general. Tuan Chi-jui's right-hand-man and chief of staff. Leader of the Anfu Club. Usually known as "Little Hsu." Called a traitor by the students because of his pro-Japanese sympathies.

HU SHIH -- Born into a wealthy family, Hu Shih became one of the greatest men in modern Chinese history and a staunch defender of the freedom and rights of all individuals. Hu's life spanned Manchu rule, Republic, Revolution and Communism. Hu Shih's greatest single achievement was the promotion of the vernacular language in replacement of the literary language. For this he has been compared with Chaucer. Hu studied in the United States, at Cornell and at Columbia (under Dewey). His Doctorate, in philosophy, is from Columbia. Hu returned to China to join the faculty of Peking University. Hu firmly believed in the establishment of a new China through education and in this differed from Chen Tu-hsiu who was more politically inclined. When New Youth and other organizations with which Hu was associated took on leftist colors, Hu withdrew. He became very active in educational movements in China and was a leading member of the committee assigned the task of establishing a new curriculum for Chinese schools. Said Marquis Childs in Hu's obituary last year (1962) "... a humanist in the finest sense of (the) term."

KANG YU-WEI -- Author with anarchistic and utopian socialistic ideas. One of the early reformers (100 Days of Reform) and cofounder of the Society for the Strengthening of Learning which later became Peking University. Many of the student leaders were profoundly influenced by the ideals and writings of Kang. Mao Tse-tung told Edgar Snow, "I worshipped Kang Yu-wei" (Snow, p. 133)

KUANG HSU -- Son of Prince Chun and nephew of the Empress Tzu-hsi, regent during his reign. Kuang Hsu issued the reform decrees of the 100 Days of Reform (1898) which incurred the wrath of Tzu-hsi, the Empress Dowager, who then ordered him confined as she took over control of the government.

LIANG CHI-CHAO -- Another of the leaders of the 100 Days of Reform. Edited and published a magazine (The New People) which advocated adoption of Western methods in China. Liang was one of the first to favorably comment on Marx (1902) and was a co-founder of the Society for the Strengthening of Learning, which later became Peking University. A great and famous journalist (Lin Yu-tang) called him "the greatest personality in the history of Chinese Journalism." Liang was also a leader in the Chinputang and one of the first to suggest inviting Bertrand Russell to China.

- LI HUNG-CHANG -- An early advocate of foreign schooling for Chinese students. Paul Clyde calls him a "great nineteenth century leader." Li was also a militarist, in spite of his traditional Confucian education. He understood the value of Western knowledge to China and consistently advocated progressive policy.
- LI TA-CHAO -- One of the committee of editors for New Youth. Also wrote for The Tiger. Chief librarian at Peking University and later a professor there. Once served as secretary to a leader of the Chinputang. Li and Chen worked closely together and are recognized as co-founders of the Chinese Communist party. Li later became virtual leader of the party in the North. He was one of the few Communists to promote a coalition of Kuomintang and Communists. As a Communist, he was elected to the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee. Mao Tse-tung worked for Li at the Peking Library and was influenced by him. Li was hanged by Chang Tso-lin in 1927.
- LU KAN-CHANG -- One of the early reformers who was particularly far-sighted when it came to observing the changes Western knowledge would make in China. Lu wrote extensively, always advocating the adoption of scientific thinking and methods. He was one of the very early ones to advocate a simple script for the Chinese language.
- LU TSUNG-YU -- Director of the Currency Reform Bureau. Studied in Japan. Regarded as one of the most pro-Japanese officials in the Peking regime. His favorite subordinate was "Little Hsu." Served as Chinese Minister to Japan at the time of the Twenty-one Demands. One of the three "traitors" Attempted to resign but President Hsu refused to accept his resignation.
- MA CHUN -- One of the better known young men who became a student leader, Soviet sympathizer and prominent Communist.
- MAO TSE-TUNG -- At Peking University from 1918 to 1919. Oddly enough, many of the student and intellectual leaders at that time seem to have ignored him. Li Ta-chao helped him but Chen was singularly unimpressed (see Chow Tse-tung, p. 75). Mao was very impressed with what he saw and learned at Peking. He became a student leader at Changsha and an active supporter of the May 4 movement. He edited what came to be known as a very fine newspaper -- the Hsiang River Review. Mao himself admits he took a more direct role in politics after the May Fourth Incident. He founded a New People's Study Society and the Changsha Society for the Study of Marxism. In 1920 he organized workers politically and admits he was guided by the influence of Marxist theories and the Russian Revolution. At one time Mao edited a publication issued by the Kuomintang. He found himself doing more and more writing and also working extensively with the peasants.

SUN YAT-SEN -- 1866-1925. Formed several revolutionary societies and was the successful leader of the 1911 revolt which resulted in the Chinese Republic. Authored the San Min Chin (Three Principles of the People), which quickly became known as "nationalism, democracy and socialism." His doctor title is that of M. D. The following is taken from "Sun Wen: Revolutionary and Idealist," The Chinese Recorder, Vol. LVI (April, 1925) p. 213-214.

Although frequently regarded as a dreamer and idealist there was a forcefulness about his character which made his name one to conjure with, and his movements of wide importance. He has been considered very generally as a plotter rather than an organizer; one who could pull down an undesirable and dangerous edifice, but had not the qualities necessary to become an empire builder Progressivism in China in those days meant direct and drastic action rather than expressing petitions and earnest hopes. It may safely be said that, as was expressed in an article in the last August "Asia," "If there is a republic in China to-day, the credit belongs to Doctor Sun. If, also, the republic is a failure, the blame attaches to Doctor Sun more than to any other individual."

TSAI YUAN-PEI -- Minister of Education under Sun. Later Chancellor at Peking University. Helped organize a group to send students to France for study. Also went to France and Germany. After 1917 campaigned to reorganize and reform Peking University. Devoted his life to education, revolution and Russian nihilism. Gathered the new intellectual leaders at Peking University which traditionally was conservative. Tsai permitted coexistence of divergent opinions. "All theories which can be maintained on rational groups and which have not reached the fate of natural elimination, shall be allowed to be freely propagated at the University." (Tang, p. 104) Considered the "high priest" of the intellectual class, Tsai established guidelines for the ideal university -- academic research, wide learning (not just preparation for government examination) and an institution of academic freedom. After Tsai took over at Peking University, enrollment soared. Tsai was very impressed with Chen and also with the movement to establish the vernacular as a suitable means of communication. He resigned under pressure after the May 4th incident but the students insisted on his return and he was back in triumph in July, 1919. He early advocated co-education and formally enrolled women as students in the university in 1920.

TSAO JU-LIN -- Studied abroad (Japan) and became vice-minister of foreign affairs by the end of the Manchu Dynasty. He was dismissed after the revolution but remained Yuan Shih-kai's personal advisor. He was a member of the Chinputang and in 1915 negotiated the Twenty-one Demands. Named Minister of Communications in 1917 he also became (concurrently) Acting Minister of Finance. He worked closely with the pro-Japanese Anfu Club. Dismissed after May 4, 1919, as

one of the "traitors" he was later honored by the government, to the dismay of the students. It was his home which was stormed May 4.

TSAO KUN -- Militarist. Defeated Tuan Chi-jui. Had British sympathies on his side. Eventually became president of China (Northern government) in what has come to be known as the most dishonest election in Chinese history.

TUAN CHI-JUI -- Militarist. Gained early fame by helping suppress the Boxer Rebellion. Closely allied with Yuan Shih-kai for several years. With "Little Hsu," he established the machinery for the Anfu Club. Tuan was defeated by Tsao Kun and Chang Tso-lin in 1920.

TZU HSI -- No doubt the most famous woman in Chinese history. Unscrupulous but powerful. Very proud of the throne and what it represented, she resisted all types of reform as being dangerous to the continuance of the power of the Emperor. She began her career as a Royal concubine; ended up as virtual ruler of the empire. Pearl Buck has published a fictionalized biography of "Old Buddha," under the title Imperial Woman.

JAMES YEN -- Studied in the United States, graduating from both Yale and Princeton. Went to France to help the Chinese workers there and initiated a simplified education system to teach the illiterate to read and write easy Chinese. After his experience in France, Yen returned to China as secretary of the National Committee of the Y.M.C.A. in China. He helped to found the Chinese National Association of the Mass Education Movement of which he became director. Forster (p. 140) compared Yen's activities in education with those of Hu Shih.

YUAN SHIH-KAI -- Li Hung-chang's agent in Korea during the Sino-Japanese War. Yuan became the central figure in military reforms following 1895. He won the confidence of Tzu Hsi and maintained order in Shantung during the Boxer Rebellion. He was entrusted with direction on military and foreign affairs in North China after the death of Li and became the "chief warlord." He was dismissed from office in 1908 but in 1913 was elected president of China. Later he schemed to restore the monarchy. He died in 1916.

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