Analyzing the American and German governments' usage of the web: Framing, and agenda-setting, and the Iraq war

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Melanie C. Gipp

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THESIS ACCEPTANCE

Acceptance for the faculty of the Graduate College,

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This thesis presents how the American and German governments used their official websites to support or oppose the war in Iraq in 2003. This study is a qualitative framing analysis of www.whitehouse.gov, www.bundesregierung.de, the American newspaper New York Times, and the German newspaper Die Welt. The timeframe of documents examined in this study is from March 1st, 2003 until May 1st, 2003. The theories of framing and agenda-setting were used to examine the websites as well as the New York Times and Die Welt.

The results of this study show that the American government used distinct frames to set the agenda in order to gather support from the American public. The New York Times used similar frames to www.whitehouse.gov, but additional frames were found, discussing issues not mentioned on the U.S. government's website. In the same way the German government used specific frames to set its agenda to gather support from the German public to unify and oppose the war in Iraq. Frames found in Die Welt were very similar to those on the website with some additional information about the war.

There were distinct differences found between the coverage of the war among the American and German websites and newspapers. The frames of the U.S. governments
website www.whitehouse.gov had distinct differences in ranking and content to the frames in the *New York Times*. Whereas the frames of the German governments website www.bundesregierung.de and the frames of *Die Welt* ranking and content wise were very similar.

**Keywords:** framing, agenda setting, war, Iraq, political, U.S., Germany, governmental websites, *New York Times*, *Die Welt*
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

To many people the war in Iraq in 2003 seems to be a repetition of what happened in the early 1990’s in regards to politics, media coverage and the impact of communication. The Gulf War also caused discussions about the magnitude of issues around the world. The parties involved were examined closely regarding their policies and the media’s role.

Much research has been done about the occurrences and the impact the Gulf War had on the communication field, but the research of last year’s war is still in the making. Communication research about the Gulf War was done with the use of theories such as agenda-setting, framing, gatekeeping and other public opinion theories such as the Spiral of Silence. I find these theories very useful for an examination of the war in Iraq in 2003 as well, but almost no papers have been published in the communication field on this subject to date.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the theories of agenda-setting and framing and study how they help explain the media coverage of governmental activities, such as the war in Iraq in 2003. This research will give a better insight in how these theories can be useful in contrasting how the U.S. and German governments distribute information about policies, conflicts and in this instance - war. This research is important for people in any country to be able to interpret information given directly by their governments as well as the enhancement of understanding of the media’s usage of government sources. It
will also help the public to evaluate coverage of wars and conflict as well as possible propaganda.

The first and to this date, only published journal article dealing with communication aspects and the war in Iraq of 2003 is, “Public relations and propaganda in framing the Iraq war: a preliminary review” by Ray Eldon Hiebert, where the author discusses public relations and propaganda strategies used by the Whitehouse and Pentagon to frame the war in Iraq. One of the frames identified by the author is the particular justification of a war, which will also be discussed as one of the findings of this study.
CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

Agenda-setting and War Coverage

Agenda-setting is “the idea that media don’t tell people what to think, but what to think about” (Baran & Davis, p. 311). Agenda-Building is “a collective process in which media, government, and the citizenry reciprocally influence one another in areas of public policy” (Baran & Davis, p. 314). Carter (1998) finds that “by choosing which stories are disseminated, editors are able to influence the public’s perception of what are the important issues of the day” (p. 392). This study will look at which stories were emphasized by the German and American governments in order to influence the public’s opinion. Scheufele (2000) found, that “agenda-setting research has widely accepted the media agenda as a given and only a few studies have considered the process by which it is constructed” (p. 5). The author also stated that “agenda-setting needs to be examined across levels of analysis” (p. 5), which include agendas of the media we well as the government. Scheufele (2000) concluded that many agenda-setting studies found a “positive association between the amount of mass media content devoted to an issue and the development of a place on the public agenda for that issue” (p. 7).

Brosius and Weimann (1996) found that “most agenda-setting studies have focused on the effects of media agendas on the agendas of the public and decision makers as well as the public’s effect on decision makers” (p. 562). And their study revealed that “interpersonal communication could enhance agenda-setting effects when the discussion dealt with issues covered in the media” (p. 563). Therefore interpersonal communication
can reinforce or compete with the media’s agenda, depending on its power and usage, leading to issues of opinion leadership as well (Brosius & Weimann, 1996).

Baran and Davis (2003) explained how Iyengar and Kinder (1987) demonstrated causality when they wrote that “Americans view of their society and nation are powerfully shaped by the stories that appear on the evening news. We found that people who were shown network broadcasts edited to draw attention to a particular problem assigned greater importance to that problem” (p. 313).

“The activities and issues the media cover and include in their content make up the media’s agenda of what the public should think about” (VanSlyke Turk & Franklin, 1987, p. 31). VanSlyke Turk and Franklin (1987) found that agenda-setting of political news differ internationally. They examined American and British journalists according to governmental public information on local media and governmental levels to find these differences. In both countries “an important task for government and for the public relations practitioners they employ is the separation and transmission of messages to the media” (p. 31). No such studies have been conducted to compare American and German practices, especially when the opinion about the topic studied differs drastically among these nations.

Wanta and Foote (1994) examined the influence a president has on the media’s “coverage of issues on which he is an important source” (p. 437) such as international crises. They found that there is a strong give-and-take, interactive relationship between the media and the President that is very different than the public-press relationship, with which he is successful in influencing media coverage. Their research suggests that “an
elite official, such as the President, should play an important role in the process of agenda-setting” (p. 441). Their analysis of presidential documents “clearly showed the President's success in influencing the media agenda” (p. 440). Especially during the Gulf War, "presidential statements and media coverage after the invasion could have affected the results, because the news media likely would have approached President Bush for information about the invasion” (p. 442). Wanta and Foote (1994) discuss how “during some international crises, however, the President may have been able to keep some issues on the media agenda, even after real-world events subsided, by emphasizing the issues” (p. 447). They concluded, “that the President influenced media coverage” (p. 445) during the Gulf war, but that in general “media coverage also may have influenced presidential emphasis” (p. 445). This may very well be the case in the government-press relations during the war in Iraq in 2003, which this study will examine.

Baran and Davis (2003) found that lead stories have a greater effect in terms of agenda-setting, which shows the importance of the position of a story in a newscast or newspaper. Iyengar and Kinder (1987) state that rather than increasing television agenda-setting power, dramatic news accounts undermine the agenda-setting process and that a vivid presentation also may be important. Igengar and Simon (1993) found that the media set the agenda of the Gulf War. It was the most important topic of news coverage during the crisis. Shifts in public opinion regarding the issue of conflict involve “the amount of news coverage accorded various political issues will dictate the degree of importance that the public attaches to these issues” (Iyengar & Simon, 1993, p. 367). The authors found, that “the ‘Gulf’ came in for a greater share of public attention than the
economy, deficit, and drugs combined. Just as readily, the ‘Gulf’ disappeared from the public agenda” (p. 374).

Okeowo and Swain’s (1999) study used the theory of agenda setting to examine the 1967-1970 Biafran-Nigerian civil war, analyzing news magazine coverage to determine whether public relations strategies employed by both sides were successful and advisable. The authors concluded, that “the ability of a government to seek to position itself positively or its enemy negatively through public relations or publicity might well be enhanced if that nation begins with comparatively low visibility and unmeasured valence on the Western media and public agendas” (Okeowo & Swain, 1999, p. 53).

**Information and Flow of Communication**

The two-step flow of communication indicates the existence of an opinion leader or another second person between the media and the recipient of media information. Brosius and Weimann (1996) tested their hypothesis on German television networks, finding that the notion of the two-step flow of communication exists and greatly affects media’s agenda.

Lenart and Targ (1992) interpreted their agenda-setting research in the way that “media potential for setting and altering political consciousness in a well-examined field of empirical research in political science” (p. 356).
Framing of Politics and War

Framing is related to agenda-setting due to its “focus on the relationship between public policy issues in the news and the public perceptions of these issues” (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000, p. 93). Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) defined news frames as the tools to “convey, interpret, and evaluate information” (p. 94). These frames are being used to talk about public events. Lenart and Targ (1992) stated, that the “selection, presentation, emphasis, and exclusion of media frames results in persistent patterns of cognition and interpretation that routinely organize the content and parameters of public discourse” (p. 341). By framing the media or public select certain parts of their perceived reality “to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation” (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000, p. 94).

The authors identified five frames common in U.S. news coverage:

1. Conflict frames, which “emphasizes conflict between individuals, groups, or institutions as a means of capturing audience interest” (p. 95),

2. Human interest frames, which bring “a human face or an emotional angle to the presentation of an event, issue, or problem” (p. 95),

3. Economic consequences frame, which report “an event, problem, or issue in terms of the consequences it will have economically on an individual, group, institution, region, or country” (p. 96),

4. Mortality frame, that “puts the event, problem, or issue in the context of religious tenets or moral prescription” (p. 96), and
(5) Responsibility frame, which “presents an issue or problem in such a way as to attribute responsibility for its cause or solution to either the government or to an individual or group” (p. 96).

During this study it will become apparent, that the German as well as the American government made extensive usage of conflict frames, human interest frames as well as responsibility frames. Also important to remember is, that “media frames are shaped by economic interests, dominant ideologies, government influences, and journalistic norms” (Lenart & Targ, 1992, p. 342), which both countries have a history of using to establish their influence in the political world.

In their 2000 study, Semetko and Valkenburg analyzed newspaper stories and television news and found that the responsibility frame was most often used by the media to report a political event. According to their data most news reported was from the past 24 hours and sensationalistic news concentrated mostly on human interest stories.

Framing was used by Iyengar and Simon (1993) to research news coverage and military affairs and found their respondents reported “higher rates of exposure to diplomatic response to the crisis” (p. 365). Looking at the coverage of the Gulf War, the authors found that audiences were rarely given background information of the conflict, history, socioeconomic, or cultural aspects of the conflict. Due to the frames set by the media, Iyengar and Simon (1993) “anticipated that exposure to television news would enhance viewers’ preference for the military” (p. 379). Lenart and Targ (1992) state, that the "government spends large amounts of money compiling and disseminating self-serving information that serves as the source of a large percentage of materials used in
news stories” (p. 354). This is, according to the authors, often a fraction of the journalists need and want of “readily available information” (p. 354) and they are unlikely to “challenge official frames and thus antagonize the government media source” (p. 354). This study will be comparing the government’s official website and compare it with the two major papers in each country, to see if these frames were indeed picked up by journalists.

Scholars suggested that media frames parallel U.S. policy (Lenart & Targ, 1992), which he draws from the observation of the “dependence on agency press releases and briefings, essentially public relations operations, serves to blur the line between the notions of and independent, public interest press and a press that facilitates the dispersion of official propaganda” (Lenart & Targ, 1992, p. 353)

In his 1999 research, Scheufele developed a process model of framing including the four stages of frame building, setting, individual-level process and feedback loop, for which he suggested future research. These stages are based on the agenda building process. Therefore frame building is “the formation of frames” (p. 115), frame setting is “concerned with the salience of issues, frame setting, or second-level agenda-setting” (p. 116). The “individual-level influence of audience frames (is based) on several behavioral, attitudinal, and cognitive variables (which) have been examined using, in most cases, black-box models” (p. 117), and the feedback loop constantly introduces or reproduces these frames. (Scheufele, 1999).

The framing of wars and information flow during Times of conflict is also considered to be propaganda. Nowadays news, though distributed and framed by the
government is rarely considered propaganda, and it is "less known how the United States Government manipulated the domestic news media during the Cold War years" (Parry-Giles, 1996, p. 149). The author questions the amounts of "interactions between the propaganda program and the domestic news medium" (p. 150) and their influence on journalists and therefore the information the public receives. Gattone (1996) argues that during the Gulf War "most reporters knew they were part of a massive propaganda campaign, but were unable to avoid covering the war on the administration's terms due to the limited material it offered" (p. 198).

The framing of the Gulf War was focused on "'clean images' such as high technology, efficiency, and expertise, while at the same time deemphasizing civilian casualties and the unpleasant realities of death and suffering (Kanjirathinkal and Hickey, 1992, p. 105). The authors also found that "the media portrayal of events such as the Persian Gulf War not only depicts the flesh and blood realities of war and global politics, but also evokes a myth in which the forces of good confront evil in an epic drama" (p. 105). They categorized the media's war coverage into "The Myth of the Hero", "Good versus Evil", "Overcoming Obstacles", "Fulfillment and Return", and "Incomplete Exorcism", where they found interesting facts about the media coverage of the Gulf War. Similar categories will be used in this study to examine the government publications as well as newspapers in both countries. Kanjirathinhalan and Hickey (1996) found that average soldiers were elevated to heroic levels (p. 108), the president demonized Sadam Hussein (p. 106), stripped him of any "socially acceptable personas" (p. 107) and the media focused on battered POWs, release of crude oil, pollution, rapes, murders and
plundering (p. 107). “The media then described various encounters between heroes and demons” (p. 109) and finally documented the return of the hero is “symbolized in dramatic parades, marches, weapons displays, and touching scenes of family reunions, shown in close-ups for maximum cathartic effect” (p. 110). Similar findings will be demonstrated and discussed in this study after examining the documents published.

Liebes (1992) conducted a study “comparing Israeli coverage of the Palestinian intifadeh and American coverage of the Gulf (“our” wars) with American coverage of the intifadeh (“their” war)” (p. 44), which revealed very different framing mechanisms. The author concluded that journalists treat their own country’s wars in different way from other people’s war, bringing up the question of objectivity, neutrality and balance (Liebes, 1992).

**Computer-mediated Communication**

The literature on computer-mediated communication (CMC) helps explain how people may use the Internet. In her book, Barnes (2003) discusses, how during early research computer-mediated communication was seen to be impersonal or even hostile communication, but that "these expectations do not hold true among experienced computer users because many individuals mix work correspondence with informal social messages" (p. 34).

The Internet is “the most participatory marketplace of mass speech that this country – and indeed the world – has yet seen” (Carter, 1998, p. 391). This relatively new form of communication changes the way we communicate with each other and our
governments, just as many other across the world, have transformed their communication techniques to this new medium and are able to set agendas and frame issues according to their policies. “During the nineties, computer-mediated communication (CMC) – denoted by such phrases as the Net, the World Wide Web, and cyberspace – has become the latest technological form to achieve the status of democracy’s savior” (Nedderman, Jones, & Fitzgerald, 1998, p. 9-10).

Levin (2002) stated how Howard Rheingold argued that “the political significance of computer mediated communication lies in its capacity to challenge the existing political hierarchy’s monopoly on powerful communications media, and perhaps thus revitalize citizen based democracy” (p. 81). Rheingold was also quoted by Nedderman, Jones, and Fitzgerald (1998) as finding CMC to be “a phenomenon that every virtual community member knows instinctively, the power of informal public life… Cyberspace is one of the informal public places where people can rebuild the aspects of community that were lost when the malt shop became a mall” (p. 10-11). Computers have changed the flow and availability of information and news (Levine, 2002). The author also argued that though we have this easier access, “most citizens know very little about politics not because such knowledge is hard to find but because they have no interest in finding it” (p. 84), which makes the internet’s importance and effectiveness to politics questionable. He also draws attention to the “inefficiency of government agencies is partly caused by their complicated procedures for moving information” (p. 85).
In their conclusion Nedderman, Jones, and Fitzgerald (1998) found that CMC cannot cause democracy to spread or flourish; but CMC may be especially helpful in making us better democrats, in facilitating the open discourse and the public policy formation processes associated with democratic institutions” (p. 19). Gattone (1996) writes that “carrying out a war increasingly involves a sophisticated understanding of how to use information technologies in the management of public opinion” (p. 197). In his paper he stated, how computer-mediated communication was being used by the government during the Gulf War “to frame the conflict in a certain way” (p. 198), which is what this study will also discuss in the findings.

SUMMARY

In this study the theories of agenda setting and framing will be vital in describing the communication released on the U.S. and German government websites as well as articles published in the American newspaper New York Times and the German newspaper Die Welt.

Agenda-setting is “the idea that media don’t tell people what to think, but what to think about” (Baran & Davis, p. 311). This idea will help examine the websites of the German and American government to determine what agenda they had to communicate to their citizens.

Framing is related to the study of agenda-setting. By framing the media or public selects certain parts of their perceived reality “to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation” (Semetko &
Valkenburg, 2000, p. 94). To determine the agenda of the German and American
governments, the author of this study will have to examine the frames apparent in the in
the communication of their websites as well as the newspapers selected.

Computer mediated communication is a relatively new form of communication
involving the Internet. It has changed the way we communicate with each other and how
our government communicates issues such as politics and conflict to us. The author will
also discuss whether CMC had an impact on the communication passed on to Americans
and Germans.

PURPOSE

The purpose of this study is to examine how the U.S. and German governments
used their official websites to promote or oppose the war in Iraq. This study will examine
which stories and information were emphasized by both sides and how they were trying
to promote their cause. Frames and agendas of each government’s website will be
determined.

The purpose of the study is also to conduct a qualitative framing analysis on how
the American newspaper *New York Times* and the German newspaper *Die Welt* reported
about the American government’s need to act, the German government’s opposition to
the war, the United Nations involvement, the impact on international relations, plans for a
future Iraq and other issues developed through the coding process. The author will
compare the frames apparent to determine whether the U.S. as well as German
government had certain agendas in publicizing this war.
This study will not be looking at the development of the war itself. The author will not discuss military advancements, strategic plans reports of casualties, bombardments and captures.
RESEARCH QUESTION

**RQ1:** What are the dominant frames, besides military information, found in the documents the American Government released through its website www.whitehouse.gov?

**RQ2:** What are the dominant frames, besides military information, found in the documents the German Government released through its website www.bundesregierung.de?

**RQ3:** What are the dominant frames, beside military information, found in the articles published in the *New York Times*?

**RQ4:** What are the dominant frames, beside military information, found in the articles published in *Die Welt*?

**RQ5:** How do the agenda and frames of the *New York Times* compare with the agenda and frames of the documents U.S. Government published on its website www.whitehouse.gov just before and during the war in Iraq in 2003?

**RQ6:** How do the agenda and frames of *Die Welt* compare with the agenda and frames of the documents German Government published on its website www.bundesregierung.de just before and during the war in Iraq in 2003?
DEFINITION OF TERMS

Iraqi War: For the purpose of this research study the term Iraqi war will be considered the time frame of the beginning of combat on March 15\textsuperscript{th}, 2003 till the official end of combat on May 1\textsuperscript{st}, 2003.
CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY

WEBSITES

In this study the researcher conducted a framing analysis to determine the U.S. and German governments’ uses of their websites www.whitehouse.gov and www.bundesregierung.de in order to promote or oppose the war in Iraq of 2003.

Whitehouse.gov

The U.S. government’s website creators have developed a special section called “Iraq: Special Report”, of which the researcher has printed and analyzed the News Releases, Speeches, Global Messages, and Fact Sheets published by the government and stored in the websites “Achieves”. The American governmental documents were accessed and printed in October of 2003. This research study only includes documents that were present on the website at this particular time and does not take into consideration documents that were on the websites before and might have been removed in the meantime, as well as documents that might have been added later in the year.

Bundesregierung.de

This study will also look at the German government’s publications on www.bundesregierung.de. Documents were retrieved from the “English Section” under the link buttons of “Press Releases” and “Speeches”. These documents were chosen
because they are the closest to what the government intended the public to know about the government’s mission and the war. The German government documents were accessed and printed in January 2004. As it is the case with www.whitehouse.gov, the analysis of www.bundesregierung.de only includes documents that were present on the website at this particular time and does not take into consideration documents that were on the websites before and might have been removed in the mean time, as well as documents that might have been added later in the year.

**Timeframe**

The messages in the selected publications have not yet been altered and interpreted by the media. The documents used for the study were published in the time period from March 1, 2003 until May 1, 2003. These particular dates were determined to be the beginning and cut off date of this study, because the publication of information about the war is still ongoing. March 1st lets the researcher still include some pre-combat information, which seems to be important to why the U.S. government decided on a war with Iraq and some controversial issues regarding this decision. May 1st was selected in order for this study to include material of actual war time. During this time, the U.S. government posted 77 of the earlier mentioned documents on its website and the German government posted 43 documents.
NEWSPAPERS

After conducting a framing analysis of the government documents this study will determine which of the messages were also published in the American newspaper the New York Times and the German newspaper Die Welt during the same time period. This will help determine whether the U.S. and German governments’ agendas differed from the agendas set by the newspapers, as well as the frames used to describe the conflict in Iraq.

New York Times

The author selected the New York Times as a source due to its reputation as the most literate, comprehensive and magisterial of U.S. newspapers (Goss, 2003). The paper is known for its international newsgathering ability and extensive international and foreign affairs coverage (Zhang & Cameron, 2003). The newspaper ranks 3rd in circulation and enjoys the reputation of high journalistic prestige (Kengan, 2002). The New York Times is a good choice for this topic, because it is also the choice for intellectuals, politicians, and other powerful members of society, which puts them into the position to influence debates on important issues (Kengan, 2002).

The New York Times has archives on the academic search engine Lexis-Nexis, during February 2004, and was searched for the terms “Iraq” and “war”. To further focus the article selection this study will only focus on the “Section A” of the newspaper, which mainly deals with government policies and international issues. During an initial search over 556 articles were found. Excluded from the study were editorials as well as news
summaries. The reason for excluding editorials was the fact that there was no direct comparison to be made with the websites, and the news summaries just repeated the information already discussed in the generally published articles. The number of articles was reduced to 214 during the coding process due to the nature of the articles. Some articles came up during the search, but did not represent the content matter required for this research project.

**Die Welt**

The German newspaper selected by the researcher to investigate this topic is *Die Welt*, which also ranks 3rd in circulation and is one of the most respected and prestigious papers in Germany (Cooper-Mahkom, 1998). "*Die Welt* aspires to be the paper that will explain German politics" (Dougherty & Roberson, 1999, p.16) and is known to be stodgily conservative. Like the *New York Times* in the United States, *Die Welt* is known for the journalistic accomplishments and the choice of news source by intellectuals.

The Archives of *Die Welt* were accessed in January 2004 through the website www.diewelt.de. Doing a general search for Iraq in the online archives of *Die Welt* for articles concerning Iraq in the selected time frame resulted in 1607 articles. Due to restraints on research time the decision was made to focus on the section of *Die Welt* that deals with politics in Germany. This was found to be the best solution because the German government’s policies will be discussed in this section of the paper. Search terms were “Irak” (Iraq) and “Krieg” (war). 94 articles were included in the study.
Editorials were also here excluded from the study, because of the reasons given for the New York Times. New Summaries did not exist in Die Welt.

The archives of Die Welt did not have an English version. The articles were translated by the researcher, which lead to no direct quotes being able to be included into this section of the study.

**Timeframe**

These two papers have been selected for a framing analysis of the article pertaining to the war in Iraq in the time frame from March 1 through May 1, which includes the time shortly before the beginning of the conflict until the end of combat. This also represents the same time frame of analysis as the American and German governmental websites for accurate comparison.

**CODING**

While reading through the documents chosen to be included in the study, a number of themes became apparent. The author noted those themes throughout each group of documents and then created frames according to these themes. These frames were created to help readers understand the material covered more clearly. Codings made in the frames are not mutually exclusive, which means that some pieces of information may have been coded and counted in one or more frames. The data was not coded by stories, but by pieces of information.
**Whitehouse.gov**

During the coding process the documents from www.whitehouse.gov were broken down into the categories of “Need to Act”, “Negative Talk against Iraqi Regime”, “U.S. as the Savior”, “Future Plans”, “Building Support and Positive Talk about U.S. Troops”, and “International Involvement”.

The frame “Need to Act” entails information regarding the reasoning of the administration to pursue a conflict in Iraq. Messages with a negative connotation against the Iraqi government or the Iraqi people were gathered under the category “Negative Talk against Iraqi Regime”. “U.S. as the Savior” is a category where information will be described the United States military as a savior of the Iraqi people, the Middle East and the World. The government released much positive information about its troops and their commitment and this type of rhetoric will be called “Building Support and Positive Talk about U.S. Troops”. The last category is “International Involvement”, where the author will discuss the international opinions about the conflict as well as the impact on international relations. These categories were chosen to present the much different intent of messages the U.S. government wanted to communicate to its people and everyone around the world (since the posting of messages on websites made this information retrievable from anywhere).

Military information will be excluded from this study. Though much “factual” information was released, the military developments are not of interest of the researcher. These categories include all the data in the documents on www.whitehouse.gov and are therefore to been seen as effective in analyzing the documents.
**Bundesregierung.de**

During the coding process the documents from www.bundesregierung.de are broken down into the categories of “No War - More Inspections,” “Humanitarian Concerns,” “Support by the German Government,” “International Relations and U.S.-German Relations,” and “The Role of the United Nations.”

These frames were chosen to present the many different intents of messages the German government wanted to communicate to its people and the international community. Major themes found on the website include information of the German government’s and people’s disapproval with a military intervention without United Nations support. This rhetoric as well as demonstrations were gathered in a category called “No War – More Inspections.” One of the reasons the German government opposed a military intervention was its belief that the U.N. inspections were effective and that the intelligence regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction was not complete. A major concern of the German government seemed to have been the delivery of humanitarian aid and the well being of the Iraqi people, which is being examined in the category “Humanitarian Aid”. The category “International Relations and U.S.-German Relations” discusses the German government concerns about relations among its allies, especially the United States and what the discussion of the conflict has done to them. The last category in the documents provided by the German government, is its concern about the role of the United Nations in this conflict and the discussions going on at Security Council meetings. This was examined in the Section “United Nations”.
New York Times

The coding of the 214 articles in the New York Times lead to the following frames. The messages of the newspapers can be grouped in the “The Role of the United Nations,” “Future Plans and Cost,” “International Relations,” “Humanitarian Concerns.” “Need to Act,” and “Negative Talk about the Iraqi Regime.”

The frame “The Role of the United Nations” covers the discussions that took place in Security Council meetings regarding this issue. The frame “Future plans and Cost” displays the information about the discussions of Iraq’s future, reconstruction and the costs associated with this. This frame also includes the discussion about international involvement in the future of a potentially war-torn country. Further reports about international discussions about Iraq were gathered in the frame of “International Relations”. The frame of “Humanitarian Concerns” discusses the need and organization of humanitarian aid for the Iraqi people. In this frame, the author describes conditions reported in the New York Times, which made Iraqis living conditions difficult. Many articles in the New York Times stated the U.S. governments “Need to Act”, describing conditions under which a military intervention was needed. Lastly the frame of “Negative Talk about the Iraqi Regime” gathered all negative statements made about the Iraqi Regime in the New York Times.

Die Welt

The dominant frames established for coding of Die Welt articles are “Call for no war and more inspections,” “International Relations and U.S.-German relations,” “The

The frame “Call for no war and more inspection” displays the messages found in the Die Welt articles that display anti-war message and the need for more inspections. A larger portion of the Die Welt coverage discussed the effect this war is having on international relations, in particular U.S.-German relations, which is being gathered under the frame of “International Relations and U.S.-German relations”. The role of the United Nations was emphasized by many of the newspapers articles and will be represented in the frame “The Role of the United Nations”. The newspaper also reported on the German governments and the German peoples concern for the Iraqi people and how they would be supplied with humanitarian aid, if the United Nation was not involved in a military intervention in Iraq. These messages will be gathered in the frame of “Humanitarian Concern”. The frame “Legality of the War” gathers the information representing concerns of a legal war without United Nations involvement. The frame of “Support by the German Government” discusses pledges made by the German Government to support the international community with the situation in Iraq. Lastly, the frame “Future Plans” deals with the discussions reported on involving the future of Iraq and who needs to plan and pay of the reconstruction – will it only be the U.S. or will the U.N. and other nations help?
CHAPTER IV
RESULTS

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

During the course of the coding of www.whitehouse.com for the categories of “Need to Act”, “Negative Talk against Iraqi Regime”, “U.S. as the Savior”, “Future Plans”, “Building Support and Positive Talk about U.S. Troops”, and “International Involvement” the researcher came to the following results.

The most common frame, with 27% of coding found in the data set, was the frame of “Building Support and Positive Talk about U.S. Troops.” This includes the praises of the U.S. military to boost morale among troops as well as the building and maintaining support of the public at home. “U.S. as the Savior,” the second common frame with 19%, covers rhetoric used by the U.S. administration to portrayed itself as a noble savior of the Iraqi people and the world. This positively charged frame is intended to gather more support from the American people. The frame “Need to Act,” next common frame with 18%, includes information communicated to the American public why the U.S. government felt the need to act by using the means of military intervention. The frame of “Future Plans,” 18% of the data set, covers the U.S. administrations statements on what to do in the future in Iraq. This includes how to deal with reconstruction, a creation of a new government, as well as the length of stay by United States military. “Negative Talk about the Iraqi Regime” entails all statements made by the U.S. administration to cast the
Iraqi regime in a very negative light. This information covered 13% of the frames determined. Lastly, under frame of “International Relations,” which covered 6% of the data set, the information released by the U.S. government pertaining to involvement by the international community during the selected time period.

**TABLE 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Negative Talk against Iraqi Regime&quot;</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Future Plans&quot;</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;International Involvement&quot;</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Need to Act&quot;</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;U.S. as the Savior&quot;</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Building Support and Positive Talk about U.S. Troops&quot;</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Need to Act**

In this frame the data was gathered that included information communicated to the American public on why the U.S. government felt the need to act by using military
intervention. It was the most common type of information found in the data and covers 27% of all codings made.

Most of this information was communicated before the beginning of major combat. Reasons given were the existence of weapons of mass destruction, the fact that Saddam’s regime targeted civilians, destroyed natural resources, and maintained connections with terrorist networks. President Bush stated “We’re dealing with Iraq because the dictator of Iraq has got weapons of mass destruction; he’s used weapons of mass destructions on his own people. He can’t stand America, he can’t stand our friends, he can’t stand our allies and he’s got connection to terrorist networks.”

The Bush administration felt the need to destroy chemical and biological weapons in the hands of Saddam and disarm him. The U.S. government saw Saddam Hussein as a threat to international peace due to his continuing efforts to produce missiles, as well as a threat to the security of the region. It also felt that 12 years after the end of the Gulf War the Iraqi regime has not complied and had not cooperated “…immediately, unconditionally, and actively” with U.N. sanctions.

The Bush administration decided that the U.N. inspections did not work and there was an imminent threat in the form of a danger of development of nuclear weapons as long as Saddam holds power and aids, trains, and harbors terrorists which have a deep hatred for America. “Saddam Hussein possesses weapons of terror, and provides funding, training, and safe haven to terrorists” he “…has a long history of reckless aggression and terrible crimes”. U.S. leaders decided that they need to take every threat seriously and not turn away from conflict in order to help prevent future acts of
terror and to protect America. They also felt that Iraqis deserve to be lifted from insecurity and tyranny and should be able to enjoy freedom, prosperity, and equality.

The author of the website documents stated that “The Iraqi regime has not complied and has not cooperated ‘immediately, unconditionally, and actively’” and there were still over 10,000 liters of anthrax unaccounted for.

On March 17th President Bush addressed the nation, and during this speech the frame of Need to Act was very apparent. He stated, that “Our good faith has not been returned...”, Saddam Hussein “…conceals some of the most lethal weapons ever devised”, “the regime has already used weapons of mass destruction against Iraq’s neighbors and against Iraq’s people” and that he might do it again and “kill thousands or hundreds of thousands of innocent people.”

Communication by the administration on www.whitehouse.gov stated that “peaceful efforts to disarm the Iraqi regime have failed” and that now a military intervention had to follow, in order to “rid Iraq of weapons of mass destruction” and free the Iraqi people.

After the beginning of combat the administration released hardly any communication fitting this frame “Need to Act.” The only time that this frame was being mentioned is on a fact sheet on April 4th, where anecdotes of life under Saddam Hussein showed precisely why the United States administration felt the need to act. Once again, the U.S. government stated that it needed to prevent the Iraqi regime from using its hidden weapons of mass destruction and that the Iraqi people are good and gifted people who deserve to be free.
There was no longer any need to communicate the necessity of a military intervention after it took place, because if the administration had not made its case by now it would admit an illegal aspect of this intervention.

**Building Support and Positive Talk about U.S. Troops**

This category includes the praises of the U.S. military to boost morale among troops as well as the building and remaining support of the public at home. Combined with the related category of “U.S. as the Savior” it was the most prominent frame in the administrations website. Both frames indicate a very highly charged publicity impact. It was the second most common type of information found in the data and covers 19 % of all codings made.

The administration stated that the United States of America does not turn away from its duties because they are difficult, it will assume immense and unacceptable risks and Saddam cannot weaken the military’s morale with fear.

The communication by the administration became more detailed after the beginning of combat. The administration repeatedly praised the military for its great skill and bravery; the communication said that the U.S. will prevail. It stated that the military will liberate Iraq and that the Iraqis demonstrate the honorable and decent spirit of the American military.

In many of the president’s speeches he thanked the soldiers and their loved ones and appreciated their sacrifice - “Thanks to the courage and might of our military...” and
“We all appreciate what you do on behalf of the security of this country,” were some of the president’s statements.

The communication often points out the fact that the U.S. military treats Iraqi military prisoners humanely and highlights the soldier’s daring against ruthless enemies. U.S. and coalition soldiers are “…treating innocent civilians with kindness, and showing proper respect to soldiers who surrender.”

Attention is often drawn to the fact that the American public needs to pay tribute to the professionalism and integrity of its forces and that the current generation of the military is not letting the public down “Their skill and their bravery, stands in sharp contrast to the brutality of Saddam’s regime”. “The current generation of our military is not letting us down,” and it is continuing to uphold the finest tradition and making this country proud. Other phrases often used are “acting together in a noble purpose” and “honorable conduct of our military.”

U.S. President Bush explained, that “We fight for the liberty of an oppressed people, for the security of the United States, and for the security of the world.” He added, these “…act of heroism and generosity…” will be rewarded. He also praised the “…strengths and kindness and goodwill…” of the U.S. military.

Most statements of this kind were made in March. Only a few references fitting this frame resurfaced in the last days of this data analysis, when it seemed very likely for official combat in Iraq to be over.
U.S. as the Savior

This frame covers rhetoric used by the administration to portray itself as a noble savior of the Iraqi people and the world. This positively charged frame does also intends to gather more support from the American people. It was the third most common type of information found in the data and covers 18% of all codings made.

The U.S. administration stated that the “tyrant will soon be gone,” and the day of liberation of the Iraqi people was near. It said that it is the U.S.’s duty to defend its people by uniting against the violence. The administration needs “to disarm Iraq, to free its people and to defend the world from grave danger” in order to ensure that there will be “no more aggressions against your (Iraq’s) neighbors, no more poison factories, no more executions of dissidents, no more torture chambers and rape rooms.” The president announced that the United State’s mission is “to free the Iraqi people from the clutches of a brutal dictatorship.” “Free nations have a duty to defend our people by uniting against the violent. American and our allies accept that responsibility.”

President Bush also promised to deliver needed food and medicine and help to build an Iraq that is prosperous and free as well as that the military will not destroy oil wells, which mean wealth for Iraqi people.

The administration also promised, in its communication, to spare innocent civilians from harm, make the world more peaceful, and fight for the liberty of an oppressed people, for the security of the U.S. and its friends and allies. President Bush on many occasions said in his speeches that “…we will defend our freedom. We will bring
freedom to others and we will prevail,” which was again repeated in the Global Messages, put out the next day.

President Bush made his belief in freedom for the world clear when he said, “the liberty we prize is not Americans gift to the world, it’s God’s gift to humanity.” He added that he believed the “…long-suffering Iraqi people will be free…” from a brutal dictator with his administration’s help. Mr. Bush, on multiple occasions, said that he wanted to “Make all free nations of the world more secure, and to free the Iraqi people…,” “…fight for the liberty of the oppressed people…,” and “…save lives…”

In April only three references were found that could be coded as the frame of the “United States as the Savior.” This may mean that President Bush and his administration felt that they have clearly communicated the frame of the United States role of the savior to the Iraqi people and the world.

The few comments that were made in April stated that “Now America has entered a fierce struggle to protect the world from a grave danger and to bring freedom to an oppressed people.” “We have applied our might in the name of peace, and the name of freedom. That’s why we applied our might and gave our word that the threat from Iraq would be ended.”

**Future Plans**

This frame covers the U.S. administration’s statements on what will happen in the future in Iraq. It was the fourth most common type of information found in the data and covers 17% of all codings made.
As the administration often emphasized before the war, that it will in the future deliver food and medicine, blankets and water, deliver humanitarian relief, bring economic sanctions to a swift close, and work for the long-term recovery of Iraq’s economy. “Any military presence, should it be necessary, will be temporary and intended to promote security and eliminate weapons of mass destruction, the delivery of humanitarian aid; and the conditions for the reconstructions of Iraq.”

The Bush administrations repeatedly promised to remain as long as necessary, prevent and repair damage caused by Saddam Hussein’s regime, and the natural resources (with oil being the major concern) will remain the property of the people of Iraq. The government also stated that it will protect Iraq’s territorial integrity, help its people determine the precise form of Iraq’s new government and, after the war is over, support representative government. The administration pledged, “We will protect Iraq’s territorial integrity; we will support representative government that will govern Iraq on the democratic basis of human rights and the rule of law.”

In their publications, the administration threatened that Saddam and his sons must leave Iraq or their presence will provoke attacks. It was made clear that war crimes will be prosecuted, and war criminals will be punished. The U.S. government also often stated that Iraqi military units will receive clear instructions on how they can avoid being attacked.

After the beginning of combat hardly any information about future actions were published by the government, the administration only stated again that they will spare
innocent lives, will prosecute with the utmost vigor, stay as long as necessary, and address immediate suffering.

**Negative Talk against Iraqi Regime**

This category entails all statements made by the U.S. administration to put the Iraqi regime in a very negative light. It was the fifth most common type of information found in the data and covers 13% of all codings made.

The administration continuously portrayed the Iraqi regime as a brutal regime with a history of mass murder and a “...long history of brutal crimes...” The communication stated that the U.S. is not dealing with peaceful men and that they “...will not be intimidated by thugs and killers.”

After the beginning of combat the administration put out many more of these negative messages. They reported that Saddam Hussein had placed Iraqi troops and equipment in civilian areas, attempting to “...use innocent men, women and children as shields for his own military final atrocity against his people.” President Bush said that this “outlaw regime” threatened the peace with weapons of mass murder and does not have any regards for conventions of war or rules of morality.

The administration called Saddam Hussein a “brutal dictator” and “tyrant” who is “evil at heart in many different ways.” Saddam’s troops are being called thugs who are an “enemy that knows no rules of law,” will wear civilian uniforms, willing to kill in order to continue the reign of fear. It added U.S. soldiers are facing the most desperate elements
of a doomed regime, which use real civilians as human shields, pretend to surrender, and kill their own citizens.

The Iraqi regime was called a “violent criminal gang calling itself a government” which breaches all the proper conventions of war. The releases of pictures of executed British soldiers were called acts of cruelty beyond comprehension. The government also gives examples such as a dissident who had his tongue cut out and others being tied to a stake in the town square where they bled to death. Regular army forces tried to desert, but got blown away by fellow Iraqi citizens.

Not only Saddam and his regime were portrayed to be “tyrants,” but Saddam’s sons are also called “brutal, brutal people” – “barbaric in nature,” a group of men that used fear as a tool of domination by President Bush.

**International Involvement**

In this frame the information released by the U.S. government pertaining involvement by the international community during the selected time period is gathered. It was the sixth, and least common type of information found in the data and covers 6% of all codings made.

In the first publications the administration called upon the international community for help and support and stated that they will work closely with the international community. These two statements concluded the information released before combat.
After the beginning of combat the U.S. government stated that it has the finest of allies. They published statements of support from the coalition, which usually simply included the promise of use of airspace. President Bush also stated that these countries have not “…failed to act.”

The administration credited a number of members with the securing of the southern oil field and vital port cities and with the delivery of tons of humanitarian aid. They praised the gunfire provided to support coalition troops, the clearing of port of mines, the securing of a key Iraqi oil platform in the Gulf, the monitoring of Iraqi intelligence, and with providing a special chemical and biological weapon response forces. The U.S. Administration thanked the international community for providing supplies, logistical and intelligence support, basing and over-flight rights, and humanitarian and reconstruction aid, and sharing the sacrifices of this war.
GERMAN GOVERNMENT

During the course of the coding of www.bundesregierung.de the frames of “No War - More Inspections,” “Humanitarian Aid,” “International Relations,” “Support by the German Government,” and “The Role of the United Nations” surfaced.

The frame of “No War – More Inspections” represents a larger portion of released information by the German government on www.bundesregierung.de and involves the issue, that the German government opposed the war in Iraq. This frame covers the most common type of information found in the data and includes 42 % of all codings made.

“The Role of the United Nations”, which covers 29 % of codings, displays the frame involving the importance of the United Nation during the conflict in Iraq. Here the German government mainly points out the necessity of war being approved through the U.N. and not alone by one nation. The frame of “Humanitarian Aid”, with 10 % is the third common frame and gathered the German governments’ statements that voice concern about enough humanitarian aid, pledge to provide humanitarian assistance, work out ways for the United Nations to provide humanitarian aid, and the governments concern for the people of Iraq. The German government stressed its position towards the importance of the maintenance of good international relations throughout the documents published, which were gathered in the frame “International Relations” and also covered 10 % of codings. The least common frame with 9 % of codings, is “Support by the German Government” and discusses the German government position against the war, but its pledges for certain levels of support to the United States and British administrations.
TABLE 2

Most Common Frames on www.bundesregierung.de:

- "No War - More Inspections" 42%
- "The Role of the United Nations" 29%
- "Support by the German Government" 9%
- "International Relations" 10%
- "Humanitarian Aid" 10%

No War - More Inspections

A larger portion of released information by the German government on www.bundesregierung.de involves the issue, that the German government opposed the war in Iraq. This was the most common type of information found in the data and covers 42% of all codings made.

Until almost the end of March the documents entailed messages, that the weapons inspections are working, the Iraqi government is destroying weapons as requested and the German government believed that through negotiations by U.N. authorities Iraq can be...
convinced to cooperate better with the demands of the international community, in particular the United Nations.

The German government stated many times on its website that there were effective alternatives to war and that “...a war would only foment further hatred, divisiveness and intolerance.” The Schroeder administration supported its position by stating their concern about the consequences to the people of Iraq and possible deaths, as well as the effects of “…economic sanctions under which the people of Iraq are suffering can be eased and ultimately lifted together.”

The government stated its case for more inspections and no military intervention by stating that there is “…no justification either for abandoning the weapons inspection process or for replacing it with a strategy which involves the use of force.” The government felt that the current intelligence provided by the United States and Britain did “…not justify a war that would bring certain death to thousands of innocent men, women and children.” A majority of statements called for more inspections and that disarmament should be the top priority.

Stating that “war must never be inevitable” and that the international community has to do anything to “avert a humanitarian disaster” the government made it their mission to promote peace.

“Germany would not approve a U.N. resolution that legitimized a war against Iraq,” was the policy of the administration though March. The government also stated that “Germany would not participate in an intervention against Iraq” because it believed in a “political solution to the crisis.”
The administration thought that “…the destruction of the Al-Samoud missiles is a visible sign of real disarmament” and the United Nations should continue its weapons inspection in Iraq with the aim being “full disarmament of Iraq by peaceful means.” Officials also believed, that there were signs of “…noticeable improvement in Iraqi cooperation with the inspectors” and this should be continued.

After the beginning of the military intervention by the United States and British military, German Chancellor Schroeder stated, that “The news that the war against Iraq had begun evoked a strong sense of concern and dismay in the German government.” It still believed that it was possible to “avoid a confrontation” through “accelerated and intensified” weapons inspections in Iraq.

German Chancellor Schroeder exclaimed in multiple press conferences, which were transcribed on the governments’ website that “The Middle East needs a new peace, not a new war.”
The Role of the United Nations

This frame displays the information involving the importance of the United Nation during the conflict in Iraq. Here the German government mainly points out the necessity of a war being approved through the U.N. and not alone by one nation. It was the second most common type of information found in the data and covers 29% of all codings made.

The United Nations has been and continues to be a framework for the promotion of peace and “Iraq conflict should be dealt with by the U.N. Security Council” if the peaceful route which was proposed by the Security Council and supported by the overwhelming majority within the international community is not possible. It is also the view of the German government that “…Iraq can and must be disarmed peacefully on the basis of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441.”

Chancellor Schroeder repeated his position, that “No one should be entitled to take military action against the country without prior legitimation by the U.N. Security Council,” and that the “German constitution permits involvement in military operations only on the basis of a corresponding U.N. resolution.” The government stressed that the “U.N. Security Council is and must remain the center of decision-making on the Iraq crisis” and a decision to go to war needs to be “on the basis of the U.N. Charter.” A spokesperson for the government stated, that “the German government wants to see a multilateral world order with a strong role for the United Nations.”
Germany is "prepared to assume responsibility" and will fulfill its international obligations, but the government feels like and often states that the "primary responsibility for dealing with Iraqi disarmament lies with the Security Council."

The administration strongly believed, that "...reconstruction of the country should (...) be carried out under the directing of the U.N."

In regards to humanitarian aid, the German government said that "humanitarian aid (should be delivered) under the leadership of the United Nations" and supports that "U.N. aid organizations have appealed to member nations to provide an additional 2.2 billion dollars for refugees and the people in Iraq." The website, www.bundesregierung.de also reported on the passage of a U.N. resolution to "...restart the oil-for-food program."

**Humanitarian Concerns**

In this frame the study gathered the government statements that pledge to provide humanitarian assistance, work out ways for the United Nations to provide humanitarian aid, and the governments concern for the people of Iraq. It was the third most common type of information found in the data and covers 10 % of all codings made.

The German government in the first pieces of communication released, expresses its concern "to prevent the impending humanitarian disaster in Iraq." The administration calls this threat of a humanitarian disaster a "catastrophe," making a point of urgency.

Chancellor Schroeder stated repeatedly throughout the documents that, "The German government is willing to support the United Nations and its specialized agencies
in providing humanitarian relief to help alleviate the suffering of the Iraqi people.” Often mentioned throughout the documents is the reaffirmation of “Germany’s willingness to help provide emergency aid and refugee relief,” and the government’s strong support to “...restart the ‘oil-for-food’ program,” to provide humanitarian aid to the Iraqi people.

Numerous statements were made that the government “…stressed the priority need to provide the people of Iraq with food, water, and basic health care” and that “Germany, like other counties, will help to finance humanitarian assistance provided on the basis of the U.N. resolution.” The government stressed the importance of this issue often proclaiming that they will fulfill their international obligations.

In one of the last pieces of data, German chancellor Schroeder remarked that “The responsibility for seeing to it that the basic needs of the civilian population are provided for lies in the hands of the coalition forces who have waged this war.” He made his point that responsibilities towards the Iraqi people cannot be forgotten.

**International Relations**

In this frame the German government stressed their position towards the importance of the maintenance of good international relations throughout the documents published. It was the fourth most common type of information found in the data and covers 10% of all codings made.

The main message apparent in this frame is that the German governments “…international involvement is greater than it has ever been before…” and important to the administration.
A good example is the repeated mentioning of a memorandum issued by Germany, France and Russia against the war, showing that decisions are not being made on an individual basis. Statements of “…Russia support(ing) the German position…” and comments that the government hopes the difference of opinion will not damage or have long-term effects on German-American relations.

Schroeder often stated that Germans and Americans are good friends and good allies and Germany will “…ensure the protection of American facilities in Germany…” and “… protect the families of military personnel living in Germany.” Not wanting to damage international relations Germany early on and later repeated its willingness to “grant overflight, transit and access rights in the event of a military intervention against Iraq.” These statements were made just before and at the beginning of combat.

The further into war, the more strained relations became. In April www.bundesregierung.de reported that U.S. President Bush was reported to have described U.S. – German relations to be “At best, we are estranged friends, where ‘estranged’ probably has to be underlined and ‘friends’ put in inverted commas”

Germany’s concern was also involved with the European Union’s role in this conflict and documents discuss Germany’s opinion, that “Europe should play a prominent role in the process of stabilizing postwar Iraq.” Germany’s general policy, “…we are partners in Europe and we want more European responsibility,” emphasizes this unity.

In one of the last pieces of data examined the German government reported, that “…there is full agreement between Germany and Ukraine with regard to Iraq” and also
talks about Russian-German relations that have strengthen over the course of this conflict.

**Support by the German Government**

This frame discusses the German government position against the war, but its pledges for certain levels of support to the United States and British administrations. It was the least common type of frame, created from the data and covers 9% of all codings made.

The German government made it very clear, that since the attacks on September 11\(^{th}\) Germany would “...provide military assistance to the United States in the fight against international terrorism.” When inspections in Iraq and the discussion of war intensified the administration pledged, that, “Germany will support the work of the inspectors with personnel and equipment” and “provide considerable resources for the inspections.” German Chancellor Schroeder also multiple times stated that Germany’s “…international involvement is greater than it has ever been before.” The administration also made its opinion about the importance for humanitarian assistance clear, by pledging help. “Like other countries, (we) will help to finance humanitarian assistance provided on the basis of the U.N. resolution…,” said Chancellor Schroeder, “If we can help, for instance with providing medical treatment for children, then this is an obvious humanitarian obligation.”

After criticism of German policy became louder, the administration stated, that “…the German government has never ruled out the use of force as a last resort,” and it
would “…fulfill its international obligations under the aegis of the United Nations.”

“Germany will do what it can to help achieve stability and peace in the region, if this is desired,” and their support of the United States is best stated in this part of a release, pledging help and fulfillments of Germany’s international obligations:

“With regard to protecting U.S. assets, using U.S. bases in Germany, as well as granting overflight rights, Schroeder said the stance taken by the German government on Iraq did not change the fact, that the United States and Great Britain are alliance partners and friends. The alliance provides rights but it also imposes obligations. These obligations follow from the provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty and various status-of-forces agreements. Schroeder reaffirmed that the German government would continue to respect these agreements. He said there may be differing positions on this in international law, but in light of German’s alliance obligations the German government would continue to allow the use of U.S. bases and not deny overflight rights. He added that it went without saying that American assets would be protected and – to the extent possible – also the families of military personnel living in Germany.”
The coding of the 214 articles in the New York Times lead to the results presented in the following section. The messages of the newspapers can be grouped in the “The Role of the United Nations,” “Future Plans and Cost,” “International Relations,” “Humanitarian Concerns,” “Need to Act,” and “Negative Talk about the Iraqi Regime.”

The most common frame found in the articles published in the New York Times from March 1st until May 1st is the issue of “The Role of the United Nations” involvement in the war. This frame includes 29% of codings made in the data set. The New York Times thoroughly covered the discussions that took place in Security Council meetings regarding this issue. The next most common frame, which covers 22% of information, discusses Iraq’s “Future Plans and Cost,” associated with this. The frame also includes the discussion about international involvement in the future of a potentially war-torn country. Further reports about international discussions about Iraq were gathered in the frame of “International Relations”, which also covers 22% of codings made. But this frame also includes the disagreements about the American Governments decision to go to war in Iraq, which drove a rift between the U.S. and some, mainly European, countries. The frame of “Humanitarian Concerns”, covers 12% of codings and discusses the need and organization of humanitarian aid for the Iraqi people. In this frame, the author describes conditions reported in the New York Times, which made Iraqis living conditions difficult. Many articles in the New York Times stated the U.S. government’s “Need to Act.” This frame covers 9% of all codings and describes conditions under which a military intervention was needed and also includes one of the
most compelling statements made by the U.S. government to act in Iraq. The Times extensively reported on the threat the United States faces through Iraq and its weapons of mass destruction. Last but not least important, was the frame of “Negative Talk about the Iraqi Regime.” In this category, which covers 6% of all codings, the author gathered all negative statements made about the Iraqi Regime in the New York Times, which was not a very prominent frame, but seemed important to the author for the course of this study.

TABLE 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Need to Act&quot;</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Humanitarian Concerns&quot;</td>
<td>12%</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;International Relations&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;Future plans and Cost&quot;</td>
<td>22%</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;The Role of the United Nations&quot;</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Negative Talk about the Iraqi Regime&quot;</td>
<td>6%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The Role of the United Nations

This category includes the information found most often in the articles of the New York Times. The coverage of the role of the United Nations, meetings and discussions was extensive and covers 29% of all codings made.

At the beginning of the conflict the newspaper reported that it was reported to the Security Council that Iraq has made ‘very limited’ progress toward full disarmament was followed by Iraq’s decision to destroy a whole class of banned ballistic missiles,” (Tyler, 03-01-03) which lead the United States further down the road towards war.

Leading up to the beginning of the conflict the New York Times extensively reported on the U.S. governments efforts to influence the vote at the United Nations Security Council to legitimize military action against Iraq. “Mr. Bush is desperately pursuing Mr. Fox for Mexico’s crucial vote on the United Nations Security Council in favor of a resolution implicitly authorizing an American-led attack on Iraq” (Bumiller, 03-03-03). The United States governments decision to enter the war was partially influenced by, “The new United Nations report, noting that Iraq had been found able to make chemical warheads for longer-range Scud missiles, said inspectors ‘assumed’ that Iraq could do so for shorter range missiles as well,” (Cushman, 03-10-03) as the New York Times reported.

The Times also reported on the extensive international battles that occurred at the United Nations regarding a war in Iraq. French President Chirac stood firm saying, that his country “…would veto a United Nations resolution threatening war against Iraq” (Sciolino, 03-11-03). While the U.S. President Bush said that his military would stage,
"...an attack on Iraq, whether or not the United Nations approved" (DePalma, 03-11-03). Joining this debate at the United Nations, Kofi Annan, U.N. secretary general said,

"...any military action taken without Security Council backing would violate the United Nations Charter" (DePalma, 03-11-03). The difficulties at the United Nations prompted the New York Times to describe the situation in the matter that, "President Bush and his plans for war with Iraq took two steps forward at home, and one step backward at the United Nations and abroad" (DePalma, 03-11-03). It was repeatedly reported that, "If the United States and Britain attack Iraq without United Nations backing, under the rules of the Geneva Convention they will be considered occupying powers and the onus of preventing any relief crisis will fall to them" (Santora, 03-13-03). This made the role of the U.N. crucial.

After the beginning of the war the focus of the United Nations role as described in the New York Times shifted from votes on whether to enter the war to the United Nations role of contributing humanitarian aid to the Iraqi people. The Times reported that "more than 16 million Iraqis now dependent on the United Nations' oil-for-food program" (Tyler, 03-12-03).

Towards the end of combat the New York Times reported on the U.S. government’s plans for Iraq’s future it became apparent that “Plans for the rebuilding of Iraq call for private American corporations to undertake much of the work, with the United Nations development agencies and other multilateral organizations sidelined” (Becker, 03-18-03). The paper also reported on discussion on “…whether the United Nations oil-for-food program could be restarted quickly...” (Tyler, 04-02-03) in order to help the Iraqi people,
as well as other roles the United Nations will assume during the postwar period. Reports were made, that “United Nations involvement might be necessary to convince banks and financial markets that they could safely and legally lend money to Iraq” (Stevenson & Hoge, 04-08-03). Other nations have established that it is “…expected (for) the United Nations to play an important role, whether as a political facilitator or dealing with issues like reconstruction or human rights,” (Stevenson & Hoge, 04-08-03) according to New York Times articles. But later articles report that “The Bush administration awarded the Bechtel Group of San Francisco the first major contract today in a vast reconstruction plan for Iraq that assigns no position of authority to the United Nations” (Becker & Opel, 04-18-03).

It was reported, that “President Bush pledged … to grant the United Nations a ‘vital role’ in postwar Iraq, but defined that principally as providing food, medicine and aid” (Stevenson, 04-09-03). Just a few days later an article a senior administration official was quoted saying that the administration does not “…see the need for a U.N. operation at all -- the Iraqi interim authority will be the equivalent of a civilian U.N. administration” (Becker & Opel, 04-18-03). This theme became more apparent, after other administration officials were being quoted in the New York Times saying that, “Iraq will not be put under a U.N. flag. The U.N. is not going to be a partner” (Becker & Opel, 04-18-03).
Future Plans and Cost

During the first five weeks examined in this study not many mentions were made in articles of the *New York Times*, most likely due to lack of the release of government plans for postwar Iraq and the countries reconstruction. It was the second most common type of information found in the data and covers 22% of all codings made.

First reports stated that one of “Mr. Bush's top security aides said recently that it was not possible to tell, even now, whether any war would last ‘three days, three weeks, three months or three years’” (Sanger, 03-03-03). Americans needed to realize that the government is involved in Iraq for the long haul. The article also clearly criticized that “Mr. Bush and his aides have never really addressed the question of casualties, cost or even how long a war in Iraq might last” (Sanger, 03-03-03). It questioned from the beginning the existence of concrete future plans.

The *New York Times* reported on discussions taking place about the formation of a new government. First reports quoted President Bush saying that, “The United States has no intention of determining the precise form of Iraq's new government” (Sanger, 03-03-03).

The U.S. Government planned to “…act swiftly in appointing an interim authority” (Tyler, 04-05-03). Administration official said “…an interim authority would draw from Iraqis both inside and outside the country and serve as ‘a repository of sovereignty,’ but would not act ‘as a provisional government’” (Tyler, 04-05-03). Initially the *New York Times* reported, “Under the initial timetable, that move was not to take place until three to six months after the government fell” (Jehl & Schmitt, 04-30-03).
But on April 20th the *New York Times* reported, according to administration officials, “…the scope of that has yet to be defined” (Shanker & Schmitt, 04-20-03). Through repeated mentioning in articles it is being made clear, that “The goal is not to install some particular group as the new leaders of Iraq,” (Pundrum, 04-07-03) which would “…absolutely contradict the whole notion of democracy” (Pundrum, 04-07-03). It was also reported, that the “United States will not tolerate an Iranian-style theocracy in Iraq,” (Jehl & Schmitt, 04-30-03) clarifying the administration’s requirements.

Some statements by government officials reported the “…rebuilding Iraq would cost at least $20 billion a year” (Wakin, 03-12-03). Other articles suggest, that the estimated “$20 billion a year estimate of costs ‘would be much greater’” (Tyler, 03-12-03). Early on the *New York Times* reported that the “White House request an immediate $3 billion for Iraq reconstruction tasks and food aid for the initial postwar phase” (Tyler, 03-12-03). Articles suggested that some members of the international community were, “…looking toward the post-war situation, where Europe will be called upon to provide aid and participate in rebuilding Iraq” (Bernstein, 03-18-03). It is also reported, that “At this stage, the only plan for including foreign corporations is as subcontractors to the American companies that win the bids” (Becker, 03-18-03). It added, “…even British companies have been excluded” (Becker, 03-18-03).

A number of articles discussed administration statements that Iraq’s oil resources are expected to play a critical role in “…financing Iraq's reconstruction as Washington faces massive rebuilding costs and uncertain partners with whom to share the burden” (Tyler, 03-20-03). But for this to be the case, the United Nations will have to remove the
sanctions imposed on Iraq. The administration plans that the Iraqis will, “…work with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, institutions with which the United States enjoys wide influence, to reshape the country. In the end, much of the reconstruction is to be paid for with revenues from Iraq's oil” (Fisher, Feuer, & Kifer, -4-20-03).

Mistakes by administration officials were also reported by the Times, such as the following remarks by Mr. Rumsfeld. "I don't believe the United States has the responsibility for reconstruction…” (Shanker & Bumiller, 03-28-03) of Iraq after the war.

**International Relations**

The next most widely reported, covering 22% of the codings, was on issue involves the United States and the toll the war in Iraq has taken on the countries “International Relations.”

The reports in the *New York Times* about support and opposition of the international community and the influence on international relations were very extensive during the weeks leading up to major combat, when the world was discussing what to do about the situation. But after the beginning of combat hardly any articles involved the mentioning of international relations anymore until talks about the postwar period began. This is when a few articles again mentioned international involvement and relations.

In the first articles of this data collection, the *New York Times* reported that “the Bush administration until now has argued that neither France nor Russia nor China will want to risk the ‘isolation’ that would come from using their veto at the Security Council
only to have the United States, Britain, Spain, Italy and many of the smaller nations of
Europe peel away to act in concert" feeling confident in its international presence. But
the more apparent it became that some countries will not vote for a U.N. resolution in
enter a war in Iraq, the more strain was put on international relations. Articles reported
that “Mr. Bush and Mr. Putin argued on the telephone over war and Iraq,” (Tyler, 03-01-
03) and a Russian official was quoted that how the U.S. “…decide(d) on Iraq is going to
have some consequences for U.S.-Russian relations” (Wines, 03-01-03). The Russian
president was not the only one contacted by the administration. President Bush contacted
numerous international leaders. As reported, “Mr. Bush is desperately pursuing Mr. Fox
for Mexico’s crucial vote on the United Nations Security Council in favor of a resolution
implicitly authorizing an American-led attack on Iraq,” (Bumiller, 03-03-03) but Mr. Fox
was “…feeling neglected…” (Bumiller, 03-03-03) and not easily agreeable.

In the articles published in the *Times* the strong agreement between France,
Russia and Germany was often pointed out and that their position opposed, the United
States regarding a war. But the government heads “…agreed ‘to keep open the channels
of communication’,” (Filkins, 03-03-03) though disagreeing with reports that, “’Old
Europe’ to some Bush aides -- may have recovered some of that influence today” (Tyler,
03-06-03). “The White House was dismissive of the European statement, saying no
conclusions should be drawn from it about any vote next week on the resolution,”
portraying the “trans-Atlantic split as a dispute among friends” (Tagliabue, 03-06-03).

The *Times* articles talk about German Chancellor Schroeder’s statements that,
“For Germany, the trans-Atlantic relationship remains a ‘fundamental pillar’ of its
foreign policy,” (Tyler, 03-06-03) and that relations “…could resume normally after a
war” (McFadden, 03-10-03). While such statements were being reported from leaders of
European countries, “President Bush appeared unconcerned by a rising chorus of protest”
(Tyler, 03-27-03). Though alienating most countries, the alliance with Britain, Spain and
Portugal was reportedly growing stronger.

In the final stages before the beginning of combat, many nations pledged support
in some kind of way. “Mr. Powell said 45 nations supported the move to disarm Iraq,
including Estonia and Uzbekistan,” (Cowell, 03-19-03) “Poland took the hardest line of
support, pledging 200 troops, most of whom are already in the gulf,” (Cowell, 03-19-03)
and “Czech soldiers would take part only in cleaning up after the use of any chemical,
biological or nuclear weapons” (Cowell, 03-19-03).

Whereas “Hungary's government said it would not send troops or combat units to Iraq,
limiting its support,” (Cowell, 03-19-03) “Canada said it would not allow its troops to
take part in the absence of a new United Nations resolution,” (Stevenson, 03-18-03)
India, China and Mexico were reported to be “…in opposition to America's war plans”
(Cowell, 03-19-03). “Australia's government said it would commit a token 2,000 troops,
 flying in the face of wide Australian opposition to the deployment” (Cowell, 03-19-03).
“The Berlin government would honor pledges to permit overflights by American planes
and the use of American bases in Germany” (Cowell, 03-19-03).

The New York Times reported that problems are being caused internationally due
to the fact that, “the United States had not shared all the intelligence it has had on Iraq”
(Reuters, 03-12-03). The rough international situation was regretted by some senior
official, stating that, “There's a recognition this has not been our finest diplomatic hour” (Sanger & Hoge, 03-14-03). However, one of the latest articles in the data said stated that, “The Bush administration is pursuing steps to punish France for opposing the United States on the war in Iraq,” (Bumiller, 04-24-03) clearly not a sign of regretting bad international relations.

**Humanitarian Concerns**

In this frame the researcher reports on themes found in *New York Times* articles regarding concern for civilian life, humanitarian aid such as food, water, medicine and schools. It was the fourth most common type of information found in the data and covers 12 % of all codings made.

A number of articles were published discussing war opponents concerns regarding humanitarian aid. A major concern of theirs was that the beginning of combat would “…result in Iraqi civilian casualties despite the military's best efforts to prevent them” (Schmitt & Bumiller, 03-05-03)

The most apparent issue discussed by many in the articles examined is the supply of food, water and medicine to the Iraqi people. Over the past years, “…more than 16 million Iraqis are now dependent on the United Nations' oil-for-food program,” (Tyler, 03-12-03) which would be suspended during a war. Articles suggest, that a “U.S. intervention is an increase of humanitarian suffering,” (Tyler, 03-12-03) but to prevent this, “…Mr. Bush has created a new Pentagon Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance” (Tyler, 03-12-03). Articles quote President Bush’s speech that
relief assistance will be “...a priority of any campaign in Iraq. ‘America also accepts our responsibility to protect innocent lives in every way possible,’ he said last week. ‘We'll bring food and medicine to the Iraqi people’” (Santora, 03-13-03). “Relief work will begin almost as soon as the first bombs are dropped and the military is confronted with Iraqi civilians in need of food, water, medicine and shelter, officials said” (Becker, 03-18-03).

But aid does not come cheap and the New York Times reported that the “United Nations World Food Program, which will supply the bulk of the food in the event of a crisis, has only $7 million of the $23 million requested” (Santora, 03-13-03). In one of the latest articles in the dataset it was reported, that the “United Nations should resume its oil-for-food program, in which revenue from sales of Iraqi oil was ostensibly used to buy food and aid supplies” (Wines, 04-30-03).

Other articles reported on the “...shortage of resources...,”(Santora, 03-13-03) which makes the aid agencies work harder. “Relief organizations in the region say they have neither sufficient supplies nor enough money to cope with the millions of injured, displaced and starving people that could result” (Santora, 03-13-03). The Iraq peoples own concerns about humanitarian well being triggered reports about people, “…stocking food, water and other supplies; lining up at gasoline stations; mobbing pharmacies for antibiotics...,” (McFadden, 03-17-03) to ensure their own well-being.

But humanitarian concern is also an issue for proponents of the war in Iraq, emphasizing that “children under the age of five are now dying at twice the rate they were a decade ago, according to a United Nations report” (Santora, 03-13-03).
There were a number of articles expressing humanitarian concern of the international community. Chancellor Schroeder of Germany said that President Bush's decision would mean “certain death to thousands of innocent men, women and children” (DePalma, 03-19-03). And this is precisely what many articles report – the accidental or intentional killing of many civilians. “The leaders of Russia, Germany and France noted that the Geneva Convention binds American and British forces to protect Iraqi civilians and ensure their humane treatment until order is restored” (Perlez, 04-12-03).

After a higher level of security was reported, there were more and more articles about “…engineers race(ing) to construct a pipeline to Umm Qasr from Kuwait to relieve the desperate shortages of drinking water” (Tyler, 03-27-03). It added, towards the end of official combat, “…two-thirds of city (Baghdad) residents ha(d) drinkable water” (Schmitt & Bumiller, 05-01-03).

But just as many articles reported about the “shortages of food and water” (Tyler, 03-27-03) and that it “…might take up to two months before huge shipments of food aid could be landing once again in Iraq” (Tyler, 03-27-03). It added a majority of households had “…been without electricity and water for a week…,” (Burns, 04-08-03) and “…working telephone lines are scarce…” (Burns, 04-08-03). These articles conflict with a speech, where, “Mr. Rumsfeld said there had been no intelligence to suggest that the combat had created a humanitarian crisis in Iraq” (Shanker & Bumiller, 03-28-03).

The New York Times reported the “United Nations would play a ‘vital’ but decidedly advisory role limited to coordination of food, medicine and other relief supplies” (Schmitt & Weisman, 04-11-03). A number of articles deal with how the
humanitarian aid will be distributed in Iraq and state, that “...assistance planned by USAID for Iraq is to be delivered by major American nongovernmental organizations such as CARE, the International Rescue Committee, Mercy Corps and Save the Children” as well as the International Red Cross” (Perlez, 04-12-03).

Need to Act

The New York Times also published a significant number of articles, during the time frame examined, expressing the United States need to act in Iraq. It was the fifth most common type of information found in the data and covers 9% of all codings made.

The majority of this data collected took place between March 1st and March 11th and only very few times was a justification for the war published after April 1st.

The first messages involved, that “…Iraq must ‘completely and totally’ disarm or its leaders must ‘go into exile’” (Sanger, 03-01-03). But other articles stated that, “New information based on intelligence sources showed that Iraq was making new rockets even as it was destroying old ones” (Tagliabue, 03-06-03). These are, according to New York Times articles, reasons for Mr. Powell to dismiss “the inspection process as ineffective,” (Tagliabue, 03-06-03) stating his case for the necessity for a military interaction.

Many articles dealt with the administrations need to prevent “the spread of nuclear arms,” (Weisman & Barringer, 03-06-03) the concern about “diplomacy was moving toward a showdown,” (Weisman & Barringer, 03-06-03) and the fact that
“Saddam Hussein has failed to disarm after 12 years of United Nations demands” (Tyler, 03-07-03).

Other reasons for the administration to act in Iraq were reported in the *Times* through administration officials who called Saddam Hussein a murderer, who “…has trained and financed Al Qaeda type organizations,” (Sanger & Barringer, 03-07-03) which posed an imminent threat to the United States. “…Iraq had failed to disarm…” (Sanger & Barringer, 03-07-03) and the U.S. government sees this as a “…real threat to America…” (Unknown, 03-07-03) and Saddam “…Hussein is a threat to the American people…” (Unknown, 03-07-03) Mr. Powell is reported to have said, that he, “…believe(s) Saddam Hussein is a threat, is a threat to the American people. He's a threat to people in his neighborhood. He's also a threat to the Iraqi people” (Unknown, 03-07-03). ”He has weapons of mass destruction, and he has used weapons of mass destruction” (Unknown, 03-07-03). “Iraq is thought to have produced at least 50 to 75 chemical warheads for ballistic missiles” (Unknown, 03-07-03) as well as “Iraq's stockpiles of imported or home-built weapons” (Weisman, 03-10-03).

Beginning March 11th, these types of messages continued to be published in the *New York Times*. These statements included reports of “…diplomatic failures (which) may have accelerated the schedule…,” (Tyler, 03-15-03) the United States has the goal to “…promote security and elimination of weapons of mass destruction; the delivery of humanitarian aid; and the conditions for the reconstruction of Iraq” (Agence France-Press, 03-17-03). It added “Our commitment to support the people of Iraq will be for the long term” (Agence France-Press, 03-17-03).
Negative connotations were also expressed in this category and the *New York Times* did publish such statements. It stated Saddam Hussein, had the potential to one day assist terrorists in killing “…thousands or hundreds of thousands of innocent people in our country or any other…,” (Stevenson, 03-18-03) expressing the United States need to act. The U.S. government is reported to fear “…more wars of aggression against your neighbors…,” (Stevenson, 03-18-03) and promises the Iraqi people “…no more poison factories, no more executions of dissidents, no more torture chambers and rape rooms” (Sanger, 03-18-03).

There were only four statements published in the *New York Times* after April 1st to fit this frame. The articles remind *New York Times* readers “…that the Iraqi government possesses weapons of mass destruction that were never declared,” (Tyler, 04-06-03) and about the U.S. governments,’ “…war objectives, - bringing down Mr. Hussein's government, eliminating any chemical and biological weapons in Iraq, capturing or driving out terrorists, and helping the people form a ‘representative self-government’” (Rohde, 04-12-03).

**Negative Talk about the Iraqi Regime**

In this frame the author identified all negative statements made about the Iraqi Regime in the *New York Times*. It was the least common type of information found in the data and covers 6% of all codings made.

Journalists of the *New York Times* did quote President Bush saying “He's (Saddam Hussein) a murderer. He has trained and financed Al Qaeda type organizations”
(Sanger & Barringer, 03-07-03). One of the speeches reported quoted President Bush saying that “...the tyrant will soon be gone” (Stevenson, 03-18-03). The Times reporters seemed to have been acutely aware of the frames in Mr. Bush’s rhetoric, because while reporting about a speech the author states that President Bush, “…avoided messianic language and used the word ‘evil’ only once” (Stanly, 03-18-03).

There were references such as, “Saddam and his group of killers, who have destroyed a society…,” (The New York Times, 03-07-03) “...replacing this cancer inside of Iraq...,” (Unknown, 03-07-03) “...master at deception...” (Unknown, 03-07-03)

“...reckless aggression and terrible crimes...,” (Unknown, 03-07-03) “...brutal regime...,” (Sanger, 03-18-03) “...thugs and killers...” (Stevenson, 03-18-03).

Only 27 percent of what has been considered negative talk against the Iraqi regime for the purpose of this study was published after April 1st, 2003.
The coding of the 94 articles in the selected section of *Die Welt* lead to the following results. The dominant frames found in *Die Welt* are “No War - More Inspections,” “International Relations and U.S.-German Relations,” “The Role of the United Nations,” “Humanitarian Concerns,” “Legality of the war,” and “Future plans.”

The majority of articles, 28% of all codings made, examined by the researcher dealt with the German government’s opposition to a war and its belief that U.N. inspections were working and should be continued. These were gathered under the frame of “No War – More Inspections.” The “Role of the United Nations” was emphasized by many of the newspapers articles dealing with U.N. meetings, discussions and negotiations among Security Council members. This type of information covers 21% of all codings made. In the frame of “International Relations and U.S.-German Relations,” a larger portion of the *Die Welt* coverage, 15% of codings made, discussed the effect this war is having on international relations, in particular U.S.-German relations, which were very much battered during the disagreements about how to handle Iraq. Under the frame “Humanitarian Concerns, the paper also reported extensively, with 16% of codings, on the German government’s and the German people’s, concern for the Iraqi people and how they would be supplied with humanitarian aid, if the United Nations was not involved in a military intervention in Iraq. This would be the case if the United Stated decided to go to war without U.N. backing – bringing up the issue that a war without the United Nations may not be legal according to U.N. Charter. With 7% of all codings made, the fifth most common frame of “Legality of the War,” deals with this
issue. The next common frame found in *Die Welt* articles, covering also 7% of codings made, is called “Future Plans” and deals with the discussions reported on involving the future of Iraq and who need to plan who will pay for the reconstruction – will it only be the U.S. or will the U.N. and other nations help? The least common frame found in the data derived from *Die Welt*, covers 6% of codings made. “Support by the German Government” discusses the means the German government was willing to give to the United States government to support during the war in Iraq.

**TABLE 4**

**Most Common Frames in Die Welt:**

- “Future plans” 7%
- “Legality of the war” 7%
- “International Relations and U.S.-German relations” 15%
- “Support from Germany” 6%
- “No War - More Inspections” 28%
- “Humanitarian concerns” 16%
- “The Role of the United Nations” 21%
No War – More Inspections

In this frame the statements were presented that criticized the United States and its "Coalition of the Willing," for abandoning the inspection process, which in the eyes of many authors and their sources, were working. This was the most common type of information found in the data and covers 28% of all codings made.

Die Welt reported how the German government was very outspoken about its disapproval of the United States decision going to war without the support by the international community, especially the United Nations. German government officials reportedly had the opinion, that the U.N. inspections were working and a peaceful solution to this conflict was possible and that war should be the last resort. These statements of the German government, reported in Die Welt, clearly said that under such circumstances, the German government was not going to contribute to a military intervention due to the vast risks involved. Articles in Die Welt reported the German government’s regrets that the war had started in Iraq, and though they were still opposed to it, they clearly stated that the German government is against a war, but not against the Americans. The German government also emphasized that they felt there was a peaceful solution and further inspections might have accomplished this.

Many sources interviewed and reported on in Die Welt called for an extension of U.N. inspections. The articles stated, that the German people felt the inspections were working and should not be abandoned.
The Role of the United Nations

In this frame, Die Welt reported that the German government’s opinion is that it is the United Nations’ role to ensure the disarmament of Iraq. This was the second most common type of information found in the data and covers 21% of all codings made in the data set collected in Die Welt.

It was reported that the German’s strong position was that a military intervention by the United States can not be acceptable without the support of the United Nations. The German government feared, that with such a step by the U.S., the power of the United Nations throughout the world will be diminished. The German position emphasized the United Nations role in the decision making process for international conflicts as well as political disagreements. According to a number of articles Germany finds the risks of a military intervention without U.N. approval too risky.

After the beginning of the military intervention by the United States, Germany stated that the country starting such a conflict has to carry the major financial obligation for the country’s reconstruction, but the United Nations will support a large portion of Iraq’s reconstruction and Germany will contribute its amount to the United Nations. It is also the German government’s position, that all reconstruction plans must be discussed in the frame of the United Nations. U.N.-Programs need also to be discussed and organized, such as the re-activation of the “Oil for Food” program as well as humanitarian aid.

Germany was still undecided about the support of U.N.-peacekeepers once the situation arose. But no matter what, the German government wanted U.S. and British troops to remove themselves and let the United Nations take over.
Humanitarian concerns

Reports about the plans for humanitarian aid for the Iraqi people, and the concern of the amounts and times the aid would be delivered is gathered in this frame. This was the third most common type of information found in the data and covers 16% of all codings made.

Die Welt did not report about humanitarian concerns for the Iraqi people, which would arise through a war, until March 18th when Chancellor Schroeder spoke about his concern about the well-being of the Iraqi people.

After the beginning of the war, articles of the German governments concern about a humanitarian catastrophe surfaced. They carried a great concern for the well being of the Iraqi people and expressed fear regarding the number of casualties and injuries. The German government pleaded that living areas, hospitals and water facilities not be targeted by U.S. and British troops, nor to be used as shields by Saddam Hussein’s regime.

The German government called for the support by the United Nations to concentrate their efforts on health and water and waste water issues. Money would be supported by Germany for these endeavors through the U.N. as well as the European Unions Help Funds. The German government emphasized that though they voiced a clear anti-war policy, lots of German help organization, such as the “Deutsche Rote Kreuz” (German Red Cross) and the “Deutsche Welthungerhilfe” (German World Hunger Help) were and will be involved to help the Iraqi people.
International Relations and U.S.-German relations

This frame collected the statement from Die Welt expressing the concern about the Iraqi war’s influence on international relations, and in particular the relationship between Germany and the United States. It was the fourth most common type of information found in the data and covers 15 % of all codings made.

In the articles published in Die Welt, the German government does emphasize their standpoint against the war, but not against their Allies across the Atlantic. Articles stated, that due to this conflict, Europe is divided and the transatlantic relationship is heavily damaged and the relationship between American President Bush and German Chancellor Schroeder is disrupted. The German government called for working on improving these relations, since a friendship among these two countries is important and indispensable. Quoting German President Rau, Die Welt reported that we need a “dialogue of cultures,” not a “clash of civilizations” and he did not think that the Bush administration made it easy for America’s friends to deal with the issue. The German government wanted to have a U.S.-German relationship based on respect as opposed to blind following.

According to Die Welt, U.S.-German relations took an even bigger hit, after the German Chancellor Schroeder, as the rest of the German people, were surprised by the beginning of the war in Iraq in the middle of the night, not having even received a phone call from the American administration. Beginning March 21st, the articles talk about a non-communication (“radio-silence”) between the two countries.
In the articles in *Die Welt* one can clearly see the importance of upholding of good relations and conversations among Berlin, Paris and Moscow, three of the major opponents of a war in Iraq. Their ability to express their believes as a unified force seemed to have made the opposition even stronger and more of an issue in *Die Welt*.

**Legality of the war**

This frame deals with the debate the German government staged against a war in Iraq on the basis of its legality. These messages were scattered throughout all the articles published in *Die Welt* during the timeframe examined. It was the fifth most common type of information found in the data and covers 7% of all codings made.

In early interviews with *Die Welt*, German government officials warned the United States from a military intervention without international support. The Schroeder administration believed that a military intervention would not agree with the United Nations Charter and should be considered illegal.

The “Coalition of the Willing,” was also being considered to be illegal by the German governments’ interpretations of the United Nations rules and regulations. Such an action would have serious consequences for the goal of world-peace and international relations with already critical regions. German officials said that in their eyes a military intervention would “kick people’s rights with their feet” (“Völkerrecht mit Füßen treten”). An article in *Die Welt* stated experts concerned that a war that could be considered illegal in the eyes of the United Nations will become precedent for more wars to come initiated by the United States or other countries. Another concern, voiced by the
Schroeder administration in *Die Welt*, was the developments of international law that might be an even more serious consequence of the war in Iraq.

**Future plans**

This frame includes information about what was feared might happen in Iraq after the war was over. Since the German government was not involved in the planning of the war, it had no input on plans for the reconstruction phase in Iraq or who the governing parties would be. In this frame the German newspaper *Die Welt* does report the concerns expressed by German officials for the future of Iraq. This was the next most common type of information found in the data and covers 7% of all codings made.

In articles shortly after the beginning of the war, the German government pledged support in the reconstruction of Iraq and designated billions to help the Iraqi people. But administration officials also stated that whoever destroys another country through the means of war needs to carry the main financial burden to rebuild that country. Germany pledged their support within the duties of the United Nations and NATO, and stated that the reconstruction needs to be discussed within the U.N..

Government officials did pledge financial support, but also state that with the money given in the future, German companies have to be involved and given contracts for the reconstruction process.

Other articles in *Die Welt* discuss that a large percentage of Germans believe that the Iraqi people will be better off after the war then under the rule of Saddam’s regime.
Support by the German Government

The information gathered under this frame reflects the statements of support the German government expressed and were reported by Die Welt. It was the least common frame determined from the data and covers 6% of all codings made.

Many articles stated that Germany will not actively be involved in the war but fulfill its international obligations. These international obligations include the granting of overflight rights by U.S. military airplanes and German soldiers will guard U.S. installations as well as civilian buildings on German soil to prevent terrorist acts. The German government will also allow the United States unlimited usage of its military installations on German soil, though some German officials interpreted this act to be against international law. German soldiers will participate in AWACS-Intelligence Flights over Turkey in correlation with the conflict in Iraq.

Germany pledged billions of Euros, as well as German companies support, to the reconstruction. The government did state though that they would only give the minimum required through the United Nations unless reconstruction contracts go to German companies as well.
CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Interpretation of the Research Questions

The United States and German governments utilized their websites well according to their goals. They were able to each set their own agenda that they wanted the public to be thinking about.

Whitehouse.gov

The U.S. administration was able to constantly remind the reader of the “awful regime” in power in Iraq and that they needed to save the world by means of a new war. They were successful gatekeepers by releasing information that seemed to be important to the government’s agenda and downplaying information that opposed their mission and therefore framed this conflict in a certain way. The internet seemed to have played a very important role, because it was a means for the government to directly communicate to its citizens without media interfering with the messages sent.

The communication published by the United States government on www.whitehouse.gov clearly displayed the frames of “Need to Act,” “Negative Talk against Iraqi Regime,” “U.S. as the Savior,” “Future Plans,” “Building Support and Positive Talk about U.S. Troops,” and “International Involvement.” According to results of this study the U.S. government used its website www.whitehouse.gov to communicate crucial information about the war in Iraq in order to gain support.
The U.S. government’s website served an important role in justifying America’s invasion or liberation of Iraq. They presented a number of atrocious facts about Saddam Hussein’s regime. However, these facts have been known for a number of years and, by themselves, should not have triggered this war by the American government. This issue seems very important to the author and has not received very much attention by the creator of the government’s website. Most of this type of information was released before the beginning of combat to gather the support of the American public as well as the international community.

For some of the same reasons, the government released a significant amount of information containing negative talk about the Iraqi regime. Here they used tactics of name calling and reported the atrocious tactics the regime used to undermine its people. These kinds of messages were used extensively in the communication put out by the U.S. government.

The administration also released a lot of messages portraying itself as a savior, even stating that it has to protect its own country, liberate the Iraqi people, and keep the world safe, through a military intervention. The rhetoric used in these messages is urgently stating that there were no other options. These messages entailed the vast promises of the delivery of humanitarian aid, but most often no mention was made of who will have to carry the cost of the aid or if other international countries and international organizations would be involved in its delivery. This kind of communication goes hand in hand with messages released to build support and talk positive about the troops. Most of this was done after the beginning of combat to report the good progress
achieved by the troops, to justify losses, while keeping up the morale of the troops and supporters in America.

Communication by the administration, intended to release plans for the future after their mission in Iraq is accomplished, were not very complete. The government only mentioned its humanitarian aid plans and the administration’s hope for the Iraqi people to be able to govern themselves, but did not share exact plans on how to achieve this. There was not as much information present in this frame as in others, which illustrates the priorities of the administration.

The information about the involvement of the international community is very limited and does not start until the beginning of combat. Though the British forces had a major role in this conflict, hardly any mention is being made in the data examined. The British have also suffered many losses of soldiers, but none were communicated through the United States government website. In general the responses of the world community were not mentioned on the government’s website. All pieces of communication examined failed to mention the vast international opposition and the impact this disagreement had on U.S. relations with the international community and the United Nations. The administration seemed to make a point by excluding all the existing protests. In a speech transcribed on www.whitehouse.com from March, 27th, 2003, President Bush states that “We’ve got a huge coalition.” But is this really true?

After identifying and discussing the frames present in the communication by the government, the researcher can clearly identify the U.S. government’s agenda of using its
website www.whitehouse.gov as a Public Relation techniques to gather support for the war in Iraq.

**Bundesregierung.de**

The German administration was able to communicate its opposition to the war as their clear agenda. It, like the American government, was successful gatekeepers in just releasing information that fit their agenda on its website.

Frames apparent in the communication published by the German Government on www.bundesregierung.de are “No War - More Inspections,” “Humanitarian Aid,” “International Relations,” “Support by the German Government,” and “The Role of the United Nations.” Within these frames the German government discussed its strong opposition to the war in Iraq and pleaded that more inspections need to be conducted, since the current inspection were leading the international community to the desired results – slowly, but they were achievable in the eyes of the German government. Once the war had begun the majority of information on the German governments’ website was framed as humanitarian aid concerns for the Iraqi people. This frame showed the worry about efficient water, food, and electricity supply for the general population. The German government’s main concern seemed to have been the discontinuation of the U.N. oil-for-food program, which supplied a majority of humanitarian aid to the Iraqi people. Another major frame apparent in the German government’s publications on its website, was the concern of what this war would do to the relationships among a multitude of countries. The opinions about this war were widespread anywhere from full support over some
support, moral support to total opposition. Due to these different policies, the relationships among counties suffered strains, which the German government hoped to be able to repair over time. The discussion about international relations also draws into the frame of the United Nations role in this conflict. The German government made it clear on its website, that it is the administration’s strong belief, that the United States acting without a U.N. support does not agree with the Charter agreed upon by the international community. But this frame also emphasizes the United Nation’s potential involvement in the post-war Iraq as well as its important role of humanitarian assistance.

As could be expected, there were no messages at all found on specific intelligence presented by the United States that gave them the reasons to go to war and “save” the people of Iraq. The frame found on www.whitehouse.gov that dealt with the United States as savior-attitude was also absent.

One of the most interesting findings to the author was that the German government in one of its publications on March 20th, 2003, pledged to grant overflight rights and rights for the American military to use airbases located in Germany for its operations in Iraq. But a “Statement of Support from Coalition” published by the U.S. government on March 26th excludes Germany from any mention, though other countries, such as Afghanistan, Georgia or Panama were listed with supplying moral support – nothing else. The practice of agenda-setting becomes apparent through such findings.

The most common frame found in the articles published in the *New York Times* from March 1st until May 1st is the issue of United Nations involvement in the war. The *New York Times* thoroughly covered the discussions that took place in Security Council meetings regarding this issue. The next most common frame of information is the discussion of Iraq’s future, reconstruction and the costs associated with this. The frame also includes the discussion about international involvement in the future of a potentially war-torn country. Further reports about international discussions about Iraq were gathered in the frame of International Relations. But this frame also includes the disagreements about the American government’s decision to go to war in Iraq, which drove a rift between the U.S. and some, mainly European, countries. The frame of “Humanitarian Concerns” discusses the need and organization of humanitarian aid for the Iraqi people. In this frame, the author describes conditions reported in the *New York Times*, which made Iraqi’s living conditions difficult. Many articles in the *New York Times* stated the U.S. government’s need to act, describing conditions under which a military intervention was needed. This frame included one of the most compelling statements made by the U.S. government to act in Iraq. The *Times* extensively reported on the threat the United States faces through Iraq and its weapons of mass destruction. Last but not least, was the frame of “Negative Talk about the Iraqi Regime.” In this
category all negative statements made about the Iraqi Regime in the New York Times, which was not a very prominent frame, were gathered, but seemed important to the author for the course of this study.

A limited number of messages that did depict the United states as the savior of the Iraqi people and even the world, as well as messages to praise and motivate the U.S. military did exist, but not often enough to form a coding category like in the messages released on www.whitehouse.gov.

Die Welt

The majority of articles in Die Welt examined by the researcher dealt with the German government’s opposition to a war and its belief that U.N. inspections were working and should be continued. A larger portion of the Die Welt coverage discussed the effect this war is having on international relations, in particular U.S.-German relations, which were very much battered during the disagreements about how to handle Iraq. The role of the United Nations was emphasized by many of the newspapers articles dealing with U.N. meetings, discussions and negotiations among Security Council members. The papers also reported extensively on the German governments and the German peoples concern for the Iraqi people and how they would be supplied with humanitarian aid, if the United Nation was not involved in a military intervention in Iraq. This would be the case if the United Stated decided to go to war without U.N. backing – bringing up the issue that a war without the United Nations may not be legal according to U.N. Charter. The last, but not least common frame found in Die Welt articles dealt with
the discussions reported on involving the future of Iraq and who needs to plan and pay for the reconstruction – will it only be the U.S. or will the U.N. and other nations help?

In all 94 articles, phrases that could be coded as the frame “down talk” of the Iraqi regime was only mentioned three times. These phrases included the comments that Saddam’s regime is one of the worst in the world, the many people Saddam has already and will still murder, and how Saddam Hussein disregards decent treatment of his people.

**Whitehouse.gov vs. New York Times**

This study shows that, in general, the frames found by the U.S. government publications on www.whitehouse.gov and in articles published in the American newspaper the *New York Times* were the same during the data collection period.

Both publications framed information in similar ways. They both mentioned very extensively the importance of the “Need to Act” where information was publicized about why the United States needed to turn to a military intervention. This frame talked about the threats the Iraqi regime brought to the world, its history of brutal mass murder as well as its possession of weapons of mass destructions. The difference in coverage can be found in the importance of the framing. While the “Need to Act” was the most frequent frame found on www.whitehouse.com, it was only the fifth most common frame in the articles of the *New York Times*.

Also used by both publications was the frame of “Negative Talk about the Iraqi Regime.” This frame was more extensively found on www.whitehouse.gov, but the same kind of information was also reported on in the *New York Times*. 
Both sources also communicated the administration’s plans for the future as well as the costs involved in this endeavor. “Future Plans and Costs” was the second most common frame in the *New York Times*. “Future Plans” was the fourth most common frame on www.whitehouse.gov, but the topic of war cost and other costs incurring in the future was not discussed often enough to consider it to be a frame.

Frames, which the government website and the *New York Times* discussed similarly, but not in the same way, are the frames of “International Relations” and “International Involvement.” The *New York Times* focused more on the impact this war has on the relationships among different countries and the United States, while www.whitehouse.gov concentrated more on the involvement of the international community in the war in Iraq and who supported them in their efforts.

Frames found in the *New York Times*, but not on the government’s website, are the frames of “The Role of the United Nations,” most common frame in the *New York Times*, and the “Humanitarian Concerns.”

Frames apparent on www.whitehouse.gov, but not found in the reports of the *New York Times* are the frames of “Building Support and Positive Talk about U.S. Troops” and “U.S. as the Savior,” which were the second and third most common frames discussed on the government’s website.

**Bundesregierung.de vs. *Die Welt***

Comparing the frames found on the German government website www.bundesregierung.de and in the German newspaper *Die Welt*, the researcher found,
that four of the five frames from *Die Welt* were also present on the website. The frames “No War - More Inspections,” “International Relations,” “Humanitarian Concerns,” as well as “The Role of the United Nations” were extensively discussed in both sources. All four had the same ranking order of most mentioning, where “No War – More Inspections” was the most common frame, “The Role of the United Nations” was the second most common issue discussed, followed by “Humanitarian Concerns and International Relations.”

While the fifth and last frame discussed on www.bundesregierung.de was the frame called “Support by the German Government,” which dealt with the pledge of support of certain aspects of the Iraqi war. The German governments website www.bundesregierung.de also displayed the frame called “Support by the German Government,” which discussed all actions taken by the government to support the United States and its allies. Though some mentioning could be found about this issue in the newspaper *Die Welt*, the researcher could not justify creating a frame for it in the Section of *Die Welt*.

The frames of “Legality of the War” and “Future Plans” were found in *Die Welt*, but hardly on www.bundesregierung.de, certainly not enough to justify creating a frame.

There were two frames found in *Die Welt*, which were not discussed in detail on the website of the German government. The newspaper in great detail discussed the legal issues about entering a war in Iraq without United Nations backing, which is discussed in the frame “Legality of the War.” Also discussed in *Die Welt* is the issue of what will happen in Iraq in the future, how long the United States military would be an occupying
force, the structure of a new government, the treatment of the Iraqi people, and which role the United Nations might play later on in the future.

The data shows, that though both sources had slightly different frames and slightly different agendas, the main issues communicated were the same across the board.

Influence of Previous Literature

As VanSlyke Turk and Franklin (1987) found in their research that agenda-setting of political news differ internationally, this study confirms these findings. There were distinct differences found between the agendas of American and German governments, as well as the coinciding newspapers. The same event was discussed in both countries, but spun by each government towards the agenda they wanted their citizens to be thinking about.

The influence a president has on the media’s “coverage of issues on which he is an important source,” (Wanta & Foote, 1994, p.437) such as international crises was examined by Wanta and Foote (1994), becomes apparent in the agenda-setting process of the governments websites. The American, and the German official governmental websites, were both very much shaped by speeches given by President Bush and Chancellor Schroeder.

The role the websites played for the U.S. and German governments reinforces Nedderman, Jones, and Fitzgerald’s (1998) findings, that “CMC may be especially helpful in making us better democrats, in facilitating the open discourse and the public policy formation processes associated with democratic institutions” (p. 19). The use of
their websites gave both the American and German people a better insight in each
governments’ official position and policies. Their agendas and frames were
communicated more effectively on this direct discourse, than through the newspapers,
which distorted the frames slightly.

The five most common frames identified by Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) in
U.S. news coverage - Conflict frames, Human interest frames, Economic consequences
frame, Mortality frame, and Responsibility frame – were found in the documents by the
U.S. and German governments as well as the *New York Times* and *Die Welt*.

What Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) defined as conflict frames was deliberately
excluded from this particular study, but the Human interest frame can be seen in the
frames defined for this study’s purpose as “Humanitarian Aid” as well as “Future Plans.”
Both of these frames discussed the concern for the Iraqi people as well as the region and
the world. Their Economic consequences frame in this study was discussed in the frame
of “Future Plans,” where the concern for the future economic and political situation was
expressed. The Mortality frame discussed by Semetko and Valkenburg, was not part of
the coding process in this study, but could partially be found in the frame of
“Humanitarian Concern,” in which the U.S. and German governments concerns for
civilian casualties among the Iraqi population and mortality issues due to insufficient
humanitarian aid. Just as Semetoko and Valkenburg found that the “Responsibility”
frame was most often used to report political events, in this study the most common
frame used is the “Need to Act” frame. In this section, the American government
discusses its important role in the world to keep up order and save living environments for people around the globe.
Limitations of the Study

In this study the author only looked at the written communication published by the U.S. and German governments on their websites. The U.S. administration did daily press conferences, released numerous pictures and video as well as speeches given, which were not transcribed on the website.

The timeframe of the study could also be a limitation, because taking an extended to look at the rest of the war, may show whether the frames in the government publications as well as the newspaper articles changed after May 1st.

The exclusion of Editorials in the two different countries newspapers may have also excluded interesting information and more opinionated pieces.

Recommendations for Future Research

The author recommends an extension of the examination of all communication published by the U.S. and German government, including pictures, interviews, press conferences, and so on for future research. This extended study of the material might reveal the usage of specific public relations, publicity, and community relations techniques. This might fill in the picture of what governments do to set their agenda and build support from its people.

Another interesting aspect in future research would be to study more than one newspaper per country to determine if different newspapers within the two countries had different agendas in reporting about the war in Iraq. Studies could determine whether
different frames were used by these newspapers and how were the agendas determined through the different gatekeepers.

Evaluating Editorials or Letters to the Editor regarding this issue would be an interesting study as well, comparing opinions regarding this issue would add an interesting third set of information besides websites and newspapers.

Examining a cross-checker, an independent international publication to determine a common ground of reporting across the world, would give the international community a better picture about the general reporting, the agendas and frames across the world.

Future research may also compare the American government’s agendas of its communication about the war in Iraq in 2003 to the agenda of the American government’s communication of the Gulf War. It would be interesting to see how the agendas and frames used a decade ago differ from the agendas and frames used in 2003, and if it was due to generally different public relation techniques, or due to a different goal by the government.
CONCLUSION

This study verified other researchers’ work by finding that the same international news events do get framed differently in different countries according to their government’s agenda and the people’s major belief systems.

In both countries the political leader (president or chancellor) had a major impact on what the agenda of his own administration’s website was, as well as a large impact on the agenda of the country’s newspapers.

The findings of the exact same first four frames on the German government’s website www.bundesregierung.de and the first four frames found in Die Welt were surprising to the author. One can theorize about this occurrence, especially since this correlation was not found between www.whitehouse.gov and the New York Times.

The results of this study show that the German press is more closely connected to messages distributed by its government than is the American press to its government. This may also be a function of the government’s and press’s reflection of the German public’s opinion. A clear majority of the German people opposed the war in Iraq. The messages distributed by the German government on its website www.bundesregierung.de clearly opposed the war in Iraq, which may have lead to the press’s strong theme of opposition to the war in its articles.

On the American side, comparing the government’s website www.whitehouse.gov to the New York Times, one can see a clear difference in themes of message emphasized. As expected, the U. S. government used its website to support a military invasion of Iraq and removal of the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. While the
New York Times maintained its objective reporting on the important issues surrounding the controversy of a war in Iraq.

Let's consider the opposition in political beliefs among the two countries political leaders and the two newspapers. German Chancellor Schroeder could be considered liberal and Die Welt is said to be more conservative, whereas the U.S. President Bush is conservative and the New York Times is a more liberal newspaper. It seems obvious, that though wanting to believe in these newspapers impartiality and objectivity, the New York Times liberal views would disagree with a conservative presidents policies and agenda’s set by his administration. But I believe in the objective reporting of the New York Times and that they developed their agenda and frames according to how the Times editors and reporters saw the importance of news stories regarding this conflict.

The reasons why the frames of www.bundesregierung.de and Die Welt were so similar is more difficult to explain. One might be inclined to say that Die Welt follows government political beliefs more closely than the New York Times. But I believe it has more to do with the German government representing the major opinion of the German people. A clear majority of German people opposed the war in Iraq. This majority pressured the German government to represent a line in international politics, by speaking up against a military intervention, but more U.N. inspections. Since this was the dominant opinion across the nation, Die Welt picked up this agenda in its reports and the articles fit in the frames the German government also had. It is reassuring to see, that the author could determine three more frames for Die Welt which were not found in this way on www.bundesregierung.de. This makes the reporting more independent, meaning, the
Reporters of *Die Welt* did not just follow the German government’s publications, but extended their reporting to other topics.

Public Opinion Polls in both countries do represent the coverage on the U.S. and German governments’ websites well. Whereas the German public opinion polls showed a rising popularity of the German Chancellor Schroeder and his opposition to a war in Iraq without United Nations backing, American public opinion polls expressed the still high popularity of President Bush and his expression of the need to go to war in Iraq. During the course of this war the stance Chancellor Schroeder took did increase his popularity with the German public, whereas the positive American public opinion on President Bush declined throughout the course of this international crisis.

Newspapers and other means of media often use government sources for their political reporting. The Internet has made it much easier for these media to receive information about government policies and stances. Reporters don’t have to talk to someone to know what the government says about a certain event or issue. With official government websites such as www.whitehouse.gov and www.bundesregierung.de, media can also more quickly determine a government’s agenda through determining the frames present.

In conclusion, while following international political events it might be useful to rely on more than one source of information. By relying only on the information a government website supplies, the interested party may be faced with certain frames and a certain agenda. By only following one newspaper’s or one type of media’s coverage of an important event such as a war, the consumer of the news is only exposed to one type of
framing of an event. Being more diverse in one's choice of news coverage, a very different picture of the event might be presented.
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APPENDIX A

Rank order of most common frames on www.whitehouse.gov:

1. “Need to Act”
2. “Building Support and Positive Talk about U.S. Troops”
3. “U.S. as the Savior”
4. “Future Plans”
5. “Negative Talk against Iraqi Regime”
6. “International Involvement”

Rank order of most common frames on www.bundesregierung.de:

1. “No War - More Inspections”
3. “Humanitarian Aid”
4. “International Relations”
5. “Support by the German Government”

Rank order of most common frames in the New York Times:

2. “Future plans and Cost”
3. “International Relations”
4. “Humanitarian Concerns”
5. “Need to Act”

6. “Negative Talk about the Iraqi Regime”

**Rank order of most common frames in Die Welt:**

1. “No War - More Inspections”


3. “Humanitarian concerns”

4. “International Relations and U.S.-German relations”

5. “Legality of the war”

6. “Future plans”

7. “Support from Germany”
APPENDIX B

www.whitehouse.gov articles used in this Study:

Mar. 1, 2003
President's Radio Address

Mar. 4, 2003
President's Remarks to American Medical Association

Mar. 6, 2003
Global Message on Iraq

Mar. 7, 2003
Global Message
Secretary Powell's Remarks at U.N. Security Council Meeting

Mar. 8, 2003
President's Radio Address

Mar. 11, 2003
Global Message

Mar. 12, 2003
Global Message

Mar. 14, 2003
Global Message

Mar. 16, 2003
President Bush: Monday "Moment of Truth" for World on Iraq
Statement of the Atlantic Summit: Commitment to Transatlantic Solidarity
Statement of the Atlantic Summit: A Vision for Iraq and the Iraqi People

Mar. 17, 2003
Global Message
Presidential Remarks

Mar. 19, 2003
President Bush Addresses the Nation
Global Message

Mar. 20, 2003
Cabinet Meeting
Mar. 21, 2003  
President Thanks Congressional Leaders  
Global Message

Mar. 22, 2003  
President's Radio Address

Mar. 23, 2003  
President Bush Discusses Military Operation

Mar. 24, 2003  
Global Message

Mar. 25, 2003  
President to Submit Wartime Budget

Mar. 26, 2003  
President Rallies Troops at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa  
Global Message  
Our Coalition  
Statement of Support from Coalition

Mar. 27, 2003  
President Bush, Prime Minister Blair Hold Press Availability  
Global Message  
Coalition Members

Mar. 28, 2003  
Global Message

Mar. 29, 2003  
President Discusses Iraqi Freedom Progress in Radio Address

Mar. 31, 2003  
President Updates America on Operations Liberty Shield and Iraqi Freedom  
Global Message

Apr. 2, 2003  
Global Message

Apr. 3, 2003  
President Discussed Operation Iraqi Freedom at Camp Legeune  
Global Message
Apr. 4, 2003
Dr. Condoleezza Rice Discusses Iraq Reconstruction
Global Message
Fact Sheet

Apr. 5, 2003
Global Message
President's Radio Address

Apr. 8, 2003
Dr. Condoleezza Rice Discusses Meeting between President Bush and PM Blair
Global Message
Joint Statement by President Bush, Prime Minister Blair on Iraq's Future

Apr. 9, 2003
Vice President Cheney Salutes Troops
Global Message

Apr. 10, 2003
President's Message to the Iraqi People
Global Message

Apr. 11, 2003
President Visits Soldiers at Army and Navy Medical Centers
Global Message

Apr. 12, 2003
Global Message
President's Radio Address

Apr. 14, 2003
President's Message to America's Military and Their Families
Global Message

Apr. 15, 2003
President's Remarks on Iraq from the Rose Garden
Global Message

Apr. 16, 2003
President Bush Outlines Progress in Operation Iraqi Freedom
Humanitarian Update
Global Message
Apr. 17, 2003
Global Message

Apr. 18, 2003
Global Message

Apr. 20, 2003
President Meets with Former U.S. POWs

Apr. 21, 2003
Global Message

Apr. 22, 2003
Global Message

Apr. 23, 2003
Global Message

Apr. 24, 2003
President Gives Iraq Update to Workers of Tank Plant in Lima, Ohio
Global Message

Apr. 25, 2003
Global Message

Apr. 28, 2003
President Discusses the Future of Iraq
Global Message

Apr. 29, 2003
Global Message

Apr. 30, 2003
Global Message

May 1, 2003
President Bush Announces Major Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended
APPENDIX C

www.bundesregierung.de articles used in this Study:

3. March 2003
Interview with Federal Minister Wieczorek-Zeul in Berliner Zeitung

4. March 2003
Policy statement by Federal Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder on the international situation and on the results of the Brussels European Council
Iraqi cooperation showing progress and deficits

6. March 2003
For peaceful disarmament – against the use of force

10. March 2003
Fischer: Noticeable improvement in Iraqi cooperation

11. March 2003
Schroeder welcomes French proposal for heads of state and government to be present at U.N. Security Council vote

14. March 2003
“Courage for peace and courage for change”

17. March 2003
Fighting for peace – averting war
Joint French-Russian-German statement on Iraq

18. March 2003
Schroeder: War against Iraq not justified
Statement by Chancellor Schroeder on the Iraq crisis

19. March 2003
A clear policy for the outset: peaceful disarmament of Iraq
  Schroeder: Middle East needs new peace, not new war
  Schroeder says military intervention in Iraq would be a mistake
  Chancellor Schroeder re-affirms his rejection of military action in Iraq
  Federal Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder welcomes Security Council resolution on Iraq
  Overflight and transit rights for possible military intervention against Iraq
  Schroeder: War must never be inevitable
  Schroeder calls for more time for U.N. weapons inspectors
  Schroeder notes growing approval of his government’s stance on Iraq
Schroeder: Iraq conflict should be resolved by U.N. Security Council
Statement by government spokesman, Bela Anda, on declaration by eight
European heads of state and government
Schroeder and Putin reaffirm common views on Iraq
There is still an alternative to war
Disarming Iraq without war
European Union calls for peaceful disarmament of Iraq
Memorandum
Schroeder and Putin: Iraq must be disarmed peacefully

20. March 2003
Schroeder: No new parliamentary mandate needed for AWACS flights over Turkey

21. March 2003
German government regrets failure of efforts to achieve peaceful resolution of conflict

24. March 2003
Statement of the Federal Government on Turkey’s possible entry into the war
German AWACS crews to be withdrawn if Turkey enters war with Iraq

31. March 2003
Humanitarian aid for the people in Iraq
   Assisting the Iraqi population

6. April 2003
Chancellor Schroeder in a ZDF interview with Ruprecht Eser

7. April 2003
A just society under changed conditions

8. April 2003
Stabilization of Iraq under the aegis of the United Nations

10. April 2003
Schroeder welcomes signs that war may be over soon

11. April 2003
Germany can and will be involved in a reconstruction effort under U.N. leadership

13. April 2003
Reconstruction of Iraq under U.N. leadership

16. April 2003
Schroeder and Blair agreed on key role for U.N. in reconstruction of Iraq
22. April 2003
Under the umbrella of the United Nations, with a strong Europe

24. April 2003
U.N. oil-for-food program to be extended briefly
APPENDIX D

New York Times articles used in this Study:

1. March 2003
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Threats And Responses: Moscow; Putin Again Rejects U.S. Calls For Support Of A War, Fearing Effect On The Mideast
Putin Today Rebuffed American Calls
Threats And Responses: News Analysis; New Element In Iraq's Mix
Threats And Responses: Diplomacy;

3. March 2003
Threats And Responses: The Turks; Turkey Will Seek A Second Decision On A G.I. Presence
Threats And Responses: The Opposition; Ending Conference, Iraqi Dissidents Insist On Self-Government
Threats And Responses: The Outlook; A Stalwart Of Certainty: Bush Undeterred On Iraq
White House Letter; Two Presidential Pals, Until 9/11 Intervened

5. March 2003
Threats And Responses: Attack Strategy; Top General Sees Plan To Shock Iraq Into Surrendering
Threats And Responses: Diplomacy; Powell Says U.S. Can Wage War On Iraq Without Turks

6. March 2003
Threats And Responses: Protests; Students Skip Class For Peace (And Frisbee)
Threats And Responses: News Analysis; A Deepening Fissure
Threats And Responses: Military Options; Pentagon Ready To Strike Iraq Within Days If Bush Gives The Word, Officials Say
Threats And Responses: Blunt Diplomacy; Powell Attacks Validity Of The Work By Weapons Inspectors In Iraq
Threats And Responses: Discord; France And Russia Ready To Use Veto Against Iraq War
Threats And Responses: Baghdad; Iraq's Two Faces Of War: Armed, Ready, Yet In A Mood To Disarm

7. March 2003
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Threats And Responses; Outsiders Will Be Given Time To Leave Iraq
Threats And Responses: The President; President Readies U.S. For Prospect Of Imminent War
Threats And Responses: News Analysis; A Reminder Of A Missio
Threats And Responses: Pakistan; Musharraf Facing Decision In The Security Council Soon

8. March 2003
Threats And Responses: Public Opinion; Sentiment Against War Is Voiced Across World
Threats And Responses: Congress; Senate Republicans Back Bush's Iraq Policy, As Democrats Call It Rash And Bullying
Threats And Responses: An Overview -- March 8, 2003; Squabbling Diplomats, A Mixed Report Card From Iraq And A Ticking Clock
Threats And Responses: United Nations; U.N. Split Widens As Allies Dismiss Deadline On Iraq
Threats And Responses: Congress; Senate Republicans Back Bush's Iraq Policy, As Democrats Call It Rash And Bullying

10. March 2003
Threats And Responses: Turkey; Once Banned, A Turkish Leader Is Elected And Revives U.S. Hopes For Access
Threats And Responses: An Overview: March 9, 2003; Diplomatic Lobbying, A Growing Gap In Britain And Protests Pro And Con
Threats And Responses: Security Council; Urgent Diplomacy Fails To Gain U.S. 9 Votes In The U.N.
Threats And Responses: Intelligence; U.S. Asks Over 60 Nations To Expel Iraqi Envoys
Threats And Responses: Inspections; U.S. Says Blix Played Down Details Of Banned Weapons
Candidates Find Agendas Eclipsed By Antiwar Questions

11. March 2003
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Threats And Responses: Diplomacy; U.S. Says U.N. Could Repeat Errors Of 90's
Threats And Responses: United Nations; Annan Says U.S. Will Violate Charter If It Acts Without Approval
Threats And Responses: Military; Allied Plan Would Encourage Iraqis Not To Fight
Threats And Responses: Inspections; U.S. Says Blix Played Down Details Of Banned Weapons
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Threats And Responses: Discord; France To Veto Resolution On Iraq War, Chirac Says

12. March 2003
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U.S. Lays Siege To Mexico's Chief, And So Do Many Others
Threats And Responses: Washington; U.S. Would Accept Short Extension Of Iraq
Deadline
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Threats And Responses: Turkey; Erdogan, Turkish Party Leader, To Form Government
As U.S. Presses For Use Of Bases
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Beleaguered Blair And De-Frenched Fries
Threats And Responses; U.S. Diplomat Quits Job Over Iraq Policy

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Brothers
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Testifies
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Taking On Role Of Hawks
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War Preparations And A Wall Street Rally

15. March 2003
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Sway U.N.
Threats And Responses: An Overview -- March 14, 2003; A 3-Way Huddle, Mideast
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Threats And Responses: American Jews; Divide Among Jews Leads To Silence On Iraq War

17. March 2003
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Threats And Responses: An Overview: March 16, 2003; An Ultimatum, Frayed French Relations And Stockpiling In Iraq
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Threats And Responses: Protests; Candlelight Vigils Are Held Around The World To Oppose Military Action Against Iraq
Threats And Responses; Diplomacy; Bush And 2 Allies Seem Set For War To Depose Hussein
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Threats And Responses; Diplomacy; Europeans Still Seek A Solution To Avert War
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Threats And Responses; News Analysis; A New Doctrine For War
Threats And Responses; Military Plans; Allies Will Move In, Even If Saddam Hussein Moves Out
Threats And Responses; Strategy; Allies Hope To Move Quickly To Seize City In Iraq's South
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Threats And Responses; The President; Bush Gives Hussein 48 Hours, And Vows To Act
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Threats And Responses; The President's Day; Just Another Monday, Except For Its Conclusion

19. March 2003
Threats And Responses; An Overview: March 18, 2003; Defiance From Baghdad, Troops On The Move, And Security Warnings
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Threats And Responses: Disarming Saddam Hussein; Teams Of Experts To Hunt Iraq Arms
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Sibling Cities Issue A Plea For Decency Toward Frites
Letter From Europe; Germans Balk At The Price Of Economic Change
Threats And Responses: The Defense Secretary; Rumsfeld Seeks Consensus Through Jousting

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Threats And Responses: Desert Front; In Day Of Waiting, First Surrenders And The First Missile Attack
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Threats And Responses: Paying For Defense; Bush Administration To Seek Emergency Money To Protect Against Terrorist Attacks In U.S.
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Threats And Responses: A Command Post; Reluctant Saudi Arabia Prepares Its Quiet Role In The U.S.-Led War On Iraq
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Threats And Responses: Military Analysis; Setting The Stage
Threats And Responses: The White House; Bush Orders Start Of War On Iraq; Missiles Apparently Miss Hussein
Threats And Responses: Ankara; Turkey Limits Military Help To U.S. On Iraq

21. March 2003
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A Nation At War: The Attack; U.S. And British Troops Push Into Iraq As Missiles Strike Baghdad Compoun
A Nation At War: Pressure On Iraq; U.S. Reports Talks Urging Surrender
A Nation At War: Baghdad; Surprise Strike At Outset Leaves Urgent Mystery: Who Was Hit?

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A Nation At War: Airstrikes; Aerial Pounding Intended To Push Iraq's Government Toward Brink
A Nation At War: The Poll; Support For Bush Surges At Home, But Split Remains
23. March 2003
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24. March 2003
A Nation At War: News Analysis; Lowering Expectations
A Nation At War: The Attack; Allies And Iraqis Battle On 2 Fronts; 20 Americans Dead Or Missing, 50 Hurt
A Nation At War: The Iraqi Capital; As Allied Troops Race North, Iraq Warns Of A Fierce Clash
A Nation At War: The Strategy; In Crucial Step, U.S. Starts Push Near Baghdad

25. March 2003
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A Nation At War: White House; Bush Is Requesting Nearly $75 Billion For War Expenses
A Nation At War: The Iraqi Capital; Hussein Rallies Iraqi Defenders To Hold Capital
A Nation At War: Military Analysis; The Goal Is Baghdad, But At What Cost?

26. March 2003
A Nation At War: The Strategy; U.S. Shifting Focus Of Land Campaign To Fight In South
A Nation At War: Combat; Heavy Iraqi Losses Seen In Big Battle

27. March 2003
Hands Out For Shares Of War Budget
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A Nation At War: In The Field Third Division; Fierce Clashes, Firefights And Wire Prisons
A Nation At War: In The Field The Marines; Iraqi Soldiers Say It Was Fight Or Die
A Nation At War: The Northern Front; 1,000 U.S. Paratroopers Open Northern Front
A Nation At War: The Iraqi Capital; Blasts In Baghdad
Canadians Of Two Minds Over Neighbor To The South

28. March 2003
A Nation At War: Heads Of Government; War To Keep Going Until Regime Ends, Bush And Blair Say

29. March 2003
A Nation At War: The Attack; Airstrikes Continue As Allies Consider Timing Of A Thrust
A Nation At War: The Iraqi Capital; Iraq Blames U.S. For Market Blast That Killed Civilians In Baghdad

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A Nation At War: Baghdad; Iraqis Threatening New Suicide Strikes Against U.S. Forces
A Nation At War: News Analysis; Bush Peril: Shifting Sand And Fickle Opinion.

31. March 2003
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A Nation At War: Washington; Calling Troop Levels Adequate, Rumsfeld Defends War Planning

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A Nation At War: Strategy; A New Doctrine's Test

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A Nation At War: Combat; Iraq Is Planning Protracted War

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A Nation At War: In The Field Third Infantry Division; G.I.'S Pry Iraqis Loose And Surge Over River
A Nation At War: Combat; U.S. Ground Forces Sweep Toward Baghdad

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Chirac Apologizes For Vandalized Graves
Spanish Premier's Support For War Is Hurting Him Politically
A Nation At War: A Capital's Plight; A Capital's Plight
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A Nation At War: In The Field March To Baghdad; At Airport, Bombs Provide The Only Light
5. April 2003
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A Nation At War: News Analysis; Dash To Baghdad Leaves Debate In Dust

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A Nation At War: Combat; A Show Of Force
A Nation At War: In The Field Third Infantry Division; U.S. Tanks Make Quick Strike Into Baghdad

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Congressional Memo; What Price War? It's Too Soon To Tell, But Expect The Final Tab To Be High
A Nation At War: Postwar Planning; Transition Plans
A Nation At War: Combat; Allies Strike In Baghdad And Press Into Basra
A Nation At War: In The Field 101st Airborne Division; A Sinister Past Comes To Light At An Iraqi Post
A Nation At War: Baghdad; Dissonance Of Guns Heralds Ground War In Iraq's Capital
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A Nation At War: Postwar Planning; Transition Plans

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A Nation At War: The President; Bush Meets Blair
A Nation At War: Combat; U.S. Blasts Compound In Effort To Kill Hussein
A Nation At War: Baghdad; Capital Has Look Of A Battlefield After The War

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A Nation At War: Combat; U.S. Tightens Grip; Rockets Rain On Baghdad
A Nation At War: The President; Bush Sees Aid Role Of U.N. As Limited In Rebuilding Iraq
A Nation At War: Iraqi Capital; Key Section Of City Is Taken In A Street-By-Street Fight
A Nation At War: News Analysis; Bush's War Message: Strong And Clear
A Nation At War: Strategy; Push To Finish The Job

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A Nation At War: Washington; Bush Tunes In And Sees Iraqis In Celebrations
A Nation At War: Tumult; Cheers, Tears And Looting In Capital's Streets
A Nation At War: Combat; U.S. Forces Take Control In Baghdad; Bush Elated; Some Resistance Remains
A Nation At War: The Plan; Speed And Flexibility

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A Nation At War: Civilian Casualties; G.I. Who Pulled The Trigger Shares Anguish Of 2 Deaths
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A Nation At War: Mosul; Sniper Fire Greets G.I.'S In Big City In North
A Nation At War: Military Analysis; Seeking Calm In The Chaos

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A Nation At War: Military Analysis; Last Symbol: Tikrit Capture
A Nation At War: Marines; U.S. Troops Move To Restore Order In Edgy Baghdad
A Nation At War: In The Field Third Infantry Division;

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A Nation At War: Combat; U.S. Troops Poised To Oust Loyalists In Northern City
A Nation At War: Freedom; Marines Discover 7 P.O.W.'S In Town North Of Baghdad
A Nation At War: The Iraqi Capital; Baghdad Residents Begin A Long Climb To An Ordered City

15. April 2003
A Nation At War: The Streets; G.I.'S And Iraqis Patrol Together To Bring Order
A Nation At War: The Postwar Task; U.S. Overseer Set To Remake Iraq
A Nation At War: Military; Pentagon Asserts The Main Fighting Is Finished In Iraq

16. April 2003
A Nation At War: Baghdad; Free To Protest, Iraqis Complain About The U.S.
A Nation At War: The Stronghold; Tale Of Hussein's Last Sighting Takes On A Life Of Its Own
A Nation At War: Conference; Pledge Made To Democracy By Exiles, Sheiks And Clerics
A Nation At War: White House; Bush Says Regime In Iraq Is No More; Syria Is
Penalized
European Union's Expansion Is Overshadowed By Disarray

17. April 2003
A Nation At War: Recovery; Bush Urging U.N. To Lift Sanctions Imposed On Iraq
A Nation At War: Recovery; Bush Urging U.N. To Lift Sanctions Imposed On Iraq

18. April 2003
A Nation At War: Military; U.S. Captures A Half Brother Of Iraqi Chief
A Nation At War: Reconstruction; U.S. Gives Bechtel A Major Contract In Rebuilding Iraq

19. April 2003
A Nation At War: Rebuilding; Bush Plans To Ask U.N. To Lift Penalties Against Iraq In Phases

20. April 2003
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A Nation At War: Reconstruction; From Power Grid To Schools, Rebuilding A Broken Nation
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A Nation At War: Baghdad Diary; Last, Desperate Days Of A Brutal Reign
A Nation At War: Baghdad; Back At Work, Iraqis Discover Offices In Chaos

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Aftereffects: President; Bush Now Says He Believes Syria Wants To Cooperate
Aftereffects: Most Wanted; Hussein's Last Son-In-Law Gives Himself Up To U.S. Forces
Aftereffects: Prohibited Weapons; Illicit Arms Kept Till Eve Of War, An Iraqi Scientist Is Said To Assert
Aftereffects: Assessment; Baghdad's Power Vacuum Is Drawing Only Dissent
Aftereffects: President; Bush Now Says He Believes Syria Wants To Cooperate

22. April 2003
Aftereffect: Baghdad; U.S. Overseer Vows Quick Restoration Of Iraq's Services

23. April 2003
Aftereffects: The Iraqis; As Baghdad Waits For Aid, Passions Rise In The South
Aftereffects: The Search
Aftereffects: The Interim Leader; American Overseer In Iraq Returns To A Kurdish Zone
Aftereffects: United Nations; France Urging U.N. To Suspend Iraq Penalties

24. April 2003
Aftereffects: Retaliation; U.S., Angry At French Stance On War, Considers Punishment
Aftereffects: In Custody; Four More Officials Are Captured, Two Of Them Intelligence Agents
Aftereffects: The Search; U.S.-Led Forces Occupy Baghdad Complex Filled With Chemical Agents
Aftereffects: Strategy; U.S. Tells Iran Not To Interfere In Iraq Efforts
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Aftereffects: Retaliation; U.S., Angry At French Stance On War, Considers Punishment
Aftereffects: Washington; Under Fire, Powell Receives Support From White House
Aftereffects: Hussein's Rule; Iraqis Tell Of A Reign Of Torture And Maiming

25. April 2003
Aftereffects: United Nations; Security Council Votes To Extend Oil-For-Food Plan In Iraq
Aftereffects: Weapons; Specialists Deploying To Disable Any Arms
Aftereffects: Paris; France Works To Limit Damage From U.S. Anger

26. April 2003
Aftereffects: Iraqi Officials; Rumsfeld Says Prisoners Are Providing Useful Data

28. April 2003
Aftereffects: Natural Resources; Iraqis Anxiously Await Decisions About The Operation And Control Of The Oil Industry
Aftereffects: Forbidden Arms; Franks Foresees A Weapons Hunt At 'Several Thousand Sites'
Aftereffects: Hometown; Hussein Birthplace Uneasy On The Eve Of His Birthday
Aftereffects: Bases; U.S. Will Move Air Operations To Qatar Base
Aftereffects: Baghdad; Americans Arrest Would-Be Leader Of Iraq's Capital

29. April 2003
Aftereffects: Policy; American Forces And Terror Group Reach Cease-Fire

30. April 2003
Blair And Putin Discuss Iraq, But There's No Meeting Of Minds
Aftereffects: Reconstruction; U.S. Tells Iraq Oil Ministers Not To Act Without Its O.K.
Aftereffects: Manhunt;
Aftereffects: Strategy; U.S. Planning To Regroup Armed Forces In Baghdad, Adding To Military Police
Aftereffects: Policy; U.S. Reported To Push For Iraqi Government, With Pentagon Prevailing
Aftereffects: The Military; U.S. Force Said To Kill 15 Iraqis During An Anti-American Rally
Aftereffects: Nato; 4-Nation Plan For Defense Of Europe
Aftereffects: Policy; U.S. Reported To Push For Iraqi Government, With Pentagon Prevailing

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Aftereffects: Violence; G.I.'s Kill 2 More Protesters In An Angry Iraqi City
Aftereffects: Iraq; Rumsfeld Visits 2 Cities In Iraq, Meeting Troops
APPENDIX E

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Prestigeprojekt vor dem Aus

4. March 2003
Et hält noch imme joot jejange
Regierung bewertet irakische Abrüstung zurückhaltend

5. March 2003
"Letztlich ist Gewalt nur durch Gewalt zu beseitigen"

6. March 2003
Grüne Novizen und barocke Bußfertigkeit
Die große Polit-Gaudi II

8. March 2003
Überflugsrechte: Bei einem U.S.-Schlag droht Streit in der Koalition
Unionspolitiker auf dem Weg nach Bagdad
Rau fordert friedliche Lösung des Irak-Konflikts

10. March 2003
"Nabelschau gehört nicht zu meinen Hobbys"
Verfassungsschutz warnt vor Racheakten
Die Woche der Entscheidungen
"Die Hemmschwelle sinkt"

11. March 2003
Treiben Paris, Berlin und Moskau die USA zu Alleingang?
Greenpeace besetzt das Brandenburger Tor

12. March 2003
Gauweiler und Wimmer berichten im Vatikan über Bagdad-Reise
Mahnminuten gegen Irak-Krieg
Bischöfe warnen Bush vor "gefährlichem Spiel"
Die Entscheidung des U.N.-Sicherheitsrates

15. March 2003
Deutsche Bischöfe: Auch Saddam Hussein ist böse
Irak-Krise: Auswärtiges Amt gibt verschärfte Reisewarnung heraus
17. March 2003
Bundesregierung will Botschaft in Iraks Hauptstadt Bagdad schließen
Friedensdemonstration: 100 000 Menschen bei Lichterkette in Berlin

18. March 2003
Schröders Dilemma
Schröder spricht Bush jede Rechtfertigung für Irak-Krieg ab
Berlin vor dem Krieg

19. March 2003
"Ausmaß der Bedrohung rechtfertigt keinen Krieg"
Wachsende Furcht vor Anschlägen in Deutschland
Union unterstützt Bushs Kriegskurs
Terrorismusexperte sieht Gefahr „durch fanatisierte Einzeltäter“

20. March 2003
Volkerrechtler kritisieren U.S.-Politik
Rau: Deutschland nicht unmittelbar bedroht
Krieg der Worte im Bundestag
"Viele Menschen ermuntern mich zum Neuanfang"
Bundesregierung äußert sich betroffen
Bestürzung im Bundestag über Irak-Krieg
Fischer kritisiert Alleingang der USA gegen Irak

21. March 2003
Schröder erfährt vom Ausbruch des Krieges aus dem Fernsehen
Irak-Krieg sorgt bei Rot-Grün für Turbulenzen
Streit um Irak-Kurs im CDU-Vorstand
Fischer: Friedliche Alternative war möglich
Sorge um Schicksal von Zivilisten im Irak wächst
Deutsche Soldaten im Ausland geraten erneut in Gefahr
Der Golf-Krieg mobilisiert die Massen

22. March 2003
Abschiebestopp für irakische Flüchtlinge
Irak-Krieg spaltet Religionsgemeinschaften
"Nach meiner Meinung ist dieser Krieg nicht richtig"
Awacs-Einsätze: FDP klagt in Karlsruhe
"Wenn die Türkei sich offensiv am Krieg beteiligt, dann müssen die deutschen Awacs-Soldaten abgezogen werden

24. March 2003
Thierse: Deutschland soll dem Irak beim Wiederaufbau helfen
Weltweite Proteste gegen Irak-Krieg
25. March 2003
"Dies ist ein schändlicher Krieg"
Entscheidung in Karlsruhe

26. March 2003
Nach dem Krieg droht eine Steuererhöhung
"Im Haushalt fehlt das Geld für ein Aufbauprogramm"
Basis rebelliert gegen Merkels Irak-Politik
Die größte Hilfsaktion der Geschichte läuft an
DRK-Präsident Ipsen: "Bisher noch kein Verstoß gegen die Genfer Konventionen"
Debatte um Wiederaufbau im Irak
Schröder lässt Blauhelm-Einsatz im Irak offen

27. March 2003
"Schröders Reformkurs ist alternativlos"
Frontbilder öffnen keine Portemonnaies

28. March 2003
Merz übt Kritik an Bush-Administration
Nordirakische Oppositionelle in Deutschland fühlen sich verraten

29. March 2003
Bundesweit sind 50 Demonstrationen gegen den Irak-Krieg geplant
Umfragen: Kanzler könnte von langem Krieg profitieren
Bundesweite Proteste gegen Irak-Krieg

31. March 2003
"Die Bundesregierung musste sich entziehen"
Ein Nachtragshaushalt wird immer wahrscheinlicher

1. Apr 2003
Bundesregierung will Alliierten im Irak nicht militärischen Erfolg wünschen
Merkel zunehmend unter Druck

2. Apr 2003
Unicef warnt: "Im Irak arbeitet die Zeit gegen die Kinder"
Rau einig mit den beiden großen Kirchen
73 Prozent der Deutschen unterstützen Anti-Kriegs-Kurs

3. Apr 2003
Kohl: Gerhard Schröder ist ein Anti-Amerikaner

4. Apr 2003
Pflüger: Bundeswehr in den Irak
Der Kanzler vermeidet scharfe Töne

5. Apr 2003
Das Volk macht Stress
Berlin als Mittler zwischen Paris und London
Bundeswehr plant Irak-Einsatz nach dem Krieg

7. Apr 2003
CDU-Basis in NRW begrüßt Merkels Irak-Haltung
PDS-Friedensparteitag fehlten die Delegierten

8. Apr 2003
CDU-Spitze gegen Kochs und Steinbrücks Steuerkompromiss

12. Apr 2003
Beim Fall der Mauer gab es keine Toten

14. Apr 2003
Psychologische Hilfe ist unabdingbar
Politiker für deutsche Beteiligung am wirtschaftlichen Irak-Aufbau

15. Apr 2003
DRK mobilisiert Irak-Hilfe für insgesamt 150 Millionen Euro

16. Apr 2003
Umfrage: Mehrheit für Aufbauhilfe im Irak
"Andere tun weniger"
Besuch beim Botschafter Ohneland

22. Apr 2003
OsterMarchsche in 105 Städten
Papst fordert "solidarischen Wiederaufbau" des Irak

25. Apr 2003
"Die Union ist der politische Verlierer des Monats April"