Sino-Soviet ideological dispute and the stability of Asian subsystem (A case study of North Korea)

Jong-Mahn Hong

University of Nebraska at Omaha

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SINO-SOViet IDEOLOGICAL DISPUTE AND THE
STABILITY OF ASIAN SUBSYSTEM
(A CASE STUDY OF NORTH KOREA)

A Thesis
Presented to the
Department of Political Science
and the
Faculty of the Graduate College
University of Nebraska

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts
University of Nebraska at Omaha

by
Jong-Mahn Hong
May, 1982
THESIS ACCEPTANCE

Accepted for the faculty of the Graduate College, University of Nebraska, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts, University of Nebraska at Omaha.

Committee

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Date: 4/20/1982
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Deepest appreciation is extended to my advisor who served as Chair of the Committee, for his many hours of thought, inexhaustible patience, and constant encouragement.

I am deeply indebted to the Korean Air Force Authority for my study and Kwang-Hee, friend, partner and wife.
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INTRODUCTION

The division of the Korean peninsula into North and South, a legacy of the Cold War, was turned into a hot war in 1950. Because of its bitter experiences in this war, South Korea has remained one of those countries where anti-communist sentiment runs very high despite the changes that have taken place in the world since 1950. Even when the era of Cold War yield to that of détente in the 1970s, the Cold War in Korea continued between the two competing states.

The Korean peninsula is a strategically important area\(^1\) where the interests of four powers--China, Japan, the Soviet Union, and the United States--intersect. Historically, Korea has served as a buffer state between China and the Soviet Union, and between Japan and the Soviet Union. It is natural that each of these powers wants Korea to remain friendly to itself. If one of them seeks to exercise hegemony over Korea, the latter cannot help but fall victim to the conflict between the contending powers as demonstrated by the Sino-Japanese at the end of

the 19th Century and the Russo-Japanese wars that occurred at the beginning of this century. A very similar situation has existed since World War II.

In addition, the transformation of Sino-Soviet relations from alliance to confrontation in the 1970s provided the major impetus to the trend toward diversity in the global balance of power. This was inevitable because the United States began to negotiate with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Soviet Union instead of confronting them. As these two communist giants themselves sought détente with the Western powers, such détente made it possible for other communist countries also to explore better relations with the Western countries. Since President Nixon made the famous trip to Beijing in February, 1972, all the major powers have normalized their bilateral relationships with one another. Consequently, the bipolar world of the Cold War was replaced in Northeast Asia by a four-power balance involving the United States, Japan, the PRC, and the Soviet Union. With regard to Korea, the interests of these powers diverse somewhat, but they do not seem to want any change in the existing territorial status quo on the Korean peninsula. But such events as the Sino-Japanese peace treaty, the Soviet-Vietnamese friendship treaty, and Sino-American normalization have made the rivalries among the Asian powers more volatile than before.
The Sino-Soviet competition is becoming sharper over the Korean peninsula, and in particular over the behavior of North Korea. Since the latter borders on the two communist powers, both China and the Soviet Union have been trying to place North Korea in its own sphere of influence. In fact, both Beijing and Moscow concluded treaties of alliance and cooperation with Pyongyang in 1961. While Pyongyang has endeavored to maintain its neutrality in this rivalry, because of its geographic proximity and cultural affinity, it has leaned toward Beijing in recent years. Despite this competition, however, the Korean question is no longer a direct obstacle to Beijing's and Moscow's rapprochement with Washington. In this sense, therefore, North Korea could become increasingly "North Koreanized" and pursue a more independent foreign policy.

Figure 1: Stability of Korean Peninsula
Thus, I may hypothesize that:
the more intense Sino-Soviet competition
becomes over North Korea, the more inde­
dependent military action of North Korea
will become.

Figure 2: Pendulum of North Korean Exercise

Shown on Figure 2-A, just as the tides are the high­
est when the gravitational pulls of the sun and the moon
join together, North Korea was strong when the gravitational
pulls of the PRC and the Soviet Union were aligned as in the
beginning of the Korean War in 1950.

Therefore, this paper is confined to: first,
research of the two communist giants vying for influence
over North Korea and the relationships among the three coun­
tires. It covers the border clash from 1969 to 1978, a ten­
year period (shown on Figure 2-B, C). Secondly, to examine closely the reactions of the other side when North Korea on the pendulum moves from one side to the other. Thirdly, to analyze the Sino-Soviet conflict and its impact on North Korea (shown on Figure 1).
CHAPTER II

THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT AND THE DIVERGENCE OF MARXISM-LENINISM

Political ideology is an institution that is used to further a country's national interest. The existing ideologies vary from pluralist democracy to communist socialism, and a specific national interest may be defined as whichever nation-building stage is being highlighted in the political system at a given time on the basis of these two variables—ideology and national interest. International conduct can be constructed that may be applied to the analysis of contemporary world politics.

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<th>National Interest</th>
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Figure 3: Types of International Conduct
A major activity of many scholars of communism has been the attempt to identify the causes or sources of the Sino-Soviet conflict. No consensus has resulted from this activity. However, four fundamental viewpoints have emerged on the Sino-Soviet conflict: (1) the conflict originated as a struggle for control of the world communist movement and was made virtually inevitable by the appearance of a second powerful center in that movement. (2) The clash between China and the Soviet Union simply reflects the national interests of the two states; the perceptions of national interest involved are determined by historical, cultural, or geopolitical factors. (3) The conflict arose from the vastly different levels of development attained by the two societies; that is, it is primarily economic in origin. (4) The split originated in essentially different interpretations of Marxism-Leninism by the ideologically oriented elites who dominate the two political systems.  

An obvious answer to the difficulties encountered in attempts to assess the relative importance of ideology and power.

---

power in communist politics is that Marxism-Leninism is, above all, an ideology of power. All ideologies must, of course, deal with power relationships; Marxism-Leninism is distinguished by the fact that it explicitly ties the achievement of utopian social goals to the development of a particular kind of political organization and the amassing of social power by that organization. Thus, for a Marxist-Leninist any question of ideology is immediately a question of political power; any question of political power is immediately a question of ideology. This conjunction of ideology and power means that a satisfactory analysis of conflict between communist party-state systems is unlikely without consideration of ideology, for a major function of the ideology is the explanation or justification of power relationships.

The Sino-Soviet conflict can best be understood in terms of the Marxist-Leninist theory of social development. The reasons are threefold. First, the Soviets and the Chinese explain fundamental conflicts within this frame of reference. Second, the application of different developmental models, both purportedly Marxist-Leninist, appears to have directly resulted empirically in severe conflict situations. And finally, continuation of the power of dominant elites in these communist political systems is dependent upon the validity of the propositions contained in their respective variants of developmental theory; moreover, these elites explicitly attribute the legitimacy of their control of
these societies to Marxist-Leninist developmental theory.

Developmental theory provides the essential theoretical link between the other two major components of communist ideology: the basic worldview or philosophical grounding set by dialectical materialism and the vision of the future communist utopia. As such, it is obviously the most flexible part of the ideology; it also provides the rationale by which communist leaders constantly justify their specific political actions.

In Marxist theory, political power has its basis in functional specialization or the division of labor. Material need or functional necessity produces a differentiation of social structure and leads to the development of political structures controlled by dominant classes. In other words, functional specialization is a necessary response to material needs and necessarily produces variations in social and political power. So long as the production of material goods falls short of abundance, functional specialization continues, as does the predictable conflict between dominant and dependent social elements, who struggle for the control of scarce resources. Over time, development of the forces of production erodes and eventually destroys the material basis for the power of dominant social elements, through the elimination of economic necessity. Human material need is the vital force driving mankind toward achievement of the abundant, nonrepressive society.
Regimes established under the standard of Marxism-Leninism are not immune to the material necessity identified by Marx, or to the production of conflict endemic to the developmental process identified by him. Moreover, these regimes face the severe problem of equating empirical change in the social system with the change dictated by Marx's developmental model. Starting from a much lower level of development than that indicated as the revolutionary take-off stage in the original Marxian model, they must carry out the revolutionary economic development produced by capitalism in the original model and show that the essential substitution of political for economic means will lead to the same goal.

Many roads to communism approach means, of course, that the communist system itself accepts and itself begins to generate that structural differentiation which, in Marxism, contains such conflict-producing propensities. However, if the economically less advanced countries are moving in the same general direction as the more advanced countries in their processes of development, there is no problem. Moreover, even if this is not the case, the underlying problem can be rather effectively masked between crises, if the center is in a clearly dominant position, as was done by Khru­shchev in late 1950s with his conceptualization of the Socialist Commonwealth.
If there is no single power center, the situation is vastly changed. Where there are differences in levels of development, different "roads to communism" are virtually inevitable. The resulting development must be explained by each communist party-state's spokesmen in terms of relevance to the ultimate goal. The survival of any single regime with a divergent social development constitutes a denial of the validity of all other approaches. The interests of the dominant elites in the communist party-states with divergent patterns of development become inextricably tied to the competing claims to legitimacy that are central to ideological conflicts.

Such conflicts are difficult to contain or resolve without coercion. Conflict resolution through bargaining inevitably involves concessions and compromise; here, divergent patterns of social development assume crucial importance. The inception of bargaining over ideological questions means at least provisional recognition of the legitimacy of one's bargaining partner's regime. Real settlement of ideological issues by such methods would have to include explicit recognition of the legitimacy of the bargaining partner's social system, thus posing a direct threat to the legitimacy of the dominant political elites in the countries involved. The reason lies in Marxist ideological claims to universality. From the standpoint of Marxism-Leninism, Communist Party elites are legitimimized by the claim that their
behavior and ideological positions represent the coming universalization of social relations, which will be characterized by the absence of classes and group conflicts. Acknowledgment of the validity of another approach to communism necessarily means some diminution of the legitimacy of a particular Communist Party's elite, some weakening of claims to universality. But one need not consider these matters from the standpoint of the Marxist-Leninist view of legitimacy; there is a very practical matter involved. In communist party-states, where competing ideologies cannot be overtly expressed, the party elite's claim to represent the future of mankind, constantly repeated, is a powerful weapon for inducing compliance. Acceptance of a different approach to communism in communications media dominated by the elite suggests the possibility of political alternatives. This break in the monolithic pattern of communications may increase the potential for domestic dissent and so undercut elite power.

Mao has long demonstrated a profound awareness of these problems of social development. He has, in fact, shown a willingness to sacrifice economic development, at least in the short run, in order to prevent the bourgeoisie-fication of Chinese society. This motivation appeared clearly in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.3

has pushed for achievement of an undifferentiated social structure while economic modernization is in progress. In practice, this has meant a drive for social atomization more in accord with the traditional model of totalitarianism formerly accepted by most Western scholars than with the actual practice of the Soviet system. Despite severe conflict, or perhaps because of it, Mao has succeeded to a significant degree in shaping Chinese society to his vision of development. The Maoist thrust for a more fluid social organization adds structural differentiation to the initial developmental divergence between the two societies. All of this is reflected in the contrasting evolution of developmental theory in the two systems. The Soviet model of development in the contemporary epoch could be characterized as the routinization of revolution; that is, the Soviets view technological development and technical expertise as the principal forces in social transformation. The Chinese model contains distinct anarchistic tendencies, emphasizing what the Maoists call "the factor of man," in the Chinese view, social transformation can be carried out independently of technological development by application of the human will.

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The Divergence in Developmental Theory

Permanent Revolution

The Maoist concept of permanent revolution differs considerably from Marx's "revolution in permanence" and from Trotsky's "permanent revolution." The concept has two essential and distinctive features. First, the revolution must be uninterrupted. As one stage or process is completed, there must be immediate movement to the next stage or process. Second, revolution continues in the stage of communism. The process of change is qualitatively different under communism, but change continues to occur through qualitative leaps. This concept of permanent revolution is quite consistent with, and indeed is inextricably tied to, Mao's general theory of contradictions and disequilibrium.

The revolutionary strategy involved here is dictated by Mao's concerns about structural development. Of course, uninterrupted revolution during the stage of building socialism is related to the overwhelming tasks of Chinese economic development. No such motivation can be ascribed to Mao's projected revolution in Communist society unless he has rejected all previous Marxist formulations concerning the material base of communism. Clearly, Mao is concerned about the tendency of social structures to form and harden and deny the projected universal unity at every stage of development.

Although all political structures, including the Communist Party, are subject to the universal law of contradictions, the great danger is that the principal contradiction may turn out to be the contradiction between dominant political structures and the underlying material base. If one political structure is destroyed through its internal contradictions, another may arise to take its place. Uninterrupted revolution rapidly intensifies the existing contradictions and prevents the rise of the feared structural power. The political strategy associated with Mao's theory of disequilibrium thus provides his answer to the long-run problem of structured and separate political power. In this general, theoretical approach to power, there is no necessary connection with social class, and so Mao takes another step away from the underlying economic motivations of the Marxian model.

These Maoist concerns are not reflected in the thought of contemporary Soviet theorists. While there is no great concern for the problem of increasing complexity of social structure at advanced levels of development, no Soviet theorist admits the possibility of a real conflict of interest between the Communist Party and society as a whole.

View of Class

Social class does not have the same importance for Marxists as for other Marxists. Moreover, against the Soviet
adherence to the orthodox view concerning the objective basis for class development, the Maoists have put forward a loose and contradictory concept of class containing both objective and subjective elements.

In the Maoist view, the class struggle is an objective reality independent of man's will. The origin of social class is the division of labor, and social class is determined by one's relationship to the means of production. This is an orthodox Marxist position. However, while this orthodox view continues to be maintained in Beijing, an antithetical conception of class is advanced without acknowledgment of any contradiction.

This formulation is quite consistent with the Maoist distinction between antagonistic and nonantagonistic contradictions and the possibility of continuation of several parties into the stage of communism. It appears that, for Mao, the primary political aspect of the phase of socialism is something other than the resolution of class conflict. Moreover, during the Cultural Revolution, certain assertions concerning classes and class struggle were put forward which definitely conflict with Marxist orthodoxy, and these assertions have not subsequently been disavowed. A subjective definition of the term "proletariat," emphasizing adherence to "Mao Tse-tung thought," was consistently found in the Maoist polemics. During the Cultural Revolution, an attempt was made to purge the party along "class lines," class lines
were determined by attitudes toward the thoughts of Mao.6

Mao, like Bakunin, acknowledges the existence of an economic basis for class conflict. Mao appears to recognize that something more fundamental than the class struggle is going on in society. With Bakunin, the fundamental struggle is against all forms of political power. It is a struggle against bureaucratic forms of power. Mao's special contribution here is the suggestion that class struggle and the nature of classes themselves can be transformed outside an economic context.

The Material Basis for Revolution

In Marxist theory, material development is an absolute precondition for fulfillment of the substantive goals of social change and the transformation of human nature. The orthodox viewpoint is still fully accepted by Soviet theoreticians. Mao made a virtue of necessity, arguing that the primitive level of development facilitated revolutionary transformation because poor people were naturally disposed toward change, action, and revolution. Again, Mao is dealing with what is for him the overriding structural problem.

If the revolutionary transformation were to begin at advanced levels of economic development, the existing complex social structure would pose a major obstacle; for Mao, formalized social and political structures are coincident with

resistance to change. At advanced levels of economic development, vast disparities in social and political power ordinarily mean that powerful forces exist which have a material interest in resisting the revolutionary goals of equality and monolithic social organization. In the Maoist view, this is true alike of bourgeois societies, which pose the threat of counterrevolution.

Primitive social development alone provides the objective conditions for effective confrontation of this potential problem. Here the material basis has been inadequate for development of a power really threatening to the revolution by economic forces or bureaucracies. The masses have no stake in socio-political inequality. On the contrary, according to the Maoists, the masses are prone to a value-identification with ideological leaders who posit the goals of an abundant society and an undifferentiated social structure. If this linkage between leaders and masses can be firmly established at the outset of the developmental process, then the rise of separate, essentially anti-revolutionary centers of power among intermediate social and political structures can be prevented. Thus, for the Maoists, the most important social transformation occurs at the outset of revolution and is not only independent of but also prior to economic development.

Contradictions and Disequilibrium

A theory of contradictions was crucial in Marx's
thought. Engels extended Marx's conception of contradictions to develop an all-encompassing phenomenology that he claimed to be universally valid. Mao has attempted to deal with the logical problem involved in Engels' phenomenology, which had become accepted as part of Marxist-Leninist dogma—how can a phenomenology of universal disequilibrium be made consistent with the vision of ultimate order contained in Marx's philosophy of history? Mao has done this by emphasizing, more than any other theorist, the distinction in Marxism-Leninism between antagonistic and nonantagonistic contradictions.

According to Mao, contradictions are at the center of all phenomena and will continue there even in the stage of communism. However, in that ultimate stage, contradictions will be nonantagonistic contradictions. Moreover, Mao does not tie social contradictions to control of the means of production so stringently as was done in Marxism. His distinction between the national bourgeoisie and the compradores, which was central to the New Democracy, shows clearly that Mao was thinking at a very early date in terms of a more fluid structural development than that postulated by Marx and Lenin. Given the primitive level of economic development attained at the outset of revolution, the rather rigid Marxian

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framework associated with control of the means of production might pose virtually insuperable obstacles to economic development. That is, if the dominant structure in production was poorly developed, so was the counterstructure that would replace it. This is not to say that Mao's theory of contradictions was simply a response to Chinese developmental problems; however, his theory, which lies at the heart of Maoist ideology, was obviously consistent with his perception of the awesome problem of economic development in China.

Lenin dealt with the problem of an inadequate social base for revolution in his Two Tactics. His solution was superficially similar to Mao's: augmentation of the revolutionary force by other elements opposed to the existing political order. Since the proletariat was the only truly revolutionary force, however, this alliance could be only temporary. Moreover, the economic development directed by the vanguard would create in the long-run the social base for unity which would make such expedient accretions of political power superfluous. With Mao, coalition formation loses its quality of temporary tactic and becomes enmeshed in his overall view of the sources of social conflict. This is reflected clearly in Mao's assertion that a coalition of many parties might continue into the stage of communism. 9

In Mao's thought, particular social structures do not necessarily and automatically yield patterns of social conflict;

what is essential is the attitudes associated with formation of the structures and their continuation. Whether a particular contradiction is antagonistic depends less upon one's relationship to control of the means of production than upon one's attitude toward the ongoing historical movement. The sources of conflict are both internal and external. Mao has thus excised a portion of Marx's behavioral teleology and has opened up the possibility of the development of consciousness independent of economic forces. As Soviet writers quite rightly claim, Mao's theorizing contradictions within the people strikes directly at the class basis of Marxism.10

The current Soviet viewpoint on contradictions is basically that of Stalin's gradualism, with allowances made for possible sudden intensification of contradictions and consequent upheavals owing to the increasingly desperate tactics of the imperialists as the power of the capitalist system declines.11 The internal basis for such upheavals is primarily increasing antagonistic contradictions that arise because of the increasing complexity of social structure associated with economic development. Such upheavals are,


of course, unwelcome; they are to be guarded against by a strengthening of the superstructure. Without sacrificing entirely the model of contradictions upon which the Maoist theory is based, the Soviets have moved toward a view of imposed equilibrium within socialist society, amid the general necessary disequilibrium among conflicting world systems.

The Maoist theory of contradictions provides a theoretical basis for social change which differs from both the original Marxian and the contemporary Soviet models. If contradictions inhere in every political structure, whether antagonistic or not, disequilibrium is inevitable. Realization of the ultimate utopia is unlikely either through historically necessary structural development or through the imposition of political structures upon society. But the process remains, engendered by the unavoidable appearance of contradictions. Both conflict and order are internalized, and Mao moves away from the objective framework so dear to Marx. For Mao, disequilibrium is a problem only when viewed from the standpoint of structure; when viewed in another perspective, it becomes a positive blessing.

Military Means

Mao's maxim that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun" flows directly from the analysis underlying the Peking Road doctrine. Under conditions of primitive social and economic development, with an inadequate prole-
tarian base, revolution became crucially dependent upon change in the internal balance of forces through application of violence by military forces; military means took precedence over political means. For Mao, the means dictated by Chinese experience appeared to assume over time a quality of universal validity. According to Mao, the seizure of power by armed force, the settlement of issues by war is the central task and highest form of revolution. Much more significant is the fact that the military forces have a key role not only in the overthrow of political regimes but also in the revolutionary transformation of society after the seizure of power. Despite Mao's subjective approach, he also requires a structural basis for power. The army forged in the revolutionary struggle and thus uniquely armed with revolutionary consciousness, becomes the principal force available to direct the revolutionary transformation of society.

The Soviets have increased their emphasis upon military means in recent years; this has resulted in part from the pressures of the Sino-Soviet split and in part from the problems of cohesion of the East European bloc which led to the elaboration of the Brezhnev Doctrine. The political upgrading of the Soviet military forces is reflected in the

the increase in the percentage of military men on the new Central Committee elected at the Twenty-fourth Party Congress. Nevertheless, the Soviet leadership continues to insist upon the primacy of political over military means within socialist systems. Inroads by military officers into leading party bodies remain quite limited, despite their recent gains; it seems clear that now, as in the past, military leaders cannot be regarded as potential competitors for political power against the civilian leadership of the CPSV.

The Role of the Party

The CCP has never gained the kind of dominance usually possessed by the party in communist party-states. The CCP apparently has also never been regarded as the sole bearer of legitimacy within the political system. For Mao, legitimacy is tied to process but evidently not to specific organizations involved in social development. The Soviets, on the other hand, continue to insist upon the centrality of the party's role in the developmental process, and in fact call for the strengthening of the party as an organizational system at advanced levels of development.

The contrasting theoretical formulations summarized above are related to the extreme differences in levels of


14 Schram, "Party in Chinese Ideology, pp. 5-7."
social and economic development between the two societies at
the inception of their revolutions. However, practical
application of these theoretical formulations has served
also to create essentially different social and political
structures and additional differences in developmental pro­
blems. The Soviet model is much more conducive to further
differentiation of social structure. The Chinese model
invites disruptions in economic development. Application of
the models produces effects that are virtually certain to
have decisive impact upon relations between the two commun­
ist party-states and upon their roles in the international
political system. These effects may be briefly summarized:

1.) The two models contain contrasting assumptions
concerning the sources of political power. For the Soviets,
political power is economically based, and Soviet power has
been, and continues to be, dependent upon development of
economic structure. For the Maoists, political power arises
from mobilization of the masses.

2.) The two models point toward different centers
of power and different ancillary power structures. In the
Soviet Union, the power center is a massive party bureau­
cracy that owes its existence to its specific role in Soviet
economic development. In China, the power center is an
inner-party or supra-party ideological elite. In the Soviet
Union, the ancillary structures are composed of technologi­
cally oriented elites, principally the Soviet military-
industrial complex. In China, the primary ancillary structure is the army.

3.) Application of the Soviet model is less likely to lead to domestic political instability than is application of that of the Maoists. The Chinese emphasis upon revolution "from below" makes likely, and Mao has actively promoted, periodic revolutionary convulsions directed against domestic bureaucracies. The Soviet model, on the other hand, emphasizes controlled and relatively low-key mobilization of the masses and is specifically directed toward the containment of political instability. These different approaches are likely in the short-run to accentuate the substantial Soviet advantages in political, military, and economic power. However, in the long-run, the power of these major communist party-states is dependent upon their relative success in applying the models and upon world trends of development. If the Maoist model has general validity, Soviet power will be ultimately overwhelmed by bourgeoisification and inescapable contradictions of socialism. On the other hand, if the Soviets are right about the essential parallelism between structural and functional development, then the Chinese communists cannot generate enough political power to make possible the continuation of the Maoist system. China faces

the problem of technological encirclement; the Soviets confront the problem of structural fragility. Thus developmental theory is not simply an abstraction; it is crucially tied to the survival of these conflicting systems.

**Ideological Struggle and Sino-Soviet Relations**

It appears that developmental theory is both an indicator of primary conflict and a source of secondary conflict among communist political systems. The Soviet and Chinese variants of Marxist-Leninist developmental theory originated in the interests of dominant political structures confronted internally with vastly different patterns of social relationships. In other words, the emergence of different approaches to social development can be explained largely as a matter of reaction to developmental levels already attained at the outset of revolution. If this were the only aspect of the conflict, we would have a simple struggle between the "haves" and the "have-nots." This initial divergence was complicated, however, by the pronounced tendency of communist elites to legitimize their actions by reference to Marxist-Leninist ideology. Over time, the political elites in the Soviet and Chinese systems formulated two distinct models of social development, each of which in its main features was claimed to have universal validity. These formulations have provided the central issues of the Sino-Soviet conflict.
The general conflict in Sino-Soviet relations resulting from application of these two developmental models has many forms and nuances; here it is sufficient to point out two significant aspects. First, the Chinese developmental model obviously challenges the legitimacy of dominant Soviet elites. Second, while the Chinese development of the productive forces is undeniably impressive, application of the Maoist developmental model has weakened the Chinese political system vis-a-vis the external world of crucial points. That weakening renders China vulnerable to the political and military power of the Soviet elites challenged by Mao. The new politics of coalition formation since 1970 can be seen to follow directly from those aspects of Sino-Soviet relations that are tied to developmental theory. Soviet and Chinese political elites explicitly view each other as constituting a greater threat for the short-run than does the leading capitalist power.16

Here we must look to the actual development of social structure in the two systems and the accompanying ideological development. In the Soviet case, both the overwhelming bureaucratization of Soviet society and the party's ideological pronouncements point toward powerful and growing conservative tendencies. For the foreseeable future, Soviet political elites must necessarily view the revolutionary

thrust of Maoism as posing a severe potential threat to their conservative dominance.

More importantly, account must be taken of the real practical consequences of Mao's revolution for Chinese society. Maoism has provided the energizing goal-culture of the Chinese revolution;\(^\text{17}\) that revolution has produced internal changes in social structure and social relationships far surpassing the internal changes in social structure and social relationships far surpassing the internal changes wrought by the French Revolution. Since this is the case, Mao's successors could carry out an overt renunciation and reversal of Maoism only at the probable cost of serious domestic upheavals which would further weaken China vis-a-vis the external world. And this appears to be the price demanded by the Soviets for a resumption of fraternal socialist ties.

Temporary stabilization of Sino-Soviet relations, including the resolution of boundary disputes and peripheral issues, certainly cannot be ruled out. But resolution of the broader issues discussed above poses problems of much greater difficulty and complexity. For the foreseeable future, it seems likely that both Soviet and Chinese political elites will find a continuation of existing tensions to be less of a threat to internal control and cohesion than a resolution of their ideological conflict.

\(^{17}\text{Chalmers Johnson, Change in Communist Systems (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970), pp. 6-7.}\)
CHAPTER III

SINO-SOVET CONFLICT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND NORTHEAST ASIAN POLITICS

During the 1970s, Sino-Soviet relations changed very little: the entire ten years saw continued military confrontation, diplomatic encirclement and counterencirclement, ideological estrangement, and the atrophy of economic ties. In contrast, all around the two countries, and throughout the globe, the character of political and economic relations changed more in this decade than in any other period in the last two centuries. How did China and the Soviet Union so successfully insulate their relationship from the immense shift that occurred everywhere else? Alternatively, are important shifts in intra-communist relations about to occur in response to the cumulative effect of recent changes? The answer is important, for relations between Moscow and Beijing form one leg of the Sino-Soviet-American strategic triangle that occupies the center of international relations and vitally affects the foreign policies of all Asian countries, even in Western states.

The ten years from 1969 to 1979 began with the two communist giants in Asia at military confrontations. Following a series of small scale but symbolically important border
clashes in the spring and summer of 1969, the Russians had coerced the Chinese into agreeing to several arms control measures along the border and to reopening the long-suspended border talks. Moscow followed that up with a large military deployment that upset even further the balance between the two antagonists, panicked Beijing into thinking that war was around the corner, and drove the Chinese into the hands of their previously most hated enemies, Japan and America.

Through the decade, Soviet military superiority was so great in Beijing's eyes that even the death of Mao Tsetung whose personal anti-Sovietism was the most important factor in the decline of Sino-Soviet relations did not immediately free his successors to renew discussions even for an interim settlement, lest the Kremlin drive too hard a bargain. Indeed, although the threat of imminent war had passed by mid-decade, China still felt the need to continue its insurance policies in Washington by striving to construct an all-around global anti-Soviet coalition. The result, thanks to Chinese persistence, perceived Soviet expansionism, and Japanese and American cooperation, was restoration of a diplomatic balance. This paid dividends in 1979 when China turned military upon its old Vietnamese ally--now solidly linked with the Soviet Union--to prevent it from becoming the

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dominant force in Southeast Asia. So things ended about where they had started: Moscow and Beijing still faced each other across a long, heavily armed, and hostile border and each continued to mortgage too much of its overall foreign policy to the struggle against the other.

The end of the decade did, however, differ from the beginning in several regards. Perhaps most importantly, decision makers in both Moscow and Beijing were sensitized, by the three occasions of Sino-Soviet war or near war, to the ultimate need for a modus vivendi. In this regard, the Vietnam crisis of 1979 was more important that the two military confrontations earlier in the decade, because only in this case did both the Soviet and the Chinese leaderships face the possibility of large-scale war and uncontrollable escalation. Secondly, the character of Asian international relations had changed enormously. Thirdly, the overall international system, both political and economic, had undergone great modifications that have influenced all actors, including Moscow and Beijing. Finally, the Soviet and Chinese societies have each gone through important evolutions in the intervening years, with the result that the domestic motivations of their respective foreign policies, toward each other and in general, had increasingly shifted direction.

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With the possible exception of the 1940s, Asia changed more in the 1970s than during any other decade in the last two centuries. The most important development has been the emergence of six modern, rapidly growing, capital­ist, developed states or city-states along the eastern periphery of the continent. Stretching from South Korea in the north through Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia in the south, these states have set the economic pace for Asia as a whole, are economic models for other developing states in Asia and elsewhere, constitute a grouping whose size and common interests rival those of the European communities, and exert an increasingly strong pull on the centrally planned, but slower growing, communist economies on the Asian land mass. Both Russia and China feel themselves caught in the dynamic field of these states' economic progress, so that much of the Sino-Soviet rivalry during the decade has taken the form of competitive economic appeals to Japan, rivalry as to who could better assist the North Koreans in keeping up economically with the South Koreans, and attempts to profit from the economic growth of noncommunist Southeast Asia. 20

If the Sino-Soviet conflict had not been so acute, the Chinese would have been overjoyed at this prospect, for it represented the fulfillment of one of their major policy

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goals, often enunciated since 1949. However, the Chinese were so fearful of the Soviet military threat that even they had to join the chorus of Asian statemen calling upon the new American president to come back to his policy senses. By the end of the decade, these cries, and those of many foreign policy analysts within the United States, seemed to have been heard, for the United States began to renew its interest and activism in Asia. To be sure, much of the resurgence in American policy attention to Asia was the product of the desire to use the new Chinese connection for anti-Soviet purposes or to claim that too much had been solved through Sino-American normalization. But much of it also derived from the belated realization that Asia had become the United States' greatest trading partner, that Asia still was a cockpit of global conflict, that only in northeast Asia did Soviet-American-Chinese and Japanese interests geographically coalesce.

The third major change in Asian international relations in the 1970s was the parallel emergence of China and Japan into policy activism. The causes of this activism were, of course, quite different. In the Japanese case, they were almost entirely economic. What influence Tokyo gained in Beijing and Moscow derived almost exclusively from its large gross national product, its high rate of growth.


its foreign trade dynamism, and its capacity to export technology to anyone who could pay the right fee. In the Chinese case, the reasons were almost entirely political. During the Cultural Revolution, China had isolated itself virtually completely from the external world; a large part of Beijing's diplomatic activity was therefore an attempt to restore China to its self-perceived natural place at the center of the Asian international order.

These Japanese and Chinese developments meant that, for the first time in modern history, the two most important Asian states were actively engaged in the region and were friendly toward each other. The character of Asian international relations was, therefore, unprecedented. These changes also accentuated continued American involvement and increasing Soviet activism. It was, in fact, expansion of Soviet involvement in Asia and the possibility of a Soviet strategic breakout from its traditional position of geographic isolation from Asia that threatened permanently to upset the Asian balance of power.\footnote{Jacobsen, Sino-Soviet Relations, pp. 125-132.} This constituted the fourth major change in Asia during the 1970s.

Historically, the very geography of Asia, the necessity for Moscow to devote its still limited resources to Europe, and the weakness of the Soviet Union at home had combined to keep Russia out of any but peripheral involvement in Asian politics. But by the mid-1970s Soviet society was
clearly stable and reasonably strong. Moreover, the Soviet military build-up had gone far enough that Moscow could increasingly invest in building up its strength in Siberia. Indeed, the need to deter perceived irrational Chinese actions along the Chinese border merely accelerated what had already become a clearly perceived policy goal.

There were many manifestations of this new Soviet activism. Even by the beginning of the decade, Moscow had become the only external power of consequence in South Asia. Following the end of the Vietnam War, it was Moscow that wrestled with Beijing over who was to be the most important extra-regional power in Southeast Asia. The Soviet naval and air build-up in Northeast Asia was largely responsible for the Japanese decision to draw perceptibly closer to China, to build-up its own military force, and to renew pressure on the United States to continue its own military presence.

One immediate result of this new Soviet policy was to replace Asian lines of tension that generally went east and west, and between communist and noncommunist societies, between one communist state and another. Once the Vietnam War was past, all conflicts in Asia in the decade involved communist military forces on both sides of the battle line. Vietnam invaded Cambodia. China invaded Vietnam. The Soviet

\[24\text{Ibid., pp. 140-142.}\]
Union threatened China with immense harm. Moreover, the traditional flashpoints between communist and noncommunist countries dropped below the kindling point, at least temporarily. There was no new north-south war in Korea. The intra-communist wars were based materially on a liberal supply of Soviet armaments. The decline in East-West conflict in Asia was due principally to the combination of these internecine communist conflicts and the rise of American-Japanese assisted local powers—South Korea, Taiwan, and the countries of the Association of South-East-Asian Nations (ASEAN).

At present, it is not clear how long this new Asia would persist. Everything depended upon continuation of Sino-Soviet enmity. And despite the wars and threats of wars in 1979, the scare resulting from the Sino-Soviet confrontation over Vietnam motivated policy-makers in both capitals to return to their policy senses far enough to engage jointly in a new search for peace.

A final Asian trend vitally affecting Soviet-Chinese relations in the 1970s has just been alluded to, namely, the rapid growth in status of regional powers. In Northeast Asia, the most startling examples were South Korea and Taiwan. Their economic influence was felt throughout the


Western world and even penetrated the Middle East. Each constructed a military force increasingly representative of its new economic power. Despite their need for continued high-technology American assistance, their own efforts were largely sufficient to deter attack from their very heavily armed communist antagonists. In Southeast Asia, the same role was played by the newly reunited Vietnam state, with the obvious difference that Vietnam's strength derived almost entirely from its military success and was bought at high cost in economic hardship and popular distress. It was the military stalwartness of the Vietnamese that made it possible to reunite all of Indochina under one rule, and it was this reunification that, in turn, upset the delicate communist-noncommunist military balance in Southeast Asia as a whole.

Amidst all of these major changes, it is startling that Soviet-Chinese relations remained so stable. One reason surely was that both Moscow and Beijing were afraid that the very rapidity of these changes could work to the advantage of the other side. Hence, their reaction was to continue the status quo in Sino-Soviet relations and to deal with external problems as they arose. Another reason was that, with Soviet-Chinese relations reduced to military confrontation and conflict too severe even to contemplate, a reasonable strategy for both was to do battle against the

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27 Ibid., pp. 152-154.
other indirectly. This meant supporting one or another of the antagonists in war, or, to the extent possible, standing on opposite sides of the nonmilitary trends in the regions just noted. Other reasons for Soviet-Chinese stability stem from the changing character of the international system and the evolution of events in China and the Soviet Union. Suffice it to say here that if all of these factors resulted in temporary stability in Soviet-Chinese relations, once the effects of these changes have been absorbed, Moscow and Beijing may conclude that the time is ripe for addressing, and then solving on their merits, the whole range of differences that have separated them for more than two decades.

The 1970s also saw changes in the general international system that were more revolutionary than in any of the decades of the 20th Century, save perhaps those associated with the two world wars, and surely held more potential for further change than any single decade in two centuries. Moreover, as in Asia, it was all that China and the Soviet Union could do to keep up with these changes and their effects on their respective societies and foreign policies.28

Again, the apparent stability in Soviet-Chinese relations may be both artificial and temporary, depending among other factors whether the rapidity of international systemic changes will now diminish, whether the two societies can

successfully grapple with the changes, and whether those changes themselves will at last vitally affect the futures of Moscow and Beijing.

Changes in the international system in the 1970s can be summarized by noting the effects of five trends. The most important was continued dominance of the international system by military competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. This imparted to the system a residual bipolarism that influenced all issues and trends. What changed, of course, was the rise in raw power of the Soviet Union and the relative decline of that of the United States. By the end of the 1970s, the Soviet Union had clearly drawn abreast of the United States in overall military strength and threatened American dominance in other measures of power as well. 29

Certainly the 1980s could witness a period of overall Soviet military superiority, however temporary that might prove to be. Never mind why the Soviet Union chooses to pay such a high price in terms of overall development to assure conventional and strategic equality/superiority with, or over, the United States. 30 The point is that the Soviet Union built itself up militarily partly as a means of deterring the Chinese and partly to achieve overall equality with the United States.

30 Ibid., p. 11.
This implies that Moscow perceived it to be necessary to possess greater military strength than the armaments likely to be arrayed against it by America and China at the same time. Thus, the criticalness for global military stability of Sino-Soviet relations has risen steeply in recent years merely because of the changed military equation between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Equally important, this new American-Soviet military relationship severely modified, if not totally overcame, the effects of four other international trends during the 1970s. One of these was the replacement of Cold War, East-West enmity with a somewhat more relaxed feeling of cooperation and even harmony in many spheres. As many Cold War barriers came down, it became possible to think of East-West relations based on trade, cultural exchange, the flow of mutually beneficial ideas, and attack upon common global problems. These currents obviously influenced the Soviet Union more than China, although the degree of penetration of Western ideas still seemed superficial and was always subject to the control of Soviet authorities. As for China, only after Mao's death did Beijing even begin to open itself to renewed Western influence; after several years it was still not clear


whether the modernization-related changes which the new Chinese leadership was attempting to carry out would not be reversed after a short period of experimentation.

There was one beneficial influence of the major changes in the international system during the 1970s: in both the Soviet and Chinese cases, the classical Leninist-Marxist bifurcation of every aspect of international relations into mutually antagonistic Eastern and Western components was modified if not entirely set aside. Neither Moscow nor Beijing felt itself threatened from all sides by a predatory capitalist world. Indeed, both strongly interacted with, and grew in many regards to admire, the West, thus lessening the need to stand together in an unfriendly world. Conversely, the decline in perceived ideological pressure from the outside meant that both communist giants could pay more attention to solving their respective domestic problems and conducting bilateral political battles. Thus, paradoxically, the slackening of tensions between East and West became a precondition for exacerbating, over the short-run, tensions between the two most important communist countries.

Whatever the reality, the Soviet Union and China looked upon interdependence with envy, not merely because socialist societies and economies are by nature autarkic, but more importantly because the socialist world was largely
left out of these exciting developments. To be left aside was to be left behind, and Russia and China, each in its own way, sought to gain the benefits of interdependence while minimizing the costs associated with the dismantling of autarky. Moscow and Beijing were like moths circling an attractive but clearly destructive flame.

Were it to become the dominant mode of communist dealings with the West, interdependence could lead to irreversible changes in Soviet and Chinese attitudes and policies toward the United States, Europe, and Japan. Further, were it ever decided that East-West cooperation rather than all-out competition was best, little would be left of the ideological imperative to overthrow capitalism by force. Communists in Moscow and Beijing could then think in realistic and favorable terms about convergence, and of socialism and capitalism as alternative and not necessarily antagonistic means of modernization. Thus, a little bit of East-West interdependence would go a long way toward preventing reconstitution of joint Sino-Soviet ideological opposition to the outside world.

By the end of the 1970s, the question for Sino-Soviet relations was how the influence of these new aspects of the Asian subsystem would affect the military rivalry between the two. Soviet-Chinese relations ought to have

been modified by these factors as much as they changed the character of international relations. Obviously, a major portion of the answer must be traced to the dominant weight of the military factor. When two enormous and powerful countries share a very long border and have a falling out that leads eventually to military confrontation, everything else becomes secondary in importance. Still, that does not explain all. An additional, important, and continuing element is the propensity of both communist states to insulate their problems from outside scrutiny and influence. The Sino-Soviet dispute began as an internecine ideological dispute and has retained elements of an argument between believers within one fold. It is true that, as differences became more serious and as both states began to fear the worst from the other, each looked to the outside for assistance against the other. That call has gone farther in the case of the Chinese who, being the weaker party, must naturally seek allies wherever they can be found. Nonetheless, it is startling how little Moscow and Beijing have allowed their conflict to modify their respective policies toward other countries when that modification is measured in terms of actual expenditure of resources.

It is true that mutual problems and fears have

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severely warped both Moscow's and Beijing's otherwise natural policy of opposition to the West. But it is remarkable how little irreversible change in the relationship has occurred as a consequence of the factors mentioned above. How long this relative insulation of Soviet-Chinese problems from these other, changing, aspects of the international system can continue is unclear. But so long as both Russia and China are reasonably self-sufficient economically and so long as their respective communist parties continue to place the highest value on ideological, economic, and sociological autarky, it is likely that the influence of changes in the international system on Sino-Soviet relations will not be great.

Perhaps the 1980s will finally see international systemic factors breaking through the dike set up by the militarization of Sino-Soviet relations and the still successful attempt to insulate their differences from outside influence. It is more likely, however, that restoration of reasonably good Sino-Soviet relations will strengthen further the propensity in both communist capitals to address their common problems in isolation from the rest of the world. Conversely, restoration of a measure of Soviet-Chinese harmony would itself be of such great importance to the Asian subsystem that these other factors would, in turn, undergo severe modification. What their revised effect on

Moscow-Beijing relations under such circumstances would be impossible to say.\textsuperscript{36}

In the 1970s, major changes occurred in China and the Soviet Union, some of which affected the course of Sino-Soviet relations. The death of Mao Tse-tung, the reversal of many of his policies, and the new emphasis upon modernization all seemed to enhance prospects for changes in Chinese foreign policy favorable to bettering Sino-Soviet ties.\textsuperscript{37} After all, it was Mao himself who often singlehandedly kept China on the path of stringent anti-Sovietism. His departure, along with the arrest or decline of his erstwhile followers, removed one impediment to eventual rapprochement with Moscow. Indeed, were it not for the Soviet military threat and the comparatively greater economic attractiveness of China to the West, it is likely that Soviet-Chinese relations would already have improved. To be sure, domestic changes do not always give rise to corresponding changes in foreign policy. But in the past the general character and direction of developments inside China were closely associated with, and usually led, changes in Chinese foreign policy.

The mere fact of momentum in Chinese foreign policy was also responsible for the nonevolutionary character over the short-term of Chinese policy toward the Soviet Union.


\textsuperscript{37}Ibid., p. 63.
Such unfinished business as completing normalization with the United States, establishing a solid working relationship with Japan, and demonstrating China's status as a regional power in Southeast Asia all had to be taken care of before Beijing felt itself strong enough to approach negotiations with Moscow on the basis of reasonable equality. The domestic requisite for many of these foreign policy changes was the strengthening of the country economically; that is what China after 1976 began in earnest.

The Chinese modernization drive will affect Sino-Soviet relations in three ways. Firstly, China will eventually decide it is strong enough to drive a more equal bargain with Moscow. Secondly, economic modernization will inevitably change the character of Chinese socialist society to look more and more like Soviet socialist society. At some point, bureaucratic authoritarianism will come to dominate China just as it has the Soviet Union. Thirdly, successful modernization will allow the domestic pragmatists to speak out on foreign policy issues from a stronger power base. The probability is strong that they will favor melioration of relations with Moscow.

If there have been several important changes in China relevant to Sino-Soviet relations, such was not the case in the Soviet Union. Down to mid-1979, there have been no major changes, no reversals of course economically, and no swift modification of the character of Soviet society. Things
always move slowly in Moscow and elsewhere in the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, two domestic trends seem relevant to Soviet policies toward China. One is the increasing ideological conservatism of the Moscow leadership. Depending on how one views Mao's own ideological pretensions and how his successors changed Beijing's ideological emphasis, such Soviet conservatism may cause the Kremlin to be somewhat more sympathetic to the Chinese world outlook than previously. Mao was a radical, utopian visionary. His successors certainly are not. They are pragmatic and decisively uninterested over the short-term in diverting many Chinese resources to furthering revolutionary communism throughout the world. Their interest is in building up China economically and militarily. These are nearly the same goals as the Soviet leadership sets for Russia, the only difference being that Moscow has more power to apply to foreign policy than does Beijing. But as the Soviet moves further along in the national process of ideological ossification, and as the value of the Soviet industrial plant steadily increases, so also does the Soviet leadership's propensity to go more slowly in foreign policy ventures.

The other domestic Soviet trend is the rapidly increasing bureaucratization of Soviet society. This has

a double effect on Soviet foreign policy.\textsuperscript{39} Firstly, it makes it ever more difficult for the Kremlin to carry out foreign policy initiatives. Secondly, it brings an increase in tension between populace and government that will give added impetus to any Soviet leadership to clear away problems with Beijing. This is not to say that the Kremlin is anxious to compromise its policies toward Beijing merely to address domestic problems. The history of Sino-Soviet relations during the last decade indicates that Moscow would like to improve relations with Beijing for foreign policy reasons alone.\textsuperscript{40} But as these domestic Soviet trends become increasingly important, the pressure to try for a \textit{modus vivendi} with the Chinese will surely increase.

In sum, the influence on Sino-Soviet relations of domestic forces and trends in the Soviet Union and China is clear. Domestic concerns drive Moscow and Beijing to look with ever greater favor on improving relations with the other, or at least not worsening relations. Hence, for the first time since Mao's death in 1976, domestic trends in the two countries point their foreign policies in the same direction. The Kremlin has relatively greater control over its own domestic fate and hence can better modulate the effects of domestic factors on its policy toward China. China oscillates in

\textsuperscript{39}Ibid., p. 159.

\textsuperscript{40}Middleton, \textit{Duel of the Giants}, pp. 223-229.
its foreign policy largely due to policy variations at home. Moreover, China's foreign policy tends to change faster than that of the Soviet Union and is thus affected more rapidly. In a statistical sense, this means that domestic Chinese conditions favoring improved Sino-Soviet relations are likely to appear periodically.

It is well to remind ourselves of these recent events and then to consider Soviet and Chinese strategies as they conduct their negotiations. The years 1978 and 1979 saw a rapid development of events that brought the two countries to the brink of war. The sequence is well-known. In early 1978, Moscow failed to achieve a breakthrough in its economic and political relations with Tokyo. This, combined with Japanese perceptions of a greater Soviet military threat and Chinese promises of a vast improvement in Sino-Japanese economic relations, drove Tokyo into the arms of Beijing. Therefore, the Sino-Japanese Friendship Treaty was signed, which was correctly interpreted as an anti-Soviet move on Tokyo's part and which formed one leg of what the USSR perceived as an emerging and hostile American-Chinese-Japanese cooperative relationship. Moscow struck back by signing a treaty of alliance with Vietnam which was not only anti-Chinese but which permitted Vietnam, in Moscow's eyes, to invade Cambodia without fear of a Chinese military response which it could not handle.

But China was constrained by geography and its own
military backwardness to limit its incursion in Vietnam and could go no further than the edges of the Red River Delta Plain. More importantly, Beijing directly felt the pressure of Soviet maneuvers along the Sino-Soviet border, and, although no conclusive documentary evidence is yet available, the USSR likely conveyed threats to take direct action against China. China wisely stepped back from the brink of war by claiming that it had achieved its goals in Vietnam and withdrawing. It then seized upon the occasion of the expiration of the old 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty to suggest that the two states begin the process in earnest of working out a new relationship. It took the catharsis of confrontation to bring the Chinese to the realization that a further deterioration in relations with the Soviet Union could lead to a spiralling conflict that could only end in nuclear war. It was this catharsis, then, combined with the broader trends noted above, that initiated the slow process of improvement of relations between China and the Soviet Union.

Other considerations pointed in the same direction. On the Chinese side, three elements emerged in mid-1979. For one, China by then had restored close ties with Japan and the United States and looked forward to similar success with India. This would take care of three of the four major powers on China's periphery, thus clearing the decks for a direct approach to Moscow. Secondly, there was an objective need to replace the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty with some other.
instrument, statement, or understanding that would define Moscow-Beijing relations. In the wake of the Soviet-Vietnamese crisis in 1979, the Chinese had formally given notice of their intention to allow the treaty to expire according to its one-year denunciatory clause. Now some in Beijing felt, not unreasonably, that the time had come to place Sino-Soviet relations on a more realistic formal basis. The evidence indicates that this argument was raised in high policy meetings during the spring of 1979. Finally, by early 1979, it had become clear that the Chinese modernization program was not only too ambitious but that, even with severe reductions in the scope of the four modernizations, Beijing would need to look to all suppliers of technology and capital if it were to succeed. Obviously, this would include the Soviet Union who was a major supplier to China during the 1950s. In sum, China was driven by the necessities of diplomacy and economics to look more favorably upon improving relations with the Soviet.

From the very beginning of its dispute with China, the Soviet Union had offered to compromise their several disputes. But in each instance, Soviet policy and style was to complement such offers with safeguards to its own security, that is, the snapping of economic relations, the attempt to isolate China diplomatically, ideologically, and geographically, and the enormous overgarrisoning of its border with China.
Major impediments might render this process still-born. One is Korea. For years, Moscow and Beijing have competed for influence in Pyongyang, one result of which was North Korea's major military build-up. This threatened South Korea and made difficult any real progress toward solution of the Korean issue. However, with a positive turn in Sino-Soviet relations, accompanied in all probability by continued downward movement in Soviet-American relations and a halt in improvement of ties between China and America, important obstacles impeding joint Soviet-Chinese support for North Korea would be removed. Thus, Korea would not likely be a problem were Moscow and Beijing to meliorate their own relations. The probability of a negotiated solution to the Korean problem might decline therewith and the prospects for war on the peninsula might even increase. The point, however, is that nothing in the Moscow-Pyongyang-Beijing triangle makes it impossible for the two communist giants to cooperate with each other (and with Pyongyang) rather than to compete for influence in the North.

The most important aspect of a general agreement would be settlement of the military and border issue, the impediment to improved Sino-Soviet ties. Settlement of that problem would, of course, pose a serious threat for the United States, for thereafter both Moscow and Beijing could

\[41\text{Solomon, } \text{Asian Security in the } 1980\text{s, p. 110.}
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\[42\text{Ibid.}
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concentrate resources and attention in different areas and not dissipate their energies in fratricidal competition across their common frontier and around each other's peripheries. This possibility is made all the more real once the border question is considered directly. It has been clear for many years that, as mentioned above, the border problem is solvable on its merits at any moment. The real problem is not the border as such but the military imbalance in favor of the Soviet Union and the high concentration of forces on both sides of the boundary. As the years go by, China's military strength can only increase; and although in the foreseeable future it is not likely to equal that of the Soviet Union, the relative imbalance could right itself as China invests in new military technology and imports up-to-date weapons systems from the West. Thus, short-term improvement in Chinese military ties with Europe and America could, in the long-run, enhance prospects for resolving the military stand-off between Moscow and Beijing. Indeed, for the first time since 1959, Beijing, as well as Moscow, may seriously be attempting to resolve this issue, the most important Sino-Soviet difference. With Mao gone and the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty no more, Beijing may have decided that the time is ripe to approach Moscow to work out a fresh start.

Since 1950, the Soviet Union has found Asia an increasingly difficult region to penetrate. One after
another, countries that historically were weak increased dramatically in strength. The way was led by China and all other states of Northeast Asia followed. In each case, the Soviet Union found it harder and harder to exert its influence until, in most cases, it was physically excluded and could conduct only a military policy from within its own borders or in international waters or air space. It then turned to South and Southeast Asia where, thanks to the volatility of the situation and the weakness of the indigenous states, it was at least partly successful. But, by the end of the 1970s, those regions also saw strong governments replacing weak ones. Here also, therefore, Moscow found it increasingly difficult to exert its influence. It had to depend on chance opportunities presented by regional conflicts or internal revolution to continue and, sometimes, to extend its operations.
CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS OF SINO-SOViet CONFLICT AND
ITS IMPACT ON NORTH KOREA

Pendulum of the North Korean Exercise Between
Beijing and Moscow

The super powers have been relatively free to shape their policies toward one another, but each has sought to win the support of its allies for major moves affecting world tensions. North and South Korea, by contrast, would appear to be much more constrained by dependence on outside allies than the larger powers. Thus, some South Koreans have argued that Koreans have become accustomed to thinking that their division was a result of the East-West Cold War, because—at least in the 1950s and 1960s—opposition from the great powers could have made unification impossible. Others hold that, even in the 1970s, the prospects of North-South rapprochement depend on East-West détente.

The regime of Kim II-Sung, on the other hand, emphasizing self-identity and self-reliance (chu ché) at least since 1955, has pursued a rather autonomous course, either ignoring Russian and Chinese preferences or playing them off against each other. Despite these tactics, the North Koreans have enjoyed considerable support from Moscow or Beijing or from both over the years, though the magnitude
of foreign assistance to the Republic of Korea has been even greater. Relations between Pyongyang and Moscow cooled after 1962, following the Cuban missile retreat and the Soviet stand on the Sino-Indian frontier disputes. Following Kosygin's February, 1965, visit to North Korea, however, Soviet assistance resumed again, though Moscow seems to have been concerned in 1968 and 1969 lest the Pueblo and EC-121 incidents lead to a major United States-North Korea confrontation. North Korea's relations with PRC deteriorated in the mid-1960s, tensions mounting during PRC's Cultural Revolution to the point that Red Guards put up wall posters in Beijing calling Kim II-Sung a "counterrevolutionary revisionist" as well as a "millionaire, an aristocrat, and a leading bourgeois element in Korea." In 1968-1969, border clashes were reported between Chinese and North Korean forces, amid signs that Beijing wanted territorial "compensation" for the intervention of its "volunteers" in the Korean War. By 1969-1970, however, Chinese-North Korean relations had turned dramatically for the better. Beijing signed a five-year aid agreement with the North Koreans and quietly dropped its claim to a 100-square mile strip of North Korean territory bordering Manchuria. In November, 1970, Kim II-Sung took the occasion of the Fifth Congress of the Korean Workers Party to assert that "revisionism" had appeared in the international communist movement and obstructed its unity and cohesion, causing ideological confu-
sion. Without harming the Soviet Union directly, Kim criticized revisionism for obscuring the line of demarcation between friend and foe, yielding to United States' imperialism, scared at its policy of nuclear blackmail, and casting sheep's eyes at the imperialists while playing lip-service to an anti-imperialist position. After hearing these and other oblique attacks on the USSR, the party congress affirmed the North Korea's independent line.

Friendly relations between North Korea and PRC were restored after the Ninth Congress of the CCP in April, 1969, which marked the end of the most intense phase of the Cultural Revolution. As the Cultural Revolution in China drew to a close at the end of 1969, Beijing apparently decided to relax its policy of self-imposed isolation and attempted to reestablish normal political relations with selected countries, including North Korea. The North Korean communists once again seemed to feel that they had leaned too far in one direction. There were some indications that Soviet economic help had not been as abundant as anticipated and that Pyongyang wanted to build a military and economic base more independent of Moscow. A major factor contributing to the revival of Pyongyang-Beijing friendship was their shared hostility toward Japan and their increased fear of Japan's growing strength. During 1969 and 1970, two significant developments seemed to forerun a larger future role for the Japanese in Asian security arrangements, reinforcing
North Korean fears. First was the Nixon Doctrine announced in November, 1969, which implicitly urged a more positive Japanese role in the maintenance of the Asian security. Second was the Nixon-Sato joint communique in which Premier Sato stated that the maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area was . . . a most important factor for the security of Japan and that "the security of the Republic of Korea was essential to Japan's own security." Speaking at the National Press Club in Washington, the Premier reemphasized the importance of Korea to Japan's security.

The main turning point in Sino-North Korean relations probably was Premier Chou En-lai's visit to North Korea during April, 1970. His visit was the first by a top-level Chinese official since President Liu Shao-chi visited North Korea in 1963. Chou's speech, delivered upon his arrival at the Pyongyang airport, clearly conveyed Beijing's desire to restore friendly relations with North Korea. Recalling their blood-cemented militant friendship, Chou said: "China and Korea are neighbors as closely related as lips and teeth, and our two peoples are intimate brothers." During his

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visit, Chou loudly denounced U.S.-Japanese collusion and, probably out of consideration for his hosts, avoided public attacks on the Soviet Union.


As Sino-North Korean relations improved considerably after late 1969, North Korea's relations with Moscow cooled somewhat. However, it should be emphasized that North Korea did not intend to break away from Moscow as she had done in 1962. Pyongyang relations with Moscow slipped in the wake of the downing of an EC-121 American intelligence aircraft on April 15, 1969. While China promptly praised North Korea, the Soviet Union waited three days to endorse the North Korean attack, and Soviet ships joined the U.S. Navy in the search for possible survivors. President Nikolai Podgorney's visit to North Korea the following month probably was

designed to restrain Pyongyang's excessively bellicose posture. The Soviet reaction to the EC-121 incident did not please North Korea.

While in Pyongyang, Podgorny attempted to gain North Korean support for Moscow's position concerning the Sino-Soviet border dispute of 1969 and to win Pyongyang's participation in the Moscow conference of world communist parties the following month. But North Korea took a neutral position on the border dispute issue, and the North Koreans refused to attend the Moscow Conference, joining China on the list of absent parties.48

Beijing and Pyongyang stood together on two important issues: support for Cambodia's ousted chief of state, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, and opposition to the revival of Japanese militarism and aggression. When Sihanouk formed a government-in-exile in Beijing early in 1970, China and North Korea immediately recognized the exile government, while the Soviet Union continued to recognize Lon Nol's government in Phnom Penh. Despite North Korea's veiled criticism of Moscow's insensitivity to growing Japanese militarism, Moscow continued its friendly gestures toward Tokyo.

The first indication of disagreement between North Korea and the Soviet Union surfaced publicly when North Korea announced its decision to withdraw from a joint Soviet-North

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Korean oceanographic study of the sea of Japan. The reason was Moscow's unilateral decision to include Japanese scientists in the research project, which was originally undertaken on the basis of scientific and technological cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang.⁴⁹

North Korea's deteriorating relations with Moscow were confirmed at the Fifth Congress of the Korean Worker's Party held in November, 1969. In his report to the Congress, Kim criticized the Soviet Union asserting that revisionism appeared in the international communist movement and obstructed its unity and cohesion, causing ideological confusion.

On July 16, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon announced that he would make an official trip to Beijing in 1972, and less than three months later, on October 12, Washington and Moscow announced that Nixon would also visit the Soviet Union that year. Nixon's scheduled visits to both Beijing and Moscow in 1972 undoubtedly caused serious apprehension in Pyongyang, but North Korea was much more concerned with the consequences of Nixon's journey to Beijing than with his trip to Moscow. This was perhaps because the Moscow visit was the less dramatic and unusual by far.

North Korea referred to Nixon's forthcoming Beijing visit as not the march of a victor but a trip of the defeated.

Although North Korea offered reassurance that Nixon's visit would not affect Pyongyang's relations with Beijing, the Korean Worker's Party organ expressed some misgivings and subtly demanded an acceptable explanation of the trip. North Korea's concern about Washington-Beijing rapprochement had some impact on Pyongyang's relationship with Beijing. For example, the October 25, 1971, commemoration of China's entry into the Korean Conflict passed almost unmarked in each country, in sharp contrast to 1970.

Realizing North Korea's apprehension over Nixon's Beijing visit, Chinese leaders made a considerable effort to reassure North Korea. Even before the announcement, Beijing proclaimed July 9-15 as Chinese-Korean Friendship Week. Upon receiving additional economic and military assistance and assurances from China, Kim II-Sung then announced that Nixon's China trip would temporarily ease international tension. In his statement, Kim again stressed that Sino-American rapprochement had no direct bearing on North Korea. Chou En-lai had apparently succeeded in persuading Kim II-Sung to accept the new Sino-American relationship.

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52 Ibid., pp. 30-31.
North Korea's concern over Nixon's journey to Beijing was shared fully by Moscow. Apparently to counter the Sino-American rapprochement, for instance, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko suddenly visited Japan just before President Nixon's visit to Beijing and agreed with Japanese leaders to open negotiations within 1972 for a Japanese-Soviet peace treaty. The Soviet Union seemed to use the situation to strengthen her position in North Korea by providing additional economic and military assistance and exchanging high-level delegations. Meanwhile, North Korea made an effort to utilize the Nixon visit to Beijing to strengthen its relations with Moscow. There is no doubt that Pyongyang became more intimate with Moscow.

As Nixon's visit to Beijing neared, there were unusually frequent exchange of high-ranking delegations between Moscow and Pyongyang. A high-level Soviet delegation, led by Sharaf R. Rashodov, First Secretary of the Uzbekistan Communist Party, came to Pyongyang, probably to inform and assure the North Korean's communists about Nixon's forthcoming Moscow visit. While in North Korea, Rashodov made an unusually strong statement in support of Korean unification under communist leadership. During the week prior to Nixon's Beijing visit, the Soviet press accused Beijing of breaking the solidarity of the communist camp by receiving President Nixon. Although North Korea bitterly criticized the United States, without mentioning Nixon's
arrival in Beijing, the North Korean's shied away from siding with Moscow's criticism of Beijing.

Immediately after Nixon's Moscow visit, the Soviet Union dispatched two separate delegations to North Korea. The first delegation, composed of Foreign Ministry officials, came to Pyongyang apparently to inform the North Koreans of the Nixon-Brezhnev talks and agreements. During the conference, the Soviet Union reportedly agreed to increase its deliveries of certain industrial equipment and raw materials, to expand scientific and technical cooperation.

The display of friendship between Moscow and Pyongyang during these periods served the common interests of both countries. For North Korea, the display of friendship toward the Soviets might have been a well-planned act of political maneuvering both to reassure Soviet assistance and to warn Beijing not to go too far in its relations with Washington. For the Soviet Union, it was a good opportunity to bring North Korea closer to its side by capitalizing on Pyongyang's apprehension over the new Sino-American relationship. Despite the warm display of North Korean-Soviet cooperation and the obvious campaign that the Russians waged to promote their influence in North Korea at China's expense, the Soviet Union apparently had only limited success. The North Korean refrained from siding with Moscow against Beijing. In general, North Korea appeared to be still closer to Beijing than to Moscow.
Foreign Trade As An Indicator of
Sino-Soviet Conflict

Looking Back

The Chinese have always been exceptionally reluctant to publish meaningful data on any aspect of their economic situation, and in foreign trade, Moscow and Beijing continue to conceal the nature and full extent of their economic ties.

However, during the Stalin period, the Soviet Union negotiated directly with the Manchurian warlord in July, 1949, concerning the restoriation of Soviet-dismantled industries in Manchuria, but the final treaty of April, 1950, designated the contracting parties as the PRC and the Soviet Union. Thus, the PRC were temporarily forced to assume the obligations which Manchuria incurred as a result of her relatively weaker bargaining position.

From then on, Soviet machines, equipment, and other industrial goods were exchanged for industrial and agricultural raw materials from the PRC. Sino-Soviet trade was more closely geared to Chinese than to Soviet requirements. Some of the Soviet deliveries, however, were simply transfers of captured Chinese assets and reparations or of military aid consigned from stocks stored during the Korean War. 53

53 Griffith, Sino-Soviet Rift, p. 231.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Soviet Exports to PRC</th>
<th>Soviet Imports from PRC</th>
<th>Turnover</th>
<th>Balance Soviet</th>
<th>Balance PRC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>742.50</td>
<td>643.50</td>
<td>1386.00</td>
<td>99.00</td>
<td>1520.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>733.00</td>
<td>764.25</td>
<td>1497.25</td>
<td>31.25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>544.00</td>
<td>738.25</td>
<td>1282.25</td>
<td>194.25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>633.90</td>
<td>881.20</td>
<td>1515.10</td>
<td>247.30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>954.45</td>
<td>1100.25</td>
<td>2054.70</td>
<td>145.30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>817.00</td>
<td>848.00</td>
<td>1665.00</td>
<td>31.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>367.33</td>
<td>551.44</td>
<td>918.77</td>
<td>184.11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>233.21</td>
<td>515.84</td>
<td>749.03</td>
<td>284.61</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>187.03</td>
<td>412.59</td>
<td>559.62</td>
<td>225.56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>135.20</td>
<td>313.91</td>
<td>449.11</td>
<td>178.71</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total surpluses 99.00 1520.59


When the PRC was suffering from the dislocation of agricultural collectivization post-1956, the decline in Soviet deliveries aggravated their disenchantment. Furthermore, during the same period, the Soviet Union launched a massive aid program to the neutralist countries (mainly Egypt, Indonesia, and India) thereby significantly reallocating its foreign aid resources, a step which must have

infuriated the PRC's leadership and further worsened Sino-Soviet relations.

**TABLE II**

**SOVIET-INDIAN TRADE COMPARED WITH SOVIET EXPORTS TO PRC**

(in Million U.S. Dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Soviet-Indian Trade</th>
<th>Soviet-Sino Trade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Turnover</td>
<td>Imports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>57.8</td>
<td>26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>84.5</td>
<td>36.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>94.8</td>
<td>49.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>101.0</td>
<td>63.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>91.0</td>
<td>63.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>119.0</td>
<td>65.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>168.0</td>
<td>83.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>316.4</td>
<td>94.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>390.2</td>
<td>155.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In the case of Moscow's policy and gesture towards India (between 1955 and 1962, the Soviet Union granted loans to India amounting to $800 million),\(^{55}\) which the PRC was watching with utmost sensitivity, a brief chronological comparison of Sino-Soviet and Sino-Indian trade relations

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\(^{55}\)Between 1955 and 1962, the Soviet Union granted loans to India amounting to $800 million (New Age, September 23, 1962), an amount close to the excess of Soviet deliveries over imports from China prior to 1955.
seems appropriate, even though the magnitude of India's exchange of goods with the Soviet Union was not in the same digital category. Soviet exports to the PRC thus declined markedly from 1956 through 1958. While Soviet-Indian trade jumped more than 500 percent, decline in Soviet exports to the PRC during 1961 paralleled by a near doubling of exports to India, the same trend continued during 1964.

Consequently, when the Soviet Union upheld India which was another rivalry of the PRC, the reaction of the PRC was tremendously jealous. In other words, as India was at high tide with the Soviet Union in foreign trade, the PRC was at low tide with the Soviet Union. This phenomenon alternatively oscillated from 1955 to 1964. Therefore, the foreign trade as an indicator is valuable to evaluate the relationship between two countries.

Sino-Soviet Foreign Trade

Then in 1960, following the Sino-Soviet split, the PRC made a deliberate, major shift in the direction of their foreign trade, essentially for political reasons. As in 1950, the choice was not wholly Beijing's, since Moscow withdrew all Soviet technicians from PRC and tried to use economic pressure to change PRC policies. But clearly Beijing, on its part, decided to disentangle its interests from Moscow's, and in the 1960s it rebuffed all Soviet attempts to restore old ties. As a result, trade with the Soviet
Union dropped rapidly. It declined to 34 percent of total trade in 1964. Sino-Soviet relations went from bad to worse, culminating in the Chempao Island incident and the sharp border clashes of 1969, then in 1969 trade with the Soviet Union was $56 million, a mere 1.4 percent of PRC's total trade. In the 1970s, trade with the Soviet Union again rose in absolute terms, but it continued to decline as a percentage of total trade, in 1970 trade with the Soviet Union dwindled to 1 percent at its low point, and in 1978 trade with the Soviet Union, totalling $338 million, was only 1.6 percent of PRC's total trade.

**Violations of the Armistice Agreement As An Indicator of the Stability of the Korean Peninsula**

For divided Korea, where the lowlands and mountains separating the two sides have been difficult to police, large-scale infiltration has probably been checked in recent years by the installation of a fence and supporting defensive position. The success of these defensive efforts was then reflected by an increase in clandestine seaborne landings along South Korea's craggy coastline. After concluding the truce between North and South Korea in 1953, there were countless violations of the armistice agreement. While 58 violations of the armistice agreement by the North were reported in 1971, this was 50% less than the total in 1970. In 1972, however, no significant incidents or exchanges of
### TABLE III

**SOVIET-SINO TRADE**

(in Million U.S. Dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Soviet Exports to PRC</th>
<th>Soviet Imports from PRC</th>
<th>Turnover</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>PRC Trade</th>
<th>Soviet Trade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>135.20</td>
<td>313.91</td>
<td>449.11</td>
<td>3,220</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>191.48</td>
<td>225.33</td>
<td>416.81</td>
<td>3,880</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>171.16</td>
<td>142.97</td>
<td>318.13</td>
<td>4,245</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>50.28</td>
<td>56.61</td>
<td>106.89</td>
<td>3,915</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>59.27</td>
<td>36.63</td>
<td>95.90</td>
<td>3,785</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>27.75</td>
<td>28.97</td>
<td>56.72</td>
<td>3,895</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>24.89</td>
<td>21.67</td>
<td>46.56</td>
<td>4,340</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>77.89</td>
<td>76.22</td>
<td>154.11</td>
<td>4,810</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>120.87</td>
<td>133.17</td>
<td>254.04</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>136.50</td>
<td>136.91</td>
<td>273.41</td>
<td>10,300</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>143.25</td>
<td>139.42</td>
<td>282.67</td>
<td>14,080</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>128.64</td>
<td>149.43</td>
<td>278.07</td>
<td>14,575</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>238.54</td>
<td>178.51</td>
<td>417.05</td>
<td>13,275</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>160.78</td>
<td>176.44</td>
<td>337.22</td>
<td>15,055</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>174.90</td>
<td>163.80</td>
<td>338.70</td>
<td>21,100</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Fire were noted in the DMZ or in South Korea—a shift that can only be attributed to high policy decisions and not to improved defense systems. The total number of significant incidents and exchanges of fire within the DMZ and inside the South Korea plotted over time were as shown in Table IV—Violations of the Armistice Agreement by North Korea.
TABLE IV

VIOLATIONS OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT
BY NORTH KOREA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Violations</th>
<th>Intensity Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>784</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>985</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


By the way, this writer's assumption was "the more intense Sino-Soviet competition becomes over North Korea, the more independent military actions of North Korea will become" We have to test an association between two properties—Sino-Soviet competition and North Korean military actions.

In Figure 4, the difference between the Sino-Soviet conflict and North Korean military actions is not significant. Shown on Tables III and IV, a t-test was utilized that would test for a significant difference between two means of independent samples.
Figure 4: Traces of Sino-Soviet Conflict: PRC USSR--Crises and Selected Representative Peak Events--1950-1972

Above equation, an estimate of

\[ t = \frac{\bar{x}_1 - \bar{x}_2}{\frac{1}{\sqrt{N_1 + N_2 + 2}}} \sqrt{\frac{N_1 S_1^2 + N_2 S_2^2}{N_1 + N_2}} \]

= 130.93.

The following results were obtained:

\[ t = \frac{298.75 - 4.16}{130.93} = 2.25 \]

There was no significant difference between the Sino-Soviet conflict and North Korean military actions. The results of t-test was as follows: \( t = 2.25 \). To be significant, the results would have had to be: \( (t) = 2.365 \) or more. Subsequently, there is no significant difference between the Sino-Soviet conflict and North Korean military actions.

Finally, this writer can accept the project hypothesis—"the more intense Sino-Soviet competition becomes over North Korea, the more independent military actions of North Korea will become."
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The Sino-Soviet dispute has had major implications for North Korea in formulating policy toward Beijing and Moscow. The dispute presented a serious dilemma to the North Korean leaders because various political, economic and military factors made it difficult for them to avoid alienating either of the neighboring communist powers. However, the dispute presented an opportunity to deal with the two powers in such a way as to augment North Korea's national interest.

By the autumn of 1962, the North Korean regime had begun gradually to lean toward the Chinese line in the course of the communist camps' dispute over such matters as Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement, the Sino-Indian border dispute. From the beginning of 1963 until Khrushchev's downfall in October, 1964, North Korea became Beijing's strongest ally in Asia in the Sino-Soviet rift.

But Khrushchev's ouster in 1964 changed the situation. While North Korea's relations with the Soviet Union began to improve, its relations with China deteriorated slowly. This change reflected an altered view of North
Korea's national interests, namely, Pyongyang's desire to modernize its armed forces with new weapons as well as to seek economic assistance from the Soviet Union. However, this change did not mean the conversion of the North Korean regime to the Soviet line, nor did it mean a return to the pre-1950 Soviet-North Korean relationship. Rather, North Korea returned to a neutralist posture in the Sino-Soviet dispute.

At the end of the Chinese Cultural Revolution in 1969, North Korea and China restored their friendly relations. The major factors contributing to the revival of Pyongyang-Beijing friendship were their mutual interest in improving the deteriorated relationship that had existed during the 1966-1969 period and their common fear of Japan's growing strength, which was becoming increasingly evident. But despite its warm relations with China, North Korea continued to maintain substantial ties with the Soviet Union.

President Nixon's visits to Beijing and Moscow in 1972 undoubtedly caused serious apprehension within the North Korean regime. North Korea was more concerned with the outcome of Nixon's trip to Beijing than with his journey to Moscow. Pyongyang and Moscow fully shared their apprehension over Nixon's visit to Beijing, and the Soviet Union apparently used the situation to promote its influence in North Korea at China's expense by exchanging high-ranking
delegations and by providing additional economic and military assistance. But the Soviet Union achieved only partial success.

Most Asian communist regimes and parties seem to be trying to preserve relations with both Moscow and Beijing without being excessively dependent upon, or subordinate to, either. Kim II-Sung's domestic and foreign policies claimed to be, and to a large extent were, based on the principle of chuché (self-reliance). For economic, military, and political reasons, however, North Korea most likely will continue to live in the shadow of the two communist powers: The Soviet Union, to which North Korea owes its creation immediately after World War II, and China, to which North Korea owes its survival during the Korean War.

This thesis tested the relationship between Sino-Soviet conflict and North Korean military actions. The writer found that there was no correlation between two variables. Foreign trade as an indicator of conflict between two countries was valuable data. But other indicators, for example, foreign investment, technology exchanges, sports events, and visitors, could be utilized to measure the relationship between two countries.

As long as the Sino-Soviet dispute continues, North Korea indeed is and increasingly will be in a delicate position in its relations with the two neighboring powers, both very sensitive about their prestige and power position. Therefore, the Pyongyang regime will probably continue to
be cautious and circumspect on issues and events that divide Moscow and Beijing, while attempting to maintain correct and balanced relations with both Beijing and Moscow.
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Books


Articles


