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African Tribalism, African Socialism and the Goal of Political Democracy in Kenya

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African Tribalism, African Socialism
and the Goal of Political
Democracy in Kenya

A Thesis

Presented to the
Department of Political Science

and the
Faculty of the Graduate College
University of Nebraska

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts
University of Nebraska at Omaha

by

Robertson Ngunyi Ndegwa

December 1982

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THESIS ACCEPTANCE

Accepted for the faculty of the Graduate College,
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requirements for the degree (Master of Arts), University
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ABSTRACT

The thesis of this study is that the goal of political democracy, which was based on Kenya's "African Socialism," has over time fallen in abeyance because the political leaders underestimated possible barriers (such as ethnic-political conflict) when defining the ideas of "African Socialism."

This study evaluates Kenya's economic, political, and social systems in operation before white conquest, during colonialism, and after independence. This approach is analytical and explains how the system as a whole functions or fails to function.

The thesis concludes that the government's goal of political democracy has not been met because it was based on misconceived notions of "African Socialism." African tribalism existed before "African Socialism" and continues to dominate the Kenya society.

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PREFACE

Most writers on African politics have been Western scholars. Obvious differences in culture, religion, language, customs, and even manners may often result in conflicts between western and African perspectives.

Other writers on African politics are African politicians. They represent poor economies and underdeveloped political systems. Their feelings for fellow Africans and the zeal of African nationalism results sometimes in misplaced emphasis, misrepresentations, and distortion of facts.

There is a considerable amount of literature dealing with Kenyan society. Critics may argue that everything that is essential has already been written, but political scientists have, on the whole, neglected the comparative study of political systems in African tribes. This study does not claim to be the final word on Kenya. It is rather an attempt to examine Kenya from several perspectives, explaining how the country, as a whole, has functioned or failed to function.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Anyone who undertakes a thesis project inevitably incurs numerous debts to those individuals that assist in the process of researching and compiling data.

Professor Ken Lohrentz of the University of Nebraska at Lincoln graciously allowed me to examine his personal bibliographies for African Studies. Librarian, John Hill of the University of Nebraska at Omaha was instrumental in helping me acquire many inter-library documents that provided me with helpful research material.

I owe special thanks to Professor Walter Bacon, who as Chairman of my Thesis Committee supervised this project. I am grateful for his many helpful comments and valuable criticisms.

I am also grateful to Professors Joong-Gun Chung, and Roger Sharpe for serving as members of my Thesis Committee, and for their advice. They continually brought to my attention issues that I had overlooked or taken for granted, urging me to rethink passages that were unclear or otherwise in need of improvement.

The thesis of this study is that the goal of political democracy, based on Kenya's "African Socialism" was and is incompatible with the tribal political culture of Kenya's politically dominant tribe, the Kikuyu. "Political democracy" is to be understood as a principle founded on respect of the human being--every human being, and implies the acceptance of equality of all citizens regardless of race or tribe. Political democracy must also guarantee every individual the full rights of democratic citizenship without discrimination.

In the African sense, "Socialism" meant mutual caring, democratic equality of individuals, and "rational" utilization of the factors of production for the benefit of all the people. The government had the responsibility to control this process and to ensure that economic and political development functioned according to the dictates of mutual social responsibility and is generally understood to include among its goals:

1. political equality;
2. social justice;
3. human dignity including freedom of conscience;
4. freedom from want, disease, and exploitations;

5. Equal opportunities; and
6. high and growing per capita incomes, equitably distributed.¹

The government of Kenya, as well as its only political party, the Kenyan African National Union (KANU), has based its program of modernization and development on the illusory supposition that the intertribal independence which mobilized black Kenyans in the struggle for unity could be perpetuated after liberation. Thus, cultural fragmentation along tribal lines was to be replaced by Kenyan nationalism, producing a political community drawing upon shared traditional values but resistant to ethnic cultural incompatibilities.

These aspirations and expectations were best articulated in Kenya Government Sessional Paper Number 10, 1965, "African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya", Ministry of Information, Kenya 1965, pp. 1-18. In brief summary the following are some elements of "African Socialism".

In the phrase "African Socialism", the word "African" is not introduced to describe a continent to which a foreign ideology is to be transplanted. It is meant to convey the African roots of a system that is itself African in its characteristics. African Socialism is a term describing an African political and economic

system that is positively African not being imported from any country or being a blueprint of any foreign ideology but capable of incorporating useful and compatible techniques from whatever source. . . .

There are two African traditions which form an essential basis for African Socialism-- political democracy and mutual social responsibility. Political democracy implies that each member of society is equal in his political rights and that no individual or group will be permitted to exert undue influence on the policies of the state. The State, therefore, can never become the tool of special interests, catering to the desires of a minority at the expense of the needs of the majority. The State will represent all of the people and will do so impartially and without prejudice.

Political democracy in the African tradition would not, therefore, countenance a party of the elite, stern tests or discriminatory criteria for party membership, degrees of party membership, or first and second class citizens. In African Socialism, every member of society is important and equal; every mature citizen can belong to the party without restriction or discrimination; and the party will entertain and accommodate different

points of view, African Socialism rests on full, equal and unfettered democracy.

Mutual social responsibility is an extension of the African family spirit to the nation as a whole, with the hope that ultimately the same spirit can be extended to even larger areas.

First of all, although the paper was launched in an atmosphere of national unity and appeared to be a unifying force of the Kenyan people, it was not entirely so. Popular interest and involvement in the political system caused frequent tribal conflicts. In addition, the social system was internally stratified so that it was less likely to organize an integrated society.

The document, launched in immediate post-independence euphoria, was both unrealistic and dissembling. Tribal particularism did not wither away but rather intensified as political participation and institution-building increased. Social stratification further undermined ephemeral national unity. The document did not reflect a unified political culture but mixed indigenous and western ideas which were often nebulously understood and incompatible, eliciting the vigorous dissent of Oginga Odinga, among others, who wrote:

In the mouths of the government and KANU leaders, "African Socialism" has become a meaningless phrase. What they call African Socialism is neither African nor socialism. It is a cloak for the practice of total capitalism. To describe the policies of the present government as "African Socialism" is an insult to the intelligence of people. The deception is obvious, but the leaders of the government and of KANU do not have the courage to admit that they are fully committed to the western ideology of capitalism.²

Odinga's skepticism is reflected in a similar statement by Julius Nyerere:

We in Africa have no more need of being converted to socialism than we have of being taught democracy. Both are rooted in our past-- in the traditional society which produced us.³

Regardless of the genuineness of KANU's devotion to "African Socialism", the political democratic goals articulated in the document ignored the reality of inter-tribal conflict in Kenya. The authors of the document were most probably aware of this undermining incompatibility. In order to prove these assertions this thesis will first describe and analyze Kenyan culture prior to

independence, emphasizing both the unifying and dis-unifying elements between the tribal cultures. Second, the thesis will describe the British colonial policy of "divide and conquer, unity and rule." And third, the thesis will conclude with an analysis of post-independence Kenyan politics when the incompatibilities between nation-building and tribal loyalties all but unmasked the goals of political democracy and "African Socialism" as unattainable if not undesired.

GEOGRAPHICAL AND PRE-COLONIAL SETTING

Kenya covers an area of approximately 225,000 square miles, and consists of seven politico-geographic regions; the Rift Valley, Central Province, Eastern Province, Nyanza Province, Northeastern Province, Coast Province, Western Province, and Nairobi Province.

The Rift Valley is the largest of the Provinces, (Fig. 1) slicing through the center of the country from its southernmost border, with Tanzania to the western side of Lake Turkana. It is populated by the Kalenjin, Samburu, Dorobo and Kikuyu tribes. Central Province, largely populated by the Kikuyus, lies to the east of the Rift Valley, southwest of Mt. Kenya. The third largest of the provinces is Eastern. It has a common frontier with Ethiopia. The main tribes are the Turkana, Meru, Embu, Kamba, and nomadic Rendille and Boran. Northeastern is sparsely populated, lying along the Kenya-Somali border. It is mainly populated by the Somali. Coast Province lies on the Indian Ocean. Its tribes include Bayun, Galla, Giriama, Rabai, Digo, Taita, and Taveta. The Nyanza Province runs northward through Lake Nyanza. The province is predominantly peopled by Luo. Western Province touches the Uganda-

Kenya border and is peopled mainly by the Luyia. Nairobi Province is centrally located and is the center of government. Its inhabitants come from all over the country.

The following list, based on 1970 census data, gives a good picture of the location of population and tribal composition of the provinces.

Ethnic Group	Number	Percent	Traditional Occupation	Language Group	Major District	
					Province	District
Kenyan Africans						
Kikuyu	2,201,632	20.12	Agriculture	Bantu	Central	Kiambu, Murang'a, Nyeri, Kirinyua
Luo	1,521,595	13.91	--- do ---	Nilotic	Nyanza	Kisumu, Siaya, Homa Bay
Luhya	1,453,302	13.28	--- do ---	Bantu	Western	Bungoma, Busia, Kakamega
Kamba	1,197,712	10.95	--- do ---	--- do ---	Eastern	Machakos, Kitui
Kalenjin	1,190,203	10.88	--- do ---	Paranilotic	Rift Valley	Kericho, Uasin Gishu, Karuri, Nandi, Baringo, Elgeyo-Marakwet
Kisii (Gusii)	701,679	6.41	--- do ---	Bantu	Nyanza	Kisii
Meru	554,256	5.07	--- do ---	--- do ---	Eastern	Meru
Mijikenda	520,520	4.76	Agriculture, some herding, fishing	--- do ---	Coast	Kwale, Kilifi
Somali	250,112	2.29	Pastoralism	Cushitic	North-Eastern	Garissa, Wajir, Mandera
Turkana	203,177	1.86	--- do ---	Paranilotic	Rift Valley	Turkana
Masai	154,906	1.42	--- do ---	--- do ---	--- do ---	Kajiado, Narok
Embu	117,969	1.08	Agriculture	Bantu	Eastern	Embu
Taita	108,494	1.00	--- do ---	--- do ---	Coast	Taita
Iteso (Teso)	85,800	0.78	--- do ---	Paranilotic	Western	Bungoma
Kuria (Tenda)	59,875	0.54	--- do ---	Bantu	Nyanza	Homa Bay
Samburu	54,796	0.50	Pastoralism	Paranilotic	Rift Valley	Samburu
Tharaka	51,883	0.45	Agriculture	Bantu	Eastern	Meru
Mbere	49,247	0.45	--- do ---	--- do ---	--- do ---	Embu
Pokomo	35,181	0.32	Agriculture and fishing	--- do ---	Coast	Tana River
Boran	34,086	0.31	Pastoralism	Cushitic	Eastern	Marsabit, Isiolo
Bajun	24,387	0.22	Fishing and agriculture	Bantu	Coast	Lamu
Nderobo (Dorobo) ..	21,034	0.19	Hunting and gathering	Paranilotic	Rift Valley	Laikipia, Nakuru
Rendille	18,729	0.17	Pastoralism	Cushitic	Eastern	Marsabit
Orma	16,306	0.15	--- do ---	--- do ---	Coast	Tana River
Gabbra	16,108	0.15	--- do ---	--- do ---	Eastern	Marsabit
Swahili-Shirazi	9,971	0.09	Trade, fishing, agriculture	Bantu	Coast	Mombasa, Kwale
Njemps	6,526	0.06	Fishing	Paranilotic	Rift Valley	Baringo
Taveta	6,324	0.06	Agriculture and trade	Bantu	Coast	Taita
Sakuye	4,369	0.04	Pastoralism	Cushitic	Eastern	Isiolo
Boni ¹	3,972	0.04	Hunting and gathering	--- do ---	Coast	Lamu
Sanye ¹			Hunting, some cultivating	--- do ---	--- do ---	Tana River
Gosha	2,928	0.03	Agriculture	--- do ---	North-Eastern	Mandera
Total	10,677,079	97.58				
Non-Kenyan						
Africans ²	56,123	0.51				
Non-Africans³						
Asians ⁴	139,037	1.27				
Europeans	40,593	0.37				
Arabs	27,886	0.25				
Total	207,516	1.89				
Others ⁵	1,987	0.02				
TOTAL	10,942,705	100.00				

¹ Boni and Sanye were combined in census.

² Mainly from Tanzania and to a lesser extent from Uganda; some from Rwanda.


³ In contrast to African groups, numbers declined after 1969, but precise figures were not available in 1976.

⁴ All persons originating from Asia except those from the Middle East.

⁵ Ethnic group not specified.

Source: Based on information from Kenya, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Statistics Division, *Kenya Population Census, 1969, I*, November 1970.

KENYA



PROVINCES









-  - Rift Valley
-  - Central
-  - Eastern
-  - Nyaruga
-  - Coast
-  - North Eastern
-  - Western
-  - Nairobi

Figure 1
(Source: Kenya Ministry of
Tourism and Wildlife, 1978.)

The majority of Kenya's tribes are of Bantu stock, which immigrated northward from south Central-Africa in the first millenium A.D. The largest tribe in this group are the Kikuyus who live in the highlands around Mt. Kenya. Other Bantu tribes are the Embu; Meru; Wakamba; Luyia; Kisii; and Nyika, or the Coastal Africans. The Bantu tribes differ from the other groups in language and culture. They also constitute a majority of the population of Kenya. They speak dialects unintelligible to the other groups and subsist mainly as herdsman, keeping cattle and goats. They also raise some crops, notably maize and millet. Some still hunt and collect wild plants.

The Luos are racially and linguistically allied to the Ugandan and Tanzanian Luos. They belong to the Nilotic group. They were essentially small cultivators (not pastoralists) using different types of hoes and living on yams, millet, and fish. They kept cattle and sheep in small numbers and had no individual or family rights to land. Everyone grazed and watered his cattle wherever he wished. They were involved in constant battles with the Luyia. However, during times of prosperity, temporary hospitality was extended between neighboring families of the two tribes. They were confined to the Nyanza plateaus and never came in contact with other interior tribes. They remained unmixed with allied blood.

The Nandi and the Kalenjin are also non-Bantu. They are excellent cultivators, but like the Bantus, recognize cattle as symbols of wealth. They live in Rift Valley.

The Masai are Nilo-Hamites. They lived in the grasslands of southern Kenya and neighboring Tanzania. They introduced many arts such as the working of iron (previously unknown to the Bantus), and probably cattle-keeping and sheep-rearing as well. They are the greatest fighters that Africa has ever known, with a superior military tribal organization. Although much smaller than most of the tribes, they were perhaps the most feared tribe in Kenya. Owing to the grazing and water needs of their livestock, they are essentially nomadic. Like the Somali, Rendelles, and the Boran, they wander intermittently following the movements of game in search of water.

There are several other minor Kenyan tribes which have distinct characteristics and are mainly closer to the non-Bantu tribes.

All Kenyan tribes, except the Luos and Turkana practice circumcision. Through it, individuals gained membership to an age-set, which provided them with new identity in their community. The grouping into age-sets also provided a system of seniority ranking, the basis of which important social duties--such as judicial, military, and eldership--were allocated.

The Luos and Turkana also practice age-set groupings however, the ascendency into the first adult age set does not include the ceremony of circumcision.

Further examination into the traditional values attached to adulthood among the Kikuyus reveals yet another political dimension. The Kikuyus believe that uninitiated men should not hold any political or public office on behalf of the community, regardless of other qualities. All uncircumcised men had no membership in the tribal community. For example, they could not attend political or judicial meetings. Their testimony and judgment was considered that of a child. They could not marry or mix freely within their respective tribes. They were still children.

The Kikuyu tribe, for instance, use the word "Kihii" to refer to uncircumcised men, regardless of tribe or nationality. They also use the word "Mwanake", which is a more respectable word for a grown-up or a circumcised man. When pressed, the Kikuyu tribes recognize a "real man" distinction between themselves and the Luos because Luos are uncircumcised. The ancient tribal beliefs therefore still prevail. One might even argue that the cultural "mind" of the Kikuyu does not exclude the Luo or Turkana man from participating in non-leadership roles in government, however an uncircumcised man as a national leader is unthinkable. On the other hand the absence of cultural

beliefs about circumcision of women does not preclude their ascending to leadership in the Kikuyu "mind."

Strong tribal beliefs are also another important ingredient in tribal culture. In his analysis of belief systems, Philip Converse describes a belief system as follows:

. . . a belief system is a configuration of beliefs in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence.

Hence, an evaluation of tribal beliefs and their form of "constraint" or "functional interdependence" within a given tribe assures . . . a reasonable degree of success in evaluating some major elements of political conflict based on beliefs or values held by various tribes.⁴

Tribal beliefs are still held strongly as well in Kenya today and therefore Kenyan society is made up of incongruant systems of beliefs. The success of the contemporary political system depends on major modification or total elimination of some of these beliefs because they encourage conflict. The last chapters of this thesis will be concerned with the relationship between types of beliefs and types of conflict.

It is not the purpose of this study, however to stray into the broad and more difficult discussion of Kenya's tribes and their past. Rather, an analysis of symbolic beliefs will be made to test the hypothesis.

In his book, Facing Mt. Kenya, Kenyatta argues that the structure of the Kikuyu government was democratic prior to the advent of the Europeans.

At the first meeting, every village appointed a representative to the council which passed laws for the tribe.⁵

For the purposes of this study, the following laws are important:

- (1) Universal tribal membership as the unification of the whole tribe, the qualification for it to be based on an individual's adult status and not on the extent of his property. For this reason, it was then decided that every member of the community, after passing through the circumcision ceremony as a sign of adulthood, could take an active part in the government: . . . socially and politically all circumcised men and women equally could be full members of the tribe . . . the government would be in the hands of councils of elders (Kiama) chosen from all members of the community. . . (Author's emphasis)⁶

It should be noted that only those circumcised were considered adults and therefore full voting members of the tribe.

On the central importance of circumcision, Godfred Muriuki, in his book on The History of the Kikuyu: 1500-1900, writes:

The initiation rituals [circumcision] dramatized the symbolic "death of childhood," and the "birth" of adulthood. Childhood had tied the young to their family, their lineage or locality; adulthood, on the other hand, flung the adolescents into the willing arms of the community as a whole . . . consequently, initiation was not a private concern but a public and communal rite. It was a crucial importance to the community as a whole because it conferred social status upon the initiates. To the Kikuyu, circumcision was of fundamental importance. It stands for the whole values embodied in the age class system with all its "educational, social, moral and religious implications. It is a "conditio sine quo non" for being a real Kikuyu and the visible and outward sign of adhering to the tribal cultures.⁷

Circumcision was and is so fundamental to the definition of an adult member of society, that the thought of an uncircumcised chronological adult having an active

part in society, let alone, leadership, is an impossibility.

Despite tribal differences in culture, relative wealth or living conditions, all tribes shared many similarities in social structure. The "family" was the heart of the tribal society. The young members of the family had an obligation to help the older members. Mutual helpfulness was a virtue not only essential but also compulsory. In addition all tribes encouraged the worth and freedom of the individual. The concept of property rights among all tribes was directly related to the mode of life. Rights to the exclusive use of anything resulted from work expended or habitual use by a particular individual or group. This was a practical concept, and it seems to have entailed a minimum of conflicts. If a Masai made a spear, or if a Kikuyu built a hut, they were his. However, the materials used in making the objects belonged to no one. Among the Luo, any family might fish in a certain stream, but if a clan or a group of families built a fishing canoe, it alone had a right to use that boat. Among the Kamba and the Kalenjin, the harvest belonged to those who had planted the seeds. These social "laws" were upheld by the chief of the elders.

A spirit of social responsibility was also common to all tribes. If, for example, a member of a family was in need of help, all individuals were willing and

ready to help. The survival of the family and the tribe depended on helpfulness and cooperation. Greed, as it is understood in materialist terms today, was seldom present among the tribes. Thus, while each person maintained his individuality, he never did so to the detriment of his community.

The tribal social life manifested itself at four levels. First of all, the intimate bonds of clan kinship afforded numerous opportunities for close fellowship within each family and between families. People enjoyed eating together, and hospitality was a norm of life. There was constant interchange of gifts between members of each family and between families. Everyone agreed that for the general good of the community, it was better to give than to receive. Such rules of hospitality were only within the tribe.

The second level of social life took place at the community level. The entire community shared in an annual cycle of social and political events: victory celebrations, dances, dissemination of all important news, and in frequent marriage or initiation ceremonies.

The third level of social organization was natural outcomes of the strong spirit of social cooperation and identification of the individual in his community. Community activities were played out in a heightened sense at the tribal level: craft displays, huge dances, warrior adulation, games, and the like.

The process of politics in African tribes has been described by Busia, a sociologist and former President of Ghana:

African communities, or tribes, developed their own political systems before the period of colonization Some communities and tribes had highly developed political organizations with hierarchies of office holders, from attendants to Kings and Chiefs wielding varying degrees of authority. Each organization was one in which different individuals played different roles, and everyone had some degree of participation in political life; for political organization was an aspect of the social life in which everyone participated.⁸

The most important basis of the political system was, of course the tribe. The tribal government was based on tribal principles. Within this same framework, kinship relations with fellow tribesmen were an important base for political action. All Kenya tribes were ruled by a Chief, elected or hereditary, or by representatives to a council of elders. As an example the Kikuyu system of government as described by Kenyatta is as follows:

. . . it was based on true democratic principles. Each village appointed a representative to the Council, and in order to maintain harmony in the government in the country, it was necessary to make a few rules which would act as the guiding principles in the new government . . . The government should be in the hands of council of elders chosen from all members of the community who had reached the age of leadership.⁹

The tribe was in a total sense, an administrative entity which contained a structure for central political control. The rulers (elders, chiefs) acted in conformity with the laws of the tribe. In cases of any deviation from those laws, the communities imposed fines on their rulers or impeached them from office. No tribe came under the direct control of another tribe.

The chiefs and the elders also had connections within the tribe which served as an important base for political control. These connections were established and maintained through a rudimentary type of political organization, operating mostly through the kinship system. Interestingly wealth was of great importance in attaining political power. The word of the richest man usually commanded greater attention than that of the not so rich. The rich were, in fact, the chiefs and the elders.

Another important aspect of tribal life related to the methods of trade used by the tribes. A casual investigation shows similar economic values among all tribal communities. Each individual or family unit produced nearly all the necessities of life for consumption. Direct exchange in trading existed, but there was no common denominator in which to express the value of products. Thus, the tribes used a barter system. For example, if an individual wanted to sell commodity A for commodity B, it was necessary to determine the worth of unit A before accepting a B unit. This required expressing the value of commodity A in terms of the value of commodity B, and vice versa. This in turn required mental calculations by the owner of each commodity as well as endless bargaining which consumed both time and energy. It was also necessary to repeat the process when trading commodities A for C, D, E, and so forth.

In recent times the creation of the Republic of Kenya resulted in the fourth level of social organization--the republic. This republic was thus a conglomerate of tribes: the tribes were located in one area or another, and were comprised of family groups that lived across the tribal land that they considered their own. The members defined themselves by the tribes to which they belonged, perhaps as much or more than by their family affinities. As a consequence, their tribal bonds became absolute. These bonds and

traditions were so strong that they encouraged discrimination against all non-tribal strangers whether they be black or white.

Tribal boundaries before colonialism were fairly vague. Each tribe seems to have claimed only the land actually used by its members for cultivation and grazing. Big stretches of uninhabited land and thick forests divided them from their neighbors. When war threatened, the land was marked to show boundaries of some kind. This also demonstrated how deeply the people were attached to their own territory.

In his book, Facing Mt. Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta argues that the cause of friction among tribes was economic.

There was no war of annexation of territory or subjection of one tribe to another The Masai, whose lives depended entirely on the meat, milk, and blood of animals, were forced by necessity to raid the stock of their neighbors or die of hunger and starvation.¹⁰

Hostilities also consisted of feuds resulting from woman-stealing and mere tribal suspicion. Once revenge had been taken, a series of reprisals and counter reprisals might follow. There were also occasions when a tribe would form an alliance with members of a warring tribe to raid fellow tribesmen. With regard to tribe relations, Kenyatta stated:

In territories where friendly relationship was established, especially between the Kaptei Masai and the southern Kikuyu, the warriors of the two tribes joined together to invade another section of Masai, like Loita or a section of Gikuyu, like Mbeere or Tharaka. 11

In spite of occasional alliances such as these, the Kikuyus were always fighting with the Masai.

Although some aspects of tribal structure were seriously affected by colonialism, regional isolation, intertribal warfare, and tribal loyalties continued after independence. When the government set the goals and objectives for development, the characteristics of personal allegiance to customs, loyalty to the family (defined in terms of a unit of close relatives), and loyalty to the tribe were still the strongest bonds felt by individuals. This placed sharp limitations on the political leaders working for a more balanced growth. Long standing jealousies, tribal feuds, group loyalties and the like were never seriously influenced by the new government. Even though the post-colonial governments tried to lessen the impact of tribalism, the system still persists. In his writing on the "detrribalized" African, Max Gluckman makes the following point:

[the] African is always tribalized, both in towns and in rural areas; but he is tribalized in two quite different ways. As we see it, in the rural areas he lives and is controlled in every activity in an organized system of tribal relations; in the urban areas tribal attachments work within a setting of urban association.¹²

NOTES

¹ Kenya Government, African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya. (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1965), pp. 1-18.

² Kenya People's Union. Manifesto. (Nairobi 1966) Reproduced in C. Gertzel (ed) Government and Politics in Kenya (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1970), p. 145.

³ Julius Nyerere, Ujamaa: The Basis of African Socialism in William H. Friedland and Carl G. Rosberg, African Socialism, Appendix 11. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964).

⁴ Philip Converse, The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics in Apter D. Earnest, Ideology and Discontent (London: Free Press, 1944), pp. 206-6.

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THE BEGINNING OF COLONIALISM

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, more than ninety percent of the African continent was ruled by Africans. By 1900, all but a small fraction of it was under European rule. The lives of the Africans started being deeply affected by the changes brought about by the foreign rulers.

The Colonial period in Africa lasted well over eighty years. The first thirty years of this period may be called the years of establishment, the next thirty may be called the years of active development, and the last twenty may be called the years of retreat.¹³ In this chapter, the writer will deal with the years of establishment from the point of view of the British government and from the point of view of the Kenya Africans. The years of active development focus on economic and political events during this period and their impact on the African population.

Finally, the writer will address the question of African nationalism that led to Kenya's independence. Kenya was by far the most troubled territory in British

East Africa and offers an interesting evaluation in political and social conditions which are necessary in testing the thesis.

There are several theories regarding the justification of European colonialism in Africa.

F. D. Lugard who epitomised other pioneers of colonialism in East Africa informed his countrymen in 1893 of the following:

The "Scramble for Africa" by the nations of Europe--an incident parallel in the history of the world--was due to the growing commercial rivalry which brought home to the civilized nations the vital necessity of securing the only remaining fields for industrial enterprise and expansion. It is well, then, to realize that it is for our advantage--and not alone at the dictates of duty--that we have undertaken responsibilities in East Africa. It is in order to foster the growth of this country, and to find an outlet for our manufacturers and our surplus energy, that our farseeing statesmen and our commercial men advocate colonial expansion.¹⁴

Lugard went on further with his enunciation:

There are some who say we have no right in Africa at all, that it belongs to the natives. I

hold that our right is the necessity that is upon us to provide for our ever-growing population-- either by opening new fields of emigration, or by providing work and employment which the development of overseas extension entails--and to stimulate trade by finding new markets.¹⁵

The argument, therefore, is that British colonialism in East Africa was based in terms of material advantages beneficial to England. In Lugard's spirited argument, colonialism is represented as a consequence of British capitalist expansion, its aim and result being the colonization of East Africa irrespective of the injustices of economic and political domination over the native tribes. This theory is of special interest since it identifies colonialism with capitalist exploitation.

The second theory which is of some interest to this study shows different reasons and motives for colonialism. The theory of innate superiority of certain races and innate inferiority of others has been advocated to justify colonialism.

In his book Ethics of Empire, 1896, H. H. Wyatt, with special reference to Africa, wrote:

To us [i.e., the British] and not to others, a certain definite duty has been assigned: to carry light and civilization into the dark places of the

world, to touch the mind of Asia and of Africa with the ethical ideas of Europe to thronging millions who would otherwise never know peace and security, their first conditions of human advance.¹⁶

Wyatt's ideals must be greeted with skepticism. A few missionaries with a sense of true mission came to some parts of Africa. The point, however, is that individual motivations of these few people should not be confused with British colonial policies. It was wider imperial interests which led Britain to occupy East Africa.

According to a famous British scholar, colonial acquisition of Kenya was tied to England's imperialist policies elsewhere in Africa. Colin Cross explains that British entanglement in Africa resulted, in part, from her entanglement in India. He says:

Africa lay on the way to India and whether the route was around the Cape or through the Suez Canal it was regarded as essential to prevent hostile European powers establishing bases there. This was as much a rationalization as an operative cause; but pushful British pioneers on the spot could always claim London's support by using the argument of communications with India. The most obvious chain of conquest on these lines had been

that in East Africa. To protect the Suez Canal, it was regarded as essential to control Egypt. To control Egypt it was essential to control the hinterland, Sudan. To control Sudan and the source of the Nile, on which Egypt depended, it was necessary to have a railway running from the East Coast. To control the railway, it was necessary to control Kenya, the territory which the railway crossed.¹⁷

Apart from the simplicity of Cross' reasoning, there are several important facts to remember. First of all, the Indian Empire was not threatened.

Secondly, Africa was still "the dark continent." In his book African Discovery, published in 1942, J. Simmons describes the physical condition of Africa as follows:

. . . Africa is extremely uninviting. Vast stretches of it hardly afford even a sheltering roadstead, and good natural harbours are very rare. Nearly half of it is baked by desert or semi-desert; much of the rest by thick forest, difficult or impossible to penetrate. Few of the rivers are navigable."¹⁸

According to Simmons, it appears that Cross' argument is specious and superficial. East Africa was

not strategically located for Britain to mount a useful defense for India's security.

Other views of British expansion were given in the Times of London of September 28, 1892. In defense of British occupation of East Africa, the paper stated the following:

. . . any withdrawal would be nothing short of a national calamity. It would mean not only the loss of great capital already expended, but the destruction of our influence and prestige throughout Central Africa . . . whether we desire it or not, the British East African Company must be identified for all practical purposes with national policy.¹⁹

According to the Times, then, the reasons for British occupation of East Africa were more important than the countries themselves. The motives for the occupation were political and economic. Other theories of "higher purposes" or "civilizing mission" were only necessary to help clear the way for this expansion.

Professor Albert Szymarski, a distinguished student of European colonialism, well expressed the reasons for European expansion.

The pressure for the political expansion of Europe came primarily from the desire of the landowning class to increase their expansion, wealth, and power.

A secondary dynamic of colonialism in this stage was the growing need for raw materials to satisfy the increasing demands of the growing urban population.²⁰

The desire for expansion led to the formal establishment of a British protectorate over Kenya in 1895. In 1920, Kenya became a British Colony.

The word "protectorate" means an area over which some stronger power exercises authority while allowing the natives some forms of nominal command. The natives are forbidden to have direct diplomatic relations with an outside state, and all foreign powers may only deal with natives through the protecting government.²¹

The greatest political advantage of this arrangement is that it allows the protecting power to get obedience from the natives while providing a convenient excuse when things fail to work out.

The word "colonial" as used in the political sense is characterized by heavy settlement. It consists of settlers who form autonomous government while maintaining economic and cultural links with their homelands. A colonial relationship is therefore created when one

nation establishes and maintains political domination over a geographically external political unit inhabited by others. ²²

The British protectorate over and the eventual colonization of Kenya were effected through two complimentary methods: the first of which was chicanery. The tribes were promised British protection in exchange for their surrender and cession of their territory. Due to a lack of knowledge in international affairs, some tribes yielded to these ambiguous, vague and meaningless promises, thereby losing their sovereignty. Loss of territories led to the conclusion of various treaties with Britain.

L. T. L. Oppenheimer, on the effect of treaties in international laws, makes the following statement:

Although a treaty was concluded with real consent of the parties, it is, nevertheless, not binding if the consent was given in error or under a delusion produced by a fraud of the other contracting party. ²³

Thus, it can be argued that the British, through a process of pious fraud, duped the tribes into relinquishing their territorial sovereignty. It is perhaps just as well to make a general observation that contacts between Christian missionaries and the natives,

especially those missionaries who wanted to see the country under British rule, had considerable effect in mollifying the attitudes of the natives towards the colonizing power.

The second method involved the use of British military force against those tribes which resisted the entire colonial system. The reasons for military confrontation have been described by Tignor:

In the first place, the British had military and technological superiority. The major period when military force was in continuous use was the so-called era of pacification. At that time, the British used violence in an exemplary fashion, hoping to render its further use unnecessary. When the British sent forces against recalcitrant groups, they inflicted severe military lessons, burning villages, expropriating livestock, and in some cases, killing large numbers. These forays were designed to demonstrate, not only to the people against whom they were sent, but to the neighbors as well, that resistance was futile and rained down intolerable destruction.²⁴

One other way British achieved its intentions was by shrewdly manipulating tensions within the tribe, finding important collaborators before launching a

military attack. In spite of military defeats, anti-colonial disturbances among tribes continued. These were in the form of scattered quasi-guerrilla skirmishes during the years 1895 through 1920.

After 1920, some tribes, especially the Kikuyus, continued to seek direct confrontation in the form of land struggles, labor strikes, and occasional acts of violence.

After Kenya was declared a colony, a network of British and native administrators was rapidly provided. This was in the form of indirect rule. The governor ruled through district commissioners who ruled through indigenous tribal groupings headed by a chief. The basic hypothesis of indirect rule was that through creating two sets of rulers--British and native, working either separately or in cooperation (in which the native chiefs had well-defined duties and an acknowledged status)--a minimization of conflicts and retention of the efficient organizational structure of traditional life would result.

The general control principles were laid down by Lord Lugard in 1922, as follows:

1. Native rulers are not permitted to raise and control armed forces or to grant permission to carry arms.
2. The sole right to impose taxation in any form is reserved to the Suzerain power.

3. The right to legislation is reserved.
4. The right to appropriate land on equitable terms for public purposes and for commercial purposes is vested in the governors.
5. The right of conforming or otherwise deciding the choice of the people of the successor to a Chieftain and of deposing any ruler for misrule or other cause is reserved to the governor. [Succession is governed] by native law and custom, subject in the case of important chiefs to the approval of the governor in order that the most capable claimant may be chosen.²⁵

Politically, the concept of indirect rule achieved two goals: a total belief in the colonial government and the foreign advancement of a political system over the natives. Similarly, Lugard said the following:

If continuity and decentralization are as I have said, the first and most important conditions in maintaining an effective administration cooperation is the key-note of success in its application--continuous cooperation between every link in the chain, from the head of the administration to its most junior members-- cooperation between the government and the commercial community, and above all, between the provincial staff and the native rulers. Every individual adds his share not only to the

accomplishment of the ideal, but to the ideal itself. Its principles are fashioned by his patient and loyal application of these principles, with as little interference as possible with native customs and mode of thought.²⁶

Lugard's argument, misplaced as it is, overlooks two fundamental facts. First of all, it does not take into account that the system of "continuous cooperation" and "decentralization" achieved the unquestionable authority of the British Crown.

In the second place, this argument ignores the fact that the system also shifted the focus of authority away from the legitimate traditional society to those of British power. The chiefs, whose powers were traditionally balanced through the process of consultation with the tribes, became petty tyrants making a mockery of their beliefs and ruled only because they had the British force to keep themselves in power. This in turn disabled the political sub-structures of the tribes, slowly diminishing the traditional values of their democracy. Another consequence of the "indirect rule" system of government was that it subordinated the tribes to the British.

Being politically disorganized and unable to continue effective resistance against the British, the tribes faced the challenge of European settlement on their land.

Jidlaph G. Kamoche described the manner in which the African tribes lost their land:

As African land was alienated to Europeans, it became nominally part of the highlands if the land was 4,000 feet above sea level . . . when a need arose for the colonial government to put to public use a part of the African land a method called "exclusion" was employed to alienate the desired land.²⁶

Large amounts of African land were appropriated by the Europeans between 1903-1911. The colonial government established two types of applicants that could apply for this land. Those in the first group, called Class A, were men of small means and were to be given small grants of small farms. Those in Class B were men with £ 1000 capital and an assured income of £ 200 per year. Farms were also available to this group for purchase on generous terms. Using this method of land distribution, a total of 1,052 Class B farms and 257 Class A farms were created.²⁷ This produced bitter and violent episodes against the colonial

government, especially from the Kikuyu, Maasai, and Kamba tribes.

In an attempt to resolve the land problems, the colonial government created "African Reserves" as a form of compensation for lost land. These were designated forest areas which separated European settlers from the African tribes. In spite of British efforts to resolve the land grievances, the tribes remained bitter.

In his study of Gikuyu tribal organization, Jomo Kenyatta underlined the importance of land in the African culture.

. . . Land is the key to the people's life; it secures for them that peaceful tillage of the soul which supplies their material needs and enables them to perform their magic and traditional ceremonies in undisturbed serenity facing Mt. Kenya . . . it supplies them with the material needs of life, through which spiritual and mental contentment is achieved. Communion with the ancestral spirits is perpetuated through contact with the soul in which the ancestors of the tribe lie buried . . . the earth is the mother of the tribe . . . As it is, by driving him off his ancestral lands, the Europeans have robbed him of the material

foundations of his culture, and reduced him to a state of serfdom forever²⁸

It was the intensification of such land beliefs which later posed a challenge to European colonization of the country.

In brief, about one quarter of the land, representing most of the fertile upland territory, was held by Europeans and was termed "White Highlands." The Africans remained bitter over the land issue and gave the colonial government continuous trouble throughout the colonial period.

Closely connected with the land issue was the procurement of African labor for European farms. The European settlers viewed the African landlessness as a source of cheap farm labor.

Due to the African's resentment concerning the land issue and their unwillingness to work on European settlements, the colonial government levied a "Hut and Poll Tax" on all African male adults. The payment of this tax required the Africans to work. Punitive measures such as imprisonment and brutal and ruthless beatings were used on those Africans who failed to pay the tax.

Complicating the land and tax issues were the low wages which Africans received from European settlers. The colonial administration linked African taxes and

low wages as positive factors necessary for economic development. For European settlers, African labor was essential in the development of opportunity and potentiality of agriculture (such as coffee, tea, wheat, and corn). The justification used in support of African labor by the colonial administration was that the initiative, knowledge, and industrialization of Europe were needed in the colony and consequently the Africans would benefit.

The Africans viewed this in terms of ruthless confiscation of their land. They argued that, by being forced to work, the colonial government made it impossible for them to live otherwise. They saw little reason to work beyond the time needed to secure money for the payment of taxes and thus repeatedly deserted from European farms.

Another consequence of African labor was the introduction of European agriculture methods to the Africans. This created a tremendous hardship upon the Africans' traditional lifestyle of subsistence agriculture. The European settlers, however, expected the Africans to emulate the model of high production and efficiency and consequently assure themselves a share of the affluence believed to be the reward of superior knowledge.

Together with the land issue, British economic policies in the colony were conditioned by her desire to become a major manufacturing and capitalist exporting country. This desire was greatly intensified by the effects of World War I, which had suddenly exposed her competitive weakness. This in turn heightened the importance of creating new markets which could be directly controlled through the colonial system.²⁹ Britain had also accepted large loans from the United States, which resulted in economic and political dominance of the United States in areas once dominated by Britain.³⁰ The following statement from the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster explains this fact.

. . . Remember that by the service of our debt to America we have to find many millions a year, and at the same time we have to purchase raw materials from America amounting to many millions a year.

Every single pound that we can take off the American exchange so much the better for us, especially if it is spent within the British Empire. The development of cotton, sugar, and tobacco--all these are matters of the utmost importance, not only in providing our own people here with employment, but they are essential because if it is essential to purchase these

commodities they should be purchased from our own people.³¹

The commodities referred to above came from British exports from her own markets at home and those under colonial rule. The colonies were capable of producing tropical raw materials required for British industries and the colonial economies were controlled by Britain with her own interests in mind. This view was confirmed in 1923 by members of the British Empire Cotton Growing Corporation.

I believe we shall in the future see the whole of our cotton coming from our own dominions, [i.e. Empire]. I believe we shall thus secure cheaper cotton, cheaper raw materials for the use of our British manufacturers. I also believe that in doing that we will be supplying a market for our own people beyond the seas, and that the money that they obtain for their cotton may to a great extent be spent in making purchases from the mother country.

It is an ideal for which we all ought to work, that the money obtained from us should in a different form come back to this country. When we are able to do that we are really though separated by thousands of miles, an Empire united and strong.³²

This view assumed a natural harmony of economic unity between the mother country and the colony. British investment in the colony would speed rapid development of essential primary products; and in turn create the desired markets for overseas exports.³³

L. S. Amery, a British economist of the period, explained the multiple virtues of this economic system in the following manner:

I think we have never realized sufficiently the immense economic possibilities of those colonies, and the immense wealth that could be created by science, energy, and organization in those parts of the world. The prime object, of course, of that development must be the welfare of the inhabitants of those regions. Our first duty is to them; our object is not to exploit them, but to enable them materially, as well as in every other respect, to rise to a high plane of living and civilization. But I am sure as I stand here that we cannot develop them and help them without an overflow of wealth and prosperity that would be an immense help to this country in the difficult times ahead.³⁴

In Kenya, this system required the establishment of an export-oriented infrastructure capable of producing products in demand on world markets such as coffee, cotton, tea, wheat, etc.

The economic ideology also required that colonial development be confined to forms of production which would not compete with British manufacturers as colonial consumers preferred British commodities, however uncompetitive.

This commitment was justified in terms of the interests of the local economy since it gave access to the world markets and was believed that this would advance the economic well-being of the natives. 35

Since the colonial economy was entirely constructed according to the wishes of and for the benefit of the home country, the railroad and other modes of transportation and communication were developed to facilitate the centralization and exportation of agricultural products. 36

In addition, economic and social infrastructures were created for the benefit of the large European-owned import-export companies and for the convenience of the Europeans.

At the other end, land in the African reserves did not benefit from these economic arrangements because the

colonial government had decreed that Africans were forbidden from planting cash crops on their land. Also, their land did not benefit from any of the improvements settlers made on their farms.

Economic activities in the industrial sector involved only the transformation of agricultural products for overseas markets.

In both the agricultural and industrial sectors, no minimum salary was set; employers were free to set salaries for their employees. About a third of African salary was represented by payments in kind: lodgings and small pieces of land to grow food crops.

Racism accentuated the differences in living conditions between Europeans and Africans. African salaries appeared phenomenally low. The average annual salary was about two hundred dollars in 1961 as against three thousand five hundred dollars for the Europeans. Equally large plantations, cheap labor, and high yields assured very comfortable revenue for their owners.

In the public sector, the European earned about \$4200 annually and the African \$300. Racial discrimination had also imposed limits of social mobility for the Africans, and while the Europeans

filled the highest jobs, the Africans were the manual workers.³⁷

Thus, the system of colonial economy entirely founded on business profit and for the benefit of the Europeans created unbearable economic difficulties and unjust social treatment of the Africans. The system was also responsible for creating a political system which was designed to protect the economic interests of the Europeans at the expense of the Africans. With that in mind, it is my purpose to analyze briefly events which led to African nationalism and independence.

NOTES

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¹⁶ H. H. Wyatt, Ethics of Empire (1896; rpt. Henson H. Hensley, London: Oxford University Press, 1927), pp. 1-19.

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²⁹ Kenyatta, Facing Mt. Kenya (London: Martha Secker and Warbuig Ltd., 1952), n. pag.

³⁰ E. A. Brett, Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa (London: University of Sussex, 1973), pp. 70-75.

³¹ Brett, p. 70.

³² House of Commons, Debates 25 VII 23, V. 167, c. 589. in E. A. Brett, Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa. (London: University of Sussex, 1973) p. 70.

33 Empire Cotton Growing Corporation, Report of the Second Annual General Meeting, 1923 pp. 8-10.

34 House of Commons Debates, 30 VII 19, V. 118 c. 2182 in Brett, Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa (London: University of Sussex, 1973), p. 73.

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36 Albert Meister, The Past in Chains, The Future in Pawn (New York: Wacker and Company, 1968), p. 29.

37 Meister, p. 33.

AFRICAN OPPOSITION AND INDEPENDENCE

As discussed before in this study, the Africans had a striking record of uprisings since the beginning of colonialism. There were small-scale rebellions which never culminated in major revolts partly because of European readiness to suppress them. At first their uprisings centered on the Africans' resentment of European settlements. But later numerous grievances brought Africans into major conflicts with the Europeans. The root problem, as mentioned earlier, was the land issue. Other grievances were socio-economic and political.

In 1920, the first African political association known as the Young Kikuyu Association was founded. It voiced grievances over land, taxation, and the regulation of 1920 which made carrying a pass--the Kipande--obligatory for all African adult males. The association demanded restitution to the tribe of land occupied by the Europeans and facilities to develop the economic well being of the Africans, it also demanded direct African representation in the European controlled legislative council. 38

The association also accused the chiefs of being government stooges. The founder of the association, Harry Thuku, expressed his anger with the Europeans in 1921:

I, Harry Thuku, am greater than you Europeans. I am even greater than the chiefs of this country. How is it that I have left Nairobi without being arrested if it is not because I am a great man. I desire if the Europeans tell you to do any work at all, that you tell them Harry Thuku has refused to allow you to make camps, or to make roads, or to work in the station or for the public works department . . . Hearken, everyday you pay hut tax to the European government. Where is it sent? It is their task to steal the property of the Agikuyu.³⁹

Thuku's campaign against colonial injustices was short lived. He was exiled the following year, and it was not until 1924 that the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA) was formed to carry on with Thuku's campaign.

Jomo Kenyatta became its general secretary. The Association sent him to England the same year and again in 1931 to air their grievances. Kenyatta faithfully reflected the Kikuyu rejection of European domination and values by later writing his book, Facing Mount Kenya.

In an article entitled "An African Looks at British Imperialism," which appeared in the January, 1933 issue of the Negro Worker in England, Kenyatta took an offensive stand by criticizing British policies in Kenya. He wrote:

Kenya is the most important British Colony in East Africa. During the last 35 years, these people have been robbed of their best land and are today reduced to the statue of serfs forced to work on their own lands for the benefit of the "white owners," and in some circumstances to work without pay and food.⁴⁰

Kenyatta argued that British imperialism supported the backward form of social relationships in Kenya and that the British had succeeded in breaking tribal organizations and felt no need to listen to the opinions of the Africans.⁴¹ He argued further that the Africans were worse off under the British than they had been under their own tribal systems.⁴² He accused the British of levying taxes on Africans many times over in order to pay for a huge colonial budget that dwarfed the layout of the colonial government in Kenya.⁴³ He also argues that the Africans had to pay the cost of modernization without receiving any of the benefits. Roads and railroads for which the Africans paid so dearly in both

labor and taxes did nothing to improve African conditions, but made it possible for British merchants to accumulate and export Kenya's resources for their own profits.⁴⁴ To Kenyatta, this did not represent African development. He viewed settled plantations as places where landless Africans had to go to slave and die because their land had been given to the British men by the colonial government.⁴⁵

Kenyatta wanted to throw off the chains of British colonialism and create a new democratic African society.

Between 1928-1945, many articles by Kenyatta appeared in African national newspapers abroad, and by the time he returned to Kenya in 1946, he had already become a world famous African politician. Following his return, Kenyatta devoted himself to the task of building KCA to a Kenya wide African political party. Over time, he developed personal relationships with leaders from other tribes. Notably, Oginga Odinga, Achieng Oneko, and Paul Ngei. This team was very successful in arousing the minds of the people by stirring up hatred against the British and by their calls for political freedom. Wherever they went, Africans poured into the meetings to hear them. Especially when Kenyatta rose to speak, the people listened in complete silence and rapt attention.

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Kenyatta used examples to explain himself. He would contrast the rich European way of life in Kenya with the exploitation of Africans. Kenyatta was also reported to say one thing openly in a public meeting and then take his tribesmen off by themselves where he spoke in Kikuyu idioms.⁴⁶

The colonial government suspected that the Mau Mau movement was born out of these secret meetings.

Kenyatta was also referred to by the colonial government as the "most accomplished agitator of all the Africans." In fact, by the time Kenyatta returned to Kenya, he was regarded by the Europeans as their greatest enemy, and they accused him of thoughtless opposition to administrative policies which were aimed at improving the conditions of the Africans.⁴⁷ This was much the same language the Europeans had used since he became the president of the KCA.

In 1953, KAU was banned. The colonial authorities could not conceive of any political opposition to their policies, nor could they accept the reality of African aspirations strongly advocated by Kenyatta and other African leaders.⁴⁸

They viewed these activities as destructive and continued to believe that any solution to the African problems lay in the initiative of the colonial administration under European leadership, not in changing the political system as Africans demanded. While some African leaders believed in political changes, under this situation, Kikuyu resistance to colonial rule became increasingly militant and more committed to the use of force to achieve social, economic, and political change. The gap between the colonial authorities and the Kikuyus widened as each rejected the assumptions on which the other's arguments were based.⁴⁹

As time passed by, reports of oathing and a movement called Mau Mau appeared. The oathing grew out of a need to mobilize support for political tactics and to raise the level of unity and political commitment among the Kikuyus. Josiah Mwangi Kariuki, himself a Mau Mau detainee, describes the vows and promises made by members of the movement in oath-taking ceremonies:

I speak the truth and vow before our God
 And by this Batuni oath of our movement
 Which is called the movement of fighting
 That if I am called on to kill for our soil
 If I am called on to shed my blood for it
 I shall obey and I shall never surrender
 And if I fail to go

May this oath kill me,
 May this he-goat kill me,
 May this seven kill me,
 May this meat kill me.

I speak the truth and vow before our God
 And before our people of Africa
 That I shall never betray our country
 That I shall never betray anybody of this movement to
 to the enemy
 Whether the enemy be European or African
 And if I do this

May this oath kill me, etc.

I speak the truth and vow before our God
 And by this Batuni oath of our movement
 That I shall never sell my country for money or
 any other thing
 That I shall abide until my death by all the promises
 that I have made this day
 That I shall never disclose our secrets to our enemy
 Nor shall I disclose them to anybody who does not
 belong to the movement
 And if I transgress against any of the vows that I
 have thus consciously made
 I shall agree to any punishment that the movement
 shall decide to give me
 And if I fail to do these things
 May this oath kill me, etc. 50

At the same time, political activities among other tribes assumed various forms, such as labor strikes, political demonstrations and selective political violence.

These activities made it clear to the colonial government that the idea of "freedom" was common to all Africans. In spite of these developments, the colonial government's attitudes did not change much, and a declaration of a "state of emergency" was declared in October, 1952.

The oath-taking and a state of emergency accelerated the Kikuyu exodus to the forests where they ambushed and killed European settlers with the help of Kikuyu employees. African collaborators, especially colonial chiefs, were killed.

The colonial government believed that by locking up African leaders, this would in turn disable the movement, and Kenyatta and other prominent Africans were detained. This, however, did not stop the movement but rather precipitated more violent resistance throughout the country.

Although perhaps a military defeat, the movement was a great political success resulting in greater flexibility of colonial leadership in meeting African demands.

The initial flexibility occurred in 1954 when "principles of multiracialism" were incorporated into what was called the "Lyttelton Constitution." The following year African political associations, on a district level, were permitted, but the Kikuyus were barred from political activity. The non-violent African leadership fell to other tribes. 51

In 1957, six Africans were elected to the Legislative Council. They used this opportunity to press for greater political concessions from Britain. The aim was to pressure the British for a constitutional conference which would lead to independence.

By 1960, there were fourteen African members of the Legislative council, including such men as Oginga Odinga, Tom Mboya, James Gichuru, Julius Kiano, Ronald Ngala, and Daniel Moi. The African members of the Legislative Council decided to form a national political party and bring all tribal political associations under a single political union. The Kenya African National Union (KANU) was launched in 1960, and James Gichuru, a Kikuyu, was elected its president on the understanding that he was only holding the seat for Kenyatta.

Oginga Odinga was elected Vice President. Mboya became its general secretary, but Ngala, a politician from the Coast Province chose not to join. Moi Kalenjin,

also refused to join KANU. The reasons these men did not join KANU were perhaps justifiable in that, once independence was won, they feared the Kikuyus would secure political dominance.

In the same year Ngala formed the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) which was joined by Moi's Kalenjin Political Alliance, the Masai United Front, the Kenya African Peoples Party, the Coast African Political Union, and the Somali National Front.⁵²

The KADU objective was to work towards a multi-racial self government within the existing political system. The most significant aspect of this was that the party represented the people who felt that their interests would be threatened by a kikuyu and Luo dominated alliance.⁵³

KANU was demanding a fresh constitutional conference and new elections. KANU also demanded the "unconditional" release of Kenyatta under whose leadership it would form a predominantly African government.⁵⁴

Each party was pressing for a constitutional structure most likely to secure it in power, but despite their political differences, both parties agreed to work together as a team on most issues of African independence.

A formal expression of this agreement was adopted when the group visited Kenyatta at Lodwar.

This meeting of KANU and KADU delegates at Lodwar under the chairmanship of the national leader Jomo Kenyatta and attended by fellow-freedom-fighters Paul Ngei, B. M. Kaggia and Peter Kigundu unanimously resolved:

1. That unity among all Africans is essential for our struggle towards independence and should be pursued relentlessly.
2. That meantime it is agreed that KANU and KADU work together and in full consultation as from today on the immediate questions of
 - (a) immediate and unconditional release of Kenyatta;
 - (b) full independence for Kenya in 1961.
3. The meeting being convinced that personalities and selfishness, mutual suspicion and fears may be at the bottom of current misunderstandings and disunity, calls on all African people and members of Legislative Council and party leaders to completely refrain from those negative and disruptive attitudes, and work together for the good of Kenya.

4. That to pursue the above, the meeting recommends the setting up of a joint consultative committee of the KANU Governing Council and KADU Supreme Council and their respective parliamentary groups to facilitate greater cooperation and collaboration and closer association. 55

In August of 1961, Jomo Kenyatta was released. He immediately became KANU's president.

KADU, on the other hand, was becoming increasingly popular with European settlers and, on the whole, repudiated Kenyatta's leadership. 57

This period also marked a phase of communication between the Africans and the British government. A series of constitutional conferences both in Kenya and London were called where British officials and African leaders talked about constitutional changes.

KADU's plan at these meetings was devised by European supporters, essentially to protect prevailing land rights and to prevent political domination over the weaker groups by KANU.

In the Lancaster House Conference attended by Kenyatta, KADU's plan was strongly supported, not just by the Europeans but also by the British

government. In the end, KANU abandoned its own plan and accepted a British version of the KADU plan, providing for a bi-cameral legislature and for six regional assemblies. This would have entrenched political powers but limited financial powers. KANU won on through free elections and Kenyatta's release. 56

In the general elections held in 1961, KANU won 83 of the 124 House of Representative seats and won in every Province. It also won the majority in the Senate and controlled three of the seven regional assemblies, namely Central, Eastern, and Nyanza. KADU's victories were in the Coast (Ngala's territory), the Rift Valley (Moi's territory), and the Western Province.

Kenyatta's presence dominated the whole election. Odinga emerged as the number two man in KANU. He had a long personal relationship with Kenyatta, but his political powers in Luoland were unmatched. Kenyatta still faced political opposition from KADU. His cabinet included five Kikuyus, four Luo, and six other tribes with one representative each. Apart from Odinga, who was Vice-President, all other senior cabinet ministers were Kikuyus. Mboya was assigned the ministry of labor.

In the 1963 general elections KANU won again, and in December of that year the country became independent; Kenyatta was sworn in as the country's first Prime Minister.

NOTES

- 38 Jeremy Murray-Brown, Kenyatta (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1973), p. 100.
- 39 East African Chronicle, August 20, 1921.
- 40 Negro Worker, January 1933 in Jeremy Murrey-Brown, Kenyatta pp. 180-210.
- 41 Murray-Brown, p. 250-261.
- 42 Murray-Brown, p. 265.
- 43 Murray-Brown, p. 265.
- 44 Murray-Brown, p. 265.
- 45 Murray-Brown, p. 205-230.
- 46 Murray-Brown, p. 275.
- 47 Bowyer Bell, On Revolt (Harvard University Press, 1976), p. 95.
- 48 Carl G. Rosberg, The Myth of Mau Mau (London: Pall Mall Press, 1966), p. 234.
- 49 Josiah Mwangi Kariuki, Mau Mau Detainee (London: Oxford University Press, 1963) pp. 29-30.
- 50 Oginga Odinga, Not Yet Uhuru (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967), pp. 193-194.

51 Odinga, pp 195-196.

52 Odinga, p. 195.

53 Odinga, p. 197.

54 Odinga, p. 208-209.

55 Odinga, p. 210.

56 Bennet and Rosberg, The Concept of Urban and Rural Nationalism (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 192-216.

POST INDEPENDENCE ERA

Kenyans looked to their government with great hopes, pride and satisfaction. They believed that the government led by fellow Africans would bring fruits of independence to all citizens equally. The spiritual leader of the independence movement Jomo Kenyatta, was seen as the symbol of economic and political justice. He had been detained by the colonial government, and had suffered with the rest of the citizens. People called him Mzee, a swahili word meaning a supreme elder, and as such trusted by the people to be a fair and honorable guardian. Even the flag represented this spirit. It was composed of red, green and black, each color representing the independence nationalism. Red blood shed in the years of strife towards independence. Green represented the green pastures of the land and black represented the people, independent of colonialism. Unfortunately, the hopes of the people were short lived. The first year of independence was wrought with many changes.

The problem of developing national unity and a new sense of national identification which goes beyond tribal loyalties is being faced in one after another of the countries of Africa, both before and after independence--African countries are composed

of many tribal societies, each with its own history, loyalties, vested interests and prejudices. These societies had expressed no desire for unification; rather, they have long been divided by suspicion, rivalry, or open hostility.⁵⁷

The foregoing observation of William Bascom was no less true for Kenya than for other newly independent African states. Once independence had been achieved, the logic of KANU's leadership evaporated, leaving a residue of intertribal animosities and suspicions. Kenyatta recognized the dangers of the dissolution of national unity and appealed to all Kenyans to perpetuate the unity he had fostered during his leadership of the national liberation struggle. He perceived in the existence of KADU and its regionalism a major stumbling block in the realization of this goal. Coincidentally, Kenyatta wished to extend his personal power beyond his Kikuyu base to the Coast, the Rift Valley and Western Province.

In 1964, Kenyatta, then the Prime Minister, engineered the establishment of the Republic and his election as President. Arguing that KANU and KADU had shared goals, and that existence of two competing parties was illogical and dysfunctional, he also arranged the dissolution of KADU, leaving the Kikuyu-dominated KANU as the country's only legal political organization.⁵⁸ However, he was clever enough to obscure the true intent of Kadu's demise by appointing Odinga, a Luo, as Vice President of both KANU

and of Kenya. Tom Mboya, another non-Kikuyu potential rival of Kenyatta, was relegated to the insignificant post of Minister of Constitutional Affairs. At the same time, the most important ministries including those for Finance, Economic Planning, Defense, Foreign Affairs, Justice, and Land, were assigned to Kikuyus. Curiously, all but one of Kenyatta's top Kikuyu appointees had little involvement with the freedom movement.

This led to accusations of tribalism, especially from former KADU leaders, who alleged that the Kikuyu were given preferential treatment in both cabinet and civil service appointments. Such feelings were shared by non-Kikuyu KANU members of parliament. Strong criticism also came from Kikuyus in Central Province, especially in the districts of Nyeri and Muranga. These Kikuyu were critical of Kenyatta's favoritism toward their kinsmen from Kenyatta's home district of Kiambu.⁵⁹

References in parliament to the problem of tribalism increased. These references were predominantly to the alleged dominance of the Kikuyus over other tribes. The Kikuyu appeared to many to be the major beneficiaries of independence dominating both the bureaucracy and the country's economy. So explicit did this become that one Luo member of parliament felt it necessary to warn that there was no place for establishing one clan or one tribe as a ruling class in African society. By the end of the year,

fears of Kikuyu dominance in government and therefore control over policy making were regularly voiced in and out of parliament.⁶⁰

Widespread criticism also alleged that Kikuyus were dominating the country's economy.

Kenyatta still faced the problem of land distribution to the poor, especially concerning those who had lost their land in the struggle for Kenya's independence. Many KANU members of parliament called on the government to seize land owned by Europeans for free distribution to the landless. They also criticized the government for failing to restrict foreigners' ownership of land. In answering his critics, Kenyatta blamed everything on the colonial government. He reiterated his government's commitment to eliminating all forms of injustice, but warned the people that it was impossible for everyone in the country to own land. He pointed out that wealth and progress could not be achieved overnight or by magic and wishful thinking, rather it would come from the physical labor of all Kenyans.

Despite these excuses, strong criticisms continued charging the government with "Kikuyu corruption," blaming it for creating the gap between the haves and the have nots, and calling it anti-democratic.

In response, the government pledged itself to a program of modernization and development designed to

ensure an equitable distribution of wealth and to guarantee political democracy. The most important element of the program was that through governmental efforts, the African tradition of "mutual social responsibility" would play an important role in the development of the country, would establish a basis for political democracy, and would bring about a unified national effort aimed at the goals of development. It was the government's function to control the whole process and to ensure that progress was made according to the dictates of "mutual social responsibility".

Describing the virtues of "African Socialism," Tom Mboya said:

. . . To make progress toward these fundamental objectives, we have decided to employ the system of African Socialism; we must draw particularly on those African roots that are especially among all tribes in Kenya: political democracy and mutual social responsibility. In the traditional African society in Kenya only one requirement was imposed on an individual before he could participate fully and equally in political affairs. He had to be a mature, responsible member of that society and nothing else. Indeed, the Constitution already guarantees that every person in Kenya is entitled

to the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual whatever his race, tribal place of origin or residence or other local connections, political opinion, color, creed, or sex--during our struggle for Uhuru, we always asserted that only through freedom and human rights could the people cooperate fully with the government. (author's emphasis).⁶¹

There were three problems with Mboya's idealism. First, it ignored the problem of tribalism, the incompatible customs and traditions of which fragmented Kenyan society.

Tribal antagonisms, which had been encouraged and exploited by the colonial government, undermined national commitment to KANU's developmental and democratic goals. Briefly subordinated to the struggle for national liberation, the nefarious affects of tribalism were exacerbated by the Kikuyu domination of KANU and the national government. The necessary and laudatory goals of development and modernization were thus interpreted as benefitting only the ruling tribe at the expense of the others and subverted any chance of a national consensus on mobilization for these goals.

The second problem was closely related to the first. Tribal relations of authority were based on tradition, the individual defining his political allegiance in terms of the recognized leader of his tribe. Thus, the Kikuyu

were strongly attached to Kenyatta because he was the leader of their tribe. Similarly, Oginga Odinga remained the undisputed leader of the Luo despite his relegation to the Vice Presidencies of KANU and the Republic.

Mboya, unrecognized as its leader by any tribe, had no traditional claims to authority. In order to achieve national mobilization for KANU's developmental goals, such traditional definitions of leadership had to be replaced by rational-legal or charismatic basis for authority. As leader of the struggle for national liberation, Kenyatta may have acquired a rational-legal or charismatic legitimacy for his leadership, but the post-independence resurgence of tribalism subverted whatever authority that had been thus created, leaving only the traditional bases of leadership. Kenyatta was forced, therefore, to work through tribal leaders for the accomplishment of KANU's goals at the expense of establishing his legitimacy as the leader of Kenya, not just leader of the Kikuyu.

The third problem was related to the difficulty of achieving the goals of "African Socialism" and political democracy while tribal economic relationships remained unmodernized.

The aspect of tribalism always comes into play on important roles in the country's political leadership. For example, the President has difficulties retaining political support from a different tribe without the

intermediary of tribal leaders. This was a problem which was never recognized as an obstacle to progress. While all tribal cultures included the notion of "mutual social responsibility", the material benefits of traditional collectivism were not distributable outside the tribe. The tribal basis for the economic ingredients of African socialism, therefore, was incompatible with the goals of national economic equity. Kikuyus, who dominated both KANU and the government, tended to favor other Kikuyus in employment and distributing the available resources of Kenya, regardless of their kinsmen's political orientation prior to independence. Luos and other tribesmen who were more qualified for jobs or who were active in the struggle for independence naturally resented such discrimination.

Mboya's idealism, whether the result of naivete or delusion, was exploited by an increasingly cynical KANU leadership which gradually subverted whatever democracy was left in the organization. Of course, they denied any such intent and continued to project a party image which was clearly at odds with reality.

Before independence our party was rightly geared to the struggle against colonialism. Its structure, organization and slogans and even mood . . . Now that we are free, we have to reconstruct the party for the task of nation-building, economic freedom, today the party is

the government and must teach the people to accept, respect and trust the government and its officers To ensure effective working of the party . . . it must be organized to provide real and serious debates on policy. It must not be just a contest for factions and personalities.⁶²

The dichotomy between image and intent becomes more striking when one examines the steps KANU's Kikuyu leadership took to insure its perpetuation in power.

KADU had been "voluntarily" dissolved in 1964. In order to mitigate the fears of the non-kikuyu membership of the defunct party, whose suspicion had been raised with the increasingly heavy-handed Kikuyu domination of Kenyan politics, Kenyatta and his allies sought to allocate ceremonial and symbolic authority to members of other tribes. In a partial response to an emerging left-wing of KANU, the leadership designated Oginga Odinga as party Vice President, hoping to defuse the Luo leader's strident criticism of the regime

Vice President Odinga became the focal point of left wing dissention. A speech he made in which he said "communism is like food to me" was taken as significant by many people. He complained that he had been stripped of all government power when he was appointed Vice President. He became increasingly

critical of other ministers and in April, 1965, he attacked Mboya and Ngala for being tools of Great Britain and the United States.⁶³ The ploy did not succeed and the leadership began to fear an eventual Odinga succession to the aging Kenyatta. Mboya, ever the faithful tool of the leadership, maneuvered a KANU conference to redefine the party Vice Presidency, replacing its single incumbent, Odinga, with an eight man Vice Presidency representing Kenya's eight districts. The move was specifically designed to eliminate Odinga as Kenyatta's designated successor, an intent made all the more clear by the purging of Odinga's supporters during the same conference. Odinga angrily resigned from his party and government posts.

You have not given any consideration to me as your number two in state affairs. I have a conscience and this in fact does prick me when I earn public money but with no job to do. I consider this a waste of public money and I am worried lest the future generations question my sincerity when they would learn that I allowed myself to hold a sinecure post in the midst of poverty and misery in our country. With this realization I cannot continue to hold this position any longer and I hereby tender my resignation.⁶⁴

The final elimination of Odinga was achieved some months later after he had formed the Kenya Peoples Union (KPU), a Luo-based opposition party with socialist leanings. The party was banned and Odinga imprisoned.

Joseph Murumbi, a half-Masai, replaced Odinga as Kenya's Vice President but resigned a few months later, partly due to political pressures from some of his opponents in the government.⁶⁵ Daniel Arap Moi, a Kalenjin, was appointed Kenya's Vice President--a position he held for twelve years. Even with Moi as Vice President, Mboya considered himself most likely successor to President Kenyatta.⁶⁶ He was national secretary of KANU, and unlike party Vice Presidents, who represented tribal regions, Mboya held a national position which represented all ethnic regions. However, Mboya's attempt to project himself as Kenyatta's successor failed. Kenyatta, who in 1968 was about 75 years old and in poor health, had not publicly designated or favored any person as his successor. At the same time Kikuyus, especially from Kenyatta's own district of Kiambu, became increasingly concerned about the possibility of a non-Kikuyu successor.

Mboya was seen as a roadblock to another Kikuyu President. Two well known journalists in Kenya pick up the train of events.

Tom Mboya, the youthful Secretary-General of the party,--who, in the independence movement, had outwitted some of Macmillan's ablest ministers; and who, because of his legendary efficiency, organizational brilliance, cosmopolitan upbringing and deeply right-wing world outlook, was the darling of establishment forces both at home and in the west and was thus regarded by such forces and other observers as their favourite successor to Kenyatta. The argument goes that once Mboya--who was of course doing all these things to enrich his own position--had performed his function (namely to help the family to liquidate Odinga politically), he (Mboya) had outlived his usefulness and must himself be liquidated.⁶⁷

The family refers to the men who were around Kenyatta and may or may not have been related to him by blood.⁶⁸

On July 5, 1969, Tom Mboya was shot dead in Nairobi. The assassin, a Kikuyu, admitted in a public enquiry that he had been ordered to kill the "Luo" from the top. Key government officials, all of them Kikuyus, were suspected as collaborators, but none was ever tried or convicted for the crime.⁶⁹

Mboya's murder led to a period of political crisis between the Luos and the Kikuyus. The Luos started a campaign aimed at uniting other tribes against the

Kikuyus.⁷⁰ Kenyatta, in the meantime, appealed for calm.

Brothers and sisters, I know that every one of us is very much grieved, but what I appeal to you my fellow citizens at this unfortunate time--for as you all know death is inevitable and it is a path which every one will pass, whether he likes it or not, I appeal to you to identify ourselves as Kenyans, to unite together as one people, and one big tribe of Kenya.

As we know, it is only love and unity that can rid us of the disease of separation and disunity, we should not be thinking in terms of I come from that place or that district or that tribe, because all of us are of one tribe and that tribe is Kenya.⁷¹

Despite Kenyatta's assurances, the Kikuyus reacted to the Luo threat by restarting oathing which, as in colonial times, was to enhance the Kikuyu solidarity. While taking the oath, the Kikuyus swore that the flag of Kenya should not leave the House of Mumbi.⁷² (Mumbi is the legendary mother of the Kikuyus.)

The oathing ceremonies were condemned all over the country by other tribes who argued that the Kikuyus were dividing the country for selfish reasons.⁷³ In October of 1969, President Kenyatta visited Nyanza

Province in his continuing effort to obscure Kikuyu domination, but the visit proved catastrophic. On arrival, Kenyatta's car was stoned, and Kenyatta's bodyguard returned fire, killing twenty people and wounding hundreds more.⁷⁴ Kenyatta returned to Nairobi without delivering a speech. With the banning of KPU, imprisonment of Odinga, and the death of Tom Mboya, the Luos were left with no political alternatives.

Between 1970-1976, Kenyatta was the dominant force of Kenya's politics. KANU was, to a great extent, rubber stamping his policies. Kenyatta dominated every political scene, usually by way of arbitrary decrees. He suppressed political opposition by detaining dissidents. During that same period, Josiah Kariuki, a prominent Kikuyu politician who attacked governmental, economic and political policies, was assassinated. It was revealed in a parliamentary hearing that a former commissioner of police was seen with Kariuki hours before he died.

There were, however, limits to the flagrant abuse of constitutional procedures which even some of Kenyatta's kinsmen recognized. Beginning in October, 1976, a group of Kikuyu politicians, fearing the Kenyatta was already too old and physically weak to carry on as head of the government, began another campaign aimed at changing the Kenya Constitution in order to prevent Moi from

becoming President.⁷⁵ Chapter 11, Section 1 of the Kenya Constitution reads:

1. If the office of President becomes vacant by reason of the death or resignation of the President, or by reason of his ceasing to hold office by virtue of Section 10 or Section 12 of this Constitution (qv) an election of a President shall be held within the period of ninety days immediately following the occurrence of that vacancy, and it shall be held in the manner prescribed by Section 5 (5) of this Constitution (qv).
2. While the office of President is vacant as aforesaid, the function of that office shall be exercised by the Vice President; or if there is no Vice President, or if the Vice President considers that he is for any reason unable to discharge the functions of the office of President, by such minister as may be appointed by the cabinet.⁷⁶

The KANU Constitution called for an annual delegate's conference every year, the last KANU meeting was held in 1966 with the main purpose of ousting Odinga from KANU.⁷⁷ In 1976, a KANU meeting was convened with the

sole purpose of preventing Moi from becoming President in the event of the death of Kenyatta. The idea was not only to change the Constitution and make it impossible for Moi to succeed Kenyatta, but also to vote Moi out of his position as KANU Vice President. (After Odinga's removal from KANU, the party went back to the single Vice Presidency.⁷⁸ Both strategies failed. Otiotiptip, a prominent Masai politician, obtained more than the two-thirds vote from members of parliament opposing both moves. Kenya's Attorney General also warned of possible criminal prosecutions of those behind the "Change the Constitution Movement." Kenyatta died in 1978, and Moi became the country's President.⁷⁹ He appointed Mwai Kibaki, a Kikuyu, as Vice President mainly to muster the support of the Kikuyus. KANU has not held a meeting since 1976, and Moi has repeatedly delayed the election of party officials citing his chairmanship of the Organization of African Unity as the cause of the delay. Moi has also barred Odinga and his supporters from joining KANU.

The government, in the meantime, has amended the Constitution--disallowing the legal existence of an organized opposition--thereby legalizing a style of government that has effectively prevailed since 1964. This move reflects government's increasing sensitivity to opposition.

CONCLUSION

After the brief experience of inter-tribal solidarity which forced the British to relinquish colonial rule, the post-independence era in Kenya has been characterized by a return to traditional tribally specific political cultures. The Kikuyu, who led the struggle for national liberation, have succeeded in dominating both KANU and the Kenyan government, both by eliminating real or potential opposing political organizations, such as KADU and the KPU, and individuals, such as Odinga, Mbóya and Kariuki, and by appealing to the common interests of all Kenyans to economically develop and socially modernize the country. In juxtaposition to the appeal for national unity and modernization, the Kikuyu elite has proved to be incapable or unwilling to discard their traditional tribal exclusivity and to share political power by allowing other tribes to participate fully in the political process. They simply cannot conceive of the possibility of being governed by an uncircumcized Luo.

In order to achieve the ambitious economic goals of "African Socialism" and the equity implied by political democracy, the Kikuyu elite will have to abandon their

tribal beliefs and replace them with the secular and empirically proven beliefs of modern societies. Thus far such a transformation has been impossible. As a result, the incompatibility of tribalism and modernization delegitimizes the regime among the majority of the population and postpones the realization of Kenyatta's dream of a single Kenyan "tribe".

Tribalism is a fact of life in contemporary Kenya. The practices and attitudes of thousands of years are proving resistant to change. Traditional tribal antagonisms and exclusivenesses, born of the ages and nurtured by the British stubbornly impede the achievement of national goals. While all the tribes shared behavioral patterns on which, it was assumed, "African Socialism" could be built, the differences in the application of these behaviors has fragmented Kenyan society.

This thesis has traced the origin of and the recent history of tribalism in Kenya. Individual tribal identities helped stimulate and perpetuate political rivalries. However, the government emphasis in "African Socialism" rested on the assumption that Kenyan society was made up of one whole African tribe, a factor the leaders believed would contribute to the effectiveness of governmental undertakings of economic quality and political democracy. This study has shown that the Kenyan people have a strong sense of tradition and reverence for their historic tribal identities. This produces a deep

and abiding awareness of traditional bonds of social solidarity making it impossible to integrate different tribes into one social structure.

The government's goal of political democracy has not been met because it was based on misconceived notions of "African Socialism" which mistakenly ignored tribal exclusiveness. In other words, "African tribalism" existed before "African Socialism" and continues to dominate Kenyas society.

NOTES

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63 American University, Area Handbook for Kenya American University Press, 1977), p. 338.

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65 Joseph Karimi and Philip Ochieng, The Kenyatta Succession Nairobi: Transafrica, 1980), p. 9.

66 Karimi and Ochieng, p. 9.

67 Karimi and Ochieng, pp. 9-12.

- 68 Karimi and Ochieng, p. 8.
- 69 Karimi and Ochieng, pp. 9-13.
- 70 Joseph Karimi and Ochieng, pp. 9-10.
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- 72 Murray-Brown, p. 317.
- 73 Murray-Brown, p. 317.
- 74 Karimi and Ochieng, p. 12.
- 75 Karimi and Ochieng, p. 12-16.
- 76 Kenya Weekly Review, November 20, 1981, p. 3.
- 77 Kenya, Government Printer, Chapter 11, Section 1 and 2.
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- 79 Karimi and Ochieng, pp. 19-30.

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