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DOORS LEFT OPEN THEN SLAMMED SHUT:
THE GERMAN COLONIZATION OF SOUTHWEST AFRICA
AND THE ANGLO-GERMAN RIVALRY, 1883-1915.

A Thesis

Presented to the

Department of History

and the

Faculty of the Graduate College

University of Nebraska

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts

University of Nebraska at Omaha

by

Matthew Erin Plowman

July 1995

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THESIS ACCEPTANCE

Acceptance for the faculty of the Graduate College,
University of Nebraska, in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the Master of Arts degree, Univer-
sity of Nebraska at Omaha.

Committee

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17 Jul 95

Abstract

In 1883, Otto von Bismark had a “change of heart” regarding colonialism. Through shrewd diplomacy and secrecy, the German Chancellor was able to spring the reality of German colonies on the world, particularly in the last available or unclaimed regions in Africa and Oceania where the Germans subsequently encroached upon British territory. One of Germany’s first colonies was Southwest Africa, or present-day Namibia, where a German businessman secured the purchase of a large tract of the Skeleton Coast from indigenous rulers and then requested the protection of the German Reich, which Berlin granted to him. The result was a vicious dispute of private claims between German and British citizens and an entangled diplomacy between the two empires.

In Britain, both Tory and Liberal governments tried to prevent the Germans from establishing themselves so close to their precious Cape Colony and both later attempted to confine the German territory so that the Afrikaners in the Transvaal could not link up with the Germans. Eventually, London and Cape Town would only succeed in the latter. Both Britain and the Cape failed to produce any evidence of prior official claims to the Skeleton Coast. In fact, any official British presence there had been previously withdrawn, leaving a vacuum, because of the bloody wars between the indigenous tribes. They had “left the door wide open” for the Germans to walk into southern Africa, and when they tried to close this door, the British found Bismark’s foot firmly established in it. Humiliatingly, Bismark forced both London and Cape Town to support Germany’s control of Southwest Africa by turning down offers of annexation

from indigenous tribes or from British traders (with one such trader even trying to establish an independent republic) who wanted a British presence there. In the end, Britain admitted to the world that this was German soil.

Although Southwest Africa was not a prosperous German colony at first, requiring many subsidies from the Reich, it became the most popular destination for German colonists far exceeding the other German colonies in Africa and Oceania due to the relatively small native population and large tracts of seemingly vacant land. Yet as the 20th century came, Southwest African mining began to profit and the discovery of diamonds created an economic boom which finally made Southwest Africa a valuable asset to the German Reich.

The German colonists did have, and created, some problems with the indigenous population or particularly with the Herero and Nama tribes. Although the German colonial government was able to gain control over them in the 1890's, they had an explosive rebellion in the early years of this century which pushed German policy to a horrifying extreme, rivaling even the later Third Reich in its brutality. Yet just as the German colonial government had gained total control over Southwest Africa and just as the colony had become profitable with a hopeful future, World War I gave Britain and the Union of South Africa the pretext to invade the German colony. Despite the South African rule over the territory until just recently when Namibia became independent, the German impact on the region is as fundamental as the genetic makeup of a living creature.

Acknowledgments

The first and foremost person I wish to thank is my wife Laurie, for whom I dedicate this work. For our entire first year of marriage she has had to share me with this thesis and pick up the slack around the house while I spent hours in my study. Her love and understanding kept me going, though I am positive she is glad it is over. You have your husband back, Laurie. I would like to thank my thesis committee Dale A. Gaeddert and Orville D. Menard, and particularly my thesis advisor, Richard Overfield for all the help he gave me in my rough drafts and for making all the administrative arrangements for me. Dr. Overfield's suggestions in structural changes and his exorcism of the passive tense have made my thesis much more readable. I would not have been able to put this together without him.

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I also appreciate the assistance I received at UNL Love Library's microservices, where they assisted me in sending seven hundred pages of British documents to Missouri to be photocopied. Additionally, a thanks goes out to Tom Jackson who helped me create a flexible work schedule and

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Preface

Southwest Africa, or modern-day Namibia, extends from Angola to the Union of South Africa on the Atlantic coast and inland to the Zambezi River and the Kalahari Desert. Namibia's Skeleton Coast was named for the skeletons of ships which wrecked along the thousand miles of quicksand-infested shore where the great battle between the cold, rough Atlantic and the fierce Namib Desert took place. The latter is the oldest desert in the world where dunes can reach nearly a thousand feet high and at times create an impenetrable barrier. The average temperature in this southern hemispheric country is around sixty degrees fahrenheit in July and the mid- to upper seventies in January. Only between the Namib and the Kalahari is there land of any agricultural value. In the southern region, called Namaland, the karakul sheep thrive in the semi-desert where over seventy acres of land are needed to support one animal. In the central region between the great deserts lies Hereroland where the capital of Windhoek was eventually established by the Germans. Here, with somewhat more rainfall, the indigenous population and European settlers were able to raise larger livestock such as cattle (though some cattle can be raised in northern Namaland as well). In seasons with enough rain great grasslands form, but in years of drought thousands of livestock die and the earth becomes parched. Ovamboland is the last great region lying in the extreme north where there is enough rainfall for cultivation and settled agriculture. Nearly half the population of Southwest Africa or Namibia, both in its history and even now, lives in Ovamboland. In addition, Giraffes, wildebeest, lions, oryx, elephants, and many other great African animals still roam the countryside in and between

Hereroland and Ovamboland.¹

The ethnic make-up of Southwest Africa is rather varied. The tribes consist of two major linguistic groups: the Khoisan and the Bantu. The Khoisan peoples, who originally inhabited all of southern Africa were increasingly pushed south and west by the Bantu migration towards the more arid regions of the Kalahari and Namib. One group of these Khoisan retained their stone-age culture of nomadic life and were called "bushmen" for their miraculous survival in such harsh conditions. The Bushmen have been hunted down or used as slaves by nearly every other tribe in Southwest Africa. Another group called the Nama, labeled "Hottentots" by outsiders, represent a mixture of the Bantu and Khoisan blood with some indigenous to the region and others later pushed into Southwest Africa from South Africa by Dutch colonists between 1800 and 1830. Another group, the Herero, represent the Bantu invasion from the north into Southwest Africa directly and became the most powerful tribe in the central region probably due to their more centralized tribal system whereas the others remained divided and scattered. Another Bantu tribe, though much weaker, called the Berg Damara was pushed into the mountainous fringe of the Namib by both the Herero and Nama. Not until the German colonists had almost wiped out the Damara's enemies were they to flourish and gain a significant population. Another small group, called the Basters (or "Bastards"), a mixture of Bantu, Malay (from Madagascar), and Dutch blood, was pushed out of South Africa and allowed by the Herero in the 1870's to move north slipping past the Nama to form a buffer for the Herero from their southern Nama enemies. The last major ethnic group, other than various tribes which inhabited the Caprivi Strip or panhandle of the country, were the Ovambo. These people,

like the Herero, were Bantu who had invaded from the north and settled in the region north of the Herero. The Ovambo make up almost half the population of Southwest Africa or Namibia and are able to raise corn in their land that receives on average 22 inches of rain per year (compared with the only 5 inches of rain per year in the southern region of Namaland).²

The first Europeans to visit Southwest Africa were the Portuguese in 1484. They named a natural harbor on the Skeleton Coast, on their way towards the Cape of Good Hope, "Angra Pequena" which would later have some significance in the region's history. The Dutch, who created their colony south on the Cape, were the next to make expeditions along the coast, visiting Southwest Africa as early as 1670. Yet neither the Portuguese nor the Dutch ever annexed or settled there with the Portuguese confining themselves to Angola and the Dutch remaining on the Cape. One reason was the lack of readily apparent resources, including drinking water. One exception was a 1791 Dutch expedition which discovered gold, but it was dismissed by the Cape with skepticism. Most expeditions for gold actually ended up being mere hunting excursions for exotic animals. In 1796, a year after the British took over the Cape Colony, one English ship sailed up the coast to take temporary possession of six places along it, though the Napoleonic wars drew London's attention away from the Skeleton Coast where nothing permanent or official was ever done. The only valuable resource found by Europeans and exploited prior to Germany's entry, were the islands off the coast near Angra Pequena. These islands had guano (bird dung) deposits as much as seventy feet thick, which entrepreneurs excavated and later sold as rich fertilizer to Europe. They removed hundreds of thousands of tons between 1843 and 1848, when at one

point three hundred ships anchored off one island alone. However, by 1847 one company gained a monopoly over the guano, De Pass, Spence & Company, which represented nearly the only permanent European presence in Southwest Africa beyond the missionaries which crossed the Orange River boundary of the Cape into the region as early as 1802.³

I would like to note to the reader that many regions are identified by different names, but I have attempted to standardize most of them. For Walvis Bay, as an example, which was also known as Walfisch or Whale Fish Bay, I have strictly used the contemporary identity. Also, regions like Hereroland or Namaland which have been at times identified as Damaraland or Namaqualand respectively I have tried to standardize in their use to hopefully ease any confusion. Furthermore, I have tried to refer to Britain's bureaucratic branches involved in this affair as the Foreign and Colonial *Offices* whereas for the German government I have referred to the applicable entities as the Foreign *Ministry* and the Colonial *Department*. For the most part these are the accepted names anyway, though some individuals involved and some historians writing their accounts mix the terms in the whole affair. Hopefully this will make my account clearer than some.

The bulk of my primary material comes from British government documents, therefore one should expect a somewhat more thorough British view. However I have supplemented this with documents from the German Foreign Ministry and the records of a particular official there who was in office for nearly the entire lifespan of the German colonies. I chose him for his tendency to avoid political circles, in which he seemed to play the more neutral and objective role in that office. I hope the balance which I sought was achieved.


NOTES

¹Alice Mertens, South West Africa and Its Indigenous Peoples, (New York: Taplinger Pub. Co. Inc., 1967), p. 1, plates 1, 7, 6-10, 46, 48, 50, 51, 94; South Africa, South West Africa Survey 1967, Foreign Affairs Dept., Republic of South Africa, (Cape Town: Cape and Transvaal Printers Ltd., March 1967).

²South Africa, Survey, pp. 18-22; Ruth First, South West Africa, (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1963), pp. 27, 31, 37, 41, 46-49; J. H. Esterhuysen, South West Africa 1880-1894: The Establishment of German Authority in South West Africa, (Cape Town: C. Struik [Pty.] Ltd., 1968), pp. 2-3; Thomas Malnar, South West Africa: The Last Pioneer Country, (New York: Fleet Publishing Corp., 1966), pp. 11-14, 17; Jared Diamond, "How Africa Became Black," Discover, Vol. 15, No. 2, (February 1994), pp. 72-81.

³I. Goldblatt, History of South West Africa: From Beginning of the Nineteenth Century, (Cape Town: Juta & Co. Ltd., 1971), pp. 3, 4, 37, 192-194; Esterhuysen, Establishment, pp. 6, 9, 10; First, South West Africa, pp. 64, 65.

PLATE 1



Chapter 1

Open Doors Entered

In the middle of 1915, as the weather became increasingly colder in the southern hemisphere, the bulk of the German forces defending Southwest Africa from the South African invasion surrendered near Tsumeb in the northern part of the colony. The Germans had been hopelessly outnumbered and were only able to fight a delaying war which lasted into July, well after the fall of the capital of Windhoek. The retreating German forces had had only one hope for escape: to reach the Caprivi Strip and fight their way across the British trans-Zambezi region to reach other German forces on Lake Tanganyika in East Africa. Unfortunately for them, they were out-flanked and cut off by the South Africans. Thus with Germany losing this and eventually all of her colonies, and with South Africa gaining control over Southwest Africa, a door which had been misfeasantly left open long ago by Great Britain and the Cape Colony (South Africa), now had been closed once and for all.¹

In 1883 Prince Otto von Bismark, Chancellor of the new German Reich, was fully engaged on two fronts: to maintain the European balance of power and *pax* that he had orchestrated with Germany on top, and to keep his Conservative imperial government in power. Germany was one of the most vulnerable nations in Europe. Prior to unification it had two conflicts with Austria and Denmark, followed by a successful war with France to defend German unity. The result was the birth of the German Reich with Prussian aristocrats and other Conservatives leading the government under the former Prussian king, now German emperor, Wilhelm I. Following unification, Chancellor Bismark embarked on a dream policy of balancing friends and foes in a way

that would prevent a war against Germany. He allied the three emperors of Germany, Austria, and Russia and made authorized rapprochement efforts with defeated France.² Bismark vacillated between conflicting policies playing off each nation's fears and distrust of one another in an effort to segregate and diffuse any threat from growing against Germany. Although the Chancellor had a distaste for Britain, he used England to play off French and Russian fears and vice versa. However, with new powers emerging like the United States, Italy, and Japan, with new technologies making European war increasingly dynamic, volatile, and out of control, and with new international rivalry on the rise, Bismark's system of juggling began breaking down in the final decades of the nineteenth century. Furthermore, despite Bismark's distaste for democracy, he had to deal with the new Reichstag and the public opinion of the new German electorate. Although control was fairly centralized within the imperial government on most matters, the Reichstag possessed "the power of the purse" when it came to two particular matters that were fairly new to Germans: naval priorities and colonies. Nor did Bismark's Conservatives rule by themselves; there were liberal, moderate, and socialist parties and factions represented in the Reichstag and in the government as well. Only through alliances between Conservatives and the National Liberal and Center parties could the imperial agenda be assured. That meant at times giving in to more industrial and liberal planks, such as colonies, which Bismark and his Prussian agrarians would have otherwise liked to forego.³

Just as enthusiasts, industrialists, and public opinion divided and pushed many German Conservatives into colonialism, British Liberals in control of London were also divided and prodded. Traditionally British Liberals had been

against new colonial expansion or any rejuvenated imperialism which had waned since mid-century. The Liberal Cabinet in Britain from 1880 to 1885 refused to accept any increase in cost or responsibility which new colonies or expanded colonies would incur. William E. Gladstone, as Prime Minister, stated this well in March of 1882: "Throughout the whole of my political life . . . I cannot recollect an occasion on which I gave a vote or took a step . . . except on the side which was opposed to [further] annexation." Gladstone further believed that the goal of British colonization was to eventually create independent, anglophile nations--"so many happy Englands"--in which London would be the model, and yet not necessarily the leader responsible for them. The Prime Minister even demanded that no further annexations be considered unless the expressed and authenticated "wish of the people to be annexed" was given.⁴ However the Prime Minister's anti-imperial influence began to lose its effect, especially with those who disagreed with his 1872 opposition to the annexation of Fiji, his 1881 offer of autonomy to the Transvaal (in which Gladstone had British public opinion against him), and his 1883 prevention of Australian efforts to annex New Guinea. Gladstone's own Cabinet had varying degrees of concurrence and even dissension. The Lord Chancellor and Home Secretary were both well known for their hostility against new or larger colonies, while Gladstone's Colonial Secretary, Lord Derby (Edward Stanley), though likewise evasive of increased cost and responsibility, gave into pressure from the British colonies themselves in the issues of expansion. Others in the Cabinet went much further, calling for the English race to rule the world. Yet even these radicals underestimated any rumors of possible German colonization and the effects it would have, and even believed that this remote possibility would be

preferable to any further French gains.⁵

Such diversity of opinion was just as apparent in Bismark's government, though initial German interest and involvement in southern Africa came without any official sanction or control. German missionaries were the pioneers in this. They had been active under the London Missionary Society (LMS), which had access to Southwest Africa ever since the first missionaries began crossing the Orange River into Namaland in 1802. After the LMS and the later Wesleyan Missionary Society (WMS) had failed among these indigenous peoples who seemed to vigorously oppose the cross, the Rhenish Missionary Society (RMS) based out of Germany was given exclusive rights over Southwest Africa by the LMS in 1840. This embarked them on a course of cultural imperialism that increasingly drew more German involvement into Southwest Africa. However, the evangelical field remained very wide in this land where natives resisted the Christian faith. The RMS therefore helped and encouraged the Finnish Missionary Society (FMS), which was also Evangelical Lutheran, to set up amongst the Ovambo in 1870 well to the north.⁶

The sociopolitical climate of Southwest Africa was as severe as its physical climate, which did not help evangelical or mercantile enterprise. The Nama and Herero had been at odds over cattle and land in the region's heartland ever since the Nama entered the land from the south colliding with the Herero who had entered from the north during the Bantu migration. However, the 1864 Herero-Nama war exploded with particular vigor and complexity when Western weapons and personalities, mostly traders, entered the picture. English traders and the Swede merchant Charles Andersson (who was given the Herero title "regent and military commander for the period of his

natural life or as long as he desired”) assisted the Herero. After several defeats by the aided Herero, the Nama made a raid in 1868 on Andersson’s shop and a RMS mission. The RMS later requested protection from Prussia, but the Franco-Prussian war and German unification diverted any attention. A tentative peace in 1870 between the Nama and Herero also dropped the matter for a while.⁷

The British Cape Colony became involved when it sent William Palgrave to the scene as “special commissioner in Southwest Africa” on a four year mission to gain tribal allegiance to Cape authorities. However, by 1876 only the Basters (who the Herero allowed to move past the Nama northward to become a buffer around Rehoboth between their own tribe and the Nama) agreed to Cape overseers. The Herero wanted complete protection from any Nama revenge, but the Cape was not willing to offer it entirely. Palgrave tried likewise to bring the Nama under the Cape’s sphere, but the Nama wanted nothing to do with the British. Palgrave reported to the Cape that eventually the British colony needed to invade the Nama territory.⁸ However for now, the imperial powers simply did not want to go to any great effort or expense in the colonies, which such protection in Southwest Africa for the missionaries, traders, and Herero would cost. No one wanted to “foot the bill.” In 1878, the British Cape only occupied Walvis Bay as a symbol of their protection of the Herero.⁹ The Herero paramount chief Maherero, also known as Kamaherero, commented that British protection was not what he envisioned: “The British flag flew here [at Walvis Bay]. It waved this way and that; we attached ourselves to it, and we were waved backwards and forwards with it.”¹⁰ The Herero fell away from any

commitments to Britain as more and more Boer settlers entered their territory without any Cape efforts to stop it, and with little evidence of British protection from the Nama offered.

In 1880, London received its first hints of increased German interest in Southwest Africa. In a letter of July 19 (which usually took over 20 days to be sent from Cape Town to London and vice versa), Cape Governor H. B. E. Frere sent a copy of an article by Ernst von Weber published in the Berlin *Geographische Nachrichten* of November 1879 in which the writer argued for a German colony in southern Africa after having visited the region in 1871. The Cape Governor claimed that this idea had been “much discussed in German commercial and political circles even before the Franco-German War.” He added that a possible colony was “one of the immediate motives of the German mission of scientific inquiry which visited Southern and Eastern Africa in 1870-71.” Governor Frere also warned London that “recent events have drawn together the German and Dutch Republicans in the colony” and that Weber’s article noted that the Dutch Boers have the same “Teutonic blood” as Germans.¹¹ Weber supported the idea of a German occupation of Delagoa Bay in Mozambique, which he claimed Germans possessed from 1776-1781, and then push “forward, little by little, a chain of German trading stations as far as the Upper Zambesi” such that the Boers in the Transvaal would have an open door out of British encirclement.¹² London took the matter seriously. The Colonial Office quickly forwarded the dispatch to the Foreign Office in September 1880, after which the latter made inquiries to their embassy in Berlin. The British ambassador there made an accurate assessment of the poor support for colonies in the German imperial government. He cited that Germans preferred

to emigrate to lands controlled by republican national governments rather than colonial ones. The Ambassador felt that Germany was “more the want of soldiers than of colonies” and that the rejection of the Samoa Bill in the Reichstag had “marked its disinclination to acquire distant dependencies however advantageous to German enterprise.” He assured London that “under present circumstances therefore the plan for a German Colony in South Africa has no prospect of success.” London then assured the Cape that such was the case. However, those circumstances soon changed.¹³

In 1880, the Herero-Nama war began anew. This war began because of a water hole incident where both the Nama and Herero had cattle herds. One cow was found missing among thousands, and accusations were made which led to open conflict. Cape authorities sent the HMS Dwarf to Walvis Bay as a show of force, which did little or nothing to aid the Herero. The conflict became very bloody. Whites who had intervened in tribal affairs before or who had unfairly traded with the indigenous population, found themselves to be targets. Traders and missionaries lost property and sometimes their lives. The Cape, instead of trying to provide protection for the whites or to resolve the conflict, pulled the few officials it had there back to Walvis Bay and constructed a fort there to protect them. When the RMS appealed to the Cape for protection (while Germany appealed on their behalf to Britain), both London and the Cape stated that only Walvis Bay was British, and they could only provide protection there.¹⁴ The British Foreign Secretary told the German government that “Her Majesty’s Government cannot be held responsible for anything that may take place outside of British Territorial limits, which the latter only includes [Walvis]

Bay and a small portion of country surrounding it.”¹⁵ This statement would later come back to haunt British officials, as they now left an excuse for the Germans to become more actively involved in Southwest Africa to protect their subjects there. To make Britain’s tenuous hold on the region worse, when London had given the Cape powers to annex Walvis Bay in 1878, the latter dragged its feet despite only needing to pass an act of annexation. Therefore the only area occupied by Britain on the mainland of the Skeleton Coast was not even officially British or Cape territory. The door was left completely open.¹⁶

In 1882, the Cape tried working out the foundations of a peace in the Herero-Nama conflict; but as soon as they lifted the threat of an attack on Walvis Bay they left the rest of the peace effort to the German missionaries. In mid-June the RMS concluded a peace on paper between the Herero and Nama at the Baster capital of Rehoboth. However, conflicts still smoldered for a while with Nama raids on Herero and Baster cattle. The Boers who had moved into the region even joined in this pillage, which created further difficulties between natives and whites. Finally by late fall the peace became more evident. Yet the RMS made appeals once more to Germany for protection of their life and property, distrusting the entente between the tribes.

At this point, Bismark was still completely opposed to intervention in or creation of colonies, as were most Prussian Conservatives. The Chancellor called colonies *versorgungsposten* or “maintenance posts” which took resources and troops away from the Fatherland.¹⁷ As early as 1868, before a united Germany even existed, Bismark had expressed that private organizations should colonize, not governments which then had to construct a navy to

protect them and which would embroil themselves with other governments. He felt it "difficult to justify the imposition of heavy taxation upon the whole nation for the benefit of a few branches of industry."¹⁸ In the negotiations of 1871 over the French surrender, the Iron Chancellor refused French offers of colonies in Asia. In the following two years he likewise refused requests from Fiji's ruler and the Sultan of Zanzibar for German protection in the Pacific and East Africa respectively. In early 1873 a British official reported to London that "colonies, in his opinion, would only be a cause of weakness, because colonies could only be defended by powerful fleets, and Germany's geographical position did not necessitate her development into a first-class maritime power."¹⁹ Three years later Bismark denied approachments by German merchants (led by Weber and F. A. E. Luderitz) for a German protectorate or colony in the Transvaal. This position continued into the next decade, with the Chancellor boasting in 1881 that "so long as I am Chancellor we will carry no colonial policy."²⁰ Bismark's policy against colonies was further evident when his Foreign Ministry sent a dispatch to one of its officials in Egypt (which was occupied by Britain in 1882) that: "The consciousness of being a major Great Power must not seduce us into pursuing a policy based on prestige in the French fashion. In reality our international and overall European interests are not sufficiently great to allow us to take the lead in Egyptian affairs."²¹ Britain, under Gladstone's Liberal government, even requested Germany's position in Egypt. Leo George Leveson-Gower (Lord Granville), Gladstone's Foreign Secretary, in a letter to Bismark said that a statement by Germany of its overseas role would be "a most useful guide and probably prevent some unnecessary mistakes being made."

The German Chancellor responded that he “was not in a position to endanger Germany’s relations with the other Powers by making suggestions for English policy.” At this point, Germany was not going to get in the middle of France and England in the contest over Egypt or any other colonial matter, nor endanger relations with Russia by allying with Britain. The only suggestion Bismark made to England was to “throw Gladstone out” which reflected his favoring a Conservative rather than Liberal government in London as well as in Berlin.²² At this time, Bismark valued good relations with Russia above those with Britain. The main concern for the Chancellor in 1882 was Russia’s superior railway which everyday could move 20,000 more troops to the field than Germany. In November, Bismark deemed the construction of defensive forts along the eastern frontier with Russia as “urgently necessary” whereas the idea of sending German troops overseas was unfathomable.²³

Even into 1883, Bismark was more concerned with the European balance of power than any extension of German power abroad, which in his view might weaken the German position in Europe. With Germany’s endless fear of encirclement, officials were carefully monitoring the turbulent situation in and the uncertain policies of France and the possibility of a Franco-Russian alliance that would threaten Germany. Berlin was actually encouraging Paris and St. Petersburg to spend their resources in possessions outside Europe rather than have them focus their efforts on the home continent. The secretary of the German embassy in Paris, Bernhard Bulow who would later be head of the Foreign Ministry and even German Chancellor, reported to Berlin that France was entrenched in colonial matters with conflicts in Madagascar and Tonkin. Germany feared that if the present French government fell it would

“disengage France from her colonial enterprises in order to be able unhindered to devote herself to building up a European coalition against us.”²⁴ Berlin successfully played British and French fears off each other, for instance pointing out to London French gains in southern China. Paris was then infuriated by British resistance to French colonial efforts which restored the balance in Germany's favor. Bulow pointed out in December that Britain's exclusion of France in the Egyptian Question was the worst French setback since 1871 when Germany defeated her in war. Germany's embassy in Paris made efforts to convince France that British and French interests clashed across the globe whereas German and French interests only clashed in Alsace-Lorraine. Bulow wrote to Berlin that “a more active French colonial policy is capable of making the French aware of the disadvantages of the notion of *revanche*, of demonstrating to them that they have other rivals besides ourselves, and, above all, of improving their feelings towards us.”²⁵ Into the next year, Bulow had the German embassy submit anonymous articles in French newspapers, supporting a more active French colonial policy. It was clear that the German imperial government looked at colonies as being a liability that a foreign power could exploit rather than being an advantage.²⁶

Bismark had mainly opposed colonies because of their cost in resources, that the German navy was too small to defend them, that they would hurt Germany's balance with other Powers, and that the German people were not ready for them. By 1883, circumstances changed. Differing with Bismark, some Germans came to believe that founding colonies in Britain's neighborhoods would actually help rapprochement efforts with France, while retaining Britain's

dependence on Germany to keep France out of British colonial ventures such as Egypt. Also, German Crown Prince Friedrich, the heir apparent to the Kaiser's throne, was a Liberal diehard and supported such factions in the Reichstag in opposition to Bismark. To complicate it further for Bismark, Friedrich was an adamant anglophile having married Queen Victoria's daughter. Therefore, it would be in Bismark's favor to create colonies that would estrange the Crown Prince from England before Friedrich and his wife ascended the German throne. Also, the German public was very much ready for colonies now--despite the reality of Germany being only little more than a decade old. Deputies in the Reichstag were making speeches for colonies. German newspapers were reporting a public colonial hunger. The *Deutsche Kolonial Verein*, a colonial society, was founded with others soon to follow. In the first year membership grew into the thousands, reaching well over ten thousand within two years. By January 1884, membership was strong enough to support the publication of the *Kolonialzeitung* which was to voice public demands for German colonies. The public had already read about the exploration and exploitation of Africa by England's Stanley and France's Brazza and could now read about Germans like Bohm, Kaiser, or Reichard in the Tanganyika region, Buchner, Wiesmann, Wolff, Schulze, or Kund in the Congo, or Peters and Nachtigal in other parts of the "dark continent." By the 1880's explorers and scholars were calling for German colonies in southern Africa before Britain gained it all. A sense that a door of opportunity for Germany was closing created in early 1884 a colonial frenzy, called the *Torschlusspanik* or "door-closing-panic," which effected that year's Reichstag election. Bismark was acutely aware of all of this.²⁷

However, Bismark's greatest objection to colonies had been the cost which still remained despite the colonial frenzy in the German electorate or the beneficial effect it would have on Bismark's enemies--especially the heir to the German throne. Despite attempts by Adolph Woermann (a Hamburg merchant who owned one of the largest trading firms in Africa especially in Cameroon) and F. A. E. Luderitz (a Bremen merchant and entrepreneur interested in the Skeleton Coast of Southwest Africa) to convince Bismark to extend German protection or simply annex territory in certain areas, Bismark was hung up on the cost. Regarding this fiscal challenge, Heinrich von Kusserow, a privy councillor in the Foreign Ministry, came to Woermann and Luderitz's rescue. In April 1883, misinterpreting an Anglo-French agreement to respect each other's life and property in Sierra Leone as a trade agreement, Kusserow warned Bismark to "beware of France and Britain" and that the two, with Portugal, would gobble up the unclaimed regions of Africa.²⁸ In February Bismark had requested Britain to protect Luderitz in Southwest Africa since Germany had no interest there. However by August, under Kusserow's guidance, Bismark had the German Consul in Cape Town announce German protection over Luderitz's enterprises. Kusserow had suggested that a British style charter system would make colonies painless to the German taxpayer, unlike a French style imperial system which Bismark feared. With the public responding favorably to Bismark's extension of protection to Luderitz and the fear of cost dispelled, Bismark decided to throw his weight towards backing Luderitz. His change caught London and his own Foreign Ministry completely off guard. Although the Iron Chancellor had enforced German commercial rights abroad before (such as in the South Pacific in 1876 and 1879), this endeavor seemed different from

the start.²⁹

In his office on 128 Leadenhall Street in London, Daniel de Pass sat down to read the *Daily News* of July 12, 1883, particularly interested in what was going on under the South African headlines since he had much invested in the region. There he read a telegraphed article from Cape Town, dated July 9: "Angra Pequena harbour on the West Coast between [Namaland] and [Hereroland] has been bought from the Natives, and occupied by a German trading company *under an alleged* guarantee of the German Government." It was also mentioned that: "*Possession has been taken of some miles inland.*"³⁰ De Pass was in shock, he was the one who possessed a lease over Angra Pequena harbor, several inland copper mines, and all the guano islands of the Ichaboe group which extended from Angra Pequena northward along the coast. He immediately notified the Colonial Office, which constituted the government's first news of the German occupation in Southwestern Africa. The alarm sent Colonial Secretary, Lord Derby, and Foreign Secretary, Lord Granville, clambering to deal with the German appearance on the Skeleton Coast. However they still retained the belief, which was specifically intended by Bismark, that Germany was not securing colonies but only protecting German subjects abroad.³¹

Before England could fully realize what was going on, Luderitz had made a second purchase from the Bethanie Nama on August 25, 1883, thereby expanding his possession from Angra Pequena south all the way to the Orange River border of the Cape Colony and inland many miles. This put the British government in a state of confusion, since many officials thought that all of the

coastline between the Orange River and Walvis Bay had been officially taken into possession in 1878, including Angra Pequena harbor. However, the Cape Parliament never passed the necessary legislation to officially annex the territory. Even Walvis Bay, though under *de facto* British occupation, had not been officially annexed. Britain had left the door open and met the German arrival completely unprepared.³²

On July 26, Derby forwarded De Pass' letter and the *Daily News* article to the Cape requesting information. But before there was an answer, De Pass' company had sent more articles from the *Standard* and the *South African* which told more of the German occupation. The Colonial Office then began a long process of delaying responses to De Pass & Company, since they possessed no more information than the business. The Cape administration sent a dispatch from the Resident Magistrate of Walvis Bay who reported that "two ships with a party of Germans have arrived in Angra Pequena in charge of a Mr. Vogelsson [Luderitz's manager], that he has purchased the port from the Chief of Southern [Namaland]."³³ The magistrate feared that the Germans would prolong the Herero-Nama conflict by supplying the Nama with modern weapons against the Herero (whom the British had given guns).³⁴

On September 6, 1883, Foreign Secretary Granville received a dispatch from the British Ambassador in Berlin, who was informed by the German government that Luderitz had purchased territory in and around Angra Pequena from a Nama chief and that the German government was extending its protection of him and his enterprise. However, the Ambassador reported to Granville that he believed this protection would only be like that offered any

other German subject abroad and that London should not consider Luderitz's private possessions a French-like crown colonization process since Berlin was only referring to it as a *Handelsniederlassung* or commercial colony. On September 12, London received news from the Cape that two ships of John Spence, an associate of De Pass, reported observing German weapons unloaded at Angra Pequena. With Colonial Secretary Derby's approval, Lt. General L. Smyth, the Cape administrating officer, sent the HMS Starling up the coast to investigate, which he believed would also have "a beneficial effect on the natives."³⁵

By autumn, 1883, Bismark was carefully and secretly changing his own personal attitudes towards colonies. The Chancellor decided to "raise the ante" on Southwest Africa by requesting whether Britain claimed Angra Pequena and if so on what grounds. On September 10, Baron Plessen, the German Charge d'Affairs at the London embassy, communicated that the Luderitz claim extended from the Orange River boundary of the Cape Colony northward through Angra Pequena to the Little Fish River. Derby, on October 2, requested that the Foreign Office give Germany the Letters Patent of February 27, 1867 (official imperial recognition), which backed De Pass' claims to the guano islands off the coast of Luderitz's purchase. Six days later, the Colonial Secretary received a dispatch from the Cape that included a report that the guano islands off the Skeleton Coast were claimed for Britain by Captain Forsyth of the HMS Valorous on May 5, 1866, and annexed to the colony by Cape Act No. 5 of 1874 and then proclaimed by Sir Henry Barkly on July 8, 1874, in accordance with the Letters Patent of February 27, 1867. However, having met with Luderitz, Smyth found out that the German company did not

want the guano islands to begin with and were only interested in the mainland and interior of Southwest Africa. Luderitz assured him that he would not interfere with preexisting rights and was only given approval by the German Foreign Ministry if he did not interfere with such rights. Smyth reported that Luderitz believed he could move ships in and out of Angra Pequena without disturbing the guano deposits on the islands, as his company had done for five years on the west coast of Mexico. Luderitz also revealed to Smyth his belief that water was moving under the Namib Desert to the ocean, with only the Bushmen hitherto having knowledge of, in which productive wells could be dug to enable transportation across the coastal desert into the interior grasslands of the Nama and Herero. This too made Luderitz's enterprise more menacing to De Pass & Company, who had failed to effectively access the interior.³⁶

In a dramatic episode, De Pass, Spence & Company took matters into their own hands. Smyth sent an urgent telegraph on October 19, 1883, which was received by wire the same day in London. The Cape informed London that British traders were planning to leave the next day for Angra Pequena to expel the Germans physically from the harbor. Granville notified Derby that a gunboat should be sent to prevent such a collision between the commercial forces of De Pass and Luderitz. The Colonial Office sent a request to the Admiralty which in turn sent orders to the Cape commander, Rear Admiral Salmon. On October 24, the Admiralty reported that the Cape commander sent the HMS Boadicea to Angra Pequena. The ship returned a little more than a week later with the collision prevented and with it De Pass' hopes of removing the Germans forcibly.³⁷

Meanwhile, Germany had laid the full burden of proof on Britain to argue

her claims on Southwest Africa, which plunged London and Cape Town into an intensive search of their records and archives trying to find evidence. The Colonial Office received a report from the Cape on October 30 stating that upon investigation they found that Britain and the Cape had failed to officially annex Walvis Bay let alone any other stretch along the mainland. Three weeks later, after Granville had forwarded to Derby Germany's request of evidence of British claim to Angra Pequena, the Foreign Secretary wrote to the German Ambassador, Count Munster, that "although Her Majesty's Government have not proclaimed the Queen's sovereignty along the whole country, but only certain points, such as [Walvis] Bay and the Angra Pequena Islands, they consider that any claim to sovereignty or jurisdiction by a Foreign Power between the southern point of Portuguese jurisdiction at latitude 18 and the frontier of the Cape Colony would infringe their legitimate rights." Granville added that Britain could not offer the German government more information until a report was received from the Cape regarding Britain's claim to the mainland. Interestingly Granville gave an exact boundary for the Portuguese while giving only a vague one for the Cape, trying to have the latter be as inclusive as possible. Also, the Foreign Secretary gave Munster the impression that Walvis Bay had been officially annexed to the Cape, when the Cape Administrator had already reported it had not. That bluff would at least work. For now, Britain needed time.³⁸

The Colonial Office received the Cape report on November 28, twenty-two days after it had been sent, which contained a letter from Spence who enclosed a deed (dated September 21, 1863) signed by David Christian, then chief of the Bethanie Nama. This deed gave De Pass, Spence & Company the

right to mine in the coastal territory near Angra Pequena. De Pass' associate admitted in his letter that the British company had to suspend mining operations of copper and silver until there were better roads into Southwest Africa, and that therefore the company's operations on the mainland had been abandoned for some time. Beyond Spence's information, Smyth also enclosed a report from the Cape Ministers. The Ministers believed that Spence's (and therefore De Pass') claim was a private right beyond the Cape Colony and that therefore they as ministers of the Cape could not comment on its validity. The Ministers further believed that the guano islands were officially annexed in 1867 regardless of De Pass & Company's private claims on them, and that the only possible mainland annexation they knew of was Walvis Bay in 1878. The Ministers expressed to the Cape Administrator that they were glad Germany's colony would only be a commercial one but that London needed to make a more exact definition of British or Cape claims to Southwestern Africa.³⁹

Smyth then forwarded a report from Rear Admiral Salmon, commander-in-chief of naval forces in southern Africa, enclosing a report from the HMS Boadicea on its trip to Angra Pequena to prevent the collision of commercial interests from becoming violent. Captain Church of said ship reported that Luderitz wanted duties from British ships (i. e. De Pass & Company) that entered the harbor, but would not enforce it. The Germans presented the British warship with a deed of sale from Chief Joseph Fredrick of the Bethanie Nama, and affirmed that De Pass' deed for the mainland, which was only a mining lease, was null and void. Captain Church believed RMS missionaries had helped Luderitz secure the sale of land, but also reported that a resident of Angra Pequena, John Grove (although an employee of De Pass), asserted that

Angra Pequena harbor to be British despite there being no records to back this up. Church enclosed a copy of Luderitz's deed of sale. It follows: "On this day, the 25th August 1883. . . (Chief) Joseph Fredriks, of Bethanie, did sell and give up to the firm of F. A. E. Luderitz, of Bremen, in Germany. . . a portion of his country, namely the entire coast from the Great or Orange River up to the twenty-sixth degree of south latitude, inclusive of all harbours and bays, up to 20 geographical miles inland, reckoned from every point along the coast."⁴⁰

This information sent both London and Cape Town scrambling. Derby received a letter from Smyth on December 6, 1883, in which the Cape Administrator argued that Angra Pequena was annexed by Captain Forsyth of the HMS Valorous on May 5, 1866. The Colonial Office then forwarded the report of Captain Church of the HMS Boadicea to the Admiralty on December 12 and requested any "record of the proceedings of Her Majesty's Ships" that might support that Angra Pequena had been annexed by Britain so that they could answer Germany's request for evidence.⁴¹

Britain, true to form for all the colonial powers until Germany's entry and the subsequent scramble for the last unclaimed regions of Africa and Oceania, was still not willing at this point to spend a great amount of resources on the colonization process. Both London and Cape Town passed the economic and political responsibility for colonial expansion back and forth, with neither party willing to be responsible for the increased expenditure. Derby sent a dispatch to the Cape Administrator on December 13, finally responding to Smyth's letter, in which he warned the Colonial Secretary that even Walvis Bay remained officially unannexed. The Cape had wanted London to extend the Imperial Acts 26 & 27, which set and documented the boundaries of the British colony, to

include Walvis Bay, but Derby refused:

Her Majesty's Government are not prepared to propose such legislation. . . . you are aware that a solution of the question would be afforded by legislation on the part of the Cape Parliament, under Her Majesty's Letters Patents of 14th December 1878 for the annexation of [Walvis] Bay to the Cape Colony; but I understand that the Colonial Parliament would not be willing so to legislate, and in such case it will become a serious question whether Her Majesty's sovereignty can continue to be maintained at that place.⁴²

Obviously London had made arrangements in 1878 for the Cape to annex Walvis Bay, but the Cape only dragged its feet. This began a long process of both London and Cape Town passing the responsibility back and forth and in effect doing much of nothing. The door remained open. This bought a tremendous amount of time for Germany--time it needed for an about-face in colonial policy.

On December 27, 1883, the Admiralty responded to the Colonial Office's request for evidence that a British ship had claimed Angra Pequena in the past. The answer was not what Derby wanted to hear. According to the Admiralty's records, the HMS Grecian "visited Angra Pequena in 1851, but there is nothing to show that the ship took possession of any portion of land on behalf of the Crown." A decade later, the HMS Furious visited the coast and annexed Ichaboe Island, twenty-four English miles north of Angra Pequena, but the Admiralty warned that "it must be observed that the 'Furious' did not call at Angra Pequena in 1861 on her way to Ichaboe Island."⁴³ The Admiralty then reported that Captain Forsyth of the HMS Valorous in 1866 annexed the rest of the islands of the Ichaboe group that "extend from Hollam's Bird Island, in latitude 24 38' S., . . . to Sinclair's Island, in latitude 27 41' S., . . . [with] Ichaboe

forming about the centre.” The Colonial Secretary had wanted to hear that more than just the guano islands had been officially claimed and annexed by Britain. Derby had his office request the records of Captain Alexander of the HMS Star from the Admiralty, who was thought to have visited Angra Pequena in 1796, to see if he possibly made any official British claim to the mainland; but nothing was found to that end.⁴⁴ Derby was “grasping for straws,” and he had yet to respond to the German request whether Britain claimed Angra Pequena and if so on what grounds.

On December 31, 1883, Bismark had his ambassador in London, Count Munster, who he had intentionally kept in the dark about Germany’s true aspirations, deliver a message to Granville, which was then forwarded to Derby in the new year.⁴⁵ Germany knew Britain had no evidence of claim to the mainland of Southwest Africa with the exception of possibly Walvis Bay. Berlin, through Munster, was in the process of calling London’s bluff: “I have communicated to my Government the reply which your Lordship [Granville] gave . . . to my inquiry ‘whether England maintained claims to the territory of Angra Pequena, and, if so, upon what foundation.’ The tenor of your Lordship’s answer was that Her Majesty’s Government had not indeed proclaimed the sovereignty of Her Majesty the Queen throughout the country, but only at certain points, as, for instance, at [Walvis] Bay and on the Angra Pequena islands.” The German Ambassador regurgitated Britain’s stand “that the pretension of any other Power to sovereignty or jurisdiction over the territory lying between . . . the Portuguese [frontier] and the frontier of Cape Colony, would be an infringement of [Britain’s] legitimate rights.” Munster told Granville that Berlin doubted “the legal ground of the claims of the British Government” and announced

Germany's stand: "That the British sovereignty beyond the frontier of Cape Colony was limited to [Walvis] Bay and the islands off Angra Pequena, is on the hypotheses under which the Imperial Government is entitled and bound to grant the house of Luderitz the protection of the Empire for a settlement which this firm contemplates establishing on territory outside the sovereignty of any other Power, on the southwest coast of Africa." Ambassador Munster then used Britain's own words and actions of the past, particularly in regard to the 1880 pullout due to the Herero-Nama war, against London's arguments that the region was within her sphere of claim: "In consequence of an application from the [Rhenish] Missionary Society for protection for their missionary and trade settlements in [Namaland] and Herero[land], your Lordship had informed me in your note of 25th May 1880 that the district under British sovereignty was restricted to [Walvis] Bay and a small extent of surrounding territory." Munster then added: "An instruction to the Governor of Cape Colony, dated 30th December 1880, from the then Secretary for the Colonies, Lord Kimberley, communicated to the British Parliament under the heading of South Africa, 1881, stated in its 28th paragraph that the Orange River was to be regarded as the northwest frontier of Cape Colony, and that the Government of Great Britain would not carry out any plan for the extension of British jurisdiction over [Namaland] and Herero[land]."⁴⁶ The German Ambassador recalled to Granville's attention a dispatch of January 13, 1881, from London to Cape Town which cited such legislation limiting British jurisdiction to Walvis Bay and territory south of the Orange River when London denied the application of the RMS for British protection in Southwest Africa. Munster even stretched this to the point of asserting that the Cape Parliament Act of 1873 annexing the guano

islands would be in conflict with London's commitment to the Orange River boundary established in December 1880. Yet Munster quickly added that Germany was not questioning the island claims. Britain had painted itself into a corner with its own arguments. What made matters worse was that the German Ambassador pointed to Britain's arguments in March 1875 against Spanish claims to the Caroline and Pelew Islands in the Pacific. England at that time maintained that a power must have *de facto* control over the territory to claim it. Munster followed this example with Britain's negotiations with Spain over the Sooloo Archipelago in March 1877 using the same argument. Thus using Britain's own policy, Southwest Africa--save possibly Walvis Bay and the guano islands--between Portuguese Angola and the Orange River of the Cape Colony, remained open. There was simply no defense that Britain could offer against its own arguments. Therefore, London tried to buy time by delaying any response to Berlin, while trying to get Cape Town to take action.⁴⁷

However Bismark had kept up the appearance, with even Munster kept in the dark to the true reasons, that Germany was still only seeking protection for German traders and missionaries, and possibly creating some commercial system abroad. Yet even at this point, London sensed that the ante had been raised by Bismark despite believing that Germany had no colonial aspirations. On February 5, 1884, Derby sent a dispatch to the Cape Administrator requesting the Cape Government to annex or establish jurisdiction over Angra Pequena, or else it would "be difficult to resist representations made by the German Government that, failing other protection for German subjects there, they would be compelled to assume jurisdiction over the place." Cape Town sent back a telegraphed reply the next day: "Angra Pequena. Ministers ask

matter be kept open, pending Cabinet meeting here. Premier away.”⁴⁸ A quick response was not to be had. Smyth had sent a dispatch to Derby that enclosed a report by Colonel J. T. Eustace, the Cape’s official in contact with Namaland. Eustace, Smyth reported, had met with Bethanie Nama Chief Joseph Fredrick “successor of his uncle, David Christian.” The Nama Chief had indeed sold Angra Pequena to Luderitz in May 1883 for 100 British pounds and 200 guns. Joseph Fredrick then admitted to selling Luderitz the entire coast from the 26th south latitude to the Orange River and twenty German miles inland for 600 British pounds and 60 more guns. The Chief denied the sale of any lands by David Christian to anyone and stated that his uncle had only given leases.⁴⁹

Derby also received a dispatch from the Cape which enclosed a report from the Ministers regarding Walvis Bay. The Cape Ministers presented the fact that the Cape had already informally annexed Walvis Bay to the Cape to gain “some sort of control over one of the main inlets of the trade in munitions of war” (i.e. the arming of the Herero) and called to Derby’s attention that the Cape had bore the cost of such venture. Therefore, the Cape Ministers wanted to see London make the first move in formally annexing Walvis Bay or any other part of the Skeleton Coast “leaving the question of the settlement of the amount of effective control and provision to be made in that behalf to be arranged between Her Majesty’s Government and the Government of the [Cape] Colony.”⁵⁰ Again the buck was passed with no one wanting to “foot the bill.” Both London and Cape Town dragged their feet in the matter through the spring of 1884. In April, Berlin had to respond to Cape doubts whether Germany would truly enforce its claimed right to protect Luderitz in Southwest Africa. After being notified

through the German Charge d'Affairs in London, Granville reported that "Bismark has instructed the German Consul on the spot [in Cape Town] to say that no doubt exists as to this right."⁵¹

Germany was not alone in becoming frustrated at being practically ignored by delays in London to buy time. De Pass & Company wrote to the Colonial Office on May 6, 1884, asserting that they had not heard anything from the government on its request for more information since August 1883. De Pass wanted to know if there were any truth in the newspaper articles which reported German intentions to establish a naval station to protect German settlements "on the Gold Coast and at Angra Pequena."⁵² However, the Colonial Office continued to stonewall De Pass probably because they had no more answers than the newspapers. Derby's office could only tell De Pass "that the question is still engaging the attention of Her Majesty's Government."⁵³ De Pass followed this by sending to the Colonial Office a clipping from the *Standard* of May 14 entitled "Germany and Africa" which read:

The German Government intends to take over the suzerainty of Angra Pequena and all the neighbouring territories acquired [by] Herr Luderitz, of Bremen, the English claims in that part of the coast being regarded as altogether invalid. German law courts will be established, and a position will be assumed similar in all respects to that of the French Republic in Tunis.⁵⁴

However, Derby declared the article to be unfounded.⁵⁵

On May 7, 1884, feeling the increased pressure to give a reply to Berlin, the Colonial Office sent a telegraph to the new Cape Governor, Sir Hercules Robinson, that: "It is necessary to tell German Minister what is intended by Her Majesty's Government respecting Angra Pequena and if [the Cape] Government

desire that it should be under British jurisdiction they should immediately express readiness to accept responsibility and cost." Governor Robinson sent a telegraph back on May 15 that read: "New Cabinet making inquiries *re* Angra Pequena, and hope to send definite reply within ten days."⁵⁶ The delays continued.

Meanwhile, Granville had his Foreign Office send a letter to the Colonial Office to force it into action regarding "the alleged assumption by the German Government of sovereignty over Angra Pequena." The Foreign Secretary hoped "no unnecessary delay would be allowed to occur in giving an answer to the inquiries made by Count Munster in the month of December last."⁵⁷ It had been six months since the German Ambassador first requested whether Britain claimed Southwest Africa and if so on what grounds. Further pressure on Derby came from the Royal Colonial Institute which wrote to the Colonial Office on May 28, expressing their concern over German actions regarding Angra Pequena and their hopes that Britain would "maintain the right . . . to exclude foreign powers from the occupation of this valuable harbour and the country adjacent thereto."⁵⁸ The Foreign Office again wrote to the Colonial Secretary on the 29th requesting an answer soon, though it assured Derby that according to Ambassador Munster Berlin had not taken any further steps beyond their inquiry into British claims.⁵⁹

Of course, London did not realize that Bismark was keeping his own ambassador in London in the dark as to his true intentions. However, London's delay in responding to German requests for British claims and evidence was frustrating Bismark's plans. Earlier in December of 1883, Bismark had to deny a

German lobby from annexing Cameroon, despite rumors that the British Consul there was back in London trying to get Britain to annex the region. Bismark could only suggest that a commissioner might be sent to Cameroon to make commercial agreements with the indigenous leaders. Therefore, along similar lines, Bismark's patience was wearing thin by March 1884, with still no response from Britain claiming or disclaiming Angra Pequena. Bismark considered this delay *Deutschfeindlichkeit* or "hostility to Germany." The Chancellor came to believe that London was using this time to annex Angra Pequena for themselves rather than give an honest reply to the German inquiry. The Anglo-Portuguese treaty regarding the Congo, rumors that Britain was planning to annex Togo (where German traders had already set up), and the return of Luderitz from the Cape Colony with news that the Cape believed it had documents to support British claims to Angra Pequena all pushed Bismark's patience towards breaking-point.⁶⁰

It was at this point that Kusserow, the colonial proponent in the Foreign Ministry, began to win over Bismark. He suggested the British-style charter-system for colonization in which the colonial proprietors bore the full cost for the colonies. Berlin would just hand Luderitz an imperial charter for the colony without any drain on the resources of the Reich. It was on April 8, 1884, that Kusserow's suggestion in memo took hold of Bismark, as the Chancellor confessed years later that it was then that "Kusserow dragged me into the *Kolonialtummel*" or "colonial whirl."⁶¹

With the worries of cost aside, Bismark received news by wire that same day from Luderitz's men in Cape Town that the British colony was prepared to annex the Skeleton Coast, including Angra Pequena. The Chancellor told

Kusserow that the time had come, "now let us act."⁶² Bismark was now prepared to have Angra Pequena, Togo, and Cameroon annexed, but it all had to be done before those in the British government found out the plans and annexed those locations for themselves. On April 24, 1884, the German Consul in London was ordered to declare that Angra Pequena was "under the protection of the Reich."⁶³ This was meant to confuse London. Germany stuck its foot through the door just in case Britain or the Cape tried to close it, yet without revealing Bismark's new policy beyond just seeking protection for German settlers. The same information was sent to Lord Amthill, the British Ambassador in Berlin, and to Berlin's own ambassador in London, Count Munster. Munster, and for that matter most of the Foreign Ministry, was misled as to the real plan. In May, Bismark had a secret telegraph sent to a German explorer on the German ship Mowe to raise German flags and establish the Reich's claims at Togo, Cameroon, and then Angra Pequena. Unfortunately, Bismark estimated that Angra Pequena would not be annexed then until at least July. Other possible plans to get to Angra Pequena were later explored. The Chancellor hoped the declared protection over Luderitz would delay any British response while he put his plan in motion.⁶⁴

Good news came for Derby when Robinson telegraphed on May 29: "Ministers have decided to recommend [Cape] Parliament to undertake control and cost of coast line from Orange River to [Walvis] Bay."⁶⁵ That spring the Cape Parliament had finally, after Derby's threat of a British pullout from Walvis Bay, passed Cape Act No. 35 of 1884 which after six years of dragging their feet officially annexed the British outpost. The Colonial Secretary wrote to Granville

on June 2, 1884, that the Cape had finally accepted responsibility and cost in annexing Southwest Africa's coast, at least between Walvis Bay (which was now finally annexed itself) and the Orange River. Derby wanted the Foreign Secretary to immediately have Germany informed that after finally communicating with the Cape, German subjects may be placed under the protection of the British flag and that a possible joint commission could be created to sort out the private claim disputes between De Pass, Spence & Company and Luderitz. Also, upon being notified that a German warship was heading for Angra Pequena, Derby suggested to Granville that a British warship should also be sent "in order that there may be no ground for alleging that the continued absence of British protection has rendered German intervention necessary."⁶⁶

However, on June 3 the Foreign Office sent Derby a copy of a dispatch from their Berlin embassy. British Ambassador, Lord Ampthill, enclosed a clipping from an article in the previous day's *Nord-Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* which published a telegram from Bismark to the German Consul in Cape Town, W. A. Lippert:

According to statements of Herr Luderitz, Colonial authorities doubt as to his acquisitions north of Orange River being entitled to German protection. You will declare officially that he and his establishments are under the protection of the Empire.⁶⁷

The *Zeitung* followed with: "Up to the present time nothing further has come to our knowledge with regard to this matter."

Up to now, Germany had not heard anything from Britain since their inquiry of December 31. London had yet to furnish any proof of ownership for any part of Southwest Africa, though admittedly the Germans let the British off

the hook regarding Walvis Bay which Berlin acknowledged to be British. At the same time, Bismark had not confessed his change of heart regarding colonization. Through Ambassador Amphill, Granville stated that he believed the *Standard* article of May 14 “respecting the alleged assumption of the sovereignty over Angra Pequena by the German Government [to be] unfounded.” Bismark’s bluff was still working at this point, though Amphill sent another dispatch the same day warning London that Luderitz’s brother was planning the departure of an expedition, to be led by Lt. Siegmund Israel (who had been on two expeditions with Stanley), to find a road between Angra Pequena and the Congo. Obviously the Germans thought Angra Pequena might possibly be the door into all of central Africa. Amphill asserted that German warships will carry the expedition to Angra Pequena but that “this would appear to be the limit of the support expected from the Imperial Government to the enterprise.”⁶⁸ The Foreign Office then followed this with a note of June 7 from Amphill, who reported a meeting of the West German Society for Colonization and Export Trade which met at Dusseldorf and passed a resolution to be sent to Bismark:

The society recognises with grateful satisfaction the recent preparatory steps taken by the Imperial Government to protect Germany’s present and future interest in the district of the Congo, and on the West Coast of Central Africa. With still greater gratitude and satisfaction, the society has received the declaration of the Imperial Chancellor that Angra Pequena and the coast line of the Great Namaqua country have been placed under the protection of the Empire. The society expresses a confident hope that the protection of the German Empire will also be extended to the more northerly coast line of the Herero country.⁶⁹

London was only beginning to see that something much bigger than a Bremen

merchant on the Skeleton Coast was brewing in the policies of Berlin.

Four days after Derby was finally notified of the Cape's willingness to annex the Skeleton Coast from the Orange River to Walvis Bay, Cape officials gave the same news to the German Consul in Cape Town. With Bismark yet to be given a response from his inquiry made December 31 via Munster in London, and with the secret expedition of the Mowe reported unable to make it to Angra Pequena, Bismark exploded. The Chancellor sent his son, Herbert, first to talk with the British Ambassador and then off to London to speak with Granville personally.⁷⁰ Having met with Herbert, the British embassy quickly reported back to London that "while [the Chancellor] still entertained the same friendly feelings towards Her Majesty's Government and was desirous of supporting [British] policy in Egypt, his thought that [Britain] should be warned that the feeling in Germany as regarded the colonial question was so strong that with best wishes, he felt that he would be unable to afford us the same friendly assistance hitherto."⁷¹ Bismark had his son "hit them below the belt" with Egypt, in which Britain needed German support against France if the British were going to retain exclusive control over the Nile and the Suez Canal. It was blackmail. Herbert himself arrived in London on June 13, 1884, and was in the Foreign Office meeting with Granville the next day. Herbert immediately "laid the cards on the table" declaring that Britain had delayed in answering Berlin in order to have the Cape annex Southwest Africa from under the Germans.⁷² Granville, to Herbert's surprise, took full responsibility with Derby on the delay in responding to Germany which had so insulted the Chancellor. The Foreign Secretary confessed to Herbert: "It is very hard for me, as I have so much to do,

that I cannot go into detail on these colonial questions. . . . Besides this, a part of the Parliamentary business falls on me as leader of the Upper House in this difficult time. On top of this I have to conduct the awkward Egyptian negotiations.”⁷³ Granville had even written Derby in early June: “I had mentioned in the House of Lords the other day that any blame that was due as regards the [six month] delay in the correspondence attached to our side, though it had been unavoidable owing to the change of the [Cape] Ministry.”⁷⁴ Whatever the excuses, the truth remained that London had no idea Bismark wanted a colony for himself at Angra Pequena and just believed the effort was to afford protection--just the impression that the Chancellor had intended. When Herbert made his father’s true intentions known, followed with the threat to the Egyptian question, it was enough for Gladstone’s government, so they capitulated. Herbert reported to the Foreign Ministry from London that Germany “should be somewhat friendlier [now] towards the English in order that they may see that it is to their advantage to comply with our wishes . . . [in] coming years they will find themselves in a pickle on account of Egypt anyway, no matter what one does now.”⁷⁵ However, this was not the last time Germany would use Britain’s precarious position in Egypt as blackmail for colonial gains, at least until Britain consolidated its position on the Nile.

On June 17, 1884, Derby telegraphed Governor Robinson in Cape Town that the Cape Government “better not bring forward vote [on] control and cost [of] coast line and Angra Pequena, at present, in order to avoid any misunderstanding between Her Majesty’s Government and German [Foreign] Ministry, with whom communications are proceeding.” Although the Colonial Secretary

was calling the Cape off for now, he did ask how long the Cape Parliament would be in session just in case the situation changed and London could give them the nod to annex Luderitz's possession. Robinson telegraphed back two days later a short message: "Session will last another month."⁷⁶ With the Cape finally coming to a point of accepting cost and responsibility for annexing the Skeleton Coast, London had called them off for now. Chancellor Bismark had already been making speeches in the Reichstag calling on the assembly to support protectorates over German enterprises abroad, though he made it clear that they would be charter colonies. By June 21 London had finally accepted the German diplomatic victory and accepted Germany's sphere at Angra Pequena and communicated this to the Foreign Ministry the following day. The door could not be shut and Germany was allowed to walk uncontested into this part of Africa.⁷⁷

On June 26, the Colonial Office also received a letter from De Pass, who had been disheartened that the Colonial Office had not provided his company with any information. De Pass admitted he could only rely on information from the press and then cited that day's *Times* which reported Bismark's speech to the Budget Committee of the Reichstag professing German protection for Luderitz. De Pass soberly commented: "It would appear that Herr Luderitz's recent purchase will override that of mine, and of my occupation for so many years."⁷⁸ Derby sent De Pass' letter to Granville with the suggestion that a joint commission might be created now with Germany to deal with such private claim disputes. But that was as far as Derby would go on De Pass' behalf.⁷⁹

In the meantime, the Foreign Office forwarded a dispatch from their Berlin

embassy containing a copy of Bismark's speech made on June 23 in the Reichstag as summarized in the *Zeitung*. It included the statement by Bismark that since London had denied RMS missionaries protection in 1880 because of the strict Orange River boundary, Germany had been pursuing a policy to find the means to protect them. Bismark reportedly cited the Foreign Ministry's request of December 1883 sent to London on whether Britain formally claimed Southwest Africa and if so on what grounds. The *Zeitung* continued that:

For a long time no answer was received, although it could undoubtedly have been possible to furnish one out of the official documents relating to the actual extent of England's colonial possessions. Instead of this a correspondence commenced between London and Cape Town, which was looked upon there as if we had expressed a desire for English protection for a German settlement. A ministerial crisis occurred in Cape Town, and consequently a decision on this point was postponed there. Upon the circumstances becoming known here, it appeared only natural, in order to clear away that misapprehension, that the German Consul in Cape Town should be instructed to inform the authorities there that Herr Luderitz and his establishment were under the protection of the Empire. . . . According to a telegram received yesterday from London, [the Chancellor] thought that he might consider the question settled. . . . The Imperial Chancellor further declared his present intention to be to place under the protection of the Empire and similarly established settlements in the future.⁸⁰

Bismark also revealed Germany's support of the Belgians in the Congo and anticipated "securing German interests by a treaty which would give us complete freedom of trade and communication" there. Bismark's speech reportedly affirmed:

In this manner, therefore, His Majesty the Emperor had endeavoured to keep the wide domain of Central Africa open for free development. As to the form in which the Settlement of Angra Pequena would receive the protection of the Empire, the Government had in view the idea of issuing for it an Imperial Letter of Protection, similar to the Royal Charter given by England to the East Indian Company,

and lately to the North Borneo Company. This system would possibly be supplemented by the establishment of coaling stations [for warships] and an extension of the Consular system. This system might possibly be also applied to other enterprises of the same nature on the African coast and in the South Sea.⁸¹

Bismark's speech was ringing through the halls of the Reichstag while Germans were making their way along the west coast of Africa towards Angra Pequena. The *Zeitung* then reported Bismark's final plea to the Reichstag for Germany's new colonial policy: "Once foreign nations had recognised the firm will of the German nation to protect each German according to the motto *Civis Romanus Sum*, it would not be difficult to afford this protection without any special display of force. But if, indeed, foreign nations were to see that we were not united, we should then be powerless to do anything, and we do better to renounce all idea of any development beyond the sea."⁸²

On July 2, 1884, Granville's office forwarded another dispatch from Amphill in Berlin that included his own summation of another speech made by Bismark in front of the Reichstag, obviously concerned about the resistance of his own Prussian agrarian Conservatives against colonization. Amphill reported that Bismark "repeated that he was entirely opposed to the creation of colonies on what he considered a bad system, namely, to acquire a piece of ground, appoint officials and a garrison, and then seek to entice persons to come and live there." Bismark considered what was happening in Angra Pequena and elsewhere different, where Germans were already settled and requesting a German protectorate. Amphill wrote that the Chancellor "approached the whole subject with great reserve, he admired the energy of the men who wished to found these colonies, and he had said to himself how [he'd]

be justified if he replied to them that Germany was too weak to found colonies; her fleet not strong enough; and that difficulties might arise with foreign Governments.” The British Ambassador continued that “it was impossible for him, the first Chancellor of the newly created Empire, to say to these men, even if he believed it, ‘Germany is too weak and too poor for such undertakings.’”⁸³ Ampthill reported that Bismark then proceeded to give a full account of the negotiations with England on the subject of Angra Pequena to the Reichstag. Bismark emphasized Britain’s inability to furnish evidence for any official claim. The German Chancellor had anteed up, called England’s bluff, and was now grabbing for the winnings.

Meanwhile Cape Governor Robinson sent an urgent telegraph to Derby on July 9 at the request of Cape Ministers:

As [the Cape] Parliament will soon be prorogued, Ministers are anxiously awaiting information relative to negotiations with German Empire on question of [Skeleton] Coast. . . . Ministers advise me that feeling in Colony is strongly in favour of retention of British authority over coast line from Orange River upwards, and that rumour that British jurisdiction over [Walvis] Bay is to be abandoned has caused great uneasiness. Annexation of [Hereroland] to German Empire is also greatly deprecated.”⁸⁴

The Cape was still ready to annex Southwest Africa, and it had no intentions of having German neighbors who would undoubtedly sympathize with and possibly support the Boers. Also, on July 4, De Pass had written to the Colonial Office that he had two other harbors south of Walvis Bay in which Luderitz had not set up claim yet, at Sandwich Harbor and Hottentot Bay. De Pass urged them to have the HMS Boadicea sent to claim them before a German warship heading for Angra Pequena could. Derby replied, however, that he had ceased

trying to establish British claims in Luderitz's domain saying that Britain was "not in a position to oppose the intention of the German Government to afford its protection to German subjects having duly acquired concessions or formed establishments where no British sovereignty exists."⁸⁵ Yet, the Colonial Secretary did point out to the Foreign Office that De Pass' establishments at Sandwich Harbor and Hottentot Bay could be possible annexation points for the Cape if Granville concurred. On July 12 Granville gave his concurrence and asserted that he was requesting assurances from Germany that British subjects would be protected in the German sphere, that no penal settlement would be created, and that a joint commission could resolve private claim disputes. Two days later Derby, with Granville's support, sent Governor Robinson a dispatch giving up on Luderitz's possession but asked if the Cape was willing to assume cost and control over De Pass' establishments at Sandwich Harbor and Hottentot Bay if they were proven to be beyond Luderitz's claim. However, with Luderitz's deed from the Bethanie Nama granting the entire coast and all its harbors and bays from the Orange River to the 26th south latitude, there was little support for such claims.⁸⁶

In his reply to Derby Governor Robinson displayed how far behind London had left Cape Town in the dark regarding the international situation; reporting that the Cape Parliament passed a resolution declaring it "expedient" to annex the Skeleton Coast to the Cape. Robinson also reported that the Parliament was going to dismiss the next day, so he needed London's nod immediately. The Governor added that the Cape wanted to annex the coast from Walvis Bay north to the Portuguese frontier as well. However, with the end of the Cape Parliamentary session went the hopes of keeping Southwest Africa

British, with London failing to give them approval for an annexation vote.⁸⁷

Amphill accepted the German protectorate but warned that “no doubt can be entertained as to [Walvis] Bay and the islands adjacent to Angra Pequena being British.”⁸⁸ On August 6, Munster called on Granville to accept the British acknowledgement. All that was needed now was the inevitable flag raising.

Cape Town gave a suspicious glance at any German ships in the region. For example, a July 23 report from Rear Admiral Salmon reached the Colonial Office in August, 1884, that the German warship Wolf was spotted arriving in Cape Town from Singapore bound for Angra Pequena or the Congo. Although waiting for the inevitable, the Cape at this point had problems of its own, requesting more rockets from England “as [the British commander] still anticipates trouble in Zululand.”⁸⁹ Then came a telegraph from Governor Robinson that the German frigate Elizabeth, had arrived along the Skeleton Coast and claimed the Luderitz territory from the Orange River to the 26th south latitude, including Angra Pequena, for the German Reich. However, the German commander of the Elizabeth mistakenly claimed all the guano islands within cannon shot of the coast as well as the mainland. This began a new diplomatic struggle.⁹⁰

NOTES

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²⁵Holstein, Papers, Vol. III, p. 100.

²⁶Holstein, Papers, Vol. III, pp. 98-99, 106.

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⁷²Pakenham, Scramble, p. 209.

⁷³Pakenham, Scramble, p. 209.

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Chapter 2

The Scramble

When news reached the Cape that the commander of the German warship Elizabeth ignorantly annexed the islands as well as the mainland of the Skeleton Coast, save of course Walvis Bay, the Cape Ministers were infuriated. They immediately had Governor Robinson ask London to inform Germany that those islands were officially and formally claimed by the Cape as British territory under the Letters Patent of 1867, in which Britain officially recognized and authorized the annexation, and under the Act of Cape Parliament No. 4 of 1874, in which the actual annexation was carried out.¹ Yet, when news reached Germany of the commander's misfeasance, Berlin seemed content to let the matter slide for a while to see where it went rather than immediately correct it.

During 1884, however, Berlin was having its own challenges to deal with now that it was trying to become a colonial power. Many colonial supporters in Germany by this time criticized Bismark's government for its slow progress. Even Kaiser Wilhelm I openly criticized Leo von Caprivi, head of the German Admiralty, for not sending warships to Zanzibar on the east coast of Africa to protect German interests that were in competition with Britain. Coolheaded Foreign Ministry officials, according to Senior Councillor Friedrich von Holstein, were trying to protect Caprivi from the new frenzied *Kolonialtummel* that seemed to throw all "caution to the wind." Caprivi simply did not want to disperse his fleet, which was much smaller than Britain's anyway, across the globe while the possibility of Anglo-German hostility remained. At the same time, Ambassador Munster had become the scapegoat for any difficulties that arose with Britain. Herbert Bismark wrote to the Foreign Ministry after his visit to

London that Munster “ruins everything there; it would be far better not to have any ambassador. . . . to embroil oneself with a Power unnecessarily is a great mistake.”² This seemed ironic since it was Herbert himself who had laid down the law with Granville regarding Germany’s bid for colonies, while Munster was misinformed the entire time by Berlin. While Berlin was questioning the performance of its own ambassador, the diplomatic situation became more uneasy, at least for a short time, when British Ambassador Amthill died. Therefore while London was considering a replacement, opinion grew in Berlin that if relations were going to normalize with England, Munster had to be transferred somewhere else.³

London had little wait before hearing news of German colonial expansion. On August 22, the German Charge d’Affairs in London, Baron von Plessen, visited the Foreign Office and reportedly made the following statement: “To the north of the territory which Luderitz acquired last year by treaty with the Chief of [the Bethanie Nama], other subjects of the German Emperor have, during the last two years, by treaties with independent Chiefs, or by cessions from those previously in possession, obtained rights of property, and other rights, in the territories of [Namaland] and [Hereroland].” Plessen stated that these regions were not recognized as ever having been under British jurisdiction and that in reference to the Germans there requesting “the protection of the Empire for their acquisitions, the Imperial Government has granted it to them. The Imperial Government give their protection as soon as it is asked for, whenever German settlements are founded on territory not previously occupied by another Power, and when the claim is supported by

valid treaties which do not violate the rights of third parties.”⁵

Such statements gave British colonialism new energy and support, proving that there was indeed a scramble for the last unclaimed regions of the world, particularly in Africa and Oceania. Plessen followed this statement with a protest against the Cape government’s efforts to claim the area north of Luderitz’s possession. In 1880, the British restricted the Cape frontier to the Orange River, with the exception of Walvis Bay, and this had not been changed or nullified. The day following Plessen’s protest, Granville forwarded to Derby the Cape’s suggestion to annex territory north of Luderitz’s, i. e. from the 26th south latitude to the Angolan frontier of Portugal’s claim. The German Charge d’Affairs complained that “most assuredly the German Government did not calculate when they made the [December 1883] inquiry that the definitive answer would be put off for more than six months, and that the interval would be utilised to push forward rival schemes of English annexations of territory.” Plessen further announced Germany’s contention that “it is impossible to admit the theory advanced by the Cape Parliament of theoretical annexations of extended and unexplored coasts and stretches of land by means of decrees published at a distance; it is contrary to the law of nations and to tradition.”⁶ Britain’s own arguments against such annexation protocol, particularly against Spain, were already in the record books in Germany’s favor. The German embassy then supplied arguments on how the Cape had no evidence or support for such claims. Both Britain and the Cape had still left doors open further north of Luderitz’s claim, and could not legally shut them now, once again with Bismark’s foot in those doors.⁷

Reports of further German expansion then came when Cape Governor Robinson telegraphed Derby on September 7, 1884, and reported that the German Consul in Cape Town, W. A. Lippert, announced that the German warship Wolf had placed under the German Southwest Africa Protectorate, with the exception of Walvis Bay, the entire Skeleton Coast from Cape Frio to the Orange River. Robinson noted that the protectorate included the islands of Mercury and Hollamsbird which the Cape had claimed as their's for some time now. Interestingly, the Cape Governor telegraphed this German announcement, since his report of August 20 regarding the Elizabeth's annexation of Luderitz's possession and the guano islands had been conventionally written and thus delayed in reaching London. The Cape was now taking advantage of the technology at hand finally to deal with the increased tempo of colonization that Germany had brought to Africa. However a conventional report followed the telegraph enclosing a letter from the German Consul which included the actual report of Captain Schering of the Elizabeth. Consul Lippert reported that the guano islands were now German territory according to the Law of Nations which "means and includes all the islands within gunshot distance of the mainland."⁸ Governor Robinson also included a letter from his Ministers who, although accepting the German Protectorate over the mainland, insisted that the guano islands--including Hollamsbird and Mercury--were British territory. Daniel de Pass also sent his concerns on September 11, after reading in the *London Times* about the German extension north of the 26th southern latitude. De Pass reminded the Colonial Office that he suggested to them back on July 4 to take possession of his establishments there. He was also alarmed by a rumor that Germany was claiming the islands and soon sent clippings from the

Times which confirmed the rumor. His associate John Spence also protested the German island claim citing their official annexation in 1866 by the HMS Valorous, which of course the Colonial Office already knew. However, the Colonial Office ignored De Pass and Spence for a long time in this matter until the matter was laid to rest with Berlin.⁹

Meanwhile, both countries continued to attempt to resolve the boundaries of the new German Protectorate and the ownership of the guano islands. On September 13, Foreign Secretary Granville acknowledged the willingness of Germany to have a joint commission assembled to delimit the boundary of Walvis Bay, which was now surrounded, and the German Protectorate. Britain accepted Germany's proposal.¹⁰ Regarding the guano islands, the Cape naval commander, Rear Admiral Salmon, provided an explanation of the initial German occupation of Southwest Africa in greater detail. Salmon told how the German ship Elizabeth from Europe bound to Australia stopped at the Cape Colony after annexing Luderitz's territory from the Orange River north to the 26th, including the islands. Salmon reported that he informed Captain Schering that England had those islands since 1866, which the latter confessed he was not aware of and admitted that he had no instructions from Berlin to annex them but just assumed according to international law that he should. Salmon told the German captain that when the HMS Boedicea last visited there the Union Jack was flying on Seal and Penguin islands in Angra Pequena harbor, but Schering told the Admiral that he had seen no flags there. Upon Salmon's inquiry, Robinson wrote back to the Admiral that ten islands, rocks, or islets along the coast from the Orange River to the 26th were British: Ichaboe, Long, Seal, Penguin, Halifax, Possession,

Albatross Rock, Pomona, Plum Pudding, and Sinclair's Island (also known as Roast Beef). Hollamsbird and Mercury north of the 26th south latitude were also British.¹¹

On September 23, another question accompanying the boundary issue from the British side was whether Southwest Africa was to be "described a colony or a territorial political protectorate of a defined type." However, the Germans did not ever really give a definitive answer to Foreign Secretary Granville. Though regarding the issue of boundaries, Granville did have the British embassy in Berlin inform the German government that "Her Majesty's Government will welcome Germany as a neighbour in those parts of the coast which are not already within the limits of the Cape Colony and not actually in British possession."¹² Cordial, but to the point. Britain was acknowledging Germany's mainland claim from Cape Frio to the Orange River, save Walvis Bay, but standing firm that the islands were British. Immediately the German Charge d'Affairs, Baron Plessen, visited Granville and informed him that Germany did not claim the guano islands and recognized them as British territory which had been the original stand all along. This should have ended the difficulty, but there were small islands and rocks that were not specifically claimed in Cape records (Note: The German government had not yet informed Luderitz of Berlin's capitulation on the major islands which enhanced the difficulty as well). In one such circumstance, Plessen announced to Foreign Secretary Granville that "Shark Island, in the Bay of Angra Pequena, which is joined to the mainland at low tide, is property of Herr Luderitz, and does not appear to have been annexed at any time by the Cape Colony."¹³ So the

matter remained for the time being. Regarding Britain's welcome to Germany as a new neighbor in the region, Granville acknowledged a note from Bismark to Baron Plessen in which the German Chancellor saw it "a first step in that direction which he had hoped British policy would take."¹⁴

However, ownership of these islands became an immediate issue when De Pass wrote to the Colonial Office on September 24 that a German ship, the Trojan, was about to leave Hamburg with German settlers bound for Angra Pequena, and requested that the German government be asked to inform them that some portions of that territory were still in dispute. Shark Island, as noted above, was only one specific case though De Pass was still entertaining the hope of keeping some mainland claims as well. Derby's office informed De Pass of Germany's claim to Shark Island and requested what evidence he had of that island or rock being British. Infuriated by now, De Pass immediately responded citing Clause No. 2 of his lease, which was written in Cape Town on November 1, 1871: "All rocks and islets lying between Hollamsbird Island on the north and . . . Sinclair's Island on the south, not herein specially named, called the Ichaboe Group, shall nevertheless be declared and taken to be included in this lease."¹⁵ Of course, this was a lease from the Cape government to De Pass with no specific acknowledgement or endorsement of an indigenous leader of Southwest Africa recorded. Regardless, the German argument was that Shark Island during low tide was attached to the mainland which Luderitz had purchased from the Bethanie Nama, whereas De Pass at best had only a lease. Therefore Luderitz felt he was De Pass' new landlord, and as the new landlord was simply asking the old tenants to vacate.¹⁶

Making matters worse, London was informed that De Pass now alleged having claims on the mainland from Baker's Cove to Angra Pequena, which of course Luderitz had taken into possession. While London seemed content with the guano islands and Walvis Bay, and Berlin seemed content with the mainland save Shark Island, De Pass was still claiming parts of the mainland and Luderitz was still claiming several more islands. The entrepreneurs attempted to push their respective governments into confrontation.¹⁷

German and British newspapers did try to make the public aware of the confrontations at hand. The British public read about the German colonial invasion of Africa and Oceania. The *Times* in London reported on September 4, 1884, that Dr. Nachtigal had annexed parts of Cameroon for Germany that summer and had become the German Consul General for the region. The article reported that "a protest against the German annexation is about to be sent to the Foreign Office in London, it being stated that the majority of the inhabitants of Cameroon are desirous that it should remain under British control."¹⁸ English readers were informed that Nachtigal was in fact delayed in Cameroon so that the German warship Elizabeth was sent to Angra Pequena for the flag-raising. Although the event had occurred in August, the *Times* printed a letter on September 16, which had been published in the *Zeitung* for German readers, from the warship's captain congratulating Luderitz after the event: "I beg to add that the act, notwithstanding the wildness of the country, made a very promising impression, and will, I hope, form the basis of a good future there." The captain also enclosed his official proclamation which began: "His Majesty the German Emperor, William the First, King of Prussia, has

commanded me to go with his corvette Elizabeth to Angra Pequena, to place the territory belonging to Herr Luderitz on the West Coast of Africa under the direct protection of His Majesty.” The account also included the Captain’s infamous island annexation “according to international law” which had provoked such debate and difficulty between the governments.¹⁹ The picture was only now unfolding for the British and German public in realizing the tense negotiations which had taken place. The *Times* further reported the next day that “Dr. Nachtigal’s mission is by no means at an end, but that he has received orders to proceed to the Congo.”²⁰ Though there were some articles which followed acknowledging the quick German colonization of parts of Africa, the *Times* did offer some reassurance to the British public. In one article, the paper reported that German newspapers believed “that at Cameroon and other places on the West African coast there has been no annexation in the name of the Empire, but only a declaration of protectorate exactly of the same nature as at Luderitzland, Angra Pequena.”²¹ For the time being, the German colonies were really believed to be commercial or charter, but economic hardship would make them increasingly dependent and therefore controlled by Berlin. However the newspapers did make the British public more aware of the “scramble.”

Back on the diplomatic scene, in early October 1884, reports from Berlin illuminated how Germany was trying to get control over the *Kolonialtummel* and possibly harness it. The British embassy reported that the German Colonial Association had met on September 21 and passed some resolutions in which it was known that “the Chancellor had to a certain extent sanctioned the policy of the Association.” The Association president reportedly “warned his audience

against giving in 'to a sort of colonial fever,' which might carry the nation further than might be prudent . . . and [to] remember the old adage *erst wag's, dann wag's* [or 'look before you leap']." The Association passed resolutions requesting the Chancellor to place German factories in West Africa under the protection of the Reich, and for the Reichstag to consider "the establishment of a fixed and rapid steam service between Germany and distant lands . . . essential for the proper development of German commerce . . . and for the maintenance of a close relationship between Germans abroad and at home."²² The British Charge d'Affairs, Sir Charles Scott, who was in control of the Berlin embassy since Ambassador Amphill died, later sent an article in the *Zeitung* of September 27 to London which reported a meeting between Bismark and representatives of Hamburg firms that were engaged in trade in West Africa with the discussion focused on the future of German settlements there--though emphasis was on Togo and Cameroon. The *Zeitung* was under the impression that negotiations with France and England would have a beneficial result for German colonization. That same paper the next day reported the organization of a West African squadron of German ships, which could also be used to protect Southwest Africa, including the Bismark (flagship), the Gneisenau, the Olga, and the Ariadue. At the same time, Bismark's other son, William, wrote to Holstein in the Foreign Ministry regarding the coming elections in the Reichstag: "If I can succeed in securing that the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* only rides the colonial horse in the election . . . I will be very glad."²³ The Chancellor, and those around him, were hoping that his new colonial policy would tap into the popular enthusiasm and therefore fill the Reichstag seats with

Conservatives.²⁴

Meanwhile in Europe the British, under Granville's leadership in the Foreign Office, were requesting friendlier relations with Germany while Berlin was making headway in rapprochement with Paris. Bismark believed, and thus it was German foreign policy, that friendlier relations with France would make Britain respect German interests abroad by feeling threatened. The Chancellor would just as soon deal with France than with Gladstone's Liberal government anyway. By now Luderitz had expanded German colonial interests beyond the Skeleton Coast in Southwest Africa, with Britain forced to be the spectator. In an effort to prevent Germany from acquiring another colony in Cameroon, the British Foreign Office informed Germany that as early as 1879 chieftains in that region had requested British protection and that in May 1884 London had finally sent a consul to accept the cession. This did not impress Berlin. Many German officials who had Bismark's ear believed that Germany would "only gain England's goodwill--if only a goodwill accompanied by gnashing of teeth--by way of an alliance with France. . . . [England must be told to be] in colonial matters *with* us through thick and thin; or [England] cannot reckon upon our friendship." Herbert Bismark even asserted that Germany's rapprochement with France would "squash Gladstone against the wall. . . . but first [Gladstone] must ride the English deeper into the mire so that his prestige will vanish even among the masses of the stupid English electorate."²⁵ Furthermore, British frustration with the French blockade of southern China in the Tonkin war with China, now that it was hurting British commerce, gave Berlin further hope of less resistance from London.²⁶

Soon the German Chancellor began pushing harder in colonial issues, and even threw his own criticism Caprivi's way when the latter refused at times to send warships to the aid of German interests in Angra Pequena on the southwest coast and in Zanzibar on the east coast of Africa. Caprivi, in his distaste of the colonial policy, began referring to the founder of German Southwest Africa as "King Luderitz" in jest. Bismark felt he needed to talk with his head of the Admiralty. In September, Bismark confessed to Caprivi that he himself still held "disdain" for colonization and explained that it had all been a ploy to win the coming elections in the Reichstag. Still conservative in heart, Bismark had merely ripped the planks from under the liberal-industrial platform by using the popular idea of colonies to show how backward many of the Conservatives, dominated by Prussian agrarians, had been in resisting the idea. Yet the Chancellor did not keep only German liberals in his sights. Later, in October, Bismark confessed to his son Herbert that Germany had better keep some promises to France in order to "squeeze and isolate England still more, until it becomes so bad that even the most stupid of the English Liberals will become alive to the folly of Gladstone's silly policy [of resisting Germany]."²⁷ This of course exaggerated Gladstone's resistance to German colonization, since his government had basically rolled over for Germany on most issues. Also, in the latter months of 1884, German officials fumbled the Franco-German rapprochement that was suppose to bring Britain to her knees in fear of Germany.²⁸

Regarding Southwest Africa, ambiguity still remained over the possession of certain guano islands. Therefore Foreign Secretary Granville, wanting to give a definitive statement, had the British embassy in Berlin inform

the German government that all the islands off the coast were indeed British and “that further communication will be made to them . . . in regard to Shark Island, and probably some islets and other territory in the same vicinity.”²⁹ It seemed the respective governments were standing behind De Pass and Luderitz in their conflicting claims to these still disputed areas. On October 3, De Pass sent word to the Colonial Office that his Captain Spence had been warned to leave the islands near Angra Pequena by Luderitz’s company. This was supported by a telegraph from the Cape Governor Robinson informing Colonial Secretary Derby that Luderitz was claiming all the islands from the Orange River border to the 26th south latitude and had called on Spence to vacate them. The Cape Ministers labeled Luderitz’s claim unlawful. Granville sent information to Derby from British Charge d’ Affairs Scott in the Berlin embassy that the German government had already agreed the islands were British, save Shark and a few other rocks, and were still willing to have a joint commission to sort out the mess. Also, German Charge d’ Affairs Plessen in London had notified Granville that Berlin declared the captain of the Elizabeth wrong in having the German Consul notify the Cape government of the German Protectorate. Plessen called it a “mistaken execution of instructions” and that the British government should have been notified in London directly.³⁰ In addition, De Pass was also around to hound the Colonial Office after reading the October 6 *Times* which reported Luderitz’s demand for Spence to vacate the islands, and told Derby’s office that Luderitz was acting on the misfeasant annexation by the Elizabeth commander. The frustrated businessman then added the smug remark about the lengthy gunshot range claim by the German commander: “I have to hope that the gunshot distance alluded to by the

German commander may be determined to be that of the longest range of our best carrying gun.”³¹

In the first week of October, the Colonial Office sent Foreign Secretary Granville a lengthy report reexamining the entire negotiation history concerning Southwest Africa, and included the German accusation that the British had used their long delay in response to annex the territory from underneath Luderitz. The Colonial Office admitted that “the extent of Herr Luderitz’s territory was, apparently through inaccurate information, understated to the extent of more than 2,000 per cent.”³² The long delays in information that could have been sent via telegraph from the Cape did not help matters. The current situation regarding the guano islands was snowballing for no real apparent reason. The German government had already renounced claims to almost all the islands. Only Luderitz was claiming more than that. Therefore Derby wanted to send, with Granville’s concurrence, a telegraph to Robinson that in fact Berlin did not support Luderitz in the guano island claims and with the suggestion that a British gunboat should be sent to inform Luderitz thus, to protect the British islands, and to finally end the entire matter which had drudged on for months. However, Granville told the Colonial Secretary to hold off the gunboat for now, and said he would ask the German government to have the Bremen merchant withdraw his claim to the guano islands. The German Charge d’Affairs in London sent word the next day that the Foreign Ministry in Berlin promised to attend to Luderitz immediately. With this new sense of actually accomplishing something on the matter, Derby had De Pass notified that the two governments were in the process of setting up a joint commission to finally handle the private claim disputes. However, this was only met with De Pass’ complaints on

whether he would be given ample time to prepare his case.³³

Despite De Pass' murmurings, negotiations regarding Southwest Africa ran as smoothly as could be expected. Plessen visited the Foreign Office on the 11th, handing Granville a note that contained Germany's official approval of the joint commission and nominated Dr. Bieber, the newly appointed consul for Cape Town replacing Lippert, as their commissioner. Germany wanted the commission to meet in Cape Town, and agreed that the disputed islands (Shark Island and other islets or rocks unspecified in De Pass' lease) would be settled by the commission. Plessen restated Germany's disclaimer to any other islands and agreed to protect the private rights of British subjects in German territory if Britain reciprocated. However, Berlin wanted Granville reminded that "no British population worth mentioning exists in the coastal region in question, as but few British subjects frequent it for trade, seal-hunting or fishing."³⁴ A couple of days later Derby had De Pass informed that Acting Foreign Minister Klemens Busch (Note: Busch replaced former Foreign Minister Paul von Hatzfeldt who in turn had been reassigned to replace Count Munster as Ambassador to Britain) gave assurances that steps would be taken "to prevent any further molestation of guano deposits."³⁵ Busch also offered reasons why Luderitz had yet to be informed of Germany's position not to claim the guano islands, despite the commander of the Elizabeth's misfeasance, with the paramount being the absence of any German consul in Cape Town at present. On October 21, the Foreign Office sent Derby word that Bieber had left for Cape Town and that Plessen inquired whether Britain had nominated a commissioner yet. Four days later Granville also had the Colonial Secretary informed that Busch had

sent for Luderitz to inform him not to interfere with preexisting rights in Southwest Africa and that disputes were to be settled by a joint commission.³⁶

Yet after a few days Colonial Secretary Derby still believed Luderitz was trying to claim the islands, using the 1880 British proclamation of the Orange River boundary with only Walvis Bay given exemption. The Colonial Office wrote to Foreign Secretary Granville "that [Luderitz] is dealing with the question of private property and not with that of public sovereignty, and with a singular confusion of ideas, he believes that the three-mile doctrine is applicable to questions of private ownership as well as to questions of territorial jurisdiction."³⁷ In truth however, De Pass too had made this confusion defending his personal property with arguments of British claims to sovereignty which had nothing to do with his private grants or leases. Also, Derby's office was in this very statement acknowledging the three-mile doctrine of international law that would have recognized many of the islands as being German. All sides seemed to merge the issues which could easily go both ways. The Colonial Secretary did have Granville informed that a commissioner from their side would be appointed soon, and that the Cape Town site would be appropriate. However, Derby did strongly assert that the commission should visit "the localities in questions" before ruling on them. De Pass was already by the end of the month pressing both the Foreign and Colonial offices for information on the commission and its protocol. Granville had Derby write De Pass that he would be the first to know and that all protocol would be decided "on the spot."³⁸

Tension grew as the joint commission began to form. On November 5,

the German embassy in London informed the British government that Berlin was going to back Luderitz's claims of ownership over De Pass' claims as tenant on the mainland, which was especially critical since De Pass claimed several mining leases around Angra Pequena. The embassy had Luderitz's deed of sale forwarded to the Foreign Office which in turn was given to Derby. Chief Joseph Fredrick of the Bethanie Nama and successor of David Christian described in the deed to Luderitz the "grant [not sale] by David Christian under date of 21 September 1863, to . . . De Pass, Spence & Co. of the tract of land from Baker's Cove to the southern corner of Angra Pequena," the very land De Pass was now claiming. The Nama chief declared:

That the aforesaid tract of land and my right thereover *was never sold* to Mssrs. De Pass, Spence & Co., *but that they acquired only the concession* (verguming) *thereof*. Nor have they ever paid anything for it. . . . Whereas Herr F. A. E. Luderitz, of Bremen, in Germany, in virtue of contracts of sale of May 1, 1883, and August 25, 1883, has purchased from me the whole coast from 26 S. latitude to the Great [Orange] River, including all havens and bays . . . and is thereby become from this time the sole and rightful owner thereof, the abovementioned grant to Messrs. De Pass, Spence & Co. ceases herewith of itself.³⁹

The indigenous authority in the region was also backing Luderitz's exclusive mainland claims. Derby sent the deed to De Pass and the Cape, though he did acknowledge to De Pass that Granville believed the documents to only effect private ownership not sovereignty. Of course, De Pass was only interested in the private issue which effected his wallet. It seemed Luderitz was the new landlord, at least until the commission decided anything. By this time Sydney G. Shippard was approved as the British commissioner. On November 11, the Foreign Office sent the German embassy documents contesting their side of the issue, including the full text of the 1866 Proclamation and the Letters Patent of .

1867, although these were restricted only to the matter of the islands which Germany was not contesting anyway--save Shark Island. However, this seemed enough for a fight and De Pass sent a letter to Derby a week later disagreeing with the language of Luderitz's deed stating "whatever may be the rights of Josef Fredricks . . . he only sells havens and bays to Herr Luderitz, no mention is made of islands."⁴⁰ For the first time, De Pass furnished a map showing the location of the islands, which was quickly forwarded to Granville.⁴¹

In November 1884, Britain was getting ready for the West African Conference to be held in Berlin and the inevitable repercussions of the Anglo-German tension over Southwest Africa. Sir Edward Malet, the former British ambassador in Egypt, was now the ambassador in Berlin and England's delegate to the Conference. London expected the worse; that Germany would exploit its fairly good relations with France to make huge claims in Africa. Granville also sent Percy Anderson, who headed the African department in the Foreign Office. His instructions were clear: Give Bismark anything he demanded, except the Niger, and block French efforts. Yet when the German Chancellor, in the early afternoon of November 15, rose to greet and address the conference, he blasted out the "3 C's" of Livingstone--"commerce, Christianity, and civilization." To the surprise, and delight of the British delegation, Bismark laid down the issues of the conference being only to promote the free navigation of the Niger, the free trade in the Congo, and to set up some kind of protocol for future annexation efforts. With the discussion confined only to the future rules for the scramble of colonies and on matters of free trade and navigation which Britain supported, London breathed a sigh of relief and began looking at Berlin in a more cordial light, though some issues

still needed defending.⁴²

In December 1884 after the conference, the Assistant Under Secretary of the British Colonial Office, R. H. Meade, went to Berlin where he met with Dr. Busch, the Under Secretary of the Foreign Ministry, and with the Iron Chancellor himself. In a December 13 letter to Granville, Meade reported his unofficial discussions with Busch on colonial issues. While in Berlin the British official first met with Daniel de Pass who was there, and reported to London that De Pass “was quite prepared to make terms with the Germans, and only desired to be placed in communication with the German Government, so I do not anticipate any difficulty in that quarter. If [De Pass] is satisfied and we secure promise of fair treatment for any others of our countrymen established within the new German Protectorate, I do not think that the Cape would object to the cession of these islands and rocks to Germany.”⁴³ After the British official visited the Foreign Ministry, Meade reported that “I assured [Busch] that we at the Colonial Office had no jealousy of the recent development of German colonial enterprise, that we felt the world was large enough for all.” However, Meade was told of German suspicions of British intentions regarding Cameroon, Samoa, and Bechuanaland. In regards to Cameroon: “I said that we were doing and contemplating nothing which would militate in any way against their free action . . . we wished the Germans all success . . . that there was, no doubt, some natural feeling of irritation on the part of the English residents when the German Protectorate was announced, but that his was all past; we certainly intended to take the Cameroons, but [Germany] had forestalled us, and we had no other wish now than for their success.” Meade assured Busch that “at this moment Mr. Baynes, the Secretary of the Baptist Missionary Society, was in Berlin,

anxious to explain to the Foreign [Ministry] that though he would have preferred the sovereignty of our own country, he was quite prepared loyally to accept the new order of things.”⁴⁴ After hearing from Busch of some local British officials resisting German intentions in Cameroon, Meade suggested to Granville that the officials there “should be careful to cultivate the most friendly relations with the German authorities . . . [and that the officials should] smooth the matter down, using whatever influence [they] may possess with the natives to accept their new masters, and with the English traders to keep quiet, and not raise difficulties.”⁴⁵ Meade did dodge the matter of Samoa, which was far from being resolved any time soon.

Regarding Bechuanaland, which had direct consequences for German Southwest Africa, Meade described the British expedition of 3,500 men into that region as a “clearing out [of] certain freebooters from the British Protectorate” of the Cape. This was a creative excuse for Britain wanting to create a buffer via the Kalahari between the Germans of Southwest Africa and the Boers of the Transvaal who they wished to keep separated.⁴⁶ Meade “pointed out that Angra Pequena, the inland limits of which are stated by Germany to be 20 [German] miles, is separated from Bechuanaland by over 700 miles, of which the greater part is desert, and that there could be no possible connexion [sic] between our expedition and the interest of the German Colony.” This of course underestimated the true appetite for the hinterland that Bismark wanted, which the British had become aware of and wanted to stop before it grew any further from the coast. The British official told Busch that Germany should not listen to any rumors regarding the British expedition into Bechuanaland, and that when

“we sometimes heard rumours that Germany had designs on the strip of coast between Natal and Delagoa [on the southeast coast of Africa] . . . we knew that this was impossible.”⁴⁷ Of course Meade did not mention how the Cape quickly tried annexing this unclaimed coast before any Germans arrived. Meade exaggerated Britain’s lack of suspicions in his criticism of Germany’s skepticism over British action in Bechuanaland, which was apparent in another of his rebuking examples--regardless how false it was: “It never occurred to us to attribute dark designs . . . when [Germany] sent an unusually powerful squadron of five ships to visit their new acquisitions on the West Coast of Africa. We did not express any uneasiness and imagine that a *coup de main* was intended by Germany against any of our colonial possessions.”⁴⁸ Meade then reported that Busch told him, regarding Bechuanaland, “that Prince Bismark feared we were about to use the large force we had collected forcibly to annex further territories, cutting the Germans off from any extension inland beyond their general limit of 20 miles; but that he was very glad to hear that we had no ulterior objects in sending the force . . . [other] than those I had mentioned.” Of course that force was cutting off any German expansion too far east, but gave Germany 700 miles to “chew on” in the meantime. Meade then reported Busch’s comments on Germany’s basic colonial philosophy: “He said he looked on this step taken by Germany as an experiment. It might succeed or it might fail. If it succeeded, in all probability England would reap a large share of the reward by the opening up of fresh trade routes. If, as was possible, it should fail, then at least something would have been done by Germany, and whatever fruit there might be would then certainly be gathered by England.”⁴⁹

On December 14, Busch called on Meade to inform him that the Chancellor wanted to see the British envoy himself. In person then, Meade agreed that there should be free access to all African rivers, but then the discussion quickly focused on Bechuanaland. The Chancellor still believed Britain was cutting his colony off from a hinterland in central Africa.⁵⁰ Meade reported that:

[Bismark] produced a map and showed me the Kalahari Desert, and said that he was informed that it was erroneously described as a desert, that there are elephants there, trees, grass, and water. I told him that we were within our rights in taking over the Kalahari district, which merges into Bechuanaland, but that behind the coastline of Angra Pequena was a waterless tract some 30 miles broad [the Namib], but behind that again was a better country [Namaland], and that Lord Granville had said that there was . . . no objection from our point of view to Germany going into the interior even as far as the 20th degree of longitude, which I pointed out to him on his map, and beyond which westward we did not propose to go.⁵¹

In other words, Britain was not willing to allow Germany to move so far inward as to have the ability to link up with the Boers, but London was willing to allow Germany to take over the lands of the Nama and Herero.

After Bismark protested British resistance to Germany's colonization of the northern coast of New Guinea, and reminded Meade how Germany had supported England in Egypt, Meade made the offer of the guano islands off the Skeleton Coast and in Angra Pequena harbor to Germany. Bismark quickly interrupted Meade and asked: "Including [Walvis] Bay?" The British envoy answered: "Oh no; that is a regular British Settlement on the mainland; I am only proposing to deal with the islands." Meade tried to argue how Germany would be better off controlling the islands which are so close to "the very mouth of the principle harbour." But Bismark "attached no importance to it" and barked

"I do not find your proposals sufficient."⁵² Meade, quite troubled, visited Busch after his meeting with Bismark. However Meade's main objections focused on Bismark's undiplomatic position regarding New Guinea, not Southwest Africa. It was then discovered that a note which was suppose to have been given to London by Munster back in July, so that England could have had time enough to deal with any Australian jealousy, was not. Therefore the whole New Guinea affair came as a surprise to London. Again Berlin used Munster as a scape-goat, before his official transfer to their Paris embassy.⁵³

Although 1885 brought smoother Anglo-German relations, with Britain concentrating on the Russian threat in Central Asia, there were other objections to German colonial expansion. Spanish officials were outraged at German advances into areas in the Pacific which they considered their own since the days of Magellan. German officials reported from Madrid of the "excited state of public feeling." They added that "the idea that a foreign Power wanted to take from Spain part of its territory was enough to set the entire nation ablaze." Although the Spanish King and his Conservatives kept calm, Spanish Republicans were trying to arouse a frenzy against Germany. One German negotiator revealed his frustrations in resolving the issue by commenting: "Spain does not have a single statesman."⁵⁴ Germany had to back off somewhat from her more aggressive plans of seizing the Caroline Islands, which now Spain claimed to have held for three and a half centuries. Also, 1885 brought a new Russian threat in the Balkans for German officials and strategists to concentrate on. Yet, through all of this, negotiations and controversy regarding Southwest Africa continued.⁵⁵

In January 1885, Derby acknowledged an earlier dispatch from Cape Governor Robinson which reported that the Resident Magistrate of Walvis Bay, William Palgrave, was helping British interests in Hereroland "as far as he can do so, whilst residing at his post at [Walvis] Bay." Derby was adamant that Palgrave give no more than token support for the Herero and give the Germans as much room as they needed. The Colonial Secretary rejected the idea of having Palgrave or anyone else become the resident magistrate with the Herero paramount chief, Maherero, "seeing that there has been no Resident with the Chief since the end of 1880, the appointment of one now would have the appearance of an attempt to thwart the development of the German protectorate which Her Majesty's Government has recently recognised." The British did not intend to reestablish themselves in Hereroland after England had pulled back to Walvis Bay during the Herero-Nama war of 1880.⁵⁶

The joint commission to resolve private claim disputes was still organizing, though both Berlin and London dropped the issue of the major guano islands since both now recognized them as British and under De Pass' lease from the Cape. However, the Colonial Office informed De Pass on February 10, 1885, that "with regard to Shark Island . . . and any unnamed islets and rocks . . . it will be for you and your advisers to make out your title to them before the Commission."⁵⁷ Three days later, Granville informed the German embassy that De Pass was on his own defending Shark Island or any other islet or rock not specifically named in his lease. The Foreign Secretary also acknowledged that the Cape Governor gave the Cape lease of 1869 to De Pass, replacing the older imperial lease of 1861 which did not include unspecified islets or rocks. Granville also admitted that the Cape lease of 1869 was actually made two

years before the Cape was invested with such independent powers. Granville hoped Germany would not exploit this infraction since the former Governor was acting on good faith then. In addition, the Foreign Secretary reported to the German embassy "that the cable to South Africa is broken . . . instructions will be sent by post and will be followed by a telegraphic communication as soon as the cable is repaired."⁵⁸ Whether by simply using private wire channels or actually misleading the German government, London was still able to receive wired information from the region for some time. Whatever the case, this did interestingly enough give Britain some advantage at least in biding time.⁵⁹

On February 17, 1885, after the British government waited for quite awhile for De Pass to go to the Cape to represent himself, De Pass wrote to the Colonial Office that the Commission need not wait for him, as he had a lawyer representing his firm already in Cape Town. The next day Derby sent instructions to Governor Robinson for the Commission to begin, inviting them to decide on the validity of conflicting claims between De Pass and Luderitz on Shark Island and other unspecified islands included in the lease of 1869. Derby instructed Robinson to have Resident Magistrate Palgrave in Walvis Bay announce that all those with claims in the Walvis Bay vicinity should attend the Commission.⁶⁰

However, Palgrave had been taking matters into his own hands, ignoring orders from London via the Cape which tried to limit his assistance to the Herero. Via the Reuter's Telegraphic Agency, the British Colonial Office was informed on February 25, 1885: "Cape Town, February 24--Mr. Palgrave . . . [in Hereroland] held conference with principal Chiefs, the result of which was

satisfactory, the Chiefs unanimously deciding to accept British rule.”⁶¹ Derby immediately sent his own telegraph back that he wanted Palgrave out of Hereroland and to act only within his instructions. Governor Robinson responded three days later that “Palgrave has returned here, having been recalled.” Although the Governor had not the time for an official investigation, he assured Derby that “if press version true, I propose to inform [Maherero] Her Majesty’s Government cannot accept his offer to place his people and country under British rule.”⁶² Not until March was Robinson able to furnish any official information on the meeting with Herero chiefs. According to Robinson’s later report, an English trader, Robert Lewis, visited Palgrave requesting that he visit Maherero (who was also known as Kamaherero), paramount chief of the Herero, which he had done on December 29, 1884. Palgrave reported that: “On my arrival, Kamaherero at once took measures to collect his headmen and councillors, and, after some day’s deliberation, he handed me a deed of cession of his whole country to the British Government.” Apparently Maherero only stipulated that “the [Herero] laws should, as far as possible, remain in force until the laws of the Government were understood by his people, and that he should continue to be acknowledged as the paramount Chief of the country, and that the two mining concessions granted by him [to Lewis] should be respected.” Maherero’s deed of cession stated:

“I, KAMAHERERO, paramount Chief of [Hereroland], with the consent of my under Chiefs and Counsellors [sic], subject ourselves to the Government of the Queen of England in Her Government of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope as one of Her posts, namely our whole country In the name, and with the consent, of myself and my people, I subject myself to the Government in order that we may receive that protection which we have for so long a time asked for in vain, and now, in firm confidence, I know for certain that we shall be

treated in all respects as the true subjects of the Queen herself.”⁶³

The Herero, having been defeated by the Nama who were supplied with German arms in exchange for land, tried to turn back to their old protectors, the British, who had forsaken them in the last Nama-Herero war in 1880 and withdrawn to Walvis Bay. However, Governor Robinson admitted to Maherero that the Cape had considered annexing all of the lands of the Herero and Nama, but that his government now recognized the German colony and was not going to interfere with its expansion into the heartland of the Southwest African tribes.⁶⁴ Meanwhile, the British Colonial Secretary was busy trying to repair the damage caused by Palgrave's acceptance of the Herero concession. By April 8, Derby sent his approval to Robinson for his actions, and received news that the rejection of the Herero protectorate by London and the Cape satisfied the Germans. Derby informed the Governor that the German embassy also suggested that: “Her Majesty's Government should express to your Ministers a hope that no endeavour will be made to obtain influence in the country north of the Orange River and west of the 20th degree of east longitude. Such a hope is in conformity with the policy which your Ministers are aware Her Majesty's Government have adopted in regard to the portion of South[ern] Africa in question.” However Derby, who was easily influenced by colonial entrepreneuring, did add that “I consider the expression ‘influence’ to apply to political influence, and I have no desire to suggest that the legitimate operations of trade between the [British] Colonists and natives should be curtailed or terminated.”⁶⁵ Therefore, British business was not prohibited from operating in German Southwest Africa. Furthermore, the British were not in a hurry to

comply with German requests to quickly notify natives of Britain's capitulation by again using the excuse of broken telegraph lines or ships having already left dock.⁶⁶ Though the inevitable did come a week later when Foreign Secretary Granville's instructions were sent to Robinson in Cape Town which confirmed that the tribes residing in Southwest Africa would become German subjects:

I shall be glad if, whenever an opportunity occurs for communication with any of the Chiefs living to the west of the 20th degree of east longitude, you will intimate to them that Her Majesty's Government have agreed to limit the Queen's authority to the country eastward of that line [Bechuanaland], and that if the authority of the German Government should be extended inland up to that line, Her Majesty's Government will not do anything to interfere with such an extension.⁶⁷

The British sent a copy of these instructions to the German embassy on June 9, 1885, concluding this potential conflict.⁶⁸

Matters regarding Daniel De Pass were still heated throughout this time, though the British Colonial Office seemed less the advocate for the company. Back in September 1884, Colonial Secretary Derby informed De Pass that the Foreign Office had requested that Germany take action against any more gunshots by Luderitz's men around the guano islands. However, Derby's office warned the British businessman "that the formation of a settlement in the immediate neighbourhood of the islands . . . [will] have a tendency to drive away the birds."⁶⁹ Obviously a different tone was afoot. De Pass' associate, Captain John Spence, had likewise complained to Governor Robinson, reporting that the German cannons were scaring birds away (claimed that one shot could scare away the birds in a vicinity for years), though a similar disinterest was received from officials. In March 1885, De Pass had sent yet another complaint

to the Derby's office, claiming that he was losing money in the guano islands because of German traffic in Angra Pequena harbor. To emphasize this, De Pass reported that extracting 580 tons of guano from the islands in 1883 worth 5,075 British pounds, comparing this with the only 300 tons extracted in 1884 worth 2,200 pounds. De Pass then claimed that, according to Spence, they would be lucky to get 100 tons worth less than 750 pounds in 1885. The businessman complained that he had lost 4,200 pounds already and projected that since he had a lease for eleven to twelve more years, he would lose 40,000 pounds at this rate.⁷⁰ John Bramston, the Assistant Colonial Under Secretary, answered him on April 4, 1885: "Lord Derby desires me in reply to say that he regrets to hear of the diminution in the yield of the islands, which he hopes is only temporary, but I am to remind you that no guarantee has ever been given you that settlements on the mainland would be prevented with a view to your benefit."⁷¹ De Pass sent an abrupt rebuke two weeks later: "We apprehend, if your Lordship fully appreciated all the facts, that you would not form this conclusion."⁷² For now, with tempers on edge, both sides allowed the matter to slide.

On June 8, Gladstone's Liberals resigned over a taxation dispute and two weeks later Lord Salisbury, Robert Cecil, accepted Gladstone's seal becoming Prime Minister. With new elections far away, a new conservative Tory government had to rule weakly with Parliament still in a Liberal majority. A worst case scenario for any British prime minister--all the responsibility without most of the power. Salisbury made Colonel Frederick Stanley the new Colonial Secretary, while reserving the office of Foreign Secretary for himself (Note:

Salisbury governed as Prime Minister right out of the Foreign Office). Salisbury had criticized the Liberal government, as opposition leader in the Commons, for its “vacillation and inconsistency” in its African policy over the last five years. He had denounced Gladstone’s diplomatic defeats, the concessions to the Boers in the Transvaal, and the mess emerging in the Sudan with the rise of the Mahdist state. Salisbury wanted to make foreign policy the priority of the day. He turned to Percy Anderson, who held the African desk in the Foreign Office, and carved out a new strategy of securing England’s position in Egypt so Germany could never again use it as blackmail. Overall, the Prime Minister began to push a more vigorous British participation in the “scramble for Africa.”⁷³

Despite this, Salisbury let Germany keep her sphere west of the 20th east longitude in Southwest Africa along with its gains in Cameroon. His strategy was not as much to inhibit the Reich in Africa as it was to race Germany, and everyone else, for control over the “dark continent.” Therefore, although Bismark and the Foreign Ministry (who were mostly conservatives) preferred Salisbury over Gladstone, British policy towards Germany during this transition of British governments remained very much the same. The fact that the lower government officials in London rarely changed with the leadership also assisted this. In the end however, Salisbury proved a more worthy opponent for Berlin, despite its preference for him.⁷⁴

In July 1885, Governor Robinson, in his first dispatch to the new government, requested instructions from Colonial Secretary Stanley for the joint commission regarding claims by British subjects caught between Luderitz’s coastal claim and the 20th east longitude which Britain was informally recognizing as the eastern limit of acceptable German advance into the

Kalahari. Stanley did not answer until September and then only with instructions for the British commissioner to operate within the bounds of his original instructions from Gladstone's government. Accordingly, British subjects wanting London's protection were to keep out of Germany's way west of the Kalahari border.⁷⁵ However, the Cape Ministers had other convictions about letting Germany that far inland and had hoped a change in government in London might effect that. In a dispatch of August 1885, the Cape Ministers objected to Britain's refusal to protect or annex Hereroland east of Walvis Bay and requested that the Governor "urge Her Majesty's Government to refrain from forcing the inhabitants of that country to acquiesce in German annexation."⁷⁶ However, bowing to London's clear instructions, Robinson answered his ministers on July 30 with a note that sounded much like Granville and Derby: "Her Majesty's Government have expressed a hope that no endeavour will be made by [the Cape] Ministers to obtain political influence in the country north of the Orange River and west of the 20th meridian of longitude, and the Governor trusts that [the] Ministers will be so good as to instruct the various frontier officers accordingly."⁷⁷ At this time, Robinson also reported informing Maherero of the Herero and William Christian of the Bondelswarts (a southern Nama tribe just north of the Orange River) that Britain, and thus the Cape, refused to intervene in their regions.

In regard to the remaining rivalry between De Pass and Luderitz, the Joint Commission on Southwest African private claim disputes finally made its decisions known in September 1885. Although the German and British Commissioners were able to agree in some cases, they went to their respective

corners on the major issues, as reflected in a telegraph from Robinson: "British Commissioner considers islands in lease of 1869, although not annexed to Colony, to be British, and the claims under lease valid; German Commissioner disagrees." Regarding the Luderitz-De Pass rivalry on the mainland, Governor Robinson relayed: "British Commissioner considers De Pass, Spence, and Co[mpany]'s proprietary claims on mainland, under grants from [Bethanie Nama] Chief David Christian of 1863 and 1864, including entire coast of Angra Pequena, to be valid; German Commissioner disagrees." Robinson added that the "British Commissioner considers De Pass, Spence, and Co[mpany]'s claims for rent [from Luderitz's] German factory at Angra Pequena, and for compensation for damage done to Penguin Island through such factory on mainland opposite, valid; German Commissioner disagrees."⁷⁸

Robinson's subsequent written report went into more detail. The Commission agreed to many small, preexisting claims by British, Boer, and German entrepreneurs in Southwest Africa, especially regarding small mining claims. The Commission also agreed to give the Rhenish Missionary Society land and privileges in Walvis Bay to build a church, a school, and other buildings throughout the Bay's territory. Therefore all of Southwest Africa was now open to the RMS. The Commission did agree to deny questionable grants and claims made by many, especially Boers, to capitalize on the situation in the change of landlords. Though the British commissioner wanted to give the large mining grant, given by Maherero, to the British businessman Lewis, which the German commissioner vetoed. Likewise, the British commissioner wanted to give the title of land to Anders Ohlsson, an employee of De Pass, in Sandwich Harbor while his German counterpart only wanted to recommend that no one

disturb him as long as he confined himself to fishing. The real conflicts came on issues between De Pass, Spence & Company versus Luderitz's Southwest African Colonization Company, in which both commissioners backed their countrymen. The British representative supported De Pass' questionable claim to Shark Island, whereas the German commissioner denied that it was included in any lease though he was willing to allow De Pass & Company to use Angra Pequena harbor for their guano business without any official land title. The German representative rejected De Pass' 1864 deed which included the mainland because it was only a lease, whereas Luderitz's was a deed of purchase. The German commissioner also rejected his counterpart's support for De Pass' 1000 pounds per annum rent claim on Luderitz, since by Spence's own admission Luderitz's factory was well outside De Pass' supposed claim. Furthermore, the German commissioner flatly denied De Pass' claim to 89,205 pounds worth of damages to guano supply on Penguin island--he declared that Spence had submitted the claim after the established deadline anyway. Overall, the dispute between Luderitz and De Pass remained unresolved.⁷⁹ A real scare alarmed Cape Town and London though in late September and early October, 1885, when the Commission found the eastern boundary of Walvis Bay to be incorrectly defined. However, whether respecting that Britain had cooperated in withdrawing support for the Herero or whether giving Salisbury's new government some room, Germany decided not to exploit this and cooperated with the British in redefining the eastern boundary correctly.⁸⁰

Making a productive colony out of Southwest Africa was just as uncertain and clumsy as the negotiations that created it. The first year of the German colony was a disappointment for Luderitz's mining. Roads had to be laid, wells

dug, and mines improved or created. More money was going in than coming out. To make matters worse, one of Luderitz's ships, the Tilly, sunk off the coast with expensive drilling equipment for water wells and other essential equipment. This disaster coupled with a poor start put the Bremen merchant on the threshold of ruin. Bismark himself called Luderitz's domain the *sandpotjie* or "little sand pot."⁸¹

However the diplomatic channels became emblazed once more when news came that a British trader, W. W. Jordan, had purchased land from an Ovambo chief; the land was disputed territory between the Ovambos and the Herero in the northern part of the colony. The Ovambos inhabited the far northern regions where adequate rainfall enabled cultivation. Their numbers far exceeded the Herero and Nama put together, yet the southern-most of the Ovambo seemed dominated by the Herero, possibly because of the modern weapons the Herero had from English traders. What came as a shock was that Jordan had declared the region he purchased, which the Herero also claimed, an independent republic. He named his supposed republic "Upingtonia" after a Cape official who was a proponent of northern expansion for the Cape.⁸² Jordan declared himself president and considered a group of Boer settlers around him as his council. The Cape's agent-general or lobbyist in London, wrote to the Colonial Office on January 7, 1886, after telegraphing a short request to the Cape the previous day: "Excitement--Reuter's cable Upingtonia Republic--Wire Facts."⁸³ The Cape telegraphed back:

Jordan trader alleges purchase part [Ovamboland] from Chief. He resold in farms to Europeans who without authority have named district Upingtonia, and established some Council. Cape Government never heard of transaction till newspapers had obtained information and have no connexion [sic] with matter. They are studiously avoiding

all interference north of Orange River as requested by Imperial Government.⁸⁴

There were some British subjects who were so frustrated with not being able to officially keep parts of Southwest Africa out of German hands that they were willing to do it on their own privately. Although the Germans had not claimed Ovamboland as far as Portuguese Angola yet, they had already claimed control over Hereroland, and Upingtonia was right in between Ovamboland and Hereroland. The Ovambo claimed the region was their's to sell to Jordan, which the Herero denied. In fact, the Herero even regarded these particular Ovambo as their vassals. This time the Germans supported the Herero, having been firm supporters of the Nama up until this time. Of course, they were supporting Maherero for their own gain, to eliminate any rival claims to Southwest Africa. Although the Cape was officially "hands off," there were many who hoped Upingtonia would succeed. Colonial Secretary Stanley had Salisbury informed of the matter on January 12, 1886, stating that: "Having regard to the declarations made by Her Majesty's Government as to their abandonment of all claims or interest [in Hereroland], they could not interfere . . . without incurring the risk of a serious misunderstanding with the German Government."⁸⁵ Also at this time, British officials gave attention to a *Times* article of January 8, which announced the arrival of a German official in Berlin with treaties securing German control over all of Southwest Africa from the Orange River in the south to Cape Frio in the north, and to 22 degrees east longitude (which was in conflict with the Anglo-German agreement regarding the 20 degree east longitude Kalahari border). The Colonial Office wanted Ambassador Edward Malet, Ampthill's replacement in Berlin, to inquire into this

new eastern claim "as the Government of the Cape Colony and the German Government have already been informed that the British protectorate over Bechuanaland extends westward as far as the 20th degree of East longitude and northward to the 22nd parallel of South latitude."⁸⁶ Furthermore, Colonial Secretary Stanley in a dispatch to Cape Governor Robinson on January 13, reaffirmed that Salisbury's government intended to stand with the decision of Gladstone's not to get involved west of the 20th east longitude, and therefore not to get any ideas regarding Upingtonia.⁸⁷ Matters remained intense though.

Interestingly, some British subjects in Southwest Africa resented Jordan's self-proclaimed republic as much as the Germans did. Robinson received a letter from R. Lewis, the same English mining entrepreneur who had been denied a Herero mining concession near Otavi (which would lie in Upingtonia) by the German commissioner. This time Lewis was on the German side in rejecting Upingtonia, for obvious self-interest. Lewis claimed to be writing to the Cape Governor on behalf of Maherero, though his own interests seem at the heart of it:

I am desired by [Maherero] . . . to seek your aid in the withdrawal of one W.W. Jordan who is going about buying certain tracts of country belonging to me. . . . For instance he has purchased Raipoort from the [Nama] to whom it certainly does not belong. He has further bought at Ondonga from an Ovambo minor Chief, certain land on my northern territory, including Otavi. He is buying from whom he can, whether they have the power or right to sell it or not. This to him seems to be outside the question altogether. I would here further state that we do not acknowledge any such purchases.⁸⁸

Lewis, still claiming Maherero's words, went on to say that Jordan's life was in danger because of his mischief and mischance. In one instance, when Jordan gave an Ovambo minor chief some brandy, the chief died an hour later making

the Ovambo tribe believe that Jordan poisoned him. Maherero claimed that the Ovambo "will kill Jordan if they can lay hands on him." The Herero overlord also reported that his own people, the Herero, "are so enraged against him . . . that the Chief will not hold himself responsible for what the people may do to him."⁸⁹ Robinson replied to the Herero request with the standard conviction that the Cape could not involve itself in matters west of the Kalahari line, save for Walvis Bay. The Governor could only suggest that Lewis write a complaint to the German Commissioner, and Stanley sent his approval of Robinson's actions.⁹⁰

German expansion in Southwest Africa continued despite the phantom republic of Upingtonia, making the issue of the specific eastern boundary of the colony sensitive. British Ambassador Malet finally did send confirmation from Berlin that the Germans did not claim an extended eastern border for Southwest Africa as the *Times* had earlier reported (the Germans acknowledged the 20 degree east longitude Kalahari border, not 22 degrees east as reported by the London paper). However, despite the fact that Germany confirmed the boundary between Southwest Africa and Bechuanaland, this was really only applicable in the southern reaches of the colony--no border had yet been agreed upon north of 22 degrees south latitude, or just north of the Tropic of Capricorn. In the meantime the Germans tried to at least become more involved in the Kalahari by pushing its occupation to the very borders of Bechuanaland. German Ambassador Hatzfeldt informed London that "territories which are situated eastward of the Southwest African Protectorate . . . which belong to the [Nama] of Berseba and Gibeon, to the Bastards of Rehoboth, to the Herero, and to the Red People [a branch off the Nama] have, in consequence of Treaties . . .

been placed under the protection of the Reich.”⁹¹ On February 3, 1886, Colonial Secretary Stanley sent word to Robinson that Germany had finally and officially declared its expansion all the way to Bechuanaland, including all of Hereroland and Namaland. With the eastern part of the colony for the most part established, Germany’s only task seemed now to negotiate control over Ovamboland--at least in terms of international recognition--part of which laid in Portuguese Angola and part in Southwest Africa.⁹²

In the midst of Germany’s expansion and the resulting difficulties, a new government formed again in London in February 1886, with Rosebery chosen as Foreign Secretary and Granville, who was Gladstone’s old Foreign Secretary, now the new Colonial Secretary. However, again the minor officials in both offices remained much the same, with interdepartmental affairs remaining fairly unchanged.⁹³ In this government’s first actions regarding Southwest Africa, Rosebery sent Granville a note enclosing information from a British official in Lisbon, Portugal. The Portuguese were not happy in regards to Upingtonia which they considered created “by some Boers and Englishmen” and must have considered the district farther north than what it actually was to consider it a threat. The official reported that “anything likely to interfere with a free expansion eastward of Portuguese territory into the heart of the South African Continent traverses a fixed purpose of Portuguese and Colonial Policy, and therefore excites vigilant attention here.”⁹⁴ Portugal had also been whipped into the new colonial enthusiasm and “scramble for Africa” by Germany’s presence and had now entered the situation as another opponent of Upingtonia along with Germany and the Herero. However the major

breakthrough came in March 1886. Foreign Secretary Rosebery had sent a dispatch to Ambassador Malet in Berlin, ordering him to inquire from Bismark whether an Anglo-German conference could meet in Berlin to sort out the still unresolved private claims in Southwest Africa which the Joint Commission in Cape Town failed to agree upon. Rosebery suggested a possible meeting between British officials and Dr. Friedrich Krauel, the German Foreign Ministry's colonial planner. Bismark agreed. If a major Anglo-German agreement could be made resolving all outstanding issues regarding the colonies, Germany and Britain could look more into a possible alliance. However, both sides delayed organizing the conference for several months. In the meantime, both London and Berlin bickered over unresolved details trying to gain an advantage. German Ambassador Hatzfeldt filed a complaint from Chief Manasse Noresch of the Red People (a subtribe of the Nama) with London, in that:

The western and northern boundary, 20 E. long. and 22 S. lat., fixed by the English Government for its protected district in Bechuanaland, cuts off . . . a portion of lands and hunting grounds belonging to the Red People. The bushmen subject to him had lived from time immemorial to a point as far east as Nosob. He places his boundary in the east as reaching from the Chamob River to the Nyami [or Ngami], which seems to agree with the boundary which separates the territories of the [Nama] from those of Betschuana. The [German] Imperial Government . . . is not in a position to judge of the justness of these claims within the British Protectorate which it has recognised. It would however, regret if in consequence simply of a boundary drawn according to latitude and longitude the Red People should be deprived of lands which have belonged to them for a long time.⁹⁵

Evidently Germany, at least along the northern section of its eastern frontier with Bechuanaland, felt confident enough to pursue a more eastern limit towards the Okavango region, a region that annually flooded to become a luscious watering hole in the middle of the arid region north of the Kalahari. It seemed to Britain

that Germany wanted a piece of it, with the Germans actually using the suzerainty of some Nama over particular bushmen as a means to that end. This would definitely be one issue in the coming conference.⁹⁶

In April and on into May 1886, while London was trying to get its side of a conference delegation organized, the Colonial Office was swamped amid an increased tempo of actions regarding Southwest Africa. On May 7, for example, De Pass & Company sent a simple request to the Colonial Office: "We should be happy to hear if any progress has been made in the Angra Pequena and coastal claims, as we have not been favoured with any communication of late."⁹⁷ Colonial Secretary Granville had De Pass answered with news of the new conference. London also received requests from the Portuguese government wanting information about Upingtonia. However, it was not until June that Granville's office was even able to send Robinson's report on Upingtonia to Foreign Secretary Rosebery. This report did confirm that Jordan had purchased the area from the Ovambo and was now inviting South Africans to come and settle. Governor Robinson also reported that Chief Maherero likewise claimed it and had already given it as a silver mining concession to R. Lewis. Yet, most of the important information the Governor sent was unrelated to Upingtonia but regarded the German colony in general. Cape Governor Robinson warned in his report that the northern regions of and around Bechuanaland, which was ambiguously defined (with only the southern part of the western boundary recognized with the German colony) be attended to else it "is likely to be appropriated by some other power."⁹⁸ These seemed to be issues destined for the planned conference. The Colonial Office was also

prompted in May with news from Ambassador Malet that the Reichstag had received and recorded all treaties securing control over the Southwest African tribes, save the Ovambo. Such news made London quicken its pace. Granville suggested to Rosebery that they send John Bramston, Assistant Under Secretary in the Colonial Office under Gladstone and Salisbury governments, to the Berlin conference to help British Charge d'Affairs Scott since Bramston had been involved in the affair since the very genesis of the German colony.⁹⁹

While London awaited the conference it received more news regarding the status of German and British power in the region of Southwest Africa. In late June, London received a dispatch from Walvis Bay that a German ship on her way to Cameroon had stopped there. It stated that: "The captain made particular inquiries as to the possibility of landing at the mouth of Swakop River, which the magistrate told him was not possible on account of the surf and reefs of rocks at the mouth." Actually, the later German establishment of Swakopmund as a port would challenge this opinion. A German professor and geologist also came through Walvis Bay on his way to the interior "to examine the various mines" while other Germans were buying up "the various mines from the present owners, natives, and traders."¹⁰⁰ German momentum seemed to be building both on the coast and in the interior, while Walvis Bay was becoming a ghost port. A British naval commander reported that although meat from fishing and herding was plentiful, vegetables in Walvis Bay were rare, and that:

None but slightly brackish water is to be procured; all drinking water is brought from the Cape by the schooners trading with the settlement. Of trade there is very little indeed, and that falling off; a good many years ago, a quantity of ivory, ostrich feathers, and skins used to be exported to the Cape, but little now; occasionally a few

cattle are shipped to St. Helena. [The Resident Magistrate] said that one small schooner of a 100 tons would bring all the merchandise and carry away all the produce for a whole year. No merchant vessels or whalers ever visit the harbour; the coasting schooners . . . call about once in three months from the Cape, and bring the drinking water and the few stores that are required . . . and get a cargo of dried fish which they take to the Cape. No revenue is collected at [Walvis], as it is established as a free port of entry and export, except from licenses to sell spirits, etc.¹⁰¹

Evidently Walvis Bay, also known as Walfisch (“Whale fish”) Bay, was now worthless with the whaling days of its namesake gone. Also, Walvis Bay was only of value as a doorway into Southwest Africa. With the Germans cutting it off from the interior, its only value to the Cape was that it was not in German hands. If the Germans could control a port with the geography of Walvis Bay it would enhance their power tremendously. Instead the Germans built Swakopmund next door to Walvis Bay. Luderitz had wanted to find a harbor on the northern coast equal in potential to that of Angra Pequena, but he settled on making something at the mouth of the Swakop River despite warnings against the surf.

Finally, the Berlin Conference on Southwest Africa met in July 1886, with Bramston and the British embassy Charge d’Affairs Scott representing Britain, and with German colonial head Dr. Friedrich Krauel and Southwest African commissioner Dr. Heinrich Goering (the father of the later *Luftwaffe* head), representing the Reich. Overall, the Germans were the acknowledged rulers of mainland Southwest Africa, with the commercial rights of Daniel De Pass respected only offshore though not to De Pass’ liking. Dr. Goering acknowledged De Pass’ private property rights on all of the islands save a few unspecified islets and rocks, including Shark Island in Angra Pequena harbor,

which Goering believed to be German. He pointed out that De Pass' lease ran out on some islands in 1895 after which Luderitz's company would take over the private rights. Dr. Goering also affirmed that De Pass' claims to interior mines and mainland areas should be canceled, using Spence's deed as evidence. Where Spence had interpreted the Dutch word *vergunning* to mean land "grant" Goering pointed out that it really means "permission" to use the land in Dutch, which is what David Christian speaking in Dutch would have meant. Therefore when Luderitz purchased the land, he became the landlord and could cancel that permission. The German delegates presented other issues in arguments favorable to Luderitz's position. However, the Germans did not press their issues too far, and most of the issues of private ownership or lease were decided in favor of the British. The main concern for Berlin was to resolve the issues and bring British involvement in Southwest Africa to an end, while still keeping Angra Pequena German and the British in a favorable enough mood to eventually deal with other colonial issues. The British delegation basically complied with Goering's decisions, they agreed that the islands would become Luderitz's after De Pass' leases ran out and even agreed to give up their sovereignty over the unspecified islands, islets, and rocks, such as Shark Island if the Germans respected De Pass' leases until their expiration. On July 15 all four representatives signed the protocol (though not nearly enough outstanding issues had been resolved involving Anglo-German rivalry over Southwest Africa let alone the other German colonies). Unfortunately for Luderitz, he would never see the day when De Pass' possessions fell into his hands. The Bremen merchant drowned later that year when his boat capsized while on an expedition on the Orange River. More out

of patriotism than any faith in Southwest Africa's resources, German businessmen came to the aid and formed the *Deutsche Kolonial Gesellschaft fur Sudwestafrika*, or German Colonial Company for Southwest Africa. This organization assumed control over the colony, though almost immediately many British investors moved in.¹⁰²

The effects of the race for private claims in Southwest Africa were being felt. On July 27, 1886, De Pass & Company wrote to Granville's office informing them that Spence was now bankrupt and that therefore all his interests was De Pass' alone. In a slightly self-serving tone, De Pass wrote: "The compensation and other benefits which will be made in respect of the Angra Pequena and coast claim will therefore belong to us."¹⁰³ The London businessman also wrote that he expected that the Colonial Office would inform him of the settlement just completed in Berlin. Of course, unknown to De Pass, the Protocol of July 15 contained no monetary compensation for De Pass' guano loss. The Colonial Office answered De Pass within a few days, but only acknowledged Spence's reported bankruptcy and told him that they would furnish information on the Berlin agreement shortly.¹⁰⁴

On August 2, the Colonial Secretary gave formal approval of the Berlin Protocol involving Southwest Africa. The Colonial Office reported to Rosebery that "Lord Granville is glad that this satisfactory termination of the questions awaiting settlement has been attained."¹⁰⁵ London, it seemed, was relieved to have the issue finally resolved after three years, and the attention of three ministries. Berlin too was delighted to have the private issues involving the British in Southwest Africa resolved, so that the Reich could turn its attention

towards carving out a hinterland for the colony and resolving more official, and in Berlin's eyes more important, issues with Britain concerning Southwest Africa and the other German colonies. At least the 1886 Berlin Protocol Agreement removed De Pass and Luderitz as stumbling blocks.

NOTES

¹Commons, British, Vol. 1884/1885 LVI, No. 11-12 (Encl. 1-2), pp. 21-23.

²Holstein, Papers, Vol. III, p. 127.

³Holstein, Papers, Vol. III, pp. 126, 128.

⁴Commons, British, Vol. 1884/1885 LVI, No. 7-8, pp. 15-17.

⁵Commons, British, Vol. 1884/1885 LVI, No. 9, pp. 17-18.

⁶Commons, British, Vol. 1884/1885 LVI, No. 10 (Encl. 1), p. 19.

⁷Pakenham, Scramble, p. 217; Commons, British, Vol. 1884/1885 LVI, No. 10 (Encl. 1-2), pp. 18-21.

⁸Commons, British, Vol. 1884/1885 LVI, No. 12, p. 22.

⁹Commons, British, Vol. 1884/1885 LVI, No. 12-13, 15-18 (Encl.), pp. 21, 24-31.

¹⁰Commons, British, Vol. 1884/1885 LVI, No. 14, pp. 24-25.

¹¹Commons, British, Vol. 1884/1885 LVI, No. 19 (Encl.), pp. 32-33.

¹²Commons, British, Vol. 1884/1885 LVI, No. 23 (Encl.), p. 34.

¹³Commons, British, Vol. 1884/1885 LVI, No. 24, p. 36.

¹⁴Commons, British, Vol. 1884/1885 LVI, No. 32 (Encl.), p. 40.

¹⁵Commons, British, Vol. 1884/1885 LVI, No. 29, p. 38.

¹⁶Commons, British, Vol. 1884/1885 LVI, No. 27-29, pp. 37-38.

¹⁷Commons, British, Vol. 1884/1885 LVI, No. 33-34, 37, pp. 41-42.

¹⁸"French and German Annexations in West Africa," *Times*, (September

4, 1884), p. 5e.

¹⁹"Germany," *Times*, (September 16, 1884), p. 5c.

²⁰"Germany and Africa," *Times*, (September 17, 1884), p. 5c.

²¹"Germany and Africa," *Times*, (September 19, 1884), p. 3c.

²²Commons, British, Vol. 1884/1885 LVI, No. 38 (Encl. 1), p. 43.

²³Holstein, Papers, Vol. III, p. 131.

²⁴Commons, British, Vol. 1884/1885 LVI, No. 38 (Encl. 2), p. 43.

²⁵Holstein, Papers, Vol. III, p. 131.

²⁶Holstein, Papers, Vol. III, p. 131 (Note 3), 133, 137 (Note 4), 138.

²⁷Holstein, Papers, Vol. III, p. 138.

²⁸Holstein, Papers, Vol. III, p. 135-136, 141.

²⁹Commons, British, Vol. 1884/1885 LVI, No. 39 (Encl.), p. 44.

³⁰Commons, British, Vol. 1884/1885 LVI, No. 41, 43-45, 47, pp. 47-48.

³¹Commons, British, Vol. 1884/1885 LVI, No. 45, p. 48.

³²Commons, British, Vol. 1884/1885 LVI, No. 46 (Encl.), p. 49.

³³Commons, British, Vol. 1884/1885 LVI, No. 46-50, 65, pp. 48-56, 64.

³⁴Commons, British, Vol. 1884/1885 LVI, No. 56 (Encl.), p. 61.

³⁵Commons, British, Vol. 1884/1885 LVI, No. 58, p. 61.

³⁶Commons, British, Vol. 1884/1885 LVI, No. 56, 62, 65, pp. 60, 63-65.

³⁷Commons, British, Vol. 1884/1885 LVI, No. 72. pp. 71.

³⁸Commons, British, Vol. 1884/1885 LVI, No. 72, 74-75, 78, pp. 73-75.

³⁹Commons, British, Vol. 1884/1885 LVI, No. 81 (Encl.), p. 77.

⁴⁰Commons, British, Vol. 1884/1885 LVI, No. 86 (Encl.), p. 87.

⁴¹Commons, British, Vol. 1884/1885 LVI, No. 81 (Encl.)-82, 84-86 (Encl.), pp. 77-87.

⁴²Quoted in Pakenham, Scramble, pp. 241-242.

⁴³U. K. House of Commons, British Sessional Papers, Vol. 1884/1885 LIV, Edgar L. Erickson (ed.), (New York: Readex Microprint, 1948-1967), No. 2, p. 656.

⁴⁴Commons, British, Vol. 1884/1885 LIV, No. 2, p. 656.

⁴⁵Commons, British, Vol. 1884/1885 LIV, No. 2, p. 656.

⁴⁶"Bechuanaland," *Times*, (December 18, 1884), p. 3e; "The Transvaal Boers," *Times*, (December 22, 1884), p. 6b.

⁴⁷Commons, British, Vol. 1884/1885 LIV, No. 2 (Encl. 1), p. 657.

⁴⁸Commons, British, Vol. 1884/1885 LIV, No. 2 (Encl. 1), p. 657.

⁴⁹Commons, British, Vol. 1884/1885 LIV, No. 2 (Encl. 1), p. 658.

⁵⁰Commons, British, Vol. 1884/1885 LIV, No. 3-4 (Encl.), pp. 660-661.

⁵¹Commons, British, Vol. 1884/1885 LIV, No. 4 (Encl. 1), p. 661.

⁵²Commons, British, Vol. 1884/1885 LIV, No. 4 (Encl. 1), p. 663.

⁵³Commons, British, Vol. 1884/1885 LIV, No. 4 (Encl. 2)-5, pp. 663-665.

⁵⁴Holstein, Papers, Vol. III, p. 154.

⁵⁵Holstein, Papers, Vol. III, pp. 145 (Note 2), 148, 154 (Note 3), 157-158, 164, 170.

⁵⁶U. K. House of Commons, British Sessional Papers, Vol. 1887 LXI, Edgar L. Erickson (ed.), (New York: Readex Microprint, 1948-1967), No. 2, pp. 13-14.

⁵⁷Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 3, p. 14.

⁵⁸Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 4 (Encl.), p. 15.

⁵⁹Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 7-9, p. 17.

⁶⁰Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 5-6, pp. 16-17.

⁶¹Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 7, p. 17.

⁶²Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 8-9, p. 17.

⁶³Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 13 (Encl. 1), pp. 21-22.

⁶⁴Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 13 (Encl. 2), pp. 23-24;
Governor Robinson to Maherero, March 5, 1885: "I thank you for the offer you have made, which I appreciate as a proof of your goodwill towards the British Government, but it is my duty to tell you that it cannot be accepted."

⁶⁵Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 19, p. 27.

⁶⁶Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 20 (Encl.), pp. 27-28.

⁶⁷Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 21, p. 28.

⁶⁸Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 16, 19, 22, pp. 25, 27-28.

⁶⁹Commons, British, Vol. 1884/1885 LVI, No. 17, p. 26.

⁷⁰Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 11, p. 19.

⁷¹Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 15, p. 24.

⁷²Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 18, p. 26.

⁷³Pakenham, Scramble, pp. 276-280.

⁷⁴Pakenham, Scramble, pp. 280-281.

⁷⁵Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 23 (Encl.), pp. 28-29.

- 76Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 24 (Encl. 1), p. 29.
- 77Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 24 (Encl. 2), p. 30.
- 78Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 26, p. 31.
- 79Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 27 (Encl.), pp. 32-36.
- 80Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 29 (Encl. 1-2)-31, pp. 36-39.
- 81Esterhuysen, Establishment, pp. 91-93; First, South West Africa, p. 73.
- 82Walker, Southern Africa, pp. 401, 403.
- 83Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 34 (Encl. 1), p. 40.
- 84Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 34 (Encl. 2), p. 40.
- 85Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 36, p. 40.
- 86Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 36, p. 41.
- 87Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 37, p. 41.
- 88Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 39 (Encl. 1), p. 42.
- 89Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 39 (Encl. 1), p. 42.
- 90Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 39 (Encl. 2)-40, p. 43.
- 91Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 42 (Encl.), p. 44.
- 92Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 43, 45 (Encl.), pp. 44-46.
- 93Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 45, 47, pp. 45-46.
- 94Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 46 (Encl.), p. 46.
- 95Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 51 (Encl. and trans.), p. 48.
- 96Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 48 (Encl.), 50 (Encl.), 52 (Encl.),

54, pp. 47-50.

⁹⁷Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 57, p. 51.

⁹⁸Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 62 (Encl.), p. 57.

⁹⁹Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 59 (Encl.)-60, pp. 51-56.

¹⁰⁰Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 66 (Encl.), pp. 59-60.

¹⁰¹Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 66 (Encl.), p. 60.


¹⁰²Eschel M. Rhodie, South West: The Last Frontier in Africa. (New York: Twin Circle Publishing Inc., 1967), p. 135; Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 67 (Encl.), pp. 60-69; Pakenham, Scramble, p. 604.

¹⁰³Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 68, p. 69.

¹⁰⁴Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 69-70, p. 70.

¹⁰⁵Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 71, p. 70.

PLATE 2



Chapter 3

Walls Raised

Late in the summer of 1886 the British government switched hands again when the Liberal Unionists deserted the Liberal Party. Salisbury's old friend Stafford Northcote, who was now the Earl of Iddesleigh, was made Foreign Secretary replacing Rosebery. Likewise, Granville was replaced with Edward Stanhope as the new head of the Colonial Office; yet familiar names remained in the lower echelons of both offices--including John Bramston. Iddesleigh sent off a letter to the Colonial Office as early as August 9, confirming the protocol reached with Berlin that summer which resolved the private disputes plaguing Anglo-German negotiations over Southwest Africa. Again the new officials backed decisions of the prior ministry and there was a smooth transition in colonial diplomacy without any abrupt reversals. Besides, the Skeleton Coast and the lands between the Namib and Kalahari were not any areas to fight for; the real target now became the trans-Zambezi region and East Africa. Yet Southwest Africa continued to be important as Germany tightened its grip on the colony and expanded the colony into the interior.¹

Upingtonia was one standing issue of private, and official, dispute not dealt with by the Berlin conference. Englishman W. W. Jordan had purchased land from the Ovambo and declared his realm an independent republic in the face of German and Herero claims. In early August 1886, new Colonial Secretary Stanhope indirectly received a request from Upingtonia settlers to reveal the German efforts of supporting the Herero in their claim to the region over the Ovambo--and therefore over Jordan who claimed it. The Colonial Office obtained a copy of the April 21, 1885, deed of purchase from the Ovambo

which had Chief Kambonde Kampingana's (of the southern Ovambo tribe of Ondanga) pledge that "in case it should at any time become necessary for Mr. W. W. Jordan to hold possession of [Upingtonia] . . . by force, we pledge ourselves to assist him and to do so with the strength of the whole of our tribe."² Of course, this was before Jordan had his brandy debacle with the Ovambo. Evidently Jordan made some sort of an appeal to the German representative in Southwest Africa, L. Nels (Reich Commissioner Goering's representative). Nels replied to Jordan: "In consequence of the preliminary information which I have gathered the Herero will at present be protected in the possession of [the Otavi region or Upingtonia]. I therefore request you and those Boers commissioned by you to sojourn on neutral grounds till the question shall be definitely settled." The German official also wrote to Jordan that "the German Government can but consent to a settlement of Boers in a territory under German protection provided that it is performed in a just and peaceful manner, as such would be favourable to the advancement of civilization in this territory. Please make the Boers acquainted with the above." So began Germany's attack on the phantom republic, while trying not to alienate any Boers. Nels informed Jordan that the latter would not be able to send goods through Herero territory "in consideration of the notorious hostile behaviour which you have formerly shown towards the Hereros and which has been evidently declared to me by creditable Europeans." As for lifting this embargo in the future, the German declared that "it will depend on your future behaviour."³ Jordan retorted:

[I] in reply beg to inform you that by virtue of deed of purchase and by right of occupation I and the burghers of the district intend holding firm possession of the same, and totally ignore the pretentious claims of the Hereros to this portion of Ovamboland in which is situated the Otavi Mines. In re[gard] to your actions in sanctioning the pro-

hibitions of my goods and transport passing through [Hereroland], and of your assuming sovereign rights prior to the confirmation of the German Imperial Government to the establishing of its protectorate over [Hereroland], I will hold you responsible for all losses I sustain in my business or otherwise. Any further communication you have to make on this subject you will please address to J. Lees, Esq., 9. Cape Good Hope Bank Chambers, Cape Town.⁴

Jordan intended to fight for Upingtonia. Interestingly, though there was never any official support from the Cape, some Cape colonists did give Jordan some private support. However, Stanhope's Colonial Office wrote to Upingtonian associates with the now standard response for involvement in Southwest Africa: Britain would not interfere west of the 20th east longitude, where Upingtonia was clearly situated.⁵

Later on October 22, 1886, news reached London that W. W. Jordan, the self-proclaimed president of his self-proclaimed republic of Upingtonia, had been murdered. The *Cape Times* and a private letter provided the Colonial Office with a description of the incident which occurred on August 8. According to this information, thirty Ovambo found Jordan's wagon parked outside a missionary house for the evening. Talking with Jordan's driver:

The driver replied that his master was still asleep, but that he would call him. Whereupon Mr. Jordan was roused, and got out of the wagon, greeted all those present, and sat down by the fire, and commenced lacing his boots. While so engaged the driver handed him a cup of tea, and as Jordan raised himself to take the tea, the Ovambo directly opposite him, at a distance of some three feet, discharged the contents of a double-barreled elephant-gun right into his chest. Mr. Jordan fell, and death was instantaneous. The driver on seeing this ran to the wagon for his gun, whereupon the Ovambos opened fire . . . from the effects of which he died some 48 hours after. . . . [Their chief upon being informed] dispatched some eight bushmen to the scene of the murder in order to bury Jordan.⁶

John Cane, the *Cape Times* correspondent in Southwest Africa, added:

It is only to be hoped that immediate steps will be taken by our [Cape] Government to aid us, and exterminate this cowardly, wicked, and treacherous Ovambo race. The blood of missionaries, the blood of traders, and the blood of Will Jordan to-day cries out in vengeance against these people, the Ovambo tribes, and we petition to you, the civilised Powers of Europe--England, Germany, Belgium, France, and Portugal--to come over and help us.⁷

Most of the time the Ovambo kept out of the affairs of lands farther south but were known in the past to have killed some Catholic missionaries and others. Only the FMS seemed to make headway with them evangelically, but few Europeans tried to ever encroach upon their land. However, in this case Jordan had been provoking both the Herero and the Ovambo into a confrontation, and he had been warned by Maherero, the paramount Herero chief who wanted the Cape to get Jordan out of the region. As for any revenge, obeying London's instructions the Cape could not intervene in matters north of the Orange River and west of the Kalahari border. An anonymous letter from Southwest Africa to the Cape, dated August 18, read: "There is little doubt that 'Upingtonia' will now collapse, and I think the Boers will soon leave either for the Transvaal or for Humpata in Portuguese territory."⁸ Many of the Boers did stay in Southwest Africa, however under German control. In fact, the Boer population increased steadily, with many Cape Boers finding the Germans more to their liking. It is doubtful that the Germans had any hand in Jordan's murder, because the Reich barely had minimal control over the Herero and had never really tried to control the Ovambo. It seems Jordan's mistreatment of the indigenous population merely caught up with him.⁹ Later in November 1886, the Foreign Office decided to have Ambassador Malet in Berlin at least bring the issue of Jordan's

murder to Germany's attention, if it had not been done so already. The British Ambassador reported back that Count Herbert Bismark (the Chancellor's son) "spoke to me with regard to it yesterday and said that the Imperial Government was still in negotiation with the Portuguese Government respecting the northern limits of the territory over which Germany desired to exert its influence, but until these negotiations were complete the authority of the German Government would not be exerted in the regions concerned, and the tribe of Ovambos appeared to be within them."¹⁰ In other words, Germany shrugged off responsibility in the matter by stating it had as yet no official power in the region though they were working on getting that power. This happened despite the fact that the German representative earlier in the year felt he had enough power to make sanctions against Jordan in the region. Fortunately for Berlin, London did not press the matter.

Meanwhile, another old issue continued to cause controversy. Governor Robinson had finally responded to London's request for information on the Red People's (and therefore Germany's) claim to lands east of the 20th east longitude into Bechuanaland. The Cape Governor had researched the subject with inquiries made to those who had traveled through or resided with the Red People, a poor branch off the Nama who claimed suzerainty over the desert. Dr. Theophilus Hahn for instance told Robinson that he doubted the succession of the chief who Germany recognized over the Red People, and therefore questioned their claim over particular bushmen who dwelled and/or hunted between his realm and the Okavango region (to which Germany wanted access). However, Hahn did admit that the Red People themselves inhabited territory over to the 21 30' east longitude and sometimes all the way to Lake

Ngami in the Okavango, and that bushmen did in fact extend throughout western Bechuanaland both in and north of the Kalahari proper. Robinson also cited as an authority a former Cape civil commissioner who once officiated in Namaland, and "a trader who has been traveling through the country for the past 31 years."¹¹ Both seemed to agree that the Red People did in fact occupy lands further east than the 20th east longitude in some areas and that the bushmen were all over western Bechuanaland; yet they also reported that all the subtribes of the Nama and Herero had mistreated the bushmen. In the end Governor Robinson, in response to Germany's protest of the 20th east longitude border, believed that "any other boundary than an arbitrary astronomical line through such an unknown desert would be an impossibility, and it is inevitable that in the case of any such line drawn without reference to ethnological or topographical considerations, questions such as the present must arise with reference to claims which are sure to be set up by Chiefs on both the British and German sides of the boundary."¹² Robinson suggested that London should inform Berlin that, no matter where the border existed, Britain would guarantee the Red People access to hunting grounds in what England considered Bechuanaland. Stanhope forwarded Robinson's suggestion to the Foreign Office, with the recommendation that Iddesleigh have Berlin given the gist of it.¹³

Although the Anglo-German private property dispute involving Southwest Africa had been resolved, problems for Daniel De Pass remained when his associate, John Spence, went bankrupt. On November 9, 1886, Daniel De Pass wrote once again to the Colonial Office, this time complaining about the Cape not Luderitz. The Cape was forfeiting Spence's share in the company

(which was one-third) to possible public auction rather than giving them to De Pass. It seemed that traditional British law and new Cape policies were in conflict as to how Spence's bankrupt shares should be forfeited. Nevertheless, De Pass wrote to Stanhope that "if the Cape Government come into this property through the action of laws unprovided for, I have to urge that you will bring before the Cape Government the hardship and loss I should suffer should they take measures to sell this share by public auction, and set up a conflicting disturbance on the islands to the ruination of my property."¹³ The Colonial Office replied nine days later with the confirmation that the Colonial Secretary understood the fact that De Pass had control over the islands before they were annexed to the Cape and even before the Cape was given domestic autonomy from Britain. Yet Stanhope remained unclear how the shares should be forfeited, either by Cape or British policy, but could "express no opinion on it."¹⁴ However, the Colonial Secretary did have the Cape consider De Pass' situation, though admitting this would be his only intervention. The London firm wrote to Stanhope afterwards declaring their belief that the Cape policy would triumph and then suggested a possible deal in which the Cape could "make over to me this third share for, say a moderate increase of rent, the amount of which might be mutually arranged, and provided me with such documents that will protect me from the action of the present Cape insolvent law as regards forfeiture."¹⁵ The Colonial Secretary sent De Pass' letters to the Cape for the Ministers to consider. London wanted no more of De Pass' problems dealing with the islands off Southwest Africa.

By the end of the year more crucial issues affecting Southwest Africa

occurred. An agreement with Portugal established Southwest Africa's northern border. Germany pushed the boundary north from Cape Frio to the Kunene River. The border extended from the mouth of that river eastward to the Okavango River, which farther east dipped south into the inland delta region that Germany desired to gain from the British. With the northern border firmly established, and the southern Orange River border having been established very early on, Southwest Africa's eastern border (still technically open north of 22 south latitude) became the new focus. Berlin wanted at least part of the Okavango flood region and access to the Zambezi River which it considered a future highway into Central Africa and to German possessions in East Africa.¹⁶

However, the colonial rivalry and negotiations among the foremost European powers were not resolved during the course of 1886, nor into the next year, primarily due to matters in Europe. The new year of 1887 brought with it the continued mounting emergency in the Balkans in which Austria-Hungary's High Command was preparing for war with Russia in which Vienna would call upon Berlin for support. In addition, France again seemed to be moving further over to Russia's side. By March the German Reichstag approved an increased military budget for the next seven years, which by the end of the year they increased yet again, with the German High Command preparing for a two-front war against both France and Russia. However, with Britain having problems with France regarding Egypt (and Russia in Central Asia) and with Germany wanting to keep as much of its troops at home rather than abroad defending colonies, both Berlin and London moved towards a more helpful atmosphere while also trying to maintain the "scramble" against one another for Africa and Oceania.¹⁷ Salisbury continued to bring new vitality in Britain's race, and was

again both Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, replacing his old friend Iddesleigh, and having Stanhope replaced with H. T. Holland in the Colonial Office--though Bramston still remained at his desk. One of Salisbury's earliest actions in the Foreign Office was to officially accept the July 15 Protocol regarding Southwest Africa which his predecessors concluded. True to form, De Pass did not waste any time in sending a request to Colonial Secretary Holland to obtain a copy of it.¹⁹

De Pass, despite Scott and Bramston's ability to secure most of his private rights, was not pleased upon reading the Protocol agreement. On February 11, he wrote to Holland: "We have perused the copy of [the] Protocol . . . and do not consider that the agreement entered into . . . in reference to our claims is drawn in accordance with the justice which we . . . have a right to expect, and we will endeavour in due course to put this plainly before you. No mention is made of our claims to the mainland under a grant from David Christian so we shall be obliged if you will inform us of the result of the Commissioner's investigations of our title thereto." De Pass then inquired "what documents or title deeds we shall receive in reference to the Protocol to enable us to sell or transfer properties therein mentioned should we at any time wish to do so."¹⁹ The Colonial Office answered De Pass on February 23, 1887, with: "It was found quite impossible to induce the German Government to admit the present validity of the documents of 1863-64 . . . and the best compromise that was possible was made. . . . Further papers on the subject will shortly be presented to Parliament and that a copy of them will be sent to you."²⁰ Holland did agree to have the Germans provide documentation, but that was the extent

of it.

Animosity still remained in Southwest Africa despite any agreements, as evident by still another complaint from De Pass on March 22, 1887, reporting that Germans were still firing salutes to approaching ships, even for De Pass' ships who of course wanted no such thing since it scared the birds away. The London businessman enclosed a complaint his firm sent to the German Consul in Cape Town, which reported that a German employee, named only as Bedeker, was hurt firing a cannon salute to De Pass' ship, the Seabird, when it arrived at Luderitzbucht (Angra Pequena): "From the very earliest occupation of the shores of Angra Pequena by Luderitz's people we had reason to complain of disturbance by explosions, blasting of rocks, and firing of light and heavy guns. We represented through the Government that our guano islands were being injured, and we were informed that this unnecessary firing of heavy guns would be discontinued. We made certain claims through the Anglo-German Commission for the loss of guano, and our evidence as to disturbance was ignored." To highlight the effects of this irresponsibility, the complaint continued with: "The man Bedeker now brought up is a living witness of the truth of our statement, and we hope you will give order's to Mr. Luderitz's representative at Angra Pequena to deliver up this piece of artillery, the firing of which is heard at [the islands]."22 On April 2, 1887, the Colonial Office reported to De Pass that Salisbury was having Germany informed of the matter, though little was done.

The standoff between Austria and Russia continued through the year and into 1888, with both Germany and England dragging their feet in making any commitments to each other as far as any alliance if war broke out. But if a European war was to come, no one was willing to fire the first shot. Actually, the

death of Kaiser Wilhelm I on March 9, 1888, had a greater impact on German policymaking than international tensions. His son and successor, anglophile Crown Prince Friedrich III, however only ruled as Kaiser for 90 days before he in turn, died from throat cancer. So 1888 brought the Reich a new, young (only 29 years old), energetic Kaiser, Wilhelm II who had no interest in his father's liberalism but savored his grandfather's imperialism. Despite his grandmother being Britain's Queen Victoria, he was willing to shed the present anglophile attitudes if it served him.

The new Kaiser brought increased vitality into the "scramble for Africa," countered only by Salisbury's renewed imperialism once a vice-consul in Africa, Harry Johnston, gained his ear. In August, Foreign Office officials were astonished to open the *Times* of the 22nd to find all of Salisbury's secret plans for British extension into Africa published. When officials asked Johnston whether he did this, the young official replied: "Yes, and I think I may say Lord Salisbury knew of my doing so and did not disapprove."²² It told of Salisbury's plan for a British corridor extending from "the Cape-to-Cairo" to be laid out with plans to push north from the Cape into the trans-Zambezi region, through a corridor skirting Leopold's Congo and the Germans in East Africa, and to link up with the Nile. Diamond entrepreneur Cecil Rhodes, in South Africa, was only too willing to help with Salisbury's plans to cross the Zambezi.²³

As for Germany, the new Kaiser quickly began lessening tensions between Austria-Hungary and Russia, so that the Reich could once again focus on creating a large navy and extending imperial territories abroad. However, Chancellor Bismark seemed too old and out-dated for the young Kaiser. Bismark began receiving more criticism from Wilhelm II's throne than he had

from Kaiser Friedrich's and his English wife. The Iron Chancellor was losing his die-cast hold of the government. Alfred von Waldersee of the German High Command told Berlin officials how the Foreign Ministry many times did not know what the Reich Chancellery was doing and claimed that Bismark on one occasion drank two bottles of alcohol with him in less than two hours. Bismark was losing his influence and in late October 1888, he even had to remind the Foreign Ministry to direct matters for the Kaiser only through himself as it had been for so long.²⁴ By 1890, Bismark even began losing the support of the German public to the gain of the young Kaiser's popularity. Holstein advised Herbert Bismark that "under these circumstances it is inadvisable to push things to extremes as [the Chancellor] may have made up his mind to do during his solitary walks."²⁵ Tensions between Kaiser Wilhelm and the Iron Chancellor became too intense by now. The German emperor demanded that Bismark resign, which the Chancellor did in late March 1890. Holstein commented from the Foreign Ministry that Bismark had gradually become isolated because he himself avoided contact with political circles." The Foreign Ministry official commented, as if looking for an epitaph: "This fact was confirmed in a way which even I found surprising when yesterday in the Landtag not a single party could find a good word for Prince Bismark, not even the Conservatives. I find that quite incredible, but significant."²⁶ In the end, Bismark alienated rather than balanced the forces around him. Count Munster, who had been Berlin's ambassador in London (1873-1885) and now was ambassador in Paris (1885-1900), had been one of Bismark's pawns in the game and wrote an analysis of Anglo-German relations now that Bismark had fallen. Munster acknowledged

that Salisbury wanted to avoid colonial conflicts with Germany by reaching an agreement, though there were forces in London which did not--like Salisbury's own Colonial Secretary. The German Ambassador did shed light on the effects of Bismark's colonial policymaking:

While still Ambassador in London, I foresaw very clearly the inevitable outcome of the violent, reckless way in which Prince Bismark launched his colonial policy and unleashed a savage Press campaign against England. I gave repeated but fruitless warnings [to Berlin]--unfortunately no one would listen. Even those Englishmen who regard Russia as their natural foe and Germany their natural friend are indeed deeply shocked at the way we conducted our colonial affairs. Envy and rivalry play their part too; in Central Africa the [British and German East Africa companies] are at each other's throats and are setting their two countries against each other. . . . The wily [British East Africa Company] director, [William] Mackinnon, accordingly enlisted [Henry] Stanley, whose stand against Salisbury is intended to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for the English Company and the British government, just as we have unfortunately tried to do for our own. He will not succeed, but he is putting the British government in a very difficult position.²⁷

Munster then continued with comments about Paul von Hatzfeldt (the German ambassador in London after Munster, 1885-1901) who he believed: "Hopes to reach an agreement with Salisbury over East Africa through direct negotiations; but this will be very difficult because Salisbury can make no concessions to us that might endanger his position. . . . The Carolines fiasco set us at odds with Spain . . . the Samoa fiasco cost us well-earned influence . . . [but an East Africa fiasco] would be the most dangerous of all, for it would drive England into the arms of Russia and France."²⁸ Although not a top priority for Munster, Southwest Africa was right in the middle of this conflict as well.

Yet before Bismark's fall Germany had strengthened its wall around Southwest Africa, though it ran into some resistance. Bismark had sent Reich

Commissioner Dr. Goering to the colony to secure additional treaties from the indigenous groups. Goering was successful in negotiating a treaty with Maherero who wanted his Herero protected from the ever strengthening Nama. Goering found similar success with the Rehoboth Basters who even promised to muster troops to fight for the Germans if necessary. However the Nama, particularly under the guidance of Hendrik Witbooi, proved to be more of an obstacle. In fact, in April 1888 the Nama attacked the Herero. Though Maherero's forces were able to repel the attack the Herero paramount chief withdrew his treaty with Germany and expelled Goering, who quickly withdrew to Walvis Bay and from there to Berlin. The Herero believed the Germans would no more protect them from the Nama than the British had done. Goering convinced Berlin to send at least a few German soldiers to Southwest Africa in 1889 under the command of Captain K. Francois. Francois, though claiming Windhoek to be "no man's land" knew it was in Hereroland and in March 1890 asked the aging Maherero to cede the area to the German forces to be used as a military station. When the German officer received no reply of any commitment he occupied the deserted Windhoek, thereby gaining control over the most critical crossroad in Southwest Africa. Later when the Herero protested Francois exclaimed that "the expected objections of the Herero came too late."²⁹ Windhoek now became Germany's colonial capital in Southwest Africa. Although this gave Germany a foothold in the center of the colony (since up to now the Germans had only stations along the coast), this also allowed Francois to prevent any more modern weapons from reaching the Nama by controlling the interior crossroads. However, it was four years before the German commander felt confident enough to leave Windhoek and challenge

the Witbooi Nama of Gibeon led by Hendrick Witbooi.

Francois became obsessed with fighting a war to subdue the indigenous population. When the Herero forced some of Francois men in 1892 to return after making an unsuccessful attempt at escorting an expedition by the Southwest African Company to Otavi in northern Hereroland, the German officer's attitudes became extreme. The German commander even gained Reich Commissioner Goering's approval in taking action against the indigenous. However Chancellor Leo von Caprivi, former head of the Admiralty who succeeded Bismark, refused to allow such wars. The German commander in Southwest Africa could only submit plans for dealing with the Herero and Nama in the event that hostilities broke out. Yet ironically the most significant event during Francois' command was the conclusion of a peace in November 1892 between the Herero and Nama, ending the open rivalry which had affected the region for such a long time. Although the Herero and Nama believed that Germany was stronger than they were, the German commander quickly complained to Berlin about the weak position his meager force was now in. Not until March 1893, did Caprivi agree that Southwest Africa needed a greater force. Pressured by colonial supporters, of which he was not, the German Chancellor acquiesced: "Southwest Africa is ours. . . . How it all happened and whether it was a good thing or not is irrelevant. It is ours, German territory, and it must remain so."³⁰

Two weeks later, 216 German soldiers landed in Southwest Africa as reinforcements. Then Francois, ignoring Caprivi's orders and not informing his own men until the very night before, attacked Hendrik Witbooi's camp at Hornkranz. He had his men fire 16,000 rounds into the camp within a half hour

DOORS LEFT OPEN THEN SLAMMED SHUT:
THE GERMAN COLONIZATION OF SOUTHWEST AFRICA
AND THE ANGLO-GERMAN RIVALRY, 1883-1915.

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on the morning of April 12. It is uncertain how many Nama soldiers died there, but most sources agree that few were actually there. Yet the German troops slaughtered 78 women and children and wounded as many as a 100 more. Hendrik Witbooi and his force, however, followed the German unit back to Windhoek and stole most of their horses on night raids. Thus most of the German cavalry was now on foot. The German force became trapped in Windhoek like a prison, while the Nama all but halted German trade which had freely run through Namaland before. This fiasco was too much for Chancellor Caprivi and in 1894 Berlin recalled Francois replacing him with Major Theodor Leutwein. Leutwein, though an officer in the German Army, according to Berlin was Southwest Africa's first civil governor. He succeeded in forcing Hendrik Witbooi to surrender his Nama into German "protection" in July 1894 (after which Witbooi actually helped Leutwein suppress Herero and other Nama revolts), though the Nama leader's rebel spirit had yet to be crushed completely. By 1898, the Germans had placed the indigenous tribes in respective reserves and the percentage of native-held land dwindled quickly. Germany had finally and effectively enclosed its walls around Southwest Africa, with the exception of Ovamboland. Southwest Africa was truly Germany's colony now.³²

Berlin changed somewhat as a result of the new chancellor. Although a Prussian Conservative and opponent of colonization, Caprivi helped German industrialists even at the expense of Prussian agrarians. With Bismarkian policies brushed off the books (with his entanglement of alliances to balance European power), efforts at rapprochement with France and Russia were not given as much effort so long as Berlin could secure peace. Under Caprivi, Germany took a more definitive policy in European politics, supporting Austria-

Hungary more. In Anglo-German diplomacy, Caprivi actually gave the approval for vigorous efforts to reach agreements with England, and possibly even an alliance.³³

The German government did continue its efforts to keep Britain and France apart, since an Anglo-French understanding would create "difficulties" in Africa. However, Britain had pretty much accepted Germany's presence in Africa, which now included Togo and East Africa in addition to Southwest Africa and Cameroon. Carl Peters had established the German East Africa Company to compete with Mackinnon's company for control of the area from Zanzibar to Lake Tanganyika on the border with the Congo. Germany had already many Lutheran and Catholic missionaries roaming the countrysides and still more traders. By 1890 both countries wanted to take some preventative measures to ensure that British and German interests would not clash in the scramble for hinterlands into the heart of Africa. Salisbury sent Percy Anderson, head of the African desk in the Foreign Office, to Berlin to create an Anglo-German agreement that would resolve all outstanding African issues, including Southwest Africa's northeastern frontier with Bechuanaland which recently became uncertain since Germany's efforts to expand towards the Okavango Delta and the Zambezi River.³⁴ A similar situation was found in other parts of Africa where Anglo-German interests clashed. London received Anderson's report on the meetings with Dr. Krauel on June 28, 1890, which described them as successful and that "the object has been so to define the sphere as to endeavour to avert the danger of the revival of 'hinterland' disputes."³⁵ Anderson reported that the delimitation of British and German East Africa

created two consolidated spheres in place of the checkerboard of German and British occupation that existed prior to the agreement. British East Africa (later called Kenya and Uganda) was now "from its extensive coast-line with its valuable harbours to the western watershed of the Upper Nile, made conterminous . . . no gap is left in the boundaries." Anderson believed German East Africa (later called Tanganyika, then Tanzania), was "equally protected." The British negotiator admitted that allowing German East Africa to extend from the Indian Ocean all the way to Lake Tanganyika on the border with the Congo "may not correspond with the desire which has been expressed in some quarters that an uninterrupted British sphere should extend through Central Africa, but it must be remembered that the realization of this idea was already impracticable when the negotiations commenced."³⁶ It was the very dream of Cecil Rhodes, supported by Salisbury after 1888, to have the British Empire run from Cairo down the spine of Africa all the way to Cape Town. This had been the very reason why Britain had outflanked Germany by occupying Bechuanaland and scrambling across the Zambezi to the very shores of Lakes Tanganyika and Nyasa, only now to be blocked by the Germans in East Africa. Anderson believed that British traders now had to rely on the eighth article of this agreement reached with Germany for their security "which gives ample guarantees for untrammelled communication between the British spheres both by land and water." In theory, British trade and communications were not to be cut off between the Cape and Cairo. In addition, Anderson included in his report the official boundaries of Anglo-German borders involving West Africa, Cameroon, East Africa, and Southwest Africa agreed upon in Berlin. Anderson added the comment that more permanent and consolidated German and British

spheres would put “an end forever to the existence, in any shape, of the Slave Trade” which Portugal and some muslims had kept up in the regions.³⁷

Most interesting in the Anglo-German Agreement of 1890 was the final clarification of Southwest Africa’s eastern border with British Bechuanaland and with the Zambezi region (or Rhodesia, which Britain named after the colonial expansionist Cecil Rhodes). Both London and Berlin by this time knew of the rich potential for Ngamiland, the region situated between the Kalahari Desert and the Zambezi River in northwestern Bechuanaland. The Okavango River entered from the German-Angolan borderland bringing annual flood waters into this otherwise semi-arid region emptying itself into the desert in one of the world’s few inland deltas. At around the 18th south latitude the river during flood season swells over its banks to create a huge swampy lake and inland delta over 70 miles wide at times. Elephants, zebra, buffalo, and wildebeests make treks to it during and after every flood for the explosion of vegetation that followed; but more importantly for imperialists this region was valued for potential cattle ranching. Both London and Berlin in 1890 mistook this watery area for Lake Ngami which was the name given to this fluid sanctuary on all the maps at the time. However, Lake Ngami is only a part of the Okavango Delta and may remain dry for several years if flood waters are not high enough.³⁸ Whatever the name, both sides wanted it, or for Germany, at least a western portion of it. Anderson wrote that “the territory hitherto assigned to neither Power (since Britain had only officially defined the Kalahari border for southern Bechuanaland adjacent to Namaland, not between the northern regions of German Southwest Africa and northern Bechuanaland) extended from the 20th to the 24th degree of east longitude” with the Okavango Delta lying within it. In

other words, there were four degrees of longitude which had remained obscure in the north, and Germany was trying to take its share. However, allowing for German gains in East Africa (Britain allowed the Germans to extend inland to Lake Tanganyika), British delegate Anderson remained firm in the Southwest Africa-Bechuanaland border dispute that "a portion covering three degrees will be under British, the remainder covering one degree will be under German, influence."³⁹ Therefore, Britain allowed Germany to extend the northern portion of Southwest Africa's eastern border one degree east to the 21st degree of east longitude, but well short of the rich Okavango Delta region which according to Anderson's information laid east of the 22nd east longitude, or about 70 miles beyond the new German boundary. Southwest Africa only gained more arid land of the Omaheke Desert, which was merely a northern extension of the Kalahari, dividing Hereroland from the Okavango.⁴⁰

However, Britain did give Germany one more concession for Southwest Africa: access to the Zambezi River, which runs across south-central Africa to empty into the Indian Ocean. German strategists predicted this would be Southwest Africa's tap into rich Central Africa and a more direct highway to German East Africa on the Indian coast (rather than travel all the way around the Cape). Actually, it was less a British concession than correcting a prior geographical mistake. Anderson explained in his letter that this rectification "is inserted because in certain maps Andara, which is the southern limit of the Portuguese sphere under the arrangement with Germany, is placed south of the 18th (latitude); in all the best maps, however . . . it is placed well to the north of that parallel." Therefore there was a narrow strip of land left between Portuguese Angola and British Bechuanaland north of the 18th south latitude.

This gave Germany a 60 mile wide stretch of the Zambezi River, but unfortunately upriver from Victoria Falls which challenged navigation on it and thus proved less the easy highway than Berlin had imagined. Anderson assured his government that Germany would protect the private rights of British companies operating within the region where the Zambezi and Chobe rivers forked, which was now part of Southwest Africa.⁴¹

On July 1, 1890, Salisbury requested Ambassador Malet, in Berlin, "to express to Sir Percy Anderson my entire approval of the manner in which he has performed the duties entrusted to him in connection with this Agreement, and of the tact and ability with which he has carried on the negotiations with the German Foreign [Ministry]." ⁴² Regarding Southwest Africa, the third article of the Anglo-German African Agreement, which was negotiated and signed by Malet, Anderson, Dr. Krauel, and Caprivi, read:

In South-West Africa the sphere in which the exercise of influence is reserved to Germany is bounded:

1. To the south by a line commencing at the mouth of the Orange River, and ascending the north bank of that river to the point of its intersection by the 20th degree of east longitude.

2. To the east by a line commencing at the above-named point, and following the 20th degree of east longitude to the point of its intersection by the 22nd of parallel south latitude, it runs eastward along that parallel to the point of its intersection by the 21st degree of east longitude; then it follows that degree northward to the point of its intersection by the 18th parallel of south latitude; it runs eastward along that parallel till it reaches the River Chobe; and descends the centre of the main channel of that river to its junction with the Zambesi, where it terminates.

It is understood that under this arrangement Germany shall have free access from her Protectorate to the Zambesi by a strip of territory which shall at no point be less than 20 miles in width.

The sphere in which the exercise of influence is reserved to Great Britain is bound to the west and north-west by the abovementioned line. It includes Lake Ngami.⁴³

Appropriately or not, Germany named the strip or *zipfel* giving Germany access to the Zambezi after Caprivi.⁴⁴ Although in the past he had been against colonies, refusing to send warships at times to Angra Pequena and Zanzibar, and highly critical of "King Luderitz," the German Chancellor did help bring Anglo-German relations to this point of cordial agreement. The third article of the Agreement went on in regards to the still disputed southern boundary of Walvis Bay, and stated that it was "reserved for arbitration, unless it shall be settled by the consent of the two Powers within two years from the date of the conclusion of this Agreement." In addition, until such a settlement "the territory [in dispute] shall be considered neutral."⁴⁵ Except for Walvis Bay's exact southern border, the limits of German Southwest Africa were finally established on all sides, since Germany had back in 1886 in an agreement with Portugal, pushed its northern boundary towards Angola, enveloping at least half of Ovamboland. After 1890, Britain washed its hands of Southwest Africa until the 20th century, however this did not mean that matters affecting the German colony were quiet throughout the last decade of the old century.⁴⁶

After Portugal's monarchy fell to a republican revolution, as a result of humiliating Portuguese concessions to British demands in the colonies, Germany began negotiating with Britain over a possible division of Portuguese colonies in Africa--particularly with regard to Angola and Mozambique. German Ambassador Hatzfeldt reported to Berlin after negotiations with Salisbury on February 11, 1891: "Make no mistake about it, we can achieve a satisfactory result in this matter only by coming to a previous understanding with England [Otherwise] British companies and adventurers . . . would close in from all

sides and take possession. . . . Will anyone make war on England for that, or even pick a serious quarrel? I think *not*.”⁴⁷ Hatzfeldt told Prime Minister Salisbury a month later: “You are in an excellent position from which you can profit. Either Portugal gives in to your demands, and in that case you will get what you want; or the government in Lisbon falls and you will pick up her colonies like ripe fruit.” Hatzfeldt reported to Berlin that Salisbury “said nothing to contradict me, and smiled with gratification to think I had grasped the subtleties of the situation.”⁴⁸ So Germany tried to rekindle old sore spots with England by talking of Zanzibar and possible cooperation with French interests in Egypt if Britain did not back off from the possibility of taking the Portuguese colonies without regard to German interests. Holstein, still Senior Councillor in the Foreign Ministry, wrote in a memo that a Cape Colony strengthened by Portuguese territory would be an “undesirable neighbour for us.” Holstein believed that the Anglo-German African Agreement of the previous year should have shown “that we rate our European relations higher than our colonial interests,” since for instance Germany let the British have Ngamiland.⁴⁹ Britain caught the hints from Berlin and allowed Germany to take over the mediation between England and Portugal, resulting in a treaty signed on June 11, 1891. This put on hold any possibility of splitting Portuguese territories in southern Africa as neither London nor Berlin wished the other to have any portion of them. For Britain, Delagoa Bay in southern Mozambique would have been a strategic possession for it would have completed the encirclement of the Boers in the Transvaal. It seemed, because of Germany, the Boers maintained their link to the neutral port as a door to the outside world. Britain could not close

even that open door.⁵⁰

Between 1891 and 1895 London and Berlin tried to bridge their differences and work for a possible agreement or even an alliance. Poor Anglo-French relations, over several colonial and trade issues, and a Russian build-up in Central Asia, which Britain perceived as a threat to India, probably helped this process. Yet for a variety of reasons, both Germany and Britain fumbled this opportunity. German Ambassador Hatzfeldt reported to Berlin that Salisbury was “hold[ing] as far aloof as possible” from Anglo-German issues because of the 1892 elections.⁵¹ When the Tory prime minister lost to Gladstone’s Liberal government in the June general elections, German Conservatives balked. Within a short time Hatzfeldt was criticizing Gladstone’s Colonial Office for its “unfriendliness” towards Germany. In addition, it did not help matters having a German Chancellor estranged from his own government either. Caprivi had lost support from the Kaiser, Conservatives, and the military for various liberal and commercial programs that he introduced in the Reichstag. By 1894 the strain between the Chancellor and the now popular Kaiser was too much. After resigning in October, Caprivi was replaced by Prince Chlodwig zu Hohenlohe. The Kaiser’s actions frustrated the German Foreign Ministry which they believed hurt Berlin’s credibility and prestige abroad. Holstein criticized the young emperor for interfering in delicate foreign affairs and for irresponsibly replacing officials who stood in his way, “nowadays no European nation is ruled in the way he is ruling.” Somewhat prophetically Holstein wrote that this Kaiser would not die on the throne but fall to a republic, but in the meantime he was making the “whole world nervous.”⁵² On the British side, A. P. Primrose (Lord

Rosebery and his cabinet worked better with Berlin on most issues.⁵³ Yet any future possibility of an alliance began to decline as Britain's view of Germany worsened. Hatfield commented on December 19, 1894, that with regard to London "the danger here does not lie in offending some Minister or other, but in the possible shift of so-called public opinion, which is by the way making itself felt as a result of the estrangement between us; and even Salisbury will not be able to contend with it if, by the time he returns to office, public opinion has turned decisively against [us]."⁵⁴ The German ambassador even reported that the director of the Foreign Department of the *Times* "who was usually so well disposed towards us . . . sense[s] the coming about-face of public opinion, and, as the *Times* always does, is changing his tune in time [against us]."⁵⁵

The awkward relations with London had its effects on colonial matters, though sometimes with a beneficial effect. Paul Kruger, president of the Boers, made a speech on January 27, 1895 (the Kaiser's birthday), to Germans in Pretoria in which he voiced hopes for German support in southern Africa against the British Cape.⁵⁶ Possibilities of a new Boer threat combined with the possibility of German support, made the British Colonial Office take notice and make plans for possible negotiations with and concessions to Germany, while trying also to control its own African adventurers. On January 30, German Ambassador Hatfield telegraphed from London that Rosebery's Foreign Secretary, Lord Kimberley, "just told me that he has agreed with the Prime Minister shortly to discuss with me in strictest confidence the bases for an

eventual partition of [Portugal's] Mozambique."⁵⁷ In greater detail, Hatzfeldt explained:

The speech of President Kruger had a very disquieting effect here, and Kimberley has just poured out his heart to me about it. The [British] Government is doing its best here for the Boers [by giving them Swaziland], even put the damper on [Cape Colony Prime Minister, Cecil] Rhodes, and things like that speech worsen an already difficult situation. People here are extraordinarily sensitive about South Africa. The Government is especially anxious to prevent public opinion from turning against *us* on account of such speeches, *especially now*, when Kimberley wants to reach a closer understanding with us about Mozambique and in general wants to make extensive arrangements in colonial matters. Moral: The moment is as favourable for colonial matters as is conceivable here. I must therefore *very shortly* be prepared for a confidential talk about Moz. and other questions, probably the hinterland of Togo, and in order not to lose the opportunity it is necessary for me to know *exactly* what we *want* and what we *don't* want. Therefore I beg you most urgently to grant my telegraphic request for *immediate* instructions.⁵⁸

Thus the Boer situation came to Germany's rescue in developing a stronger international position from which it could bargain with Britain, despite the cooling relations between the two. The next day Berlin responded to Hatzfeldt with instructions that Germany could not agree to give Delagoa Bay in southern Mozambique to Britain nor allow British forces to occupy it in the event of the territory being partitioned. This stand was necessary even if Germany gained access to the Zambezi River on the east coast which could then access Southwest Africa's Caprivi Strip, at least commercially. Unfortunately for negotiations, Delagoa Bay was the only strategic position Britain wanted in the deal. This would complete the encirclement of and therefore control over the Boers. Berlin even had the audacity to instruct Hatzfeldt to demand a hinterland for Togo which would gain access to the Niger River. This too was very

unlikely.⁵⁹

In the meantime, Governor Leutwein moved to gain further control over the Herero and Nama tribes in Southwest Africa. In fact one of Leutwein's earliest successes was to get Witbooi to sign a protection treaty in which the Nama chief retained his position but promised to provide Nama troops in supporting the Germans if necessary. The German governor also successfully backed Samuel Maherero's rise to power in the more centralized Herero tribe. When Samuel's father, Maherero, died in October 1890, many Herero refused to acknowledge his son's ascension since he was a baptized Christian. The issue of succession among the Herero remained alive until 1897 when Governor Leutwein faced his first revolt. A portion of the Herero, particularly in the eastern reaches of the colony, had refused Samuel Maherero as their chief and joined with the Nama of the Kalahari in an effort to gain their independence from the Germans. However, Hendrik Witbooi made good on his promise and sent his own Nama forces to help subdue the rebellion. In the end, the Germans and Samuel Maherero executed two eastern Herero subchiefs placing the paramount chief firmly in power. The Germans gave control over the remnants of the Kalahari Nama to Witbooi for his effort, though many of these defeated Nama rebels had fled into Bechuanaland. Since the Germans allowed the Ovambo to have their autonomy (the Germans believed they would be "biting off more than they could chew" if they did tried to gain control over the numerous Ovambo) and since the greater part of the Herero and Nama were now under treaties, Leutwein felt confident enough to leave the capital, Windhoek, with his small force and suppress smaller Nama tribes in the far south near the Orange River. For the most part, the German colonial

government had effective control over Southwest Africa by 1897.⁶⁰

Despite Leutwein relative control over the situation in Southwest Africa, factions in Berlin made Chancellor Hohenlohe's position more difficult. Once more Berlin seemed poised for another catastrophe in the imperial chancellery. Criticism had been mounting against Hohenlohe, first for being Catholic and then for his dismissal of Carl Peters as governor of German East Africa for the latter's severe treatment of the indigenous population there. German officials convinced the Kaiser in the end to not replace Hohenlohe and create another spectacle, though Kaiser Wilhelm made his position and beliefs known when he made Carl Peters his own *aide-de-camp*. Friction only continued between the Chancellor and the young Kaiser.⁶¹

However the international situation remained uncertain and full of controversy which affected German and British African policies as well as any alliance possibilities between them. Relations between England and Germany seemed to be heading in a better direction again, though their relations tended to trough and crest as frequently as waves on the ocean. Though there were some in Germany, including the Bismark family, who tried to stir anti-British sentiment. One such opinionated official even wrote to Holstein on May 3, 1895, that in matters of world trade "our deadly enemy in this field is England [regardless of] whether Rosebery or Salisbury is in power."⁶² Yet moderate officials in the Foreign Ministry, like Holstein, kept such opinions in check. Furthermore, when France and Russia made a joint demonstration at the opening celebration of the Kiel Canal in Germany that June, both London and Berlin went back to the table to discuss better relations. A correspondent of the

London Times even wrote to Holstein from Peking: "I am convinced that in spite of keen commercial rivalry . . . between England and Germany, the political and in the long run commercial interests too of both countries, are, if not identical, at least parallel."⁶³ Further good news came to Berlin in July 1895, when Salisbury and his Conservatives won the general elections. The new Prime Minister even visited the Kaiser to propose future actions which might end the hostility between Britain and the Triple Alliance which had plagued Anglo-German relations. However hopes of any benefits from the return of the Conservatives in England fell when London refused any concessions in German Togo (because Britain had already given large concessions to France in West Africa to keep the French out of the Nile Valley). Both governments tried to smooth the issue over but with little productivity. Ambassador Hatzfeldt reported back to Berlin "the apparent concern of Salisbury that we are demanding too much in Africa" though the Prime Minister asked what the "minimum demands would be."⁶⁴ The British military attache in Berlin even wrote to Hatzfeldt on October 4, in a letter marked "Secret!" that: "Africa is and will remain a stumbling block to both Powers. . . . we must continue the struggle as good humouredly as we may."⁶⁵ In the end, German sympathy for the Boers in South Africa became the critical obstacle.⁶⁶

After the Jameson Raid in South Africa (December 29, 1895-January 2, 1896), a deliberate though unsuccessful attempt by British subjects from Cape Colony to take control of Transvaal, Kaiser Wilhelm flew into a pro-Boer frenzy. On January 2, the Kaiser sent a letter to the Russian Tsar that, "now suddenly the Transvaal Republic has been attacked in a most foul way as it seems not

without England's knowledge. I have used very severe language in London, and have opened communications with Paris for common defence of our endangered interests, as French and German colonists have immediately joined hands of their own accord to help the outraged Boers." The Kaiser then added: "I hope you will also kindly consider the question. . . . I hope that all will come right, but come what may, I never shall allow the British to stamp out the Transvaal."⁶⁷ Of course any attempt to block the British, if they made further attacks against the Boers, would involve using Southwest Africa. However, the Foreign Ministry was successful in preventing some of the damage the Kaiser caused by not opening communications on the subject with anyone other than England. In an air of dissension with the Kaiser, Holstein reported in the Foreign Ministry on January 10 that "none of our embassies, except London, has received anything. . . . When our ambassadors are without instructions it is the best proof that they are not instructed to approach other Powers for support."⁶⁸ However the the Kaiser bypassed the Foreign Ministry and sent a message of congratulations to President Kruger for the Boer victory over the Jameson raiders. British public opinion exploded against the Kruger Telegram. Ambassador Munster in Paris reported to Berlin, having been the former ambassador in London:

Our Kaiser only saw the surface of things [when he visited London previously] . . . this is how I explain how His Majesty sent the telegram, without realising in advance that it was a match to set fire to an accumulation of inflammatory material; I do not believe that it will really come to war. I hope not. God preserve us from that. . . . But even without war the political and commercial damage is very great and cannot be estimated. The English Admiralty has used the pretext to strengthen and to arm the fleet to an enormous extent. . . . Here [in Paris] *they are rejoicing*. . . . But I can see from many signs that the French are trying to get closer to England.⁶⁹

Kaiser Wilhelm pressed issues further after hearing rumors that the British had landed in Delagoa Bay, Mozambique, to cut off the Boers. Holstein pleaded with Hatzfeldt to have British newspapers print a "reassuring paragraph," to have London instruct British Ambassador Malet in Berlin to make an announcement, or to have Salisbury at least give assurances to Hatzfeldt himself, that the British had taken no such actions. Also, the Kaiser planned a militant speech to the members of the original 1871 Reichstag, on their 25th anniversary assembly, to get Germany "fired up" against Britain. Wilhelm also requested a bill providing additional appropriations for the German navy, but Chancellor Hohenlohe refused to introduce it, thus widening the breach between the two. To the relief of the German Foreign Ministry, Hatzfeldt reported on January 17, 1896 that Salisbury denied any landing at Delagoa Bay. However, the Kaiser commented "all bosh" against the news.⁷⁰ A week later, Holstein stated that the emperor was "in a state of pathological excitement" and obsessed with a naval build-up to the point of dissolving the present Reichstag if he must.⁷¹

In this now trough in Anglo-German relations, Britain sent troops up the Nile to secure its position in Egypt and Sudan, especially since southern Africa seemed now so unstable. Germany could no longer hold British insecurities in Egypt over London's head as it had done to secure footholds on the African continent. The Foreign Ministry remained apprehensive regarding the South African issue which the Kaiser seemed intent on keeping open. On April 8, Senior Councillor Holstein wrote that unless Britain "indulges in some manifest tactlessness in South Africa" Germany would not side with France and Russia

and that he was "fed up with the whole of South Africa because we have nothing to gain there under any circumstances."⁷² Holstein even wrote to his superior, Bernhard Bulow, that although the possibility of an Anglo-German war had decreased, France was still pledging support to Britain. Germany had to keep a better wedge between Paris and London.⁷³

By May 1896 British public opinion still ran high against Germany for the Kruger Telegram, and tension in South Africa was getting fairly close to German Southwest Africa. German officials there were requesting reinforcements of German infantry and compulsory service for German nationals residing in the colony. Wilhelm agreed, though ever the naval enthusiast he wanted to send a battalion of marines which displayed his inexperience. The Foreign Ministry, the High Command, and the Kaiser's own advisors convinced him that marines would not fair well crossing the Namib Desert "notwithstanding the fact that no troops have had less training in riding."⁷⁴ Thus corrected, Wilhelm agreed to send mounted infantry to Southwest Africa. Governor Leutwein was likewise intent on making Germany's colony defensible with the reinforcements, not only against possible indigenous uprisings, but against the British Cape if necessary.⁷⁵

While tensions in southern Africa escalated, and while Britain secured its position in Egypt, the Foreign Ministry continued its efforts to smooth relations with London. When Russia asked for German assistance in protesting the English replacement of Egyptian garrisons with Imperial troops from India, Berlin refused. This coolness on the part of the Foreign Ministry paid off; Hatzfeldt reported from London in late May: "If one goes to the Foreign Office or

meets an English statesman elsewhere, one gets the impression that Europe is living in a state of profound peace and that there is not a cloud on the horizon out of which a thunderstorm could develop within the next fifty years. . . . interest in the Transvaal, although it is still being stirred up by some newspapers, is beginning to evaporate.”⁷⁶ Anglo-German relations were finally normalizing, six months after the Kruger Telegram.⁷⁷

However by November 1896 Kaiser Wilhelm made matters worse again. He disclosed his real beliefs regarding Southwest Africa via a talk with the Director of the Colonial Department in the Foreign Ministry announcing: “Bismark conceived of our entire colonial policy only to drive a wedge between ourselves and England on account of the ‘English influences’ [namely Kaiser and Kaiserin Friedrich] . . . so use the money the Reichstag gives [to the Colonial Department] for East Africa. Nothing will come of South-West Africa in any case. We will have to sell that at a good price to England one of these days.” Holstein wondered, after all the efforts by Francois and Leutwein to gain control over the Southwest African natives, what “the German people will say if the news leaks out that the Kaiser is talking about abandoning an area which we have already fought to preserve. . . . [it would be] most dismal.”⁷⁸ To make matters worse by the year’s end, German newspapers and the Kaiser blamed the British for supporting strikes in Hamburg. The Foreign Ministry again tried to control the damage, but Hatzfeldt reported only grim relations with London: “With respect to England, to be sure, our alliance possibilities won’t get any worse because the English seem resolved in any case to abstain from any alliance with us.”⁷⁹ In light of such relations, German officials observed

Germany's tenuous hold over her overseas colonies. The German consul-general in China wrote on January, 17, 1897: "Our warships can't swim about here forever like homeless waifs, and we run the risk of losing prestige because we have expressed wishes without pushing them through. . . . A strong maritime force is a vital necessity, and that our fleet cannot do without the firm support of a naval base in overseas territories." Such was the case for Southwest Africa too.⁸⁰

In February 1897 Transvaal became an issue once more when the Kaiser commented to a Boer representative: "You may depend on me." Holstein wrote to Foreign Minister Bulow on his concerns how this might affect England: "I would be surprised if this remark of the Kaiser's will pass unnoticed." The Senior Councillor did however succeed in having officials prevent the Kaiser's statement from going to press, commenting "I did not know what else could be done."⁸¹ This all came as divisions widened between those who believed Germany should have a strong global empire, which the Kaiser supported, and those Junkers who believed in concentrating resources at home. A navy bill met bitter resistance in the Reichstag with the Kaiser's men showing charts of German naval strength in comparison with other Powers; but to emphasize their point rather deceptively they accounted for only Germany's most modern vessels in comparison with every French and British ship including "even the most ancient barges." Wilhelm wanted Hohenlohe to give a speech in the Reichstag emphasizing Germany's "dangerous international position" but the Chancellor refused. Holstein even commented to Bulow that "it is only due to the ineptitude, ill-will, and lack of interest on the part of (the Kaiser's) Government that the money for the gigantic fleet hasn't yet been

granted or that the first steps have not yet been taken to secure the appropriations.” He added further criticism that “with respect to [Wilhelm’s] treatment of foreign affairs . . . the Ambassadors already know . . . that in every conversation [the Kaiser] is trying to warn the Russians against the English and the English against the Russians. What do you think that will accomplish in the long run?” The Kaiser was Germany’s greatest liability in Anglo-German relations.⁸²

Matters in southern Africa heated up again in April 1897. Rumors came that British ships were sighted off Delagoa Bay. Holstein urged Chancellor Hohenlohe to resist any of the Kaiser’s demands for immediate action or words against England. The Chancellor agreed. However, Holstein admitted to Hatzfeldt that “the prevention of further disasters will not get us out of the South African blind alley--we must do more than this.”⁸³ The Senior Councillor believed that if the Ambassador could convince Salisbury to give Germany some colonial concessions, German public opinion would be neutralized in future British actions against the Boers. Holstein added that this could be the opportunity to “settle once and for all the difficulties over *Walvis Bay and Samoa* both of which the Germans wanted” and that even the Kaiser “despite his naval hobby-horse” would then see the benefits of better relations with Britain. However, in a note to Hatzfeldt, Holstein emphasized two “possibilities of danger.” The first danger was if Britain seized Delagoa Bay. Then German “chauvinists” would block any compensation efforts by Britain unless it included giving Portuguese territory “bordering German Southwest Africa on the north (and) Walvis Bay.”⁸⁴ Yet the Senior Councillor admitted that England had to

move first: "So long as England leaves Portuguese possessions alone and only expands or intensifies her power at the expense of the Transvaal, I can see no half-way plausible excuse for us to annex Portuguese territory." The German Foreign Ministry was willing to cut a deal with London, allowing the latter "to subordinate further the (Boer) elements in South Africa" if Britain gave Germany a fair share of Portuguese territory, especially in Angola and Mozambique.⁸⁵ However, as yet, Salisbury remained unwilling to initiate this. The second danger, which Holstein warned, was the growing contingent in Berlin who felt that English "animosity" for Germany was only partly due to colonialism but really focused on commercial competition which could never be settled. They believed that Britain was setting Germany up for "a situation in which it can fall upon the German merchant fleet and destroy it." Holstein admitted that "all navy enthusiasts think this is the case."⁸⁶ In other words, with Germany's naval build-up increasingly souring Anglo-German relations, the Foreign Ministry knew time was running out for gaining any more colonial concessions from Britain and in particular the division of Portuguese territories. Only in an immediate Boer-British conflict could Germany use its offer of neutrality to gain such concessions. Hatzfeldt responded on April 22, 1897, with news that British ships could be in Delagoa Bay or in the Zambezi River moving inland, which prompted him to try to find Prime Minister Salisbury to make a deal. Hatzfeldt believed: "[Germany has] nothing to gain from a conflict between England and the Transvaal. . . . [and if] Hohenlohe shares this view . . . he will have to take a very firm stand against new Kruger Telegrams or worse. Take my word for it: if [Colonial Secretary Joseph] Chamberlain, with Salisbury's approval, has now actually decided on aggressive action, no protest on our part and no dispatch of

auxiliary troops from [Southwest Africa] would prevent it from being carried out.” The German Ambassador then warns: “The sole result of such steps would be a conflict between England and ourselves, in which we could do absolutely nothing . . . whereas they could . . . perhaps bombard Hamburg. To desire to intervene under such circumstances would therefore be sheer madness.” If Britain were to shake up the status quo in southern Africa with an attack on the Boers, Hatzfeldt informed Holstein that he would point out to Salisbury Britain’s choices: “*Either* [England] must give us compensation, which was the only thing by which we could calm down our public opinion; *or* . . . from now on and in every question . . . we would under all circumstances take the side of the enemies of England.” If Germany could not protect the Boers, the Foreign Ministry wanted to at least benefit from their demise.⁸⁷

However, to the fears of the Foreign Ministry who knew time was slipping away for such a deal, Hatzfeldt reported that Britain was not seeking such action against the Transvaal yet. Though the German ambassador was not so convinced, believing this “by no means proves that some sort of action is not being prepared with Chamberlain and Rhodes behind the scenes.” Hatzfeldt thought Colonial Secretary Chamberlain was pushing Prime Minister Salisbury into stronger actions against the Boers because of the latter’s extended absence from London which “would be very typical of him to arrange for everything to happen during his absence so that he could not be immediately called to account.” The German embassy could only wait, with Hatzfeldt emphasizing to Berlin: “For Heaven’s sake no new Kruger Telegrams, no threats of colonial troops [in Southwest Africa], and above all, nothing whatever which could bring about a conflict.”⁸⁸ Yet even if the Kaiser supported a deal

with London, Hatzfeldt believed “Walvis Bay and *especially* Samoa seem to me to be extremely dubious and I don’t think [Salisbury] would have the courage to defend these concessions here.”⁸⁸ The opportunity for territorial gain in Southwest Africa or in the Pacific did not improve. On May 12, 1897, Hatzfeldt reported: “[Salisbury] hasn’t forgiven us for the Kruger Telegram, but he would nevertheless like to see relations improved . . . if it doesn’t cost anything. With respect to the Transvaal, he assumes that Kruger will now be as amenable as necessary . . . and therefore sees no reason why he should make concessions to us.”⁸⁹ This time Britain was able to close the door in Germany’s face.

By the following year, however, this stagnation in colonial expansion seemed to be drawing to a close. On March 29, 1898, Chamberlain actually approached Hatzfeldt with the possibility of an alliance and with concession possibilities in Africa though nothing specific. Yet by April both Berlin and London again fumbled the opportunity with neither side willing to make any firm commitments to each other. Both sides feared such commitments would entangle them with the other Powers. Interestingly, the German Foreign Ministry already at this time feared England being convinced to stand aside and Italy being bought off by France and Russia in an attack on Germany and Austria-Hungary. On a different front, Hatzfeldt reported in May that Spanish rule in the Pacific was coming to an end due to American victories, but warned against any “premature grabbing” that would upset international relations. However, when the German Ambassador reported what the British were willing to give Germany, which seemed confined to giving up British possessions in Borneo, the Kaiser only commented “not enough!”⁹⁰ The situation in the Pacific

improved on June 17 when Ambassador Hatzfeldt reported to Berlin that with the Spanish command in Manila ready to fall to the Americans, this was the time for Germany to seize the Carolines. Further correspondence between Hatzfeldt and Bulow concluded that if London and Berlin should conclude another Anglo-German agreement, Germany should receive southern Angola to attach to Southwest Africa and northern Mozambique for German East Africa, while Britain could have Delagoa Bay to complete their encirclement of the Boers. Though this was a reversal of an earlier position, the British would not support such an agreement. The only resolution both sides could agree on was to keep the Portuguese territories out of anyone else's hands. On August 30, 1898, England and Germany signed the Secret Convention on Portuguese Colonies which prevented any other power from moving in on Mozambique and Angola.⁹¹

The next year, 1899, hampered possibilities of further agreements which might have benefited Southwest Africa. First, Anglo-German relations became bleak after the king of Samoa recognized by Germany, Britain, and the United States died, after which a civil war commenced. Military action had been taken by all three supervisory powers with Germany countered by England and America. The Germans suffered the largest set back there with much of their property and some ships destroyed when the British bombarded the port of Apia. In April Hatzfeldt soberingly told Salisbury that it gave him "no pleasure to watch here how my efforts over many years to bring about a better German-English understanding had been ruined because of a miserable object like Samoa."⁹² Second, in a letter written on August 27, 1899 Hatzfeldt made his worst prediction to date by believing there would not be a British-Boer war

“unless they have gone mad in Pretoria.” Yet the Ambassador conceded that although Salisbury was firmly against war “he will be dragged along if Kruger insists that England must expressly renounce suzerainty” over Transvaal.⁹³ When tensions in southern Africa escalated Berlin used this to the utmost, with enthusiastic support from the Kaiser, to get concessions out of London on Samoa, which it finally received. On October 10, 1899, Holstein commented to Hatzfeldt that this militant attitude in Berlin and its international consequences “would then dictate Germany’s policy for the next period of history.”⁹⁴ Hatzfeldt replied two days later doubting the Kaiser’s aggressive policy backed by the German Admiralty: “If our foreign policy depends on the views of Herr Tirpitz we will not go far in the world.”⁹⁵

However, the Kaiser’s visit to England November 20-28, which was made only after British concessions in Samoa, brought Anglo-German relations again to a better level. On the 30th, Chamberlain even made a speech in Leicester calling Germany and Britain a “natural alliance.”⁹⁶ Yet these feelings were short-lived. The Boer War which erupted by the year’s end, slowly finished Anglo-German rapprochement because of the Kaiser’s and the German public’s pro-Boer sentiment, despite the efforts by the Foreign Ministry to go in the opposite direction. Hatzfeldt’s assistant, H. Eckardstein, observed that this war was settling the question whether England would have total control over southern Africa or whether the Boers had the strength to push the British off the Cape. Foreign Minister Bulow added a marginal comment: “Surely it is in our interest [especially in Southwest Africa] that Boers and English should balance each other in South Africa, neither one completely driving out the

other.”⁹⁷ Eckardstein reported on December 21, 1899 that:

I am convinced that England will master this problem in the end, but if she had waited only one more year to fight this war, she would have been simply thrown out of South Africa. In that case we would have seen an Afrikander republic in South Africa . . . [which] would have created a kind of Monroe Doctrine for the whole of the South Africa continent, to which both our German colonies as well as the Portuguese colonies would inevitably have fallen victims. I am firmly convinced that within a very short time Germany would have lost her best colony, i. e. Southwest Africa, without being capable of the least resistance.⁹⁸

Though the German official noted: “[Yet] if England were to win, the danger could arise for us that . . . a large part of the refractory Boer population, encouraged by German public opinion, would emigrate to German Southwest Africa and from there continue to intrigue constantly against England. Taking the pro-Boer attitude in Germany into account, our Government would after all probably find it very difficult to prevent this.” Bulow agreed and was already making plans to pursue issues like the German Baghdad railway and coaling stations in the Red sea, along with concession issues, with England. In other words, the Foreign Ministry was willing to stick to an anglophile policy as long as England gave concessions that Bulow could hand to the German public and as long as Britain did not obliterate the Boer republics. The London embassy even reported to Bulow’s office on January 23, 1900, that Britain probably would use a strong Anglo-German relationship “to get England’s chestnuts out of the fire” with fears of a Russian threat to Persia while the Boer War demanded Britain’s attention.⁹⁹

However, tensions did mount when the British seized and searched German ships bound for southern Africa from December 1899 to January 1900.

The German mail steamer Bundesrath was seized and searched for contraband heading for the Boers. On January 16, England promised to release all the ships and pay any indemnity, but the diplomatic damage had been done. In February even Holstein agreed with Karl Wichmann, a member of the Southwest Africa Colonial Society and a representative of the high-explosive industry, that an article should be published condemning these actions. The Senior Councillor commented that "England's astonishment at Germany's bitterness can in turn only be regarded here with the greatest astonishment. Is [the] English astonishment real? If yes, a slap in the face must have a different meaning in England than it does in Germany. Just a year ago we received more than one slap in the face over Samoa. The worst was the bombardment of Apia."¹⁰⁰ Thus even the coolest minds in Berlin were resenting British actions.

In April 1900, there came more doom and gloom in the Foreign Ministry with dissension and intrigue, along with the prolonged illness of Hatzfeldt. However by summer the situation improved with Holstein making calls for an Anglo-German agreement now that German public support of the Boer's had deflated because of the latter's new guerrilla tactics: "A nation of soldiers like Germany was bound to be sobered by the manner in which the Boers have behaved since (Boer General Piet A. Cronje's) capitulation (on February 27, 1900)."¹⁰¹ The Kaiser had even congratulated the British on their success.

Yet relations remained oscillating. It troughed once more when London secured an agreement from Portugal to close Delagoa Bay from arms shipments to the Boers, thus avoiding a deal with Germany. This was followed by an issued statement that Britain claimed all of southern China in its sphere

as German interests became established there. Following the Samoan affair in which German property was destroyed by British warships, the search and seizure of ships bound for southern Africa, these new developments hurt the Foreign Ministry's efforts to convince the Kaiser to support Anglo-German relations. Those efforts did not impress the Kaiser, despite the Anglo-German Yangtze Agreement (signed in October 1900, which resolved the southern China issue), because of continued British resistance to German policy and plans. Although the Kaiser was well received in London in January, 1901, visiting the Queen who was sick, Anglo-German relations seemed to stagnate with a mutual exhaustion from trying to build a colonial agreement, much less an alliance, in these troubled times. Hatzfeldt reported that the new Director of the Colonial Department in the German Foreign Ministry, Dr. O. W. Stubel, was received poorly in London, with the Germans dumbfounded why. In May 1901, the Germans tried to initiate negotiations, with Hatzfeldt telling one of Salisbury's men "if an alliance treaty were not concluded now it would never be concluded." Salisbury later commented to the embassy that "he refused to negotiate at pistol-point."¹⁰² Thus one of the last windows of opportunity slid shut for improved relations which might have benefited German colonies in Africa. A wall seemed to be raised between Britain and Germany.¹⁰³

Yet the real blow to Anglo-German relations came when certain elements in Germany began criticizing British conduct in dealing with the guerrilla warfare of the Boers, including the use of concentration camps. On October 24, 1901, Chamberlain gave a speech in Edinburgh challenging German criticism and pointing out that in the last war with France German troops were not above

criticism, which of course threw the German public into a fury.¹⁰⁴ A press war between the countries mounted.¹⁰⁵ Chancellor Bulow who believed Chamberlain was not being "ill intentioned" but "incredibly clumsy" tried to do what he could to suppress German opinion, and the Kaiser's, but admitted "we would only be pouring oil on the flames."¹⁰⁶ When one Reichstag member called Chamberlain "the most villainous knave on God's earth" for criticizing the German Army and proceeded to criticize the British Army in South Africa, Chancellor Bulow rose up in rebuke: "I believe I am in accord with the vast majority of this House when expressing the hope that it should not become custom to insult foreign Ministers from the tribune of the Reichstag . . . I am equally bound to express my deep regret at the manner in which the previous speaker referred to the army of a nation with which we live in peace and friendship."¹⁰⁷

An end of an era of opportunity in Anglo-German relations seemed to be felt by everyone. Following Hatzfeldt's dismissal in 1901 and Salisbury's resignation as Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary in 1902, the link between London and Berlin seemed severed. Chancellor Bulow brought an end to the press war but with mixed results, since both Otto von Bismark and his son Herbert were behind many of the insulting editorials. With the Kaiser ruining further attempts at reconciliation, many officials such as Eckardstein in the London embassy, simply resigned. Anglo-German relations were beyond repair, with many in Berlin feeling a sense of doom that the *pax Europa* would end with Germany attacked by everyone around them. Interestingly however, the Kaiser entered his first war not in Europe, but in Southwest Africa.¹⁰⁸

NOTES

¹Pakenham, Scramble, p. 336; Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 72 (Encl.), p. 71; Rhodie, Last Frontier, p. 136.

²Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 73 (Encl.), p. 72.

³Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 73 (Encl. and trans.), p. 74.

⁴Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 73 (Encl.), p. 74.

⁵Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 74-76, p. 76.

⁶Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 80 (Encl.), p. 86-87.

⁷Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 80 (Encl.), p. 86.

⁸Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 80 (Encl.), p. 87.

⁹Goldblatt, History, pp. 192-194; Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 80, p. 85.

¹⁰Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 90 (Encl.), p. 92.

¹¹Rhodie, Last Frontier, p. 136; Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI No. 77 (Encl.), p. 78.

¹²Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 77, p. 77.

¹³Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 77 (Encl.), 79, p. 77-85.

¹⁴Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 84, p. 89.

¹⁵Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 85-86, pp. 90-91.

¹⁶Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 87-90, pp. 91-92.

¹⁷Rhodie, Last Frontier, p. 136; Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 90 (Encl.), p. 92.

¹⁸Holstein, Papers, Vol. III, pp. 196, 214, 226, 241 (Note 3), 292.

¹⁹Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 92-95, pp. 93-95.

²⁰Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 96, p. 96.

²¹Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 97, p. 96.

²²Commons, British, Vol. 1887 LXI, No. 100 (Encl.), p. 98.

²³Quoted in Pakenham, Scramble, p. 338.

²⁴Pakenham, Scramble, pp. 338-339, 341, 349-350; Holstein, Papers, Vol. III, pp. 278, 278 (Note 2).

²⁵Holstein, Papers, Vol. III, pp. 278-279, 296, 326, 328.

²⁶Holstein, Papers, Vol. III, p. 325.

²⁷Holstein, Papers, Vol. III, p. 337.

²⁸Holstein, Papers, Vol. III, pp. 341-342.

²⁹Holstein, Papers, Vol. III, pp. 341-342.

³⁰Quoted in Horst Drechsler, Let Us Die Fighting: The Struggle of the Herero and Nama against German Imperialism (1884-1915), (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1966), p. 50.

³¹Quoted in Drechsler, Let Us Die, p. 69.

³²Jon M. Bridgman, The Revolt of the Hereros, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), pp. 39-55; Pakenham, Scramble, pp. 605-607; Rhodie, Last Frontier, pp. 137-40; Drechsler, Let Us Die, pp. 50-53, 69-70.

³³Pakenham, Scramble, pp. 355; Holstein, Papers, Vol. III, pp. 339-340, 358.

³⁴Pakenham, Scramble, pp. 341-342, 346-347, 356-357; Holstein, Papers, Vol. III, p. 295 (Note 1); U. K. House of Commons, British Sessional Papers, Vol. 1890 LI, Edgar L. Erickson (ed.), (New York: Readex Microprint, 1948-1967), No. 1, p. 21.

³⁵Commons, British, Vol. 1890 LI, No. 1 (Encl. 1), p. 21.

³⁶Commons, British, Vol. 1890 LI, No. 1 (Encl. 1), pp. 21-22.

³⁷Commons, British, Vol. 1890 LI, No. 1 (Encl. 1), pp. 22-23.

³⁸Walker, Southern Africa, p. 431 (map).

³⁹Commons, British, Vol. 1890 LI, No. 1 (Encl. 1), p. 22.

⁴⁰Walker, Southern Africa, p. 431 (map).

⁴¹Commons, British, Vol. 1890 LI, No. 1 (Encl. 1), pp. 22-23.

⁴²Commons, British, Vol. 1890 LI, No. 2, p. 23.

⁴³Commons, British, Vol. 1890 LI, No. 3, p. 26.

⁴⁴Thomas Malnar, South West Africa: The Last Pioneer Country. (New York: Fleet Publishing Corp, 1966), p. 8; Walker, Southern Africa, p. 431 (map).

⁴⁵Commons, British, Vol. 1890 LI, No. 3, pp. 26-27.

⁴⁶Commons, British, Vol. 1890 LI, No. 3, p. 24-31; U. K. House of Commons, British Sessional Papers, Vol. 1909 CV, Edgar L. Erickson (ed.), (New York: Readex Microprint, 1948-1967), pp. 439-444.

⁴⁷Holstein, Papers, Vol. III, p. 367.

⁴⁸Holstein, Papers, Vol. III, p. 370.

⁴⁹Holstein, Papers, Vol. III, p. 374.

⁵⁰Holstein, Papers, Vol. III, pp. 364-365 (Note 1), 372, 374, 380 (Note 3).

⁵¹Holstein, Papers, Vol. III, p. 396.

⁵²Holstein, Papers, Vol. III, pp. 406, 409, 418, 422 (Note 2), 432, 479, 480 (Note 2).

⁵³Holstein, Papers, Vol. III, pp. 397 (Note 1), 406, 409, 418, 421 (Note 6), 422 (Note 2), 425, 434 (Note 4), 435, 440, 442-443, 447, 467 (Note 3), 473 (Note 1), 474.

⁵⁴Holstein, Papers, Vol. III, p. 483.

⁵⁵Holstein, Papers, Vol. III, p. 486.

⁵⁶Holstein, Papers, Vol. III, pp. 440, 440 (Note 2).

⁵⁷Holstein, Papers, Vol. III, p. 493 (Note 5).

⁵⁸Holstein, Papers, Vol. III, p. 493-494.

⁵⁹Holstein, Papers, Vol. III, p. 494 (Note 1).

⁶⁰Rhodie, Last Frontier, pp. 139-141.

⁶¹Holstein, Papers, Vol. III, pp. 498, 501, 502.

⁶²Holstein, Papers, Vol. III, p. 512.

⁶³Holstein, Papers, Vol. III, p. 524.

⁶⁴Holstein, Papers, Vol. III, p. 547.

⁶⁵Holstein, Papers, Vol. III, p. 548.

⁶⁶Holstein, Papers, Vol. III, pp. 521 (Note 3), 533, 533 (Note 2), 544 (Note 3), 547 (Note 3), 549, 554 (Note 1), 554 (Note 3), 574 (Note 2).

⁶⁷Holstein, Papers, Vol. III, p. 584 (Note 3).

⁶⁸Holstein, Papers, Vol. III, p. 584; Thomas Pakenham, The Boer War, (New York: Random House, 1993), pp. 13-17, 20.

⁶⁹Holstein, Papers, Vol. III, p. 585.

⁷⁰Holstein, Papers, Vol. III, p. 586 (Note 4).

⁷¹Holstein, Papers, Vol. III, pp. 584 (Note 4), 586, 589 (Note 2).

⁷²Holstein, Papers, Vol. III, p. 603.

⁷³Pakenham, Scramble, pp. 340-341; Holstein, Papers, Vol. III, p. 599, 605.

⁷⁴Holstein, Papers, Vol. III, p. 610.

⁷⁵Holstein, Papers, Vol. III, p. 608 (Note 3), 610, 610 (Note 2).

⁷⁶Holstein, Papers, Vol. III, p. 616.

⁷⁷Holstein, Papers, Vol. III, p. 628.

⁷⁸Holstein, Papers, Vol. III, p. 655.

⁷⁹Holstein, Papers, Vol. III, p. 661, 664 (Note 1).

⁸⁰Friedrich von Holstein, "Correspondence, 1897-1909," Vol. IV of The Holstein Papers, Norman Rich and M. H. Fisher (ed.), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), p. 5.

⁸¹Holstein, Papers, Vol. IV, p. 13.

⁸²Holstein, Papers, Vol. IV, p. 19.

⁸³Holstein, Papers, Vol. IV, p. 22.

⁸⁴Holstein, Papers, Vol. IV, pp. 23-24.

⁸⁵Holstein, Papers, Vol. IV, pp. 24-25.

⁸⁶Holstein, Papers, Vol. IV, p. 25.

⁸⁷Holstein, Papers, Vol. IV, p. 29.

⁸⁸Holstein, Papers, Vol. IV, p. 30.

⁸⁹Holstein, Papers, Vol. IV, p. 36.

⁹⁰Holstein, Papers, Vol. IV, pp. 76, 79.

⁹¹Holstein, Papers, Vol. IV, p. 68 (Note 3 & 5), 70 (Note 5), 75-76, 79, 88 (Note 3), 89, 98 (Note 4).

⁹²Holstein, Papers, Vol. IV, p. 109, 109 (Note 1)

⁹³Holstein, Papers, Vol. IV, p. 151.

⁹⁴Holstein, Papers, Vol. IV, p. 161.

⁹⁵Holstein, Papers, Vol. IV, p. 162.

⁹⁶Holstein, Papers, Vol. IV, pp. 166, 169 (Note 2).

⁹⁷Holstein, Papers, Vol. IV, pp. 172, 173 (Note 1).

⁹⁸Holstein, Papers, Vol. IV, p. 173.

⁹⁹Holstein, Papers, Vol. IV, pp. 173-175.

¹⁰⁰Holstein, Papers, Vol. IV, p. 176.

¹⁰¹Holstein, Papers, Vol. IV, pp. 185-186.

¹⁰²Rich. Holstein. IV p. 231.

¹⁰³Rich. Holstein. IV pp. 185 (Note 2), 217 (Note 2), 223.

¹⁰⁴Rich. Holstein. IV p. 236 (Note 5).

¹⁰⁵Rich. Holstein. IV p. 238.

¹⁰⁶Rich. Holstein. IV p. 239.

¹⁰⁷Rich. Holstein. IV p. 244.

¹⁰⁸Rich. Holstein. IV pp. 255, 270.

Chapter 4

Blood, Diamonds, and the End

In the first two decades of this century, economic, political, social, and military matters in Southwest Africa came to a climax with very extreme results. The indigenous population offered their last attempt to throw out the Germans, the discovery of diamonds created an economic boom, and the first world war ended German imperialism abroad, including the very existence of German Southwest Africa.

By 1904, Germany reached new levels of isolation, with the Kaiser's actions doing little to help the situation, and with England moving farther and farther into a relationship with France and thus with Russia. On July 11, Holstein wrote from the Foreign Ministry that "Germany's prestige has shrunk in the last few years, while our opponents and rivals are on the point of encircling us. Difficult situations must therefore be expected to arise for which I would prefer not to take the share of moral responsibility which every collaborator bears."¹ On September 5, 1904, the Senior Councillor of the Foreign Ministry further wrote: "I don't think that our future is going to become easier, standing between England, France, and Japan--a group united by a common hatred of Germany."² By the year's end Chancellor Bulow, after predicting that even Italy could enter as Germany's enemy, wrote: "[In the event of an Anglo-German war] we are practically powerless [to do anything serious] against England. By capturing our colonies and shipping, England could within a foreseeable time force us to a disadvantageous peace."³ By 1905, Germany was giving in to the French on many issues, fearing that with England, Russia, Japan, and possibly

Italy to aid the French, they would successfully carry out their *revanche* if matters went into open conflict. Holstein reported, after receiving news from the German High Command, in late June that:

[French] reservists had been called up for the frontier corps, while none were being released. Further that the troops in the frontier garrisons had received combat uniforms and equipment with tinned rations for four days. For the time being the Chancellor wants to prevent counter-measures being taken--I think he is definitely right in this, because once that starts, both sides will drive each other further and further. . . . Let us hope for the best.⁴

Despite this particular alarm, with the creation of the *entente cordiale* between London and Paris imminent, and with the impending sensation of doom that the European *pax* was finally over, open hostilities were still a decade off. In the meantime, the Kaiser had to fight his first war against his own subjects, in Southwest Africa.⁵

While the Germans were establishing themselves in Southwest Africa, by building their northern port of Swakopmund at the edge of Walvis Bay and by occupying Windhoek for their capital in the interior, the native population met hardship. The German mining industry was still struggling in the colony, with the only railway from Swakopmund to Windhoek, the Otavi Railway, still incomplete. In fact, the Southwest Africa Company was actually a British firm which obtained exclusive mining rights in the Otavi region for copper; thus the mining, rail building, and administration in that region of Southwest Africa were not even German. In addition, the *Otavi Minen und Eisenbahn Gesellschaft* (Otavi Mining and Railway Company) which had only partial rights in the Otavi and primary control over the Tsumeb area to the north, was a joint German-British firm. British businessmen seemed equally as influential in developing

the German colony.⁶ Also, whereas the Germans were able to occupy footholds among the Herero, like Windhoek, Okahandja, Otjimbingwa, and Omaruru, and thus connect Swakopmund with the interior, the Nama strongholds of Bethanie, Keetmanshoop, and Gibeon remained outside German control thereby restricting German penetration from Luderitzbucht (Angra Pequena) in the southern part of the colony.

In 1897 a rinderpest epidemic was actually very significant in giving the Germans control over their colony. Up to 90 percent of Herero cattle in some areas died while 50 to 95 percent, depending on the location, of European colonist cattle herds survived. At one point the Herero previously had 250,000 head. These dwindled to around 40,000 in just a few years and were only about the number that the few hundred German farmers and ranchers owned. Natives sold land to German and Boer farmers and ranchers so that they could afford to inoculate at least some of their remaining cattle.⁷ Therefore both German and Afrikaner (Boer) control increased rapidly. Yet there were still only some 5,000 Germans facing 80,000 Herero and 20,000 Nama. Interestingly, while German colonists left the larger Ovambo tribes alone in the northern regions, they allied with the few thousand Basters of Rehoboth south of Windhoek who had themselves been vulnerable between the two super-powers of the grasslands--the Herero and Nama. In this way the Germans could concentrate on those that might rebel.

Still by 1904 Governor Leutwein had only four companies of troops in the colony, and early in the year had taken three of them south to deal with an uprising of the Bondelswart Nama on the Orange River border. This left Windhoek and the northern half, the Herero portion, of the colony practically

undefended since the governor thought he had the firm allegiance of Samuel Maherero of the Herero and Hendrik Witbooi of the Witbooi (or Gibeon) Nama.⁸

In January 1904, Samuel Maherero wrote to Hendrik Witbooi and revealed his plans for a revolt against German imperialism. He requested Nama support, despite the many years of bitter war between the tribes--which had finally ended in 1892 with a general peace. Later the Herero chief wrote to Witbooi:

All our obedience and patience with the Germans is of little avail, for each day they shoot someone dead for no reason at all. Hence I appeal to you, my Brother, not to hold aloof from the uprising, but to make your voice heard so that all of Africa may take up arms against the Germans. Let us die fighting rather than die as a result of maltreatment, imprisonment or some other calamity. Tell all the [other Nama] down there to rise and do battle.⁹

However, this letter and others never reached Hendrik Witbooi, for other Nama betrayed the correspondence to the Germans. Yet this probably would not have altered much if it had reached the powerful Nama chief, because once the Herero Revolt came, Witbooi actually sent some of his own troops to help fight the Herero according to the promise he gave Leutwein years before. If the Nama had combined with the Herero effort, the outcome would have been much different indeed.¹⁰

Samuel Maherero issued a decree, and told the missionaries, that "none of my people lay their hands upon the English, the Bast(ers), . . . the Nama and the Boers."¹¹ Furthermore, Herero subchief Daniel Kariko reported that "at our clandestine meetings our chiefs decided to spare the lives of all German women and children--the missionaries, too." Thus the rebels were going to act as humanely as possible in what would become "Germany's bloodiest and most

protracted colonial war.”¹² However, despite the initial strategic advantage, communication was not the rebellion’s strong suit, as evident when the rebels failed to inform about 600 Herero working on the Otavi Railway about the revolt until it was too late.

On the first day of revolution, January 12, 1904 the rebels gained the entirety of Hereroland and the herds of the German colonists. Only the fortified garrison towns of Windhoek, Okahandja, Otjimbingwe, and Omaruru remained, but were themselves besieged.¹³ Over one hundred German soldiers and colonists, men only, died that first day. However, unwilling to assault the German strongholds in Hereroland, which were defended with machine guns, the Herero began losing their initial advantage. The Germans refused to come out of their fortified towns into open battle as the Herero had intended. They decided to play a waiting game, calling up reservists until Leutwein and his troops in Namaland could return or until Berlin could send reinforcements. Captain Franke, on his way south to reinforce Governor Leutwein’s operation against the Bondelswarts, quickly turned around when informed of the revolt. Franke called on his troops: “I must demand from everyman, whether trooper or officer, the utmost!”¹⁴ His cavalry covered over two hundred miles of hostile terrain in just one hundred hours. His forces raised the siege of Windhoek, then further north and west relieved Okahandja and Omaruru.¹⁵ In addition, just prior to the Herero cutting the only communications (one telegraph line) between Windhoek and Swakopmund, the Germans notified their warship Habricht of the revolt. The warship sent eighty-five marines inland to help reinforce the garrison towns which Franke had relieved. By the time Germany steamed initial

reinforcements to the colony, and by the time Leutwein disengaged himself from the Bondelswarts and proceeded northward, it was mid to late February.¹⁶

The head of the Colonial Department in the Foreign Ministry had only ten other officials with which to deal with this colonial crisis and maintain the rest of Germany's colonies. This lack of developing a colonial division autonomous from the Foreign Ministry and lack of personnel shown blatantly Germany's lack of colonial organization. Yet ironically with only a few individuals needing to make the calls and very little bureaucracy needing to be crossed, this did speed up Germany's reaction. On January 18, the Colonial Department called for reinforcements for Southwest Africa and received approval the same day. Soon five hundred marines, who volunteered for this first war since the Franco-Prussian, departed. This was done despite Governor Leutwein's initial and inaccurate report (which was made while he was still in the southern reaches of the colony) that reinforcements were unnecessary. Also, on January 18, Bulow went before the Reichstag and informed them of the Herero revolt after which the body approved a 2.8 million mark act for military operations in Southwest Africa. Even the noted anti-imperialist and Socialist leader, August Bebel, did not challenge this surge of patriotic enthusiasm in defending their first colony and fighting Germany's first war of the twentieth century, though Bebel did request an investigation into its causes.¹⁷

While the German troops and settlers in the colony barricaded themselves in their fortified towns in Hereroland, the 500 marines were steaming for Swakopmund, and while the Army organized further reinforcements, German officials were already planning the inevitable fate of the Herero. The Otavi Railway's chief engineer wrote to the Southwest African desk of the Colonial

Department in Berlin, that “all here in the colony agree that this rebellion must be put down with severity and that all those responsible must receive their just desserts.” At the same time the commander of the warship Habricht cabled that “the most severe punishment needs to be inflicted on the enemy,” and he talked of confiscating all the land and cattle of the Herero.¹⁸ Some who had the Kaiser’s ear envisioned even more severe punishment. They talked of executions, expulsions, forced labor camps, and even the genocide of the entire Herero tribe. This resembled similar talk, even about genocide, by British and Cape officials and journalists when W. W. Jordan was killed many years before by the Ovambo--and that involved only two men killed, this was over a hundred German colonists and still growing. Whereas the Herero leadership had decided to leave German missionaries, women, and children alone, the Germans were looking for complete revenge. One missionary described the horrific frenzy of revenge that was spilling from the lips of German Southwest Africans: “The Germans are consumed with inexpiable hatred and a terrible thirst for revenge, one might even say they are thirsting for the blood of the Herero.” The missionary reported only hearing “give no quarter” among the colonists and confessed: “I shudder to think of what may happen in the months ahead.”¹⁹ Already anticipating victory once their forces landed, cooler minds in Berlin were making plans, to export Herero throughout Germany’s overseas colonies for cheap labor.²⁰

In the initial stage of the war, from January to June, 1904, Governor Leutwein, who was still dumbfounded by the Herero’s revolt, led the German forces. Leutwein had opposed colonists’ calls for disarming the Herero in the

past and had criticized the *rassengegenfatzen* or "race-hatred" which existed among the colonists. He had especially denounced any murder, flogging, or rape of the Herero, which in fact was common. The Governor confessed being sickened when no jury ever convicted a white settler of these crimes.²¹ At the same time Leutwein criticized high-minded liberals like Bebel who thought there could be a more civilized way to colonize, once saying "colonization is always inhumane" and that any promises ever made to the Herero, or any others, was only due to "our weak strategic position at the time."²² The Governor already in the first months of the revolt gave Berlin hints that he wanted to negotiate with Maherero, which Berlin countered with direct orders of demanding unconditional surrender. Leutwein was in Swakopmund by mid-February and by March had a force of 2,500, with cannon and machine guns, ready to face some 10,000 Herero rebels.²³

Thousands of volunteers were offering their services in Germany to be shipped to Southwest Africa to fight for the Fatherland. The Kaiser almost immediately took the command of the war from the Colonial Department and placed it directly into the hands of the High Command, whose chief was General Graf von Schlieffen. Schlieffen appointed General Lothar von Trotha, who had served the Reich in the Boxer Rebellion, as commander of expedition to clear the colony from all resistance. Trotha was to take over all military operations, thus replacing Leutwein, who on April 13 fumbled his counter-offensive at Oviumbo. Three thousand Herero surrounded Leutwein's force there forcing to the Governor to withdraw, barely escaping annihilation. Despite his replacement as commander-in-chief it was clear that for now Leutwein was

to remain Governor. Leutwein still hoped that once the German forces defeated the Herero in a few battles they could arrange a conditional surrender, because, as the Governor well knew, the colony needed the labor of the Herero (with Southwest Africa already requiring a nine million mark per annum subsidy from Berlin).²⁴ After the battle at Oviumbo, the Governor acknowledged that "the Herero apparently believe that they can expect no quarter and are therefore fanatically determined . . . fighting will therefore come to an end only when the enemy has fired his last shot."²⁵ Leutwein even sent Berlin a critical comment on their unconditional surrender demands: "The insurgents must know that there is an alternative to death--otherwise, we will only drive them to despair, bringing on an endless war."²⁶ He wrote:

I do not concur with those fanatics who want to see the Herero destroyed altogether. Apart from the fact that a people of 60,000 or 70,000 [his estimate was somewhat low] is not so easy to annihilate, I would consider such a move a grave mistake from an economic point of view. . . . It will be quite sufficient if they are politically dead . . . denied any form of tribal government and confined to reserves. . . . [with those] found guilty of having looted farms or murdering innocent people, be[ing] sentenced to death. . . . The only favour I beg of you is to give me a free hand concerning the diplomatic methods to be used to bring the negotiations to a close.²⁷

At one point the Governor balked, stating that "it is meaningless to talk of encirclement, for in order to encircle [the entire Herero] people we would have to bring together more men than this water-poor and resourceless land could sustain."²⁸ The High Command ignored Leutwein in its zeal. As for Leutwein's forces, he had divided them in March into three groups. However, heavy casualties quickly reduced the eastern most detachment, which by April 3 was nearly nonexistent. Leutwein dissolved it on May 6. By the time of his dismissal

as commander, Governor Leutwein regrouped the western detachment with the main force for its own protection. However, most of the battles at this point were relatively small in terms of numbers involved. From the opening battles of January 12-20 to the battle of Oviumbo on April 13 the Herero had lost only 250 while the Germans had lost only 210 soldiers. Yet by May, General Trotha was already steaming for Swakopmund with more reinforcements, so Leutwein took the defensive and remained at the fortified points to wait. From May to June, 2,126 soldiers, 169 officers, and 2,126 horses left Hamburg for Southwest Africa.²⁹

Trotha himself landed with his men on June 11, 1904. He gathered the German force and moved into the open field. With no offers of giving quarter, Trotha quickly had Samuel Maherero's Herero force cornered at Waterberg between his forces and the expanse of the Omaheke wasteland or *sandveld*, which was several hundred miles wide and simply a northern extension of the Kalahari that separated Hereroland from Lake Ngami in Bechuanaland.³⁰ Trotha brought the encircling grip of his six detachments around Waterberg fighting an inconclusive battle from August 11-12, with the Germans impressed with the Herero resistance. However, Trotha left one link open for the Herero to find, a hole leading out into the wasteland. Despite objections made by Governor Leutwein and some of Trotha's own officers, the General continued to squeeze the Herero through the hole. By August 20 the Herero retreated past the eastern edge of the Waterberg plateau and entered the Omaheke. Trotha immediately had the last waterhole closed off with a line of fence and guardposts extending over 150 miles to keep the Herero in the *sandveld*. Over 8,000 Herero rebels with an auxiliary of women and children of twice that

number, made their exodus into the Omaheke with whatever cattle they had left.³¹ On October 2, 1904, Trotha made his *Vernichtungsbefehl* or “extermination order”:

I, the Great General of the German soldiers, address this letter to the Herero people. The Herero are no longer considered German subjects. They have murdered, stolen, cut off ears and other parts from wounded soldiers, and now refuse to fight on, out of cowardice. I have this to say to them . . . the Herero people will have to leave the country. Otherwise I shall force them to do so by means of guns. Within the German boundaries, every Herero, whether found armed or unarmed, with or without cattle, will be shot. I shall not accept any more women or children. I shall drive them back to their people-- otherwise I shall order shots to be fired at them. These are my words to the Herero people.³²

General Trotha had offered 1,000 marks to any settler who captured a Herero subchief and 5,000 marks to anyone who supplied the General with Samuel Maherero himself. He later added that German soldiers were also eligible to obtain any reward, though he amended that “the firing of shots at women and children means firing over their heads to drive them away” which he thought two shots would suffice. As for Herero men he stated: “*I am in no doubt that as a result of this order no more male prisoners will be taken*, but neither will it give rise to atrocities committed on women and children.”³³ Despite this the greatest atrocity was the maintenance of the 150-mile fortified border keeping the Herero in the Omaheke wasteland. Afterwards even the High Command admitted that the fence destroyed the Herero more than any German weapons could have. Most of the Herero died a slow death. Though some 1,000 Herero, including Samuel Maherero, made it across the *sandveld* to the Okavango region which had water, they were in turn mistreated as refugees by Sechome, the paramount chief of the Tswana in Bechuanaland. Samuel Maherero’s power

was now extinguished. Some 200 Herero made it westward to Walvis Bay where the British quickly sent them to Cape Town, while an unknown number of Herero made it safely into Ovamboland. Yet the bulk of survivors who did not flee into the Omaheke or were not at the Waterberg battle, simply ran back to their homeland in Hereroland where the German army hunted them down and herded the survivors into concentration camps. By 1905, there were 5,000 Herero refugees in Bechuanaland or in the Cape Colony while nearly twice that number remained in the labor camps of Southwest Africa.³⁴

By now even the chief of the High Command, Schlieffen, was questioning General Trotha's methods. He believed Trotha had complicated matters by keeping the conflict going, because the German forces could not reach the remnant of the Herero and the Herero could not surrender because of the *Vernichtungsbefehl* (extermination order).³⁵ Also, when the Colonial Department of the Foreign Ministry informed Chancellor Bulow what Trotha was doing, he was outraged. He immediately requested the Kaiser to lift the extermination order since it was uncivilized, impractical, and worked against the economy of Southwest Africa--in other words, everything Governor Leutwein had argued. Bulow bluntly told Wilhelm that this genocide was "demeaning to our standing among the civilized nations of the world." After five days of delaying, the Kaiser consented to have Trotha "show mercy," and only after eight more days did Bulow get the Kaiser to cancel the *Vernichtungsbefehl* entirely.³⁶ Bulow tried to compromise with the General by allowing him to create concentration camps if need be "where the rest of the Herero people would be placed and kept for the time being."³⁷ However Trotha delayed

complying with the new cancellation orders as long as possible. Berlin had even insulted Trotha by demanding that he use the Rhenish Missionary Society (RMS) to make contact with the Herero. The General blamed the missionaries for the whole mess with the natives and wanted nothing to do with them. He reported that the RMS wanted a letter sent to Herero leaders "to persuade their people to lay down their arms and to return to their old hunting grounds under the guiding hand of the Church." The General threw this aside and announced his own plan to the missionaries: "Those of the Herero who are ready to lay down their arms will be transported back to areas far removed from the front line--there they . . . will be put in irons and employed as labour."³⁸ General Trotha and Governor Leutwein bitterly fought over Trotha's continued massacre despite Chancellor Bulow and the Kaiser's orders. Trotha even wrote to Leutwein: "The eastern border of the colony will remain sealed off and terrorism will be employed against any Herero showing up. That nation must vanish from the face of the earth. Having failed to destroy them with guns, I will have to achieve my end in that way."³⁹ Trotha even denied that the Governor had any say in the military operations. After the High Command supported Trotha's position, Leutwein's future as governor was in jeopardy.

Shockingly, on October 3, 1904, the day after Trotha issued his extermination order, Hendrik Witbooi as leader of the most powerful Nama finally "put on the white feather" of rebellion, thus bringing the Nama and all of the colony's south into the revolt.⁴⁰ Unfortunately because the Germans had exterminated Herero power the Reich could now focus its efforts entirely on the Nama. Also, whereas Maherero acted when the German strategic position was

at its weakest, Hendrik Witbooi waited until thousands of German soldiers were in the colony for his rebellion. Troopships had dumped battalion after battalion into Swakopmund to make the trek across the Namib from the Skeleton Coast. By October 1904 there were over 10,000 German troops in Southwest Africa, with Witbooi only having 900 rebels to begin his assault. However, the Nama chief was more of a guerrilla leader than Maherero, and the Nama simply could no longer contain their rage after seeing the Herero nearly "wiped off the face of the earth." Quickly enough half of the Nama tribes responded to Hendrick Witbooi's call to arms, and admittedly there were only 500 German soldiers in Namaland when the revolt began.⁴¹ Sensing the increased hostility among the Nama, Leutwein had sent two companies and one artillery battery to Luderitzbucht (Angra Pequena) and further reinforcements into Namaland just in case, so as not to be caught as unprepared as he was with the Herero. The Germans quickly outnumbered these new rebels as Trotha sent waves of reinforcements southward, with the Nama Chief having to run for his life on certain occasions and even driven into the Kalahari for a time. However, the guerrilla tactics paid off with the interruption of supply lines. Furthermore, Trotha was frustrated by two more rebel groups. The first was another Nama tribe led by a chief named Cornelius who rebelled after Witbooi led most of the other Nama into rebellion. The second group was led by a cattle thief from the Cape Colony, named Morenga, who after frustrating Cape officials crossed into Southwest Africa. Actually General Trotha tried negotiating with Cornelius early by sending his own son, a young lieutenant, to the Nama camp. But a German patrol, ignorant of what was going on, fired into the camp and thus Cornelius had the General's son killed. Against the three rebel groups Trotha's army, now

15,000 strong, seemed stalemated. The Germans wanted an open battle which these rebels never gave them after observing what happened to the Herero. The guerrillas only raided upon the Germans or attacked them in small groups at night, which actually proved far more successful.⁴¹

Morenga had been operating in the region even before Hendrik Witbooi donned his white feather of war. At one point the cattle raider captured the horses of an entire German company, with the Germans having to walk back to Keetmanshoop. Morenga, himself half Herero and Nama, succeeded in bringing both Nama and Herero into his group, the first truly Namibian force. Morenga gave the German's many small defeats, but he had to be "put on the back burner" by the German command when the Nama Revolt broke out. The Cape would actually help put Morenga out of Germany's misery when the cattle-raider later crossed back into British territory.⁴²

Hendrik Witbooi had only the loyalty of half the tribes in the revolt, and yet the entire Nama people equaled only one fourth the size of the Herero who had already been defeated. More discouraging was the fact that Witbooi was being met by a German force almost equal to the entire Nama population in Southwest Africa. To offset these odds the Nama guerrilla leader put his faith in God. Hendrik Witbooi was a Christian fanatic, almost having his own daughter executed for premarital sex, and envisioned an African church free from the western missionaries. However, even more reinforcements arrived from Germany and despite Hendrik Witbooi's religious visions the Nama cause looked hopeless.⁴³

The critical blow which ended the stalemate between the German army

and the Nama came on October 29, 1905, when the Germans fatally wounded the Nama rebel leader. His last words were reported thus: "It is enough with me, it is all over--the children should now have rest." Trotha called it "a beautiful message" and soon Samuel Witbooi, the Nama leader's son and successor, surrendered.⁴⁴ The Germans spared the Witbooi Nama and promised to allow them to remain near their old capital of Gibeon. Likewise, Cornelius' Bethanie Nama (the same tribe who two decades earlier sold Angra Pequena to Luderitz) were also allowed to remain near Bethanie once they surrendered. Most surviving Nama rebels surrendered during 1905-06, but some who were outraged by Samuel Witbooi's early capitulation did not surrender until 1907.⁴⁵

When the High Command sided with General Trotha on many military issues, though he was now forced to take prisoners due to the Foreign Ministry, Berlin granted Governor Leutwein home leave which he apparently requested. This was just a dignified but forced resignation. Yet just as Berlin was frustrated by Leutwein's leniency and unproductivity in the rebellions, German officials were themselves aghast by Trotha's cruelty and overproductivity. The General had ignored certain orders and assumed powers not given to him. Berlin felt he was uncontrollable and therefore had him recalled. In November 1905 Trotha was on his way back to Germany. These two were replaced with a new team to run the post-rebellion colony--Friedrich von Lindequist (the former German Consul in Cape Town, who tried to encourage Leutwein to annihilate the Nama) as civilian governor, and General Dame as the new commander of Southwest Africa.⁴⁶

In November 1905, the Germans, breaking their promise, actually sent

over one hundred Witbooi Nama (the late Hendrik Witbooi's own tribe) to the German colony of Togo in West Africa. However, after the Togo officials shipped them back when they found them quickly dying due to illness there. Also, after General Trotha was gone, another 6,000 returning Herero and 2,000 of the rebelling Nama were willing to surrender--almost all going to concentration (labor) camps. In 1907, by Germany's own admission, over half of the 2,000 Nama and now 15,000 Herero prisoners died in those camps. The worst camp was on Shark Island, that rock in Angra Pequena Bay (now Luderitzbucht in memorial to the founder) which had been long fought for between De Pass and the Bremen merchant. Witbooi and Bethanie Nama rebels were sent there, in violation of the surrender agreements made with them. Some 1,000 of the 1,700 sent to Shark Island died within seven months. Cornelius himself perished in the cold winds of this Skeleton Coast prison. By 1911, further testifying to the total extinguishment of indigenous power (save of course the Ovambo), only an estimated 9,800 of the 20,000 Nama and 15,000 of the 80,000 Herero survived the wars--though reports vary. Perhaps if the Nama had donned their white feather of war when Samuel Maherero gave his plea to "let us die fighting" events and results might have been different. But this was the first German war for this Kaiser and one of the few since 1871 for the German Army (though some German forces did participate in the international force during the Boxer Rebellion, as did General Trotha himself). Since the resulting enthusiasm caused by this rare call to arms sent waves of German volunteers to Southwest Africa, the end result would have been much the same. Though perhaps if the Nama had rebelled with the Herero the German victory might have been delayed and there would have probably been a longer

German casualty list (2,000 Germans were actually killed in both revolts). However the fact remains that the Nama did not fight with the Herero and therefore the Germans had the luxury of dealing with them in succession. In this war at least, the Second Reich rivaled the Third Reich in atrocity and genocide. Though admittedly on a smaller numeric scale, this war was much greater in its per capita impact and created ghost villages and regions. Yet upon returning home, the Kaiser gave General Trotha the Order of Merit for his accomplishments. The Treaty of Ukamas officially ended all rebellion in Southwest Africa in 1907, though it also at least ended the ability for settlers or soldiers to hunt down remaining Herero.⁴⁷

With the revolts ended, the Germans and Boers took complete economic control over the region. The "Imperial Decree of 26 December 1905 Pertaining to the Sequestration of Natives" issued by the Kaiser's government, and endorsed by him personally, ensured the economic fate of the Herero. Though it included confiscating land from the Nama, Governor Lindequist, possibly because the raider Morenga was still at large, told the Colonial Department that it was "premature to take action against the Nama tribes at the present stage."⁴⁸ However, once news finally arrived in Windhoek of Morenga's death in the Cape nearly all of Namaland fell to the same fate as all of Hereroland. German colonists quickly built their homesteads on the former native soil. Despite there being only around a thousand white farmers, of whom over nine hundred were German, by 1913 they owned over 13.4 million hectares of land, or almost one-sixth of Southwest Africa's entire area. Also by this time, whites owned 183,000 of the 205,000 head of cattle, with the Basters, who had allied themselves to the Germans in both revolts, owning half of the remainder. This severe action

against the indigenous population did not escape criticism from several elements in Berlin. Even the Reichstag opposed the Kaiser's action. One deputy from the moderate Center Party called it "nothing else but robbery on a large scale" and that the "Decree marks the entry of modern slavery into Southwest Africa."⁴⁹ August Bebel, a deputy for the Social Democrats in the Reichstag and critic of German imperialism, said that the Decree merely used the rebellions as an excuse to gain what the colonists always wanted, to "wrest the land from the natives and transfer it to the settlers."⁵⁰ The Social Democratic and Center parties passed a resolution through the Reichstag on May 30, 1906, demanding that the Kaiser's government return at least a portion of the confiscated lands back to the Herero and Nama. However, because of its weak parliamentary powers in the German government, the Kaiser and Governor Lindequist basically ignored the Reichstag.

The economics of the colony remained discouraging, despite the some companies and enterprise making huge profits during the confiscation of Herero and Nama property. At the turn of the century there had been only 3,387 whites in Southwest Africa, but by 1913 there were 14,830. This number was actually a lot, since it now nearly equaled the post-revolt population of the Herero, who despite the genocide were still the second largest tribe in this sparsely populated colony. Only the Ovambo remained in their own category, and autonomous, with well over a hundred thousand people. With the sharp rise in settlers came a large increase in imports, which created a larger trade deficit. Governor Lindequist tried to develop the infrastructure of the colony by building new railways, wells, dams, and schools. However, only the discovery of diamonds redeemed Southwest Africa, yet this occurred only at the very end of

this colony's life within the German Reich. In 1908, the first year after settlers discovered diamonds near Luderitzbucht, 39,000 carats of diamonds were exported with the largest single diamond measuring 34 carats. Already by the next year that export figure was 483,000 carats. In 1910 the export quantity doubled, and by 1913 Southwest Africa exported over one and a half million carats from Swakopmund in the north and Luderitzbucht in the south. The latter of these ports, the former Angra Pequena, shipped over 36 million marks worth of diamond and copper in 1912 alone, the same year in which exports finally exceeded imports. However, Swakopmund was a difficult port with ships having to anchor offshore with smaller boats needed to load and unload cargo through the rough surf until a stable and very lengthy pier was constructed. Yet Swakopmund remained the gateway to Windhoek from the coast since Walvis Bay remained in British and then South African hands. In addition to diamonds, gold and silver mines likewise began producing huge profits. Luderitz's dream, and that of many others, had finally come true on this return for all the investment. Tsumeb in the north became the largest lead mine in all of Africa while also yielding sixteen other metals which the new Tsumeb-Swakopmund railway transported to the coast. Bismark's "little sandpot" which even the Kaiser wanted to give away was finally a shining, profitable colony for the Reich paying off the millions of marks invested into its roads, harbors, railways, and defense. De Pass had given up too easily, Luderitz's survivors could say. De Pass settled with the bird dung of the coast rather than continuing to dig for Namibia's buried wealth. The German colonial government and organizations built permanent offices, hospitals, and churches replacing temporary ones. The Germans even erected a radio transmitter that could communicate directly

with Berlin. The British Consul in the German colony reported that a new, more elaborate period of public construction was to begin in 1914. However, all of this belated economic progress came too late for German Southwest Africa, as a shot fired in Sarajevo determined its fate.⁵¹

There were only seven short years between the last of the revolts and the first world war, and an even shorter period of economic success. When the war began in 1914, Britain relied on the first prime minister of the Union of South Africa, General Louis Botha, to defend the Union and to seize the now profitable German colony. Yet South Africa's forces included many Boers and English who were disenchanted by the Boer War and who called this conflict "Britain's War" wanting no part in it. When the South African Parliament decided to go ahead with invasion plans for Southwest Africa, many Boers openly rebelled.⁵²

As early as August 4, Botha informed the British command that South African (Union) troops could take over the responsibilities of the British imperial troops stationed there, so that England could use the latter in the European war. London quickly accepted the offer.⁵³ From the new seat of power at Pretoria, the Acting Governor General, De Villiers, wasted little time and instructed his ministers:

If your Ministers at the same time desire and feel themselves able to seize such part of German South-West Africa as will give them the command of Swakopmund, Luderitzbucht, and the wireless stations there or in the interior, we should feel this was a great and Imperial service. You will, however, realise that any territory now occupied must be at the disposal of the Imperial Government for purposes of an ultimate settlement at the conclusion of the war. Other Dominions are acting in similar way on the same understanding.⁵⁴

With South Africans understanding that they refrain from making claims to any

German territory that they might occupy, London approved invasion plans on August 9, 1914, and called it “an urgent necessity” to take the two German harbors via “a joint naval and military expedition up the coast.” The British command also suggested that the “capture of . . . Wind[hoek], which is of great importance, might follow another expedition [up the coast] . . . or be carried out independently from [the] interior.”⁵⁵ Regarding the invasion, Botha wrote that “the naval part [is] to be undertaken by the Imperial authorities and the military operations [are] to be undertaken by the Union Government.”⁵⁶ However, before Botha could load South African troops on to British ships or could mass a land force on the border with Southwest Africa, growing resistance from Boer (Afrikaner) commanders and troops brought South Africa to the brink of civil war.

Hopes of an independent Afrikaner republic began as soon as the war commenced in Europe. These hopes were completely anchored on Germany’s early successes on the western front in Belgium and France. Another basis for the Afrikaner revolt had to do with the mystical visions of a man simply known as Van Rensburg, who prophesied a bloodless end to the Union in which the resurrection of the Boer Republics would not even require one shot fired. Those planning rebellion attempted early to enlist General De la Rey, the commander of western Transvaal. However, De la Rey instead calmed down the Afrikaners on August 15, inhibiting the revolt, though this only delayed the inevitable. Yet due to the General’s popularity, the conspirators still wanted to enlist him.⁵⁷

Lt. Colonel Solomon Maritz, later a rebel general, was another key individual in the uprising. Maritz had fought in the western districts of the Cape

near Southwest Africa during the Boer War against the British, and left South Africa after the peace of 1902. He resided in Madagascar briefly before he went to Southwest Africa where he helped the Germans in the Herero Revolt. Maritz subsequently returned to South Africa and enlisted in the Union Police.

However, after the new Union created a Defense Force he was actually offered a commission and in January 1913 given the command of the twelfth military district, the northwestern region of the Cape where South Africa bordered German territory. Amazingly Maritz was in control of the same region in which he had fought the British in the Boer War; now he was suppose to defend British and Cape interests there. This remarkable, and unlikely, appointment was achieved through the efforts of General C. F. Beyers, even with the reluctance of the Union defense minister. A British report on Maritz asserted that the colonel was "in communication with the German authorities. . . . [even] before he was appointed to the command of the north-western districts."⁵⁸ Maritz himself reportedly confessed that he was planning for the return of an independent Afrikaner republic as early as 1912, which he believed an inevitable Anglo-German conflict would enable. Beyond German Southwest Africa, Maritz maintained close communication with Generals Beyers, De Wet, and Jan Kemp, as well as keeping contact with the leaders of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State which were now part of the Union of South Africa.⁵⁹

As early as August 7, 1914, Maritz declared to Afrikaners in his military district that "we in South Africa have no enemy unless we make one ourselves" and exclaimed that he and his force would not be a part of any invasion of Southwest Africa.⁶⁰ Furthermore, an old associate of Maritz, Piet J. Joubert,

who fought in the Boer War with him and commanded the Transvaal Boers, had been residing at a farm near Keetmanshoop in German Southwest Africa. Joubert returned to help Maritz's efforts, and at one point South African locals accused him of being a German spy. The actions of Maritz gave Germany a buffer along the Orange River, at least for a while, in the early stages of World War I and even concealed German violations, via patrols, of the South African border. At one point, Maritz even allowed a German force to cross into South Africa to capture the Liebenbergs, an Afrikaner family who had fled from the German territory with their cattle and who had shot at German patrols in the process.⁶¹

With the rebellion delayed by De la Rey, Maritz sent Joubert to see Generals Botha and Smuts, the leaders of Union forces, to put aside any skepticism which might have arisen because of Joubert's return. However the real reason for Maritz sending his associate to Pretoria was to make contact with Beyers and De la Rey. Beyers had made preparations for a general Afrikaner revolt on September 15, 1914. Maritz was to keep protecting Southwest Africa from an invasion, while also allowing German support to flood in for the rebels. Beyers' plans were for Major J. Kemp, later a rebel general, to work under De la Rey in the western Transvaal, unless Beyers could not convince De la Rey to rebel; if such was the case Kemp would take over. By mid August, Maritz had traveled to Pretoria and confirmed to Beyers that the revolt indeed had German support. After the seer Van Rensburg revealed further visions to the Afrikaner people in which he saw 40,000 Germans marching through the streets of London, and with news of continued German success in western Europe, General Beyers also announced publicly that he

too would not participate in any invasion of Southwest Africa.⁶²

Although rumors were circulating that the Germans were massing a force at Nakab, a watering hole close to the Orange River border with South Africa, Maritz covered German activity by supposedly sending out patrols that found nothing. He tried to keep Union leaders, Botha and Smuts, in the dark as long as possible. Also, the Nationalist Party, an Afrikaner dominated entity, by September 9 disclosed it opposed Botha's plans for an invasion of Southwest Africa. Several clergy of the Dutch Reformed Church also opposed such plans and were in early communication with Beyers offering assistance.⁶³

In early September, Beyers continued with plans for the uprising to begin on September 15, which would include a march on Pretoria in what he hoped to be a bloodless coupe against the Union government. The General tried telegraphing De la Rey to enlist him more solidly into the group, but he was unable to contact him. Thus Beyers had only De Wet's support and troops in the Orange Free State, Maritz's in the northwestern Cape territory, and Kemp's control over part of De la Rey's forces in the western Transvaal. On September 11, 1914 a force led by General Duncan Mackenzie, was about ready to set sail from Cape Town to seize Luderitzbucht (Angra Pequena). The pressure mounted for those wanting to prevent a full invasion. By the 14th, Beyers had written his resignation from Union forces and had his car ready for quick travel. The next morning, Joubert met with Beyers in Pretoria "informing him that all arrangements [by Maritz] had been made and all was ready."⁶⁴ So the General had Joubert sent to Johannesburg in his car, since it would be safer there for him, and had General De la Rey brought back to Pretoria. Both Kemp and

Beyers had already made their resignations known to their men by the time De la Rey arrived.⁶⁵

With his arrival, Beyers made sure De la Rey was against the invasion of Southwest Africa, and he confirmed that he was. However the leader of the coup still did not reveal the true aspirations of their movements to De la Rey, but persuaded him to speak to Kemp's massed troops, around 1,600 in number, at Potchefstroom Camp. He was to give the rebellion some integrity and to win over those in the ranks who might be swayed by criticizing the Union plans of invasion. However, as the two generals and a driver made their way from Pretoria to Kemp's camp via Johannesburg, they encountered a police cordon. Unfortunately for the rebellion, the police were after a gang of three people who had recently stolen a car. When Beyers saw the police barrier he had his driver run it, thinking that news had leaked out about the revolt and that the police were looking for him. The police fired and fatally shot General De la Rey, the most respected and followed leader in the western Transvaal.⁶⁶ Equally unfortunate and frustrating for coup leaders was the fact that the mystic seer, the "prophet," had refused to go to any meeting and speak which might give the rebellion credibility, only saying "it was not yet clear to him that [this] was his path."⁶⁷

The rebellion's rough start continued as the conspirators tried to carry it into action, though they made some progress. When news was heard of De la Rey's death, Kemp had raced in his car to withdraw his resignation, but it was too late. Although there were fears that the coup would topple, Smuts and Botha remained ignorant of it regarding the resignations as simple protests

against the invasion. A few days later, after the Potchefstroom debacle, Kemp exclaimed: "Thank God, we've still got . . . Maritz on the Orange River."⁶⁸ With Maritz's continued assurances of German support, Beyers, Kemp and De Wet met on September 20, the evening of De la Rey's funeral, to plot another attempt. The next day, under the the flag of the old Orange Free State, they preached to seven or eight hundred Afrikaners against the invasion of Southwest Africa, continuing to criticize the invasion and to draw Afrikaner support.. However a Union force slipped by Maritz and crossed into the German colony. This almost spoiled the rebellion when it was learned that the South African force "was badly cut up" by the Germans.⁶⁹ Maritz continued to deny that any German threat existed on the border so that Afrikaners would not be swept up in Botha's and Smut's calls to arms, which would deflate the planned rebellion. In early October, De Wet and Kemp made speeches denouncing the Union government in the northern parts of the Orange Free State, trying to gain support for a revolt.⁷⁰

Meanwhile, Union General Smuts ordered Maritz to invade Southwest Africa. Maritz refused, however, saying that the Germans had now 3,000 men on the border, a force he had been denying existed. Maritz claimed the Germans had machine guns and howitzers and were too strong for his untrained force of volunteer Afrikaner commandos. Smuts immediately demanded Maritz to hand over his command to Major Enslin, whom Smuts knew was loyal to the Union, and that Maritz come to Pretoria to explain his actions. Maritz refused, and Enslin secretly wired to Smuts that his commander was in contact with the Germans: "Will do my best [in] most difficult position--l

am afraid to trust any one [in] camp.”⁷¹ The few Union loyalists in Maritz’s force, in control of the maxim gun section, trained their weapons back on the camp just in case Maritz tried anything. Yet further orders for Maritz to step down came from Pretoria, but Maritz replied: “It is impossible for me to come over [to Pretoria] under circumstances and hand over command to Major Enslin, as matters would certainly go wrong.” Trying to prevent government interference, on October 2, 1914, Maritz wired Pretoria that he could handle the border situation with his current force, thus contradicting his earlier report. However, Smuts had already ordered reinforcements and a new commander to be sent to the scene.⁷² That afternoon, the rebel leader broke camp and moved towards the border of Southwest Africa. Though this is what Pretoria had originally commanded, Enslin telegraphed:

Maritz’s movement all of the sudden not understood and suspicious. It may be he thinks he is clearing himself from disobedience by moving to the border. He expressed no intention [of] proceed[ing] further, but have just ascertained he has taken all ammunition with him. I warned Lieutenant Freer [in] charge [of] machine guns [to] keep sharp lookout.⁷³

By October 6, Maritz had made arrangements with his German contacts across the border for continued support. Three days later he assembled his force of five to six hundred men in such a way as to surround the Union loyalists of the maxim gun section, which he had disarmed and had taken into custody. Maritz then gave a lengthy speech condemning Botha, Smuts, and explained why he refused the orders to invade German Southwest Africa. At this time he revealed the plan to gain the independence of the Afrikaner regions from British control. The rebel commander explained:

I can assure you that I did not put on this uniform to serve

England--far from it. I did it solely for the goodwill of my country, and now I am on the point to act. When General Botha insisted on my taking command, I told him that it was a fruitless attempt to try such a thing, but he would not listen . . . [and now] I lay down my distinction as an English Lieutenant Colonel, for I want to be nothing more than a common [Afrikaner] to fight for the freedom of my country, and I shall not cease, though my blood may flow.⁷⁴

In addition Maritz had accepted the rank of general from the Germans and handed over 60 Union loyalists, from his own force, to be held as prisoners in Southwest Africa.

Maritz's actions quickly pushed Beyers, De Wet, and Kemp to take their own action which had been repeatedly delayed. They had no choice now that Botha and Smuts had figured out what was going on. On Monday, October 12, the Union government announced martial law and the existence of a rebellion, having newspapers announce: "Ever since the resignation of General Beyers . . . there have been indications that something was wrong with the forces in the north-west of the Cape Province [under Maritz]". The report also denounced Kemp and De Wet as rebels. Full rebellion now became the coup leaders' only option. Immediately, news reached Pretoria that Maritz had German weaponry and possibly personnel at his disposal with the rebel General reportedly boasting "that he would overrun the whole of South Africa."⁷⁵

In the original plan for the coup attempt, in September, Beyers was to be president of the Boer republic with De la Rey as commander-in-chief. Now, however, when Maritz forced matters to a head, the best they could do was to have Beyers form some sort of leadership with commandos under De Wet in Transvaal and under Kemp in the Orange Free State. Dutch Reformed ministers immediately helped by transporting the rebel leaders where they

needed to go. However, Unionists immediately searched for Beyers, forcing the rebel general to hide for a time, so that De Wet had to take temporary control over the situation.⁷⁶ De Wet addressed a crowd of Afrikaners trying to gain further support, stating that “you shall know shortly if happiness or misery is coming over the land. There are only a few here, but thousands are ready and waiting for the word.”⁷⁷

On October 13, Beyers and a delegation met with Botha in Pretoria and formally announced the coup. At the same time they ordered Afrikaner troops to “*bedank dadelik*,” or “resign immediately” from Union commands or posts.⁷⁸ Three days later Beyers was in the field with his army. Later that month Beyers issued another call to arms: “All [Afrikaners] of the Union of South Africa from 16 to 60 years of age are commandeered with horse, saddle, and rifle and ammunition complete (with) rations for eight days to appear on Tuesday morning, 27th October, 1914, at 8 o’clock a. m. at Hatoschlangte.”⁷⁹ Hopefully this call would bring in larger numbers as the public finally knew the true reason for the rebellion--their independence.

Responding after this call, Union General Botha issued a statement on October 26: “Citizens who have been . . . guilty of disobedience . . . need not fear any action against them . . . on the part of the Government, so long as they remain quietly at home and abstain from acts of violence or hostility against the authority of the Government of the Union.”⁸⁰ Botha and Smuts relied on the offer of amnesty to keep Afrikaners from answering the call, but it went largely unheeded as hundreds and then thousands took to the field in the Transvaal . . . and in the Orange Free State. The next day Botha himself took to the field to do

battle with those who had already responded to Beyers' call. Almost immediately, General Botha dispersed Beyers' forces at Commissie Drift, south of Rustenburg, and forced the rebel general into hiding once more. A couple of days later, the government again offered amnesty with warnings that if the rebel commandos did not return home the government would seize their property. Shortly, Union forces dispersed another rebel group, some of Beyers' and some of Kemp's, at Treurfontein. So far victories had been made without blood spilt, so the Union government issued yet another warning to have local commanders "call upon [Afrikaners] to lay down their arms and go home. . . . if not, they will be prosecuted and punished as rebels."⁸¹ At this point, amnesty was also offered to rebel leaders provided no blood was spilled in the meantime.⁸²

Union General Smuts did not want a civil war in South Africa in the middle of World War I, and therefore he authorized numerous attempts to open negotiations with De Wet and Beyers in addition to the amnesty offers. One report of such negotiations stated:

The conversation turned on the resolution by Parliament with regard to the campaign against German South-West Africa and the reason for General Beyers and others taking up the position in which they stood. Beyers stated that he was taking up a position of passive resistance . . . and as it was impossible to address the [Afrikaners] in the ordinary way, on account of the regulations under Martial Law being so strict they were bound to come together in the manner they had done, to silently protest. Such restrictions, he said, were only to be expected in Russia.⁸³

Beyers at one point in negotiations denied ties with Maritz and even offered a compromise in which he would stop his revolt if only volunteers were used against Southwest Africa. However, it appears that the rebel general was just

buying De Wet and Kemp time to build-up. The government received a report that De Wet would continue the fight until the Union government agreed to withdraw all troops that had already invaded the Skeleton Coast. Another report indicated that: "De Wet announces that all troops be removed from German South-West Africa to within Union borders. If this is not done, he will fight for the independence of the Transvaal and the Free State. He states that arms, etc., will be supplied him by Maritz."⁸⁴ De Wet also bluffed a readiness to undertake negotiations in order to buy time. These Boer leaders knew full well they were going to ride this coup to its professed end--a sovereign Afrikaner republic. During one set of promised negotiation meetings, De Wet instead used the ruse to blow up bridges and cut telegraph lines.⁸⁵ On November 5, De Wet even felt confident enough to write:

Without making any promises now already (we are not going to divide the bear's skin before the bear is shot), I wish it to be known that my intention is that, if we attain our ideal, those [Afrikaners] who support our endeavour to attain independence are to receive a reward. The money for this (purpose) must come out of an assessment levied upon the [Afrikaners] who remained at home, [and] the unfaithful who fought against us.⁸⁶

Beyers likewise used the bluff of diplomacy to take the advantage of surprise. After having a face off with a Union force for hours, pending negotiations, he actually maneuvered his forces into an offensive against the Union commandos.⁸⁷ One British report concluded that "it is self-evident that the rebel generals were trifling with the seriously meant offers of peace made by the Government, and were taking advantage of its anxiety to avoid bloodshed to concentrate their forces and to complete their organization."⁸⁸ Because of the delays in hostilities, in the efforts of finding peace, the Union government had

given De Wet time enough to mass 5,000 troops in the Orange Free State alone.⁸⁹ On November 7, Smuts reported that “fighting had already begun at Kroonstad in order to oppose [De Wet’s] destruction of [rail]line and blowing up of bridges.” On the same day, Smuts reported that Union forces had successfully confronted Beyers near Hoopstad and had captured 350 of his commandos. Regarding the issue of amnesty, Smuts the next day admitted that the situation had totally changed now that “private property had been destroyed and numerous lives have been lost.”⁹⁰

Also, Botha severely defeated De Wet at Mushroom Valley on November 12, in which the rebels suffered heavy losses. This prompted Botha, now as Prime Minister of South Africa and as commander-in-chief of all Union forces in the field, to issue his proclamation of November 21, 1914, which again offered amnesty but only to those who immediately disarmed. Furthermore, he withdrew the offer now from all rebel leaders. Pretoria had become more aggressive against the rebels. Only after Mushroom Valley did De Wet finally agreed to serious peace negotiations, but Smut perceiving that the tables were turning against the rebels refused. However, Pretoria did extended the length of time for the “rank and file” Boer rebels to accept amnesty, even after blood had spilled, while also announcing that the government would confiscate the cattle of all rebels who remained in the field. Smuts, sensing victory over the coup, demanded the unconditional surrender of rebel officers, though he assured that “at present no intention to apply capital punishment” was being considered.⁹¹ Following Mushroom Valley, Union forces continued to gather momentum against the rebels. In early December, Botha personally led further

operations in the Orange Free State. By the 4th he had already captured seven hundred rebels, adding two hundred more on that day alone. Within a week several rebel leaders had unconditionally surrendered around twelve hundred more Boers. The Union officers allowed "rank and file" rebels to return to their homes upon reporting to their local magistrates, but held all leaders in custody.⁹²

By the new year Union forces were decisively on the offensive. Praises rang in the London *Times* for Generals Smuts and Botha. One article described Smuts' "surrounding of a rebel commando [via] horses, foot, motor-cars, and armoured trains, all moved with the skill of chess players."⁹³ Soon it was reported that Union forces had heavily defeated De Wet's *Freikorps*, or volunteer corps of commandos, after which the rebel general fled into Bechuanaland trying to flee to Southwest Africa. However Union motor-car troops ran over and killed De Wet (while Beyers drowned in a river around the same time). With both De Wet and Beyers out of the picture, Kemp and Maritz kept the revolt alive for another month and even attempted an offensive, although it failed.⁹⁴ Maritz and Kemp met near Upington on January 30 and decided to submit to the terms of the unconditional surrender. On February 3, news from Pretoria reported that 104 of Maritz's men had surrendered along with 529 of Kemp's. By the next day news came in that Kemp himself had surrendered, with Maritz expected to in a matter of days. However, it was later revealed that Maritz had actually crossed into German territory to collect what men he had there and bring them back to surrender. On February 9, 1915, news from Pretoria informed London that the Germans had shot Maritz in

Southwest Africa upon finding out that Maritz was performing double treason by leading German artillery into a trap near Kakamas (though later reports indicated that he fled German territory). Before the month's end many of the rebel officers captured were facing trial for their treason.⁹⁵ One article in the *Times* read that "the whole of the Union Forces can be launched in the desired direction [against Southwest Africa]."⁹⁶

After the Afrikaner coup had been snuffed out, Botha and Smuts concentrated their efforts on the invasion of German Southwest Africa. General Smuts took the command of one Union column crossing the Orange River into Namaland pushing northward. General Botha went to Luderitzbucht (Angra Pequena) where he addressed the troops who had seized the port the previous year and had been waiting for the end of the coup. He stated:

I know it is not your fault that you are still here. It is my fault; but in our country I have had to deal with a rebellion, which gave me much pain and sorrow. I have had to give much of my attention to this. Thank God it is past. (Cheers) I am here now, and may tell you that more men are coming along to help us achieve our object. It has been hard for you to have to be lying apparently idle so long, but still you have been doing very good work. Indeed, I know that the British Empire is grateful . . . We in South Africa have undertaken this task, and we are going to carry it through with all possible determination.⁹⁷

Eventually, two columns pushed inland from Walvis Bay towards Windhoek, as Smuts pushed up from the south. The South African force of 50,000 outnumbered and outgunned the German force of 9,000 who were mostly reservists. However, the use of chemical warfare was not limited to the European continent as the Germans poisoned most of the few wells that aided the crossing of the Namib Desert into the colony's heartland. The Germans

used the harsh environment as their greatest weapon, though in the end they could only fight a delaying war due to a lack of sufficient forces. The Germans could not get their Baster allies to fight against the South Africans because of that tribes reluctance to kill whites. Despite the minefields prepared by the Germans, Botha crossed the Namib with his column from Swakopmund and captured the capital of Windhoek on May 12, 1915. Then, after “double-timing” his force over 120 miles in one week, the South African commander cut off the German forces before they could retreat into the Caprivi Strip and escape across the Zambezi to German East Africa. Nearly 3,400 German troops and militia surrendered on July 9, 1915, near Tsumeb under the command of Colonel Franke, the same officer who had raced to Windhoek’s rescue during the Herero revolt. In this war of more maneuver and delay than actual combat, only 113 South Africans and 311 Germans actually died in combat according to most accounts.⁹⁸ All remaining pockets of Boer resistance in South Africa surrendered only four days before Franke’s at Tsumeb. In reality, the Boer rebels in South Africa, which in November 1914 numbered 11,000, had defended Southwest Africa just as effectively or more so than the German troops. The Union of South Africa made Sir Howard Gorges the military governor of Southwest Africa, and he ruled under martial law until the League of Nations determined the fate of the former German colony.⁹⁹ Therefore, nearly as quickly as Germany had established itself on the Skeleton Coast, it had now been thrown out. London and Cape Town could finally close the door they had left open thirty-two years earlier.

NOTES

¹Holstein, Papers, Vol. IV, p. 297.

²Holstein, Papers, Vol. IV, p. 306.

³Holstein, Papers, Vol. IV, p. 318.

⁴Holstein, Papers, Vol. IV, p. 347.

⁵Holstein, Papers, Vol. IV, pp. 348 (Note 3), 356.

⁶Rhoodie, Last Frontier, p. 141.

⁷Pakenham, Scramble, pp. 605-607; Drechsler, Let Us Die, pp. 50-53, 69; Rhoodie, Last Frontier, pp. 139-141.

⁸Pakenham, Scramble, pp. 602, 604; Rhoodie, Last Frontier, p. 142.

⁹Drechsler, Let Us Die, p. 143; Pakenham, Scramble, p. 608.

¹⁰Drechsler, Let Us Die, p. 143; Pakenham, Scramble, p. 608.

¹¹Drechsler, Let Us Die, p. 143.

¹²Pakenham, Scramble, p. 609; Drechsler, Let Us Die, p. 144.

¹³Katjavivi, Resistance in Namibia, p. 8; Bridgman, Revolt, p. 73; Pakenham, Scramble, p. 609.

¹⁴Bridgman, Revolt, p. 81.

¹⁵Bridgman, Revolt, pp. 81, 84; Drechsler, Let Us Die, p. 144; Rhoodie, The Last Frontier, p. 142.

¹⁶Bridgman, Revolt, p. 80; Pakenham, Scramble, p. 604; Drechsler, Let Us Die, p. 147.

¹⁷Bridgman, Revolt, p. 75; Pakenham, Scramble, pp. 602, 604; Drechsler, Let Us Die, p. 147.

- 18Drechsler, Let Us Die, p. 145; Bridgman, Revolt, p. 86.
- 19Drechsler, Let Us Die, p. 145.
- 20Drechsler, Let Us Die, pp. 146-147.
- 21Pakenham, Scramble, pp. 604, 607; Drechsler, Let Us Die, pp. 132-137; Bridgman, Revolt, pp. 56-70.
- 22Pakenham, Scramble, p. 608.
- 23Bridgman, Revolt, p. 87; Drechsler, Let Us Die, p. 148.
- 24Pakenham, Scramble, pp. 602, 609; Drechsler, Let Us Die, p. 149.
- 25Bridgman, Revolt, p. 103.
- 26Drechsler, Let Us Die, p. 148.
- 27Drechsler, Let Us Die, p. 148.
- 28Bridgman, Revolt, p. 28.
- 29Pakenham, Scramble, p. 610; Bridgman, Revolt, pp. 101, 108, 114; Drechsler, Let Us Die, p. 149.
- 30Pakenham, Scramble, p. 610; Drechsler, Let Us Die, p. 160.
- 31Rhodie, Last Frontier, p. 143; Pakenham, Scramble, pp. 610-611.
- 32Drechsler, Let Us Die, pp. 156-157; Pakenham, Scramble, p. 611.
- 33Drechsler, Let Us Die, p. 157.
- 34Pakenham, Scramble, p. 612; Drechsler, Let Us Die, pp. 158, 166-167.
- 35Pakenham, Scramble, p. 612; Drechsler, Let Us Die, p. 162.
- 36Drechsler, Let Us Die, pp. 163-164; Pakenham, Scramble, p. 612.

³⁷Drechsler, Let Us Die, p. 165.

³⁸Drechsler, Let Us Die, p. 165.

³⁹Drechsler, Let Us Die, p. 161.

⁴⁰Katjavivi, Resistance, p. 9; Rhodie, Last Frontier, pp. 144-145; Pakenham, Scramble, p. 613.

⁴¹Bridgman, Revolt, pp. 139-140; Pakenham, Scramble, pp. 612-614; Drechsler, Let Us Die, pp. 181-189.

⁴²Drechsler, Let Us Die, pp. 179-180, 194-195.

⁴³Pakenham, Scramble, pp. 613-614; Drechsler, Let Us Die, pp. 179-190.

⁴⁴Pakenham, Scramble, p. 614.

⁴⁵Drechsler, Let Us Die, pp. 190-193; Pakenham, Scramble, p. 614.

⁴⁶Drechsler, Let Us Die, pp. 184-189; Pakenham, Scramble, 613-612.

⁴⁷Legendre, Okovango, p. 27; Drechsler, Let Us Die, p. 210-211; Pakenham, Scramble, p. 615; Katjavivi, Resistance, p. 10; Rhodie, Last Frontier, p. 145.

⁴⁸Drechsler, Let Us Die, p. 216.

⁴⁹Drechsler, Let Us Die, p. 216.

⁵⁰Drechsler, Let Us Die, p. 217.

⁵¹Albert F. Calvert, South-West Africa: During the German Occupation 1884-1914, (New York: Negro University Press, 1915), reprint (1969), pp. 16, 17, 81, 98; Alice Mertens, South West Africa: And its Indigenous Peoples. (New York: Taplinger Pub. Co. Inc., 1967), plate 52; Goldblatt, History, p. 199; Drechsler, Let Us Die, p. 98; Katjavivi, Resistance, pp. 11-12; Rhodie, Last Frontier, pp. 141, 146-147.

⁵²Walker, Southern Africa, pp. 559-560; Goldblatt, History, p. 202; First, South West Africa, p. 88; Rhodie, Last Frontier, p. 149.

53U. K. House of Commons, British Sessional Papers, Vol. 1914-1916 XLV, Edgar L. Erickson (ed.), (New York: Readex Microprint, 1948-1967), No. 1-2, p. 439.

54Commons, British, Vol. 1914-1916 XLV, No. 4, p. 440.

55Commons, British, Vol. 1914-1916 XLV, No. 5, p. 440.

56Commons, British, Vol. 1914-1916 XLV, No. 6, p. 440.

57Commons, British, Vol. 1914-1916 XLV, "Report on the Outbreak of the Rebellion and the Policy of the Government with Regard to its Suppression" April 1915, pp. 446-448.

58Commons, British, Vol. 1914-1916 XLV, "Report," p. 449.

59First, South West Africa, p. 88; Goldblatt, History, p. 203; Commons, British, Vol. 1914-1916 XLV, "Report," pp. 448-450; Walker, Southern Africa, p. 560,

60Commons, British, Vol. 1914-1916 XLV, "Report," p. 450.

61Commons, British, Vol. 1914-1916 XLV, "Report," pp. 450-451.

62Commons, British, Vol. 1914-1916 XLV, "Report," pp. 451-454.

63Commons, British, Vol. 1914-1916 XLV, "Report," pp. 455-456.

64Commons, British, Vol. 1914-1916 XLV, "Report," p. 456.

65Commons, British, Vol. 1914-1916 XLV, "Report," pp. 456-457.

66Walker, Southern Africa, p. 560; Commons, British, Vol. 1914-1916 XLV, "Report," pp. 457-458.

67Commons, British, Vol. 1914-1916 XLV, "Report," p. 459.

68Commons, British, Vol. 1914-1916 XLV, "Report," p. 460.

69Commons, British, Vol. 1914-1916 XLV, "Report," p. 461.

⁷⁰Walker, Southern Africa, p. 560; Commons, British, Vol. 1914-1916 XLV, "Report," pp. 460-461.

⁷¹Commons, British, Vol. 1914-1916 XLV, "Report," p. 463.

⁷²Commons, British, Vol. 1914-1916 XLV, "Report," p. 464.

⁷³Commons, British, Vol. 1914-1916 XLV, "Report," p. 464.

⁷⁴Commons, British, Vol. 1914-1916 XLV, "Report," p. 465.

⁷⁵Commons, British, Vol. 1914-1916 XLV, "Report," pp. 466-467.

⁷⁶Commons, British, Vol. 1914-1916 XLV, "Report," pp. 467-468; Walker, Southern Africa, p. 560.

⁷⁷Commons, British, Vol. 1914-1916 XLV, "Report," p. 468.

⁷⁸Commons, British, Vol. 1914-1916 XLV, "Report," p. 469.

⁷⁹Commons, British, Vol. 1914-1916 XLV, "Report," p. 470.

⁸⁰Commons, British, Vol. 1914-1916 XLV, "Report," p. 475.

⁸¹Commons, British, Vol. 1914-1916 XLV, "Report," p. 477.

⁸²Commons, British, Vol. 1914-1916 XLV, "Report," pp. 476-477.

⁸³Commons, British, Vol. 1914-1916 XLV, "Report," p. 478.

⁸⁴Commons, British, Vol. 1914-1916 XLV, "Report," pp. 478-480, 483.

⁸⁵Commons, British, Vol. 1914-1916 XLV, "Report," pp. 485-486.

⁸⁶Commons, British, Vol. 1914-1916 XLV, "Report," p. 486.

⁸⁷Commons, British, Vol. 1914-1916 XLV, "Report," pp. 486-487.

⁸⁸Commons, British, Vol. 1914-1916 XLV, "Report," p. 487.

⁸⁹Commons, British, Vol. 1914-1916 XLV, "Report," p. 490.

⁹⁰Commons, British, Vol. 1914-1916 XLV, "Report," p. 488; Walker, Southern Africa, p. 561.

⁹¹Commons, British, Vol. 1914-1916 XLV, "Report," p. 492.

⁹²Walker, Southern Africa, p. 561; Commons, British, Vol. 1914-1916 XLV, "Report," pp. 490-491, 494, 497-500.

⁹³"Strategy of General Smuts," *Times*, (February 1, 1915), p. 6d.

⁹⁴Goldblatt, History, p. 204.

⁹⁵"Last of the Rebels," *Times*, (February 11, 1915), p. 7c; "Maritz Reported Shot By Germans," *Times*, (February 11, 1915), p. 7c; "Maritz Fate," *Times*, (February 27, 1915), p. 7d; "Escape from Germans," *Times*, (March 27, 1915), p. 7d.

⁹⁶"Dissillusioned Rebels," *Times*, (February 5, 1915), p. 7f.

⁹⁷"General Botha At the Front," *Times*, (February 27, 1915), p. 7d.

⁹⁸"General Botha At the Front," *Times*, (February 27, 1915), p. 7d; First, South West Africa, pp. 88-89; Katjavivi, Resistance, p. 13; Rhodie, Last Frontier, pp. 149, 151; Walker, Southern Africa, p. 563.

⁹⁹Legendre, Okovango, p. 28; Katjavivi, Resistance, p. 13.

Epilogue

As Britain and France quickly took over the other German colonies in Africa, along with Australia and New Zealand occupying Germany's possessions in the Pacific, Southwest Africa remained under South African control. The Treaty of Versailles of 1919 officially stripped Germany of its colonial empire, though by this time the Second Reich had ended as well. In 1920 the League of Nations handed Southwest Africa over to the Union of South Africa to be administered as a Mandate. This allowed South Africa to rule its neighbor as its own. The Mandate took effect on the first day of 1921 when martial law was finally lifted in the former German colony. The forced repatriation of thousands of Germans back to Europe reduced the German population in Southwest Africa from 15,000 (civilian and military) to around 8,000. Yet the white population was to double by 1926 from what it had been in 1914. This was due to the encouragement from the South African government to have thousands of Afrikaners settle in Southwest Africa.¹

Most of the indigenous population viewed the South African occupation as a liberation bringing pre-German freedom back to the land. In the early years of the Mandate it looked hopeful as special courts convicted whites of their brutal treatment of blacks, and as they repealed the *zuchtligungsrecht* (the right of a white master to punish his black servant). The Herero and the Nama reported horror stories of prisons and labor camps in which the Germans tortured, starved, or executed many. However, South Africa eventually became as severe in its occupation of Southwest Africa as Germany had been. There was, however, a critical difference. The Germans had obliterated any

resistance from the Herero and Nama; but unlike Germany, South Africa attempted to eliminate the autonomy and resistance of the Ovambo. Therefore the size of the potential resistance actually doubled. Many from nearly all of the tribes of Southwest Africa, save possibly the rather passive bushmen, joined SWAPO (Southwest Africa People's Organization). Having a single enemy, South Africa, it helped create the Namibian identity beyond the separate tribes. This organization formed the foundation for armed resistance against South African's occupation. Likewise, with the League of Nations replaced by the United Nations following World War II, much of the world came to realize the injustice of the Mandate and gave increased pressure against South Africa to let Southwest Africa go. Yet South Africa held on to the territory, and to protect the white population it established a Police Zone where the government required blacks to carry passes to travel in and out of the dwindling tribal reserves. Namibia finally gained its independence in 1990; thus one of the last African regions to be colonized was also the last to be free.²

Namibia which had less than a quarter of a million inhabitants in the 1920's, now has a growing population of 1.6 million. Although only six percent of the population is white and only three percent speak German (compared with Afrikaans 14% and English 1% which are the official languages), the impact of German culture on Southwest Africa was greater than any other colony Berlin possessed. Of the 18,370 German emigrants (excluding troops) to southern Africa during her colonial period, over 12,300 went to Southwest Africa, while only 4,100 went to East Africa (Tanganyika) and only 1,650 went to Cameroon. In fact, German Namibian citizens today can still live on Goering Street in Windhoek or drive by much of the buildings in the capital, Swakopmund,

Luderitzbucht, or the other major cities and see evidence of German culture in its organization, architecture, or beer halls. Yet it was Germany's religion which had the most lasting effect. Today 51% of Namibians are Lutheran. The Rhenish Mission has become the Evangelical Lutheran Church and the Finnish Mission the Evangelical Lutheran Ovambo-Okavango Church. Also, there is the white German Evangelical Lutheran Church. In recent years all three have talked of merger. In addition to Lutherans, the present population is 20% Catholic, whereas the Dutch Reformed of the Afrikaners is an extreme minority. Another interesting comment on how well the German heritage remained in Southwest Africa, was the number of Germans immigrating there after the Second World War. Actually, half of the German immigrants living in Namibia were West German citizens at one time. Also interesting, was the fact that the Lutheran churches, at times assisted by the small Anglican Church, defied the Dutch Reformed by aiding SWAPO in its efforts to end South African occupation. South African officials expelled many Lutheran bishops from the country because of this. Namibians only recently have begun to forgive their German neighbors for the past, and are making amends with their Afrikaner countrymen. Only in the independence of Namibia and in the recent election of Nelson Mandela in South Africa has the region begun to purge itself of the negative attributes of European imperialism. While remembering this past, which was at times horrible, Namibians both white and black are finally on the same road sharing a future and destiny.³

NOTES

¹Katjavivi, Resistance, pp. 13-14; Mertens, Indigenous, p. 3; Walker, Southern Africa, p. 593.

²First, South West Africa, pp. 25, 91; Drechsler, Let Us Die, p. 1.

³Legendre, Okovango, p. 23; Mertens, Indigenous, plate 23; Reginald H. Green et al, Nambia: The Last Colony, (New York: Longman, 1981), p. 28, 132-135; "Namibia," MacGlobe, (Broderbund Software, Inc.), 1992.

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