Comparative Analysis of French and U.S Influence in Francophone Africa - A Case Study of the Republic of Senegal

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Comparative Analysis of French and U.S Influence in Francophone Africa
  A Case Study of the Republic of Senegal

A Thesis

Presented to the Department of Political Science and the Faculty of Graduate College

University of Nebraska at Omaha

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for the Degree

Master of Science in Political Science

University of Nebraska at Omaha

by

Mamadou Faye

May 2006
Acknowledgments

I would like to take this opportunity to thank my thesis advisor, Dr. Jody Neathery-Castro, for her support, guidance and expertise. I would not be able to accomplish this task without the guidance of Dr. Jody Neathery-Castro. I also like to thank members of the thesis supervisory committee, Dr. W. Meredith Bacon and Dr. Daniel Boamah-Wiafe for their guidance.

I also like to express thanks to faculty and staff members of the Political Science Department.
THESIS ACCEPTANCE

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University of Nebraska, in partial fulfillment of the
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University of Nebraska at Omaha

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Date 4/19/08
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FRENCH AND U.S INFLUENCE IN FRANCOPHONE AFRICA
A CASE STUDY OF THE REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL

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Abstract

This thesis addresses French and U.S. political influence in Francophone Africa, particularly in Senegal—what is known as a French backyard dating back to the Berlin Conference in 1884. This thesis analyzes the political, cultural, and economic influence of the United States and France in Francophone Africa, particularly in Senegal in the period following the Cold War (1989 to present). I hypothesize that French political influence has been in decline in its backyard, Francophone Africa, particularly in Senegal and that France seems unable to counteract growing U.S. influence and hegemonic ambitions. The study concludes that while French political decline is not reflected in the data and its disengagement from Francophone Africa is not significant in the short term, clearly U.S. influence and involvement in Francophone Africa is growing at a significant level.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

In the Berlin Conference of 1884, the European Powers settled the scramble for Africa by setting boundaries for their territorial conquest of the African continent. Several African countries went under the 'tutelle' of France. After independence in the 1960s, the countries referred to as Francophone Africa* inherited French governmental form as well as the French language for use in the administration and in all level of education. In the period following the Cold War, a new U.S. policy of engagement has created an intense political rivalry between France and the United States in Francophone Africa, particularly in Senegal. The hypothesis of this thesis stipulates that the historic and special link between France and Francophone Africa has been in decline, France unable to counteract growing U.S. political influence and hegemonic ambitions.

This thesis addresses the question, is French political influence declining in Francophone Africa, particularly in Senegal? In exploring this thesis, other questions are addressed. The first is what are the tools used by the United States to exert its influence in Francophone Africa, particularly in Senegal? In addressing this question, another question becomes apparent; specifically what is the reason of United States’ involvement in Francophone Africa, particularly in Senegal? To examine the above, this thesis looks at the agreements and disagreements of France and United States foreign policies in

* Francophone Africa refers to the following 25 countries: Senegal, Chad, Rwanda, Burundi, Ivory Coast, Zaire, Morocco, Djibouti, Tunisia, Algeria, Burkina Faso, Madagascar, Seychelles, Benin, Gabon, Niger, Togo, Guinea, Mauritania, Central African Republic, Mali, Cameroon, Comoros, Mauritius, and Congo.
Francophone Africa, particularly in Senegal. In this thesis, I argue that French decline in Francophone Africa is attributed to three different factors. First, French decline is due to change in political leadership in Francophone Africa, particularly in Senegal after democratization. Second, France lost credibility in the region, especially in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide. Third, the United States has a growing interest in Francophone Africa, particularly in Senegal in the post-Cold War era. Previous research analyzing French and United States political influence in Francophone Africa, particularly in Senegal, suggest a strong disengagement on the part of France and a strong engagement on the part of the United States. This research will document that U.S influence in Francophone Africa, particularly in Senegal is gradually growing and also that France has not yet disengaged from its backyard. In this research, available data were used to measure the degree to which French influence has increased or waned and the degree to which U.S influence has grown. Indicators from trade, economic aid, public opinion, and immigration were used in the comparison between France/Senegal and the United States/Senegal.

This research will help grasp the realities surrounding the U.S-French political rivalry in Francophone Africa, particularly in Senegal. In addition, readers should gain consciousness about the growing phenomenon of a new form of imperialism in the current international system.

A Review of U.S-French Political Influence Literature in Francophone Africa

In the discipline of political science, a great deal has been written on U.S-French political influence and rivalry in Francophone Africa. As an organizational strategy, this
review is organized around topics that emphasized the circumstances to which both U.S and French foreign policies are constructed. I first start with a historical perspective of the literature of the Cold War period in order to shed light on the time-line of U.S and French political influence and rivalry in Francophone Africa.

**United States, France and Francophone Africa in the Cold War**

Researchers analyzing the growing trend of U.S-French political rivalry in Francophone Africa usually propose the period after the Cold War as the real starting point (Schraeder, 1995; Schraeder, 2000). According to this literature, during the Cold War period United States and France collaborated to prevent the spread of communism in Francophone Africa. The United States viewed Francophone Africa as a backyard for France and therefore, trusted the French to keep this part of Africa free from communism. France was expected to take responsibility of counteracting the influence of communism, while the United States was a firm ally, ready to send in economic and military assistance whenever needed. Schraeder (2000) noted, however, that although United States and France collaborated to keep communism out of Francophone Africa, French foreign policy makers at that time “often privately depicted the United States as a primary long-term threat to French interests” (p.400). Schraeder (2000) pointed out minor occurrences of U.S intrusions into the French sphere of influence as in the case of Congo-Kinshasa where “a pro-United States Mobutu Sese Seko was placed in power” (p.399). However, Schraeder (2000) has underlined that in spite of U.S intrusions in the French backyard, “U.S-French tensions remained at manageable levels and rarely surfaced in public” (p.400).
**Franco-African Policy: Ancients versus Moderns**

The analysis of Franco-African policy of the post-Cold War era represents a significant era in the literature review because it give us a synopsis of the different approaches of French foreign policy as it relates to Francophone Africa, particularly in Senegal. Within the establishment of Franco-African policy, the qualitative literature distinguishes two types of French policy makers, which are the “Ancients” and the “Moderns” or “Reformists” (Chafer, 2002; Chafer, 2003; Renou, 2002). The Ancients of French foreign policy are the old political elites, such as Giscard d’Estaing, Francois Mitterand and Jacques Chirac. These political figures have been active in French politics during the fourth and fifth Republic. The Ancients are unique policy makers in their approach to keep the ‘privilege’ relationship between France and Francophone Africa.

The “Moderns” on the other hand, are political elites that emerged after the Cold War Period, such as Alain Juppe, Edouard Balladur, and Lionel Jospin. The “Moderns” are unique in their approach to redefine the “family” relationship with Francophone Africa.

The analysis of these two types of French policy makers help clarify their distinctive nature and how the changes that the “Moderns” brought help, open the door to growing U.S influence in Francophone Africa.

In the case of the Ancients, the literature underscores the importance of what is called ‘the special relationship’ that exists between political elites in France and in Francophone Africa. Chafer identifies two pillars on which France’s ‘special relationship’ with Black Africa is based. The first is *besoin de rayonnement*: the projection of French power overseas. According to Chafer (2002), particularly after
France’s loss of Indochina (1945-1954) and the War in Algeria (1954-1962), France needed to hold on to Black Africa in the post-colonial period to project French influence (p.346).

The second pillar is neo-colonialism. The political and cultural tools used to ensure dominance in Francophone Africa are the following:

1) *Francophonie*: created in 1979, it aimed at spreading the French language and culture. 2) The Franc Zone: “*franc des Colonies Françaises d’Afrique*” was created in 1945. In 1958, it was renamed “*franc de la Communauté Française d’Afrique*”. Presently, the Franc zone includes 14 countries those of l’*UEMOA* (Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africain) called “*franc de la Communauté Financière Africaine*” and those of *CEMAC* (*Coopération Economique Monétaire de L’Afrique Centrale*) called “*franc de la Coopération Financière en Afrique Centrale*”. 3) Military cooperation accords signed between France and its former colonies keep peace and stability. French military presence was aimed at promoting French interests. 4) The Annual Franco-African Summit: it was created in 1973, it is an annual *tête-à-tête* between the French president and Francophone countries head of states. The annual Franco-African Summit does not have a published agenda or make formal policy recommendation; rather it is an informal family gathering that reinforces the friendly relationship between the French president and the African head of states. The annual Franco-African Summit has broadened its membership to include Anglophone as well as Lusophone countries. Fifty-two countries attended the 2003 annual Franco-African Summit held in Paris, France.
According to Chafer (2002), the many 'réseaux' (networks) have been the vehicle for the clientelist relations maintained by France with its former African colonies in the post-colonial period (p.347). Chafer (2002) categorized this special relationship as based on private interests and the corruption of high-ranking officials both in the French and African governments.

Similarly, Renou (2002) categorized the 'personal relationship' as a clientele based or Mafia-style relationship, which lack transparency and scrutiny. The 'personal relationship' attracts corruption at the highest level of government (p.9).

In the case of the "Modems", the literature underscores the importance of the devaluation of the Franc CFA as an important turning point in Franco-African policy (Martin, 1995; Schraeder, 2000; Renou, 2002; Chafer, 2005). The FCFA (franc de la Cooperation financière Africaine) is composed of 14 African countries. The FCFA was a currency tied to the French franc and guaranteed by the French treasury and its devaluation in 1994 reveals the rise of the "Modems" within the French political establishment. The "Modems" arrival put an end to the deficit in the economies of the Franc zone member countries.

Consensus in the literature suggests that the devaluation reveals the "Modems" in France no longer viewed rayonnement culturel as important as rayonnement économique or economic self-interest (Renou, 2002; Schraeder, 2000). Schraeder (2000) best highlighted this point when he said: "it [the devaluation] clearly signaled that France's commitment to the cultural imperative of la Francophonie no longer took precedence over the pursuit of economic self-interest in an increasing competitive post-Cold War
world” (p.402). In my view, France’s cultural expansion in Francophone Africa has always been the real bind between the two entities. However, the unprecedented decision of France to devalue the FCFA was a move of the Modernist Prime Minister Edouard Balladur to send a message to the member countries of the Franc zone that France could no longer afford to subsidize their deficit.

Consensus in the literature also suggests that the 1994 FCFA devaluation was a sign of the end of the “special relationship” that existed between the member countries of the Franc zone and the former métropole (Chafer, 2005; Martin, 1995). Martin (1995) found that the devaluation ended the “special relationship” that existed between France and some of its former colonies. He underlined that the message from the reformist was that member countries of the Franc zone have to start restructuring their economies and avoid running deficit (p.18). Similarly, Chafer (2005) found that the moderns no longer viewed that the special and privileged relationship that France holds with its former colonies is viable to French economic self-interest (p.15). Finally, Martin (1995) categorized the 1994 devaluation as an event that placed the member countries of the FCFA under the influence of the United States, which runs the Bretton Wood institutions (IMF and the World Bank) (p.20). “Thus, the devaluation of the FCFA is likely to result in France’s gradual (but substantial) loss of political, diplomatic, and economic power and influence in Francophone Africa. They will probably move toward a long-overdue economic rapprochement with the major world economic powers (such as the United States and Japan)” (p.20).
In my view, it seems that the devaluation certainly made the United States get closer to France's ex-colonies because France was no longer able to bail out these African countries out of economic troubles. This new development made the United States and its financial institutions so important to the day-to-day functioning of African economies, and in the meantime, France seems to be sidelined. The devaluation was an unprecedented event that made the member countries of the FCFA feel that they were abandoned by the former métropole. The devaluation can also be viewed as a message of emancipation from France, just like they were emancipated in 1960s from colonial rule. FCFA member countries have to manage their own economies and follow all the structural adjustment programs set by the set by the IMF and the World Bank. This new imposed rule can be viewed as emancipation, considering that these programs have to be followed otherwise loans are not disbursed in time of need.

**Democratization process**

A broad consensus in the literature about democratization in Francophone Africa (Schraeder, 1995; Schraeder, 2000; Renou, 2002; Martin, 1995; Vasset, 1997; Chafer, 1992) suggests the process is a contentious issue between the United States and France. The United States is characterized as a promoter of democracy in Francophone Africa though not in the African continent overall, while France is seen as promoter and maintainer of the status quo. The literature suggests two ways in which the French maintain the status quo. First, military intervention protects pro-French leaders solidify their grip on power. Second, France increases economic assistance to pro-French leaders in times of elections. (Martin, 1995) found that the French government has intervened
militarily ten times in support of friendly regimes between 1986 and 1993 (p.17).

Similarly, Renou (2002) found that up to thirty-four French military interventions in Africa during the period of 1963-1997 were recorded and oftentimes mercenaries were used ‘to avoid public outrage’. The cost of these interventions is not known for the whole period, but in 1997 it was equivalent to official development assistance” (p.10). Finally, Vasset (1997) also found that the French military units in Chad managed all the logistics of the presidential elections in July 1996. French military officers were in charge of the “centralization of gathering results and computerized counting of the vote”. The Chadian Association for Human Rights declared that “the election was totally directed by the French political-military structure in Chad. The military advisers decided that Idriss Deby was the best candidate for French interests, and they acted according to those principles” (p.169).

Consensus in the literature also suggests that France did not honor its rhetoric about the democratization process for Francophone Africa set out in the la Baule Doctrine in which President Mitterand announced that economic aid would be cut for any Francophone African countries, which fail to initiate a democratization process (Chafer, 1992; Martin, 1995; Renou, 2002; Schraeder, 2000). However, Schraeder (2000) found France’s message contained in the La Baule Doctrine was unfulfilled rhetoric when he said, “bold rhetoric was obviated by the reality of ongoing foreign aid programs designed to keep pro-French elites in power. In the case of Cameroon, French aid to the authoritarian regime of Paul Biya expanded from $159 million in 1990 to $436 million in 1992- the year of the country’s first multiparty presidential election”(p.407). In contrast,
the United States seems to be taking the opposite position by supporting democracy in Francophone Africa. Schraeder (2000) aptly highlighted this point when he said,

U.S diplomats on average have been more vocal than their French counterparts in their support for the democratization process throughout Francophone Africa. This vocal stance is not necessarily due to a greater commitment to promoting democracy in Africa. For example, the Clinton Administration was quick to enforce comprehensive economic sanctions against a ministate of Gambia when that country’s military took power in a coup in 1994, but it refused to impose comprehensive economic sanctions against the military dictatorship of Nigeria that would have affected U.S access to Nigerian oil, the mainstay of the Nigerian economy (pp.408-409).

Overall, the democratization process in Francophone Africa has to some degree been negatively affected by French historic influence in Francophone Africa. In this era of globalization and international liberalism, democratic new elites in Francophone Africa are building new ties with other great powers beside France and their focus is to put the interests of their country first by trying to get the best trade or investment deals from the competing powers.

**Franco-African military cooperation**

Researchers analyzing Franco-African military cooperation claim that France’s military cooperation with Francophone Africa is a neo-colonial tool used to protect France’s interest by keeping the status quo through military interventions (Chafer, 2002; Martin, 1995; Renou, 2002; Schraeder, 2000; Vasset, 1997).

Vasset (1997) found that military cooperation between France and Francophone Africa has four objectives: “protecting the territory of France’s African allies, protecting the local population, building peace, and keeping peace” (p.165). Vasset (1997) also found that the military cooperation between France and Francophone Africa to be a
heavy economic burden on African countries. He stated that, “French military cooperation sustains abnormally high military expenditures. French military cooperation does not contribute to reducing military expenditures of African countries. Little attention is paid to the burden of these expenditures and the size of the army, despite the recommendations by the IMF and the World Bank to trim them. Because of the personnel involved in French military cooperation are military officers, security concerns are far more important than development issues” (p.170). In addition, Vasset (1997) found that “the economic burden of Franco-African military cooperation on African economies have received international criticism and changes to cut expenditures as well as ending military interventions in Africa” (pp.174-175).

Similarly, Chafer (2002) found that “the central innovation for France is the ‘multilateralization’ of military policy, which comprises two elements: the ‘Africanization of regional security and the ‘multinationalization’ of Western interests exemplified by Franco-British and American-led initiatives to create regional peacekeeping forces’” (p349). This new approach in French military is a policy of the Reformers. Its aims are to avoid criticism such as that provoked by French military intervention in Rwanda leading up to the genocide but also it allows France to reduce the cost and risks of military intervention and the Africans are trained to take responsibility of their own security. Military presence reduction in Francophone Africa, particularly in Senegal, a top priority for the reformers, has reduced France’s costs.
France and U.S in the Great Lakes Crisis

The qualitative literature highlights the crisis in the African Great Lakes as the epitome of French-U.S political tension in Francophone Africa because it involves indirect foreign intervention (e.g. France and United States) backing different sides. In addition, the crisis was viewed as an Anglo-Saxon gain in the French ‘sphere of influence’ (Huliaras, 1998; Ngolet, 2000; Renou, 2002; Schraeder, 2000).

The Great Lakes region of Africa is composed of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, Rwanda, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. Lake Tanganyika and Lake Victoria are shared by all the above states. The Great Lakes Crisis was caused by intra-state conflict in a region where a power struggle between mainly Hutus and Tutsis tribes can be traced back to the partitioning of Africa at the 1884 Berlin Conference. The defeat of the Hutu government, which took refuge in Zaire and drove the Zairian citizens of Tutsi origin back to Rwanda, escalated the conflict. The Great Lakes crisis became an ethnic conflict that killed over a million people, mostly Tutsis. Humanitarian organizations and international civil rights groups working in the region were appalled by the magnitude of the violence and were not prepared for the needed humanitarian assistance. The prevalence of refugees from these two ethnic groups in almost all the states has engulfed this region in a cycle of hatred and violence and caused a refugee crisis of great enormity.

Huliaras (1998) hypothesized that “Franco-American antagonism with regard to the Great Lakes crisis was a perception far more of the French government than of the United States administration. However, French views of and tactics during the Central
African crisis led to American reactions that reinforced French beliefs and contributed to Franco-American tensions, not only in the relation to the Great Lakes regions but also in reaction to other geopolitical areas” (p.593). Huliaras (1998) attempts to find the explanations of French misperceptions of the U.S role in the Great Lakes crisis. He argues that in general, the French belief that the RPF’s (The Rwanda Patriotic Front) victory in Rwanda and Mobutu’s defeat in Zaire were parts of an ‘Anglo-Saxon conspiracy’ against French-speaking Africa did not match reality. In his arguments, Huliaras (1998) proposed six factors, which he thinks explained this French misperception. 1) He believes that France is going through a post-Cold War identity crisis, which made it unsure about its place in the world. Therefore, France viewed that the crisis in Central Africa as a reiteration of its loss of world hegemony (pp.598-599). 2) Huliaras believed that there was a diffusion effect that led to French misperceptions of the Great Lakes crisis. The misperceptions come from Franco-American tensions in other geopolitical areas, such as France’s disappointment of seeing an Anglophone elected as Secretary of the United Nation versus the Francophone Boutros-Boutros Ghali. In addition, France lost on the bid to have a European commander placed as a head of NATO’s southern command. Finally, France’s attempt to initiate a unilateral mediation in the Arab-Israeli conflict took strong criticism from the United States. Huliaras believed that these events were diffused in Zaire causing France to believe that there is an ‘Anglo-Saxon conspiracy to reduce French hegemony (pp.599-600). 3) Huliaras (1998) believed that there was uncertain exclusivity that France’s loss of insecurity was the result of.
reflected its reactions in the Great Lakes crisis (pp.600-602). 4) Huliaras (1998) believed that the Fashoda Syndrome*, which points to the defeat of the French by the Anglo-Saxon, has traumatized the French psyche. Huliaras believed that the Fashoda incident “remained a significant part of the French political culture and thinking” and it led France to get involved in the Rwandan crisis quickly and deeply (pp.602-603). 5) Huliaras (1998) believes that France resents U.S economic expansion in its private backyard (Francophone Africa). However, in practice the U.S overall, does not have as great a share of the African market (Francophone countries) as France. Thus, to a certain extent, French beliefs of “Anglo-Saxon economic expansion” were based on misperceptions. But from another viewpoint, French fears seemed justified since the U.S has already taken the role over from France as the leading partner of some Francophone African countries like Zaire (pp.604-605). 6) Huliaras (1998) believed that there was bureaucratic resistance inside the French government. He believed those reformists who favor the end of French military intervention in Francophone Africa disputed the traditionalist approach of military intervention. The strong feeling of anxiety toward an ‘Anglo-Saxon invasion’ prevalent mainly among the traditionalists kept reform from taking place (pp.605-607).

Huliaras (1998) acknowledges that French foreign policy toward Africa is a presidential domain and the decision-making process is monopolized. Therefore, it produces abstract formulations that are more policy guidelines than precise answers for specific circumstances. On the other hand, the U.S displays a foreign policy that involved more actors and is rooted in intra and inter-agency bargaining (pp.607-608) French

* Fashoda Syndrome is the name given to a tendency within French foreign policy in Africa, giving
African policy to a great extent reflects France's centralized form of government and in this system foreign policy lacks democratic scrutiny in the decision-making process. Unlike U.S policies, issues of Franco-African policy rarely get debated in the hall of the French Assembly. Consequently, Franco-African policies can end up in failure at times and ultimately attract both domestic and international criticism, as in the case of the Rwandan genocide where many think that the French have their hands drenched in blood. The second interesting point Huliaras makes in his concluding remarks, is that serious structural changes are being made by the moderns in Franco-African policy because the traditionalist approach to the ‘special relationship’ and to military intervention is seen as outdated and likely to draw international criticism (p.608).

Huliaras (1998) concluded that, "French foreign policy is in an era of transition, in search of a new identity, in quest of a new role in the post-bipolar world. The French view of the Great Lakes crisis reflected that uncertainty. The theory of ‘Anglo-Saxon expansionism’ was definitely a misconception. French policy towards post-genocide Rwanda and Zaire was mainly determined by pre-constructed beliefs, psychological insecurities and bureaucratic resistance. Only to a minor extent was it the result of rational calculations” (p.609).

Contrary to Huliaras (1998), Ngolet (2000) believes that the Great Lakes Crisis was not based on French misperceptions but realities, which underscore two views. First, the transfer of power from Mobutu to Kabila in Congo-Zaire has solely been an African matter, and in this process, Westerners have been completely powerless. By fighting the importance to asserting French influence in areas which may be becoming susceptible to British influence.
Mobutu regime, the African forces composed of Rwanda, Uganda, and Angola were simply attempting to stabilize their borders by denying opposition in these countries the use of the Congo to destabilize their respective regimes. The second view is that the United States supported the rebellion to extend its influence in Central Africa, to exploit natural resources, filling the Congolese soil while containing Islamic Fundamentalism in East Africa (pp.65-66). In sum, Ngolet advocates a synthesis of both the role of African forces and an American orchestrated policy in leading to French retreat or loss of influence in the African Great Lakes. Here, it seems clear that the African forces from Uganda, Angola, and Rwanda took part in the Great Lakes crisis to stabilize their borders but also to rid the area of French influence, which they saw as a facilitator of the Rwandan genocide. French military and economic aid to the Habyarimana Hutus regime leading up to the genocide of the Tutsis has contributed to a loss of credibility in the region of the Great Lakes, in the rest of Africa and on the international scene. The United States may have provided technical, logistical and economic support to rebel forces to promote its future economic interest but also to redeem itself from failing to intervene in a modern day genocide that took the lives of 800,000 Rwandans (mostly Tutsis). Consequently, the United States orchestrated a policy that drove a tarnished France out of the Great Lakes region.

Renou (2002) found that France was the main facilitator of the Rwandan genocide. He stated that “France offered both economic and military support to the Habyarima undemocratic regime. France also put pressure on the media not to tell the truth about the genocide, and opposed the will of neighboring Anglophone countries to
intervene in the conflict to stop the genocide” (Renou, 2002, p.12). In addition, Renou (2002) found France to be responsible in destabilizing the Great Lakes region with its support of the Mobutu regime against Laurent Kabila backed by the United States. Finally, Renou (2002) found that the Great Lakes crisis has tarnished France’s image at the international realm and inside France. “Civil society groups such as Survie and Agir Ici mobilized against French African policy and demanded an investigation of France’s role in the Rwandan genocide. For the first time an official body was formed to investigate French foreign policy and put it under democratic scrutiny” (pp.12-14). The Great Lakes crisis was clearly a significant defeat of French African policy. France was implicated in the Rwandan genocide and its image tarnished at the international level but also France was blamed for the destabilization of the whole Central Africa region and the Great Lakes fell into ‘Anglo-Saxon’ influence.
Chapter 2

French influence in Francophone Africa

Introduction:

In this chapter, I explore French cultural, economic and political influence in Francophone Africa. French influence took decades to solidify and it has practically affected all aspects of life in Francophone Africa. In the post-independence era, the mechanisms of neo-colonialism ensured continuity in political dominance and created a high ratio of dependency toward the former métropole. However, the emergence of new actors in Franco-African policy in the post-Cold War era has helped dismantle many of the neo-colonial mechanisms due to a growing controversy of French foreign policy in France, Francophone Africa and in the world scene.

The following figure reflects French economic, political and cultural influence in Francophone Africa as of 1997 (Encyclopedia Britannica, 1998).
Cultural influence

La Francophonie:

Faced with growing African nationalism in the late 1950s, France gave independence to its former colonies in Africa, but kept a variety of institutions intact as a strategy to preserve its colonial interests. At the epicenter of these institutions was la Francophonie, an effective neo-colonial cultural tool aimed at propagating la langue et culture française in the hearts and minds of Africans living in France’s former colonies.
Before the creation of La Francophonie, the Alliance Française used cultural diplomacy as a “powerful instrument of cultural propaganda” (Maack, 2001, p.61).

The Alliance Française always believed that “every client of the French language… [might become] a natural customer for French Products” (Maack, 2001, p.61). Toward this end, “French embassies set up cultural centers in tropical Africa beginning in 1959, when the first center was inaugurated in Dakar-Senegal by high ranking French and African officials. Within a decade there were eighteen centers, fourteen located in national capitals and four others cities such as Saint-Louis in Senegal and the port of Douala in the Cameroon”(Maack, 2001, p.77).

La Francophonie was created in 1970 and today it includes 49 member states. It has four objectives, the promotion of democracy and human rights, multiculturalism, education and training and economic development. While La Francophonie’s objective entails a message of cooperation between France and Francophone Africa, it seems that each of these 4 objectives serves France’s interests at large, therefore making La Francophonie an effective cultural tool of exploitation rather than of cooperation. I will elaborate on how France uses each one of the four objectives of this organization to advance its own interests.

During the democratic wave of the 1990s, France’s message from La Baule Summit in 1990 which was aimed at pressuring Francophone Africa to democratize by withholding economic aid did not hold. Instead, France blocked democratic prospects in Francophone Africa through backing pro-French elites who would protect its interests.
Renou (2002) captures well France’s lack of commitment to democracy after the La Baule Summit when he said:

How did France deal in practice with the democratization it had publicly encouraged? In every situation, it tried to maintain the status quo to keep traditional pro-French elites in power. In 1991, total French developmental assistance to Francophone Africa amounted to 8 billion Francs. But instead of encouraging countries experimenting with democratic transitions, such as Mali, Benin, and Niger, France reduced the share to these countries drastically as if to express its disapproval or even undermine the process, while dictatorships saw their share increased during the same period (Cameroon, Togo, Zaire) (p.17).

France’s actions toward the democratization process seemed to be contradictory to the pro-democracy message embodied in the La Baule Summit and in general, in La Francophonie, an institution France helped create in the first place. Furthermore, France’s poor faith in democracy in Francophone Africa is demonstrated by its unwillingness to intervene militarily to protect democratically elected leaders from coups d’etat. The underpinning of France’s inaction is based on the fact that these leaders failed to ensure continuity in the promotion of French interests. “The growing contradictions in French support for democracy was shown by the Chirac administration’s response to 1990 coup d’état in Niger--the first against a democratically elected government in France’s former colonies since the beginning of the democratization process of the 1990s” (Schraeder, 2000, p.408). It is therefore obvious France’s failure to intervene militarily to back a democratically elected government in Niger displays a lack of commitment toward democracy. It is also a clear violation of the military accords that France had signed with Niger.
A second objective of La Francophonie: promotion of education and training, is seen as key to the advancement of the organization. After all, the patriarchs of La Francophonie (Senegalese ex-President Leopold Sedar Senghor and Tunisian ex-President Habib Bourguiba), were deeply immersed in the French culture following years of education and training in France. While there are numerous benefits to education and training for Africans, education and training within the framework of La Francophonie was conducted completely with the French language. This is a prime example of the strategy of binding France culturally with its former colonies in Africa. As a result, some young African students, educated in France and culturally in tune with its culture, became political elites with loyalty to France (Senghor, Bourguiba and Cote d’Ivoire’s Houphouet- Boigny). The cultural affinity between political elites in France and in Francophone Africa created the ‘special relationship’ which many suspect brought an environment of corruption and exploitation on the part of France that led to chronic underdevelopment in Francophone Africa in the years following independence.

A third objective of La Francophonie; promotion of economic development is a key objective for the organization. As Neathery-Castro and Rousseau (2005) note, “the redistribution of resources, especially to impoverished French-speaking countries, is an implicit goal of the OIF (Organization Internationale de La Francophonie). While more emphasis was put on social and cultural development in the early years, economic development has been a primary goal recently” (p.683). However, it seems from the very beginning of the creation of La Francophonie, the objective of economic development was geared towards the economic prosperity of France at the expense of the Francophone
African countries. Toward this end, Francophone Africa provided the raw resources at a low price to France, while the former métropole sold relatively expensive finished products. These unequal terms of trade led to the flourishing of the French manufacturing base over time. The message of cooperation for economic development of all member states embodied in the organization was eclipsed by one of exploitation by la métropole. “Although camouflaged under the mantle of cooperation, France’s African policy is, in fact primarily motivated by a narrow conception of its national interests. A former President Valery Giscard d’Estaing once bluntly declared, ‘I am dealing with African Affairs, namely with France’s interests in Africa’” (Martin, 1995, p.6). In recent years with the rise of new democratically elected elites in Francophone Africa dedicated to protect their countries’ interests, and, the end of the ‘special relationship’ between political elites in France and Francophone Africa, and at last the emergence of reformists of Franco-African policy have fostered new hope for La Francophonie to live up to its true objective of economic development across the board.

The final objective of La Francophonie, the promotion of multiculturalism is important to the organization. This objective holds that culture and cultural diversity are to be encouraged and protected. Toward this end, France has been active in rallying not only members of the OIF but also forming alliances with Spanish and Portuguese-speaking nations organizations to push and promote the protection of languages. This dedication on the part of France for the promotion and protection of the French language fought under the banner of encouraging and protecting global cultural diversity caused “France held the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations hostage in the early 1990s, until it
won the right to a ‘cultural exception’. Allowing it, in effect, to subsidize French films and discriminate against American ones” (“The French,” 2002). However, as Neathery-Castro and Rousseau (2005) have pointed out, “Some critics of the OIF charge France with caring more about “beating” Anglo-Saxon English language hegemony than promoting the development and well being of poorer OIF members” (p.688). French leaders dating back to the beginning of the fifth republic have advocated that French interests are tied to the ability of France to effectively assimilate the leaders and the population in Francophone Africa. In addition, over the last three decades, France has portrayed itself as the guarantor of Francophone Africa’s interest at the international level. The French language and the French State’s interests are so intertwined that its economic and political survival depends upon counteracting the spread of Anglo-Saxon English in Francophone Africa. In other words, France has a greater stake in the effectiveness of La Francophonie than all the other members do. Thus, the objective of multi-cultural promotion obscures France’s objective to protect the French language. Consequently, the whole politics of ‘cultural exception’ is in the best interest of France because it guards against the spread of Anglo-Saxon English within France and in its ‘sphere of influence’.

Mostly, one can say that all the objectives of La Francophonie described above protect and promote France’s own economic, political and cultural interests. If one considers La Francophonie within the scope of U.S-French political rivalry, one can note that France has been using this institution to promote its interests in its backyard in Africa. France also has used La Francophonie at the international level (United Nations)
to try to counter Anglo-Saxon influence and reinforce its medium power status. Franco-
African policy of the post-Cold War period has to be truly revised. France should try to
repair its tarnished image on the world scene by being a true champion of democracy,
human rights and sustainable economic development in Francophone Africa. In this
regard, France would be able to use La Francophonie very effectively to counter the
growing influence of “Anglo-Saxonism”.

**Economic influence**

**Economic aid and Trade**

In the Franco-African relationship, foreign economic aid has been an effective
tool of French foreign policy used to secure its ‘backyard’ (Francophone Africa) from
other great power influence such as the United States and Great Britain and to promote its
interests as well. Schraeder (1995) found France’s economic aid to be based on three
different rationales. He identifies cultural expansionism as the first and most important
determinant of French economic aid to Francophone Africa. He rightly pointed the reason
for cultural expansionism being a key factor in French economic aid when he said:

First assistance was designed to promote the *rayonnement* (radiation) of
such ‘exceptional’ cultural values as the French language, intellectual
traditions, and a way of living. Also referred to as the promotion of
‘cultural nationalism’, or the cultivation of *la francophonie* (a greater
French-speaking community), such a policy ensured that a large portion of
foreign assistance would be directed to the former French colonies in
Africa, as well as to where French constitutes one of the national
languages, such as the former Belgian colonies of Burundi, Rwanda and
Zaire (p.542).

France’s end goal was acculturation of the masses in Francophone Africa. This
policy has proven to be effective because the more the people of Francophone Africa
identify themselves as ‘French’ the more they tend to think that their interests are linked to those of la métropole. Therefore, economic assistance under the rational of cultural expansionism went mostly toward the promotion of education and training such as the building of libraries, cultural centers, schools and student exchange programs.

Similarly, Martin (1995) found cultural expansion as the first rationale for economic aid when he stated “In keeping with France’s policy of rayonnement culturel and promotion of francophonie, her bilateral aid to Africa remains heavily biased in favor of cultural and technical co-operation. Indeed, in 1991, France still maintained over 7,000 French technical assistance personnel in Francophone Africa” (p.11).

Economic interest is the second rationale of French economic aid to Francophone Africa. “French leaders from de Gaulle onwards have assumed that the economy of their country would develop naturally as French spread into the Third World countries” (Schraeder, 1995, p.543). Undoubtedly, the rationale behind French economic aid is to promote its economic and political interests through trade and investments. Francophone Africa constitutes a vast market for French goods and services. According to Schraeder (1995), “The continuing importance of Francophone Africa in French economic calculations is demonstrated by the fact that the fourteen franc zone countries of West and Central Africa (including the Comoros) absorb nearly 50 percent of all French exports to Africa ($7.5 Billion)” (p.401). The close cultural ties and the proximity made Francophone Africa one of France’s biggest trading and investment partners. In this trading relationship Francophone Africa is the periphery, it provides cheap raw resources to the center’s (France) industries and in turn, the finished products are shipped back to
the periphery and sold at a very high price. Martin (1995) aptly highlighted France’s trading influence with Francophone Africa, which shows unequal trading terms when he said, “the post-independence co-operation and defense agreements concluded with the Francophone states contain special provisions concerning French exclusive access to such strategic raw materials as oil, natural gas, uranium and helium. These must be sold to France on a priority basis-restricted to third countries-as required by the interests of common defense” (p.10).

Moreover, French business in Francophone Africa is a rationale for economic aid. French investment in Francophone Africa is a lucrative business based on four factors. One, the French government encourages investment in this part of the world because of the close cultural ties. In Senegal, French investment grew by nearly 20 million euros between 2001 and 2003 (French Embassy in Senegal, 2005). The use of the French language in Francophone Africa makes it easier for French businesses to effectively communicate with the natives. Two, in Francophone Africa the local natives rarely have capital to venture in businesses. The flow of capital is limited because most of these societies have an agricultural-based economy and this sector is often plagued by repetitive years of drought. Three, corruption in Francophone Africa has also increased French investments in recent years. There are a great number of Francophone Africa’s businesses that have fallen into the hands of French investors because these CEOs simply took the money and let the businesses go bankrupt. Often little or nothing is being done to prosecute these CEOs because of the ties they hold with political elites at the highest level of government. Finally, the neo-liberal economic policies of the Bretton Woods
institutions reflected in economic adjustment programs have encouraged privatization of businesses. Consequently, these businesses have moved from state-owned to the hands of foreign investors who are mainly French. In Francophone Africa, particularly in Senegal, French easy access to the markets for trade and investments deals is simply due to the fact that “France gives two-third of its public development aid to Africa, with Senegal standing out as the most important African recipient of this aid, followed by Morocco and the other French-speaking countries” (“Senegal,” 2005).

A third rationale to French economic aid in Francophone Africa is security interest. “French leaders signed numerous defense accords, generously providing arms and military coopérants for training purposes, and authorized numerous interventions by French military forces to ensure maintenance of the status quo” (Schraeder, 1995, p.544). The rationale behind French economic aid for security interests is primarily aimed at keeping pro-French leaders who are sensitive to French interests in power. Toward this end, France has not been seen by many as a champion of democratic change in Francophone Africa. According to Chafer (1992), “the message from President Mitterand in the la Baule Francophone Summit to encourage democracy did not match France’s action to promote the democratic process” (p.50). Beside the provision of economic aid to keep pro-French elites in power, Schraeder (1995) found two other reasons that were related to the increase of French economic aid for security reasons. The first is the fact that there was “intensification of the economic crisis that has affected the whole of the African continent, an important dimension of which often severe dislocation that accompanied the implementation of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) imposed
The economic crisis of the 1990s in Francophone Africa was in part nature-induced; consistent years of drought hurt agricultural production in Francophone Africa. The economic crisis was also man-induced; it emanated from mismanagement and corruption at the lower level (administration, and services) and corruption at the highest level of government that many suspect have emptied the state coffers to be deposited in secret Swiss Bank accounts.

Finally, according to Schraeder (1995), France’s concerns over Islamic movements were evident in the 1980s. Fearing that an Algeria governed by Islamists would pose a direct threat to French interests in the Maghreb and Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as radicalize the substantial Islamic communities in France itself, policy makers increased ODA (Economic Development Assistance) commitments to Algeria.

**Monetary influence-CFA**

French influence in Francophone Africa is reflected in the formulation and implementation of monetary policies. Through cooperation agreements with *la métropole*, most Francophone African countries were part of the Franc Zone. The franc CFA (*franc des Colonies Française d’Afrique*) was created in 1945. In 1958 it became (*franc de la Communauté Française d’Afrique*). Today, it is called (*franc de la Communauté Financière Africaine*). The Franc CFA currency of the Franc zone since its creation constituted a neo-colonial monetary policy aimed at ensuring continuity in economic dependency. Schraeder (1995) sums up elegantly how the Franc Zone is a neo-colonial tool based on French economic interest when he said:
By wedding its fiscal policy to that of the franc zone, France preserved monetary stability throughout the region. Concurrently, it co-ordinated regional financial flow, regulated fiscal policies, provided emergency credit, subsidized private investments to member-states, offered tax breaks to French companies doing business in the region. While the members of la zone franc gained financial stability, they lost a significant degree of autonomy over domestic macro-economic policy. For example, one of the most effective tools for promoting exports—devaluation of the national currency—is deferred to French authorities, and therefore is unavailable to member-states (p.543).

The devaluation of the CFA in 1994 by France is a further sign of French influence in Francophone Africa monetary policies. The devaluation was justified under the ground of economic stagnation of the Francophone African countries. The effects of the sluggish economic years of the 1980 persisted through the 1990s made France devalue the CFA by 50 percent in 1994. Martin (1994) suggests four primary reasons that brought the 1994 CFA devaluation: 1) an overvalued CFA made goods in CFA member countries uncompetitive on the African market, 2) an increased in capital transfer from European banks to CFA member countries eliminated the free convertibility of the CFA, 3) repeated bail out from CFA member countries by the French treasury, 4) economic recession in the former métropole and the CFA member countries deeply in economic crisis made France realized that it is no longer possible to bear the cost (p.18).

France’s position on the issue of the devaluation signaled a new dawn—the direct involvement of the IMF and the World Bank institutions in managing and directing the economies of Francophone Africa. As Edouard Balladur French Prime Minister in 1994 stated, France can no longer afford to assist countries that does not comply to the rules of international economic liberalism. From now on, only countries that undertake structural
adjustment programs with the IMF and the World Bank will be guaranteed financial assistance. (Marchal, 1995, pp.910-911). The 1994 CFA devaluation was an unprecedented event for it allowed an opening of U.S influence into monetary policies of the Francophone countries. France also saw the devaluation as a sign of abandonment to its former African colonies. Some critics also saw the devaluation as a sign of emancipation of the French former African colonies because it opened the door to the America’s international financial institutions (IMF and World Bank). These critics have pointed to the fact that the CFA devaluation was done to alleviate France’s economic recession by propping up its currency. Overall, the devaluation of the CFA was an unwelcome event that hit the economies of the 14 member countries of the Franc zone hard. It also has further elevated an already higher ratio of dependency of the African member countries toward the West. As Dembéle (2004) pointed out, “Overall, the devaluation of the FCFA has further weaken the fragile African economies and made them dependent. The devaluation has also handicapped the growth of the manufacturing sector, contributing to unemployment and the destruction of the fabric of society” (p.22).

Political influence

Military presence and cooperation

French influence in Francophone Africa is reflected in the French military presence and the military cooperation accords signed in the early years after independence. “France has maintained military accords with 8 African countries and programs of military cooperation with 23 others” (Vasset, 1997, p.165). France military cooperation and presence has been an effective foreign policy tool for two main reasons.
First, it serves as an instrument to keep peace and stability. The French early on realized that only in an atmosphere of peace and security could they promote their interests in Francophone Africa. Second, through military cooperation and intervention France can keep pro-French leaders in power to serve its interests. Vasset (1998) aptly underlined the role of French military presence/cooperation in Francophone Africa when he said:

French military cooperation does not enhance the security and well-being of African populations. In the presidential office, the policy guidelines for French military cooperation in Africa have always been inspired by a quasi-religious devotion to regional political “stability”. Stability is considered valuable in itself, and superior to economic development and civilian aspirations. An African administration even if opposed by its population, will be supported by French military cooperation to preserve the status quo (p.170).

Moreover, “the presence of French military in Africa is determined by three main factors: the size and degree of her economic interests and involvement; the number of French residents; and the nature of the links existing between France and the national ruling elites” (Martin, 1995, p.14). Toward this end, military cooperation in Francophone Africa, particularly in Senegal remains strategic to the French, considering the enormous size of French investments (60 million Euros) in 2003 and the estimated 27,000 French nationals living in Senegal. French military cooperation is also strategic to Senegal, considering that peace is volatile in the region. According to recent interview by Radio France International, President Wade of Senegal has stated his ongoing support of the 600 French soldiers stationed. President Wade also claimed that military cooperation with France is Senegal’s interest best interest (“President,” 2005). Finally, according to Vasset (1998), France military cooperation has economic ramifications for the weak economies of Francophone African countries, which allocate a great deal of their revenues to

In sum, French military presence/cooperation is a neo-colonial political tool aimed at enhancing the interests of France in Francophone Africa. According to Diop (2005), France displays a non-partisan interventionist military policy. “French government from left to right, always had the free hands in its former colonies with murder targets, plundering of resources and the backing of brutal dictators” (p.12). The highly militarized relationship between France and Francophone Africa reflects its continued presence in its backyard. While this relationship creates an atmosphere of peace and stability, it has certainly undermined the democratic process by maintaining the territorial status quo. France military presence/cooperation also has further increased the deficit of the feeble African economies. It is estimated that an average of 3.2 percent of GNP is allocated for military expenditures each year. The 23 African countries in military cooperation with France have to pick up the tab, which puts a tight squeeze on their annual budgets.

**Franco-African policy within the French political establishment**

Franco-African policy has been a hot-button issue dating back to Charles de Gaulle. The policy of “rayonnement culturel” coupled with the politics of “grandeur” of de Gaulle led France to design neo-colonial policies aimed at projecting French power in its former colonies. France’s centralized form of government with immense powers instituted in the hands of the president allowed hot-button issues such as the management
of its *pré-carre* (backyard) to be an exclusively “presidential domain”. Consequently French presidents in the fourth and the fifth republics have appointed personal advisors for African foreign policy. As a “presidential domain”, foreign policy toward Francophone Africa was handled in the highest level of government. It involved two actors, the president and his circles and political elites in Francophone Africa. The closeness of these political elites in both France and Francophone Africa reflected in the annual Franco-African Summit led to a personal relationship stripped of any potential scrutiny or transparency. Chafer (2002) defines the personal relationships that are facilitated by the Annual Franco-African Summit as institutionalized and non-institutionalized form when he said:

They are institutionalized to the extent that they bring together French and African political elites and their officials and non-institutionalized, insofar as they do not have any published agenda or make formal policy recommendations. Finally, there is what I call here the Paris-African complex, which has traditionally operated through both officials channels and unofficial contacts-the so-called ‘réseaux’ (networks). These networks have been one of the main vehicles for the clientelist relations maintained by France with its former colonies in the post-colonial period (pp. 343-347).

Similarly, Renou (2002) defines these personal relationships as Clientele-based or Mafia-style relationship when he said:

These relationships are developed through institutional channels such as the Francophonie Summit and the French-African Summits, frequent phone calls or official meetings with minimal protocol or intermediaries as if they are just family or friendly meetings, or regular private meetings for game hunting and holidays. Common friendship is maintained through various personal gifts (diamonds, weapons, animal skins) and shared secrets (p. 9).
The politics of personal relationship has been a very effective for Franco-African policy. It allows French leaders to keep permanent contacts with political elites in Francophone Africa. In a way this is a very efficient policy because French leaders to a great degree know what is going on inside the circles of African leaders. This policy allows French presidents to psychoanalyze and anticipate African leaders’ political moves and once an African head of states is evaluated as a potential threat to French interests, he could wake-up and find himself out of power through a *coup d'état*. Since most African heads of states preferred to stay in power, they collaborated with the French political elites. As Chafer (2005) rightly pointed out when he said:

> It was thus a special kind of relationship, not at all in the line of with true French Republican ideals, in which the interlinking of state, party and personal interests made it possible to present a set of policies and interventions as serving the wider national interest, that in practice brought major benefit to particular interest groups and small sections of the population in both France and Africa (p.11).

Within the French political establishment, the upholders of these close relationships with Francophone African elites that are conducive to all sorts of corruption are called the “Ancients”. So what is the politics of the Ancients? In recent French politics, both presidents Mitterand and Chirac are viewed as Ancients. So far, they have upheld the personal *foccartiste* relationship toward African heads of states. Beside the personal relationship, there are other patterns to the politics of the Ancients. Both presidents Mitterand and Chirac mainly have fallen short in the promotion of democratic change. They have backed the territorial status quo through the use of military intervention and
supported undemocratic elected Francophone African leaders (Mitterand in 1994 and Chirac in Zaire in 1997).

In sum, there are three main characteristics to the politics of the Ancients. First, they have kept and nurtured the personal relationship with African political elites to promote France’s interests. Second, the Ancients have undermined the democratization process and opted for an undemocratic atmosphere of peace and stability. Finally, the Ancients supported the status quo through the use of military intervention or mercenaries. They backed pro-French leaders or helped overthrow leaders not sensitive to French national interests. The foreign policy of the Ancients has attracted a great deal of criticism in France. In the case of Rwanda, critics pointed to the fact that “the French supplied diplomatic and logistical support, and petrol, to the Rwandan government during the 1994 genocide, and a Rwandan general, Cyprien Kayumba, visited Paris lobbying for an acceleration of arms shipments” (Knapp, 2002, pp. 246-247). Policy miscalculations of French political elites, especially in the aftermath of the Rwandan crisis has made Franco-African policy a hot button issue placed at the forefront of national political debate in France. France’s role in the Rwandan genocide though not clearly established yet has attracted concern and interest from a broad section of French society.

French African policy came under criticism in France itself, especially after the genocide in Rwanda ... This growing concern among educated French people led to the call for parliamentary commission to inquire into the responsibilities of French leaders with respect to the criminal regime that committed the genocide. This was the first time an official body was formed to investigate French foreign policy and put it under democratic scrutiny (Renou, 2002, p. 14).
As Franco-African policy took center stage in the media in France, it brought a need for reforms. This need for reforms brought along new political actors called the “reformists” dedicated to restoring France’s torn image at the international level. So what distinguishes this so-called group of reformists from the Ancients? Reformers of Franco-African politics came at a right time. A time of controversial French foreign policy and a time of “cohabitation government” in France, this brings flexibility, compromises and excitement for new prime ministers such as Edouard Balladur, Alain Juppé, and Lionel Jospin to flex their political muscle. Unlike Mitterand and Chirac, the reformers are not “foccartistes”, who were active politicians in the fourth and fifth republic. They do not have any vested interest in the ‘personal relationship’. On the contrary, the reformers see the ‘personal relationship’ as a principle that has outlived it usefulness, therefore favors like, Francophone Africa having an overvalued currency with weak economies should be ended. Chafer (2005) best pointed out the first political move of Edouard Balladur one of the reformers in Franco-African policy when he said:

The adoption of the Abidjan doctrine (CFA devaluation) marked an end to one of the distinguishing feature of the Franco-African ‘family’ relationship-the provision of financial assistance to the pays of du champ without any formal conditions attached. From now on, only countries undertaking an IMF/World Bank-sponsored reform program were eligible for aid (p.15)

Moreover, France’s tarnished image emanating from the Rwandan genocide and the backing of a discredited Mobutu regime in Zaire led the reformers once again to see a need for change in France’s interventionist military policy in Francophone Africa. The old style of maintaining the territorial status quo seems no longer a viable policy in
Franco-African policy. As a result “the French prime Minister Lionel Jospin planned to reduce the number of French troops in Africa from 8350 to 5500 by 2001, for Senegal, 150 out of 1300 soldiers stationed in Dakar would be cut” (“France,” 1997). The new military policy is aimed at reducing the presence of French forces in Africa but also to help the Francophone African countries to take the matter of peace and security into their own hands. Toward this end, Chafer (2002) notes, RECAMP (Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix), a new peacekeeping initiative gives the Africans a greater share of responsibility for the task of maintaining peace and security in Africa. This new military policy entails a ‘multilatéralisation’ that would bring the Africans as well as Western powers such as France, Great Britain and the United States to cooperate and assemble a peace keeping force in Africa (p.349). This new “multilateralist” approach of the reformers means that France has to collaborate with other Western powers to help achieve peace and security on the African continent. This meant that France has to share the costs as well as the risks with other great powers, but it also meant that the share of France’s interest in its backyard would decrease substantially.

Another policy change undertaken by the reformers was the decrease of economic aid toward Francophone Africa. According to Chafer (2005), France’s bilateral aid to its African backyard receded from 4,137 Billion Euros to 2,653 Billion Euros (from 73% to 59.7%) between 1995 and 2001. This dramatic reduction in aid clearly showed a downward shift to maintain France’s African backyard (p.14). The decline of the political will was also a reality for some new African leaders, mainly those new democratically elected ones. The new leaders, who for so long have seen their authoritarian opponents
backed by France, came to power with new perspectives of diversifying their foreign relations with other Western powers. The former métropole is no longer seen as having the interests of Francophone Africa. In Senegal for instance, a “demystification” of France by the newly elected President Abdoulaye Wade in 2000 and the population at large seemed to leave a negative attitude toward France. The rise of President Wade to power was seen as a French defeat. For so long there has been accusation of French support by many Senegalese of a corrupt regime lead by President Abdou Diouf.

In sum, reformers within the French political establishment came at a time of intense criticism of Franco-African policy. The policy change made as it relates to breaking the old ‘personal relationship’, the ending of military intervention to back the territorial status quo, the devaluation of the CFA and the cut of economic aid can be seen as an emancipation for Francophone African countries. The new policy of “normalization” is also one of “diversification” for both France and Francophone Africa. For France, it means the fostering of new foreign relations with Anglophone, Lusophone and Eastern European countries. This new French Foreign policy of the Reformists has certainly offered the United States a window of opportunity to strengthen ties with the French backyard. Francophone African countries, it means are building new partnerships with other Great powers, such as the United States and the United Kingdom.

Conclusion

In sum, the analysis of French cultural, economic and political influence shows Francophone Africa, particularly in Senegal to be truly an extension of the former métropole. The umbilical cord that France and Francophone Africa shared seems hard to
sever. In the past, the French political leadership has always suggested keeping France’s political relationship with Africa on-going. Illustrative of this was François Mitterrand’s famous saying “Without Africa, there will be a France in the 21st Century”. However, the political ramifications from the controversial Franco-African policies of the 1990s seemed to have given France a low profile in Francophone Africa, particularly in Senegal. The 1990s provided troubled France that has truly taken the approach to bring essential reforms in its African foreign policy.
Chapter 3

U.S influence in Francophone Africa

Introduction:

In this chapter, I explore the American political, economic and cultural tools used to exert influence in Francophone Africa, particularly in Senegal. The end of the Cold War, the wave of democratization of the 1990s in Africa and the controversy surrounding Franco-African policy opened a window of opportunity for the United States to get involved in the French backyard. The end of the Cold War ended U.S-French complementary policies against communism and brought a face-off between France and the United States. The wave of democratization in the 1990s provided new leadership in Francophone Africa that took the approach to diversify their foreign relations. This gave rise to a politics of "rapprochement" toward the United States. Controversy over Franco-African policy gave rise to a leadership in France that allowed reforms that increased U.S involvement in Francophone Africa. In addition to the above factors that contributed to growing U.S influence in Francophone Africa, the democratic decision making process of U.S foreign policy and the unprecedented economic growth of the 1990s facilitated the United States desire to carve a new "sphere of influence".

Economic influence

Economic aid

Economic aid has been an influential U.S foreign policy tool used in Francophone Africa, to gain access to markets for investments as well as strategic natural resources such as oil. Since its independence in the 1960s, Francophone Africa has not has much
contact with the United States. This part of the world has always been viewed as France’s backyard. Generally, the United States has stayed out until the 1990s. “One of the most cited examples of this trend occurred in 1983 when President Reagan is said to have told President Mitterand that any needed interventionist measures in Chad’s (Francophone African country) growing crisis was ‘French historic responsibility’” (Schraeder, 1995, p. 46). Like in other parts of the world, U.S economic aid in Francophone Africa is a foreign policy tool used to promote U.S interests in the form of trade, investments or simply security. As Schraeder (1995) found, U.S economic aid in the 1990s was based in general on two different rationales in Francophone Africa. Schraeder (1995) identifies the promotion of democracy as the first and most important rationale for economic aid in Francophone Africa, where in a handful of countries ODA (Economic Development Aid) was given to facilitate transition to democracy or consolidate successful transition “indicative of calculations by American foreign policy-makers that the promotion of democracy (most notably the emergence of new elites) throughout Francophone Africa is a very low-cost strategy with potentially high returns (i.e. a new, more pro-U.S regime may be installed)” (pp. 560-561).

It seemed economic aid, to promote democracy in Francophone Africa, benefited the United States in the long term. New democratically elected leaders and their populations felt that the democratization process was blocked by the former métropole. The new atmosphere of change in most of Francophone Africa fostered new relations with the United States. On the contrary, it seems there is a feeling of irritation manifested toward
the former métropole, which has maintained the territorial status for so long it hampered progress toward economic and political development.

The second rationale for U.S economic aid to Francophone Africa is economic self-interest. As Schraeder (1995) notes, "the economic component of American foreign policy is to strengthen further the small but growing expansion into Francophone Africa of certain key U.S industries, notably oil and telecommunications that has accompanied the end of the Cold War. In the eyes of the French policy-makers, however, this constitutes 'at best an intrusion' and 'at worst an aggression' into their chasse gardée" (p.562). The democratization process of the 1990s in Francophone Africa allowed U.S access to resources that it would not otherwise have had. New political elites have sought to strike the best deals between great competing powers of the West. But overall, France still has a greater share of the market in Francophone Africa, especially in the most lucrative industries of oil and natural gas. Recent terrorist acts committed in Africa and elsewhere around the world have made the United States realize that the war on terrorism is to be fought on a global front. The grasping of this undeniable reality has led the United States to commit economic aid for security interests. The creation of Africa Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) is aimed at resolving conflict in African countries, but since the United States provides economic and technical support, it will ultimately be used to protect the U.S interest in Francophone Africa and beyond. Abramovici (2004) has pointed to the reason for growing U.S military involvement in Africa, "U.S strategy in Africa has two main axes. The first is the unlimited access to the key markets, energy and
other strategic resources. The second is the military securing of communication channels, particularly to allow the transport of raw materials to the United States” (p.6).

**U.S trade and investments in Francophone Africa**

Trade between the United States and Francophone Africa and particularly with Senegal has been growing in recent years. According to the UN International trade Statistics Yearbook, in 2003, Senegal exports to United States were estimated at $8.1 million and its imports at $86.1 million. Ten years earlier in 1993, Senegal exports to Unites States were estimated at $4.1 million and its imports at $59 million. United States and Senegal traded mainly in raw resources, food products and machinery. The Africa Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA), signed into law by the Clinton Administration in 2000. This market initiative aimed at encouraging the private sector and the U.S government to engage with their African counterparts in the pursuit of new trade and investment opportunities. In addition, a series of African/African-American commercial summits renamed the Leon Sullivan Summit was created in April 1991 to foster a solid investment partnership between the rich African-American business community and their counterparts in Francophone Africa. The resulting trade has been advancing trade and investment relationships between the United States and Francophone Africa. As Schraeder (1995) best highlighted to show its popularity in recent years when he said:

> Originally designed as a meeting ground to further strengthen cultural ties, the African/African-American gathering has evolved into a burgeoning forum for encouraging trade and investment between America and Africa, and is threatening to overshadow the long-established Franco-African Summit. ‘It is no accident, explained a senior French official in Dakar,
‘that all three have targeted important Francophone capitals of West Africa’ (pp.562-563).

In Senegal, U.S businesses were practically non-existent in the past due to long established French monopolies. In recent years, U.S businesses have flourished due to the increased contacts between with Senegal. According to the U.S State Department, direct investment in Senegal is about $38 million in pharmaceuticals, manufacturing, chemicals, and banking. In Senegal, U.S companies such as Exxon Mobil, Colgate-Palmolive, Pfizer and Citibank are present and doing businesses across West Africa.

Overall, business relationships between the United States and Francophone Africa, particularly in Senegal are growing steadily. However, critics argue they could improve dramatically once the United States reduces to zero the tax on repatriated earnings for U.S companies willing to invest in Francophone Africa, particularly in Senegal. These critics claim that doing so would make U.S companies as competitive as many OECD companies that have completely wiped off taxes on repatriated earnings.

Looking into the future, one can predict that with the threat of international terrorism looming, the United States will redouble its efforts to help African countries make a positive mark in the global economy by promoting peace and prosperity across the board. Otherwise, these countries may become “failed states” deeply enmeshed in the cycle of violence.

**Political influence**

**Military cooperation**

U.S political influence in Francophone Africa is reflected its military cooperation with some Francophone African countries. Through ACRI (Africa Crisis Response
Initiative), the United States in collaboration with France and Great Britain provide financial, logistical and technical support for the training of African soldiers. After the Rwandan Genocide in 1994, the United States, France, Great Britain and the Africans themselves saw the need for the creation of a peacekeeping force in Africa that can maintain peace and stability throughout the African continent. ACRI is also a military cooperation used by the United States to protect its security interests in Africa, particularly from the rise in global terrorism. According to the U.S State Department, there was a 263% increase in U.S aid for peacekeeping operations in Africa between fiscal years 2000 and 2005. “Africa’s growing production of oil has also renewed U.S interests in Africa in recent years. An estimated 25% of America’s imported oil will come from West Africa by 2025, which has prompted the Bush Administration to announce that Africa is “of strategic national interest” (Klare & Volman, 2004, p.227). According to Booker et al., “With the focus on energy security and terrorism concerns; U.S relations with Africa are likely to become increasingly militarized” (2004, p.234).

Growing Africa’s oil production is certainly redefining the continent as a strategic place for the United States. In this new relationship, U.S foreign policy makers have an opportunity to pressure African governments to redistribute the oil revenues among the population. Oil wealth redistribution is key to guaranteeing an atmosphere of peace in the long term because it would offset potential popular grievances like those in Nigeria, where the Ogoni and Ijaw people who live in the oil rich delta are the most poverty stricken in the country. This has raised concerns not only about pollution, but also about the Nigerian government’s collaboration with Western oil and the lack of infrastructure
for the local people. According to a March 2006 BBC News report, “grievances from the Ogoni and Ijaw people seemed to have been escalating and have led to the capture of Western hostages” (“Nigeria”, 2006). These events in Nigeria seem unprecedented and it could be leading to increase in well-armed guerilla groups that may threaten Western interests through sabotage of oil pipelines.

**African-Americans and U.S policy in Africa**

Although rich in natural resources, the African continent has been decimated by countless civil wars, poverty, and the spread of HIV. Africa, mostly independent from the yoke of colonialism in the 1960s, remains one of the areas of the world with the lowest standards of living and the lowest life expectancy. The volatile situations in Africa coupled with the lack of good governance have prevented substantial foreign investments that could foster economic development. The marginalization of Africa has been an issue taken on by African-American political elites in the 1990s. African-Americans raised their concerns about the fact that Africa occupies the bottom rank of the U.S foreign policy hierarchy. According to Leanne (1998), “leaders of prominent organizations such as the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) and TransAfrica-an advocate group for global justice harbored a threefold view of U.S foreign policy toward Africa” (p.17). Leanne (1998) identifies the African-American view of Africa as important only for Cold War politics, and the perception that Africa was viewed as low priority under the Clinton Administration due to the “colonial mindset” that still persists in U.S policy toward

CBC members and TransAfrica continued to declare their concerns about persisting forms of U.S racism, or what has also been more delicately referred to as a “legacy of deep-seated cultural attitudes and stereotypes”. They have drawn attention to a perceived tendency among U.S policy makers to apply different standard to African and non-African states. CBC and TransAfrica members believed that the U.S often refuses to uphold the human rights and democracy as policy aims in Africa because of the unwillingness to see African as equals (p.20).

The campaign by African-American political leaders of the CBC and TransAfrica for United States to reevaluate its foreign policy toward Africa was fuelled to a large extent by the failure of the United States and other powers to intervene in the Rwandan genocide. The visit of Clinton to Africa in 1998 was a great step forward in the eyes of the CBC and TransAfrica. However, criticisms were voiced against the various deals made with Africa during Clinton visit, questioning whether they would really help lift people out of poverty. Much credit is due to the CBC and TransAfrica for their contribution in pushing U.S foreign policy makers during the Clinton Administration to get involved in the French ‘sphere of influence’ as well as other part of Africa. The campaigning of the CBC and TransAfrica truly reflect how in a democracy foreign policy issues can involve other actors beside the state.

**Cultural influence**

U.S cultural influence, although not as significant as political and economic influence, has been growing in recent years. As an instrument of cultural diplomacy to “win the minds of men”, Maack (2001) points to the first USIA (United States Information Agency) English library created in Dakar-Senegal in 1958. This was the first
free access library in all of the French West African territories (p.69). This acculturation effort, it seems, has worked well in the post-Cold War era. Undeniably, today in Senegal, the English language is seen as a prestigious language and there is a growing interest among the urban population, especially the young, to speak fluent English. Chafer (2003) suggests three reasons for the decline of the importance of the French language in Senegal: 1) the selection of English as the language of the social elites, 2) the growing use of English as the language of international commerce and, 3) the increasing difficulty of Senegalese to obtain student visas to France (p.163).

Restrictive French immigration policies coupled with a series of expulsions of African immigrants from France in recent years have made many Francophone Africans choose the United States as the next destination for higher education or simply the pursuit of their economic dream. Agence France Presse (2003) reported “Some 570 illegal Senegal immigrants were expelled from France between January and June 2003, including 140 on chartered group flights. France was accused by many Senegalese and by President Abdoulaye Wade of treating their compatriots “like cattle”. In 1994, according to the Ministry of External Affairs and Senegalese Resident Abroad, there were 3500 Senegalese immigrants present in the United States. But by 2003, the number of Senegal immigrant in United States had jumped to 11,000. U.S immigration policies in recent years have been less restrictive, particularly, with the introduction of the annual diversity lottery visa program that admits candidates with legal immigrant status. Furthermore, U.S cultural influence in Senegal has been apparent in the arts with an increasing number of
Senegalese musicians using English in their music and coming to the United States for concert tours and promotion of their albums.

Conclusion:

In summation, the analysis of this chapter shows that the United States has expanded its interests in Francophone Africa. The different tools the United States has used to exert influence in Francophone Africa, particularly in Senegal, are clearly effective because they have promoted a growing interest of all things related to the United States. Francophone Africans seem to have embraced U.S influence by either forming new political partnerships with the United States or simply trying to immerse themselves deeply into “Anglo-Saxon culture”.
Chapter 4

Agreements and Disagreements of French and U.S policies in Francophone Africa

Introduction:

In this chapter, I analyze U.S and French foreign policy agreements and disagreements. In the first section, I examine U.S and French foreign policy agreement concerning peace and stability in Francophone Africa. In the second section, I explore the general disagreements between U.S and French foreign policy. This section analyzes the economic disagreement and the last section examines the political disagreements of U.S and French foreign policy in Francophone Africa, particularly in Senegal.

Agreements of French and U.S policies in Francophone Africa

The promotion of peace and stability in Francophone

French and U.S foreign policy agreements are reflected in the promotion of peace and stability in Francophone Africa. The prevalence of an atmosphere of peace and stability is imperative to the promotion of interests for both the United States and France as well as for Francophone Africa itself. In the aftermath of the crisis of the African Great Lakes region, which has claimed the lives of 800,000 Rwandans and destabilized a whole region, France, the United States and the African countries have vowed that such atrocities would never happen again. This promise has led them to collaborate and set up a task force called ACRI-Africa Crisis Response Initiative, it is composed of African soldiers that respond to African conflicts. The Western powers provided aid as well as
technical and logistical support to help make ACRI an efficient task forces ready to intervene in any trouble spot on the African continent.

However, the creation of ACRI did not come easy and it displays to some degree the mistrust that existed between France and the United States. According to Marchal (1995), the French were concerned about participant countries and U.S hegemony in the decision-making process, and subjected the draft paper crafted by the United States in 1996 to criticism. Finally, an agreement in 1997 that would allow at least a membership of seven African countries to keep modern military equipment available in Africa ended the "bitter argument" (p.364). The creation of ACRI put France in a policy straitjacket because it restricts France from conducting business as usual in Africa. French military interventions of the past to keep the territorial status quo are no longer tolerated. Today, the former métropole finds itself as the world greatest multilateralist, which fits its end goals as a medium-sized power. France seems to be only able to remain in the game of competing against United States superpower through multilateralism. The multilateralism embodied in ACRI allows both the United States and France to cooperate and promote their interests, but also helps both keep an eye on each other's tactics and moves of growing hegemonic ambitions in Francophone Africa and beyond.

**Disagreements of French and U.S policies in Francophone Africa**

**Economic Disagreements**

U.S-French rivalry in Francophone Africa, particularly in Senegal has reached the highest point in history in the period following the Cold War. The Clinton administration's engagement policy of the 1990s is defined by a new concept of
economic conquest around the world. Francophone Africa, particularly in Senegal, was certainly not immune to this concept. Former Clinton Administration Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Herman Cohen, used a 1995 speech in Libreville, Gabon to point to the United States’ new interest to explore Francophone Africa’s markets. “The African market is open to everyone … We must accept free and fair competition, equality between all actors” (Schraeder, 2000, p.404). Undoubtedly, this statement signaled Washington’s new belief that Francophone Africa should not remain only a trading and investment partner with France, but it should be expanded. U.S-French economic competition of the 1990s happened mainly in the lucrative industries of oil and other precious natural resources that are in great demand by Western powers. Schraeder (2000) addressed two examples (one in Congo, the other in Senegal) of the U.S-French economic squabble that help clarify the intensity of rivalry between these two western powers in Francophone Africa.

The Senegalese government under Abdou Diouf in 1995 refused to give in to French pressure and signed a contract with an American petroleum company for oil exploration. In the case of Congo-Brazzaville, French refusal to approve a requested loan by president Lissouba for future production of three promising new offshore oil deposits led the latter to initiate a secret deal with the U.S oil company Oxy. President Lissouba came under heavy French pressure and renounced the Agreement with Oxy eight months later (pp.405-406).

The actions of these new African leaders are indicative of a new generation of leaders in Francophone Africa that does not abide by the former rule that France is to be considered as first priority in the awarding of contracts. Undoubtedly, the aim of these new leaders is the prioritization of their countries’ interests at the expense of those of the former métropole. Relations between the United States and Senegal have intensified in recent
years. Illustrative of this was President George Bush’s visit to Senegal in 2003.

Abdoulaye Wade has also had numerous visits to the United States.

In sum, we say that U.S-French economic competition started in the 1990s is one of the signs of the rise of globalization and international economic liberalism. New realities have rendered the notion of ‘pre-carre’ outdated and it is substituted by a quest for economic interests in an unprecedented manner, such that states are no longer confined to one single geopolitical area. The intensity of economic rivalry between the United States and France in the 1990s caught a conservative France off-guard. This conservative approach was reflected in the French fear for political change in Francophone Africa, leading it to permanently back the territorial status quo. Thus, when the political regimes changed in Francophone Africa, new leaders emerged with an agenda of diversification of foreign relations. France’s most realist president Charles de Gaulle’s old saying “states does not have friends but interests” has recently been adopted by the Francophone African countries toward France the ‘long time friend and ally’, supposedly viewed as the promoter and guarantor of Francophone Africa’s interests at the international level.

**Political disagreement**

U.S and French foreign policy disagreements are reflected in the crisis of the African Great Lakes region. Serious allegations about France’s implication in facilitating the Rwandan genocide has made France lose credibility in Africa and at the international level. The African Great Lakes crisis is one of the conflicts in which foreign powers (United States and France) backed two different sides; one the government forces, the
other the rebel forces, reminiscent of the Cold War era when the American and the
Soviets constantly backed opposite sides to advance their ideologies. French disastrous
foreign policies of the African Great Lakes region led to the advancement of ‘Anglo-
Saxon’ influence in the Great Lakes region. Ngolet (2000) pointed this out, when he said,
“The United States supported the rebellion to extend its influence in Central Africa; to
exploit natural resources. But the strengthening of both the African and American
presence in Congo is forcing former colonial powers to withdraw from their zones of
influence and allow the redesigning of a new political map in which African and
American interests will be dominant” (p.66).

The U.S policy of providing technical and logistical support to rebel forces to root
out French influence in both Rwanda and in the Congo showed U.S dedication to further
its influence in Francophone Africa. French foreign policy makers, especially the ones
involved in the African Great Lakes Crisis have come to realize that Franco-African
policy is no longer viable. They also realized that their unrectifiable policy mistake has
led both to lack of credibility and the advancement of ‘Anglo-Saxon’ influence in the
African Great Lakes region, especially in France’s backyard of Rwanda and Zaire.

The French must come to grips with the fact that a new era has dawned. Eastern and Central African leaders-be they rebel commanders in Zaire or
political leaders in Gabon and Rwanda-feel less and less obliged to answer
to Paris. These scions of the old Francophones will no longer think in term of belonging to an empire; they may well prefer Coca-Cola to Beaujolais. Whether this will make Africa, a better place to live remains to be seen

Although, France took most of the blame for facilitating the Rwandan genocide,
which as a result tarnished its image and hurt its influence in Francophone Africa, Some
critics pointed to the fact that the United States could have done more to prevent the Rwandan genocide. As Braeckman (2004) noted, the United States refused to join the Belgian military contingent in order to prevent a wider crisis and was reluctant to label the Rwandan crisis a "genocide" which would have made military intervention compulsory under international law (p.22). The failure of the United States to act to prevent the Rwandan genocide, and even refusing the use of the term "genocide" did not do as much damage to its image as France. The United States assistance of the victims and the backing of a new Tutsi government under the leadership of President Paul Kagamé right after the genocide have helped restore its tarnished image to some degree. The French took harder criticism than the United States for failing to prevent the Rwandan genocide because Rwanda is part of the French backyard and French elites were said to have facilitate the genocide.

Moreover, U.S and French policies toward Francophone Africa display a disagreement in the democratic process. The United States promoted democracy based on the rationale that it would bring to power pro-American political elites in Francophone Africa sensitive to both U.S interests and to the belief that democratization is conducive to economic development. The French on the other hand, seek to maintain the territorial status quo and keep in power pro-French political elites sensitive to French interests mainly through the use of military intervention. In addition, the French seem to prioritize peace and stability for the achievement of progress in economic development. To the French, it seems that economic development should be prioritized over democratization based on the rationale that it is the former that fosters the latter. To the French, it seems
any attempt to speed up the latter would ultimately lead to instability and political violence in Francophone Africa, which is in no way in anyone’s best interest.

**Conclusion:**

In sum, the analysis of this chapter shows that the end of the Cold War have intensified economic and political tensions between France and the United States. The United States have renewed its interest in Africa and in the French backyard. Collaboration between France and United States is limited in the area of peace, security and stability. However, in the quest for economic and political influence, tensions between these two Western powers are likely to increase in Francophone Africa and beyond. The new political rivalry between France and the United, it seems has given the African continent a sort of new recognition. A new political leadership in Africa has noticed this recognition and is starting to figure out a way to advantage of Western power rivalry in Africa.
Chapter 5

The case of Senegal

Data analysis, findings and conclusion

Introduction:

In this chapter, I explore the importance of Senegal as a case study in the competition between France and the United States. Cultural and economic competition is prevalent in Senegal. Senegal as the capital of French West Africa represents truly an interesting case to examine. In this chapter, the data is analyzed and discussed.

Senegal located in West Africa; it is bounded by the Atlantic Ocean in the west, Mauritania in the north, Mali in the east, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau in the south. As the gateway to West Africa, the French early on knew the strategic position of Senegal. They established themselves in coastal towns like Dakar, Saint Louis, Rufisque and Gorée known as "les quatres communes" where local residents were considered legally French citizens dating back to the French Revolution. After independence in 1960, the French relinquished power to the Senegalese who modeled their institutions after the former métropole. Close relationship between France and Senegal dating back to the Berlin Conference of 1885 (which regulated European colonialism in Africa), left a Senegal deeply immersed in French culture even after the post-independence years.
**Figure 2: Views of U.S. and French Influence**

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Source: BBC, 2005.
According to a 2005 BBC World Public Opinion Poll, 72% of Senegalese viewed French influence mainly positive, against 25% who viewed U.S influence to be mainly positive. This poll reveals that almost three times more Senegalese have a positive view of French influence than U.S influence. Nevertheless, in recent years, it appears that Senegal is shifting its foreign relation priorities. Today, new connections with Washington have made Senegal, a former French colony, particularly interesting to analyze.

In view of this phenomenon of growing U.S influence, Senegal witnessed in 1999 the unprecedented launching of an American style of education. Suffolk University, an outpost of the Boston, Massachusetts private college opened a campus in the heart of the capital, Dakar. This University has attracted Senegalese students eager to learn with English as the primary language of instruction. The significance of this new development reinforced the Franco-American “culture war” that has intensified following the Cold War. The establishment of Suffolk University has made Senegal a symbol of the “language battle” that exists between these two Western powers. French anxiety in the “language battle” seems reinforced in the following statement made by the former French Minister for Cooperation:

In less than ten years, Africans will speak English, the technology they use will be American, their elites will be educated in the United States, and we will be cut off from our African roots, huddled up over a Europe which feels the cold and is incapable of being a power that anyone listens to. (Bernard Debré as quoted in Kom, 2003, p.1).

In spite of the fact that many Senegalese viewed English to be a prestigious language; there was no urgent need to have an American style education. The establishment of
Suffolk University in Dakar seems to have been an alternative choice for Senegalese students to have access to higher education at a time the former métropole is unwilling to issue neither work nor student visas to Senegalese. The French daily newspaper *La Croix* best captures the anger a Senegalese man in the streets of Dakar generated from France’s restrictive immigration policies:

These expulsions of groups of tens of Senegalese last spring were lived like "a humiliation", "a treason", for Malal, 48 years old. "Our compatriots were returned like dogs," storms this father of six children. He assures us that he will never ask for a visa from France, because "France does not want Africans". "France came and stripped us from our raw materials to grow rich and then rejects us. Our compatriots who live over there clean the sewers and do what the French do not want to do" ("Sénégal," 2003).

These recent expulsions of Senegalese immigrants from France are viewed as a humiliation by the Senegalese government. They have prompted an unprecedented retaliation on the part of the Senegalese government. “Last March and April, some 25 Senegalese were expelled from France. Senegal retaliated by sending 9 French nationals out of its territory” (“France,” 2003). In this retaliatory game, it seems that the Senegalese government has much to lose considering the revenues from French tourism constitute a substantial amount of its overall GDP. Political tensions over the issue of immigration between France and Senegal were diffused following a visit of French Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy after which he announced that “Financial assistance given by the French office of international migration has doubled. Senegalese immigrants who are willing to go back home could now receive from 4000 euros to 7000 euros to create micro-businesses” (“Nicolas,” 2003). This incentive program aimed at
encouraging Senegalese immigrants in France to return back home seems to be having little or no success at all. “According to the International Office of Migration, only 9 of the 47,000 Senegalese estimated to be legally resident in France took advantage of it last year” (“France,” 2003). It seems most Senegalese prefer to remain in France chasing the “French dream” than return to Senegal with few thousands euros and invest in a weak economy, where the profits are low and the risks of bankruptcy are considerable.

In retrospect, the creation of Suffolk University shows the Senegalese government’s willingness to accommodate its student population who are growing anxious to speak English in the new international system. Restrictive immigration policies of recent years seem to have not helped France’s doctrine of cultural rayonnement, considering that fewer students from its former backyard can now pursue higher education in France. However, for the United States the establishment of Suffolk University clearly represents an important step in the “language battle” against France. Suffolk University represents an important “cultural tool” that definitely exerts U.S influence inside the country of France’s closest ally in the Francophone world. U.S cultural imperialism in Senegal seems unintended, but it is undeniable that the United States is slowly shaping a future Senegal where children of the social elites will be fluent in English and holders of American degrees. At the same time, critics have pointed out the decades old unbreakable bond between France and Senegal. Among these, Derrick (2001) asserted that “American influence is said to be noticeable and English spoken in the presidential palace in Dakar under Abdoulaye Wade. The French have to accept this,
and can do so readily because in truth nothing will ever stop Francophone Africans from using French as their language of instruction and loving France" (p.18).

U.S-France economic competition in Senegal

Within the scope of U.S-French economic competition, Senegal presents a particularly interesting case due to its growing economic ties with the United States. As a way to keep its economic preeminence, France kept economic ties with Francophone Africa, particularly in Senegal. These economic ties seem to have been based on exploitation rather than mutual benefit and equal trading terms. As Martin (1995) pointed out

... the post-independence years co-operation and defense agreements concluded with the Francophone states contain special provisions concerning French exclusive access to such strategic raw materials as oil, natural gas, uranium...and helium. These must be sold to France in a priority basis-and restricted to third world countries – as required by the interests of common defense (p.10).

But France still wields a powerful economic partnership with Senegal that is no match to the one with the United States. According to a 2005 report of the French Foreign Ministry:

France is the first supplier and customer of Senegal. There are approximatively 250 French businesses present in Senegal, with a sell turnover of 1.7 billion euros, employing 22,000 people. In 2004, the total volume of exchanges, constitute 84% of the exports-a total of 637 billion euros. French exports (535 million Euros) have progressed by 6.1% in 2004.

The period following the Cold War has been one of economic friction between France and the United States. The Clinton Administration policy of engagement of the
1990s defined by a new concept of economic conquest around the globe made Francophone Africa, particularly Senegal, a French backyard certainly not immune to this concept. Former Clinton Administration Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Herman Cohen, used a 1995 speech in Libreville-Gabon, to point to the United States’ new interest to explore Francophone Africa’s markets. “The African market is open to everyone …We must accept free and fair competition, equality between all actors” (Schraeder, 2000, p.404). Undoubtedly, this recent statement signaled Washington’s new belief in the notion that Francophone Africa should not remain exclusively a trading and investment partner with France, but it should be opened. U.S-French economic competition of the 1990s happened mainly in the lucrative industries of oil and other precious natural resources that are in great demand by Western powers. Schraeder (2000) highlighted an example of Senegal caught between the U.S-French economic competition that helps better put into perspective the intensity of rivalry between these two Western powers. “The Senegalese government under Abdou Diouf refused to give in to French pressure and signed a contract with an American petroleum company for oil exploration” (p.405). This action of Abdou Diouf is indicative of a new generation of leaders that does not abide by the former agreement that France was to be considered as first priority in the awarding of contracts. Undoubtedly, Adour Diouf’s action is sign of the prioritization of Senegal’s interests at the expense of those of the former métropole.

In Senegal, power changed hands at the ballot box in 2000 with Abdoulaye Wade elected as president of Senegal. He seemed to have adopted a politics of “rapprochement” toward the United States. President George Bush’s visit to Senegal in 2003 is proof of
closer ties between these two countries. Toward this end, economic relations between the United States and Senegal have been growing in recent years. According to the UN International Trade Statistics Yearbook, in 2003, Senegal’s exports to the United States were estimated at $8.1 million and its imports at $86.1 million. Ten years earlier in 1993, Senegal exports to the United States accounted for only $12 million and its imports $59.2 million.

In recent years trade promotion initiatives have been created to promote more trade between Africa and the United States. The Clinton Administration in 2000 signed the Africa Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA) into law. It is a market initiative aimed at encouraging trade between the United States and Africa. The U.S private sector is also encouraged to engage with its African counterparts in trade and investment opportunities. The Bush Administration has been backing the AGOA trade initiative, which has contributed to a growing economic partnership between United States and AGOA member countries such as Senegal. According to a 2005 Xinhua News Agency report:

In 2004, U.S exports to Sub-Saharan Africa have increased by 25% compared to the previous year with an amount of $8.6 billion, nearly 5000 billion FCFA. Whereas, U.S imports from Africa under AGOA have reached $26.6 billion (around 15000 billion FCFA), a rise of 88% compared to 2003.

In sum, we can say that U.S-French economic competition started in the 1990s is one of the signs of the rise of globalization, international economic liberalism and ‘creative destruction’. New realities have rendered the notion of ‘pre-carre’ outdated and it is substituted by a quest for economic interests in an unprecedented manner, where states are no longer confined to one single geopolitical area. The intensity of economic
rivalry between the United States and France in the post-Cold War era caught a conservative France off-guard. This conservative approach was reflected in the French fear for political change in Francophone Africa, particularly in Senegal, leading it to back permanently the territorial status quo. Thus, when the political regimes change in Francophone Africa, new leaders emerge with an agenda of diversification of foreign relations. France’s most realist president Charles de Gaulle’s old saying “states do not have friends but interests” has recently been adopted by the Francophone countries, particularly Senegal toward France the ‘long time friend and ally’, supposedly viewed as the promoter and guarantor of Francophone Africa’s interests at the international level.

Looking into the future, one can predict that with the threat of international terrorism looming, the United States will redouble its efforts to help Francophone African countries, make a positive mark in the global economy by promoting peace and prosperity across the board. Otherwise, these countries may become “failed states” deeply enmeshed in a cycle of violence. In the meantime, U.S engagement seems likely to increase since, according to a 2003 World Public Opinion poll conducted in the United States, “Seventy-one percent of respondents said the United States should increase military and police training and exchange intelligence with African countries” (World Public Opinion.org, 2003). Whatever the case may be, Senegal appears to be on the offensive to diversify its foreign relations. The days of restraints in foreign relations dictated by the ex-colonial power seems to be a thing of the past. In the U.S-French economic competition, it seems that Senegal has come to realize that getting more from France may mean opening up to the United States. Abdoulaye Wade, President of
Senegal seems to have mastered the art of keeping the leverage going. It is reasonable to say that Senegal’s foreign policy toward these two Western powers may remain the same in the near future.

**Humanitarian influence**

The humanitarian presence of the United States makes Senegal a particularly interesting case to discuss. U.S influence in Senegal is reflected in the presence of humanitarian organizations such as the Peace Corps and USAID (United States International Agency for International Development). According to the State Department, USAID in Senegal promotes democracy, good governance and economic growth and has invested over a $1 billion in a wide range of projects since 1961. An average of nearly $30 million each year was used to tackle constraints to national development. The USAID in Senegal has teamed up with the Senegalese chapter of the Internet Society (a group that promotes the spread of the Internet) to expand Internet access among the population. To advocate wider Internet use, both USAID and the Internet Society have campaigned for improved capacity and lower cost services. In addition, the Xinhua News Agency reported (2003) that “The U.S would provide an aid package of 6, 5 million dollar destined for the purchase of data-processing equipments within the frameworks of “Digital freedom initiative”, an American project aimed at helping poor countries in the sector of numerical technology and communication” (“Les Etats-Unis,” 2003). Only 225,000 internet users exist in Senegal out of the 10 million Senegalese, but this is number is expected to grow as more Internet promotion initiatives are introduced (CIA World Fact Book, 2000). The Peace Corps has 135 volunteers in Senegal and this number
is expected to rise according to the United States State Department. The Peace Corps in Senegal runs primary health care projects, small enterprises, development projects, and agriculture sector projects.

**Data Analysis-Senegal**

An analysis of data in the following tables in general does not support the original hypothesis that French influence in Senegal is in decline due to expanding U.S influence. But one can note the fact that U.S influence in Francophone Africa, particularly in Senegal is a growing phenomenon.

Table 1 shows a comparison of trade between Senegal/France and Senegal/United States for fiscal year 1993, 1998, and 2003. Table 1 reveals that in 1993, Senegal imports from France constituted 35% of its total imports. The United States, however, represented 5% of its total imports. In 1998, Table 1 reveals that Senegal imports from France constituted 34% of its total imports. While the United States accounted only for 6% of Senegal total imports. In 2003, Senegal imports from France constituted 24% of its total imports. However, the United States accounted only 3% of Senegal total imports.

Senegal imports from France reveals an interesting pattern of regression in percentage overall (11%) from 35% in 1993 to 34% in 1998 and 24% in 2003. While the dollar amounts follows a progression pattern from $403 million in 1993 to $537 million in 1998 and $589 million in 2003. The decline of Senegal imports from France reveals that Senegal is diversifying its trade relations. This diversification is also supported by the “Imports to elsewhere” column, which shows a jump of 13.5% from 1993 to 2003. However, Senegal imports from the United States reveals a progression of 1% from 1993
to 1998 and a regression of 3% from 1998 to 2003. Overall, when France and the United States are compared, we can conclude that France is by far a greater supplier to Senegal than the United States.

In summation, Table 1 reveals that Senegal exports to France have decreased both in term of volume and dollar amounts. This regression means that Senegal is diversifying its trade. This diversification is also supported by the “Exports to elsewhere” column, which shows an overall decline of 14.9% between 1993 between 2003. Senegal exports to the United States reveal that fiscal year 1993 was higher than both 1998 and 2003. It seems that the historic 1994 FCFA devaluation lowered Senegal revenues from exports. Overall, table 1 reveals that Senegal exports more from France than the United States, which can lead us to conclude that France is by far the biggest trading partner of the Republic of Senegal.

In comparing the number of Senegalese immigrants living in France and the United States, the results in Table 2 show that in the three different time points there were four times more Senegalese in France than in the United States. This is obvious considering the close cultural ties that exist between France and the Republic of Senegal. The most important thing this table reveals, however, is the nature of immigration policies of France and the United States in recent years. As it relates to the republic of Senegal, France’s immigration policies between 1994 and 2000 are much more restrictive than United States during the same period. Between 1994 and 2000, France admitted 6.9 times fewer Senegalese than the United States. However, between 2000 and 2003, one can notice a slight reverse trend, with France admitting 2.5 times more Senegalese
immigrants than the United States. The decline of visa issuance to the United States between 2000 and 2003 may be attributed to security concerns after the September 11 2001 terrorist attack, which has increased screening for visa applicants in Senegal and other part of the world. Table 2 reveals there are overall, 3.8 times more Senegalese residents in France than in the United States.

Table 3 shows a substantial increase in the number of Senegalese students enrolled in U.S universities (96.7%) from academic year 1991-1972 to 2003-2004. The result from this table supports my expectation of growing U.S influence in Senegal, which in this case even started before the end of the Cold War era. This table reveals that the United States is slowly shaping a Senegal with a social elites educated in the United States. Table 3 reinforced the veracity of Bernard Debré statement about growing “Anglo-Saxon” influence in Francophone Africa.

Table 4 shows a comparison of direct investment from France and the United States in Senegal between fiscal year 1994 to 2004. For the recorded data, Table 4 shows from 1994 to 2003, direct investment from France to Senegal increased overall by 11.5%. However, U.S direct investment in Senegal overall decreased by 1.4% from 2000 to 2004. U.S direct investment in Senegal reached its highest peak of 37 million euros in both years 2001 and 2002. Table 4 reveals that from 2000 to both 2001 and 2002 to 2004 the last year recorded, U.S direct investment to Senegal actually decreased by 1.3% (28 million euros). Overall, when France and United States are compared, based on the recorded data, table 4 reveals that direct investment from France is ten times higher than that of the United States.
Data analysis-Francophone Africa

Table 5 shows a substantial decrease in French aid 35.8% to Francophone Africa between 1995 and 2001. The results from this table support my expectation of the decline of French influence in Francophone Africa. The negative change in French aid to Francophone Africa is significant. This table reveals an attitude of disengagement on the part of France.

The growing engagement of the United States in Francophone Africa as predicted is revealed in Table 6. This table, although not specifically pertaining to Senegal, reveals a growing interest on the part of the United States 2000 between 2005. For Senegal, and many other Francophone African countries (except Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco) this table is relevant because they are part of Sub-Saharan Africa. Notable is the substantial increase in all expenditures related to security. There are also significant increases in humanitarian and development assistance.

Table 7 shows a substantial increase in the number of Francophone students enrolled in U.S universities (99.6%) from academic year 1954-1954 to 2003-2004. The results from this table once again support my expectation of growing U.S influence in Francophone Africa, which in this case started during the Cold War period. Table 7 shows that the United States is slowly shaping Francophone Africa, where social elites would be fluent in English and holders of American degrees. Table 7 also reinforces the anxiety expressed by Former French minister of cooperation Bernard Debré.
Tables 8-13 chronicle the trade between six Francophone African states, France and the United States. Only in two states (Madagascar and Gabon) is my hypothesis of French decline and U.S growth upheld. Table 8 shows a comparison of trade between Benin/France and Benin/United States for fiscal year 1993, 1998 and 2002. Benin imports from France reveal a pattern of decline overall (-1.1%) from 25% in to 23.9% in 2002. From 1993 to 1998, Benin imports decreased by 4.3% and from 1998 to 2002, its imports increased 3.2%. While the dollar amounts follow a pattern of increase from 1993 to 1998 and from 1998 to 2002, the decline of Benin imports from France reveals that Benin is diversifying its trade relations. This diversification is also supported by the “imports from elsewhere” column, which shows a jump of 3% from 1993 to 2002. However, Benin imports from the United States show an increase of 0.9% from 1993 to 1998 and a decline of 2.8% from 1998 to 2002.

Benin exports to France show an increase both in terms of dollar amounts and percentage in Table 8. Overall, from 1998 to 2002, there is an increase of 0.7%. However, exports to the United States reveal an increase from 0.1% from 1993 to 1998 and a decrease of 0.3% from 1998 to 2002. In terms of dollar amounts, Benin exports to the United States increased overall, from 1993 to 2002. Table 8 reveals both France and United States exports to Benin increased in terms of dollar amounts overall from 1993 to 2002.

Table 9 shows a comparison of trade between the Seychelles/France and Seychelles/United States. Seychelles imports from France reveal a pattern of increase in term of percentage overall (6%) from 4.6% in 1992 to 9% in 1998 and 10.6% in 2002. In
terms of dollar amounts, however it increased from 1992 to 1998, but decreased from 1998 to 2002. Overall, in terms of dollar amounts fiscal year 1998 was higher than both 1992 and 2002.

Seychelles imports from the United States increased from 2.5% from 1992 to 3.4% in 1998 and then decreased to 1.7% in 2002. In term of dollar amounts, Seychelles imports increased from 1992 to 1998 and then decreased from 1998 to 2002. Overall, the dollar amounts increased from 1992 to 2002. The “Imports from elsewhere” column shows that Seychelles is diversifying its trade relations. In term of percentage, the “Imports from elsewhere” column reveals that Seychelles imports is in decline.

Seychelles exports to France show an increase of 0.7% from 1992 to 1998 and another increase of 15.9% from 1998 to 2002. Seychelles exports to France increased overall by 16.6%. However, in terms of dollar amounts, it increased from 1992 to 1998 and then decreased from 1998 to 2002.

Seychelles exports to the United States, however, show a pattern of decline that accounts for 2.2% from 1992 to 2002. Seychelles exports to the United States decreased by 2% from 1992 to 1998 and from 1998 to 2002, it also decreased by 0.2%.

Table 10 shows a comparison of trade between Madagascar/France and Madagascar/United States for fiscal year 1993, 1999 and 2003. Madagascar imports from France reveals a pattern of decline in percentage overall (10.9%) from 2.7% in 1993 to 20.7% in 1999 and 16.2% in 2003. While the dollar amounts follows a progression pattern from 1993 to 1999 and from 1999 to 2003. The decline of Madagascar imports from France reveals that Madagascar is diversifying its trade.
However, the United States reveals a decline of 3.2 from 1993 to 1999 and 0.2 % from 1999 to 2003. The overall decline of Madagascar imports from the United States accounts for 3.4%. Table 10 reveals that both Madagascar imports from France and the United States have increased in term of dollar amount. For France, it increased from 1993 to 1999 and from 1999 to 2003. For the United States, it increased from 1993 to 1999 and from 1999 to 2003. Overall, when France and the United States are compared, France is a bigger supplier to Madagascar than the United States.

Madagascar exports to France show a pattern of increase in both percentage and in terms of dollar amounts. From 1993 to 2003, Madagascar exports to France increased by 5.8%. However, Madagascar, exports to the United States also show a remarkable increase overall (21.2%) from 1993 to 2003. From 1993 to 1999, there is a decrease of 1.9% and from 1999 to 2003 a remarkable increase of 23.1%. In term of dollar amount, Madagascar exports to the United States increased from 1993 to 1999 and from 1999 to 2003. Table 10 shows that Madagascar exports to both France and the United States increased overall from 1993 to 2003.


However, Gabon imports from the United States show overall a pattern of increase both in term of percentage and dollar amounts. From 1993 to 1996, Gabon imports from the United States increased by 1.3%, they increased again from 1996 to
2000 by 0.7%. This total increase of Gabon imports from the United States between 1993 and 2000 is 2%.

Table 11 indicates that Gabon imports from the United States supports a growing trend both in term of dollar amount and percentage. While for France, it indicates an increase in dollar amounts and a decrease in percentage.

Gabon exports to France reveal overall a substantial decrease of 15% from 1993 to 2000. From 1993 to 1996, Gabon exports to France decreased by 11.9% and from 1996 to 2000, exports to France also decreased by 3.1%. In term of dollar amounts, Gabon exports to France increased from 1993 to 1996 then decreased from 1996 to 2000. However, the dollar amount increased overall from 1993 to 2000.

Gabon exports to the United States show overall an increase of 10% from 1993 to 2000. From 1992 to 1996, Gabon exports to the United States decreased by 11.6% and then increased by 1.4% between 1996 and 2000. In term of dollar amounts, Gabon exports to the United States increased overall from 1993 to 2000. Table 11 indicates a growing trend for Gabon exports to the United States.

Table 12 shows a comparison trade between Morocco/France and Morocco/United States for fiscal year 1992, 1999 and 2003. Table 12 reveals that in 1993, Morocco imports to France constituted 23.8% of its total imports. The United States however, represented 6% of its total imports. In 1999, Table 12 reveals that Morocco imports from France constituted 26.3% of its total imports. While the United States accounted for only 6.6% of Morocco total imports. In 2003, Morocco imports to France
constituted 20.5% of its total imports. However, the United States accounts for only 4.2% of Morocco total imports.

Morocco imports from France show an increase of 2.5% from 1992 to 1999 and a decrease of 5.8% from 1999 to 2003. However, in terms of dollar amounts, it follows a pattern of progression from 1992 to 1999 and from 1999 to 2003. Morocco imports to the United States showed an increase of 0.6% from 1992 to 1999 and a decrease of 2.4% from 1999 to 2003. In terms of dollar amounts, Morocco imports to from the United States showed an increase from 1992 to 1999 and a decrease from 1999 to 2003.

Table 12 reveals that Morocco exports to France increased by 5.4% from 1992 and decreased by 3.9% from 1999 to 2003. In terms of dollar amounts, Morocco exports to France followed a pattern of progression from 1992 to 1999 and from 1999 to 2003. However, for the United States, Morocco exports followed a decline pattern from 1992 to 1993 and from 1999 to 20003. Morocco exports to the United States decreased by 0.4% from 1992 to 1999 and by 0.6% from 1999 to 2003. Overall, Morocco imports to the United States decreased by 1%.

Table 13 shows a comparison of trade between Algeria/France and Algeria/United States for fiscal year 1992, 1999 and 2003. In 1992, Algeria imports from France constituted 24.2% of its total imports. The United States, however, represented 11.1% of Algeria’s total imports. In 1999, table 13 shows that Algeria imports from France constituted 22.7% of its total imports. While the United States accounted for 8.5% of Algeria’s total imports. In 2003, Algeria imports from France constituted 20.8% of its
total imports. However, the United States accounted for only 4.6% of Algeria’s total imports.

Algeria’s imports from France increased by 1.5% from 1992 to 1999 and decreased by 1.9% from 1999 to 2003. However, in terms of dollar amounts, Algeria’s imports from France shows both an increase from both 1992 to 1999 and from 1999 to 2003.

Algeria’s imports from the United States show an overall decreased of 6.5%. From 1992 to 1999, imports from the United States decreased by 2.6% and from 1999 to 2003, Algeria’s imports from the United States decreased by 3.9%. In terms of dollar amounts, Algeria’s imports from the United States show a decrease from both 1992 to 1999 and 1999 to 2003. The “imports form elsewhere” column reveals that Algeria is diversifying its trade relations.

Algeria exports to France showed a decrease of 4.4% from 1993 to 1999 and an increase of 6.1% from 1999 to 2003. However, Algeria’s exports to France showed overall an increase of 1.7% from 1993 to 2003. In terms of dollar amounts, Algeria’s exports to France increased both from 1992 to 1999 and 1999 to 2003.

Algeria’s exports to the United States showed overall a decrease of 1.4% from 1992 to 2003. Algeria exports showed a decrease of 0.1% from 1992 to 1999 and a decrease of 1.3% from 1999 to 2003. However, in term of dollar amounts, Algeria’s exports to the United States increased from both 1992 to 1999 and from 1999 to 2003. Clearly, the trade data from these six case studies does not provide strong support for the original hypothesis of French decline and U.S growth.
Discussion

Overall, the data in this study does not support a substantial decline in French influence in Francophone Africa. However, the reform of Franco-African policy in the area of economic aid is noticeable. From 1995 to 2000, France’s economic aid to the Francophone African countries decreased by 35.8%. The sample analysis of trade drawn from six Francophone Africans to compare France and U.S economic influence reveals mainly that French has not disengaged from its backyard. An analysis of France and U.S direct investment also does not support our expectation of French decline in Senegal. Direct investment from the United States has actually dropped during the tenure of Abdoulaye Wade from 2000, his first year in office, to 2004. But since there are no recorded data before 2000, it is hard to draw the conclusion that U.S direct investment under the leadership of President Wade has dropped or increased.

However the trade tables show that the influence of the United States is definitely growing in Francophone Africa. Analysis of Francophone African students enrolled in U.S universities has shown a remarkable increase in both in the Cold War era and in the post-Cold war era. These findings mean that increasingly Francophone Africa’s social elites will be fluent in English and holders of American degrees. This could definitely contribute to strengthening the relationship with the United States. Finally, U.S aid to Sub-Saharan Africa, which includes many Francophone African countries, has substantially increased from 2000 to 2005, especially in the area of improving security in the African continent. It appears the literature put an emphasis on French disengagement from Francophone African countries, which is not fully reflected in the hard data. The
relationship between France and its former colonies in Africa took centuries to solidify. Although, the relationship undergoes a period of strain, it seems that the disengagement suggested in the literature will take a long time to happen, if ever that is the case.

For the United States, we can note a growing influence in Francophone Africa, particularly in Senegal. The rise of this U.S influence in Francophone Africa can be attributed to three different factors. First, the 1990s U.S policy of engagement has renewed U.S involvement in Africa. This involvement may be due to economic interest especially in the lucrative oil industry. As African oil production continues to rise, U.S involvement in Africa will increase substantially. Second, the change in leadership in some Francophone African countries has brought new democratically elected leaders in to power with new priorities and a politics of “diversification” in foreign relations, like President Wade of Senegal or Pascal Lissouba of the Republic of Congo-Brazzaville. As the former métropole diversifies its relations, the new African leaders also will follow the pattern and seek better deals from other great powers like the United States, China, and Japan. In the case of Senegal, President Abdoulaye Wade has adopted a politics of “rapprochement” toward the United States since his election in 2000. I believe that this new stand of Senegal is a strategic political move that can help President Wade get more from both France and the United States. Third, the rise of U.S influence in Francophone Africa can be attributed to the failure of Franco-African policy of the 1990s, which has tarnished France’s image in Africa and at the international level. The French withdrawal is reflected in the rise of the reformers and in their agenda to decrease the number of French troops in Africa, restrictive immigration policies, and the economic aid, and in the
French politics of “diversification” of foreign relations that target Anglophone and Lusophone African countries. These new policies of the reformers have left more room for the United States to be engaged in what is considered the French backyard—Francophone Africa.

Conclusion

U.S-French influence in Francophone Africa, particularly in Senegal, is a new phenomenon; it dates back to the period following the Cold War. With globalization and international liberalism, the phenomenon of political rivalry is likely to last. The hypothesis presented in this thesis was not strongly supported in the data—namely that the historic and special link between France and Francophone Africa has been in decline and France seems unable to counteract the growing U.S political influence and hegemonic ambition. There has not been sufficient evidence to confirm the decline of French political influence in Francophone Africa, particularly in Senegal. However, a growing U.S political influence cannot be refuted either. This research has documented that U.S influence in Francophone Africa is growing gradually and also that France has not disengaged from its backyard. It is my hope that future research in this area will focus on measuring of how much France has disengaged from Francophone Africa and how much U.S influence has grown. With more available data, I believe the question addressed in this thesis can be more completely quantified and put into perspective. Research in this area will help comparative political scientists comprehend this new dynamic as Western powers scramble for influence in Africa. As we slowly move toward what is said to be the Asian Century, with developing countries like India and China fully
joining the economic world competition, research in this area will be even more interesting.
# APPENDIX

## Table 1: Senegal Trade with the US and France (value in millions of US dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1993</th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imports from France</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>537</td>
<td>589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports from US</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>86.3</td>
<td>86.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports from Elsewhere</td>
<td>677.2</td>
<td>950.6</td>
<td>1716.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Imports</td>
<td>1139.2</td>
<td>1573.9</td>
<td>2391.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports to France</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports to US</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports to Elsewhere</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>457.2</td>
<td>1006.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Exports</td>
<td>605.1</td>
<td>517.4</td>
<td>1151.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** UN International Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1993-2003.

## Table 2: Number of Senegalese Immigrants in France and the US, 1994-2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1994</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>39800*</td>
<td>40848**</td>
<td>42000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>3200*</td>
<td>10535***</td>
<td>11000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:**
- *Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Senegalese Resident Abroad
- **Eurostat available at. www.nidi.nl/pushpull
- ***U.S Census Bureau 2000.

## Table 3: Number of Senegalese Students Enrolled at US Colleges and Universities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>805</td>
<td>779</td>
<td>96.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Institute of International Education.
Table 4: France and United States FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) in Senegal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurostat at http://epp.eurostat.cec.EU.INT/portal/page?_page id=1136173.0

Table 5: France Aid to Francophone Africa (Value in billion Euros)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>Change</th>
<th>%change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>4.137</td>
<td>2.653</td>
<td>-1.484</td>
<td>-35.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Observatoire Français de la cooperation Internationale [OFCI], 2003.

Table 6: U.S. Foreign Assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa (in thousands of US dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>FY 2000 Actual</th>
<th>FY 2005 Estimate</th>
<th>Change</th>
<th>% Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Development Assistance</td>
<td>446,988</td>
<td>747,446</td>
<td>100,458</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Military Financing</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>26,288</td>
<td>16,288</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Health &amp; AIDS Initiative</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>781,469</td>
<td>781,479</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International military education &amp; training</td>
<td>7,543</td>
<td>10,807</td>
<td>3,264</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Narcotics control and Law enforcement</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10,500</td>
<td>10,500</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, demining and Related Programs</td>
<td>16,445</td>
<td>31,518</td>
<td>15,073</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping Operations</td>
<td>36,654</td>
<td>133,192</td>
<td>96,538</td>
<td>263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Corps</td>
<td>52,347</td>
<td>66,937</td>
<td>14,590</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: U.S Department of State, USAID, Peace Corps, US Treasury-Budget Tables
Table 7: Number of Francophone African Students* Enrolled in US Universities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27</td>
<td>115**</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>3956</td>
<td>4315</td>
<td>7914</td>
<td>+ 7887</td>
<td>99.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Institute of International Education

* Francophone Africa (25 Countries)

** 4 out of 115 were from West Africa, but failed to specify country of origin

Table 8: Benin Trade with the US and France (value in millions of US dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1993</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imports from France</td>
<td>148.5</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>167.3</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>174.3</td>
<td>23.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports from US</td>
<td>241.8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports from Elsewhere</td>
<td>406.2</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>591.9</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>531.6</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Imports</td>
<td>578.87</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>807</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>727</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports to France</td>
<td>5.953</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>65.1</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports to US</td>
<td>2.490</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports to Elsewhere</td>
<td>173.15</td>
<td>95.3</td>
<td>265.3</td>
<td>79.6</td>
<td>291.6</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Exports</td>
<td>181.59</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>332.9</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 9: Seychelles Trade with the US and France (value in millions of US dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1992</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imports from France</td>
<td>8.699</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports from US</td>
<td>4.812</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports from Elsewhere</td>
<td>177.4</td>
<td>92.9</td>
<td>335.8</td>
<td>87.6</td>
<td>215.6</td>
<td>87.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Imports</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>383.1</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>245.7</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports to France</td>
<td>8.180</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>33.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports to US</td>
<td>101.7</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports to Elsewhere</td>
<td>388.0</td>
<td>80.8</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>82.1</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>66.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Exports</td>
<td>480.0</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>90.1</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10: Madagascar Trade with the US and France (value in millions of US dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Imports from France</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Imports from US</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Imports from Elsewhere</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Total Imports</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>127.0</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>293.9</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>312.1</td>
<td>66.6</td>
<td>468.6</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>104.7</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>385.6</td>
<td>76.2</td>
<td>505.3</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>177.5</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>883.7</td>
<td>68.9</td>
<td>1091.0</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 11: Gabon Trade with the US and France (value in millions of US dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Imports from France</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Imports from US</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Imports from Elsewhere</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Total Imports</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>370.3</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>709.9</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>333.5</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>774.9</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>384.7</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>93.4</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>898.1</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>421.4</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>106.4</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>428.3</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>956.1</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 12: Morocco Trade with the US and France (value in millions of US dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Imports from France</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Imports from US</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Imports from Elsewhere</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Total Imports</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>175.0</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>434.9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>516.9</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>735.5</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>2778</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>705</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>7303</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>1072.0</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2927</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>578.1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>1072.0</td>
<td>75.3</td>
<td>1423.0</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 13: Algeria Trade with the US and France (value in millions of US dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1992</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imports from France</td>
<td>2097</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>2086</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>3233</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports from US</td>
<td>954</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>769.7</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>708.6</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports from Elsewhere</td>
<td>559</td>
<td>64.7</td>
<td>6306</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>1159</td>
<td>74.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Imports</td>
<td>864</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>9161</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>1553</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports to France</td>
<td>203.7</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>1719</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>3107</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports to US</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>1755</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4899</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports to Elsewhere</td>
<td>754.5</td>
<td>67.7</td>
<td>9051</td>
<td>72.2</td>
<td>1660</td>
<td>67.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Exports</td>
<td>11136</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>1252</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>2461</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

References


