The Ishii mission and the Lansing-Ishii negotiations of 1917

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THE ISHII MISSION AND THE LANSING-ISHII
NEGOTIATIONS OF 1917

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It is my firm belief that so long as the two Governments maintain a perfectly appreciative attitude toward each other, so long as there is no lack of statesmanship to guide public opinion, the reign of peace and tranquility in our part of the world will remain unchallenged.

Viscount Ishii

7 November 1917
PREFACE

This paper has been written primarily to reveal the Japanese side of the Lansing-Ishii negotiations (or as it is referred to in Japan, the Ishii-Lansing negotiations). The main source for material on the Japanese position was microfilmed records of the Japanese Foreign Office obtained from the United States Library of Congress.

I wish to acknowledge the indispensable translation assistance provided by my wife Mitsuyo Endicott. Without her devotion the more than one hundred Foreign Office messages written in bureaucratic, Taisho Japanese would have never seen this writing.

We hope that this paper will contribute meaningfully to the historic scholarship on this often maligned agreement.

Tokyo, 1967
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CHAPTER I

THE NEED FOR AN UNDERSTANDING

The Japanese government had become apprehensive and confused as to American policy in China by early 1917. This uncertainty as to the intentions of her great eastern neighbor was the result, in large measure, of the interplay between the American Minister in Peiping, Paul S. Reinsch, the State Department, and the Japanese themselves.

On the one hand was Reinsch, articulate spokesman for Chinese interests, often acting far beyond the normal call of duty for a diplomatic representative. In fact, on occasion he acted as confidential advisor to members of the Chinese Foreign Office, and he always did his utmost to counter and retard what he considered as Japanese commercial, political and military encroachment into China.¹

On the other hand was the American State Department, headed during the first years of World War I by the silver-tongued William Jennings Bryan, and then, during the period considered in this paper, by Robert Lansing. Both men were champions of American commercial activity in China through adherence to the principles of equal opportunity and respect

for the open door. Both men had occasion to disavow the over zealous deeds of their Minister Reinsch.²

In between, caught by some embryonic form of American "double diplomacy" was the Japanese government, guilty of encroachment as charged by the United States, but nonetheless, baffled by the contradictions of American diplomacy.

These contradictions did nothing to help the Japanese policy-makers in their drive to have a completed diplomatic position relative to China prior to the end of the First World War. Japan wanted the Shantung Peninsula and wished to secure all advances made at the expense of China and Germany during the war. In short, Japan hoped to insure diplomatically that which she held by force of arms.³

The Japanese had become party to the Declaration of London, and had signed individual pacts with the various Allies to assure her position and desiderata at the conference table. When the United States entered the war and likewise gained a seat at the post-war peace negotiations, she too had to be reckoned with.⁴


⁴Ibid. The Declaration of London of September 5, 1914, was a mutual declaration by England, France and Russia not to consider peace with Germany except by general agreement among the three allied powers.
Japan had received the Bryan Note of March, 1915, during the period of the controversy over the Twenty-one Demands. This note apparently conceded certain interests in China to Japan. Two months later, she had received the May, 1915, caveat which had the effect of negating the March note.

Which note represented the true American policy? Did Reinsch speak for himself or for the State Department? These questions, among others, plagued the Japanese and underlined the need to arrive at a settlement with the United States. A settlement which, it was hoped, could unravel these seemingly endless contradictions.

The United States, on the other hand, had every reason to desire an understanding with Japan. American attention was being diverted from the Pacific area by full participation in the European war. Wilson desired that Chinese territorial integrity be respected as well as her political independence, and the State Department had strong reason

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6 Ibid.

to suspect that Japan had a current interest in a German detente. 8

As early as 1916, Lansing had received information from the American Ambassador in Tokyo, Guthrie, that Japan was interested in a settlement with the United States. Guthrie was able to report what concessions the Japanese government might be willing to make. These points generally revolved around the following items: Japan might promise to drop her complaints about the immigration issue; might surrender her claims to German political and military rights in Shantung; and American commercial interests in China proper would not be resisted. 9

In return, Japan would expect recognition of the existence of her special interests in South Manchuria, and acquiescence in Japanese leadership of East Asia. 10

Such wishful thinking was not limited to the Japanese. Americans also were predisposed to working out some-kind-of-agreement with the Japanese. In Burton F. Beers' book Vain Endeavor, an interesting thesis is found with regard to Lansing's concept of a Far Eastern settlement based strictly on American commercial interests. Beers explains


9 Beers, op. cit., p. 104.

10 Ibid.
that Lansing's ideas went so far as to encompass the transfer of the Philippines to Japan in order to eliminate the basic Far East weakness of the United States.¹¹

With reference to China, Lansing had outlined his interpretation of American policy when, acting for Bryan in 1914, he had informed Reinsch that in China "... America's primary aim was to safeguard all American rights in China, to protect all legitimate American interests there and promote by all proper methods the development of American trade."¹² He was emphatic that China's territorial integrity and its defense should not involve the United States in international difficulties.¹³

Lansing's grand scheme for a Japanese-American settlement based purely on American economic interests ran headlong into what may be called "Wilsonian logic." What Wilson envisaged as the United States' role in China was preservation of China's administrative and territorial integrity through strict adherence to the open door. He hoped to help China develop along "modern, democratic, and Christian lines."¹⁴


¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Beers, op. cit., p. 29 and pp. 16-17.
When an opportunity presented itself for possible high level talks to clarify American policy, the Japanese were quick to act. Such an occasion occurred on May 12, 1917, during talks in Washington between Japanese Ambassador Sato and the American Secretary of State Robert Lansing. During the meeting, the American Secretary mentioned to Ambassador Sato that the sending of a special envoy to the United States would "greatly contribute to the friendly relations between the two nations." 15

Sato received the idea most favorably and set about to convince the Tokyo government of its desirability. In a cable to Minister for Foreign Affairs Motono, Sato reported the conversation and expressed the opinion that since Russia, Italy, Britain and France had sent, or were preparing to send, delegations to the United States, it would seem most appropriate for Japan to do likewise. He reported that Secretary Lansing had suggested that the mission should appear to be Japanese-initiated and not at America's request. 16


16 Japan, Foreign Office Documents, Cable 186, Sato to Motono, May 15, 1917. (Hereinafter referred to as Foreign Office.)
Sato and Lansing also discussed the possibility of sending an American mission to Japan. Lansing indicated that perhaps Mr. Elihu Root, former American Secretary of State, could visit Japan, but nothing substantive came from this meeting. Sato commented to Tokyo that it "appeared" as if the United States wished to resolve existing problems between the two countries.17

In a follow-up cable, Sato pointed out to his government that since the release of the Zimmerman Telegram, "much ill will is found in the United States toward Japan and the Japanese," implying that the visit of a special mission could help relieve tensions between the two nations.18

Sato also reported to Tokyo that Lansing would probably talk on matters relative to the more efficient use of supplies by the Allies, and on Pacific security.19 However, on May 22nd, Sato forwarded a letter from Lansing which stated that at this early stage, he did not want to get bogged down with agenda items. The American secretary recommended that the mission be publicly identified only as congratulatory in nature.20

17Ibid.
18Foreign Office, Unnumbered cable, Sato to Motono, May 22, 1917 (received).
19Ibid.
20Foreign Office, Cable 187, Sato to Motono, May 17, 1917 (received).
Foreign Minister Motono replied in a cable sent to Sato on May 22nd, that he agreed with the idea of sending a special mission. He said the next step was to decide who would head the mission. Sato was instructed to keep the matter secret for the time being.21

On the 25th of May, Motono received another dispatch from Sato forwarding Lansing's comments about a meeting. The American Secretary of State had agreed in the necessity for a special mission, and said that secrecy should be maintained for the present. He suggested haste in sending the mission once its composition was decided.22

On the 30th, Motono instructed Sato to question Lansing as to the acceptability of the Viscount Ishii and a supporting staff for the mission.23 Sato replied on the 31st that he had met with Lansing and the latter said he would be very happy to welcome the Viscount.24

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21 Foreign Office, Cable 159, Motono to Sato, May 22, 1917 (dispatched).
22 Foreign Office, Cable 195, Sato to Motono, May 25, 1917 (received).
CHAPTER II
DIPLOMATIC PREPARATIONS

On June 15, 1917, shortly after Ishii had been confirmed as special envoy, the Japanese Ambassador to the United States called on Secretary of State Lansing to protest an early-June note sent by the American secretary to the Chinese government counseling it to end internal strife before entry into the World War. Sato indicated that his government considered the note to be gross interference in Chinese matters at a time when his government considered China the prime responsibility of Japan. Specifically Sato stated:

... as Japan has a predominate interest in China, politically and economically, Japan will suffer greater damages than any other nation if conditions become serious. However, Japan takes a policy of non-interference toward China and so, does not intend to make any proposal concerning this political crisis ...  

Ambassador Sato then injected the Bryan Note of March 13, 1915, into the conversation, and asked that the note, especially the portion referring to Japan's "special and close relations, political as well as economic ..." be

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1 Kamikawa, op. cit., pp. 335-336.
reaffirmed. He handed the following note to the American Secretary:

The government of the United States well knows that Japan has special and close relations with China, both political and economic. Secretary of State Bryan recognized this fact and stated that the activities of Americans in China were not political in his letter to Ambassador Chinda of March 13, 1915 ... because Japanese public opinion is particularly sensitive to the problem of China. ... rumors of the American conduct has created uneasiness among some Japanese. For the above reason, it will favorably impress the general public of Japan and contribute to the friendly relations between the United States and Japan if the United States government re-affirm in some way the Bryan statement and clearly confirm that the United States will take a friendly policy on China toward Japan. The government of Japan hereby frankly expresses its beliefs and asks the intentions of the government of the United States.3

During the conversations and in the note mentioned above, Sato did not distinguish between all of China and those parts contiguous to Japan when he addressed Lansing, and he referred quite obviously to political interests. Lansing at the time failed to catch the significance. He replied that he thought the note was "in accord with the deep sense of the memo."4 Unwittingly, Lansing had played the "straight-man" for a Japanese maneuver to improve its bargaining position.

4 Foreign Relations-1917, p. 259.
Several days later this was made patently clear to Lansing when the American Charge d'Affairs in Tokyo, Mr. Post Wheeler, forwarded a dispatch containing the Japanese version of the Sato-Lansing conversation. It had been translated as "Japan possessed paramount interests both political and economic in China." Lansing informed Ambassador Sato that his statement of June 15th was meant "to vary in no way the formal declaration of Mr. Bryan." The Japanese diplomatic probe had been recognized and parried.

Although there is no record in the Foreign Office microfilms as to whether this move by Sato was directed by Motono or self-initiated, it does fit into a broad pattern of intense Japanese activity in preparation for the Lansing-Ishii meeting. On June 10, 1917, Vice Admiral Takeshita, who was senior naval member of the special mission, received detailed instructions from Imperial Naval Headquarters; on the 12th Prime Minister Terauchi outlined his government's broad objectives to the Foreign

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7Foreign Office, Letter from Imperial Navy Headquarters to Vice Admiral Takeshita, June 10, 1917.
Office; and on the 19th, Lt. General Sugano, who represented the Imperial Japanese Army, received his complete instructions from Imperial Army Headquarters.

A detailed examination of these three communiques sheds significant light on the attitudes, sincerity and desiderata of the Japanese government.

The June 10, 1917, letter to Vice Admiral Takeshita from Imperial Navy Headquarters informed him that he would have authority to assist Ishii on naval matters; that he would soon have available for review the Foreign Office instructions given to Viscount Ishii, and that specific instructions relating to naval questions were attached. He was enjoined to do background study on unspecified "important problems."

His detailed instructions revealed a Japan that was ready to make concrete and rather astonishing proposals concerning Pacific security. Takeshita was informed that upon request from America, Japan would be willing to patrol the area west of 180 degrees in the Pacific, and that

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8*Foreign Office, Letter from Prime Minister Terauchi to Foreign Minister Motono, June 12, 1917.

9*Foreign Office, Letter, Instructions for Military Member of the Special Mission, Information copy to the Foreign Office from the Imperial Army Headquarters, June 19, 1917.

10*Foreign Office, Letter from Imperial Navy Headquarters to Vice Admiral Takeshita, June 10, 1917.
Japanese naval forces would be made available for patrol duty in the Manila-Guam and Hawaii-San Francisco areas if requested. He was cautioned not to volunteer this information, but rather he was to let America do the requesting. In the event United States naval authorities did request Japanese participation in Pacific security, the following ships were to be made available:

<table>
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<th>Manila-Guam area</th>
<th>San Francisco-Hawaii area</th>
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<tr>
<td>1 battle cruiser</td>
<td>2 or 3 Tokiwa Class cruisers</td>
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<tr>
<td>12 cruisers</td>
<td>cruisers</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 or 2 destroyer squadrons</td>
<td>1 or 2 destroyer squadrons again depending on the need</td>
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If any of these ships were required, Vice Admiral Takeshita was instructed to obtain: United States agreement to use American naval facilities on a "no-red-tape" basis; a refueling/refitting agreement where the United States would provide supplies and Japan would pay; and permission to use American cable/telegraph facilities if needed.12

Concerning the sending of supplies to the Allies, Vice Admiral Takeshita's instructions read like those of a naval lobbyist. He was directed to inform the Americans that the Japanese Navy was immediately capable of producing effective weapons and related military items and that the

11Ibid.
12Ibid.
national arsenals were constructed to function on a permanent basis. Along this same line, he was instructed to endeavor to obtain access to raw materials at that time denied to Japan by the United States.  

Takeshita's instructions returned to the question of naval vessels but in a somewhat larger reference than earlier:

If in the Mediterranean and Pacific Areas the United States requests more Japanese ships, the Imperial Navy will cooperate with the Allied countries to the utmost; however, as the majority of the new type cruisers are already in the Mediterranean and the remaining cruisers are in the Pacific area protecting ships from enemy raiders or in for repairs, it will be rather difficult to offer more ships. The entire matter depends on the course of the war and, of course, Pacific security is related.

Takeshita's instructions concluded by saying that America's true intentions toward Japan would be judged through these meetings.

Two days later, on June 12, 1917, Prime Minister Terauchi sent very general instructions to Foreign Minister Motono concerning the coming special mission. He reviewed the fact that a special mission was going to be sent to the

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13Ibid.  
14Ibid.  
15Foreign Office, Letter from Prime Minister Terauchi to Foreign Minister Motono, June 12, 1917.  
16Ibid.
United States to demonstrate Japan's sincerity in America's entry into the war, and to discuss other important matters. Terauchi said that it seemed as if the United States wished to conclude an agreement on supplying goods to the Allies, Pacific security and other things associated with the war. The Prime Minister pointed out that the talks should be used as a means to open discussion on anything disturbing Japanese-American friendship; however, he stressed especially two subjects: the position of Japanese in the United States and Imperial Japanese interests in China.¹⁷

Under the second subject, Terauchi emphasized the need to give a clear understanding of Japanese interests to the United States, and the question of harmonizing the future actions of both countries in China. Motono was cautioned to use care in reaching an agreement on these two matters as they were considered extremely critical to future Japanese-American relations. The instructions end with Terauchi directing Motono and Ishii to get together to discuss the matter.¹⁸

One week after Terauchi informed the Gaimusho (foreign office) of Japan's broad objectives, Lieutenant General Sugano

¹⁷Ibid.
¹⁸Ibid.
received his instructions from Imperial Army Headquarters.19

The Foreign Office received a copy of the Army's instructions through its Bureau of Military Affairs.

These instructions, dated June 19, are quite revealing. They begin by informing the general that he has been selected to be a member of the special mission, and that he is to assist the mission as necessary; he is instructed to keep the following points in mind:

a. To maintain Allied strategic capability and also improve it, you must know how many weapons and military supplies are available to the United States and Japan. Each party must understand how it can best help in this area.
b. If United States Pacific Fleet has to move to the Atlantic due to United States involvement in the war, Japan will take the responsibility for Pacific security if the United States so desires. If the United States desires to give the Philippines its independence or give it or Guam to another power in the future, Japan should be consulted first.
c. As a matter of policy, the Japanese Army will not go to Europe.20

The next item (d.) is without a doubt an effort to collect information on the mobilization capability of the United States. General Sugano is asked to obtain information on the following items: the American Army plan for deployment to Europe; and facts on the wartime expansion

19 Although the addressee is not readily apparent on the paper, I am assuming that the correspondence was addressed to Lt. General Sugano. Foreign Office, Letter, Instructions for Military Member of the Special Mission, Information copy to Foreign Office, June 19, 1917.

20 Ibid.
of the United States Army. It was added parenthetically, but nonetheless emphatically, that the Imperial Japanese Army did not like to have the American military functioning in Siberia.

The information requested in these "research items" is most interesting. It will be recalled that it was a little-held secret that the sympathies of a great number of Imperial Army personnel were with the Central Powers. It is conceivable that information gathered on United States mobilization and deployment schedules would be used to "cover all bets."

The point parenthetically made is also thought-provoking. Was Japanese Army opposition to American forces moving across Siberia due to Siberia's proximity to Manchuria and the Japanese presence there, or was the Imperial Army anticipating a Russian collapse and did not want American forces readily available to fill a possible power vacuum? These instructions to General Sugano were almost coincidental with the dispatch of 50,000 Japanese troops to Manchuria.21

The subparagraph dealing with the China situation was so dynamic and pertinent to later discussions that it is quoted here as translated:

21Boers, op. cit., p. 112.
Japan respects all countries' business and industrial opportunity in China. At the same time, Japan has a special position geographically and historically. Make clear Japan's special political position in China, and the fact that Japan will not allow any American activity in China besides economic.22 (Italics mine.)

This highly militant section makes it clearer why the Japanese reacted so emphatically to Lansing's June 4, 1917 letter relative to China entering the war and to the various obtrusive moves by Reinsch. Evidently Japan was under the impression that she had obtained recognition of political suzerainty over China through the Bryan note, and was endeavoring to have it confirmed.

Concluding these instructions in subparagraph f was the issue of the position of Japanese immigrants in the United States.

Lieutenant General Sugano was ordered to make his preparations complete for the mission, and he was further informed that instructions would be sent to him if any problems developed.23

An interesting insight may be gained into the Japanese government by reviewing these three sets of instructions. On the one hand one observes that the Navy which was

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23Ibid.
British-trained and generally pro-ally stressed "utmost cooperation" in its instructions. The Army, on the other hand, with Prussian traditions and considered pro-Central Power, asked its representative to obtain information on present military strengths, logistical backup, mobilization and expansion data, deployment schedules and went so far as to tell its representative to make it clear that the presence of American officials in China would be tolerated only as long as their efforts were directed towards economic matters. In the middle, and attempting to synthesize the two, was the Terauchi government. It stressed the need to give a "clear understanding" to the United States of Japanese interests in China while not providing America with a _causa belli._

While preparations continued for instructing the various key individuals in the intentions of the several departments, the Gaimusho took steps to confirm the composition of the special mission. On the 13th of June, Motono sent Ambassador Sato in Washington a proposed list of attendees.\(^{24}\) Ishii was listed as mission head with Vice Admiral Takeshita, Lieutenant General Sugano, Mr. Nagai, Commander Ando, Lieutenant Colonel Tanigawa, and Vice Counselor Imai as his supporting diplomatic staff and naval/military advisors.

\(^{24}\) _Foreign Office_, Cable 186, Motono to Sato, June 13, 1917 (dispatched).
Sato was instructed to relay this list of individuals to the American government and obtain its approval. The Wilson administration had already informed Japan on May 31st, of its willingness to accept Ishii, and on June 16th, Mr. Post Wheeler, the Charge d'Affairs in Tokyo, informed the Japanese Foreign Ministry that the United States would be "delighted" to welcome the entire mission to the United States.26

The news of the Japanese special mission was released to the American press, and a very-interested Sato reported to his home government a favorable editorial which had appeared in the *New York World* on June 16.27

On the 5th of July, the American Secretary of War, Newton D. Baker, visited Ambassador Sato to discuss the coming mission and specifically its itinerary.28 Baker proposed that the mission visit numerous cities on its way from San Francisco to Washington, D.C., in order to stimulate good relations between the United States and Japan, but particularly to let Americans see the visitors


27*Foreign Office*, Cable 228, Sato to Motono, June 19, 1917 (received).

28*Foreign Office*, Cable 243, Sato to Motono, July 5, 1917 (received).
from the remote Orient. He especially pointed out Denver, Kansas City and Saint Louis as the kind of cities he hoped Ishii would visit. On the return trip from Washington, he suggested that the mission visit cities on the East coast and then take the southern route through Texas to Los Angeles.  

To Sato, it was obvious that the United States was going to use the mission to stimulate the personal involvement of its nationals in the war. This was true with regard to the people of the Southwest States who, according to the Secretary of War, were very cold or ignorant of the war. In the true fashion of any bureaucrat, Sato was reeled by such a schedule for the Viscount, and he replied to Secretary Baker that he did not like the idea of Ishii meeting so many people and visiting so many cities prior to his formal introduction to the President and other high government officials. He pointed out that the missions of Britain, France and other countries had visited only twelve cities, nothing so arduous as that being proposed for Ishii. He, of course, did not say "yes" or "no," but agreed to forward the problem on to his government.  

Secretary Baker stressed the thought that the Ishii Mission would be extraordinary, implying greater

29Ibid.
30Ibid.
expectations from the Japanese than from either the British or French. Finally, he stated that he believed the President would not be opposed to his proposal.³¹

A reply to Sato's report of the Baker visit was dispatched two days later from Tokyo. The entire matter of Ishii's itinerary was taken care of in a very efficient, but typically Japanese manner. "Ishii is not good at making speeches... so to give so many would be difficult for him."³² For the moment, the issue rested.

On the 24th of July, five days before Ishii and his entourage left for Honolulu, the Cabinet, meeting in Council Session, decided to give further private instructions for the Viscount.³³ These instructions were forwarded in two pieces of correspondence. The first, drawn up in rather general terms consisted of the decisions of the Cabinet Council and was so designated. The second, an attachment to the first, was a more lengthy and detailed review of Japanese policy and objectives for the mission. It was entitled simply, "Instructions for Viscount Ishii."³⁴

³¹Ibid.
³²Foreign Office, Cable 219, Motono to Sato, July 7, 1917 (dispatched).
³⁴Ibid.
As both documents are germane to an evaluation of the success or failure of the mission, the present writer will review their contents at length. In the communique entitled "Decisions of the Cabinet Council on the Ishii Mission," the envoy is enjoined on four points:

1. First, he is directed to meet President Wilson and deliver the congratulations of Japan upon the United States entry into the war as an Ally.

2. Second, he is advised that it appears that the United States desires to make a pact on Pacific security and related matters. Ishii is told that the Japanese government will cooperate to the fullest extent; however, discussions relating to this question are to be initiated by the United States.

3. Third, the Cabinet memorandum asks that Ishii make Japan's thoughts and desires on China clearly known to the United States. In this vein, he is instructed to follow the more detailed directive which is attached.

4. Fourth, the general instructions conclude with a brief review of Japanese policy toward the German Pacific Islands occupied by Japanese forces. As the Japanese government is determined to obtain these islands at the conclusion of the war, Ishii is told to indicate, at an appropriate moment, his government's concern that German ownership of these Pacific islands after the war
would be a source of trouble in the future. As Britain, France and Russia had already informally agreed to transfer the islands to Japan, Ishii was instructed to most discreetly broach the subject with appropriate authorities. It was felt that asking for American consent to the proposition would be appropriate, but Ishii was warned to hint only at this time.35

The attached paper, referred to above in Item 3, is entitled "Instructions for Viscount Ishii." This memorandum is quoted practically in its entirety as translated:

The government of Japan thinks it most essential to establish a lasting and solid international friendship between Japan and the United States, and wishes to eradicate all the conditions that are feared might cause troubles in international relations in the future. The American policies at which the Japanese are chagrined are the American political and economic activities in China and the unfair and prejudicial treatment of Japanese in the United States.

1. The Problem of American Activities in China. American interests in China are mainly economic, none of which is of vital importance to the destiny of the United States. In the case of Japan in China; however, Japan far surpasses the United States in capital investment. Economically, and politically, the Japanese interests in China are unparalleled, and of special and vital importance to the destiny of Japan. Naturally, if any nation tries to establish political influence in China in disregard of the Japanese position and impairing Japanese interests, Japan will have to take measures to defend her interests. For the above reasons, the Japanese are particularly sensitive about international problems concerning China. The government of Japan believes that the United

35Ibid.
States government recognizes these circumstances. It is a matter of fact that Japan's policy of maintaining the independence and territorial integrity of China has not changed. Japan is willing to reaffirm this policy if the United States thinks it necessary.

Regarding the economic activities of the United States in China, Japan has no intention to obstruct them if they do not encroach on Japanese special interests. A fair and just competition guarantees the people of the world free and equal opportunities. Under the present conditions in China; however, the cooperation of capitalists of Japan and the United States will be to the benefit of both nations and contribute to the development of the natural resources of China. Accordingly, Japan thinks it the best policy for the governments of the United States and Japan to encourage and pave the way for the cooperation of the capitalists of both nations. If other nations make direct contracts with the Chinese government for such enterprises as railways or mining in South Manchuria and the eastern part of Inner Mongolia, spheres of Japanese influence, Japan cannot overlook it, but the Japanese government will have no objections to the investment by Americans in these areas under contract with the Japanese.

2. Regarding the Unfair and Prejudicial Treatment of Japanese in the United States:

Here, the instructions review the general situation and the relative power of the American Federal government to take action in opposition to state laws. The issues upon which agreement must be reached to prevent the situation from becoming grave in the future are then listed:

a. The governments of the United States and Japan mutually give most-favored-nation treatment in acquisition, enjoyment, exercise, and inheritance

36Ibid.
of real property to the peoples of both nations.

b. Industry, trade and other vocations taken up by the peoples shall be based on most-favored-nation treatment.

c. Corporations and partnerships, whose employees and stockholders are wholly or partly composed either of Americans or Japanese, shall be given the same treatment in the acquisition, exercise, and enjoyment of their real property as other corporations and partnerships whose employees and stockholders are wholly or partly composed of the people of most-favored-nations.

d. This agreement shall have no effect on the existing laws.

e. The Japanese demand for the repeal of the Land Law of California shall be reserved.37

A brief recapitulation shows the intent of the authors of these instructions to Viscount Ishii. Japan wished to establish "lasting friendship" with the United States provided the United States practiced complete abstinence from political activity in China, and limited her independent economic activity to areas not encroaching on Japanese special interests. It was clear that the special interests of Japan included the Shantung area, Manchuria, and Inner Eastern Mongolia. In these areas the United States was asked to submit to what amounted to Japanese management of American investments. Friendship between the two nations was also contingent upon American removal of prejudicial treatment toward Japanese living in the United States, and upon legally granting them the same

37Ibid.
business and real estate privileges as were then granted to the most-favored-nation.

These instructions, coupled with the more general directives, leave little doubt that Japan was preparing to use the diversion caused by America's entry into the European War to remove the United States as an effective force from China.

To present these desiderata the Japanese government selected one of their most able and experienced diplomats. Kikujiro Ishii was fifty-one years old. He had graduated from the Law School of the Imperial University of Tokyo in 1890, and had been engaged in diplomatic activity almost continually since then. He had held various posts with the Japanese Legations in Paris, Nimsen, and Peking; and had been First Secretary of the Foreign Office, Chief of the Telegraph Section and Director of the Commerce Bureau. In 1907 during the serious outbreak of anti-Japanese trouble along the West Coast of Canada, and the United States, he was sent to San Francisco and Vancouver to help settle the difficulty. He was made Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1908, and during the same year started a tour as Ambassador to Paris. During 1915-1916 he had acted as Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Okuma
government. Ichii had been named a Baron in 1912, and was made a Viscount in 1916.

The Terauchi government had selected one of Japan's most qualified diplomats to carry out the special mission, and had vested him with plenipotentiary and extraordinary power.

On the 26th, three days prior to the mission's departure, Motono sent Terauchi a letter for his approval to be sent from the Emperor to President Wilson. The letter, addressed to Yoshihito's "Dear Friend," was a letter of introduction and accreditation for the Viscount. It is quoted here in full as a remarkable example of a bygone age.

Great and Good Friend:

Animated by the most lively feelings of satisfaction at the entry of the United States into the arena of war on the side of Justice, I extend to you, and to the Nation over whose destinies, under Providence, You preside, My sincerest wishes for the speedy victory of Our common cause.

Engaged Myself in the vindication of that cause, and in the battle against the inhuman submarine warfare waged upon the innocent, I have directed the

\[38\] During this period he established a diplomatic dialogue with representatives of the Central Powers in Peiping and Stockholm.


\[40\] Foreign Office, Letter from Motono to Terauchi with
Viscount Ishii, My late Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, to proceed to Washington as My Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at the head of a Special Mission charged to convey you My sentiments of congratulation upon the momentous and chivalrous decision taken by the United States, as well as My earnest wishes for the advancement of those relations of true friendship between our two Nations which are always very near my heart.

The knowledge which I have of the Viscount Ishii's fidelity, his zeal for My service, and his eminent talents, as well as of the other high personal qualities which in an especial degree distinguish him, convinces Me that he will accomplish to My entire satisfaction, the honourable and special mission which is entrusted to him, and that he will neglect nothing in order to merit Your confidence and esteem.

I therefore request that You will give full credence to whatever he shall communicate to You in My name, more especially, when he shall express to You My constant wishes for Your happiness and for the prosperity of Your country, and shall assure You of the profound esteem and invariable attachment with which I am,

Great and Good Friend

Your sincere friend,
Sign Manual:

Imperial Palace, Tokio,
the twenty-sixth day of the seventh month
of the sixth year of Taisho. 41

With this, all preparations for the mission were completed. At 12:32 P.M. on Sunday the 29th of July, the Ishii Mission departed Tokyo Station for Yokohama and the TKK steamer Korea Maru. The mission was seen off by a host of notables including Admiral Count Togo, Count Terauchi, Baron Goto, Admiral Kato, General Oshima,

41Ibid.
Viscount Motono and the American Charge d'Affairs Mr. Post Wheeler. At 3:00 P.M., amid streams of multicolored tape, the mission steamed on its way for Honolulu.\textsuperscript{42}

\textsuperscript{42}The Japan Times, July 29, 1917.
On August 6, 1917, at 11:00 A.M., Ishii and his party arrived in Honolulu, and received, in the words of The Japan Times, a "genuine ovation." The territory of Hawaii reportedly received official United States instructions to accord the Ishii Mission the "treatment due to a state guest." Evidently, Governor Bingham and the residents far exceeded the requirements of these instructions. Ishii's speeches and his activities while in Hawaii were given wide coverage and extremely favorable comment in the Pacific Commercial Advertiser and the Honolulu Star-Bulletin.

Consul Moroi of Honolulu was so pleased at the reception given Ishii that he forwarded a seven-page report to Foreign Minister Motono in which he especially stressed the value of the trip to the Japanese residents of Hawaii. While in Honolulu the Viscount and party

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1 The Japan Times, August 8, 1917.
2 Ibid., August 1, 1917.
3 Foreign Office, Letter, Consul Moroi (Honolulu) to Motono, August 10, 1917 (received September 3, 1917).
4 Foreign Office, Itinerary of Viscount Ishii, undated.
32

stayed at the Young Hotel; they were given the thrill of visiting the historic Nuuanu Pali before the hasty continuation of the trip on August 7th.

On August 13, 1917, the Korea Maru arrived off San Francisco. Traveling in a United States Navy launch, an official welcoming party went out to meet the mission. This party consisted of Mr. Breckingridge-Long, Assistant Secretary of State; Mr. Calvin McNap, leader of the Democratic party in California and Chairman of the San Francisco Reception Committee; former Consul to Seoul, Mr. Miller; United States Navy Captain March; United States Army Colonel Iron; and other local military officials plus British Consul Ross and Japanese Consul Uehara.

Upon the mission's arrival, they were taken to a "monster reception" at City Hall where the reaction of the people was spontaneous and sincere. The party was housed at the Saint Francis Hotel.

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5 The Young Hotel is still in operation in Honolulu, but the habitat of less distinguished visitors.

6 Foreign Office, Itinerary of Viscount Ishii, undated.

7 Foreign Office, Letter, Uehara to Motono, August 17, 1917.

8 The Japan Times, August 15, 1917.

On the evening of the 14th, Ishii gave a speech to a gathering of 600 local citizens at the Grand Hotel, the first of numerous speeches he made throughout his stay in the United States. A quotation from a speech given at a banquet staged by the citizens of San Francisco on the evening of the 15th is typical of the type of speech made by Ishii, as he crossed the United States. But he did vary this theme later when he introduced the Monroe-Doctrine-in-Asia idea.

My mission is a mission of peace and good will. I have come here at this very important time in order to confer on some important problems of common interest to Japan and America. It may be said that I have come as an ally, in that I have brought to your shores the guarantee that the Japanese people will closely co-operate with your country in this great war. Your country is on the side of justice and right, and the welcome extended to the Japanese special mission indicates that Japan and America are friends with each other in peace and trade, and also means that their interests and their civilization are common and equal. Your country has shown to the world that America prefers humanity to love, to happiness, to wishes, even to the extent of the sacrifice of lives.10

One interesting aspect of the official reporting by both Japanese counselor officials of Honolulu and San Francisco was their obvious amazement at the intensity, spontaneity, and general nature of the welcome given Ishii. Moroi in Honolulu was extremely impressed as

10 The Japan Times, August 18, 1917.
was Uehara in San Francisco. Uehara pointed out that the numerous guest lists were well planned (a compliment to Mr. McNap), and all segments of the society including workingmen's representatives were present at the official functions. Uehara summed up his impressions by reporting to Motono that the welcome would surely help kindle better American-Japanese relations.11

After four days of magnificent receptions by the city of San Francisco, the Ishii Mission left by special train for Yosemite.12 The group departed Stockton, California, at dawn on the 18th of August for Washington, D.C., which they reached on the 22nd.

After their arrival in Washington, the members of the mission embarked on a demanding schedule of official functions including formal presentation of the Viscount's credentials on August 23rd to President Wilson, dinners, speeches, wreath-laying, and tours.13

In Ishii's own account of the trip and negotiations, Diplomatic Commentaries, he wrote at length about his first conversation with President Wilson. Ishii said that the

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11Foreign Office, Counsel Uehara to Motono, August 17, 1917 (received September 11, 1917).


13Ibid.
President introduced the subject of China, and indicated that American desires for that area encompassed only the "faithful observance ... of the open door and equal opportunity principles."\(^{14}\) Wilson further stated, according to Ishii, that the introduction of spheres of influence by various powers was disturbing him, and that these spheres were interfering with the complete attainment of the mentioned principles.\(^{15}\)

Ishii, relieved apparently that Wilson had brought up the subject of China first, quickly pointed out that the spheres had been introduced by Germany and Russia, and that Japan "... has never failed to uphold in its sphere the principles of the open door and equal opportunity."\(^{16}\)

With that exchange the meeting was concluded except for an invitation to Ishii on the part of Wilson to carry on these conversations with the Secretary of State.\(^{17}\)

Ishii, so he states, returned to his hotel and sent a cable to Tokyo recommending that the Terauchi government agree to the abolition of spheres of influence for the


\(^{15}\)Ishii, *op. cit.*, p. 112.

\(^{16}\)Ibid., p. 113.

\(^{17}\)Ibid.
obvious reasons that Japan could make greater progress commercially in China than any of her European or American competitors primarily due to the factors of inexpensive labor and location. Thus, Japan stood to gain rather than lose if the spheres were renounced. 18

Ishii did not hear from the Japanese government on his proposal as the question had been turned over to the Foreign Affairs Investigation Council and received a generally hostile reception. He eventually tired of waiting and prepared to open discussions with Lansing on his own initiative. 19

Before beginning a description of the negotiations between Lansing and Ishii, we must pause for a moment to consider one further issue that was of great interest to Ishii and the Japanese generally, that of the steel/iron embargo. No reference to this problem was made in Ishii's personal instructions; however, the naval representative, Vice Admiral Takeshita, had received general instructions to look into the problem. It must be introduced here as much of Ishii's preliminary talks were related to the embargo. 20

18 Ibid., pp. 113-115.
19 Ibid., p. 115.
20 The matter of the iron/steel embargo hit the Japanese with great impact. During the month of August, the Japan Times devoted an unusually high degree of coverage to the
Arrangements had been made for the United States to complete shipment of half of the 400,000 tons of steel on order when the embargo took effect. It was up to Ishii to obtain release of the remaining 200,000 tons and make arrangements for the future. In regard to this matter, Ishii dispatched two messages from Washington prior to his first business meeting with Lansing.

In a cable received by the Gaimusho on August 27, Ishii reviewed the attitudes of the American public toward the special mission. He evidently believed that the general consensus was that the mission had been sent to satisfy the "selfish interests of Japan." He thought

problem, some of which tended on emotionalism. Generally, the issue revolved around the fact that Japanese consumption of imported iron was projected at 600,000 tons for 1917. (From the Japanese language newspaper Yorodzu--translation of the article appeared in the Japan Times on August 26, 1917.) It was reported that Japan's capability to produce iron without drawing on American resources would be a meager 30,000 tons. Against this, the desire to use 1/80th of America's reported annual production of 40,000,000 tons appeared to the Japanese as no serious drain. The American objectives of the ban were reported to be: 1. Stop fluctuations in the steel market; 2. Stop Japanese shipments beneficial to the enemy; 3. Encourage Japanese shipping available in the Atlantic to aid the Allies; 4. Fear of Japan winning a firm position in the marine world if further exports are allowed; 5. A United States attempt to check the prosperity of Japan. (Primarily from the Japan Times, August 26, 1917.)

21The Japan Times, August 23, 1917.

22Foreign Office, Cable 315, Sato to Motono, August 27, 1917.

23Ibid.
that, with such mistrust, it would be better to start negotiations on a problem mutually profitable for all sides. Such a problem was the steel embargo question. Once negotiations had started he would wait for an appropriate time to introduce the question of China and the position of Japanese immigrants in the United States.  

Having decided that this would be his course of action, he realized the determination of the United States not to export steel plates for shipping except in support of the war effort. In a message to Motono, received in Tokyo on the 30th, Ishii stated that the term "war purposes" or "war effort" was not too clear, and that he would need a more explicit definition by the United States. Ultimately, he insisted, the meaning of war purposes must be left up to Japan. He recommended that the embargoed materials be obtained under a "war purposes" clause and later used as necessary. (A most interesting insight into Mr. Ishii's concept of diplomacy.)

Start of the formal talks between Lansing and Ishii had been postponed due to the Secretary of State's pre-occupation with the preparation of a reply to a Papal

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24Ibid.

25Foreign Office, Cable 322, Sato to Motono, Ishii 8, August 30, 1917 (received).

26Ibid.
peace note. Ishii, however, was quite occupied as he visited Arlington Cemetery to see the tomb of Dr. Stevens, a one time advisor to the Japanese Foreign Office, addressed the Senate on August 30th and the House of Representatives on September 5th and then had some quiet visits with the British Ambassador.

His speeches before both legislative bodies were well received. Before the Senate he stressed the selfless nature of Japan's involvement in the war, and in the House he warned against intrigues aimed at sowing dissension between Japan and America. For a man who "couldn't speak too well" he was certainly leaving his mark and he was generally aiding his cause.

On the 3rd, the British Ambassador visited Ishii as he returned from his summer vacation. He indicated that

27 The Japan Times, September 4, 1917.
28 Ibid., September 2, 1917.
29 Ibid., September 5, 1917.
30 Ibid., September 9, 1917.
31 Foreign Office, Cable 328, Sato to Motono, Ishii 9, September 6, 1917 (received).
32 Foreign Office, Ishii's Speech Before the Senate, Film 478.
33 Foreign Office, Ishii's Speech Before the House of Representatives, Film 484.
34 Foreign Office, Cable 328, Sato to Motono, September 6, 1917, Ishii 9 (received).
Britain was prepared to talk with the Americans on Japanese desires relating to the Pacific Islands and China as the British wished to do everything necessary to prevent a Japanese-American rift. Ambassador Spring-Rice said that the Japanese position with respect to these matters was correct. He was of the opinion that the United States had no vital interests at stake on these subjects, especially those relating to China.35

The British Ambassador cautioned Ishii that he may run into trouble with Lansing over the China question as the American Secretary was related to John Foster, a man greatly interested in China. Spring-Rice advised the special envoy to be persistent in these areas since non-recognition by the United States of Japanese interests may only be Lansing's personal bias.36

Ishii inquired if the American government was aware of the Teinsien and Stockholm peace talks between Japan and the Central Powers. Spring-Rice assured him that they were and that he had received all the accounts of this matter from the United States government and none from London.37

On the 5th, the day prior to the first formal talks between Lansing and Ishii, the special ambassador once

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35Ibid.
36Ibid.
37Ibid.
again met with the British Ambassador. At this meeting the two discussed China and the possibility of pushing for American recognition of a Japanese Monroe Doctrine over China. The British envoy did not believe that the American government could go that far. Official cognizance of the Japanese position in China may be gained, but he did not think it possible that the Wilson Administration would publicly admit a Japanese Monroe Doctrine for China. The British Ambassador did state that his government was trying to explain the Japanese position to the Americans.

Armed with this confidential advice, the Japanese special envoy met the next day in Foggy Bottom with Robert Lansing. During the first part of the two-hour session questions of Japanese participation in the war and possible ways of more complete cooperation with the Allies and the United States were discussed. Lansing suggested that Japan could possibly supply more ships for commercial purposes. As Ishii had intended to discuss the iron and steel embargo problem initially and move on to the China question, Lansing's first comments fitted conveniently into the Viscount's preconference plans.

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38 Foreign Office, Cable 332, Sato to Motono, September 8, 1917, Ishii 10 (received).
39 Ibid.
40 Lansing, op. cit., p. 290.
Ishii related the entire question of shipping to the United States embargo by saying that Japan's ship building program was restricted because of the embargo. Lansing in his account of the meeting records that the subject was reviewed in detail by the two. An understanding was reached that some-kind-of system would be appropriate which would incorporate steel shipments to Japan in exchange for the use of Japanese merchant ships by the Allies.\textsuperscript{41}

In a supplementary report submitted by Ishii to the Terauchi government, and received in Tokyo on September 9, 1917, Ishii pointed out that Lansing inquired whether the Japanese government contemplated sending troops to Europe. Ishii stated in the report that he had replied in the negative and that Lansing had responded by indicating agreement or understanding, and finally that the American had said Japanese troops in Europe might seem a bit strange.\textsuperscript{42}

As the day's conversations progressed, Ishii stated that "it would be unfortunate not to consider some of the other questions as we had to look forward to a time when the war would be over."\textsuperscript{43} Ishii then told Lansing of

\textsuperscript{41}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{42}Foreign Office, Cable 336, Sato to Motono, September 9, 1917, Ishii 13 (received).
\textsuperscript{43}Lansing, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 291.
Germany's peace feelers of 1916. He mentioned that the Germans had approached Japan three times in an effort to draw it away from the Allied camp. 44

Lansing, certainly with tongue in cheek replied "... that it was a matter of no concern to this government, in view of the fact that Japan's loyalty to an ally and her reputation for good faith was too well established to be ever suspected." 45

The special envoy also informed the American Secretary of the Japanese talks with the British, 46 and the fact that Sir Edward Grey had apparently approved the Japanese retaining the Pacific Islands north of the Equator. 47 Ishii commented that returning these islands to Germany after the war would be against the interests of humanity. 48

Lansing replied, "Yes, that's right." 49 However, he was noncommittal as to who should get them.

44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Foreign Office, Cable 333, Sato to Motono, September 8, 1917, Ishii 11 (received).
47 Lansing, op. cit., p. 291.
48 Foreign Office, Cable 333, Sato to Motono, September 8, 1917, Ishii 11 (received).
49 Ibid.
The two diplomats turned their attention to a consideration of China; this subject was to occupy most of their conference hours until negotiations ended. In light of the propaganda accusing Japan of inactivity in the European war and great activity at the expense of China, Lansing proposed a joint declaration. Such a manifesto would stress the two governments' respect for the territorial integrity of China as well as the principles of the open door and equal opportunities.

Lansing described Ishii as "taken back" by the suggestion. A term possibly more close to Ishii's true reaction might be exasperated. The Japanese envoy replied that such a declaration already existed, specifically the Root-Takahira Agreement of 1908. A restatement of these ideas was to Ishii's thinking valueless and could be misinterpreted by the Japanese people as a manifestation of America's mistrust of Japan. He stated that "... my government must avoid creating any such misunderstanding among the Japanese people. I cannot persuade myself, therefore, that a joint American-Japanese declaration such as you have suggested is appropriate at this time...." 

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50 Ishii, op. cit., p. 116.  
51 Lansing, op. cit., p. 291.  
52 Ishii, op. cit., pp. 116-117.
He could have added, but did not, that such a declaration did not satisfy his instructions. The Viscount went on to state that a joint declaration must contain "something new and different" to make it significant. He proposed that the old agreement of 1908 be reaffirmed, but that a "statement defining Japan's relationship to China . . . be added to it to allay misinterpretation by the Japanese people." The definition of Japan's relationship to China, Ishii suggested, could be based on a recognition of Japanese interest in China which is quite similar to that of the United States in Central America, as manifested in the Monroe Doctrine.

Ishii pointed out that Japan's special interests in China arose from "the arrangements of Nature" and need not be recognized by the various states; however, these interests had been made a matter of record in the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Alliance, the Franco-Japanese convention and the Russo-Japanese agreements. Ishii explained that "under certain circumstances . . ." such recognition could be beneficial.

At this point, as recounted in the Ishii memoirs, Lansing stated that the discussion had "unexpectedly

53 Ibid., p. 117.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
assumed a very serious aspect" and he (Lansing) asked that the meeting be adjourned to allow time to study the proposal.56

In Ishii's official communique to the Foreign Office, a slightly different account is available. He reports that after a slight hesitation Lansing said that "the American government understands Japan's position in China, but the American people would not."57 He further advised that the United States could only point out Japan's geographical position in a declaration. At this time Lansing suggested that consideration of the matter be postponed till the next meeting which was scheduled for Monday the 10th of September.58

In the Lansing version of the first meeting, we observe a somewhat more dynamic and aggressive Secretary of State. Rather than asking for adjournment of the meeting after presentation of Ishii's proposal, Lansing replied that as Japan's interests were a direct result of her geographical position, the sources of her interests were natural and not political. Lansing insisted that such a declaration would not be germane to a reaffirmation

56Ibid.

57Foreign Office, Cable 333, Sato to Moto, September 8, 1917, Ishii 11 (received).

58Ibid.
of the open door and that it might be misinterpreted as referring to primarily political interests.  

Lansing pressed his rebuttal by pointing out the advantages Japan had by recognizing the open door as opposed to the older system of spheres of influence. Japan, by complete adherence to the open door, would have great commercial advantages in China due to her geographical location and cheap labor. Lansing stressed that a return to the spheres of influence after the war would restrict Japan far more than free commercial competition. He then ended the first session stating that he hoped Ishii would be willing to discuss the proposal further at the next meeting.  

The reasons for the omissions and slight differences in emphasis can be attributed to the fact that both individuals wrote their accounts some years after the negotiations, were writing for native consumption, and in defense of their own positions. Rather than stress these differences in partisan text, I will try to add, where possible, to their accounts to give a somewhat clearer picture of the negotiations than is provided by either of the two principals.

59Lansing, op. cit., p. 292.  
60Ibid.
On September 8th, two days after initial discussions with Lansing, Ishii once again visited the British Ambassador who appeared more and more to be Ishii's primary foreign confidant and advisor. During this meeting the two discussed the attitude which the American government would take concerning the mission. Ambassador Spring-Rice held quite strongly that the United States would take China's side on negotiations. He said the Chinese were quite wary of Japanese ambitions on the mainland, and would be distraught at any Japanese conference success.61

Ishii explained that he would push for the abolition of spheres of influence. He thought it not difficult for Japan to adhere to the open door as in free competition she could develop commercial preeminence in the area.62

To this plan the British Ambassador was none too receptive. He remarked that repudiation of the spheres might be good for Japan, but not necessarily for Britain. He sighted specifically some railroad concessions held by British nationals in the Yangtze River area as reason for probable British nonconcurrence.63

61Foreign Office, Cable 334, Sato to Motono, September 9, 1917, Ishii 12 (received).

62Ibid.

63Foreign Office, Cable 339, Sato to Motono, September 10, 1917, Ishii 14 (received).
The two diplomats once again discussed the problem of Japanese ownership of the German Islands in the Pacific north of the equator. Evidently, Ishii had been quite optimistic on this point, but he began to have reservations as a result of the day's conversations. Spring-Rice explained that there was "still some difficulty" on this matter.64

On the 10th of September Ishii met Lansing for the second time. In the published accounts of the negotiations, the tenth is written off as a day when "nothing new" occurred;65 however, several very interesting items need to be recorded. Lansing, in Ishii's report to Motono, said that he was still "in the thinking stage" on a joint statement concerning China and the open door. Ishii said that as no instructions had been received from Tokyo, he also wished to defer till later conversation on that particular issue. The two went on to a discussion of a request for Chinese troops for the European war, forms of financial assistance to China, and the Bryan-Chinda Agreement.66

64 Foreign Office, Cable 334, Sato to Motono, September 9, Ishii 12 (received).
65 Lansing, op. cit., p. 293.
66 Foreign Office, Cable (unnumbered), Sato to Motono, September 12, 1917, Ishii 16 (received).
Ishii showed some obvious interest in Lansing's remark that the Chinese had been asked to send troops to Europe. He commented that the sending of large numbers of troops would impose a logistics problem and the dispatch of a few would be valuable for morale purposes only. He stated that engineers, light and heavy infantry would be of value.67

The conversation turned to a consideration of various ways to assist China financially. Lansing said that the United States would "gladly" give loans to China.68 He mentioned that China had asked that payment of the Boxer Indemnity be postponed and that the current import tax be increased. The American Secretary of State indicated that the United States intended to recommend that these requests be followed.69

Ishii replied that he would need instructions from Tokyo to comment meaningfully on the loan matter, but he would say that the request for an increase in the Chinese import tax would be favorably considered by the Japanese government even though it would be an imposition on Japanese civil enterprise.70

67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
The most significant point of the September 10th talks was then brought up by Ishii, and it concerned the treatment of Japanese living in America. Ishii stated that he thought the time was appropriate for reconsideration of disclosing the terms of the Bryan-Chinda Agreement. This convention, evidently aimed at preventing or inhibiting anti-Japanese legislation in the various states, had been agreed to by Wilson, but never released to the public. Lansing stated that he was aware of the agreement, but wanted time to research the matter and reply. With that, the second meeting came to an end.71

71 On the matter of the Bryan-Chinda Agreement, I must point out that my research, to date, has failed to yield a text or a concrete subject. I was able to determine that in January, 1913, the 40th Session of the California Legislature had prepared thirty-three separate bills or regulations restrictive to Japanese residents in California. The California State Attorney General, a man by the name of Webb, consolidated these proposals into one bill which became known as the Webb Bill. Ambassador Chinda received instructions from the Japanese Foreign Office to meet with Bryan (then Secretary of State), and to register Japan's concern. This occurred in April, 1913. As a result of the conversations, President Wilson sent a telegram to Governor Johnson of California requesting his assistance. The California governor promptly took a state's rights stand, replying that land laws were state matters and not the responsibility of the federal government. Bryan was sent to California to stop passage of the bill, but did not succeed as with only minor amendments it passed both houses and became law on August 10, 1913. All evidence points to an accord of some kind between Secretary of State Bryan and Ambassador Chinda, but I cannot be any more specific as of this date. Zaidan Hojin Kikoku Hyakunen Kinen Bunza Jin Yo Kai, Nichibe Bunka Koshoshi (Tokyo, Japan: Yoyosha, 1964/65), pp. 145-146.
A heartening indication of the success of the mission was seen in an article of the Washington Post. On September 10th, the paper editorially took the position that Japan should be exempted from the steel embargo. The matter was highlighted in the Tokyo press as it was reported that the Post had been until recently anti-Japanese.72

Tokyo's keen interest in the question of the steel embargo was reiterated to the special envoy in a message dispatched on September 12th from Motono. The Japanese Foreign Minister stated that "... Japan has a vital interest in its outcome," and prompted Ishii to keep Tokyo informed by forwarding results of the conversations as they occurred.73

The urgency of this matter to the Japanese is further indicated in a recapitulation of Ishii's activities prepared by the Japanese Embassy and forwarded to Tokyo on September 15th. In this summary it was reported that American officials were hinting that the United States was contemplating cutting all needless expenditures to save economic resources and shipping for the war effort.

72 The Japan Times, September 14, 1917.
73 Foreign Office, Cable 302, Motono to Sato, September 12, 1917, To Ishii 3 (sent).
The Japanese diplomats were quick to pick up the implication that imports of raw silk and silk products might be stopped. To avert this economic calamity, Sato recommended that Japan "decide to let the United States use presently owned Japanese ships" to prosecute the war.  

On the 12th, Ishii had visited the Shipping Department, and had been briefed on United States steel plate production. He was informed that the recently expanded United States production capability would be 2.6 million tons per annum. Ishii reported to Tokyo that this figure conflicted with the one of 3.5 million tons obtained by a Japanese shipping agent in New York. Ishii asked the President of United States Steel Corporation, Elbert H. Gary, to explain the discrepancy. Gary identified the 3.5 million figure as only "a dream without any fact."  

It was about this time that the Japanese realized that although Lansing had talked freely on the embargo problem, he did not have authority to make a decision on the matter. The Japanese Embassy, through Ambassador Sato, called upon the Export Committee and Shipping Department.

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74 Foreign Office, Sato to Motono, Recapitulation of Viscount Ishii's Activities, Compiled September 15, 1917.
75 Foreign Office, Cable 366, Sato to Motono, September 23, 1917, Ishii 21 (received).
76 Ibid.
which evidently did have responsibility for determining embargoed items.\textsuperscript{77}

Sato's preliminary talks yielded wishful thinking in the vein that if the United States shipbuilding program were cut back, the savings in steel plate could be sent to Japan.\textsuperscript{78} In a report of this meeting Sato reiterated American determination on this issue, and stated that it "will be difficult to establish private contacts" with them. The Ambassador emphasized the need to share presently-owned vessels in the face of the United States desire to cut expenditures as imports of Japanese silk could be at stake. He concluded with a plea to Tokyo to stop sending so many messages and appeals concerning the embargo as "they show our desperation."\textsuperscript{79}

Ishii spent the period from the 15th to the 21st of September giving speeches in Philadelphia, Newport, Boston and Washington. He addressed, among others, the Chamber of Commerce and the American Academy of Political Science in Philadelphia, the Massachusetts Legislature and Boston

\textsuperscript{77}Foreign Office, Cable 343, Sato to Motono, September 15, 1917, Ishii 18 (received).

\textsuperscript{78}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{79}Ibid. At this point we will cease to follow the Embargo Problem as it has become a matter to be dealt with by Ambassador Sato and his staff. It no longer receives Ishii's attention.
City Club in Boston, and the National Press Club in Washington, D.C. 80

While Ishii was occupied with his short speaking tour to East Coast cities, results of talks between the Japanese naval member of the mission, Vice Admiral Takeshita, and the American Chief of Naval Operations were cabled to Tokyo. Takeshita reported that in a meeting on the 8th of September, the Americans had revealed certain planned changes in the disposition of their naval forces. The cruisers Saratoga, Galveston and Cincinnati were to be transferred from the Philippines area to the Atlantic, and five destroyers were already on their way to the Atlantic from the Philippine Station. The United States asked that these force alterations be offset by having two Japanese cruisers in the Philippines area and one in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands. United States patrol craft in the Pacific off the West Coast were considered adequate and augmentation was not requested.81

The Assistant Naval Minister, Tochiuchi, in a reply to Vice Admiral Takeshita stated that the Allies expected the Japanese Navy to do its utmost in the Pacific area.

80 Foreign Office, Itinerary of the Viscount Ishii, Film.

81 Foreign Office, Cable 1583, Assistant Naval Minister Tochiuchi to Deputy Foreign Minister Hidehara, September 17, 1917 (received).
As it was Japanese policy to concentrate on Pacific problems, he asked Takeshita to get a clear picture of American intentions in this regard.\textsuperscript{82}

Tochiuchi replied to the request for augmentation of naval forces quite positively. The cruiser \textit{Tokiwa} was being made available for Hawaii duty and the First Special Destroyer Squadron with the cruisers \textit{Yagumo}, \textit{Yahagi} and \textit{Yodo} was to be placed on Philippine patrol.\textsuperscript{83}

When Takeshita returned to inform the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) of the latest Japanese offer, he was told that America appreciated the Japanese Navy's kind gesture, but that only the \textit{Saratoga} would need replacing. Evidently the British had indicated a strong desire that American naval forces remain in the Manila area. This wish was acceded to by the United States. The CNO expressed the hope that in the North Pacific tight security could be realized through close Japanese-American cooperation. The Americans informed the Japanese naval representative that they wished to talk further on this before his return home. The Japanese offer for ships for Philippine duty was held open.

\hspace*{1cm}\textsuperscript{82} \textit{Foreign Office, Cable Unnumbered, Tochiuchi to Takeshita, undated.}

\hspace*{1cm}\textsuperscript{83} \textit{Ibid.}
Takeshita indicated that it was up to the Americans if they were to be used or not.\footnote{\textit{Foreign Office}, Cable 3, Japanese Naval Attache to Naval Ministry, September 22, 1917; and Undated letter from Acting Secretary of Navy (P. D. Roosevelt) to Lansing, OP-9-B.}

On the 22nd of September at 3:00 in the afternoon, Ishii met Lansing for their third working meeting.\footnote{\textit{Lansing}, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 293-294.} Ishii stated that his government did not want to get involved in any action that might upset the status quo in China.\footnote{\textit{Foreign Office}, Cable 361, Sato to Motono, September 25, 1917, Ishili 22 (received).} The possibility of an agreement on the spheres of influence thus became remote.

Lansing then asked about a declaration on the open door to which Ishii replied that he could make no such statement unless it recognized in some manner Japanese special interests. The American Secretary of State stated that the United States would recognize Japan's economic interests, but that paramount interest and the open door policy were mutually exclusive ideas.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}}

Ishii replied that the Japanese government did not have any particular awareness of the word paramount. He thought that the United States itself had paramount...
interests in Mexico, and that the open door policy did not seem to conflict with paramount interests there.  

"The United States does have special interests, but doesn't demand paramount interests" argued the Secretary.  

"If you don't like paramount interest" Ishii replied, "we can use special interest as an alternative."  

Ishii, according to Cable 361, then defined what he meant by special interest. As this is particularly critical to later developments, his remarks are quoted practically verbatim.

Japan will be satisfied with the recognition of Japanese special interests in China, if not preeminent interests. However, in order to avoid misunderstandings, I should like to explain the meaning of special interests. A civil war or collapse in China may not have any direct effect on other nations, but to Japan, it will be a matter of life and death. A civil war in China will immediately be reflected in Japan, and the downfall of China means the ruin of Japan. On the above ground, Japan cannot rest reassured for her self-defense unless China is well governed in defense and public security. Japan thinks it her duty, therefore, to dispatch military officers to keep peace and order in China within the limits set up by the necessity of maintaining the independence of China.  

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88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid. and Kamikawa, op. cit., p. 345. It certainly seems quite clear that Ishii is not making reference to economic special interests, and that he has defined Japanese interests in China bordering on a "right to intervene" in order to maintain a government friendly to Japan.
Lansing commented that the United States was not against other countries sending advisors to South American countries. "Also in China, if that country needs advisors, not only Japan, Britain or France, but even the United States should take part in this." The Secretary indicated that in China the predominance of one country would stifle equal opportunity.92

Ishii, evidently warming up by this time, replied that the Chinese government did not have enough power to govern, and that Japan's relationship was one of life and death. He then openly said to Lansing:

It seems you think Japan is attempting to assume power in China; if you think this way, you don't comprehend the Japanese position . . . Japan has always respected the expressed statement and the implied spirit of treaties. Certainly it doesn't give you any suspicion . . . .93

Lansing replied that he had always been deeply impressed with Japanese fidelity in international relations. He stated that he understood the intention of the Japanese government and that he would draft a note which would include a statement on Japanese special interests. The Secretary indicated that he would obtain Presidential approval and then pass the note to Ishii.94

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92Ibid.
93Ibid.
94Ibid.
Lansing concluded by stressing the need for solidarity between the United States and Japan. He said, "At this moment, to publish a declaration is important to make Germany realize that there is no room for Germany to alienate Japan from the United States."95

Ishii replied, "If you complete a draft, I'll study it anytime gladly."96

The Lansing account of this meeting, as recorded in his memoirs, again differs slightly from the Japanese. Lansing writes that Ishii suggested the redeclaration of the open door. In this conversation Lansing pointed out that the United States and Japan were the only two powers capable of taking advantage of the European war by acting in China. He stated that Japan and America must "dispel the impression that we would selfishly seek to take advantage of their [the European nations'] wasted condition..."97

Ishii in his reply, according to Lansing, pointed out that the Japanese public would hold the Terauchi government accountable for agreeing to a declaration which did not mention Japan's special interests.98

95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
97 Lansing, op. cit., p. 294.
98 Ibid.
Lansing's answer to this was categorical. If Ishii meant by "special interests," paramount interests then the matter would not be further discussed. However, if the special interests referred to or could imply those interests arising out of geographical position, Lansing would consider a declaration.99 According to Lansing, Ishii then asked him to prepare a draft declaration for consideration.100

The Lansing memoirs state that at this meeting the American Secretary tried to clear up the "misconception of the underlying principle" of the Monroe Doctrine.101 That it was not an "assertion of primacy or of paramount interest by the United States in relation to other American republics; that its purpose was to prevent foreign powers from interfering with the sovereign rights of any nation in this hemisphere."102

Ishii made no mention of this lecture in his official cables regarding the conference.103

In a second cable covering the events of the 22nd of September meeting, Ishii did report that Lansing still

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99Ibid.
100Ibid.
101Ibid., p. 295.
102Ibid.
103Foreign Office, Cable 372, Sato to Motono, September 24, 1917, Ishii 23 (received).
had not had sufficient time to research the Bryan-Chinda Agreement, and that he had no comment on it. He also informed Tokyo that Lansing wanted him to stay in the United States "if at all possible" until a declaration could be decided upon. 104

This meeting on the 22nd seemed to qualify as one during which "... the conversations frequently became excited and lost their coherence" 105 as Ishii later wrote in his memoirs. Out of what must have been a rather lengthy and heated session came the agreement that a draft declaration would be prepared by Lansing. Little else seems to have been accomplished save a rather complete exchange of views on the open door, Japanese special interests in China, and the "true" meaning of the Monroe Doctrine. The lasting significance of the day's exchange on the two principals seems questionable since both, in recording their memories, chose to ignore practically all but their own parochial arguments.

Keen Tokyo interest in the status of the Bryan-Chinda Agreement was reflected in a cable from Motono dispatched on the 25th of September. In it, Motono

104 Ibid.
105 Ishii, op. cit., p. 122.
asserted that realization of this agreement had been desired for many years by the Japanese government. He encouraged Ishii to "work hard for it." 106

106 Foreign Office, Cable 325, Motono to Sato, September 25, 1917, To Ishii 6 (sent).
CHAPTER IV

THE DRAFT

On the morning of the 26th of September, Ishii received a draft declaration from Lansing. It was forwarded to Tokyo by cable and was received there on the 28th.¹

The following is the text of the first draft:

I have the honour to communicate herein my understanding of the agreement reached by us in our recent conversation, touching questions of mutual interest to our Governments relating to the Republic of China.

Charges have repeatedly been made of late, some accusing the United States, and others Japan, of seeking to take advantage of present world conditions to acquire political influence or control in China. The Governments of the United States and Japan, having always recognized China as a sovereign and independent state, and having repeatedly declared that they consider foreign interference in China's domestic political affairs to be violative of Chinese sovereignty, resent such accusation as offensive and as wholly unjustified.

In order to silence such mischievous report, however, it is believed by us that public announcement once more of the desires and intentions shared by our two Governments with regard to China is advisable.

The Governments of the United States and Japan recognize that territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries, and consequently the United States Government recognize

¹Foreign Office, Cable 377, Sato to Motono, September 28, 1917, Ishii 24 (received).
that Japan has a special relation to China, particularly to that part to which her possessions are contiguous, for participation by the citizens or subjects of all nations having treaty relations with China, in the commerce and in the economic and industrial development of that country, and that they will not take advantage of present conditions to seek special rights or privileges in China which would abridge rights of citizens or subjects of other friendly states. Moreover they mutually declare that they are opposed to acquisition by any other Government of any special rights or privileges that would affect independence or territorial integrity of China, or that would deny, to the subjects or citizens of any country, full enjoyment of equality of opportunity in the commerce and industry. Territorial sovereignty of China, nevertheless, remains unimpaired, and the Government of the United States has every confidence in the repeated assurances of the Imperial Japanese Government that in enjoyment of such special rights, they have no desire to discriminate against the trade of other nations or to disregard commercial right heretofore granted by China in treaties with other Powers.

The Governments of the United States and Japan deny that they have any purpose to infringe in any way independence or territorial integrity of China, and they declare furthermore that they earnestly desire faithful observance throughout all China of the principle of the so-called-open door or equality of opportunity of China.

They furthermore agree to bring this declaration to the attention of other interested Governments, and invite those Governments to give their adherence to these declarations.

I shall be glad to have Your Excellency confirm this understanding of the agreement reached by us.

(Signed)²

²Foreign Office, Cable 377, Sato to Motono, September 28, 1917, Ishii 24 (received).
this meeting the two negotiators agreed to make the following changes:

1. In paragraph two, they agreed to delete the words "and having repeatedly declared that they consider foreign interference in China's domestic political affairs to be violative of Chinese sovereignty."

2. In paragraph four Ishii wanted to change, "Japan has a special relation" to "paramount" or "pre-eminent [sic] interest in," but Lansing did not agree. The two finally settled on "special interest in China."

3. Also in paragraph four, they changed the words "particularly to that" to "particularly in."

4. Finally in paragraph four the words between "Japanese government that" and "they have no desire" became "while geographical position gives them special interests."

5. In paragraph five, the two agreed to substitute "always adhere to principle of so-called open door or equal opportunity for commerce and industry in China" where "earnestly desired" began. This particular sentence, used in the Root-Takahira Agreement, was inserted at Ishii's insistence as he felt if he didn't, Tokyo would; Lansing agreed.

Ishii reported that after agreeing on the listed changes, Lansing asked for a two hour recess in order to

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3Foreign Office, Cable 381, Sato to Metono, September 25, 1917, Ishii 25 (received).
obtain President Wilson's approval. After this recess the negotiators met again, and Lansing informed the special ambassador that Wilson had approved the draft.\footnote{Ibid.}

In the cable which forwarded these changes to Tokyo, Viscount Ishii made it pointedly clear what he thought he had achieved from the negotiations thus far. "... this proposal recognizes Japan's Monroe Doctrine toward China."\footnote{Ibid.}

It is doubtful if the Monroe Doctrine has ever been defined strictly in economic terms. Certainly Ishii was not of the opinion that he was bargaining for United States recognition of Japan's economic preeminence in China. This fact, that Ishii was out for more than recognition of economic interests, must have been patently clear to Lansing especially in light of the changes Ishii recommended to the draft. The deletion of the phrase "and having repeatedly declared that they consider foreign interference in China's domestic political affairs to be violative of Chinese sovereignty," and the change from "faithful observance throughout all China of the principle of the so-called open door" to the innocuous statement "always adhere to principle of so-called open door" must have indicated Ishii's intent.
Ishii forwarded several additional dispatches to expand on the September 26th meeting with Lansing. He reported America's willingness to lend up to ten million dollars to China; the fact that the Chinese intended to send troops to Europe; some background information on paragraph six of the draft declaration; and a few remarks on the term "special interests."

With respect to the question of large loans to China, the Japanese envoy inquired about Chinese intentions and capability to repay. Lansing indicated that the Chinese, as a matter of principle, had the right to obtain loans from the United States if they ordered military goods. As to repayment, Lansing said that there was still certain room for negotiations. 6

Concerning Chinese troops in the European theater, Ishii showed considerable surprise at China's determination to send troops to Europe in the face of north-south dissension verging on civil war. He indicated that transportation of the force to Europe would be the major problem and would be quite expensive. Lansing observed that if Japan furnished the ships it would be a real contribution to the war effort. 7

6 Foreign Office, Cable 383, Sato to Motono, September 28, 1917, Ishii 27 (received).

7 Ibid.
The rationale for paragraph six of the draft declaration was also forwarded to Tokyo. Evidently, President Wilson felt strongly about its inclusion. According to Ishii, Wilson was particularly interested in presenting a united front to Germany, and was concerned that a bilateral agreement between Japan and America be coordinated with the Allies. In this cable, Ishii stated that it might be appropriate for Japan's special interests in China to be approved by all the Allied Powers. Lansing reportedly agreed with this idea.

Ishii's comments on the choice of the term "special interest" are quite interesting. The Viscount explained in a brief cable that as Lansing would not agree to "paramount" or "pre-emenent" as the English to express Japan's relationship to China, the words "special interests" were chosen. Ishii thought that these words were vague and required some-kind of explanation. In fact, Ishii held that the term seemed strange in diplomatic language.

In his memoirs, Lansing writes at length on the reason for his choice of "special interests." It seems he found the two words to contain less political overtones

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8 Foreign Office, Cable 384, Sato to Motono, September 28, 1917, Ishii 28 (received).

9 Foreign Office, Cable 385, Sato to Motono, September 28, 1917, Ishii 29 (received).
than "paramount," "pre-eminent" or "special relations," and accordingly sought their inclusion. Lansing states that he made the Japanese special representative "fully understand"\textsuperscript{10} that the term related only to Japan's geographical position and her commercial interests.\textsuperscript{11}

Obviously, Lansing was splitting semantic hairs and was not as fully understood as he thought. Ishii's message makes this quite clear.\textsuperscript{12}

On this same day, the 26th of September, Ishii had a half-hour private talk with the President. Although he does not report to Tokyo on subjects discussed during this conversation, aside from the fact that he told Wilson he was going to New York,\textsuperscript{13} we can gather from Ishii's memoirs that this particular session was none too successful. He mentions that Wilson was suspicious of Japan and imagined it was opposed to the open door and to equality of opportunity in China.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{10} Lansing, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 296.

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{12} Foreign Office, Cable 385, Sato to Motono, September 28, 1917, Ishii 29 (received).

\textsuperscript{13} Foreign Office, Cable 382, Sato to Motono, September 28, 1917, Ishii 26 (received).

\textsuperscript{14} Ishii, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 118.
On the 27th, Ishii left Washington for New York and a series of public appearances and speeches. He sent the Secretary of State a letter informing him of his departure from the capital and thanking him for all the courtesies thus far extended.

During this seven day sojourn in New York, the representative of Japan made at least seven speeches to a variety of audiences ranging from the Japan Society to the New York State Chamber of Commerce. The most notable of the speeches from a controversial point of view was the one given on the 29th of September at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel. The occasion was a dinner given in honor of Mr. Ishii by the mayor of New York, John Purroy Mitchel. Ishii spoke at length on Japan's position vis-a-vis China. This relationship as outlined by Ishii was interpreted in the press, and justifiably so, as the declaration of a Japanese Monroe Doctrine toward China. The Viscount in part said:

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15 Foreign Office, Cable 381, Sato to Motono, September 28, 1917, Ishii 25 (received).
16 Foreign Office, Letter, Ishii to Lansing, September 27, 1917, Film 526.
17 Foreign Office, Itinerary of Viscount Ishii, Film 550 and 553.
18 Ibid., Film 556.
19 The Japan Times, October 6, 1917.
... circumstances for which we were in no sense responsible gave us certain rights on Chinese territory but at no time in the past and at no time in the future do we, or will we, seek to take territory from China or to despoil China of the rights. We wish to be and to always continue to be the sincere friend and helper of our neighbor for we are more interested than anyone else except China in Good Government there, only we must at all times for self protection, prevent other nations from doing what we have no right to do. Not only will we not seek to assail the integrity or the sovereignty of China, but will we eventually be prepared to defend and maintain the same integrity and independence of China against any aggressor. For we know that our own landmarks would be threatened by any outside invasion or interference in China. (Italics mine.)

The speech is valuable as it sheds light on Ishii's own interpretation of Japan's position in Asia. More important, however, the special ambassador probably used the speech as a means to determine the public temperament on the issue. The reaction was sufficiently keen so that two days later at a dinner at the St. Regis Hotel, Ishii qualified and clarified his remarks.

... I find that this utterance of mine is taken as the enunciation of a "Monroe in Asia," I want to make it very clear to you that the application of the term "Monroe Doctrine" to this policy and principle, voluntarily outlined and pledged by me is inaccurate.

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20 Foreign Office, Viscount Ishii's Speech at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel, September 29, 1917, Film 556.
21 Foreign Office, Speech at St. Regis Hotel, Film 578.
22 Ibid.
The Viscount went on to point out that the policy he had outlined bound Japan to observe certain voluntary restrictions such as respect for China's territorial integrity, equality of opportunity and the open-door. Japanese action in China, he pointed out, would thus be far more restricted than similar United States activity in the Americas.23

Ishii stayed in New York until the 3rd of October at which time he departed for Atlantic City and a slight respite from the demanding schedule of the past week. On the 5th of October he returned to Washington and stayed at the Willard Hotel.24

While Ishii was in New York, Vice Admiral Takeshita informed Tokyo that it had been decided, after consultation with both Lansing and Ishii, to release a statement on naval cooperation between Japan and the United States at the same time that a diplomatic note was publicized. In the Pacific it was noted that agreement had been reached between American naval officials and the Japanese naval representatives who accompanied Ishii. One phase of the Ishii Mission apparently was concluding successfully.25

23Foreign Office, Viscount Ishii's Itinerary, Film 553.
24Ibid.
25Foreign Office, Cable 1670 (Secretariate), Assistant Naval Minister Tocchiuchi to Assistant Foreign Minister Hidehara, September 29, 1917.
The strain of the mission was beginning to be felt by the Viscount because on October 3rd, he recommended that the visit be concluded. He reported that the American people had formed a good impression, and he feared that a further stay would only increase the risk of ruining achievements to date.26

On October 7th, Ishii received Tokyo's comments on the draft declaration. The Gaimusho felt that the draft was generally acceptable, but recommended several significant changes. Paragraph two which dealt with accusations against United States and Japanese opportunism in China was deleted from the Japanese counterdraft in its entirety. Motono stated that its inclusion would only result in criticism and misunderstanding and implied that detailed coverage in such a declaration would tend to give validity to the accusations. As it "dealt merely with fabrications,"27 he recommended the paragraph be deleted and paragraph three changed to meet the requirements of the new text. In this relation, Motono thought that paragraph three should be changed to read, "In order to silence mischievous reports

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26 Foreign Office, Cable 182, New York Counselor Yada to Foreign Minister, October 3, 1917, To Ishii 9 (sent).
27 Foreign Office, Cable 347, Motono to Sato, October 6, 1917, To Ishii 9 (sent).
that have from time to time been circulated it is believed..." 28

The words "special interests" that gave Ishii such a time seem to have equally baffled the men at the Foreign Office. The cable from the Gaimusho stated: "This term is flexible as well as boundless." In studying this term, Motono and his staff found it used in a British cable dated the 12th of January, but slightly expanded. The words "and influence" had been added. Accordingly, Tokyo recommended that "special interests and influence" would be more clearly understood without hurting the original meaning. It was requested that this item be brought to Lansing's attention. 29

Ishii was told to delete the phrase, also in paragraph four, "The territorial sovereignty nevertheless remains unimpaired." This statement was held to be misleading and casting an impression that Japan intended to infringe upon China's territorial sovereignty. The Foreign Office considered that respect for China's territorial integrity and independence would be covered adequately in draft paragraph five. 30

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28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
Two portions of paragraph four were cited as being indicative to a third party of "some-kind-of argument between the United States and Japan," and did not seem in keeping with the current good relations between Japan and the United States. Motono requested that the following phrases in the fourth paragraph be deleted:

... and that they will not take advantage of present conditions to seek special rights or privileges in China which would abridge rights of citizens or subjects of other friendly states...

... they have no desire to discriminate against the trade of other nations or to disregard commercial right heretofore granted by China in treaties with other Powers.

Not only did Motono ask that these passages be deleted, he reiterated his feelings by saying that they should "definitely be deleted."

In regard to paragraph six, Motono instructed Ishii that "at least" the phrase "and invite those Governments to give their adherence to these declarations" should be deleted. He indicated that he was not completely happy with the first part of the paragraph as it might put some of the powers in a difficult position; however, he would not object to its inclusion.

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31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
In reviewing the draft declaration, Motono stated that as compensation for making a statement on respect for Chinese territorial sovereignty, the open-door, equal opportunity, et cetera, the United States should in turn admit Japanese special interests in China. The Japanese position as reflected in the latest changes, in Motono’s opinion, could not be compromised further. "This is the limit, so think of it that way" was the Foreign Minister’s advice to Ishii.35

Motono concluded his cable to Ishii by reminding him of Japan’s existing agreements with Britain and Russia concerning Chinese policy. He pointed out that it would be proper to notify them privately before consummation of the United States-Japanese notes. Ishii was asked to pass this point along to Lansing.36

The Japanese special envoy met Lansing to discuss this latest dispatch on the 8th of October. In his report of the meeting Ishii said that the item concerning expansion of "special interests" to "special interests and influence" and the request for deletion of the phrase "territorial sovereignty nevertheless remains unimpaired" had been submitted to Lansing. They were taken under

35Ibid.
36Ibid.
advisement by Lansing as he wanted to have one day to think the matter over. 37

Ishii indicated that the "they will not take advantage" clause of paragraph four caused him considerable anguish. He reported that he repeatedly explained the Japanese position to Lansing on this item and that finally the American Secretary agreed to think it over. It was Ishii's candid opinion that Lansing would finally agree to its deletion. 38

The unexpected intransigence on the part of Lansing and the Americans concerning some of the Japanese revisions was explained by Ishii as traceable to two major points. From a private source, identified only as a Mr. Miller, Ishii states that he learned that the original draft as proposed by Lansing had taken the State Department by complete surprise. Evidently, reported Ishii, State Department officials had not expected Wilson and Lansing to go as far as they had. 39

Wilson was also extremely disappointed over the absence from the draft declaration of any reference to the problem of spheres of influence in China. Ishii

37 Foreign Office, Cable 422, Sato to Motono, October 10, 1917, Ishii 34 (received).

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.
stated that he and Lansing came to the conclusion that Wilson did not congratulate the special envoy on the draft note when the two met on September 26th, because of his unhappiness over this matter. 40

The Japanese Special Ambassador feared that because of the absence of a statement regarding abolition of spheres of influence, the entire declaration was endangered. He held that doubt as to Japan's intentions would be created if recognition of Japanese special interests were demanded without agreeing to abolish spheres of influence.41

Ishii made one other interesting point in this cable in relation to statements of respect for China's territorial integrity. He did not necessarily agree with Tokyo's request to delete the statement on unimpaired territorial sovereignty. He astutely pointed out that Japanese recognition of Chinese territorial integrity could be "profitable in the future." "For instance," Ishii continued, "military and police functions are very important; however, they are not related to Chinese territorial integrity and are part of phases of protecting Japanese special interests." With great insight, Ishii observed that "... Lansing didn't say Chinese political
independence, he said specifically Chinese territorial integrity.\textsuperscript{42}

To Ishii's observations and suggestions, Tokyo replied in a message dispatched on the 10th that the revisions as previously suggested were carefully conceived by the Japanese government and represented its position. He was encouraged to continue to try to obtain the desires as detailed in the previous communication.\textsuperscript{43}

In the Lansing account of the meeting on October 8th, one observes a slight divergency. Lansing indicates he rejected the addition of "and influence" to the term "special interests."\textsuperscript{44} According to Ishii, that occurred at a later date.

On the 10th, Lansing and Ishii met for another working meeting. Lansing informed Ishii that the deletion of paragraphs two and six had been approved, as well as the change to paragraph three. However, the two changes requested in paragraph four dealing with opportunism and trade discrimination in China were held critical to the declaration, and the United States would not agree to their deletion. Ishii reported that the matter was even discussed in detail with

\textsuperscript{42}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{43}Foreign Office, Cable 353, Motono to Sato, October 10, 1917, To Ishii 10 (sent).

\textsuperscript{44}Lansing, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 298.
President Wilson, but to no apparent avail. "The American government," continued Ishii, "wants these points admitted by Japan."  

At this session, Lansing asked that the "other" in paragraph four in the phrase beginning with "acquisition by any other" be deleted. Ishii apparently agreed with the suggestion, but stated in his report that it was difficult to determine Lansing's rationale for the suggestion as the American Secretary did not give any obvious reasons. The special envoy reported that on this matter, Lansing had made up his mind and was not inclined to change.

The two also discussed the matter of releasing the notes to allied powers. Lansing wanted to give a copy of the agreement to each allied country with a representative in the United States, and release it publicly the day after. Ishii commented to the Foreign Office that as England, France, Russia and China had representatives in Japan, they should probably be told. Both Lansing and Ishii agreed that distribution of these advanced notes should be based on the desires of both countries.

In the Lansing record of this day's session, one does not receive the impression of strong American opposition.

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45 Foreign Office, Cable 427, Sato to Motono, October 10, 1917, Ishii 37 (sent).
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
to deletion of the section dealing with opportunism. Certainly the sense of urgency which is found in Ishii's cable concerning this phrase is absent from Lansing's version. If they deleted this portion, Lansing stated, the two powers would be missing a great opportunity to demonstrate their lack of self-interest. Ishii, according to the Lansing memoirs, indicated his appreciation of Lansing's logic, but intimated that the political situation in Japan dictated expediency.

Lansing countered with a minor quid pro quo, saying that if the section were deleted, the word "other" had better be removed from the next sentence to make the declaration more acceptable.

In summing up the exchange over this matter Lansing said:

\ldots while I would have liked to see the eliminated phrase retained, I considered that to exchange it for the elimination of the word "other" was a good bargain.

It was indeed a good bargain as the sentence without "other" read, "Moreover they mutually declare that they are opposed to acquisition by any \textit{other} Government of...

\footnotetext[48]{Lansing, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 299.}
\footnotetext[49]{Ibid.}
\footnotetext[50]{Ibid.}
\footnotetext[51]{Ibid., p. 300.}
any special rights or privileges that would affect independence or territorial integrity of China, . . . ."  

This change would have seriously restricted Japan's position vis-a-vis the gains made as a result of the Twenty-one Demands of 1915, and might have put similar restriction on Japan's post-war plans.

Further instructions for the Viscount were cabled from Tokyo on the 12th of October. Motono stated that "by all means" Ishii should seek the deletion of the section beginning "and that they will not take advantage." He also instructed Ishii that it was alright to agree to Lansing's strong desire to delete the word "other" from the phrase "acquisition by any other government."  

On the 12th of October, in Washington, the two negotiators met again. This meeting, according to Ishii, was specifically devoted to discussions of the two items introduced by the Japanese representative on the 10th, namely the possibility of adding "and influence" to "special interests" and deleting a reference respecting China's territorial sovereignty.  

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52 Foreign Office, Cable 377, Sato to Motono, September 28, 1917, Ishii 24 (received).

53 Foreign Office, Cable 358, Motono to Sato, October 12, 1917, To Ishii 11 (sent).

54 Foreign Office, Cable 435, Sato to Motono, October 12, 1917, Ishii 40 (received).
Lansing soon made it clear that "and influence" would not be added to the declaration. The American Secretary said that "influence" was incorporated into "special interests," and more importantly, if added would add to confusion and misunderstanding. He reiterated to Ishii that the reason diplomatic notes were to be exchanged between the United States and Japan was to establish "perfect" understanding between the two countries. The injection of such a phrase would be contrary to the purpose of the meeting, and, as such was the case, the American Secretary would not agree. 55

On the subject of deleting the phrase "territorial sovereignty nevertheless remains unimpaired" from paragraph four, Lansing asked for further time to think about it. 56

In commenting about the day's encounter, Ishii reported to Tokyo that the American attitude on the addition of "and influence" was very firm. Ishii thought the position so firm, in fact, that he recommended that the point be dropped as Japanese insistence would be unprofitable and indeed might jeopardize the entire declaration. 57

55Ibid.
56Ibid.
57Ibid.
According to the Lansing memoirs, Ishii had promised him on the 10th to cable Tokyo concerning the section "and that they will not take advantage of present conditions to seek special rights or privileges in China which would abridge the rights of the citizens or subjects of other friendly states." This apparently was done on the 13th. Ishii tried once more to change Tokyo's mind as Lansing had tied deletion of this section to deletion of "other" from the sentence, "Moreover they mutually declare that they are opposed to acquisition by any other government of any special rights or privileges that would affect the independence or territorial integrity of China." The Viscount carefully drew Motono's attention to the fact that the clause dealing with opportunism would be in effect as long as "present conditions" existed. Thus, Ishii pointed out, although binding and restrictive for the moment, as soon as the war ended its efficacy would be concluded.

In commenting on Lansing's quid pro quo, Ishii pointed out its long term nature, and the fact that it

58 Lansing, op. cit., p. 299.
59 Foreign Office, Cable 437, Sato to Motono, October 13, 1917, Ishii 41 (received).
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
would have the effect of making Japanese special interests meaningless. If "other" were deleted, the sending of Japanese military advisors to China might prove impossible. Ishii concluded his very concise review of the issue by suggesting that Japan should restrict its activity during the immediate future and admit to the restraint of the section in question. To do otherwise would tie Japan to an indefinite commitment "so clearly unprofitable."  

Discussions continued on the 13th. The two diplomats again reviewed in detail the question of deleting "territorial sovereignty remains unimpaired" from paragraph four. Lansing said the United States would agree to its omission, but that in view of President Wilson's desires, respect for China's territorial sovereignty would have to be indicated by the addition of "sovereignty" to the phrase "territorial integrity of China." Lansing recommended it be added right after "integrity."  

Ishii did not like the idea, and observed that the phrase in question had been used originally in the Root-Takahira Agreement and to now add "sovereignty" would create misunderstanding. In his report, Ishii once again

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62Ibid.
63Foreign Office, Cable 439, Sato to Motono, October 13, 1917, Ishii 142 (received on the 15th).
64Ibid.
recommended to his government that "territorial sovereignty remains unimpaired" be retained as it appeared in the original draft. He thought that its inclusion could be profitable to Japan, and then all the American counter-suggestions could be disregarded.\footnote{Ibid.}

After discussing the above change, Lansing and Ishii moved on to a reconsideration of the self-denial phrase "they will not take advantage." Ishii's report reveals that he indicated Japan's continued desire to have it deleted from the declaration. Lansing replied that to do so, three conditions would have to be met. The word "other" would have to be deleted as discussed before. "They mutually declare" would have to be changed to "they severally declare," and "in the same way" should be added after "they are opposed." He then indicated initially that the deleted section might appropriately be placed in a secret note.\footnote{Ibid.}

Ishii's own views on this section of paragraph four were unchanged. He reiterated his opinion to the Terachi government as was detailed in Cable 422. To change the original draft on this section would prove unprofitable to Japan. As far as the new conditions were concerned, he recommended only that the government think about them.\footnote{Ibid.}
Ishii concluded his report of this meeting with a lengthy review of his deteriorating relationship with Lansing. Ishii observed that since he tried to add "and influence" to the declaration, the American Secretary of State's attitude had become stiff and hard. He felt that, at least, conversations were strained. Ishii stated that he had indicated a need to see President Wilson, but Lansing had informed him of its impossibility. The Viscount warned that in the present atmosphere, bargaining had practically ceased. "If now we miss this opportunity, it will be extremely difficult to settle the Chinese problem between America and Japan. So, even if some difficulties and disadvantages exist, we should exchange official notes."  

The Foreign Ministry replied to Ishii's message on the 15th of October. Motono acceded to certain of the special ambassador's arguments, and agreed to retention of the phrase "terrestrial sovereignty remains unimpaired." However, concerning the phrase, "They will not take advantage," the Foreign Minister was adamant, and maintained that it should be deleted. 

Several days later, the Viscount dispatched a message which placed particular emphasis on Lansing's scheme to

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68 Ibid.

69 Foreign Office, Cable 366, Motono to Sato, October 15, 1917, To Ishii 13 (sent).
exchange secret notes to supplement the public declara-
tion. Ishii reviewed his initial reaction and said that he had not indicated to Lansing any particular feeling on his proposal. However, the Japanese special ambassador pointed out to the Gaimusho that he was really at a loss to formulate an effective argument to counter Lansing's latest proposition. "So," he continued, "I'll have to indicate approval of the secret note idea." Ishii stated that if he did concur, he would make one more try to get Lansing to agree to the retention of "other" in the paragraph four phrase "any other government." Ishii asked for instructions and a draft, in the event the government decided in favor of exchanging secret notes.

Motono replied with unusual rapidity and clarity. Ishii was not to agree to the idea of secret notes as Motono insisted it would be impossible to keep them secret. Their existence would be leaked to the public, and then the significance of the contents would be exaggerated without basis. In addition, the Minister for Foreign Affairs mentioned that there always existed the possibility that Germany would use these notes as a means to separate Japan from America. He insisted that

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70 Foreign Office, Cable 444, Sato to Motono, October 18, 1917, Ishii 43 (received).
71 Ibid.
the entire concept was out of place in view of the present good relations between Japan and America.  

Ishii was told to try to get Lansing to agree to a simple deletion of the section beginning "and that they will not take advantage" and in return "other" could be deleted from "any other government." Motono's tone reflected exasperation as he concluded the message with, "I hope this satisfies him. Desire that you finalize this note."  

Armed with these rather definitive instructions, Ishii met Lansing on the 20th to resume discussions. He explained the disadvantages inherent in an exchange of secret notes, and submitted that as an alternative, Japan could agree to deletion of "other" and then in compensation, there would be no secret notes.  

Lansing replied that the deletion of "other" was a necessity indicating that its use as a barter item was

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72 Foreign Office, Cable 372, Motono to Sato, October 18, 1917, To Ishii 15 (sent).

73 Ibid.

74 Foreign Office, Cable 452, Sato to Motono, October 21, 1917, Ishii 45 (received). The date of the meeting in this cable is listed as October 17th; however, this is believed to be a typographical error. Lansing lists a meeting on the 20th, Ishii's itinerary, as found in the Foreign Office Microfilms, shows no meeting on the 17th, and the message itself was received in Tokyo on the 21st. All evidence indicates a meeting on the 20th rather than the 17th.
not to be considered. However, he did say that he would talk to the President on this point. 75

Ishii relayed the change in Tokyo's attitude concerning the phrase "territorial sovereignty remains unimpaired." Lansing agreed to its retention, and informed Ishii that he was dropping the idea of adding "sovereignty" or "sovereign rights" to that paragraph. 76

Finally, the Japanese envoy proposed that the "them" in the phrase "geographical position gives them" be made more specific. Ishii suggested it be amended to read "Japan," but Lansing simply said "no." 77

At the next negotiating session on the 22nd, the American Secretary of State notified the special envoy that the United States would not insist on secret notes, and would be satisfied if the Japanese would furnish some special memorandum explaining the deletion of the section concerning the two nations' self restraint in China. 78

Ishii's cable to the Foreign Office relates how he explained the Japanese position so many times to Lansing

75Ibid.
76Ibid.
77Ibid.
78Foreign Office, Cable 456, Sato to Motono, October 23, 1917, Ishii 43 (received).
regarding a simple deletion of the section in return for deletion of "other," but Lansing was unmoved. 79

Evidently President Wilson was insistent that some form of written record exist declaring that Japan did not intend to take advantage of the war in Europe to further its aims in China. Ishii recognized this and recommended to Motono that to continue debate over the subject would certainly increase doubt as to Japan's protestations not to use the war for self advantage. 80

At the meeting on the 22nd, Lansing gave Ishii a draft of a memorandum to cover the self denial section. Ishii indicated to Motono that the final portion of the draft memorandum was "not very interesting and he wanted it deleted." 81 Lansing promised, Ishii reported, that the memorandum would not be leaked to the press, but would be kept secret in his files. The American draft was reported as follows:

Confidential Memorandum to Accompany the Reply of The Japanese Government.
In the preliminary draft Note, dealing with questions relating to the Republic of China which are mutual interest to Japan and the United States, and which on September 26th 1917 were/was(?) sic submitted by the Government of the United States to the Government of Japan for their consideration, there appeared, following the declaration by the

79 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
two Governments of their adherence to the so-called "open-door" policy, a further declaration that "they will not take advantage of present conditions to seek special rights and privileges in China which would abridge rights of citizens or subjects of other friendly states."

For certain reasons of expedience which have been orally explained to the Government of the United States, the Government of Japan considered it to be unwise to include above quoted declaration in the proposed note, and it was therefore stricken out by mutual consent.

In order, however, to avoid misconstruction being placed upon this amendment of the note, the Government of Japan desire to affirm that by so doing there was no purpose, on their part, to assert a contrary principle or policy, and that the elimination of the declaration has no significance whatsoever in determining the terms of the Note as finally agreed upon by the Government of His Majesty.

(Signed)

Foreign Minister Motono replied to Ishii's latest cable and the draft memorandum on the 26th of October. Viscount Motono repeated his feelings about the undesirability of such a document, but noted that, "If America doesn't bend her position, at the final point we may have to agree." Motono's mood seemed extremely irritable as he chided the Americans for doubting Japan's true intentions. He commented that the memorandum certainly was not appropos in view of current good relations, and that upon close scrutiny, it was a one-sided declaration by the

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82 Foreign Office, Cable 457, Sato to Motono, October 24, 1917, No Ishii number (received).

83 Foreign Office, Cable 380, Motono to Sato, October 26, 1917, To Ishii 17 (sent).
Japanese government. He agreed with Ishii that the section from "and that the elimination" should be deleted, but Motono went one step further and called everything after the second paragraph uninteresting or undesirable. 84

As a substitute for the American memorandum, Motono introduced the possibility of a protocol. Such a document would be executed by both parties, and if misunderstandings were to arise in the future, it could be made public. He informed Ishii that a draft protocol would be sent in another encoded message. 85

In the event of American nonconcurrence in the protocol, Motono instructed the special envoy to recommend a change in the American memorandum. He was emphatic that this measure was to be adopted only as a last resort. The Foreign Minister suggested that the paragraph that began "In order however" could be changed to read, "It was well understood that the principle communicated in the declaration which was thus suppressed was in perfect accord with the policy actually pursued by the two Governments in China." 86

On the same day, October 26th, the draft Protocol was cabled to Ishii. It read:

84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
PROTOCOL

In the course of the conversations between the Japanese Special Ambassador and the Secretary of State of the United States, which has led to the exchange of notes between them dated this day, declaring the policy of the two Governments with regard to China, the question of embodying the following clause in such declaration came up for discussion:

"They [the Government of Japan and the United States] will not take advantage of the present condition to seek special rights or privileges in China, which would abridge the rights of the subjects or citizens of other friendly states."

Upon careful examination of the question it was agreed that the clause above quoted, being superfluous in the relations of the two Governments, and liable to create erroneous impression in the minds of the public, should be eliminated from the declaration.

It was however well understood that the principle enunciated in the clause which was thus suppressed was in perfect accord with the policy actually pursued by the two Governments in China.®

The two statesmen conferred again on the 27th. Ishii reported that after some discussion, Lansing indicated that he would withdraw the American memorandum. The American Secretary of State regretted the way in which the Japanese Government was interpreting American moves during the negotiations as if America were doubting Japan's intentions. He insisted that America wanted everything mutual in intent as well as style. In light of these developments, Lansing intimated that he was planning to make a third proposal.®

87 Foreign Office, Cable 381, Motono to Sato, October 26, 1917, To Ishii 18 (sent).

88 Foreign Office, Cable 464, Sato to Motono, October 28, 1917, Ishii 49 (received).
Ishii informed Lansing that Japan did not want a memorandum, and offered as a substitute, the draft Protocol. After explaining the Japanese position regarding this declaration, Ishii said that he was to explain that his government was eager to conclude the negotiations.89

Lansing replied that the protocol would be taken under consideration. As the two men left the room, Lansing commented that he also rather wished to end the discussions, and implied that the protocol might be the means to end the current impasse.90

In the message reporting this meeting Ishii informed the Gaimusho that the Korea Maru had been reserved for the 9th of November. The special envoy wanted to leave as soon as possible, and asked Tokyo to get everything ready for an exchange of notes.91

Motono's reply of the 29th, primarily dealt with procedures for releasing the notes to Britain and Russia. The two countries had been kept informed of the progress of the negotiations through the Japanese Ambassadors in Russia and Britain, Uchida and Chinda respectively. Ishii was told to cable both ambassadors and Japan when

89Ibid.
90Ibid.
91Ibid.
the notes were exchanged. The Foreign Minister instructed Ishii definitely not to mention the contents of the Protocol.92

Lansing and Ishii met on the 29th, to discuss the draft Protocol submitted by Japan on the 27th. Lansing had checked with Wilson and requested to make one minor change. He observed that the section "policy actually pursued" did not include reference to the future, and it might cause confusion or misunderstanding. Lansing recommended that it be changed to read "with the declared policy of the two governments in regard to China." The Americans accepted all other sections of the Protocol.93

Ishii sent the change to Tokyo with the comment that on the 27th, Lansing had seemed quite satisfied with the draft; however, after talking with the President, they wanted a change. Ishii believed that even the added phrase did not commit Japan to future restraint so he recommended it be accepted.94

On the 31st, Motono dispatched his approval of the Protocol change, and informed Ishii that authorization

92 Foreign Office, Cable 389, Motono to Sato, October 29, 1917. To Ishii 19 (sent).

93 Foreign Office, Cable 466, Sato to Motono, October 29, 1917, Ishii 50 (received on 31st).

94 Ibid.
to exchange notes would be cabled on November 1st.95

The Japanese Foreign Office, also on the 31st, sent messages to the Japanese Ambassadors in Britain and Russia. These cables alerted the two, Chinda in Britain and Uchida in Russia, that the negotiations had finally been concluded, and that within three days the resulting notes would be exchanged. They were instructed to inform the Foreign Ministers in their assigned countries of this fact, and to hand them copies of the notes as soon as possible. The Protocol was not to be disclosed, but there was a possibility that in the future it would be.96

Motono cautioned the Japanese diplomats that Germany may try to make some propaganda capital from the exchange; overall, he thought that the negotiations and notes revealed a strong United States-Japanese alliance, and he believed that the agreement would prove beneficial not only to the United States and Japan but also to China.97

The release of the text of the notes prior to the public exchange between the United States and Japan was only being done by Japan noted the Foreign Office. The

95Foreign Office. Cable 393, Motono to Sato, October 31, 1917, To Ishii 21 (sent)

96Foreign Office. Cables 733, 734, Motono to Chinda, and Cables 818, 819, Motono to Uchida, October 31, 1917.

97Ibid.
United States would not release the notes to anyone prior to their official exchange.98

The next day, November 1st, Motono informed Ishii that all the necessary procedures had been completed in Japan, and that Tokyo was ready for the exchange to take place. He instructed the special ambassador to cable Japan, Britain and Russia as soon as the exchange took place. Chinda in Britain would cable France and Italy upon receipt of the Ishii message. He reported that public release of the notes was set for November 7th, or as soon thereafter as possible. He asked Ishii to cable Tokyo if anything relating to the method for disclosing the agreement came up in his discussions with Lansing.99

Motono followed up the above message with instructions to Ishii to prepare a "thank you" note for Lansing. He specifically wanted to thank the American Secretary for helping to expose the German plot against close United States-Japanese cooperation, and for freely discussing all matters affecting the relations of the two countries. The Foreign Minister wanted this letter ready for presentation at the exchange of notes or as soon thereafter as possible.100

98Ibid.

99Foreign Office, Cable 394, Motono to Sato, November 1, 1917, To Ishii 22 (sent).

100Foreign Office, Cable 396, Motono to Sato, November 1, 1917, To Ishii 23 (sent).
After receipt of Motono's cable, discussed immediately above, Ishii met with Lansing and settled the manner of releasing the notes. He reported to the Gaimusho that the release would be "simple" as was desired by the Japanese government, and would be accompanied by a statement by Lansing. Ishii commented that he recommended to Lansing that release of the notes be about three days after the exchange. The Japanese Special Ambassador feared that a longer delay would be likely to lead to a leak of the information prematurely.

Ishii continued his report on the accomplishments of the day's meeting including a discussion on such minor details as the signature element for himself, and the lack of one for Lansing; the changing of an "a" to a "the" in the American copy of the Protocol, and other minute information.

On the 2nd of November, in Tokyo, Motono penned instructions for the Japanese representative in Peiping, the Baron Hayashi. In Cable 807, he directed Hayashi to:

\[\ldots\] meet Chinese authorities on November 4, and tell them the meaning of coded message 808, and hand them a copy of the note. Cable their

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101 Foreign Office, Cable 476, Sato to Motono, November 2, 1917, Ishii 55 (received).

102 Ibid.
reactions. However, the copy of the note for the Chinese government is only in English (not Japanese). Also, don’t tell them at all about the Protocol. So, please be reminded. On November 1st, the British, French, Russian and Italian Ambassadors resident in Japan were told privately . . . . Official notes will be exchanged on the 2nd or 3rd. A few days after the exchange it will be released. So, up till that time, please remind the Chinese government to keep it secret.103

Cable 808, mentioned above which was to be briefed to the Chinese only reviewed the fact the United States-Japanese diplomatic discussions had taken place. The Chinese were to be told that the results of the negotiations would improve the relations between the United States and Japan, and would reflect a "correct and friendly" policy by the two governments toward China. Motono concluded encoded Cable 808 with, "I believe Asia will have peace and security."104

The day after instructing Hayashi to notify the Chinese of the impending exchange of notes, Tokyo received one of Ishii’s last cables from Washington. The special ambassador reported a conversation with Lansing on the 2nd during which the American Secretary had specifically observed that China was not among the nations to be notified by Japan of the official exchange.105

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103 Foreign Office, Cable 807, Motono to Hayashi, November 2, 1917.

104 Foreign Office, Cable 808, Motono to Hayashi, November 2, 1917.

105 Foreign Office, Cable 477, Sato to Motono, November 3, 1917, Ishii 56 (received).
It is not clear what Ishii's reply to Lansing was; however, in this cable he suggested that China definitely should be notified. In fact, he observed, some additional explanation would be in order for their benefit.  

Motono, in a rather rapid reply, reminded Ishii that the scheme for notifying Allied countries prior to release of the notes was available to Sato, and that it made provision for alerting only four countries, Britain, Russia, France, and Italy. For some reason, Motono was keeping his special representative in the dark concerning the release to China. In any case, this cable clearly exonerates Ishii from any knowledge of coming events.

On the same day that Motono dispatched the above message, he received one that had been awaited eagerly for several months. Cable 479 from the Viscount in Washington, notified the Gaimusho that the notes had been exchanged on the morning of the 2nd. Ishii had signed two copies of the Protocol, and had kept one. Release was to be on the 7th in Tokyo, and in Washington on the afternoon of the 6th. The Naval Agreement was to be released by Lansing at the same time.

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106 Ibid.

107 Foreign Office, Cable 405, Motono to Sato, November 3, 1917, To Ishii 28 (sent).

108 Foreign Office, Cable 479, Sato to Motono, November 3, 1917, Ishii 58 (received).
Ishii's closing words in this message were, "Going to leave tomorrow afternoon, November 3, 1917."\textsuperscript{109}

Motono quickly dispatched a thank-you note to Ishii which cited all the hardships that had been overcome by the Viscount satisfactorily to complete the negotiations and exchange notes.\textsuperscript{110}

On the 4th, Motono received Ishii's last dispatch from the American capital. In it the special ambassador reported what Lansing's statement would contain when the notes were released. Generally, Lansing was going to cover the facts that the notes would remove all misunderstanding, assure continued friendship for both countries, keep peace in the Orient, and demonstrate to enemy nations a strong unity between the United States and Japan. His statement, the Viscount concluded, would commend the part played by the Japanese Special Ambassador.\textsuperscript{111}

Ishii left Washington for the West Coast on the evening of November 3rd.\textsuperscript{112} As he traveled a drama was unfolding in Peiping about which the special ambassador had no advance knowledge.

\textsuperscript{109}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{110}\underline{Foreign Office, Cable 409, Motono to Sato, November 3, 1917, To Ishii 29 (sent).}

\textsuperscript{111}\underline{Foreign Office, Cable 482, Sato to Motono, November 4, 1917, Ishii 59 (received).}

\textsuperscript{112}\underline{Foreign Office, Viscount Ishii's Itinerary, Film 431.}
Baron Hayashi, as instructed by Minister for Foreign Affairs Motono, called on the Chinese Foreign Minister to deliver confidential information on the just concluded Japanese-American negotiations. Finding him sick, he dutifully contacted the Deputy Foreign Minister and explained the events of the immediate past.\textsuperscript{113}

After carefully studying the note, the Chinese diplomat replied, "Germany attempted to disrupt American-Japanese relations using Chinese affairs which is so stated in the Note. So, at this time, to have agreement between America and Japan is certainly suited to the current situation."\textsuperscript{114}

The Chinese official additionally noted that he would inform the appropriate government officials concerning this matter.\textsuperscript{115}

Hayashi, in his report, recounted the above event, and added that he would be visiting Prime Minister Tuan in the afternoon.\textsuperscript{116} This he did. In noting Tuan's reaction, Hayashi reported that the Chinese Prime Minister had thanked him for the private notification,

\begin{itemize}
  \item[\textsuperscript{113}]\textit{Foreign Office}, Cable 1530, Hayashi to Motono, November 4, 1917.
  \item[\textsuperscript{114}]\textit{Ibid}.
  \item[\textsuperscript{115}]\textit{Ibid}.
  \item[\textsuperscript{116}]\textit{Ibid}.
\end{itemize}
but had indicated that he wanted to think about it for awhile because of its importance to China.  

The inevitable happened. That against which Ishii had warned the Foreign Office occurred. Soon after the confidential release to the Chinese, by coincidence or intent, the news of the agreement was leaked.

According to the American Minister Reinsch, the Chinese, after their private exposure to the notes, expressed the belief that they had been forsaken by the United States. Chinese dismay, and, it might be added, that of Reinsch, was abject.

In the meantime, quite oblivious to these developments, Ishii sped westward to arrive in San Francisco on the 8th of November.

The next day, Ishii telegraphed a farewell message to Lansing and boarded the Korea Maru for Japan. On the morning of the 16th, the Ishii Party arrived in Honolulu, and that afternoon they were once again on the high seas and headed for Yokohama.

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117 *Foreign Office*, Cable 1534, Hayashi to Motono, November 4, 1917.
120 *Foreign Office*, *Viscount Ishii's Itinerary*, Film 432.
121 *Ibid.*, Film 433.
The welcomed sight of Mount Fuji in the winter was
Ishii's once again as the Korea Maru arrived at the port
of Yokohama on the 26th of November. 122

122 Ibid., Film 433.
CONCLUSION

In assessing the Ishii Mission and its success or failure, one must return to the instructions which Viscount Ishii received from the Terauchi Cabinet. A brief recapitulation of the main points reveals the following:

1. Ishii was ordered to meet President Wilson and deliver congratulations from the Emperor on America's entry into the war.

2. He was to negotiate a pact on Pacific security and related matters. The extent of Japanese participation in this pact was to be based on American desires.

3. The special ambassador was directed to make Japan's thoughts and desires clearly known to the United States relating to China and the Japanese living in the United States.

4. Finally, he was to indicate Japan's concern about post war disposition of the German Pacific Islands.¹

The mission accomplished three points satisfactorily. Ishii clearly fulfilled the instructions of points one, two, and three.

two and four; however, point three which encompassed the complex problems of Japanese-American relations in China as well as the immigration issue requires closer examination.

It was hoped that the mission would be able to eradicate the causes of concern and misunderstanding between the United States and Japan. In referring to this, Ishii's instructions stated in part:

The American policies at which the Japanese are chagrined are the American political and economic activities in China and the unfair and prejudicial treatment of Japanese in the United States.\(^2\)

The notes finally exchanged between the two nations did not curtail in any way the American economic and political activity which had given original impetus to the months of negotiations. The United States did not agree to restrict its economic activities to non-Japanese areas of interest nor did it agree to Japanese management of American investments. In fact, Lansing informed Ishii of American intent to lend up to ten million dollars to China, and the fact that America seemed to support Chinese troop involvement in Europe. In that respect, the American political and economic thorn was not removed from Japan's side.

The mission evidently relegated the task of improving the lot of the average Japanese resident

\(^2\)Ibid.
of the United States to tertiary importance. On the 26th of September, Ishii obtained Lansing’s commitment to continue discussions on the Bryan-Chinda Agreement with Ambassador Sato. This was the only concrete item realized in conjunction with the immigration problem.³

Attempts by the mission to mollify or restrict American political and economic interference in China and improve the conditions for the Japanese living in America were less than successful. The Ishii Mission did not, therefore, completely satisfy the instructions of the Cabinet Council directive.

Due to the ambiguity of the notes, the Japanese were still able to reap considerable diplomatic capital. By having the most restrictive phrases, as far as Japanese policy was concerned, confined to the confidential Protocol, Japan was able to interpret the agreement to the rest of the world as American recognition of its preeminent position in China.⁴

Ishii, himself, if not convinced that he had won recognition of Japanese preeminence in China at least was convinced that he had obtained a Monroe Doctrine in Asia for Japan. This interpretation was possible as he

³Foreign Office, Cable 382, Sato to Motono, September 28, 1917, Ishii 26 (received).
considered that an Asiatic Monroe Doctrine would in no way conflict with the independence or territorial integrity of China which the notes recognized.5

In the end, Lansing and Ishii agreed to recognize Japan's special interests in return for a reaffirmation of Japan's respect for the open door, respect for China's territorial integrity, and a statement denying intent to use the war for disproportionate gains in China. It enabled the United States to keep Japan out of Germany's awaiting arms for the period of the war, and in return was ambiguous enough to satisfy Japanese purposes.

The real significance of the notes to Japan appears to have been in the way they put them to use in their relations with China. Reinsch states that Chinese dismay over the notes was translated into a stronger influence of the pro-Japanese clique in the Peiping government;6 this group was instrumental in concluding the secret Japanese-Chinese negotiations of 1918. "Through these agreements Japan obtained China's de facto recognition of Japanese interests in Shantung."7 To China these

5Foreign Office, Cable 381, Sato to Motono, September 28, 1917, Ishii 25 (received).
6Reinsch, op. cit., p. 316.
treaties of 1918 were ultimately more damaging than the agreements resulting from the Twenty-one Demands as duress was not involved.

The Lansing-Ishii Agreement cannot be considered instrumental in the conclusion of these treaties, but it can be said that it helped to create an atmosphere in which the secret accords became realities.

Although the notes contributed in some small way to strengthening Japan's apparent position in relation to China, there was neither a winner nor loser, vanquished nor victor in this brief episode of American-Japanese diplomatic relations. The two nations retreated behind the screen of ambiguity to conceal from the world basic areas of unreconcilable national objectives.

This convenient arrangement lasted a brief six years. By 1923 the notes had become embarrassing and were superseded by the Washington Treaties.

Ishii had journeyed to the United States with instructions which reflected a confident, almost arrogant, Japan. In America he encountered a new idealism almost completely devoid of the pragmatism of past American administrations. Forced to negotiate from a rigid Japanese position and faced with an equally unbending American attitude, Ishii sought to obtain an agreement which had only the hallmark of victory, not the substance.
Ishii realized, I am sure, better than most that his nation and the one he had just visited would ultimately clash on the solution of the problems momentarily tabled by the Lansing-Ishii Agreement.
APPENDIX

THE FINAL AGREEMENT

(FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO VISCOUNT ISHII)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, November 2, 1917.

Excellency:

I have the honor to communicate herein my understanding of the agreement reached by us in our recent conversations touching the questions of mutual interest to our Governments relating to the Republic of China.

In order to silence mischievous reports that have from time to time been circulated, it is believed by us that a public announcement once more of the desires and intentions shared by our two Governments with regard to China is advisable.

The Governments of the United States and Japan recognize that territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries, and, consequently the Government of the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous.

The territorial sovereignty of China, nevertheless, remains unimpaired and the Government of the United States
has every confidence in the repeated assurances of the Imperial Japanese Government that while geographical position gives Japan such special interests they have no desire to discriminate against the trade of other nations or to disregard the commercial rights heretofore granted by China in treaties with other Powers.

The Governments of the United States and Japan deny that they have any purpose to infringe in any way the independence or territorial integrity of China and they declare furthermore that they always adhere to the principle of the so-called "open door" or equal opportunity for commerce and industry in China.

Moreover, they mutually declare that they are opposed to the acquisition by any Government of any special rights or privileges that would affect the independence or territorial integrity of China or that would deny to the subjects or citizens of any country the full enjoyment of equal opportunity in the commerce and industry of China.

I shall be glad to have Your Excellency confirm this understanding of the agreement reached by us.

Accept, Excellency, etc. etc. etc.

ROBERT LANSING

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1Foreign Office, Diplomatic Note from Lansing to Ishii, November 2, 1917, Films 253-254.
(FROM VISCOUNT ISHII TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE)

JAPANESE EMBASSY,
Washington, November 2, 1917.

Sir:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of to-day, communicating to me your understanding of the agreement reached by us in our recent conversations touching the questions of mutual interest to our Governments relating to the Republic of China.

I am happy to be able to confirm to you, under authorization of my Government, the understanding in question set forth in the following terms:

In order to silence mischievous reports that have from time to time been circulated, it is believed by us that a public announcement once more of the desires and intentions shared by our two Governments with regard to China is advisable.

The Governments of Japan and the United States recognize that territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries, and, consequently the Government of the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous.

The territorial sovereignty of China, nevertheless, remains unimpaired and the Government of the United States
has every confidence in the repeated assurances of the Imperial Japanese Government that while geographical position gives Japan such special interests they have no desire to discriminate against the trade of other nations or to disregard the commercial rights heretofore granted by China in treaties with other Powers.

The Governments of Japan and the United States deny that they have any purpose to infringe in any way the independence or territorial integrity of China and they declare furthermore that they always adhere to the principle of the so-called "open door" or equal opportunity for commerce and industry in China.

Moreover, they mutually declare that they are opposed to the acquisition by any Government of any special rights or privileges that would affect the independence or territorial integrity of China or that would deny to the subjects or citizens of any country the full enjoyment of equal opportunity in the commerce and industry of China.

I take etc. etc. etc.

K. ISHII

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary on Special Mission.²

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²Foreign Office, Diplomatic Note from Ishii to Lansing, November 2, 1917, Films 258-260.
THE UNITED STATES-JAPANESE NAVAL COOPERATION NOTE

Complete and satisfactory understanding upon the matter of the naval cooperation in the Pacific for the purpose of attaining the common object against Germany and her Allies have been reached between the Representatives of the Imperial Japanese Navy who is attached to the Special Mission of Japan and the Representatives of the United States Navy.  

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3Foreign Office, Cable 480, Sato to Motono, November 2, 1917 (received November 3, 1917).
ISHII'S FAREWELL LETTER TO LANSING

My final departure from Washington affords a fit occasion for me to express once more to the American people my deep sense of gratitude for the cordial reception and hospitality accorded to the special mission of Japan. The spontaneous and enthusiastic manifestations of friendship and good-will toward us on all hands have profoundly impressed not only the members of the mission but the whole Japanese people. The kindly feeling and fraternal spirit always existing between the two nations have never been more emphatically testified. Believing as I do in frank talking I have tried the best I could, in my public utterances in this country, to tell the truth and the facts about my country, the aspirations and motives which spur my nation, for to my mind it is misrepresentation and the lack of information that allow discordance and distrust to creep in the relationship between nations. I am happy to think that at a time when the true unity and cooperation between the allied nations are dire necessities, it has been given me to contribute in my small way to a better understanding and appreciation among the Americans with regard to Japan. The new understanding in regard to the line of policy to be followed by Japan and America respecting the
Republic of China augurs well for the undisturbed maintenance of the harmonious accord and good neighborhood between our two countries. It certainly will do away with all doubts that have now and then shadowed the Japanese-American relationship. It cannot fail to defeat for all time the pernicious efforts of German agents to whom every new situation developing in China always furnished so fruitful a field for black machinations. For the rest this new understanding of ours substantiates the solidarity of comradeship which is daily gaining strength among the honorable and worthy nations of the civilized world. It is a great pleasure for me to add that this declaration has been reached as an outcome of free exchange of frank views between the two Governments. I cannot pay too high a tribute to the sincerity and farsightedness of Secretary Lansing with whom it was my privilege to associate in so pleasurable a way. It is my firm belief that so long as the two Governments maintain a perfectly appreciative attitude toward each other, so long as there is no lack of statesmanship to guide public opinion, the reign of peace and tranquility in our part of the world will remain unchallenged.

(Signed) \(^4\)

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