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United States foreign policy with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 1945-1959

Otis C. Moore

University of Nebraska at Omaha

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UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY WITH THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
1945-1959

A Thesis
Presented to the
Department of History
and the
Faculty of the College of Graduate Studies
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In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

by
Otis C. Moore
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Accepted for the faculty of the College of Graduate Studies of the University of Omaha, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts.

Paul J. Beck History
Chairman

Graduate Committee

Name

Department

Historian

Department

Kennedy

College
This thesis considers the changes in United States relations with the Soviet Union after World War II. In discussing the major events which shaped the changes in policy, I have not addressed the details of the events themselves, since each in itself is worthy of a complete volume. Instead, I have limited my discussion to the broad indicators of diplomatic policy changes which resulted from the events.

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Dr. A. Stanley Trickett, head of the University of Omaha History Department and to his associate, Dr. Paul L. Beck. Seminar courses in historic research conducted by Dr. Trickett, in which I was fortunate enough to be enrolled for three semesters, provided me with the necessary basic guidelines and techniques upon which to proceed with this thesis. For the thesis paper itself, Dr. Beck has rendered many hours of detailed perusal, assistance, and advice as the paper has progressed from draft to format for submission to the University. For his criticisms and critiques, I am most appreciative.
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"Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland:
Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island:
Who rules the World-Island commands the World."

Halford MacKinder

"Who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia; who
rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the
world."

Nicolas Spykman
INTRODUCTION

During World War II, when it became apparent that Germany would attack Russia, both Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt were inclined to welcome full cooperation with Russia. Churchill remarked on June 21, 1941, that "If Hitler invaded Hell I would make at least a favorable reference to the Devil in the House of Commons."¹ In actuality much more than a "favorable reference" was forthcoming. A massive program of military aid was promised and delivered by both the United States and Britain, and of equal importance, a three power military alliance was formed

² General Augustin Guillaume, Soviet Arms and Soviet Power (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1949), pp. 90-91. Aid from the United States was governed by the Lend-Lease Agreement, concluded on June 11, 1942. The material furnished from the end of 1942 on under this agreement totalled 17,500,000 tons, or 2,600 shiploads of all types of war making vehicles as well as basic essentials for life sustenance. England furnished 3,800 tanks, 6,800 aircraft and 2,000 tons of copper.
to combat the Nazis from three directions. Churchill reflected
the feelings of his nation when he said in December, 1941:

...the glorious steadfastness and energy with which they [the Russian Armies] have resisted...have now been made plain...We must faithfully and punctually fulfill the very serious undertakings we have made to Russia...\(^3\)

Both the United States and England's undertakings proved successful; consequently, by 1943 it became obvious that victory in the war must ultimately rest with the Allies. Therefore, in November 1943 the leaders of the Big Three met at Teheran, and for the first time, seriously discussed postwar policies and problems. A cooperative tendency among the leaders, which had been established during the three trying years of combat against a common enemy, was still prevalent at Teheran and led to general agreements regarding postwar problems, particularly that of the establishment of a United Nations. \(^4\) As a finale, the Big Three stated that "We came here with hope and determination. We leave here friends in


fact, in spirit and in purpose."

The "spirit of Teheran" persisted among the Big Three during 1944. As allied armies closed on Germany from east and west, there was a general feeling of acceptance in England and the United States for Uncle Joe Stalin and the glorious Red Army.  

Yet by the beginning of 1945 a feeling of apprehension was developing regarding Russia's intentions in the postwar world. Roosevelt remarked in his annual message to Congress on January 6, 1945, that "the nearer we come to vanquishing our enemies, the more we inevitably become conscious of differences among victors."  


The first chapter of this paper will investigate the causes, events, and policies which precipitated the bipolarization of world powers after World War II. Enigmatically perhaps, such bipolarization would include a split among the wartime Big Three and would align former enemies, Germany and Japan, with the Western Allies against the Soviet Union in a policy of containment around the Soviet territorial periphery or rimland.
CHAPTER I

THE DETERIORATION OF THE WARTIME ALLIANCE WITH
THE SOVIET UNION

The postwar age actually began in early February, 1945, at the Big Three meeting conducted at Yalta in the Crimea. In selecting a location for the meeting, Stalin stated that the military situation on the Eastern Front demanded his presence in Russia; therefore, he insisted on the Crimea as the site of the conference. Roosevelt, who in top military advisor William Leahy's opinion was already an ill and worn-out individual, was forced to undertake the difficult trip to Russia via a stopover at Malta. He was accompanied by a host of political and military advisors, including Secretary of State Stettinius and "Assistant President" Byrnes. Churchill and Stalin likewise had their top aids in attendance.  

At Yalta it was clear to the conferees that the end of hostilities was "in sight," and consequently, a

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determination of postwar policies was required. It was also obvious that England was no longer to play the star role in international relations, because the United States and the Soviet Union had clearly emerged as super-national powers which would dominate the postwar world. The unknown factor in the equation was the degree of cooperation which could reasonably be expected between the new dominant powers of state.

The United States delegation approached Yalta with some uneasiness. In December, 1944, Roosevelt had become disturbed by reports of Stalin's support for the Lublin (Communist) Government of Poland rather than for the Free Polish Government in exile in England. The President wrote to Stalin on December 16, 1944, requesting that Russia do nothing in Poland until the issue was discussed at Yalta. On December 27, 1944, Stalin replied in effect to the President that he should mind his own business. On December 30, 1944, Roosevelt again wrote Stalin expressing his concern for

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9 Ibid., pp. 302-322.


12 Ibid., p. 221-223.
Poland, but to no avail. Stalin replied on January 1, 1945, that the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR had on December 27 decided to recognize the Provisional Government of Poland "as soon as it is formed." 13

Yalta then was the initial encounter of the Cold War, coming as it did after the Soviet Presidium's action in regard to Poland's Communist government.

Actually, negotiations at Yalta proceeded smoothly at first. The Big Three Leaders had emerged unscathed in the war as a result of tremendous personal efforts as well as those on the part of their countrymen. Unquestionably, at Yalta at least some of the wartime "team spirit" still persisted among Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin. They were proud of the exclusive nature of their "club" and even joked about it. For example, at one point in the conference, Churchill remarked that the entrance fee for the Big Three was 5,000,000 soldiers. "Stalin must have bitterly reflected that the entrance fee that Russia had paid was more than five million dead soldiers." 14

13Ibid., p. 226.

As the Yalta Conference progressed, the Big Three found acceptable solutions to problems such as the composition of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the final plans for the defeat of Germany, and the terms for Russian entry into the war with Japan. Even on the controversial subject of Poland there was at least a tacit understanding. Stalin agreed to a new government in Poland to replace the Lublin regime. The new government was to be "reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad."\(^{16}\)

All three nations considered Yalta a success at its conclusion.

Stalin toasted: "...to the firmness of our Three-

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\(^{15}\)Leahy, p. 320. Concessions made by the U.S. to Russia were attributed to the military situation which existed at the time: In Europe, territory lost to the Germans in the Battle of the Bulge was only recently (February 1, 1945) regained. In the Japanese theater, the Allies faced the momentous task of invading the Japanese islands without, as yet, any help from the atomic bomb. See Chester Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1952), pp. 628-643.

Power Alliance. May it be strong and stable; may we be as frank as possible."\(^{17}\)

Churchill commented on his return to England: "I know of no government which stands to its obligations, even in its own despite, more solidly than the Russian Government."\(^{18}\)

Secretary of State Stettinius regarded Yalta as "a most successful meeting" and pointed out that there was "every evidence...of the Russian desire to cooperate along all lines with the United States...."\(^{19}\)

Contrary to expectations, Stalin's promises at Yalta, particularly those concerning Poland, proved to be the initiation of a continuing policy of misrepresentation of intentions rather than the panacea for postwar international problems. In the period immediately after Yalta, the Russians were negligent in carrying out the terms promised for the Polish


\(^{18}\)Ibid., p. 401.

government. Free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot, as specified in Section VII of the Yalta Agreements, were not conducted at all until January, 1947, and then they were not "free and unfettered."  

The Soviet Union's disregard for the terms of the Yalta Agreements produced an immediate reaction in the United States and Britain. On February 19, 1945, Senator Vandenberg wrote a letter to Acting Secretary of State Grew, stating that it had been

...asserted that...the Lublin government has outlawed certain elements of the Polish army which had been allied with the U. S. in the Middle East and Italy as traitors. If this is true in any degree it seems to me that it makes it simply unconscionably immoral for us to recognize the Lublin government.

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20Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 418.


22Jackson, pp. 20-22.

Churchill recognized the true Soviet Union objectives as early as March, 1945. In a letter to Roosevelt on March 27, 1945, Churchill said that he wanted no part of permitting the "Russian version of democracy" to be imposed on Poland or any other Eastern European nation. Roosevelt responded to Churchill that he viewed "with anxiety and concern the development of the Soviet attitude since...Yalta, and...that the time has come to take up directly with Stalin the broader aspects of the Soviet attitude (with particular reference to Poland)." A subsequent message from the President to Stalin expressed his concern in this regard. Stalin replied on April 7, 1945, that "matters on the Polish question have really reached a dead end." Almost simultaneously with the

24Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 432.

25Ibid., p. 435. As late as March 1, 1945, the President had maintained a degree of optimism regarding Big Three unity and the end of spheres of influence, balance of power, etc. See Leahy, p. 329.

26Ibid.

exchange of letters between President Roosevelt and Premier Stalin, Ambassador Harriman cabled Washington from Moscow, "advocating in a general way a tough policy with Russia as the one possible way of maintaining a soundly friendly relationship with her."\(^{28}\)

As a result of the post-Yalta Polish situation and other issues related to the Yalta Agreements, Congress concluded that a change in United States policy was required. On April 2, 1945, Mr. "Foreign Policy," Senator Vandenberg, noted in his private papers, following discussions with Secretary of State Stettinius and Senator Connally, that

> There is a general disposition to stop this Stalin appeasement. It has to stop sometime.\(^{29}\) Every new surrender makes it more difficult.

Later in the same month, the Senator wrote in his diary following another session with the Secretary of State that the "revolt against any further Soviet appeasement is growing."\(^{30}\)

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28 Millis, The Forrestal Diaries, p. 40. On the 20th of April, Harriman stated essentially the same thing to Secretary Forrestal. See Millis, p. 47.

29 Vandenberg, p. 161.

30 Ibid., p. 165.
Unfortunately for the cause of the United States, the President, who alone was aware of all the facts in the matter of negotiations with the Soviet Union, died a few days after Senators Vandenberg and Connally's anti-appeasement meeting with Stettinius and was succeeded by Vice President Harry S. Truman. With President Roosevelt's untimely death, White House leadership in negotiations with the Soviet Union was transferred to a man who initially possessed only a limited understanding of the details of the previous conferences.\textsuperscript{31}

As might be expected, Stalin characteristically rose to the occasion of Roosevelt's death with the statement that "We shall support President Truman with all our forces and with all our will."\textsuperscript{32} Stalin, the master opportunist, quickly reversed a previous decision to restrict Molotov from attending the opening session of the United Nations

\textsuperscript{31}Welles, pp. 340-341. In Welles' opinion President Truman possessed "neither knowledge, experience, nor strength" for the Presidential task of directing foreign policy.

in San Francisco, and even permitted the Foreign Minister to visit President Truman enroute.

The new President had found the occasion to study recent events and had become aware of the serious breach developing between the two countries. The meeting between Truman and Molotov did not improve matters. Truman reported:

...a complete deadlock had been reached on the subject of carrying out the Yalta agreement on Poland...our agreements had so far been a one-way street and that this could not continue.

As a result of Truman's discussions with Molotov regarding the Polish government, Molotov stated that "I have never been talked to like that in my life." The President replied, "Carry out your agreements, and you won't get talked to like that." President Truman's official recognition of Soviet deceit was only the first official indication of a future change in United States policy. Actions were still many months away.

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33Byrnes, All in One Lifetime, pp. 287-288.
35Ibid., p. 82.
Also in April, 1945, Prime Minister Churchill
directly challenged Stalin over the question of the Polish
Government. By letter he warned Stalin that England would
not recognize a Polish Government not in accordance with
the Yalta Agreements. 36 The Prime Minister went even one
step further: he recommended to the United States that
Allied armies advance as far as possible into Germany,
Austria, and Czechoslovakia -- also contrary to previous
agreements. In this he was overruled by the American
President, and Russia proceeded to "liberate" Berlin,
Vienna, and Prague. 37 In May of 1945, Churchill went on
to complain about the "iron curtain" which was descending
as the Soviet armies advanced and our own armies remained
static in their designated zones of occupation. 38

As Allied anxiety regarding the "iron curtain"
mounted, the "Big Three" met at Potsdam, Germany, in July,

36 Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Roosevelt and the
Russians (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc.,

37 Jackson, p. 10.

38 Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 573.
1945. In place of President Roosevelt there was Truman, accompanied by Secretary of State (newly appointed) James F. Byrnes. As a further complication, in the middle of the conference Churchill had to withdraw to London to await the outcome of a general election. Since he was defeated and subsequently replaced by Mr. Attlee, the wartime Big Three was reduced to the Big "One" — Stalin. 39

Although such knotty problems as German Reparations, German economic unity, and the western boundary of Poland were discussed with some success, the question of Poland's government "dominated the Conference." 40 Between Yalta and Potsdam, the United States and Britain had withdrawn recognition of the Polish exile government, and had, in faith with Stalin's pledge for free elections, recognized the Provisional Lublin Government. But at Potsdam, there was still no indication that Poland had been allowed any freedom of action in her internal affairs, which remained dominated by Red Army influence. Churchill expressed concern in

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39 Byrnes, *All in One Lifetime*, p. 296.

the opening sessions about Poland's plight, since it was to save this particular country from Fascism that Britain went to war in the first place.\footnote{Churchill, \textit{Triumph and Tragedy}, p. 647.} To the Prime Minister's question regarding elections, Stalin replied: "The Provisional Government of Poland have never refused to hold free elections."\footnote{Ibid., p. 654.} However, the Western Allies were convinced otherwise, and insisted that the Potsdam Agreement reiterate that Poland hold "free and unfettered elections...on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot..."\footnote{\textit{State Department Bulletin}, Vol. XIII, August 5, 1945, p. 158.}

While these negotiations were in progress at Potsdam, President Truman was informed that an atomic bomb had been successfully tested in New Mexico.\footnote{Truman, \textit{I}, 415-416.} This event was to have major repercussions. When Churchill was likewise informed, it was mutually agreed that Russia was no longer required to fight against Japan. Stalin's reactions were twofold:
his distrust of the Allies was increased immeasurably because he had not been informed of the project from its inception and secondarily, now foreseeing a quick termination of the Japanese War, he hastened his declaration of war against Japan, in spite of the lack of enthusiasm for his action by his allies, who had requested as a pre-requisite that Soviet Russia conclude an agreement with China.

In retrospect Potsdam represented the last serious attempt by the Big Three to amicably settle their differences. Thereafter, they designated their Foreign Ministers to debate the issues at the conference table prior to top level consideration. The first such meeting was scheduled for September, 1945, in London.

MEETINGS OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS

Between September, 1945, and July, 1946, there were numerous meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers,

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45Welles, p. 346. Stalin reacted quite casually when President Truman informed him of the successful testing of the first bomb. See Deutscher, p. 547.

46Truman, I, 425. The bombing of Hiroshima occurred on August 6, 1945. On August 8, 1945, Russia declared war on Japan.

primarily for the purpose of identifying the participants and for making ground rules which would ultimately permit the signing of peace treaties for the Balkan nations, Finland and Italy. In addition, the agenda included consideration of postwar government of Japan, Balkan governments, and atomic energy control.\(^{48}\)

The first session was held in London. Thereafter, the foreign ministers met at Moscow (December, 1945), London (January, 1946) and finally in Paris (April, 1946. At all of these conferences the United States was represented by Secretary of State Byrnes.\(^{49}\)

From the beginning the meetings were a running dispute between Byrnes and Molotov. The conflicting interests of the two powers represented by these individuals caused ever increasing personal bitterness between the two and political maneuvering at the conference tables.\(^{50}\)

\(^{48}\)Ibid., pp. 11-12.


Byrnes' long speeches on principles meant little to the Russians, who, according to Churchill, recognized force as the only basis for bargaining. Molotov later remarked that "he wished he could find out what it was I wanted so we could negotiate."  

Actually, the situation which Byrnes faced was most difficult. In the first place, Allied military forces were being de-mobilized even faster than the build-up had occurred during the war. Within a short period of time, a relative Allied vacuum faced the Russian pressure in Europe. In addition, Britain was obviously on the decline, and its future depended on the support which the United States might render in the postwar world. Since her other European Allies were in an even worse condition than Britain, the United States alone suddenly faced Soviet power in Europe. A third factor which complicated Byrnes' job was the open

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51 Millis, The Forrestal Diaries, pp. 144-145.  
52 Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p. 100.  
53 William B. Ziff, Two Worlds (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1946), p. 256. The New York Times, January 5, 1946, reported that the War Department was forced to slow down demobilization, since only 1,500,000 soldiers remained overseas (global).  
54 Ibid., p. 265.
hostility of Stalin and Molotov to any American proposal. Molotov still smarted over his encounter with the candid American President. Stalin's distrust of his Western Allies dated back to 1943 when he felt that Russia's very existence depended on the timely initiation of a Second Front by England and the United States. When this did not materialize until 1944, Stalin conjectured that possibly his allies were intentionally delaying invasion plans to permit their two ideological opponents to consume each other. In addition, Stalin could not forget his exclusion from the development of the atomic bomb, nor the sudden cessation of Lend-Lease aid after the final victory over Japan. Finally, the Soviet leader found it difficult to ignore his exclusion by the United States from active participation in matters pertaining to the Japanese occupation Government.


On the other side of the ledger there was the growing animosity which the United States held for Russia. The situation in Poland, which has already been reviewed, was not soon forgotten, even though that nation was already firmly behind the Iron Curtain. In addition, the United States was perturbed by the methods utilized by the Soviet government in maintaining governments "friendly" to Soviet Russia in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania, in conflict with the letter and spirit of the Yalta Agreements. Finally, there was the problem of Russian troops remaining in Iran after the war was over. Byrnes advised Stalin in December that if Iran brought this issue to the United Nations that the United States would support Iran. In January, 1946, this occurred. When the Secretary reacted as promised, both Stalin and Molotov became furious. Later, Molotov charged Byrnes with deliberately instigating an "anti-Soviet" campaign in Iran.

For the United States in the immediate postwar period, Secretary Byrnes was indeed the "key" to the situation. In the early months after the war, Byrnes kept the affairs of state mainly to himself; however, this tendency was

58 Leiss, p. 6.  
59 Opie, pp. 84-87.  
60 Welles, p. 386.
quickly changed by the President who recognized the value of a foreign policy which was understood and supported by the people and Congress. Another of Byrnes' ideosyncrasies was related to his leadership of State Department delegations at overseas conferences. At meetings conducted with Molotov, Byrnes often made on-the-scene decisions for the Nation. President Truman later expressed his concern for this usurpation of Presidential authority when he said that "More and more during the fall of 1945 I came to feel that in his role as Secretary of State, Byrnes was beginning to think of himself as an Assistant President in full charge of foreign policy."\(^6^1\)

For his conciliatory actions at London, in December, 1945, Byrnes was criticized by members of a variety of factions. Sumner Welles accused Byrnes of departing from

the fundamental principles established by the Yalta Agreements in order to appease the Soviet government. In a further effort at appeasement, we have recognized the Communist minority dictatorships in Yugoslavia and in Rumania...\(^6^2\)

Senator Vandenberg later remarked that he thought Byrnes

\(^{6^1}\)Truman, I, 546. \(^{6^2}\)Welles, p. 380.
was "loitering around Munich" in this period. On the other hand, according to Byrnes himself, there were those in the State Department who thought that the Secretary had been anything but conciliatory at London.

Finally, in January, 1946, the President interceded by personal action with a letter to Byrnes which provided the "point of departure of our new policy." The last sentence contained the essence of his thoughts for he said: "I'm tired of babying the Soviets." 

Senator Vandenberg confirmed the new thinking in a speech on February 27, 1946, in which he asked the Senate the question, "What is Russia up to now?". The Senator further specified that "there is a line beyond which compromise cannot go."

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63 Vandenberg, p. 246.
65 Truman, I, 551-552. See also James F. Byrnes, "Byrnes Answers Truman", Collier's, April 8, 1952. The former Secretary of State denies that the alleged letter by President Truman "was either read to me or sent to me." The issue of the existence of the letter apparently has never been fully resolved.
66 Vandenberg, pp. 246-249.
In July-August, 1946, the Paris Peace Conference categorically convinced Secretary Byrnes of the fallacy of trusting the Russians in negotiations. Afterwards, Byrnes stated

...I should be less than frank if I did not confess my bewilderment at the motives which the Soviet Delegation attributed to the United States at Paris...They charged that the United States...was now seeking to enslave Europe economically.67

Even though peace treaties with Italy, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, and Finland were signed in February, 1947,68 Byrnes had already resigned two weeks before, and was replaced by George C. Marshall.

THE IMMEDIATE POSTWAR PERIOD IN RETROSPECT

There has been much speculation in the past twenty years that the United States was "sold out" at Yalta. Yet in retrospect, when the United States' concessions to Soviet Russia are measured against her military requirement for Soviet participation in the Far East theater of operations, they become more reasonable. In Europe the situation

67 Zacharias, p. 72. 68 Leiss, p. 15.
emerging from Yalta was more immediately of grave concern to the Western Allies, as the Soviet leaders neglected to abide by Big Three sanctioned agreements, most distinctly in the case of Poland.

After Potsdam, the de facto military situation in Eastern Europe precluded any earnest endeavors by the United States and Britain to force Russian compliance with the Yalta Agreements, for by calculation Stalin maintained large military forces in Europe for the purpose of extending Communist influence. On the other hand, Britain and the United States rationalized that agreements with Russia would indeed be binding and as such, adequate for the security of Europe. Consequently, military forces in Europe other than those for constabulary and occupation duties were essentially disbanded and returned to the parent nations en masse. This disregard for the military balance of power in Europe would lead to some rather emphatic reversals of policy within a short period of time. Fortunately for the Allies, Russia's staggering war losses, both in industrial capability and manpower, limited to a degree a timely and more aggressive

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policy in Europe; otherwise, not only Poland, Austria, Hungary, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia would have become Communist, but possibly West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, France, and Italy as well.\textsuperscript{70}

By early 1947, Russian designs on western Europe had become clear enough for the United States to recognize that a major policy change was not only in order, but absolutely essential.

\textsuperscript{70}Deutscher, p. 532.
CHAPTER TWO

THE U. S. POLICY OF CONTAINMENT

A new policy was first suggested by the United States Charge d'Affaires in Moscow, George F. Kennan, who cabled his recommendations to Washington in February, 1946. In July of the following year, essentially the same information appeared in Foreign Affairs Magazine, anonymously authored by Mr. "X". Ambassador Kennan's analysis indicated that United States foreign policy required reshaping along lines to counter Soviet "expansive tendencies" wherever they might occur on the Soviet periphery.  

As Secretary of State Acheson later remarked, the object of the containment policy was, and is, to build situations of strength in opposition to Soviet thrusts

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1George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy (The University of Chicago Press, 1951), pp. 107-124 for the text of Kennan's article in Foreign Affairs Magazine. See also James Burnham, Containment or Liberation (New York: The John Day Co., 1952), p. 20. Also, Rostow, p. 199. Also, J. F. Dulles, War or Peace, pp. 29-30. Dulles says that containment is a "no appeasement" policy and that Secretary Byrnes initiated it in September 1945. However, the first reference to the policy as a national objective is contained in Mr. Kennan's cable to Washington.
towards political and/or military vacuums. If the new policy proved successful, it would promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power.

Containing Communism on a near global scale promised to be no mean assignment for the United States and its Allies. Ambassador Kennan's definition of containment specifically warned of the long term requirements of the new policy. In this regard, implementation of such a policy would require not only free nations on the periphery with stable governments and sound economies, but in addition, would require the necessary military forces within the territorial confines of the peripheral nations to thwart communist aggression from its inception and prevent further losses in the balance of power. Such Allied military counter-actions would be required on a quick reaction basis -- there would be no time available to call up and train the reserves.

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3Kennan, American Diplomacy, p. 124.
How the United States faced the total threat posed by the Soviet Union on all fronts and how she assisted in the reestablishment of economically stable governments on the Russian periphery will be further discussed.

THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE

The first of many confrontations between the United States and Russia which called for the application of the policy of containment occurred in early 1947 in Greece and Turkey. More precisely, it was the first encounter between the two world giants wherein the Soviet position was not directly enhanced and guaranteed by the Red Army; as such it was indeed the first situation which was really contestable at all.

The trouble within Greece was precipitated by Communist guerilla actions emanating from and supported through Yugoslavia. A Communist take over appeared likely.

4Spanier, p. 19. Secretary Marshall, in Moscow in early 1947, later said..."I was being pressed constantly... to give the Russians hell...At that time, the facilities for giving them hell...was 1-1/3 divisions over the entire U.S. That is quite a proposition when you deal with somebody with over 260...". See John C. Sparrow, History of Personnel Demobilization in the United States Army (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951), p. 282.
Similarly, in Turkey apprehension mounted as Communists applied diplomatic pressure and threatened the use of military force. On February 24, 1947, the British Ambassador submitted two communiques to the United States which declared that the British economy could not continue to provide aid to either Greece or Turkey and that within weeks British military support must be terminated. On a priority basis, the State Department analyzed the problem facing Greece and Turkey and obtained the concurrence of President Truman that American economic and military aid constituted the best possible solution. On the 12th of March, 1947, the administration's plans for the assistance program for Greece and Turkey had progressed sufficiently for the President to present specific details to a joint session of Congress. The President said

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures...The assistance that I

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5 Rostow, p. 207.

am recommending for Greece and Turkey $400,000,000 amounts to little more than one-tenth of one percent of...the wartime investment of $341,000,000,000."

For Congress in 1947 the bill which would implement the Truman Doctrine was somewhat difficult to accept without considerable deliberation prior to passage. A protracted debate ensued on the floors of Congress, in which it was asserted by Senator Vandenberg that the United Nations had been created specifically to maintain the peace and that consequently American assistance to Greece and Turkey should be administered under the auspices of the United Nations. Others saw Greece and Turkey as clearly beyond the area where the United States should directly intervene; on the contrary, they argued that the eastern Mediterranean area was and should remain primarily a British concern. Others debated that intervention in Greece and Turkey could lead to further involvement in the form of dangerous confrontations directly with Soviet Russia.  

Proponents of the legislation argued simply and effectively that Greece and Turkey would become Communist


if Congress failed to act favorably on the assistance act. Ultimately, the act passed Congress on May 22, 1947, after a vote of 287 to 107 in the House and 67 to 28 in the Senate. The State Department proceeded to reach agreements with Greece and Turkey in June and July of 1947, thereby consummating America's first positive action toward containing Communism in Southern Europe and the Middle East.

THE MARSHALL PLAN

While the Truman Doctrine promised to secure the "southern flank of Europe," it did not directly address itself to the postwar problems of Western Europe. Since a small number of American troops remained in that area, the threat of direct Soviet intervention was rather distant, obviously because the small contingent could be reinforced if required. On the other hand, economic problems were probably just as acute in Europe as in Greece and Turkey.

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The items needed to recover from the devastations of four years of war, such as "wheat, cotton, sulphur, machinery, trucks, and coat," were available only in the United States. This shortage of raw materials in turn created a shortage in export produce; hence there were few American dollars coming into Europe. Thus, a dollar gap existed which propelled European economies headlong toward the precipice of complete collapse.

Even before 1947, the United States had recognized the serious economic situation in Western Europe. In December, 1945, at the termination of Lend-Lease aid, a loan of $3,750,000,000 had been extended to Britain in an effort to maintain the stability of the pound. A similar loan of $1,200,000,000 was made to France, and before the end of 1946, a total of $7,500,000,000 in loans was extended to Western Europe. This financial assistance proved insufficient to maintain solvency. By 1947, the economic crisis had permitted political gains by the Communist parties in France and Italy, and by early 1948 had exhausted the $3,750,000,000 loan to Britain.

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11Spanier, p. 39  
12Ibid.  
13Rostow, pp. 197-198  
14The New York Times, March 4, 1948
Whereas there had been some opposition in Congress to American assistance rendered previously to Greece and Turkey because the area was so far afield, few Congressmen contested the requirement for United States assistance in Europe to maintain a favorable balance of power in so vital an area. The consequences to the United States of a Communist Europe were clear to most government officials; hence even by 1947 Europe was recognized as America's first line of defense in a contest or possible war with Russia.15

Into the middle of Europe's economic problems stepped the new Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, who was recalled from China to replace James F. Byrnes, effective on January 8, 1947. In April, Marshall created within the State Department a new super planning division which he called the "Policy Planning Staff." Headed by Mr. "X," George F. Kennan, the policy planning staff was initially directed to devise an overall plan for the reconstruction of Western Europe. The resultant plan, which called for a large economic aid program for Europe, was completed on May 23, 1947, and introduced by Secretary Marshall in a

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15Spanier, p. 40  
speech at Harvard's Graduation Exercise on June 5, 1947.

In his address, Secretary Marshall said

The breakdown of the business structure of Europe during the war was complete... she must have substantial additional help or face economic, social, and political deterioration of a very grave character... The initiative, I think, must come from Europe.  

The Marshall Plan, or European Recovery Program as it was officially designated, was developed in detail during the second half of 1947. Under this plan United States officials asked seventeen European states to present a "plan for their common needs and common recovery."  

With the consent of the other participating members, Great Britain shaped the joint recovery plan and the request to the United States.  

The State Department originally estimated that the four-year costs of the European Recovery Program would approach $22,000,000,000; however, in the course of debates

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18 Ibid.  
19 Rostow, p. 213. Participating members formed the Organization of European Economic Cooperation, which became the instrument for application of American assistance.
and refinements in the Congress, the figure was reduced to $17,000,000,000 and in actuality between 1948 and 1952, only $12,000,000,000 in aid was delivered. 20

Although the final and complete European Recovery Program did not pass Congress until April 1948, an Interim Aid Plan for France, Italy, and Austria was submitted to Congress in November, 1947, and received quick passage. 21 John Foster Dulles was in France at the time the Interim Aid Plan was under consideration by Congress, and he related how Communist strikes had disrupted rail communication, paralyzed industry, and interrupted the supply of electric power and water in Paris. He recorded that the strikes subsided in December as France regained hope and confidence with the promise of economic aid from the United States. 22 The Foreign Aid Act of 1947, as the Interim Plan was officially designated, in authorizing $597,000,000 in aid, stated that

It is the purpose of this Act to provide immediate aid urgently needed by the peoples of Austria,

20 "Development of U. S. Foreign Policy, 1943-1950," The Congressional Digest, Volume 30, Jan to Dec, 1951. Paul Hoffman, Director of the Economic Cooperation Administration estimated the 4½ year ERP Program costs at $17,000,000,000. See Appendix A for a summary of foreign aid (and military aid) for the period 1946-1955.


22 Ibid.
China, France, and Italy...to alleviate conditions of hunger and cold and prevent serious economic retrogression.\(^{23}\)

America's economic plans for European recovery took the initiative from the Soviet bloc. Soviet satellite nations in eastern Europe initially reacted favorably to overtures for their participation, since their economic situation was similar to that within western European nations. However, within the Kremlin there was consternation concerning the ultimate effects of such cooperation with Capitalism on the part of Soviet satellite nations. Fearing that he might lose some of his tight control over the nations, Stalin disapproved their participation in the European Recovery Program.\(^{24}\) In Moscow, Ambassador Walter B. Smith reported that the Soviet Union publicly criticized economic assistance plans of the United States as a "cunning way of subjecting all Europe to American capital."\(^{25}\)

The plan proved to be not only a significant political maneuver in that it provided a degree of unification among


\(^{24}\) Rostow, p. 212. The subsequent quasi-defection of Yugoslavia and the revolt in Hungary proved that Stalin's concern was well-founded.

Western European nations vis-a-vis Communism, but of even more importance, it proved successful in its economic mission. By 1950 European production exceeded production figures for 1939 by twenty-five percent,\textsuperscript{26} by 1951, forty percent.\textsuperscript{27} The massive success enjoyed in Europe even had the side effect of creating a boom in the United States, since European dollars became available for the purchase of American products.\textsuperscript{28}

AID PROGRAMS IN RETROSPECT

As the Truman Doctrine contained Communism in Greece and Turkey, so did the European Recovery Program contribute to its containment in Europe. Ambassador Smith said that "The Marshall Plan... has been the major force in the stabilization of Europe..."\textsuperscript{29} The two plans clearly mark a turning point in American-Soviet relations in that they actively initiated the Cold War for the Allies, opened the door for the Point Four assistance program,\textsuperscript{30} and finally

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{26} Spanier, p. 43.
  \item \textsuperscript{27} Rostow, p. 216.
  \item \textsuperscript{28} Spanier, p. 43.
  \item \textsuperscript{29} Smith, p. 332.
  \item \textsuperscript{30} The Point Four program provided technical assistance for undeveloped nations. It was called "Point Four" because it was the fourth point mentioned in the Presidential address of January 20, 1949, which introduced it. See Rostow, p. 256.
\end{itemize}
precipitated the next step in containing Communism, a collective security defense pact.

THE BERLIN BLOCKADE

The European Recovery Program certainly did not ease the tensions which had developed between the United States and the Soviet Union since 1945, nor was it designed to do so. The resultant Soviet boycott of and resentment to the plan did, however, add a new subject for tirades from F. M. Molotov and the Soviet foreign office. Concurrent with the propaganda emanating from Moscow was a continued Communist effort to bring under Soviet control additional European nations. Efforts to expand Soviet influence proved successful in Czechoslovakia, when a successful Communist Party coup d'etat established Soviet domination and Communist control in February, 1948.\(^{31}\)

The apprehension which had been mounting among the remaining free European nations now reached the acute state as they realized that military unity would be required to

complement American economic assistance. In early 1948 England and France were formally allied under the terms of the Dunkirk Pact. In March, 1948, this alliance was expanded to include Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, and was called the Brussels Pact. At the same time there was serious thought and discussion by the National Security Council of bringing the United States into a military alliance with the Brussels Pact nations.

These open manifestations by the European community to stop Communism, overtly if necessary, caused Stalin deep concern as did the spectre of a resurgent Germany. When Secretary Byrnes, at Stuttgart, Germany, in 1946, stated that "the German people..., under proper safeguards, should now be given primary responsibility for the running of their own affairs," it became clear that the United States and Soviet Russia had vastly different ideas as to the future of Germany. In addition to Byrnes' proposal to transfer a

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32 "Development of U. S. Foreign Policy, 1943-1950," The Congressional Digest, Volume 30, Jan to Dec, 1951. The idea had been introduced as early as March, 1946, in the W. S. Churchill "Iron Curtain" speech at Fulton, Missouri. See also F. R. Dulles, p. 241.

degree of self-control to the Germans, between 1946 and 1948 the United States and her Allies became staunch supporters of German economic unification. This concept also was opposed by Russia who sought to maintain the status quo of separate zones. As the Brussels Pact alliance evolved, the issue of Germany took on more and more importance, not only because of Germany's previous roles as chief antagonist in the two World Wars, but now, and more importantly, because she was enmeshed between Communism and the free world in the area which held the industrial balance of power - the heart of industrial Europe. Thus by 1948, Germany, which only three years before had been the instrument of unity between the United States and Soviet Russia now had become, in the words of Bernard Baruch, the "focus of their disunity."\footnote{Rostow, p. 193.}

Secretary Marshall's State Department deputy, Dean Acheson, later summarized the events relating to Germany in 1948 by saying that the Soviets clearly were seeking "virtual control over German economic and political life." The "resultant paralysis" in Germany would obviously hinder the

overall European Recovery Plan which needed German resources and industrial strength. The only recourse open to the Allies appeared to be a complete economic unification of the three zones occupied by the United States, England, and France. By agreement in London, in June, 1948, this unification became a reality, with the added proviso that Germany would be authorized a provisional government exclusive of the zone occupied by the Soviets but including the allied-controlled areas in Berlin, deep inside the Soviet Zone.

Concurrent with the new economic and political reorganization of Germany was a currency reform. The purpose of this action was to free the newly unified area financially from the inflated currency of the old Reichsmark.

Ambassador Smith in Moscow reported that the Allied moves towards unification and revival of Germany were considered by Stalin as a direct challenge to Soviet Union

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37 Ibid. 2,500,000 Germans lived on the "island" of Berlin. See J. F. Dulles, pp. 54-56. See Appendix B, a map of the zones of Germany.

38 Ibid.
interests in Europe. On June 24, 1948, from Moscow came the order to retaliate with a land and rail blockade of the allied access route to Berlin, virtually isolating the 2,500,000 Berliners on their island within a sea under Communist control.

From the initiation, Stalin hoped to trade a delay of the formation of the new West German government as the price for termination of the blockade. If this trade proved unacceptable to the Allies, the alternative, as he saw it, was an allied withdrawal from Berlin.

The United States avoided these alternatives by choosing a third alternative, one probably unexpected by the Soviets - an airlift of supplies from the free zones of Germany and Europe into Berlin, called "Operation Vittles" by the American pilots who flew their C-47 and C-54 cargo aircraft over the land blockade.

On June 26, 1948, the massive airlift began, with planes eventually attaining a landing interval of as close

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39 Smith, p. 230. Smith and Molotov had discussed the overall situation in Europe at some length in May, 1948, without effectively relaxing tensions. See Smith, pp. 159-164.


41 Smith, pp. 252-253.

as one every three minutes and delivering payloads of from 4,000 tons to almost 13,000 tons per day. 43

Reaction to the blockade was rather slow in coming. Not until October did the item appear on the United Nations Security Council agenda; that agency proceeded to study the problem during the winter of 1948-1949. 44 The next Soviet move occurred on December 1, 1948, when a separate Communist city government was installed in the Soviet Sector of Berlin. 45

Some 321 days later, the efforts of the American Air Force had proven that free Berliners could survive on goods delivered by air supply lines only. The airlift had successfully weathered the winter fogs at the Berlin airdromes. 46 American prestige in Germany was vastly enhanced as a result of the tremendous effort on the part of our airmen in delivering vitally-needed food and coal for survival. 47 An allied counter-blockade of East Germany

43 Clay, p. 381. Eventually, a total of 1,592,787 tons of supplies were moved in to Berlin. See Smith, p. 231.
44 J. F. Dulles, pp. 56-57.
46 Ibid. 47 J. F. Dulles, p. 58.
had proven more effective than the Berlin Blockade.

Consequently, Stalin decided to pick a time and place suitable to the Soviet cause and terminate the blockade. 48

Thus, on the 12th of May, 1949, the blockade ended on terms advantageous to the United States and West Germany. 49

This overt action on the part of the United States in meeting Soviet aggressive tendencies in Germany demonstrated the effectiveness of the containment policy when backed with determination and resources.

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

As Secretary Marshall had related in Moscow in early 1947, it was quite difficult to negotiate with the Soviets when backed by only 20,000 troops as opposed to over 2,500,000 on their side. 50 Secretary Byrnes had also been

48 Smith, p. 257. After Stalin mentioned that the Berlin situation might be "solvable," subsequent discussions with Mr. Malik led to the actual termination agreement. See J. F. Dulles, p. 58.

49 Ibid.

faced with the same problem in his dealings with Molotov and later remarked that "He [Truman] announced the policy of containing Russia... But failed to provide any divisions to support such a policy." 51

The search for an improved military posture which would transform Allied forces from their weakened, demobilized condition into a credible deterrence was a two-pronged effort. The American monopoly on the atomic bomb and the means to deliver it were exploited with an almost immediate increase to eleven combat-ready wings within the Air Force by mid-1947. 52 The National Security Act of July 1947 provided for a major reorganization of the national military structure. This act, the so-called Unification Act, in actuality created a third service, the Air Force, which was elevated to equality with the Army and the Navy. New agencies formed included the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Resources Board. 53 In short, the new reorganization promised improved

51 James F. Byrnes, "Byrnes Answers Truman," Collier's, April 26, 1956.

52 Rostow, p. 172.

53 Rostow, p. 174. The National Security Council was created with the purpose in mind of coordinating military and foreign policy. Although initially dominated by military representation (all three service secretaries plus the Secretary of Defense), eventually the three service representatives were dropped. See Graebner, p. 260.
efficiency and coordination for the formation of national policy as well as the application of national force if required.

The second of the two-pronged effort to enhance the military posture of the United States vis-a-vis Soviet Russia was aimed directly at the area where Soviet aggression tendencies were prevalent and where already the Interim Aid Bill and the European Recovery Plan had sought to stave off aggression through economic means. Russian opposition to the Interim Aid Bill, the excessive use of the veto in the United Nations Security Council, the stalemate at the London Conference of Foreign Ministers in December, 1947, and the fall of Czechoslovakia in January, 1948, convinced Secretary Marshall and other national leaders of the necessity to complement the European aid programs with active military protection.  

Although discussions and thought at the time emphasized the military defensive alliance as the prime function of the future organization, other obvious benefits from such an alliance were not excluded. For example, it was recognized that the unity provided by a mutual defense pact

54Graebner, p. 261.
would provide considerable advantages in political negotiations with Soviet Russia.  

The formation of the Brussels Pact in March, 1948, provided the vehicle through which expansion could be accomplished to include the North American nations of Canada and the United States. The suggestion by Canadian Prime Minister St. Laurent in April, 1948, for such inclusion, provided the concept with the necessary momentum. The United States Senate, spurred on by the initiation of the Berlin Blockade in June, passed a resolution introduced by Senator Vandenberg in mid-June, 1948, which basically agreed in advance to United States' "association...with such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid." The Vandenberg Resolution thus paved the way for preliminary negotiations in July, 1948, in Washington.


56 Ibid.


58 Osgood, p. 33. Bailey, p. 808, points out that the Senate Resolution broke the long-standing U. S. policy of maintaining no entangling alliances in Europe.
In the preliminary planning stage, there were some who considered the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a sort of a Kellogg-Briant Pact for western nations wherein if any of its members were attacked, the remaining members would respond with military force against the aggression. Dean Acheson of the State Department said that

What is required /In lieu of brute force stoppage/ is rather sufficient strength to make it impossible for an aggressor to achieve a quick and easy victory...The fundamental pledge of the treaty, that an attack on one signatory will mean an attack on all, closes the door to piecemeal aggression.59

The "guaranty pact" concept created considerable apprehension in the forward area where about twelve scattered divisions faced twenty-five fully armed and, more importantly, fully coordinated Soviet divisions.60 French Premier H. Queuille predicted that any recurrence of invasion such as those of the two previous world wars would leave France only a corpse and not worth recovery. Consequently, he emphasized that the American line of defense in Europe must be considered the existing Soviet border.61


60 Osgood, pp. 28-29.

In accordance with French desires, a "forward strategy" was finally adopted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization with the concurrence of the United States. Military planners foresaw a requirement for something on the order of eighty to eighty-five divisions of ground forces with two-thirds of these to be immediately available. Such a ground force would serve two purposes: (1) Act as a "trip wire" in which initial contact in an invasion would directly involve a clash with American nationals and hence assure full United States retaliation, (2) Actually hold the Red Army at the Elbe River until the full force of American airpower could be applied.

Although there was never much doubt regarding the approval by the Brussels Pact nations of the broader treaty, since the inclusion of the United States inspired considerable confidence in Western Europe, prospective members were

62 Osgood, p. 34-38.

"advised" to join the new North Atlantic Treaty Organization if they expected any military aid from the United States.\textsuperscript{64}

On April 4, 1949, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Iceland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands Norway, Portugal, and the United States signed the treaty which formed the new organization.\textsuperscript{65} As approved, the treaty guaranteed military assistance from all members in the event of an attack on one of its members. Even more important was the fact that it specified that a joint military staff be formed to assure unified actions for forces committed to mutual support. In addition, its format, as presented to Congress, authorized the President to use American forces as required in support of the mutual defense agreement. In spite of these far-reaching, and on the whole, quite revolutionary provisions, public debate on the treaty in the United States fell far short of expectancies.\textsuperscript{66} Dean Acheson had little difficulty maneuvering the treaty through


\textsuperscript{65}State Department Bulletin, Vol. XX, April 17, 1949, pp. 471-482.

\textsuperscript{66}The New York Times, May 19, 1949. Initially, there was no direct commitment of American ground forces authorized for integration with North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces. However, this integration did occur in 1951 and 1952.
the Senate which had previously agreed to the principle in advance. The Senate approved the measure on July 21, 1949, by a vote of eighty-two to thirteen. 67

Brussels Pact nations were so confident that the Senate would approve the treaty that on April 5, 1949, the day after the signing, but well in advance of Senate approval, they delivered a request to the United States for military assistance to put teeth in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Pact.

Their request stated that

In order to carry out a common defence programme...there is an urgent need for United States material and financial assistance. 68

In response to this request, on the same day that he signed the treaty implementing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, President Truman presented a bill to Congress authorizing military assistance to countries included in the new organization. As approved in October, 1949, this bill

67 F. R. Dulles, p. 244.

68 John Gange, American Foreign Relations (New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1959), pp. 122-123. Although the quotation is from paragraph 5 of the request from the Brussels Pact nations, the words deleted refer to the previous portion of the request, which enumerated the principles upon which further negotiations should proceed.
authorized expenditures "not to exceed $500,000,000" but with another $500,000,000 available on a standby basis. 69

Thus, the loop in Europe was completed. Economic aid had been provided. A viable military organization supported by American atomic bombers had come into being, and finally, military assistance had been authorized by the Congress for European allies. A feeling of complacency set in temporarily in the United States only to be shattered for the long term by the Soviet detonation of an atomic device in 1949 and for the short term by the Korean War which commenced in 1950. 70

THE KOREAN WAR

The long term destabilizing event, the Soviet atomic bomb, could be met only by increasing the potency of the United States' strategic deterrence. President Truman's approval for the production of a hydrogen bomb in January, 1950, and the build-up of the Strategic Air Command assured at least a temporary advantage over the Soviet Union in this regard. 71


70 Osgood, pp. 50-51. 71 Rostow, p. 233.
The successful economic revival of Western Europe, the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the resurgence of Germany, the successful airlift into Berlin, and finally, the implementation of the Schumann Plan all contributed to the Soviet stratagem of a transference of expansive tendencies from Western Europe to the Far East. Stymied by allied strength in Europe, the Soviet Union turned elsewhere to a geographical location where the balance of power was in her favor. Such a situation had been created by the withdrawal in June, 1949, of 50,000 American occupation troops from the area of Korea south of the 38th parallel.

The surprise and unprovoked attack on South Korea occurred before dawn on June 24, 1950. The stunned Republic of Korea defenders, supported only by a handful

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72 The Schumann Plan of May 1950 sought "increased productivity in the European steel and coal industries." It also bound "France and Germany together in ways which would minimize the possibilities of future friction and conflict." See Rostow, p. 218.

73 Spanier, p. 67.


of American military advisers, reeled southward from the
effects of the North Korean artillery barrages and troop
assaults. 76

President Truman, enroute from Washington to Kansas
City at the time of the attack, kept abreast of the situation
by telephone with the new Secretary of State Acheson and the
Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, Dean Rusk. The
gravity of the situation as reported from Korea caused the
President to return to Washington the following day. John
Foster Dulles, who only a few days before had returned from
a visit to South Korea, cabled Washington from Tokyo as
follows:

...to sit by while Korea is over-run by an
unprovoked armed attack would start a disastrous
chain of events leading most probably to world
war. 77

Unquestionably, the Korean invasion constituted the
severest test thus far of the containment policy. Secretary
Acheson had committed the United States to the defense of
free Asia on general security grounds and had specifically
warned the Chinese against "aggressive or subversive

76 Ibid., pp. 333-334.
77 Beverly Smith, "The White House Story: Why We Went
to War in Korea," Saturday Evening Post, November 10, 1951.
adventures beyond their borders." However, earlier in the year, Secretary Acheson, in discussing the situation in the Far East, had specifically excluded South Korea as an area to be protected by the United States. Thus, based on State Department papers, the President could have justifiably chosen to withdraw entirely from Korea or to stand and fight the aggressor.

By Monday, June 26th, it had become clear the attack was in fact an all-out invasion and that the Republic of South Korea could not survive without external assistance. With the support of a Security Council resolution to the effect that the invasion constituted a breach of the peace, President Truman declared to his staff on the 26th of June that

What was developing in Korea seemed to me like a repetition on a larger scale of what had happened in Berlin. The Reds were probing for weakness in our armor; we had to meet their thrust without getting embroiled in a world-wide war.

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80 Truman, II, 337.
On the evening of the 26th of June, instructions were passed to General Douglas MacArthur to send all available ammunition which could be spared to the South Korean army and, in addition, to furnish ships and planes for the protection and evacuation of American dependents. This latter requirement was naturally interpreted very liberally by the General, who from the initiation of the first attack, advocated direct American assistance. The same directive from Washington started the Seventh Fleet north from the Philippines to take up station in the Straits of Formosa for the purpose of completely neutralizing Formosa and thereby preventing a widening of the conflict.

By Wednesday, the 28th of June, the military situation in Korea had further deteriorated to the point that General MacArthur called the Pentagon advocating direct commitment of two American divisions. With the approval by Washington of MacArthur's plea for general force commitment under the United Nations banner and the immediate authorization of a naval blockade of North Korea, the policy of containment concurrently became fully implemented in the Far East and passed

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81 Ibid., pp. 334-335.  
82 Ibid., p. 343.
from the passive to the active.

Although forced back by August into a small perimeter around the port of Pusan on the south tip of the Korean peninsula, General MacArthur on September 15th executed a "brilliant maneuver," an invasion from the sea at Inchon, behind enemy lines. 83 This maneuver turned the tide against the North Koreans who by September 30th had hastily retreated north to the 38th Parallel. 84

At this point in the war a further major policy decision was in order: should United Nations' forces pursue the war into North Korea with the aim of unifying all Korea or was a standstill in order at the 38th Parallel, from whence the initial attack came? The National Security Council recommended the unification of all Korea and the destruction of the army of North Korea, provided "there was no indication of threat of entry of Soviet or Chinese Communists elements in force..." 85 With the approval of the President and with the support of the United Nations, the forces of General MacArthur successfully moved into

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83 Truman, II, 360. The President so stated in a message of congratulations to General MacArthur.
84 Rostow, p. 236.
85 Truman, II, p. 359.
North Korea and approached the Yalu River by November, 1950.

Contrary to the national intelligence estimate, however, in late November Red Chinese forces streamed into North Korea from Manchurian bases, and the Korean War suddenly took a turn for the worse. Secretary Acheson remarked that

...This is not merely another phase of the Korean campaign. This is a fresh and unprovoked aggressive act, even more immoral than the first. 86

By March of 1951 the see-saw affair was back again where it all started, and in April General MacArthur was removed by the President for publicly advocating direct involvement with Red China. 87 In the process of reaching a decision to remove his subordinate, the Commander-in-Chief reasoned that

...our Constitution embodies the principle of civilian control of the military. This was the principle that General MacArthur threatened... It was my duty to act. 88

The war then took on a stalemate condition at the 38th Parallel which lasted through the truce negotiation phase, 89 and in fact the 38th Parallel ultimately became the line

87 Truman, II, pp. 442-449.
88 Ibid., p. 445. 89 Rostow, p. 236.
of demarcation in Korea or the so-called Bamboo Curtain.

In retrospect there are several aspects of historical importance of the Korean War which need to be highlighted. First, the invasion was obviously specifically designed to exploit a position of weakness, a position created by the previous year’s withdrawal of American troops and additionally by the general de-emphasis within the Department of Defense of the importance of Army ground troops. This latter concept envisioned a heavy reliance on American atomic bombers to maintain the peace.  

However, the United States chose not to utilize her bombers in their designed mission as atomic bomb carriers. Instead, the American atomic bombers were used only in the more conventional role of dropping high explosive bombs, and Communist forces chose not to employ heavy bombers at all. From this it may be concluded that both the Communists and the United States felt either that the atomic bomb was not required in Korea, or that its use would result in retaliatory strikes by the opposition, or that its use was immoral and might bring world censure.

90 Ibid., pp. 228-230.
Finally, the American response, even though involving less than full scale commitment of weapons, and even though by the final settlement achieving only a stalemate or status quo ante bellum, did represent a clear statement and resolve by the United States to stop Communist aggression in the Far East. Secretary Acheson summarized the situation as follows:

In Korea the Russians presented a check which was drawn on the bank account of collective security /containment in disguise/. The Russians thought the check would bounce. They thought it was a bad check. But to their surprise, the teller paid it.91

Short term though the Korean War may be considered, it also had several important long terms results which affected not only the Far East but the entire position of the free world vis-a-vis Soviet Russia. Success within the United Nations Security Council during the crisis months of June and July, 1950, was directly attributable to the absence of the Soviet delegate and his veto power. However, his return in August clouded the future in regards to United Nations responses in any future situation similar to the Korean War. Consequently on September 20, 1950, Secretary

Acheson presented United States recommendations "designed to increase the effectiveness of United Nations action against aggression." The Acheson Plan, as this was later named, provided that if the Security Council failed to take action to maintain international peace and security by virtue of a veto, the General Assembly would "consider the matter and make recommendations to members for collective measures, including force if necessary."

In June 1950, Congress authorized $5,000,000,000 for the defense of Europe. In 1951 Greece and Turkey joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Military forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization were reinforced in 1951 and 1952 by the direct commitment of American divisions, as General Eisenhower, recalled from Columbia University by President Truman as the first supreme commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, sought to strengthen the forces supporting the policy of containment. Serious thought was given to rearming Western Germany itself.

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92 Bundy, p. 255.  
93 Ibid.  
95 Rostow, p. 217-258.
Service forces in the United States were increased from 1,500,000 to 3,500,000 and have since been maintained at about the 3,000,000 level. The military budget rose from $12,000,000,000 annually to $41,000,000,000 and also has since leveled off at about the same figure. Finally, foreign aid rose from $4,500,000,000 annually to $7,100,000,000, but has since tapered off into the $3,000,000,000 category. 96

In short, Korea positively convinced American leaders of the long term threat posed by Communism and acted as a catalyst in the implementation of further long-range manpower and monetary tactics designed to stop the Sino-Soviet Bloc on its existing borders.

CHAPTER III

THE U. S. POLICY OF MASSIVE RETALIATION

The Eisenhower Republicans alleged during the presidential campaign of 1952 that the Democrats had failed to concoct a positive foreign policy vis-a-vis Soviet Russia since World War II. In contrast, General Eisenhower and his future Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, promised to move from the negative or defensive to the positive or offensive policy and concurrently to balance the federal budget. ¹ On taking office, however, President Eisenhower found that the issue of a peace or truce in Korea was still the predominant issue in foreign affairs and that its successful conclusion was prerequisite to concentration on foreign affairs elsewhere. ²

In an effort to force the North Korean and Chinese representatives to the United Nations mediation table in

₁ Eisenhower, pp. 127-130. Also, Rostow, pp. 301-304.

₂ C. J. V. Murphy, "The Eisenhower Shift," Fortune, March, 1965, p. 112. Hereafter referred to as Murphy. According to McGeorge Bundy, Murphy and William Donovan were privy to official government papers not available to other writers, hence can be considered most authoritative.
Seoul, the United States under its new president quickly enlarged the standing army in South Korea from twelve to sixteen divisions and removed the Seventh Fleet shield from the Straits of Formosa. Both of these actions were taken with the objective in mind of causing Red China to augment its trained manpower in the two critical areas. Hopefully, these tactics would make a peace in Korea more desirable than ever before for the Communists. In addition, Secretary of State Dulles resorted to a maneuver later to be known as the "brinkmanship" tactic when he used the "thinly veiled threat" of a retaliatory atomic bomb attack if the Chinese persisted in ignoring and boycotting truce negotiations. Although the president exercised extreme restraint and was quite concerned that the threat might alienate our allies as well as the neutrals of the world, it did prove effective at a time when the United States enjoyed a clear thermonuclear weapon advantage. By June of 1953, the State Department had both the truce negotiations with China and fiery President Rhee of South Korea under control to the extent that there was little danger of further escalation of the

3Ibid., p. 230.

conflict in Korea.

The two major powers, the United States and the Soviet Union viewed the results of the Korean conflict in completely different ways. Russia became convinced that military aggression could not succeed against the power of containment enhanced by indigenous troops armed under the auspices and backed by the nuclear power of the United States. Therefore, her thoughts and efforts turned for the moment toward ideological conflict and diplomatic maneuvering. Perhaps paradoxically, the United States felt that an enhanced military capability and defense pacts with rimland free nations would continue to be the most effective way to contain Communism.

With Korea under control, the new administration put renewed emphasis on a second major objective, that of extending the "system of alliances" around the "periphery of the Iron Curtain." In the Pacific theater, the Truman Administration had already completed a security treaty with

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5 Adams, pp. 99-102. "Escalation" is a journalistic invention of recent vintage which means "the introduction of more destructive weapons or more troops in a conflict."

6 Rostow, p. 325.

7 Eisenhower, pp. 446-447. Both political parties in the presidential election of 1952 had advocated the continuance of American leadership of the free world and the policy of collective security. See R. F. Foster, pp. 266-267.
Japan which included the use of certain Japanese bases. Similarly, a bilateral treaty with the Philippines was already in effect, as was the pact with Australia and New Zealand, popularly known as ANZUS. In September 1954, Secretary Dulles extended the ANZUS pact to include Britain, France, the Philippines, Pakistan, and Thailand and called the new organization the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, known popularly as SEATO, the Pacific guardian organization against Communist aggression.

In Europe and indeed in the United States itself there had been much opposition to the Korean War on the grounds that it could easily lead to a general war in Asia, when in fact the important area which deserved primary focus of interest should be Europe. To placate those persons with such opinions, a European Defense Community pact was signed in May 1952 which brought West Germany into the Brussels Pact family for defensive purposes. In return for her partial sovereignty, Germany was to contribute 500,000 men for the common defense of Europe. In addition, the United States received permission in 1953 for the use of

8 Reitzel, pp. 311-312. 9 Ibid., p. 283.
10 Spanier, p. 64.
military bases in Spain which would ultimately be utilized as forward bases for strategic bombers and nuclear submarines. 11

In the Middle East, the Truman administration had successfully brought Greece and Turkey into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in March, 1952. Secretary Dulles took up the project where Secretary Acheson had left off. He extended it to the eastern extremity of the Southeast Treaty Organization with the conclusion of a defense pact in March 1955, supported by the United States, which included Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan. 12

Of even greater importance than the enhancement of the collective security concept on the rimland was the direct security of the United States, because economically, politically, and militarily, the United States represented the heart and soul of resistance to Communism and as such its defense was the sine qua non. 13 Recognizing this, the Eisenhower administration proceeded to put its military

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11 Reitzel, p. 310-311.

12 Ibid. See Appendix D for a graphic display of the aggregate of collective security organizations and defense pacts on the Soviet periphery.

13 Reitzel, p. 336.
forces in order and to establish planning objectives for the future. An early analysis of the status of rearmament within the three services revealed that the Air Force was planning its strategy and forces for a nuclear war, while the Army and Navy were concentrating efforts on non-nuclear forces.  

After several exhaustive studies regarding roles and missions and military commitments, basically two alternative plans evolved. Admiral Radford, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recommended a strategic mobile reserve of army power, supported by naval and air power. Secretary Dulles supported the alternative viewpoint, developed within the National Security Council, that United States' retaliation should rely primarily on atomic weapons with minimum emphasis on ground army power.  

This position of the National Security Council was undoubtedly influenced by a study performed by a retired Brigadier General, Robert Cutler, who headed a team of distinguished former military and civilian authorities. Cutler later recalled that in reaching a decision on the matter, that

14 Adams, p. 398.

The President's thinking was from the beginning heavily influenced by concern that any serious prolongation of the huge military programs of the kind then underway and in contemplation must inevitably turn the U. S. into a garrison state...Before his inauguration and later...the considerations that controlled the President's judgment were, first, the working up of a strategy for the "long haul" that would be within the nation's capacity to pay and, second, a defensive and retaliatory power of such overawing strength as to deter the possibility of attack upon this country.16

The President further emphasized that expenditures for military preparedness should remain within the boundary established by a balanced national budget when he said in his State-of-the-Union message of February 2, 1953, that "Our problem is to achieve adequate military strength within the limits of endurable strain...."17 Faced with the dilemma of several alternative military strategies as championed by the respective services, yet desirous of balancing the budget, President Eisenhower "cleared away some of...[the] underbrush by ordering the Pentagon to assume that if we got into war it would be fought with nuclear weapons."18

There followed several speeches on the part of Secretary Dulles in bringing this policy to maturity. In

17 Ibid.
18 Adams, p. 398.
June of 1953, he announced to the cabinet that

Our deterrent against the Russians... was a retaliatory striking force that could be launched quickly from bases near the enemy and this meant that the United States must maintain such bases on foreign soil in various distant parts of the world... 19

The world was officially informed in detail of the American policy of massive retaliation by the Secretary's speech on the night of January 12, 1954, to the Council of Foreign Relations in New York City:

The way... is to place more reliance upon community deterrent power, and less dependence upon local defensive power... Local defense must be reinforced by the further deterrent of massive retaliatory power.... The way to deter aggression is for the free community to be willing and able to respond vigorously at places and with means of its own choosing. 20

As initially defined, the new policy therefore consisted of a rimland solidly allied with the United States and charged with the task of maintaining local army forces but backed by the airpower of the United States, standing ready to respond

19 Ibid., pp. 103. Mr. Adams was paraphrasing from notes taken at the cabinet meeting.

instantly with atomic weapons. The local forces became known as the **Shield**, while the retaliatory nuclear forces became known as the **Sword**.\(^2^1\)

Dulles extolled the virtues of the new policy by citing its success in bringing the Korean truce negotiations to final settlement. He concluded that "The lesson of Korea is this: If events are likely which will in fact lead us to fight, let us make clear our intention in advance; then we shall probably not have to fight."\(^2^2\) In April 1954, Secretary Dulles also cited the policy's success in keeping Red China from intervening in Indo-China;\(^2^3\) however, with the loss of North Vietnam by the French at Dien Bien Phu the exclusion of Red China from Vietnam must have been a hollow victory at best.

In spite of the Secretary's enthusiasm for the policy, the ominous spectre of Soviet equality in


\(^2^2\) *State Department Bulletin*, Vol. XXIX, September 14, 1953, p. 339. Secretary Dulles delivered the speech to the American Legion in St. Louis, Missouri, on September 2, 1953.

thermonuclear technology appeared on the free world's horizon in the summer of 1953 when Russia exploded its first high yield weapon. Admittedly, the Soviets did not at the time or even in early 1954 have a means or system for the delivery of such a weapon, such as a bomber or a missile, but even her first successful test caused jitters in the free community and a rather immediate modification of the basic precepts of American massive retaliatory policies. In April 1954 Secretary Dulles announced that massive retaliation

...may not have the same significance forever. The free world...must not put itself in the position where the only response open to it is general war. Required is...a system in which local defensive strength is reinforced by more mobile deterrent power. The method of doing so will vary according to the character of the various areas...That does not mean turning every local war into a world war...The point is that a prospective attacker is not likely to invade if he believes the probable hurt will outbalance the probable gain.

While the State Department was thus conceiving and later modifying the massive retaliatory policy in the effort to more emphatically contain Communism, the Soviets were

25 J. F. Dulles, Foreign Affairs, April, 1954.
26 Adams, p. 87.
concurrently adopting a more conciliatory attitude towards the United States. The death of Premier Stalin in 1953 and the subsequent fight within the Kremlin for succession undoubtedly contributed to the lack of Russian activity on the international scene between 1953 and mid-1955. Certainly the Soviet leaders wanted time to perfect an inter-continental ballistic missile and initiate deployment of these weapons with nuclear warheads prior to any further serious confrontation with the United States. Last but not least in causing this lull in American-Soviet confrontations in the period was the system of defense pacts newly created and now literally surrounding the Sino-Soviet Bloc except across the northern tier. By the middle of 1955 the lull had convinced American leaders that there was no immediate threat of a general nuclear war with Russia although the accidental war or the limited war were always recognized as possibilities which required constant attention. This reasoning also recognized that the Soviet threat required analysis as to outcome and effect over the long-duration period, including not only military and technological considerations, but economic and social as well. While thus

27 Rostow, p. 325. 28 Ibid. Also pp. 281-292. 29 Reitzel, p. 372.
exploring means to develop and/or maintain close rapport with allied nations and seeking for the first time to seriously compete with Communism for the favor of undeveloped new nations, the policy of massive retaliation came apart at the seams. These other nations began to see the unilateral aspects of the American retaliatory policy and could not bring themselves to believe that it would actually be invoked against similarly potent Soviet Russia. Nor could they morally condone its use except in a situation which necessitated nuclear response to a Soviet pre-emptive attack and only then after consultation with the entire free-world community rather than on the existing unilateral basis.30

Although Secretary Dulles initially defended his unilateral policy, popularly referred to as brinkmanship,31 in October, 1957, he further modified his basic policy by saying

30Ibid., pp. 322-323, p. 350, and p. 444. General Eisenhower, as Commander of NATO in 1953 had already faced this same problem of resentment among our European allies for not having access to atomic secrets and weapons. See Rostow, p. 319.

31Adams, p. 118. In an interview with James Shepley of Life and Time, Sec. Dulles said that "Some say that we were brought to the verge of war in threatening to enlarge the Korean War, on the Indo-China situation, and on the question of Formosa....We walked to the brink and we looked it in the face. We took strong action...."
In the future it may thus be feasible to place less reliance upon deterrence of vast retaliatory power. It may be possible to defend countries by nuclear weapons so mobile or so placed as to make military invasion with conventional forces a hazardous attempt.32

So ended the clear-cut American policy of massive retaliation. In retrospect it is rather ironic that the policy was actually valid between about 1945 and 1950 when the United States in fact had an atomic monopoly, and had not publicly suggested that it might be used; yet when formally announced to the world in 1954, it was no longer valid.33

SUMMIT TALKS AND CONFRONTATIONS

The less-aggressive Soviet policy of 1953-1956 gave promise that the problems posed by bipolarization might be solved through the use of meetings among the heads of state of major powers in the world. Churchill had suggested such a meeting immediately after the death of Stalin in 1953, but to no avail. However, by 1955 the political climate had

mellowed to the point that direct negotiations seemed possible. The first such meeting of heads of state convened on July 16, 1955, at Geneva. President Eisenhower represented the United States and formally proposed that the group, including Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union, accept an "Open Skies" concept, whereby each nation would exchange basic data regarding military installations with the others and additionally be permitted aerial reconnaissance of military areas for inspection purposes.\(^34\)

Nothing productive was forthcoming from Geneva. The Soviet Union maintained her Iron Curtain. George Kennan later wrote that the meeting at Geneva failed because "no intimacy of understanding is really possible," since the Russians refuse to look at the facts with any degree of "objectivity."\(^35\)

In the period of two or three years following Geneva, there occurred several new confrontations between the United States and Soviet Russia on the rimland with the balance of thermonuclear power still favoring the Americans but by a margin quite unclear. Soviet Russia took advantage

\(^{34}\)Eisenhower, pp. 505-511. See Reitzel, pp. 400-401 for a summary of events leading up to the Summit meeting. Also, Donovan, p. 344.

\(^{35}\)Kennan, Russia, the Atom and the West, pp. 20-27.
of the uncertainty to employ the threat of her own retaliation on several occasions.

The first such confrontation occurred over the Suez Crisis which resulted from British and French efforts to depose Nasser and countermand Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal. The report on October 31, 1956, that British aircraft from Cyprus had bombed Egypt was a complete surprise to President Eisenhower. Soviet leaders threatened military reprisals against Western Europe, implying the use of missiles. At the expense of the loss of considerable prestige within the ranks of her allies, the United States "joined the Russians and the Arab-Asian Block in raising the hue and cry against its friends." With the realization that their efforts against Egypt were being opposed both by the Soviet and American governments, no alternative remained open to England and France except a cease-fire. As a result of the cease-fire, Premier Nasser's pro-Communist regime in Egypt remained intact.


38 Acheson, pp. 110-116. Also, see Adams, p. 257, and Rostow, pp. 358-359.

39 Ibid.
Virtually concurrent with the Suez Crisis was the Hungarian revolt which was initiated on October 23, 1956. Even though this was apparently more of an internal affair for Soviet Russia than the Suez Crisis, Soviet leaders made it clear that no outside interference would be permitted. Even though the ill-fated Hungarian revolutionary force made repeated requests by radio for Allied assistance, no assistance was permitted, and the revolt collapsed when revolutionary forces were attacked by Soviet tanks on November 4th.40

In a diplomatic move designed to stop Nasser in the Middle East and also to enforce the containment policy against Communism in the same area, President Eisenhower announced a new policy on January 5, 1957, which became known as the Eisenhower Doctrine. It proposed:

...that the U. S. ...cooperate with and assist any nation...of the Middle East in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence... to include...military assistance...and...employment of the armed forces of the United States...against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by International Communism.41

40Adams, p. 257.

41Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957, p. 12-13. Anthony Eden, British Prime Minister during the Suez Crisis, said that the Eisenhower Doctrine "helped to show that the West was not prepared to leave the area wide open for infiltration and subversion by others." See Anthony Eden, The Memoirs of Anthony Eden, Full Circle (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1960), p. 646.
In April, 1957, when Jordan requested assistance under the terms of the new doctrine, the United States responded by dispatching the Sixth Fleet to the eastern Mediterranean and by providing Jordan $10,000,000 for her army and economy. But these steps provided only temporary relief. In July of 1958, the internal situation in both Jordan and Lebanon deteriorated to the point where direct intervention was required. British paratroopers landed in Jordan and 14,000 American soldiers were landed by naval vessels on the shores of Lebanon. Soviet veiled threats to use ballistic missiles notwithstanding, the stability of the governments of Jordan and Lebanon was preserved and eventually in October, 1958, Allied troops were withdrawn.

In 1959 the crisis scene shifted to Germany, with the Soviet Union again demanding Allied withdrawal from Berlin. Kruschev's announcement to the press said that

If the Western powers disagree with our proposals, that will not stop us. When the time of six months expires, we will implement our proposals as stated in our documents.

On June 23, 1959, he announced to the United States that

Your generals talk of maintaining your position in Berlin by force. That is bluff. If you want war...our rockets will fly automatically. 47

Although Mr. Krushchev's threats came to naught as the deadline passed, his remarks ushered in the international condition which still confronts us today - the balance of terror.

THE BALANCE OF TERROR

President Truman said before departing from the White House in 1953: "The war of the future would be one in which man could extinguish millions of lives at one blow...Such a war is not a possible policy for rational men." 48 His nucleomitophobia, or fear of atomic attack, 49 undoubtedly stemmed from his study of the probable effects of nuclear weapons in a general war. In order to understand even to a small degree what the balance of terror really means, it is important to understand the probable effects of thermonuclear bombs. For instance, the

radiation effects alone of a one megaton thermonuclear bomb equal that of about one million tons of radium. In addition to the fallout effect of such radiation, a population must contend with blast, thermal effects, and secondary fires. One of the leading experts on this subject, Herman Kahn, has estimated that if Soviet Russia launched a nuclear attack against American urban-industrial complexes, between 75 percent and 100 percent of the population would be killed. Soviet Major General N. Talensky said basically the same thing in 1960:

...nuclear war would mean that human society would be set back and that the road to Communism would be immeasurably lengthened.

A second major point to be understood even before defining the balance in terror is the correlation between the physical size of a nation and the degree to which its citizens suffer from nucleomitophobia. It was almost unnecessary for Soviet Marshal Vasilevsky to inform the British that

50 Hahn and Neff, p. 257. Figures are derived from a U. S. government document, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons.


atomic and hydrogen bombs...are particularly dangerous for countries with a small territory and a large population.\textsuperscript{53}

What this really means is that all things being equal, the balance of power tends to favor the nation whose population and industrial capacities are spread out over the largest area.

With the break in the American monopoly on thermonuclear weapon technology and the means of delivery in the late 1950's, the Free World was faced with a situation that offered at best only equality with Communism. This fact has, of necessity, dominated all decisions since that time which were related to national security, including foreign policy with Soviet Russia. This balanced condition constitutes considerably more than merely the capability for each of the two societies to launch massive nuclear attacks against each other, and although the balance is related to and affected by respective defensive environments, it is to a much greater degree related to the deterrent capability of each of the adversaries. "To deter an attack means being

\textsuperscript{53} Acheson, p. 100, quoting from \textit{Pravda}, December 4, 1954.

\textsuperscript{54} Reitzel, pp. 327-329.

\textsuperscript{55} Glenn H. Snyder, \textit{Deterrence by Denial and Punishment} (Princeton University Center of International Studies, 1959), p. 43.
able to strike back in spite of it." A balance of terror exists when each side has such a capability to strike second and still inflict unacceptable damage on the other side. A more finite description has been provided by Herman Kahn who reasons as follows: If Country A fires all of its missiles, for example, 2000, at Country B's 1020 missile sites, he will destroy perhaps 1000 of them, but subsequently Country B will launch its remaining 20 at Country A and kill 20 percent of Country A's population. Under such conditions even a pre-emptive or surprise attack becomes the worst possible national strategic alternative.

Our rimland allies, particularly in industrial Europe, have recognized the sterility of the nuclear retaliatory policy vis-a-vis Communist aggression; yet they still recognize its necessity as a deterrent to Soviet nuclear capability. However, since the balance of terror greatly


57 Snyder, p. 97.

58 Klaus, Knorr and Thornton Read (ed's.), Limited Strategic War (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, 1962), p. 48, quoting Herman Kahn's essay, "Some Comments on Controlled War."
reduces the probability of employment of nuclear power, the defense against other forms of armed aggression becomes a more serious problem.

American security planning has also taken this conclusion into account. As early as 1955, the then Army Chief of Staff, Maxwell D. Taylor, began to prepare United States Army forces for limited ground wars in support of national objectives as a substitute for the unappliable force of the atom. 59

Unfortunately, the requirement for the graduated response or limited war capability has not lessened the requirement for the technique or situation known as nuclear umbrella, for it remains the sine qua non. Maintaining a viable and credible nuclear deterrence, capable of response even after being attacked by the enemy, requires excellence in nuclear technology and weapon systems' survivability against enemy defenses. A continuing, major effort by the American populace is required in the future to assure a "strike second" deterrence second to none.

CONCLUSIONS

Bipolarization of world power between 1945 and 1947 and the ensuing Cold War caused the pendulum of American foreign policy with the Soviet Union to swing from the wartime alliance to one advocating containment on the rimland backed by the threat of nuclear power. Soviet postwar objectives to eliminate American influence from Japan and Europe and to implant Communism in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Africa had been thwarted by Free World policies which had established collective security on the rimland from the 38th Parallel in Korea, to Formosa, to Southeast Asia, to the Baghdad Pact, and finally to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

In 1953 as equilibrium was reached in nuclear technology, the pendulum moved back a little towards the center with the establishment of a mutual suicide pact or balance of terror. This balance placed prime emphasis in both camps on obtaining the favor of uncommitted and undeveloped new nations who because of the courting by the two competitors could afford to be quite demanding in playing one against

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60 Rostow, pp. 261-262
the other. Some American leaders found it difficult to condone the sometimes indifferent, sometimes arrogant attitude displayed by the recipients of the $3,000,000,000 annual outlay of aid funds. Yet the courting continued, by necessity, for it was recognized that marriage with uncommitted nations could be decisive in determining the eventual outcome of the East-West struggle. This conclusion takes on increased significance as additional nations become technically capable of producing and delivering thermonuclear weapons.

Concurrent with Soviet parity in nuclear technology was the rapid expansion of her industrial capability. Although a true balance does not yet exist, she is admittedly second only to the United States and should she be capable of integrating all Communist economic might into a commonwealth, her market would be even larger than the combined North American and Western European markets.

62 Reitzel, p. 317. See also Baruch, pp. 409-410.
63 Isaac Deutscher, The Great Conflict (Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 50-51. See also Kennan, Russia, the Atom and the West, p. 2.
Soviet advances in technology were emphasized by initial leadership in space activities. On October 4, 1957, the Soviet Union launched the world's first artificial satellite vehicle, Sputnik I. In the race to gain the favor of uncommitted and undeveloped nations, the publicity and prestige associated with such a feat produced marked effects. The United States respect for the threat posed by Soviet technology increased considerably. President Eisenhower took action to accelerate dispersal programs for Strategic Air Command bombers, sought improved and longer range warning devices, initiated research for a defense against missiles, and approved additional long-range missiles for the United States arsenal.

In the same speech which announced improvements in the American arsenal, President Eisenhower told of American reaction to Sputnik as follows:

...We know of their [Soviet] vigorous education system and their technological achievements...
When such competence in things material is at the service of leaders who have so little regard for

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things human, and who command the power of an empire, there is danger ahead for free men everywhere. That, my friends, is the reason why the American people have been so aroused about the earth satellite...The world will witness future discoveries even more startling than that of nuclear fission. The question is: Will we be the ones to make them?\textsuperscript{66}

Concurrently, the President requested increased endeavors on the part of American scientists to place our own satellite in orbit.\textsuperscript{67} When this was successfully accomplished on January 31, 1958,\textsuperscript{68} the Space Race, as an adjunct to the Cold War, was officially underway.

The Soviet industrial growth and technological development has enforced the deterrent value of American strike-second capabilities, because now the Soviet leaders have come to regard their industrial base as their prized possession. Whereas in World War II, Stalin could afford to somewhat disregard population losses, today's leaders cannot disregard the possibilities of the loss of the industrial base.

Finally, by 1959 the United States had recognized that the balance of terror demanded other military alternatives in addition to nuclear response and consequently had initiated a build-up of limited war forces. She also had recognized that

\textsuperscript{66}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{67}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{68}Caidin, p. 274.
the cold war problem embraced not only military strategy, but the entire gamut of political, scientific (including competition in space), and ideological strategies as well. As Herman Kahn has so aptly written:

Clemenceau: 'War is too important to be left to the generals.'

A. Wohlstetter: 'Peace is too important to be left to the generals.'

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69 Kahn, *Thinking the Unthinkable*, p. 32.
APPENDIX A

NATIONAL DEFENSE, FOREIGN AID AND MILITARY AID EXPENDITURES 1946-1955
(IN BILLIONS OF DOLLARS, 1947 PRICES)

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The "Assistant President" under President Eisenhower gives his "view from the top". Chapters 6, 7, 13 and 14 pertain to foreign policy.


The Presidential adviser at Yalta and the Secretary of State at Potsdam and critical meetings of the Big Three Foreign Ministers discusses his efforts to do business with the Russians on a diplomatic basis.

This is Byrnes' autobiography of his entire political career, including his jobs as "Assistant President" and Secretary of State.


The Allied Commander of the military government in Germany during the crucial post-World War II period including the period of the blockade, gives his on-the-scene account of the events concerning Berlin and Germany.


The influence of Bernard Baruch on various U. S. presidents is the basic theme of this account of Baruch's life. Particularly appropriate is the account of Baruch's discussions with Truman regarding the use of the atomic bomb.


Original material from the early phase of the war which depicts the interface between England and the Russian and American war efforts.


Churchill's personal account of Yalta and the early days at Potsdam until his defeat in the general election of 1946.


A well documented RAND account of the Berlin airlift and the Cold War politics related to the German city from 1945 through 1949.

An excellent account of the life of Stalin, including a detailed analysis of some of Stalin's actions at Yalta, Potsdam, and the immediate period thereafter.


An eyewitness, authoritative account of President Eisenhower's first term.


Although this book addresses primarily domestic issues, it does show how the Congressmen "back home" finally got "fed up" with the Russians.


Chapter 5 discusses the period of interest and relates foreign aid programs to national objectives designed to stop communism.


Articles about Yalta authored by Harry L. Hopkins, James F. Byrnes, W. S. L. Churchill, and others.
A detailed and well documented account of US-USSR relations from 1917 through 1950.


In Chapter 5, "The Decade of Dilemma, 1945-1955," the former Chief of Army Research and Development discusses the impact of the policy of massive retaliation on Army strategy.

An account of Dean Acheson's tenure of office as Secretary of State by the editor. An account of John Foster Dulles' tenure by Hans J. Morgenthau. An account of Byrnes; tenure by Richard D. Burns.


This book addresses Roosevelt's entire political career. Chapters 19 and 20 deal with FDR at Yalta and during the short period of his life remaining thereafter.


An account of the unification of the military services, the creation of the National Security Council, and the Central Intelligence Agency.

Discusses the various doctrines of strategy and associates leading American writers with each strategy, e.g., Robert Strausz-Hupe' with the "forward strategy."


A short concise history of the early events which promulgated the bipolarization of the world.


An excellent though relatively brief summary of events in the period.


A discussion of the Secretary of Defense's theories regarding options and alternative ways to accomplish the same military task with different military weapon systems.


Explains the dangers of the arms race and the spread of nuclear weapons; concurrently explores the alternative strategic responses open to the U. S.


A definitive treatment of the probable effects of a nuclear war.
Kennan, George F. *Russia, the Atom and the West.* New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957.

Mr. Kennan addresses the problem of containing communism ten years after his famous Mr. "X" article. He concludes that the military aspects of the problem have been over-emphasized in relation to the economic and ideological aspects.


A short book of lectures to Princeton University students. Discusses what should be general objectives of foreign policy, the advisability of pursuing "liberation" versus "containment."


A collection of essays on the pro's and con's of a "shoot-look-negotiate" limited nuclear war.


A brief account of Yalta from the military viewpoint.


Pages 298-323 contain Diary type accounts of Yalta.

Text of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Rumania, Italy, Finland, and Hungary. Chapter 1 sets the stage for the treaties with an overview of negotiations and procedures as they developed among the Big Powers.


A brilliant analysis of the political role of economic aid in the Cold War.


A collection of separate essays which deal with sovereignty and alliances in the nuclear age.


Deals with circumstances that led to the present division of Germany and the part Berlin has played in post-war crises.


Pages 60-67 deal with strategic doctrines.


The then Secretary of the Navy relates in his diaries the events which transpired in the area of foreign policy as these events affected military affairs and vice versa.

Opie, Redfers. The Search for Peace Settlements. Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institute, 1951. This book examines the efforts of the Allies to reach agreements on the terms of peace treaties during the next five years after World War II. It traces negotiations and events from Yalta to Korea.


Peeters, Paul. Massive Retaliation. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1959. An explanation of the policy of massive retaliation and a defense of the policy as it was developed by Secretary of State Dulles.


Smith, Walter B. *My Three Years in Moscow*. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1950

The Ambassador at Moscow during the crucial period of the blockade of Berlin relates the events as they appeared to Marshal Stalin.


A discussion of nuclear age problems.


A basis for the correlation between deterrence and defense in the nuclear age.


A concise and fully documented political history of crisis-ridden postwar Berlin.


Although this book addresses the whole life span of Harry Truman, portions of it, particularly Chapters 29 through 32, present interesting accounts of Truman's immediate postwar dealings with the Russians.


The Secretary of State during FDR's last few years in office relates the events of Yalta and the World Security Conference at San Francisco based on his personal contributions to each. His account of Yalta presents probably the extreme "rosy side" of the picture.
Pages 116-123 present an excellent matrix for the strategic options available among nuclear armed nations. The author is generally regarded as one of the chief proponents of the strong deterrent force.


This book contains original letters and other manuscripts of the late Senator. It shows the development of a bipartisan foreign policy during negotiations with the Russians at San Francisco, London, and Paris.


Sumner Welles analyzes the shortcomings of the Truman-Byrnes regime and expounds on the virtues of FDR. His conclusion is that we must have a U. N. with one-world connotations.


A most objective account of the war in Europe.

This account of Yalta presents the rather extreme view that Roosevelt in particular, and Churchill, to a lesser degree, "sold the farm" at Yalta. Included as appendices are many excerpts from actual agreements which were negotiated at Casablanca, Teheran, and Yalta.


A retired naval officer analyzes the shortcomings of U. S. foreign policy in its relations with the U. S. S. R.


The author recognizes the difficulties caused by the atomic bomb and the political, economical, and ethical reasons for two worlds. Recommends U. S. and U. S. S. R. federalize the world.

Articles and Periodicals


Clarification of the doctrine of massive retaliation.


The article of March 1956 includes source material on the administrations views towards the economics of military security.