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Russia Shrinking: An Analysis of Russia's Population Decline: Causes, Effects and Solutions.

A Thesis

Presented to the Department of Political Science and the Faculty of the Graduate College

University of Nebraska

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Science, Political Science

University of Nebraska at Omaha

Michael C. Sullivan

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THESIS ACCEPTANCE
FOR
MICHAEL C. SULLIVAN

Acceptance for the faculty of the Graduate College,
University of Nebraska, in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree, Master of Science in Political Science
University of Nebraska at Omaha.

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Abstract

Russia Shrinking: An Analysis of Russia's Population Decline: Causes, Effects and Solutions.

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University of Nebraska, 2005

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The author argues that population decline is the most important challenge to the Russian Federation in the twenty-first century. First explored are the causes of the decline, including losses incurred during World War II and Stalin's bloody purges of the 1930s. Massive health problems are reviewed and offered as leading causes of the loss of population. Diseases such as alcoholism, tuberculosis, and HIV/AIDS are noted at the top of the list. The writer points a finger at the health system as a whole, indicating that its status is of a third world country. Second, the writer examines what effects the decline has had on Russia as a whole. Most notable is the lack of an active population that can fill the labor needs of Russia. The writer contends that if the Russian economy is to continue to grow it must find a way to replace workers as the population grows older. In regards to national security, testimony from the Russian military is that there are not enough able bodied soldiers to fill the ranks. Third, increased immigration is offered as the only viable short term solution to Russia's population decline.

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Introduction

The population crisis in the Russian Federation is quickly approaching critical mass. Russia is facing a challenge that, left unchecked, will ultimately spell its demise as a viable nation state in the twenty-first century. Due to massive health/social issues and emigration, Russia is dying. The current population stands at approximately 147 million with roughly half considered to be a part of the legitimate workforce. The majority of projections, from Russia and the West, predict the population will decline to around 100 million by the year 2050 (U.S. Census). Coupled with the challenges listed above, the astounding death to birth ratio only adds to the premise that, figuratively and literally, Russia is dying.

My intent in this research is to explore the reasons for Russia's population decline, the consequences of the decline, and the best available solution to arrest the slide. The research questions in this paper are threefold. Specifically I ask: What are the causes of Russia's population decline? What are the effects of Russia's population decline? What is the best available solution to Russia's population decline? It is my contention that population decline is the most important challenge that the struggling, "managed democracy" of Russia faces in contemporary times. If there is no population to support a nation state, what relevance are other issues? Everything else is peripheral. Russia must confront its population crisis or risk remaining permanently behind the west. Increased immigration is the only logical remedy.

The causes of Russia's population decline could fill volumes. In the following

pages I first argue that the current population problem has its roots in World War II and the purges of the 1930s. These two events deprived Russia of tens of millions of able bodied men, most in their reproductive years. While Americans came home from the war and started the baby boom, Russians simply did not come home. America surged ahead in population as a result.

I also address the problem of disease in Russia, and of course, alcoholism is a logical starting point. The time honored favorite drink, vodka, is consumed to the tune of 4 billion bottles a year in Russia, or 40 bottles per resident. Those are figures for *vodka only*, nothing else. Certainly if one were to add other spirits, the alcohol consumption statistics would skyrocket. One seventh of the population, or around 20 million people, are estimated to be alcoholics (*Javeline*).

Tuberculosis, or TB, is another massive health challenge. Some estimates put the number of cases in Russia as high as two million. The problem is only escalating. In 1985 7.7 of every 100 TB victims died. The death rate now is over 25 per 100. In 2004 83.1 cases per 100,000 residents were diagnosed. The Red Cross says that 130,000 new cases are diagnosed every year (*Feshback*).

HIV/AIDS has also hit Russia hard in the last two decades. It is estimated that one out of every one hundred people is infected. I provide regional statistics that show Russia is responsible for 75% of all HIV/AIDS cases within that FSU region. This represents 206,002 more cases than the nearest country in that region (*Russian Politics & Law*).

Declining fertility is also shown as cause for de-population. I show that the

births per woman in 1987 were 2.19 and dropped to 1.17 in 1999 (*Eberstadt*). That figure has come up marginally but still not close to that needed for natural population replacement. Additionally, an overview of the health system is offered and the startling statistics for life expectancy are graphically shown.

The effects of the population loss can be seen in two main areas. First, there are simply not enough people who are economically active. In the past couple of decades the number of people over the age of 60, and thus not working, has doubled (*Rand*). This number will continue to grow and within the next twenty years 50% of the population will be over the age of 60. I provide data in the following pages that indicates very few people in Russia over the age of 60 are economically active. Economic productivity is being lowered every year as a result (ILO).

The second effect can be seen in the military. There is not enough of the young demographic that is needed to fill the ranks. Dmitry Trenin of the Carnegie Moscow Center says that the composition of the army is absurd (*MCC*). The distorted proportion of officers to enlisted men is one example he lists. Moreover, the recruits are of a low quality. Since the fall of the Soviet Union problems have abounded. Twenty-five percent of draftees have only eight years of education and many others have drug problems and arrest records. Russia has been forced to lower the induction standards, but the quality of recruits must be enhanced to field an effective army.

Finally, I argue that increased immigration is the only viable short term

solution to Russia's population decline. I stipulate that the country must reverse its natural replacement trend; however, this can only be a long term solution. The population in Russia is decreasing and ageing so rapidly, that a quick fix must be implemented. A major psychological obstacle, suspicion of foreigners, must be tempered for long term viability.

Chapter I

The Causes

World War I, II & the 1930s Purges

In addition to the current causes of Russia's population crisis-disease, alcoholism etc.- it is important to look back at the population losses of the twentieth century, most notably World War Two and Stalin's bloody purges of the 1930s.

However, one can see that a mass destruction of the Russian population actually began with World War I. This conflict, following a humiliating defeat at the hands of Japan in 1904-05, was a disaster for the country. Several million soldiers were lost in this conflict. Notwithstanding the Red Terror of Lenin in the early 1920s, Stalin's regime was responsible for the loss of tens of millions of the population during the 1930s and as a result of World War II, known in Russia as "The Great Patriotic War."

"The estimates for the destruction of the Russian and other non-Russian peoples during the period of Stalin's various five-year plans for modernization, Stalin's war against the intelligentsia and the kulaks, plus the catastrophic losses that occurred during World War II, vary between 30-40 million people," writes Seymour W. Itzkoff (*Journal of Social, Political & Economic Studies*). The estimates for the losses vary from source to source though most agree with Itzkoffs'. The effects of losing millions of able bodied men during this period, in their reproductive years, would haunt Russia for decades to come. Also catastrophic, during Stalin's purges, was the elimination of hundreds of thousands

of highly educated “intellectuals.” This further hampered Russia’s ability to produce the scientists necessary to deal with the health problems of the twentieth century, a legacy that lives on today. “The immigration of hundreds of thousands of highly educated Jews to Israel following the collapse of communism,” adds Itzkoff, “was a further loss.” (JSPE)

While Stalin’s purges were responsible for many deaths, World War Two was most likely responsible for the majority of population loss in the 1930s and 1940s. J.T. Dykman, of The Eisenhower Institute, sums up the almost inconceivable losses of World War II. To Stalin it was a war of attrition:

The populations of the United States and the USSR were about the same, 130,000,000, when both nations went to war within six months of each other in 1941. To Americans, we were sending our boys to fight a foreign war that we'd never experience. To the Soviets, it was an up front and personal war of monumental savagery. America would lose slightly more than 400,000 soldiers (killed or missing) and almost no civilians during World War II and the USSR, depending on which historian you believe, would lose at least 11,000,000 soldiers (killed and missing) as well as somewhere between 7,000,000 and 20,000,000 million of its civilian population during the Great Patriotic War (Eisenhower).

Robert Conquest, author of *The Great Terror*, describes the results of Stalin's purges in the 1930s. Conquest is widely considered to be one of the leading authorities on population loss due to the purges of the 1930s:

Many women died as a result of the war and the purges. But in both cases the great bulk of the victims was certainly male. From neither cause should there be much distinction in the figures for the sexes for the under-

30 age groups in 1959. Nor is there. For the 30-34 block there is a comparatively small difference, presumably indicating the losses of the young Army men in their late teens during the war. In the 35-39 group, which could have been expected to take the major war losses, we find figures of 391 to 609 women. One would have thought that these men, in their early twenties in the war, would have had the highest losses. *But the proportion then gets worse still*, and for the 40-44, 45-49 and 50-54 [cohorts] remains a set 384 to 616. Even more striking, the worst proportion of all comes for the 55-59 age group (334 to 666: in fact in this group alone there are almost exactly twice as many women as men). The figures for the 60-69 group (349 to 691) and for the 70 and over group (319 to 681) are also much worse than the soldiers' groups. Now all authorities agree that the Purge struck in the main at people "between thirty and fifty-five", "generally, arrested people are all thirty or over. That's the dangerous age: you can remember things." There were few young or old, most of them being "in the prime of life." Add twenty years for the 1959 position. Precise deductions are not possible. Older men died as soldiers in the war. But on the other hand, the mass dispatch to labour camps of prisoners of war returned from Nazi hands in 1945 must have led to an extra, and non-military, death rate among the younger males. So must the guerrilla fighting in the Baltic States and the Western Ukraine, which lasted for years after the war, and so must the deportations from the Caucasus and the general renewal of Purge activities in the post-war period. But in any case, the general effect of the figures is clear enough. The wastage of millions of males in the older age groups is too great to be masked, whatever saving assumptions we may make. We here have, frozen into the census figures, a striking indication of the magnitude of the losses inflicted in the Purge (*Conquest*).

Conquest is certainly correct that precise deductions are not possible. Many

factors contribute to the legitimacy of numbers offered up for losses in the war, as well as from the purges. First of all, it is important to remember that Russia was part of the Soviet Union. Although it is difficult to determine exact figures for the ethnic Russian population versus the overall population of the Soviet Union at that time, the table below, showing the figures from 1989, can lend some perspective. Only imprecise deductions can be made. Additionally, the secrecy of the Stalin regime leads one to be pessimistic in regards to figures released, even after *Glasnost*.

Table 1

Population of the Soviet Union by Region and by Ethnicity, 1989			
	Soviet Union	Russia	Not Russia
Population in Millions	285.7	147.0	138.7
Ethnic Russians	145.1	119.8	25.3
Ethnic non-Russians	140.7	27.2	113.4
<i>Source: Anderson</i>			

An important part of the analysis is the result of the 1937 census. During the Seventeenth Party CPSU Congress of 1934, Stalin had stated that the population was 168 million. The census put the figure at 162 million and cost the census takers their lives. The first figure they had arrived at was actually 156 million, a number they realized was too low. They had excluded certain demographics such as the military, the NKVD, and prisoners. Famine and flight from the Soviet Union further

compounded the problem. This exemplifies the problems in determining precise numbers (Getty). S. G. Wheatcroft, another widely known expert on this subject, wrote the following in a 1990 issue of the journal *Soviet Studies*:

The demographer Mark Tolts revealed in late 1987 that results of the 1937 census had indicated a population of 162 million. This flatly contradicted the claims of Rosefielde and Yuri Antonov-Ovseenko that the 1937 census had indicated that the population in the USSR was only 156 million and that an additional 6 million deaths needed to be added to estimates of excess mortality. Subsequently Vsevolod Vasilievich Tsaplin, the Director of the Central State Archive of the National Economy of the USSR (TsGANKh SSSR), has revealed more information about the 1937 census, intercensal population movements and contemporary evaluations of them. Tsaplin reported that the NKVD contingent listed in the 1937 census was 2,653,036, that 5.7 million deaths were recorded in the famine year of 1933 instead of the average number of 2.6 million per year for 1927-31, and that Kurman, the Deputy head of the Department of Population and Health Statistics in the Central Statistical Department (TsUNKhU¹), had sent a formal statement (*'dokladnaya zapiska'*) to Kraval, the Director of TsUNKhU, on 14 March 1937 arguing, amongst other things, that the mortality recorded in 1933 underestimated reality by 1 million. The content and importance of Tsaplin's article is covered in more detail in Alec Nove's article in this issue of *Soviet Studies* (Wheatcroft).

Indeed, Nove does explain this in more detail in the same issue, attempting to make some sense of the numbers. Addressing Tsaplin's article he says:

¹ The Statistical Office.

He begins by deploring the fact that many key documents and archives remain closed, and that this has led to the appearance in the Soviet press of extremely high estimates of the number of victims, estimates based on memoirs, doubtful sources and even inventions. He had access, in his official capacity, to documents held by TsUNKhU and Gosplan. These give a number of particulars relating to the census of 1937, which, as is known, was suppressed, and its authors shot. He cites a letter to Stalin and Molotov in March 1937 by I. Kraval, the head of TsUNKhU: the population on January 6 1937 came to 162,003,225, or 156.9 million 'less military servicemen.' But the same source gives the number of servicemen at that date as 2 million, including camp guards. This leaves a gap of just over 3 million (*Nove 1*).

Nove goes on to note that the population between 1926 and 1937 had grown by 15 million. It was expected, however, to grow by 21.3 million, according to the birth and death records of that period. This gap was addressed by a man named Kurman, who was the deputy head of the Department of Demography and Health. Kurman said that the gap was explained by 2 million Kazakhs, Turkmen, and Tadzhiks leaving the USSR between 1930 and 1933. Additionally, he reported that the 1926 census had included some double-counting. The bulk of the gap, he said, was due to "under-recording of deaths in the previous decade."

At the end of 1990 Nove wrote a follow up article in the same journal incorporating newly discovered data and scholarship. He concludes with the following:

If upwards of 7 million were famine and famine-related deaths, and if the total (to the nearest round number) was of the order of 10 million, this

would imply almost 3 million other deaths: in deportation, detention, and shooting. Does this seem plausible? As was noted also by Wheatcroft, the Gulag statistics cited in *Argumenty i fakty* showed a high death rate in the war years (the highest figure, 248,777, was for 1942, the average number of Gulag inmates in that year being 1,067,000). For pre-war years the reported death rate was very much lower, e.g. Only 4% in 1939. It is of course possible that some of the considerable numbers which appear in these statistics as having been 'transferred to other places of detention' and 'released' were never seen again. Tsaplin, in his article, specifically referred to the possibility of a further '1.3 million unregistered deaths in places of detention'. So the total could be above 10 million, say 11 million. This is well above the estimates of some of the so-called 'revisionists', and well below those of Conquest and Antonov-Ovseenko. I again emphasise that this relates only to the period ending in January 1939.

A word about total war losses. The figure of 26-27 million is now frequently cited, e.g. by Volkogonov. Some suspect that it is too high, indeed made too high to hide the real scale of the deaths in the 1930s. Without wishing to enter into this argument, let me put forward an interpretation. It arises from a phrase used by the historian Polyakov: "*nas stalo na 26-27 millionov men'she.*" The population at the outbreak of war may be calculated by adding to the result of the 1939 census the population of acquired territories and the natural increase in 1939-1941. If the total were 193 million, this in turn implies a population at the end of 1945 of 166-167 million. Maksudov's view is that, even after allowing for the overstatement of the 1939 population in the census of that year, 193 million is on the low side. *Argumenty i fakty* cites the work of I. Kurganov, who estimates the population in 1941 at 197 million, the 1946 total as 168.5 million. There are as yet no official Soviet figures for the years 1945-1949, but published data enable one to get back as far as 1950, and these would be consistent with an end-1945 total of 167-168 million.

Kurganov's estimate of losses comes to 44 million, but this high figure includes the natural increase which would have occurred had there been no war. This he estimates at 15.4 million. Subtracting these purely hypothetical unborn souls, Kurganov's figure becomes 28.6 million, still somewhat higher than Polyakov's 26-27 million. These include not only war losses of every category and from all causes, military and civilian, but also emigration, both forced and voluntary, and also the natural decrease, i.e. the excess of 'normal' deaths over the low wartime number of births (*Nove2*).

The numbers shown in the previous pages, of course, are highly subjective and certainly open to interpretation. As with many issues in Stalin's regime, many official statistics were kept in secret or never recorded. Table 2, from the Russian Federation archives, shows the statistics for the period of 1921-1952, minus war losses.

Table 2

YEAR	SHOT	CAMPS/PRISON	EXILED	OTHER
1921	9701	21724	1817	2587
1922	1962	2656	166	1219
1923	414	2336	2044	0
1924	2550	4151	5724	0
1925	2433	6851	6274	437
1926	990	7547	8571	696
1927	2363	12667	11235	171
1928	869	16211	15640	1037
1929	2109	25853	24517	3741
1930	20201	114443	58816	14609
1931	10651	105683	63269	1093
1932	2728	73946	36017	29228
1933	2154	138903	54262	44345
1934	2056	59451	5994	11498
1935	1229	185846	33601	46400
1936	1118	219418	23719	30415
1937	353074	429311	1366	6914
1938	328618	205509	16842	3289
1939	2552	54666	3783	2888
1940	1649	65727	2142	2288
1941	8001	65000	1200	1210
1942	23278	88809	7070	5249
1943	3579	68887	4787	1188
1944	3029	70610	649	821
1945	4252	116681	1647	668
1946	2896	117943	1498	957
1947	1105	76581	666	458
1948	0	72552	419	298
1949	0	64509	10316	300
1950	475	54466	5225	475
1951	1609	49142	3425	599
1952	1612	25824	773	591
TOTAL	799257	2623903	413474	215669

Source: State Archive of the Russian Federation, fond 9401, op. 1, delo 4157, ll. 201-203, 205.

The table, of course, does not show the losses of World War Two, famine and those killed never reported. Additionally, based on the conduct of Stalin's

regime, it is logical to assume that a great portion of the millions sent to the gulags did not survive. The data, and researchers' opinions, support the conclusion that, at a minimum, the Soviet Union lost 25 million people during Stalin's rule.

The seeds of Russia's current population problems were sown during the period of Stalin's purges and World War Two. However, the decline of the Russian population today is not just due to the past, of course. Adding immensely to the problem is Russia's poor health care system. The social and political challenges the country faces have given rise to diseases, such as alcoholism and Tuberculosis. These diseases not only put a tremendous strain on the health care system, but also threaten to accelerate the population's downward spiral.

Alcohol

According to Debra Javeline of the Kennan Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Russians drink 4 billion bottles of vodka a year. This averages out to nearly forty bottles per adult, per year. It is estimated that 20 million Russians, or roughly one-seventh of the population, are alcoholics (*Javeline*). The social crisis that has arisen is not a new one; Russians, for centuries, have loved the hard stuff. The twenty-first century will not be different.

Nicholas Eberstadt, is the Henry Wendt Scholar in Political Economy at the American Enterprise Institute and a member of the Publication Committee of *The Public Interest*. "Russians have always demonstrated a predilection to drink heavy spirits in astonishing excess--a fact remarked upon by visiting foreigners for

centuries,” reports Eberstadt. “Russia's thirst for hard liquor seems to have reached dizzying new heights in the late Soviet era, and then again in the early post-Communist era.”(*Eberstadt*) Additionally, there is a strong correlation between alcohol consumption and mortality. This is more striking when looking just at the men. When the alcohol consumption rate goes up, so does mortality. The reverse is true as well. Large quantities being consumed in one sitting appear to be a major cause in risking life ending injury and long term use is causing death through heart failure (*Eberstadt*). An editorial in the St. Petersburg Times explains the statistics and points an accusing finger at Moscow:

It is especially frustrating to watch as government agencies address serious problems with proposals that are almost laughably inadequate. The latest case in point came on Tuesday, when Deputy Health Minister Gennady Onishchenko launched an assault on the beer industry, claiming that beer had become a major contributing factor to Russia's overall alcoholism crisis.

Obviously, it is ridiculous that Russian law treats beer as a non-alcoholic beverage and it is clear that this absurdity plays a role in introducing children to drink. This lapse can, and should, be immediately remedied, and Russia's responsible beer producers should be the first to advocate this step.

However, the Health Ministry must realize that Russia's alcoholism problem is far more serious than this. In fact, the bare statistics make a strong case that alcoholism is the most serious problem Russia faces. Half of all Russian men who die, says one study, are drunk. Thirty thousand Russians each year die of alcohol poisoning. Alcohol plays a

major role in road accidents, homicides, suicides, domestic violence, industrial accidents, birth defects, violent crime and so on. Orphanages are full of children abandoned by their alcoholic parents.

Alcoholism is a major contributor to the country's demographic crisis, the claims of nationalists about an anti-Russian genocidal conspiracy notwithstanding. In fact, even though former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's anti-alcohol campaign was roundly trashed as a failure, demographic data show clearly that the number of deaths owing to non-natural causes fell considerably from 1986 to 1988, before once again beginning to rise. Since 1991, accidental death in Russia has increased by 83 percent, according to the British Medical Journal.

A big part of the problem lies in the fact that the state is as addicted to drink as the people are. Last year, vodka duties accounted for \$470 million in state revenues. Last May, the government set up a state-controlled holding company made up of 70 distilleries in an effort to squeeze even more revenue from this sector. Obviously, it will be hard for the Health Ministry to combat the alcohol problem when other state agencies are committed to increasing production and sales.

All of which means that the government is unlikely to do what desperately needs to be done: an effective, all-out campaign - on television and radio, on street billboards, in schools, in the press - to persuade people to reduce their alcohol consumption. Health officials directing the occasional broadside at the beer industry will do nothing (*SP times*).

Tuberculosis

This disease has become one of the most frightening challenges to Russia's health crisis. Estimates put the number of tuberculosis cases in Russia at two million. Murray Feshbach, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (*Feshbach*), says that this horrible disease is most prevalent among those persons

weakened by HIV/AIDS, alcoholism, and poverty. “Findings by the research institute of the Russian Federal Security Service project enormous numbers of deaths from tuberculosis,” he said. “Whereas only 7.7 of every 100 new Russian tuberculosis victims died in 1985, the death rate is now 25.5 per 100. According to official reports, the number of tuberculosis deaths soared by 30 percent in the 1998-99 period. The 1999 death toll of 29,000 was about 15 times the toll in the United States, or nearly 30 times greater when measured as deaths per 100,000 population in both countries.” (*Feshbach*)

Tuberculosis, commonly referred to as TB, is a disease caused by the bacteria *Mycobacterium tuberculosis*. Usually attacking the lungs, these bacteria can attack any other part of the body. Once the leading cause of death in the United States, Tuberculosis is no longer the threat it once was (See table 3 for Russia v United States comparison). TB is an airborne disease. That is to say that when an infected person sneezes or coughs the bacteria discharges into the air and rapid proliferation can occur.

Tuberculosis runs rampant in Russian prisons precisely due to this. Those with deficient immune systems are highly vulnerable and so are those with substance abuse problems. Therefore Russian alcoholics are at high risk (*CDC*).

The problem of Tuberculosis proliferation in Russia will not correct itself anytime soon. In March 2005, a senior health ministry official told a news conference in Moscow that 188,000 new cases are registered each year and up to 30,000 of those die. Yekaterina Kakorina, deputy director of the Health Ministry’s

department for medical care and health resorts, said that Russia's TB rate ran up to 21.3 cases per 100,000 people in 2004. Moreover, she said that 83.1 new cases of TB per 100,000 were diagnosed last year (*Moscow News*).

Compounding this problem is the explosion of HIV/AIDS. The increase of tuberculosis in Russia is closely related to HIV/AIDS, according to experts at the CSIS:


Those with HIV are at greater risk for contracting TB because of their depressed immune systems. The Red Cross estimates that Russia has 340,000 cases of TB, with 130,000 new cases each year. 30,000 people die from TB each year in Russia. In addition to an increase in overall rates, the proportion of multi-drug resistant TB is increasing (*CSIS*).

Additionally they opine that the Russian government is not doing enough to combat the spread of TB and warn that it must embark on a rigorous campaign, targeted at Russian youth, if there is to be hope in the future.

Table 3 Estimated Cases of Tuberculosis 2003

The Russian Federation & The United States

Source: WHO (Global Atlas)



HIV/AIDS

The global challenge of trying to end the spread of HIV/AIDS has not bypassed Russia. In fact, many experts contend, the spread of this disease will not reach the apex of its trajectory in the foreseeable future. *Russian Politics and Law*, a Russian scholarly journal, recently listed the challenges that Russia has to contend with and provided statistics that further enhance the opinion that this disease is one of the major health care issues that must be dealt with post-haste:

1. In Russia one in a hundred residents is infected with HIV.
2. The number of HIV-positive people in Russia is growing exponentially every year. In 2003 over 253,000 HIV-infected Russian citizens were officially registered. On average, from 0.17 to 0.18 percent of the population is infected, but the numbers are higher in some regions. In the opinion of V. Pokrovskii, an academician of the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences who heads the Russian Federal Center for the Prevention and Control of HIV/AIDS, the real number of HIV-infected individuals in Russia is much higher, up to one million people.
3. In analyzing the ways in which HIV/AIDS is spreading throughout the Russian Federation, experts emphasize its epidemiological nature. Numerous studies, including those broadcast on television, have shown that at present the problems associated with AIDS are the center of attention only within a narrow circle of experts and among those who have the disease, those who are HIV-infected, and their loved ones.

4. The specific social characteristics of the spread of the HIV infection in the Russian Federation are manifested as unique cultural traits—our citizens' attitude toward the problem of AIDS, their low level of awareness, their unusually infantile attitude toward measures of personal safety, their inclination toward risky behavior, and so on. In addition, the presence of social problem zones, such as rising drug addiction, prostitution, and homosexuality, combined with a lack of preparation (both psychological and professional) among a majority of medical professionals for contact with HIV/AIDS-infected people, and the limited efficiency at prevention exhibited by centers for AIDS control all contribute to the spread of the infection throughout the post-Soviet space.
5. Almost one-fourth of Russia's population lives below the poverty line. All this could not help but influence the spread of the AIDS epidemic in Russia.
6. The public is not well informed about the disease. In a 2002 survey 19% said they were sufficiently well informed. 35% responded that they were "somewhat" informed but not sufficiently. 44% said they were relatively poorly informed.
7. There is a direct correlation between crime, drug use and HIV/AIDS infection (*Russian Politics and Law*).


AVERT.ORG is an international HIV and AIDS charity based in the UK, with the aim of averting HIV and AIDS worldwide. They provide table 4 below with statistics on Eastern European/Central Asia countries and HIV/AIDS diagnoses for 2003. The perspective shown is startling. In regards to the total number of diagnoses, Russia accounts for a full 72% of the total of all the countries. Russia's rate of 275.5 per million is 62.5 more than the nearest country Ukraine and more than 100 more than the third place finisher, Latvia. Most frightening, Russia is responsible for 75% of total cases reported, with 206,002 more than the nearest country, again Ukraine. Clearly an epidemic has been in the making for some time.

Table 5 shows that from 1996 to 2003 Russia was second only to Estonia in Eastern Europe in the category of new infections. Russia shows over six hundred infections per million during this time frame, indicating approximately 90,000 new cases.

Table 4

Republic of Moldova	258	60.5	1,946
Russian Federation	39,470	275.5	268,367
<i>Source: Avert.org</i>			
Tajikistan	42	6.7	119
Turkmenistan‡	*	*	2
Ukraine	10,009	206.3	62,365
Uzbekistan	1,836	70.4	3,596
Total	54,504	*	354,641
Kyrgyzstan	130	25.3	494
Latvia	403	174.7	2,710
Lithuania	110	31.9	845

Table 5




Source: Avert.org.

Fertility

The fertility rate in Russia is yet another cause of the declining population. When the Soviet Union collapsed the fertility rate followed right behind. Going from a high in 1986/1987 of 2.19 births per woman to a low of 1.17 in 1999 illustrates the sharp drop. Fertility has increased slightly in the last few years, up to 1.4, but in 2001 the Council of Europe said the net reproduction rate was .59. They compared this to a rate of 1.0 that would signify the replacement of population. Table 6 shows the pattern over the past four decades (*Eberstadt*).

Table 6



Source: Anderson

Vladimir Shkolnikov is a leading Russian demographer at the Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research in Rostock, Germany. He warns that the natural replacement rate of 2.1 is far out of reach for Russia at this time. "Overall, it should be understood very well that what we are talking about, this increase proclaimed by Goskomstat, I mean there is an increase, that's true, but this increase doesn't make a big difference demographically because this is an increase from the level 1.3 to the level of 1.4 and it has nothing to do with reaching the level of population replacement," he says (*Bransten*). Nicholas Eberstadt offers additional factors that have led to the declining rate:

First, Russia's poor and declining overall health patterns prevail in the realm of reproductive health as well—meaning that involuntary infertility

is a more significant problem for Russia than for Western countries, and possibly a worsening one. Data on infertility for contemporary Russia are problematic. According to some recent reports, notwithstanding, Thirteen percent of Russia's married couples of childbearing age are infertile, nearly twice the 7 percent figure for the United States in 1995 offered by the National Center for Health Statistics.¹⁰ Other Russian sources point to an even greater prevalence of infertility today, with numbers ranging "from 15 percent for couples, or even 15–20 percent for females and 5–10 among males, or, alternatively, 30 percent of all males and females of childbearing age."¹¹ Whatever the true level, medical diagnoses of infertility in Russia today are reportedly "on the rise" and that reported increase is unlikely to be an artifact. With respect to female infertility, Russia suffers today from two pronounced and highly unusual risks. First, Russian womanhood has, quite literally, been scarred by the country's extraordinary popular reliance upon abortion as a primary means of contraception—with the abortions in question conducted under the less-than-exemplary standards of Soviet and post-Soviet medicine. Given past and existing patterns, a Russian woman can expect to have more abortions than births over the course of her childbearing years. In 1988, at the end of the Soviet era, Russian women underwent an officially tabulated 4.6 million abortions—two for every live birth (*Eberstadt*).

Overall view of the health system

The overall health system in Russia is one that Americans of *fifty* years ago would have thought woefully inadequate. In *The Wall Street Journal*, Dr. Alexei Serov described a scene that is happening all around the country. Pipes had begun bursting in his maternity hospital while he watched the plaster falling from the walls. The building, not renovated in 40 years, was closed by health regulators, and

Dr. Serov was forced to move his patients to temporary quarters across the street. With no elevators to move his pregnant patients from floor to floor, conditions were not much better than at the hospital. There was a Tuberculosis clinic next door that must have terrified the expecting mothers. "We physicians are working on the razor's edge," says Dr. Serov, who earns the equivalent of \$130 a month. "All our problems boil down to a lack of financing." (Whalen) This is evidenced by the fact that two children had died within the last year but would have survived with a \$15,000 breathing machine (*WSJ*).

The article also reminds that up until 1991 health care was free to citizens of the Soviet Union; however, the quality of care equaled your level of social and/or Communist Party status. Although health care is still state subsidized the funding has been cut by a third, resulting in patients having to foot the rest of the bill. Even with a doctor, such as Dr. Servov, making only \$130 per month, health care is simply something many Russians must live without.

Another story shows that just being born in Russia can be dangerous. In January of last year six premature babies lost their lives due to the nurses failing to sanitize the breathing machines the infants needed to survive. The chief doctor of the hospital was fired, and a state inquiry concluded that the accidents were caused by a "lack of qualified personnel and equipment." (Whalen) President Putin has been advised to cut back on free health care and move toward a privatized system. As we know here in the United States, the quality of health care is excellent in a privatized system. Putin, though, is wary of doing anything that may damage his

high approval ratings. Certainly if health care stays in the states' hands it will not improve in any measurable degree (*Whalen*).

The babies discussed above, if they had survived, would not have had a very long life to look forward to, compared to the United States and other countries in the West and Europe. Tables 7 & 8 below, show just how far Russia has to go for female and male life expectancy at birth. In 1999 the average Russian male was expected to live to age 61. The same male in the United States could add another twelve years and die at 73. For female Russian babies the gap is strikingly narrower. The life expectancy for them is 72 compared to 79 for the American females.

Table 7 Expectation of Life at Birth for Males (Source:Anderson)





Table 8 **Expectation of Life at Birth for Females (Source:Anderson)**



The figures for 2002, the latest available, show that life expectancy has not become better since 1999, according to Kent R. Hill, Assistant Administrator for Europe and Eurasia U.S. Agency for International Development. In testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Mr. Hill said, “The largest gender differences in life expectancy worldwide are found in Eurasian countries. Russian females with a life expectancy of 72, for example, live 13 years longer than Russian males (59 years).” (USAID)

Yuriy Komarov, vice president of the Russian Medical Association adds a frightening perspective to the life expectancy issue. Speaking to the Fifth Pirigov All-Russia Congress of Doctors he said, “Today, the difference in the life expectancy of Russians and the inhabitants of developed countries abroad is 15-18 years. Something like 100 years will be needed to close the gap.” (*Wash. Times*) Komarov added that the premature death rate is higher than almost 100 years ago in

Russia, and that if basic medical treatment was available nationwide, 40% of premature deaths could be avoided (*Wash. Times*).

Debra Javeline of The Kennan Institute, quoted earlier in regards to Russia's alcoholism, cites a number of challenges that are presented by Russia's health system.

1. According to the World Health Organization, by 1999, 3.5 million Russians (out of 145 million) were treated for psychological disorders, and more than one-third of Russians, or 52 million people, have "psychological disorders of various degrees."
2. Suicides in Russia have climbed from roughly 26 per 100,000 people in 1990 to roughly 40 in 2000, representing an increase of more than 50 percent in only a decade.
3. In terms of nutrition, Russians have a poor diet. They consume increasing quantities of potatoes and bread, sacrifice more nutritious meat, vegetables, and fruit, and suffer important vitamin and mineral deficiencies.
4. In terms of morbidity, Russians are increasingly prone to diseases like tuberculosis, cholera, diphtheria, polio, and heart disease.
5. In terms of mortality, Russians are dying. They are dying at rates that are alarming for a supposedly postindustrial country, and they are dying for reasons that are similarly alarming, like alcohol abuse and accidents. The rate of mortality has increased significantly for all age groups, and at its most extreme, it has doubled for men between the ages of forty and forty-four years, giving Russian men the highest rate of death in Europe.

6. The principal victims of Russia's health crisis are middle-aged men, especially those aged forty to forty-four years. Between poverty and death, some mechanism is intervening, and that mechanism is likely psychological or emotional. Specifically, powerlessness, hopelessness, or "loss of control" is the likely intervening variable. Identifying loss of control as the problem sheds light on why Russia's two leading causes of death are cardiovascular disease and alcohol abuse (which features prominently in accidents or "death by external causes" in Russia). Both causes of death are more prevalent among individuals who perceive a loss of control. Stress from lost control is said to be especially prominent among individuals who have experienced "status loss events" such as unemployment, divorce, the death of a loved one, and other losses of income, power, and prestige. In the case of Russians and other post-Soviet citizens, most have experienced such status loss events on a personal level while also sharing in their country's major loss of status from a world superpower to developing world charity case. The resulting stress in turn can affect health directly by causing disease. Stress affects the nervous system, the neuroendocrine system, the immune system, and the cardiovascular system, and it leads to a higher risk for a whole range of illnesses, including hypertension, heart attack, gastric problems, stroke, ulcers, colitis, diabetes, infectious disease, and cancer (Javeline).

The state of Russia's health system has advanced little since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russian's, accustomed to state funded health care under

communism, struggle with assuming more responsibility for their own health care. However, the state must assume more responsibility of its' own. It must devote more resources to the infrastructure of the health system, as well as prevention programs for disease targeted at the youth. Russia cannot afford not to do this, if it desires to reverse the trend of de-population.

Chapter II

Effects

The effects of Russia's population decline may appear to be obvious. In terms of national security the demographic that the army depends on is dying. There simply will not be enough young fit males to fill the ranks. Likewise for the people needed to work in the factories, keep the trains running, etc. Moreover, the people who are not dying are getting older. "In recent decades, the number of persons aged 60 and over has doubled. The number of older persons will continue to grow in coming years, and the ratio of retired people to working-age people will increase. Between 2005 and 2020, for example, this ratio will increase by 50 percent," says Julie DaVanzo and Clifford Grammich, both analysts from RAND (*Rand*). Assuming the analysts are correct, Russia will have to make dramatic steps forward in the area of technology to make up for the loss in manpower. Table 9 indicates the seriousness of Russia's population that is economically active. The 30-40 age group is the most active, with at 90.1 percent economically active. The percentages trail off down to the 55-59 age group where only 49.7% are economically active. This is compared to 69.5% in the United States, where the years 55-59 are considered prime earning years (ILO). As Russia's population continues to age, those available to be productive members of the labor force will dramatically decline, further worsening the economic outlook. After the age of 59, the table shows, hardly anyone is working, and the 18 million over 65 will be dying

off rapidly in the coming years. In the United States, 46.8% of those between 60 and 64 are still working compared to only 15.5 percent in Russia.

Table 9

Age group	Total			Total population	Men		Women		
	Total population	Active population	Activity rate		Active population	Activity rate	Total population	Active population	Activity rate
Total	146740.000	66736.000	45.5	68820.000	35273.000	51.3	77920.000	31464.000	40.4
Total (15+)	117722.000	66736.000	56.7		35273.000	.		31465.000	.
0-9	16664.000
10-14	12354.000
15-19	11182.000	1558.000	13.9	...	775.000	783.000	.
20-24	10527.000	7096.000	67.4	...	3941.000	3155.000	.
25-29	9849.000	7980.000	81.0	...	4489.000	3491.000	.
30-34	10170.000	9166.000	90.1	...	4892.000	4274.000	.
35-39	12738.000	11351.000	89.1	...	5829.000	5522.000	.
40-44	12240.000	10629.000	86.8	...	5264.000	5365.000	.
45-49	10802.000	8991.000	83.2	...	4373.000	4618.000	.
50-54	5915.000	4111.000	69.5	...	2012.000	2100.000	.
55-59	8510.000	4228.000	49.7	...	2736.000	1492.000	.
60-64	7404.000	1147.000	15.5	...	697.000	450.000	.
65+	18385.000	479.000	2.6	...	265.000	215.000	.

Source: International Labour Organization

The military is facing similar shortages according to Dmitry Trenin of the Carnegie Moscow Center. “The General Staff is having a difficult time mustering the 100-120 thousand servicemen for the campaign in Chechnya. And the composition of the Armed Forces today is absurd: it has more officers than privates and as many colonels as lieutenants.” (MCC)

The decline in numbers of the overall population, especially those of service age, is forcing the army to conscript those that are not military worthy. In

short, the quality and quantity of Russian soldiers is declining. For example, securing 9.5% of the entire draft base in the spring 2004 draft was far too small, according to Colonel-General Vasily Smirnov, head of the General Staff's main organization and mobilization directorate (*McDermott*). Roger McDermott, of the Jamestown Foundation adds that, "It has been in steady decline during the last decade, with around 27% accepted from the draft base in 1994. Unfortunately, the Presidential team considers the same draft a success, since it collected 95% of the fixed-term soldiers the army requires. Such a positive spin diverts attention from the real horror of the draft: the poor quality of the new draftees."(*McDermott*) Moreover, McDermott notes that many fail the medical and get a reprieve from the unpopular military service, and Russian medical doctors, according to reports, judged 50% of draftees to have "limited suitability" on health grounds. This has a direct affect on manning the higher readiness formations and Special Forces. Not only is the supply of men of draft age dwindling, the quality of recruits is also faltering; 25% of draftees have only eight years of education, 6% were registered with the local police, 2.7% were known to have a drug-related problem, and 5% had a criminal record.

Not surprisingly the General Staff solution to these manpower problems is simply to increase the number of draftees from the current draft base by up to 2.5 times over the next five years. The entire draft base currently is 1.6 million, and is expected to decrease to between 800,000 and 1 million within two or three years. Concluding, McDermott said, "If the army switches to a 12-month term for draft

service, it would have to recruit 200,000 in each draft campaign, around 20-25% of the total number of conscripts. In other words, the General Staff vision entails returning to higher percentage levels than the Russian armed forces recruited in 1994.” (*Eurasia Daily Monitor*)

In 2000 the United Nations convened an expert group to discuss population decline and population ageing in the Russian Federation. The group noted the following:

- The most urgent problem for the economy of Russia caused by the population ageing will be the rising pressure on the government budget and more strong necessity of financing the pension and social security systems.
- In Russia, the government pension system fails to provide somewhat normal standard of living for the elderly people. Despite of the measures intended to increase pensions, the mean size of the appointed pensions is still below the pensionary cost of living. Even the improvement of the economic situation will not necessary increase the pension fund contributions to a marked degree because according to the Goskomstat projection the number of the working-age persons who are the main tax bearers will start to decrease since 2006. The absence of the integrated reforms will cause in the long-term perspective a dangerous aggravation of the financial status of the pension system which will take place under the influence of the gradual ageing of the population of Russia.
- The increase in the number of old persons will demand for the development of the social support services for the lonely elderly people and expansion of the

network of the old people's homes and boarding houses. Currently, these institutions in Russia experience serious problems with the material and personnel maintenance.

- The increase of the share of the elderly persons with higher needs in medical treatment will cause a stronger load as regards the medical establishments. The latter will require the reorganization of the public health system with the purpose of improving geriatric care. For all age groups, it is necessary to improve the information on health, including reproductive health and food because the health of the old persons depends both on the quality of the rendered medical services and living conditions and on the status of health during the young years.
- The share of the population of older age groups within the total population will increase. By 2016, each fifth inhabitant of Russia will be in the age of 60 years and more.
- The potential support ratio (the number of the persons of the working age per person of past working-age) will decline from 3 at the beginning of the 2000 to 2.3 by 2016. However, the cumulative potential support ratio (children and the persons of the past working-age) by 2016 would not exceed the level of 2000 – 1.5 persons, due to the decline of the share of children within the total population. (*U.N. Pop. Center*)

There is a direct correlation between health and economic productivity. In a wealthy country, such as the United States, they compliment and reinforce each other. If there is good health care, that spurs economic productivity from an active

populace. When there is economic activity the needed resources for health care are produced. Therefore Russia cannot expect to have a consistently active economy when its population, especially the young who produce, is growing smaller. Natural resource revenues will not suffice indefinitely. "Apart from the obvious military implications of the envisioned disproportionate decline of the age group from which army manpower is traditionally drawn, there would be economic and social reverberations as well," says Eberstadt. "With fewer young people rising to replace the older retirees graduating from the Russian workforce, the question of improving (or perhaps maintaining) the average level of skills and qualifications in the economically active population would become that much more pressing. And since younger people the world over tend to be disposed toward and associated with certain kinds of discovery, innovation, and entrepreneurial risk-taking, a pronounced choke-off of younger blood could have intangible, but real, consequences for Russia's social capabilities and economic responsiveness." *(Eberstadt)*

The two major problems created by Russia's population decline are clear. They are national security and economic security. The army is finding it difficult to fill the ranks, and as said above, the proportion of officers to enlisted men is seriously out of balance. The army is growing increasingly dependent on conscripts that have little or no education and many have had problems with the law. The tangible components of the military are outdated so there must be technological advances made in weaponry. If Russia does happen to be able to modernize the military, it

will need highly trained and educated recruits. Currently the army is trying to sustain itself with large numbers of troops. That will not suffice for long if it hopes to be able to defend the long borders that span eleven time zones. Brains, rather than brawn, will be needed in the future.

The problem of simply having enough people to work and provide economic productivity is a challenge that Russia will have for decades to come. The available work force continues to shrink as the population gets older. In contrast to the United States and other western countries, the younger generations are not sustaining the population, so there will be fewer people to replace them in the workforce as they move into middle-age and retirement. Therefore, population growth must be the top priority of the Russian government.

Chapter III

The Solution

Immigration

Russia must develop a plan to increase the population, as all indications are that the population will drop by a third to around 100 million in 2050 (*U.S. Census*). As established earlier the population is growing older, and by 2050 the majority will be at or near retirement age. Increasing births, although a logical step which must be encouraged, will not provide the needed relief in the short term. This leaves only one viable alternative, increasing immigration.

The Kremlin must develop an immigration plan that will provide immediate relief to its aging work force problem. Immigration is happening but is not at the level of population replacement. The need for a higher level of immigration, however, is an issue that must take a back seat for a moment to discuss the problem of *emigration*, those that are leaving Russia for greener pastures. In many circles this is referred to as “brain drain.”

The problem of emigration, or brain drain, is not a new phenomenon, according to Tat’iana Naumova in *Russian Politics and Law* (Naumova). She notes the fact that Europe experienced this in a high degree during the 1940s and 1950s when academics, intellectuals and scientists were leaving Europe in droves for the

west, most notably the United States. At this time though it was not for greener pastures, but to escape the oppression and war that was enveloping the continent. The numbers leaving Russia have been large, said Naumova, noting that Russia's Security Council estimated that two hundred thousand scholars had left the country by the end of the twentieth century. She provides the causes that she believes have been the root of the problem:

- Negative developments in the Russian economy have led to a situation in which science is no longer in demand in Russian society. The causes of contemporary academic emigration are closely linked to the general crisis of science in Russia, primarily a response to the dramatic reduction of scientific investment (by twelve times in the span of a decade). As the experience of scientifically and technologically advanced countries has shown, the share of state funding in scientific development cannot fall below 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) without that important area of public life beginning to decline. In 2003 Russian state funding for science made up 0.31 percent of the GDP, whereas until recently the value of that indicator in our country had been one of the highest in the world.
- In leading countries with highly developed economies, intellectuals are a respected part of society. In the United States and Japan, the average academic salary is twice that in the national economy as a whole. Even the neighboring post-socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which are implementing radical market and democratic reforms, have higher real academic salaries and living standards than Russia does, although the role of science there is also on the decline. As is well known, in our country academic salaries are below the subsistence wage and lag far behind the average national salary. Moreover, we should take into account that many Russian academics depend on their salaries as their main source

of income, which makes this one of the main factors determining their welfare. Most of them receive a salary that can provide neither a dignified living standard nor an acceptable social position. Quite a few scholars are simply forced to look for nonacademic sources of income.

- The collapse of the Soviet Union destroyed the integrated academic space, broke up the academies of sciences in the former Soviet republics, led to the demise of scientific schools (which were in essence Russian schools), and ruptured ties formed in the course of history. Millions of our compatriots found themselves beyond Russia's boundaries, and these included quite a few scholars.
- Most academics have only one practical form of capital left—their rather high level of professionalism, industriousness, and efficiency. The intellectuals who have come back to Russia have turned out to be very vulnerable under conditions of labor-market competition. Studies show that scholars have few chances to find jobs in their areas of expertise in Russia.
- The contradictory nature of the radical reforms in Russia has had a dramatic impact on values in our society. The systemic crisis has produced a conflict over the hierarchy of values, and the prestige of intellectual work has dramatically declined in the public mind. This is not a situation based on considerations of the moment but a prospect for many years to come. The growing antiscientific sentiment that has emerged in Russian culture, an outgrowth of our society's sense of crisis, has contributed to scholarship's now having little prestige.
- These days, antiscientific sentiment among the public is quite strong. Scientific mastery among the young has begun to decline. Studies show that graduate schools have difficulty filling their enrollments, since a negligible number of respondents prefer to take that route. The decline in the prestige of scientific work is catastrophic, and the social status of scholars has plummeted: one can say that it has never been as low as it is at present (*Naumova*).

The preceding points have had dire consequences for Russia as a whole. The lack of prestige for what I will call the intellectuals has influenced the younger population to avoid the sciences. This has caused further harm to Russia's ability to produce technological advances to keep up with the west. Once on an even par with the west, Russia finds itself falling further and further behind. Of course Russia's loss is our gain. The intellectuals that were once heralded in Russia are now helping the United States to become *more* advanced and *more* competitive in the global economy. Of course the psychological effect is felt as well. Many Russians are despondent over the loss of Russian prestige in the world after 1991, and this further enhances that despondence. Those feeling this way will either fall deeper into despair or decide to leave themselves.

All is not so bad, argues Timothy Heleniak in the *Journal of International Affairs*. He stipulates that, yes, Russia is experiencing a level of brain drain, but it is also benefiting from an influx of "brains" from peripheral areas. "However, an overlooked fact is that as Russia loses persons to the far abroad, it is gaining them from the other FSU states," he contends:

The Russian diaspora population in the other FSU states disproportionately tended to be highly educated urban dwellers, and it is those populations who have decided to return in the largest numbers. In addition, many highly educated and skilled members of the non-Russian nationalities have chosen to migrate to Russia, either permanently or temporarily. While Russia may indeed have lost large portions of persons among select, highly specialized occupations, overall the country seems to have greatly increased the

educational level of its population through migration during the post-Soviet period, largely at the expense of the other FSU states.*(Heleniak)*

There is no doubt though that the status of intellectuals in Russia has declined, and something must be done to reverse that trend. Even if Russia is getting a portion of these back from the FSU, it must address the problem of declining enrollments in scientific studies. To do this it must address the problem of low salaries, and it must ensure that the jobs the intellectuals are qualified for have a high level of prestige. Heleniak misses the important point that those who are migrating back to Russia are not going to stay if they are looked down upon and are not compensated well for their services. You cannot simply rely on the emigrating intellectuals being replaced from the FSU. That will prove to be a benefit in the short term but dismisses the root of the problem. However, in a policy memo, Theodore Gerber of Arizona State University agrees in part with Heleniak:

Given the unremitting crisis in Russia's economy since 1991, it may surprise some that Russia has been a net recipient of migrants throughout the transition period. Although the migration rate peaked in 1994, it has been positive throughout the period and remained fairly stable in subsequent years. The bulk of this in-migration consists of ethnic Russians "returning" to the Russian Federation from other CIS countries for either economic or political reasons. Russian policy gives all Russian nationals the formal right to reside in Russia. Many such immigrants receive official

status as "forced migrants," which formally entitles them to receive some assistance from the Federal Migration Service. However, the FMS, which first and foremost fulfills monitoring and regulatory functions, is severely underfinanced and plagued by inconsistent practices in its regional offices (*Gerber*).

Gerber notes that there are problems associated with this influx of migrants that are not typically recognized. First, he stipulates that one may view this migration as a "positive development" in helping to offset the decline in population. However, he also suggests that Russia cannot take care of the people it already has, so the immigrants will only tax the system more. "Russia's constricted housing market, negative growth, and decaying infrastructure are ill-prepared for influxes of migrants," he says (*Gerber*). He also notes that frequent media reports focus on common problems that are typically associated with large numbers of migrants. The problems of high crime rates, unemployment, epidemics, and housing shortages suggest that immigrants from the FSU come from all levels on the socio-economic scale (*Gerber*).

Russia is experiencing a net immigration increase according to the latest statistics available. That is to say that more people are immigrating *to* Russia than are emigrating *from* Russia. Table 10 shows that in 2000 Russia gained 350,874 and lost 161,178 for a net gain of 189,696. The following year the net gain decreased dramatically but still managed to stay on the plus side with a net gain of


49,840. Table 11 indicates that historically, the net migration rate has remained relatively flat save for a small surge in the few years following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Table 10 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION: RUSSIAN FEDERATION

	2000	2001
Arrived in the Russian Federation, total	350874	187413
among them from the countries of:		
CIS and Baltic region	350288	186226
other regions ¹⁾	586	1187
Emigrated from the Russian Federation, total	161178	137573
among them to the countries of:		
CIS and Baltic region	83438	62545
other regions ¹⁾	77740	75028
Migration increase, decrease (-), total	189696	49840
including the result of migration exchange with the countries of:		
CIS and Baltic region	266850	123681
other regions	-77154	-73841

Source: Russian Federal State Statistics Service

Table 11 (Source: Anderson)



Christof Ruehl, Chief Economist, The World Bank Russia Country Department, makes several excellent points on the effects of immigration:

Many observers voice the concern that open borders have exacerbated Russia's economic problems due to the "brain-drain", i.e. the outflow of young well-educated people. By official estimates, Russia lost an additional 1.1 million people to emigration from the start of reforms until 2002 (almost all to Germany, Israel and the US), and indeed mostly of working age and with above-average education. However, immigration prevented an even more rapid depletion of Russia's human resources. First, with new arrivals outweighing departures, positive net immigration of 5.6 million reduced the natural population decline from 5 percent of Russia's 1989 population to about 1.2 percent (these are 2002 census estimates, while other estimates are even more optimistic). And second, the quality of immigration has been relatively high: In every single category, by education level as well as by age group, Russia has received more people than it lost. So from the economic perspective, immigration has greatly cushioned the blow to Russia's human resources. The conclusions for economic policy are obvious and have been drawn before: In an economic perspective the main issue raised by immigration is not how to restrict it, but how to define a policy that manages the

inflows. This is particularly true as the “supply” of immigrants from ex-Soviet republics dries up and the question of immigration to Russia from elsewhere becomes more topical. In finding answers to such questions, Russia faces exactly the same kind of problems, which most EU economies have to wrestle with (*Ruehl*).

Many economists and demographers believe that Russia needs several hundred thousand migrants each year just to keep major industries working. The theory is that this influx of workers would need to be kept up until the country grows wealthy enough to afford better social programs, thereby cutting the death rate and raising the birth rate. “This need makes immigration policy one of the most important, if not the most important, part of national security planning,” said Davlat Khudonazarov a visiting scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center in Washington and former member of the Supreme Soviet. “Now would be the most favorable time to accept more migrants from former Soviet republics like Tajikistan, people who would like to live and work in Russia. They were once citizens of the same country as Russians, and they share the same past and historical fate. In a mere 15 years, migrants and Russians will not share these things.” (*Moscow Times*)

Russia at least appears to acknowledge the need for more labor via immigration. On March 17, 2005, Russian President Putin addressed the immigration matter in remarks to the Security Council:

An effectively implemented immigration policy is of critical importance for our country. We need to act rapidly to adjust our immigration policy strategy and turn the problems of the past into an advantage for the future.

In order to achieve this, we first need to make improvements to the state immigration policy and we also need to tie it in more closely with our country's real social and economic development needs.

It is clear that immigration issues require constant and vigilant attention. This is partly because Russia has international obligations it must abide by, but even more, it is because we must take urgent steps to resolve the country's economic and demographic problems.

We all know that Russia's working population is on the decline and that it will not be long before this begins to have a negative effect on our economic growth and on our ability to fulfill various social commitments.

According to the Federal Migration Service, immigration flows are decreasing with every passing year. It is a fact today that immigration no longer has a positive effect on the demographic situation in the country. It no longer compensates for the natural population decline, as was the case in the mid-1990s.

Many countries have successfully resolved similar problems and continue to do so. Their success has been thanks to a competent immigration policy. They put in place targeted policies to encourage people with capital, knowledge and good qualifications into their economic, scientific and cultural spheres.

Indeed, our specialists are also among those who leave for

countries with an effective immigration policy. We are well aware of this. Specialists estimate that more than 100,000 scientists working in what have been traditionally strong sectors in Russia such as mathematics, chemistry, physics and biology left the country between 1989 and 2001. Most of these people were mature people aged 35-45.

We must continue to work on ensuring good living and working conditions for our specialists in their native country, but at the same time we should also take steps to ensure that foreign specialists and qualified workers find suitable living conditions here in Russia. Our primary task today is to encourage immigration. I stress that we are talking about encouraging immigration and not just compensating for our population decline.

Some Russian entrepreneurs are interested, of course, in having a cheap labor force. Indeed, some specialists even say that this is one of Russia's economic advantages. But at the same time, this disorder and these unclear naturalization procedures for immigrants eventually cause damage to the state, society and the economy.

We are well aware that some regions face quite an acute situation with a rapid increase in the number of immigrant workers. But we have to be particularly attentive when dealing with such problems and it is extremely important that the entire system of state power have a common view and implement a coordinated state policy regarding all the principal immigration issues.

I would also like to point out that immigration policy is a powerful instrument for consolidating the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States. People who come to Russia from the CIS countries can make a real contribution to strengthening our integration. Ensuring that they can legally work and live a normal social life here is one of the ways in which we can build up our cooperation with our closest partners.

Drawing on these people is the most natural way for us to attract the labor force we need. After all, what is important to us is not religion, skin color or other ethnic factors, but the fact that practically all these people speak Russian and know Russian culture. They have no problem adapting to Russian life. This is a huge advantage for us, an advantage that other countries do not have. Take Western Europe, where there is a flow of immigrants from other regions, from North Africa and Latin America, for example. It is a complicated situation there because these immigrants take decades to adapt to life in European countries. Only the second and third generation really manages to adapt. We don't have this problem and we should make use of this advantage (*Kremlin*).

Putin, at least on the surface, does appear to have a grasp on the problem, but whether he takes concrete action we will just have to wait and see. So far in his regime, what he says and what takes place are two different things. He is correct in believing that there is plenty of labor surrounding Russia that can be capitalized on, most notably the Central Asian states of the FSU. Indeed, Russia has become the primary destination for unskilled migrants from these states. Due to major unemployment, poor social conditions, and poverty, these migrants from countries such as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are filling the need in Russia for unskilled workers. Not unlike Mexican immigrants to the United States, these migrants are taking the jobs that the ordinary Russian does not want. A bonus is that the majority of these migrants are familiar with Russian culture and most of them speak the language, a stark contrast to the Mexicans flowing into the United States.

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs recently issued a report on this status of this immigration from Central Asia:

THE NUMBER OF LABOUR MIGRANTS

According to a recent study by the International Labour Organization (ILO) on illegal labour in Russia, there were 3.5 to 5 million illegal labour migrants in the country, mainly from Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries, including Central Asia. Tyuryukanova, who headed the project, estimated that around 30 to 40 percent of these workers - up to 2 million people - may come from Central Asia, with Tajiks - among the poorest in the region - leading the list.

TAJIK LABOUR MIGRANTS

Hakim Muhabbatov, a Moscow-based expert on Tajik labour migrants, told IRIN that the large flow of Tajiks into the country could be attributed to poor social and economic conditions in the country, still reeling from five years of civil war in the 1990s.

According to the World Bank, Tajikistan is the poorest of the former Soviet republics, with over 80 percent of its population living below the national poverty line. Salaries average just US \$11 a month, while the minimum wage is a mere \$2, figures that make it hard to understand how people survive. By comparison, an average monthly salary in Russia is around \$120, with those in Moscow being more than \$500.

Tajik labour migrants in Russia are generally aged between 16 and 40, with 75-80 per cent being men. Most of these migrants do unskilled jobs that Russians are reluctant to take up, such as work at markets, construction sites, food services and as farm labour.

KYRGYZ LABOUR MIGRANTS

The second largest group of Central Asian labour migrants in Russia comes from Tajikistan's northern neighbour, Kyrgyzstan. Janybek, 32, came to Moscow to work as a construction worker together with his two friends from the southern Kyrgyz province of Batken more than two years ago. Now he works cleaning streets in one of Moscow's poorer districts. "I plan to bring my wife here," said Janybek. "I have this job and it pays \$200 [a month], which is quite good. As long as we have such an opportunity we will keep working here."

He is not alone. Some analysts estimate that more than 500,000 labour migrants from Kyrgyzstan are currently working in Russia. However, Askar Beshimov, the consul-general of the Kyrgyz Embassy in Russia, claimed that their numbers were no more than 30,000.

Dairbek Aliev, another Kyrgyz labour migrant, arrived in Moscow almost a year ago. "First, I was hired by Donstroy [a local construction company], where I worked for seven months but was paid only for two," the 21-year-old lamented. "All the workers there - amongst whom were Tajiks, Turkmen and Uzbeks - were hired informally without labour agreements," he said, adding that many were required to work the first two or three months for free in return for the 'employment' opportunity. "This was kind of a bribe for hiring us to work for them," Dairbek explained.

UZBEK LABOUR MIGRANTS

As for Uzbekistan, although the precise number of labor migrants working in Russia is not known, the number of such migrants leaving for South Korea, Russia and Kazakhstan from Central Asia's most populous nation has reportedly increased. According to the Uzbek Ministry of Labor, more than 600,000 to 700,000 Uzbek citizens are working in various countries. Some experts suggest that Russia's Samara province, 600 km

southeast of the capital, may alone host up to 24,000 Uzbek migrants.

They are dispersed over the whole of European Russia, says Nikolay Mitrohin, a representative of the Moscow-based Memorial human rights organisation. Primarily engaged in agricultural, general services (restaurants and cafes), bazaars and construction work, Uzbek migrants find the pay in Russia quite favourable compared to the average (\$20-30 a month) back home.

TURKMEN LABOUR MIGRANTS

The numbers of Turkmen labor migrants in Russia, by contrast, are limited given the reclusive policy of the Turkmen government and severe restrictions on traveling abroad. Since the autumn of 1994 all transport routes, except for air links, were closed between the two countries. Additionally, the controversial political status of ethnic Russians living in Turkmenistan has contributed to a fall in migration from the energy-rich, but increasingly poor, Central Asian state. Experts comment that, unlike ordinary citizens, only those who work in the gas and petroleum refining industries in western Turkmenistan are able to travel to the Russian cities of Tyumen and Yamal by plane. Nevertheless, there are still many Turkmen migrants who work in Russia's booming construction sector, particularly in larger urban areas like Moscow. And while their status is no different from their counterparts from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, reliable statistics on their actual numbers remain hard to come by.

KAZAKHSTAN LABOUR MIGRANTS

Kazakhstan - the leader in Central Asia in terms of economic growth - has the lowest level of labor migration to Russia. "Kazakhstan is the country which has the fewest number of migrants per capita amongst Central Asian countries," Andrey Grozin, head of the Central Asia and Kazakhstan department at the Moscow-based Institute of Commonwealth of Independent

States (ICIS), told IRIN, citing comparatively higher social and economic growth indicators as the main contributing factor.

Kazakhstan has enjoyed annual economic growth of some 10 percent over the past years, boosted mainly by the oil industry. The average monthly salary in the largest Central Asian country is the highest among the CIS countries, almost \$170. However, a number of highly skilled Kazakh labor migrants can be found in Russia's petroleum refining industry in eastern Siberia region. Additionally, Kazakhstan, just as Russia, hosts a substantial number of migrants coming from neighboring Central Asian countries.

IMPACT ON RUSSIAN ECONOMY

There are conflicting views on whether labor migration is good or bad for the Russian economy. Some say that migrants deprive local Russians of jobs, making competition more intense. But others maintain that migrants usually do the jobs that locals themselves are reluctant to do.

According to Tyuryukanova, in some industries, on average 40 percent of jobs were done by migrants and often a migrant took over following a local workers' refusal to fill the job. "This is a situation where a certain niche is firmly occupied by the migrants," she explained. But for the rest there could be competition for jobs between migrants and locals, she conceded. "They do not come to Russia with the purpose of staying here long-term or permanently. The results of our surveys indicate that these migrants come here with short-term goals, related to earning money from temporary jobs," said Svetlana Soboleva, a scientist conducting research on Central Asian migrants in Siberia (*U.N Office*).

The migrants are not only coming from Central Asia, however. In fact, "Over the past 10 years, Russia has become the migration magnet for the rest of Eurasia," stated Fiona Hill, a Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the

Brookings Institution, at a 27 September 2004 Kennan Institute lecture. “We’ve literally had millions of economic migrants moving into places like Moscow, St. Petersburg, and many other Russian cities in search of work and a better life.” (Hill) Between 1991 and 2001, an average of 790,000 people immigrated to Russia annually; only the United States and Germany receive more immigrants per year. Among Hill’s major observations are the following:

- Russia has experienced positive net migration since 1991, with the majority of immigrants arriving from other Soviet successor states. Ethnic Russians migrating to their titular homeland from other Soviet republics comprised nearly 60 percent of total immigration to Russia between 1989 and 2002. However, Hill noted that these numbers reflect only legal migration. She argued that significant numbers of non-Russian labor migrants have come to Russia from the Caucasus and Central Asia, often illegally. As many as 2 million Azerbaijanis, 1 million Armenians, 650,000 Tajiks, 500,000 Georgians and Kyrgyz, and 100,000 Uzbeks may be working in the Russian Federation.
- High levels of immigration have affected Russia in a number of ways—many of which have been very beneficial to the country. The Russian economy has more than doubled since 1999 and domestic demand has increased significantly. Immigrant entrepreneurs provide Russian consumers with cheap goods (primarily from Asia and the Middle East), which is particularly important in Siberia and the Far East, where transportation costs make goods from European Russia prohibitively expensive. In addition, cheap labor is filling a void inside Russia

itself, the whole of the lower-paying sectors in the Russian economy are increasingly being filled by migrants from elsewhere in the CIS.

- Immigration has also helped to ameliorate the consequences of Russia's demographic decline. Russia could face serious labor shortages in all fields due to out-migration of skilled workers, high death rates among working age people, low birth rates, and a high percentage of the population above retirement age. However, immigrants have compensated for three-fourths of Russia's natural population decrease between 1992 and 2003. The majority of immigrants are of working age, and although many are employed in low-skill sectors of the economy, migrants from the CIS also include a large number of university graduates (Trough).


Notwithstanding the number of immigrants moving into Russia, the net increase in population continues to be negative. As table 13 shows, immigration is providing little relief. At a peak of 809,000 in 1994, immigration fell to 72,000 in 2001. In the same year the natural "increase" was an astonishing *negative* 943,000. The 2004 estimates by the CIA in Table 12 indicate that the trend continues.

Table 12

Population growth rate:	-0.45% (2004 est.)
Birth rate:	9.63 births/1,000 population (2004 est.)
Death rate:	15.17 deaths/1,000 population (2004 est.)
Net migration rate:	1.02 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2004 est.)

Source: CIA

Table 13



Source: Migration Information Source

Anatoly Vishnevsky, in a report to the Expert Group Meeting on Policy Responses to Population Ageing and Population Decline, Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations Secretariat concluded:

In Russia, like in most industrial countries, the balance of births and deaths will most likely be such in the first half of the 21st century that the natural population increase will be negative. If the country's population will continue to depend largely on the natural reproduction, it will unavoidably decrease in size and will age rapidly. These two trends might be counteracted only by an inflow of immigrants, to a larger or smaller extent, depending on the volume and composition of immigration flows

Their inevitability is dictated by the internal demographic situation in Russia", he continued. "While unfavorable consequences of the population aging are not so dramatic as sometimes imagined, and those actually present may be largely neutralized by economic and social policy measures, the population decrease will present Russia with a very hard choice. It should either succumb to a continuous aggravation of the already meager population / territory ratio, or to widely open its doors to immigration. Both solutions bear unwelcome consequences, so the lesser of two evils should be chosen (Vishnevsky).

The immigration policy for Russia appears to be one of including only Russian speaking peoples from the FSU. However, as we can see from the information provided this source is drying up. Lost in the discussion is the paranoia that Russia has had historically in regards to its borders and the inflow of non-Russian speaking people. One can look as recently to the border policies during the cold war or more notably, the Mongol invasion of the 13th century. Since then

Russia has been suspicious of all foreigners within its borders and has seen everyone as a threat. A position such as this, ingrained for centuries, will be difficult to lose. But lose it they must, if they wish to see population numbers in the black ever again.

The goal of replacing Russia's population with natural increase of course remains a long term goal. The current challenges are what to do in the short term. Massively increased immigration is the logical short term solution. Expanding its borders is the only other solution, and not a good one in today's environment. With democratic changes happening within its sphere of influence, this will be a more unlikely scenario. Recently Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan have taken a path that indicates they would like to distance themselves with Russia and align more to the West. The current regime has overplayed its hand, most notably in the Ukraine election where Putin strongly supported the losing candidate. Putin may have been counting on Ukraine to rejoin Russia at some point and create a powerful block. Ukraine, with its new president Yushenko, is intent on staying a sovereign state. The chance of integrating Ukraine's 50 million people into Russia's population is gone. With Russia predicted to lose up to one million people per year for the foreseeable future, the time to act is now. Russia must open up its borders to massive immigration.

Chapter IV

Conclusion

In chapter one I asked, “What are the causes of Russia’s population decline?” Starting with World War II and the purges of the 1930s I argued that the population decline we see today has its roots in these events. A total loss of 30-40 million people during this time, many in their prime reproductive years, had a catastrophic effect. In addition to losing millions of able bodied men, Russia also lost hundreds of thousands of intellectuals. This loss certainly had a negative effect on scientific endeavors and advancement in technology.

Furthermore, I have shown that controlling disease is one of the main challenges that Russia has today. The statistic that Russia consumes 4 billion bottles of vodka alone, or 40 bottles per Russian, is a startling fact. It is estimated that one out of every seven people is an alcoholic. Research has shown that alcohol plays a major role in accidental death, not to mention deaths from alcohol poisoning. Many Russians drink to excess, and this leads to other health problems such as heart failure and birth defects. The Russian government surely shares the blame for this, as it is addicted to the revenue accumulated from alcohol sales (CSM). Hundreds of millions of dollars in state revenue comes from vodka sales alone. At the same time the health ministry is trying to combat alcoholism.

But alcoholism is not the only disease threat Russia faces. Tuberculosis is a rampaging epidemic. Just a couple of decades ago 7.7 of every 100 new TB victims died as a result of the disease. That figure now hovers around 25.5 per 100. With

188,000 new cases of TB reported each year, the problem is not getting any better. A senior health ministry official has estimated that 30,000 of those new cases will face death. Compounding the problem is the spread of HIV/AIDS. With this disease the immune system is depressed making it much easier for a person with HIV/AIDS to contract TB. Therefore many HIV/AIDS patients also contract TB further enhancing the chances of death.

Research has determined that one percent of the population is infected with HIV/AIDS and in 2003 there were 253,000 new registrations. One of the main challenges, the experts say, is that of information and awareness. Russians, especially the young, simply are not aware of the risks and have not been informed by the government. Additionally I showed that Russia is responsible for 75% of total cases in the region, or the “near abroad.”

The fertility rate in Russia is yet another opportunity to return to natural replacement. Whereas in 1987 the births per woman were 2.19, by 1999 it had been cut almost by half. This is well below the level of natural replacement level of 2.1. It is shown that 13% of Russia’s married couple of childbearing age are infertile, twice the number in the United States. Female infertility comes from two highly unusual risks. First, Russian women have come to rely on abortion as the primary means of contraception, usually in conditions paralleling those of the old Soviet health system. Second, all indications are that the average Russian woman can expect to have more abortions in her lifetime than live births.

I finally argued in chapter one that the Russian health system is in a state of disrepair. I noted a physician that makes the equivalent of \$130 per month and runs a maternity ward that sits next door to a Tuberculosis clinic. The health care that was state provided during Soviet times is still state funded, although benefits have been cut by a third. Because of this, many Russians simply cannot afford a degree of health care that comes anywhere close to the standard in the West. As a result, the life expectancy of Russian men and women has dropped considerably since 1991.

In chapter two I asked, “What are the effects of Russia’s population decline?” I argued that there are two main effects. First is the number of people who are economically productive, or able to work and contribute to the economic well being of the country. A stark reality is that the number of people over the age of 60 has doubled in the last couple of decades. I presented data that very few people in Russia over the age of 60 are economically active. Furthermore, studies have shown that the ratio of retired to working people will increase by 50% by the year 2020. Dramatic steps forward in technology would have to be accomplished to counter the loss of productive workers.

The second major effect, I argued, is that of national security and the state of Russia’s armed forces. The lack of able bodied men has presented a problem just to provide the number of forces needed in Chechnya, let alone to have the standing army needed to protect a country that spans eleven time zones. The military has therefore lowered the standards for recruits. According to some reports 50% of

drafttees have “limited suitability” on health grounds. Furthermore, 25% of drafttees have only eight years of education and many others have drug and criminal histories.

In addition to the woes of the army, the government will be pressured greatly to be able to take care of the ageing population. Financing the pension and social security systems appears to be an impossible task.

In chapter three I asked, “What is the solution to Russia’s population decline?” I argued that increased immigration is the only logical short term solution to the decline in population. Increasing births and decreasing deaths, I showed, can only be seen as a long term solution, but must be made a priority along with immigration. It is not just the *quantity* of people that Russia is losing due to death that is problematic. The *quality* of people it is losing to emigration is also a concern. Intellectuals have experienced a loss of prestige in Russia and are leaving for greener pastures in the West. This trend must be reversed and incentives created to stop the “brain drain.”

Furthermore, Russia is seeing some immigration from FSU states, most notably Central Asian Russian speaking individuals. But these immigrants are typically those of little education who are filling the jobs ordinary Russians do not desire. I likened this to the majority of Mexican immigrants coming to the United States to take the jobs not desired by Americans. Still, the number of immigrants is not enough to offset the decrease caused by those factors covered in chapter two. Worse yet, is that those coming in do not possess the same skills, needed to

contribute to the economy, as those that are leaving. Immigration numbers are falling each year as the number of people in FSU states that want to “return home” dwindles.

The history of the Russian people is one that can only be admired. Russians, throughout their history, have shown a remarkable resiliency and have overcome obstacles that are hard to fathom in the West. Rich in culture and tradition, long oppressed and finally free, they find themselves saddled with the most difficult challenge yet, the steep decline in population. The government must institutionalize massive immigration reform or be prepared to spiral down to the status of a third world country.

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