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Emperical and fantasied realities: Methodologies of qualitative social scientists and fiction writers

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EMPIRICAL AND FANTASIED REALITIES: METHODOLOGIES
OF QUALITATIVE SOCIAL SCIENTISTS AND FICTION WRITERS

A Thesis
Presented to the
Department of Sociology
and the
Faculty of the Graduate College
University of Nebraska

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts
University of Nebraska at Omaha

by
Agnes Czerwinski Riedmann
December, 1977
THESIS ACCEPTANCE

Accepted for the faculty of the Graduate College, University of Nebraska, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts, University of Nebraska at Omaha.

Thesis Committee

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DEDICATION

To Bill
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Perhaps the most poignant sociological lesson that doing a thesis brings home is the fact that no one operates alone. This thesis is the result, very literally, of the support of many others, some whose influence I now recognize and others whose contributions I will no doubt come to see later.

My mother gave me my first writing lessons back when I still could only print. And it was she, a scientist herself, who taught me to value, rather than to fear, curiosity. (And that’s not all: she did me the real favor of proofreading the final draft of this thesis!) My father, whom I wish were alive to share with me this accomplishment, taught me to laugh from the heart and to cry from the soul. Without those important lessons from him, I may never have written anything.

I owe each member of my thesis committee acknowledgement and thanks for his help and support. I owe special gratitude to Dr. Wayne Wheeler, my thesis chairman. In a struggle the pain and joy of which only we can really know, he took my inexperienced hand and guided me through the doing of sociology. He could—and it would have been much easier for both of us—have swept me through this process in such a way that, like a third-grade arithmetic student, I got the right answers without thoroughly understanding how. He didn’t do that (although I’m sure at times I asked it of him). He deserves a big thank-you, not so much for the fact that he helped me get a thesis finished (which he did) but for the fact that he was patient and dedicated enough to want me to learn something.

Monica Aita and Dixie Colvin are two colleagues without whom this thesis would not be what it is. Long, soul-searching talks with Monica helped me at several places in this process to recognize what it was that had me intellectually and/or emotionally stumped. Dixie demonstrated her support by phoning me with pertinent little things she kept running across while she was studying for theory comps. Many references throughout this thesis are directly traceable to one of her generous phone calls. Both Dixie and Monica deserve recognition for their amazing capacity to listen.

Dr. Bob Simpson is another friend whose both vocal and silent support I vividly felt as I worked through not only this occasion of personal growth but others. Thank-you, Bob.

Sophie Katz is a person whose encouragement, support, and enthusiasm cannot be underestimated in terms of what she did for the graduate students who knew and loved her. Thank-
you, Sophie, not only for locating all the number-two lead pencils and rubber cement, but for your genuine concern for each of us.

Finally, a special note of acknowledgement to my family: to my partner and friend, Bill, and to my children, Beth and Billy, who have learned to delight not just in mom's homemade cookies but also in my more selfish endeavors. Both children helped me type the final draft of this thesis. The letters they struck slowly and deliberately may well form the most significant words on all these pages.
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"I had a lot of fun making up stuff."
Michael Crichton, novelist

"Imagine someone over your shoulder demanding, as you write up your monograph, to know: How do you know this? What do you have to back this up? How can you be sure of this? What proof do you have?"
Andris Skreija, anthropologist

"Only when we are thoroughly aware of the limited scope of every point of view are we on the road to the sought-for comprehension of the whole."
Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia*

INTRODUCTION

For three semesters I attended a fiction "writer's workshop," affiliated with a metropolitan university. During two semesters there I completed a novel (unpublished) and several short stories (two published.)

Following my second semester at the workshop, I enrolled as a graduate student in sociology at the same university. After two full years—and upon the initiation of a thesis project—I decided to attend the writer's workshop for a third semester. I intended to act as a covert participant observer in that setting. Upon my return to the workshop I was greeted as a "prodigal daughter" who had come back to the fold.

I began the new series of observation in September, 1975. By November 15, I found myself confessing to my thesis adviser that I could no longer continue the project. I could not "study" my friends. Moreover, this was my second aborted attempt at participant observation. During the previous spring, I had attended a group that was forming in Omaha for the purpose of "helping" terminally ill persons or members of their families to accept impending death. At the suggestion of a sociology faculty member, I had chosen to attend the group and observe its growth and organization.

After the first meeting, however, I knew that I
would not return. The experience had been too painful. My role as researcher had been difficult to maintain; I had found myself discussing my own father's terminal illness and receiving what I later considered unsolicited advice.

So, on November 15, 1975, I sat discussing with my thesis adviser not the data I had gleaned from participant observation but the method itself. I apologized that I could no longer attend the writer's workshop with the intent of observing and later publishing my analysis of the behavior and values in that setting. My adviser asked, only half in jest, "But could you write a novel about the sociology department?" I laughed nervously, wondering in what ways the two situations were similar and in what other ways different. And in the pause which followed was born this project.

The purpose of this research project then is to make an investigation of the methodological assumptions and practices of qualitative sociologists and/or anthropologists and of writers of fiction.¹

What practices, attitudes toward work, and general methodological assumptions distinguish scientific participant observers from novelists? How are these two kinds of writer alike in the ways they perform their respective observations

¹This thesis limits its analysis to qualitative social scientists and fiction writers who have produced book-length works. Throughout this paper the terms social scientist, sociologist, anthropologist, and field worker are used interchangeably, all four referring to the concept sociologist/anthropologist as elaborated above. The terms fiction writer, literary artist, and novelist are also used interchangeably.
and, ultimately, in the modes in which they present their observations to their audiences? How are they dissimilar?

What is the nature of the subject matter about which sociologists and novelists write? What influences their choices of subject matter? Do novelists and sociologists differ with regard to subject matter?

How do sociologists and novelists differ—and how are they alike—in the ways in which they gather their data or material? How do sociologists and fiction writers feel about observation? Introspection? Keeping notes? What is bias and how is it regarded by both social scientists and literary artists?

When it comes to presentation of material to an audience, how do fictionalists and social scientists differ with regard to their respective purposes? How are they similar in their purposes of presentation? How do literary artists and social scientists differ—and how are they similar—in their rhetorical styles?

In fiction and in social science, what is the place of imagination? How is truth defined by these two categories of writer? How do the methodological positions of these two kinds of writer and observer influence or imply their respective assumptions concerning human beings? Put another way, what does a particular writer's scientific or aesthetic view of human beings say about his/her choice of methodology?

In general we shall see that social scientists and fiction writers focus upon common material from
respectively divergent vantage points. Social scientists investigate human beings from a scientific perspective while writers of fiction portray humans from an aesthetic one. The social scientific point of view focuses upon human material as predictable; the aesthetic perspective concentrates upon the spontaneous and freely responsive within human beings.

Moreover, the divergent perspectives of science and art encompass different definitions of truth and, consequently, differing epistemologies, methodologies, and methods. The scientific point of view defines truth as a body of facts, generalizations and theories derived by means of intersubjective observation open to public scrutiny. Consequently, qualitative social science—as opposed to fiction—emphasizes the need for an "outer" epistemological perspective and depends upon participant-observation as its primary methodology. With regard to more specific methods, social scientists practice systematic observation, extensive and accurate note keeping, and "gaining entrance" into sociocultural units for observation.

Literary artists, meanwhile, define truth as an expression of some universal reality to which virtually all humans can relate emotionally. Consequently fiction writers—as opposed to social scientists—emphasize the need for an "inner" epistemological perspective and depend on personal experiencing as their primary methodology. With regard to more specific methods, fiction writers as a group do whatever possible to enhance opportunities for personal intro-
spection. Moreover, the divergent perspectives of science and art imply different attitudes toward theorizing, different rhetorical styles in the written report, and divergent goals in terms of anticipated audience response.

Social scientists engage in theorizing which is virtually unbiased analysis based on systematic observation, while literary artists develop personal, individual idea-systems. With regard to rhetorical style, social scientists tend to write in passive, cool, straightforward language while literary artists more often use active, warm, vividly intriguing vocabulary and figures of speech.

Finally, with regard to the respective goals of social scientists and literary artists, the former seek to encourage readers' understanding based primarily on knowledge while the latter seek to elicit understanding based primarily upon emotional identification and projected experiencing on the part of audiences.

To describe analytically the methodological divergences, however, between qualitative social science and literary art should in no way detract from their equally important convergences. For, as we shall see, qualitative social science and fiction combine in all aspects of their methodology—and also in their perception of human beings—both the scientific and the artistic points of view. Moreover, for sources of new insights both categories of writer depend upon imagination and inspiration. Consequently, social science and fiction, taken together, will throughout this thesis be treated as a common entity or body of
scientific-artistic work.

Much of the data for this thesis has come from my personal experience as an apprentice both in the writing of fiction and in the practice of qualitative sociology. The larger share of the data has been gleaned from listening to the practitioners themselves.

Those interested in listening to literary artists in discussion of their art and craft are fortunate to have at their disposal a collection of interviews with well-known novelists, published in *The Paris Review* over the past twenty-four years. These interviews began with the first issue of the literary journal, *The Paris Review*, in the spring of 1953. The new quarterly had been founded by young literary artists who were in Europe working on their first novels or collections of poems. These artists planned to print stories and poems by new, unknown writers—"and to pay for them too, as long as the magazine kept going" (Cowley, 1959, 1975: 4). In order to finance the venture, editors planned the interview series with famous authors as a device for building circulation. Well-known authors responded enthusiastically, talking about their methodology knowledgeably and candidly (Cowley, 1975: 3-4).

*Paris Review* interviewers usually worked in pairs. Since "no recording equipment was available for early interviews, they both jotted down the answers to their questions at top speed and matched the two versions afterward" (Cowley, 1975: 6). More recent interviews were taped. After two or three recording sessions these later interviews were typed
and then cut and arranged in logical order, whereupon they were sent to the author interviewed for approval. Sometimes the author "took a special interest in the text and expanded it with new questions" or "important additions" (Cowley, 1975: 6).

Those familiar with the interviews generally agree with editor Malcolm Cowley that the series "is the best series of interviews with writers of our time that I have read in English" (Cowley, 1975: 3). For the purposes of this thesis, furthermore, the series proves a cache of enlightening data because the interviews, concerned primarily with the methodology of literary artists, reveal not only "what fiction writers are as persons," but more importantly for our needs, "where they get their material, how they work from day to day, and what they dream of writing" (Cowley, 1975: 4). Consequently, these interviews with internationally acclaimed novelists published in The Paris Review over the past twenty-four years, along with my notes taken from three semesters at a community writers' workshop and "how-to" manuals for fiction writers, have been read and analyzed.

Meanwhile, accounts by participant observers of not only their research findings but also--and to some degree more importantly--their methodology and investigative experiences in the field among their subjects form the bulk of the data on practitioners of qualitative social science. Such works as Liebow's *Talley's Corner*, William Whyte's *Street Corner Society*, E.E. LeMasters' *Blue-Collar Aristocrats*,
Hortense Powdermaker's *Stranger and Friend*, Glaser and Strauss' *The Discovery of Grounded Theory*, Lofland's *Analyzing Social Settings*, Rosalie Wax's *Doing Fieldwork*, Laura Bohannan's *Return To Laughter*, Margaret Mead's *Blackberry Winter* and others have been read as data.

In addition, a separate but integrated aspect of this thesis undertakes the analytic examination of selected bodies of work: paired fiction and sociology works dealing with particular ethnic and/or regional American subcultures. That fiction and qualitative social science often deal with virtually the same subject matter is apparent upon browsing in any library. Nowhere is this more evident perhaps than in the area of American ethnic or regional subcultures. Novelists and social scientists alike have approached the subjects of southern Americans, black Americans, native Americans, western Americans, midwestern Americans--to name only a few. In order critically to analyze, therefore, the fine distinctions between social science and literary art, this thesis undertakes a comprehensive comparison of four paired social scientific monographs and novels dealing with American ethnic and/or regional subcultures.

father (1969); Arthur Vidich and Joseph Bensman, Small Town In Mass Society (1968) and Edmund Wilson, Memoirs of Hecate County (1942, 1965). Specifically these works deal with Bohemian immigrants, Mexican-Americans, Italian-Americans, and Anglo-Saxon Americans residing in upstate New York. Kutak, Madsen, Gans, and Vidich and Bensman are social scientists. Cather, Barrett, Puzo, and Wilson are novelists.

Not the least important in terms of methodology, I have throughout the project attempted to keep my eyes and ears open for any unexpected bit of data that might come my way. Serendipity is a necessary element of creative inquiry.

Finally, it should be said that this thesis is not explicitly intended to yield sociological theory but to elucidate methodologies. It is expected, however, that through comparison of two groups or categories of observer-writer certain grounded theory will evolve (cf. Glaser and Strauss, 1967, 1973).
CHAPTER I

SCIENCE AND ART: THE PROBLEM AND A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

Occasionally Johnny Carson of "The Tonight Show" plays, in drag, the character Aunt Blabby, an elderly woman possessed with an exaggerated sense of her age. Typical of the skits in which this character appears are lines such as these:

Ed McMahon: You must have a cold. I see you're coughin'.
Carson: Never say "coffin" to an old person!
Ed McMahon: I like your shoes. Did you have them dyed to match your purse?
Carson: Never say "died" to an old person!

One can imagine a similar interview, not with Aunt Blabby, but with an esteemed sociologist. "Tell me, Dr. Precise," the questioner might ask, "what is the difference between social science and fiction?" Dr. Precise: "Never say 'fiction' to a sociologist!"

Or still another interview with a renowned novelist. The question might be: "Tell me, Dr. Intuitive, what is the difference between fiction and a community study?" Answer: "Never say 'study' to a literary artist!"

That social science and fiction can be rather similar may appear obvious to an outsider. Both claim human beings as their subject matter. Both tell, in prose, something of a story. One might assume that these two kinds of writers, having much in common, consider themselves colleagues of
sorts. My own experience with both fiction writers and sociologists, however, has convinced me that this is not always the case.

I had majored in sociology as an undergraduate. I had also minored in literature, taking all the creative writing courses available to me. During the years after I married, while I was at home with young children, I often found myself writing poetry or fiction.

Several years after obtaining a bachelor's degree, I began attending a fiction "writer's workshop," affiliated with a metropolitan university. Following my second semester at the workshop, I enrolled as a graduate student in sociology at the same metropolitan university. I recall telling my mother (herself a Ph.D. in pharmacology and physiology) of my decision to return to sociology. "That's wonderful!" she encouraged. "Sociology and creative writing should complement one another."

However, at the writer's workshop, response to my decision to join the sociology department was much different. I had written a short story in which a beleaguered wife and mother leaves her family in search of herself. In that story I had used the following metaphor:

She had done that once before--left him--two years ago now. It was after he had stuffed her, a grand Thanksgiving turkey, spent years stuffing her with the right ingredients, the proper amounts of personal seasonings. And once she had been properly dressed, roasted to the loveliest complexion, he had set her in the center of his table. He had stood there, oooing, awing, above the feast. When he spoke of carving, she gathered her children to flee the knife (Riedmann, 1975: 55).
The story had been published nationally and all of us at the workshop were proud. It was in this atmosphere that I mentioned to the writing instructor my plan to return to sociology.

"Then next time you write a story about someone in search of freedom, you can add footnotes," the instructor smirked. "You can say, 'Sixty-two and eight-tenths percent of those wives who leave their husbands relate that at one time or another they have felt like a Thanksgiving turkey.'"

Across campus in the sociology department, I was again surprised. My mother had suggested—and I had agreed—that the study of sociology and the writing of fiction might enhance one another. My writing instructor had rebutted that in his way. But surely, I reasoned, having written fiction ought to make more vivid one's study and understanding of sociology.

Intermittently, I was asked by faculty members and graduate students alike whether it was difficult to return to sociology after the years I had spent away.

"I wrote fiction and a little poetry while I was at home," I would begin. "And I've been at the writer's workshop for a year, doing short stories..."

"Oh," they often responded blankly. And I saw they were wondering what my answer had to do with their question. Had they forgotten, I wondered, that the literary arts, like the social sciences, are primarily concerned with people? Whether, as a fiction writer or as a sociologist, there is
not some art to knowing people?

"I thought writing fiction and sociology would fit together neatly," I complained once to a fellow graduate student over lunch. "But now I'm confused. Where is reality anyway? What is truth?"

She smiled, assuming that attitude of irreverence which graduate students reserve for one another. "Reality," she said, "in this institution has mainly to do with finding a parking place."

My mind pictured the university campus. Writer's workshop members meet in a large, old house which had once been a private home, located on the west end of the campus. The "library office annex," which houses the sociology department, is approximately two city blocks away. Separating the two facilities is--along with several classroom buildings, the student center, and the university library--a large parking lot in which students vie with one another for scarce places. While my friend had spoken in cynical jest, I began, over the days that followed, to return to her response as metaphorically valid. Perhaps that parking lot was the main thing uniting the sociology department and the writer's workshop. In the height of my confusion, finding a parking space seemed to me the single act common to both doing sociology and writing fiction.

It was at about this time that I first read C.P. Snow's *The Two Cultures* and *A Second Look*. I read with comfort as Snow related his own experiences and frustration similar to mine upon encountering social distance between lit-
There have been plenty of days when I have spent the working hours with scientists and then gone off at night with some literary colleagues. I mean that literally. I have had, of course, intimate friends among both scientists and writers. It was through living among these groups and much more, I think, through moving regularly from one to the other and back again that I got occupied with the problem of what, long before I put it on paper, I christened to myself as the "two cultures." For constantly I felt I was moving among two groups—comparable in intelligence, identical in race, not grossly different in social origin, earning about the same incomes, who had almost ceased to communicate at all, who in intellectual, moral and psychological climate had so little in common that instead of going from Burlington House or South Kensington to Chelsea, one might have crossed an ocean (Snow, 1964: 2).

In 1959 when C.P. Snow first spoke of the two cultures, he referred primarily to the physical sciences, on the one hand, and the humanities on the other. Four years later, upon taking a second look, Snow recognized what he termed a third culture, perhaps not already in existence, but at least emerging in his British milieu.

That third culture, the social sciences, would find its place between the other two: it would bridge an ocean. The social sciences, Snow predicted, would ultimately span the chasm between physical science and art (Snow, 1964: 70ff).

While my experiences at the university seemed similar to those Snow had described from moving between the separate worlds of physical scientists and literary artists, it was also clear that, as a member of a third culture, I was expected to have more in common with literary writers than a search for parking places.
The Problem

Just what does doing sociology have in common with writing fiction? And what does it not have in common? Put another way: What, specifically and generally, are the convergences and divergences between sociology and fiction? The purpose of this thesis is to explore these questions. This thesis asks what practices, attitudes, and general methodological and theoretical assumptions distinguish and unite qualitative social scientists from/with novelists. How are these two kinds of writers alike in the ways in which they perform their respective observations and, ultimately, in the modes in which they present these observations to their audiences? Put another way, how similar or dissimilar are the respective meaning systems, or "definitions of the situation," of social scientists and literary artists?

Science and Art

The problem as stated is a specific topic within a more general theme: the differences and similarities between science and art. The specific topic, of course, represents an essentially contemporary issue, for sociology as contrasted to fiction is a young discipline. Moreover, sociologist Robert Nisbet reminds us, the larger theme of the differences between art and science is itself a purely contemporary problem. Throughout human history, during both the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, and until the nineteenth century, art and science were regarded as but "different manifestations of the same form of creative con-
sciousness: (Nisbet, 1962: 67). However, during the nineteenth century, beginning with social movements generated by the French Revolution and closely connected with processes of division of labor introduced by the industrial revolution, there was a growing tendency to assume that the artist and scientist work in ways that are alien, even antagonistic, to one another (Nisbet, 1962: 68).

Procedure-vs.-Inspiration Mythology

The result was that two complementary myths developed. One myth championed the view that art was not concerned with reality or truth, but only with beauty. Another held that science must above all be useful, and therefore must concern itself with only the accurate description and prediction of reality, not beauty. The artist was, according to the mythology, working creatively "through some inscrutable process called genius or inspiration, never through technique and experimental work" (Nisbet, 1962: 68). What was essential to scientific investigation, it was believed, "was not free reflection, intuition, and imagination, but rigorous adherence to procedure" (Nisbet, 1962: 68).

We of the contemporary world have inherited these myths. For many practitioners of both science and art, these beliefs have become ideology.¹

¹The concept ideology is used here as Karl Mannheim specified its meaning, i.e., the idea that groups "can in their thinking become so intensively interest-bound to a situation that they are simply no longer able to see certain facts which would undermine (their positions)....There is implicit in the word 'ideology' the insight that in certain situations the collective unconscious of certain groups obscures the real condition of society both to itself and to others and thereby stabilizes it" (Mannheim, 1936: 40).
Social scientist George Lundberg gave evidence of what may be termed the scientific ideology\(^2\) when he wrote:

I think the following conclusion is inescapable: In our time and for some centuries to come, for better or for worse, the sciences, physical and social, will be to an increasing degree the accepted point of reference with respect to which the validity (Truth) of knowledge is gauged (Lundberg, 1947: 43).

The very title of Lundberg's classic mirrors the myth. "Can science save us?" As Lundberg asks it, the question is rhetorical. Similarly, novelist Kurt Vonnegut, Jr., portrays the artist's ideology in his lectures. Speaking to a college graduating class in 1970, he opined:

...we would be a lot safer if the Government would take its money out of science and put it into astrology and reading of palms....Only in superstition is there hope (Vonnegut, 1974: 161, 163).

George Lundberg and Kurt Vonnegut, Jr., are polar types. They represent extreme positions within their respective scientific or artistic perspectives. Each has purchased the mythological package described by Nisbet. Both agree that while art is based upon inspiration, science depends upon technique, experiment, and procedure.

\(^2\)Karl Mannheim discusses scientific ideology in the following passage from Ideology and Utopia: "...the development of modern science led to the growth of a technique of thought by means of which all that was only meaningfully intelligible was excluded. Behaviorism has pushed to the foreground this tendency toward concentration on entirely externally perceivable reactions, and has sought to construct a world of facts in which there will exist only measurable data, only correlations between series of factors in which the degree of probability of modes of behavior in certain situations will be predictable" (Mannheim, 1936: 43).
All of us who seek some form of intellectual creativity are in some way or another affected by this mythology. Statistically oriented social scientists, subscribing to their collective point of view, are inclined to argue that since works of literature "do not meet the rigorous requirements of a scientific sociology, they may be ignored (except, of course, as sources of empirical data themselves in the sociology of literature)" (Truzzi, 1973: 1). And Margaret Mead, recalling her experiences as an anthropologist in Bali, remarks that on occasion she felt herself drawn into conflict with European artists there who "rebelted against" what they considered her "cold and analytic procedures" (Mead, 1975: 250). I was personally influenced by the mythology when I moved from the writer's workshop to the sociology department of the same university and back again to the workshop.

The myth that art is all inspiration while science is only a technically accurate procedure has divided the social sciences themselves. Ironically, social science, which Snow recognized as a bridge across an ocean of non-communication between the physical sciences and art, has itself been influenced by the mythology described by Nisbet. As a result, one sees within the social sciences what appears in the twentieth century to be two opposing epistemological attitudes.

On the theoretical level the procedure-versus-inspiration polemic is represented by contemporary sociological theorists such as Hans Zetterberg (1965) and their aca-
demic opponents such as Glaser and Strauss (1967, 1973).

Zetterberg holds that sociological theory is best developed by the procedural verification process. Hypotheses are to be arrived at according to rigorous deductive reasoning and ultimately tested (Zetterberg, 1965). Glaser and Strauss (1973), on the other hand, represent a group of scholars who hold that sociological theory is most accurately derived from an exploration of and an intimate familiarity with data. Theory, to be valid, must always be "grounded" in the real data of human existence. Construction of social theory, in this view, is essentially an inductive process not independent of inspiration.

Methodologically, the division is one between those who advocate a technical positivistic approach to empirical research, modeled after the physical sciences, and those others who insist that the nature of the subject matter of the behavioral or social sciences demands a markedly different, reflective and sometimes introspective methodology.

The positivistic position is illustrated, albeit much simplified, as it is presented for beginning sociology students:

The scientific method is one procedure used by people to answer questions about humankind and about the universe at large. As a guide for scientific inquiry, the scientific method is composed of five steps: Formulate a hypothesis.... Develop a Research Design....Collect Data.... Analyze Data....Draw Conclusions....

Despite obvious differences between the physical and social sciences, all sciences have in common the utilization of the scientific method. However, each science must develop its own techniques of investigation because each science considers different
subject matter. Sociologists cannot use telescopes, microscopes, test tubes, and beakers when they study human social behavior (Hobbs and Blank, 1975: 17-18).

While sociologists "cannot use telescopes, microscopes, test tubes and beakers," they can and should, according to the positivistic approach, model all inquiry after "the scientific method."

Taking a contrary position are those sociologists who claim that, because human beings are essentially different from stars or chemical compounds, any scientific investigation into human behavior demands the development of a radically different methodology. It is not enough to admit that men and women will not fit into test tubes or beakers. More is necessary.

William Filstead, a proponent of this view, argues that

paradoxically, the (positivistic) sociologist... rarely comes in contact with that which he is trying to understand...If the ultimate goal of sociology, the understanding of human behavior, is based upon the sociologist's ability to discover the complexities of human behavior, then this understanding should decrease as a result of current theoretical, methodological, and conceptual tendencies that widen the gap between the sociologist and the empirical social world that contains the ultimate test of his understanding.

At the risk of over-simplification, it can be said that the single most important factor that has led to the mounting dissatisfaction with the present direction of sociology is the sociologist's obsession with *The Scientific Method* (Filstead, 1970: 1-2).

Glaser and Strauss, Herbert Blumer, Filstead, and others advocate for the social sciences a form of scientific methodology which has come to be known as qualitative. John
Lofland defines a qualitative social scientist as one who seeks to "capture the participants 'in their own terms' " (Lofland, 1971: 7).

Charles H. Cooley defined "social knowledge" as that which is "developed from contact with the minds of other men, through communication, which sets going a process of thought and sentiment similar to theirs and enables us to understand them by sharing their states of mind" (Cooley, 1926: 60).

Writing in this tradition, that of "verstehen" or "sympathetic understanding," Severyn Bruyn remarks that what is "especially distinctive" about social science is "the manner by which the researcher gains knowledge. By taking the role of his subjects he re-creates in his own imagination and experience the thoughts and feelings which are in the minds of those he studies" (Bruyn, 1966: 12).

Qualitative methodology refers to those research strategies, such as participant observation, in-depth interviewing, total participation in the activity being investigated, field work, etc., which allow the researcher to obtain first-hand knowledge about the empirical social world in question (Filstead, 1970: 6).

The social sciences themselves, therefore, can be viewed as divided both theoretically and methodologically into two contrary camps. One of these espouses deductive reasoning and verification procedures modeled after the physical sciences. The second, meanwhile, insists upon imaginative induction based upon participant observation, field research, and/or other qualitative methods as a means to social scientific theory.
Snow, as we have seen, envisioned an emergent third culture, the social sciences, which will, when fully developed, rest comfortably between the other two already existing cultures. His treatise is generally interpreted to mean that while the social sciences take hands with art in common subject matter, they at the same time join science methodologically. Social anthropologist Robert Redfield, urging members of this emergent third culture to engage in a common dialogue with literary artists, asked:

What shall they find to talk about? What have they in common?
The answer is simple. They have humanity in common. Humanity is the common subject matter.... It is the central and essential matter of interest to social scientist and humanist alike (Redfield, 1950: 11).

It is this phenomenon of their common subject matter to which my mother referred when she observed that social science and creative writing should work well together.

Science and Art: A Continuum

Snow implied by his image of a bridge spanning an ocean--although he did not explicitly state it—that the divergence between science and art is best perceived as a continuum. In this view, the social sciences stand near the center of the continuum while the various physical sciences approach the social sciences from one pole. Similarly, the arts stretch from the opposite pole of this continuum to join the social sciences in the center.

The social sciences themselves, moreover, must be perceived as extended along the central portion of this con-
tinuum, rather than neatly positioned at a single point. That is, quantitative social science, patterned after the physical sciences, lies between the physical sciences and the qualitative social sciences. Put another way, qualitative social science is further from the pole which represents the physical sciences than is quantitative social science.

Furthermore, just as all the sciences are not equally "scientific," so also are not all the arts equally "aesthetic." Just as the physical and social sciences stretch over portions of the continuum rather than occupying single points upon it, so also do the arts. Such very abstract arts as music, some kinds of painting, and some forms of poetry might be conceived as occupying positions near the extreme artistic pole. Fiction, however, is the literary art which is most "scientific." Just as qualitative social science depends methodologically upon inspiration, so also fictional art implies the accurate description of reality. Hence fiction takes its place along the continuum between qualitative social science and the other arts.

The following diagram depicts graphically the continuum described:
The Third Culture

When we recall, moreover, as does Nesbit, that until the nineteenth century, art and science were considered but different products of the creative, reflective mind, we can expand Snow's concept third culture to include not only social science but also the literary art of fiction. According to this expanded definition, the third culture rests along the central portion of the continuum and embraces both the social sciences and fiction. Therefore, the concept third culture when used throughout this thesis shall henceforth refer to the social sciences and fiction taken together.

Moreover, while the term third culture includes the social sciences generally, it is qualitative social science which more directly incorporates the artistic element in its methodology (Nisbet, 1962). Put another way, of the two methodological camps within the social sciences, it is qualitative social science which more often converges methodologically with literary art. Social science has even more in common with fictional art than mere subject matter. Moreover, it is possible that as the social sciences continue to emerge, increasingly more social scientists and literary artists alike will come to believe that there is within their methodology both a scientific and an artistic element.

Consequently, this thesis is an investigation into and comparison of the methodological assumptions and practices of qualitative social scientists and/or anthropologists and literary artists, specifically writers of fiction. It
is a look at the methodological convergences and divergences between the science of qualitative sociology and the art of literary fiction—the "art" of sociology and the "science" of fiction.

As Redfield, among others, has pointed out, the social sciences and literature share a common subject matter. Both social science and the humanities explore the "three different but interrelated manifestations of humanity: human nature, personality, and culture" (Redfield, 1973: 18). Sociologists Laurenson and Swingewood in their book, The Sociology of Literature, state that

As with sociology, literature too is pre-eminently concerned with man's social world, his adaptation to it, and his desire to change it. Thus the novel, as the major literary genre of industrial society, can be seen as a faithful attempt to recreate the social world of man's relation with his family, with politics, with the State; it delineates too his roles and tensions between groups and social classes. In the purely documentary sense, one can see the novel as dealing with much the same social, economic, and political textures as sociology (Laurenson and Swingewood, 1972: 12).

David Riesman, furthermore, in a foreword to Laura Bohannan's Return to Laughter, relates that in the summer of 1961 he addressed a group of Peace Corps volunteers who would be the first such group in Nigeria. He was glad, he remarks, to find that several of them had read Bohannan's work, and he "recommended in addition the African novels of Joyce Cary, to complicate their sense of the land to which they were going and of the social ambiguities that might be faced there" (Riesman, in Bohannan, 1964: ix). Riesman
could recommend the reading of novels because, like sociologist Lewis Coser, he recognized that literary artists "have provided their readers with an immense variety of richly textured commentaries on man's life in society, on his involvement with his fellowmen" (Coser, 1963: 2). "Both sociology and the humanities center their attention on Man and his cultural products," writes sociologist Marcello Truzzi (Truzzi, 1973: 11). The third culture, then, consists of the social sciences joined with the humanities in common subject matter.

The social sciences "stand apart" from the humanities, however, according to Severyn Bruyn, in two basic ways.

First, (the social sciences) are all systematic in their approach to knowledge, for they seek to generate conceptual systems or theories about the nature of human phenomena. Second, they all conduct field experiments or studies which consist of placing certain controls on observational methods to collect data about the subject with which they deal (Bruyn, 1966: 86).

Sociologists, one concludes, work toward the development of accurate conceptual systems about human beings—systems necessarily based upon valid and verifiable facts.

Literary artists, on the other hand, view themselves as pursuing valid truth about the human condition by engaging largely in fantasy. A fiction writer is one who produces prose works not necessarily based upon actual or empirical facts. The 1969 edition of the American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language defines fiction as "an event, statement, or occurrence that has been invented or
feigned rather than having actually taken place....A liter­
ary work whose content is produced by the imagination and
is not necessarily based on fact."

The same dictionary defines *imagination* in the fol­
lowing ways:

1a. The formation of a mental image or concept of
that which is not real or present;
1b. A mental image or idea;
2. The ability or tendency to form such mental
images or concepts;
3. The ability to deal creatively with reality.

The concept *imagination* as a component in the defin­
ition of fiction refers primarily to the meaning elucidated
in number 1a: the formation of a mental image of that which
is not real or present. Fiction is often fantasy, illusion,
or "make-believe," portrayed in prose.

Sociology, of course, is a product of imagination
too, a fact which C. Wright Mills in 1959 urged its practi­
tioners (too many of whom he felt had succumbed to the pro­
cedure-vs.-inspiration mythology) to remember. A sociolo­
gical imagination, Mills wrote,

is a quality of mind that will help (those who em­
ploy it) to use information and to develop reason
in order to achieve lucid summations of what is
going on in the world and of what may be happening
within themselves (Mills, 1959: 5).

The concept *imagination* when posited as a necessary element
in the social sciences refers primarily to the meaning
set forth as number 3 above: the ability to deal creatively
with reality.

As we shall see in chapter four, the ability or
tendency to form mental images, ideas, or concepts--the
meaning of imagination as defined by numbers 1b and 2--
is necessary to both literary artists and social scientists.
Both groups of writers, it should be remembered, view the
products of their imaginations as valid.

In spite of their imaginative and thematic similarities, social scientists and fiction writers differ methodologically, the former stressing the necessity of verifiable facts, the latter spinning tales of occurrences "invented or feigned." Social scientists' and fiction writers' differing methodologies, furthermore, are integrally related with their respective but differing theoretical attitudes toward a common subject matter. Put another way, in order adequately to understand the methodological differences between sociological and literary art, we must also explore the theoretical assumptions toward human beings of each.

Both sociologists' and novelists' theoretical attitudes, assumptions, and/or theories concerning their common subject matter are integrally related with their choice of methodologies. Karl Mannheim reminds us that a thinker's world-view performs "a certain psychological-sociological function," namely to "fix attention" upon those aspects of the empirical world which support his/her preconceived meanings or "definitions of the situation." Mannheim writes that "from a purely functionalist point of view, the derivation of our meanings, whether they be true or false, plays an indispensable role, namely it socializes events for a group" (Mannheim, 1936: 21). The respective methodological
and theoretical "meanings" of literary artists and sociologists provide them with interpretations of events which they observe in terms of those meanings.

...every source from which we derive meaning and interpretation acts also as a stabilizing factor on the possibilities of experiencing and knowing objects with reference to the central goal of action which directs us....Every concept represents a sort of taboo against other possible sources of meaning--simplifying and unifying the manifoldness of life for the sake of action (Mannheim, 1936: 22).

Those assumptions, then, which social scientists and literary artists have concerning their common subject matter act to "simplify" the "manifoldness" of human life for the sake of performing the respective action of doing sociology or of writing fiction. The assumptions of social scientists and fiction writers concerning subject matter, moreover, are different ones.

Robert K. Merton, in two essays (Merton, 1967: 139-171) points to the interrelationship between a scholar's theoretical perspective and his/her choice of methodology. One's theoretical perspective about the subject of inquiry provides a general "orientation" or "context for inquiry," and as such has a "profound effect" upon the development of methodological attitudes (Merton, 1967: 142). Moreover, methodological positions influence theory in terms of both focus and conceptual clarification (Merton, 1967: 165-171). Both sociologists and fiction writers explore human beings, a common subject matter embued with "the manifoldness of life." Each kind of writer, as we shall see, explores that subject matter through a different simplifying orientation.
Sociology is science and, as such, sociology centers its attention on man from a scientific vantage point—a vantage point not shared by literary art. Max Weber wrote that the science of sociology must "attempt the interpretive understanding of social action in order thereby to arrive at a causal explanation of its course and effects" (Weber, 1947: 88). In deriving causal explanations for social action, sociology embodies, to some degree, what sociologist Robert Friedrichs terms the "presumptive faith" of all science.

Modern science, Friedrichs explains, is based upon at least three assumptions: first, intersubjectivity, the assumption that what is observed must be capable of being observed in the same way by more than one person; second, recurrence, the assumption of the manifestation of order or "repetitive regularity" over time; and third, the relational, the assumption that what is observed must be perceived as an element within the "web of system" (Friedrichs, 1970, 1972: 197-220).

These three assumptions, and especially the second, working together have led science toward an ideology of determinism (Friedrichs, 1972: 271).

The second by-law of science (is) repetitive regularity—the "recurrent"—which the scientist seeks to extract from his confrontation with the empirical. Reified by the science of the last century and projected into its social sphere by Marxism, the prism dissolves and all—the prism and the scientist together—become manifestations of an "iron necessity" that is seen to characterize both nature and society (Friedrichs, 1972: 271).

Illustrating his belief in iron necessity, sociologist George
Homans, commenting in the *American Sociological Review*, writes:

> Our knowledge is always going to be inadequate in some degree, and we shall never be able to demonstrate universal determinism, for even if we got to the place where we thought that in principle we could predict everyone's behavior, it would cost more to do it than the result would be worth. Money, not doctrine, will be the savior of free will. I myself have always been utterly convinced that every single bit of human behavior is determined down to the last sneer... (Homans, 1963: 100).

The "presumptive faith of science," reified by the procedure-vs.-inspiration mythology of the nineteenth century, has often resulted in the assumption of a deterministic view toward that which is to be observed and consequently explained. Moreover, when the producer of social science forgets that man-as-determined is but a simplifying perspective, not to be reified, sociology may cease to be inspired and become only technical procedure or abstracted empiricism lacking imagination.

The presumptive faith of science, even when not reified, demands the perspective of probability. If social scientists are to study human beings, they must do so from the perspective of probability. To social scientists human beings are "subjects." As subjects of intersubjective observation they do little to cause their actions by their own free wills. Rather, human beings' social actions are subjected to and contingent or dependent upon certain elucidated environmental causes. The subject matter of the social scientist, then, consists of human beings whose attitudes and behavior are probable and recurrent, if not totally deter-
While science demands that sociologists intersubjectively study subjects from the vantage point of probability, literary artists individually portray characters from their own simplifying perspective—that of the aesthetic. The matter of the artist is not primarily comprised of observed subjects whose actions result from their having been previously directed by certain causal factors, but of observing, experiencing characters who act with an element of free will. The artistic point of view focuses upon what F.S.C. Northrop called the "indeterminate aesthetic component" of man's nature (Northrop, 1946, 1974: 471). As sociologist Hugh Duncan wrote, literature "is the exploration through symbolic action of how men can act when they act freely in human society" (Duncan, 1953: 5).

When the aesthetic perspective becomes reified, human beings are seen as totally unique and sensitive individuals, sometimes geniuses, sometimes inspired, who continually surprise themselves and others. The actions of individual human beings, in the artist's extreme view, are never determined and seldom are they systematically related. As such, they are unpredictable. Novelist Joyce Cary exemplifies this ideology:

Roughly, for me, the principal fact of life is the free mind. For good and evil, man is a free creative spirit. This produces the very queer world we live in, a world in continuous creation and therefore continuous change and insecurity. A perpetually new and lively world...(Cary, in Cowley, 1975: 55).

The artistic ideology is one in which man becomes unpredic-
able, free, creative and unique.

When the procedure-vs.-inspiration mythology elucidated by Nesbit is reified by either social scientists or literary artists, these two categories of writer view their common subject matter from contrary points of view. Social scientists regard human beings as determined by the iron necessity of sociocultural agents. Literary artists view individual human beings as totally free creators of their own, always unpredictable, acts.³

Even when the scientific and the aesthetic points of view are not reified, the respective tasks of doing sociology and writing fiction demand that social scientists and literary artists focus upon their subject matter from somewhat different perspectives. Social scientists focus upon human beings as subjects whose attitudes and behavior are to a degree predictable, recurrent, and systematic. Literary artists, meanwhile, focus upon human beings as characters

³While most of us have to some degree been influenced by the culturally instilled procedure-vs.-inspiration mythology, not all scientists and artists have reified their respective points of view. See, for example, Dennis Wrong's "The Oversocialized Conception of Man In Modern Sociology," American Sociological Review, April, 1961: 183-193, wherein Wrong laments sociologists' "view of man that is tailor-made to our special needs." Other examples—and this is not meant to be either an exhaustive or a representative list—include C. Wright Mills' Sociological Imagination, 1959; Robert Friedrichs' A Sociology of Sociology, 1970, 1972; Severyn Bruyn's The Human Perspective in Sociology, 1966; Herbert Blumer's Symbolic Interactionism, 1969; George Herbert Mead's Mind, Self, and Society, 1934, 1972; and Karl Mannheim's Ideology and Utopia, 1936. Mannheim encourages his readers to "think through what becomes of our psychic and social world when it is restricted to purely externally measurable relationships" (Mannheim, 1936: 43-44).
whose attitudes and behavior are to a degree unpredictable, free, nonsystematic, and often surprising.

A Theory of Human Nature

Some social scientists, moreover, who have refused to be victims of the reified scientific ideology can posit a sociological theory of human nature sufficiently comprehensive to explain the existence of both subjects and characters in prose writing. A social scientific theory of human nature which addresses itself to both the scientific and the aesthetic points of view is necessarily one which describes human nature as dual, i.e., as simultaneously predictable and free. For example, an early social scientist William James, brother of literary artist Henry James, was one of many social scientists who refused to ignore the "manifoldness" of human life. In his classic Psychology, William James elaborates the theory of the human self as "duplex." The total person is composed of two aspects, the I and the Me.

Whatever I may be thinking of, I am always at the same time more or less aware of myself, of my personal existence. At the same time it is I who am aware; so that the total self of me, being as it were duplex, partly known and partly knower, partly object and partly subject, must have two aspects discriminated in it, of which for shortness we may call one the Me and the other the I (James, 1961: 43).

According to James, it is the Me which is the "empirical self." The I, or "pure ego," can be defined simply as one's "passing state of consciousness," and "is a very much more difficult subject of enquiry than the Me" (James, 1961;
When human beings are perceived as primarily predictable subjects of scientific inquiry, it is the Me which is investigated. Poised against the Me—the predictable, recurrent, or empirical self—stands the I or "pure ego." The I is a "very much more difficult subject of inquiry" presumably because it refuses to fit the presumptive faith of science. The I of the duplex self cannot readily be observed with intersubjectivity; nor does it follow the rational principles of recurrence and relationality.

When human beings are perceived as primarily unpredictable individuals to be depicted as characters in literary art, it is the I which is illuminated. Both the scientific and the literary view, it must be remembered, provide access to but one aspect of human nature.

George Herbert Mead, influenced by James, Dewey (a student of James) Cooley and others, elaborated the concepts of the I and the Me. Mead recognized that human beings partake in "inherited" situations, patterns of thought, and modes of response. By internalizing these, Mead lectured, human beings appropriate a generalized other.

The self-conscious human individual, then, takes or assumes the organized social attitudes of the given social group or community (or of some one section thereof) to which he belongs, toward the social problems of various kinds which confront that group or community at any given time, and which arise in connection with the correspondingly different social projects or organized co-operative enterprises in which that group or community as such is engaged.... The organized community or social group which gives to the individual his unity of self may be called "the generalized other." This attitude of the generalized other is the attitude of the whole community (Mead, 1934, 1962: 156, 154).
Inasmuch as human persons appropriate to themselves the attitudes of the community to which they belong and then assume those same attitudes toward events which later confront them, their actions are predictable. The organized social attitudes of the community present within the individual in the form of a generalized other form the basis from which recurrent and logically related social actions flow. Inasmuch as the self operates from the internalized generalized other, self is determined. In this sense the generalized other constitutes the Me within the duplex nature of human beings. "The me represents a definite organization of the community there in our own attitudes" (Mead, 1962: 178). As such the Me is empirical; it can be studied scientifically. The Me, therefore, is the primary subject matter of social scientists.

The I, however, is that part of the self which is aware of the Me, which is called upon to react to the Me, but which at the same time is unpredictable. The I, therefore, is the primary subject matter of literary artists. The Me in human selves creates "a moral necessity but no mechanical necessity for the act" (Mead, 1962: 178). "It is because of the 'I' that we say that we are never fully aware of what we are, that we surprise ourselves by our own action" (Mead, 1962: 174). In the conceptual framework of Berger and Luckman it is the I which potentially externalizes new meanings or "products" for society. It is the Me

\footnote{C. Wright Mills remains cognizant of the potentially surprising \textit{I} within human beings. He, therefore, views}
which internalizes objectivated, socially constructed "reality" (Berger and Luckmann, 1967).

In order further to elaborate the concepts of the I and the Me, we now turn to the work of another sociologist, Alfred Schutz, in an examination of Max Weber's concept of meaningful action, closely parallels George Herbert Mead's social psychology. Weber, Schutz notes, declared it the task of sociology to understand and interpret social action. Weber defined social action as that action which "by virtue of the subjective meaning attached to it by the acting individual (or individuals), takes account of the behavior of others, and is thereby oriented in its course" (Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, quoted by Schutz, 1967: 15).

Schutz notes, however, that not all lived experience can be understood subjectively as meaningful action. While virtually all lived experience provides material for the literary artist, only that which constitutes subjectively meaningful social action is subject matter for the social scientist. From the social scientific view, lived experience or the stream of pure duration must be broken up, so to speak, in order that experiences can be "apprehended, distinguished, brought into relief, marked out from one another" (Schutz, 1967: 51). This is done through the act of attention. It is the act of attention, sometimes termed the "act of reflection," which makes certain designated action the most useful fruits of a sociological imagination as lucid rather than rigid "summations of what is going on in the world and of what may be happening within (human beings) themselves" (Mills, 1959, 1973: 5).
subjectively meaningful. This point is crucial, Schutz emphasizes, because it implies that subjectively meaningful action—the material of social scientists as opposed to literary artists—can be only that which has already occurred.

Because the concept of meaningful experience always presupposes that the experience of which meaning is predicated is a discrete one, it now becomes quite clear that only a past experience can be called meaningful, that is, one that is present to the retrospective glance as already finished and done with (Schutz, 1967: 52).

Schutz reiterates:

Only from the point of view of the retrospective glance do there exist discrete experiences. Only the already experienced is meaningful, not that which is being experienced. For meaning is merely an operation of intentionality, which, however, only becomes visible to the reflective glance. From the point of view of passing experience, the predication of meaning is necessarily trivial, since meaning here can only be understood as the attentive gaze directed not at passing, but at already passed, experience (Schutz, 1967: 52).

It is the task of sociology to investigate subjectively meaningful action. But not all human action is subjectively meaningful. Those actions of human beings which constitute only a stream of pure duration or living experience and which for some reason—perhaps because they are occurring in the present—cannot be focused upon with the act of attention are not subjectively meaningful. These acts comprise, in James' phraseology, one's "passing state of consciousness" (James, 1961: 62). These are the acts by which, in Mead's language, "we surprise ourselves" (Mead, 1962: 174). These acts provide material for fiction writers.

Subjectively meaningful action is only that which
has already occurred and which can be focused upon through one's reflective attention. Subjectively meaningful action is that which, to use Mead's terminology now, "represents a definite organization of the community there in our own attitudes" (Mead, 1962: 178). It is that action through which human beings demonstrate the generalized other.

It would appear now that Weber sought to limit the subject matter of sociology to that which could be called the Me in human beings. It is the Me which can be studied empirically, systematically, sociologically. It is the Me about which one might generate "conceptual systems or theories" (Bruyn, 1966: 86) based upon field experiments or other controlled observational methods. It is the I, focused upon more directly in fiction, which ever surprises, remains fluid, and insists upon its unpredictability.

Social scientists William James and George Herbert Mead, and more indirectly Max Weber and Alfred Schutz, have therefore elaborated a theory of human beings as duplex. Human selves embody both a predictable, empirical Me and an unpredictable, more elusive I. This social scientific theory, moreover, is adequate to explain humans from both the social scientific and the aesthetic points of view.

Making use of the methodological injunctions of Herbert Blumer, therefore, this thesis will analyze, or "inspect" (Blumer, 1969: 43) the data gathered concerning

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5"By 'inspection' I mean an intensive, focused examination of the empirical content of whatever analytical elements are used for purposes of analysis, and this same kind of examination of the empirical nature of the relations between such elements" (Blumer, 1969: 43). Blumer maintains
the perspectives and methodologies of social science and fiction in terms of the sociological concepts, I and Me. Social science, because it is science, studies the Me of human selves. The point of view through which the sociologist sees human beings provides a simplifying perspective by means of which the predictable aspects of men's and women's sometimes surprising social selves can be studied. Literary art, on the other hand, subscribes to a different simplifying perspective. Literature focuses attention upon the I within human selves. The primary subject matter of the literary artist is not comprised of subjects to whom things happen or have happened, but of characters who act and react with an element of free will.

Summary

This chapter has presented a statement of the problem to be investigated in this thesis and the theoretical perspective employed. The problem for investigation is the convergent and divergent methodological assumptions and practices of both qualitative social scientists and writers of fiction who together comprise the third culture.

The two categories of writer are perceived as together comprising a third culture, existing along a continuum between physical science at one pole and the more abstract arts at the other. Social science and fiction comprise a third culture, furthermore, because, first, they share con-

that it is concepts which must be analyzed in terms of the relevant data explored throughout a study.
mon subject matter, and second, both kinds of writing are simultaneously "scientific" and "artistic."

This is not to say, however, that the social sciences and fiction approach their tasks from identical points of view. Indeed, the social sciences investigate humans primarily from a scientific perspective while fiction writers explore humans mainly from an aesthetic one. The scientific perspective demands intersubjectivity in research while the aesthetic one encourages personal introspection.

Moreover, investigators' methodological assumptions and practices are integrally related to their subject matter of inquiry. Consequently, it is necessary, in order to understand the methodological differences between qualitative social scientists and literary artists, to investigate the divergent lenses through which social scientists and writers of fiction focus upon common subject matter. Social scientists view humans primarily as predictable subjects while fiction writers see them essentially as free actors.

William James and George Herbert Mead, in refusing to ignore either the predictability or the spontaneity of human action, offer a theory of human beings adequate to explain both human selves as subjects for social scientific research and human selves as individually unique fictional characters. According to James and Mead, humans are duplex, composed of both a predictable, empirical Me and also an unpredictable, non-empirical I. The Me of social selves, which can be studied with intersubjectivity, provides the focal
subject matter for social scientists. Meanwhile, the I of social selves, which can be known by means of introspection, provides the focal subject matter for literary artists.

With this theoretical perspective in mind, we turn in the next chapter to examination of data from four paired social scientific monographs and novels.
CHAPTER II

SUBJECTS AND CHARACTERS:
DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES ON COMMON MATERIAL

Human beings provide material common to both social science and literary art. Social scientists and fiction writers, however, focus upon that common material from divergent points of view. The perspective of social scientists demands that their subject matter be viewed as "subjects," whose behavior is determined, or at least predictable. Consequently, social scientists focus upon that aspect of human beings which is systematic, recurrent, and predictable, i.e., the Me of social selves. The perspective of literary artists, on the other hand, demands that their subject matter be viewed as "characters," free, elusive, and unpredictable. Consequently, writers of fiction focus upon that aspect of human beings which is nonsystematic, unique, and unpredictable, i.e., the I of social selves.

This divergence in focus upon common subject matter will be illustrated in this chapter through an examination of four paired works, each pair consisting of a social scientific monograph and a novel. In the first case, Arthur Vidich and Joseph Bensman's Small Town in Mass Society (1968) will be compared and contrasted with Edmund Wilson's Memoirs of Hecate County (1942, 1965). Both of these books deal with white Anglo-Saxon Americans residing in upstate
New York. The second case examined presents a comparison of Robert Kutak’s sociological monograph *The Story of A Bohemian-American Village* (1933, 1970) and Willa Cather’s novel *My Antonia* (1918, 1954). Material for these two works was provided by Bohemian immigrants in rural Nebraska. In the third case, social scientist William Madsen’s *The Mexican-Americans of South Texas* (1964) is compared and contrasted with novelist W.E. Barrett’s *The Shadows of the Images* (1953). These two works deal with Mexican-Americans in Texas and Denver, Colorado, respectively. The fourth case presents a comparison of sociologist Herbert Gans’ *The Urban Villagers* (1962) with novelist Mario Puzo’s *The Godfather* (1969, 1970). Material for these two works was provided by Italian-Americans of Boston and New York respectively.

Examination of these eight works illustrates both areas of convergence and divergence with regard to focus of social scientists and literary artists upon their common material. Social scientists, viewing their material primarily from the scientific perspective, focus upon the Me within social selves. Literary artists, on the other hand, viewing their material primarily from the aesthetic point of view, concentrate on the I of human beings. The "subjects" of social scientists must be predictable if not fully determined; the "characters" of fiction writers must be unpredictable and surprising.

Yet, as shall become more apparent, neither qualitative social scientists nor writers of fiction undertake their work solely from their own reified perspective. Quali-
tative social scientists recognize and explore the implications of the I within social selves just as writers of fiction recognize and often depict the implications of the Me within duplex social selves. The art of sociology and the science of fiction focus from divergent-yet-converging perspectives upon common material. Together they comprise a third culture.

Vidich and Bensman's *Small Town in Mass Society* and Wilson's *Memoirs of Hecate County*

*Small Town in Mass Society*, first published in 1958 by Arthur Vidich and Joseph Bensman, is the result of two and one-half years of participant observation undertaken by Vidich while he was employed by Cornell University as a resident field director (Vidich and Bensman, 1958, 1968: 398).

In a series of conversations with co-author Joseph Bensman, Vidich began to develop the analytic image or theme which pervades the work. *Small Town in Mass Society* is a descriptive and analytic study of "Springdalers," residents of a rural town in upstate New York. Springdalers, while they would like to view themselves as autonomous directors of their own futures, are continually reminded that actually the routines of their daily lives are largely the result of political and cultural decisions made in urban America. "This study," the authors write in their preface, "is an attempt to explore the foundations of social life in a community which lacks the power to control the institutions that regulate and determine its existence" (Vidich and Bensman, 1968:}
Edmund Wilson's *Memoirs of Hecate County*, first published in 1942 and revised by the author before republi­cation in 1959, is a collection of short stories and novelettes about people residing in Hecate County, a wealthy suburb of New York City. The longest of the six selections presented, "The Princess with the Golden Hair," is the story of a young, intellectual male resident of Hecate County who becomes enamored with a local, married, golden-haired "princess," named Imogen Loomis. When Imogen proves unattainable, the male protagonist, who tells the story in first-person-narrative style and never reveals his own name, moves into central New York City and obtains a position as assistant curator at an art museum.

While living in New York, the protagonist meets Anna, a youthful, small-breasted Irish immigrant who works as a barmaid and later as a waitress. The novel tells of his ambivalent desire for both women. While the I-character delights in Anna's emotional and sexual candor, he is often repelled by her blatancy. And while the protagonist admires the beautiful, nicely figured, well educated Imogen, he also finds her emotionally neurotic, aloof, and sexually unsatisfying. Wilson's tale is essentially the drama of the process through which the protagonist chooses whether to face or to avoid his own ambivalence.

Both *Small Town in Mass Society* and *Memoirs of Hecate County* explore social selves' attempts to construct new belief systems in order to legitimate their previously reified,
but now threatened, values. Springdalers must adapt the rural, frontier value of autonomy to the encroaching pressures from urban mass society. The protagonist of Hecate County must somehow reconcile Anna’s immigrant point-of-view with a suburban Anglo-Saxon value system and all the norms propriety which that system imposes.

Vidich and Bensman describe what they term a "dependence-resentment mechanism" (Vidich and Bensman, 1968: 102) operating in Springdale. Town members, while they must depend upon mass society for survival, resent its intrusion. The same theme appears in "The Princess with the Golden Hair." Although the protagonist has come to depend upon Anna for the spontaneity which he finds with her, he resents the fact that he cannot enjoy the same emotional freedom with Imogen. He was once content in Hecate County, he reminds himself. The character suffers his own version of Vidich and Bensman’s analytic concept, the "dependence-resentment mechanism."

Vidich and Bensman write of Springdale:

But the people of Springdale are unwilling to recognize the defeat of their values, their personal impotence in the face of larger events and any failure in their way of life. By techniques of self-avoidance and self-deception, they strive to avoid facing issues which, if recognized, would threaten the total fabric of their personal and social existence. Instead of facing the issues, they make compromises and modify their behavior in some cases, and reaffirm their traditional patterns in other cases. They do this, however, without any overt conscious recognition of the basic problems (Vidich and Bensman, 1968: 314).

In many ways "The Princess with the Golden Hair" is a story of one man who lives out this analytic description. "By techniques of self-avoidance and self-deception," Edmund
Wilson's protagonist convinces himself that he does not and has never cared for Anna. He strives to avoid facing the issue of his love for her because to do so "would threaten the total fabric of (his) personal and social existence."
The two works, then, while similar in geographic setting, can more importantly be viewed as parallel in theme.

Small Town in Mass Society, however, is "descriptive and social analysis" (Vidich and Bensman, 1968: xix). The reader is told that "to see the community in action one must be aware of the organizations and social groups that attend to the affairs of community life" (Vidich and Bensman, 1968: 4). It is not possible, in other words, adequately to comprehend the generalized other working in Springdale without becoming aware of the major socializing agents responsible for fashioning and promoting it.

Much of Small Town in Mass Society, therefore, consists of descriptions of those "major institutional realities" (Vidich and Bensman, 1968: 48) through which community attitudes flow. The authors discuss "the major dimensions of social and economic class," the "ethos of village politics," the "organization and character of town government" and "the public school board," and "the place of the church in community life" (Vidich and Bensman, 1968: 49-257). Moreover, in order for readers to begin to understand Springdalers' reactions to an intruding mass society, they also learn of the community's "image of itself" (Vidich and Bensman, 1968: 29). Consequently, the authors devote considerable energy to describing that image. Springdalers think of themselves as
"just plain folks," we are told (Vidich and Bensman, 1968: 29). They extol the "rural virtues" of neighborliness and friendliness, characteristics which "contribute substantially to the community's dominant tone of personalness and warmth" (Vidich and Bensman, 1968: 35). Furthermore, the authors explain that while "gossip exists as a separate and hidden layer of community life," Springdalers' collective image of themselves includes the local expression, "We're all equal" (Vidich and Bensman, 1968: 42, 39).

With the exception of a few "old cranks" and "no goods," it is unthinkable for anyone to pass a person on the street without exchanging greetings. Customarily one stops for a moment of conversation to discuss the weather and make inquiries about health; even the newcomer finds others stopping to greet him. The pattern of everyone talking to everyone is especially characteristic when people congregate in groups. Meetings and social gatherings do not begin until greetings have been exchanged all around. The person who feels he is above associating with everyone, as is the case with some newcomers from the city, runs the risk of being regarded a snob, for the taint of snobbishness is most easily acquired by failing to be friendly to everyone (Vidich and Bensman, 1968: 39).

Vidich and Bensman elucidate the community's "image of itself" and investigate the "major institutional realities" within Springdale because knowledge of these collective images and institutional socializing agents is necessary in order to understand rural Springdalers' modes of adaptation to mass society. Together, the community's collective images and institutional realities comprise the generalized other at work in Springdale. That generalized other creates in community residents--with the exception of a few "old cranks," "no goods," and some "newcomers from the city"--
a "moral necessity" (Mead, 1962: 178) for normative action. Thus, knowledge of that generalized other necessarily precedes any logical understanding of why Springdalers act the way they do when threatened by an intrusive or relatively new phenomenon such as mass society.\(^1\) In this sense, reaction to the encroachment of mass society can be viewed as the dependent variable in the study while the generalized other of Springdale residents assumes the characteristic of an independent variable. Acting from the Me within their social selves, Springdalers, it is assumed, define and act toward the situation presented by mass society according to their community's ethic. The assumption here is that social selves exhibit a fairly dependable degree of predictability.

Similarly, William Foote Whyte, while doing participant observation for *Street Corner Society*, "tested" his analytic insights based upon the assumption that social selves are predictable. "I was excited to discover," he writes, "that the men had actually finished (in a bowling tournament) in the (Whyte's) predicted order with only two exceptions that could readily be explained in terms of the group structure" (Whyte, 1943, 1970: 319). And again, "As issues arose within the club I could predict who would stand where" (Whyte, 1970: 334). That Whyte "could predict who

\(^1\)It is further assumed by Vidich and Bensman that some Springdale deviants, such as "the person who feels he is above associating with everyone," are "newcomers from the city" who had previously internalized different, urban attitudes and whose behavior is logically related to those attitudes. (See Vidich and Bensman, 1968: 39).
would stand where" is taken by him as evidence of his accuracy in analyzing the social attitudes of the group he was studying. His assumption is that community attitudes influence individual behavior. Put another way, Whyte assumed that each member of Doc's gang was endowed with a generalized other—those "organized social attitudes of the given social group or community...to which he belongs" (Mead, 1962: 156). The Me within Doc and his gang members could be expected to respond to that generalized other. Therefore, if Whyte had correctly assessed the group's "organized social attitudes," he could test his analysis in terms of the predicted behavior from responding Me's within the group. Having been subjected to and consequently internalizing group attitudes, Doc's gang, like Springdale residents, could be expected to act accordingly. In that sense, the actions of both groups are predictable.

Novelist Edmund Wilson, however, proceeds from a different premise. He, like Vidich and Bensman, depicts for his readers a "community in action," i.e., Hecate County. But this is not the primary focus of the piece. Wilson wants his readers to understand Hecate County, Imogen, and Anna only insofar as this is necessary for an appreciation of the decisions through which the protagonist must labor. The main character, while he has internalized the beliefs, values, and norms of Hecate County, need not be bound by them. Indeed, the drama in the novel lies in watching the protagonist struggle with the decision whether to "rise above" the organized social attitudes of the com-
munity to which he belongs.

Although certain responses might be more expected from the main character than others, the reader is vividly cognizant that the protagonist is indeed a man who freely makes his own decisions. His choice to love Anna or to love Imogen has not been predetermined. Whether the character ultimately chooses Anna, Imogen, neither, or both is a decision dependent not primarily upon social attitudes existent in Hecate County, but upon the I-character's free will. Wilson's protagonist exemplifies the image Francois Mauriac holds concerning human beings: a "man is someone creating himself or destroying himself" (Mauriac, in Cowley, 1957, 1959: 47). This view is focused upon what George Herbert Mead termed the I within human selves.²

While Vidich and Bensman view Springdale as "a stage on which major issues and problems typical of the society are played out," (Vidich and Bensman, 1968: xviii), Edmund Wilson views Hecate County as a setting before which a man actively and freely works through his personal conflicts.³

The line of demarcation between fiction and social

²George Herbert Mead writes: "The response to that situation as it appears in (an individual's) immediate experience is uncertain, and it is that which constitutes the 'I'." (Mead, 1962: 175).

³Use of the passive form of the verb play here is noteworthy. From the perspective of predictability, issues and problems are played out. From the perspective of free will, individuals attack and work through issues and problems which they confront.
science is not rigidly drawn, however. Qualitative social scientists evidence recognition of the I within their subjects while novelists sketch many of their characters in terms of the Me. Vidich and Bensman recognize the presence of "a few 'old cranks' and 'no goods';" individuals who freely choose to ignore the normative prescriptions of the community (Vidich and Bensman, 1968: 39). Furthermore, their study is one of Springdalers' adaptation to the intrusion of mass society. If we assume that the ability of human beings to adapt to new situations involves some degree of initiative, we must conclude that human adaptation involves the I.

The "I," then, in this relation of the "I" and the "me," is something that is, so to speak, responding to a social situation which is within the experience of the individual. It is the answer which the individual makes to the attitude which others take toward him when he assumes an attitude toward them. Now, the attitudes he is taking toward them are present in his own experience, but his response to them will contain a novel element. The "I" gives the sense of freedom, of initiative (Mead, 1962: 177).

Small Town in Mass Society is not the result of the scientific perspective reified to the point of ideology. At the same time, Edmund Wilson draws minor characters Imogen and Anna in stereotypical, predictable lines. Moreover, the protagonist, while we are ever aware of his freedom of choice, ultimately rebukes Anna, hence affirming the attitudes and values of his own Hecate County. George Herbert Mead writes that "social control is the expression of the 'me' over against the expression of the 'I' " (Mead, 1962: 210). In recognizing the forces of social control in Hecate County,
Wilson recognizes the Me within social selves. The differences between social science and literary art are ones of focus. The lens of the novelist is adjusted to display the I of selves while the Me forms background, less explicitly shown. Similarly, the sociologist's lens focuses upon the Me of selves while the I stands behind, recognizable but smaller. This becomes even more clear when one compares and contrasts Willa Cather's My Antonia with Robert Kutak's The Story of a Bohemian-American Village.

Kutak's The Story of a Bohemian-American Village and Cather's My Antonia

Robert I. Kutak wrote The Story of a Bohemian-American Village as his doctoral dissertation at Columbia University. First published in 1933 and reprinted in 1970, the study is of Milligan, Nebraska, an "isolated rural community" sixty miles west of Lincoln and approximately fifty miles north of the Kansas-Nebraska border. Kutak spent considerable time in the Bohemian-American town between 1919, when he "passed the summer...visiting the family of the village banker," and July and August, 1930, when he conducted intensive interviewing there (Kutak, 1970: viii). The sociologist's story deals with the problems of adjustment of Czechs to immigrant life in America.

Willa Cather's My Antonia, first published in 1918, is similarly a story of Bohemian immigrant life in rural Nebraska. Living earlier in Red Cloud, Nebraska, a rural community approximately seventy-five miles southwest of
Milligan, Cather observed and recorded the life around her. Her novel tells of the life of Antonia Shimerda, a Bohemian girl who immigrated to Nebraska with her family at age twelve or thirteen (Cather, 1954: 4).

Both of these works relate the trials and triumphs of Bohemians as they attempted to build new communities in a "prairie country which was difficult to subdue" (Kutak, 1970: 12). Indeed, "the land was new and unused to the plow, and the work unending" (Kutak, 1970: 12). Upon this prairie in which "there was nothing but land: not a country at all, but the material out of which countries are made" (Cather, 1954: 7), immigrant Bohemians lived and dreamed, raised families, bore losses, formed deep friendships and, sometimes, went separate ways. Cather's novel, like Kutak's monograph, deals with the theme of Bohemians' adjustment to immigrant American life, particularly in rural Nebraska. 4

Kutak, however, approached that theme in a different manner than did Cather. The former's purpose was to gain some understanding of the social conditions which influenced immigrant adjustment to American life. He elaborates:

In making this study the investigator had two purposes in mind. The first was to discover which modes of behavior had persisted in the new world and which had changed, and, in so far as possible, to discover the causes of these persistences and changes. The second purpose was to discover whether or not the adjustment of a group of Czech immigrants

4Cather critic Mildred Bennett writes that "Willa Cather often stated that one of her deepest interests was the life of the foreign immigrant in America, and it is no secret that it was the struggle for adjustment of these people in their new country that formed the basis for all her most significant and enduring work" (Bennett, 1961: 53).
to a country environment in the new world differed from that made to a city environment in America (Kutak, 1970: vii).

In light of these purposes, Robert Kutak examined those attitudes and practices of Milligan residents which appeared to have persisted from peasant Bohemia and those which, on the other hand, appeared to be the result of Bohemians' Americanization.

The earliest Czech settlers in the southeastern part of Nebraska came in the 1860's, Kutak informs his readers, before the railroad was built (Kutak, 1970: 8). They came in long caravans of covered wagons to a wild prairie which promised better than the poverty and oppression they had experienced in Bohemia. When these early immigrants first arrived in the new world, they may have felt homesick and exchanged letters with family and friends back in Bohemia, but "the passage of the years and the building of a community life in this country have caused the people to forget about Bohemia" (Kutak, 1970: 13).

Early immigrants were often forced to abandon those trades which they had acquired in the old country as village peasants, such as cloth-painter, basket-maker, or musical-instrument maker. Instead they learned to farm. Agriculture provided virtually the only occupation of these immigrants until 1887 when the town of Milligan was established, and "the economic life of the community became increasingly complex" (Kutak, 1970: 18). Storekeepers arose to supply the people with the goods they needed. A doctor, dentist, and priest, and several school teachers emerged in Milligan,
along with an array of butchers, blacksmiths, shoe repairers, flour-mill operatives, and the like (Kutak, 1970: 18).

By the 1930's, second-generation, American-born immigrants had begun to inherit the businesses of their fathers.

Individuals born in Bohemia built the community and several of them are still actively engaged in business. This condition meets with the disapproval of the American-born. These feel that the foreign-born, who are considerably older, should retire and give them a chance. They believe that the foreign-born are too old and too conservative, and that they interfere with the progress of Milligan (Kutak, 1970: 18).

Kutak's main concern is to document and analyze the phenomenon of social change. Constantly he examines the changing attitudes of Milligan residents as second-generation immigrants reach maturity.

**The Story of a Bohemian-American Village** is a detailed examination of Milligan residents' attitudes and practices concerning such things as women's working in the fields and in community business establishments, home ownership, membership in political parties, local politics, women's suffrage, education of Milligan children, church membership and family size. The larger share of Kutak's presentation is devoted to discovery and presentation of "which modes of behavior had persisted in the new world and which had changed" (Kutak, 1970: vii).

The sociologist wrote *The Story of a Bohemian-American Village* with sociological analysis as one of his primary goals. Although he admits that "as far as the changes are concerned, it is easier to describe them than to discover their causes," he does engage in causal analy-
sis (Kutak, 1970: 154). "Undoubtedly," he writes:

one of the factors responsible for the changes is
the greater differentiation of the social structure
today. The school has taken over the job of edu­
cating the children, and the school introduces new
ideas into the life of the community. Outside
associations affect the community through such
organizations as the woman's club. Meanwhile, the
changes which are made in the minds of the people
by such organizations as these in turn affect
those associations which try to preserve the cul­
ture of the old world. The young people in the
community have been taught a different way of life,
and demand that the organizations controlled by the
elders change to conform to the new point of view
(Kutak, 1970: 154).

Many of the changes which Kutak describes, therefore,
result from "greater differentiation of the social struc­
ture" in Milligan than was found in the old world. Kutak,
furthermore, had a second analytical purpose in studying
the community: "to discover whether or not the adjustment
of a group of Czech immigrants to a country environment in
the new world differed from that made to a city environment
in America" (Kutak, 1970: vii). After comparing his data
with that of other social scientists who had studied Bohemian
immigrants in Chicago, Kutak concluded that immigrants'
adjustment is easier when they come to a country environment
in the new world than when they emmigrate to American
cities. Because "in the city the social environment is com­
plex," and highly differentiated, while in the country
it is simple and "there are few associations and life is
pretty largely lived in primary groups," Czechs who set­
tled in country districts "were thus going from one envir­
onment to another which did not differ greatly from that
which they had known" (Kutak, 1970: 153).
When the immigrant goes from his village in the old world to a great city in the new, he finds that he must make, not one great adjustment, after which all will be peace, but that he will be forced to make new adjustments during all the remaining days of his life (Kutak, 1970: 154).

Robert Kutak's research report, then, consists of depiction and causal analysis of the social facts of life in a Bohemian-American community. The author has, in his own words, examined the progression of Milligan, Nebraska, from "the Bohemian town with the Irish name," to "the American town with a Bohemian past" (Kutak, 1970: 156).

Cather's My Antonia, on the other hand, is essentially a story of deep-felt, platonic love. Throughout the novel Jim Burden, speaking in the first-person narrative voice, tells of his friendship with Antonia, the brown-eyed Bohemian girl he grows up with--the girl who is, in Jim's words, "as bright as a new dollar" (Cather, 1954: 4). The story is the tale of the pair's traveling to Nebraska as children aboard the same train, becoming acquainted, building nests together in the tall prairie grass, digging potatoes side by side, sharing the joys of snowbound Christmases, the sorrow accompanying the death of Antonia's father, and later living as next door neighbors in the town of Black Hawk where they occasionally danced together at the town hall. My Antonia is the bittersweet portrayal of two people who care and share very much, but who both realize--even in their youth--that their lives will take separate directions. Jim Burden will go to school, study Latin, and eventually become an attorney in New York City.
Antonia will work the fields with her brother Ambrosch, marry a local Bohemian named Cuzak, and mother a brood of children. The novel, then, tells of two friends' watching one another grow into inevitable adulthoods which one day will separate them.

Later, however, as the novel draws to a close, Jim Burden travels from New York to visit Antonia. Together on the Cuzak farm the two exchange experiences from the twenty years which have intervened since they last saw one another. Antonia, forty-four years old and absent many teeth, looks at Jim with brown eyes he did not forget. "We stood looking at each other," Jim relates. "The eyes that peered anxiously at me were—simply Antonia's eyes. I had seen no others like them since I looked into them last, though I had looked at so many thousands of human faces" (Cather, 1954: 331).

The theme and literary style of the novel is exemplified in the following passage. "You see," Jim Burden tells Antonia's boys during his visit, "I was very much in love with your mother once, and I know there's nobody like her."

The boys laughed and seemed pleased and embarrassed.

"She never told us that," said Anton. "But she's always talked lots about you, and about what good times you used to have. She has a picture of you that she cut out of the Chicago paper once..." (Cather, 1954: 346).

In the final pages of *My Antonia*, Jim Burden, before he leaves Antonia Cuzak's homestead for his return to his office and family in New York, takes a reminiscent walk "over those rough pastures." "I sat down and watched the haystacks turn rosy in the slanting sunlight," he tells the reader.
Then he remembers that this road, upon which he now rests, "was the road over which Antonia and I came on that night when we got off the train at Black Hawk and were bedded down in the straw, wondering children, being taken we knew not whither" (Cather, 1954: 370-371). "For Antonia and for me," Burden ponders, "this had been the road of Destiny; had taken us to those early accidents of fortune which predetermined for us all that we can ever be" (Cather, 1954: 372).

Robert Kutak's The Story of a Bohemian-American Village and Willa Cather's My Antonia are both depictions of Czech immigrant life in rural Nebraska. Moreover, in both works there is a strong sense of "destiny" or predictability. It is predictable that Bohemian-immigrant attitudes and behavior will change as they become immersed in a more differentiated social structure. It is destiny that Milligan, once known as "the Bohemian town with the Irish name," will one day become "the American town with a Bohemian past." Similarly, it is predictable that Antonia will remain near Black Hawk, settle there, and raise a family just as the reader knows early in the novel that Jim Burden will become educated and pursue higher education and occupational advancement elsewhere. Antonia and Jim Burden had met as children, "being taken" they knew not whither; together they walked "the road of destiny."

In this sense, neither Antonia nor Jim--not unlike the residents of Milligan--torment themselves with decision-making. Generally they obey the respective generalized
others—the demands of their communities—within themselves. Cather's characters, like Kutak's subjects, follow the attitudes of the primary groups in which they were raised. Jim Burden's grandparents urged him to study Latin after school hours; Antonia's mother and brother expected her dedicated help in the fields. Neither Jim's nor Antonia's story is identical to that of the I-character in Edmund Wilson's *Memoirs of Hecate County*, for neither Jim nor Antonia agonizes through decision-making processes. Both follow the courses set for them by their families and the circumstances of the frontier.

While social scientist Robert Kutak presents the Milligan community as *that which is known*, novelist Willa Cather depicts characters primarily as *knowers*. Kutak writes that "the thing the settlers missed most in America was not the greater comfort of life in Bohemia, but rather the social life of the small village from which they came" (Kutak, 1970: 13). The observation is presented in terms of that which can be known about his subjects, the settlers of Milligan. Cather approaches the same phenomenon from a different perspective. Late in the novel, while Burden is visiting the Cuzak farm, he talks with Antonia's husband and finds him a "most companiable fellow." In the course of the conversation, Burden tells Cuzak about a trip he took through Europe during which he travelled in Bohemia. "Gee!" Cuzak returns, "I like to go back there once, when the boys is big enough to farm the place. Sometimes when I read the papers from the old country, I pretty near
run away" (Cather, 1954: 366). Cuzak is, of course, someone about which something is known: He is homesick, missing at times the "social life of the small village from which he came" (Kutak, 1970: 13). More than that, however, Cuzak is an individual character who actively feels that he could "pretty near run away." Among other things, Willa Cather's story tells of a man's experiencing or "knowing" his own homesickness.

Similarly both The Story of a Bohemian-American Village and My Antonia deal with the lack of schooling received by first-generation Bohemian immigrant children. Kutak writes that "in Bohemia women often worked in the fields with the men" (Kutak, 1970: 21). Hence it was not uncommon that first-generation Czech girls, like their brothers, labored on the Nebraska prairie with their parents, rather than attend school.

Ten immigrants who had been of school age both in Bohemia and America reported that settlement in the new world usually made it impossible for them to continue their education. Only one of them had attended high school, and he was one of the more recent arrivals who came after the country had been pretty well settled. Those who arrived when Miligan was young were put to work on the farm and attended the local school for not more than one year (Kutak, 1970: 57).

Willa Cather approaches the same topic in the following:

When the sun was dropping low, Antonia came up the big south draw with her team. How much older she had grown in eight months! She had come to us a child, and now she was a tall, strong young girl, although her fifteenth birthday had just slipped by. I ran out and met her as she brought her horses up to the windmill to water them....She kept her sleeves rolled up all day, and her arms and throat were burned as brown as a sailor's. Her
neck came up strongly out of her shoulders, like the bole of a tree out of the turf. One sees that draught-horse neck among the peasant women in all old countries.

She greeted me gaily, and began at once to tell me how much ploughing she had done that day....

While the horses drew in the water, and nosed each other, and then drank again, Antonia sat down on the windmill step and rested her head on her hand....

"Tony," (I said) "Grandmother wants to know if you can't go to the term of school that begins next week over at the sod school-house. She says there's a good teacher, and you'd learn a lot."

Antonia stood up, lifting and dropping her shoulders as if they were stiff. "I ain't got time to learn. I can work like mans now...."

She clucked to her team and started for the barn. I walked beside her, feeling vexed....Before we reached the stable, I felt something tense in her silence, and glancing up I saw that she was crying....

Antonia took my hand. "Sometime you will tell me all those nice things you learn at the school, won't you, Jimmy?" she asked with a sudden rush of feeling in her voice (Cather, 1954: 122-124).

Antonia "knows" or experiences her own response to Jim's invitation that she join him at school. Her silent crying conveys that "knowing".

While first-generation Bohemian immigrants are subjects about which something can be known, they can also, as individuals, feel, experience, or "know" their own situations. Kutak writes from a scientific perspective: Milligan residents are subjects about which sociological facts can be known. Cather, on the other hand, writes from an artistic point of view: Jim Burden and Antonia, among others, are characters who witness their own actions.

William James, quoted earlier, described the "duplex" human being as "partly known and partly knower" (James, 1961: 43). George Herbert Mead, elaborating upon this,
emphasized that it is the I within one's social self which
does not automatically respond to the expectations of the
group or community to which s/he belongs.

The "I", then, in this relation of the "I" and
the "me", is something that is, so to speak,
responding to a social situation which is within
the experience of the individual. It is the an­
swer which the individual makes to the attitude
which others take toward him (Mead, 1962: 177).

Because human beings internalize a "moral necessity" but
possess no "mechanical necessity" for an act, the I within
social selves freely chooses whether to obey prescriptions
flowing from the generalized other. Choice, as we have
seen, is located within the I of social selves. It must now
be emphasized, moreover, that human freedom can be depicted
in different ways.\(^5\)

While a novelist may dramatize the act of choosing
itself, as did Edmund Wilson in Memoirs of Hecate County,
another author may depict individuals' watching themselves
as they pursue the "correct," "moral," or normative choices.
This latter is Willa Cather's perspective in My Antonia.
Cather's focus is not directly upon the unpredictability of
human beings' lives, but upon their knowing or experiencing

\(^5\)This is so because the indeterminate element in
human nature evidences itself in different manners. F.S.C.
Northrop explains: "Man is in part free because he, in
his essential nature, is in part indeterminate. At any time
man can withdraw into the indeterminate aesthetic component
of his nature, giving up any commitment to determinate,
transitory, aesthetic qualities, or to determinate, inferred,
theoretical theses, thereby in part escaping the deter­
minism which attaches to all determinate things; and, be­
cause of this capacity, he may also freely accept the deter­
minate, taking all its causal consequences" (Northrop, 1974:
471).
both their choices and the expected consequences thereof.\(^6\)

In the purely documentary sense, one can see the novel dealing with much the same social, economic, and political textures as sociology. But...literature transcends mere description and objective scientific analysis, penetrating the surfaces of social life, showing the ways in which men and women experience society as feeling (Laurenson and Swingewood, 1972: 12-13).

The artistic perspective may, therefore, focus upon human beings as knowers of their own choices—even choices which, when looked upon with what Schutz termed the "act of reflection," will take on the color of "destiny." On the other hand, Robert Kutak's *The Story of a Bohemian-American Village* focuses upon the Me of social selves, upon that which can be known about them from an observer's point of view.

Yet, as we observed in Vidich and Bensman's *Small Town in Mass Society* and Edmund Wilson's *Memoirs of Hecate County*, the dividing line between the literary or artistic perspective and that of science is often nebulous. Many times throughout his study, Kutak allows his subjects to speak. When he quotes Milligan residents, he is in some sense depicting them, not just as that which is known, but also as knowers:

\(^6\)One is reminded at this point of an interview with William Faulkner in which the interviewer remarked, "It has been said by Malcolm Cowley that your characters carry a sense of submission to their fate."

"That is his opinion," answered Faulkner. "I would say that some of them do and some of them don't....I would say that Lena Grove in *Light in August* coped pretty well with hers. It didn't really matter to her in her destiny whether her man was Lucas Birch or not. It was her destiny to have a husband and children and she knew it, and so she went out and attended to it without asking help from anyone. She was captain of her soul..." (Faulkner, in Cowley, 1975: 139; emphasis added).
The thing the settlers missed most in America was not the greater comfort of life in Bohemia, but rather the social life of the small village from which they came.

"I missed the social life of Bohemia. All are together there. We lived in large towns there; here we lived on scattered farms."

"At first I missed everything. I did housework for an American family...."

"At first I missed the music and entertainments. Here we just sat on Sunday...."

"I missed the social life of Bohemia. People liked each other more. Here people want to get rich; then they don't think of the poor " (Kutak, 1970: 13).

Again, regarding the issue of education for first-generation school-age immigrants, Kutak writes:

One of these says today, "The old man put me to work as soon as we came to Nebraska. The teacher we had didn't know much and didn't care if we came or not. So we stayed at home and worked" (Kutak, 1970: 57).

By sharing his subjects' own perceptions with his readers, Kutak reminds us that Milligan residents are not just known, but also knowers. Willa Cather also presents a good portion of her novel from the perspective of that which is known. The following passage provides an example:

There was a curious social situation in Black Hawk. All the young men felt the attraction of the fine, well-set-up country girls who had come to town to earn a living, and, in nearly every case, to help the father struggle out of debt....

I can remember a score of these country girls who were in service in Black Hawk during the few years I lived there....Physically they were almost a race apart, and out-of-door work had given them a vigour which, when they got over their first shyness on coming to town, developed into a positive carriage and freedom of movement, and made them conspicuous among Black Hawk women (Cather, 1954: 197-198).

In spite of the fact, then, that Cather writes from a primarily artistic perspective, concentrating particularly
upon human beings as knowers, and Kutak writes primarily from a scientific perspective, concentrating primarily on human beings as known, neither writer uses one perspective exclusively.

Once again it becomes meaningful to conclude that the differences between social science and literary art are ones of primary focus. Kutak's sociological study contains direct quotations from subjects insofar as these are necessary to provide data. His audience must understand upon what evidence is based the author's empirical generalizations. Cather's novel, on the other hand, describes attitudes and behavior in Black Hawk insofar as this is necessary for the reader to grasp the characters' knowing or experiencing their own reactions to community attitudes and behavior. The primary emphasis of *The Story of a Bohemian-American Village* is on what is known about social selves; the primary emphasis of *My Antonia* is on those social selves' knowing or experiencing themselves. While the social scientist focuses intently upon the knowable, predictable *Me* of human selves, the literary artist focuses more vividly upon the free, experiencing, and responding *I* within those same selves. With this perspective in mind we turn to an examination of the similarities and differences between a third social science monograph and a third novel.
Madsen's *The Mexican-Americans of South Texas* and Barrett's *The Shadows of the Images*

*The Mexican-Americans of South Texas*, by William Madsen, is an anthropological study of Chicanos residing near the Texas-Mexico border. Written in 1962-63 while the author was at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, the work is one in a series of case studies in cultural anthropology, edited by George and Louise Spindler. Financed by the Hogg Foundation for Mental Health at the University of Texas, the research resulting in *The Mexican-Americans of South Texas* was conducted by the staff of the Hidalgo Project on Differential Culture Change and Mental Health during a four-year period, 1957-61 (Madsen, 1964: vii-ix). The work focuses on acculturation among Mexican-Americans. *Shadows of the Images*, on the other hand, is a novel by William Barrett, first published in 1951. The story takes place in a Spanish-American enclave of State City, Colorado. While the main characters of the novel are other than Chicano, the setting for the novel along with many of the minor characters are Spanish-American. A primary theme of the work involves description of Chicano attitudes and actions along with resultant Anglo reactions. Each of these two works depicts "aspects of behavior and belief that make the Mexican-American way of life distinctive" (Madsen, 1964: vii).

Anthropologist Madsen approached his subject matter from a different perspective than did Barrett. He explains in his introduction:
I will try to describe the sociocultural condition of the Mexican-Americans in one county on the Mexican border today in order to provide some understanding of the stresses of the acculturation process in this area (Madsen, 1964: 2).

The anthropological monograph, then, is intended to be not only descriptive but also analytic. Madsen discovered three levels of acculturation among the Mexican-Americans he studied. "The base line" of the Americanization process is the traditional folk culture, La Raza, derived from Mexico. The second level includes those Chicanos "caught in the value conflict between two cultures." Finally, the third level is composed of Mexican-Americans who "have achieved status in the English-speaking world. These individuals see science and progress as the twin keys to a brighter tomorrow" (Madsen, 1964: 3).

Hidalgo County, the setting for Madsen's study, lies across the border from Mexico in the valley of the lower Rio Grande of southeastern Texas. Originally settled by Spaniards and Mexican-Americans nearly a century before the first settlers from the United States reached the area, the population of Hidalgo County was in 1964 seventy-five percent Mexican-American. Madsen describes the economy of Hidalgo County as follows:

Although tourists constitute an important source of revenue, the economy rests primarily on products of the land. In the northern part of Hidalgo County, petroleum and oil are pumped from the earth. The Sal del Rey salt deposit has been worked from the earliest Spanish days. Cattle and sheep are still major industries. Above all, Hidalgo County represents a highly developed and rich agricultural land with fields of cotton, corn, beets, black-eyed peas, carrots, tomatoes, cucumbers, cabbage, green peas, potatoes, lettuce, onions, peppers,
cantaloupe, and watermelon. But the most impres­sive crop is citrus fruit including red-fleshed grapefruit, oranges, and tangerines. ... Cotton is one of the largest and most reliable crops of the county.

The growth of commercial agriculture was accompanied by the development of related industries. Canneries, packing plants, and cotton gins dot the landscape (Madsen, 1964: 7).

In Hidalgo County first, second, and third genera­tion Mexican-American immigrants strive to reconcile their culturally inherited folk values with Anglo notions of advancement, efficiency, science, and progress. Still it is not uncommon, Madsen observes, that "as opportunities open for economic advancement and social acceptance of the Mexican-American, he still resists complete conformity to Anglo patterns" (Madsen, 1964: 14). That folk culture which exercises such power over the Mexican-American is repre­sented by the term, La Raza. According to the philosophy of La Raza, God has planned for Spanish-Americans a glorious destiny. Failure to achieve that destiny personally is the result of sin. 7 Along with the notion of destiny exists the element of fatalism, which produces an attitude of resignation.

What the Anglo tries to control, the Mexican-American tries to accept. Misfortune is something the Anglo tries to overcome and the Latin views as fate. ... Unlike the Anglo world view where man emerges as the dominant force except on Sunday, the Latin view conceives of God as all-powerful and man as but a part of nature that is subject to His will (Madsen, 1964: 16).

7Yet, "the Mexican-American does not suffer undue anxiety because of his propensity to sin. Instead of blaming himself for his error, he frequently attributes it to adverse circumstances" (Madsen, 1964: 15-16).
While "acceptance and appreciation of things as they are constitute primary values of La Raza," other focal values include rendering one's primary loyalties to the family, the general prescription that both men and women conduct themselves with integrity, dignity, and honor in virtually any social situation, the concept of machismo for the male, and the necessity of pre-marital virginity and marital obedience and chastity for the female (Madsen, 1964: 17-20).

One area of social life in which the conflict between La Raza and Anglo world view becomes apparent is that of illness. Because "the members of La Raza do not divide the natural and the supernatural into separate compartments as the Anglos do," illness is often viewed by unacculturated Mexican-Americans as the result of supernatural causes. La Raza prescribes the employment of curanderos or folk healers who pray, mix herbal medicines, apply salves, and lend counsel. Many curanderos, Madsen writes, appear to practice a kind of psychotherapy.

Curanderos have cured several cases of mental illness that previously failed to respond to psychiatric treatment in modern hospitals....Many curanderos are unrecognized but highly skilled social workers. The successful resolution of the social conflict responsible for the illness usually relieves psychosomatic symptoms and re-enforces relief in the reality of the folk diseases as well as the curandero's ability to cure them (Madsen, 1964: 104-105).

Using these values and others as a kind of loose "operational definition" of La Raza, Madsen analyzes the extent to which different groups and/or categories of Mexican-American continue to reify these values. Lower class Mexican-Americans and first generation immigrants generally
continue to reify beliefs, values, and normative prescriptions of La Raza. Middle and upper class Mexican-Americans of Hidalgo County and those who are second and third generation immigrants appear to have become increasingly acculturated. Presenting analytic correlations, Madsen notes that the three levels of Mexican-American acculturation "frequently represent a three-generational process." Moreover, "the three acculturative levels are further correlated with the class structure" (Madsen, 1964: 3). Moreover, William Madsen, like Robert Kutak, perceived at least one cause for acculturation in the differentiation of a group's environment. Mexican-Americans occupying the second level of acculturation are generally those who

were born into folk society but have had enough education and experience outside of their own group to recognize the conflict between the Mexican values they learned from their parents and the values of United States society (Madsen, 1964: 3).

The degree of acculturation, then, among Chicanos of Hidalgo County is a variable dependent upon several interrelated sociological factors: whether these Mexican-Americans are first, second, or third generation immigrants, the degree to which they have been subjected to educational and other experiences outside their ethnic group, and the social classes in which they find themselves within United States society. The Mexican-Americans of South Texas is descriptive, providing the reader with richness of detail concerning beliefs, values, norms, and behavior which comprise La Raza. The detailed description, moreover, provides the foundation upon which scientific analysis is built.
On the other hand, William Barrett's *The Shadows of the Images*, while it contains much detailed description, does not present the reader with social scientific analysis. Written from the third-person omniscient point of view, the novel depicts the interwoven, and sometimes surprising, lives of four main characters: self-indulgent, lying, occasionally hysterical Beverly Colter; Paul Logan, a devout Christian whom Beverly eventually marries; Paul's older brother Tom, a detective lieutenant who works State City's Spanish-American second precinct; and Victoria Leighton, a third-generation resident of the second precinct whose family owns property there and who gradually falls in love with Tom Logan.

Third-person omniscient point of view refers to one perspective or vantage point from which a fiction writer may choose to tell a story. Unlike the first-person point of view, the third-person vantage involves the telling of a story by a narrator who is not a major character. Third-person points of view employ third person pronouns when referring to characters. The third person omniscient perspective, as opposed to the third-person limited or close-focus perspective, refers to the fact that the narrative voice is all-knowing and can relate anything about any of the story's characters.

The most dramatic surprise of the novel comes at the book's major climax when Beverly, now Paul Logan's wife, hursts their five-month-old child against their apartment wall, killing it:
"The baby kept on screaming...."
"'Stop it,' she said. 'You've got to stop it!'
"His face was red, all his features tense and straining....He started crying again. She shook him...."
"Something exploded inside of Beverly's brain. There was a great white light, shot through with silver, and she could hear herself screaming at the baby, the baby screaming back at her. Her muscles tensed and stiffened, and she lifted the baby high above her head...."
"She felt the baby's kicking, squirming body between her two hands--then, she hurled him, as hard as she could hurl him, against the farthest wall.
"There were two thuds: the first heavy, the second
These four characters weave the fabric of their lives against a backdrop peopled with minor characters, the majority of whom are Spanish-American. There is Terresita Rojas, the young girl who has been brutally raped by three of her own people and who—after her testimony at their trial failed to convince the jury—fled the city in fear. There is Diego Soboso, "a big man with more years than forty," who had immigrated to Colorado to work in the beet fields. Now an unemployed, sullen, alcoholic, Soboso and his neglected family inhabits one of the Leighton's rental houses. There is Aureliano Sanchez, the devout Catholic and friend of Father Brennan, pastor of Our Lady of Guadalupe Church. Sanchez has carved a Christmas Creche for his parish alter—and a wooden leg for himself. Of these lesser characters, among others, the author gives us but glimpses. Several of the novel's other minor characters, however, play larger roles in the work. One of these is Joe Vasquez, a young Chicano who has gotten into trouble with legal authority previously but who is presently attempting to support himself honestly. A big man whose mind has been dulled by two years' work in the Colorado mines, Vasquez has recently decided to marry.

The reader meets Joe Vasquez when Lieutenant Tom Logan visits him at Saraiva's gym. Vasquez is working out there for an upcoming boxing match.

one soft....Beverly looked at the small, motionless bundle on the floor, and the dark fluid that flowed out from under it...." (Barrett, 1953: 461).
Tom Logan lighted a match and held it for (Vasquez) as a friendly gesture. "Why go back to fighting, Joe?" he said. "Money. I need it."
"You've got a job, haven't you?"
The thick shoulders shrugged slightly. "I load the trash in the truck."
"Maybe we can get you another job."
"Maybe no. I cannot do work of importance."
The dark eyes lifted to his. There was, for a moment, a desperate, hurt expression in them. "I have tried," he said slowly. "I do not learn good...."
"Fighting is no good, Joe," (Logan) said. "You are too easy to hit."
"I hit too. I hit hard."
"It's still no good. Two years in the mines made you slow."
"I am more strong. In the mines I work heavy."
The scarred face was set in stubborn lines. Joe Vasquez drew deeply on the cigarette. "To load the trash is no good," he said. "To live in Las Manchitas is no good. I fight."
There was finality in his voice. Logan asked the inevitable question, knowing the answer. "A girl, Joe?"
"Si!" (Barrett, 1953: 181-182).

If Joe Vasquez is to escape the "no good" job of loading trash and if he is to gain the respect of both his bride and himself, he must win the upcoming match.

His opponent will be Paco Soboso, Diego Soboso's son. Having recently returned from the army and appalled at the squalor in which he finds his family, young Paco is determined to do something about it. In the following scene, Paco, having resolved to pay to the Leightons past-due rent, meets and talks with Victoria.

The clangorous summons of the front doorbell cut sharply....Victoria rose swiftly and hurried down the stairs....She did not recognize the young man on the porch. He was slender, athletic, and medium tall, with skin of a soft golden shade. There was a patch of adhesive tape in crisscross design on his right cheek and his lips were puffed, but he held himself proudly erect....He bobbed his head, smiling faintly. "I am Paco Soboso. I brought the rent."
He took a crumpled wad of bills from his pocket and counted them into her hand. A faint memory was stirring in her now....
"You’ve been in the Army?" she said.
"Si! Three years...."
"It must be good to get home."
"It is not good," he said. "Things must change. I will bring you the rent every month. I bring it on time myself."
He looked away, thinking perhaps of the other things that must be changed, but unable to mention them.
"That will be nice," Victoria said. "My grandmother needs it. One of her other houses was destroyed. She does not have much left."
"I know about that." The boy's eyes came back to hers. "We will not do it to her. I personally am responsible." He lifted his head. He was no more than twenty-one, if that, the girl thought. "In the Army I learn how to fight. Very good...." He held up his fists.... He had large hands, strong hands, that were well shaped.
"I will fight in the ring," he said. "Last night I knock out Morino. Next fight I will be state champ. Welterweight. Soon I make a lot of money. I will change many things" (Barrett, 1953: 174-175).

If Paco Soboso is to raise his family from desperate poverty and continue to feel deserving of the respect he appreciated during three years in the Army, he—as much as Joe Vasquez—must win the upcoming boxing match. 

On fight night, Vicky Leighton and Tom Logan are together among spectators. "I'm scared," Vicky complains, "I can hardly stand it." "Relax," Tom soothes later. "Your man is going to win." "He can't," Vicky insists, worried (Barrett, 1953: 223, 225). When Soboso does win, it is only after a long and bloody fight which he, at several points, came dangerously close to losing. Soboso will continue to fight until, having managed to save a few thousand dollars, he is encouraged by Father Brennan to open a restaurant in the area. Vasquez will go on to marry his
sweetheart, eventually returning with her to his work in the mines. *The Shadows of the Images* is a novel which un­veils the life events of many characters, among them Spanish-Americans such as Joe Vasquez and Paco Soboso.

Both William Madsen's *The Mexican-Americans of South Texas* and William Barrett's *The Shadows of the Images* de­pict attitudes and behavior of Chicano immigrants in the United States. The concept of *La Raza* is introduced early and developed as a major theme in both books. "Second pre­cinct is *la raza*, Spanish American," Tom Logan explains to Victoria when he first meets her (Barrett, 1953: 40). And Madsen writes:

The Mexican-American thinks of himself as both a citizen of the United States and a member of *La Raza* (The Race). This term refers to all Latin­Americans who are united by cultural and spiritual bonds derived from God (Madsen, 1964: 15).

Description of beliefs, values, and norms of *La Raza* is a major element in both the literary and the anthropological works. Furthermore, Barrett depicts Mexican-Americans in the sociological process of acculturation. Joining the army, for example, along with boxing and paying the rent on time are vehicles for and values of acculturation. The novel, then, depicts Mexican-American beliefs and values both as they comprise *La Raza* and also as they influence accultura­tion.

*The Mexican-Americans of South Texas* consists not only of description of *La Raza* and certain vehicles for acculturation but also of analysis of the acculturation process. Madsen discovered correlations between variables.
First-generation Mexican immigrants of the lower social classes are more likely to cling to the folk values associated with La Raza. Second-generation immigrants who have been exposed to schools and other experiences in the United States are likely to feel themselves "caught in the value conflict between two cultures." Finally, third-generation Mexican immigrants who have not only been educated but also achieved status in the Anglo world have reified some values directly opposed to those of La Raza (Madsen, 1964: 2-3). By developing analytic correlations, Madsen introduced into his monograph the notion of predictability. Upon comprehending Madsen, one can predict with some degree of certainty that a Mexican-American of the lower class who breaks out in boils will visit a curandero while a Mexican-American of the upper class will make an appointment with a physician.

Because of the ability of individuals to internalize the attitudes of group members around them, first-generation Chicanos who associate little with Anglos predictably represent the stronghold of La Raza. Moreover, second-generation Mexican-American immigrants, exposed to schooling and other experiences outside La Raza can be expected to feel themselves torn between two different world-views. And third-generation immigrants who have been exposed to Anglo education, and who also interact occupationally with middle and upper class Anglo Americans, recurrently demonstrate a greater degree of acculturation than did their parents. Drawing correlations which imply causation, Madsen concen-
trated upon the predictable element of human behavior. The Mexican-Americans of which Madsen wrote are empirically predictable, much as Vidich and Bensman's Springdalers, Whyte's gang members, and Kutak's Bohemians are predictable. Because their actions are predictably recurrent, they can be empirically known or understood. Human beings are predictable, George Herbert Mead lectured, "in so far as the individual arouses in himself the attitudes of the others." Furthermore, "the taking of all of those organized sets of attitudes gives (the individual) his 'me', " (Mead, 1932: 175). The Mexican-Americans of South Texas was written from the scientific perspective. Madsen, like other scientific analysts, has focused upon the Me within his subjects.

Novelist William Barrett, however, proceeds from a different perspective. His characters play out their lives before us. The Shadows of the Images presents--to use the language of Schutz--"lived experience." Lived experience without the "act of reflection" does not constitute subject matter for social science.

The simple experience of living in the flow of duration goes forward in a uni-directional, irreversible movement, proceeding from manifold to manifold in a constant running-off process. Each phase of experience melts into the next without any sharp boundaries as it is being lived through; but each phase is distinct in its thusness, or quality, from the next insofar as it is held in the gaze of attention (Schutz, 1967: 51).

Barrett has written a novel in which characters experience the "flow" of living, going forward "in a uni-directional, irreversible movement." Throughout the final paragraphs of the work, the characters continue to look forward:
Tom spoke slowly, thoughtfully. He was watching the rain wash Winchester Street from curb to curb. "But what will (Paul and Beverly) have, Vicky?" he said. "What can they ever have?"

Vicky moved in his arms...."I want things to be different for our children, Tom," she said (Barrett, 1953: 539-540).

Barrett's story is a detailed depiction of lived experience. Because the story unfolds chronologically, it contains an element of suspense and some surprises. The reader does not know, until Joe Vasquez and Paco Soboso themselves experience their boxing match, what will be the outcome. Nor does the reader suspect that Beverly will fitfully murder her infant son until she does so.

As we have seen, the unpredictability of human beings may be presented by writers by various means. Some, like Edmund Wilson, dramatize the act of choice itself. Others, like Willa Cather, draw characters who knowingly watch themselves align their behavior with that expected by the group to which they belong. William Barrett has focused upon the unpredictable within social selves in still another way. He has chosen to unfold for his readers characters enmeshed simply in "lived experience." Punctuating that "flow of duration" are dramatic surprises, heightened by increasing suspense. One is reminded of George Herbert Mead's remark: "It is because of the 'I' that...we surprise ourselves" (Mead, 1962: 174). What a man's response to a given situation will be "he does not know and nobody else knows" (Mead, 1962: 175). Human beings live lives beset with surprises because they themselves are, in some sense, unpredictable.
While William Madsen's *The Mexican-Americans of South Texas* concentrates upon the predictable Me within social selves, William Barrett's *The Shadows of the Images* is a story of surprising events, resulting from the I within social selves. The two authors have employed a common subject matter, Mexican-American immigrants, but from different perspectives. Madsen, concentrating upon the recurrent, has made use of the scientific perspective. Barrett, illustrating the unpredictable, has employed the aesthetic perspective.

It should be noted, however, that neither author has ideologically reified his respective point of view. As was noted in reference to Vidich and Bensman's *Small Town in Mass Society*, recognition of subjects' adaptation involves recognition of the I within selves. The point can be further elaborated here. Acculturation involves not only the presence of foreign stimuli in a differentiated environment, but also individuals' reactions to those stimuli. When an individual reacts or responds to a situation, s/he does so "as an 'I'" (Mead, 1962: 175). Madsen, therefore, in recognizing the on-going process of acculturation, recognizes the I within social selves. This is not to say that the major focus of the anthropologist's work is not upon the Me.

Just as Madsen does not focus only upon the predictable within human beings, so Barrett does not look solely at the unpredictable. The logical pattern of social migrations is the subject of the following passage:
Tom was watching the man who was sprinkling resin in the ring where another man had just swept it. He told (Vicky) about the first decade of the century when the Irish were the despised minority and fighters were nearly all Irish, of the second and third decades when the Jews and the Italians were hungry and when the Jewish and Italian boys dominated boxing, of the colored boys, who were always hungry, but who were late in getting a chance to fight (Barrett, 1953: 220).

Barrett's perspective, then, is not solely on the unpredictable within human beings. His point of view, while incorporating both the recurrent and the surprising, however, is perhaps best exemplified in a pronouncement made by Father Brennan near the conclusion of the novel:

"You know, I have often felt upon finishing a book," he said, "that a story about bodies, and what people do with them, is never more than a story half told. The importance of a story...lies in what happens to souls" (Barrett, 1953: 522).

William James remarked that some people chose to call the I or "pure ego" by the philosophical term, soul (James, 1961: 61).

While neither anthropologist Madsen nor novelist Barrett has employed one point of view exclusively, both authors do exhibit different perspectives. The former focuses upon the empirical and predictable within social selves and the latter draws attention to the surprising and unpredictable element of "lived experience." Having proceeded thus far, we tackle now the examination of a fourth social science study and a fourth novel.

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10 The conclusion of the paragraph quoted is an interesting admission by Barrett that he has allowed himself to veer from the literary perspective. "The history of the prize ring," Barrett writes, "was a study in sociology if one knew how to write it that way" (Barrett, 1953: 220).
Gans' *The Urban Villagers* and Puzo's *The Godfather*

Sociologist Herbert J. Gans published *The Urban Villagers* in 1962. The book is a report of his participant observation in West End, an inner-city Boston neighborhood inhabited by several immigrant ethnic groups, forty-two percent of whom were Italian-Americans (Gans, 1962: 8). Gans lived in West End from October, 1957, until May, 1958. Upon initiating his study, his main research interests were "to study a slum and to study the way of life of a low-income population" (Gans, 1962: ix), and since Gans was "interested in...aspects of class and ethnic group behavior," his study "developed into an extensive analysis of the Italian-American society and culture" (Gans, 1962: x).

Mario Puzo's novel, *The Godfather*, was first published in 1969. Written by an Italian, it is a story of struggles among the Italian-American families who control Mafia activities in and from New York City. While the majority of Italian-Americans are not involved in organized crime (*Time*, May 16, 1977: 35), Puzo's novel is comparable to Gans' sociological study in that both reveal similar socio-cultural attitudes and behavior of Italian-American immigrants and their children.

Gans, however, approached his subject matter differently than did Puzo. *The Urban Villagers* is a work of description and analysis. Gans describes the beliefs, values, and normative prescriptions which comprise what he terms the "peer group society" of Italian-Americans. "The
basis of adult West End life," Gans relates, "is peer group sociability" (Gans, 1962: 74). For Italian-Americans, whose worst fear perhaps is to be alone, "a routinized gathering of a relatively unchanging peer group of family members and friends...takes place several times a week" (Gans, 1962: 74).

The peer group meets regularly in the kitchens and living rooms of innumerable West End apartments. There are no formal invitations or advance notifications; people arrive regularly one or more evenings a week....The talk goes on for hours--often past midnight--even though the men have to be at work early the next morning....The sexes remain separate most of the evening, and, even, when they gather around the kitchen table for coffee and cake, the men often sit at one end, the women at the other (Gans, 1962: 77).

Italian-American peer group society provides more than just sociability. Indeed, it is within the peer group that members find their own individual identities. Gans explains:

Although the peer group is the most important entity in the West Ender's life, he is not merely a robot whose actions are determined by the group or the cultural tradition. In fact, peer group life in many ways is just the opposite of the cohesive and tightly-knit group that has served as a model for descriptions of primary relations in other societies. It is a spirited competition of individuals "jockeying" for respect, power, and status. Indeed, to the outside observer, West Enders appear to be involved in a never ending dialectic: individual actions take them out of the group momentarily and are followed by restraints that bring them back, only to be succeeded by more individuating talk or behavior (Gans, 1962: 81).

Consequently, Gans reports, peer group society is characterized by paradox: "that the group is used by its members to express and display individualistic strivings and that these strivings (in turn) prevent the group from acting in concert" toward any external goal over an extended
period of time (Gans, 1962: 89ff). To further elucidate this point, Gans distinguishes between what he terms "object-oriented individualism" and "person-oriented individualism" (Gans, 1962: 89-92). "Object-oriented individualism involves striving toward the achievement of an 'object' or goal, either moral or material. "Person-oriented individualism also strives, but not for object goals." To the person-oriented individual,

the overriding aspiration is the desire to be a person within a group; to be liked and noticed by members of a group whom one likes and notices in turn. Now, wanting to be liked and noticed is also an object, and people join groups for this purpose. The difference between object-orientation and person-orientation is that whereas the former exists prior to and apart from a group, the latter is intrinsically tied to, and is itself a product of participation in the group. Object-oriented people may enter secondary groups or reshape primary ones in order to achieve their object goals; person-oriented ones develop their aspirations within a primary group in which they are members, and which they are not interested in leaving. Without such a group, they have no aspirations, and for them, being alone is undesirable precisely because aspirations are so closely tied to the group...the person-oriented (people) need the group to become individuals (Gans, 1962: 90).

This "person-oriented" peer group society fosters and supports certain beliefs and attitudes. Among them is the valued "pattern of mutual-obligation." Among Italian-American peer group members, giving and receiving--of help or gifts--involves the individual in a spiral of reciprocating obligations.

The obligation may be latent, in which case people feel a desire to give and receive, and enjoy the resulting reciprocity. Or it may be manifest, thus becoming a duty. In this case reciprocity can turn into a burden, and people try to escape involvement...Among close friends and relatives, goods
and services are exchanged freely and obligations remain latent, unless one or the other person falls seriously behind in reciprocating, or unless the exchange becomes competitive....When relationships are not close, obligations are manifest....When obligations concern authority figures and hierarchical relationships, the rejection of dependence becomes stronger, and often evolves into fear of domination (Gans, 1962: 84-85).

Not only does peer group society embody reciprocal obligations among members, it also serves to influence, among other things, male-female and, consequently, husband-wife relationships. West End Italian-American husbands and wives, Gans relates, engage in marriages which involve "segregation of functions" (Gans, 1962: 51). Not only are tasks strictly divided into sex specific roles, but also this segregation of functions is even more clearly visible in the emotional aspects of the husband-wife relationship.

Although young West Enders are as much concerned with romantic love as other Americans, and although couples do marry on the basis of love, the marital relationship is qualitatively different from that of the middle class. Not only is there less communication and conversation between husband and wife, but there is also much less gratification of the needs of one spouse by the other. Husbands and wives come together for procreation and sexual gratification, but less so for the mutual satisfaction of emotional needs or problem solving.... Thus the marriage partners are much less "close" than those in the middle class. They take their troubles less to each other than to brothers, sisters, other relatives, or friends. Men talk things over with brothers, women with sisters and mothers; each thus remains on his side of the sexual barrier (Gans, 1962: 51).

The culture of Italian-American immigrants in West End, then, can be understood in terms of relationships within a peer group, and particularly in terms of the reciprocal obligations or loyalty felt toward same-sex members of that
group. Peer group society, moreover, fosters and supports suspicion and distrust for all "outsiders" (Gans, 1962: 120). "The West Ender always expects to be exploited in his contact with the outside world, and is ready to exploit it in return" (Gans, 1962: 121). This belief is expressed in many ways: attitudes toward government, politicians, crime, lawyers, and more generally toward upward social mobility.

The West Enders become most suspicious of, and hostile toward, the outside world when they must deal with government and the law. Most West Enders are convinced that police, the government bureaucracy, the elected officials, and the courts are corrupt and are engaged in a never-ending conspiracy to deprive the citizens of what is morally theirs (Gans, 1962: 163).

Consequently, the local or area politician, himself a member of the peer group society, is viewed as an ambassador (Gans, 1962: 163) to the outside world. As such, doing favors for his constituents is his most important function (Gans, 1962: 170).

Most of the favors are requests for jobs and for welfare payments....The politician is also asked to do favors that require the application of his political influence (Gans, 1962: 171).

The hostility toward the outside world also allows the West Ender to condone illegal work activities (Gans, 1962: 127). The author notes that in West End

Some of the commercial establishments...served as hangouts and communication centers for sub-rosa activities. A number of the men who could be seen in the area during the day made their living as petty gamblers, or by working for more organized gambling endeavors....Some of the luncheonettes were perhaps able to stay in business only because of income derived from the ancillary gambling activities. Maybe this is why they had been opened in the first place (Gans, 1962: 119).
Moreover, "little disapproval is expressed toward gamblers, and even racketeers, as long as their activities do not hurt the peer group society" (Gans, 1962: 127).

Thus, West Enders usually had only words of praise for a well-known gambler--one of the wealthiest men in the West End--because he gave lavishly to local organizations and to charities. And while the bootleggers and racketeers who had lived in the area during the days of prohibition were not praised, even they were thought to have done no harm, because their illegal activities had been aimed at the outside world, and their violence had been restricted to their own associates and competitors (Gans, 1962: 127).

Just as suspicion of the outside world shows itself in Italian-Americans' attitudes toward government, politicians, and crime, so also this distrust influences the attitudes of West End professionals, specifically attorneys. Their legal work, Gans relates, is devoted less to the achievement of professional perfection and recognition from fellow professionals than to the application of skills--and contacts--in behalf of the peer group society.

Thus, lawyers become politicians and agents of the Italian community in the outside world. Consequently, their legal practice consists primarily of cases to help Italian clients get what is theirs from the outside world. They also use their legal skills and contacts for business dealings. But while these lawyers do want to maximize both incomes and status, their primary reference group is still the peer group society (Gans, 1962: 125).

Italian-Americans of Boston's West End, then, manifest their suspicion and hostility toward those outside their ethnic peer group society in their attitudes toward (among other things) government, politicians, crime, and attorneys. Moreover, their attitudes toward upward social mobility are closely related to their suspicion and mistrust
of outsiders. Generally, West Enders, Gans relates, reject mobility as individuals, while they may accept and pursue it as a group. Italian-Americans who attain higher incomes generally do not as individuals assume attitudes associated with higher socioeconomic classes. Predictably, they do not move from the neighborhood or peer group society or modify their beliefs, values, and behavior to comply with middle class expectations.

The West Ender has little sympathy for what he believes to be the goals and behavioral requirements of (the middle-class) way of life. Moreover, he rejects the conscious pursuit of status and the acquisition of artifacts that would require him to detach himself from his peers, and to seek ways of living in which they cannot share (Gans, 1962: 219).

This is not to say that Italian-Americans do not pursue or at least wish for high incomes.

Certainly, most West Enders would like to have middle-class incomes, and the other advantages which this class enjoys. But they would use these opportunities to enhance peer group life, without embracing what they feel to be undesirable, unhealthy, and even immoral middle-class ways (Gans, 1962: 221).

Italian-Americans of West End, thus, live predictably according to the generalized other operating within their peer group society. Not only does Gans describe that society in detail; he also offers analysis of its origins and future. Immigrants from southern Italy and Sicily, he writes, were generally farm day laborers who lived in villages. The peer group society is one which has been transported from the villages of southern Italy and Sicily to the urban village of Boston's West End (Gans, 1962: 199ff). Differences, which have probably resulted from West Enders' acculturation,
are apparent however. Should acculturation continue, as Gans predicts, future Italian-American "peer groups will be likely to feel less hostility toward the outside world than do present ones," yet they "still will probably not fully participate in it" (Gans, 1962: 226).

Indeed the middle class will continue to seem to be different because it is different. Thus the majority of third-generation people will keep some distance between it and themselves. Even with augmented prosperity, then, the third generation will not be swept into the middle-class institutions and ways of life that have increasingly come to dominate the American scene.

At the same time, an ever expanding number of individuals will leave the peer group society for the middle class. Moreover, as the peer group society undergoes changes that make it more similar to the rest of society, it will resist these desertions less strenuously. Not only will it be unable to stop relatives and friends who seek more drastic changes, but the movement into the middle class will seem a less drastic step than it does to West Enders today. Consequently, external (individual) mobility will be a less hazardous venture (Gans, 1962: 226).

The Urban Villagers is a descriptive, sociological monograph, providing detailed information concerning the correlated beliefs, values, and norms of what Gans terms the "peer group society" (Gans, 1962: 74) operating within the Italian-American subculture. Moreover, descriptive details provide the data from which is fashioned analysis of that peer group society, both in terms of social psychological concepts such as person-oriented or object-oriented individualism and also in sociological concepts such as acculturation and social mobility.

Mario Puzo's The Godfather, meanwhile, deals with the Italian-American peer group society from a different, an
aesthetic point of view. Like The Shadows of the Images, The Godfather is written from the third-person, omniscient point of view. Also like Barrett's novel, The Godfather depicts the interrelated life events of several characters. There is the aging Godfather, Vito Corleone, a Sicilian immigrant involved in the olive oil importing business and, more importantly, Don of one of the powerful Five Families of the New York Mafia. There are the Don's three sons: Santino--"Sonny" to all but his father--the oldest. Tall, with sensuous lips, powerful built, he is, as the story progresses, betrayed by his brother-in-law, Carlo Rizzi, and brutally murdered. Freddie, the second eldest, is short and burly, "a crutch to his father" who, unlike Sonny, "never disputed him," but at the same time a son who "did not have that personal magnetism, that animal force, so necessary for a leader of men" (Puzo, 1970: 16). Michael, the youngest son, had decided to have nothing to do with the brutality implied by his father's business, and at twenty-one had joined the Marine Corps against his father's orders. Upon returning he left his father's house, consulting no one, to attend Dartmouth College.

There is also Kay Adams, the Anglo-American girl who meets Michael at Dartmouth and subsequently falls in love with him. Fair complexioned and a little too thin by Italian standards, Kay, as the tale unfolds, marries Michael, moves with him into one of the Family houses, and dutifully bears him sons. There is the Don's daughter, Connie, whose husband, Carlo Rizzi, is, near the end of the novel, strangled
because of his earlier treason in betraying Sonny Corleone. Another important character is Tom Hagen, adopted by the Corleone family at age twelve, now an attorney and consigliori to the Don. Faithful throughout, Hagen is nevertheless occasionally reminded that he is Irish, not Italian.

There are other, more minor characters. Jack Woltz, the important Hollywood producer who makes the error of denying Hagen a request and, upon awaking one morning, finds the disembodied head of his beloved and expensive race horse glaring at him from the foot of his bed. Amerigo Bonasera is an undertaker whose daughter has been raped and who, after leaving the trial dissatisfied with the men he believed guilty, visits Don Vito Corleone to request vengeance. Johnny Fontane is a washed-up singer who wants a job in Hollywood but who cannot seem to land one on his own and seeks his Godfather's help. Virgil "the Turk" Sollozzo suggests that the Don join him in drug trafficking and is refused by the Godfather; Sollozzo subsequently but unsuccessfully arranges for Vito Corleone's execution.

The Godfather, then, is a novel of these characters' involvement in the struggles for power both among New York's Five Mafia Families and in the "peer group society" (Gans, 1962: 74) of the Corleone family itself.

The first major scene of the story takes place at the Don's home where his daughter, Connie, and Carlo Rizzi are celebrating their wedding. The Don's sons, Sonny and Freddie, dutifully take places beside their father, but Michael is
seated at a table in the far corner of the garden with his fiance, Kay Adams. Kay, unaware that her future father-in-law is a gangster and murderer, is fascinated by both his extravagant display of wealth and the atmosphere of exotic mystery which surrounds him and his family. Michael, meanwhile, tells Kay partially revealing anecdotes about his family and their guests. He will one day succeed his father as Don.

Whether he knows it at this point, Michael will inherit the family business. The remainder of the novel is the story of Michael's progression from a state of "chosen alienation from his father and family" (Puzo, 1970: 17) to a man who, having gunned down two men and ordered the strangulation of his sister's husband, receives the homage due a Don (Puzo, 1970: 437). The Godfather is simultaneously the story of the romance and marriage of Kay Adams and Michael Corleone, and of Kay's progression from a Protestant girl thrilled by the Corleone intrigue and peasant customs to a woman who rides with her mother-in-law in a family limousine to daily Mass and Communion in order to pray for her husband's immortal soul.

Puzo's novel depicts Italian-American attitudes and behavior patterns similar to those described by Gans. In both works, for example, the themes of peer group society, with its emphasis upon patterns of mutual obligation and sexually segregated marriage relationships, is strong. While Michael Corleone and Kay Adams sit in the garden at Connie's
wedding reception, for example, she asks him why so many of the guests "bother your father with business on a day like this?" Michael laughs and explains, "Because they know that by tradition no Sicilian can refuse a request on his daughter's wedding day. And no Sicilian ever lets a chance like that go by" (Puzo, 1970: 27). Later, during the same conversation, Kay remarks that everything Michael has told her about his father "shows him doing something for other people. He must be very good-hearted." Young Corleone replies:

"I guess that's the way it sounds, but let me tell you this. You know those Arctic explorers who leave caches of food scattered on the route to the North Pole: Just in case they may need help someday? That's my father's favors. Someday he'll be at each one of those people's houses and they had better come across" (Puzo, 1970: 43).

Just as the common pattern of mutual obligation among peer group society is apparent in both Gans' and Puzo's books, so also is that of sexually segregated marriage relationships, especially regarding emotional gratification and mutual problem solving. All husband-wife relationships depicted in The Godfather illustrate sexually segregated relationships, even, ultimately, that of Michael and Kay. Shortly before Michael and Kay are married, for example, Kay chides young Corleone for his silence, feeling he does not trust her enough to share everything with her.

"I can't tell you about anything that happened. I'm working for my father now. I'm being trained to take over the family olive oil business. I won't be telling you what happened at the office every day. I won't be telling you anything about my business. You'll be my wife but you won't be my
partner in life, as I think they say. Not an equal partner. That can't be" (Puzo, 1970: 361-362).

It is this failure to be an emotionally trusted and "equal" marriage partner of Michael that eventually leads Kay to leave him.

Just as the themes of sexually segregated husband-wife relationships and patterns of mutual obligation can be found in both works, so also can the theme of Italian immigrants' distrust for outsiders. Puzo writes that young Michael Corleone had once

enlisted and fought over the Pacific Ocean. He became a Captain and won medals. In 1944 his picture was printed in Life magazine with a photo layout of his deeds. A friend had shown Don Corleone the magazine...and the Don had grunted disdainfully and said, "He performs those miracles for strangers" (Puzo, 1970: 17).

And, later in the novel shortly after Michael has decided to follow in his father's footsteps, he is suddenly surprised to find himself so secretive with Kay. He loved her, he trusted her, but he would never tell her anything about his father or the Family. She was an outsider (Puzo, 1970: 120).

In both The Godfather and The Urban Villagers this distrust of outsiders results in similarly depicted attitudes toward government in general, toward politicians and lawyers specifically, toward crime and, finally, toward individual and group mobility.

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11 Tom Hagen acts not as a professional attorney but as consigliori or personal legal adviser to the Don.

12 Increased wealth provides for the Corleone family "enhancement of their peer group society" (Gans, 1962: 221) rather than individual mobility for any single group member.
Moreover, Gans and Puzo present similar views on two minor topics in both works: the attitude of Italian-Americans regarding those who would become ingroup leaders and the symbolic meaning, religiously, of becoming a godparent to a friend's child. Puzo writes that Michael will one day inherit his father's status, for he, unlike his brothers, is a natural leader, one whom Sicilians can respect. "He had all the quiet force and intelligence of his great father, the born instinct to act in such a way that men had no recourse but to respect him" (Puzo, 1970: 17). It is this quality of "quiet force and intelligence," coupled with a certain "instinct" or charisma which makes leaders among Italian-Americans. Gans points out, for example, that the concept of mutual obligation among these immigrants "often evolves into fear of domination." Therefore,

whereas West Enders still subordinate themselves to someone whom they recognize as a leader, they will bitterly reject the individual who is imposed as a leader from the outside--or who tries to impose himself (Gans, 1962: 85).

In peer group society, then, certain attitudes toward lead-

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This fear of domination resulting from patterns of mutual obligation--along with the valued practice of peer group sociability, especially among godparents--is illustrated by Puzo in the following exchange between Don Vito Corleone and undertaker Amerigo Bonasera:

"Don Corleone rose from behind the desk. His face was still impassive but his voice rang like cold death. 'We have known each other many years, you and I,' he said to the undertaker, 'but until this day you never came to me for counsel or help. I can't remember the last time you invited me to your house for coffee though my wife is godmother to your only child. Let us be frank. You spurned my friendship. You feared to be in my debt.'

"Bonasera murmured, 'I didn't want to get into trouble!'" (Puzo, 1970: 31).
ers are implied and, consequently, corresponding qualifica-
tions are expected in those who assume leadership.

Peer group society, furthermore, contains symbolic
meaning systems, an example of which are the obligations at-
tached to becoming a religious godparent of a friend's child.

Gans writes that while membership in the peer group is pri-
marily based upon kinship, the group also includes god-
parents and friends.

Godparents are friends who, because of their close-
ness, are given quasi-familial status. Godparentage
is awarded to best men at a wedding or to the children
of one's godparents, as well as to true god-
parents; in short, to people who become "friends
of the family" in middle-class American kinship
terminology. It is also used as a way of cementing
relationships (Gans, 1962: 74-75).

In The Godfather, correspondingly, Connie Rizzi, near the
end of the story, requests that Michael Corleone stand as
godfather to Carlo and her new son. Her reasoning, it is
presumed, is that if Michael will act as godfather, this
will "cement the relationship" (Gans, 1962: 75) between Car-
lo and Michael and, hence, Michael may be dissuaded from
ordering Carlo's death, a fear which Connie has carried ever
since she began to suspect Carlo's betrayal of her brother,
Sonny.

And so the day before the meeting with the Barzini
Family, Michael Corleone stood Godfather to the son
of Carlo and Connie Rizzi. He presented the boy
with an extremely expensive wristwatch and gold band.
There was a small party in Carlo's house, to which
were invited the caporegines, Hagen, Lampone and
everyone who lived on the mall, including, of course,
the Don's widow. Connie was so overcome with emo-
tion that she hugged and kissed her brother and Kay
all during the evening. And even Carlo Rizzi became
sentimental, wringing Michael's hand and calling him
Godfather at every excuse—old country style. Michael
himself had never been so affable, so outgoing. Connie whispered to Kay, "I think Carlo and Mike are going to be real friends now. Something like this always bring(s) people together" (Puzo, 1970: 415).

That the ceremony will not bring Carlo and Michael together is a fact which Connie will not discover until later in the novel, when she learns of her husband's murder.

The two topics, then, of the symbolic meaning of godparentage among Italian-Americans and of the attitude toward leadership among Italian-Americans, while both presented by Gans and Puzo in different ways, embody essentially similar information.

Moreover, as we have seen, both Gans' sociological monograph and Puzo's novel contain reliably similar information concerning the beliefs, values, and normative behavior of Italian-Americans generally. While Gans describes and analyzes the predictable, recurrent, and consequently knowable attitudes of West End Italians, Puzo depicts—much as did Barrett—the gradual unrolling of a plot or story in which actors freely choose among and respond to alternatives offered them by the culture to which they belong. Nowhere is this more evident perhaps than when Michael, after his father has been shot—though not, we learn later, fatally—gradually makes choices which progressively involve him in the

14 Gans' analytical explanation of "person-oriented individualism" (Gans, 1962: 89ff) explains Puzo's characters' seemingly contradictory behavior of belonging to a peer group and at the same time insisting on many occasions upon working against common goals, even to the extent of betraying a fellow group member.
Family business. Shortly after the Don has been struck down, Michael arrives at his father's home and enters the study where the men are trying to ascertain just who has shot the Don and why.

Michael had sat down in one of the big leather armchairs. Sonny gave him a quick sharp look and then went to sit down behind the desk.

"You hang around me, Mike," he said, "you're gonna hear things you don't wanta hear."


Michael's help, however, will include only "answering the phone, running errands and messages," he believes. At this point in the story, Michael feels "glad that he was not truly part of all this," and that he will not have to "involve himself in vengeance" (Puzo, 1970: 96). As the novel progresses, though, Michael becomes increasingly aware of his brothers' inability to lead in the absence of their hospitalized father. In the following excerpts, Puzo depicts Michael's intellectual-emotional process of making a choice:

When Michael Corleone went into the city that night it was with a depressed spirit. He felt he was being enmeshed in the Family business against his will and he resented Sonny using him even to answer the phone (Puzo, 1970: 119).

Yet, after some meditation, Michael realizes that

Sonny and Tom were off-center on this guy Solozzo, they were still underrating him, even though Sonny was smart enough to see the danger. Michael tried to think what the Turk might have up his sleeve (Puzo, 1970: 119).

Shortly thereafter, Michael muses that what he wanted was out, out of all this, to lead his own life. But he couldn't cut loose from the family until the crisis was over. He had to help in a
civilian capacity. With sudden clarity he realized that he was annoyed with the role assigned to him, that of the privileged noncombatant, the excused conscientious objector. That was why the word "civilian" kept popping into his skull in such an irritating way (Puzo, 1970: 120).

In the above sequence Michael realizes that what he really wants is not "out of all this," but actually to be a real combatant, to be heavily involved. Here Puzo depicts Michael's personal experiences in freely making a choice. In so doing, Puzo focuses upon human beings' ability to respond unpredictably.

A second occasion wherein Puzo focuses upon the human ability to choose is contained in the final several paragraphs of the novel. Kay Adams, readers learn, has left her husband. She did so, moreover, because shortly after Carlo Rizzi's murder, Michael "deliberately used all their trust and love in each other to make her believe his lie"—that he did not order Carlo's death (Puzo, 1970: 442). Both Kay Adams and Michael Corleone are characters who freely choose among and respond to alternatives offered them by society. That is, Mario Puzo in writing The Godfather focused upon the unpredictable, freely responsive I within social selves. In writing The Godfather, moreover, as we have seen, Puzo employed methods used by the three novelists analyzed previously. He dramatized the act of choice itself, as did Edmund Wilson. He drew characters, such as Michael, who knowingly and emotionally watch themselves align their behavior with that expected by the group to which they belong, as did Willa Cather. He depicted the chronological unfold-
ing of the plots of characters' lives, enmeshed as they were in the process of lived experience, as did William Barrett. Moreover, Puzo, near the end of his novel, depicted one character, Kay Adams, in the act of choosing between two different and opposed generalized others, that of her family of orientation and that of her family of procreation. Mario Puzo the novelist employed all these methods, moreover, in order to focus upon that unpredictable, freely responding, and occasionally surprising I within social selves.

Herbert Gans, meanwhile, in detailing recurrent attitudes and behavior of West End Italians, and in subsequently analyzing that behavior, has engaged in scientific investigation of the predictable Me of social selves.

Social scientist Herbert Gans, then, and novelist Mario Puzo have presented reliable information concerning Italian-American immigrants, but they have done so from divergent perspectives. While Gans concentrated upon the empirical Me, Puzo focused upon the unpredictable and more nebulous I.

Summary

Memoirs of Hecate County—provide illustrative cases through which we have seen that the common material of the third culture—of social science and literary art—is viewed differently by the scientific and the aesthetic perspectives. Social scientists William James and George Herbert Mead, among others, refusing to reify any single limiting intellectual perspective on the manifoldness of human life, offered a theory of human selves capable of explaining this divergence between the scientific and aesthetic points of view concerning their common subject matter. According to James and Mead, social selves are duplex, consisting of a knowable, predictable, empirical Me and a knowing, experiencing, feeling, freely choosing and unpredictable I.

Two other social scientists, furthermore, who recognize the manifoldness of human life, are Clyde Kluckhohn and Henry A. Murray. Anthropologist Kluckhohn and psychologist Murray point out that "every man is in certain respects like some other men, like no other men, and like all other men" (Kluckhohn, 1953: 53). A human being is like some others in that s/he is similar to other members of the same socio-cultural unit. The statistical prediction can safely be made that a hundred Americans, for example, will display defined characteristics distributed as to age, sex, social class, and vocation (Kluckhohn, 1953: 54).

There is, meanwhile, "the inescapable fact" that a man is in many respects like no other man.

Each individual's modes of perceiving, feeling, needing, and behaving have characteristic patterns which are not precisely duplicated by those of any other individual (Kluckhohn, 1953: 55).
Human beings, moreover, are like all other men in several ways, many derived from the fact that they are of one species. Because all human beings are social animals, furthermore, they share universally the condition under which "social life means some sacrifice of autonomy, subordination, and the responsibilities of superordination" (Kluckhohn, 1953: 54). Moreover, human beings share universally the fact that they experience their own emotions.

Social scientists William James, George Herbert Mead and others would argue that human beings are like some other men inasmuch as they, as members of the same or similar socio-cultural units, have internalized beliefs, values, and norms which they generally can be expected to obey. That aspect of human nature which comprises internalized norms is the generalized other or Me present in social selves. Moreover, that Me of social selves comprises the primary subject matter of social science. Social scientists, in Kluckhohn's terminology, focus upon attitudes and behavior by which human beings demonstrate that they are like some other men.

At the same time, each human being is like no other man inasmuch as s/he acts or responds freely--i.e., either accepting or rejecting internalized socio-cultural attitudes. The behavior of any one human being, consequently, may be unique. It is that freely responding element within social selves, the I, which is responsible for the individuality of human beings and which provides literary artists with their
subject matter. Novelists in Kluckhohn's language focus upon that behavior by which an individual demonstrates that s/he is like no other man. While both social science and fictional perspectives focus upon human beings as their subject matter, they do so in ways which accent different aspects of human nature. In this regard, Aldous Huxley has written:

Science may be defined as a device for investigating, ordering, and communicating the more public of human experiences. Less systematically, literature also deals with such public experiences. Its main concern, however, is with man's more private experiences (Huxley, 1963: 5).

Social science stresses the public Me within social selves; literature emphasizes the more private experiences of the I within human beings.  

Moreover, human beings, as Kluckhohn points out, are in some ways like all other men. And the aesthetic perspective, as we shall see, not only focuses upon what is unique in human individuals but simultaneously draws attention to that which is universal among them. Put another way, literary artists in depicting stories of characters who are like no others draw attention to those ways in which human

15This difference in focus on subject matter between social science and literary art may be the critical reason that anthropologist Laura Bohannan chose to present the results of her ethnographic work with a native African tribe as a novel. Return To Laughter, in David Riesman's words, "focuses less on the West African tribe among whom she worked and lived...and more on her own emotional hegira as a neophyte anthropologist" (Riesman, in Bowen, 1964: x). In an "Author's Note," Bohannan agrees. "Here I have written simply as a human being," she writes, "and the truth I have tried to tell concerns the sea changes in oneself" (Bowen, 1964: xix).
beings are like all others. Just as it is the I within selves that makes individuals unique, so also the I is universal to all human creatures.

Social scientists, then, focus more directly upon the culturally determined Me of social selves. Meanwhile literary artists focus upon the feeling, freely responding I, which evidences itself in one's singularity and nevertheless is universal to all.

Yet, the line of demarcation between the social scientist and the literary artist is neither heavily nor rigidly drawn. When Vidich and Bensman's *Small Town In Mass Society* was compared with Edmund Wilson's *Memoirs of Hecate County*, for example, we found that the social scientists recognized the existence of certain Springdale individuals who refused to obey the generalized other operant within the community. In that aspect of their behavior, these individuals—or "characters"—were persons behaving unpredictably and like virtually no others. Vidich and Bensman, in drawing these individuals to readers' attention, portray the I of social selves. Novelist Wilson, meanwhile, not only painted many of his minor characters in predictable hues, but also thematically illustrated the internalization of the generalized other of Hecate County by the novel's unnamed protagonist. In recognizing the social-psychological forces of social control at work in Hecate County and their influence upon the protagonist, Wilson recognizes the Me within human beings. Social scientists Vidich and Bensman,
therefore, and novelist Wilson—while they write primarily from their own respective points of view—incorporate both the scientific and the aesthetic perspectives in their writing.

Similarly, comparison of Kutak's *The Story of A Bohemian-American Village* and Cather's *My Antonia* revealed that both of these authors combined the scientific and artistic perspectives in their work. In allowing his subjects to speak, Kutak presents them as experiencing, knowing individuals. That is, the social scientist in depicting Milligan residents as knowers engaged in dialogue about their own feelings, draws attention to the I within his subjects. At the same time, Cather, as we have seen, related information about her characters' sociocultural milieu. In so doing, she presented parts of her novel from the perspective of that which can be empirically known. Put another way, the novelist periodically draws attention to the Me within her characters. Social scientist Robert Kutak and novelist Willa Cather, like Vidich and Bensman and Wilson, write primarily from their respective points of view. Yet they simultaneously view and present human beings from both the scientific and the aesthetic perspectives.

Finally, still another illustration of the fact that the line of demarcation between the scientific and the artistic perspectives is not rigidly drawn was provided by a comparison of William Madsen's *The Mexican-Americans of South Texas* with W.E. Barrett's *The Shadows of the Images*. 
Social scientist Madsen, we have seen, in recognizing (as did Vidich and Bensman, Kutak, and Gans) that subjects under investigation adapt and change, recognizes the responsive \( I \) within social selves. Meanwhile, novelist Barrett has not reified his aesthetic point of view by focusing only upon the surprising and unpredictable behavior of his characters. Both Barrett and Madsen, like other literary artists and social scientists examined in this chapter, combine the scientific and the aesthetic perspectives on subject matter they share in common.

Novelist Joyce Cary once stated that "the principle fact of life is the free mind... Man is a free creative spirit. This produces a world in continuous creation and therefore continuous change..." (Cary, in Cowley, 1975: 55). The qualitative social science monographs examined in this chapter recognize, with Cary, that subjects of investigations comprise communities and groups involved in a free, creative, and continuous process of social change. This recognition involves appreciation for the indeterminate \( I \) of social selves. Moreover, we have seen that literary fiction depicts not simply free minds, but characters struggling through acts of choosing among and responding to attitudes and alternatives offered them by society—attitudes which have been internalized into the generalized other or \( \text{Me} \) within social selves and which therefore can act to determine those selves. Qualitative social scientists and fiction writers, therefore, focus from different-yet-merging
perspectives upon a common subject matter. Together these two groups of writers comprise a third culture existing between the two cultures of the physical sciences and the very abstract arts.

The difference between the converging perspectives of qualitative social science and literary art with regard to the material they share in common, then, is one of focus. Sociologists/anthropologists focus more directly upon the knowable, predictable and empirical Me of social selves; writers of fiction focus more intently upon a knowing, freely responding, unpredictable "more difficult subject of inquiry" (James, 1961: 63)--i.e., the I--of social selves.

Moreover, investigative writers' respective methodologies are interrelated with the theoretical perspectives through which they view their subject matter. Put another way, the theoretical assumptions with which writers focus upon material are interrelated with the methodologies they use in researching and/or depicting such material. Just as this chapter, therefore, investigated the convergences and divergences in the perspectives of qualitative social scientists and literary artists concerning subject matter and its presentation, the next chapter undertakes to examine corresponding convergences and divergences with regard to the methodologies of those qualitative social scientists and writers of fiction.
CHAPTER III

PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION AND EXPERIENCING:
GATHERING DATA AND MATERIAL

This inquiry into the methodological convergences and divergences between qualitative social science and literary art rests on the premise that both the aesthetic and the scientific perspectives include values, beliefs, normative prescriptions and "definitions of the situation" appropriate to the pursuit of either science or art. The third culture tends to fuse these two perspectives.

Moreover, as we have seen, the vantage point from which an investigator views his/her subject matter is interrelated with the methodology that investigator employs. Consequently, in order more fully to understand the methodological similarities and differences between social science and fiction, we have first explored with the aid of paired cases the divergent manners in which social scientists and fiction writers focus upon common human material.

We have seen that while literary artists tend to define human beings as free, creative spirits, social scientists incline to define persons as understandable results of sociocultural influences. The respective lenses, furthermore, through which social scientists and writers of fiction view human selves is related to their respective investigative and/or rhetorical purposes. Social scientists strive
toward accurate description and analysis of subjects' predictable attitudes and recurrent behavior. Literary artists, on the other hand, pursue the faithful depiction of characters' involvement in choice and response. Just as the respective purposes of social scientists and literary artists influence their divergence of focus upon subject matter, so the respective purposes of doing social science and creating art influence methodologies.

This chapter, therefore, provides description and analysis of the divergences and convergences between the methodologies of qualitative social scientists and writers of fiction. We shall look first at the divergent-yet-merging manners in which the scientific and the aesthetic perspectives define truth and subsequently posit epistemological approaches to that truth. Next, we shall investigate the differences and similarities between the methodologies offered by the scientific and the artistic points of view as properly related to their respective epistemologies. Finally, we shall examine the respective methods or techniques which the methodologies of the scientific and the artistic perspectives prescribe. In this chapter, then, we look at the divergent-yet-converging "definitions of the situation" within the scientific and the aesthetic perspectives regarding truth, epistemologies, and methods or methodological techniques.

Just as the social scientific and the literary points of view focus upon their common subject matter differently, so too they understand the concept truth in dif-
ferent manners. The perspectives stress not only different definitions of truth, but also epistemologically different approaches to that truth. The scientific and artistic perspectives require divergent but not necessarily opposed methodologies and methodological techniques. We will begin the description and analysis in this chapter, then, with an investigation into the scientific and the artistic notions of truth.

Scientific Truth and Aesthetic Truth

An examination of the respective methodologies of literary artists and social scientists requires some understanding of their respective notions of truth. Severyn Bruyn (1966: 86) distinguished social science from the humanities in that the former insists upon valid, and verifiable facts. Similarly, philosopher John Kemeny states that "the more characteristic feature of Science is its method," a method which falls into three major, cyclical stages: "the formation of theories, the deduction of consequences, and the verification of predictions" (Kemeny, 1959: 85, 247).

Truth, from a scientific point of view, depends upon its verifiability and, consequently, upon what scientists term its reliability. Scientific theories are credible if and when they yield predictable results. Moreover--This is critical to the scientific perspective.--the predictability or validity of deduced consequences must be agreed upon publicly. Facts, from a scientific standpoint, are verifiably credible in as much as the methods through which they
are derived are reliable: i.e., in as much as fellow scientists can simultaneously and/or subsequently examine and agree upon those facts.  

While replication of research endeavors, particularly of experiments, is important in the scientific perspective as a means of ascertaining reliability, it is a practice not extensively employed in qualitative social science. One reason, among others, for this is that the subject matter itself of social science is continuously reinterpreting, redefining, and thereby changing its sociocultural environment. Hence, sociological/anthropological restudies can be expected to yield different results from those of initial investigations. One anthropological monograph which illustrates this point is Art Gallagher's Plainville Fifteen Years Later, 1961. The work is a restudy of Plainville, U.S.A., first investigated by Carl Withers in 1939-40 (cf. West, 1945; Gallagher, 1961).  

Gallagher explains that he re-investigated Plainville in order "to study change, utilizing the first report as a base line against which to measure and evaluate change" (Gallagher, 1961: 221). Gallagher, furthermore, subsequently "found, on the basis of my own research and checks against (Withers') materials, that I can agree with most of the data which he reported" (Gallagher, 1961: 222).  

Still, the "overall view" of Plainville presented by Withers "differs considerably" from Gallagher's. However, "this does not mean that one is right, the other wrong, but rather that the community has changed extensively during the fifteen years separating our visits" (Gallagher, 1961: 222).  

Another reason that replication is not extensively used in qualitative social science is that the ideas and personalities--the I--of social scientific researchers influence the potentially distinctive approaches they may take to their observations. A restudy which illustrates this phenomenon is Oscar Lewis' Life In A Mexican Village: Tepoztlan Restudied, 1951. Lewis' study followed Tepoztlan, A Mexican Village by Robert Redfield, first published in 1930. Lewis reports that he initially "did not anticipate there would be any fundamental differences between our findings. In the course of the work, however, many differences did emerge" (Lewis, 1951: 428).  

While some of these differences can be explained by changes which occurred in the Mexican village in the interim between the two studies (Lewis, 1951: 43), others cannot. These other differences, Lewis explains, primarily result from the fact that "the questions (Redfield) asked of his data were quite different from those asked in this study" (Lewis, 1951: 432).  

Consequently, as became evident in Chapter II of
That element of the world, explains Robert Friedrichs, is acceptable and accessible to science which meets "one crucial condition: that it may be observed by more than one person." The scientific enterprise demands, by nature and tradition, a plurality of witnesses. "In its insistence on being as positive as is humanly possible about what it concludes, science has defined itself in plural terms" (Friedrichs, 1972: 208). From the perspective of the "presumptive faith of science," then, truth is defined as that body of facts which is first, relational or can be logically deduced; second, is recurrent or predictable; and third, is intersubjectively verifiable.

Gans' *The Urban Villagers*, along with Madsen's *The Mexican-Americans of South Texas*, Kutak's *The Story of a Bohemian-American Village*, and Vidich and Bensman's *Small Town In Mass Society*, are true because they each contain a body of empirical facts which are logically ordered and intersubjectively verifiable. Put another way, the incidents, characterizations, and descriptions which are presented in each of these social scientific works exist actually in the empirical world. Moreover, empirical generalizations and theories presented in these social scientific monographs are based upon systematic observation of the actual, empirical

this thesis, many social scientists begin their studies with information concerning the purposes of their research, i.e., a list of those questions which they plan to ask of their data. When this is done, consumers of social science are better equipped to judge validity and reliability of findings.
world.

Moreover, truth from a scientific standpoint is best understood as the progressive creation of a monistic system in which "the world's enormous multiplicity" (Huxley, 1963: 9) becomes rationally and logically ordered. Because this ultimate goal of science has not been realized, it is understood that previously established scientific facts and theoretical paradigms are continuously subject to revision and, even, to "revolution" in light of new empirical and inspirational discoveries (cf. Kuhn, 1973).

Scientific research often yields empirical generalizations which support theoretical systems. Each time that this occurs—i.e., when a hypothesis derived from a theoretical paradigm is tested and found to explain elements of the empirical world with reasonable accuracy—the scientific theory in question is judged in the scientific view not to be "true", but to be simply "more nearly credible" than it was before. While the ultimate goal of science may be an absolute and all-inclusive empirical truth, scientists, especially social scientists, remain cognizant that scientific facts and generalizations are difficult to establish as universal and invariant. The cumulative truth of science lies in the verifiable credibility of its theoretical paradigms on the one hand and its empirical generalizations on the other.

The artistic perspective, as well as the scientific, views the objective of its labors as credibility or truth.
"Reality is the quest of the artist as of the scientist," writes Robert Nisbet (Nisbet, 1976: 22). Literary critic Clayton Hamilton wrote in 1911 that the purpose of fiction is "to embody certain truths of human life in a series of imagined facts" (Hamilton, 1911: 1, emphasis added). Furthermore, while "a genuine antithesis subsists between the words fact and fiction," the concepts fact and truth are not synonymous.

It is only in the vocabulary of the very careless thinkers that the words truth and fiction are regarded as antithetic... The novelist forsakes the realm of fact in order that he may better tell the truth, and lures the reader away from actualities in order to present him with realities (Hamilton, 1911: 2).

Truth, then, from the aesthetic perspective, is not dependent upon fact. Similarly, reality from the artistic point of view, is not necessarily synonymous with actuality. This view is different from that of science in which truth is consistently based upon fact, and reality considered synonymous with actuality. Nevertheless, novelists, like social scientists, insist that they convey truth. In his Nobel Prize lecture delivered before the Swedish Academy, Saul Bellow urged his fellows to reaffirm their commitment to imaginative fiction, for it is within this medium that truth best evidences itself (Bellow, 1977: 14-15).

Writers of fiction, moreover, recognize that they, unlike scientists, convey truth by means of fabricating non-actualities, fantasies, or "lies." Ken Kesey's Indian character, before relating his story in One Flew Over the
Cuckoo's Nest, tells the reader that his tale is "the truth even if it didn't happen" (Kesey, 1962: 13). "People will say you 'tell lies'," one instructor used to tell students at the writer's workshop I attended. "You tell them your lies are truer than theirs."

Literary lies might be "truer" than scientific statements of fact but only when "truth" is defined as it is in the aesthetic. Although, to the scientist, truth is that which leads mankind closer to a rationally ordered explanation of all that exists empirically, truth for the artist is independent of facts or actualities.

If truth is aesthetically attainable and yet independent of empirical facts or intersubjectively observed actualities, from what basis can that aesthetic truth be recognized or judged as credible? The answer is that for the artist truth is essentially dependent upon the ability of an aesthetic artifact to appeal emotionally to other human beings. Truth, from the aesthetic perspective is essentially interrelated with emotion or feeling. Thus, Joyce Cary speaks of "emotional truth" (Cary, in Cowley, 1975: 55) and William Faulkner speaks of "the truth and the human heart" (Faulkner, in Cowley, 1975: 138), two perspectives centered on the same goal. Similarly, Georges Simenon is aiming at depiction of emotional truth when he

2Similarly Richard Dietrich in his textbook, The Realities of Literature, reminds students of Pablo Picasso's remark: "Art is a lie that makes us realize truth" (Dietrich, 1971: viii-ix).
writes that, "I try to put in my novels some things which you can't explain, to give some message which does not exist practically" (Simenon, in Cowley, 1975: 155).

The message which cannot be explained "practically" is an emotional one; it is a message of feeling, the conveying of experience. The credibility or truth of Simenon's artistic message, moreover, is dependent upon the work's capacity for conveying emotional experience. The novelist's message, therefore, as opposed to the social scientist's, need not express explainable facts which actually exist, but must however convey genuine human feeling. Fiction which depicts the reality of emotional experience conveys truth.3

Edmund Wilson's Memoirs of Hecate County, along with Cather's My Antonia, Barrett's The Shadows of the Images, and Puzo's The Godfather, are novels. As such, they contain truth in that they convey human feelings or emotional experiences. As contrasted to social science monographs, furthermore, neither the situations, characters, nor dramatic sequence of events are necessarily factual nor actually existent in the empirical world. What is real or true in these novels is that with which readers can identify emo-

3Novelist Katherine Anne Porter argues that "Any true work of art has got to give you the feeling of reconciliation--what the Greeks could call catharsis, the purification of your mind and imagination--through an ending that is endurable because it is right and true" (Porter, in Plimpton, 1974: 151). Here Porter reminds one of John Dewey's thesis that the essence of the aesthetic quality in all art is its ability to provoke within the viewer or consumer an emotional--yet intellectually ordered--experience (Dewey, 1934, 1958).
tionally, e.g., the confusion of Wilson's protagonist as he works through choosing between Imogen and Anna in *Memoirs of Hecate County*.

Consequently, literary truth—unlike scientific truth—depends ultimately upon its potential to evoke emotional identification. If readers can partake experientially in the emotional drama presented, the literary piece is aesthetically credible. To use the jargon of the artistic writer, the piece "works." Stanley Elkin, arguing that all protagonists must be "ultimately sympathetic," insists that "if they aren't the novel fails, becomes silly" (Elkin, in *Paris Review*, 1976: 78). A novel fails or "becomes silly" when it is not credible, when others cannot relate to the experience of the primary characters.

Aesthetic truth, then, unlike scientific truth, is not dependent upon fact. Put another way, artistic credibility or reality is not contingent upon actualities. Literary artists, consequently, define themselves as seekers of the goal of truth via non-actualities, non-facts, fantasies, or lies. However, this is not to say that any fictional piece is considered credible or true within the aesthetic perspective. Not all fiction "works." Only that fiction works—i.e., is true or credible—which is not "silly" (Elkin, 1976: 78). In order for a work of literary art not to be silly, furthermore, the written piece must depict experiences of human feeling to which others can respond
sympathetically or identify emotionally. We shall deal in more detail with this necessary emotional identification on the part of consumers of fiction in Chapter IV. Suffice it to say here that while scientific credibility depends upon the intersubjective reliability of empirical findings, i.e., facts, artistic truth rests upon sympathetic or emotional identification of those who read it.

Moreover, still further differences exist between the scientific and the artistic definitions of truth. While the scientific perspective stresses the limited nature of empirical generalizations and the potentially finite characteristic of theoretical paradigms, the artistic point of view insists upon the universality of certain truths.

We have seen that the aesthetic perspective concentrates upon the I of social selves, an element responsible for the uniqueness of individuals which is, nevertheless, universally present in all human beings. It follows, therefore, that virtually all humans possess the capacity to respond emotionally. That is, if all humans are composed of a duplex nature, part of which is comprised by an emotional or feeling I, then the capacity to respond sympathetically or emotionally to certain stimuli is virtually universal. Theoretically, moreover, according to the aesthetic point of view, certain truths exist to which virtually every human being can emotionally or experientially relate. These truths to which all human selves poten-
tially relate with sympathetic feeling are understood from the aesthetic vantage point to be universal. To the novel­ist, then, certain truths or realities are universal. Willa Cather, for example, expresses in *My Antonia,* a universal truth that childhood friends may follow different courses into their adult lives, thus going in separate direc­tions even in spite of a deep mutual affection for one another. Novelist Elkin appeals to this universality when he asks, "We all die, yes? We suffer, correct?" (Elkin, in Cowley, 1975: 65). Aldous Huxley writes that litera­ture "is a window opening onto the universal" (Huxley, 1963: 7). Fiction, then, from the point of view of its own aes­thetic perspective, depicts certain universal human truths the credibility of which depends ultimately upon their potential for evoking in others sympathetic emotional identification. F.S.C. Northrop writes that

while setting man free, because of its ultimate and irreducible indeterminateness, the indeter­minate aesthetic continuum, because of its all­embracing oneness and continuity, also tends to make man a sensitive compassionate human being (Northrop, 1974: 472).

Joyce Cary illustrates the same notion when he says, "I am influenced by the solitude of men's minds, but equally by the unity of their fundamental character and feelings, their sympathies which bring them together" (Cary, in Cowley, 1975: 57). Social scientists who view subjects primarily as Me's—predictable, knowable social selves responding to a culturally specific generalized other—generally consider truth as that combination of cumulative facts and theory re-
sulting from reliable observation. Literary artists, meanwhile, who view characters primarily as I's—choosing, experiencing actors responding to the universal condition of human indeterminateness—consider truth as that which potentially evokes empathetic identification with some universal emotion.

Truth, then, or credibility, is valued and pursued by both social scientists and literary artists of the third culture. The concept truth, however, is defined differently from the vantage points of science and art. To scientists truth represents a growing body of specific facts, limited empirical generalizations, and potentially deposable theories ascertained by means of intersubjective study and/or research. To artists, meanwhile, truth represents certain universal realities not necessarily based upon facts or actualities, with which virtually all feeling human beings can emotionally sympathize or relate.

These two divergent definitions of truth, moreover, share in common the fact that the credibility of either the scientific or the artistic product is ultimately to be judged by persons other than one individual producer. In the case of science, credibility is dependent upon observational intersubjectivity; in the case of art—and, in particular, fictional art—credibility is dependent upon the piece's capacity to evoke within others emotional identification. Truth, therefore, is a concept defined divergently from the two perspectives of science and art. At the
same time, however, these perspectives converge in the recog-
nition that ultimately the truth of what their practi-
tioners have to say is to be judged by others. Now that we
have explored two different kinds of truth—one scientific
and one artistic—we shall undertake to examine the diver-
gent epistemologies of the scientific and the aesthetic
points of view.

Outer and Inner Epistemologies and Their Convergence in
Qualitative Social Science and in Fiction

Science and art stress divergent epistemologies. Severyn
Bruyn discusses what he considers "polar orienta-
tions in research," the "inner" and the "outer" perspectives
(Bruyn, 1966: 23-28). These two points of view—the "inner"
perspective and the "outer" perspective—are reminiscent
of what Florian Znaniecki (1952, 1963: 115ff) recognized
some years ago as two opposing epistemological ideologies.

One of these two contrary epistemologies—that which
is generally considered to be most closely associated with
the scientific intellectual perspective—asserts, in its
extreme, that only sensory experience can be used for gain-
ing knowledge (Znaniecki, 1963: 116). This intellectual

4 "Down through the literate history of man one
finds a basic polarity evident between what may be called
the outer perspective and the inner perspective....Philos-
yophy has conceptualized the differences between these two
perspectives into two major systems of thought roughly
distinguished as naturalism and idealism. Naturalistic
philosophies have maintained an outer perspective of ob-
servation while idealistic philosophies have maintained
an inner perspective" (Bruyn, 1966: 24-25).
orientation comprises the outer epistemological perspective. The second epistemological stance elucidated by Znaniecki is associated with that system of thought known as idealism. It coincides with that which Bruyn describes as the "inner" ontological point of view, "which include writers who reject the creation of thought systems altogether and emphasize the importance of meaning found through each man's personal encounter with the world" (Bruyn, 1966: 56).

The Outer Epistemological Perspective:

Concerning the outer epistemological perspective, Znaniecki writes that two main reasons are generally given by scientists for the assertion that valid knowledge or truth is necessarily dependent only upon sensory experience. These two reasons are:

First, sensory experience has an objective foundation: it is a reaction or response of the human organism, which is scientifically known, to external physical processes or environmental stimuli, which are also scientifically known. Second, the rapid progress of physical and biological sciences is due to the fact that all their theories are based on the evidence of sensory experience (Znaniecki, 1963: 116-117).

The epistemological focus on sensory experience by scientists is elucidated and qualified by Friedrichs. "The identification of sense-experience as the raw material of science is an overstatement of the case if the intersubjectivity criterion is not added," he writes (Friedrichs, 1972: 211). In other words, the outer epistemological perspective (that which Znaniecki describes as the scientific demand for sensory experience) is an appeal to inter-
subjectivity, a scientific pre-requisite discussed earlier. In its extreme the outer perspective "would eliminate the personal dimension entirely and insist upon stressing the more definitive and mathematical nature of truth" (Bruyn, 1966: 56).

In its non-reified version, however, the outer epistemological orientation stresses the necessity for intersubjective sensory experiencing of actual environmental stimuli. According to this point of view, those who seek knowledge should do so by looking outside themselves. Those seeking truth ascertain facts about the world external to them by collectively using their senses through which they come into contact with that outside world. The outer epistemological orientation, therefore, is one which focuses upon sensory experience as a necessary, if not sufficient, avenue to truth.

The Inner Epistemological Perspective:

The inner epistemological orientation, on the other hand, focuses upon introspection as the proper avenue toward truth. This point of view is assumed especially, Znaniecki writes, by "students of various divisions of what is commonly called 'spiritual' culture: religion, literature, art, music, ethical, and political ideas, etc." (Znaniecki, 1963: 118). The inner epistemological perspective holds that all reliable evidence concerning the world is provided "by man's direct experience of his own mental life" (Znaniecki, 1963: 118). Proponents of this particu-
lar point of view accept as self-evident two related premises: first, that all the content of empirical data is derived from individual experience; and, second, that all knowledge about the world is a product of individual thinking.

All the data of (the idealist's) experiences are integrated in his mind, not in the sense of a metaphysical substance, but as a dynamic, functional combination of conscious processes; no datum can be isolated from the stream of his consciousness as something existing outside of his mind. Whatever order there may be among these data he finds to be his own product; he is directly, immediately aware of himself as the producer of this order, whose thoughts, volitions, and feelings synthesize and organize the data of his experience (Znaniecki, 1963: 119).

Robert Penn Warren exemplifies this inner ideology when he asserts that

When you try to write a book—even objective fiction—you have to write from the inside not the outside—the inside of yourself. You have to find what's there. You can't predict it—just dredge for it and hope you have something worth the dredging (Warren, in Cowley, 1975: 195).

Similarly, the following quotation from Samuel Clemens illustrates not only the artist's epistemological perspective but also the manner in which that inner perspective is prescribed by the aesthetic view that truth is universal. Clemens writes:

I have not read Nietzsche or Ibsen, nor any other philosopher, and have not needed to do it, and have not desired to do it; I have gone to the fountain-head for information—that is to say, to the human race. Every man is in his own person the whole human race without a detail lacking; I have studied the human race with diligence and strong interest all these years in my own person: in myself I find in big or little proportion every quality and every defect that is findable in the
mass of the race. I knew I should not find in any philosophy a single thought which had not passed through my own head, nor a single thought which had not passed through the heads of millions and millions of men before I was born (Clemens, in Anderson, 1972: 176).

Clemens' assertion that he has studied the entire human race "in his own person"—like Warren's insistence that the literary artist write "from the inside"—exemplifies that second epistemological ideology elucidated by Znaniecki. When ideologically reified, the artistic perspective values only the inner epistemological stance, relying solely upon individual thinking, inspiration, and personal introspective experience as the means to truth.

In its non-reified version, meanwhile, the inner epistemological point of view, closely associated with the aesthetic, stresses the necessity for introspection, coupled with the imaginative play of the mind and emotions. According to this view, those who seek truth should do so by looking inside themselves. Those seeking truth delve into the inner resources of their own feelings. Readers of Mario Puzo's The Godfather, for example, can expect that the emotional reality depicted by the author is a result of Puzo's own personal life experiences and introspection regarding those experiences. That is, Michael's reaction to the threat of his father's death after the Don has been shot and subsequently hospitalized, conveys an emotional message similar to that which Puzo may have felt upon experiencing something similar. This is not to say, however, that Puzo necessarily experienced personally or even observed
first-hand all or any of the incidents depicted in *The Godfather*. The inner epistemological orientation, therefore, is one which focuses upon personal imagination and introspection as a necessary, although not sufficient, avenue to truth.

Moreover, the scientific and aesthetic definitions of truth, elucidated earlier in this chapter, are interrelated with the outer and the inner epistemological orientations. The scientific perspective, which defines truth as a body of intersubjectively observed facts, generalities, and theories about the actual world, stresses the outer epistemological orientation as the means toward that truth. The aesthetic perspective, meanwhile, which defines truth as a collection of certain universal conditions or realities to which all humans can relate emotionally, stresses the inner epistemological view as the means to that truth. Samuel Clemens illustrated the interrelationship between definition of certain truths as universal and the inner orientation when he wrote that "every man is in his own person the whole human race without a detail missing" (Anderson, 1972: 176). Within the scientific and the artistic points of view, then, definition of truth is interrelated with epistemological orientation.

Moreover, we should note here that the outer and inner epistemologies, when reified to the point of ideology, are elucidations of the procedure-vs.-inspiration mythology described in Chapter I. That is, those scientists who
posit intersubjective sensory experience as not only necessary but also sufficient to ascertain truth concentrate upon procedural precision in research and neglect inspiration. Similarly, those artists who posit imaginative introspection as not only necessary but also sufficient to ascertaining truth focus upon personal inspiration and ignore procedural accuracy. The notion that scientific truth is derived solely by means of intersubjectivity while aesthetic reality is derived only by means of individual introspection is one aspect of the procedure-vs.-inspiration mythology.

The Outer and Inner Worlds of Scientists: John Kemeny, however, among others, in his A Philosopher Looks at Science, helps to refute the procedure-vs.-inspiration mythology which holds sway in much of science. Kemeny insists that for practicing scientists there are "two worlds": that of accurate observation and that of "the world of ideas" (Kemeny, 1959: 89). Scientists, like artists, must generate ideas. Those ideas can result from what

5Physical scientist Lewis Thomas insists that surprise is essential to basic research. "If an experiment turns out precisely as predicted, this can be very nice, but it is only a great event if at the same time it is a surprise. You can measure the quality of the work by the intensity of astonishment" (Thomas, 1974: 118-119).

Znaniecki terms "individual thinking." That science, like art, inhabits the imaginative "world of ideas" is, furthermore, a basic theme within Robert Nisbet's *Sociology As An Art Form*. Nisbet writes that what is "vital" to science is the underlying act of discovery or illumination or invention that is the clue to all genuine creative work. The greater scientists have long been aware of the basic unity of the creative act as found in the arts and in the sciences (Nisbet, 1976: 5).

Science, like art, is often the product of imaginative inspiration.

That the scientific perspective utilizes both the outer and the inner epistemological frames of reference is evident moreover within the social sciences. In his appendix to *Street Corner Society* William Foote Whyte writes:

> The ideas that we have in research are only in part a logical product growing out of a careful weighing of evidence. We do not generally think problems through in a straight line. Often we have the experience of being immersed in a mass of confusing data. We study the data carefully, bringing all our powers of logical analysis to bear upon them. We come up with an idea or two. But still the data do not fall in any coherent pattern. Then we go on living with the data...until perhaps some chance occurrence casts a totally different light upon the data, and we begin to see a pattern that

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6 Evidence that social scientists combine the inner and the outer epistemological perspectives in their work, however, is limited. Robert K. Merton offers an explanation for this. He writes that largely because of "the mores of scientific publication which call for a passive idiom and format of reporting which imply that ideas develop without benefit of human brain and that investigations are conducted without benefit of human hand," the completed "scientific paper or monograph presents an immaculate appearance which reproduces little or nothing of the intuitive leaps, false starts, mistakes, loose ends, and happy accidents that actually cluttered up the inquiry" (Merton, 1967: 5, 4).
we have not seen before....The ideas grow up in part out of our immersion in the data and out of the whole process of living. Since so much of this process of analysis proceeds on the unconscious level, I am sure that we can never present a full account of it (Whyte, 1970: 279-280).

Later, in the same statement, Whyte describes his experience in developing a theoretical framework within which to analyze his mounting data. Well into his role as participant observer and after having accumulated considerable data, a single new bit of information "set off a flash bulb in my head. Suddenly all the pieces of the puzzle fell together" (Whyte, 1970: 328).

That social science is imaginatively inspired is the argument of Robert Nisbet. Sociological themes, Nisbet concludes, such as community, authority, status, the sacred, and alienation--just as sociological "landscapes" such as Gemeinschaft, Gesellschaft, or metropolis and sociological "portraits" such as the worker or the bureaucrat--are the results of inspiration and creative imagination (Nisbet, 1976).

The problems, insights, ideas, and forms which come to the artist and to the scientist seem to come as often from the unconscious as the conscious mind, from wide, eclectic, and unorganized reading, observing, or experiencing, from musing, browsing, and dreaming, from buried experiences, as from anything immediately and consciously in view. They come, as Arthur Koestler has shown us in several of his extraordinary works, as often from the "left-handed" channels of feeling and intuition as from the "right-handed" channels of logic, empirical directness, and reason (Nisbet, 1976: 19).

Sociologist C. Wright Mills, like Robert Nisbet, William F. Whyte and others, recognizes the necessity that
all creative thinkers—and social scientists in particular—combine the worlds of observation and inspiration. In an essay on intellectual craftsmanship in his *The Sociological Imagination*, Mills advises that the social scientist "ought not to become rigidly committed to any one plan" (Mills, 1973: 198).

Encouraging his readers to take "a large volume of notes from any worthwhile book you read" (Mills, 1973: 199) and from other sources, such as "snatches of conversation overheard on the street" (Mills, 1973: 196), Mills further suggests that the intellectual craftsman periodically re-arrange his filing system in order to "loosen" imagination (Mills, 1973: 200). Mills, it appears, would agree with literary humorist James Thurber who asserts, "I don't believe the writer should know too much where he's going. If he does, he runs into old man blueprint—old man propaganda" (Thurber, in Cowley, 1975: 87).

And Whyte's comment that a single new piece of information

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Both physical and social scientists have expressed themselves on Mills' theme that a creative intellectual "ought not to become rigidly committed to any one plan." Physical scientist Lewis Thomas writes that "what you need at the outset is a high degree of uncertainty....You start with an incomplete roster of facts, characterized by their ambiguity....I do not know how you lay out orderly plans for this kind of activity, but I suppose you could find out by looking through the disorderly records of the past hundred years" (Thomas, 1974: 118-120).

Similarly Robert Merton bemoans the fact that "the books on method present ideal patterns: how scientists ought to think, feel and act, but these tidy normative patterns, as everyone who has engaged in inquiry knows, do not reproduce the typically untidy opportunistic adaptations that scientists make in the course of their inquiries" (Merton, 1967: 4). And Robert Nisbet worries that the budding scientist is encouraged to "jacket himself in the restrictive types of intellectual bureaucratization which are the staple of so many of the textbooks in methodology and theory construction lying around us at the present time" (Nisbet, 1976: 16).
"set off a flash bulb in my head" reminds one of a remark by Elkin: "Like a lot of what happens in novels, inspiration is a sort of spontaneous combustion--the oily rags of the head and heart" (Elkin, in Paris Review, vol.66: 66).

The Outer and Inner Worlds of Artists:

Just as the scientist must reside in the "two worlds" of observation and imaginative ideas so, too, must the artist. Robert Nisbet writes:

So is the artist interested...in problems which are presented by reality, by the world of experience and fact. Without perception of problems there would be, as John Dewey correctly noted many years ago, no real thought at all; only musing, reverie, simple association, daydreams, and the like (Nisbet, 1976: 18).

Florian Znaniecki reached a similar conclusion when he wrote that idealism, or the inner epistemological point of view, when taken to its logical limits, results only in "barren" solopsism (Znaniecki, 1963: 119).

Literary artists attest to the fact that, while they may rely upon combustion of the "oily rags of head and heart," they also engage in observation. Fictionalist Dorothy Parker admits, "I haven't got a visual mind," but immediately adds, "I hear things" (Parker, in Cowley, 1975: 80). And literary artist Alberto Moravia comments that "I can't say I know America, though I've visited there. I couldn't write about it. Yes, one uses what one knows...." (Moravia, in Cowley, 1975: 213). Moravia and Parker illustrate their use of the outer epistemological orientation, one which advises sensory observation of the external world.
Examples from literature itself provide evidence that literary artists inhabit the world of observation and even research. Truman Capote's *In Cold Blood* (1965) and Alex Haley's *Roots* (1977), among others, are novels built upon research inspired by the social scientific themes of deviant and racial subcultural minorities respectively.

Herman Melville's *Moby Dick*, furthermore, provides an example of a novel developed after the author engaged in both observation and research. Written by a man who had himself sailed on whaling ships, the novel is rich in factual detail. Denham Sutcliffe, a student of Melville, writes:

> Out of this experience in the whale ships (Melville) fashioned the greatest of his many books. But he was not content to rely on his private experience and memory. In preparation of his masterpiece he consulted all he could find of the best technical books on the whaling industry. Much of what he says about whales and whaling we are to take not upon the sole authority of his limited experience but upon that of men of far wider knowledge. This reference to printed sources was an established habit with Melville (Sutcliffe, in Melville, 1961: 543).

Another example of a literary work dependent to a significant degree upon the author’s observation of facts is Theodore Dreiser's *An American Tragedy*. In an introduction to the 1962 edition of that classic, Robert Penn Warren explains that Dreiser modeled his protagonist, Clyde Griffiths, after an actual man, Chester Gillette, who, in 1906, drowned his sweetheart, Grace Brown, in Moose Lake, Herkimer County, New York. Dreiser had read the facts in a newspaper account of the drowning and subsequent trial
(Dreiser, 1962: 9). 8

The four novels chosen for analysis in this thesis offer evidence that literary artists do indeed make use of observation. Born in Red Bank, New Jersey, Edmund Wilson spent his childhood and much of his later life in Talcottville and in Lewis and Oneida Counties in upstate New York, one area about which he wrote (Wilson, 1971: 3-8). Literary critic Sherman Paul writes that "within the large world of Wilson's work, we discover his world, its geography and history--and houses" (Paul, 1955, 1965: 3; emphasis added). Similarly, Willa Cather's *My Antonia*, along with her other fiction about the pioneers of the midwestern prairie, is a consequence of her having lived in rural Nebraska. Having traveled by railroad as a child as did Antonia and Jim Burden to Red Cloud, Nebraska, in 1883, Cather grew up on the plains. "The ideas for all my novels," she wrote later,

have come from things that happened around Red Cloud when I was a child. I was all over the country then, on foot, on horseback and in our farm wagons. My nose went poking into nearly everything. It happened that my mind was constructed for the particular purpose of absorbing impressions and retaining them. I always intended to

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8 Warren goes on to say that "the contrast between the dreary factuality of an old newspaper account and the anguish of inwardness of the personal story may well have served as a mirror for the contrast that always touched Dreiser's feelings--the contrast between the grinding machine of the world and pathos of the personal experience." The comment reminds us that both Theodore Dreiser and Robert Penn Warren view themselves as writers whose primary subject matter is the feeling, experiencing human being which William James and George Herbert Mead term the I of social selves.
write, and there were certain persons I studied. I seldom had much idea of the plot or the other characters, but I used my eyes and my ears (Bennett, 1961: 77).

((Sociologist Robert Kutak made use of Willa Cather's observations. He refers to her empirical findings in *The Story of a Bohemian-American Village* (Kutak, 1970: 21n).))

William Barrett, moreover, in a brief preface to *The Shadows of the Images*, tells us:

It is inevitable that State City will suggest Denver, Colorado, to many readers. Denver is the dominant city of the Rocky Mountain West, and the author lived in Denver during the writing of the book (Barrett, 1953: 9).

And Mario Puzo, who depicts in *The Godfather* a picture of the hopes, dreams, frustrations, and tragedies which beset Italian-Americans similar to that depicted by responsible journalism (cf. *Time* magazine, May 16, 1977: 32-42) is himself Italian. Literate artists, we have seen, make use of observation, and Ernest Hemingway once put it very strongly: "If a writer stops observing he is finished" (Hemingway, in Plimpton, 1974: 235).

In this regard, Macauley and Lanning, authors of *Technique In Fiction*, point out that coupled with literary artists' valuing of an inner epistemology is "a good deal of conscious and unconscious observation." They continue:

It may be that for many writers the conception of character, and hence of story, seems to come (mysteriously)... It may especially seem to be the case when, in memoirs or prefaces, they are writing in a retrospect that covers the work of a good many years. But one may feel fairly certain that behind

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9"Most of the novels written about Italian-American life are at least partially autobiographical" (Gans, 1962: 125).
these real or imagined revelations lies a good deal of conscious and unconscious observation. So the process, though subterranean, is not perhaps as mysterious as writers would have their readers believe—or as they believe themselves (Macauley and Lanning, 1964: 8-9).

Both social scientists and literary artists of the third culture, then, inhabit the realms of observation and imagination. Both groups of creative thinkers combine the outer observational and the inner experiential epistemological perspectives. What distinguishes science from art is the relative primacy assigned to one ontological persuasion over the other. Science has, since the nineteenth century, tended to stress the value of accurate observation; art, on the other hand, has tended to emphasize the value of inspired ideas stimulated through personal introspection and experiential knowledge. Still, however, both scientists and artists combine the outer and the inner epistemological orientations in their work. Moreover, the social sciences, along with fiction, comprise a third culture. Because the social sciences share with the humanities a common subject matter, many social scientists have argued that their fellow practitioners must inhabit both the inner and outer worlds in yet a manner further than do scientists generally. Znaniecki (1963), Mead (1962), Cooley (1926), Bruyn (1966), Blumer (1969) and others insist that the social scientist must combine both the inner and the outer ontological perspectives, not simply as do all creative scientists, but also within the realm of accurate observation.
The Outer and Inner Perspectives of the Observing Social Scientist:

We have seen that a number of social scientists refuse to view human beings simply as thoroughly predictable objects. Possessed with both a Me and an I, a human being does not respond automatically nor mechanically to stimuli. Rather, persons focus attention upon selected stimuli and ignore others.

The human animal is an attentive animal, and his attention may be given to stimuli that are relatively faint....Our whole intelligent process seems to lie in the attention which is selective of certain types of stimuli. Other stimuli which are bombarding the system are in some fashion shunted off. We give our attention to one particular thing....We open the door to certain stimuli and close it to others....Here we have the organism as acting and determining its environment. It is not simply a set of passive senses played upon by the stimuli that come from without (Mead, 1962: 25).

Because human beings are attentive creatures they, unlike inanimate objects or lower animal forms, attach meaning to selected stimuli. They order and interpret those stimuli. Herbert Blumer writes:

Instead of being merely an organism that responds to the play of factors on or through it, the human being is seen as an organism that has to deal with what it notes. It meets what it so notes by engaging in a process of self-indication in which it makes an object of what it notes, gives it a meaning, and uses the meaning as the basis for directing its action (Blumer, 1969: 14).

Human selves, then, in their ability to order, interpret, and focus attention upon self-designated stimuli, while ignoring others, embody an element of unpredictability. Social science, in this view, cannot ignore the "self-
interacting" human being, the human being who is

not a mere responding organism but an acting
organism—an organism that has to mold a line of
action on the basis of what it takes into account
instead of merely releasing a response to the play
of some factor on its organization (Blumer, 1969:
15).

Accordingly, the essential task of sociology is
interpretation of meaningful social action, i.e., that
action which results by virtue of the subjective meaning
attached to the act by the actor. Meaning-attending ele­
ments of social action comprise, in social scientific lan­
guage, attitudes. Attitudes, moreover, because they re­
currently result in logically consistent and appropriate
actions, must be understood as empirical. That is, inner
attitudes can be perceived indirectly through externally
observable actions which they inspire. Mead argues that
human subjects' inner experience can be approached sci­
entifically,

provided that we do not too narrowly conceive this
point of view. What one must insist upon is that
objectively observable behavior finds expression
within the individual, not in the sense of being
in another world, a subjective world, but in the
sense of being within his organism. Something of
this behavior appears in what we may term "atti­
tudes," the beginnings of acts....The external act
which we do observe is a part of the process which
was started within (Mead, 1962: 5).

Similarly Blumer writes:

We must recognize that the activity of human beings
consists of meeting a flow of situations in which
they have to act and that their action is built on
the basis of what they note, how they assess and
interpret what they note, and what kind of projected
lines of action they map out (Blumer, 1969: 16).
It is empirical concentration upon and explanation of human action resulting from human meanings that distinguishes the social sciences from both the physical sciences and the aesthetic humanities. That the social sciences seek to explore subjective human meanings sets them apart from the physical sciences. That the social sciences, furthermore, seek to explain those subjective meanings empirically distinguishes them from the more aesthetic humanities. In order to examine subjective human meanings empirically, moreover, the social sciences must combine the outer and the inner epistemologies within the act of observation itself. Addressing himself to this peculiarly social scientific task of interpreting subjectively meaningful behavior scientifically, Florian Znaniecki wrote of "the irreducibility of cultural data to either objective natural reality or subjective psychological phenomena" (Znaniecki, 1963: 134). Because of this irreducibility social scientists must employ both the outer and the inner epistemological orientations throughout their research.

Those social scientists, moreover, who decline to reify what we have called the scientific ideology, stress that the researcher is himself of the species of his/her subjects. Social science embodies the unique situation in which the researcher and human subject share humanity in common. Consequently, both the necessity and the opportunity exist for more than simplistic observation specified by the outer epistemological point of view. This methodological
position within the social sciences has come to be known generally as "qualitative" and follows the intellectual tradition of verstehen (Filstead, 1970: 4-5).

The knowledge which scientists are striving for in (social science) involves knowledge of human actors' "inner states." For it is these "inner states" of actors, i.e., their motives, plans, affects, emotions, etc., which cause their actions and thereby give these actions their subjective meanings. Knowledge of such "inner states" and therewith the meanings of actions and objects in conjunction with which such inner states occur has usually been called "understanding" (Verstehen) (Berger, 1976: 103).

Among American proponents of verstehen is Charles Horton Cooley. Cooley argued that the social scientist--because s/he is of the same species as the subject--can understand the behavior of a human subject by being able to share his/her "state of mind." The result of this sharing is what Cooley terms "social knowledge," a kind of "inner" understanding epistemologically different from more external knowing (Cooley, 1926). Similarly, George Herbert Mead argues that since all meaningful acts involve "both an inner and an outer phase, an internal and an external aspect," the social scientist must "work from the outside to the inside" of his subjects (Mead, 1962: 8). Likewise, Herbert Blumer asserts that "one has to get inside of the defining process of the actor in order to understand his action" (Blumer, 1969: 16). Sociologists who hold that verstehen is necessary to social scientific inquiry avoid employing only the outer, observational perspective. Rather they insist upon the validity of data other than that which
can be observed only "from the outside." In so doing, these social scientists combine in their observations both the inner and the outer perspectives.

Accordingly, Mead suggests a methodology for social science which he terms "social behaviorism." Social scientific methodology, Mead writes, must be behavioral in the sense of starting off with an observable activity--the dynamic, on-going social process, and the social acts which are its component elements--to be studied and analyzed scientifically. But it is not behavioral in the sense of ignoring the inner experience of the individual--the inner phase of that process or activity (Mead, 1962: 7).

Social behaviorism is implemented by the researcher's "taking the role of the other." The essence of human intelligence, Mead lectured, lies in the human being's ability to "put himself in the place of" other individuals in given social situations (Mead, 1962: 141). This method must be employed in social scientific research.

The human individual, through his gesture and his own response to it, finds himself in the role of another. He thus places himself in the attitude of the individual with whom he is to co-operate.... What the assumption of the different attitudes makes possible is the analysis of the object.... The sympathetic assumption of the attitude of the other brings into play varying impulses which direct the attention to features of the object which are ignored in the attitude of direct response (Mead, 1962: 374-376).

For Mead, therefore, it is by virtue of the researcher's ability to take the role of subjects that s/he can interpret attitudes--attitudes necessary to any explanation of meaningful social action. The notion of assuming vicariously the roles and attitudes of one's subjects is also in-
cluded in Znaniecki's methodology of the humanistic coefficient:

In contrast with the natural scientist, who seeks to discover an order among empirical data entirely independent of conscious human agents, the student of culture seeks to discover any order among empirical data which depends upon conscious human agents, is produced, and is maintained by them. To perform this task he takes every empirical datum which he investigates with what we have called its humanistic coefficient, i.e., as it appears to those human individuals who experience it and use it (Znaniecki, 1963: 132).

Similarly, Cooley speaks of sympathetic introspection, a process through which the researcher engages in

putting himself into intimate contact with various sorts of persons and allowing them to awake in himself a life similar to their own, which he afterwards, to the best of his ability, recalls and describes (Cooley, 1922: 7).

Vidich and Bensman, authors of Small Town in Mass Society, moreover, denote this same methodological position—as do many contemporary social scientists—participant observation. "As a technique," they write, "participant observation is central to all the social sciences....

Participant observation enables the research worker to secure his data within the medium, symbols, and experiential worlds which have meaning to his respondents (Vidich and Bensman, 1968: 349).

And Robert Kutak, author of The Story of a Bohemian-American Village, asserts that

The subtle inner aspects of the social life of a community cannot be deduced from hard facts and cold figures. The investigator must participate in the life of the community, must enter into the social relationships of the people. Only so can he really observe what goes on in the community life (Kutak, 1970: xi).

Each of the four methodological labels set forth—participant
observation, sympathetic introspection, humanistic coefficient, and social behaviorism--stresses the combination within the realm of observation itself of the outer and the inner epistemological perspectives. Qualitative social science methodology "cuts complexly across the traditional categories of idealism and naturalism as much as did pragmatism when it appeared" (Bruyn, 1966: 26).

As we have seen, literary artists and scientists, both social and physical, occupy the two worlds of observation and ideas, of sensory perception and personal experience--the outer and the inner. Just as the novelist cannot rely only on epistemological idealism in producing his/her art, neither can the scientist rely solely upon epistemological naturalism. We have seen, moreover, that social scientists often urge that the two epistemological perspectives be combined within the world of observation. In its emphasis upon including the element of personal introspection, sympathetic understanding, or individual inner experience within accurate observation, social science incorporates elements traditionally associated with the artistic perspective. Robert Kutak writes:

Sociology is a science, and like all sciences it must be sure of its facts. However, it is a unique science, in that it treats of social living, which is an art. Hence art and science must be combined in the presentation of its data or sociology fails to realize the objective toward which all science strives, to tell the truth about the subject matter with which it deals (Kutak, 1970: xi).

In this respect, then, the third culture can be viewed as consisting of social science converging with art. As
Kutak illustrates, that convergence is considered by many to be essential to social scientific validity.\textsuperscript{10}

We see, then, that what distinguishes the scientific perspective from the aesthetic is a matter of focus. Literary art—which focuses primarily upon the experiencing, feeling \textit{i} and which views truth as those universal realities to which all humans can relate with feeling—places priority upon that personal, individual knowledge gained through inner personal experience. The scientific point of view—which focuses primarily upon the predictably knowable \textit{Me} and which views truth as intersubjectively derived facts, empirical generalizations, and theories—emphasizes the reliability of knowledge acquired by means of accurate, careful sensory observation. While literary artists combine the outer and the inner epistemological orientations in their work, the aesthetic view places greater emphasis upon the inner perspective influenced by philosophical idealism. While social scientists combine the two contrary epistemologies in their research, the scientific frame of reference places greater emphasis on the outer epistemological perspective flowing from philosophical naturalism or realism. This divergence in epistemological focus, moreover, specifies differing methodologies.

The first two major sections of this chapter have examined the respective definitions of truth and the corresponding epistemological avenues to that truth as viewed

\textsuperscript{10}See also Filstead, \textit{Qualitative Sociology} (1970: 1-11) for more on this.
from the two vantage points of science and art, and specifically social science and fiction. The following two major sections will explore the differing methodologies and methods of social scientists and literary artists—methodologies and methods specified by scientific and aesthetic definitions of truth and epistemological persuasions.

Scientific and Aesthetic Methodologies and Their Divergences in Social Science and Fiction

Among the cases chosen for comparative analysis in this study there is an apparent difference in methodological attitudes between social scientists and literary artists. Social scientists, studying recurrent human behavior and valuing scientific intersubjectivity, are concerned that their fellow scientists understand as much as possible how they reached their empirical generalizations and consequent conclusions. Literary artists, depicting free, feeling human beings and valuing individual experience as a means to truth, are not concerned that their readers be informed as to how they fashioned their products. Consequently, while the social science monographs analyzed contain remarks by the authors concerning both their general methodologies and their specific methods, the fictional works do not. As a result, methodological data on fictionalists was gleaned for this section of this thesis from a series of unstructured interviews published by *The Paris Review* and from other sources outside the novels themselves, such as works in literary criticism.
Parts of the scientific community study, *Small Town in Mass Society*, exemplify the social scientist's practice of spelling out the processes through which s/he gathers data. The monograph is the result, readers are informed, of extensive interviewing and field research.

Vidich was employed by Cornell Studies in Social Growth, College of Home Economics, Cornell University, as a resident field director. His major duties in the field included administration of field surveys and supervision of field workers who interviewed the town's residents and observed the community's organizations. As an institutional obligation, he fronted for the project in the town and was responsible for maintaining rapport with all community members. As a result of this work, several thousand interviews were completed and three or four hundred protocols on meeting of community organizations were filed. In addition to these duties, Vidich acted as a participant observer in the community. In this capacity, he was allowed to do field work on his own initiative, using informal methods of research not subject to the formal mechanism of data collection (Vidich and Bensman, 1968: 403).

The *Story of a Bohemian-American Village* opens with a description of the author's methodology. Prior to beginning the study officially, we are told, Kutak "in his own family ... had an opportunity to observe the process of (Bohemian immigrants') adjustment to life in the new world" (Kutak, 1970: vii). He made "several brief visits" to Milligan, Nebraska, prior to pursuing his study. During July and August, 1930, the author lived in Milligan, officially conducting research.

He used two sets of (interview) schedules, one individual and one household, consisting of questions which would bring out evidences of persistence and change in the modes of behavior of the Czech inhabitants (Kutak, 1970: vii).

Convinced, furthermore, that "in dealing with the folkways
of a community an important method which must be pursued is the observational," Kutak

spent considerable time attending dances and funerals, sitting on the benches in front of the stores on Main Street or in the soft-drink parlors, visiting professional men in their offices, eating lunches and dinners with the townspeople and the farmers (Kutak, 1970: xi).

Similarly, anthropologist William Madsen, after studying The Mexican-Americans of South Texas, informs readers that:

The research for this study was conducted by the staff of the Hildalgo Project on Differential Culture Change and Mental Health during the four-year period from 1957 to 1961. The staff included: Antonieta Espejo, Octavio Romano, Arthur Rubel, Albino Fantini, and William Madsen (director). . . . Ethnographic field work took place in four communities of Hildalgo County, Texas, ranging from a rural-folk society of Mexican-Americans to a bi-cultural urban center (Madsen, 1964: ix).

And Herbert Gans includes in an appendix to The Urban Villagers that, because he "believed strongly in the value of participant observation as a method of social research," and because he wanted to study a neighborhood designated as a "slum," he moved into an Italian-American section of Boston known as the West End. "My actual field work employed six major approaches," Gans explains:

1. Use of the West End's facilities. I lived in the area, and used its stores, services, institutions, and other facilities as much as possible. This enabled me to observe my own and other people's behavior as residents of the area.

2. Attendance at meetings, gatherings, and public places. I attended as many public meetings and gatherings as I could find, mostly as an observant spectator. I also visited area shops and taverns in this role.

3. Informal visiting with neighbors and friends. My wife and I became friendly with our neighbors and other West Enders, spending much time with them in social activities and conversations that provided
valuable data.

4. Formal and informal interviewing of community functionaries. I interviewed at least one person in all of the area's agencies and institutions--talking with directors, staff members, officers, and active people in settlement houses, church groups, and other voluntary organizations. I also talked with principals, ministers, social workers, political leaders, government officials--especially those concerned with redevelopment--and store owners.

5. Use of informants. Some of the people I interviewed became informants, who kept me up to date on those phases of West End life with which they were familiar.

6. Observation. I kept my eyes and ears open at all times, trying to learn something about as many phases of West End life as possible, and also looking for unexpected leads and ideas on subjects in which I was especially interested (Gans, 1962: 337-338).

In a subsequent monograph, The Levittowners, Gans again states and emphasizes these methods and suggests desired additions (Gans, 1967: xxi-xvii). Virtually all social science monographs contain--either in an introduction, in an appendix, and/or throughout the text--more or less detailed descriptions of the author's methodological point of view and consequent research methods. Moreover, the inclusion of a methodology chapter is an element in the legitimation of the work as adequately scientific.

Novelists, on the other hand, apparently find no need to explain their methodologies and methods to readers. None of the four novels chosen for analysis in this thesis contains reports of how the work was done or of what kinds of observations led the author to produce the product. This fact alone points to the divergent methodological values and norms existing between social scientists and literary
artists.

 Literary artists do express their methodological perspective when interviewed however. Generally, they believe that because "it's much easier to write when the spirit moves" (Wilson, in Cowley, 1975: 257), novelists are committed methodologically to doing whatever necessary to keep the "trance" (Miller, in Plimpton, 1974: 191) in effect. The successful literary artist, in the words of Henry Miller, is one "who has antennae, who knows how to hook up to currents which are in the atmosphere, in the cosmos" (Miller, in Plimpton, 1974: 172). To master one's "facility for hooking on" (Miller, in Plimpton, 1974: 172)—or, as Ernest Hemingway phrases it, to fill one's inspirational "well" with "juice" (Hemingway, in Plimpton, 1974: 229)—the artist must consciously sharpen his sensitivity both to his inner self and to others. Thus, "Get into your own head," was common advice often offered at the writers' workshop I attended. Furthermore, the artist probably should endeavor to broaden his/her own range of both vicarious and personal experience. Thus literary artists generally make a practice of reading extensively. Some, aiming to increase sensitivity and widen personal experience, take drugs. On the point of the necessity for broadening one's range of personal experience, Hemingway offers some advice. Asked what he would say to a would-be writer, Hemingway answered in characteristic elitism and good humor:

 Let's say that he should go out and hang himself be-
cause he finds that writing well is impossibly difficult. Then he should be cut down without mercy and forced by his own self to write as well as he can for the rest of his life. At least he will have the story of the hanging to commence with (Hemingway, in Plimpton, 1974: 224).

Novelists, then, commit themselves methodologically to doing whatever necessary in order to maintain their inspirational, creative resources. They do not, as we have seen, incorporate information regarding their general aesthetic methodology or specific methods into their literary products. Sociologists/anthropologists, because from the scientific perspective, the validity of their findings depends significantly on the public nature of their investigatory processes, include in their monographs statements elucidating their methodologies.

The divergences existing between social scientists and literary artists with respect to definitions of truth, primary epistemological perspectives, and methodologies further specify corresponding divergences regarding specific methods or observational techniques.

Scientific and Aesthetic Methods and Their Convergences and Divergences in Social Science and Fiction

The divergence of social scientists and literary artists with regard to specific methodological norms is shown by their respective attitudes and practices concerning, among others, the following issues: observing systematically, note keeping, gaining entrance, and checking the reliability of informants.
Scientific and Aesthetic Attitudes Toward Observing Systematically:

We have seen that not only social scientists but also literary artists value observation as an essential means to their respective ends. Sociologist John Lofland argues that observation is "salient" to all reporting about the world. This is true regardless of whether the report is scientific or fictional.

Using the term "reporter" in the general sense of "he who makes a report" (of whatever kind), it can be said, first, that the reporter should have himself been close to the people he reports on. By the term "close" I refer to four types of proximity. (1) He should have been close in the physical sense of conducting his own life in face-to-face proximity to the persons he tells about. (2) This physical proximity should have extended over some significant period of time and variety of circumstances. (3) The reporter should have developed closeness in the social sense of intimacy and confidentiality. He should have developed relationships that provided him reasonable access to the activities of a set of people through their entire round of life. (4) He should have conducted his recording activities in such a way that his reportage can give close and searching attention to minute matters. He should have paid attention to the minutiae of daily life (Lofland, 1971: 3).

Ernest Hemingway revealed his own practiced observation of the "minutiae of daily life" when he told an interviewer: "I...was searching for the unnoticed things that made emotions, such as the way an outfielder tossed his glove without looking back to where it fell, the squeak of resin on canvas under a fighter's flat-soled gym shoes, the gray color of Jack Blackburn's skin when he had just come out of stir, and other things I noted as a painter sketches" (Hemingway, in Plimpton, 1974: 237).
Literary artists not only testify to the value of observation, but there is evidence that they intentionally enter situations in which they can observe. Norman Mailer, before writing *The Naked and the Dead*, was intent upon creating a "novel about a long patrol." Then a member of the military, he asked to be assigned to a reconnaissance outfit. His reason was that he wanted to do some participant-observation. "A reconnaissance outfit, after all," he explains, "tends to take long patrols" (Mailer, in Plimpton, 1975: 260). Similarly Stanley Elkin tells that while writing *A Bad Man*, a novel set in a prison.

After I was about 150 pages into the novel, I tried to get into a prison to see what a prison was like....I wanted to see how far off I was, so I went through the Walpole State Penitentiary in Massachusetts (Elkin, 1976: 80).

Both Elkin and Mailer purposefully entered into situations in which they could observe the external world.

In the writers' workshop, which met twice weekly, apprentice writers were expected to relate in detail, at the beginning of each meeting, what had gone on during the previous meeting. This was not, it was emphasized, intended as a substantive review of what had been discussed, but a more important device to encourage young writers to observe. "Who was sitting there?" writers were asked. "What did he say then?" "What did she do then? Did she gesture in any way? How? What was she wearing?" Both social scientists and literary artists intentionally observe the external or outside world. What distinguishes the social scientist from
the novelist is that the former engages in systematic observation while the latter does not. 11

Systematic observation refers to observation of the external world which is consciously designed to yield a comprehensive picture of that which is being viewed. Social scientists insist on systematic observation. Fiction writers, inclined to observe sporadically and without planning do not. 12 Consequently, Cans' observations necessary to both The Levittowners and The Urban Villagers, were systematic. Not only did he reside within the areas studied, but he also made extensive use of the facilities, attended formal meetings, gatherings, and public places, participated in informal visiting, interviewed personnel affiliated with the community's agencies and institutions, talked with informants, and—in his study of Levittown--

11 Anthropologist Laura Bohannan, however, used systematic observation to glean data upon which she later built a novel. (cf. Eleanor Smith Bowen, Return To Laughter, 1954, 1964).

12 If a social scientist and a novelist, for example, were to enter a junk yard with the purpose of writing about a group's discarded artifacts, the two writers could be expected to observe that junk yard differently. The social scientist would plan his/her observations systematically so as to view the many kinds of artifacts there. The novelist, meanwhile, might become interested in only one artifact or one category of artifacts initially and subsequently discontinue further observation. While the social scientist would conceivably produce a monograph analyzing the various discarded artifacts in the junk yard, the literary artist might create a novel upon observation of but one rusted car body, a single tin fork, or a broken baby crib. Typically, social scientists observe systematically while writers of fiction do not.
designed an interview schedule for a population larger than he could personally observe (Gans, 1962: 337-338; Gans, 1967: xxi-xxii). Likewise, William Madsen, while directing research for *The Mexican-Americans of South Texas*, conducted field work not in just one, but in four different communities in Hidalgo County. As we have seen, those four communities ranged, in Madsen's view, "from a rural-folk society of Mexican-Americans to a bicultural urban center" (Madsen, 1964: ix).

Robert Kutak tells us he attended dances and funerals and sat on Main Street benches or in soft-drink parlors. He also visited professional men in their offices and ate lunches with both Milligan "townspeople" and farmers. Moreover, data was gathered from the files of "the village and county newspapers" (Kutak, 1970: xi) and from personal interviews conducted by him. In the following excerpt he illustrates the scientist's value and practice of systematic observation.

Because the investigator had to rely greatly upon data which he had gathered, it was necessary to make sure that the sample of the population to be visited would be adequate to serve as a basis for conclusions. Because the population living in the village was relatively heterogeneous, it was felt that it would be necessary to visit every home in order to secure adequate data. Data were secured from 128 or 134 homes in the village.... The population living on the farms surrounding Milligan is much more homogeneous. It was believed that data from about one-third of the farms would be an adequate sample. The farms to be visited were selected at random (Kutak, 1970: ix).

Just as Kutak, Madsen, and Gans practiced systematic observation, so also did Vidich and Bensman. Under the dir-
ection of Vidich, as we have seen, "several thousand interviews were completed and three or four hundred protocols on meetings of community organizations were filed" (Vidich and Bensman, 1968: 403). Kutak, Madsen, Gans, Vidich and Bensman—along with other qualitative social scientists—illustrate systematic observation, a practice advised by sociologists Glaser and Strauss in the following passage:

The criterion for judging when to stop sampling the different groups pertinent to a category is the category's theoretical saturation. Saturation means that no additional data are being found whereby the sociologist can develop properties of the category. As he sees similar instances over and over again, the researcher becomes empirically confident that a category is saturated. He goes out of his way to look for groups that stretch diversity of data as far as possible, just to make certain that saturation is based on the widest possible range of data on the category (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, 1973: 61).

While qualitative sociologists insist upon the necessity for introspection and personal, experiential learning in their scientific pursuits, they also rigidly adhere to both the value and the practice of systematic observation. Fiction writers, on the other hand, while they also observe, refuse to do so systematically. Christopher Isherwood explains:

Stephen Spender said an amusing thing about Yeats—that he went for days on end without noticing anything, but then, about once a month, he would look out of a window and suddenly be aware of a swan or something, and it gave him such a stunning shock that he'd write a marvellous poem about it. That's more the kind of way I operate: suddenly something pierces the reverie and self-absorption that fill my days and I see with a tremendous flash the extraordinariness of that person or object or situation (Isherwood, 1974: 174).
Unconscious, non-deliberate observation, then, is a necessary method of the fiction writer because it provides, in Katherine Anne Porter's words, a "tiny seed" from which grows literary art. "The truth is," Porter admits, "I have never written a story in my life that didn't have a very firm foundation in actual human experience," (Porter, in Plimpton, 1974: 153). But that experience is singular and generally

became my own by hearing the story, by witnessing the thing, by hearing just a word perhaps. It doesn't matter, it just takes a little--a tiny seed. Then it takes root, and it grows. It's an organic thing (Porter, in Plimpton, 1963, 1974: 153).

From the aesthetic perspective, non-deliberate, un-systematic observation provides the seed from which grows the fictional narrative. As it grows, moreover, it changes. The single observed fact for the novelist, as opposed to the scientist, is something to be modified. Willa Cather tells of her literary interest in Annie Pavelka, the actual Bohemian girl who arrived in Nebraska when she was twelve and the model upon whom Cather would later build *My Antonia*.

One of the people who interested me most as a child was the Bohemian hired girl of one of our neighbors, who was so good to me. She was one of the truest artists I ever knew in the keenness and sensitiveness of her enjoyment, in her love of people and in her willingness to take pains. I did not realize all this as a child, but Annie fascinated me and I always had it in mind to write a story about her (Bennett, 1961, 1974: 46-47).

While the resulting novel clearly parallels Annie Pavelka's life, the following remarks by Cather illustrate the aesthetic tendency to mold and modify the final report.
But from what point of view should I write it up? I might give her a lover and write from his standpoint. However, I thought my Antonia deserved something better than the Saturday Evening Post sort of stuff in her book. Finally, I concluded that I would write from the point of a detached observer, because that was what I had always been.

Then I noticed that much of what I knew about Annie came from the talks I had with young men. She had a fascination for them, and they used to be with her whenever they could. They had to manage it on the sly, because she was only a hired girl. But they respected and admired her, and she meant a good deal to some of them. So I decided to make my observer a young man.

There was material in that book for a lurid melodrama. But I decided that in writing it I would dwell very lightly on those things that a novelist would ordinarily emphasize, and make up my story of the little, every-day happenings and occurrences that form the greatest part of everyone's life and happiness (Bennett, 1974: 47).

The observed fact, when viewed from an artistic vantage point, is, like the sculptor's clay, material to be worked. This is the case with regard to both a novel's plot and its characters.

Observation, then, for the literary artist is necessary in that it provides a springboard, a "tiny seed"—indeed, material—from which grow both plot and characters.  

Because this is the purpose for which the artist looks about, s/he—unlike the social scientist—neither values nor practices systematic observation. As Gore Vidal remarks, "I am not a camera....What I remember I remember" (Vidal, 1974: 148).

In this section we have seen that social scientists

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13 Laura Bohannan remarks that while she "knew people of the type...described," her characters are essentially fictional composites (Bowen, 1964: xix, x).
pursue their observations of the external world systematically with the purpose ultimately of perceiving a comprehensive picture of it. Literary artists, on the other hand, undertake observation of the external world in a sporadic, unplanned, and spontaneous manner. Moreover, literary artists often change what they observe. That is, they fictionalize actuality.

The divergence existing between social scientists and literary artists with respect to observing systematically is specified by the divergences existing between these two categories of writer with regard to definitions of truth and to epistemological and methodological preferences. Social scientists and literary artists, while they comprise a third culture together, attack their material from somewhat different perspectives. The scientific vantage point encourages researchers to observe their subject matter systematically while the artistic point of view does not. This divergence in values with regard to observing systematically is evidenced in, among other things, social scientists' and literary artists' respective attitudes toward the keeping of notes.

Scientific and Aesthetic Attitudes Toward Keeping Notes:

We have seen that the social scientist practices systematic observation while the literary artist does not. These writers' divergent attitudes toward observation specify in turn their attitudes and practices concerning the keeping of notes resulting from their respective observations. While both social scientists and novelists may keep
notes, the former do so systematically while the latter do not. Moreover, social scientists both value and practice the keeping of accurate notes, either written or recorded. Literary artists do not often place the same premium on empirical and, therefore, note-keeping accuracy.

E.E. LeMasters, while doing participant observation in the Oasis Tavern,

attempted to record conversations and events seen after returning home from the tavern—usually within an hour or so. Where possible the exact language of the speaker was used, with some identification of who said what. In recording events (such as a fight) the circumstances surrounding the event were recorded. The recording was by hand, tape recorders were not used (LeMasters, 1975: 5).

Similarly, Herbert Gans writes that when researching The Urban Villagers, "I recorded my observations and interviews as soon as possible after they had been completed, together with the generalizations they stimulated, and placed them in a field diary" (Gans, 1962: 346). Later, when Gans was engaged in research on The Levittowners, he, trying not to "act like a formal researcher," memorized interviews. He "made quick notes as soon as I could, and later wrote the whole interview in my field diary" (Gans, 1967: xxiv).

Likewise, Rosalie Wax, several times mentions writing field notes (Wax, 1971: 196, 201, 225).

One of the more informative social scientists, however, who writes about his own field note-keeping is William Foote Whyte. He tells us that daily, while doing participant-observation in Cornerville,

After breakfast, I returned to my room and spent
the rest of the morning, or most of it, typing up my notes regarding the previous day's events (Whyte, 1970: 297).

Moreover, at times he arranged the role he played among his subjects with the purpose in mind of taking notes. He explains:

At one time I was nominated as secretary of the Italian Community Club. My first impulse was to decline the nomination, but then I reflected that the secretary's job is normally considered simply a matter of dirty work—writing the minutes and handling the correspondence. I accepted and found that I could write a very full account of the progress of the meeting as it went on under the pretext of keeping notes for the minutes (Whyte, 1970: 305).

Later, when he began to study Cornerville politicians and to attend campaign meetings of political workers,

I suggested to Carrie Ravello—the candidate's wife and the real brains of the family—that I serve as secretary for such meetings. I then took notes while the meeting proceeded and typed her out a summary for later use. (The invention of carbon paper enabled me to retain my own copy of all the records.) (Whyte, 1970: 312).

Social scientists Whyte, Wax, Gans, and LeMasters, at a minimum, illustrate that which John Lofland views as essential in analyzing social settings. "For better or worse," Lofland writes, "the human mind forgets massively and quickly." Consequently,

Writing, in the form of continued notes with which the forgotten past can be summoned into the present, is an absolutely necessary if not sufficient condition for comprehending the objects of observation....Field notes provide the observer's raison d'être. If he is not doing them, he might as well not be in the setting (Lofland, 1971: 101-102). 14

14 Lofland examines three stages of systematic note-keeping: "mental notes," in which "one is preparing oneself
Lofland speaks of social scientists and from a scientific perspective. Literary artists do not share this point of view. Asked whether he keeps a notebook, novelist E.M. Forster replied, "No, I should feel it improper" (Forster, in Cowley, 1975: 30). And Dorothy Parker, when asked essentially the same question (Do you keep a notebook?) replied: "I tried to keep one, but I never could remember where I put the damn thing. I always say I'm going to keep one tomorrow" (Parker, in Cowley, 1975: 79). Many literary artists generally neither value nor practice keeping observational notes. Some profess to value note-keeping, but fail to direct their behavior accordingly. Other literary artists, moreover, while they do keep either notes or a "diary," do not intend that these accurately reflect systematic observations. Katherine Anne Porter who wrote Ship of Fools based on observations she made while on a voyage to Europe, "kept a diary in the form of a letter to a friend, and after I got home the friend sent it back" (Porter, in Flimpton, 1974: 161).

Both the social scientific and the aesthetic points of view are compatible with the practice of note-keeping. to be able to put down on paper what he is now seeing"; jotted notes, constituted by "all the little phrases, quotes, key words, and the like that one puts down during the observation and at inconspicuous moments"; and "the full field notes," which represent "a running log of observations" (Lofland, 1971: 102-103).

15 Just as Bohannan based her novel, Return To Laughter, upon systematic observation, so also she took extensive field notes.
In these two perspectives, however, the practice is both valued and pursued differently. Social scientists insist that if a scientific observer is not keeping detailed and accurate notes "he might as well not be in the setting" (Lofland, 1971: 102). Literary artists, on the other hand, do not value systematic note-keeping. Some believe note-keeping "improper"; others have kept notebooks but lost interest—not to mention the notebook! Still others make notes and file them, but they are not intended to be factually representative.

The divergence in scientific and aesthetic epistemological and methodological attitudes specifies a similar divergence in attitudes toward systematic observation and, consequently, toward the practice of note-keeping. The epistemological divergence between scientists and artists, moreover, specifies still further differences with regard to methods. Only social scientists, for example, pay attention to the problems of cooperating with informants, particularly that of "gaining entrance" into a research setting.

Scientific and Aesthetic Attitudes Toward "Gaining Entrance": Fictionalists, whose subject matter lies primarily in the knowing, feeling, experiencing I of all human beings, are not essentially interested in the cultural differences manifested within humanity nor of gaining cooperation of their subjects. Novelists, assuming that the gamut of human emotions is universal rather than culturally specific, find
themselves continuously an integral part of the human setting in which they observe. While social scientists are participant-observers, literary artists view themselves as member-observers. That is, social scientists, whose primary subject matter is the culturally specific Me of social selves, view humanity as divided, separated, or categorized into divergent sociocultural groups. To Robert Kutak, for example, the Bohemian-Americans residing in Milligan comprised a sociocultural entity. Similarly, Vidich and Bensman perceived Springdalers as a sociocultural group. The same can be said for Madsen's view of the Mexican-Americans of southern Texas and Gans' view of Italian-Americans of Boston's West End. Hence, West Enders, Mexican-Americans in southern Texas, Springdalers, and Bohemian-Americans of Milligan, Nebraska, comprise four separate and distinctive sociocultural entities.

Social scientists who conduct research amid a particular group of subjects, moreover, generally see themselves as non-members of the group to be researched. While this is obviously true of traditional cultural anthropologists studying foreign or primitive cultures, it is also generally true of qualitative sociologists. Even the qualitative sociologist who chooses to do research on a group to which s/he belonged prior to the commencement of research attempts to become or to remain sufficiently apart or detached from the group in order to observe and analyze. This attitude is one in which social scientists generally
do not see themselves as having internalized the same generalized other to the same degree as that of the group under scientific investigation. In this sense, social scientists see themselves as outsiders observing in the group they are researching. Consequently, qualitative social scientific methodological literature focuses upon the observer as participant. By means of participating actively in a culture to which s/he does not totally belong—i.e., in a culture the generalized other of which s/he has not thoroughly internalized—the scientific observer comes to understand the generalized other that has informed the Me of members of a group.

Literary artists, meanwhile, view themselves not as participant-observers but as member-observers. Writers of fiction, whose primary subject matter is the universal I of human beings, view humanity as comprised of individuals, singularly unique, but at the same time essentially alike. Humans are essentially like all others in that they are capable of experiencing human emotion. Edmund Wilson, for example, like Willa Cather, William Barrett, and Mario Puzo, sees his characters not as members of specific socio-cultural units primarily, but rather as feeling and freely responsive human beings.

Literary artists, moreover, observe among humans whom they perceive as universally alike inasmuch as they all possess an I. Consequently, they see themselves as members of the group under observation. Put another way, liter-
ary artists view themselves as in possession of an I essentially similar to that of all members of the human race. Hence, writers of fiction are members of the world-wide human group which they observe. Consequently, fiction writers focus upon themselves as member-observers. They are members of the human group under observation. Social scientists, then, perceive themselves as participant-observers while writers of fiction might define themselves as member-observers.

The literary artist embued with an aesthetic perspective, therefore, finds no need to "gain entrance" into a potentially observable community. Indeed, the artist's community is all mankind.

Social scientists, on the other hand, whose subject matter lies primarily in the knowable, culturally determined—and culturally specific—Me of human beings, view themselves as students of communities or groups. Hence, social scientists must, upon undertaking participant-observation, "gain entrance" into the community of subjects to be researched. Because social scientists recognize that "what an observer will see will depend largely on his particular position in a network of relationships" (Vidich and Bensman, 1968: 349) within the community to be studied, much social scientific literature dealing with qualitative methods addresses itself to the task of "gaining entrance."

16 Sociologist John J. Johnson, author of Doing Field Research, writes: "In the written work about participant observation research, one issue consistently addressed concerns the process by which permission is obtained for the
Myron Glazer in his book, *The Research Adventure*, advises that

In all research it is essential for the investigator to spend an initial period of time preparing the kinds of questions he wants to ask, developing his tools of data collection, and then venturing out and determining the extent to which his pre-conceived research design will fit into the actual field work situation. Gaining acceptance from informants and respondents is a crucial component of this process (Glazer, 1972: 11, emphasis added).

John Lofland, furthermore, relates that

Upon becoming interested in a particular setting or a particular type of setting, professional sociologists typically seem to begin not by going directly to the people of the setting—if they know no one there. Rather, they cast about among their friends, acquaintances, colleagues, and the like, for one or more persons who are either already members or are already favorably regarded by members in the setting of interest. That is, there is an attempt to use pre-existing relations of trust as a route into the setting, rather than "going in cold" (Lofland, 1971: 95).

research project from those whom an investigator seeks to study. (In the case of covert research, the issue is one of establishing the initial contacts.) There are two salient reasons why this is regarded as important. One of them is so obvious that it hardly needs to be stated; the other is not so obvious. First, the achievement of successful entree is a precondition for doing the research. Put simply, no entree, no research.... But there is a more subtle reason why the matter of one's entrance to a research setting is seen as so important. This concerns the relationship between the initial entree to the setting and the validity of the data subsequently collected. The conditions under which an initial entree is negotiated may have important consequences for how the research is socially defined by the members of the setting. These social definitions will have a bearing on the extent to which the members trust a social researcher, and the existence of relations of trust between an observer and the members of a setting is essential to the production of an objective report, one which retains the integrity of the actor's perspective and its social context" (Johnson, 1975: 50-51).
Accordingly, Vidich and Bensman write that "before Vidich came onto the (research) scene, Springdale people had been assured, when their collaboration was sought, that no individuals would be identified in printed reports" (Vidich and Bensman, 1968: 398). And Robert Kutak, in a Preface to his *The Story of a Bohemian-American Village*, writes:

> Without the co-operation of the people of Milligan this study could not have been made. The author is greatly indebted to the inhabitants, Czech and non-Czech alike, who gave frank and honest answers to the many questions asked them. In previous visits the author had made many friends in the Milligan community. Among these Mr. Charles Smrha, Dr. V.V. Smrha, Mr. James Charvat, and Mr. J.J. Klika gave many constructive suggestions and helped pave the way for the visits to the households (Kutak, 1970: v).

Herbert Gans, in an appendix to *The Urban Villagers*, writes that entry into West End society was particularly vexing:

> As the West Enders were a low-income group, they had neither been interviewed by market researchers nor been exposed to the popular sociology of the slick magazines. Consequently, they were unfamiliar with the methods and goals of sociology. Also, they were suspicious of middle-class outsiders, especially so because of the redevelopment threat. As a result, I was somewhat fearful at the beginning whether I would be able to function as a participant-observer once I had told people that I was a researcher (Gans, 1962: 340).

However, eventually, by a kind of "lucky accident," the problem of gaining entrance "almost resolved itself." New residents of West End,

> My wife and I were welcomed by one of our neighbors and became friends with them. As a result, they invited us to many of their evening gatherings and introduced us to other neighbors, relatives, and friends. These contacts provided not only pleasant companionship, but a considerable amount of data about the workings of the peer group society.

> As time went on, I became friendly in much the
same way with other West Enders whom I had encountered at meetings or during informal interviews. They too introduced me to relatives and friends, although most of the social gatherings at which I participated were those of our first contact, and their circle.

After I had been in the area for about three months, I became a familiar face, and was able to carry on longer conversations with storeowners and other West Enders. Finally, the entry problem disappeared entirely (Gans, 1962: 340-341).

Gans' confession that he was "somewhat fearful at the beginning" of his research as to whether he could carry out the role of participant-observer reminds one of William Whyte's account of a "false start" in his efforts at obtaining entry to Cornerville. 17

Following the advice of a young economics instructor at Harvard who impressed him with his self-assurance and his knowledge of Boston, Whyte sought entry into Cornerville by means of dropping into a local drinking place and striking up a conversation with a girl. He might "buy her a drink," he was advised, "and then encourage her to tell him her life-story."

Because "this approach seemed at least as plausible as anything I had been able to think of," Whyte resolved to try it out.

I picked on the Regal Hotel, which was on the edge of Cornerville. With some trepidation I climbed the stairs to the bar and entertainment area and looked around. There I encountered a situation for which my adviser had not prepared

17 Whyte candidly admits that he found himself "baffled at the problem of finding my way into the district. Cornerville was right before me and yet so far away. I could walk freely up and down its streets, and I had even made my way into some of the flats, and yet I was still a stranger in a world completely unknown to me" (Whyte, 1970: 289).
me. There were women present all right, but none of them was alone. Some were there in couples, and there were two or three pairs of women together. I pondered this situation briefly. I had little confidence in my skill at picking up one female, and it seemed inadvisable to tackle two at the same time. Still, I was determined not to admit defeat without a struggle. I looked around me again and now noticed a threesome: one man and two women. It occurred to me that here was a maldistribution of females which I might be able to rectify. I approached the group and opened with something like this: "Pardon me. Would you mind if I joined you?" There was a moment of silence while the man stared at me. He then offered to throw me downstairs. I assured him that this would not be necessary and demonstrated as much by walking right out of there without any assistance (Whyte, 1970: 289).

Whyte could look with humor upon his "false start" after he had met Doc at the Norton Street Settlement House and established with him a rapport which has become an element in the methodological heritage of subsequent qualitative social scientists.18

Not only must social scientists gain entrance into an observable community, but also they must throughout the project enlist the continued cooperation of and ascertain the reliability of informants. Sociologist Howard Becker warns that

Many items of evidence consist of statements by members of the group under study about some event which has occurred or is in process....These cannot be taken at face value; nor can they be dismissed as valueless. In the first place, the observer can use the statement as evidence about the

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18 For a description of Whyte's developing rapport with Doc, told in Whyte's own words, see pp. 290-299 of the Appendix in the second edition of Street Corner Society.
event, if he takes care to evaluate it by the criteria an historian uses in examining a personal document. Does the informant have reason to lie or conceal some of what he sees as the truth? Does vanity or expediency lead him to mis-state his own role in an event or his attitude toward it? Did he actually have an opportunity to witness the occurrence he describes or is hearsay the source of his knowledge? Do his feelings about the issues or persons under discussion lead him to alter his story in some way? (Becker, 1970: 192).

Similarly sociologist S.M. Miller warns against what he terms "over-rapport," the situation in which "the researcher may be so closely related to the observed that his investigations are impeded." In studying the membership of a local union, Miller confesses, he made the mistake of growing too close to the union leaders. As a result "some penetrating lines of inquiry had to be dropped," because "to continue close rapport and to pursue avenues of investigation which appeared antagonistic to the union leaders was impossible." Furthermore, Miller's "over-rapport" had a "second limiting effect" in that the sociologist found himself overly influenced by the views of the union leaders and consequently not thoroughly objective when listening to the sometimes contrary definitions of situations by the rank and file. Miller concludes that "to protect himself from developing research-limiting over-rapport, the researcher should ask himself: At what point does closeness to the subjects limit the research role?" (Miller, 1952: 97-98).

For social scientists whose purpose in being in the field is to gain some understanding of cultural agreements, i.e., of "generalized others", different from their
own, the validity of the completed study rests, to a significant degree, upon the ability to cooperate with and assess the reliability of informants. Unlike the literary artist, the sociologist does not wholly trust his/her personal experiences or feelings as a resident of the community to the exclusion of data gained from systematic interaction with informants. Because the social scientist inhabits the precarious position of both sharing "in the life activities and sentiments of people in face-to-face relationships" (Bruyn, 1966: 13) and at the same time acting as researcher--indeed, because "the scientific role of the participant observer is interdependent with his social role in the culture of the observed" (Bruyn, 1966: 18)--the social scientist faces the problem, among others, of how to define his role for his subjects. Participant-observation research may be either overt or covert. i.e., social scientists may decide either to reveal their scientific intent to community residents or group members or to withhold it. Methodology books in the area of qualitative social science deal with the tactical advantages and the limitations of each approach.

Lofland writes that while occupying the covert role may "be the only way in which a setting can be observed," and while a covert observer may become more "intimately acquainted" with the setting of which he is a part, the role simultaneously imposes certain "observational limitations." Among these is "the structural constriction of occupying an
existing role....This means that (the researcher) is not free to wander about and observe the activities of other roles as freely as (is) a known observer" (Lofland, 1971: 94).

Should the social scientist decide to conduct participant-observation overtly, s/he faces the problem of what and how much to tell subjects about the research project. Glazer warns:

Every field worker immediately faces some form of resistance and suspicion. Regardless of the setting, prospective respondents and informants will be wary of the researcher's first overtures. They will want to know what kind of information he desires and how the accumulation of that knowledge will affect them. The researcher now faces his first set of field work challenges. How will he identify himself and his work? (Glazer, 1972: 11).

Faced with this problem of how to identify himself and his work, Gans wrote:

One of the factors that complicated the entry problem was my initial desire to be only an observer and a real participant, that is, to gather data simply by living in the West End and to learn from the contacts and conversations that came my way just by being there. I soon found that this was impossible. There were simply too many questions that I could not ask in my role as an ordinary--and newly arrived--resident. Given the short time I had in which to do research, I could not wait for these questions to come up spontaneously in the conversation. Consequently, I told people that I was doing a study of the neighborhood, especially of its institutions and organizations. I also sensed quickly that they were familiar with historical "studies," and thereafter described my research as being a recent history of the area. The revelation of my research role ended a few relationships, but on the whole, it helped my study, and made it easier for me to approach people with unusual questions (Gans, 1962: 342).
Gans illustrates one problem which faces social scientists in their investigations of human subjects: how to identify themselves and their work to prospective informants. Integral related is the issue of the morality involved in introducing oneself to human subjects.

This question of the morality of the manners in which social scientists introduce themselves and/or their project to subjects, moreover, is but one aspect of the larger issue, the ethics of observation. While the question of the ethics of observation might conceivably exist for both social scientists and literary artists, only the former, we shall see, deal with it directly.

Scientific and Aesthetic Attitudes Toward the Ethics of Observation:

Concerning the issue of the ethics of observation, Lofland writes that for qualitative social scientists, "among possible objections (to covert participant-observation) is the matter of the morality of observing and analyzing people without telling them" (Lofland, 1971: 94). But even when the observation is overt, social scientists, unlike most literary artists, concern themselves with the morality of their observing. The Springdale Project, undertaken by Vidich and Bensman, provides a celebrated illustration of this issue.

Upon publication of Small Town in Mass Society, Springdalers staged a protest (Vidich and Bensman, 1968: 397). The monograph, they complained, was a "Peyton Place-type
book." Furthermore, while Springdalers had been assured upon initiation of the study that no individuals would be identified in printed reports and while all subjects were given fictitious names, residents felt themselves "easily identified within Springdale" (Vidich and Bensman, 1968: 398). Vidich subsequently explained that Springdalers' anger was at least partially due to the fact that

As the research progressed, the policy of anonymity came to be equated with "doing an entirely statistical report." It appeared to me that this happened in a curiously inadvertent way: on various occasions when the project was asked to explain its purposes in greater detail or when community suspicions had been aroused, the standard practice of some staff members was to assure members of the community that there was nothing to worry about because all individuals and specific events would get lost in the statistical analysis. At the time, these assurances were very successful in allaying the fears and anxieties of key members of the community, and so some members of the project, particularly those who were less trained and more prone to panic, began to give such assurance whenever resistances developed. I personally never gave such assurances, preferring not to get any information at all than to get it under this condition. Unfortunately, some key members of the community were left with the impression that the entire report would be statistical (Vidich and Bensman, 1968: 427-428).

One result of the Springdale controversy is that subsequent researchers are more likely to consider omitting from the published manuscript illustrative data which might prove embarrassing to subjects. E.E. LeMasters, author of Blue-

19 The use of fictitious names for both subjects and their communities is a widespread practice among social scientists. William Madsen writes in his Preface to The Mexican-Americans of South Texas that "names have been changed in this report in order to protect the identity of the informants. For the same reason, the names of the four communities (studied) have not been mentioned" (Madsen, 1964: ix).
Collar Aristocrats, acknowledges that

some information gathered in a participant-observation study is too intimate for publication—the members of the group would be able to identify the person involved even though other readers would not. Where necessary, material of this nature has been omitted from this published report (LeMasters, 1975: 8).

Material edited out, LeMasters explains, primarily included verbal obscenities. "The men often modify their language," LeMasters writes, "when women are present, and I do not think they would want all of their expressions to appear in print" (LeMasters, 1975: ix).

A second more immediate result of the Springdale controversy was that the staff of Cornell Studies in Social Growth developed in 1952 a lengthy and detailed "Principles of Professional Ethics." According to that document, however, "a code of professional ethics defeats its purpose if it is treated as a set of rules to be followed without question" (Vidich and Bensman, 1968: 418).

Herbert Gans, cogitating upon his experiences among urban villagers of Boston, remarks that one problem of the participant-observation approach concerns its ethical validity.

Although I did tell people that I was in the West End to make a study, I described my research mainly as a survey of organizations, institutions, and the redevelopment process. I mentioned but did not stress my interest in studying the everyday life of West Enders, and did not mention at all that I attended social gatherings in the dual role of guest

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and observer....

The fact that I was using friendly relationships for the collection of data, coupled with my feelings that I was thus exploiting these relationships, did create some guilt (Gans, 1962: 344-345).

Again, in his introduction to The Levittowners, he writes:

As soon as I moved in, I told people I was on the faculty of the University of Pennsylvania and that I would do a study of the community formation process in Levittown. Having learned from previous experience that it is difficult to explain sociology meaningfully to people, I usually described my research as a historical study. I did not go into detail about it—I was rarely asked to—and I did not tell people on my block that I was keeping notes of their (and my) activities as homeowners and neighbors. To have done so would have made life unpleasant for them and for me. I (not truthfully) disclaimed association with the mail questionnaire or the interviews on behavior change, fearing (probably unnecessarily) that I might be rejected as a participant-observer. Finally I did not tell people I had moved to Levittown in order to do the study (Gans, 1967: xxiii).

Later, in the appendix to the same work, Gans admits that "the values (and feelings) which most affected my fieldwork concerned the deceptions required to be a participant-observer.

They generated...guilt and anxiety...and sometimes made me feel I was using people for my own purposes. Although I told people I was a researcher at the start, I realized that they soon forgot this, so that they did not really know how much they were being observed; and among my immediate neighbors, I was collecting data when I appeared to act as a resident. This problem is endemic to participant-observation, and I cannot find a way of eliminating it (Gans, 1967: 445).

Herbert Gans views the question of the morality of observing people who do not "really know how much they were being observed" as "endemic to participant-observation."

When stated in these terms, it seems possible that fiction
writers also might publicly ponder the morality of observing persons who are similarly unaware of "how much they are being observed." In none of the interviews with literary artists analyzed for this thesis, however, is the issue mentioned. A possible explanation is that, since literary artists believe their knowledge and understanding of human life results primarily from personal experience and introspection, they do not concern themselves with issues arising from those observations which (as we have seen) they do perform. A second, related explanation for the fact that literary artists generally do not concern themselves directly with the ethics of observation is that writers of fiction, as we have seen, perceive themselves as member-observers operating not as intruders or outsiders within a group but as members of the universal human community.

My own experience at the writers' workshop has convinced me that literary artists—while they may ignore the moral issues involved—are aware of the potential power of the member-observer role they intermittently play. At a workshop party I attended, there was considerable wine-drinking, dancing, and general frivolity. One member turned to another and, gesturing toward a third, whispered, "Be careful what you do in front of her. She has a real power with words."

Moreover, Willa Cather in a 1921 interview with the Lincoln, Nebraska, Sunday Star, gave evidence of her awareness of the power embodied in the role of member-observer.
She had, throughout her literary career, only drawn one portrait of an actual person, she said.

That was the mother of the neighbor family in *My Antonia*. She was the mother of my childhood chums in Red Cloud. I used her for this reason: While I was getting under way with the book in the White Mountains, I received the word of her death. One clings to one's friends so—I don't know why it was—but the resolve came over me that I would put her into that book as nearly drawn from the life as I could do it. I had not seen her for years.

I have always been so glad that I did so, because her daughters were so deeply touched. When the book was published it recalled to them little traits of hers that they had not remembered of themselves—as, for example, that when she was vexed she used to dig her heels into the floor as she walked and go clump! clump! clump! across the floor. They cannot speak of the book without weeping (Bennett, 1961: 159-160).

There is evidence, furthermore, that those who must interact with literary artists recognize the possibility that their behavior and characteristics may be meticulously noted even while they do not "really know how much they are being observed." "Are you going to use this?" novelists are asked by others. "Are you having fun at this picnic or are you writing?" A friend of Samuel Clemens expressed the attitude succinctly when he said of the writer that Clemens "smiled at you with remote absence....You were all there for him, but he was not all there for you" (Bissell, 1973: 4).

In spite of the fact, then, that both literary observers and those they observe recognize the potential power inherent in the role of observer, the perspective of the literary artist, as we have seen, does not contain the definition of moral issues involved in member-observation. Literary
artists essentially observe the I within themselves. They do this primarily by means of introspection. At the same time, however, writers of fiction must depict emotions in a series of dramatic situations and events played out by credible characters. In order to accomplish a certain plausibility of both plot and character, furthermore, literary artists must observe the external world. In doing so, they observe certain elements of the Me of social selves. They observe sociocultural beliefs, values, and norms operant in the society around them. They do so, however, only as a means to the end of depicting universal human emotion. Thus, Cather saw Antonia primarily as a woman filled with the feelings resulting from her own experiencing of herself. That Antonia was a Bohemian-American immigrant struggling on the Nebraska plains was secondary to the novelist and to the novel. Literary artists, then, consider their observations of the Me within social selves as less important than introspection and simply as a means to the end of depicting universal human emotion enmeshed in plausible human action. Consequently, literary artists do not concern themselves with the ethics of observation. Viewing themselves as essentially introspective member-observers and as seers or revealers of nothing that is not universal to all of human-kind, literary artists do not consider their observations to be matters for moral consideration.

Moreover, as we have seen, literary artists do not concern themselves with gaining entry into a foreign re-
search setting. Social scientists, on the other hand, intent to discover the culturally specific implications and meanings of communities and groups, must address themselves to the problem of gaining entrance into them where they see themselves as strangers or outsiders. Gaining entry is a significant problem for sociologists and anthropologists not only for the obvious reason that it presupposes research but also because the manner in which entrance is gained influences the degree to which subsequent observations can be systematic.

Summary

Unlike literary artists, sociologists and anthropologists value systematic observation as a necessary means to that end which Glaser and Strauss term theoretical saturation (Glaser and Strauss, 1973: 61). Observational saturation, in turn, is necessary from the scientific perspective because theoretically it affects potential intersubjectivity. That is, the probability that two or more observers might view similar empirical facts and consequently reach similar empirical generalizations is greater when observations are systematically ordered. Moreover, the probability that two or more observers might intersubjectively reach similar empirical generalizations is greatest when researchers pursue systematic observation to the point of theoretical saturation.

The scientific perspective defines truth as that cumulative body of verifiable facts and subsequent empirical
generalizations derived through intersubjective observation. Consequently, scientists value what we have termed the outer epistemological perspective. The definition and value specify certain methodological norms, the general purpose of which is to insure systematic observation, resulting in turn in the gathering of factual "data."

The aesthetic perspective, on the other hand, defines truth as those emotional realities of human life to which virtually all persons can relate. Consequently, artists value what we have termed the inner epistemological perspective. The aesthetic definition of truth and its related epistemological value generally indicate a methodology which enhances the artist's potential for and practice of introspection. Observation is encouraged only insofar as it is necessary in order to provide the seed—or "material"—for introspective growth.

The third culture of the social sciences, together with fiction, combines the scientific and the aesthetic perspectives. Defining truth primarily from the scientific point of view, the social sciences select for their subject matter the empirical Me of social selves. Culturally specific generalized others in communities provide data about which a cumulative body of verifiable facts and subsequent generalizations can be intersubjectively derived. The qualitative social scientific perspective, however, recognizes also the aesthetic position that members of the human species can emotionally relate to one another. Hence, social
scientists value a combination of the outer with the inner epistemological perspectives. While they insist that observation must be systematic, they at the same time hold that a researcher gains knowledge about fellow human beings through the process of "taking the role of the other," or participant-observation.

John Lofland prefaces the second part of his *Analyzing Social Settings*, entitled "Collection and Management of Qualitative Materials," with the following explanatory remarks:

The term "material," used in the part title and in the text, is chosen deliberately. In a quantitative context, the term "data" is the typical designation for gatherings from the empirical world. It is an appropriate term for that context. It has a numerical and hard ring to it. "Data" are quantified, can be manipulated very systematically, and can be processed by sophisticated technology—most notably by computers. The gatherings of qualitative researchers tend not to have these properties. Because they do not, it would not seem appropriate falsely to harden them with a term like "data." Instead, qualitative gatherings may be called "materials" (Lofland, 1971: 73).

Lofland feels that the term "data" has for the third culture of qualitative social science too hard a ring to it. Yet, it should be noted that the substitute term he proposes is not the "material" of the aesthetic perspective, but rather "materials" in the plural form. While the qualitative gatherings of social scientists do not readily lend themselves to computerized manipulation and processing but rather to imaginative analysis, materials gleaned by social scientists are factual products of systematic observation.
The third culture of the social sciences, together with fiction, bridges a metaphorical ocean between science and art not only because, like art, the social sciences focus for subject matter upon human beings. The third culture bridges the ocean also inasmuch as it combines the two divergent perspectives within its methodology. Robert Redfield summarizes:

The assertion that social science has the method of the natural sciences requires modification....Social science method is like physical science method in that it describes; it does not evaluate. Like physics and chemistry it strives for objectivity, system and comprehensiveness. It uses precise methods where it can, and where it can it experiments, and where it can it measures. But it differs in its method from the methods of all the physical and biological sciences for reasons that follow from the difference in its subject matter. In most of social science, human nature is itself a part of the method. One must use one's own humanity as a means to understanding. The physicist need not sympathize with his atoms, nor the biologist with his fruit flies, but the student of people and institutions must employ his natural sympathies in order to discover what the people think or feel and what the institution means (Redfield, in Truzzi, 1973: 17).
CHAPTER IV
ANALYSIS AND DEPICTION:
HOPES FOR READERS' UNDERSTANDING AND IDENTIFICATION

Social scientists pursue and ultimately present systematically derived analysis of cultural phenomena. Literary artists, on the other hand, aesthetically depict human feelings and behavior. For both kinds of observer-writers presentation of their completed products to an audience is important. This is so because, for both categories of writer, the truth of what they have created must be judged by others. As we have seen, social scientists operate, as do all scientists, within an intersubjective milieu. What they observe—and, indirectly, the generalizations and theories derived from those observations—must be intersubjective. That is, "If the sociologist remains faithful to his calling, his statements must be arrived at through the observation of certain rules of evidence that allow others to check on or to repeat or to develop his findings further" (Mills, 1973: 13). Robert Friedrichs referred to science as a "public" enterprise. In so doing, he considered the situation in which more than one observer must be able potentially to gather the same or essentially similar data and that generalizations and theoretical systems built upon that data are open to public scrutiny. "More than any other social system developed by man," Friedrichs
writes, "Science has an automatic policing system. Indeed, all of its active participants are policemen" (Friedrichs, 1972: 209). As a colleague of mine opined one evening in a bar over pizza and beer, "Sociology stands the test of scrutiny by others who may not share the values of the author."

Not only social science but also literary art must stand the test of scrutiny by others. We have seen that, from an aesthetic perspective, the test of truth lies in whether human beings other than the author can identify emotionally with that which has been presented. Only if readers can project themselves into the dramatic experiences presented is a novel credible. To both social scientists and literary artists, then, the presentation of their respective products to an audience is integral to their work.

Sympathetic Understanding: A Goal of Third Culture Writers

Moreover, social scientists and literary artists aim toward similar reactions on the part of their respective audiences. We shall classify these anticipated similar audience responses under the general heading, sympathetic understanding. Scholars have both directly and indirectly expressed their concern that audiences of both gain a degree of understanding of their fellow human beings. In expressing this concern, sociologist John Lofland distinguishes between different forms of knowledge. He begins his Analyz-
ing Social Settings by commenting that "a significant feature of being a modern person--of living in what we call the modern world--is to know about a wide variety of other human beings but not to know them" (Lofland, 1971: 1). To "know about a category of human beings," Lofland continues, "is to have it represented by second parties that such a category exists" (Lofland, 1971: 1). Understanding, on the other hand, involves more:

In order to feel that one understands what is "going on" with others, most people try to put themselves in the other person's shoes. They try to imagine or discern how the other person thinks, acts, and feels. They try holistically to assess the life situation of the other as this other conceives it. In sociological parlance, this is called "taking the role of the other" (Lofland, 1971: 2).

To Lofland, then, knowledge exists in two forms: one can know about situations and people or one can know them.\(^1\) The "fullest condition" for knowing another human being--i.e., for "participating in the mind of another human being"--is, according to Lofland, "face-to-face interaction." Because "it happens (however) that humans in complex, urban

\(^1\) Just as Lofland distinguished between knowing about and knowing, Charles Horton Cooley many years earlier distinguished between what he termed spatial and social knowledge. Spatial knowledge consists of "the development of sense contacts into knowledge of things, including its refinement into mensurative science." Spatial knowledge, like Lofland's concept of knowing about, makes one aware of categories of persons and things. Social knowledge, on the other hand, "is developed from contact with the minds of other men, through communication, which sets going a process of thought and sentiment similar to theirs and enables us to understand them by sharing their states of mind. This I call personal or social knowledge. It might also be described as sympathetic" (Cooley, 1926: 60).
industrial societies need to understand more people than they personally encounter face-to-face" (Lofland, 1971: 2), "into the breach between knowing about and knowing have come all manner of reporters," among them both social scientists and literary artists of the third culture.

Organized human life is significantly a phenomenon of barriers, of division and of distance which are imposed by time, geography, walls, taboos, convenience, ignorance, indifference, avoidance, fear. For the humanist, division and distance are objects to be transcended. Or, at least, the desire to transcend these barriers can be part of the impulse behind biographies, memoirs, poetry, histories, novels, travelers' accounts, plays, films, etc. Much sociological work also shares in this impulse (Lofland, 1971: 3).

One audience reaction, then, which Lofland believes both social scientists and literary artists pursue is to narrow the breach between knowing about and knowing people. Lofland would like audiences of third culture prose to be aware that human categories exist and to "put themselves in the other persons's shoes" (Lofland, 1971: 2)--even when this cannot be accomplished in face-to-face interaction. That is, sociologist Lofland anticipates that readers of both sociology and literary art will gain some degree of sympathetic understanding of the subjects and characters about which they read.

It was with the purpose of transcending the "division and distance" elucidated by Lofland and thereby potentially increasing human understanding that Margaret Mead performed her role as anthropologist. During the depression, she relates, her father commented to her ("as he
watched the price of gold, through which it had been possible to predict major wars in western Europe since the sixteenth century") that "you have ten years before the next war." She writes that her response was, "Then let's...get back to the field to rescue as many cultures as we can before a war comes that may wipe them out altogether" (Mead, 1972, 1975: 199). Her purpose, it can be surmised, was to rescue as many cultures as possible in order that other human beings might later understand them. Similarly, Robert Kutak, in his introduction to The Story of a Bohemian-American Village, writes:

It is too often assumed that there is but one American way of life, whereas actually there are two Americans, one rural and the other urban. The type of adjustment which immigrants make is conditioned by the America to which they come. A comparison of two communities, one rural and the other urban, would lead to greater understanding of the problems involved in the adjustment of immigrants to the new world (Kutak, 1970: viii, emphasis added).

Kutak, like Mead, Lofland and others, viewed his role as social scientist as a means toward effecting readers' sympathetic understanding.

Moreover, the goal of transcending the barriers of division and distance between and among human beings provides the impulse behind novels (Lofland, 1971: 3). Norman Mailer, after admitting that he feels "I'm wasting my substance completely when I'm not writing," explains that a literary artist can "affect the consciousness" of his time. "It's no little matter to be a writer," Mailer insists. "There's that godawful Time-magazine world out there, and
one can make raids on it" (Mailer, in Plimpton, 1975: 278). Making raids on the Time-magazine world of categorized human beings which persons merely know about is an endeavor of both social scientists and literary artists.

Two Divergent Types of Sympathetic Understanding: Knowledgeable Understanding and Experiential Understanding

Still, however, social scientists and literary artists pursue divergent forms of understanding from their respective audiences. While sociologists aim essentially for what we may call knowledgeable understanding on the part of readers, novelists strive primarily for what we shall term experiential understanding from theirs. In order to distinguish between these two similar-yet-different concepts we turn initially to Severyn Bruyn.

Bruyn, like Lofland and Cooley, distinguishes between what he calls "empirical-statistical" knowledge and "personal-social" knowledge (Bruyn, 1966: 172-174). The latter is similar to what Lofland means by knowing, as opposed to knowing about, and also similar to what we have termed sympathetic understanding. Unlike Lofland and Cooley, however, Bruyn further distinguishes between "personal knowledge" and "social knowledge," both of which comprise the category "personal-social knowledge."

The term "personal knowledge" often connotes a privately held knowledge. The number of people who may hold this "private" knowledge, however, is relative to the case in point. Many people may have a personal knowledge of baseball in the United States. The term personal directs attention to that which is experienced by the individual, although the basic
elements of that knowledge can be shared by others. People in a large nation can develop a personal knowledge of that nation that is widely shared because of mass communication systems; the members of a sizable ethnic group can have a personal knowledge of suffering from discrimination which they feel collectively and personally. The term personal simply emphasizes that the experience is an individual one.

The term "social knowledge" may include personal elements in it (e.g., individually felt attitudes and sentiments), but it emphasizes an interactive awareness of shared expectations in a human group. It is a consciousness of the positions and roles taken by people in the organization of a group (Bruyn, 1966: 173, emphasis added).

Personal knowledge, then, is that which is gained through actually experiencing a phenomenon. We develop a personal knowledge of baseball by playing baseball. The concept personal knowledge, furthermore, is closely related to the inner epistemological perspective discussed in Chapter III of this thesis. The result of introspection and individual experiencing within the inner perspective is personal knowledge.

Social knowledge, on the other hand, "emphasizes an interactive awareness of shared expectations in a human group" (Bruyn, 1966: 173). We develop a social knowledge of baseball by closely observing the behavior of baseball players, though not necessarily by playing the game ourselves. The concept social knowledge is less thoroughly integrated with the inner epistemological perspective than is the concept personal knowledge. Put another way, the concepts social knowledge and outer epistemological perspective are interrelated as are the concepts personal knowledge and inner epistemological perspective. Social knowledge, there-
fore, emphasizes "taking the role of the other" imaginatively rather than being absorbed in the role oneself. Social knowledge, therefore, is the result not only of personal experience, but also of observation.

Moreover, personal knowledge relates to experiential understanding as social knowledge relates to knowledgeable understanding. Knowledgeable understanding occurs when readers become aware of shared expectations in a human group. Put another way, knowledgeable understanding connotes an understanding of the knowable Me of human beings. Knowledgeable understanding refers to sympathetic awareness of the generalized other in a culture or group. Experiential understanding, on the other hand, occurs when an audience becomes vicariously absorbed in or "possessed" by (Frank, 1970: 163) the experiences of one or more fellow human individuals. Put another way, experiential understanding connotes emotional identification with the feeling, experiencing I of human beings. Experiential understanding refers to an emotional projection on the part of the audience into a choosing, responding, sometimes-suffering, sometimes-rejoicing individual. While the sociologist whose subject matter is primarily the Me in social selves works mainly toward knowledgeable understanding from an audience, the novelist who focuses more closely upon the emotional, feeling I in social selves works for an audience's experiential understanding. In the words of Hugh Duncan, the literary author is one who "desires to arouse or to dissipate a certain
emotion in his audience" (Duncan, 1953: 3).

The following data from social scientists and literary artists illustrates the distinction between knowledgeable understanding and experiential understanding. Vidich and Bensman, recognizing that they have effected a degree of understanding from their readers, write in the introduction to the second edition of Small Town in Mass Society:

> It is true that by and large the central message of the book which described the penetration of the "isolated" community by the agencies and culture of mass institutions has been understood in the terms originally intended. Because of this understanding, students of the community are now able to study the community within the framework of large-scale, bureaucratic mass society rather than as the polar opposite of urban society (Vidich and Bensman, 1968: vii).

And psychiatrist Erich Lindemann, in the foreward to Herbert Gans' The Urban Villagers, comments that

> Not only is information required about the family and kinship system and neighborhood organization, but also about basic value orientations as they affect men and women in their attitudes and aspirations for the development of the young, especially with respect to social controls and to the measure of permissible deviance (Gans, 1962: v).

When the quotations by Vidich and Bensman and Erich Lindemann are contrasted with the following excerpts of dialogue from representative literary artists, the difference between the scientific and aesthetic goals of knowledgeable and experiential understanding becomes strikingly clear.

> Ernest Hemingway, speaking of his writing in general and of The Old Man and the Sea in particular, comments that

> First, I have tried to eliminate everything unnecessary to conveying experience to the reader so that after he or she has read something it will become a
part of his or her experience and seem actually to have happened (Hemingway, in Plimpton, 1974: 236).

And Jerzy Kosinski remarks that when reading literature you have to evoke and by evoking, you yourself have to provide your own inner setting. When you read about a man who dies, part of you dies with him because you have to recreate his dying inside your head (Kosinski, 1972: 205).

"Art tends to insist that each individual (reader) translate the original vision into something peculiarly his own creation" (Nisbet, 1962: 72n).

While the literary artist depicts experiences or characters to which readers can relate or with which they personally identify, the social scientist analytically describes—though vividly and with detail—the beliefs, values, and norms which comprise a culture. That is, while the artistic writer aims for experiential understanding on the part of an audience, the social scientific author hopes for knowledgeable understanding from readers.

The third culture, then, which includes social science and fiction, has the purpose of promoting sympathetic understanding. Sympathetic understanding in turn includes two divergent forms: knowledgeable understanding and experiential understanding. Social scientists, we have seen, aim more at fostering knowledgeable understanding while fiction writers focus attention upon eliciting experiential understanding.

The scientific goal of effecting knowledgeable understanding, moreover, is related to a methodology which, as we have seen, dictates systematic observation. But systema-
tic observation is not viewed from within the non-reified scientific perspective as an end in itself. It is rather a means to the scientific end of creatively valid analysis. Put another way, knowledgeable understanding depends upon both factual description and subsequent imaginative, theoretical analysis. In order to elucidate what is meant by the concept imaginative theoretical analysis, we turn first to Severyn Bruyn.

Knowledgeable Understanding and Imaginative Theoretical Analysis

Severyn Bruyn, we have seen, distinguished between "empirical-statistical" and "personal-social" knowledge. He elucidated a third form of knowledge, moreover, which he termed "theoretical." Bruyn explains the concept by means of example. "The etiology of delinquency," he writes, can be viewed in three ways. At the theoretical level, delinquency is generally understood to be systems of relationships ("subcultures") which arise from disorganized slum areas in the form of conflict or retreatist gangs, or from well-organized slums in the form of criminal gangs which are a product of the web of politics and rackets (Bruyn, 1966: 172).

The body of sociological knowledge, Bruyn points out, is typically comprised not only of personal-social knowledge (and empirical-statistical knowledge) but also of theoretical knowledge.2 "Sociological knowledge," he writes, implies a "theoretical and structural understanding of human

2This is one essential difference between social science and journalism: the latter generally does not attempt to be theoretically analytic.
groups" (Bruyn, 1966: 173).

Similarly John Lofland, after suggesting that all "reports" (novels, biographies, sociological monographs, etc.) should contain "a significant amount of pure description" along with direct quotations in order "fully to capture the reality of a place," adds that "sociological studies have to embody yet (another) feature that strives for a scientific goal. The scientific goal is that of explicit and articulate abstraction and generalization; or, in other words, analysis" (Lofland, 1971: 4-5). He continues:

In order to capture the participants "in their own terms" one must learn their analytic ordering of the world, their categories for rendering expli-cable and coherent the flux of raw reality. That, indeed, is the first principle of qualitative analysis. Since it is the job of the analyst to dwell upon their analytic order (while the participants are living it more than analyzing it), it becomes possible for him to provide a more articulate and clearer portrayal of that order than the participants are likely to work up. The qualitative analyst seeks to provide an explicit rendering of the structure, order, and patterns found among a set of participants (Lofland, 1971: 7).

Like Bruyn and Lofland, Herbert Blumer points out that what we have termed knowledgeable understanding includes not only "direct description of the empirical social world," but also analysis.

The research scholar who engages in direct examination should aim at casting his problem in a theoretical form, at unearthing generic relations, at sharpening the connotative reference of his concepts, and at formulating theoretical propositions. Such analysis is the proper aim of empirical science, as distinguished from the preparation of mere descriptive accounts (Blumer, 1969: 42).

For Herbert Blumer, sociological knowledge results from the
accurate and creative combination of two research processes: "exploration," which results in description of the empirical social world; and "inspection," which is a process of sociological analysis (Blumer, 1969: 40-47).

There is a difference, sociologist Jerome Manis reminds readers, between analytic sociology and "common sense sociology." "Common sense sociology" is purely descriptive, relating as it were only the "common sense" meanings or "naive reality" of one's subjects (Manis, 1972: 6). Analytic sociology, on the other hand, must take into consideration more abstract concepts of interaction such as social organization, social disorganization, role conflict, and reference group. Knowledgeable understanding, therefore, is dependent upon both descriptive details and theoretical analysis. "Penetrating and useful qualitative analysis has the feature of striking a balance between abstract and general concepts on the one hand and description and quotes from a setting's participants on the other hand" (Lofland, 1971: 128).

Social scientists, then, hope to achieve in their audiences some degree of knowledgeable understanding, a form of understanding encompassing personal-social knowledge, empirical-statistical knowledge, and theoretical, analytic knowledge. Readers of social science are presented with opportunities in which they can first, take the roles of subjects whose general attitudes and behavior can be sympathetically known and second, come to some theoretical
understanding of why those subjects recurrently behave in the ways they do.

Literary artists, on the other hand, hope to achieve within their audiences a level of experiential understanding, a type of understanding which emphasizes what might be termed "vicarious personal knowledge." That is, readers of fiction are invited to project themselves emotionally into the dramatic experiences of the piece so that optimally those experiences "will seem actually to have happened" (Kosinski, 1972: 205) to them.

It must be noted, moreover, that not only social scientists engage in theoretical analysis, but also literary artists build depictions of characters upon theoretical frameworks. The divergence with regard to theorizing between social scientists and novelists is one of primary intent. Social scientists describe society in order that readers may eventually come to a knowledgeable understanding of that society through "taking the role of the other"—a necessary prerequisite to valid sociological analysis. Literary artists, meanwhile, depict social systems in order that readers might come to an experiential understanding of one or several individuals in that society. Readers of literature are encouraged to "take the role of the other" as a necessary prerequisite to emotional identification.

The scientific goal of knowledgeable understanding necessarily incorporates theoretical analysis. Meanwhile, the aesthetic goal of experiential understanding, while
often based upon the fictional artist's personal theorizing, does not incorporate purposeful theoretical analysis. The divergence in focus between the social scientific aim of knowledgeable understanding and the aesthetic aim of experiential understanding is evidenced by the following quotations, the first from sociologists Glaser and Strauss, the second from novelist Ernest Hemingway. Glaser and Strauss:

(A problem of social scientists) is how to describe the data of the social world studied so vividly that the reader, like the researchers, can almost literally see and hear its people—but always in relation to the theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1973: 228).

And Hemingway:

It is hard enough to write books and stories without being asked to explain them as well....Read anything I write for the pleasure of reading it. Whatever else you find will be the measure of what you brought to the reading (Hemingway, in Plimpton, 1974: 230).

Glaser and Strauss, in insisting that sociocultural data be described vividly, "but always in relation to the theory" (Glaser and Strauss, 1973: 228), illustrate the social scientific goal of eliciting primarily knowledgeable understanding from readers. Meanwhile, Hemingway, in insisting that whatever theoretical implications readers find in his fiction are essentially dependent upon what those readers "brought to the reading" (Hemingway, in Plimpton, 1974: 230), illustrates the aesthetic goal of evoking experiential understanding from an audience. These divergent focal values---

---Laura Bohannan, in the "Author's Note" to her novel, Return to Laughter, remarks that "the ethnographic background given here is accurate, but it is neither complete nor (analytically) technical" (Bowen, 1964: xix).
knowledgeable understanding and experiential understanding—specify for each group of writer divergent attitudes and normative prescriptions with regard to, first, the process of theorizing or analysis and, second, rhetorical style.

Scientific and Aesthetic Attitudes Toward Analysis and Theorizing

Intersubjective analysis is, from the scientific point of view, essential. It occupies a central position and is a necessary aim of social scientists. As a result, virtually all the normative procedures encouraged by social scientists have, either directly or indirectly, for their primary purpose the enhancement of conditions under which valid, intersubjective analysis can occur. Put another way, the normative prescriptions within all science—and thus within the social sciences—exist in order to minimize and virtually eliminate mere speculation or bias. From an aesthetic point of view, however, analysis of human behavior is a private and individual endeavor. The test of aesthetic theorizing lies solely in the ability of the audience to relate emotionally to the characters and situations within the resulting novel. Consequently, literary artists do not concern themselves with the peculiarly scientific problem of bias. Many novelists, moreover, adamently deny that they engage in conscious analysis of human behavior. Stanley Elkin, while he disavows that he is analytic and that readers might thus perceive a "system of ideas" within his work, engages in the following, illuminating dialogue:
Interviewer: Is there a system of ideas within which your fiction could be considered?

Elkin: No. I'm not a "thinker." For example, I'm working on a novel now called The Franchiser about the man who makes America look like America. He owns a McDonald's franchise. He owns a Fred Astaire Dance Studio franchise. He owns a KOA campsite franchise. He owns perhaps thirty franchises. He trades them like a kid with Monopoly cards. What had appealed to me--what had instigated the novel and in a way has instigated almost everything I've ever written--was the occupation...(Elkin, 1976: 60).

Elkin has apparently contradicted himself. The meaning of his rhetoric becomes more clear, however, upon hearing the remainder of his answer:

I don't know what the thing is all about until I start to write it. Then, as I'm writing, I really do invent ideas, make ideas up. Only now am I beginning to realize what this Franchiser business is all about. But there's no thought aforethought (Elkin, 1976: 60).

What Elkin is saying, it appears, is that while the analytic concept, occupation, has perhaps "instigated...everything I've ever written" and while to him it is the stereotypical franchiser "who makes America look like America," he is not about to investigate analytically "what the thing is all about until I start to write it." In his words, "there's no thought aforethought." 4

Artists, then, may profess to create their products with "no thought aforethought," while scientists generally maintain that they "talk from a basis of fact and not from...

4 That Elkin finds it important to stress this point while a doctoral candidate in the social sciences might presumably be asked to leave the program upon admitting that his/her dissertation was based upon "no thought aforethought" is, to me, a dramatic expression of the divergences between social science and literary art.
speculation" (Blumer, 1969: 42). When reified, this divergence becomes a value-free verses value-laden myth, specified as it were by the procedure-verses-inspiration mythology elucidated earlier in this thesis. According to the value-free/value-laden myth, scientists are value-free. Having no values which in any way influence their research, scientists observe, organize, and analyze facts without preconceived notions. Again according to this myth, artists are value-laden. Embued with their own visions and interpretations of the world, artists produce aesthetic products from a wealth of personal, individualistic, and introspective beliefs and values.

Social scientist Robert Friedrichs, however, has done much to disspell the value-free/value-laden myth. The very choices made when one assumes "the scientific role in preference to another," he writes, along with the choices involved when a researcher selects "one particular problem for investigation over against all others" force scientists "in principle into value-laden stances for which there is no purely empirical authorization" (Friedrichs, 1972: 142). Scientists are human beings who, from the sociological perspective, form linguistic symbols which in turn act to structure social reality. Consequently, science necessarily incorporates values within its own vocabulary.

The decisions that underlie the development of a particular set of concepts—and the grammatical framework within which they are articulated—are, in point of fact, commitments that are made prior to those that are involved in focusing upon a
particular area of concern, for they are necessary to the very formulation and expression of the problem in question (Friedrichs, 1972: 142).

No scientists, then, are value-free. Moreover, qualitative social scientists, as we have seen, understand the duplex nature of the human researcher. Themselves composed of both an internalized normative system (Me) and a freely feeling I, qualitative social scientists are ever aware of their own emotional, valuing composition. Thus qualitative social scientists tackle the problem of potential bias with seriousness.

In this regard, Max Weber reminds researchers that a social scientist must remain cognizant of the "intrinsically simple demand" that s/he keep unconditionally separate the establishment of empirical facts (including the "value-oriented" conduct of the empirical individual whom he is investigating) and his own practical evaluations, i.e., his evaluation of these facts as satisfactory or unsatisfactory (including among these facts evaluations made by the empirical persons who are the objects of investigation) (Weber, 1949: 11).

Put another way, the social scientist must study what is, not what s/he thinks ought to be. Put still another way, the social scientist--while realizing that all human beings (even scientists) are value-laden--approaches and carries out research in such a way that eventual analysis will as much as is possible be based not upon pre-conceived notions of what exists, but upon empirical facts.

Sociologist Peter Berger summarizes the social scientific view in this regard. Reminding readers that Max Weber, "in a classic statement" spoke of sociology as "value-
Certainly the statement does not mean that the sociologist has or should have no values. In any case, it is just about impossible for a human being to exist without any values at all, though, of course, there can be tremendous variation in the values one may hold. The sociologist will normally have many values as a citizen, a private person, a member of a religious group or as an adherent of some other association of people. But within the limits of his activities as a sociologist there is one fundamental value only--that of scientific integrity. Even there, of course, the sociologist, being human, will have to reckon with his convictions, emotions, and prejudices. But it is a part of his intellectual training that he tries to understand and control these as bias that ought to be eliminated, as far as possible, from his work. It goes without saying that this is not always easy to do, but it is not impossible. The sociologist tries to see what is there. He may have hopes or fears concerning what he may find. But he will try to see regardless of his hopes or fears. It is thus an act of pure perception, as pure as humanly limited means allow, toward which sociology strives (Berger, 1967: 5).

Qualitative social scientists, mindful that human beings are embued with values, nevertheless pursue factual and unbiased empirical analysis "as pure as humanly limited means allow" (Berger, 1967: 5).

Herbert Gans writes in his preface to The Levittowners that the study "is about a much maligned part of America, suburbia" (Gans, 1967: v). One of the primary purposes of his investigation of Levittown, consequently, was to test the validity of the suburban critique, whether suburban ways of life were as undesirable as had been claimed. Are people status-seekers, do they engage in a hyperactive social life which they do not really enjoy, do they conform unwillingly to the demands of their neighbors, is the community a dull microcosm of mass society (Gans, 1967: xix)? Gans' sociological conclusion in this regard, moreover, is
that Levittowners are not really members of the national society, or for that matter, of a mass society. They are not apathetic conformists ripe for takeover by a totalitarian elite or corporate merchandiser; they are not conspicuous consumers and slaves to sudden whims of cultural and political fashion; they are not even organization men or particularly other-directed personalities. Clearly inner-directed strivers are a minority in Levittown....most people maintain a balance necessary to live with neighbors and friends that, I suspect, is prevalent all over lower middle class America....Although ethnic, religious, and regional differences are eroding, the never ending conflicts over other differences are good evidence that Levittowners are far from becoming mass men (Gans, 1967: 417).

Herbert Gans, then, provides an illustrative example of scientific refusal to accept speculative social theorizing or critiques and instead to pursue a problem through unbiased systematic observation and subsequent analysis.

The social scientific perspective, we have seen, embodies methodological practices the purpose of which is to minimize and virtually eliminate bias. The value of systematic observation--along with those practices that value specifies such as keeping accurate notes and addressing oneself to informant reliability--is, as we have seen, a major concern within the scientific perspective. This is so because scientists believe systematic observation to be an essential means to unbiased analysis. Herbert Blumer writes:

The aim of exploratory research is to develop and fill out as comprehensive and accurate a picture of the area of study as conditions allow. The picture should enable the scholar to feel at home in the area, to talk from a basis of fact and not from speculation (Blumer, 1969: 42).

And anthropologist Rosalie Wax, while encouraging future
field workers to take copious notes, remarks that

A fieldworker may take some comfort in the knowledge that it is possible to train himself to the point where he may be an accurate observer and reporter—even when he is in the grip of a bias or a fanatical "ideological centricity." He might be likened to a well-trained musician or linguist who can put down an accurate record of a song or dialect, even though he may consider the material he is recording to be defective, disgusting, or atypical. When he recovers from his bias, he will have his notes and his honest memories—for one cannot really fool oneself eternally about what one has seen or heard—on which to base his report (Wax, 1971: 141).

Systematic observation, then, along with the many normative procedures it involves, has for its primary purpose the virtual elimination of pre-conceived notions or ungrounded speculation on the part of the scientific researcher. Put another way, observational intersubjectivity is valued as a means toward the end of controlling analytic bias.

Unbiased analysis is most readily accomplished when it is derived from or grounded in systematically observed cultural phenomena. Furthermore, valid theories, grounded in empirical data, optimally result from "the continual intermeshing of data collection and analysis" (Glaser and Strauss, 1973: 73). John Lofland explains that a researcher's analytic and observational activities run concurrently. There is a temporal overlapping of observational and analytic work. The final state of analysis (occurring after observation has ceased) becomes, then, a period for bringing final order into previously developed ideas (Lofland, 1971: 117-118).

Similarly, Vidich and Bensman explain that their approach to studying Springdale involved the "exhausting" of what they term "unsystematic theory." Using theories "evoked" from
their own observations in Springdale and also from reviewing previous literature, the researchers simultaneously conducted further observation and analysis until those theories were "exhausted": i.e., "if and when (the theory) either yielded little follow-up data or if the data suggested by the theory were not forthcoming" (Vidich and Bensman, 1968: 338). Among the advantages of "exhausting" analytic theory "evoked" from or grounded in observation is the possibility of "discovery of the limitations of one's own theory by its continuous confrontation with empirical observation" (Vidich and Bensman, 1968: 392). Social scientists, then, seek to minimize and virtually eliminate bias within their analyses by immersing themselves within the culture which they observe and by integrating the two processes of data collection and analysis.

While social scientists build analytical theories upon systematically observed facts, literary artists often erect novels upon personal, private, and speculative theories of human behavior. Novelist Angus Wilson suggests that "heroism"—and consequently the heroism of his characters—"is in their success in making a relationship with other human beings, in a humanistic way, and their willingness to accept some sort of pleasure principle in life as against the gnawings of a Calvinist conscience and the awareness of Freudian motivations" (Wilson, in Cowley, 1975: 261).

Perhaps Willa Cather would agree. The heroism of her Antonia fits in many ways Angus Wilson's personal defini-
tion of the term. Yet for both Angus Wilson and Willa
Cather any elucidation or illustration of the concept hero-
ism is a personal and individual one, rather than one de-
rived by means of intersubjectivity.

Again, demonstrating aesthetically private specu-
lations about human behavior, James Dickey remarks:

I'll tell you what I really tried to do in Deliverance. My story is simple: There are bad peo-
ple, there are monsters among us. Deliverance
is really a novel about how decent men kill....
(Dickey, 1976: 79).

For James Dickey the world consists of decent folks on the
one hand and monsters on the other. Decent people, moreover,
when threatened by monsters, may resort to murder. For
novelist Mario Puzo, however, the world as portrayed in The
Godfather consists not of monsters and decent folks, but
primarily of calculating businessmen capable of cold-blooded
murder when such action is deemed necessary to achieve a
rationally determined goal. The social-psychological
theorizing of both Dickey and Puzo is characteristic of the
aesthetic point of view. That is, these theories, like the
belief that heroism lies in one's "willingness to accept
some sort of pleasure principle" are personal and speculative
theories of human behavior.

Thornton Wilder, discussing a personal idea which
affected his The Ides of March, concludes that it "has so
much the character of self-evidence for me that I am unable
to weigh or even 'hear' any objections to it" (Wilder, in
Cowley, 1975: 115). Wilder, embued with the aesthetic per-
spective, sees no need to entertain contrary evidence which might refute his personal ideas. What artistic observation lacks from a scientific point of view is a conscious attempt to observe systematically without pre-conceived notions of what one ought to find. James Dickey advises that "the major thing for a writer to do is develop some means of selecting the best of his memories and ideas and images and to build on them and reluctantly let the others go" (Dickey, 1976: 62).

Literary artists, like social scientists, engage in theorizing about human behavior; this theorizing, however, is generally speculative and personal, based upon sporadic and often unconscious observation. In this regard, aesthetic theorizing is different from unbiased analysis produced by social scientists. Literary artists, as we have seen, focus most intently upon evoking experiential understanding on the part of their readers. Consequently, speculative and private ideas about human behavior are open to scrutiny only insofar as they, upon evidencing themselves in a novel, do not block readers from emotionally projecting themselves into the novel's situations and characters. Social scientists, on the other hand, direct their attention toward effecting knowledgeable understanding on the part of readers. Thus, they strive to present first, detailed and systematically observed empirical data and second, bias-free analysis.

Furthermore, the novelist's analytic framework or "interpretation" of reality is "generally much more implicit" than is the social scientist's (Glaser and Strauss, 1973: 229n).
built upon that data. This data and analysis, moreover, must be intersubjectively verifiable. That is, must be open to the scientific scrutiny of what Friedrichs has called "an automatic policing system."

To emphasize the scientific goal of intersubjective verifiability, however, and not simultaneously to recognize that analysis is essentially creative is, once again, to reify the procedure/inspiration mythology. Scientific analysis necessarily involves imagination (Mills, 1973: 159). The process involves the ability creatively to form mental images, ideas, or conceptual systems based upon reality. Put another way, scientific analysis, while it rests upon empirical facts, is an "art." "Vital" to both science and art "is the underlying act of discovery or illumination or invention that is the clue to all genuine creative work" (Nisbet, 1976: 5). In this regard, Florian Znaniecki writes that scientists work under the heuristic principle that every datum is connected by many factual relationships with other data, be they similar or different; he begins his investigation by observing these relationships in particular cases and seeks to discover some objective order among them. As a result of this approach, every datum becomes conceived either as one of several independent components of an orderly system of interdependent components or as both a system and a component of a more comprehensive system (Znaniecki, 1963: 162).

To "discover" some objective order among observed data, and to "conceive" of every datum as a component within a theoretical system is a mental process which involves imaginative inspiration. Creative scientific analysis is an artis-
tic process.

Nevertheless, some qualitative methodologists within the social sciences have tackled the problem of offering guidelines and aids to their fellow scientists in their discovery of analytic theory. Glaser and Strauss delineate what they term the "constant comparative method," an analytic process by means of which the researcher continuously throughout observation compares incidents and emerging categories of incidents with one another (Glaser and Strauss, 1973: 105ff). The "constant comparative method," write Glaser and Strauss, consists of several states, among them comparing observed incidents applicable to each conceived category, integrating categories and their properties, and delimiting the resulting theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1973: 105). The first stage, that of comparing observed incidents applicable to each conceived category, implies that the analyst begin by "coding each incident in his data into as many categories of analysis as possible, as categories emerge or as data emerge that fit an (already) existing category" (Glaser and Strauss, 1973: 105). In this regard the methodologists suggest that the scientist,

while coding an incident for a category, compare it with the previous incidents in the same and different groups coded in the same category (Glaser and Strauss, 1973: 106).

Once this is accomplished, the scientist analyst must seek to integrate the categories which s/he has previously imaginatively delineated with the various properties subsumed within that category.
This process starts out in a small way; memos and possible conferences are short. But as the coding continues, the constant comparative units change from comparison of incident with incident to comparison of incident with properties of the category that resulted from initial comparisons of incidents (Glaser and Strauss, 1973: 108).

Finally, "as the theory develops, various delimiting features of the constant comparative method begin to curb what could otherwise become an overwhelming task.

Delimiting occurs at two levels: the theory and the categories. First, the theory solidifies, in the sense that major modifications become fewer and fewer as the analyst compares the next incidents of a category to its properties. Later modifications are mainly on the order of clarifying the logic, taking out nonrelevant properties, integrating elaborating details of properties into the major outline of interrelated categories and—most important—reduction.

By reduction we mean that the analyst may discover underlying uniformities in the original set of categories or their properties, and can then formulate the theory with a smaller set of higher level concepts (Glaser and Strauss, 1973: 109-110).

Glaser and Strauss summarize the purpose of the "constant comparative method" as follows:

To make theoretical sense of so much diversity in his data, the analyst is forced to develop ideas on a level of generality higher in conceptual abstraction than the qualitative material being analyzed. He is forced to bring out underlying uniformities and diversities, and to use more abstract concepts to account for differences in the data (Glaser and Strauss, 1973: 114).

While the methodologists offer detailed guidelines for analyzing data, they do not offer in detail a description of the precise method by which one might "develop ideas" or recognize "underlying uniformities" or, initially, conceive of categories. C. Wright Mills, writing on "intellectual craftsmanship," remarks:
But, you may ask, how do ideas come? How is the imagination spurred to put all the images and facts together, to make images relevant and lend meaning to facts? I do not think I can really answer that; all I can do is talk about the general conditions and a few simple techniques which have seemed to increase my chances to come out with something.

The sociological imagination, I remind you, in considerable part consists of the capacity to shift from one perspective to another, and in the process to build up an adequate view of a total society and of its components....Certainly it seldom occurs without a great deal of often routine work. Yet there is an unexpected quality about it, perhaps because its essence is the combination of ideas that no one expected were combinable.... There is a playfulness of mind back of such combining as well as a truly fierce drive to make sense of the world (Mills, 1973: 211).

Recognizing the similarities among and differences between observed incidents is essentially a playful, creative, and imaginative process dependent upon no small degree of inspiration and imagination.

Scientific Analysis As Metaphor

Novelists generally view observation as a process necessary to provide the seed for metaphor. The same might be posited for social scientists. That is, the analytic theories which social scientists construct can be viewed as a form of metaphor. Metaphor, writes Robert Nisbet, "is no simple grammatical device, a mere figure of speech; not, that is, in its fullness." Rather, metaphor "is a way of knowing." It is most basically "the synthesis of several complex units into one commanding image" (Nisbet, 1976: 33).

Metaphor is a combination or comparison of separate and independent empirical or fabricated incidents or conditions in such a way that a more abstract image evolves, an
image which encompasses a higher level of conception than
do the singular incidents themselves. Severyn Bruyn de­
fines metaphor as "an implied comparison between things es­
tentially unlike one another" (Bruyn, 1966: 133) and goes
on to state that

The metaphor has played an important role in the
development of all scientific theory. In the
physical sciences, for example, the metaphor has
led theorists toward improved conceptions of their
subject matter. Thus, electricity has been com­
pared to a fluid; molecules and atoms have been
likened to spheres or balls; light has been com­
pared to waves when explaining one form of its com­
plex behavior, and particles when explaining an­
other (Bruyn, 1966: 135).

Within the social sciences, furthermore, metaphor "illu­
minates the nature of the subject matter" (Bruyn, 1966:
135-142). Put another way, scientific analysis is essentia­
lly a creative and imaginative process which involves con­
ceiving metaphorical similarities among systematically ob­
served empirical data.

Vidich and Bensman, for example, systematically ob­served the residents of Springdale. Their resulting data,
however, could not have in itself suggested that Springdale
is a "small town in mass society." Indeed, this metaphori­
cal image is the product of creative discovery. The authors
write that only when they knew that they "had discovered a
theme which could sustain a more extended and unified treat­
ment, did the possibility of a book emerge" (Vidich and
Bensman, 1968: 405, emphasis added). The central issue
selected by Vidich and Bensman for study in Springdale was
"the specific character of the relationship between the
rural community and the dynamics of modern, mass, industrial society" (Vidich and Bensman, 1968: xvii). The image mass society is the result of creative imagination. "It is important to stress the subjective quality inherent in this perception, this rendering—there is no other word for it—of the demographic landscape" (Nisbet, 1976: 44).

I think it would be difficult indeed to substantiate on any strictly quantitative and objective measurement the idea of the masses, as we so characteristically find the idea in (artistic, philosophical, and sociological writing) (Nisbet, 1976: 45).

Just as Vidich and Bensman engaged in creative and imaginative analysis, so also did Robert Kutak. Kutak's purposes in observing Milligan residents, he has stated, were two: to discover and causally explain those forms of immigrants' behavior which persisted in America and those forms which changed and to investigate whether or not the adjustment of immigrant groups to rural America differed from that of immigrants to cities. Kutak's data, however, could not in and of itself have answered these questions. Indeed, the concept change is an image, the result of metaphorical and creative thought processes. "When we declare some change a manifestation of growth in the social sphere," Robert Nisbet writes, "we are speaking metaphorically," for "only in the organic world of plants and animals is growth literally and plainly to be seen." Social scientists, then, in "endowing an institution or social structure with processes drawn from the organic world," engage in metaphor (Nisbet, 1976: 33).
Just as the concept of social change is metaphorical, so also is the image of city or metropolis. Speaking of the image metropolis as a "sociological landscape," Nisbet relates that the concept initially emerged during the nineteenth century in both painting and romantic literature (Nisbet, 1976: 61). Inspired by artistic and "literary vision," the metaphorical image of metropolis or city "in time became a staple of sociology" (Nisbet, 1976: 66). Thus for Kutak to analyze data in terms of concepts such as "rural" or "city" involved the use of metaphorical images at least one of which proceeds initially from an aesthetic perspective. Furthermore, imaginatively to combine singular incidents in Milligan into images such as change or persistence involved a creative mental process. Kutak's scientific analysis, then, can be viewed as artistic in several respects.

The same can be said for William Madsen's analysis of Mexican-Americans in southern Texas. Madsen, we have seen, sought to demonstrate "how processes of change have produced three levels of acculturation among the Mexican-Americans" (Madsen, 1964: 2). We have already stated that the concept change when applied to society is essentially metaphorical. Moreover, the notion of "levels of acculturation" is also an imaginative image. Madsen reminds his readers, concerning this issue, that

To some extent, the three acculturative levels are merely conceptual constructs because the acculturational process takes place on all three levels. Each Mexican American of Hidalgo County cannot be
neatly classified into one or another of these levels (Madsen, 1964: 3).

Put another way, the data in and of itself does not yield the imaginative concepts of three levels of acculturation. Rather, Madsen has imaginatively drawn from his systematically observed data certain "conceptual constructs."

Znaniecki describes this kind of analysis in which through comparative generalization one arrives at what may be considered "typological":

A particular datum—a god, a hero, a work of art or literature—selected and defined by what appears to be the most essential part of its content and meaning, serves as a model for defining other data as more or less similar to it (Znaniecki, 1963: 179).

Construction of models or "ideal types" within the social sciences is an essential process in analysis. Madsen has elucidated three ideal types in his three conceptual levels of acculturation. As such, they are models to which singular observed incidents approach, but virtually never, as Madsen points out, can one scientific datum be "neatly

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Max Weber defined an ideal type as a "conceptual pattern (which) brings together certain relationships and events of historical life into a complex, which is conceived as an internally consistent system. Substantively," he continued, "this construct in itself is like a utopia which has been arrived at by the analytical accentuation of certain elements of reality" (Weber, 1947: 90).

Weber further explains that the ideal type "is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct (Gedankenbild). In its conceptual purity, this mental construct...cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality" (Weber, 1947: 90).
classified" into one or another ideal type or model. The analytic tool of ideal type, then, is a form of model or image imaginatively honed from empirical data. Emphasizing the creative element within the process of formulating ideal types, Nisbet compares them to the artist's portrait. In sociology, Nisbet writes, "we are in the presence of role-types.

The concept of social role, is, fundamentally, the response made by sociology in the nineteenth century to the problem posed to artists, philosophers, and social scientists by the necessity of somehow imposing an interpretative pattern or structure on eruptive individualism. At the end of the nineteenth century Weber would advance the concept of "ideal-type," applying it equally to structures, processes, and personages. Whether we refer to role-type or ideal-type, the idea is the same: the object, whether structure or personage, stripped, so to speak, of all that is merely superficial and ephemeral, with only what is central and unifying left....No living, performing individual in any of these categories will be exactly like the description supplied by the sociologist for his ideal-type, but the relation will be nonetheless sufficiently close to give clarifying value to the ideal-type.

Ideal-types, or role-types, as we prefer, are sociological portraits, and irrespective of end they are, and have to be, done with an artist's skill (Nisbet, 1976: 71-72, emphasis added).

When sociologist Madsen conceived of three levels of acculturation, then, among the Mexican-Americans of Hildalgo County, he acted with an artist's method.

Just as Vidich and Bensman, Kutak, and Madsen engage in creative, imaginative, and artistic sociological analysis, so also does Herbert Gans. Empirically, he tells us, Boston's West End can be described simply as an old, somewhat deteriorated, low-rent neighborhood that housed a
variety of people, most of them poor" (Gans, 1962: 4). The "superficial observer," Gans relates, might consider such a neighborhood a slum. What Gans came to understand, however, through participant-observation in the West End was that

In most American cities there are two major types of low-rent neighborhoods: the area of first or second settlement for urban migrants; and the areas that attract the criminal, the mentally ill, the socially rejected, and those who for one reason or another have given up the attempt to cope with life (Gans, 1962: 4).

Moreover,

The former kind of area, typically, is one in which European migrants—and more recently Negro and Puerto Rican ones—try to adapt their nonurban institutions and cultures to the urban milieu.... Often it is described in ethnic terms: Little Italy, The Ghetto, or Black Belt (Gans, 1962: 4).

Gans explains that he has constructed an ideal type for this neighborhood of urban immigrants: "It may be called an urban village" (Gans, 1962: 4). The imagery, urban village, provides a "sociological landscape" against which Gans paints "sociological portraits" of "urban villagers."

In so doing, social scientist Herbert Gans has used systematically observed empirical data to provide the seed or materials for analytic metaphor.

Sociologists Gans, Madsen, Kutak, and Vidich and Bensman (among others), in analytically combining and comparing separate and independent empirical incidents, engage in the aesthetic process of creating metaphor. Put another way, the scientific endeavor of analysis is creative and imaginative.
Both qualitative social scientists and literary artists, then, imaginatively theorize about human behavior. Social scientists, however, in an attempt to elicit what we have termed knowledgeable understanding within their readers, are concerned that their analyses be as bias-free as is humanly possible. That is, social scientists artistically create metaphor from the materials of simultaneously and systematically observed empirical data. Literary artists, meanwhile, in an attempt to evoke what we have termed experiential understanding in an audience, are concerned that their own theoretical ideas do not prevent readers from identifying emotionally with characters or incidents within the novel. Just as the divergent focal values of eliciting knowledgeable understanding on the one hand and evoking experiential understanding on the other specify divergent attitudes and normative prescriptions with regard to theorizing and metaphorical analysis, so also do they specify divergent attitudes and norms with regard to rhetorical style.

Scientific and Aesthetic Attitudes Toward Rhetorical Style

I was not too far into this thesis project when I enrolled in a sociology-anthropology course on qualitative methodology. During one class session my sociology professor and thesis chairman asked how I was getting along and what I was initially finding. I answered that one thing I had begun to notice upon reading, observing, and engaging
in introspection was that social scientists seemed interested in data-gathering and analysis to the exclusion of concern for the written style of their prose products. At the same time, it appeared that literary artists were interested in effecting rhetorical style and tone in their works to the exclusion of concern for observational techniques.

The anthropology professor present chuckled (as I defined it) somewhat apologetically. I think he interpreted what I had said to imply that social scientists do not write well. That social scientists generally are somewhat embarrassed about what they consider their inability to write well seems to me a fair generalization.

David Riesman, in his foreward to Laura Bohannan's Return To Laughter, suggests that "a good many social scientists are novelists manques" (Bowen, 1964: x). And sociologist Monica Morris writes in An Excursion Into Creative Sociology that "playwrights and novelists are frequently... able to illustrate sociological concepts in familiar, day-to-day situations without the burdensome terminology so many sociologists feel constrained to use in their attempts to appear scientific" (Morris, 1977: 72). Glaser and Strauss comment that "often the novelist's tactics for getting the reader to imagine social reality are more subtle" than the social scientist's. One reason for this is that the novelist "may be a more skilled writer" (Glaser and Strauss, 1973: 229n).
At this point in this project, however, I am willing to revise my initial generalization offered more than a year ago in class. (Perhaps I had reified the procedure/inspiration mythology along with some of its ramifications.) It is valid to believe that social scientists concentrate most vividly on procedures of data-gathering and analysis while literary artists focus most directly upon effecting rhetorical style in the prose product. This does not mean, however, that social scientists are oblivious to the style and tone of their prose products, just as literary artists (we have seen) are not unaware of the necessity for observation.

**Scientific and Aesthetic Use of "Cool" and "Warm" Language:**

Indeed, for both social scientists and literary artists it is the writer's focal intent which influences the tone and style of writing in the completed prose product. Social scientists, in an effort to effect knowledgeable understanding from audiences, necessarily engage in the use of conceptual and analytic terminology—terminology which to Monica Morris seems "burdensome." A sociological monograph is not intended, we have seen, primarily to evoke in a reader an emotional experience, but rather to promote understanding on a more rational or intellectual level. As such, the sociological monograph is not designed to be emotionally or rhetorically "gripping." A scientific writer who emphasizes the "existence of an outer (knowable) world... will tend to use a high, cool, distancing terminology and
to avoid those lower, warmer, familiar levels of linguistic usage in which words are personally affecting" (McMullen, 1968: 106).

Literary artists, meanwhile, attempting to evoke experiential understanding within readers, purposefully use words in such a way as to heighten the potential emotional impact of the piece. "The development of art could be written in terms of the artist's struggle to overcome (the reader's tendency toward) emotional deadlock....One continuous trend in modern literature is the effort to maintain the audience's re-creative tension" (Koestler, 1949: 329). Because of this the successful novel is necessarily fashioned of a rhetorical style that is intentionally "gripping."

While both scientific and literary authors agree that their writing should be clear and as simple as possible---and while, as we have seen, both qualitative social scientists and literary artists employ descriptions of and quotations from subjects and characters within their work---the different goals of knowledgeable understanding on the one hand and experiential understanding on the other do impose divergences in rhetorical style. One of these divergences is that social scientists necessarily employ ab-

---C. Wright Mills advises practicing social science researchers that "I know you will agree that you should present your work in as clear and simple language as your subject and your thought about it permit" (Mills, 1973: 217). Meanwhile literary editors Macauley and Lanning suggest that "the writer whose language is fuzzy can never do full justice to any subject, no matter how well chosen it may be" (Macauley and Lanning,, 1964: 50).
stract analytical concepts in their writing and, once meanings of these are specified, repeat the terms throughout their monographs. Literary artists, however, tend to use a variety of more concrete or "warmer" (McMullen, 1968: 196) adjectives, nouns, and verbs and to combine these in colorful or emotionally intriguing figures of speech. The following from Gans' *The Urban Villagers* and Puzo's *The Godfather* illustrate this difference.

Herbert Gans informs readers of *The Urban Villagers* that

Individual mobility is that undertaken by a single individual or family unit which acts apart from other individuals or families; it is idiosyncratic. Group mobility takes place when a large number of individual members of a group move in the same direction, at the same time, and for the same reasons....Changes in the group's way of living exemplify the latter; the departure of an individual West Ender into an exclusive suburban neighborhood is an example of the former.

The second typology is related to the first. Internal mobility changes the behavior of the group, but neither breaks it up nor significantly alters its structure. External mobility, on the other hand, does break up or alter the group significantly....

West Enders do not reject mobility or change, but they do take more readily to some types than to others....The rejection of external mobility is largely a rejection of middle-class elements in the

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8This is not to say that social scientists do not or cannot create emotionally intriguing rhetoric and/or figures of speech. Rosalie Wax evidences much knowledge about creating tone in her prose as she writes the following: "He fell asleep. But I listened to the faint hoots of the owls and the distant howls of the wild dogs, the vibrating plonks of the big bull frogs, and the quiet that came between them" (Wax, 1971: 200). And Herbert Gans, engaging in analysis of Italian-American peer groups, creates the following figure of speech: "Peer group members act as if they were held together by ties of rubber, which they alternately stretch and relax, but rarely break" (Gans, 1962: 81).

It is necessary in order to effect knowledgeable understanding within an audience that analytic concepts be accurately defined and, moreover, that other terms for those concepts which might carry slightly different connotations, not be used. From a scientific point of view, in order for the reader to become informed, the message must be precisely and accurately denoted. That is, analytic concepts must be clearly specified and then used wherever applicable. Consequently, Gans defines in his monograph such sociological concepts as individual mobility, group mobility, external mobility and internal mobility. Once defined, furthermore, these terms are used repeatedly.

Contrast the above passage written by Gans with the following from Puzo:

The car threaded through the bridge approaches and then was on it, leaving the blazing city behind. Michael kept his face impassive. Were they going to dump him into the swamps or was it just a last-minute change in meeting place by the wily Sollozzo? But when they were nearly all the way across, the driver gave the wheel a violent twist. The heavy automobile jumped into the air when it hit the divider and bounced over into the lanes going back to New York City (Puzo, 1970: 148).

We are here dealing with words which, rather than having been clearly defined and specified, are designed to spur in the mind of the reader an image. Moreover, the reader must necessarily become involved in the creating of that image. The manner in which one reader perceives in his/her mind a car threading through an approach to a bridge may be significantly different from the manner in which a second reader
perceives that suggested image. Similarly, the mental image one reader may form of the heavy automobile's jumping into the air and bouncing over into the lanes going the other direction may be different from that mental picture formed in the mind of a second reader. For example, was there a concrete divider between the two directions of lanes? What kind of automobile was it? What color? What kind of bridge were the driver and his occupant threading across? Fiction fosters such questions because in answering them the reader is forced to participate and, consequently, to become involved emotionally within the characters, situations, and action of the piece. Colorful words and phrases—threaded, dump, violent, twist, jumped, and bounced—spur the reader to make use of his/her own creative imagination in envisioning them. From a literary point of view, the fact that readers may imagine such words and phrases differently is a value to be rhetorically pursued.  

Scientific and Aesthetic Rhetorical Organization:

Just as scientists, wishing to disseminate information in as accurate a prose style as possible, can seldom employ language designed to encourage a reader's free mental association and creation of images, so also they explain

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Laura Bohannan employs warm, colorful language in her novel. She writes: "The truck alternately jounced and slithered over the dirt road; after last night's rain, the first of the season, it was a lake of mud with occasional reefs of laterite" (Bowen, 1964: 1). And later, "People who always rubbed along smoothly now seemed to feel some grittiness between them, some irritant that turned their lightest teasing into anger" (Bowen, 1964: 264).
clearly from the beginning what they hope to describe and subsequently to analyze. Because readers who seek knowledgeable understanding are not to be kept guessing, scientific monographs generally begin with a clear statement of the problem to be investigated. Then, once each topic is presented and analyzed, that topic is summed up in a conclusion. When I began writing this thesis, I had just completed a long fictional narrative. Not recognizing the serious need to "shift gears" (as a friend of mine puts it), I wrote and submitted the introduction and first chapter of the thesis to my adviser. I received it back a few days later with several comments written in the margins. "Why must you keep me guessing?" he wrote. "Where are you going?" he asked. "You took too long getting here," he moaned. (I could hear him moaning as I read his remarks.) Scientific writers, aiming at effecting knowledgeable understanding by their readers, do not value keeping those readers guessing.

Literary artists, on the other hand, in an effort to evoke experiential understanding from their audiences, use means which encourage reader involvement and participation in the piece. One of these means, along with the use of imaginatively intriguing rhetoric, is to write in such a way that the reader must hypothesize or guess—or at least wait—as the story unfolds. The first several lines of Madsen's monograph, contrasted with the first paragraph of Barrett's novel, provide an illustrative example of this rhetorical divergence. Madsen writes:
Hidalgo County lies across the border from Mexico in the valley of the lower Rio Grande of southeastern Texas. This fertile agricultural land embracing Hidalgo and Cameron counties has been known to some as the "Valley of Tears" but modern promoters advertise it as the "Magic Valley."

Seventy-five percent of the population of Hidalgo County is Mexican-American. These Spanish-speaking citizens consider themselves the true Texans and sometimes refer to the English-speaking residents as "foreigners." Their viewpoint has considerable historical validity because the Rio Grande Valley was originally settled by Spaniards and Mexicans nearly a century before the first settlers from the United States reached the area (Madsen, 1964: 4).

Barrett writes:

The girl stood with her hands thrust deep into the pockets of her tweed topcoat, stubbornly ignoring the January wind and the pellets of ice that rode on it. She studied the figure in the window thoughtfully. It was one figure of many, but for her the others did not exist. She had no interest in Meissen plates or Dresden figurines, nor Buddhas, nor Kwan Yins, porcelain on brass or silver on copper. The figure stood alone on the lowest of the three shelves in the right-hand rear corner of the display window. From the lowliest spot it commanded her attention and held it (Barrett, 1953: 17).

While a critic might argue that Madsen poses but does not immediately answer the question of why Hidalgo County has been called by some the "Valley of Tears," for the most part his beginning sentences to The Mexican-Americans of South Texas relate information, rather than provoking questions in the reader's mind. Barrett's initial sentences, meanwhile, do just the opposite. Who is the girl? readers wonder. What figure is she looking at? Where exactly is she? Why does she gaze so intently upon the figure? What parts will the girl and the figure play in the story?  

9Anthropologist Bohannan's novel begins much as does Barrett's, i.e., with lines intended to raise suspense and
Social scientists, we have seen, seeking to promote within their audiences knowledgeable understanding, attempt to explain in clearly specified descriptive and analytic terminology the purposes and findings of their research. Literary artists, meanwhile, seeking to evoke experiential understanding within readers, present in emotionally charged, intriguing, colorful, and subtle or connotational rhetoric the dramatic unrolling of a story.

Moreover, the divergent primary intents of social scientists and novelists are related to the distinctive manners in which the two kinds of writers define truth. Social scientists, we have seen, regard truth as a body of knowledge or logically derived facts, empirical generalizations, and theories which can be intersubjectively verified. This view, I suggest, implies if not demands that the social science monograph embody first, sufficient data that readers can themselves ascertain the credibility of generalizations and analyses fashioned from that data, and second, some de-

Thus engage the reader. She writes: 'I expect you'll be all right.' Tall Mr. Sackerton, the administrative official in charge of that district, fingered the thin mustache that marked him a confirmed optimist. Nevertheless, he seemed dubious as he gazed at the three-ton truck loaded with wooden boxes packed as half-hundred weight headloads, canvas parcels of bed, bath and tent, my three new servants whom I'd already learned to call 'boys,' three kerosene tins destined to become a stove, and the fifteen carriers who were to take me from the road to the resthouse near Chief Kako's homestead.

'I crawled up beside the driver. Sackerton slammed the door; 'You'll be all right at Kako's. I've told him you want to learn the language.' As the truck growled off to a start on the muddy road, he shouted after me, 'If you get into trouble...' but the rest was lost in the noise of the engine" (Bowen, 1964: 1).
scription of both the author's methodology and perhaps of his/her credentials. Novelists, meanwhile, regard truth as that body of primarily introspectively derived, universal human conditions to which virtually all persons can relate emotionally or come to understand experientially. This aesthetic view necessitates that the fictional piece, in order to effect audience transcendence between the concrete experiences and characters depicted and the universal human condition implied, make sufficient logical sense that the reader is not, as it were, "thrown out" of the piece. Put another way, while the literary or artistic novel has as its primary intent the evoking of experiential or emotional response in readers, that novel must simultaneously be fashioned of logically consistent situations and events--situations and events which correspond with readers' own experiential understanding of factual reality. Novelists, whose purpose in writing is to evoke experiential understanding from their readers, must present a logically related and consistent--i.e., believable--piece in order for that piece to "work."

10 An example of a creative piece that is not experientially credible or true because others cannot share the experience being related is provided by a favorite jingle of my fourth-grade child:

"One bright day in the middle of the night
Two dead boys got up to fight.
Back to back they faced each other;
With their swords they shot each other.
Two deaf policemen heard this noise,
Got up and shot the two dead boys.
If you don't believe me, ask the blind man:
He saw it all."
We have already seen that novelists engage in observation. Much of that observation, besides providing material for metaphor or the seed from which grows a story, is directed toward making the piece appear believable to readers who have themselves observed and come to conclusions about the world. James Dickey comments in this regard that

If we make a real river, and real canoes, and real men, and real monsters, and real arrows, and real shotguns, and real woods, and real rapids and white water, then all the other stuff will take care of itself (Dickey, 1976: 81).

Novelists, seeking to engage their audiences experientially, must effect within their readers "an almost complete suspension of disbelief" (McMullen, 1968: 198). In the novel, consequently,

we are where art and life can be experienced as coinciding...where the artist aims at verisimilitude as well as at truth, and where the critic assumes a right to complain if things do not happen as he feels they really would have, given the circumstances (McMullen, 1968: 197).

Novelists, then, engage in an artistic prose medium which—as contrasted to poetry—is necessarily logically ordered.11 In this sense the novel and the social science monograph come together to form a third culture.

11McMullen notes that "To try to get behind certain obscure modern poems into a presumable more fundamental reality is as futile as trying to get behind an equation in pure mathematics. Even in relatively simple contemporary verse there is apt to be a final weakness of reference about which nothing can be done. The reader is left to assume that ultimate reality is neither a theatrical dream nor an objective fact, neither in our minds nor out there. It is in the method of representation. It is the method" (McMullen, 1968: 107).
Scientific and Aesthetic Means of Gaining Readers' Confidence:

Moreover, it is in recognition of this logical ordering of situations that, from the experience of the reader, seem credible, believable, or probable—though not necessarily based upon actual, verifiable facts—that a literary audience comes to trust a fictional author. Literary critic Stephen Tennant writes:

One might say that a fine novel is like a life you lead. Readers felt that they could lead this wonderful, vicarious life with absolute trust, enjoyment, and exhilaration, because the unseen and even forgotten writer bore the stamp of an implicit integrity. A great writer should always have an anonymous quality, something remote like a pregnant silence—which is silent, and yet contains all sound, all time, all things (Tennant, 1962: xv).

Speaking of Willa Cather in particular, Tennant continues, his comments succinctly summarizing the aesthetic view regarding this issue of trust in an author. Tennant writes that Cather's "readers took her hand in loving trust, then forgot that they were holding anyone's hand" (Cather, 1962: xv-xvi). This situation differs from that of scientists who, upon presenting facts and conclusions to an audience, generally do all that is possible to legitimize their scientific status and, by implication, the verifiability of their findings.

If the artist does not claim to be a reporter of the factual world but a constructor of imaginative and pleasurable products, his/her claim to veracity is not an essential part of the claim to artistic acceptance.... The reader need not even know the author to appreciate the novel. But where the author attests to a world of real properties, his/her integrity and competence to report is a
question (Gusfield, 1976: 19-20).

We have seen that scientists, viewing truth as a system of empirical facts, generalizations, and analyses open to intersubjective verification, offer sufficient data that readers can themselves ascertain the credibility of generalizations and analyses fashioned from that data. Furthermore, scientists elucidate the methodology and methods they employ in gathering their data. These two practices, moreover, are often accompanied upon final presentation of the manuscript to an audience, with information regarding the author's academic credentials and thus, by implication, information which may have some bearing upon the factual and analytic accuracy—i.e. the validity—of the monograph.

Thus readers are informed in the preface to Small Town in Mass Society that the data employed in the study are a by-product of the research project, Cornell Studies in Social Growth, sponsored by the Department of Child Development and Family Relationships, New York State College of Home Economics, Cornell University, with the aid of funds from the National Institute of Mental Health, United States Public Health Service, and the Social Science Research Council (Vidich and Bensman, 1968: xix-xx).

Vidich, we are told elsewhere, engaged in participant-observation while occupying the position of field director of the Cornell project (Vidich and Bensman, 1968: 398).

Similarly the audience learns that The Story of a Bohemian-American Village, "submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, in the Faculty of Political Science, Columbia University
....developed out of a report given in the seminar conducted by Professor A.A. Tenney. It is based on the sociological system of Professor R.M. MacIver, whose penetrating books are indispensable to an understanding of social life. The author is indebted to Professors R.E. Chaddock, R.S. Lynd, and F.A. Ross for many helpful suggestions (Kutak, 1970: v).

Readers are informed, furthermore, that William Madsen, author of The Mexican-Americans of South Texas, was born a United States National in Shanghai, China. He went to school in Manila, and then to Harvard University, Cambridge University in England, and finally to Stanford for his B.A. He did graduate work at the Escuela Nacional de Antropologia, Mexico, and finished his Ph.D. at the University of California, Berkeley. He served with the American Field Service in the British Eighth Army, North Africa in 1941-1943, and has taught at the University of Texas, the University of California at Berkeley, and at Santa Barbara. In 1963-1964 he was a research associate at the Institute for the Study of Human Problems at Stanford, and is now Professor of Anthropology at Purdue University. He was also acting director of the Institute of Latin American Studies at the University of Texas, and president of the Board of Directors, Centro de Investigaciones Sociales, A.C., Monterrey, Mexico, and was the founder and first president of the organization. He is a fellow of the American Anthropological Association, and is a member of several other scientific societies, including the Sociedad Mexicana de Antropologia. He is the author of numerous books concerned with Mexican and Mexican-American cultures (Madsen, 1964: vii).

Finally, in a section designated to "acknowledgements," Herbert Gans writes in The Levittowners that

My primary debt is to the Institute for Urban Studies of the University of Pennsylvania, under whose aegis the research and much of the writing was done, and which paid my salary when no grant monies were forthcoming....A first draft of the book was completed while I was on the staff of the Institute of Urban Studies of Teachers College, Columbia University; and the final one, at the Center for Urban Education (Gans, 1967: ix).

Sociologist Joseph Gusfield, asserting that scientific
writing is indeed consciously styled, argues that the value of bias-free analyses and subsequent bias-free presentation implies that, as much as possible, "the author must not intrude into the product." Yet, Gusfield points out, the scientific writer must be "trusted" by his/her audience. The consequent dilemma "between personalizing and removing the agent seems to be solved...by a device of identification through role." That is, the scientific writer informs "the audience about his professional competence and acceptance" in the scientific community (Gusfield, 1976: 19-20). Thus, the presentation of the scientific monograph to consumers with the intent of eliciting from those readers some degree of knowledgeable understanding implies in most cases that information concerning the author's academic credentials be included in the monograph.

Of the four novels analyzed for this project, however, only one carries information about the author. That is William Barrett's *The Shadows of the Images*, and the information appears on the book's dust jacket, rather than in the book itself. What novels do often contain--and I propose this is understandable as an effort to connote to readers the universality of the themes they develop--is a quotation, sometimes lengthy, sometimes brief, from a previous artist or philosopher. Thus Edmund Wilson places, on the page before the novel's contents are listed, an excerpt from Nikolai Gogel's *Viy*: Willa Cather quotes Virgil ("Optima dies...prima fugit") on the title page of *My Antonia*: William Bar-
rett begins his novel with a lengthy "prelude" from Plato; and Mario Puzo begins "Book I" of The Godfather with the following from Balzac: "Behind every great fortune there is a crime."

The divergent primary aims, then, of promoting knowledgeable understanding on the one hand and evoking experiential understanding on the other, related to the divergent manners in which scientists and artists define truth, imply stylistic differences in sociologists' and novelists' prose. While an audience learns to trust literary artists inasmuch as they present characters, situations, and experiences which feel plausible and bear the connotation of universality, readers of social science are generally aided in developing confidence in authors by the writers' insertion into the monograph of information regarding academic credentials.

Scientific and Aesthetic Use of Passive and Active Voice:

Just as the divergent focal goals of social scientists and literary artists are related to their respective definitions of truth, so also are these similar-yet-different aims related to their respective views of subject matter. Social scientists, we have repeatedly seen, focus upon the known, predictable, recurrent attitudes and behaviors which comprise the Me of social selves. To social scientists human beings are primarily subjects to whom a myriad of socio-cultural "things" have happened. This view, I suggest, implies (if not demands) the use of passive voice verbs and,
consequently, of a passive tone sometimes criticized as "burdensome." Literary artists, meanwhile, focus upon the knowing, experiencing, freely responding and surprising I within human selves. To novelists human beings are primarily actors who make or feel things happen. This view, I suggest further, implies (if not demands) the extensive use of active voice verbs and the consequent active tone.

The subject matter of social science, we have seen, lies primarily within the generalized other which is present in human beings. This generalized other has been developed through internalization of environmental or community attitudes. The Me within social selves has been, by the time the participant-observer comes onto the scene, at least partially developed. While that Me may change due to processes of further socialization, the Me is nevertheless defined within the social scientific perspective as that element within human beings which has been, is, and will be subjected to sociocultural influences. This view—that the essential subject matter of the social scientist is that which is subjected to environmental influences—finds its expression within the rhetorical style of social science monographs. Because the primary aim of social science is to foster understanding of a sociocultural milieu, the rhetoric of social science monographs is distinguished from that of literary art in at least two ways: first, because human beings' attitudes and subsequent behavior are viewed as recurrent and relational, social selves are most often depicted
as similar members of sociocultural categories. Second, elements of the sociocultural milieu more often than in literature become the grammatical subjects of sentences in the written monograph. The stylistic result of these two writing practices is that, while conceptually human beings remain the ones who perform actions, actions are often depicted in passive tones and through the use of both non-active and of passive voice verbs. The monographs of Vidich and Bensman, Kutak, Madsen, and Gans offer illustrative examples. Vidich and Bensman write that

rational farmers are those who conceive of and work at farming as a business. Cost, including labor and capital costs, are carefully calculated and related to the prices received, and costs and energy are distributed in such a way as to produce the maximum yield (Vidich and Bensman, 1968: 55, emphasis added).

In a similar rhetorical style Robert Kutak writes:

In all of the homes of Milligan the dining table draws the family together three times daily and helps determine the rhythm of its activities. The members who come together are clad in typical American clothes, factory-made or sewed at home to a popular pattern, but the table at which they sit is laden with dishes such as were eaten by their forefathers (Kutak, 1970: 67, emphasis added).

And Madsen tells readers that

The lower class earns a living by manual labor and constitutes the bulk of Hidalgo County's population. Members of the lower class are employed as agricultural laborers, food processors, canny workers and servants but they are primarily associated with the land and its products (Madsen, 1964: 29, emphasis added).

Finally Gans writes that in Boston's West End

While the husband's main role is breadwinning, the wife is responsible for all functions concerning home and child, even the finding of an apartment....
(Later) as the child grows into an adolescent, he is home less and less often... (and) relationships with parents become more tenuous and often result in conflict (Gans, 1962: 50, emphasis added).

These examples, by the nature of the stylistic tone in which they were written, offer insights into the perspective shared by their authors. For Vidich and Bensman, the many farmers who inhabit Springfield can be classified into categories, one of which they designate as "rational farmers." That classification, moreover, is dependent upon certain "sensitizing" (cf. Blumer, 1969) concepts, one of which is the manner in which these farmers view costs and energy. The concepts of cost and energy, then, become subjects for analytic investigation, and hence the grammatical subjects for the forthcoming sentence. Consequently, one reads that costs are calculated and related by farmers to the prices received. Robert Kutak views Milligan residents as social selves whose recurrent and predictable behavior results from an acculturation process which necessarily involves the combination of attitudes from both the generalized other of their homeland and that of America. Consequently, Kutak has sensitized himself as observer to certain sociological conditions, among them the clothing worn in Milligan and the kinds of food eaten there. The result is that, in the example, these two concepts become a primary concern of his paragraph. We read, therefore, that while Milligan residents are clad in typical American clothing their tables simultaneously are laden with dishes of their forefathers.
Similarly Madsen, viewing residents of Hildalgo County as social selves whose behavior is recurrent and predictable, recognizes that certain aspects of their behavior lend themselves to generalizations. Becoming interested, then, in the sensitizing concept of employment, Madsen tells us that members of the county's lower class are employed as food producers, cannery workers, and farm laborers, but that the labors of these people primarily are associated with the land.

Finally, Gans, perceiving the Italians of Boston's West End as subjects for investigation whose attitudes and behavior is fairly predictable and recurrent, interests himself in such sensitizing concepts as the roles of husbands, wives, and children. Consequently, the concept of role becomes the subject of the sentence cited above, followed by the non-active verb is along with a predicate which denotes the subject. Here, as in all the examples above, main attention is not fixed upon acting human beings themselves, but rather on the sociocultural causes for, environmental conditions surrounding, and results of those actions. Many times these causes, conditions, and results are placed at the heads of sentences, hence becoming grammatical subjects. When this occurs, the sentence takes on a passive quality, incorporating both non-active and passive voice verbs.

The subject matter of literary artists, on the other hand, lies primarily, as we have recurrently seen, in the acting, moving I of social selves. From the aesthetic perspective, human beings are freely and creatively engaged in
weaving the evolving fabric of their lives. To tell the story of human beings from an aesthetic perspective is to portray action and movement. Says William Faulkner: "The aim of every artist is to arrest motion, which is life, by artificial means and hold it fixed so that a hundred years later, when a stranger looks at it, it moves again since it is life" (Faulkner, in Cowley, 1975: 139).

This view finds its expression within the rhetorical style of the novel. Because the free actions of characters are of primary importance, literary artists tend to place characters at the heads of sentences and subsequently to allow those characters to engage in action. The grammatical result is that human acts are portrayed in active rhetorical tones, i.e., through use of action-oriented and active-voice verbs. In an effort, furthermore, to depict free human acts dramatically, novelists employ other techniques designed to build suspense and often to evoke surprise. We have already considered, in chapter II, William Barrett's use of surprise in The Shadows of the Images.

Another rhetorical technique, employed in order to heighten suspense, exists in Edmund Wilson's Memoirs of Hecate County. In that tale of a man's agonized choice between two very different women, the I-character's ultimate choice, moreover, is not revealed until the end of the tale. Readers watch a man decide his own future, unaware of what the outcome will be until the protagonist himself makes that decision. A rhetorical device used by Wilson and im-
plied by his subject matter, then, is that he segments the novel chronologically according to the days and months throughout which the dramatic action takes place. After the protagonist meets Anna, for example, (the "chunky little wench, who had heavy mascara on her lashes and who told me I was a pretty good dancer") and invites her to his New York City apartment, he waits, not knowing whether she will show. Later we are told that "she did turn up," but "very late." Then, beneath a heading marked February 20, Anna is in the protagonist's apartment, "her soft little face with its white tender skin and its shadows in the softened lighting, as she was sitting half upright on the daybed." Later, under a similar heading marked March 24, readers are told that Anna "turned up one night last week in the dress she borrows from Doris, full of excitement over a party she was going to with some dance hall girls." Still later, on April 7, both reader and I-character learn that "Anna has left (her job at) the Tango Casino and got a job as a waitress in Field's restaurant." Then, on April 10, the I-character notices (and hence can for the first time relate to readers) that "things seem to be getting worse with Anna. She is always worried and tired. Her eyes protrude and her skin is dry and her face looks a little hardened" (Wilson, 1959: 142-164). Gradually in this manner the reader watches both Anna and the I-character perform, sketching as it were, the landscapes of their lives. Wilson has em-

12 In much the same way the reader watches the relationship between Imogen, "the princess with the gold hair,"
ployed stylistic technique in order to facilitate the gradual, dramatic unfolding of his story.

If Wilson's view that human beings fashion their own lives evidences itself in rhetorical techniques through which his tale unrolls, Cather's similar view is reflected in her narrative style. This is true in at least two respects: First, Cather makes use of foreshadowing in order to build suspense; and second, she uses expressive action-oriented verbs, a practice which creates an active tone in her work.

Readers of *My Antonia*, like readers of *Memoirs of Hecate Country*, watch characters involved in the active process of mapping their own lives. To this end Cather employs the rhetorical technique of foreshadowing. By presenting some indication or suggestion beforehand of action that is to come, the author creates the illusion of movement. Hence Jim Burden tells readers:

and the I-character develop. Struck with her unapproachable beauty at the beginning and throughout the majority of the novel, the I-character only gradually becomes aware of Imogen's neurotic, cruel selfishness.

Rosalie Wax, in telling of her experiences as a field worker in several settings, often employs the rhetorical device of foreshadowing. In one example she relates that "A friend who had lived at Thrashing Buffalo asked us where we were going to stay. When we replied that we were planning to stay with Walter's folks for a while, this friend looked alarmed and urgently suggested that we not do this" (Wax, 1971: 182). The reader does not learn the source of Rosalie's friend's alarm until much later in her story.
Every morning, before I was up, I could hear Tony (Antonia) singing in the garden rows. After the apple and cherry trees broke into bloom, we ran about under them, hunting for the new nests the birds were building, throwing clods at each other, and playing hide-and-seek with Nina. Yet the summer which was to change everything was coming nearer every day. When boys and girls are growing up, life can't stand still, not even in the quietest of country towns (Cather, 1954: 193, emphasis added).

Just as Cather uses the techniques of foreshadowing to create an illusion of activity and movement implied by the freely choosing I within the human being, she also employs verbs which vividly connote action. The following paragraph provides several examples:

When we reached the level and could see the gold tree-tops, I pointed toward them, and Antonia laughed and squeezed my hand as if to tell me how glad she was I had come. We raced off toward Squaw Creek and did not stop until the ground itself stopped--fell away before us so abruptly that the next step would have been out into the tree-tops. We stood panting on the edge of the ravine, looking down at the trees and bushes that grew below us. The wind was so strong that I had to hold my hat on, and the girls' skirts were blown out before them. Antonia seemed to like it; she held her little sister by the hand and chattered away in that language which seemed to me spoken so much more rapidly than mine. She looked at me, her eyes fairly blazing with things she could not say (Cather, 1954: 25).

Use of action verbs here, along with use of the active voice, helps to create the image of movement. Jim Burden and Antonia are not persons to whom things happen; rather, they are two individuals who point, laugh, squeeze, race, pant, chatter, and—for Antonia at least—whose eyes "fairly blaze."

Furthermore, not only do Cather's characters express motion, but the author infuses the very setting of her nar-
rative with movement. Jim reflects that

more than anything else I felt motion in the landscape; in the fresh, easy-blowing morning wind, and in the earth itself, as if the shaggy grass were a sort of loose hide, and underneath it herds of wild buffalo were galloping, galloping...(Cather, 1954: 16).

Through the use of words which describe and connote action vividly, active-voice verbs, and foreshadowing, Willa Cather encourages her audience experientially to focus upon the freely choosing, feeling, experiencing, unpredictable I within Antonia—and thereby in all human selves. Because the primary purpose of literary art is to depict human beings engaged in free, unpredictable and surprising actions, novelists refuse to classify characters in categories. From the aesthetic point of view, characters are singular individuals whose thought, decisions, and feelings cannot readily be categorized.

Aesthetic Depiction of Characters as Unique Individuals:

In their attempt to depict certain universal truths, novelists portray the thoughts, feelings, and actions of individuals. According to novelist Ralph Ellison, "The universal in the novel—and isn't that what we're all clamoring for these days?—is reached only through the depiction of the specific man in a specific circumstance" (Ellison, in Plimpton, 1974: 322). Consequently, novelists present single characters or protagonists and antagonists, rather than classes, groups, or categories of social selves. "In the arts...uniqueness of personality is, and should be, accent" (Kluckhohn, 1953: 55). Consequently, Willa Cather's
Antonia is no ordinary immigrant.

Whether as a Bohemian child, one of the hired girls in town, a young woman awaiting marriage, or as a wife and mother Antonia stands out as a singular individual. Upon meeting Antonia and her family, Jim Burden as a young boy describes for the reader, first, Antonia's father and sister, and then continues:

The little girl was pretty, but Antonia—they accented the name thus, strongly, when they spoke to her—was still prettier. I remembered what the conductor had said about her eyes. They were big and warm and full of light, like the sun shining on brown pools in the wood. Her skin was brown, too, and in her cheeks she had a glow of rich, dark colour. Her brown hair was curly and wild-looking (Cather, 1954: 23).

Repeatedly, throughout the novel, the reader is reminded of Antonia's eyes, eyes which convinced those with whom she came into contact that she was, in the train conductor's words, "bright as a new dollar" (Cather, 1954: 331). Antonia—aware, feeling, experiencing, knowing—is a singular and unique individual; indeed, there is no one like her among the thousands of human faces. To depict singularly unique individuals as characters is a technique of the literary artist.

Literary artists, embued with the aesthetic point of view, envision human beings primarily as knowing, experiencing, feeling and free individuals. Because of this, the characters which they portray are generally "extraordinary" (Isherwood, 1974: 174) individuals, endowed with characteristics peculiar to themselves—characteristics
which, like Antonia's eyes, cannot be matched in a myriad of human faces.  

Just as Cather draws Antonia as unique, so too Puzo rhetorically introduces both Michael Corleone and Kay Adams in such a way as to accent their individuality. In the following passage in which Michael is introduced to the reader, he is set apart from the book's other figures spatially, physically, and attitudinally:

The third son, Michael Corleone, did not stand with his father and his two brothers but sat at a table in the most secluded corner of the garden.... Michael Corleone was the youngest son of the Don and the only child who had refused the great man's direction. He did not have the heavy, Cupid-shaped face of the other children, and his jet black hair was straight rather than curly. His skin was a clear olive-brown that would have been called beautiful in a girl. He was handsome in a delicate way....

Every guest noticed that the Don paid no particular attention to this third son. Michael had been his favorite before the war and obviously the chosen heir to run the family business when the proper moment came. He had all the quiet force and intelligence of his great father, the born instinct to act in such a way that men had no recourse but to respect him. But when World War II broke out, Michael Corleone volunteered for the Marine Corps. He defied his father's express command when he did so (Puzo, 1970: 16-17).

14 Jerzy Kosinski in an interview related that while living in Russia he found it difficult to write artistically, since to be a spokesman in a field which used language would require one to be a spokesman for a particular political position. He turned, therefore, to photography. Asked how he brought his aesthetic perspective to photography, he replied that "Within the limits of photography, I could point out certain aspects of human behavior as contrasted with collective behavior. I could show the solitude of a man lost in a large field; I could point out that there is, after all, an independent, naked human being" (Kosinski, 1972: 185).
Similarly, Puzo introduced Kay Adams by setting her apart--spatially and ethnically--from other characters.

Beside (Michael) sat the American girl everyone had heard about but whom no one had seen until this day....They were not impressed with her. She was too thin, she was too fair, her face was too sharply intelligent for a woman, her manner too free for a maiden. Her name, too, was outlandish to their ears; she called herself Kay Adams. If she had told them that her family had settled in America two hundred years ago and her name was a common one, they would have shrugged (Puzo, 1970: 17).

Both Kay, "the washed-out rag of an American girl" (Puzo, 1970: 17), and Michael are, like Antonia, individuals among social selves.

Summary

The different primary aims, then, of eliciting knowledgeable understanding on the one hand and fostering experiential understanding on the other, when related to the similarly different manners in which social scientists and literary artists perceive their subject matter, imply certain stylistic differences apparent in their respective rhetoric. Social scientists generally depict subjects as similar members of sociocultural categories. As a result, elements of the sociocultural milieu often become the grammatical subjects of sentences--a practice which tends to give the work a "passive" tone. Literary artists, on the other hand, employ stylistic techniques such as, among others, foreshadowing and the use of rhetorically "colorful," moving language to engage readers in the drama of lived experience. Furthermore, literary artists, convinced of the unpredicta-
bility of individuals, present their characters as singular and unique, rather than as members of sociocultural categories.

We have examined in this section of this chapter the divergences in rhetorical styles of social scientists and fiction writers. Furthermore, the interrelated areas of primary divergence which have been described throughout this thesis—divergence with regard to focus in subject matter, to definitions of truth, and to primary responses sought from audiences—affect the rhetorical styles of social science monographs and novels. Social scientists, aiming primarily in eliciting knowledgeable understanding in their audience, engage in accurate description and virtually unbiased analysis of their subjects' attitudes and behavior. The rhetoric in which their empirical generalizations and theoretical conclusions is couched is designed to facilitate knowledgeable understanding. Artists, meanwhile, directing their energies primarily toward eliciting experiential understanding on the part of audiences, engage in the believable depiction of one or more characters' unpredictable and sometimes surprising behavior. The often vivid, colorful, intriguing, and action-oriented rhetoric in which they relate suspenseful and surprising occurrences is designed to provoke that experiential understanding.

As we have previously seen, however, the line of demarcation between fiction and social science is not always rigidly drawn. Qualitative social scientists who evidence
recognition of the I within their subjects, also attempt
to evoke a degree of experiential understanding from their
audiences. Sociologist Lofland urges that both fiction and
social science be written "in such a way that one's audience
is at least partially able to project themselves into the
point of view of the people depicted" (Lofland, 1971: 4).
In this regard, Robert Kutak tells readers:

In order to assist in giving the feel of the com-
munity a number of quotations are given. These
quotations do not form the basis of the conclu-
sions reached, but are offered as a means of show-
ing the inner aspects of the life of the community.
They give an opportunity for the people to tell in
their own words how the community and its changes
affect them. They also show the real diversity of
opinion that there is within the community. "Typi-
cal" answers serve a useful purpose in that they
show what the "public" opinion in a community is,
but they never tell the whole story, or even a
large part of it (Kutak, 1970: xi-xii).

Kutak recognizes not only the diversity among his subjects,
but also the value in offering readers the opportunity to
identify with or project themselves into the feeling of
Milligan.

Similarly, novelists, as we have also seen, sketch
many of their characters in terms of the internalized values
of society, attempt to effect a degree of knowledgeable
understanding on the part of their readers. One result of
this is that literary artists have been known to employ de-
vices similar to the social scientific analytical tool of
the ideal type. Stanley Elkin's franchiser is an example.
Not all fictional characters, then, are painted in hues
singular and unique. While the artist's "rounded" char-
acters must be individuals who take on flesh, the stage of the novel is furnished with many minor, "flat" or categorized figures.

It should also be noted that William Foote Whyte's "Doc" along with Liebow's "Tally" assume characteristics common to protagonists in literary works. Just as the good novel offers insight into cultural reality, so too worthy sociology often allows its readers vicariously to experience or feel human beings' lives.

Moreover, both social scientists and literary artists, as we have seen, engage in theorizing about human behavior. Scientific theorizing—i.e., analysis—is a metaphorical process and, as such, involves the use of creative, inspired imagination. Simultaneously, the theorizing of fiction writers must be rational or logically ordered. That is, the theoretical basis upon which a story is built must be plausible and have the credibility, verisimilitude, or "inner consistency" of a "responsible statement of fact" (McMullen, 1968: 198). Here, then, precisely at the point in which literary fiction meets qualitative social science, art and science come together. Just as the artist cannot write a novel without recognizing to some degree the logical patterns of relationship among social human beings, so too the scientist cannot do sociology/anthropology without recognizing the aesthetic component in each and all persons and nurturing that quality within himself/herself.
Novelist Kurt Vonnegut, Jr., related once in an address to the National Institute of Arts and Letters, that as a college student at the University of Chicago, he initially undertook to study science. Finding both physical anthropology and archaeology "tedious," Vonnegut confessed to his faculty adviser "that science did not charm me, that I longed for poetry instead" (Vonnegut, 1974: 175).

The writer's adviser smiled. "How would you like to study poetry which pretends to be scientific?" he asked the student.

"Is such a thing possible?" Vonnegut questioned. Whereupon the adviser shook his student's hand and proclaimed, "Welcome to the field of social or cultural anthropology" (Vonnegut, 1974: 176).

While we can suppose that the conversation happened, we do not know how much Vonnegut exaggerated the interchange for aesthetic purposes. In itself, however, Vonnegut's interpretation of the exchange provides insight to the relationship between the social sciences and literary art.

That anthropology is poetry which pretends to be scientific is an over-statement of the thesis presented throughout this study. As a third-culture discipline, however, anthropology--like both sociology and literary fiction--
is at once scientific and artistic. The third culture incorp­orates the aesthetic perspective in its interest in human subject matter and in the need to learn about human beings through use of inner and outer perspectives, coupled with an ability to think metaphorically and creatively. Moreover, as an artistic endeavor, fiction writing—though not poetry—shares with the scientific perspective the need to present plausible situations, characters, and theoretical idea-systems. This implies that fictionalists learn about human individual and social behavior through use of an outer as well as an inner epistemological, methodo­logical perspective coupled with the ability rationally to order a plethora of emotions or feelings into a logically consistent sequence. Both qualitative social scientists and literary fiction artists evidence obedience to Herbert Blumer's injunction that investigators "respect the nature of the empirical world and organize a methodological stance to reflect that respect" (Blumer, 1969: 60). In the third culture, human beings are to be observed from both the inner, more subjective, and the outer, more objective, epistemological perspectives. Those observations, moreover, provide "materials" from which qualitative social scientists and fiction artists draw inspired, creative, and logically consistent metaphors. Third culture practitioners are scientists-artists!

Scientists-artists, moreover, comprise two groups: artistic, qualitative scientists and scientific literary
artists. Chapter I of this thesis proposed that the third culture exists along a continuum between the two poles of science and art. Qualitative social science and literary fiction occupy adjacent positions along this continuum. While both categories of scientist-artist are of the third culture, literary artists are closer to the artistic pole than are qualitative social scientists. Similarly, qualitative social scientists occupy a position along that continuum closer to the scientific pole than do novelists. The purpose of this thesis has been to investigate and analyze the points of convergence and divergence between these two third culture intellectual and creative enterprises. The following diagram illustrates graphically those points of convergence and divergence in social science and literary art.

Third culture scientists-artists necessarily rely on imagination and inspiration as sources of new, creative insights. All scientists-artists, moreover, aim to promote understanding. Artistic scientists, i.e., qualitative social scientists, aim primarily to effect knowledgeable understanding, while scientific artists or novelists work essentially to evoke experiential understanding. This divergence of emphasis is evidenced in social scientists' and literary artists' different rhetorical prose styles. Social scientists effect a passive, sometimes cool, straightforward tone in their prose, while novelists strive to effect an active, warmer, more intriguing rhetorical style.
# The Third Culture of Scientists-Artists

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**Literary Artists' Aesthetic Perspective**

**Scientific Perspective**

**Social Scientists' Focus**
The divergence between those scientists-artists who focus on knowledgeable understanding and those others who pursue experiential understanding primarily is evidenced, furthermore, in social scientists' and literary artists' different attitudes concerning theoretical analysis. Scientific members of the third culture value analysis which is based in a generally held systematic theory while novelists engage introspectively in personal theorizing.

The divergence with regard to theorizing among third culture scientists-artists, moreover, demands a corresponding divergence with regard to methods and, more generally, methodologies. Artistic scientists insist upon systematic participant observation, a value enhanced by the practice, among others, of taking extensive and accurate field notes. Moreover, artistic scientists, stressing knowledgeable understanding of varied human groups, recognize the pragmatic problem of "gaining entrance" into the groups they observe. Scientific literary artists, meanwhile, focus upon introspective, personal--often unconscious and haphazard--observation of themselves and their worlds as an avenue to both introspectively personal theorizing and, ultimately, experiential understanding. Scientific artists consider themselves primarily "member observers" in a single human community, united by the human capacity to feel or experience stimuli emotionally. At the same time, all scientists-artists, because they depend on imagination, inspiration, reason, and logical consistency, combine both personal ex-
perience and observation in their resultant theorizing.

Furthermore, scientists-artists blend the outer and inner epistemological perspectives. While the scientific point of view emphasizes the outer epistemology, the artistic vantage point focuses on the inner. Third culture scientists-artists recognize both the possibility and the necessity for uniting the two.

Scientists-artists, aiming to promote understanding, blend the outer and inner epistemologies in their search for truth. In the third culture, truth is a composite of intersubjectively determined facts and statements which relate to a person's personal experience. Artistic scientists tend to regard truth mainly as that body of facts, generalizations, and theories about the knowable, empirical world which can be ascertained intersubjectively through systematic participant observation and unbiased analysis. That is, artistic scientists focus upon that element of truth which embodies intersubjectively determined facts. Scientific artists, meanwhile, emphasize that element of truth which encompasses those universal statements about human beings and their world to which all persons can emotionally relate. What distinguishes social science from literary art in this regard is a matter of emphasis.

Where these two groups of scientists-artists evidence methodological and epistemological divergences, moreover, they do so in relation to their choice to emphasize different aspects in their own dual natures as human investigators.
Scientists-artists are, like all humans, comprised of both a Me and an I. Third culture practitioners embody a predictable, normative, logically consistent Me. Scientists-artists simultaneously encompass an unpredictable, spontaneous I, capable of emotional experiencing. Artistic scientists, emphasizing knowledgeable over experiential understanding, correspondingly focus upon that element of themselves as investigators which is rational or logically consistent. Scientific artists, emphasizing experiential over knowledgeable understanding, focus upon that element of themselves as investigators which is unpredictable and emotional. That is, social scientists stress the Me in their selves as methodologists while novelists focus upon the I in their selves as observer-writers. Inasmuch as both groups of scientists-artists demonstrate imagination, inspiration, and creativity they have necessarily fused within their selves the Me and the I.

The divergence of emphasis among third culture practitioners with regard to their dual natures as investigators, moreover, is apparent in social scientists' and literary artists' choice of subject matter. While all scientists-artists look to human beings for materials, social scientists focus primarily upon the predictable, empirical Me within humans and literary artists focus more directly upon the unpredictable, non-empirical I within social selves.

We began this thesis with the question as to whether the social sciences had anything more in common than subject
matter with the aesthetic humanities. What we have found is that both social science and literary art, particularly fiction, endeavor to respect the nature of the empirical world which they investigate and seek to organize a methodological stance reflecting that respect. Consequently social science, especially qualitative social science, converges methodologically with the aesthetic perspective. Qualitative social science is artistic science.

Moreover, literary art, especially fiction, converges methodologically with the scientific perspective. Thus—directly contrary to the procedure-vs.-inspiration mythology—social science and literary fiction can be viewed as comprising a third culture, existing between the two divergent cultures of physical science and aesthetically abstract humanities. This third culture differs only slightly from that of C.P. Snow who envisioned a third culture bridging an ocean between the two divergent continents of the physical sciences and the humanities, but who included in that third culture only social science.

One can conclude, moreover, that upon continued inspection of both convergences and divergences between social science and fiction, qualitative practitioners of the third culture (and quantitative practitioners too) will no longer consider qualitative sociological art as less than or unscientific. In this regard, Severyn Bruyn writes:

The cultural perspective of social science is still in the making, but we already know that the images which comprise it are basically different from the traditional images of science because the social
scientist is both a participant in and an observer of the society he studies.

Thus, the social scientist finds that the concrete, the ideal, and the simple images that are frequently a part of the "participant" perspective are as important to understand as are the formal, the realistic, and the complex images that are frequently a part of the "observer" perspective. Neither perspective could be complete without the other (Bruyn, 1966: xv).

The method of the social scientist, we are saying, must take dramatic account of the sociocultural world--the complex of actors and their plots as they live and dream on the stage of society--as a breathing part of his theoretical design (Bruyn, 1966: xiv).

A personal value which motivated this research project was my desire to sort out the similarities and differences between qualitative social scientists and writers of fiction, especially in light of the fact that, with some exceptions, these two categories of observer-writer appear to be unaware of their many commonalities in subject matter and method. Offering a statement which applies to this issue, Mannheim writes:

The sociology of knowledge seeks to overcome the "talking past one another" of the various antagonists by taking as its explicit theme of investigation the uncovering of the sources of the partial disagreements which would never come to the attention of the disputants because of their preoccupation with the subject-matter that is the immediate issue of the debate (Mannheim, 1936: 281).

Mannheim's words speak to what has been attempted here. Noting once that the fiction writers and the social scientists I knew seemed to be for the most part "talking past one another," I--for my own peace of mind--have sought to "uncover the sources of their partial disagreements."

I approached the question scientifically. That is,
I systematically examined data from the empirical world, striving to glean empirical fact. The data I analyzed were of three types: first, my personal experiences supported by introspection on those experiences as a student apprentice both in doing sociology and in writing fiction; second, testimonies of social scientists, such as William F. Whyte, John Lofland, and Rosalie Wax, and of literary artists as expressed in The Paris Review interviews; and third, selected pairs of matched social science monographs and novels, each pair dealing with Anglo-Americans, Bohemian-Americans, Mexican-Americans, and Italian-Americans respectively. The generalizations and conclusions which I have drawn from these sources are, I think, as objectively free from bias as is possible. They are at the same time artistic creations, for they result also from random, haphazard observations—things I noticed when I least expected to. My conclusions grew from allowing my mind to wander aimlessly from a television show, perhaps, to something in a novel recently read, to some snatch of dialogue overheard in an airport, to an anecdotal comment made by my thesis chairman or a fellow graduate student over lunch, to the laughter and poetic ramblings of my children.

Moreover, these conclusions resulted from inspiration. One occasion of insight I remember vividly. Two summers ago, I was busy with almost nothing but loafing and corralling my children. My days included dispensing fudge bars or frozen yogurt, hauling loads of sunburned
arms and legs from the neighborhood swimming pool, clapping sand out of sticky tennis shoes, and working toward a Coppertone tan. I had, during the previous spring, submitted a thesis proposal to my adviser, but--because it was short on theory--he had asked that I write a second draft.

The sociologist who has been my thesis adviser, meanwhile, had received a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities and was spending ten weeks participating in an extended seminar in Florida. During that time he wrote me. The letter (kindly) did not mention my thesis. Nor did it mention sociology.

I received the letter one hot afternoon and read it, the tanning oil on my hands staining the stationery, smudging the type. And I was struck: "The I and the Me!" a voice which seemed to come from nowhere thundered in my brain. "It has to be!" Through the succeeding months the self-assured boom of the voice softened, often becoming shy and timid, sometimes only whispering, occasionally suggesting humbly that it had not been right in the first place--and always encouraging me to go on listening for still other voices. All this, it seems to me now, is of the essence of sociological art. From experiencing and from observing all of this I have, as I hope readers have, come to understand the third culture of scientists-artists more fully.
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