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The Relative Impact of Environmental Factors
on the Welfare Policies of Some American
States: A Causal Analysis

A Thesis
Presented to the
Department of Political Science
and the
Faculty of the Graduate College
University of Nebraska

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts
University of Nebraska at Omaha

by
Ihemelam Joshua Uhiara
July 1984
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THESIS ACCEPTANCE

Accepted for the faculty of the Graduate College, University of Nebraska, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, University of Nebraska at Omaha.

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PREFACE

Public policy in the American states has attracted the attention of an increasing number of political scientists in recent times. Many and varied kinds of studies have been done to determine the relationships between factors in the political environments of American states and the content of the public policies of these states. The results of these studies vary as do the studies themselves. More often than not, the findings contradict each other.

One such contradiction is observed in the findings of studies on the relationship between economic and political factors within the political environment and state public policy. Some studies identify economic factors as the major determinants of state public policy while others claim that political factors play the major role in determining public policy.

I observed an environmental factor that has not been given sufficient attention in many of these controversial studies. Many researchers have not seriously considered political culture as a possible prominent influence in the making of state public policy. The stimulus from this discovery coupled with the curiosity to find out what lies behind that of which little is known, impelled me to embark upon this study that uses the path analytic technique and
hypothesizes that political culture, vis-a-vis wealth and political participation, makes the greatest impact on the welfare policies of the states in the plains and southeastern regions of America.

It was found that when the direct and indirect impacts of independent variables (political culture, wealth, and political participation) upon the dependent variable (welfare) are taken into account, none of these impacts equals that of political culture. Subsidiary hypotheses also show that states with moralistic subcultures pay higher welfare benefits than states with traditionalistic subcultures, and that the difference in the amount of welfare benefits does not stem primarily from differences in wealth.

Although the methodology employed in this study is open to further refinement, it has shown the need to develop and test causal relationships in the study of public policy in American states.

I express my gratitude to Dr. James Johnson who gave much of his time to encourage and direct me during this study and to Professor Orville Menard and Dr. Phil Secret for their invaluable advice and corrections. I also thank my wife, my mother-in-law, and my two sons for patiently enduring some of the inconveniences which my devotion to this study brought upon them.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PREFACE</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF TABLES</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anthropological Concept of Culture</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Culture</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Utility of Models</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elazar's Categorization</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REVIEW OF PAST STUDIES</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROBLEM STATEMENT</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rationale for the Study</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective of the Study</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>METHODOLOGY</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypotheses</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Null</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subhypothesis 1</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subhypothesis 2</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Definition</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Culture</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Participation</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealth</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limitations of the Study</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DATA ANALYSIS, RESULTS, AND DISCUSSION</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Null Hypotheses</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Hypothesis</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsidiary Hypothesis 1</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsidiary Hypothesis 2</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF TABLES

I. The Distribution of Elazar's Political Subculture Among American States. .................. 23

II. The Significance of Effects of Political Participation, Wealth, and Culture on Welfare ............ 47

III. The Indirect and Direct Effects of Wealth, Culture, and Political Participation on Welfare .......... 49

IV. The Significance of Differences in Welfare Payments Between Moralistic and Traditionalistic States . . . 55

V. The Comparative Influence of Political Culture and Wealth on Political Participation. ............... 57
INTRODUCTION

Thucydides speaking through the lips of Pericles once said:

We are a free democracy . . . We do not allow absorption in our own affairs to interfere with participation in the city's. We regard the man who holds aloof from public affairs as useless; we yield to none in independence of spirit and complete self reliance.¹

The above statement evokes two thoughts regarding politics. For one thing, politics, the art of making scarce resources or values go around, has had a long history. Secondly, the political culture of the Athenians, implicit in the statement, dictated that every Athenian be a practicing politician. Although direct democracy does not obtain in America today, or anywhere else for that matter, the fact still remains that the political culture of a people, an element of their general culture, influences their political system and practice.

The concept of political culture was a latent given in ancient political thought. Political scientists have long accepted such concepts as collective will, social contract, constitutional concensus, and inherent values as concepts

that "bespeak of a basic and implicit force in human societies."\(^2\) It is the discovery of the concept of political culture that has shed some light upon this "latent coherence in political life."\(^3\) Besides shedding some light on consistency in political life, political culture could explain, to some extent, the processes of a particular political system. It becomes necessary, therefore, that the study of political culture be not merely descriptive but theoretically relevant and specific as to its application. Lucian Pye implied that such specificity of application served the useful purpose of making particular systems more understandable when he said,

> If studies of political culture were to converge more with respect to key themes, then it would be easier to judge the extent to which particular studies have successfully added to our capacity to understand particular systems.\(^4\)

This thesis with its focus on political culture will converge on a specific theme. It seeks to explore the influence political culture, vis-a-vis other environmental factors (wealth and political participation), has upon the


\(^3\)Ibid.

\(^4\)Ibid., p. 75.
content of the welfare policies of the states in two U. S. regions. It is hoped that such a limited use of political culture will add to our understanding of political life in the states under investigation and especially to our understanding of the impact of culture upon public policy.
Anthropological Concept of Culture

The word culture, in its anthropological meaning, was established in the English language in 1871 by Edward Tylor who borrowed the term from the German word, Kulture, meaning cultivation or becoming cultured, which first appeared in a German dictionary in 1793. But the ethnographic and scientific uses of the word today are no longer restricted to the idea of cultivation, but extends, instead, to the idea of a condition that transcends human beings and in which all human societies share, even though marked differences exist among particular cultures.

Tylor does not claim originality to this modern usage of culture. The meaning is traced back to his mentor, Gustav E. Klemm, who ascribed it to Voltaire. We find an early hint of political culture in Voltaire's observation of culture "as it manifested in customs, in beliefs, and in forms of government."

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7 Ibid.
The academic concept of culture originated, therefore, from anthropology where it forms a kind of pivot upon which the discipline revolves. A. L. Kroeber gives the impression that culture is what makes the anthropologist what he is when he says that:

... the anthropologist ... if he wishes to remain such, has necessarily to concern himself first of all with that aspect and product of human behavior—and reinfluence upon it—which is usually called "culture".  

Almost as many definitions of culture exist as there are anthropologists, suggesting how elusive the concept is. Some scholars see culture as that human behavior which distinguishes humans from animals. Others use it synonymously with civilization, in an ethnographic sense, to mean that which embodies "knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society."  

Besides Tylor's inclusive or general view of culture, there is a pluralistic and relativistic view. This view sees culture as that mode of expressing thoughts and actions which is peculiar to a group of people and which

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sets their lifestyle apart from that of other groups of people.\textsuperscript{10}

A. L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn have examined a total of one hundred and sixty four definitions of culture within the discipline of anthropology and have come up with a definition they felt would satisfy various social science disciplines. In their words:

Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of, and for behavior acquired and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievement of human groups, including their embodiments in artifacts: the essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e. historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values; culture systems may, on the one hand, be considered as products of action, on the other as conditioning elements of further action.\textsuperscript{11}

It is hard to say whether the above tortuous definition of culture takes care of the problem of a cacophony of definitions and explanations. Bronislaw Malinowski has also added his voice to the debate over the meaning of culture. He suggests that defining or analysing culture from a utilitarian or functional and organizational or institutional stand-point will help anthropology lay a scientific foundation for an empirical and theoretical study of culture. By a functional aspect of culture he means the place of


\textsuperscript{11}Kroeber and Kluckhohn, p. 357.
culture in enabling human beings to satisfy or meet their organic or basic needs such as "feeding, heating, housing, clothing, or protection from cold, wind, and weather."\textsuperscript{12} His concept of organization or institution implies that human beings bind themselves together, agreeing to obey some stated norms and to work within their natural and artificial environment in order to satisfy their desires. He, however, points out that all cultures are not the same. Differences exist in cultures and these account for differences in such things as institutions which, actually, are means of addressing "some highly specialized need or values."\textsuperscript{13} Malinowski's concept is a variant of the pluralistic and relativistic view mentioned earlier. The implication here is, even though all cultural patterns "crystallize around the same foci,"\textsuperscript{14} various groups of people have cultures that help them meet common human needs in different ways.

The ideas gained from the pluralistic and relativistic views of culture, particularly the functional and institutional aspects, are attractive to the discipline of political science. Given a statement such as the following,\textsuperscript{12}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{12}Bronislaw Malinowski, A Scientific Theory of Culture: And Other Essays (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1944), pp. 36-40.
\item \textsuperscript{13}Ibid., p. 40.
\item \textsuperscript{14}Kroeber and Kluckhohn, p. 349.
\end{itemize}
the attraction increases:

All cultures constitute so many somewhat distinct answers to essentially the same questions posed by human biology and by the generalities of human situation . . . Every society's patterns for living must provide approved and sanctioned ways for dealing with such universal circumstances as the existence of two sexes; the helplessness of infants; the need for satisfaction of the elementary biological requirements such as food, warmth, and sex; the presence of individuals of different ages and of differing physical and other capabilities.15

The attraction this statement has for the writer does not lie in its uniqueness (it is after all another way of expressing what Malinowski said earlier) but in the elements it contains which read like politics itself.

**Political Culture**

Political science has always borrowed ideas from other disciplines, but was slow in incorporating the concept of culture. The need to study political behavior more closely, opened the doors of political science to the concept of culture. Many Americans felt the need to study other people's cultures for military and political purposes during World War II, thus hastening the acceptance of culture into the political science discipline. However, the concept of political culture was not fully formulated until about ten years after World War II when Gabriel Almond used it for the first time in 1956.16 His intention was

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15 Ibid., p. 348.
16 Pye, pp. 65-66.
to compare world political systems with the aid of "certain sociological and anthropological concepts." He defined a political system as "a set of interacting roles . . .," a concept he said had an advantage over such concepts as institutions, organizations, or groups in the sense that "it is a more inclusive and more open concept." People in a particular political system have particular patterns of orientation to political action, constituting what he called political culture.

Almond's view of political culture intruded into areas which political scientists reserved for "attitudes towards politics," "public opinion," "political ideology," "political values," "national character," and "national ethos." He emphasized, though, that political culture did not "coincide with a given political system or society" and that it was not tantamount to the general culture.

Most political scientists borrow their concept of political culture from Almond. Sidney Verba writing later defined political culture as "the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which define the situation in which political action takes place." The

18Ibid., p. 396.
19Ibid.
definition contained in the *International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences*, which came still later, stresses the subjective and psychological aspects of political culture, observing that it is not the same as the general culture; it is quite distinct and separate from it.

Political culture is the set of attitudes, beliefs, and sentiments which give order and meaning to political process and which provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern behavior in the political ideals and the operating norms of policy. Political culture is thus the manifestation in aggregate form of the psychological and subjective dimensions of politics.21

The utility of political culture, its value and its potential are determined, to a large extent, by how political scientists use it. Some have applied the concept, first to the individual (a micro analysis) and then to the polity (a macro analysis). They borrowed this approach from Freudian psychology which extrapolated from the individual to the society. Cultural anthropologists have tended also to stress this Freudian idea, holding that "... the collective culture and individual personalities mirror each other."22

Heinz Eulau spoke against what he called fallacies that were creeping into the discipline of political science by way of the micro-macro problem. He maintained that the


ultimate units of action which are politically significant are "groups, associations, organizations, communities, states, and other collectivities," even though concrete political decisions are made by individuals. Eulau favored, therefore, the concept that gave prominence to macro analysis over micro analysis. Some political scientists feel that the way to solve the micro-macro tension is to extend the findings on the micro level to the macro level by treating individuals or small units as analogues of the larger group or unit. On the other hand, others feel that the problem is solved by attributing to the individual or the small unit that which holds for the group or the larger unit. Eulau condemns such analysis as the fallacy of personification. He discourages its use within the discipline of political science, arguing that the fallacy gave rise to the grotesque descriptions of "national character."  

Harold Lasswell, like Eulau, rejects the extrapolation from the micro to the macro levels. He insists that the collective system is a basic assumption or a given and that it consists of roles which could reflect the personalities of those who assume these roles. What he says, in effect, is that political institutions or organs are larger than

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24 Ibid.

and distinct from persons who occupy offices within them and so it would be wrong to extend to the institution or organ that which is true of the individual. The best reconciliation of the micro-macro tension is found in the concept of political socialization. Political scientists suggest that political socialization helps "political systems maintain their continuity and individuals learn how to perform appropriate political roles."\(^{26}\)

Lucian Pye suggests that political culture be used in a system oriented way to explain a particular system or general categories of systems as Almond and Verba did in *The Civic Culture*.\(^ {27}\) It is in this system oriented way that political culture is used in this thesis in order to explain political behavior in the particular systems of selected American states.

### The Utility of Models

Before discussing political culture in the context of political processes in these states, political process will

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\(^{26}\) Pye, "Culture and Political Science...," pp. 69-70.

\(^{27}\) Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitude and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963). The theoretical concern of Almond and Verba was to explain that democratic stability was contingent upon a generalized "civic culture." They tested the theory in a sample of five nations--Britain, the U.S., Germany, Italy, and Mexico. They found that the "Civic Culture" necessary for the stability of Democracy, was more prevalent in Britain and the U.S., than in the other countries.
be explained briefly using David Easton's system analysis model. Models help us to visualize or conceptualize that which does not lend itself to an easy comprehension.

According to Thomas Dye, models:

... should order and simplify our thinking about politics ... the utility of a model lies in its ability to simplify political life so that we can think about it more clearly and understand the relationships which we find in the real world. Yet, too much simplification may lead to inaccuracies in our thinking about reality.28

Any model that deserves the name must correspond with reality; that is, items in it must be relevant to reality so that it could verify reality.29 Paul Meadows agrees with the observation of the biologist, L. J. Henderson, that "all forms of activity manifest themselves" in systems.30 System is said to be the master model and it is expected to explain political life better than most other models. These are reasons enough for its use in explaining the political process that is related to this study.

Every political system—local, state, national or international—operates within an environment, usually


30 Ibid.
divided into intrasocietal and extrasocietal environments. The intrasocietal environment in turn consists of ecological, biological, social, and personality systems. These could be subdivided into such systems as cultural, social, economic, and demographic systems. The extrasocietal environment, which consists of the international society or the suprasociety, is not very germane to this thesis which investigates the impact of cultural, political, and economic factors upon the welfare policies of some American states. In other words, the study is concerned primarily with the intrasocietal aspect of the political environment which often influences every stage of the political input-output process.

According to Easton, the political system, as an open system, reacts or responds to factors or influences within its environment, otherwise known as environmental disturbances. These disturbances are communicated through inputs and "withinputs." Inputs consist mainly of supports and demands. Supports, as the name implies, consist of the actions of people involved in the political process which are favorable to those who authoritatively allocate values.


33 Easton, p. 57.
Obeying rules or laws made by those in authority is an example of support. Demands, on the other hand, impose strains upon the political system and when they become excessive, can undermine the ability of the system to process its inputs into outputs. "Withinputs" are those demands which do not stem from the environment but from within the political system itself. A demand to remedy the inequality in district representation is an example of withinput, because it is inspired from within the system.34

The inputs and "withinputs" go through a conversion process within the political system to yield outputs in the form of authoritative decisions such as public policies. Easton is not very clear on what takes place within the "box," that is, the processes that go on within the political system. But Richard Dawson and James Robinson attempt to summarize this phase of the systems model thus:

Process, as activity and interaction between the variables and components within system, in turn gives rise to the formulation and implementation of public policy. Policy in this context is the outcome of activity or interaction among external conditions, political system, and political process.35


The output or policy is fed back into the environment where it would either satisfy the demands of a segment of the public, or be challenged by an unsatisfied portion of the same public. It is hard to find a policy that commands a universal acceptance in any political community. The output could also give rise to new and related demands. The feedback lets the authorities know the state of affairs in the system and so helps them to run the system so as to cope with stress. Any interference with the feedback hinders the ability of the authorities to take necessary action if and when it is needed to keep support for the system at the desirable level.\textsuperscript{36}

Items in Easton's model—input, process, output, and feedback—are relevant to this investigation. For example, political culture, the primary variable to be tested, is believed to have a dynamic influence on the whole gamut of the political system of American states; it is suspected to regulate input demands and the political interactions that go on within the system and to influence the feedback process by influencing the conversion of outputs into new or modified inputs.\textsuperscript{37}


Elazar's Categorization

A number of policy studies have been done which implicitly or explicitly used Easton's systems analysis as a model. The interest in political culture as a significant variable in such studies has increased, especially since Elazar produced his seminal work on the political subcultures of the American states.38

Borrowing Almond's conceptualization of political culture, Elazar has identified three different subcultures within the overall American culture. People within these subcultures differ in the way they view, among other things, government intervention in the political community by way of initiation and execution of welfare programs. "The political culture of a given area affects the way its citizens and public officials perceive conditions, structure institutions, and go about solving problems."39 Even though the constitutions of American states "differ little from each other,"40 the imprint of their political cultures is often found in those areas where they differ. Some states in the South with the type of political culture that favors elitism, make provisions in their constitutions that subtly but effectively limit suffrage.

39 Berman, p. 7.
40 John D. Hicks, "The Constitutions of the Northwest States," The University Studies of the University of Nebraska Vol. 23 (Lincoln: The University of Nebraska, 1924), p. 32.
Elazar believes also that political culture is one of the three factors that influence political life in the American states.

... three overriding factors appear to be especially important in shaping the individual state's political structures, electoral behavior, and modes of organization for political action. They are political culture—the pattern of orientation to political action in which each political system is embedded; sectionalism . . .; and the continuing frontier . . . .

Elazar's categorization of subcultures in the American states is based mainly on ethnic origin and religious affiliations of the early settlers. The settlement patterns of the various groups that made up the original American colonies established the foundation for the three subcultures Elazar identified. With time, the migratory patterns of the settlers spread these subcultures as they appear today, across various areas of the United States. But the passage of time and what Elazar calls the effect of "externally generated events" have led to the erosion, intensification or modification of the cultural patterns, "to make each local situation even more complex." This probably explains the existence of cultural variation or mutations that have made it difficult to find any state today that completely represents an ideal cultural type.

\[41\text{Elazar, pp. 84-85.}\]
\[42\text{Ibid., p. 104.}\]
Explaining the subcultural patterns of the U.S. in terms of the frontier, Elazar identifies the "rural land frontier" as the period during which the basic political patterns were set as the immigrants moved in three great waves, starting at the East coast and ending at the West. This explanation has a religious element to it also. The Puritans, starting from the northern part of the nation, headed westward leaving their imprint in the New England areas, New York state, northern Pennsylvania, the upper part of Ohio, the upper Great Lakes and the upper Mississippi Valley. Immigrants from Scandinavia and northern Europe who had traditions similar to those of the Puritans joined them. Moving westward, they settled in Oregon, Washington, California, Utah (as Mormons), Kansas (as Abolitionists), Colorado, Montana, and Arizona. Elazar calls the subculture these groups developed the "moralistic" subculture.

But groups with different religious and ethnic background, primarily people "from non-Puritan England" and the interior parts of Germany, settled in the middle of the nation, covering areas of New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland. These groups sought:

... to develop pluralistic societies dedicated to individual freedom to pursue private goals, to the point of making religion a private matter, an unheard-of step at the time.43

43Ibid., p. 109.
They moved towards the West, crossing Pennsylvania into the central parts of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. They finally settled in northern California and populated the areas in between, including areas of Nebraska, South Dakota, Missouri, Wyoming, and Nevada. Some of the areas the pluralistic groups populated had elements of the other subcultures, but the subcultures which became dominant in these areas is termed the "individualistic" subculture.

Those who settled in the southern states sought the kind of opportunity their counterparts just described had. The difference between the two groups is that those in the North sought their "individual" opportunity in commerce, while those in the South concentrated their efforts on a plantation-centered agriculture—a kind of feudal system with slavery as its base. Elazar calls the subculture that developed in the South "traditionalistic." The political activity of the community revolved around the new elite—those with landed property whose relationship with the rest of the population was in terms of noblesse oblige. The slaves were completely excluded from any form of participation in the political process.

Elazar observed that the Rocky Mountains—the great mountain system of America—helped to diffuse cultural patterns because they stood in the way of the East-West movement. In some places, the traditionalistic and moralistic strains mingled. Another type of synthesis or
mixing of subcultures that developed was brought about by what Elazar calls the urban-industrial frontier, which produced a group of immigrants from Ireland, Italy, Central and Eastern Europe, and the Balkans. These immigrants, who came with a traditionalistic culture, picked up individualistic cultural attitudes as they settled the cities, implying that the urban industrial areas of the U.S. have predominantly an individualistic subculture.

The American political culture today is, therefore, made up of mixtures of the moralistic, individualistic, and traditionalistic subcultures.

. . . each subculture is strongly tied to specific sections of the country, reflecting the streams and currents of migration that have carried people of different origins and backgrounds across the continent (America) in more or less orderly patterns. 44

Elazar's identification of these patterns of dominant subcultures for each state, and even within it was not arrived at by empirical means. As Ira Sharkansky points out, the designations reflect Elazar's "own judgment, disciplined by several years of observation." 45 But his judgment and observation regarding the political characteristics of the subcultures have been confirmed in a

44 Ibid., p. 93.

number of studies. Elazar's three main subcultures are shown in the table on the following page.

Each political subculture possesses political characteristics peculiar to it and by which its political perceptions and practices are determined.

In the moralistic political subculture, politics is seen as a positive endeavor for community improvement. All members of the community are encouraged to participate in the political process and the political community expects a healthy struggle for power and a high standard of morality from the occupants of public office. Of the three political subcultures, the moralistic subculture appears to be the most open even though political


47 Elazar, pp. 96-98.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moralistic Subculture</th>
<th>Traditionalistic Subculture</th>
<th>Individualistic Subculture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>Alaska</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>Connecticut</td>
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<td>Idaho</td>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>Delaware</td>
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<td>Kansas</td>
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<td>Illinois</td>
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<td>New Jersey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Dakota</td>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>New York</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utah</td>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>Ohio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vermont</td>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>West Virginia</td>
<td>Rhode Island</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
intolerance resulting from religious convictions could at times create a problem.

A different kind of problem exists in the traditionalistic political subculture. Real political power is confined to "a relatively small and self-perpetuating group drawn from an established elite who often inherit 'their right' to govern through family ties and social position." Even though people in this political subculture see government as existing for the good of the community, they favor a political style that seeks to maintain the status quo. Those who engage in politics in this subculture are expected to gain from their participation but not necessary in monetary terms. Political parties and political competition do not count for much, a fact that held true in the Southern states where the traditionalistic subculture predominantes.

The individualistic political subculture has its own problem also. Most people in this subculture "believe that politics is a dirty— if necessary—business, better left to those who are willing to soil themselves by engaging in it." Two norms exist in this subculture with respect to what the public expects from those in public office. The higher norm dictates that public office

\[48\] Ibid., p. 99.

\[49\] Ibid., p. 95.
holders benefit from their office in return for providing high quality government services. But the lower norm expects them to serve themselves and those who help elect them into office. Corruption among public office holders in the individualistic political subculture shocks people only if it is corruption of an extraordinary dimension. The subculture resembles the traditionalistic subculture somewhat in the sense of its reluctance to expand government functions. When it does expand these functions, it is usually in response to an anticipated quid pro quo—a reward for the public that elected the official(s) into office. But unlike the traditionalistic subculture, the individualistic subculture "encourages the maintenance of a party system that is competitive, but not overly so, in the pursuit of office." 50

The utility of the concept of culture which culminates in political culture and particularly in Elazar's subcultural categorization is measured by the many and varied studies in politics that employ this concept. Even Elazar himself feels satisfied to see "the intellectual product of his formulation and . . . the successful testing of it by others." 51 A review of these studies will perhaps justify Elazar's reason for feeling satisfied, but more importantly

50 Ibid., p. 88.
it will provide the next logical step in this investigation.
Students of American state politics have done a number of comparative studies that "have employed political culture as an explanatory variable to account for interstate differences in political structure, electoral behavior, and policy outputs."^52

Sharkansky tested political culture as an independent variable against twenty three variables grouped into three categories: (1) political participation, (2) the size and perquisites of the bureaucracy, and (3) the scope, magnitude, costs, and innovative character of government programs.\(^53\) His results showed that about two thirds of the twenty three dependent variables correlated with Elazar's scale of political subcultures. The relationships between political culture and some of the measures of political participation were strongest and most consistent.

Brian Fry and Richard Winters,\(^54\) even though their study did not deal with political culture directly, concluded

^52 Hanson, p. 17.

^53 Sharkansky, pp. 73-74.

that political variables make a stronger impact upon redistributive public policy than socioeconomic variables. But Eric Uslaner and Ronald Weber\textsuperscript{55} focused attention on an aspect that is not commonly tested in policy studies. They assumed that in making policies, policy makers respond to the preferences of someone. They posited that, after all, the preferences that make the greatest impact upon public policies are those of the people who make the policies. Political culture figures into their study indirectly. They reasoned that the decision makers would feel the impact of public opinion which in turn would be influenced by:

... environmental factors such as "political culture" (which) are likely to mediate the impact of public opinion on the party system. A more liberal political culture should produce a legislative setting more hospitable to redistributive legislation. Such a setting would include a more professionalized legislature and a greater degree of interparty conflict within the legislative arena.

Charles Johnson\textsuperscript{57} carried out a study that supported Elazar's findings that the American political subcultures


\textsuperscript{56}Ibid., p. 135.

stem from migration streams of the early settlers. He used religious affiliation census figures as "tags" for the political subcultures and he used these to trace Elazar's migration streams. Grouping the states according to the three subcultures, using discriminant analysis, he found that his results tallied with Elazar's findings. He then tested the relationship between political culture and each of a total of eight state political characteristics. Controlling for socioeconomic variables, he found that political culture had a significant relationship with six of the eight variables.

In a study to test the correlation between Elazar's political subcultures and state public opinion and the content of political advertising, Richard Joslyn\textsuperscript{58} found that the variation of public opinion across the U.S. was consistent with Elazar's subcultural patterns. Citizens in states with the moralistic subculture tended to participate more in the politics of their state and to be more open toward government intervention than citizens in states with individualistic or traditionalistic subcultures. Government intervention as used by Joslyn is akin to the measure of government welfare policy, welfare payments, used in this thesis.

\textsuperscript{58}Joslyn.
Political culture was also found to be relevant to women's representation in lower state legislative houses in Albert Nelson's\(^5\) study. His results confirmed that perceptions of politics or political participation—who should or should not participate in the political process—perceptions born out of political subculture are factors that affect women's representation, since "role expectations in the larger society have a profound impact on behavior."\(^6\) Nelson found that women have a greater chance to participate in politics in the moralistic subculture than in the individualistic and traditionalistic subcultures. He warned, however, that the percentage of women's representation was still low in the U.S. even by the moralistic subcultural standard. His observation is supported by David Hill's later findings that "the traditions and cultures of some states may cause female representation to lag behind popular support for women's full participation in political affairs."\(^6\)

\(^5\) Nelson.

\(^6\) Ibid., p. 369. Role expectation is a product of socialization. It will be remembered that Pye associated political socialization with political culture when he observed that political socialization has been introduced by some political scientists to help ease the micro-macro tension encountered in the area of political behavior. See Lucian W. Pye, "Culture and Political Science: Problems in the evaluation of the concept of political culture," in Schneider and Bonjean (eds.).

Most of the past studies mentioned do not deal directly with the relationship between political culture and public policy. One thing, however, is clear. Political culture is a variable that cannot be ignored in policy studies. Even though many of these studies do not deal expressly with public policy, by implication their results predict a relationship between political culture and public policy. One such study is that done by Susan Welch and John Peters.62 Among other things, they found that "elites from the moralistic political culture are more likely to be liberal on the social and economic welfare issues . . . ."63 Another study that implies the relationship between political culture and public policy demonstrated "how the study of political culture can be used to improve our understanding of policy phenomenon."64 Nicholas Lovrich Byron Daynes, and Laura Ginger, in their study of public policy and the effects of historical-cultural phenomenon in Indiana counties, found that political culture was a stronger predictor of more of the variables than socioeconomic status conditions, urban/rural characteristics, and political party orientation. But on welfare policies, none of the variables including political culture was found to demonstrate a significant relationship.

62Welch and Peters.
63Ibid., p. 64.
64Lovrich, Daynes, and Ginger, p. 115.
One study that establishes a clear relationship between political culture and public policy is John Harrigan's. He observed that the wealth of a state is related to its Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) payment. But he argued that New York, for example, whose AFDC payment is eight times more than that of Mississippi is not eight times more affluent than that state. He, therefore, concluded that affluence does not completely explain the difference in the levels of the welfare programs or benefits of states. "The political culture of states also helps explain the difference in welfare benefits." In the light of Elazar's characteristics of the American political subcultures, it is no surprise that Harrigan found that the states with moralistic subcultures proved to be more liberal in their AFDC payments than states with individualistic or traditionalistic political subcultures, the latter being the least liberal.

Harrigan's study is related to the earlier studies of both Valdimer Key and Duane Lockard. Key suggested

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66 Ibid., p. 235.
that in the Southern states, one factor of political culture, party system, resulted in lack of party competition, for the absence of effective participation by the citizenry eliminated the need for political leaders to compete for votes. As a result, such redistributive policies as education, welfare, health, and other social service expenditures were low. Later Lockard came to a similar conclusion when he studied the politics of the New England states (Vermont, New Hampshire, Maine, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island), and discovered that "the internal structures of the parties within a state can have the most far-reaching implications for the kind of policy orientation of the state government." He divided the states into one-party and two-party states, suggesting that lack of competition in the one-party states explained the reason welfare programs were less generous in those states.

But in 1963, Richard Dawson and James Robinson contradicted Key and Lockard by asserting that socioeconomic factors influenced the content of public policy more than did political factors. Dye, in 1966, supported their view in his comprehensive analysis of public policy in the

69 Ibid., p. 324.
70 Dawson and Robinson, pp. 265-289.
71 Dye.
American states. He concluded that the competitive states were usually more affluent than the noncompetitive states and so public policy differences between them might not be as a result of party competition per se. These past studies, their results, and conclusions help create the basis on which this study is built.
Rationale for the Study

The Dawson-Robinson and Dye studies are examples of the many research efforts that have concentrated on the correlation between the wealth of states and the content of their public policies. As was observed earlier, these studies conclude that wealth or affluence and not political factors is more likely to explain public policy differences among the states. Dye and Virginia Gray also stress this conclusion saying that,

... a number of empirical studies had suggested that economic development (income, urbanization, and industrialization) had a more important impact on public policy, including welfare policy, than participation or competition.

Using the path analytic technique, Gary Tompkins has come up with a finding that tends to contradict the above conclusions. He developed a causal model, testing it with path analysis, which showed no direct path between income

72 Dawson and Robinson, also Dye.
74 The method of path analysis or path coefficients was first used by the geneticist Sewell Wright as early as 1918 to help him in a quantitative study of genetics. It is a causal interpretation of statistical relationships which has been extensively used by sociologists since Wright
and welfare benefit when ethnicity was added to the model.
Tompkins has, therefore, used "a path analytic model to suggest that neither income nor competition-participation is as important in determining welfare benefits as ethnicity." 75

Since Tompkins found ethnicity to be associated with a distinctive political culture, 76 and could be used as a crude measure of culture under certain conditions, and since reliable 77 state-by-state measures of political culture developed it. But recently, political scientists have been attracted to its usefulness. Some of them have used it in producing more realistic and accurate results of the interactions (direct and indirect) among variables by sorting out significant causal sequences. See Otis Dudley Duncan, "Path Analysis: Sociological Examples," in H. M. Blalock, ed., Causal Models in the Social Sciences (New York: Aldine-Arton, 1971), pp. 115-138.

75 Dye and Gray, p. 11.
77 Charles Johnson constructed indices of moralistic, individualistic, and traditionalistic political cultures, using religious affiliation information derived from census data for each state. "Discriminant analysis grouping the states according to the three cultural indices produced results quite congruent with the classification set forth by Elazar." See Charles Johnson's "Political Culture in American States: Elazar's Formulation Examined," American Journal of Political Science 20 (August 3, 1976): 507. Lovrich, Daynes, and Ginger classified the ninety-two counties of Indiana into political categories based on historical patterns of migration and settlement. They tested their categorization with voting behavior in the counties and found statistically significant differences in voting behavior among the traditionalistic, individualistic and moralistic counties. Their finding confirms the utility of Elazar's political cultural categorization. The above studies attest to the reliability of Elazar's cultural
are now available, the writer decided to test the relative impact of political culture, wealth, and political participation on welfare policies of states with different political cultures. The investigation is expected to produce results similar to those which Tompkins obtained for ethnicity. That is, the writer hypothesizes that political culture will explain more of the variation in state welfare expenditures than will either wealth or political participation.

**Objective of the Study**

The main objective of this study is to determine the relative impact of political culture, political participation and wealth upon the welfare policies of the states within the Plains and Southeastern regions of America. More specifically, the study seeks to confirm the hypothesis that political culture as designated by Elazar and modified by Sharkansky, makes a greater impact upon the public policies of the states in the two regions under investigation than the other two variables, using a path analytic technique.
METHODOLOGY

This comparative study goes beyond tracing associations among independent and dependent variables. It tries to test the causal linkages of a specific causal model—a four-variable causal model.

Hypotheses

Null

Political subculture makes an insignificant impact on the welfare policies of the states in the Plains and Southeastern regions of the U.S., when compared to the impact made by wealth and political participation.

Research

The impact of political subculture on the content of welfare policies of the states in the Plains and Southeastern regions of the U.S. exceeds that of wealth or political participation.

Subsidiary to the main hypothesis are two subhypotheses:

Subhypothesis 1

The states that have moralistic (M) political subcultures will likely pay higher welfare benefits than

Dye and Gray, p. 10.
states with traditionalistic (T) political subcultures.

**Subhypothesis 2**

Political culture will likely have a greater impact on political participation than wealth will.

The main hypothesis and the second subsidiary hypothesis derive from the four-variable system mentioned earlier, which is discussed further below—see Figure 1.

\[
P = \text{Political Participation (voter turnout)} \\
C = \text{Political Culture} \\
A = \text{Welfare (AFDC)} \\
W = \text{Wealth (per capita income in constant (1972) dollars)}
\]

**Figure 1. The Hypothetical Path Model of Culture, Wealth, Participation and Welfare**
The dependent variable is welfare policy while wealth, political participation and political culture are the independent variables. The model assumes (as indicated by the arrows) that wealth, political participation and political culture, each makes a direct impact on welfare. Apart from having a direct impact on welfare, wealth and political culture make indirect impacts on welfare through their impact on political participation.

To obtain the total effects of the impacts of the independent variables on the dependent variable it is necessary to add together the direct effects and the indirect effects as mediated through political participation. The direct effects are measured by standardized regression coefficients (betas) between each independent variable and welfare expenditures. The indirect effects are measured by the betas between wealth and culture as independent variables and participation treated as a dependent variable. Therefore, the effect of political culture is beta c·a + (beta c·p x beta p·a) and the effect of wealth is beta w·a + (beta w·p x beta p·a). (See the hypothetical model on p. 39.)

As indicated earlier and as shown above, this study does not merely show the association among the variables, but reveals the magnitude of these associations. It goes still a step further to measure the total effects of these variables by taking intervening variables into account.
through the use of the statistical technique of path
analysis.

**Sample**

The study uses states as the unit of analysis and
regions as the unit of selection. The regions have been
chosen on the assumption that regions that are far removed
from one another are likely to possess some cultural,
economic, and political differences and therefore, will
provide easier and clearer comparisons. By the same token,
states that are within the same region will likely have more
in common than states in different regions. Sociologists,
economists, planners, and political scientists see regions
as the right units upon which to base the administration
of national programs and so have recommended their use for
this purpose to the federal government. ^79 Sharkansky observes
that,

Regions in America have their peculiarities in
politics and public policies. Most regions were
settled by people from a common stream of migration
who have left their imprint on the politics and
public policies of such regions. ^80

His observation resembles the reasoning behind Elazar's
categorization of the political subcultures. The
distinctiveness of these regions are, therefore, germane to

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^79^ Ira Sharkansky, *Regionalism In American Politics*
^80^ Ibid., pp. 3-4.
this investigation, which draws its sample of states from the Plains and Southeastern regions.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 26-27. The Plains region consists of Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota, while Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia make up the Southeastern region.}

\textbf{Operational Definition}

\textbf{Political Culture}

The original numerical values assigned to Elazar's political subcultures taken as a continuum are as follows:\footnote{Elazar, in \textit{American Federalism: A View from the States}, p. 117, has no place for MT and the position he gives TM is after T instead of before T. But he later included MT (See Elazar's "Afterword: Steps in the Study of American Political Culture," pp. 129-130) and endorsed the use of a T-M-I continuum rather than an M-I-T continuum, indicating a preference for a triangular relationship between political subcultures as against a linear one. He said that this triangular relationship, a revised form of his former circular continuum, "would allow for greater flexibility in ordering subcultural responses depending on the issue at hand." The writer prefers Sharkansky's modification of Elazar's numeral values used as an M-I-T continuum to Elazar's T-M-I continuum.}

\begin{align*}
\text{M} & \quad \text{MT} & \quad \text{MI} & \quad \text{IM} & \quad \text{I} & \quad \text{IT} & \quad \text{TI} & \quad \text{TM} & \quad \text{T} \\
1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 & 6 & 7 & 8 & 9
\end{align*}

where the first letter signifies the primary subculture and the second, the secondary subculture.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 106-107.} But Elazar assigns numerous separate subcultures to various areas of
the states of America. He also has another designation which he calls the "dominant political culture, by state," derived from the numerous separate subcultures. This means that each state would have two different subcultural values—one being the mean of the separate subcultures and the other, the value of the dominant political subculture Elazar assigns to each state. Based on Elazar's numerous intrastate designations of subcultures, Sharkansky has produced revised numerical values for the political subcultures of the forty-eight states with which he worked. The writer feels that these final numerical values assigned to the states lead not only to greater flexibility in the empirical study of political subcultures in the U.S., but also to greater accuracy. The final scores are shown in Appendix D.

Political culture is measured in this study by the revised scores which Sharkansky assigned to the American states. They are used as interval level variables.

84 Ibid.
85 Ibid., p. 117.
87 Sharkansky used the formula $C = \frac{\text{Sum} \ c}{n}$, where $C$ stands for the average numerical value to be assigned the state's culture; $c$ equals the value of each cultural designation that Elazar assigns to sub-areas within a state; and $n$ equals the number of such designations within the state. See Sharkansky's "The Utility of Elazar's Political Culture: A Research Note," p. 71.


Political Participation

This is a measure of the role the individual citizens of the states play in the political process as measured by the percentage of age-eligible voters who voted in the presidential elections in 1972, 1976, and 1980.

Welfare

It is the public policy of the states toward welfare as measured by the average monthly payment per family in dollars as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) in 1972, 1976, and 1980.

Wealth

The wealth or affluence of the states is measured by the per capita income in constant (1972) dollars for the states in 1972, 1976, and 1980.

Limitations of the Study

Sharkansky has identified seventeen regions in the

88 The raw data for political participation, wealth, and welfare were extracted from the Statistical Abstract of the United States. These data are shown in Appendices A, B and C.

89 Gubernatorial elections would have constituted an ideal measure of voter turnout. But some states elect their officials in off-year elections and so are robbed of the special stimulus which the presidential election years generate. This unequal stimulus would produce a voter turnout based upon gubernatorial elections that are not comparable for all the states. See Tompkin's "A Causal Model of State Welfare Expenditures," p. 398.

90 The per capita income in constant (1972) dollars for 1976 was obtained by dividing the 1976 per capita income in current dollars by implicit price index for 1972 (1.321).
U.S., a departure from the six regions commonly used in most social science literature. Sharkansky's classification, however, appears superior as it takes care of the problem of border states and includes geographically contiguous states in the same region because regions are supposed to share similar "historical experiences and contemporary characteristics." The result is a finer classification of the states which better brings out variations among the states and regions and so helps in determining the politics and policies of the states with greater clarity. This clarity, according to Sharkansky, is enhanced when variables are tested in all of the seventeen classifications.

The writer considers it cumbersome to test the variables in all of the states in the seventeen regions of the U.S. This thesis is limited, therefore, to the states in only two of the regions--the Plains and Southeastern regions of the U.S.--derived from the larger groupings of the North Central and Southern regions respectively. Because the study is restricted to two regions that are not representative samples, (they do not even include the individualistic subculture) the results cannot be generalized to all the states in the U.S.

91 Sharkansky, Regionalism in American Politics, pp. 3-4.
92 Ibid., p. 18.
DATA ANALYSIS, RESULTS, AND DISCUSSION

An examination of the raw data (see Appendix) shows that the wealth and AFDC payments of all the states increase with time. Judging from Sharkansky’s subcultural values, all the states in the Southeastern region are traditionalistic and all the states in the Plains region are moralistic except Missouri which is traditionalistic. Sharkansky lists Missouri as a border state under the Southern region which may explain its traditionalistic subculture. The moralistic subcultures of Kansas and Nebraska are mitigated by elements of individualism that tend to pull them towards the latter. It will be observed also that the states in the Plains region are relatively more affluent and have higher voter turnout and higher welfare payments than do states in the Southeastern region.

However, a much more thorough and accurate analysis of the data is derived from the statistical results shown below. The hypotheses are restated and the results of the multiple regression and T-test performed are presented and discussed with reference to these hypotheses.

Null Hypothesis

Political subculture makes an insignificant impact on the welfare policies of the states in the Plains and
Southeastern regions of the U.S. when compared to the impact made by wealth and political participation.

The above hypothesis is tested by finding out whether each of the independent variables accounts for a significant explanation of welfare when the remaining two independent variables are controlled. The test is carried out by calculating the F ratio for each of the variables for each year from the multiple regression analysis. Their levels of significance are compared and that of political culture is expected to be non-significant (null hypothesis).

**Results**

**Table II**

The Significance of Effects of Political Participation, Wealth, and Political Culture on Welfare

(a) Controlling for Wealth and Political Culture

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>$R^2$ (Total)</th>
<th>$R^2$ Change</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>0.818</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>Not Significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>0.861</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>Not Significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>0.939</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>Not Significant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Controlling for Political Participation and Political Culture

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>$R^2$ (Total)</th>
<th>$R^2$ Change</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>0.818</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>4.53</td>
<td>p &lt; 0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>0.861</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>6.37</td>
<td>p &lt; 0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>0.939</td>
<td>0.106</td>
<td>26.07</td>
<td>p &lt; 0.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(c) Controlling for Political Participation and Wealth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Participation</th>
<th>Wealth</th>
<th>T-Value</th>
<th>p-Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>0.818</td>
<td>0.060</td>
<td>4.95</td>
<td><strong>p &lt; 0.05</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>0.861</td>
<td>0.086</td>
<td>9.28</td>
<td><strong>p &lt; 0.01</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>0.939</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>13.52</td>
<td><strong>p &lt; 0.01</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Discussion**

The null hypothesis is falsified. Wealth and political culture each make a significant independent impact upon welfare while political participation does not. This finding implies that even if political participation were omitted as an independent variable and a three-variable system or model were used instead of a four-variable system, probably the investigation would have suffered no serious loss, but not so with wealth and political culture. Perhaps the significant impact political participation is found to make on welfare in some studies could be explained by the fact that political culture is not used as one of the variables in these studies. With the introduction of political culture, which is believed to explain much of political participation, the latter shows no significant independent influence on welfare benefits.

**Research Hypothesis**

The impact of political subculture on the content of welfare policies of the states in the Plains and Southeastern regions of the U.S. exceeds that of either wealth or political participation.
The step taken in testing this hypothesis consists of recording the standardized regression coefficients (beta weights) between wealth and political culture as independent variables while political participation is treated as a dependent variable (the indirect effects) and the beta weights between each individual variable and welfare (the direct effects). The effects coefficients (total effects) of the variables are computed and the total effects of political culture on welfare is expected to exceed that of either wealth or political participation on welfare.

Results

Table III
The Indirect and Direct Effects of Wealth, Culture, and Political Participation on Welfare

(a) Beta weights between wealth, and political culture as independent variables and political participation treated as a dependent variable—the indirect effects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Beta Weights</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Wealth</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political Culture</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Wealth</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political Culture</td>
<td>0.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Wealth</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political Culture</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(b) Beta weights between each individual independent variable and welfare—the direct effects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Beta</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Wealth</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political Culture</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political Participation</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Wealth</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political Culture</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political Participation</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Wealth</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political Culture</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political Participation</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Discussion

The above results show that the research hypothesis is supported. An association of scores with the causal model and the calculation of the effects coefficients will make this fact more obvious.

For each of the three years, 1972, 1976, and 1980, the total effects coefficients of political culture substantially exceed those of wealth and political participation, those of political participation being the least except in 1972 when it equalled that of wealth. From these results, the writer concludes that political culture makes the greatest impact upon the welfare policies of the states in the Plains.
$P = \text{Political participation}$
$C = \text{Political culture}$
$A = \text{Welfare}$
$W = \text{Wealth}$

Total effect of $C$ on $A = 0.53 + 0.90 \times 0.29 = 0.79$

Total effect of $W$ on $A = 0.25 + 0.90 \times 0.29 = 0.28$

Effect of $P$ on $A = 0.29$

Figure 2. The Effects Coefficients of the Independent Variables for 1972, 1976, and 1980.
P = Political participation
C = Political culture
A = Welfare
W = Wealth

Total effect of C on A = 0.69 + 0.93 \times 0.09 = 0.77
Total effect of W on A = 0.28 + 0.10 \times 0.10 = 0.29
Total effect of P on A = 0.09

Figure 2 (continued). The Effects Coefficients of the Independent Variables for 1972, 1976, and 1980.
P = Political participation
C = Political culture
A = Welfare
W = Wealth

Total effect of C on A = 0.55 + 0.95 \times 0.09 = 0.64
Total effect of W on A = 0.44 + 0.13 \times 0.09 = 0.45
Total effect of P on A = 0.09

Figure 2 (continued). The Effects Coefficients of the Independent Variables for 1972, 1976, and 1980.
and Southeastern regions of the U.S., followed by wealth, with political participation making a negligible impact.

It will be observed that the confirmation of the research hypothesis is consistent with Tompkins's finding based on path analysis, that ethnicity is more important in determining the amount paid as welfare benefits in the American states than wealth or political competition-participation.

**Subsidiary Hypothesis 1**

The states that have moralistic (M) political subcultures will likely pay higher welfare benefits than states with traditionalistic (T) political subculture.

The comparative test which this hypothesis demands is verified by running a T-test of the two main political subcultures of the states under investigation against welfare for 1972, 1976, and 1980. The mean welfare payment of the political subcultures are compared. That of the moralistic subculture is expected to be greater than that of the traditionalistic subculture.
Results

Table IV

The Significance of Differences in Welfare Payments Between Moralistic and Traditionalistic States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Moralistic Means</th>
<th>Traditionalistic Means</th>
<th>T-Value</th>
<th>DF</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>186.17</td>
<td>105.92</td>
<td>5.38</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>&lt; 0.0009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>232.50</td>
<td>126.38</td>
<td>5.82</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>&lt; 0.0009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>280.50</td>
<td>151.62</td>
<td>6.43</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>&lt; 0.0009</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Discussion

The comparative test of the magnitude of welfare payments made by the states in the two political subcultures shows very significant results. The mean for the moralistic subculture for each of the three years far exceeds that of traditionalistic subculture, signifying that the states with moralistic subculture pay higher welfare benefits than the states with traditionalistic subculture.

One may argue that the difference in the amount of welfare benefits paid by these two subcultures is explained by their difference in wealth instead. But the statistical results do not support this argument. When political culture and political participation are controlled, the influence of wealth on welfare is minimal compared to that of political culture on welfare when wealth and political participation are
controlled. In 1972, wealth explained only about 25 percent of welfare policy variation whereas political culture explained about 75 percent of the variation. Besides, the test of the research hypothesis shows that political culture makes an impact on the welfare policies of the states under investigation that far exceeds that made by wealth. The writer maintains, therefore, that the amount of welfare benefits those states pay is contingent more upon their political culture than upon their wealth.

Subsidiary Hypothesis 2

Political culture will likely have a greater impact on political participation than wealth will.

To test this hypothesis involves only a comparison of the beta weights between political culture and political participation and that between wealth and political participation. These beta weights have been obtained already in the previous tests.
Results

Table V

The Comparative Influence of Political Culture and Wealth on Political Participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Political Culture - Political Participation</th>
<th>Wealth - Political Participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>-0.90</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>-0.93</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>-0.95</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Discussion

Comparing the beta weights between political culture and political participation on the one hand and wealth and political participation on the other, it becomes evident that the reciprocal influence between political culture and political participation is far greater than that between wealth and political participation. This result might stem from the naturally greater affinity political participation has for political culture than for wealth; political participation is more a part of political culture than wealth is.
CONCLUSION

Developing associations in policy studies has its merits. But more important than these associations is developing and testing causal models. In the light of the results of this study, grounds exist for questioning the validity of studies that attribute the greatest environmental influence on public policy to economic variables. It appears that the elevation of economic variables in many of these studies is as a result of their "failure to fully develop and test causal theories." But even some studies that employ improved methodologies have also concluded that economic factors influence public policy most. Michael Lewis-Beck using the path analytic technique concludes that:

When the effects coefficients for a common model of welfare policy are estimated in a data-based example, socioeconomic variables are found to be considerably more important than political variables.

However, in his model, Lewis-Beck did not examine the independent influence of political culture. Political

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93 Dye and Gray, p. 10.
94 Ibid.
variables may not be very important in determining the content of welfare policy; even this study reveals only a low relationship between political participation and welfare policy. But another political variable—political culture—appears to be in a class by itself and my study, based on an improved methodology confirms its importance. Further study is still advisable in order to include more sophisticated measures of participation as well as other variables that might help explain policy.

The following conclusions could be drawn from this study: 1) political culture is more important than wealth and political participation in determining the content of welfare policy in the states investigated; 2) wealth is important but its importance is secondary to that of political culture; 3) political participation as measured here seems unimportant. The implications of these conclusions suggest that one way to obtain more liberal public policies is to first work to change culture. Attempts could be made to inject the more "other regarding" moralistic subculture into areas with individualistic subculture. A process of education and the mobilization of groups in the traditionalistic areas who might have moralistic tendency are lines of action that could be taken to effect the desired change.

But the process of cultural change, noted for its slowness, will not produce the quick results some of us
might anticipate. Since culture does not yield easily to change, efforts to improve public policy content should also concentrate on the economic variable which is subject to government manipulation. Finally, realizing that cultural change takes time, perhaps generations, and that economic impacts are less effective, we need to exercise patience and accept those public policy changes that do come though they be smaller and slower than we might desire.
"SELECTED" BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books


Hicks, John B. "The Constitutions of the Northwest States." The University Studies of the University of Nebraska. Vol. 23, Lincoln: The University of Nebraska, 1924, p. 32.


Journals


### APPENDIX A

**Voter Turnout - Percentage of Age-Eligible Voters Who Voted in Presidential Elections**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States in the Plains Region</th>
<th>1972</th>
<th>1976</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>Political Culture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Iowa</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>63.7</td>
<td>63.1</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Kansas</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>58.4</td>
<td>57.2</td>
<td>3.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Minnesota</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>70.6</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Missouri</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>59.1</td>
<td>7.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Nebraska</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>56.1</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>3.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. North Dakota</td>
<td>67.4</td>
<td>67.2</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. South Dakota</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States in the Southeastern Region</th>
<th>1972</th>
<th>1976</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>Political Culture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8. Alabama</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>8.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Arkansas</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>9.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Florida</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>7.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Georgia</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>8.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Kentucky</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>7.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Louisiana</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>8.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Mississippi</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>9.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. North Carolina</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>8.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. South Carolina</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>8.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Tennessee</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>8.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Virginia</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>7.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. West Virginia</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>7.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States in the Plains Region</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Political Culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>3,476</td>
<td>4,874</td>
<td>5,232</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas</td>
<td>3,681</td>
<td>4,917</td>
<td>5,580</td>
<td>3.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>3,666</td>
<td>4,658</td>
<td>5,436</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>3,564</td>
<td>4,546</td>
<td>5,021</td>
<td>7.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nebraska</td>
<td>3,411</td>
<td>4,724</td>
<td>5,234</td>
<td>3.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Dakota</td>
<td>3,118</td>
<td>4,088</td>
<td>4,891</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Dakota</td>
<td>2,949</td>
<td>3,631</td>
<td>4,362</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States in the Southeastern Region</th>
<th>1972</th>
<th>1976</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>Political Culture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>2,963</td>
<td>3,864</td>
<td>4,186</td>
<td>8.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>2,685</td>
<td>3,840</td>
<td>4,062</td>
<td>9.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>3,885</td>
<td>4,624</td>
<td>5,028</td>
<td>7.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>3,380</td>
<td>4,217</td>
<td>4,512</td>
<td>8.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>3,025</td>
<td>4,105</td>
<td>4,255</td>
<td>7.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>2,876</td>
<td>4,077</td>
<td>4,727</td>
<td>8.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>2,497</td>
<td>3,463</td>
<td>3,677</td>
<td>9.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>3,196</td>
<td>4,095</td>
<td>4,371</td>
<td>8.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>2,925</td>
<td>3,880</td>
<td>4,061</td>
<td>8.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>3,099</td>
<td>4,112</td>
<td>4,315</td>
<td>8.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>3,883</td>
<td>4,751</td>
<td>5,250</td>
<td>7.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Virginia</td>
<td>2,962</td>
<td>4,083</td>
<td>4,360</td>
<td>7.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## APPENDIX C

### Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC)

**Average Monthly Payment Per Family in Dollars**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States in the Plains Region</th>
<th>1972</th>
<th>1976</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>Political Culture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>3.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>7.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nebraska</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>3.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Dakota</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Dakota</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States in the Southeastern Region</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>8.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>9.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>7.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>8.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>7.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>8.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>9.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>8.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>8.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>8.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>7.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Virginia</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>7.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### APPENDIX D

**Political Culture Score of 48 U.S. States as Modified by Sharkansky**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>8.57</td>
<td>Nebraska</td>
<td>3.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>5.66</td>
<td>Nevada</td>
<td>5.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>9.00</td>
<td>New Hampshire</td>
<td>2.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>3.55</td>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>7.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>3.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>8.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>7.80</td>
<td>North Dakota</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>8.80</td>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>5.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idaho</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>Oklahoma</td>
<td>8.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>4.72</td>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>6.33</td>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>4.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>Rhode Island</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas</td>
<td>3.66</td>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>8.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>7.40</td>
<td>South Dakota</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>8.00</td>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>8.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maine</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>7.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>Utah</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>3.66</td>
<td>Vermont</td>
<td>2.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>7.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>1.66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX D (continued)

Political Culture Score of 48 U.S. States as Modified by Sharkansky*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>9.00</td>
<td>West Virginia</td>
<td>7.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>7.66</td>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montana</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>Wyoming</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>