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Public Policy: A Power Holder's Reaction to Fear

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PUBLIC POLICY:
A POWER HOLDER’S REACTION TO FEAR

A Thesis
Presented to the
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and the
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of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

by
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INTRODUCTION

Public policy, that necessary consequence of the Leviathan, is the end product of a power holder's reaction to fear. Man likes to view himself as a rational being endowed with the ability to govern his own life as he chooses. Yet, man's actions are not to be found originating within his mental consciousness in an example of spontaneous combustion. Man's actions are more properly defined as reactions. There must be an outside stimulus to motivate the human creature into taking positive or negative steps. The outside stimulus must be, either consciously or subconsciously, recognized by man as affecting him personally; and the knowledge of its doing so gives him an unpleasant sense of insecurity--of fear. Through inborn and experientially dictated responses which are individualistic in nature, man reacts to remove the fear and return to a state of mental tranquility. Man's acts are truly rational only in so far as they are a natural consequence of his need for security. Popular conceptions to the contrary, man does not feel secure if he is placed in a position where he is called upon to govern his own life. His very nature causes him to seek out and to allow others to stand over him. There have been those who have met man's need to be governed and have gathered
to themselves the power to direct the composite man—the polity. It is to these holders of power that the ability to make public policy has fallen. Yet, these men cannot remove from themselves their own humanness. They, too, must have an outside stimulus to cause them to act. They, too, are motivated by fear and its reflection is found in the actions they undertake. Public policy, then, is a minority’s reaction to fear.

To support the part of the hypothesis concerning power to form public policy being held in but a few hands, a review of elitist theory concerning the presence of a few such power holders in every organization and elitist interpretations of why this phenomena takes place will be given. Their argument centers around the fact that only a few of the broad membership have the inclination and ability to grasp an organization’s leadership. Further, if successful, the oligarchy will resist broadening the power base and try to prevent others from gaining similar status.

Within the oligarchy will occasionally be found one individual who holds more power than anyone else. He will be recognized as the head of the organization and it is from him that most of the group’s policies emanate. Should another of the oligarchs have a desire to form a policy of his own, he may be able to succeed. Unless the leader’s position is rather tenuous, however, it is rare for such an act to occur without either the acquiescence, ignorance,
indifference, or support of the organization's head.

To add weight to the elitist conclusions, note will be made of the tendency of man to forego the chance to govern himself and to turn instead toward a leader. Other theories substantiating and explaining elitist observations as a biological consequence of man's evolution and struggle to survive also will be put forth.

After looking at who makes policy, the examination will turn to why it is made. The basic conclusion is that man was shaped by his desire to live. The ability to fear was implanted within him to aid in this endeavor. When man is threatened, he feels afraid and reacts to remove the fear. What may be threatened is his actual physical life, or the self he wishes to be. In either case, should the power holder have reason to be afraid, he will react with policies to alleviate his anxiety.

The remainder of the study will explore some of the fears which motivate men's responses. Examples of a particular fear embodied in the cause of an action then will be presented. While what is dealt with can be applied to any organization, the organizations which will be examined throughout the investigation are nation-states. The leaders to be shown initiating actions will usually be various chief executives of those states. Occasionally other of the oligarchs will be mentioned, but it is the chief executive who popularly is recognized as embodying the decision-making
process and, with the exception of those states where there is a differentiation between the heads of state and government, the nation itself. For "when he is insulted, the nation is insulted; when he has a dream, the nation has a dream; when he has an antagonist, the nation has an antagonist."¹ Therein lies the importance for such a study in that it will aid in understanding the reasons behind the actions encompassing the entire citizenry and have an all too real effect upon their lives.

Some clarification of what will be called public policy must first be made to help understand what is to follow. Public policy must not be confused with governmental action. While they usually are synonymous, it is not a universal constant. Public policy is the result of a power holder's desires (reactions). He must, however, because of the magnitude of his office, delegate the responsibility of transferring his policies into action to others. These "others" have fears of their own, however, upon which they must act. For them, fear of the result of not doing as ordered may be less than the fear of doing something that is personally repugnant to their beliefs or sensitivities. They will thus fail to implement the policies.²


Robert C. Tucker has pointed out that a dictator has a great deal of control over his state's bureaucracy and he is able to transfer his desires into action. This is not as true in a democracy. Long before the Cuban missile crisis arose, President John F. Kennedy ordered the removal of American Jupiter missiles from Turkey. This directive was not carried out, and it was only with the development of the Cuban situation that Kennedy discovered the State Department's failure to respond. Clearly public policy and governmental action (or inaction as the case may be) were not one and the same in this instance.

Another important facet in this regard is it may be the power holder who desires not to act. In a somewhat different context, Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz have accurately stated that recognition of non-decisions is as important as concentrating on actual decisions. Public policy calling for inaction is important to consider for it is just as much of a reaction to fear as is the policy designed to activate positive moves. It may also be that the power holder's reaction is so severe that he not only develops policy calling for an absence of action, but that he may,

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like an ostrich, stick his head in the sand and no longer perceive the existence of a certain situation.

Considering the word fear, James C. Davies writes of tension which "is characteristically derived from a specific need and released in some kind of activity relevant to a particular need, even though the activity may not be functional to the 'real' relief of the tension." As regards "unpleasant mental tension," Davies categorizes two types—fear and anxiety.

Fear is intense, short in duration, specific, and is usually related to physical survival. . . . Anxiety is chronic, relatively low level [that is, not intense], and vague. . . . Fear is apt to produce a prompt reaction either to remove the object of fear from oneself or oneself from the object of fear. . . . Anxiety on the other hand is chronic and vague. It endures over a long period of time and is (difficult) to locate. . . . It produces a different kind of reaction. One does not know quite what is the cause for his anxiety and, partly for that reason, he does not know quite what to do.

For the purposes of this study, the terms fear and anxiety will be used interchangeably. If specification is deemed necessary to show the degree of fear felt, an adjective will be used. This is not to deny the importance of remembering that fear does come in various magnitudes. A power holder's fears do change from moment to moment and

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7Ibid., pp. 66-67.
the fluctuating strengths or weaknesses of a particular fear, or between separate fears, do have much to do with the type of reaction that the man has and thus the type of policies he develops.

Where possible, the words of a power holder will be given to support the hypothesis. While one cannot completely reject the words a power holder spoke before achieving power in explaining actions after reaching the pinnacle, more importance should be placed upon those utterances emanating from the latter position. Often when one's social status changes, so, too, does his personality.  

The proud man often becomes humble, servility changes to arrogance, an honest nature learns to lie, or at least to dissemble, under pressure of need, while the man who has an ingrained habit of lying and bluffing makes himself over and puts on an outward semblance at least of honesty and firmness in character.

And often, as will be mentioned later, the man whose status changes from power seeker to power holder will come to possess different motivating fears and thereby different reasons for acting.

Obviously the power holder is not going to bare his innermost motives and publicly vent his fears. In many cases, he will not even realize them himself. Those people that are closest to the power holder will likewise often be in the dark as to the true motivation of their common nucleus.

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Therefore, the words of the power holder and the perceptions of his associates are actually often of little aid in giving satisfactory insights into the true reasons behind the formulation of a policy. Because of this, policies will often necessarily have to be focused upon rather than words for a clearer understanding of the power holder.

Admittedly much of the following will be speculative. There is no more complex subject in life than man. And as there is no surety in life, there is, therefore, none in man. The greatest difficulty in judging him and his thoughts and actions is that one is in truth judging oneself. It would require a creature from another planet to be able to make impartial conclusions regarding man. Yet, man has never stopped seeking to explain his own world. In examining that part of man's environment known as politics and power, the complexities encountered and the necessity in doing so were put down by Machiavelli writing to his Prince:⁹

Men in general judge more by the eyes than by the hands, for every one can see, but very few have to feel. Everybody sees what you appear to be, few feel what you are, and those few will not dare to oppose themselves to the many, who have the majority of the state to defend them; and in the actions of men, and especially of princes, from which there is no appeal, the end justifies the means.

The power to make public policy is held by a minority of a nation's citizenry. Occasionally a large bulk of decision making is centered in but one individual. The elitist theorists, especially Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto and Robert Michels, have recognized power's proclivity to fall into the hands of a minority and have focused attention upon the tendency. The elitist probing of the phenomena gives some insights into the oligarchical features of policy formulation as a necessary consequence of organization. Erich Fromm's observations provide some further explanation of minority rule. He holds self rule and man to be incompatible. Finally, the field of biology gives further proof that submission to leaders is a natural product of man's evolution.

Gaetano Mosca epitomized the basic tenets of what has come to be known as elitist theory when he stated:\(^1\)

Among the constant facts and tendencies that are to be found in political organisms, one is so obvious that it is apparent to the most casual eye. In all societies ... two classes of people appear—a class that rules and a class that is ruled. The first class, always the less numerous, performs all

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\(^1\)Mosca, *The Ruling Class*, p. 50.
political functions, (and) monopolizes power . . . whereas the second, the more numerous class, is directed and controlled by the first.

No matter what name is given to the type of governmental system a state or organization possesses, a minority—an elite—will be found holding the reins of power for that state or organization.

Vilfredo Pareto made note of another phenomena which added to the school of elitist thought. He, too, recognized the obvious presence of a ruling class. The additional existence of others who wish and endeavor to become part of the oligarchy cannot be denied. As Pareto notes, the first group wishes to remain in power, but for various reasons the elite will come to lose its vitality and those struggling on the outside for political status will occasionally be allowed to join with or will overthrow and supplant the power holders. Pareto has thus shown that the ruling class does not remain static. There is instead a "circulation of elites" and occasional changes in who constitutes the governing oligarchy.

What is the importance of the desire to gain power

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Pareto's words sound quite similar to those of Mosca. He wrote: "The least we can do is to divide society into two strata: a higher stratum, which usually contains the rulers, and a lower stratum, which usually contains the ruled. The fact is so obvious that it has always forced itself upon the most casual observation . . . ." Vilfredo Pareto, The Mind and Society, trans. by Andrew Bongiorno and Arthur Livingston (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1935), p. 1427.

Ibid., pp. 1425-1532.
by one group and the desire to maintain sole control of it by another?

The elitist answer:

The whole history of civilized mankind comes down to a conflict between the tendency of dominant elements to monopolize political power and transmit possession of it by inheritance, and the tendency toward a dislocation of old forces and an insurgence of new forces.

While the group known as power seekers unquestionably lie behind the cause for numerous public policies, for present purposes it is necessary to remember only one minority can be the actual holders of power at one time.

Now the question: Why does power fall to but a few individuals?

The elitist conclusion comes from Robert Michels. His affiliations with, and studies of, the German Socialist party directed him to formulate theories which help to explain those previously mentioned. Michels agrees a minority always rules. He termed the tendency for minority rule the "iron law of oligarchy." Oligarchy occurs because the group which becomes spokesman for an organization develops a penchant for power. This collection of individuals realizes the urge and out of self interest becomes consolidated and organized to withstand any challenges to its preferred

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4 Mosca, The Ruling Class, p. 65.

status. The majority, on the other hand, is naturally passive and thereby allows the minority to take control. Michels states the chief reason underlying the birth and sustenance of the oligarchy, however, is the very nature of the organization itself. Any group wishing to have an impact upon its surroundings must organize to realize its greatest possible strength. To organize takes technical capabilities; to keep the group functioning in unison likewise takes skills. These characteristics, along with the desire to use them, are found in only a few, giving that few the authority to rule. The more expansive the group is, the greater the need for organization. In order to make it more responsive and unified, it must become increasingly centralized. As the size of the group enlarges, the number of people with capabilities of directing it, in return, diminishes. Power is thus necessarily grasped by fewer and fewer hands and organization becomes synonymous with oligarchy. And as Michels implied, organization becomes synonymous with nation-state.

Power comes to be held by an ever decreasing number. If not checked, the tendency reaches the conclusion, no matter how the state is originally constructed, of a singular person arising from within the oligarchy to grasp increasing power and overshadow each of the other members of the policy-making elite. The dominant power of this person is understood by at least the ruling class if not the entire
When speaking, then, of the oligarchical features of an organization, it must be remembered a situation can develop where "there is one individual who is chief among the leaders of the ruling class as a whole and stands ... at the helm of the state."\(^6\) [Italics added].

It may be that this singular person is not the visible, "legal" ruler of the state. A dominant power holder may instead be found behind the scenes giving, not solely advice, but actual orders to what the overwhelming majority believes to be the true "head" of the state. Yet, such a situation is the exception to the rule. Overlooking hereditary accession to the throne, those who come to achieve supreme status as a dominant leader of a nation or member of the governing oligarchy do so out of desire for that position. Rare would be the case where they would knowingly relinquish their long sought for power or their social status. While one man admittedly never does hold complete power in a nation, one man occasionally does gravitate to himself dominant power in the realm of making public policy.

Evidence of others who do advise and/or request favorable policies from a dominant power holder is not to be denied. Often they are able to shape and sway the thoughts and the resulting policy decisions of the man at

\(^6\) Mosco, *The Ruling Class*, pp. 50-51.
the top of the power structure. Yet, in the final analysis, it is for the one dominant individual and him alone to accept or reject the advice, to act or not to act, to commit himself to a certain policy or not to do so. President Harry Truman’s desk had a sign summing up the situation. It said, "The Buck Stops Here." Where the buck stops, one will find the man of power.

The "iron law of oligarchy" largely tends to conclude in power for policy making falling under the domain of a singular individual, e.g., a Stalin, a De Gaulle, a Hitler, a Lincoln, who governs according to what the time, the place, and his own personal characteristics dictate. As the elitist proponents would agree, "government is an act of grace, but the ultimate sovereign is not God or the spirit of the revolution or what not. It is the person of the ruler."7

Samuel H. Beer, Nicholas Wahl and Peter H. Merkl have examined the legislative branches of Britain, France and Germany respectively. Each found evidence of the same trend of power concentration in the government they viewed. In each case there was a recognizable shift of power from

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7Davies, Human Nature in Politics, p. 300. Regarding the thought "the ultimate sovereign is . . . the person of the ruler" Charles Merriam makes an interesting point in Political Power (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1934), pp. 51-52. In political thought sovereignty is theoretically not divisible. However, in the realm of international relations, each state, large or small, is regarded as an equal. Each is supposedly sovereign. The accommodation to theory satisfies the power holder’s desire to have no one above him.
the legislature to the executive.³ To become lodged in an ever decreasing minority—in one man—is the natural tendency of power.

However, the qualification of the tendency reaching its conclusion only if allowed to continue unchecked was made. It must be stressed, the end result of one ruling class' existence is one person reaching the top of the oligarchy. Before the conclusion is reached, an era of competing oligarchs striving for supremacy is present. Dominant power hangs temptingly like the forbidden fruit waiting only to be plucked. It does not hang in the sight of but one individual, however, but in the sight of many who are all easily tempted. In the wild scramble to reach the bough where the fruit hangs, the competitors may end up trampling each other so that no one comes to wear the mantle of supremacy.

There are often eras found consisting of dominant rule of the few rather than the one. In many democracies, executive dominance of late did not occur until after periods of legislative supremacy. Yet, within the organization of the legislative branch itself, sub-oligarchies

of the ruling class were and are present. In the United States, John C. Calhoun, Daniel Webster and Henry Clay are recognized as being dominant policy makers of their time and country. Still the policies initiated during their era did come from more than one source. Perhaps they were guilty of trampling each other.

Such infighting is surely what happened within France's Fourth Republic where a number of governments quickly rose and fell. When one sat as head of the government, many policies emanating from his office were the policies of members of his supporting coalition. Should he flout the desires of his allies, their support was gone and his government fell. Often in the history of the nation-state, the competition for dominance within the elite itself exerts a strong check upon the "iron law of oligarchy" running its course.

Power is of a dynamic quality deploring a vacuum. If power is not exercised, it often is not held. There has been a propensity in the United States, too, for policy making to drift to the executive. However, following the Russian launching of Sputnik in 1957, President Dwight D. Eisenhower took no positive responsive measures. The majority leader in the Senate, Lyndon B. Johnson, stepped into the vacuum: he held inquiries into the matter and pushed through Congress a bill to improve America's role in space exploration, providing the obvious example
of policy being formed by someone other than the chief executive of the nation. The power to make policy is never completely held by one man. Yet, as in this example, when policies are made, they are the result of one man's effort with the support of, and often modifications by, other oligarchs.

Even should there be a person holding what is recognized as dominant power, many policies still will be made by others. Some policies will be initiated from within his own coterie. Definitely Lavrenty Beria, Robert McNamara, Heinrich Himmler, and Edwin Stanton initiated policies on their own affecting their nations to some degree. Since the head of any organization, certainly including one as vast as a nation-state, must allow some decisions to be made independently of himself, absolute power is never held by one individual. Others, both in and outside of a dominant power holder's group, exercise it with the same qualifications upon their acts as is found upon any dominant possessor of power.

Power inherently has limitations on its exercise. Even a dominant power holder must rely on others to retain his position and to carry out his policies. As the natural tendency of the organization necessitates the situation, power is always shared, and its exercise is always checked

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by the need not to antagonize those whose support must be maintained.

A further control against the rise of the dominant power holder, is found outside the oligarchy. There are those on the periphery of the structure who are likewise tempted to reach for power and sometimes succeed. The result is the "circulation of elites," and the "iron law of oligarchy" must start anew on the road of concentrating power into fewer and fewer hands, often without ever having neared the ultimate destination of dominant rule by one man.

Elitist observations are often regarded with anathema by those who regard democracy as the ideal form of government. The elitist theorists will say what ought to be and what is are two different subjects. They have written that there is a class of power holders in every country, including the United States. In response, there have been pluralist attacks launched against such conclusions in an effort to refute elitism. Similar maneuvers have been made against the earlier philosophers who found evidence of a


12 For some differing comments on elitism, see: Peter Bachrach, ed., *Political Elites In a Democracy* (New York: Atherton Press, 1971).
Many of the democratic theorists have attempted to deal with what is, rather than with what ought to be. They hold rule by the many really must and does exist. They do not realize that elitism per se is not bad. It is simply fact. Those in power may be good or they may be bad. Any evaluative conclusions depend upon what the power holders and their observers conceive to be the proper rules of the political game. There are different rules for a country with a heritage of dictatorships just as there are for ones having democracy as a basis of their political history. It is, in part, the conception of rules and the underlying belief systems of nations which separate one from another. Because the elitists feel power invested in a minority to be common to all polities, does not necessarily make elitism and democracy incompatible doctrines. In their separate foundations, it must be admitted, the former is based more on reality; the latter, on idealism.

One of democracy's basic tenets is the necessity of an educated, aware, motivated, and concerned citizenry. All


things, of course, are relative, but the majority of the citizenry does not possess these qualities in the same magnitude the oligarchs do. Regarding motivation, in studies of a middle-size eastern city and two parishes in Louisiana, it was discovered that politicians who held an office viewed as having high power and achievement potential were more strongly power and achievement motivated than non-politicians who otherwise held similar status in the community and occupations. Motivation for power? It is found in the oligarchs, not in the many.

Who are the politically concerned in a state? Herbert Goldhamer says it is not the great mass of people. Most individuals are concerned with matters other than public policy, with only a few finding satisfaction in dealing with its formulation. The majority, even when they do become politically activated, e.g., at election time, will center their attention on personalities and not policies.

The conclusions should not be interpreted as meaning no power is held by the great mass of non-power holders. As Mosca was quick to point out, in a representative system those oligarchs who come to bear the title of representative and want to retain it, must rely upon the votes of the

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many. They will thus necessarily listen to the people’s complaints. In this area, the majority does have power.17 For if those in power flatly reject the people’s entreaties and fall completely out of step with the great mass of opinion in a state, the elite will be forced to change (inherently or via "circulation") or face a loss of power—from no longer being obeyed to the more frightening possibility of being replaced. "Ultimately, the leader and his characteristics represent the group itself and are not at variance with its characteristics."18

In deference to the pluralist viewpoint, the people in any state under any form of government do have impact. Their support or at least acquiescence is a must for those who would sit at the pinnacle of the power hierarchy. It must be noted, say the pluralists, if the leadership does not follow, or if it runs counter to, the will of the people, the citizenry will rise and overthrow the tyrannical power holders. Therefore, the people are for all intents and purposes directing the nation. Yet, for that amorphous mass to rebel, it needs a Sorelian type of politically motivating myth19 and an organization. As in

17Mosca, The Ruling Class, p. 155.
unity there is strength, so too, recalling Michels, there is
oligarchy. For there to be a revolt, then, the mass must
have an elite of its own. There is the realm of the power
seeker. He will spring from apparently nowhere to lead. He
will give the people the necessary belief, the necessary
motivation for rebellion. He will say, "Throw the scound-
rel out!" He will mean, "Put me into power!" The power
holder, in trying to prevent and destroy revolution attempts
to provide the people the necessary belief, the necessary
motivation, not to revolt. Therefore, the seekers and
holders of authority together "are able to fashion, and
within very wide limits, even to create the will of the
people. . . . So far as this is so, the will of the people
is the product and not the motive of the political process."20
[Italics added].

The impact of the broad spectrum of the people on
public policy is, in some sense, present. Considerations
of the citizenry's response to any planned move is often
one of the aspects of proposed policy the leadership will
try to fathom before acting. However, just as they did with
their advisers, the leaders can ignore the majority. The
power holders may misjudge or fail to see the people's
possible response to an act. They may realize a public
policy will have an unfavorable impact upon the public,

20 Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, p. 263.
but for other reasons they will move anyway. The ability of the power seekers to use a policy to rally the people against the government is another of the considerations sometimes taken into account by the power holders. While it may cause harm to their position later, the important fact to remember is that policies can be, and are, made without regard of the people. In a circuitous route, the mass may influence the oligarchy, but the reverse, as shown above, is more likely to be true. The perplexing question needing to be answered is whether or not the people act on their own. It would appear that democrats would say "yes," the people can and do spontaneously react to a move by the government which is against their wishes. From what has been presented already, however, the answer would appear to be "no." The mass is just that—a formless, ununified, apathetic group of individuals who are shaped and spurred to attack or defend by the seekers and holders of power.

Man may speak of the desirability of rule by the many. The philosophy gives meaning to one's life. However, to a large extent, democracy is but motivating political myth and is but a tool of the seeker or holder of authority. True, they possibly even believe it themselves. But be that as it may, when one witnesses the actions of those before and after achieving their goal of power as they stir the masses by promising a future utopian democracy, one sees the truth in the adage, "the revolutionaries of today become
the reactionaries of tomorrow." The "iron law of oligarchy" continues with its metal-like invincibility and, if unchecked, power will gravitate to an ever decreasing number of individuals. The people's continual subjection to the cycle and their willingness to sometimes help speed it to its final product rather than hindering it can be seen in history.

Why?

Erich Fromm, watching the rise to dominance of Adolf Hitler, formulated interesting hypotheses to shed some light on this mystery. Fromm felt man and democracy to be incompatible. Democracy, in freeing men, at the same time alienates him from his environment. Man must look only to himself to find the answers for the troubled world. As he can find no answers within himself, he becomes lost, powerless and afraid. A threatening situation he must face will grow more pressing, and his feelings of helplessness will become magnified. Man will try to find relief by submerging his fears, his freedom, his self in "a person, an institution, God, the nation, conscience, or a psychic compulsion." Just as a child will turn from a threat and go

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23Ibid., p. 177.
to his father for comfort, so, too, man will turn from freedom and look to an authoritarian for respite. The figure of authority will calm his fears, answer his questions, and give him a place in the sun where he will not have to rely on himself. The majority of mankind does not want democracy. They, as Goldhamer said, do not care to worry about policies. They focus on who will comfort them. It could be said they want a leader.

Mosca, Pareto and Michels observed what mankind wants, mankind has received. Man's political organizations are indeed controlled by elites. Within each elite there occasionally is one man who comes to hold dominant power. Michels and Fromm each found reasons for the occurrence. The observations of these thinkers and others have done much to damage the philosophies of those expounding the virtues of democracy. It has been left to another group, however, to deliver the potential coup de grace to the pluralists. Biologists have delivered theories and findings of their own substantiating and clarifying the causes of the phenomena of man and his acceptance of rulers.

With Charles Darwin and his *The Origin of Species*, new thoughts concerning man and his ancestors came to the fore. As Darwin points out, animals alive today have a long history of change behind them. The composite characteristics

for each animal, including man, and the millions of years of evolution which have gone into making them possess a certain logic. Life is harsh said Darwin and his followers. It was even more so, especially for man, back at the dawn of time. In that threatening and dangerous environment, only the fittest survived. If an animal could defeat its enemies, it lived. If it could not, it died. Any species of animal fitting into the latter category would be selected out by nature and become extinct. Those in the former would live and pass on their characteristics to future generations. Occasionally, mutations would appear in a species. If the mutation hindered the survival of an animal, the animal would have little chance of living long enough to pass it on to the young. Even if it did succeed in propagation, the young inheriting the debilitating gene would have chances for survival certainly less than that of a beast not in possession of the characteristic. Eventually, animals in the former category would no longer inhabit the earth. Other mutations, however, were beneficial instead of detrimental. A new trait emerging in an animal which would aid in the creature's survival would, of course, have a very good possibility of being passed on to future generations for the same reasons a detrimental characteristic would not. Man, too, genetically handed down traits aiding his successor's survival. Just as other animals, man is the product of a long history of evolution. The characteristics he possesses are all in his composite make up because
they aided in his ancestors' fight for survival.25

These inborn features are not solely physical. Mental characteristics likewise evolved from the animals' need to live. Conscious or subconscious impulses, instincts, drives, needs, and actions all have a similar reason for existing. Graham Wallas saw that26

impulse . . . has an evolutionary history of its own earlier than the history of those intellectual processes by which it is often directed and modified. Our inherited organization inclines us to re-act in certain ways to certain stimuli because such reactions have been useful in the past in preserving our species. Some of the reactions are what we call specifically 'instincts,' that is to say, impulses toward definite acts or series of acts, independent of any conscious anticipation of their


26 Wallas, Human Nature in Politics, pp. 48-49.
probable effects. These instincts are sometimes unconscious and involuntary; and sometimes, in the case of ourselves and apparently of other higher animals, they are conscious and voluntary. But the connection between means and ends which they exhibit is the result not of any contrivance by the actor, but of the survival, in the past, of the 'fittest' of many varying tendencies to act.

There have been a number of motivating drives found in almost all animals. The need for animal groups to have their own territory is an obvious example. Should another group encroach upon this area, the animals will fight to repel them. The encroaching group, on the other hand, the farther it gets from its own territory, will come to lose much of its self-confidence making it easier for them to be repelled. Territoriality helps the species survive by giving each group its own food-producing area free from other groups. 27

Drives are evident in the creature's obvious desire to live. However, the drive to live will occasionally be held in check when the group is threatened and an animal may sacrifice himself because the drive for the species' survival is even greater than the urge for life itself. 28

Another drive is the desire for dominance which results in hierarchical structures being formed. 29 Within

27Ardrey, African Genesis, pp. 35-60.
28Ibid., pp. 81-83.
29Ibid., pp. 91-118.
animals is found the desire to achieve high status. The urge, as all others, fluctuates from animal to animal and only a few have it to any great degree. These few will compete with each other until one alone sits as king of the hill. Desire alone, of course, is not enough. Other skills, such as fighting ability or oratorical skill, are needed. In any event, a leader does arise. Below him is arranged a hierarchy, a "pecking order," according to abilities. The leader, of course, gets the choice pickings. At the other end of the spectrum, the individual farthest removed from the leader is given the leftovers. While others nearer the top may occasionally challenge the leader, he is, on the whole, recognized as being dominant and his position is infrequently contested. To challenge and to lose could mean loss of life or exile, either of which has drives often stronger than the one for dominance. Which urge is strongest in a creature varies, and when there is a conflict between two or more drives, the most dominant will win.

The natural inclination for forming hierarchies has become a beneficial survival trait passed on to man's descendants. One man against a larger creature does not have much chance of success. Yet, he must kill the beast, either for food or to rid himself of a threat. Man, therefore, learned to join with other men; and in order to succeed in their endeavors, a leader arose and was accepted. Those
men who were able to submit to a leader were able to survive and genetically pass on the submission trait. Those not able to do so were defeated by either human or non-human creatures. Anyone who has seen boys at play has seen the outcropping of the traits of dominance and submission as a leader, a captain, a quarterback is certain to emerge and be accepted. Also, in witnessing the inordinate amount of concentration placed on presidential elections over those of other American elections, it becomes even clearer that people do indeed have certain, inborn "biological demands... and they will continue to demand a leader in the form of an identifiable, solitary individual. It is a fundamental pattern of their species, and there is no avoiding it."

Since the desire for one leader came from the need to survive, it fluctuates according to the degree of tension an individual feels. When his world is most threatened, he will allow and actually help power to be concentrated in an Adolf Hitler or a Winston Churchill. When times are more calm, the desire for a solitary strong leader, in turn, diminishes; and a Churchill is then dismissed from his post of dominant power holder. In other words, it "is proportional to the distress of the followers. Hence, the leader

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30 To view it from an experiential viewpoint, it is not difficult to see that from birth one is taught to respect and accept authority—first in the family and later in the larger society.

31 Morris, The Human Zoo, p. 55.
who in fact emerges will be considered indispensible by his followers, in proportion to the magnitude of the task at hand."32

An oligarchy possesses the power to form policies in all societies. The size of the minority will vary and, at times, one individual will emerge as a dominant power holder. Those constituting the ruling class do so because of their own capabilities and desires. The majority of a state's citizenry allow an oligarchy to rise and function because of their own lack of desire for power and their inborn need to be led.

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CHAPTER II
FEAR AND REACTION

Public policy primarily emanates from the province of a few individuals. An understanding of what lies behind the policies can only be discovered by an examination of those figures. The effort must be made to look beyond the exterior countenance of the possessors of power and bring to light their innermost recesses. Only in the turbulent inner area can one try to decipher what it is that causes man to act. Somewhere within the power holder are found motivations which were placed within him at his conception, drives which were experientially spawned, and reasons for existing which he has formulated. These motivations, drives, and reasons all have direct application to why public policy occurs. Investigations into the inner sector of man must be preceded by the reminder that what is located and called truth is done so only with the belief of there being no absolutes in this complex world, least of all in its most complex creature—man. But only by attempting to understand the individual's thoughts and drives, can one come to know man. And only if one knows man, can one know his policies.

In the previous chapter, mention was made of theories
of man biological in nature. These thoughts held man, like all animals, evolved out of a struggle for survival. He had desires to live--drives to live--genetically passed to him by his ancestors. From the drive to live came man's need for a leader and other mental and physical survival mechanisms. In what is certainly overly simplistic logic, life is in essence survival. To maintain existence is to meet and overcome threats to existence. Man needs food to live. He will devote his mind and body to surmount anything menacing his food supply. He will do likewise to any challenge that may, or actually does, block any of the other needs or drives he feels must be preserved for his continued survival. The basic underlying point needing to be stressed is man does realize the presence of threats to his existence. He sees obstacles strewn along the path of his life and is afraid.

The need for a leader has been passed down through generations of mankind as a result of the struggle for survival. In the same manner, the ability to fear has been implanted in man's mind, and it has been a prime explanation for man's survival. Fear keeps man from risking his life unnecessarily. Fear gives man the time to plan how to react to a threatening situation. James C. Davies even shows

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1 Supra, pp. 28-29.
that fear, in marginal quantities, must be present for men to act at all. While extreme fear is recognized as being detrimental in often leaving one so distraught he would be unable to act, a complete absence of fear will make one unaware of the threat or the need to act at all.\(^2\)

An army in combat will find after a few engagements it is in some ways better in condition than it was before physical conflict, because it now possesses experienced fighting personnel. But let war drag on without any new infusion of replacements in its ranks, and the army will likely lose much of its vitality. In any list of reasons explaining the happening, room would have to be made for the presence of fear. It is the so-called "fearless" soldiers who will spark the troops and at the same time put their own lives into extreme danger. They will eventually come to lose those lives, and the army's driving force will be similarly lost. It is the first to take cover, to feel fear, who remain alive.

Fear is a survival mechanism found in every person. As each person is in someways different, so, too, is his ability to fear and the causes of those fears. Fear comes about as the result of the knowledge something one considers important is threatened. Fear of losing this something stirs man to act or not to act. Fear is the cause behind

\(^2\)Davies, Human Nature in Politics, pp. 68-69.
man's motivation--behind the reasons of a leader's issuance of public policies. As Robert Ardrey has written, "The world of the animal is a world of fear."\(^3\) The world of the power holder is no different.

The ability to fear; the drives for dominance, territory obtainment and defense; and the need for leadership have all been genetically pre-coded into every man's system. Their beneficiality to the human animal has been explained. In attempting to discern man's basic nature, these characteristics must be examined. Other traits do certainly exist. One of the most important of these has been the ability of an individual to learn from his own and other's experiences. The latter fact allows a person to gain knowledge of the surrounding environment from one's contemporaries and, more importantly, from one's elders. In phrases reminiscent of others previously stated, man's "cultural capacities evolved because they enhanced the ability of [his] ancestors to survive."\(^4\)

A person, then, is able to absorb and comprehend instructions as to what he should fear. He is influenced by planned example. As a child, he is told to fear the touch of fire. He may touch it anyway, but he will do so

\(^3\)Ardrey, *African Genesis*, p. 60.

only with some measure of apprehension. Then, in learning his elders were correct in this one instance, the child's questioning of other lessons will be dulled. The fear of a possible deprivation also motivates the person to listen to and obey other teachings. The results of these planned cultural admonishments will have a long term affect upon the human personality and the motivations of his later actions. Each child, of course, is taught differently and with diverse examples giving each person a separate and distinctive personality just as there is some heterogeneity in the genes each individual inherits.

Not all learned instruction is accepted as planned. The person's own individual conception of what he is taught gives him his own explanation of the world. Also, not all of the input into a child's mind is planned by his elders. Often uncontrived experiences, and the resulting answers man's mind forces him to search for to explain fearful phenomena, shape his view of the surrounding environment and his place in it. Once again, the view is different for each person; and while all motivations do have fear as a foundation, in other regards the drives vary from person to person.

Not only do man's motives vary, but so, too, do the actions he has been taught, and he has discovered on his own, to execute when faced with a threat. His choice of response is either dictated by what experience has shown was the best method to defeat the threat, or what would be the consequences of failure to act or not to act. The Spartan child in
Plutarch’s Lives allowed a fox he had stolen and hidden under his coat to disembowel him rather than make a move that would betray himself. Experience had shown him whippings and shame would be the consequences heaped upon him should he show a sign of weakness. Faced with two threats—the fox and punishment—he suffered the necessary result of not acting upon what he considered to be the lesser menace. He feared and he reacted by doing nothing. His action relieved the major fear that he felt. And recalling Davies, man acts only out of fear.

The heterogeneous experiences and conceptions man has, when applied to the atmosphere of the Leviathan, show that, "political reaction is far more personal, far less abstract and ideological, than either students of citizenry or citizens themselves are wont to recognize. . . . [T]he effect of words is far less than the individual experience . . . of assorted and intensely felt deprivations." It is to those deprivations Harold Lasswell focused upon in an attempt to explain man’s political behavior. Using Freudian concepts, Lasswell felt the experiences of a child will be reflected in his adult actions when faced with the real world. If a child receives something having


6Davies, Human Nature in Politics, p. 189.
good connotations for him, he will react, e.g. smile, when he discovers it is nothing to fear. If he fears a loss of something, he likewise will react, e.g. throw a tantrum. In essence, there is a power relationship where "extreme deprivations are threatened or inflicted against a challenger; and what the infant-child does initially is to treat every discomfort as a provocation for every form of expression at his command. It is not too far fetched to say that everyone is born a politician, and most . . . outgrow it."7

Why has the politician--the power holder--failed to outgrow it?

Lasswell would say in answer there were certain influences in the childhood of the power holder causing him to have feelings needing expression. In later life, he displaced these private motives upon public objects and rationalized the displacement in terms of public interest. 8

To give an example, a child may come to fear and hate his father as the result of an oedipal complex. As he grows older, the child will transfer the hate for his father--for authority--into a public figure, such as a king. He will come to rationalize any of his following attacks upon the monarch by saying he did it to help free the enslaved people of his country.


8See: Harold D. Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics (New York: The Viking Press, 1962); and his Power and Personality.
The successful seekers of power move from one social status to another—from outsiders to oligarchs. Fear caused these moves, and because of being placed into a strange and therefore uncomfortable environment, fear also resulted from it. Failure to satisfy a need in their youth or adolescence caused these moves and "left permanent, active [benign or malignant] lesions that kept these men in tension forever after."9 "The power seeker . . . pursues power as means of compensation against deprivation. Power is expected to overcome low estimates of the self, by changing either the traits of self or the environment in which it functions."10 These personal fears are the causes for the reactions that become public policy.

Harold Lasswell has effectively applied the impact of personality to the political world.11 Even if one was to

9Davies, Human Nature in Politics, p. 95.
10Lasswell, Power and Personality, p. 39.
disregard the biologists' theories on genetic pre-coding of characteristics, those who have made studies such as Lasswell's help in substantiating fear as the cause of public policy. Most of those studies treating a combination of personality and politics, deal with the attacker of authority --the seeker of power. Yet, what should happen to him should he succeed and find himself as the new father figure?

The consequent uneasiness is easy to understand. As mentioned above, fear both caused his moves and resulted from them. The biologists have described the inborn need for a leader. Because a seeker answers what for him is a more pressing drive, does not eliminate his need to be led. The need should be expected to be found in everyone, including the dominant power holder. Fear results when that need is not met. Erich Fromm also pointed out the tension felt when one is in a threatening situation and has no higher authority to which he can turn. Certainly, a power holder is constantly faced with threats. Thomas Hobbes aptly described the situation:

During the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against every man. . . . [Such times finds one in] continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.

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As Hobbes further noted, for the head of a state, there is no power to keep him in awe. He is in "continuall feare." And when in fear the child, or the dominant power holder, reacts.

What are those fears that haunt the power holder and cause him to react? What fears motivate and influence his public policies?

The first and foremost urge in man is to survive. The genetically pre-coded drive is obvious in all creatures. Without the urge to live, man would have long ago become extinct. The fear for the survival of self, then, is the single-most prominent trait in man. In a physical sense, one would expect to find in everyone both the desire to live and the anxiety that life may be taken away. Fear for life, then, is one feature having a bearing upon the formulation of public policy.

However, the fear for one's survival is not limited to a physical self. Included within the need to survive is an individual's mental self as well. Each person—each personality—needs certain things to make himself whole. Only by answering those hereditary and experiential drives which move his soul can the power seeker find his true self. Self-actualization is the goal moving him to attack authority and

13 Ibid., p. 105.
take power for himself.\textsuperscript{14}

For each man there are certain intangibles he desires to acquire—\textit{he must} acquire. These are the things that "make life worth living." Once they are acquired, the man is whole. His self is actualized. He lives and has a whole self worth conserving. Man now fears for his survival. It is the separate fear of not grasping those intangibles—and thus one's self—that spurs men to action in an effort to acquire them. Once possession of these incorporeal substances—and one's self—is accomplished, man acts to insure their survival. Any threat to his tangible or intangible self causes fear in man's heart and he will react. He knows if those things are lost, so, too, is he.

The true power seeker is differentiated from his fellow man by his inner need for power. In order to actualize his true self, and thereby be something worth saving, the seeker must grasp the power, the seat of authority, the leadership. There are naturally going to be others who will compete with him for the prize. Yet, he will compete. He will make any sacrifice to achieve his goal, because for him "power [is] the magic potion that [can] change poverty to wealth, failure to success, crime to virtue, and ignorance to brilliance."\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{14}For the explanation of self-actualization which has influenced this line of thought, see: Davies, \textit{Human Nature in Politics}, pp. 53-60.

This is the power seeker's destiny. Never to have fulfilled it, is never to have lived.

While it is the drive for power which separates the leader from his followers, the leader also has imbedded within himself other needs that must be satisfied in order for self-actualization to be accomplished. Even should the seeker grasp his Golden Fleece of supreme power, should his other needs fail to be satisfied, he will still not be a complete self. Once any needs are acquired, they must be preserved in order to remain viable. Whether or not one ever achieves all of his goals is a point that can be debated. Yet, as each goal is reached, each need fulfilled, man stands nearer to being whole—perhaps not in the eyes of others, but at least within his own mind's eye. Each captured desire must be retained. If it is lost, one is even less of a whole self than he was when he had it but still lacked the main goal of his sights.

For example, why was Napoleon exiled to Elba and St. Helena?

The basic reason was "without his adoring public, he could not so irrepressibly wage war and conquer nations. In short, by removing him from France and his adoring public, he was made into somebody other than Napoleon."

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Fear of never achieving his goals, as well as fear of losing those already acquired, forces the power holder to act—to make public policy. He fears for position, acceptance, esteem, legacy, creation, power, charisma, and ideology. He reacts.
CHAPTER III
FEAR FOR LIFE

The desire for life—that one supreme motivating factor which has shaped and governed man's existence—is present in all men. So, too, is the fear of the physical self being returned to the dust from which it came. However, each man, though realizing immortality in an earthly sense is impossible, tries to forget the approaching darkness. He undertakes various pursuits to occupy himself and tries to remove thoughts of the unavoidable demise from his mind.

Man will find an activity in which the individual happily loses himself—getting so absorbed that, at certain times and in some situations, he is able to forget himself in the performance of activity which he enjoys primarily for its own sake and not primarily because he thereby feeds or protects himself, his family, his community—or because he can give socially acceptable vent to his aggressions, gain great deference, or bend people to his will.

For some, the activity is the seeking and holding power.

On the face of it, it would appear as if a person with a healthy desire to live should be expected to find an occupation other than politics. For the power seeker, the percentages in favor of a long life would seem to greatly diminish if he is victorious in his quest. The dominant

Davies, Human Nature in Politics, p. 59.
power holder, especially, is the target of many latent frustrations. For those who despise the father-figure and for those who seek his position, the sword has been believed to be often a more effective tool than the ballot box in removing the leader from his position.

What fear the power holder does possess in regard to his life is more of a fear for his position—his actualized self—than for his physical life. The assassin does not attack an Abraham Lincoln or a William McKinley. He attacks a President Lincoln or a President McKinley. As Harold Lasswell pointed out, the assassin pulls the trigger, not on the average citizen, but on the father-authoritarian-figure. It is the position the power holder represents that is murdered, not the person. When a Czar Nicholas II or an Emperor Maxamillian is overthrown and then executed, it is because, by holding the positions they do, they stand in the path of the power seekers who can only actualize their individual selves by permanently removing these obstacles to their destiny. Once again, it is the position, not the individual, upon which frustration and hate has been directed. If fear for physical life was found to be the most pressing drive within the power holder, he would be expected to remove himself from office and thus from the focal point of enmity and danger to his person.

However, he does not do so. For his self to be whole he must retain his position. Only then is he a true self
worth preserving. Then, the fear for life will emerge. He will react to protect himself by either ignoring the threat, removing himself from it, taking steps to eliminate it, or combinations of all three tactics.

Whether or not the fear for life is present to any great extent within a leader, in the first place, will be the result not only of the present environment, but of the method by which power was initially acquired and later sustained. If the throne was attained and, or held by violent methods, e.g., in Russia, this gives an acceptability for such techniques to other power seekers. They will use similar methods themselves. The realization of possible physical attack will necessarily cause concern within a power holder. In nations with a strong heritage of legal or traditional pathways to power, e.g., Britain, there would however be little anxiety concerning attempts to take the power holder's life by the seekers. There will always be some fear of the assassin, along with the realization that little can be done about it. However, what would happen if, in the case of John Kennedy, the bullet had merely grazed him? Would the legally elected President then have become more fearful and taken steps to withdraw from possible threats?

Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah was an individual who did attempt to hide from his fear. His life came to be in danger; he feared for it. Yet, he refused to relinquish his position.
The result was that he isolated himself in Christianborg Castle in an effort to escape the assassin's bullet. He became dependent upon his friends and conflicting intelligence agencies for information. Those friends and agencies, seeking power for themselves, only gave Nkrumah information thought to be pleasing to him and thereby receive his favor in return, or information which would discredit their rivals. Nkrumah's fear for life caused him to rely on others who sought power. He was afraid to go into the country and seek the truth with his own eyes. As with Kwame Nkrumah, the fear for life is not often reflected directly in public policies. Action is usually reserved for different anxieties, such as the fear for position. The indirect effect of the fear for life is mostly seen in its influence on the source of information upon which the power holder bases his policies.

When tension is high over the belief his life is in danger, the power holder will often remove himself from the real world and be forced to rely upon power seekers for information. To be forced to see the world through the eyes of another is dangerous for the holder of power. His personal instincts brought him his position and are now dulled. His senses which have a "feel" for what is occurring in his

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nation are likewise removed from direct stimulation. The fear for life may thereby shape policies that have unfavorable reactions among the populace and, or the powerful groups. The position of power will then be threatened by their dissatisfaction. ³

A different indirect influence of the fear for life upon public policy is possibly seen in the case of Adolf Hitler. Hitler was often in ill health and felt that his life would be short. Once he consented to being examined by a Dr. Theodor Morell. The results of following the doctor's advice brought the German dictator temporary relief and he was forever after of the opinion that Morell was a miracle worker. In actuality, the doctor was giving Hitler a wide variety of injections of questionable medical value. A number of Hitler's intimates later felt that their leader had undergone a change after falling under the doctor's spell. The result was all of Hitler's later maneuvers were the supposed consequences of Morell's medications. ⁴

For the power holder who has used violence as a tool, fear for life may be directly reflected in some of his public policies. Nikita Khrushchev has mentioned Stalin's anxiety

³The problem of isolation will occur also for reasons other than the fear for life. See: Reedy, Twilight.

⁴Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich, trans. by Richard Winston and Clara Winston (New York: Avon Books, 1971), pp. 152-156. Speer himself doubts this thesis, however, feeling what Hitler did would have been done even if he had not had any injections.
over his own safety. Part of the fear was the result of the growing rivalry of Beria, the powerful head of the

Soviet's secret police.

Stalin started to worry about Beria's increasing influence. More than that, Stalin started to fear Beria. . . . The practical means for achieving Stalin's goals were all in Beria's hands. Stalin realized that if Beria could eliminate anyone at whom Stalin pointed his finger, then Beria could also eliminate someone of his own choosing, on his own initiative. Stalin feared that he would be the first person Beria might choose.

Stalin's reaction was to try and rid himself of the threat.

Realizing that the head of the secret police was a Mingrel, Stalin published a decree saying that the Mingrels had connections with the Turks, and that some of them were politically oriented toward Turkey. Of course the allegation was utter nonsense. Because Stalin was old and sick, he wasn't consistent in following through on his scheme. Beria turned the whole thing around in his favor and shrewdly insinuated himself as Stalin's henchman. . . . Beria assigned himself to go to Georgia and administer the punishment of the Mingrels, the imaginary enemies. Those poor fellows were led to the slaughter like sheep.

The impact of the fear for life on public policies is not great enough to cause the power holder to completely remove himself from danger by resigning his office. Often, such fear is not even found to be great enough to have

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6Ibid., p. 335.

7Ibid., p. 336.
any impact on public policy at all, and it will be ignored. But if the anxiety is of any magnitude, the power holder may come to isolate himself and thereby be forced to rely on second-hand information to formulate his policies. He may even act directly to eliminate the cause of his distress and construct policies having direct influence upon the lives of men.
CHAPTER IV

FEAR FOR POSITION

The self-righteous, confident and egocentric power seeker is motivated by inner drives he cannot fully comprehend. He only knows the prize of power lies within his reach and it must be captured in order to find self-fulfillment. When he finally achieves his goal and grasps power, much, if not all, of his personal ambitions become accomplished. Yet the power holder, be he simply oligarch or dominant leader, realizes the presence of others who have the desire to supplant him and whose hunger for power is of no less a quantity than his was. With the first flush of success, the new power holder feels omnipotent. However, the world does not sit still while he luxuriates in his newfound self. He must produce answers to problems before the power seekers do or he will find his support drifting away. Nenad D. Popovic in writing of the Communist Yugoslavian oligarchy [the new class] says:

"Individuals belonging to the new class have various and even mutually conflicting interests. Nevertheless, each is dependent on the group as a whole in order to achieve his respective degree of authority. . . . Although united by common goals and enemies, new-class

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1Popovic, The New Class in Crisis, p. 13.
members differ in that some are deeply committed to the new class, others less deeply committed. All, however, are frightened of losing whatever authority they possess.

They, as do all power holders, fear the loss of their position. W. Howard Wriggins devotes his book, *The Ruler's Imperative*, to the problem as applied to the leaders of Africa and Asia. He aptly points out, "if it were possible to measure the attention a ruler gives to different problems, it could probably be shown that he devotes more time and effort to aggregating around himself and his government sufficient political power to permit him to stay on top than to any other single purpose." It is the position of power which places the oligarch high above the masses. To lose the position is to lose the whole self—to no longer be completely alive. The power holder fears such a loss as he would fear for his physical self and he reacts. He attempts to eliminate his opponents, reassure his allies, and sway the majority to allow him to retain power.

Note should be made here of the term position. It refers to both the internal position of power held by man, e.g., head of a nation or member of Congress, and also to the external position of the oligarch's country, e.g., threatened by invasion or supreme in the world. If the nation's position falls, so, too, does his personal position. To

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2Wriggins, *The Ruler's Imperative*, p. 11.
remain in power then, the holder must have success in both world and domestic affairs. To fail in either realm is to provide the seekers with a lever which can be used to pry the holders from power. The holders realize their predicament and feel afraid. In response to the fear, the power holders often will attempt to remove, damage or alter the fear's stimulus—the power seeker.3

The technique of exiling opponents has long been employed to eliminate threats. But it is the use of a "night of long knives" to destroy any threats to a power holder's position that is deemed the ultimate response. One obvious "night" occurred in Nazi Germany. Hitler's status in the early 1930's was far from secure. The Sturmabteilung (S.A.) had been an aid in helping him to gain office, but now it reverted to a threat to his power. The storm troopers had believed Hitler's promise of remaking Germany into a true nationalist-socialist state. They had believed and they were growing restless waiting for results. Rivalry between those long-time Hitler followers and the German army was likewise present. Hitler's future plans depended greatly upon the army's support. The S.A. thus became a menace to Hitler's position, for if their desires were acceded to,

3See Ibid., pp. 159-180. As Thomas Hobbes said in his Leviathan, p. 102, "There is no way for any man to secure himselfe, so reasonable, as Anticipation; that is, by force, or wiles, to master the persons of all men he can, so long, till he see no other power great enough to endanger him."
Hitler's position would be placed in great jeopardy both from those who could not stomach the coarse methods the storm troopers employed and from the S.A. itself. On June 30, 1934, Hitler acted and with his more trustworthy Schutzstaffel (S.S.) executed the leading elements of the S.A. Hitler had removed the threat to his position causing him to become "extremely excited and . . . inwardly convinced that he had come through a great danger." He knew the threat was no longer to be feared.

The Stalinist purges are similar proof that when an oligarch senses threats to his position, he will unleash as much of the power at his command as is necessary to eliminate it. Khrushchev wrote:

All of us around Stalin were temporary people. As long as he trusted us to a certain degree, we were allowed to go on living and working. But the moment he stopped trusting you, Stalin would start to

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5 Speer, Inside, p. 87.

6 Khrushchev, Remembers, pp. 329-330. Recall, also, the actions taken by Herod when told of the birth of a new king. Another example of violent elimination of a threat to protect position can be found in the executions undertaken by the Sudanese leadership of the members of an attempted 1971 coup, "Showdown Season in the Middle East--Sudan," Newsweek, August 2, 1971, pp. 34-35; and in the Jordanian attacks upon the Palestinian commandos, Eric Pace, "Jordan Acknowledges Clash in Effort to Oust Guerrillas from Inhabited Areas," New York Times, July 15, 1971, p. 7.
scrutinize you until the cup of his distrust over­
flowed. Then it would be your turn to follow those
who were no longer among the living.

Complete and final elimination of a threat will not
always prove to be the best course to take. Bloodletting
in order to remove a threat, even if done only according to
accepted legal practice, can often sponsor the rise of a
new and more pressing danger. Actual use of violence may
have the result of bringing a power holder’s own name into
disrepute and making him into a target for suspicion rather
than trust. The use of violence may also make a former
enemy into a martyr and provide a cause round which other
power seekers will be able to gather adherents to employ
against the oligarchy.

The power holder will attempt to reverse roles to
avoid such an occurrence. He will portray himself as the
oppressed and the power seeker as the "enemy of the state." Since the state is supposedly the composite populace, the
seeker is said to be the "enemy of the people," and the
power holder, then, becomes the people’s protector. The
method damages a power seeker and can be as effective a
tool as elimination. As an example, an oligarch of the
American South will portray Abraham Lincoln as a baboon.
An oligarch of the North will portray Jefferson Davis as a
Simon Legree. Both actions are devised to damage a seeker
and turn potential support away from the camp of the power
holder’s opposition.\(^7\)

The opposition’s freedom of speech also is controlled by holding "discipline and subordination . . . (to be) indispensable to the very existence of the [state]."\(^8\) To speak against the oligarchs is to speak against the people, and the seeker is thereby appropriately punished if he should undertake those improprieties. Anyone seen associating with a threat is also openly or covertly punished. The Russian novelist, Alexander I. Solzhenitsyn, whose works often portray the ugliness of Soviet society, is looked upon by the Russian oligarchy as a definite menace. The Soviet oligarchs react by refusing to publish his writings, refusing his friends’ work, holding his name up for disrepute, and making it seemingly impossible for him to receive his awarded Nobel Prize. As is seen in Solzhenitsyn, a threat is not always recognized as coming from a true power seeker. Yet the oligarchy views Solzhenitsyn’s writings as damaging to their status. And since power fades when damaged, Solzhenitsyn is punished.\(^9\)

\(^7\)The tactic has often been used in Communist states to label a regime’s opponents as "revisionist." Dan Morgan, "Poles Applaud Gierek’s Plan," Washington Post, Febr. 9, 1971, p. A9.

\(^8\)Michels, Political Parties, p. 177.

Other times, attempts will be made to turn enemies into neutral entities, if not actual allies. As noted, the position of state must be preserved to protect the position of power holder. Therefore, a Hitler will sign a treaty with his mortal enemy Stalin to remove the threat of Russian arms from forcing Germany to fight a two-front war. A Richard Nixon, who is looked upon as the arch enemy of communism, will journey to China and face the leaders of what was once considered the "Red Menace" in order to help possibly check a growing Soviet threat felt by both China and the United States.10

Threats can also be met by means other than an after-the-fact action. Machiavelli writes of King Ferdinand of Spain who kept threats from arising by undertaking numerous surprising maneuvers "which have kept his subjects' minds uncertain and astonished, and occupied in watching their results. And these actions have arisen one out of the other, so that they have left no time for men to settle down and act against him."11

To keep opponents from coming into being, numerous tactics


11Machiavelli, The Prince, p. 110. Recall, also, the suddenness of Richard Nixon's actions in unveiling his intended trip to China and the instituting of the wage-price freeze.
other than those used by Ferdinand, also have been initiated. The primary method is to show the people it is simply more profitable to be the oligarch's ally than it is to be his enemy. While pain is inflicted upon the enemy, rewards will be provided for the faithful.¹²

Gaetano Mosca has described the unlikelihood of an oligarch appearing unless an effective minority within the state's upper echelon supports him.¹³ The minority must be kept loyal to the power holder if he is to retain his position. The power holder will thus show his gratitude to his supporters. He will allow a close ally to have a few minor favors bestowed upon him, or the power holder may even allow the decadence of a Hermann Goering to go unchecked. As the time for Abraham Lincoln's reelection in 1864 drew near, he too felt apprehension concerning his ability to retain his position. To hold the needed support of the Radical Republicans in securing the nomination of his party, Lincoln bowed to their demand calling for the removal of Montgomery Blair from the office of Postmaster General. The President wrote Blair: "You very well know that this proceeds from no dissatisfaction of mine with you personally

¹²See Wriggins, The Ruler's Imperative, pp. 145-158.

¹³Mosca, The Ruling Class, p. 53.
or officially.\textsuperscript{14} Public policy was made under the vital considerations of fear for position, then, when Lincoln rewarded the requests of the Radical Republicans.

Other less important supporters are also rewarded. While individually holding only minor power, they collectively could pose a serious challenge if not induced to remain faithful. Lincoln again provides a good example in sending a message to his Secretary of the Navy,\textsuperscript{15} Gideon Welles, which reflected his desire to reward his minor supporters.

M. de Mareil who bears this, is the Editor of the \textit{Messager-Franco-Américain (sic.)}, a French Newspaper published in the City of New York, which has sustained the Union cause during this war with great ability and energy.

I hope that any advertising which can legally and appropriately given to a journal of his class, may be given to M. Mareil.

Attempts to gain backing from certain groups within a state are sometimes made by exalting a member of the group into the ranks of the visible oligarchy. In the American context, the post office department has been used, on occasion, as a political plum which is given to such groups. When John Kennedy first constructed his cabinet, he desired it to be representative of the various sections of the country. The time came to select a Postmaster General;


\textsuperscript{15}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 343.
and since the west coast had yet to be represented on the cabinet, "word went out to dig up a California businessman. Someone suggested J. Edward Day of Prudential Insurance. . . . His credentials appeared good, and his rather hasty appointment . . . completed the Kennedy cabinet."16

The carrot thus is often looked upon as a much more valuable instrument than the stick. Hungary's Janos Kadar and Czechoslovakia's Gustav Husak both came to power following the destruction of popular movements in their respective countries by the Soviet military. Both Kadar and Husak were in tenuous positions, knowing there was little support amongst the people for them. Their biggest desire was, if nothing else, to neutralize the feelings of the Hungarians and the Czechs. They desired to keep the people from being dissatisfied enough to rally behind an issue the power holders could have eliminated and overthrow the oligarchy. Kadar and Husak thus saw to the placing of large supplies of consumer goods in their nations' shops believing that in seeing to the material desires of a people, it to see to their political needs. While Kadar and Husak may never be able to receive widespread popular support, they have allayed dissatisfaction against themselves.17


The power seeker occasionally even will be allowed to join the ranks of the oligarchy. The reigning power holders recognize a threat met in this manner forces the power seeker to become a defender, rather than an attacker of the ruling class. The Republican Richard Nixon's selection of powerful Democrat John Connally to hold an important cabinet post, is a possible example of the practice in action. However, "every oligarch is full of suspicion towards those who aspire to enter its ranks, regarding them not simply as eventual heirs but as successors who are ready to supplant them without waiting for natural death." 

Flagrant reward, also, can be as dangerous as excessive employment of violence. Dissatisfaction can arise among those who do not benefit from the oligarchs' generosity when they see favors given to their own competitors. They may then become opponents to the oligarchy and different policies following riots Poland lowered food prices. "Poland Revoking Increase," Washington Post, Febr. 16, 1971, p. A1; and Tunisia's leader removed an unpopular aid. "L'Affaire Ben Salah," Newsweek, May 4, 1970, pp. 45-48. Sweden's ruling party is ideologically opposed to monarchy and is preparing to remove all powers from the country's king. Yet, the actions will not be undertaken until after the present, popular king dies in order to avoid giving an issue around which the power seekers can rally support. "Swedes Propose New Constitution," New York Times, August 29, 1971, p. 4.


19 Michels, Political Parties, p. 176.
will have to be constructed to deal with the new threat coming from those who were ignored.

Rather than always attempting to secure position through the use of physical or material considerations, the power holder often will try to make use of the spiritual. Just as early kings claimed the legitimacy of their rule by divine right, the power holder will attempt to gain allegiance, and thereby support for his position, by inculcating an ideology, with provisions supporting the right of the oligarchy to rule, within the populace. Ideology believed brings a ruling class vast power in its ability to rouse the normally apathetic. Conflict over power forces both seeker and holder to construct chains of thought which will bring as many under their spell as possible. They know their effectiveness in this regard determines whether "they may stand or fall in the rough struggles in which they engage."

Ideology is constructed to attack or protect the oligarchs, not to give the rivals a reason for being. The opponents have found their meaning for life in the desire for status--power is their god. With ideology being but a tool, it is understandable why the Yugoslavian ruling class "is so sincerely concerned with its struggle for survival that it is capable, if necessary, of abandoning world

20 Merriam, Political Power, p. 37.
communism to safeguard its own."²¹

The fear for position produced similar reaction in the early nineteenth century. To counter opposition and relieve the resulting fears, church and state united their spiritual and secular worlds to withstand the "rationalistic and revolutionary currents" which threatened them both.²²

As Mao Tse Tung wrote a century later regarding his own movement: "It is to the advantage of despots to keep people ignorant; it is to our advantage to make them intelligent. We must lead all of them gradually away from ignorance."²³ The power holder has little respect for mankind. He will educate them—shape them—to know the truth as he sees it. For if the majority views the world as does the power holder, they will agree with the oligarch as to the legitimacy of his rule. The populace will then join with the holder to defeat his opposition and help him consolidate his grasp upon power.

For the dominant power holder, the ideology he often promotes is the cult of personality.²⁴ He will promote himself as the nation's savior and the embodiment of all wisdom,

²¹Popovic, The New Class in Crisis, p. 13. Also see Wriggins, The Ruler's Imperative, pp. 129-144.

²²Mosca, The Ruling Class, p. 92.


²⁴See Wriggins, The Ruler's Imperative, pp. 91-107.
goodness, and power. The dominant power holder attempts to encourage the impression of his indispensibility. If he should perish, the dominant power holder says, so, too, will the country. The populace must rally to him to save the state and themselves. Charles de Gaulle was one who used the cult of personality as an effective tactic to remain in power. De Gaulle, when placing a referendum before the public, would ask the French to vote as he desired. Should they fail to do so, he said he would tender his resignation. Unwilling for a long time to be without his figure of stability, the French followed De Gaulle's wishes until 1969 when a referendum was finally defeated by French voters.25

Occasionally, to strengthen his position, a possessor of power will give the impression of resigning from his office. The dramatic act will shock the people into the realization of his purported indispensibility. They will beg the power holder to remain in office, and the holder will "reluctantly" accede to the "will of the people."

Following the disastrous war with Israel in 1967, Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt followed the described course of action and successfully retained his position until his death.

As with other strategies designed to keep the power holder in his position, the cult of personality also has its limitations. The use of it by the power holder is effective only if it corresponds to the situation. Time and conditions are fluid, always changing. Should the situation drastically alter, the power holder will find the need to rely upon new techniques to remain in office. He realizes the failure to do so means his fall.

Often, of course, there is an absence of a dominant power holder. Even when a dominant personage is present, there are others who, failing to achieve dominance for themselves, cannot become reconciled to any type of second-class status within the oligarchy. As a result, there is a decentralization of power within the state. The rejected individuals will return to their own regional bases of support. "Being unable to rule the whole country, [they] prefer to rule at home, considering it better to reign in hell than serve in heaven."  

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27 Michels, Political Parties, p. 198. This has occurred in Belgium, Henry Giniger, "Belgian Coalition, Off to a Shaky Start Must Bring Together a Jigsaw Nation," New York Times, Febr. 2, 1972, p. 18, and in Iraq, William Tuohy, "Iraq's New
Should the oligarchs come under extreme attack from their constituents, they may seem to bend with the pressure and appear to relinquish some of their power. But their submission is feigned; they are well aware that if they simply remain glued to their posts, their quality as executants of the will of the masses will before long lead to a restoration of their former dominance."28

After examining the restraining influences of the fear for position, the questions should be asked: Why did the fear fail to prevent Adolf Hitler from launching his armies across the boundaries of Poland and leading his nation into war? Why was Hitler willing to risk Germany's existence and thus his own position as head of one of the world's great powers?

As with many others, the German leader was unwilling to "reign in hell" when he could dream of capturing heaven. Hitler's self was only partially actualized after he succeeded to Germany's leadership. He was not whole and thereby not at the point of feeling the need to conserve. Hitler remained a seeker at the same time he held dominant power for Germany. For his self to be made whole, Hitler had to have the German eagle grasp the globe in its claws.29 He had

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28Miohle, Political Parties, p. 173.

29Speer, Inside, pp. 221-222.
to have Germany in the undisputed position of dominant power for the entire world. Hitler was afraid his destiny would never be realized by any other method, so he reacted by plunging into war.

The power holder is confronted with no greater threat than one made against his position. His life's ambition was to achieve status as a ruler. To be forced no longer to look up, but to be able instead to look down at the world, is the basic need in his life. Yet, it is not his life's desire alone. If he is successful, there are always those waiting and attempting to supplant him. In realizing his survival is threatened, the power holder, just as his ancestors before him, fears. He reacts with every instrument at his command to destroy those who would destroy him. As his fellow oligarchs are strong enough to topple him, they must be rewarded. As the people can be rallied to attack him, the power holder in turn attempts to rally them to protect him. Public policy has been the result more often of

30 At times the ruler will attempt to either avoid a confrontation with the seeker or, at least, put the seeker at a disadvantage when the confrontation occurs. Zanzibar's Sheikh Abeid Amani Karume attempted the former method when he decreed there would be no elections for sixty years. Jim Hoagland, "Zanzibar's Revolution Becomes One-Man Rule," Washington Post, March 12, 1972, p. A16. Former Prime Minister Harold Wilson unsuccessfully attempted the latter course when he called for British elections months before he was legally bound to do when he saw polls showing a great increase in popular support for his party. "Polls Show Gain for Labor Party," New York Times, April 24, 1970, p. 9.
the power holder's reaction to the fear for losing, or never completely achieving, position than of any other single cause.
CHAPTER V
OTHER FEARS

Public policy is often the result of a power holder's reaction to a threat lodged against his position. However, there are those powerful individuals whose positions are relatively secure and fear for position is rarely found materializing within them. Also, power holders do not devote their entire concentration to worrying about the tenuousness of their status. Considerations other than those dealing with the ruler's position often are at the root of many decisions. On occasion, these other considerations are inextricably bound to the fear for position. Often times they have an impact of their own. As with the fears for life and position, the other considerations deal with desires needing to be realized to make the ruler truly whole. When the desires are threatened, be it before or after realization, the power holder reacts and public policies are conceived. Some of the desires are acceptance, esteem, legacy, creation, power, charisma, and ideology.

Upon acquiring power, and with each ascending step into the upper reaches of the oligarchy, the power holder finds himself placed in a new environment. The world he enters was only just before populated by oligarchs who looked down on him, and he up at them. To become comfortably
situated in his new position, he desires the acceptance of his new peer group. Until he feels truly accepted, he is ill at ease and his self is not realized. If his ascension is rapid, the new power holder realizes many mannerisms reflecting his previous inferior status will be all too apparent to both him and those whose approval he desires. Fear of not being accepted may cause the oligarch to make decisions reflecting what he feels is expected of him or what his new peers tell him he should do.

When Lyndon B. Johnson was thrust into the Presidency, he was forced to submit to a time of adjustment. The staff around him was dedicated to another fallen individual. While Johnson often had been at odds with them, it would be difficult to believe he did not want the acceptance of those who had formed John Kennedy's circle of advisers.¹

Almost a usurper in his own mansion, sensitive to the fact that in his every move he was being compared to Kennedy, he had, nevertheless, to carry on government in his own manner. This was the period when his harsh, almost brutal treatment of his own people reached a peak. . . .

Yet, there he was, performing beyond any normal human capacity; performing flawlessly as President, though less well as a human being; suspicious of those around him, yet at the same time trying to forgive; unable to translate himself to the idiom by which Kennedy had made the nation listen; conscious of his own style and resentful when comment was made on it by the press . . . .

Many of Johnson's initial acts were designed to show

continuity both with what Kennedy had desired and with what Kennedy's staff told Johnson he had desired. But, fear for acceptance is something a strong individual cannot live with forever. He reaches the point where fear of losing one's individual self forces him to insist his entourage conform to his desires rather than he to theirs. Johnson reflected such a moment in a meeting with government officials concerning a prearranged presentation of awards to distinguished Americans. Kennedy had decided to perform the ceremony over the space of forty-five minutes and the officials assumed Johnson would follow Kennedy's plans. "At which Johnson burst out that he was tired of people telling him he had to do this or that or another thing because it had been the most important thing in the world to John F. Kennedy--it would take him fifteen years to do it all. He wouldn't give the ceremony more than ten minutes for television . . . ."\(^2\)

Johnson's position was secure, but his acceptance was not. He had to prove to himself and others his individual ability to be made a member of the oligarchy's highest reaches. Until he was elected President on his own, he could never be certain of his acceptance as the chosen leader among his new peer group.\(^3\)

\(^2\)Ibid., p. 75.

\(^3\)Haiti's leader, Jean-Claude Duvalier, has similarly sought acceptance for his country within the world's community. Peter Braestrup, "Papa Doc's Legacy," Washington Post, May 2, 1971, p. 81.
Man wants to be looked upon fondly and deemed by others to be important. The oligarch also desires to be honored and the fear for esteem arises when the feeling is present of honor no longer being bestowed. The oligarch will often undertake actions he hopes will please his countrymen and thus receive their continued respect and best wishes.

Abraham Lincoln on numerous occasions bowed to entreaties and pardoned condemned deserters. He had a deep "craving for the approval of a wide public. When the news of Chancelloresville burst upon him, his reaction was not: only 'Our cause is lost!' but the question, 'What will the people say?'" Lincoln needed esteem, without it he was no longer whole. His unwillingness to plan for a harsh reconstruction upon the South is at least a partial reflection of his need for esteem.

At times, however, esteem is withheld. The leader's eyes then turn, if they had not done so previously, to tomorrow; and the fear for legacy now becomes a dominant consideration for the leader can say it will be left to history to judge his actions. "History will prove Lyndon Johnson right," said Lyndon Johnson. The dominant power holder is in the spotlight. His self will endure forever in books and he wants the self that endures to be glorious.

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4For example, see three of his letters in Lincoln, Collected Works, pp. 9, 205.

Note is therefore emphatically made of Richard Nixon being the first President in history to initiate many undertakings such as his visit to China. The leader who must rely on tomorrow to judge him may be less willing to shift and change policies than one who must receive continuous cheers from the crowds. The leader in the latter category, since every act is a possible issue around which the power seeker can gather support, will be apt to quickly drop or revise policies which are found to cause unfavorable response within the citizenry. The power holder who fears for legacy to a greater extent than he does esteem can wait and allow history to provide his cheers.

For the dominant power holder who has no reason to fear for life, position, acceptance, esteem, or legacy, another fear will often motivate many of his actions—the fear for creation. Most often found within the power holder who brought his nation through great ordeals and dedicated his life to its construction, the fear for creation will direct the leader to make policies assuring the product of his work will continue to survive when he no longer is on the scene. The nation is his creation and legacy, so long as it

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6See Carroll Kilpatrick, "President Stresses Peace as His Aim," Washington Post, Febr. 18, 1972, p. A1. The fear for legacy was evident in Nixon's decision to send troops into Cambodia. He said, "Whether I may be a one-term President is insignificant compared to whether by our failure to act in this crisis the United States proves itself to be unworthy to lead the forces of freedom in this critical period in world history." "Transcript of President's Address to the Nation on Military Action in Cambodia," New York Times, May 1, 1970, p. 2.
lives as he conceived it, the power holder lives.

Tito of Yugoslavia is, in essence, assured of being the dominant leader of his nation for the rest of his life. He has no reason to fear for his position. The Yugoslavs recognize him as the father of their country, and he has no need to fear for esteem. However, he does fear for his creation. Yugoslavia has often been in turmoil as the result of the rivalry of the many nationalities comprising the country. Tito's dominance of his nation has been of a quality to hold the diverse peoples together. Yet, with advancing age, Tito realizes his presence soon will be gone and, with it, his binding influence. To assure a united nation after he departs, Tito has seen Yugoslavia grant some autonomy to the various ethnic groups within its boundaries. He also has moved to reorganize the presidency, making it multiple in character and allowing representation within it of leaders of both the various republics and of leading social and political organizations. As Tito said, "It has often been said abroad that when I disappear Yugoslavia will collapse. In our country, too, there is much speculation about my successor. I thought that it could provoke a very serious crisis. . . . To spare our socialist community such a crisis, which is desired by many, we must carry out this reorganization [of the presidency]."7

Since none of Yugoslavia's power seekers can hope to supplant Tito, they have looked to their home regions for an area to rule and have courted their various ethnic groups, producing an intensification of nationalistic rivalry and a threat to Tito's creation. In anger, Yugoslavia's leader responded: "People say that Tito is an empty gun . . . . They will see this time that the gun is not empty. We have plenty of ammunition . . . ." Tito fired the gun in December, 1971, and purged a number of separatist Croat leaders. In both instances of reorganizing the presidency and purging the Croat hierarchy, Tito reflected a reaction to threats launched against his creation.

Tito knew it was his responsibility to provide for

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8 Supra, p. 65.
the continued life of his creation. Adolf Hitler knew it was his responsibility to complete his creation before his death. Mention has been made of Hitler's fear for his life, and of the precautions he made to protect his position by signing a treaty with Stalin. Albert Speer felt Hitler's belief in an imminent death motivated him to advance his deadlines for his planned destiny. His ambition was to "create a great empire. All the Germanic peoples will be included in it. It will begin in Norway and extend to northern Italy. I myself must carry this out. If only I keep my health!" The new Germany was to be Hitler's creation; he alone could achieve it and time was short. Hitler thus turned his divisions against the Soviet Union before he had originally planned and opened a second front. Hitler feared his creation would never be achieved and he reacted.

The fears for power, charisma, and ideology often have a direct relationship to the fear for position. Usually the amount of power held by an individual is the determining factor in the position he holds in an oligarchy. The fear for power, however, covers instances where position should

12 Supra, p. 48.
13 Supra, p. 57.
14 Speer, Inside, p. 156.
15 Ibid., pp. 110-111.
more properly be termed office. The fear arises within an oligarch who is secure in his office, but the power he exercises from the office is threatened. President Theodore Roosevelt was in no great danger as regards his office; yet, when he desired to send the American navy around the world by way of Japan, Congress refused to fund the venture. The negative response to Roosevelt's desire threatened his power; and in a reaction, the President sent the navy to Japan anyway and told Congress to appropriate money to bring them back. The fear for power activated Theodore Roosevelt to respond.16

The cult of personality has been an instrument long used to secure the position of power for the leader.17 The power holder fears a loss of the cult--of charisma--for two reasons. Should the power holder lose his charisma--the mechanism lying between his position and his enemies--his position will become jeopardized. Thus, the fear for charisma is linked with the fear for position. On the other hand, it is comforting to be honored. Recalling the importance of esteem for the leader, he fears the loss of charisma as it results in the loss of esteem and a part of the self worth


17 Supra, pp. 63-65.
conserving. Of course,\textsuperscript{18} charismatic authority is naturally unstable. The holder may lose his charisma, he may feel 'forsaken by his God,' . . . ; it may appear to his followers that 'his powers have left him.' . . . His followers abandon him, for pure charisma does not recognize any legitimacy other than one that flows from personal strength proven time and again. . . . He gains and retains it solely by proving his powers in practice. . . . His divine mission must prove itself by bring-ing well-being to his faithful followers; if they do not fare well, he obviously is not the god-sent master.

To retain the qualities of the "god-sent master," (should the fear for charisma prove stronger than the fear for position), the power holder will abandon his office rather than risk a loss of charisma. Following World War II, Charles de Gaulle retained the charisma he had often shown. Since the French government became more institutional than personal in character\textsuperscript{19} from 1945-1946, De Gaulle left his position to retain the charisma which would eventually prove to bring him back to power in 1958.\textsuperscript{19}

Because the need man feels for a leader fluctuates according to the difficulties he is encountering,\textsuperscript{20} the charismatic leader must continually reestablish his identity

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{19}Stanley Hoffman and Inge Hoffman, "The Will to Grandeur: de Gaulle as a Political Artist," in Rustow, \textit{Philosophers and Kings}, p. 289.
  \item \textsuperscript{20}Supra, pp. 29-30.
\end{itemize}
by fulfilling his "divine mission" and "bringing well-being to his followers." He needs times of upheaval to prove himself to his constituency and to himself. 

Conditions of distress have been ... seized (by De Gaulle) with characteristic glee so as to re-enact his mission and to renew his charisma; when he put on his general's uniform before the TV camera while Algiers was rioting in January 1960; when he smashed the army rebellion in April 1961 ... Moreover, the style of his foreign policy ... serves the function of producing ... mini-dramas that renew his appeal, as if he, too, needed to create crises for whose solutions he will be 'arrest and necessary' (for example, ... the Canadian venture).

Charisma, then, is more than merely a defensive mechanism for the power holder's position. To be charismatic may be the power holder's greatest desire. The survival of his charisma thus is more important than any position.

Man seeks power to serve his own interests. He uses ideology—the great motivator of followers—as a tool for the preservation or acquisition of power. True ideology, however, must be served by the individual. But to be a slave to an ideal is difficult.

For the great majority of men, idealism alone is an inadequate incentive for the fulfillment of duty. Enthusiasm is not an article which can be kept long

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22 Supra, pp. 62-63.  
in store. Men who will stake their bodies and their lives for a moment, or even for some months in succession, on behalf of a great idea often prove incapable of permanent work in the service of the same idea even when the sacrifices demanded are comparatively trifling. The joy of self-sacrifice is comparable to a fine gold coin which can be spent grandly all at once, whereas if we change it into small coin it dribbles imperceptibly away.

To acquire power takes self-confidence and a reliance on self. To be successful likewise takes pragmatism. Woodrow Wilson, a man who could be said to be idealistic in his hopes for the post-World War I world, stated: "Politics must follow the actual windings of the channel of the river: if it steer by the stars it will run aground." However, as W. Howard Wriggins aptly notes, "without ideologies defining purposes, projecting a higher vision of the meaning and end of it all, political life may come to appear—as it may indeed become—simply a game of jockeying for position, a crass and cynical struggle for the spoils."

Man varies and to say there has never been idealistic motivation in the oligarchy must be regarded as, at best, questionable. There have been those willing to risk their position of leadership in order to aid in their ideology’s survival. An example can be found in the early Christian leaders who allowed themselves to be sacrificed rather than

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deny their faith. Perhaps Wilson forgot his adage when he
spoke out so vehemently in favor of a League of Nations.
Still the fear for ideology as a motivating force behind
public policy has played but a minor role in the history of
the oligarch.

Power holders have been motivated by many different
fears. Fears for acceptance, esteem, legacy, power, charisma,
and ideology are factors lying behind many public policies.
Just as with the fears for life and position, the importance
of the individual anxieties varies from person to person.
One power holder may be motivated primarily by one fear.
Another oligarch may make policies reflecting a wide range
of apprehensions. Whatever the reason, the importance of
the policies is in their ability to have great or minor
affect upon the lives of the nation and the citizen.
CHAPTER VI

AN EXAMPLE: JEFFERSON DAVIS

Various fears have been portrayed as motivating forces lying behind public policies of different power holders. To gain increased insight into the broad area within which fear operates, it is beneficial to examine one power holder closely to see how his actions were governed by fear. The individual to be scrutinized is Jefferson Davis who is recognized as having been the dominant leader of the oligarchy of the American South which came to organize the Confederate States. Though the "rules of the political game" in the Confederacy had a prohibitive effect upon initiation of much domestic policy by a central authority, important actions were undertaken by its President (Davis) primarily as a result of fear. In his willingness to submit to his fears by forming policies in the restrictive atmosphere of the Confederacy, Davis is an important figure to note. For if Davis would act in such a manner as to violate the "rules of the game," how much easier it would be for a leader in a less prohibitive situation to do likewise in the face of fear.

In the early days following United States' independence, Southerners desiring power were able to find self-fulfillment
in the new American oligarchy. The dominant power of their section of the country in the sphere of foreign trade, as well as in the economy of the rest of the nation, dictated the presence of many of their number in the ranks of power holders. Virginians—George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison—all played vital roles in the Revolution and in the governing of the newly founded nation as all three later came to reach the pinnacle of power as President. Besides being well represented in the Executive Branch, the South at this time also held positions of great strength in the Congress and Judiciary as is evidenced by the presence of John C. Calhoun and John Marshall in the respective branches.

However, times changed. The Northern oligarchs were gaining increasing power as merchants and manufacturers. Immigration was swelling their populace, forcing it to expand into new areas. The South, on the other hand, could match Northern expansion for only a limited time. The basis of the Southern economy was cotton, but the conditions upon which the crop’s vitality depended quickly reached their limit. Productive land was ruined and after moves into Alabama, Mississippi, and finally Texas, new land was not to be found. As more and more people filtered into the North, the South lost its strong position in the House of Representatives. As more states came into the Union, the South, being land restricted, could only wage a delaying
action against the growing numbers of Northerners in the oligarchy with the Missouri Compromise of 1820. Eventually, the South lost control of the Senate.

Lack of land was not the only problem the cotton economy faced. The Southerners felt the need for slavery, which had given the South economic wealth and thereby power. The North's economy had no such need for slavery and it began to agitate for the destruction of this form of servitude. While the South held great power in the Congress and the Presidency, it was safe from the Northern threat to slavery and thus its position. Yet, the North was expanding, squeezing Southerners out of the national oligarchy; and in an effort to meet the growing threat, the Southern power holders took steps to insure the maintenance of their way of life.

To gain support from their fellow Southerners and to put an obstacle in the path of Northern dominance, the oligarchs developed an ideology to justify and protect their position. Best expounded by John C. Calhoun, the rising belief structure was based on America's sacrosanct Constitution and Declaration of Independence. The ideology's chief articles of faith were to be found in terminology devised to protect states' [spelled S-O-U-T-H-E-R-N] rights.

\cite{footnote:10}{Supra, pp. 62-63.}
In essence, the Constitution and resulting government were said to have been constructed by the individual states joining together and forming a compact. Should the majority of the states succeed in passing a law harmful to an individual state, that state could declare the law null within its boundaries. Should this tactic fail, the state could regard the compact as broken and separate from the nation it had previously joined. After all, the South would say, is the method not the same as was used by the revered Founding Fathers when they broke with the Crown? To the South, then, the "Compact Theory" was based on the most solid of ideological foundations.

Regarding the issue of slavery, Southerners found justification for their "peculiar institution" by claiming to feed, clothe, and shelter their slaves while the Northern factory workers received starvation wages. Further, the slave owners provided the blacks with knowledge of Christianity which they otherwise would not have gained. The Southerners claimed to be living the ideals of democracy and freedom. Northern agitators were viewed as trouble makers who did not understand the true Southern life style nor the factual meaning of the Constitution.

The North's power had grown and the South, with or without ideology, could no longer dictate its will. On the other hand, the North was not strong enough to force its own will upon the South. A middle ground was agreed upon to protect the Southern interests and the Compromise of 1850 was
affected. In retrospect, the tactics of compromise were merely delaying in nature, for the North was destined to gain control of the American oligarchy. As time passed, even though Congress was in the increasing grasp of the North, the South felt its position to be secure as long as a man with a viewpoint not anti-Southern in nature was President.

With the election of antislavery proponent Abraham Lincoln to the office of Chief Executive, however, the threat to the Southern oligarchy reached its apex. The ability of the South to have a dominant voice in the affairs of the nation was gone. The oligarchy recognized the loss and also believed their position as dominant power holders within the South itself could be put in jeopardy by Lincoln. They felt a threat, and the resulting fear caused them to react by leaving the Union. For the Southern oligarchs, it was preferable to "reign in hell than serve in heaven."³

Within 1861's atmosphere of secession, delegates representing the oligarchs of the various states met in Montgomery, Alabama, to construct a new government. Jefferson Davis, appointed by the gathering of power holders to head the oligarchy as President of the Confederacy, would take actions in the next four years having far-reaching

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³ Supra, p. 65.
consequences for the South. To understand those actions, a glimpse of Davis, the man, is necessary. Then the fears operating or not operating upon him can be examined and explained.

Jefferson Davis was born in 1808 to a family far from aristocratic in background. Still, the desire to achieve high status was evident in Davis' father. For the elder Davis, status could only be achieved with education. In his last letter to his son he wrote: "Remember the short lessons of instruction offered you before our parting. Use every possible means to acquire useful knowledge as knowledge is power . . . ."4 The youth did not initially enjoy the struggle to learn and related how his father told him,5

"Of course, it is for you to elect whether you will work with head or hands; my son could not be an idler. I want more cotton-pickers and will give you work."

The next day, furnished with a bag, I went into the fields and worked all day and the day after. The heat of the sun and the physical labor, in conjunction with the implied equality with the other cotton-pickers, convinced me that school was the lesser evil.

It was Jefferson's older brother Joseph, however, who was to exert the greatest influence upon Davis. Joseph was regarded as the richest man in Mississippi and was able to procure an appointment to West Point for his young brother. Upon graduating, Davis served a short and fairly impressionable


term in the army. Obviously, "Davis loved routine, definite organization, obedience, deference to superiors, authority, gradation in position . . . . Army life stimulated these tendencies and really caked the man's mind into fixed habits."6

He later married and resigned from the military to live the life of a planter near his ambitious brother. Shortly, however, his wife died. Davis proceeded to withdraw himself from much of the surrounding world by working all day and reading all night. With his brother, he discussed the newspapers and political journals of the day. Davis was successful as a planter and he came to nurture within himself John C. Calhoun and his fellow Southern oligarchs' view of the political world. That the ideology thus developed justified the Southerners' status was naturally not put forth as a reason for its being the explanation of TRUTH. When Jefferson Davis met the girl who would become his second wife, his manner of grasping what he believed to be the absolute forced her to write, "He impresses me as a remarkable type of man, but of uncertain temper, and has a way of taking for granted that everybody agrees with him when he expresses an opinion . . . ."7 As she wrote years later, "he sincerely thought all he said, and, moreover, could not understand any other man coming to a different conclusion after

7V. Davis, Jefferson Davis, p. 191.
his premises were stated." The tendency of Davis to appear to be an ideologue was reflected years later when talking with sometimes opponent William Seward. Seward told Davis many of his [Seward's] antislavery speeches were done for political purposes—to get support in the North. Davis asked, "Do you never speak from conviction?" Seward replied, "Ne-ver." The astonished Davis retorted, "As God is my judge, I never speak from any other motive."9

Besides the drives of status, knowledge and ideology, Davis desired military glory. With his West Point experiences and planter's influence, he eagerly seized the chance to lead a Mississippi regiment in the Mexican War. He wrote his sister: "If occasion offers it may be that I will return with a reputation over which you will rejoice as my Mother would have done."10 Davis did achieve his reputation when he personally played a large role in defeating the Mexicans in battle. He came to consider himself a brilliant tactician. But when the President offered to promote him to general, Davis refused, saying the Constitution provided for such appointments to be done by the states, not the federal government.11

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8Ibid., p. 199.


10J. Davis, Private Letters, p. 40.

11V. Davis, Jefferson Davis, p. 360.
After the war, the hero, because of the high status in the oligarchy of both his brother and himself, won appointment as Senator with the same ease which, before the war, he had been elected a Representative with little opposition. In the Senate he served well and his reputation and his power increased. Under Franklin Pierce he was an able Secretary of War, reenforcing his beliefs in his own military genius. Later Davis returned to the Senate where he often championed the Southern ideology and strove to protect both the oligarchy as it was then constituted and the oligarchy's foundation of slavery.

Jefferson Davis was the man chosen to head the new Confederate government. Encouraged to seek status and position, he accepted an ideology to explain the world in terms justifying and protecting his existence. Arrogant as to his superiority as a man and a militarist, he was chosen to use his talents to preserve power for the Southern oligarchy.

Preservation of position for the oligarchy and for himself were to be the guides by which Jefferson Davis led his nation. Being recognized as a military expert and as a member of the higher reaches of the oligarchy, Davis

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13 For instance, see the resolutions he presented to the Senate, February 2, 1860, in J. Davis, *Rise and Fall*, I, pp. 42-43.

never felt the fear for personal acceptance.¹⁵ There was no new peer group within the emerging government he had to please. Never having had to struggle and campaign to be elected to any of the positions he held in his life, Davis was not apprehensive for popular support. Since Davis refused to lower himself to do manual labor, he looked down upon those who made a living with their hands, and Davis thus did not fear for their esteem.¹⁶ Believing knowledge to be the key to power, he dismissed as ignorant both those he held to be below his status and those who lodged threats against him. "The public ... have no correct measure for military operations, and the journals are very reckless in their statements."¹⁷ "Success is the test of merit, and yet there has been nothing which I have found to require a greater effort of patience than to bear the criticisms of the ignorant, who pronounce everything a failure which does not equal their expectations or desires, and can see no good result which is not in the line of their own imaginings."¹⁸

The new President indicated much of the path he would follow in the coming years in his inaugural address as head

¹⁵Supra, pp. 69-71.
¹⁶Supra, p. 72.
¹⁷J. Davis, Rise and Fall, II, p. 41.
¹⁸J. Davis, Private Letters, p. 132.
of the provisional government. Knowing there were threats to the Southern oligarchy, Davis looked to the area where he felt secure—to the knowledge he had accumulated—and turned it against the threats. First he used ideology to gain support for the oligarchs' position by rallying the masses behind the Confederacy.19 "Our political position . . . illustrates the American idea that governments rest on the consent of the governed, and that it is the right of the people to alter or abolish them at will whenever they become destructive of the ends for which they were established."20 "The Constitution framed by our fathers is that of these Confederate States. In their exposition of it, and in the judicial construction it has received, we have a light which reveals its true meaning."21

To retain his new found dominance, Davis couched his desire for power in terms of the people. "If I mistake not the judgment of the people, a reunion with the States from which we have separated is neither practicable nor desirable."22

19 Supra, pp. 62-63.


21 Ibid., p. 36.

22 Ibid., p. 35.
To meet the threat from the North and protect the oligarch’s position, Davis turned to his military background and ignored much of his states’ rights doctrine by centralizing the armed forces. "For purposes of defense, the Confederate States may, under ordinary circumstances, rely mainly upon the militia; but it is advisable, in the present condition of affairs, that there should be a well-instructed and disciplined army. . . . I also suggest that . . . a navy . . . will be required." 23

A year later, in his inaugural address as President of the Confederacy, Davis applied the tactic of maligning those who desired to topple the Southern oligarchy. 24

Fellow-citizens, after the struggle of ages had consecrated the right of the Englishman to Constitutional representative government, our colonial ancestors were forced to vindicate that birthright by an appeal to arms. Success crowned their efforts, and they provided for their posterity a peaceful remedy against future aggression.

The tyranny of an unbridled majority, the most odious and least responsible form of despotism, has denied us both the right and the remedy.

When Davis made his cabinet selections, he reflected the need to gain support for his position. There were individuals who also had desired to head the oligarchy and Davis had to soothe their injured pride. Davis had to satisfy the wants of still others who could possibly become opponents

23Ibid., p. 34.

24Richardson, Messages and Papers, p. 188. See also, supra, pp. 55-56.
to keep them from turning against him. He, therefore, picked each member of his cabinet by giving representation to the different geographical regions of the South. He decided no two cabinet posts were to be manned by individuals from the same state and allowed the individual state delegations meeting in Montgomery to select one of their members to represent their state.25

As the Confederacy was constituted on principles of decentralization, Davis had few demands to perform domestic services. He called for a national army to meet the biggest problem he had to face—the threat posed by the Northern armies. He saw the threat and was fearful. As Mrs. Chestnut recorded, one evening26

the President walked with me slowly up and down that long room, and our conversation was of the saddest. Nobody knows so well as he does the difficulties which beset this hard-driven Confederacy. As he talks of things as they are now, in a melancholy cadence . . . .

To relieve his anxiety, Davis looked to Europe for aid. He felt the implied threat of withholding cotton—King Cotton—as a result of the impending hostilities from Europe’s textile industry, would force the continent to rally to the side of the South. For years before the war, the theory persisted in the South of Europe’s inability to

25 V. Davis, Jefferson Davis, II, p. 37. See also, Supra, pp. 59–60.

26 Chestnut, Diary, p. 352.
survive without American cotton. Davis' own acceptance of the belief was reflected in an 1861 message to the Confederate Congress. The theory of King Cotton was so accepted by the man that he initially viewed European support as a foregone conclusion. While Davis found comfort from fears of the North in the belief of impending European aid, he did recognize other threats already on the rise within the oligarchy itself. Among the oligarchs were a group of radicals who could easily apply pressure on Davis and thus be a threat to his position. Davis selected one of the most vociferous of their number, William Lowndes Yancey, to represent the Confederacy in Europe. Yancey was a fiery leader and Davis, being fearful of Yancey's presence in his midst, as well as being certain of forthcoming European recognition and support, felt safe in sending the man who desired to reopen the slave trade to represent the South on the continent where such thoughts were received with anathema. Davis' act can only be interpreted as being done under the belief that Yancey would not be able to influence the course of events. More importantly, the appointment removed from the Confederacy and Davis' mind a possible threat to his personal position.

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29 Owsley, *King Cotton*, pp. 52-53.
As time passed and European intervention failed to materialize, Davis began to grow increasingly worried. Knowing European aid was necessary to preserve the Southern oligarchy, he began to apply some pressure on the continent. While being cognizant of the fact that too much pressure might force Europe to turn instead to the federal government, Davis urged Congress to debate the necessity of a cotton embargo to strike fear rather than animosity into Europe and obtain support without actually instituting an embargo.\(^\text{30}\) The President, not necessarily fearing for personal acceptance, did fear the Confederacy itself would not be recognized as an equal in the family of nations.

The fear of not gaining favorable European intervention caused Davis, also, to forbid any invasions of the North during the war's first year. He desired the Confederacy to appear to the world as the attacked rather than the attacker. H.J. Eckenrode feels the policy may have had the actual result of costing the South the war.\(^\text{31}\)

Davis truly saw the need for European aid. As the Confederacy fell apart, Davis became increasingly vitriolic and attacked the European powers' failure to


The bitterness lingered after the war when he wrote of Britain, "how detrimental to us, and advantageous to our enemy, was the manner in which the leading European power observed its hollow profession of neutrality toward the belligerents."  

War was present; Davis recognized it and was afraid. He turned to the familiar for help. Being a former army man, he did not interfere with the operations of the navy. Having previously held the office, he did operate, in effect, as his own Secretary of War. Rather than centralizing all of the troops to meet firmly any advance, Davis divided them throughout the Confederacy. Besides preventing any one general from procuring enough power to be a threat to him, it also was in the best interest of his personal position to decentralize the troops for another reason. Since the war was supposedly being fought by the Southerners to defend themselves from aggression, local politicians pressed for troops to protect their individual states; and Davis acceded to their request in order to retain their support.

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32 Richardson, Messages and Papers, pp. 444-445, 485-487.
33 J. Davis, Rise and Fall, II, p. 382.
34 Eckenrode, President, p. 163.
Still, Davis was basically able to direct all operations against the North. Before the first battle of Bull Run, it was Davis who chose to consolidate the armies of P.G.T. Beauregard and Joseph E. Johnston to meet the advancing Union forces. As Davis said, "The great question of uniting the two armies had been decided at Richmond." Following the battle, Davis pressed his generals to pursue the fleeing enemy. In this and other instances, Davis directed what little grand strategy the South chose to exercise. He selected and removed generals, shifted forces, and approved plans. He tried to direct the war effort as much as possible. As happens in all wars, most moves are made to counter the threats of the enemy. The fear for defeat of his position, pressed long and hard upon Davis; so much so, he confided to his wife, "he felt he would give all his limbs to have someone with whom he could share it." However, he never did choose to truly share it, for his position meant too much to him.

Davis, indeed, was not above recognizing proven ability in others and he also realized the magnitude of the struggle would force him to allow others some latitude to make moves on their own. Robert E. Lee's military

36 J. Davis, Rise and Fall, I, p. 347.
37 Ibid., pp. 352-356.
38 V. Davis, Jefferson Davis, II, p. 301.
genius was hailed throughout the South and Davis certainly recognized it. Lee was the standard by which all other commanders were measured. Though Davis saw Lee's abilities as great, the President did not rank them above his own. Davis, in his own mind, was commander-in-chief because no one in the South knew more about military matters than he did. His belief in his own supremacy never faltered and though stating—"If I could take one wing and Lee the other, I think we could between us wrest a victory from those people."—he never chose to step down from his high office to lead the troops in battle. Jefferson Davis was accepted as President by almost everyone in the South. However, in directing the war effort, Davis did not always meet the approval of his generals. His most difficult moments were with Joseph Johnston. Rumors claimed that Johnston and Davis, when both were at West Point together, had a rivalry over an inn keeper's daughter. During this episode, Johnston supposedly proved himself superior. If the rumor is true, it explains many of Davis' actions as regards Johnston. In terms of a reaction to fear, Johnston would never accept him as an equal.

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Ibid., p. 392.

Hendrick, Statesmen, p. 19.
Certainly, though, the various altercations between the two can be viewed as the result of the fear for position. Following Bull Run, rumors were prevalent of Davis preventing pursuit of the routed enemy when in actuality he had urged the Confederate commanders to press their advantage. Interpreting the rumors as threats to his position, Davis wrote Johnston asking him to make open knowledge of what had actually occurred. Johnston’s response, while laying the blame of failure to proceed upon the presence of fresh Union troops, failed to make any mention of the fact Davis had urged pursuit. Johnston’s letter was not looked upon as satisfactory by Davis, and it was instead viewed as a threat to the President’s position.41

When the President presented a list of names to the Congress for appointment as full general, Johnston, while on the list, did not head it, in a possible reaction against the general’s threatening posture. Johnston was indignant and wrote of his distress to Davis who replied concerning the letter, "Its language is, as you say, unusual; its arguments and statements utterly one-sided, and its insinuations as unfounded as they are unbecoming."42 Johnston’s letter may have been the result of his own reaction to what he

41J. Davis, Rise and Fall, I, pp. 362-364.

42V. Davis, Jefferson Davis, II, pp. 144-153. See also Chestnut, Diary, p. 411.
felt was a threat to his own position. Davis' answer certainly was related to his fear for his high office, as Johnston's letter was interpreted as an open statement of Davis not acting properly in a military matter. Continually there were problems. Davis disliked Johnston and it took great encouragement by others and the greater threat to the position of the Confederacy to persuade the President to allow Johnston to command future armies.

Joseph Johnston was a capable, though unaggressive, general. As feelings mounted against Johnston's continual failure to fight, Davis, to protect his own position, replaced him with John B. Hood. The switch in commanders was done "under popular and political pressure brought by Gov. Brown and Sen. Hill of Ga., [sic.] who claimed that Johnston intended to surrender Atlanta without giving battle." To prove the soundness of his judgment and thereby his right to govern, Davis often had supported his generals, but he was quick to depose the man who was often a threat to his position.

Threats to the Chief Executive's status as commander-in-chief also emanated from Congress. In March, 1862, a bill was passed to provide for a general independent of the President to direct the Confederacy's armies. Davis responded

by vetoing the bill. In an effort to keep Congressional dissatisfaction to a minimum, Davis wrote: 44

As it cannot have been the intention of Congress to create the office of a general not bound to obey orders of the Chief Magistrate, and as this seems to be the effect of the act, I can but anticipate the concurrence of the Congress in my opinion that it should not become law.

As one of his contemporaries stated, "Mr. Davis manifested an extreme jealousy of any encroachment upon his prerogative by Congress . . . ." 45

The internal status quo of the oligarchy was retained for the next few years. However, the Confederacy was losing badly. The position of the entire oligarchy was in danger and in response to the threat some of the oligarchs began to look for a new leader. Their eyes turned quite naturally toward the individual whose successes had inspired the South—Robert E. Lee. Pressure began to rise within, as well as upon, the Confederate Congress to make Lee dictator. Davis opposed the move in an effort to continue as head of the oligarchy. While his power was great enough to slow down Congressional action, the mounting cries for Lee were of such magnitude as to force some accedence. The Congressmen also were worried about their own position's support and the threats to their position by the North. Some Congressmen, too, were seekers who wanted to cripple, if not destroy,
Davis' power. The pressures for Congress to act were too strong for even Davis to completely stem as he attempted to hold on to his position. Still, Davis had enough power to somewhat turn the tide of discontent within Congress. The two branches of government both acting from fear for position, reached a compromise; and Lee was made supreme commander of the Confederate armies rather than dictator. The compromise allowed Davis to remain as President, although "the passage in both houses of the measure for making General Lee general-in-chief by large majorities is very distasteful to the President." Most would think Davis relinquished some of his prerogatives in order to retain the rest of his position. However, Wilfred B. Yearns points out, "Davis had no qualms about being able to handle Lee." Four years of war had shown Davis that Lee would refer to him before any moves were made. Unlike Johnston, Lee would accede to, and be respectful of, the President. In actuality, according to Yearns, though appearing to relinquish power, Davis still


retained it. If the author is correct, Davis' friends were not completely correct in saying "he is honest, pure, patriotic, but no administrator—the worst judge of men in the world . . . .".

Entering the conflict with the belief the entire populace would rally behind them, the oligarchy initially made no provisions for forced conscription. However, it was the oligarchy which broke with the union for its own preservation and not the populace which resulted in a shortage of men entering the ranks. Davis again couched his true need, in this case men to save the oligarchy's position, in ideology. On March 18, 1862, he wrote:

The vast preparations made by the enemy for a combined assault at numerous points on our frontier and seacoast have produced the result that might have been expected. They have animated the people with a spirit of resistance so general, so resolute, and so self-sacrificing that it requires rather to be regulated than to be stimulated.

The men were so well stimulated Davis then said: "I therefore recommend the passage of a law declaring that all persons residing in the Confederate States, between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five . . . shall be held in the military service . . . ."

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49 Supra, p. 66.

50 Kean, Inside Government, p. 72.

51 Richardson, Messages and Papers, p. 206.
Men over thirty-five with their "natural experience are needed for maintaining order and good government at home and in supervising preparations for rendering efficient armies in the field." Five months later, threats to the Confederacy's position increased; and though trying to shift the onus elsewhere, men over thirty-five were now seen as well qualified for the army. "The very large increase of forces recently called into the field by the President of the United States may render it necessary hereafter to extend the provisions of the conscription law so as to embrace persons between the ages of thirty-five and forty-five years."52

The oligarchs were men of power whose support was needed by Davis, and exemption from the draft was provided for those who owned twenty or more slaves. The resulting public outcries forced Davis to call for repealing the act to avoid mass desertion.53

Another bill was passed by the Congress which was designed, in essence, to draft natives of Maryland residing in Richmond into the army. But in order to avoid turning neutral Maryland into a threat, Davis killed the bill with the use of the pocket veto.54

52Ibid., p. 236.
53Yearns, The Confederate Congress, p. 79.
54Ibid., p. 76.
More men were still needed to preserve the Southern oligarchy. The government tried unsuccessfully to prevent raising popular animosity toward the government by refusing to conscript slaves. Finally, however, Davis was conquered sufficiently by his fear for position on November 7, 1864, to form a policy calling for the placement of slaves in the army. Davis fought with the Senate for passage of the bill saying, "If the Confederacy falls, there should be written on its tombstone, 'Died of a theory.'"  

Jefferson Davis reached the point where his ideology would be better dead if it assured the life of his position. The self of Davis was only whole when he held the position of power. His ideology was adopted to fit his position; he did not seek position to further his ideology. Ideology, Davis discovered, is a nicety to have only when one's position is secure. For example, November 18, 1861, found Davis in a rather solid position and he was willing to state ideological beliefs. Being designed to protect position, ideology was used to damn Lincoln for suspending the writ of habeas corpus "so sacred to freemen." Three short months later, unrest in certain areas of the South forced Davis to suspend

55 Richardson, Messages and Papers, pp. 493-496.
56 J. Davis, Rise and Fall, I, p. 518.
57 Richardson, Messages and Papers, p. 138.
The Southern ideology of states' rights did not coincide with the need to fight a total war. Davis, as the war progressed, came to attempt increased centralization of the war-directing apparatus. However, in various sections of the Confederacy could be found those who preferred to "reign in hell than serve in heaven." Governors Zeb Vance of North Carolina and Joe Brown of Georgia in particular put obstacles in Davis' path which he could never completely bypass. As Frank E. Vandiver stated, "The South may have been wrecked by decentralized centralization." Davis' position could only be saved by centralization so he scrapped his ideology. Vance and Brown's positions were protected by their Southern ideology, allowing them to retain the doctrine of states' rights.

To the end, the President sought to keep possession of his position. Basil Duke was with Davis in the final days of the Confederacy. Duke told the President all was lost and Duke had a responsibility to prevent the further bloodshed of his men. Davis tried to sway Duke and his men and force them to change their minds. "Even," he said, "if the troops now with me be all that I can for the present rely on, three thousand brave men are enough for a nucleus around which the whole people will rally when the panic..."
which now afflicts them has passed away." Duke states, 60

He appealed eloquently to every sentiment and reminiscence that might be supposed to move a Southern soldier . . . . For some minutes not a word was spoken. Then Mr. Davis rose and ejaculated bitterly that all was indeed lost. He had become very pallid . . . .

Duke further states he believed Davis desired to be captured after realizing the struggle was completed.

Davis was willing to give himself to his enemy. His self was only made whole when he held dominant power. After his position was taken from him, he was no longer truly alive. Davis held all of the qualities of a power seeker: he was confident, egocentric and self-righteous.

Once in power, his public policies were geared to retaining his position. His choice of cabinet members, search for European aid, and management of the war reflect the presence of the fear for position. Possibly some of his motivations in the diplomatic field were the result of the fear for acceptance. If the Confederacy was recognized as a nation-state by the European governments, then Davis would in turn be truly recognized as the equal of any of the other heads of government in the world. Davis never achieved this acceptance. Moreover, his position of dominant power holder in the South was destroyed. He became "pallid," and he was, in essence, no longer the real Jefferson Davis. He was once

again a person who could turn to ideology. He defended his actions as President in his apologia, *The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government*, by saying,\(^\text{61}\)

The Southern States had rightfully the power to withdraw from a Union into which they had, as sovereign communities, voluntarily entered; that the denial of that right was a violation of the letter and spirit of the compact between the States; and that the war waged by the Federal Government against the seceding States was in disregard of the limitations of the Constitution, and destructive of the principles of the Declaration of Independence.

SUMMARY

As man evolved, so did his need for a leader and his ability to fear. A leader protected and fed him, while fear gave him the ability to be cognizant of threats to his survival. Man has thus allowed, or been forced, to accept rulers to be situated above him. However, those rulers cannot escape their own humanness. They, too, must obey their own inborn and experiential characteristics. They also fear, and out of their fear, react. Because of their situation, the rulers' reactions have the physical and moral force of the nation-state behind them, and their reactions become translated into public policy.

Man's survival has come to mean more than simply a breathing existence. He had developed certain psychological needs and until they are satisfied his mental self will not have been actualized. And until his mental self is made whole, he does not have a life worth preserving. For the ruler to actualize his own self, he must be in possession of the mysterious intangible substance known as power—a substance which allows him to reign over others.

After examining the phenomena, a great contradiction seems to appear in those who are called power holders. These men often spend many years desperately desiring and clawing
for the golden ring of power—for the glittering substance which will insure a whole self—and fearing it will never be attained. Yet, once the power is actually acquired, it is found to be more of an addictive curse, rather than an end to an unquenchable thirst. The self-righteous, confident, egocentric power seeker finds that the acquisition of the golden ring is in reality attainment of a new and unsteady-fear. The fear he feels of losing his preferred status is greater than was his fear of never being able to attain the position. In response, the power holder acts to calm his anxiety. Public policies which may have great effect upon the common citizen are a result of the fear of losing power. The more intensely the fear is felt, the more obvious is the evidence of anxiety being the prime motivation of public policy. The fear of losing power, which can become all consuming, is a basic, if not absolute, explanation for public policies. In essence, man does not wield power as much as power wields man.

After gaining the golden ring, the self-righteous, confident, and egocentric power seeker discovers he loses, to an ever-fluctuating degree, the element termed confidence. He does, however, retain the egocentricity which saturates him with the fear for his survival. He fears for his life. But because he cannot be whole without power, he fears for the elements which for him are embodied in power. He is anxious for his position, acceptance, esteem, legacy,
creation, power, charisma, and ideology.

Fear for life is the most basic of all anxieties. Though rarely reflected directly in policies, it has often had an indirect affect upon a leader's action. The evidence is seen in the elaborate measures taken by Nkrumah to guard his own security. The result of the fear for life is an isolation from the governed and a reliance upon a few close, but seldom completely trusted, intimates.

Apprehensions of losing the position of power which was captured only after long and hard struggle comprises the fear for position. Actions are taken to insure the maintenance of the seat of power for the oligarch. Nazi and Soviet use of violence to eliminate threats to their status reflect the extremes to which the reaction to the fear has gone.

The desire to be accepted as an equal partner in the oligarch occasions much anxiety within the power holder. The fear for acceptance is often released in policies bearing the stamp of what the power holder senses is expected of him from the rest of the oligarchy.

Many of Lincoln's humanitarian acts were the direct result of his fear for esteem. The need to be loved and honored by the wide populace of a nation often has been the basis of public policies.

For many possessors of power, the apprehensions they have concerning the future are often as great, if not greater,
than their concern for their present status. For a Lyndon Johnson, who is primarily concerned about how posterity will remember and judge him, the fear for legacy is the prime motivation of many of his actions. In his eyes, a tomorrow which may not even include his physical self is more important than the power he grasps today.

When Tito made moves to rid Yugoslavia of Croat separatists, he mirrored a reaction to the fear for creation. Tomorrow, for such a power holder, is not to be found in the pages of history; but in the organism called the nation-state. As long as it lives as he created or shaped it, the individual lives; therefore, the power holder will execute moves to insure it will survive after he passes from the scene.

The fear for power results in the initiation of public policies when the oligarch is in danger of having his office lose the prerogatives which it once held. The power holder who displays the tendency of acting when power, not solely office, is threatened does so without desiring to join the oligarchy simply to gain status as a member of the ruling class. He desires, instead, to be classified as a power wielder, not merely a power holder.

If a man possesses charisma and has attained his goal of capturing power largely as a result of the gift, he will strive to retain his charisma. He knows if he should lose the gift, the fear for position will become a more
prominent anxiety. The fear often forces the charismatic individual to remain secluded, to erect larger than life statues of himself, and to broach no criticism of his moves. For others, however, the fear for charisma is actually greater than any apprehension they have concerning a future fear for position. The impulse causes a De Gaulle to sacrifice position and not return to the public political arena if, in striving to return, a danger to charisma could result.

Being extremely egocentric and necessarily pragmatic, a man who is successful in his quest for power usually finds little time or inclination to look beyond himself. Yet, one could argue of there having been power possessors who are strongly imbued with an ideology. For them, the fear for ideology is the ruling motivation of their lives. These men wish to gain power to further their beliefs, not themselves. Once in possession of power, they will gear their actions to preserve the potency of their beliefs rather than their selves. The fear for ideology can be as all encompassing as any other fear as evidenced in the Norwegian Per Borten's willingness to sacrifice his position rather than his belief. More often, however, the power holder will scrap his ideology, as Jefferson Davis did, if his position is jeopardized by his adherence to ideology.

To be sure, evidence can be found of other fears dwelling on the minds of power holders. Even more obvious
is the fact leaders are afflicted with a combination of these anxieties. Each fear modifies the others and fights with them for supremacy within the oligarch. To calm them, the power holder acts, often with public policies.

Those who seek to grasp the golden ring of power believe it will cure an ever-present, ever-excruciating ache that dominates their hearts and souls. They do not know under a coating of glitter lies a deeper, darker core of fear.

Once in the holder’s possession, the ring of power, while retaining its glitter, unleashes the fears it bears. By bringing new fears to the oligarch, power becomes, not a tool used by man, as much as it is a force in and by itself.

All men act from fear. The power holder stands apart from others in the force which can be exerted in the reactions of his fears.

In viewing the actions of those power holders [from what has been said, it would seem that the term power holder is actually a distortion] it would appear they could often be charged with employing fear tactics upon the populace. Yet, in reality these individuals do not use fear to the extent they are, in turn, gripped by it. It is merely the power holder’s fear which causes him to act. Public policy, then, is the result of a power holder’s reaction to fear.
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**PERIODICALS**


