An Analysis of the Emergence of the Separatist Movement in French-Canada

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AN ANALYSIS OF THE EMERGENCE OF THE SEPARATIST
MOVEMENT IN FRENCH-CANADA

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PREFACE

This study is an analysis of the emergence of the French-Canadian separatist movement. It is an examination of the causes and consequences of social change that contributed to the conditions of social unrest. The interactional processes (collective processes) are used to explain the development of the movement out of a state of social unrest and discontent. The scope of this study includes an analysis of the events in French-Canada's history that were significant in the emergence of the separatist movement. The important aspects of French-Canadian culture and social structure are examined to provide an understanding of the nature of the existing social conditions.

Descriptive research is employed to interpret and analyze French-Canadian history, sociological studies of the French-Canadian society, news reports of significant events, and Canadian government documents and reports. The interpretation of these sources of data is explained in the sociological frame of reference for the study of collective behavior and social movements presented by Lang and Lang in their book, Collective Dynamics (1961).

In planning for this study, the intent was to rely heavily on primary sources of data, such as interviews, letters, and reports from English and French-Canadian contacts. Due to my inability to
make the necessary visits to Canada required to accumulate sufficient data and the unexpected out-of-country employment of my personal contacts, in Canada, secondary sources became the main source of data for this study. However, not all was lost, since previous visits to Canada (Montreal and Toronto) and frequent contact with a Canadian medical team on duty in Vietnam during my tour there in 1971 and 1972 provided a perspective from which to appreciate the biases of both the English and French-Canadians. Source material was selected on the basis of its objectivity and availability. Special care was taken in selecting books on French-Canadian history. For example, Mason Wade's French Canadians 1760-1967 (1968), was selected as a basic source for supplying French-Canadian historical data. Wade, not being a Canadian, is less likely to be biased in his interpretation of historical facts about the French-Canadians. Also, both English and French-Canadian historians and authors reporting research and studies about French-Canada and Canada in general have referred Wade as a reliable source. Wade's history of the French-Canadians presents the history of both societies (English and French) to the extent that the histories are distinct. Other studies and reports are accepted on the author's/researcher's reputation. Most of the important news reports and stories were usually confirmed by reports of the same event by other news sources. For example, Time (October 1970) magazine and Newsweek (October 1970) reported details about the LaPorte and Cross kidnappings without any variation in facts. The Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, an official publication of the
Canadian government, is accepted at face value as being an objective and reliable document (most of its statistical reports were obtained from census information).

The primary concern in this study is to analyze the emergence of the French-Canadian separatist movement through the exposure of issues, causes, conditions, and social forces that are related to separatism and the French-Canadian society. And no intentional subjective statements are made in any description or analysis of events and conditions concerning the separatist issues in Canada.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

Chapter

I. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE NATURE OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLLECTIVE PROCESSES</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCIAL UNREST</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restlessness</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contagion</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditions of Social Unrest</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREREQUISITES</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization and Strategy</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rallying Points</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

II. SOCIAL AND HISTORIC BASES OF FRENCH-CANADIAN NATIONALISM AND SEPARATISM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE BRITISH CONQUEST</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE CHURCH AND THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTION</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EARLY EXPRESSIONS OF SEPARATISM</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. SEPARATISM AND THE FRENCH-CANADIAN: PARTICIPATION AND THE PARTICIPANTS</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHANGING CONDITIONS AND PERSPECTIVES</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Conditions and Changes</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative Deprivation</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUSCEPTIBILITY OF THE FRENCH-CANADIAN</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective Processes</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. SEPARATIST ORGANIZATIONS</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARTI QUEBECOIS</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRONT DE LIBERATION DU QUEBEC</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy and Tactics</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Problems of the FLQ</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Support</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reaction</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE SEPARATIST MOVEMENT</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE EMERGENCE OF THE MOVEMENT</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditions and Social Change</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Events and Collective Processes</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHY IT FAILED</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology and Strategy</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The French-Canadian Perspective</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMPLICATIONS OF THIS STUDY</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Employees of Mill A in Cantonville by Nationality Rank, and Department, 1937</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Employment Income for Men by Ethnic Group and Official Language, Montreal Metropolitan Area, 1961</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Introduction

The study of social movements is usually regarded as part of the subject matter of collective behavior and as an aspect of social change. The collective behavior approach emphasizes the interactional processes in the emergence of social movements. The aspect of social change emphasizes causes and consequences of social movements in the changing social order within which they arise.

The framework for the study of social movements articulated by the Langs (1961) in their book, Collective Dynamics, emphasizes a "collective behavior" approach. However, the importance of social change in relation to social movements is not denigrated by their emphasis on collective behavior. The Langs strongly underscore the relationship of collective behavior to ultimate change in the larger social order. The social action identified with a social movement is continuous and directed toward pervasive changes in the social order.

On the other hand, Gusfield (1970: 7), in outlining the categories in his approach to the study of social movements, discounts elementary collective behavior as a viable concept for examining
social movements within the context of social conflict and social change. Gusfield's approach stresses the analysis of change and social conflict. He views social movements as structured collective action demanding changes in the system or the social order. The relationship of collective behavior to social movements is recognized, but he gives more importance to the organized aspects of social movements. Gusfield uses several examples of elementary collective behavior to highlight the weakness in this concept to explain change and social conflict:

A crowd at a baseball game may riot, as sports audiences have been known to do when enraged at a decision. The outbreak of fire may create panic in a public building. An audience at a theater is analyzable as a sporadic and highly suggestible group. Such behavior, however, has little significance for the system of rules and relationships we call social orders. None of these contributes to an understanding of conflicts and changes in society (Gusfield, 1970: 7).

Indeed, this behavior, as presented, has little significance for the social order, nor does it contribute to an understanding of conflicts and changes in society. These events are isolated, they are not related to a "spirit" for change, and there are no deep and vital social causes at issue. However, events like these could be significant. The significance of collective behavior to the study of social movements becomes obvious when "real" issues are used in Gusfield's brief scenarios of elementary collective behavior. Events from the French-Canadian separatist movement are used in the following examples:

A crowd at a hockey game riots when a French-Canadian hockey hero is suspended by the hockey league's president, an English-Canadian. Panic is created as a result of
terrorist bomb threats. A French-Canadian audience viewing the film, *Les Ordes* (a "fictional documentary" on the experiences of French-Canadians arrested and detained under the 1970 War Measures Act), would be a more suggestible group than they would be if they were viewing *Blanche Neige et Les Sept Nains* (Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs).

These events contribute to a better understanding of collective behavior, social movements, and social change when the question, "Why the event occurred?" as well as, "What event occurred?" is asked. The form of behavior has little if any significance for change or the social order until it is connected to a socially shared cause vital to society.

The analysis of the French-Canadian separatist movement in this paper is done within the framework of elementary collective behavior and through examining the causes and consequences of social change in relation to the separatist movement.

The Nature of Social Movements

When the organizational aspect of social movements is stressed, there is a tendency to mix social movements and voluntary associations. From an organizational aspect, a social movement lies somewhere between the associations and mass behavior. The associations, such as political parties, or pressure groups, are characterized by an organizational structure, clear boundaries and stable functions. Mass behavior, on the other hand, is an example of purely elementary collective behavior and lacks all organization (Lang and Lang, 1961: 493). Another important difference between social movements and the associations is the high degree of spontaneity and
contagion associated with social movements.

When the unstructured aspects of social movements are stressed, the tendency to view them on the same level of organization as other forms of elementary collective behavior—the mass, the crowd, and the public—must be avoided. The importance of these elementary forms of collective behavior is the crucial part they play in the emergence and early formation of social movements. The excitement, unity, and energy of a crowd may provide the necessary situation and conditions to ignite a movement. Also, the tactics and strategy of a movement could stimulate the formation of crowds. The public’s lack of resolving an issue may be the necessary ingredient to sufficiently polarize an issue to cause one side to develop its issues into objectives of a movement.

Social movements are in pursuit of an objective that has a significant impact on the social order. A sizeable portion of the society is involved in the movement. The pursuit of an objective that affects and shapes the social order is a demand for change. According to Marcel Chaput, a devout separatist and author of the book, Pourquoi Je Suis Separatist, the French-Canadians have been "battling for crumbs" for the past two hundred years. They are no longer satisfied with bilingual and bicultural tokenism from Ottawa. The French-Canadian separatist is in pursuit of an independent "state of Quebec."

The Langs (1961:490) define a social movement as

...large-scale, wide spread, and continuing, elementary collective action in pursuit of an objective that affects and shapes the social order in some fundamental aspect.
Elementary collective action, as used by the Langs, emphasizes the unstructured and spontaneously generated forms of collective action. Elementary collective action differs from conventional behavior in that it is primarily based on spontaneity and contagion rather than on traditional forms of behavior. Collective action is unstructured in the sense that it is a departure from institutionalized forms of behavior. Yet, in some respects, it is organized to the degree that it refers to a collectivity in pursuit of a socially shared objective.

Finally, before discussing the essence of collective behavior, two important features of the Langs' concept dealing with collective behavior and social movements in general need mentioning. Social movements involve people who are active and not passive responders to trends or tendencies of the social system.

...the substance of collective dynamics and mass behavior consists of those patterns of social action that are spontaneous and unstructured and therefore not reducible to a social structure. These collective patterns, since they emerge out of a more elementary kind of social interaction, cannot be fully explained on the basis of status and roles participants occupy within a given social setting (Lang and Lang, 1961: 11-12).

The other point that needs re-emphasizing is that behavior which brings about social movements is collective and spontaneous and focused on bringing about changes in the social order.

Collective Processes

Social movements do not just happen. They emerge out of social unrest. Social unrest is best explained by the processes of collective behavior. The ultimate purpose of the study of
collective behavior is to discern some of the ways social movements and social institutions become organized and come into existence. The Langs (1961: 42-44) identify five basic processes, "collective processes," by which behavior is collectively transformed.

a. "Collective definition is the process by which cognitive assessments are brought in line with one another so that some common and plausible assessment emerges." When individuals encounter new situations and events not covered by traditional norms, a definition of the situation is arrived at and followed by a collective response. The least structured way of arriving at some common definition is by rumor. Rumor leads to collective action when conventional behavior does not accomplish goals. Rumor serves two functions in the collective definition process: (1) it attempts to rationalize or make sense out of the situation; (2) it disrupts the traditional definition. Within a social movement, collective definitions may emerge as changing perspectives that serve to refocus the direction and objectives of the movement.

b. "Demoralization is when one's routine expectations and one's trust in official sources of information have been partially undermined. All kinds of breakdowns in norms are viewed as indicative of demoralization, since norms and standards of behavior no longer serve as points of orientation." Panic represents the behavior typical of this situation.

c. Collective defense. "During periods of stress, furthermore, anxieties are aroused. When these find a common focus and are acted out in behavior that does not threaten the unity of the group,
one can speak of a process of collective defense." The "crowd" offers a refuge for those overcome with stress and anxiety. Also, on a larger level, a mass movement can arise out of an alienated mass and is essentially a matter of collective defense against demoralization (Lang and Lang, 1961: 343).

**d.** "Mass conversion is the unexpected change of fundamental values under group influence."

**e.** "Crystallization designates the process by which alienation from the social order finds expression in an elementary form of organization." If, for the purpose of illustrating, the direction of "disorganization" is down and "organization" is up, then, within the collective processes, crystallization would be the first indication of an upward motion—and probably the first indication of a movement. Social movements emerge out of social unrest when discontent, hope, and goals crystallize into a collective response to a promise to cure social ills.

The collective processes do not propose a "stage model" of collective behavior; the sequence of these processes is situation dependent. In addition to explaining the emergence of social movements, these processes explain why people join and leave on-going movements. They help to explain the influence of such phenomena as communications, fashions, and public opinion on a mass society.

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**Social Unrest**

**Restlessness**

The condition within the social order necessary for the
emergence of elementary collective behavior occurs when the balance between disruptive and re-integrative tendencies is especially precarious (Lang and Lang, 1961: 42-43). This condition exists within the social order when there is no prescribed behavior within the inventory of traditional behavior patterns to deal with new situations. An encounter with a new situation requires an assessment to be made based on past experiences, current perceptions, and on some notion or idea of how the new situation is visualized to conclude.

Encounters with new situations and the conditions that foster new situations create a general restlessness (it's circular, conditions create situations and new situations reinforce the conditions). Restlessness is expressed in the form of mass excitement (individual behavior), and manifests itself in anxiety, fear, and alienation. It is random, erratic, and in severe forms, it may be characteristic of neurotic behavior, and, as such, it has a tendency to alienate others rather than generate collective response to the stimulus causing the restlessness. In order for restlessness to develop into a higher form of behavior or become collective, it must become shared through a form of social interaction. According to Blumer (1972: 73), "One may view social unrest as the socialization of restlessness."

Contagion

The Langs (1961: 209) use three concepts of contagion to explain the transformation of restlessness into social unrest. These psychological concepts—imitation, circular reaction, and suggestibility—are used to explain why individuals tend to act,
think, or feel as they observe others acting, thinking, or feeling.

Imitation takes into account an individual's perception of role models, learned behavior, and the meanings attached to a particular situation to explain why the individual copies a particular form of behavior.

Circular reaction refers to a type of "symbolic communication" wherein people respond to the meanings of vocal gestures, movements, or acts.

To the extent that A is aware what B's action means—that is, he can "read" B's intentions—A reacts to the significance that this action has both for B's future conduct and for his own in relation to B. But if B now takes into account the significance A will read into B's act, and if this significance is the same for both, the meaning of the act is shared by both. By virtue of this, the act becomes a significant symbol, and from now on the behavior of both A and B is oriented to this shared meaning. (Lang and Lang 1961: 215).

Herbert Blumer regards circular reaction as the most important mechanism of elementary collective behavior.

...it gives rise to collective, or shared behavior, which is not based on the adherence to common understandings or rules. It is for this reason that circular reaction is the natural mechanism of elementary collective behavior (Blumer, 1972: 71).

The concept of suggestibility places the leader in the active and dominant role. In this case the leader defines the situation for the participant. This is a one-way operation whereby the susceptible participant responds to the suggestions of the leader.

These mechanisms of contagion supplement each other and are interrelated with the operation of the collective processes. Contagion is the mechanism that makes spontaneous behavior collective behavior. The collective processes describe the ways in which
forms of social unrest express themselves.

**Conditions of Social Unrest**

All social unrest does not necessarily lead to large scale or visible collective responses; it may just dissipate without any consequences. However, social unrest is an incipient preparation for social movements. It plays two important functions in preparing society for change:

a. It disrupts any equilibrium or balance within the social structure by breaking down traditional behavior patterns through the modification of institutional patterns.

b. Social unrest prepares individuals and groups for changed definitions of the situation.

A movement arises when the general situation is favorable, and at the same time it gets its impetus from some specific person or event (Lang and Lang, 1961: 517). Social unrest is a favorable situation for the rise of a movement. The conditions of social unrest which favor social movements are many. Some of the more significant ones are introduced here.

Societies undergoing rapid social change and societies in a state of transition are always to some extent disorganized and thus, more susceptible to social movements than the stable societies. In a disorganized society traditions no longer serve as a dependable guide to behavior. In a disorganized society, individuals tend to become alienated, frustrated, and confused. According to Hoffer (1951: 20) frustration and confusion, rather than poverty and misery,
I X

Perceived relative deprivation is a concept which depicts the frustrations people experience when they are not receiving the things in life to which they feel they are justifiably entitled. Gurr (1968: 52) points out that

Relative deprivation is a state of mind that can be defined as a discrepancy between people's (value) expectations about the goods and conditions of life to which they are justifiably entitled, on the one hand, and on the other their value capabilities - what they perceive to be their chances for getting and keeping those goods and conditions.

It is important to note that relative deprivation is primarily in the eye of the beholder; if one does not perceive that he is relatively deprived, even if in fact he is relatively deprived, he normally does not represent a source of discontent.

Economic, political, and social injustices (real or perceived) provide fertile grounds for social unrest. When any or all of these conditions conflict with the "deprived's" image of social justice, a condition emerges whereby discontent reinforces discontent. A strong current in the French-Canadian Separatist ideology is the tenet that Quebec is a conquered nation, and only by a free "state of Quebec" will the French-Canadians break the ties of English-Canadian colonialism. Economic statistics show that the French-Canadians earn less than do the English-Canadians, and that the French-Canadians are generally blocked out of executive positions in big business organizations. Although the French language is the official language of Quebec, knowledge of the English language is a necessity when dealing with government and business organizations. The French-Canadian's self-image (as a conquered nation) is reinforced each
time he encounters a discriminatory situation. In turn, his perceptions of social justice and self-image make the situation or condition more real than what really exists.

Prerequisites

In addition to the fundamental prerequisite of a vulnerable population, with all the processes and mechanisms that operate to bring about social unrest, other variables need to be recognized to explain the emergence and consequences of social movements.

Organization and Strategy

The organization and strategy of a movement changes as the movement progresses through the various phases. In the earliest stage it comprises a core group crystallized out of elementary collective action. As the movement passes from phase to phase the organization and strategy will take on the characteristics of the leadership, ideology, and objectives (goals). The Langs (1961: 531) list several structural problems that must be solved if the movement is to survive:

1. Regularizing the relations between leaders and followers.
2. Developing an appropriate type of leadership.
3. Determining the hierarchy of leaders and functionaries.
4. Organizing of a staff.
5. Co-ordinating the relations among various groups within the movement.

Leadership

Leadership is a necessary prerequisite for a social movement. It acts as a catalyst in the crystallization of a movement. According
to Hoffer (1951: 104) leadership is an indispensable unifying agent in a movement; "without him (a leader) there will be no movement."

On the other hand, the leader is helpless until the conditions for a movement are right. "No matter how vital we think the role of leadership in the rise of a mass movement, there is no doubt that the leader cannot create the conditions which make the rise of a movement possible" (Hoffer, 1951: 103).

Leaders play an important role as unifiers. They are agents of contagion during the milling stage, the incipient stage, of a movement. They serve as examples for the discontented to imitate. Because they are recognized as leaders, they are able to define situations, define social ills, and implant a spirit of hope in the participants. A major task of leadership, regardless of the stage the movement is in, is to focus generalized social unrest toward the movement's objectives.

**Ideology**

The ideology of a movement reflects the unique character of the movement. Ideology justifies actions, reinforces beliefs, and perpetuates the cause. It provides guidance and direction for the leaders, followers, and participants. Ideology is conducive to the formation of collective definitions that support the movement and enhance unity within the movement.

**Rallying Points**

There are other factors in the category of social objects and unifying agents that determine the viability of a movement.
A movement does not have to emanate from a social object to be influenced by it. However, a movement needs something at which to "point its finger." A villain serves to move the collectivity into action, "Mass movements can rise and spread without a belief in a God but never without a belief in a devil" (Hoffer, 1951: 86). On the other hand, a social object may be a source of inspiration (in the form of an idol rather than through the organizational structure, leadership). De Gaulle served the French-Canadians in this capacity. External events that serve as rallying points for the movement are unifying agents. The idea that the French-Canadians are victims of colonialism was drawn from the African independence movements.
CHAPTER II

SOCIAL AND HISTORIC BASES OF FRENCH-CANADIAN NATIONALISM AND SEPARATISM

Introduction

To understand French-Canadian separatism in the light of French-Canadian nationalism and Canada in general, the social history of French-Canada must be examined in more detail. The purpose of this chapter is not to recount a history but to highlight the significant social conditions and historic events in French-Canadian history which fostered and perpetuated the nationalism and social unrest that eventually gave rise to the French-Canadian separatism movement.

French-Canadian nationalism was born when the British first attempted to assimilate the French into the Anglo-Saxon culture. This nationalism became stronger through the influence of the Roman Catholic Church. The interrelationship of the Church and the educational system strengthened nationalism, but failed to prepare French-Canada (Quebec) for the consequences and forces of industrialization and urbanization. For the most part, French-Canadian separatism remained submerged in the nationalist movement until the early 1960's. Separatism emerged only on a few occasions prior to post World War II.
Nationalism and separatism are not synonymous. French-Canadian nationalism, as a social movement, has general and non-specific goals and objectives. Its primary objective is to maintain the French way of life. The French-Canadian nationalists use the term, "la survi vance" (ethnic survival) to express their feelings of nationalism. The French-Canadian separatist movement has the same general objective, but more specifically, its goal is to be able to maintain the French way of life by controlling all French-Canadian social institutions (especially the economic institution over which the French-Canadians have the least control). According to the separatists, this can be accomplished only when Quebec obtains complete sovereignty. Thus, the French-Canadian separatists use the term, "l'epanouissement" (emancipation), to express the nature of their goal.

**The British Conquest**

The British defeated the French on the Plains of Abraham (near Quebec City) on September 13, 1759. Four years later France ceded New France (what now is Canada) to Britain. This event had psychological significance as well as social and historic implications for the future relations of French and English-Canadians. The separatists would have it that the separatist movement was born the day after the British defeated the French (Corbett, 1967: 27). They draw on this event to support their self-definition as a conquered nation. The popular phrase "Je me souviens" is used by the French-Canadians to remind them of the days of New France, and to
serve as a constant reminder that the French-Canadians are a conquered people (Wade, 1955: 47). French-Canadian historians, especially those with strong separatist feelings, take great care to emphasize in their history their minority status under British rule. Abbé Lionel Grouix, a French-Canadian historian, and a source of nationalist ideology after the turn of the century, made famous the phrase "Notre maître, le passé" ("Our master, the past") and established it as a principle for action in the present (Wade, 1955: 1).

Following the British conquest, there was an unsuccessful attempt by the British to assimilate and "protestantize" the French (Clark, 1965: 16). Most of the French administrators and officials had returned to France when New France became a British colony. According to Clark (1965: 17) the remaining French population consisted of peasants, small merchants, some seigneurs, and a total of one hundred and sixty-four parish priests and monks. Thus without its political leadership, and all ties with France broken, the French-Canadian population stood alone to defend its way of life against assimilation by the dominant Anglo-Saxon culture. An important consequence of this situation was the emergence of the Roman Catholic Church as the defender of the French-Canadian's right to maintain his identity with French culture, to speak the French language, to practice the Roman Catholic religion, and to keep his own customs and privileges. The early British governors of the French colony were very lenient toward the French and won the support of the Church (Armstrong, 1947: 4). The promise not to protestantize the French was made official by the Quebec Act of 1774. This act gave the French-Canadians free
exercise of religion and retention of French law. This act also
served to reinforce the Church's support for the British government
and prevented the French-Canadians from joining the American Colonies
in the revolution against England (Armstrong, 1937: 5-6).

The Church and the Educational System

The Catholic Church played a significant role in the evolution
of the French-Canadian society. The parish, a territorial unit of
the Catholic Church, replaced the seigniorial estates in rural French
Canada and became the significant unit of social organization
(Falardeau, 1949: 528-529). "The spiritual leader of the community,
the cure, took over many responsibilities of municipal leadership and
became the secular as well as the religious leader of the local group
committed to his care" (Falardeau, 1949). The urban parish does not
exercise this degree of control over the lives and activities of its
members. However, the urban parishes provide a means of controlling
and directing discontent and frustrations within the Church organiza-
tion through various movements and professional associations called
"Catholic action" movements (Falardeau, 1949: 353-367). The Church
maintained its influence over the French-Canadian population and
supported the Canadian government until the late 1950's and early
1960's when its control was weakened by urbanization and internal
conflict within the Church, especially between the older and younger
clergy (Wade, 1968: 1107-1109).

The influence of the Church was prevalent in the educational
system in French-Canada. According to Armstrong (1937), the Quebec
educational system was supervised and staffed by members of the clergy. The "Catholic committee" selected teachers and approved the curriculum for most of the schools in Quebec. This gave education a strong religious flavor: "its object has been to form good men who shall also be good Catholics," (Armstrong, 1937: 40). Hughes (1943: 106-114) points out in his study of a French-Canadian community that the emphasis on training in the classics and professions (doctors, lawyers, dentists, etc.) in the French-Canadian schools left its graduates ill-prepared to assume a managerial role in commerce and industry when industrialization impacted on French-Canada during the early 1940's. Thus, ownership and management of French-Canadian industry became dominated by the English-Canadians and the United States investors. This situation presented a source of frustration for the French-Canadian aspiring for "materialistic success" (as opposed to the idealist nature of his education). Initially, strong nationalist feelings (the French-Canadian's value system) prevented the French-Canadian from questioning or accusing his social system for his inferior position. Subsequent definitions of this situation, the French-Canadian's inferior status in the economic system, served to alienate the French-Canadian new middle class from traditional values and established the English-Canadian and United States business in Quebec as "villains" of the separatist movement.

The Economic Institution

The influence the Church had on other institutions during the period of the British conquest was a function of the Church's
stability and the disorganization experienced by the other institutions during this period of rapid social change. The Roman Catholic Church had a "foothold" in Quebec at the time of the British conquest, and through its zeal to maintain Catholicism in Quebec its influence overflowed into the other institutions. The economic institution was no exception. There was never one dominant economic system throughout the entire history of New France. The seigniorial system in New France was modelled after the land tenure system in France and was intended to be the foundation of the colony's economic system. This system has been described as a failure and, at best, a limited success (Fregault, 1954). The Seigniorial system, as an economic base, could not withstand the competition from the lucrative fur trade business, and failed as a means of social integration when the Church assumed that function.

Before the British conquest the French-Canadians lacked a viable entrepreneurial class (Corbett, 1967: 15). After the conquest, French industry suffered when the merchants who remained after the British conquest lost their trade connections with Paris and the rest of Europe. This, coupled with the influx of British merchants to Canada with the invading British Army, gave the English-Canadians an overwhelming edge in the economic arena. Eventually, the fur trade business, the most lucrative commercial enterprise in Canada at the time, was taken over from the French by the British. According to Corbett (1967: 16) within a few years after the conquest the English-Canadians dominated industry in Canada and the French-Canadians became farmers.
Early Expressions of Separatism

The French-Canadian social system that evolved from the changes associated with the British conquest prepared the French-Canadian to define situations in terms of their threat to his culture. The English-Canadian and British were natural targets when the French-Canadian became faced with these situations.

The first indication of French-Canadian separatism was the Riel Rebellion. Riel, a French-Canadian half-breed, led the Metis Indians in a protest movement against Canadian domination and annexation of the new territories. The French-Canadians regarded Riel as a patriot who sought to protect the rights of a French Catholic population and who was now being punished by the English-Canadians because of his religion and ethnic heritage. Riel was sentenced to hang by an English-Canadian judge in 1885. His execution, more than any other event, proved to the French-Canadians that Canada's responsibility was to the English Majority first (Corbett, 1967: 28).

The first significant separatist activity, the World War I conscription crisis, was inspired by the bilingual school issue in Ontario, a totally unrelated issue. The school question centered around an Ontario Department of Education regulation which limited the use of French as the language of instruction in French-English schools (Armstrong, 1937: 90-99). The French-Canadians in Ontario and in Quebec (the self-appointed protector of all French-Canadians in Canada) defined this action on the part of the English-Canadians as a threat to the separate school system. Prior to the school
controversy, French-Canadians were supporting the war in Europe with volunteers for the armed forces (Armstrong, 1937: 89). To the French-Canadian nationalist "les anglais" were depriving the French-Canadians in Ontario of a "French" education. The nationalist could not reconcile this condition with fighting an "anglais" war in Europe. They became more concerned with a more important cause at home, one that had to do with defending their culture rather than defending foreign soil. As a result the French-Canadians, not only in Quebec but in the western provinces as well, collectively opposed conscription and the war (Armstrong, 1937: 95).

Henri Bourassa, the owner of the newspaper "Le Devoir" spread nationalist and anti-conscription sentiments throughout the French population (Wade, 1955: 754-746). Lionel Groulx initiated the first teachings of French-Canadian history at the University of Montreal in 1915 (Wade, 1955: 755). His nationalist and separatist interpretations of Canadian history stressed the differences and antagonisms between the French-Canadians and the English-Canadians, and were well received by the French-Canadian youth.

French-Canadian nationalist sentiment reached its peak during June-August 1917, when violence and rioting became widespread. Crowds would march through the streets of Montreal shouting anti-conscription and separatist slogans, "A bas Borden" ("Down with Borden," the Prime Minister) and "vive la revolution." A riot broke out in Quebec City as the result of a public speech made by a politician to the effect that, "If conscription law is enforced, Canadians have only one choice—to die in Europe or to die in Canada. As far as I am
concerned, if my body is to fall in any land, I want it to be on Canadian soil" (Wade, 1955: 747).

The events and the school issue building up to the conscription crisis, as defined by the French-Canadian nationalists, proved that French-Canadians and their interests were secondary to the English-Canadians. If their interests were to be protected, the French-Canadian would have to take an active lead. The World War I conscription crisis was an important factor that contributed to the later (1960's) and dynamic emergence of the separatist movement:

1. The French and English-Canadians became divided on key issues which remain unresolved.
2. Nationalist and separatist ideology emerged as a deliberate program for action.
3. A precedent for active protest and violence was set which made the French-Canadian response to World War II conscription a foregone conclusion.
4. The conscription crisis demonstrated that the French-Canadians could unite for a common cause.

When World War II and another bout with conscription came upon Quebec, the French-Canadians had the benefit of Abbe Groulx's nationalist ideology. Canada had just experienced a great economic depression. The French-Canadians were beginning to realize their inferior position in Quebec industry and, therefore, were little concerned with the problems in Europe and especially another war (Wade, 1968: 916). French-Canadian nationalism was kept in check by traditionalist opponents and by the lack of complete endorsement
by the Quebec Roman Catholic clergy. The Prime Minister of Quebec, Maurice Duplessis, preached a demagogic nationalism but always deferred to the United States and English-Canadian investors who controlled Quebec's industry (Wade, 1968: 1107-1108). Another counter to the growth of nationalism and the emergence of separatism is that Duplessis never challenged the Church's complete control of education and massive influence on the French-Canadian's life in general.

The conscription issue during the Second World War was not as violent as the crisis experienced during World War I. However, there were minor outbursts against conscription (Wade, 1968: 1070-1072). In 1939 the Canadian Prime Minister stated, "So long as this government may be in power, no such measure (conscription) will be enacted."

In April 1942 a plebiscite was held in which the electorate was asked to release the administration from its past commitments. For the whole country the plebiscite showed 64 per cent of the votes in favor of releasing the government of its previous commitment. The Quebec vote was an overwhelming 80 per cent "No" vote. The French-Canadians felt the government had no right to renege on its promise (Wade, 1968: 916-990). Once more the French-Canadians found themselves in opposition to the rest of Canada.

An outgrowth and reaction to the World War II conscription issue was the formation of the "Bloc Populaire," a movement of nationalist youth which was organized in 1942 and a forerunner of the 1960 separatist movement (Wade, 1968: 1001).

This then, was the status of French-Canada as it found itself caught up in a period of rapid transition and had to deal with
the following:

1. A merging of urbanization and industrialization.

2. The role of the Church as the sanctioning institution of social values.

3. The traditional national goal, "survivance."
CHAPTER III

SEPARATISM AND THE FRENCH-CANADIAN:
PARTICIPATION AND THE PARTICIPANTS

French-Canadian separatism emerged as a visible expression of discontent during a period of rapid social change occurring in the immediate post-World War II period of Quebec. This period, identified by many as the "Quiet Revolution," marked the beginning of the current separatist movement. For the most part, the conditions and changes taking place in Quebec were not contrived by the French-Canadian nationalists, and happened independently of nationalism or the separatist movement. According to the Langs (1961: 507).

The social movement, while itself a collective enterprise to effect changes in the social order, is also a response to changes in social conditions that have occurred independently of its efforts. Social movements, therefore, are more likely to arise in a society undergoing rapid social change than in a stable one.

This is precisely the case of the French-Canadian nationalist movement and the emergence of the separatist movement. French-Canadian nationalism did not bring about urbanization and industrialization; if anything traditional nationalism was against or neutral to urbanization. This was especially true of the Church which stood to lose to urbanization its control over the rural population and its influence and status of preserving the French culture. Industrialization and urbanization created the conditions which forced French
Canadians to redefine their position in Quebec in relation to that of the English Canadian. The complete and sudden change in Quebec's political leadership was independent of any nationalist undertakings, but it was a significant factor in mobilizing the French-Canadians for a separate Quebec. These conditions and their ramifications ignited the separatist desire which was fed and inspired by key events and the identification with social objects at critical times to keep the movement alive.

**Changing Conditions and Perspectives**

**Urbanization**

The many social changes that have occurred in Quebec (French-Canada) are related to urbanization. Urbanization accentuated and caused severe problems of economic inequality expressed in severe social class differences. Another significant consequence of urbanization was the disintegration of traditional social institutions, specifically church, family and education.

The French-Canadian, for the most part, was an unskilled worker in French-Canadian industry; the managers and owners came from the English-Canadians and Americans. The French-Canadian's relegation to unskilled work was a function of his education and the teachings of the Quebec Roman Catholic Church. Everett Hughes (1963: 55), in his study of the impact of industry on a French-Canadian town, found that the managerial staff of a particular textile mill was exclusively English-Canadian and only twenty-five out of eighty-two foremen were French-Canadians. (See Table I).
### EMPLOYEES OF MILL A IN CANTONVILLE BY NATIONALITY
#### RANK, AND DEPARTMENT, 1937

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>PERCENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>English and Other</td>
<td>French</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>2337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Staff, above foreman</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Foremen</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. All others, by departments #</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>2311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Main office, etc.</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Engineering and chemical</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Personnel, final examination, programming and shipping</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Textile production</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>1882</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The table of nationalities furnished us by the management showed 2,324 French, 353 English, and 49 "others." Our tabulation, made from the pay roll on the basis of names and personal knowledge, finds 13 more French than does the company's tabulation. Our knowledge of individuals in the upper ranks is so complete that the error is entirely in the lower ranks, where the difference of 13 is of no importance. The error probably comes from our inclination to call any person French whose last name is English but whose first name is French. There are a good many such persons in the community, and it is our judgement that a family which gives a French first name to its child is for all social purposes a French family. If a family calls its son "Narcisse," it isn't an English family.

#The departmental groupings are (1) general office, general stores, cafeteria, purchasing, factory clerks, and the nurse; (2) as named in the table; (3) as named in the table; and (4) spinning, weaving, textile, knitting, and dyeing departments (the foremen and department heads in this group are mostly Lancashire men).

This table is taken from Hughes (1963: 55).
For the French-Canadian to aspire to greater levels in the industrial hierarchy would require him to give up too much of his French culture. A traditional French-Canadian education did not provide the type of training to support the technical skills required in industry. S. D. Clark (1971: 83), in his study of French-Canadian industrial communities, identified, in addition to a lack of technical skills, the French-Canadian's commitment to his ethnic origin and religion as key factors that tied the French-Canadian to his community and consequently to the unskilled jobs. The French-Canadian's concern over his language, religion, and way of life in general takes precedence over advancement. The French Canadian's attempt to maintain his cultural heritage is evidenced in Hughes' (1943: 180) description of how the French-Canadian industrial workers created a self-imposed hardship by building "Shanties" outside of town in an effort to maintain the rural spirit and existence under town, wage-working conditions. These settlements, in many cases, constituted slum-like conditions without the conveniences and services of town life.

Once committed to urbanization, family traditions began to break down. The family tradition of passing the family property on to the oldest son became obsolete (Hughes, 1943: 184). The passing of this tradition served to weaken the family's control over the individual and the Church's influence over the individual and the family.

The United States met industrialization with technical education and organizations, in the form of trade unions, to cope with the problems of an industrial civilization (Hughes, 1943: 211).
Unless mechanisms exist for the adaptation and incorporation into the social order of the demands of dissatisfied groups, these segments of the population, finding their aspirations unrecognized, will provide a fertile field for the growth of sectarian associations (Lang and Lang 1961: 507).

The French-Canadians did not have the mechanisms for meeting the frustrations and anxieties associated with industrialization and urbanization. The organization closest to a trade union were the "Catholic Action" groups sponsored by the Church. However, the Church hierarchy was in collusion with the political machine of Duplessis to further the nationalist cause of "survivance." As such, the Church and government supported industry by providing a trouble-free labor force.

The subordinate position of the French-Canadian worker in the urban community, the fact that the superior and controlling positions in industry were occupied by English-Canadians and Americans, and the slum-like living conditions of the industrial workers provided the conditions fostering misery and destitute characteristic of a proletariat social movement. However, a movement of this type failed to materialize from the French-Canadian working class. This lends credence to Eric Hoffer's (1951: 20) postulate that "frustration and confusion, rather than poverty and misery, give rise to social movements." Obviously, there were expressions of social unrest and discontent against the industrial hierarchy during the 1940's and 1950's but not to the extent that they became an organized (workers or nationalist) movement against "foreign" control of French-Canadian industry. What did emerge, however, during the mid and late fifties was the "new middle class" (Ossenberg, 1971: 103-123), the vanguard
Political Conditions and Changes

The new middle class is another consequence of urbanization. The mass exodus from country to city in response to industrialization naturally required additional staffing of urban institutions. Guindon (1964: 150-162) calls this the bureaucratic revolution. The new middle class was the recipient of the Union Nationale's (the incumbent political party) corruption and oppression. Thus the Union Nationale and its leader, Duplessis, became the source of frustration for the new middle class.

Between 1944 and 1959, Quebec Premier Maurice Duplessis ruled the province with an iron hand; his major allies were the Roman Catholic Church and industry. Duplessis' regime was marked by conservatism, Quebec nationalism (not separatism), authoritarianism, corruption, and the ruthless repression of reform (Clark, 1965: 21-23). Under Duplessis, as political scientist Rolf Spencer observed,

French-Canadians - always seeing themselves in the role of the defeated minority - developed a religious and educational introversion, a tight, inward-looking, backward order which emphasized family, land, church, and traditions (1964: 283-286).

Hubert Guindon (1964: 152-154) made the following comments concerning the new middle class and Duplessis,

...the economic and status interests of this new middle class were not being met. Salaries could not be increased. Why? Because of Duplessis. Staff could not be hired. Why? Because of Duplessis.

Duplessis became a symbol of oppression, of reactionary government. The growth of semi-public bureaucratic institutions required greatly increased and predictable amounts of money from the provincial treasury. Because he refused to meet these class
demands, Duplessis was emotionally and unanimously resented by the new middle class. Where Duplessis failed, Sauve succeeded. Guindon notes that Duplessis based his political machine on the rural and lower-urban social strata. After his death these classes felt unrepresented, uncared for, with no significant voice in the political arena. The Liberal party which replaced the Union Nationale, and its leader Lesage were unable to gain the support of the lower social strata. On the other hand, it was the new middle class who elected the Liberal party and Lesage to office. Interviews with members of both the new middle class and the lower urban strata confirm Guindon's comments concerning the French-Canadian's image of Duplessis (Notes, 1972).

The new middle class consisted of the educated, professional and semi-professional, salaried, white-collar workers. Their source of frustrations under the Duplessis regime was basically a lack of recognition of job importance by the government. As such, Duplessis was the scapegoat and the oppressor. After his death most of the demands made by the new middle class for economic and status recognition were met by the government. Even with the government's accommodation, the status of the French-Canadian middle class did not match that of the English-Canadian civil servant or the English-Canadian in private industry. The new middle class became acutely aware of its relatively deprived status and set out to do something about it--independence for French-Canada "état de Quebec." The English Canadians and foreign investors and managers of French-Canadian industries replaced Duplessis as the scapegoat.
Relative Deprivation

At the beginning of the decade of the 1960's over five million of Canada's eighteen million people lived in the province of Quebec. Approximately four million Quebeckers' (98 percent of the province's population) mother tongue was French; 62 percent of this group spoke only French (Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, 1967: Book I, 15-39). Lieberson's research reveals that in 1961 monolingual English-Canadians income was $5124 compared to $4385 for the bilingual French-Canadian (1970: 171). (Additional data concerning the effect of education, occupations, and ethnic origin are found in Tables II and III). Seventy-seven percent of the jobs in Quebec paying $15,000 a year or higher were held by English-Canadians, who comprised only 30 percent of the total work force, and the average income of an English-Canadian was 40 percent higher than the provincial average (Newsweek, 1970: 43). The unemployment rate in Quebec traditionally was higher than elsewhere in Canada. In one typical year during this period, French-Canadians, who made up approximately 25 percent of Canada's work force, accounted for 41 percent of the nation's unemployed. Nationwide, unemployment ran at about 7 percent; in Quebec, it stood at 10 percent (Business Week, 1970: 36).

The French-Canadians faced a tremendous disadvantage in industry; the English-Canadians and the Americans controlled Quebec's economy (Lieberson, 1970: 83-85). Few French-Canadians occupied positions of importance in large corporations, the federal civil service, or the armed forces. For example, only about 11 percent of
### TABLE II

Employment Income for Men by Ethnic Group and Official Language, Montreal Metropolitan Area, 1961

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group and Official Languages</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Elementary</td>
<td>High School</td>
<td>High School</td>
<td>University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British:</td>
<td></td>
<td>1+ Years</td>
<td>1-2 Years</td>
<td>3-5 Years</td>
<td>1+ Years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English only</td>
<td>$3323\textsuperscript{b}</td>
<td>$4077</td>
<td>$4498</td>
<td>$6074</td>
<td>$8830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilingual</td>
<td>2773\textsuperscript{c}</td>
<td>4077</td>
<td>4413</td>
<td>5818</td>
<td>9116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French only</td>
<td>2510</td>
<td>3036</td>
<td>3048</td>
<td>3131</td>
<td>4879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilingual</td>
<td>2529</td>
<td>3608</td>
<td>3958</td>
<td>4576</td>
<td>7068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English only</td>
<td>3515</td>
<td>3396</td>
<td>3779</td>
<td>4917</td>
<td>6351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French only</td>
<td>2474</td>
<td>2677</td>
<td>3084</td>
<td>3125</td>
<td>4506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilingual</td>
<td>2346</td>
<td>3783</td>
<td>4514</td>
<td>5917</td>
<td>7691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>1857</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>2391</td>
<td>2115</td>
<td>1687\textsuperscript{d}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{a}Based on persons reporting income.
\textsuperscript{b}Based on 65 cases.
\textsuperscript{c}Based on 45 cases.
\textsuperscript{d}Based on 64 cases.

This table is taken from Lieberson (1970: 170).
TABLE III


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Managerial</td>
<td></td>
<td>$9570</td>
<td>$9171</td>
<td>$5361</td>
<td>$7100</td>
<td>$8293</td>
<td>$5293</td>
<td>$8511</td>
<td>$7606</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prof. &amp; Tech.</td>
<td></td>
<td>7529</td>
<td>7953</td>
<td>4818</td>
<td>6658</td>
<td>5894</td>
<td>4081</td>
<td>6679</td>
<td>1870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td></td>
<td>3724</td>
<td>3637</td>
<td>2755</td>
<td>3501</td>
<td>3180</td>
<td>2288</td>
<td>3311</td>
<td>2314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales</td>
<td></td>
<td>5461</td>
<td>5359</td>
<td>3065</td>
<td>4605</td>
<td>4480</td>
<td>3528</td>
<td>5381</td>
<td>1563</td>
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<tr>
<td>Service &amp; Recreation</td>
<td></td>
<td>3396</td>
<td>3333</td>
<td>2550</td>
<td>3399</td>
<td>2565</td>
<td>2467</td>
<td>3097</td>
<td>1875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport &amp; Communication</td>
<td></td>
<td>4374</td>
<td>3948</td>
<td>2892</td>
<td>3599</td>
<td>3159</td>
<td>2871</td>
<td>3488</td>
<td>2235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers &amp; Stockraisers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Primarya</td>
<td></td>
<td>2771</td>
<td>2818</td>
<td>2204</td>
<td>2601</td>
<td>2688</td>
<td>1861</td>
<td>3031</td>
<td>1439</td>
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<tr>
<td>Craftsmen</td>
<td></td>
<td>4293</td>
<td>4273</td>
<td>3260</td>
<td>3807</td>
<td>3476</td>
<td>3023</td>
<td>3684</td>
<td>2310</td>
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<tr>
<td>Laborers</td>
<td></td>
<td>2794</td>
<td>2627</td>
<td>2399</td>
<td>2590</td>
<td>2582</td>
<td>2413</td>
<td>2581</td>
<td>1942</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

aExcluding farmers and stockraisers.

This table is taken from Lieberson (1970: 173).
the senior positions in the federal civil service were held by French-Canadians; in one typical year, of 1175 high-ranking federal civil servants, only 135 were French-Canadians (Caloren, 1967: 915). Another survey revealed that of 163 civil servants receiving salaries of $14,000 a year or more, only 6 were French-Canadians (Clark, 1965: 146).

The French-Canadians in the early 1960's were relatively deprived and more importantly their daily activities made them aware that their position was subordinate to the English-Canadian.

Susceptibility of the French-Canadian Collective Processes

The French-Canadian situation at the beginning of the 1960's illustrates the operation of the Langs' (1961) "collective processes" discussed in Chapter I. In applying these processes to the Quebec situation it must be remembered that when dealing with a large scale operation, a collective response to a given situation may take a period of time to develop. Also, there is not a clear cut distinction when one process stops and another starts since the processes usually operate simultaneously and tend to work toward and reinforce the crystallization process.

The Church, family, educational, and political institutions have traditionally been paramount in the life of the French-Canadian. They served to define their culture and their way of life against assimilation into the Anglo Saxon culture. These institutions provided the definitions for the French-Canadian in assessing events
and situations. He depended on the symbols of these institutions, the cure (church), papa (family), and "le chef," Duplessis, (government) to provide reconcilable solutions and answers to changing conditions and events.

Demoralization occurred when traditional values and norms failed to provide for French-Canada's economic interests in the face of urbanization. Not only did conventional values and norms fail to provide the definitions for coping with urbanization, but traditional values, especially preservation of the French language, subordinated the French-Canadian to the English-Canadian in Quebec. The process of demoralization became evident when the lower classes' response to urbanization is compared to the response of the new middle class. The lower class responded by attempting to make urban life fit into the traditional way of life. The French industrial worker, in spite of urbanization, refused to break away completely from the rural spirit. The value system of the rural spirit provided the definitions of urbanization that the lower class worker could live with. The lower class supported Duplessis' form of nationalism, even though it was detrimental to his economic well being, because it was defined as supporting the French-Canadian way of life. Consequently, there was very little if any demoralization in the lower strata. On the other hand, the new middle class entered the 1960's with its traditional ties to Church and family strained. The middle class was educated in an urbanized environment and their occupations departed from the traditional French-Canadian professional occupations. Their work environment was a constant reminder of their subordinate
position to their English-Canadian counterpart. The new middle class could not reconcile traditional nationalism, taught by the Church and supported by the Union Nationale, especially Duplessis, with its inferior economic status. If the Church and state are supposed to be the protector of French-Canadian culture and way of life, why have they allowed the English-Canadian and foreign investors to take over and control Quebec's industries? Why do the French-Canadian schools produce an education that is useless in the business world?

The new middle class's confrontation with the frustrations of urbanization naturally required assessments to be made of the situation. The sequence of events comprising the new middle class's response to perceived deprivation—the rejection of Duplessis, then its spontaneous support of Sauve's form of Union Nationale, and then its complete shift of allegiance to Lesage and the Liberal party—demonstrates the process of mass conversion and the degree of shared perspectives in its attempt to cope with frustrations and anxieties. The middle class's basic definition of the situation remained constant, the dynamic shifting was a function of collective defense. The scapegoating of Duplessis and the English Canadians is a form of collective defense. In both cases it served as a common rallying point for the French Canadians (middle class) to vent their frustrations. The middle class entered the decade leading the French-Canadian separatist movement and left behind the traditions associated with "survivance" and replaced it with "épanouissement."

The process of crystallization received its impetus from
key events and through identification with social objects. This allowed the specific issue of economic subordination to solidify into the more sweeping and radical objective of separatism.

Separatist ideology represented a resurgence of French culture—renewed identity with French-Canadian history, the French language, and culture—all the traditional values which had before failed to provide adequate definitions. However, they were now directed toward separatism. The emphasis on ethnic heritage served two major purposes. It encouraged shared perspectives to provide for collective definitions and responses. It provided the movement with an idol and a scapegoat.

An idol personifies some general achievement; each society creates its idols in its own image (Lang and Lang 1961: 291-331). During the early 1960's President de Gaulle of France had started his eviction of all NATO armed forces from France. This to the French-Canadians was an expression of French independence which coincided with separatist ideology concerning the colonial status of Quebec. This and de Gaulle's visits to Quebec made him an obvious idol and rallying point in crystallizing the separatist movement (Notes, 1972). On de Gaulle's visit to Canada in 1967, his second visit to Canada in the decade, he broke diplomatic protocol by spending four days with the Quebec Premier in Quebec before visiting the Canadian Prime Minister (New York Times, 1967: July 24 and 25). De Gaulle was given a hero's welcome in Quebec by the French-Canadian separatists. He was greeted by crowds who carried separatist banners, waved the French national colors, and shouted "Vive le Quebec libre"

If de Gaulle and "French" were positive rallying points for separatism, then Queen Elizabeth's visit to Canada and the English Canadians posed a negative social object—scapegoat. The Queen's visit served as an opportunity for the Separatist to protest a perceived colonial symbol and express a general discontent for English Canadians: as a negative rallying point, it served the same purpose as the idol. As social objects, they both serve as rallying points for common sentiments.

The French-Canadian's self-image as a colonized minority made the liberation movements in Africa and Asia another point of reference for the separatist movement.

French-Canadians are thus now the senior national minority in the western world; perhaps, instead of being proud of that position, they are wounded to think that minorities - younger, poorer, less educated and cultivated than they - have achieved a national status which they, the French-Canadians, have never really sought in large number and with continued determination (Hughes, 1963: xiv).

Pierre Bourgault, a conservative separatist, stated Quebec's identity with colonialism as, "There are similarities of mentality between
French-Canada and the inhabitants of all colonial countries. The French-Canadian is not the destitute and exploited chattel of classical colonialism, but intellectually and psychologically he does share a common bond with him" (Quoted in Jones, 1967: 19).

French-Canadian separatism emerged as a consequence of the incongruence between urbanization and the French-Canadian traditional value system. This condition was fed by collective definitions and responses to subsequent events and situations that culminated in crystallizing separatism into a social movement.
CHAPTER IV

SEPARATIST ORGANIZATIONS

The efforts of Lesage and his Liberal party in the early 1960's to propel the French-Canadians into the urbanized, commercialized, and industrialized world did not come fast enough and in sufficient amount to curb rising separatist sentiments. Out of Lesage's "Quiet Revolution" numerous organizations with separatist "ideals" appeared in the form of socialist-reform, nationalist, ad hoc, and hard core permanent organizations. Conflict Studies (1972: 3-4) lists twenty-five organizations either associated with or identified as separatist organizations. Some of the separatist organizations, like the Front de Liberation du Quebec and Ralliement National, were well known and strong in participant-follower support. Others were no more than criminal gangs operating under the cover of the separatist emotions. In 1968 a political separatist party, Parti Quebecois, emerged as the "official" voice of separatism for the French-Canadians.

In this chapter the Parti Quebecois and the Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ) will be examined in terms of their impact on the separatist movement. The events and circumstances that sent the FLQ on its 1970 reign of terror will be highlighted. The effectiveness of the FLQ's organizational structure will be compared with the criteria for internal structure of core groups set forth by Lang.
and Lang (1961). An appraisal will be made of the consequences of the FLQ's strategy and tactics.

Parti Quebecois

The issues surrounding the emergence of the Parti Quebecois were similar in nature to those that involved the French and English-Canadians in the Manitoba and Ontario school issue at the turn of the century. The 1969 issue started when a bill was presented to the Canadian parliament to promote the use of the French language in Quebec. Because of the French-Canadian reaction to the bill, it was withdrawn, but reintroduced the following year and subsequently passed (Dion and Seve, 1974: 124-144). This action, as was the previous school controversy (school issue 1895-1900), was interpreted by the French-Canadians, especially the separatists, as another case of the Canadian government putting English-Canadian interests before the interests and rights of the French-Canadian citizens of Quebec (Dion and Seve, 1974). This event was the key to the emergence of the Parti Quebecois. Based on the separatist definition of the intent of the federal government concerning the education bill, the separatist organizations "Mouvement Souverainete-Association" and "Ralliement National" merged to form the Parti Quebecois. Later, October 1968, another separatist political party, "Rassemblement pour l'Independence Nationale" (RIN) joined the Parti Quebecois.

The formation of a legally recognized political party which represents a social movement for the secession of a territory (Quebec) and its people (French-Canadians) is an unusual aspect of social
movements. It appears that a drive for political recognition at this stage came prematurely. If the formation of a legal organization, Parti Quebecois, were applied to Hopper's (1950: 270-279) frame of reference for the study of revolutionary movements, it would fall in the final stage, the "Institutional stage." This stage exists, according to Hopper,

> When the attitudes and values of the revolutionary leadership have thus become the legal and political foundation of social organization, a new society has been formed and the revolution has been consummated.

At this time, 1968, the separatist movement did not have clear, strong and definitive leadership. The revolutionary groups, the FLQ and the like, certainly were not blessed with dynamic and available leadership. The popular leadership of the FLQ during this time, Pierre Vallieres and Charles Gagnon, were serving life sentences in the Montreal prison for murder in connection with the bombing of the La Grenade Shoe Factory. Rene Levesque was a popular political figure before he organized the Parti Quebecois, but as a political leader he was untried. A "society" existed, but it had not settled on how independence would be accomplished. Generally the revolutionary groups advocated the overthrow of capitalism and imperialism and the decolonization of Quebec. The Parti Quebecois was organized to seek independence for Quebec through the electoral system.

Without identifying a specific stage of development, the Langs (1961: 505) refer to the merger of groups in general. "Any core group, if it is to be successful, must be able to link up with other groups pursuing similar objectives." This is what happened in
the formation of Parti Quebecois, but the particular form it took is the unusual aspect of its emergence.

Had the Parti Quebecois been able to gain and maintain more control over the FLQ, the October 1970 crisis might never have occurred and subsequent provincial elections might have been more favorable to the Parti Quebecois.

The circumstances and events surrounding the provincial general election of April 1970 caused the unrest and discontent that was to a large extent responsible for the October 1970 crisis—the kidnappings of the British diplomat James Cross and the Liberal cabinet minister Pierre Laporte. In that election the Parti Quebecois should have constituted the official opposition since it received 23.7 percent of the popular vote, but it won only seven out of one hundred eight seats (Saywell, 1971: 5-27). The separatist reaction to the election results is a prime example of the operation of the Langs (1961) collective process, demoralization. The separatist, supporting the democratic way to independence lost faith and trust in the official system as a means to achieve their objective. They became demoralized. (Data are not available on the number of Parti Quebecois supporters who turned to revolutionary means as a result of the election and related events).

The basis for the separatist cry of injustice concerns the lack of assembly seats acquired compared to the percentage of the total vote for the Parti Quebecois. The Union Nationale party won seventeen assembly seats with 19.6 percent of the total vote; the Ralliement Creditiste party won twelve assembly seats with 11.1 percent
of the total vote; but the Parti Quebecois won only seven assembly seats with 23.7 percent of the total vote (Saywell, 1971).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>Percentage of Total Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberals</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>41.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parti Quebecois</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Nationale</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ralliement Crediste</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This discrepancy between the percentage of total votes and the number of seats it actually won was accounted for by the electoral system, a uninominal single-ballot voting system, and a uniform distribution of the separatist vote across the province (Saywell, 1971). This explanation did not convince the Parti Quebecois militants, who had worked enthusiastically during the election campaign for the "democratic solution" to separatism, that the outcome was not the work of the English-Canadians (Saywell, 1971). The "coupe de la brink" was a scare tactic used by the English-Canadians to frighten potential Parti Quebecois supporters and to discredit the party and separatism. A pre-election poll showed the Parti Quebecois posed a threat to the Liberal party. The rumor was circulated that stocks, bonds, bills, securities, etc., should be removed from Quebec because in the event of a separatist victory the Parti Quebecois would nationalize all foreign capital. A few days before the election a
convoy of armored Brinks trucks publicly paraded through Montreal to Ontario (Saywell, 1971). The significance of this event is in the definitions formed after the election when the separatists related their defeat in the election to this and other English-Canadian connected events. Saywell (1971) describes an incident which was a forecast of trouble.

Commenting on the Brinks affair and the joyful reactions in Montreal's English dailies, Mr. Parizeau warned that "these people are just waving a red flag in front of a fuming bull...they are really asking for trouble." Not only were the internal tensions made more acute, but the election results led many to question the democratic or representative system. As Parizeau exclaimed: "God help us...You see it is not my defeat nor that of Rene Levesque that is important...It's the defeat of our arguments in favor of the parliamentary system."

As a result of the April 1970 (described by Bernard Smith as "Le Coup d'Etat du Avril 29") the Parti Quebecois lost what little influence it had had over the FLQ and thus the FLQ was free to carry out its reign of terror during the fall of 1970. In their Manifesto, the FLQ cite their impatience and the "Liberal victory proves that that which is called democracy in Quebec is and always has been the 'democracy' of the rich" (FLQ Manifesto printed in Le Devoir, 13 October 1970, quoted in Dion and Seve, 1974) as the causes of their revolutionary (violence and terrorism) behavior.

Front de Liberation du Quebec

The Front for the Liberation of Quebec (FLQ) came into existence in late 1962, and its activities date from the beginning of 1963 (Vallieres, 1971). The FLQ's founder was Georges Schoeters, a
Belgian, who immigrated to Canada in 1951. A strong admirer of Fidel Castro, Schoeters visited Cuba in 1959 and 1960. He was soon drawn to the cause of French-Canadian separatism, and, believing that revolutions always bring solutions, he established the FLQ.

**Organization**

The FLQ was organized into independent 3 to 6 man cells loosely controlled by a central executive committee believed based in Montreal. At one time or another, there were bombing, financial (robbery), propaganda, intelligence, and possibly assassination cells; however, a financial cell, for example, was not prohibited from carrying out a bombing (Pickering, 1970). For security purposes, a cell leader often did not know his men's true identities, and he rarely knew more than one member of another cell; no membership cards were issued and no membership rosters were drawn up (MacDonald, 1972: 234-235). In describing the FLQ as "loosely controlled," the emphasis is on the first word rather than the second. A Canadian Army report claims that a central executive committee issued coded messages in communiques sent to and broadcast by the commercial news media (Pickering, 1970). For all intents and purposes, however, each cell was autonomous and called its own shots. Journalist Tom Buckley of *The New York Times Magazine* (1970; December 6) described the FLQ as "a grouping...so loose that it hardly deserve(d) the name of an organization."

An article by the *US News and World Report* (1970, November 2) estimated the FLQ's strength at approximately 150 active members
supported by perhaps 2000 sympathizers. The majority were students, laborers, and "street people"; most were in their late teens or early twenties. There is some dispute over the social background of the FLQ's members. Moss (1972: 115) states that "a significant proportion of the young men who made their way into the ranks of the FLQ were from the slums and shanty-towns of Montreal." Whereas Clark (1965: 16-17) says that "almost all (of the FLQ's members) were from good, respectable families of at least middle-income level." According to interviews (Notes, 1972) most of the members were from middle class families; however, there were a few of the types mentioned by Moss.

**Strategy and Tactics**

The FLQ's goal was an independent French-speaking Quebec, set up as a radical-socialist state; violence was to be the means to this end. In its first communique, issued in early 1963, the FLQ announced that its mission was "to completely destroy, by systematic sabotage, all the symbols of colonial (primarily English-speaking) institutions" (Time, 1963: June 14).

The communique also stated that the FLQ "suicide commandos" would sabotage government buildings, English-language newspaper offices, barracks, and businesses that practiced "cultural discrimination" (Moss, 1972: 121). Terrorist activities included bombings, armed robberies, and arms thefts, hitting such targets as military recruiting offices, banks, armories, gun shops, a radio/television tower, a Royal Canadian Mounted Police building, an oil refinery, and numerous mailboxes (Pickering, 1971). One FLQ financing cell
carried out seven robberies in six months, netting $40,000 in cash and $45,000 worth of guns and radio equipment before police caught all six cell members (MacDonald, 1972: 234). The FLQ concentrated its actions in Montreal, Quebec's largest city, with a population of well over 2,000,000.

Internal Problems of the FLQ

In spite of limited "success" in some areas, the FLQ suffered from structural problems. If a movement is to survive, it must deal with and overcome structural problems (Lang and Lang, 1961: 531-532). A major structural problem identified by the Langs is "regularizing the relations between leaders and followers."

The FLQ apparently experienced a lack of disciplined and dedicated members. For example, the police were able to exploit FLQ defections and internal quarrels (Mallory, 1972: 210). Moreover, very few of those FLQ members who were captured and convicted returned to the movement after their release from prison (Conflict Studies, 1972: 10). It is perhaps this fact which led Canadian university professor Denis Smith (1971: 70) to remark that the FLQ seemed "to lack any permanent core of leaders." In addition, one source has noted that most of the money which was stolen was "spent on high-living," (Conflict Studies, 1972: 10), again suggesting a lack of discipline and dedication. Another major structural problem identified by the Langs (1961) is "coordinating the relations among various groups within the movement."

The FLQ's cellular organization enhanced security but not
coordination. For example, most police attempts to infiltrate the organization failed. (One reason for these failures was that a candidate for membership in a cell was required to participate in some crime as a sign of his good faith.) However, the FLQ was rarely able to mount a coordinated attack involving more than one cell. Moreover, the extreme secrecy existing within each cell and between cells severely limited the transmission of information in a timely manner. An organization whose cell members often do not know each other's true identities, whose cell leaders know at most only one member of another cell, and whose central leadership (according to the Canadian Army) depends upon the commercial news media to pass messages, is hardly conducive to the rapid passing of critical information. For example, timely warnings of police actions, in progress or impending, evidently often failed to reach the FLQ members concerned, since time and time again the police were able to round up entire cells (Pickering, 1971).

The October 1970 crisis is another example of an FLQ internal organization problem. On Monday morning, October 5, 1970, four members of an FLQ cell kidnapped British Trade Commissioner James R. Cross from his Montreal home.

Pierre Laporte was kidnapped on October 10 by another cell, the "Chenier" finance cell (named after a French-Canadian doctor killed in the 1837 anti-British uprising). This action is a good example of the FLQ's lack of coordination and control, and lack of discipline within the group. The members of the Chenier cell were driving near Dallas, Texas, when they learned over the radio of the
Cross kidnapping. They felt that Cross was a poor choice of victim, so they returned to Canada to plan the kidnapping of a more "appropriate" victim. There is no indication whatsoever that the Chenier cell received any instructions from a central executive committee or any other outside source to kidnap Laporte. Thus, the Chenier cell carried out a second FLQ kidnapping on its own because it disagreed with another FLQ cell's choice of victim (Pickering, 1971).

Popular Support

Shortly after the FLQ was formed Marcel Chaput, a leading separatist politician, publicly speculated that English-Canadian agents provocateurs had founded the FLQ in order to discredit the separatist movement (Moss, 1972: 116). In spite of the opposition of a number of separatist political leaders, however, the FLQ had, according to Newsweek magazine (1970, October 26), "won at least qualified sympathy from many ordinary French-Canadians" by the fall of 1970. It is certainly possible, perhaps even probable, that a number of French-Canadian separatists sympathized with the FLQ's ends, but not its means. Furthermore, those who would never take part in or support violence themselves may nonetheless enjoy seeing institutions they regard as oppressive being successfully attacked.

In regard to the mobilization of support, the FLQ enjoyed its greatest successes in two areas. First, the FLQ managed to infiltrate several organizations, including the Company of Young Canadians (CYC), a federally sponsored organization. Police
investigations later revealed that one FLQ member had become co-chairman of the CYC, and that other CYC (actually FLQ) members had managed to divert CYC funds, reproducing machines, and cars for FLQ purposes, including the distribution of FLQ newspapers (Conflict Studies, 1972). Weapons and subversive literature were also seized in the homes of CYC (FLQ) members (Pickering, 1971). The FLQ also managed to infiltrate the Front d'Action Politique (FRAP), a group which provided candidates in the 1970 Montreal civic elections; one FRAP candidate who ran for office was in fact a member of the FLQ (Conflict Studies, 1972). Other organizations which the FLQ managed to penetrate and to radicalize to one degree or another included the National Confederation of Trade Unions and various student associations.

The second area where the FLQ enjoyed some success was in organizing mass demonstrations. The FLQ was rarely able to generate a mass demonstration solely in support of itself; in other words, the FLQ on its own— not hidden behind a front— was unable to get the people into the streets. However, the FLQ was able to incite and encourage, and at times organize and give some direction to, demonstrations by such groups as dissatisfied students and striking workers and taxi-drivers. It was found, for example, that at least twenty CYC members (actually FLQ adherents) had led violent demonstrations at one time or another. During 1969, 100 demonstrations were held in Montreal alone— many of them inspired by the FLQ (Pickering, 1971).

Reaction

The FLQ had hoped that its kidnappings and acts of violence
would force the government into overreacting, into taking extreme measures that would alienate the French-Canadian populace and drive it into the active separatist camp. While the bombings, robberies, and kidnappings did generate publicity for the group, most likely enhanced the FLQ's morale, and perhaps pleased some separatist sympathizers, the terrorist acts also frightened and angered many of Quebec's citizens, both French-Canadian and English-Canadian. For one thing, none of the bomb victims, including a 65-year-old night watchman and a 64-year-old secretary, could have been considered by any stretch of the imagination "an exploiter of the working masses"; moreover, some of the victims were French-Canadians (Newsweek, 1963, May 6: 58). In fact, the FLQ's chief bomb maker quit in 1966 because he "became disillusioned at the slaughter of innocent victims;" this was a major reason that 1967 was singularly free of violence (Riseborough, 1975: 17-25). During the period 1963-1970, however, the FLQ conducted more than 200 bombings in Quebec alone; overall, the terrorists averaged one bomb planted every ten days in the seven years they were active (Conflict Studies, 1972).

The addition of kidnapping to the FLQ's reign of terror certainly did not increase the Quebec populace's feeling of safety. The FLQ had hoped to get the people into the streets; instead, it scared many Quebeckers off the streets. One Quebec French-Canadian remarked, "The FLQ makes me afraid to walk the streets of my own city. That is the meaning of terrorism," (MacDonald, 1972: 224). During the crisis period, Montreal theaters and restaurants had very few
customers, a result hardly conducive to generating support for the FLQ from those French-Canadians who depended upon these businesses for their livelihoods (Buckley, 1970: 150). A number of French-Canadians actually felt relieved when federal troops arrived to assist the police and the War Measures Act was placed in effect. As Buckley (1970: 150) remarked, "unmistakably . . . the Quebec public feared the bombing and kidnapping of the front (the FLQ) more than it did the possibility of abuse of police power."
CHAPTER V

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE SEPARATIST MOVEMENT

The Emergence of the Movement

According to the Langs' (1961) definition of social movements, French-Canadian separatism meets the criteria for a social movement. Separatism is widespread and large-scale, it concerns the province of Quebec which includes approximately six million people. It involves continuing collective action in pursuit of a specific objective that shapes the social order. Separatist goals seek independence for Quebec that would give it nationhood status, complete sovereignty.

Conditions and Social Change

The separatist movement emerged out of social conditions that were created and exposed by social change. Social conditions do not cause social movements. They provide the social backdrop for unrest and give the movement its unique character and flavor. The French-Canadian culture and social structure provide conditions for the separatist movement. Quebec's school system was dominated by the Roman Catholic Church that emphasized an education in the classics and professions. This type of training provided the French-Canadian with a respectable education and served to perpetuate French-Canadian culture. However, the French-Canadian traditional education failed
to prepare the French-Canadian to compete with his English-Canadian counterpart in Quebec's economic system. The traditional education was not seriously questioned until French-Canada began to feel the impact of industrialization and realized the inferior position of the French-Canadian in Quebec's economic system. The French-Canadian society, led by the Church, was primarily concerned with preserving its way of life as indicated by the popular nationalist phrase, "Notre maitre, le passe" ("Our master, the past"). The French-Canadian nationalist goal is ethnic survival. As long as the French-Canadian social institutions were protected from assimilation by a dominant Anglo-Saxon culture, their nationalist aspirations were being fulfilled.

The French-Canadian's lack of interest and participation in Quebec's economy dates back to the events surrounding the British conquest. The English-Canadians took charge of Canada's commercial enterprises through acquiescence and default by the French. Therefore, when big business and industry came to Quebec they were usually owned and managed by English-Canadians or controlled by English-Canadian and United States investors.

Urbanization and industrialization created a new middle class in Quebec, especially in the Montreal area. The new middle class received a non-traditional education, urban living weakened their traditional "rural spirit," and their working environment placed them in contact with the English-Canadian which provided an opportunity for comparing social-economic status. The new middle class, without the involvement of the Church in its traditional role as mediator
between the government and the individual, was able to look directly at Duplessis's government as the source of the French-Canadian's social ills.

These conditions created a state of social unrest. The combination of these conditions served to break down traditional behavior patterns and prepared the individuals, and especially the new middle class, for changed definitions of the situation. Social change is the most important aspect, at this point, of the process of an emerging social movement. Social change creates the conditions for social unrest and prepares the individuals or groups for collective responses. However, social unrest does not necessarily lead to large scale or visible collective responses; it may just dissipate without any consequences. The World War I conscription crisis is an excellent example of this. Even though the conscription crisis involved visible behavior such as rioting and disorder, this behavior was not transformed into large-scale discontent nor was the behavior continuing.

Events and the Collective Processes

Social unrest is transformed into discontent and collective responses by leaders, who provide new definitions of the situation, and events which provide new situations requiring new definitions and collective responses. An agitator or charismatic leader is the most effective type of leader to identify social causes that condition individuals and groups to redefine their traditional values and respond collectively. The timing and nature of an event are the
critical aspects conducive to the formation of new definitions and the transformation of behavior into collective responses. The force of significant events played an important and necessary role in the emergence of the separatist movement. The death of Duplessis was seen by the new middle class as a new gained freedom, a release from an oppressor, which caused them to redefine many of their traditional values. His death also caused the new middle class to shift their attention to English-Canadian and foreign investors as the oppressors of the French-Canadians and the "villains" of the movement. The de Gaulle visit, although short-lived as a rallying point, provided a model for the "French" and gave separatism international publicity. The emerging African and Asian nations provided examples of anti-colonial and independence movements. The FLQ did not have a large following, but its revolutionary tactics kept the notion of separatism in the forefront as a constant reminder to the French-Canadian of his social ills. The crises during 1970 (the election and the kidnappings) required new and critical definitions to be made concerning the separatist movement. These events, spontaneous and long-term, provided situations requiring definitions that questioned the traditional value system.

Social movements emerge out of discontent for conditions created by social change. Social change can explain the conditions but the collective processes that break down traditional behavior patterns and bring about changed definitions of the situation that lead to collective responses and the emergence of social movements
are within the domain of collective behavior.

**Why It Failed**

The following assessment of the separatist movement deals with the significant aspects of the movement which contributed to its failure to gain and maintain momentum during the 1970's.

**Leadership**

What little leadership the movement had failed to support the separatist cause during a very critical phase of the movement (the 1970 crises, the election and the October kidnappings). René Levesque, the leader of the Parti Québécois, was a strong political leader, but he was not a "true believer." His commitment to democratic means limited his alternatives, thus hampering his flexibility to act in the best interest of the movement after the separatists lost at the election polls. The FLQ leadership represented the other extreme. It consisted of terrorist leaders who were able to attract only an insignificant following. Their concentration on one particular form of strategy and tactics made the organization an "underground affair."

The man who came close to the role of a "true believer" was Marcel Chaput. He drew attention with his book, *Pourquoi je Suis Separatiste*, and his fasting episodes to raise money for the separatist cause. He made an unsuccessful attempt at provincial politics since he dropped the separatist cause as an active pursuit.
Ideology and Strategy

The separatist movement lacked mass support. The primary cause of this was due to the various separatist organizations that were demanding the French-Canadian's allegiance. Except for a common goal, separatism, the goals and ideology of the organization ran the entire spectrum of political extremes. The only effort towards uniting was the formation of the Parti Quebecois (see Chapter IV). Divergent ideologies and philosophies failed to present a clear course of action required to solicit a mass following. Therefore, when separatist feelings reached their apex in the late 1960's and during the April 1970 provincial elections, a united front for separatism could not be achieved. The Parti Quebecois' failure to acquire sufficient National Assembly seats as a result of the election disillusioned the previously democratically oriented following and caused a temporary return to the support of street violence as a means of achieving its goals. The philosophy, ideology, and strategy of the separatist organizations fit into two general categories—the democratic route to Quebec independence, the Parti Quebecois, and the authoritarian approach through terrorist and guerrilla organizations like the FLQ. These two opposite forms are similar in concept to the Langs' (1961: 187-189) description of the formation of the "gang" and the "sect" out of sectarian associations which could apply in this case to account for the opposite directions taken by the Parti Quebecois and organizations like the FLQ.

...the radical break on the part of the sectarian takes many forms. These may crystallize in two generally opposite directions. One culminates in the formation of a "gang"; the
other in the "sect.,"

... the interests of the gang are not only worldly but con-
cerned with the here and now. The gang has no futuristic
illusions and, in fact, often avoids concern with anything
but the immediate present;

As far as gang formation is concerned, vague dissatisfactions
on the part of its members coalesce into a code of active
warfare against official norms.

In this case, the "gang" represents the terrorist and guerrilla
organizations and the Parti Quebecois represents the form of the
"sect." The characteristics of the gang match the activities of the
FLQ described in Chapter IV. Their operations are planned against
the norms of society, especially against anything connected with the
English-Canadians and foreign interests.

The protest of the religious sect is against prevailing in-
stitutions as corruptions of a divine order. The sectarian
code seeks to substitute positive rigor where laxness and
compromise are the custom (Lang and Lang, 1961: 188-189).

Whereas, in the case of the Parti Quebecois, political
could be substituted for religious in reference to sect, the charac-
teristics of the sect would apply to the Parti Quebecois. The Parti
Quebecois' fight is against the controlling interest the English-
Canadians and foreigners have in Quebec's economic institution. The
protest of the Parti Quebecois is against the English-Canadians as
corrupters of the French-Canadian way of life.

The French-Canadian Perspective

To understand the loss of momentum experienced by the
separatist movement, it is necessary to put into perspective the
events that created the enthusiasm for separatism and the events
that brought about its sudden decline.
During the decade of the 1960's, French-Canadian separatists perceived FLQ tactics as being in the name of the French-Canadians. The work of the FLQ was being gradually accepted as a means of eliminating foreign control of Quebec's economy and a means of expressing French-Canadian discontent for English-Canadian domination. As long as the English-Canadians and foreign interests were the targets, no serious demonstrations were made against the FLQ's tactics. This was the situation when de Gaulle visited Quebec in 1967.

Separatism received a boon from de Gaulle's visit to Quebec in 1967, a significant event that caused the French-Canadians to crystallize their definitions concerning the separatist movement. De Gaulle was an idol to the French separatist. De Gaulle, the representative of "French," visited Quebec— not Canada— and through words and actions, "blessed" the separatist movement. Not only did this event signify a tremendous rallying point for the movement, but it forced the separatist issue to the front burner and into the international political arena. It forced Canada's and Quebec's political leaders to show their hand and to take a stand on separatism. The significance of events in determining responses to a social movement is stated by the Langs (1961: 514).

A social movement is carried by the amount of enthusiasm and support it attracts among a wider public. Support for its objective depends on many specific and unique circumstances and not just on broad social changes. Specific events shape the collective definition of a movement.

The enthusiasm created by de Gaulle's visit did not last long. After an unsuccessful attempt for a separatist victory through
the democratic process (the defeat of the Parti Quebecois in the April 1970 elections), the discontent turned to a more violent form that culminated in the kidnappings of LaPorte and Cross in October 1970. Just as the de Gaulle event generated enthusiasm for separatism, the October 1970 events generated a "shock effect" that cancelled out support and mitigated enthusiasm for the movement. Both of these events brought about a collective definition of the situation, the difference being they were on opposite ends of the spectrum. The October crises brought about a decline in support for the violent methods of the FLQ. The Parti Quebecois lost support because immediately after the October crises any form of separatism meant an approval of violence and terrorism.

Implications of This Study

Since the 1970 crises, the separatist movement has been dormant. During the 1960's, the separatist movement had all the characteristics of a dynamic social movement. However, during 1970, the movement failed to gain the momentum necessary to realize its objective because of two key aspects: the French-Canadian's rejection of the violence by the separatist revolutionary groups (a common reaction of a democratic society); and a significant lack of opposition to separatist demands from the Canadian government and the English-Canadians. This study indicates that the separatist movement will re-emerge with its main effort directed at achieving French-Canadian independence through the separatist legitimate political party, Parti
Quebecois, rather than through the separatist revolutionary groups.

The re-emergence of the separatist movement will be brought on by a critical event or events similar in nature to the events that were significant to the emergence of the movement during the 1960's. An event with the potential of giving rise to the separatist issue is the proposed revision of the Canadian constitution. This act would provide the opportunity for Quebec to cause its political status within the confederation to be modified or gain complete sovereignty. However, the driving force that will cause future events to be a significant happening for the separatist movement and keep the movement going will be a growing anti-French backlash (the necessary opposition that was absent during the earlier phase of the movement).

A growing anti-French backlash will give separatism the necessary opposition to bring about the degree of conflict that could thrust the movement into a type of revolutionary warfare. However, a full blown revolutionary movement in Quebec appears to be highly unlikely. This is based on the key role violence played in the previous failure of the movement, and the separatists' desire to preserve the present governmental structure and not to destroy it by a revolution. However, short-termed violence, normally associated with elementary collective behavior, will be present in a "nonviolent" separatist movement as it is in all social movements.

The most likely course for separatism is that it will re-emerge as a social movement. It is possible that separatism may
remain in its present "status quo" existence as long as the Canadian government continues to acquiesce to Quebec's demands for more autonomy in provincial affairs. However, in face of a growing anti-French backlash, the status quo alternative for separatism appears to be a very remote possibility.

A logical consequence of this new form of opposition (anti-French backlash) is that it will force both the English and French-Canadians to pursue the separatist issue to its conclusion. This may cause Canada to grant Quebec independence with an associate status within the confederation. The probable forces behind Canada's decision are: the potential for violence present in the separatist movement; efforts by both the English and French-Canadians to avoid violence; and the desire of most of the separatist leaders to maintain a degree of social and economic ties with the rest of Canada after its independence. An associate status will give Quebec political independence, a common currency with Canada, and an economic status similar to a type of "common market" with Canada and the United States.
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