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Voice Content: Effects of Perceived Instrumentality and Interactional Fairness

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VOICE CONTENT: EFFECTS OF PERCEIVED INSTRUMENTALITY
AND INTERACTIONAL FAIRNESS

A Thesis
Presented to the
Department of Psychology
and the
Faculty of the Graduate College
University of Nebraska

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts
University of Nebraska at Omaha

by
Patrick J. Menke
January, 1990

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THESIS ACCEPTANCE

Acceptance for the faculty of the Graduate College, University of Nebraska, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, University of Nebraska at Omaha.

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Special thanks go to Sheryl Tatelman for her assistance in conducting the experiment, and Stephen Teply for his involvement in video production and his committed support.

For my mother, Judith.

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Abstract

Voice (having one's say in an allocation procedure) was investigated for two different types of content (instrumental voice and expressive voice) associated with conditions of perceived instrumentality of voice and interactional fairness given by the allocator. One hundred and four undergraduate students at a midwestern university were used in a 2 x 2 factorial design. Data were collected from free form comments and a post-experimental questionnaire after subjects reacted to a simulated performance appraisal situation. Results did not show that voice content differed across conditions. Procedural justice perceptions were increased by a high level of interactional fairness and by a high level of instrumentality of voice.

Chapter 1 Introduction

Procedural Justice Review

Research on fairness perceptions has developed rapidly in the past 25 years. Various aspects of fairness have been investigated as well as various meanings and consequences of fairness. The following discussion presents the procedural justice research to date as it has developed from its beginnings in equity theory.

Distributive justice has been well studied under the theory of equity as presented by Adams (1963, 1965). Equity in social and economic exchanges is defined by the ratio of outcomes received to costs or investments. An inequitable situation exists when one party receives more outcomes proportional to his/her investments, or inputs, than another party receives.

One consequence of inequity is an emotional state of distress which motivates a person to restore the inequitable situation to a more equitable exchange. Equity may be achieved by adjusting the inputs or the outputs of either party in such a way that the investment-to-outcome ratios being compared match each other more closely. According to equity theory, fairness is judged exclusively by the outcomes received in relation to the inputs. Fairness perceptions are primarily constructed by examining the distribution of outcomes.

While the contribution of equity theory to the understanding of fairness cannot be underestimated, Folger (1986) points out that the theory is incomplete. Equity theory does not consider the procedures involved as determinants of perceptions of fairness. Equity theory, therefore, cannot account for recent findings in the field of procedural justice.

The work of Thibaut and Walker (1975) has greatly expanded understanding of fairness in relation to dispute resolution. They researched fairness perceptions as they relate to dispute resolution in the court of law. In addition to the outcome of the decision made regarding the dispute, Walker, LaTour, Lind, and Thibaut (1974) found that variations in procedures affected the perceptions of fairness. By controlling the inputs and outcomes of adjudication procedures, Walker et al. examined the independent effects of two different procedures on the subjects' perceptions of fairness. They found that subjects rated the fairness of the outcome more highly if an adversarial procedure was used rather than an inquisitorial procedure. The study found support for the equity theory as defined by Adams (1965); as the subjects' outcomes were increased, their ratings of fairness increased. The more striking finding was the independent increase in perceived fairness due solely to the differences in procedures. Subjects clearly evaluated their outcomes with reference to the procedure used to derive the outcomes. The linking of justice perceptions to procedures sparked research

interests in procedural justice effects separate from distributive justice effects.

Fair process effect. As equity theory focuses on inputs and outputs exclusively, it lacks explanatory power for one of the most robust findings in the study of procedural justice, which has come to be known as the "fair process effect" (Folger, Rosenfield, Grove, & Corkran, 1979). Succinctly, the fair process effect refers to the phenomenon of people feeling more satisfied with their input-to-outcome ratio when the procedure for deciding the outcomes is perceived as fair. Given the same inputs and outputs, people feel less satisfied with the outcomes when the procedure is perceived as less fair. People are also more satisfied with negative outcomes if the procedure used to decide the dispute was perceived as fair.

Cushion of support. The importance of the procedure used in resolving disputes is illustrated by what has been termed the "cushion of support" (Lind & Tyler, 1988). In general, the cushion of support refers to the positive effects of fair procedures. In an extensive review of the procedural justice literature, Lind and Tyler (1988) have outlined six major areas in which research has documented the effect of procedural justice. Procedural justice has been shown to increase (1) ratings of performance of legal institutions and authorities (Tyler, 1984, 1987); (2) evaluations of legal decisions and outcomes (LaTour, 1978; Lind, Kurtz, Musante, Walker, & Thibaut, 1980); (3) satisfaction with encounters with the legal system (Adler, Hensler, & Nelson, 1983; Tyler, 1986); (4)

perceptions of legitimacy; (5) support for legal institutions; and (6) compliance with laws and judgments (Friedland, Thibaut & Walker, 1973). Given fair procedures, a cushion of support is created for the decision maker and the institution supporting the decision.

Recipients of the decision are more accepting of the decision in general and more accepting of the institution and decision maker if the decision was made through the use of fair procedures. Of particular interest is the effect of fair procedures when the outcome is negative. It is in delivering a negative outcome to a participant in a dispute that a decision maker and institution are in need of a "cushion of support" from any ill feelings the participant may have.

Control. Provided that different procedures influence perceptions of procedural justice, and that positive effects regarding the decision maker are realized by fair procedures, the next step was to examine what makes a fair procedure fair. LaTour, Houlden, Walker and Thibaut (1976) found that subjects rated different procedures as more or less fair depending on the amount of control vested in the third party as compared to the amount of control retained by the participants.

Control over the procedures has become a focal point in the study of procedural fairness. Two types of control have been distinguished in the literature (Houlden, LaTour, Walker, & Thibaut, 1978; Thibaut & Walker, 1975, 1978). The first type of control, decision control, refers to the participants' control over the decision being made. A bargaining procedure would be an example in which

all of the decision control is retained by the disputants because a third party is not brought into the dispute resolution procedure. At the other end of the continuum presented by LaTour et al. is the autocratic adjudication procedure, which may place complete control over the decision in the hands of a third party.

The second type of control, process control, refers not to direct control over the decision being made, but to the participants' control over the presentation of evidence and arguments related to their cases. Thibaut and Walker (1975) explain that procedures are rated as more fair if the participants have more opportunity to provide the decision maker with the evidence relevant to their cases. Fair representation of the concerns of each disputant results in high process control for each disputant. By presenting their views and arguments concerning the case, the disputants control the information which is used in the resolution of the dispute.

Thibaut, Walker, LaTour, & Houlden (1974) defined five different dispute resolution procedures which vary in the amount of process control and decision control afforded to the disputants. The five procedures are as follows:

1. Bargaining Consensus without a third party. Outcomes are limited to all or nothing.
2. Inquisitorial Adjudication in which the third party investigates the dispute and renders judgment.

3. Single investigator Adjudication that includes a single investigator serving to collect information from the disputing parties for the adjudicator.
4. Double investigator Adjudication that includes an investigator assigned by the adjudicator to each of the disputants. The investigator serves to collect information from the disputants and relay the information to the adjudicator
5. Adversary A binding third party decision procedure. Each disputant selects a representative to collect and present information relevant to his/her case.

Thibaut et al. (1974) found that the most preferred procedure was the adversary procedure, and the least preferred was the bargaining procedure.

In a later study, Lind, Erickson, Friedland, & Dickenberger (1978) found that the preferences for procedures were rank ordered based on the amount of control the third-party is given. The adversary procedure was rated as investing nearly the right amount of control in the third-party. Following consecutively, the double investigator, single investigator, and inquisitorial procedures were all rated as investing too much control in the third party. The Lind et al. study investigated judgments of fairness across cultures to assess the possibilities of cultural bias. The results show very strong support for the idea that subjects prefer procedures in which they retain

control over the process leading to the outcome. Regardless of the type of court system commonly used in the targeted countries, the subjects preferred the adversarial system because it provided them with the desired level of process control.

Voice

As the procedural justice research has focused on the formal procedures of dispute resolution, the term "voice" has been used to represent process control. The original conception of the term "voice" comes from Hirschman (1970). In Hirschman's original conception of voice, the term refers to an attempt to influence a process by means of expressing one's views regarding the issue. The context in which he describes voice is in relation to consumer behavior. Voice is described as an option available to people when they are unsatisfied with an economic exchange and wish to alter the outcome of the exchange to a more favorable distribution.

A second option available to persons receiving an unsatisfactory allocation or outcome is to "exit". In Hirschman's original conception of exit, the term refers to the departure of the person from the procedure. Rather than attempting to influence the procedures in order to adjust the outcomes (voice), the exit option is used to disassociate the person from the situation by leaving the procedure. In the context of consumer behavior, exit refers to a consumer discontinuing business with a particular company pertaining to the disputed issue.

While exit has not been included in models of procedural justice, voice has been studied to a great extent and has been shown to be a very important factor influencing perceptions of procedural fairness. Through the use of voice, disputants attempt to obtain the level of process control desired, which increases the ratings of perceived procedural fairness. Procedures allowing voice have been shown to be perceived as more fair than similar procedures without voice (LaTour, 1978; Bies & Shapiro, 1988; Lind et al., 1980; Walker et al., 1974). The effect of voice is a fundamental element in the recent procedural justice research.

Instrumental voice. The definition of voice as process control has an important theoretical assumption regarding the use of voice. The assumption made is that attaining the outcome under dispute is the motivating element for the use of voice as process control. Through process control, people are able to better assure that equitable outcomes will be obtained (Thibaut & Walker, 1978; Brett & Golberg, 1983). Tyler, Rasinski, and Spodick (1985) describe this use of voice as a rational perspective on voice. Accordingly, the value of voice is linked exclusively to the amount of decision control derived from control over the procedures enacted to decide the dispute. The rational perspective depicts voice as an instrumental attempt to obtain the desired outcomes.

Lind and Tyler (1988) have reviewed the procedural justice literature to date. They have presented a self interest model to account for the findings that voice raises ratings of perceived

procedural justice due to its instrumental use in increasing the probability of equitable outcomes. The work of Thibaut and Walker (1978) is rooted in the assumption that people are interested in obtaining their desired outcome. Leventhal's (1976) theory of procedural justice is also built upon what Lind and Tyler call self interest.

Accordingly, people participate in groups in order to benefit their individual interests. People will remain in the group as long as they believe that the group will provide greater outcomes in the long run than could be obtained outside of the group. Fair procedures assure that the group will provide future benefits for the individual. In conflict with other members of the group, individual members will forgo desired outcomes provided that fair procedures are used. If procedures are not perceived as fair, group members have no assurance of future self interest benefits, and will be more likely to depart from the group, thereby threatening the group's functioning, if not its existence.

An important aspect of the self interest model and the evidence supporting it is that, ultimately, people desire decision control which raises the probability that their desired outcomes will be realized. Complete, individual decision control would be destructive for the group, however, so people will give up decision control in order to maintain the group. Process control is viewed as a way of gaining decision control. By retaining a significant amount of process control, participants are able to affect the decision without

disrupting the group. Again, process control is an instrumental attempt to gain the desired outcomes.

It follows that voice is considered an instrumental attempt by the participant to increase his/her amount of decision control. In both the self interest model (Lind & Tyler, 1988) and the rational perspective of voice (Tyler, Rasinski, & Spodick, 1985), it is predicted that voice which does not provide decision control will not be desirable to subjects. The fair process effect should not be present when voice does not provide any influence over the outcome through process control. Tyler et al., (1985) point out that feelings of injustice and dissatisfaction may actually increase when voice is allowed but does not provide any decision control.

Evidence supporting this instrumental view of voice can be found in the "frustration effect" (Folger, 1977; Folger, Rosenfield, Grove & Corkran, 1979). Contrary to the fair process effect resulting from procedures in which voice opportunity is provided, subjects who had voice opportunity without process control rated the procedure as less fair. The frustration effect can be explained with reference to the use of voice. Subjects given voice which does not seem to them to be instrumental in the acquisition of their desired outcomes may view the procedure as a "sham" rather than actual process control. It may be the dissociation of process control from decision control that accounts for the frustration effect.

Value expressive voice. The self interest model of voice cannot account for all of the findings in the procedural justice field,

however. Tyler et al. (1985) found that increased process control did in fact increase ratings of procedural justice, even when process control was linked with low decision control. The fair process effect was observed to the same degree with subjects who were given low decision control as it was with subjects who were given high decision control. This finding led the researchers to conclude that voice has a value separate from the instrumental value presented under the rational perspective. There is a component of voice that increases perceptions of fairness, yet is not associated with decision control or altering the distributions of outcomes. These findings contradict the underlying assumption of the self interest model.

Musante, Gilbert, and Thibaut (1983) conducted a study which also showed that the fair process effect occurs when process control is not associated with decision control. The most interesting finding of Musante et al. for the present study is that subjects rated the procedures and the decision more fair if they were given a chance to express their views regardless of whether or not those views would effect the decision. The Musante et al. study seems to be the clearest example that voice has an expressive component aside from any instrumental value. The expressive value of voice has been termed the value expressive component of voice (Tyler, Rasinski, & Spodick, 1985).

To account for the value expressive component of voice, Lind and Tyler (1988) present a model separate from the self interest model called the group value model. In contrast to the self interest

model, the group value model proposes that voice has a value in addition to its instrumental value. As the basis of the model Lind and Tyler suggest that people have a strong social orientation toward groups. Voice can be shown to have a value in preserving or identifying membership in the group. The expression of one's views and the consideration of those views is a representation of the person's value to the group, and acceptance in the group. The value expressive component of voice represents the desire to have one's views voiced and considered. In the group value model, increases in procedural justice ratings can be explained with reference to the value expressive component of voice. It is the contention of Lind and Tyler that people are interested in the outcome of the decision, but they also have a separate interest in being involved in the process by which the decision is made. The group value model can predict a fair process effect for people who have voice yet do not have decision control.

Interactional Fairness

Bies and Moag (1986) present a model of procedural justice which may further develop explanations of the value of voice. By focusing on the interaction between the decision-maker and the participant at the time the procedures are enacted, Bies and Moag have found that the interaction may affect perceptions of procedural justice. They present a new model of procedural justice that does not contradict past research, but adds concern for the interaction that takes place during the enactment of the procedure. Accordingly, the

model predicts that perceptions of procedural justice may be affected by any of three different parts of a dispute resolution. First, equity theory (Adams, 1965) focused on the outcome and the effect of the outcome on perceptions of procedural justice. Secondly, Thibaut and Walker (1975) focused on the procedure of dispute resolution and found it to have an independent effect on perception of fairness in dispute resolutions. Finally, Bies and Moag (1986) have shown that the interaction between the decision-maker and the participants is a third source of information used in formulating perceptions of procedural justice. Tyler and Bies (1988) contend that perceptions of fairness are socially constructed from information about the procedure, the interaction, and the outcome.

The conduct of the decision-maker is the focus of interactional fairness presented by Bies and Moag (1986). In particular, they present two aspects of the decision-maker's conduct which are salient to people when their perceptions of fairness are constructed. The first aspect is the interpersonal treatment of the person involved in the dispute. The second aspect is whether the decision maker enacted the formal procedures properly.

Tyler and Bies (1988) outline five norms with respect to the proper enactment of formal procedures by the decision maker. They are listed below for purposes of theoretical completion only, because the focus of the present study with regards to interactional fairness is interpersonal treatment. Proper enactment of procedures include the following: adequately considering employees' viewpoints,

suppressing personal biases, applying decision-making criteria consistently across employees, providing timely feedback to employees after a decision, and providing an explanation for the decision (an account of the decision).

Interpersonal treatment was examined by Bies (1987a) in a study which looked at the fairness judgments by MBA students with regard to corporate recruiting procedures. The following aspects of interpersonal treatment were found to be important: honesty, courteous treatment, timely feedback, and respect for their rights with regard to the types of questions that were asked.

Tyler (1988) conducted a study which focused on the interaction of citizens with the police and the court system. The study revealed that perceptions of fairness were affected by interpersonal treatment. The results suggest that people are interested in interpersonal treatment in addition to the formal procedures. Of particular interest for the present study is the finding that two variables had independent effects on perceptions of procedural justice: honesty and ethical appropriateness (politeness and respect for rights). Tyler and Folger (1980) found that citizen satisfaction with police performance was tied to the interaction between the police and the citizens. The citizens expected the police to conform to the ethical norms of interaction concerning a public servant. They also expected the police to be courteous in their interactions with the public.

In 1980, Leaventhal proposed six rules that have been instrumental in the theoretical development of procedural justice research. Although interactional fairness has been overlooked in the procedural justice literature, Leaventhal's rules make reference to possible effects outside of the formal procedures and the outcomes. The rules are described as follows:

1. Consistency rule-- allocating procedures should be applied consistently across people and time;
2. Bias Suppression rule-- personal self interest and blind allegiance to narrow preconceptions should be prevented;
3. Accuracy rule-- decisions must be based on as much good information and informed opinion as possible;
4. Correctability rule-- Opportunities must exist to modify and reverse decisions;
5. Representativeness rule-- the allocation process must represent the concerns of all important subgroups and individuals;
6. Ethicality rule-- the allocation process must be compatible with prevailing moral and ethical standards.

The ethicality rule is important to the current discussion as it subsumes the interactional fairness factor in procedural justice. The procedural justice model developed by Thibaut and Walker (1975), which has guided the procedural justice research to date, is subsumed under the representativeness rule. While the model

presented by Thibaut and Walker has been very valuable, and certainly a pivotal point in the procedural justice research, Tyler and Bies (1988) suggest that it is far too limiting because it does not consider the conduct of the decision-maker. Given the fact that there is an interaction involved in every dispute resolution, the finding that interactional fairness is an important consideration for people evaluating a procedure suggests that interaction should be included in the theoretical framework of procedural justice.

Barrett-Howard and Tyler (1986) investigated the six rules developed by Leaventhal and found that the ethicality rule was the second most important rule in ratings of procedural justice. The striking finding about their results is the range of situations used in the study, and the frequency with which the ethicality rule was deemed important. The ethicality rule was found to be important by the subjects across sixteen different conditions. The study lends strong support to the need to recognize interactional fairness in the theory of procedural justice.

Content of Voice

With the addition of interpersonal interaction to the theoretical model of procedural justice presented by Thibaut and Walker (1975), a fresh look at the concept of voice is warranted. Due to the nature of the procedural justice research, voice has been assumed to be an attempt to influence the procedures by stating one's case or adding pertinent information for the decision-maker to consider. Voice has been defined as a form of process control (Lind & Tyler, 1988).

Viewing voice as simply a method of process control is consistent with research inspired by the Thibaut and Walker model. Since the model focuses on the formal procedures and not on the effects of personal interactions during the procedure, it would follow that the concept of voice would not include the effects of personal interactions. Tyler and Bies (1988) contend that the lack of regard for personal interaction during the enactment of the procedure is a serious limitation of the Thibaut and Walker procedural justice model. It is the contention of the present author that the conceptualization of voice as purely a form of process control is an inadequate conceptualization because it regards only the formal procedure without reference to the personal interaction during the procedure.

With separate effects of instrumental and value expressive uses of voice, it is reasonable to expect differences in the content of that voice. The present study investigated different voice contents under different conditions. The content of voice was examined in conditions designed to produce perceptions of high and low interactional fairness and in conditions designed to produce high and low perceptions of the instrumental value of voice. Low interactional fairness indicated exclusion from the group or process, while low instrumentality of voice indicated the voice opportunity would not be effective in raising outcomes. In effect, the low conditions indicated subjects did not have process control and they were not accepted as legitimate members of the group associated with the

process. It was expected, therefore, that the content of voice in low conditions would be different than in high conditions, where high instrumentality indicated that subjects have process control, and high interactional fairness indicated that they were legitimate members of the group associated with the process. More expressed values were expected to be observed in the Comment Forms of subjects in low conditions as those subjects tended to psychologically depart from the process. Variations in perceptions of procedural justice should support the findings of Bies (1987b) that interactional fairness is an important element used in the construction of perceptions of fairness.

As process control, the content of voice should reflect an instrumental attempt to influence the process resulting in higher probability of receiving the desired outcome. Voice used for that purpose was termed "instrumental voice" (criterion for instrumental voice can be found in Appendix A.). A second type of voice, also defined by the content of the voice, should reflect a departure from the instrumental use of voice. Rather than an attempt to influence the process and obtain outcomes, voice may be used for value expressive reasons (Tyler, 1987). Subjects using the second type of voice, termed "expressive voice" (see Appendix A.) should state concerns about the procedure, decision-maker, organization or injustice in the form of expressed values or feelings. Expressive components of voice do not attempt to directly influence the outcome or decision being made. Rather than using voice as a form of process

control, the users of expressive voice use voice as an opportunity to express their views concerning various aspects of the procedure or issue. The rational attempt to influence outcomes of the dispute by means of process control should be replaced by an expression of opinions and views about the dispute. The expressive voice represents non-acceptance of the current procedure because the use of expressive voice replaces the instrumental value of voice as process control. In effect, expressive voice may represent a psychological "exit" from the procedures parallel to "exit" as conceptualized by Hirshman (1970). Expressive voice was expected to increase when perceptions of procedural justice were low.

By manipulating the perceived instrumentality of voice and the interactional fairness involved in the procedure, it should be possible to examine the content of voice and perceptions of fairness in situations where expressive voice may be used rather than instrumental voice. If interactional fairness is held constant at a socially appropriate level (high interactional fairness), instrumental voice is expected to prevail in conditions of perceived high instrumentality. In line with the fair process effect, the perceived procedural justice should be quite high in that condition because a voice opportunity is an established part of the procedure.

If the perceived instrumentality of voice is low, we may also see a predominance of instrumental voice used, provided that an appropriate level of interactional fairness is achieved through interpersonal treatment. The group value model presented by Lind

and Tyler (1988) suggests that as the identity of the participant as a member of the group is respected, positive effects of voice will be seen in perceptions of procedural justice. As an accepted member of the group, perceptions of procedural justice increase. Interactional fairness should serve to increase the status and acceptance of the participant in the group. The interactional fairness of the procedure should serve to retain the person's acceptance of the process, resulting in a high use of instrumental voice.

Empirical evidence for this can be found in the results of a study by Musante et al. (1983) where voice raised perceptions of procedural justice even when there was clearly no perceived instrumentality of voice. Without instrumentality, voice still shows positive effects on perceptions of procedural justice.

According to the rational perspective of voice (Tyler, Rasinski, & Spodick, 1985), and according to the self interest model presented by Lind and Tyler (1988), the instrumentality of voice should be of greatest concern for the subjects. In a condition where subjects perceive a high level of instrumentality of voice, they should be less concerned with interactional fairness information when constructing their judgments of procedural justice because high instrumentality of voice indicates a high level of process control for subjects. As process control is linked with decision control through high instrumentality of voice, the fair process effect should be evident. It was expected that subjects would show a predominant use of instrumental voice in the condition where they perceived a high

level of instrumentality, even when the interactional fairness was perceived as low.

In the case where the perceived instrumentality of voice is low and the interactional fairness in the procedure is perceived as low, however, a lower evaluation of procedural justice should be observed. Without perceived instrumentality, subjects may be more influenced by the interactional fairness than in a condition where there is perceived high instrumentality. If interactional fairness is low, and perceived instrumentality is low, perceptions of procedural justice should fall dramatically. The effect may be similar to the "frustration effect" found by Folger (1977). As subjects use the interaction to construct their perceptions of procedural justice, they may use the low interactional fairness as a sign that the opportunity for voice is a "sham". The use of an expressive form of voice should be the result, as the subjects psychologically depart from the procedure.

Expected Results

The hypotheses for the present study followed from the preceding theoretical discussion. The first prediction is that the content of voice will vary due to the conditions that precede the voice. Two different forms of voice were expected to be found under different conditions. They have been described previously as instrumental voice and expressive voice.

Theoretically the relationship between instrumental and expressive voice is expected to be continuous and bipolar. In the

present study, separate predictions were made concerning the use of instrumental voice and expressive voice. Voice was measured as two separate dependent variables, allowing for the possibility that it is not a bipolar variable. Inspected together, however, the predictions about each of the voice dependent variables suggest that instrumental and expressive are negatively correlated, bipolar uses of voice.

Instrumental voice. Main effects of instrumentality and interactional fairness were expected. Conditions high in instrumentality were expected to result in higher usage of instrumental voice. Conditions high in interactional fairness were also expected to result in higher usage of instrumental voice.

Expressive voice. Main effects of instrumentality and interactional fairness were expected. Conditions high in instrumentality were expected to result in lower usage of expressive voice. Conditions high in interactional fairness were also expected to result in lower usage of expressive voice.

Procedural justice. Main effects of instrumentality and interactional fairness were expected. Subjects in conditions high in interactional fairness were expected to rate procedural justice as higher than subjects in conditions low in interactional fairness. Subjects in high instrumentality conditions were expected to rate procedural justice higher than subjects in low instrumentality conditions.

Chapter II

Method

Subjects

One hundred and four undergraduate students from a Midwestern university participated in the study and received extra credit points for their participation. Thirty males and 74 females served as subjects in the study, with 26 subjects randomly assigned to each condition.

Subjects participated in the experiment as individuals, although multiple subjects were run simultaneously in partial isolation. This was accomplished by using a large auditorium room allowing sufficient space between subjects to eliminate interaction. Additionally, each individual subject viewed the performance appraisal feedback session from his/her individual monitor.

The experimenter was blind to the instrumentality condition due to the use of unidentifiable instrumentality manipulations. Subjects received a packet of information containing the manipulation, which was identified by the experimenter after the experiment. While some subjects in a particular session received the high instrumentality manipulation, others in the same session received the low instrumentality manipulation. The experimenter was aware of the interactional fairness condition of each session as it was necessary for the experimenter to be present to operate the video tape machine.

Overview of Procedures

A 2 x 2 between-subjects experimental design was used to investigate the effects of interactional fairness and instrumentality on the content of voice and on perceptions of procedural justice. Data were analyzed using analysis of variance. Upon entering the lab, subjects were given an informed consent form to complete, which can be found in Appendix B. A brief introduction followed to inform subjects about the proceedings of the experiment.

Subjects were told they were participating in a study about the performance appraisal system within a particular company that specializes in package delivery. In particular they were told that the information they were to be given involved the package sorting position at the company. In order to gain impact, subjects were told that the information they read and saw was actual information taken from the company files. In actuality, the materials were developed by the experimenter in close replication of a package sorting job in a real company. In order to get the subjects involved in the experiment, it was conducted in a role-playing style. Subjects were instructed to view themselves as employees of the company as they vicariously experienced the performance appraisal process.

The performance appraisal scenario was developed with concerns of ecological validity. According to Bem and Lord (1979), "the concept of ecological validity requires that the relationships between situational variables and the behavior in the setting replicate the relationships between situational variables and the

behavior outside the laboratory." Although shortened in time, the scenario was designed to generally replicate an actual performance appraisal system and was presented as an actual performance appraisal system to the subjects.

Subjects received a packet of information to read at the onset of the experiment (see Appendix B.). The information was designed to provide the subjects with the sense of actually being an employee at the company, as subjects were expected to role-play when filling out the Comment Form. They received the following pieces of information: (a) general information about the delivery company; (b) a description of the performance appraisal system taken from the company policy book; (c) objective descriptions of their prior performance; and (d) results from a previous employee attitude survey.

A performance appraisal feedback session was represented in the experimental conditions. Subjects read information pertaining to the performance appraisal system and their performance as employees in the company prior to watching a videotape of an "actual" performance appraisal feedback session of an employee. The information was designed to provide each subject with a clear understanding of his/her performance in order to evaluate the performance evaluation given to him/her through the videotape. Watching the videotape, all subjects witnessed a negative outcome of the performance appraisal. They were presented with a rating which was too low to qualify them for a standard merit raise. The outcome

was contrary to evidence presented earlier to the subjects indicating that their performance was actually substantially higher. The performance rating was designed to be perceived by the subjects as an injustice. After being given role-playing instructions, subjects were expected to react to the injustice as if it had happened to them.

The performance appraisal system included a formal opportunity to voice. As part of the performance evaluation process, subjects were asked to complete a Comment Form after watching the performance evaluation feedback session. After it was completed, the Comment Form was to be attached to a performance evaluation form completed by the immediate supervisor in the videotape. In order to complete the scenario, the subjects placed both forms in an envelope to be sent to the area supervisor for evaluation. The final evaluation was to be made by the area supervisor from information on the performance evaluation and the Comment Form. In order to assure that every subject voiced realistically, the process was designed so the Comment Form was a necessary part of the system. This also ensured that subjects perceived the Comment Form as a voice opportunity within the evaluation process, rather than an appeal delivered after the evaluation process. It was also made clear to the subjects that their responses on the Comment Form were strictly confidential, and that the comments would not be read by their immediate supervisors. The detail of the Comment Form was intentionally left ambiguous in order to free subjects from

restrictions of voice. Only general guidelines were presented for the completion of the form (see Appendix B.).

Manipulations

Instrumentality. Perceived instrumentality of voice was manipulated through the use of social information provided in the form of an employee attitude survey. Subjects were told that a survey of employee attitudes was conducted at the company several months prior to the experiment, which included a section pertaining to the performance appraisal system. All subjects were asked to read each question in the performance appraisal section, which consisted of two parts. The first part displayed the responses of a "typical employee" responding to the set of survey questions. Two questions in the set related directly to the instrumentality of voice in the interview process, while the remainder were general filler questions. In conditions of low instrumentality, responses to the survey questions regarding the Comment Form were negative, showing that the typical package sorter believed the Comment Form not to be effective in changing the evaluation given by the immediate supervisor. In conditions of high instrumentality, subjects read positive responses to the instrumentality questions showing that the typical package sorter believed the Comment Form was useful in changing evaluation scores. The second part of the survey results was a summary page describing the general findings of the survey. Included in the findings was a statement regarding

employees' perceptions of the instrumentality of voice. The statement varied with conditions of high and low instrumentality.

Interactional fairness. A videotape was used to administer the interactional fairness manipulation. The tape presented a realistic, staged performance appraisal feedback session between a supervisor and a package sorter. The scene took place in an office, with only the supervisor and an employee present. It was a brief discussion about the evaluation rating given to the employee. The rating of the employee was below average, resulting in the employee not receiving a merit raise.

High interactional fairness was achieved by creating high interpersonal treatment as described by Tyler and Bies (1988). Respect and truthfulness were evident by the supervisors actions and script. Eye contact, use of the employee's name, offering of a seat, and attention in listening were portrayed by the supervisor. A polite tone of voice, was used as well as professionally courteous speech. The supervisor appeared truthful when making statements about data collection and the results of the evaluation.

In the low interactional fairness condition the supervisor illustrated poor interpersonal treatment. The supervisor did not use the employee's name or offer the employee a seat. He used very little eye contact, and did not appear to be attentive when the employee spoke. The supervisor did not appear to be professionally courteous, and did not have a pleasant tone of voice. The supervisor

appeared a bit hurried and made comments which were not convincingly truthful.

After viewing the videotaped performance evaluation, subjects were given the Comment Form to fill out in response to the information presented to them about the performance appraisal. The Comment Form was later analyzed for the type of voice used, as defined by the content of the comments made. The design of the Comment Form was intentionally simplistic. It consisted of very brief instructions, followed by blank space in order for subjects to voice in whatever fashion and at whatever length they desired.

The content of each Comment Form was analyzed using rating scales. Each Comment Form was rated for instrumentality and expression. A 5-point scale was used to assess instrumental voice and a 4-point scale was used to assess expressive voice (rating scale criteria can be found in Appendix A). In order to test the hypotheses, cell means were compared using analysis of variance. In order to investigate the nature of the relationship between instrumental and expressive voice, a correlation between subjects' expressive scores and instrumental scores was used.

After all data were collected, the experimenter inspected the Comment Forms in order to derive exemplars of instrumental and expressive voice. Due to a data sheet coding scheme the experimenter was blind to conditions while examining the Comment Forms. Given the exploratory nature of the research, realistic examples of the theoretical classifications of voice had not been

previously developed. The present experiment was designed to elicit the type of voice theorized, and to refine the definitions of each.

Rating of each Comment Form was done by two independent, trained assessors. They were trained, and given exemplars to use as benchmarks in rating the forms. The assessors independently rated each Comment Form for instrumentality, and then came to consensus on the rating if they differed in their initial ratings. They then rated each Comment Form for expressiveness using the same procedure.

Pilot testing was conducted in order to assess the feasibility of the performance appraisal scenario. Other concerns addressed in the pilot testing stage were the effectiveness of the independent variables, the believability of the experimental situation, and the presence of two different types of voice. Pilot data were used to aid in deriving exemplars of voice types.

Upon completion of the Comment Form, subjects were informed that the experiment had ended, and were instructed to fill out a questionnaire about the experiment. The questionnaire included manipulation checks for each of the independent variables, explanatory questions, demographics, and dependent variables. The questionnaire used in the experiment can be found in Appendix C.

Subjects were debriefed and an explanation of the research was presented. After being asked not to discuss the experiment with classmates, subjects were thanked for their participation in the research.

Chapter III

Results

Data were collected from two sources: the Comment Forms filled out by each subject and the responses given on the post-experiment questionnaire. Analysis of variance was used for statistical analysis of each source of data. Individual subjects were used as the unit of analysis. A copy of the questionnaire used in the experiment can be found in Appendix C.

Manipulation Checks

Interactional fairness. Perceptions of interactional fairness were assessed by two questions on the questionnaire; (#2) "To what extent was your supervisor courteous and polite to you?", and (#6) "Did you feel that you as the employee were given fair interpersonal treatment in the videotape?" Responses to each question were measured using 9-point rating scales. The two questions were found to be correlated at $r = .70$. The composite score of the two interactional fairness questions was used as the interactional fairness manipulation check, and a MANOVA procedure was done to test for the effectiveness of the manipulation. The composite for interactional fairness was significant ($F(2,99) = 107.42, p < .001$). The interaction of interactional fairness and instrumentality was not statistically significant ($F = 1.15$).

Additionally, separate analyses on the two questions showed a main effect of interactional fairness for each of the questions. Table

1 shows the ANOVA results for question #2, while Table 2 shows the results for question #6. Interactional fairness perceptions were rated higher in question #2 by subjects in the high interactional fairness condition ($M=7.29$) than subjects in the low interactional fairness conditions ($M=2.70$). Responses to question #6 were similar. Subjects in conditions high in interactional fairness rated interactional fairness higher ($M=5.62$) than subjects in conditions low in interactional fairness ($M=2.73$). Accordingly, it can be confidently stated that subjects were affected by the experimental manipulation of interactional fairness.

Instrumentality. Instrumentality was assessed also by two questions on the post-experimental questionnaire. Question #1 ("How useful did you perceive the Comment Form to be for increasing your performance ratings?"), and question #10 ("Did you feel your ratings could be raised by the area supervisor after he read your Comment Form?") were used as a composite to measure subjects' perceptions of the instrumentality of voice. They were found to be correlated at $r = .44$. The composite for instrumentality was statistically significant ($F(2,99)= 13.16$) using a MANOVA test. The interaction of interactional fairness and instrumentality was nonsignificant ($F(2,99)=2.02$).

Separate analyses of each question were performed in order to investigate the quality of the questionnaire items. Results for question 1 can be found in Table 3, and results for question 10 can be found in Table 4. In question #1 instrumentality of voice was

Table 1

ANOVA: (Question 2) Interactional Fairness Ratings as a Function of Interactional Fairness (IF) and Instrumentality (I)

Source of Variation	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F
Total	816.99	103	7.93	
Explained	563.87	3	187.96	
IF	549.24	1	549.24	216.99**
I	14.62	1	14.62	5.78*
IF x I	.01	1	.01	.00
Residual	253.12	100	2.53	

* p<.05 **p<.001.

Table 2

ANOVA: (Question 6) Interactional Fairness Ratings as a Function of Interactional Fairness (IF) and Instrumentality (I)

Source of Variation	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F
Total	636.89	103	6.183	
Explained	231.43	3	77.143	
IF	216.35	1	216.35	53.36**
I	7.54	1	7.54	1.86
IF x I	7.54	1	7.54	1.86
Residual	405.46	100	4.05	

**p<.001.

Table 3

ANOVA: (Question 1) Perceived Instrumentality Ratings as a Function of Interactional Fairness (IF) and Instrumentality (I)

Source of Variation	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F
Total	513.65	103	4.99	
Explained	119.73	3	39.91	
IF	.35	1	.35	.09
I	104	1	104	26.4**
IF x I	15.38	1	15.38	3.91*
Residual	393.92	100	3.94	

*p<.051 **p<.001.

Table 4

ANOVA: (Question 10) Perceived Instrumentality Ratings as a Function of Interactional Fairness (IF) and Instrumentality (I)

Source of Variation	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F
Total	631.39	103	6.13	
Explained	30.39	3	10.13	
IF	3.12	1	3.12	.52
I	18.62	1	18.62	3.10
IF x I	8.65	1	8.65	1.44
Residual	601	100	6.01	

Note. No comparisons were significant at $p < .05$.

rated higher by subjects in conditions where they were given high instrumentality (\underline{M} =6.06) than in conditions of low instrumentality (\underline{M} =4.06). The effect was significant at $p < .001$. Question #10, however, did not show the main effect of instrumentality it was expected to show. Subjects in conditions of high instrumentality tended to rate instrumentality higher (\underline{M} =5.85) than subjects in conditions of low instrumentality (\underline{M} =5.00), but the effect was not statistically significant at $p < .05$. A closer inspection of question #10 indicates a slight ambiguity of interpretation as a possible explanation of the lack of convincing findings. Standard deviations in question #10 were substantially higher (high Instrumentality (I), high Interactional Fairness (I.F.)=2.52; low I., high I.F.=2.57; high I., low I.F.=2.41; low I., low I.F.=2.34) than standard deviations in question #1 (high I., high I.F.=1.95; low I., high I.F.=1.90; high I., low I.F.=1.84; low I., low I.F.=2.23) indicating confusion among subjects about the meaning of the question.

Given the highly significant instrumentality composite of questions it is clear that perceptions of the instrumentality of voice were successfully manipulated through the social cues placed in the informational packets read by subjects.

Confidentiality. An important aspect of the performance appraisal scenario is that voice is directed at a third party, thus freeing the employees from any fears of negative repercussions from their immediate supervisor, and freeing them from that limitation of voice. Care was taken in the design of the performance appraisal

scenario to make sure the subjects understood their voice would be held confidential by the area supervisor. Manipulation checks were included in the questionnaire to assess subjects' perceptions of the confidentiality of the voice Comment Forms. Question #8 "In this company, is the immediate supervisor permitted to read your comments on the Comment Form?" was answered in the negative by 100 subjects and in the positive by 3 subjects (one subject failed to respond to the question). A second question related to confidentiality is question #15 "How likely is it that your immediate supervisor would ever see your comments on the Comment Form?". Responses were recorded using a 9-point rating scale, and an ANOVA showed that there were no significant differences between groups in perceptions of confidentiality (Table 5). The overall mean rating for question #15 was 3.00 with a standard deviation of 2.397 where the low range reflects the belief of confidentiality. Apparently, subjects did believe their comments written on the Comment Forms were not accessible to their immediate supervisors. They were free to voice to the decision maker in whatever manner they desired, without complications of an ongoing relationship with their immediate supervisor.

Voice Content

The content of voice was rated using the rating criteria found in Appendix A. Data presented in this section represent consensus ratings between two independent raters. Inter-rater reliability for

Table 5

ANOVA: Comment Form Confidentiality Ratings as a Function of
Interactional Fairness (IF) and Instrumentality (I)

Source of Variation	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F
Total	592.01	103	5.748	
Explained	16.93	3	5.64	
IF	12.46	1	12.46	2.17
I	3.85	1	3.85	.67
IF x I	.62	1	.62	.11
Residual	575.08	100	5.75	

Note. No comparisons were significant at $p < .05$.

instrumental voice was .85, while inter-rater reliability for expressive voice was .72.

Instrumental voice. The results of an ANOVA on instrumental voice can be found in Table 6. No significant differences were found between the experimental conditions. Instrumental voice behavior was rated on a 5-point scale, which can be found in Appendix A. The distribution of instrumental voice ratings was as follows (rating; number of subjects): 1;9, 2;16, 3; 52, 4;15, 5;12.

Expressive voice. The results of an ANOVA on expressive voice can be found in Table 7. As in the case of instrumental voice, no significant differences were found between the experimental conditions. Expressive voice behavior was rated on a 4-point scale which can be found in Appendix A. The distribution of expressive voice ratings was as follows (rating; number of subjects):1; 40, 2; 53, 3; 7, 4; 4.

The results of the voice content measures are highly unexpected as they are contrary to the theoretical basis of this thesis. This issue is detailed in the discussion section.

Questionnaire Dependent Variables

Several questions were included in the post experimental questionnaire to investigate possible experimental effects, or alternative explanations of the data results. They also serve to assure the integrity of the experimental scenario.

Three-way analysis of variance tests were done to investigate possible subject gender effects and subject prior experience with

Table 6

ANOVA: Instrumental Voice Behavior Ratings as a Function of
Interactional Fairness (IF) and Instrumentality (I)

Source of Variation	Sum of Squares	<u>df</u>	Mean Square	<u>F</u>
Total	110.91	103	1.08	
Explained	1.64	3	.55	
IF	1.16	1	1.16	1.06
I	.01	1	.01	.01
IF x I	.47	1	.47	.43
Residual	109.27	100	1.09	

Note. No comparisons were significant at $p < .05$.

Table 7

ANOVA: Expressive Voice Behavior Ratings as a Function of
Interactional Fairness (IF) and Instrumentality (I)

Source of Variation	Sum of Squares	<u>df</u>	Mean Square	<u>F</u>
Total	57	103	.55	
Explained	.88	3	.29	
IF	.78	1	.78	1.39
I	.01	1	.01	.02
IF x I	.09	1	.09	.15
Residual	56.12	100	.56	

Note. No comparisons were significant at $p < .05$.

performance appraisals. These issues were measured by question #18 and question #17 respectively (#18, Please indicate your sex; #17, Have you ever had your performance rated on an actual job where you have worked?).

Results showed that neither responses to dependent variable questions nor behavioral voice dependent variables statistically differed as a function of subject gender or prior subject experience with performance appraisals. With respect to question #11, assessing the anger of subjects, a significant interaction was found between experience with performance appraisals and interactional fairness condition. A least significant differences test showed that subjects not having experience with performance appraisals were more angry in conditions where interactional fairness was low ($M=6.79$) than in conditions where interactional fairness was high ($M=5.84$). The effect was statistically significant ($p<.05$), however a Scheffe test showed no differences between groups. Although very tentative, the result suggests that affective responses of subjects without experience in performance appraisal were more likely to be influenced by interactional fairness than affective responses of subjects who did have experience with performance appraisals.

Each of the dependent variables was also investigated for a possible experimenter effect as the experiment was administered by two different experimenters at different times (one male and one female experimenter). Three-way analysis of variance tests showed no main effect differences in any dependent variable responses

between subjects who experienced a male experimenter and subjects who experienced a female experimenter.

There were two questions in which significant interactions were found, however. In question #10 (instrumentality), subjects who experienced a male experimenter rated instrumentality higher in conditions of low interactional fairness ($\underline{M}=7.13$) than in conditions of high interactional fairness ($\underline{M}=4.75$). The effect was significant ($p<.05$) using the least significant differences test; however, a Scheffe test showed no significant differences between the groups. In respect to question #11 subjects were significantly ($P<.05$) less angry in conditions of high interactional fairness and a female experimenter ($\underline{M}=4.83$) than conditions of high interactional fairness and a male experimenter ($\underline{M}=6.4$). The effect was significant using the least significant differences test; however, a Scheffe test did not show the groups as significantly different.

The indications of an experimenter effect by the interactions described above are very tentative. It should be noted that only 20 subjects in random conditions experienced the female experimenter, while 84 subjects experienced the male experimenter.

Further exploratory analysis investigated the effect of subjects' subjective ability to identify with the employee in the performance appraisal scenario. Table 8 shows the results of an analysis of variance test on question #16 (To what extent were you able to identify with the employee in the video in order to role play in the performance appraisal process?). Subjects in different experimental

Table 8

ANOVA: Ratings of Identification With Employee as a Function of
Interactional Fairness (IF) and Instrumentality (I)

Source of Variation	Sum of Squares	<u>df</u>	Mean Square	<u>F</u>
Total	417.76	103	4.06	
Explained	7.57	3	2.52	
IF	.09	1	.09	.02
I	7.01	1	7.01	1.71
IF x I	.47	1	.47	.11
Residual	410.19	100	4.10	

Note. No comparisons were significant at $p < .05$.

conditions did not differ statistically in their ability to identify with their roles as employees in the performance appraisal scenario, and subjects were able to identify with the employee in the video. On a 9-point rating scale, with 9 indicating high identification with the employee and 1 indicating low identification with the employee, means ranged from 6.35 to 7.00

Procedural justice. Procedural justice perceptions were assessed with two 9-point scale items in the questionnaire: (#5) "Overall, do you feel the performance appraisal process (Comment Form, supervisor ratings, etc.) was fair?"; and (#7) How much do you feel the entire performance appraisal system (Comment Form, supervisor ratings, etc.) results in fair performance evaluations for employees?". MANOVA on the two questions as a composite produced an F of 14.11 with 2 and 99 degrees of freedom for instrumentality, which was significant at $p < .001$. Subjects in conditions of high instrumentality rated procedural justice higher ($M = 5.00$) than subjects in conditions of low instrumentality ($M = 3.85$). An F of 2.37 with 2 and 99 degrees of freedom for interactional fairness was significant at $p < .10$. Subjects in conditions of high interactional fairness tended to rate procedural justice higher ($M = 4.76$) than subjects in conditions of low interactional fairness ($M = 4.08$). The interaction of instrumentality and interactional fairness produced an F of 1.16 with 2 and 99 df , which was not statistically significant.

A separate ANOVA procedure was used to assess each of the two procedural justice questions. Table 9 displays the results of the ANOVA on question #5, while Table 10 displays the results of question #7. This further analysis was done in order to investigate each question independently. The analysis revealed that question #5 seems to be measuring a slightly different concept than question #7. Using a Pearson Correlation the two questions were found to be only moderately correlated ($r = .596$). Significant main effects of both interactional fairness and instrumentality were indicated by question #7 (interactional fairness $p < .05$; instrumentality $p < .001$). Subjects in conditions of high interactional fairness rated procedural justice higher ($M = 4.96$) than subjects in conditions of low interactional fairness ($M = 4.23$). With respect to instrumentality, subjects in conditions of high instrumentality rated procedural justice higher ($M = 5.44$) than subjects in conditions of low instrumentality ($M = 3.75$).

Unexpectedly, neither independent variable was significant using question #5. Scrutiny of the questionnaire items indicated that question #7 may have been a more precise question, while question #5 was more vague. Standard deviations on question #7 were found to be substantially smaller (high I., high I.F.=1.63; low I., high I.F.=2.06; high I., low I.F.=1.69; low I., low I.F.=1.46) than standard deviations in question #5 (high I., high I.F.=2.10; low I., high I.F.=2.12; high I., low I.F.=2.23; low I., low I.F.=1.85), which suggests that question #7 was indeed more easily interpreted. Additionally, Question #7 more precisely reflects procedural justice questions used

Table 9

ANOVA: (Question 5) Procedural Justice Ratings as a Function of
Interactional Fairness (IF) and Instrumentality (I)

Source of Variation	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F
Total	460.99	103	4.48	
Explained	27.8	3	9.27	
IF	10.47	1	10.47	2.42
I	9.24	1	9.24	2.13
IF x I	8.09	1	8.09	1.87
Residual	433.19	100	4.33	

Note. No comparisons were significant at $p < .05$.

Table 10

ANOVA: (Question 7) Procedural Justice Ratings as a Function of
Interactional Fairness (IF) and Instrumentality (I)

Source of Variation	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F
Total	391.03	103	3.80	
Explained	93.88	3	31.29	
IF	13.88	1	13.88	4.67*
I	74.46	1	74.46	25.06**
IF x I	5.54	1	5.54	1.86
Residual	297.15	100	2.97	

*p<.05 **p<.001.

in previous research by Lind and Tyler (1988). With the preceding points in mind, the results will be discussed using procedural justice results obtained by procedural justice question #7.

A post hoc inspection of procedural justice question #7 (least significant squares) revealed significant differences ($p < .05$) between the low interactional fairness, low instrumentality condition and all other conditions. Subjects experiencing low interactional fairness along with low instrumentality of voice rated procedural justice lower ($M = 3.15$) than subjects experiencing high interactional fairness and low instrumentality of voice ($M = 4.35$); subjects experiencing low interactional fairness and high instrumentality of voice ($M = 5.31$); and subjects experiencing high interactional fairness and high instrumentality of voice ($M = 5.58$).

Distributive Justice. Question #4, "How accurate (fair) were the ratings given to you by your supervisor?", and question #14, "Rate the fairness of your not getting a merit raise." were designed to measure perceptions of distributive justice. Each is a 9-point scale item. Unfortunately one of the questions proved to be somewhat problematic.

Table 11 shows the ANOVA results for question #14. Subjects did not significantly differ in their responses to the question. In hindsight the results seem to reflect the poor quality of the question rather than a statement about distributive justice. Specifically, there are two fundamental problems with the question. First, it indicates to the respondent that he/she does not receive a merit raise, which is

Table 11

ANOVA: Distributive Justice Ratings as a Function of Interactional Fairness (IF) and Instrumentality (I) (Question 14)

Source of Variation	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F
Total	411.05	103	3.99	
Explained	6.51	3	2.17	
IF	5.54	1	5.54	1.37
I	.35	1	.35	.09
IF x I	.62	1	.62	.15
Residual	404.54	100	4.05	

Note. No comparisons were significant at $p < .05$.

inconsistent with the design of the performance appraisal scenario. In fact, the subjects leave the scenario without knowing the end results of the performance evaluation. Secondly, the wording of the question suggests a hypothetical question somewhat detached from the actual experience of the subjects. For these reasons, it would be inappropriate to interpret the question with implications regarding distributive justice.

Question #4 does not contain the before mentioned flaws of question #14. Table 12 displays the results of an ANOVA procedure indicating a significant main effect for interactional fairness ($p < .05$). Given the results of question #4, subjects in the low interactional fairness conditions apparently perceived their evaluations as less fair ($M = 2.83$) than their counterparts in the high interactional fairness conditions ($M = 3.72$). Across conditions subjects received the same objectively unfair evaluation, yet subjects who were given high interactional fairness perceived the evaluation as more fair than subjects who were given low interactional fairness.

The instrumentality conditions did not affect perceptions of the fairness of the evaluation. A significant main effect for instrumentality was not found. This result may be largely due to the particular design of this study. Normally one would expect that having instrumental voice in a procedure would affect subjects' perceptions of fairness of the outcomes associated with the procedure. However, one important aspect of this particular performance appraisal system must be considered when discussing

Table 12

ANOVA: (Question 4) Distributive Justice Ratings as a Function of Interactional Fairness (IF) and Instrumentality (I)

Source of Variation	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F
Total	384.47	103	3.73	
Explained	22.85	3	7.62	
IF	20.35	1	20.35	5.63*
I	.04	1	.04	.01
IF x I	2.46	1	2.46	.68
Residual	361.62	100	3.62	

*p<.05.

distributive justice. Subjects never receive a final evaluation from the area supervisor. The distributive justice measure of question #4 does not reflect the final outcome of the procedure; rather, it reflects perceptions of a preliminary outcome. In order to test for distributive justice of the entire performance appraisal system, perceptions must be measured upon the completion of the process. In this case perceptions of distributive justice must be measured after subjects receive a final evaluation from the area supervisor, which in turn affects their rate of pay.

Satisfaction. Overall satisfaction with the performance appraisal system was assessed with question #13 (9-point scale), "How satisfied are you with the performance appraisal system?". Table 13 displays the results of an ANOVA performed on the question, which indicate a significant main effect for instrumentality ($P < .001$). The results indicate instrumentality is an important aspect of the performance appraisal system for subjects. Subjects were more satisfied with the system if they were given voice which was viewed as instrumental in raising their outcomes ($M = 5.08$) than when they were given voice that was not perceived as instrumental in raising their outcomes ($M = 3.54$).

Satisfaction was less affected by the interactional fairness manipulation experienced by subjects. Interactional fairness only approached significance ($p < .101$). Subjects in conditions of high interactional fairness rated their satisfaction with the system higher ($M = 4.62$) than subjects in conditions of low interactional fairness

Table 13

ANOVA: Satisfaction Ratings as a Function of Interactional Fairness (IF) and Instrumentality (I)

Source of Variation	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F
Total	440.16	103	4.27	
Explained	81.24	3	27.08	
IF	9.85	1	9.85	2.74
I	61.54	1	61.54	17.15**
IF x I	9.85	1	9.85	2.74
Residual	358.92	100	3.59	

**p<.001.

(\underline{M} =4.00). In answering question #13 subjects were only marginally effected by the condition of interactional fairness which they experienced. Satisfaction was measured with only one question, which unfortunately makes it difficult to interpret the nearly significant effect of interactional fairness. It was expected that satisfaction would be more highly effected by interactional fairness than indicated by responses to question #13.

An interaction of interactional fairness and instrumentality approached significance ($p < .101$). To help explain the interaction a post hoc, least significant differences, comparison of the low instrumentality, low interactional fairness condition with the other three conditions (each of which contained a high level of interactional fairness, or instrumentality, or both) was conducted. It showed that subjects in the low interactional fairness, low instrumentality condition were significantly ($p < .05$) less satisfied (\underline{M} =2.92) than subjects in any other conditions (high I., high I.F. \underline{M} =5.08; high I., low I.F. \underline{M} =5.08; low I., high I.F. \underline{M} =4.15). These results are explained within the discussion section.

Due consideration. Question #12 ("Regarding the entire performance appraisal system, did you feel you had a chance to express your thoughts about your evaluation, and that your thoughts would be taken into consideration?") was designed to assess perceptions of due consideration. ANOVA results can be found in Table 14. A significant main effect of instrumentality was found ($p = .002$), while no significant differences were found due to

Table 14

ANOVA: Due Consideration Ratings as a Function of Interactional
Fairness (IF) and Instrumentality (I)

Source of Variation	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F
Total	624.12	103	6.06	
Explained	66.27	3	22.09	
IF	4.65	1	4.65	.83
I	58.50	1	58.50	10.49**
IF x I	3.12	1	3.12	.56
Residual	557.85	100	5.58	

**p<.01.

interactional fairness. Subjects in conditions of high instrumentality rated due consideration higher (\underline{M} =5.62) than subjects in conditions of low instrumentality (\underline{M} =3.94). The results are expected as instrumentality of voice is the usefulness of voice for impacting the decision leading to the final outcome. It would follow that those subjects who felt voice would be instrumental in increasing outcomes would feel they were given due consideration in the process.

Anger. In order to investigate emotional responses to the performance appraisal experience, question #11 was included in the questionnaire. It reads as follows; "In your role as the employee in the video, to what extent were you angry, mad or upset when filling out the Comment Form?" Table 15 shows the results of an ANOVA on the question. Neither interactional fairness nor instrumentality produced significant effects on responses to the question. This finding is not fully understood as it was expected that low conditions of instrumentality and low conditions of interactional fairness would result in more emotional responses from the subjects. Means of all conditions ranged from 6.04 to 6.81 on a 9-point scale indicating that subjects were angry when filling out the Comment Forms, however they did not differ due to conditions. A likely explanation is that the anger is related to outcomes rather than conditions of interactional fairness or instrumentality. A Pearson correlation between responses to the anger question (#11) and the outcome fairness question (#4) shows that the two questions are related ($r = -.575$).

Table 15

ANOVA: Anger Ratings as a Function of Interactional Fairness (IF)
and Instrumentality (I)

Source of Variation	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F
Total	446.53	103	4.34	
Explained	10.41	3	3.47	
IF	8.09	1	8.09	1.85
I	1.16	1	1.16	.27
IF x I	1.16	1	1.16	.27
Residual	436.12	100	4.36	

Note. No comparisons were significant at $p < .05$.

As subjects rate the fairness of their outcomes lower, they rate their anger as higher.

Voice intent. Two questions were designed to assess subjects' intentions when filling out the Comment Forms. Question #3 ("When filling out the Comment Form was your purpose to try to raise your ratings?") was designed to assess instrumentality intentions of subjects. The second intent question (#9) was designed to assess expressive intentions of subjects. It reads as follows; "When filling out the Comment Form were you trying to simply express your feelings, regardless of whether or not your ratings would be raised?" Responses to each question were measured using 9-point scales. Results from separate ANOVA procedures can be found in tables 16 and 17 respectfully. As shown in the tables, no significant effects were found for either question.

Unfortunately, the two questions seem to have been difficult to interpret. Standard deviations for question #3 were quite high (high I., high I.F.=2.48; low I., high I.F.=2.68; high I., low I.F.=2.51; low I., low I.F.=2.75), as were the standard deviations of responses to question #9 (high I., high I.F.=1.88; low I., high I.F.=2.36; high I., low I.F.=2.48; low I., low I.F.=2.38) indicating that subjects may have had a difficult time interpreting the questions, or subjects derived varied interpretations. Additionally, the means of all conditions in both questions were high ranging from 6.23 to 7.15 in question #3 and 6.65 to 7.23 in question #9. Arguably question #3 could have produced high ratings due to demand characteristics of the question,

Table 16

ANOVA: Instrumental Voice Intention Ratings as a Function of
Interactional Fairness (IF) and Instrumentality (I)

Source of Variation	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F
Total	742.29	103	7.21	
Explained	63.17	3	21.06	
IF	.47	1	.47	.07
I	16.16	1	16.16	2.38
IF x I	.01	1	.01	.00
Residual	679.12	100	6.79	

Note. No comparisons were significant at $p < .05$.

Table 17

ANOVA: Expressive Voice Intention Ratings as a Function of
Interactional Fairness (IF) and Instrumentality (I)

Source of Variation	Sum of Squares	<u>df</u>	Mean Square	<u>F</u>
Total	526.54	103	5.11	
Explained	4.42	3	1.47	
IF	1.63	1	1.63	.31
I	.01	1	.01	.00
IF x I	2.78	1	2.78	.53
Residual	522.12	100	5.22	

Note. No comparisons were significant at $p < .05$.

while question #9 may have suffered from the same problem, resulting in subjects asserting positive responses to the questions. The purpose of the two questions was to assess intentions of voicing instrumentally and intentions of voicing expressively. Due to the apparent ambiguity of subjects interpretations of the questions, the results cannot be interpreted as a reflection of the intentions of the subjects.

Chapter IV

Discussion

Voice Content

The theoretical basis of this thesis suggests that two types of voice may be employed by people faced with different types of situations. As described earlier a distinction between instrumental voice and expressive voice was expected to be apparent given the different conditions designed in this experiment. More specifically, main effects of instrumentality and interactional fairness were expected for each of the dependent variables of voice content.

According to the theoretical framework of this experiment, when subjects believe voice to be instrumental in increasing their outcomes from the allocation procedure, they are expected to voice instrumentally in an attempt to gain those increased outcomes. In effect, they adhere to the allocation process and provide rational arguments for a reevaluation of the allocation with the expectation that their outcomes will be increased. As the instrumentality manipulation checks have shown, subjects clearly understood their voice opportunities to have high or low instrumentality depending upon the experimental condition which they experienced. Theoretically, subjects in high instrumentality conditions should have used a more instrumental voice than subjects in low instrumentality conditions. This, however, was not the case. Subjects did not differ by instrumentality condition in their use of instrumental voice.

According to the group value model presented by Lind and Tyler (1988), interactional fairness should serve to provide an indication of group membership to subjects. As shown by Musante, Gilbert, and Thibaut (1983), the fair process effect can be produced even in cases where instrumentality is low. The Lind and Tyler group value theory suggests that it is the group membership associated with voice that produces the fair process effect when instrumentality is low. In relation to voice content, this study hypothesized a main effect of interactional fairness on instrumental use of voice. In conditions where they are given a high level of interactional fairness, subjects were expected to adhere to the allocation procedure by providing rational arguments for a reevaluation of the allocation process with the expectation or their outcomes increasing.

Manipulation checks of interactional fairness clearly showed that subjects differed in their perceptions of interactional fairness according to the experimental condition which they experienced. As the results have shown, contrary to the theoretical hypotheses of this study, subjects did not differ by interactional fairness condition in their use of instrumental voice.

Main effects of interactional fairness and instrumentality were also expected for the dependent variable of expressive voice, however neither was found. There were no significant differences between groups due to conditions of instrumentality or interactional fairness. On a rating scale of 1 to 4, means for all groups fell within

the range from 1.65 to 1.89. Unexpectedly, expressive use of voice was rarely employed by subjects regardless of the experimental condition they experienced. The great majority of subjects were rated 1 or 2 on the 4-point expressive scale (93 subjects), while very few were rated higher than 2 (11 subjects).

The results of the voice content measures suggest that there may not be two distinctly different forms of voice as defined by instrumental voice and expressive voice. This, however, is not conclusive and may be misleading for the following reason. The criteria developed to measure the two forms of voice (see Appendix A) were developed using the actual voice Comment Forms completed by subjects. Clear exemplars of each type of voice were used in developing the criteria. Clearly some subjects voiced expressively, while other subjects voiced instrumentally as defined by each criterion.

Due to the exploratory nature of this study, it is possible that the criteria developed for measuring the content of voice are flawed. An inter-rater reliability of .85 was established for the instrumentality measure, but an inter-rater reliability of only .72 was found for the expressive voice measures. This indicates that the rating criteria are not as clearly defined and understood as would be desired.

Equally likely is the possibility that the media used to document voice was inappropriate for capturing the theoretical differences of voice content. The written format allows subjects to

spend ten minutes formulating and writing ideas, which may result in much different uses of voice than would occur in an immediate speech format. The two formats seem equally appropriate for the testing of voice content because each is a commonly used form of voice, but speech may result in different content than a written format.

A further look at the design of the study suggests a compelling explanation for the lack of main effects of instrumentality and interactional fairness on expressive and instrumental uses of voice. Perhaps the explanation lies in the specific scenario used in the study. As stated previously, manipulation checks showed that subjects were affected by the manipulations of interactional fairness and instrumentality. Thorough pilot testing served to refine the performance appraisal system in order to assure that it was realistic and believable. Care was taken to assure that subjects could identify with the employee in the scenario. It is quite possible that demand characteristics of the performance appraisal scenario and experiment in general were stronger factors than the independent variables in determining the type of voice used. More specifically, it is possible that most subjects did not consider an alternative to instrumental voice when filling out the comment forms, and filled out the form as they felt they were expected to do in the context of the experiment. They may have perceived the purpose of the comment form to be an explanation of the results, therefore, subjects may have been lead into using instrumental voice. This explanation would account for

the lack of expressive voice in all conditions, and account for the high usage of instrumental voice in all conditions (79 subjects rated 3 or above on the 5-point rating scale).

One characteristic of the performance appraisal system that might inhibit expressive voice is the use of a third party in the process. The area supervisor was the target of the voice through the Comment Forms. Subjects believed the Comment Forms to be confidential, so the immediate supervisor would not be exposed to the voice. It is possible that subjects were more instrumental due to the fact that they were not directing their voice at the allocator of the performance appraisal ratings.

The issue of the content of voice has not been approached in the literature to date. Although the voice content results of the present study do not support the hypotheses of the experiment, they do warrant further investigation into the content of voice. By refining the criterion and exploring new experimental scenarios, the content of voice may prove to be a substantial element in the current theory of procedural justice.

Procedural Justice

As hypothesized, main effects of instrumentality and interactional fairness were found for procedural justice. As predicted by the group value model of Lind & Tyler (1988), increases in interactional fairness resulted in increases of ratings of procedural justice. As predicted by the rational perspective model (Tyler, Rasinski, & Spodick, 1985), increases in the instrumentality of voice

resulted in increases in ratings of procedural justice. The findings lend support for each of the theories suggesting that the fair process effect may be a result of voice as an instrumental attempt to increase outcomes as well as an attempt to express values. The rational perspective on voice and the group value model are not competing theories; rather, they attempt to explain the positive effects of voice under different conditions.

As a high level of interactional fairness is expected to raise perceptions of fairness, and a high level of instrumentality is also expected to raise perceptions of fairness, a post hoc test was conducted to look at the low instrumentality, low interactional fairness condition compared to all other conditions, each of which contained a high level of interactional fairness or a high level of instrumentality, or both. Interestingly, the low interactional fairness, low instrumentality condition was indeed significantly different from all other conditions. A high level of interactional fairness was sufficient to raise perceptions of fairness regardless of the perceived instrumentality of voice. Also, a high level of instrumentality was sufficient to raise perceptions of fairness experienced by subjects. The results add support to both the rational perspective model and the group value model.

Arguably, subjects could have construed high interactional fairness as an indication of process control which would translate into instrumentality for subjects' voice. Perhaps they understood fair treatment to indicate that the process would be enacted

properly. If that were the case, the rational perspective of voice could explain both main effects, because both interactional fairness and instrumentality would essentially be related to the perceived instrumentality of voice. Manipulation checks, however, showed that subjects were clearly aware of the level of instrumentality associated with their voice opportunities. It seems clear that perceptions of fairness in low instrumentality conditions were raised not by instrumentality, but by something related to interactional fairness. According to the group value model, being given fair interpersonal treatment may have resulted in subjects perceiving themselves as part of the group or process. Due to their inclusion in the decision making process, perceptions of fairness could have been raised. The distinction between the two models is clear in cases where subjects are given low instrumentality. The group value model is the best explanation for the increased perceptions of fairness, even though voice is not associated with process control. The results are evidence of a cushion of support resulting from voice even when voice is not instrumental and not associated with process control.

Given that increased perceptions of procedural justice are associated with the two motivational elements of instrumentality and group association, this study attempted to distinguish these two elements of voice by content. As discussed previously, the study did not show that the two motivational elements of voice are distinguishable by content.

Satisfaction. Satisfaction with the performance appraisal process was affected by the level of instrumentality perceived by subjects. Subjects were more satisfied with the process if they perceived a high level of instrumentality. According to the rational perspective of voice (Tyler, Rasinski & Spodick, 1985), subjects are expected to be more satisfied in conditions where they are presented with a voice opportunity because it increases their likelihood of achieving desired outcomes.

In accordance with the group value model (Lind & Tyler, 1988) increases in group affiliation should promote high satisfaction with the process. As subjects are given high interactional fairness they are expected to be more satisfied with the performance appraisal process than subjects who are given low interactional fairness. The results of this exploratory analysis suggest that satisfaction is indeed effected by level of interactional fairness; however, the effect is not conclusive because reliability of the satisfaction measure could not be determined.

As a high level of interactional fairness is expected to raise satisfaction with the performance appraisal process, and a high level of instrumentality is also expected to raise satisfaction with the performance appraisal process, a post hoc test was conducted to look at the low instrumentality, low interactional fairness condition compared to all other conditions, each of which contained a high level of interactional fairness or a high level of instrumentality, or both. Both models (rational perspective of voice and group value) are

supported by the finding that the low interactional fairness, low instrumentality condition was significantly different from all other conditions. A high level of interactional fairness was sufficient to raise perceptions of fairness regardless of perceived instrumentality of voice, suggesting that group affiliation alone can increase satisfaction. A high level of instrumentality was sufficient to raise satisfaction regardless of the level of interactional fairness, suggesting that acquiring self interests alone can increase satisfaction.

Theoretical and Practical Implications of Voice.

The fact that the groups did not differ in their uses of voice across conditions of instrumentality and interactional fairness is important. Interestingly, subjects were just as instrumental in their voice in conditions where they were both treated very poorly and told that their voice would not be effective as they were when they were given a high level of interactional fairness and told that their voice would be instrumental in raising their outcomes. The question of interest is, why would subjects voice instrumentally when they are given unfair interaction and told that their voice opportunity will not produce results? The answer could lie in the demand characteristics of the situation as discussed previously. Arguably, however, those same demand characteristics may also exist in a real performance appraisal system resulting in a lack of differences in voice content, just as found in this study.

As voice has been used in the past it has been treated purely as a form of process control, meaning an instrumental attempt at raising the outcomes of a procedure. With a value expressive component to voice identified by Tyler, Rasinski, & Spodick (1985), it is clear that voice can raise perceptions of procedural justice even when the instrumentality of voice is low. The results of the present study suggest that the content of that voice may not be an indication of which component of voice is operating to increase perceptions of fairness. Instrumental voice was the chosen form even when subjects were aware that the voice would not be instrumental. By describing the value expressive component of voice, the group value model accounts for increased perceptions of fairness and satisfaction in cases where instrumentality is low. It seems that the value expressive component of voice is not distinguished from the instrumental component of voice by its content. As in the case of this study, instrumental voice may be used for value expressive purposes. This would explain the use of instrumental voice in conditions where voice would clearly not be instrumental, and it would explain the increases in procedural justice perceptions, and ratings of satisfaction.

The experiment did not produce conditions which resulted in subjects psychologically departing from the procedure as expected. The content of voice was not found to be indicative of a psychological exit from the procedures. Even in conditions where subjects were

expected to psychologically depart from the procedure, they remained in the procedure by using instrumental voice.

There are important practical implications of the voice content results. As perceptions of procedural justice varied by condition, voice content did not. As satisfaction with the performance appraisal system varied according to condition, voice content did not. The implications of these findings are important from a managerial standpoint. In the performance appraisal system used in the study, there was no distinction between subjects who were more satisfied and subjects who were less satisfied. If the demand characteristics of the performance appraisal system result in voice with a uniform content, yet perceptions of procedural justice systematically differ, it may be easy to make incorrect assumptions about perceptions of procedural justice and satisfaction based on the content of the voice.

Additionally, it is important to understand the extent to which subjects adhered to the performance appraisal system. Apparently these subjects took behavioral cues from the situation and displayed "proper" behavior for a performance appraisal situation, even in conditions that indicated the "proper" behavior would not be effective. Behaviorally, subjects conformed to the situation rather strongly, yet their perceptions of fairness and satisfaction were not displayed in their voicing behavior. It is important to know that while some groups of subjects in this work situation were dissatisfied with the performance appraisal system and rated procedural justice quite lowly, they voiced in the same fashion as subjects who were

satisfied with the performance appraisal system and who felt the procedure was fair. Given the negative consequences of low perceptions of procedural justice, such as lower ratings of institutions and authorities, lower evaluations of decisions and outcomes, lower satisfaction with systems, lowered perceptions of legitimacy of authority, lessened support for the institution, and less compliance with decision results (Lind & Tyler, 1988), it is important to know that uniform voice content does not indicate uniform perceptions of procedural justice or satisfaction.

In light of the previous discussion it is also important to point out a possible limitation of the results pertaining to satisfaction. The satisfaction of subjects was measured using only one 9-point questionnaire item. A more dependable measure would have included at least one other item to measure satisfaction.

Interactional fairness An important aspect of this study is the influence of interactional fairness on perceptions of procedural justice and distributive justice. Bies and Moag (1986) have argued that the interaction is an important aspect of a dispute resolution or allocation procedure. The findings of this study support the theory of Bies and Moag. Subjects given high interactional fairness rated their perceptions of procedural justice higher than subjects given a low level of interactional fairness. Additionally, subjects given a high level of interactional fairness rated distributive justice higher than subjects given a low level of interactional fairness. It is important to reiterate that the outcomes (performance ratings) of each condition

in the experiment were identical. Increases in interactional fairness were associated with increases in perceptions of procedural justice and distributive justice. Simply raising the level of interactional fairness in a procedure such as the performance appraisal procedure raises the perceptions of fairness without adjusting outcomes. The magnitude of this finding is great, given the positive outcomes associated with higher levels of procedural justice and the negligible cost of increasing interactional fairness.

The study provides some support for the idea that interactional fairness affects overall perceptions of satisfaction. As in the case of increased perceptions of procedural justice, it may be possible to increase levels of satisfaction with minimal effort and cost by increasing the interactional fairness that is experienced during an allocation or dispute resolution procedure. The findings suggest that interactional fairness effects are important elements in the theory of procedural justice.

Instrumentality Another theoretically significant finding of the study lies in the importance of the perceived instrumentality of voice. When subjects perceived their voice opportunity to be instrumental in increasing their outcomes, they perceived the procedure as more fair. Although due consideration was measured using only one 9-point questionnaire item, it seems that subjects felt they had been given greater due consideration in the process when they perceived high instrumentality of voice. This may have contributed to increased perceptions of fairness. Subjects were also

more satisfied with the performance appraisal system if they perceived voice to be instrumental in raising their outcomes.

The findings of this study suggest that both interactional fairness and instrumentality of voice should be carefully considered when designing an allocation or dispute resolution system. Unlike the case of interactional fairness, concrete changes of a system may be necessary in order to establish a clear instrumental voice opportunity, however. Another point of interest in the present study is that perceived instrumentality of voice may be something totally different from a formal policy regarding the instrumentality of voice. In the present study, subjects' perceptions of the instrumentality of voice were manipulated through social cues. All subjects read the same information regarding the formal policy of voice, which indicated a clear formal opportunity for voice. Perceptions of instrumentality, however, were constructed using social information outside of the formal policies. Careful attention should be paid to formal policies regarding voice and informal information regarding the instrumentality of voice. A very instrumental voice opportunity defined by the policy of the organization may not be reflected in the perceptions of the people using the voice. Increasing perceptions of the instrumentality of voice should result in increased perceptions of procedural justice along with increased perceptions of satisfaction.

Future Research

Although this experiment was designed with careful attention to detail and believability, the results should be tested outside of the

confines of the experimental setting. An examination of the content of voice under real world situations would be helpful, especially in relation to the content of voice. It will be important to know the variation of voice content in situations where the outcome has relevance to the subjects' lives rather than situations where the outcome is hypothetical.

Additional pretesting of questionnaire items would greatly enhance the clarity of the results of this study. Particular attention should be paid to measures of procedural justice, distributive justice, and intentions of voicing behavior. Additional measurements of satisfaction, due consideration and anger should be developed to avoid the ambiguity of single item measurements and to increase the reliability of the measures. Pretesting of the experimental materials is also recommended to determine the extent of possible demand characteristics. It is quite possible that the materials in this study promoted a rational voice response in subjects.

Another avenue for future research is to modify the scenario developed for this experiment. Specifically, the target of voice and the media of voice should be examined further. The scenario becomes slightly unrealistic as the subjects voice to their area supervisor, rather than to their immediate supervisor. As discussed previously, the content of voice may be affected by the target. What would the results have been if subjects voiced to their immediate supervisor? Additionally, the content of voice may very well be affected by the written format. Perhaps a more spontaneous or

transient opportunity for voice would have been more natural, and would have produced more expressive voice as predicted in this study. What would the results have been if voice was measured in its audible form?

In each of the conditions of the present study, subjects were allowed a voice opportunity. Further research should investigate the present findings as compared to conditions that do not allow for voice. In line with the fair process effect, the lack of voice should produce lower ratings of procedural justice. Of particular interest would be the effects of instrumentality in conditions offering a voice opportunity as opposed to conditions not offering a voice opportunity. The present study is well designed for such a test, which may show the fair process effect in conditions without process control.

The study is also well designed for an investigation of the frustration effect defined by Folger (1977). By expanding the scenario, and including a final evaluation from the area supervisor, perceptions of procedural justice and distributive justice could be measured at the completion of the procedure, which would provide subjects with information regarding the effectiveness of their voice. An additional manipulation of outcome increases would present a clear investigation of the frustration effect.

Finally, any alterations to the present study should include investigation of the effects of individual differences between subjects on voice use. Perhaps variations in amounts of expressive voice and

instrumental voice are closely linked to individual differences in subjects, as well as interactional fairness or instrumentality of voice.

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Appendix A.
Voice Content Rating Criterion

Instrumentality

5. Specifically states supporting facts from four (4) of the following categories:

- production accuracy (1 missort per 3000 sorted)
- production speed (1800 per hour)
- attendance (1 day late, 3 days absent)
- production quality (Supervisor is responsible for filled slot problem.)
- safety methods (no safety incidents)

4. Specifically states supporting facts from 3 of the above categories.

3. Specifically states at least one supporting fact from one of the following categories:

- production accuracy (1 missort per 3000 sorted)
- production speed (1800 per hour)
- attendance (1 day late, 3 days absent)

2. States no specific facts. Makes general reference to "deservingness", but no factual support is provided, OR Discounts the ratings but does not provide facts. DOES NOT fully agree with ratings.

1. Agrees with the "no merit raise" decision of the immediate supervisor, OR makes no argument to influence ratings.

Expressiveness

4. Extreme dissatisfaction or satisfaction with ratings, supervisor, process or organization AND
Derogatory adjectives or names directed at ratings, supervisor, process, or organization, OR
uses offensive swear words, OR
extreme sarcasm interpreted as name calling OR
apologizes profusely and promises to improve
3. May be sarcastic. Comments on dissatisfaction or satisfaction with ratings, supervisor, organization. Uses strong adjectives or punctuation.
2. Minor amount of affect. Expresses satisfaction or dissatisfaction with ratings, supervisor, organization (as opposed to agreement and disagreement). Claims he or she has been treated unfairly or fairly.
1. Logical, calm comments. May agree or disagree with ratings, but does not claim personal violation (unfairness).

Appendix B.
Experiment Materials

CONSENT FORM

TITLE OF THE RESEARCH STUDY

EMPLOYEE PERCEPTIONS OF A PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL SYSTEM

INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE

You are invited to participate in a research study of a performance appraisal system.

BASIS FOR SUBJECT SELECTION

You were selected as a potential subject because you are an English-speaking adult.

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

The purpose of this study is to assess people's perceptions of a particular performance appraisal system.

EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURES

This study will take about one hour to complete. The following are the procedures you will undergo as a subject in this study:

You will read material pertaining to a particular performance appraisal system. The information will include a description of the system and perceptions of employees affected by the system. You will be given information pertaining to the performance of one particular employee at the company, and you will be asked to identify with the employee as if you actually work for the company and your performance is being evaluated.

You will then watch a videotape of the employee receiving job performance feedback from his/her supervisor in the form of a performance appraisal feedback session, and complete a comment form regarding the evaluation.

Upon completion of the study you will be asked to fill out a questionnaire pertaining to the study, and you will be given a full debriefing and explanation of the study.

POTENTIAL RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS

There are no known risks or discomforts that you will experience.

POTENTIAL BENEFITS

There are no known direct benefits that you will personally receive by participating in this study. You will be given the opportunity after the study to gain a full understanding of the study and the current research.

Performance Evaluation

13(a) Employee performance in the envelope sorter position will be evaluated every six month period, beginning 30 days after the date of hire.

13(b) Envelope Sorters will be evaluated initially by their immediate supervisors. Evaluations meetings will take place during working hours, and will not exceed 30 minutes.

13(c) A Comment Form will be given to each employee following evaluation by the immediate supervisor. It will be used by the employees to voice any concerns or reactions they may have regarding the performance evaluation. The employee will attach the Comment Form to the supervisor's rating form, place them in an envelope, and forward them to the area supervisor. The final evaluation will be made by the area supervisor using both the immediate supervisor's rating form and the confidential Comment Form.

13(d) The following dimensions of the envelope sorter's performance will be evaluated:

Attendance A percentage of time when the employee is present during scheduled working time. This shall include tardiness, absenteeism and excessive sick time.

Production speed A summary of timings taken during employee's production time. Speed will be measured in terms of envelopes sorted per hour.

Production quality A rating of the quality of sorting done by the employee [see section III 2(b) for sort quality criterion].

Safety methods A percentage of time when the employee adheres to safe working methods [see section VII 3(a) for listing of safe working methods].

Production accuracy The percentage of envelopes which are sorted to their correct destinations.

13(e) Performance will be rated with the following 5-point rating scale [see section V 12(c) for descriptions of the five anchors]:

- 1.-- unacceptable
- 2.-- needs improvement
- 3.-- minimally acceptable
- 4.-- good (merit raise)
- 5.-- excellent (merit raise)

Transfer Requests

14(a) Any employee wishing to transfer positions from one work shift to another must submit a formal written request for transfer to his/her immediate supervisor.

14(b) Transfer position options will be posted each month in the personnel office. Transfer requests must be made for

The following information will aid you in understanding the envelope sorter position, and the role which you are going to assume. Please read the information carefully in order to understand the job from the perspective of an employee. In order for you to assume the role of an envelope sorter for this experiment, it is important for you to understand various aspects of the job and your hypothetical performance.

The company which you work for is a national package delivery company, specializing in the delivery of packages and envelopes. You work part time in the production plant in order to gain extra money while going to school.

You have worked at the company for about two years and worked in several positions throughout the production area. You have loaded packages into trucks, unloaded packages, sorted boxes, and now you sort envelopes. In total you have had four different jobs within the production area. You have been able to select the jobs that you desire within the company because you have been successful in each previous position. You have received merit raises after each performance evaluation because you are a good employee and your ratings are quite high. You are aware that it is vary rare that an employee does not rate high enough to obtain a merit raise, because normally everybody rates a four or above on each rating scale.

Your current position of envelope sorter requires sorting envelopes to every destination in the United States. You sort individual envelopes into 30 different slots, which are located in front of a sorting table. You stand at a long sorting table along with six other envelope sorters and sort the envelopes from large boxes. You read the address of each envelope and put the envelope into one of the slots depending upon its destination. All of the envelopes are arranged so you can easily read the addresses. Your primary duty is to sort the envelopes. Other employees are used to bring more

envelopes for you and to empty out your sorting slots when they are full. Your normal working shift is four hours.

You have been in the job for about six months and you are able to sort at about the same rate as the other employees in the envelope sorting area. You have been timed frequently by your supervisor and the your production speed is about 1800 envelopes per hour (the production speed requirement is 1500 envelopes per hour so your rate is 300 better than the minimum). You are also about as accurate as the other envelope sorters. Your production accuracy rate is one envelope missorted for every 3000 sorted correctly (the minimum acceptable production accuracy rate is one missorted envelope per 2000 envelopes sorted, so your production accuracy rate is better than the minimum requirement.) You feel comfortable in the job, as you have for the last three jobs that you have had in the production area. You have acquired a strong sense of pride in your work.

In order to sort envelopes it was necessary for you to learn the zip-code organization. You were tested over the zip-code material and the test results were satisfactory. In conversations with other envelope sorters, you have been told that you are a very good envelope sorter. You believe that your performance is quite good because you have really applied yourself to the envelope sorting position. You have not had a performance evaluation yet because you have only been sorting envelopes for about six months.

You have been late to work only one time since you have

worked for the company and you have been absent from work on three occasions. Each time that you were absent, you called your supervisor to inform him that you would be using sick leave on that particular day. You have never been reprimanded or written up for disciplinary action.

The employee labor union conducted a company wide survey in January of 1989 to assess a wide variety of envelope sorter attitudes and perceptions about the company. The following information shows the results of the survey questions that relate to the performance appraisal system. The first page is a general summary of envelope sorters' responses. The remaining two pages show the questions used in the survey and the responses made by an envelope sorter currently working at the envelope sorting position.

Please read the information carefully in order for you to gain an understanding of the performance appraisal system from an employee's point of view.

Employee Perception Survey
(section 6-c: **GENERALIZED SUMMARY**)
2/12/89

1. Envelope sorters generally feel that the comment form used in the performance appraisal system is not very useful.
2. Envelope sorters are generally aware of the performance appraisal process and how it works.
3. The majority of envelope sorters are aware that performance is evaluated every six months.
4. Most envelope sorters believe that only a very small percentage of employees do not receive merit raises.
5. The great majority of envelope sorters know that a rating of 4 or above on each rating scale is needed in order to earn a merit raise.
6. The great majority of envelope sorters believe that the comment forms used in the performance appraisal system are strictly confidential, and that their immediate supervisors never know what is written on the forms.
7. The majority of envelope sorters report that evaluation feedback sessions take place during working hours and are usually less than one half hour in length.

Employee Perception Survey
(section 4: **INDIVIDUAL RESPONSES**)
2/12/89

Employee number 507-72-7750

1. How often is your performance evaluated?

-- about every six months.

2. Have you ever received an unrepresentative performance evaluation?

-- Yes, and I used the comment form, but it didn't help at all. My ratings from the area supervisor were exactly like the ratings my immediate supervisor gave me.

3. Who evaluates your performance?

-- First my immediate supervisor does and then the area supervisor after that.

4. Does your supervisor have enough contact with you to accurately evaluate your performance?

-- He can't watch me all of the time, but I guess he sees me working quite a bit.

5. Do you feel that your comments on the comment form negatively effect your working relationship with your immediate supervisor?

-- No, it couldn't, the union makes sure of that. The immediate supervisors couldn't see those comments even if they wanted to.

6. What rating is needed to qualify you for a merit raise?

-- I just need to get at least a 4 on all of the rating scales. Anything lower is no good.

7. Is the 5-point rating scale used in the performance evaluation clearly understandable?

-- Yes, it is pretty simple really. Five is the best and one is the worst.

8. How many employees receive merit raises after performance evaluations?

-- Almost everybody. Actually you have to be a pretty bad worker to miss your merit raise.

9. Are your performance appraisal meetings scheduled at convenient times?

-- Yes, most of the time they are short and to the point, and they are always on company time.

10. Can you think of a time when an employee's initial ratings by the immediate supervisor were changed by the area supervisor because of comments written by the employee on the comment form?

-- No. I don't think the comment form works. The final ratings are always the same as the first ratings done by the immediate supervisor.

The employee labor union conducted a company wide survey in January of 1989 to assess a wide variety of envelope sorter attitudes and perceptions about the company. The following information shows the results of the survey questions that relate to the performance appraisal system. The first page is a general summary of envelope sorters' responses. The remaining two pages show the questions used in the survey and the responses made by an envelope sorter currently working at the envelope sorting position.

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7. The majority of envelope sorters report that evaluation feedback sessions take place during working hours and are usually less than one half hour in length.

Employee Perception Survey
(section 4: **INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEE RESPONSES**)
2/12/89

Employee number 507-72-7750

1. How often is your performance evaluated?

-- about every six months.

2. Have you ever received an unrepresentative performance evaluation?

-- No, because I fill out the Comment Form and my ratings get raised by that when the area supervisor makes the final evaluation.

3. Who evaluates your performance?

-- First my immediate supervisor does and then the area supervisor after that.

4. Does your supervisor have enough contact with you to accurately evaluate your performance?

-- He can't watch me all of the time, but I guess he sees me working quite a bit.

5. Do you feel that your comments on the comment form negatively effect your working relationship with your immediate supervisor?

-- No, it couldn't, because those forms are very confidential. The immediate supervisors couldn't see them even if they wanted to.

6. What rating is needed to qualify you for a merit raise?

-- I just need to get at least a 4 on all of the rating scales. Anything lower is no good.

7. Is the 5-point rating scale used in the performance evaluation clearly understandable?

-- Yes, it is pretty simple really. Five is the best and one is the worst.

8. How many employees receive merit raises after performance evaluations?

-- Almost everybody. Actually you have to be a pretty bad worker to miss your merit raise.

9. Are your performance appraisal meetings scheduled at convenient times?

-- Yes, most of the time they are short and to the point, and they are always on company time.

10. Can you think of a time when an employee's initial ratings by the immediate supervisor were changed by the area supervisor because of comments written by the employee on the comment form?

-- Yes. I know of several people who have filled out the comment form and ended up with higher ratings after the area supervisor looked them over.

EMPLOYEE EVALUATION FORM

Semi-annual performance appraisal

Employee _____ Date of hire 9/8/87

Position Envelope Sorter.

Immediate supervisor Dean Williams.

Area supervisor _____

Rate the above employee along each of the five job performance dimensions. Ratings must not deviate from the defined scale values. (Ratings must be either 1,2,3,4, or 5. No 1/2 values or double values are permitted.)

Unacceptable	Needs Improvement	Minimally Acceptable	Good	Excellent
1	2	3	4	5

Attendance	1	2	3	4	5
Production speed	1	2	3	4	5
Production quality	1	2	3	4	5
Safety methods	1	2	3	4	5
Production Accuracy	1	2	3	4	5

Ratings of 4 or above on all performance dimensions results in an employee merit raise. A single rating below 4 disqualifies employee for a merit raise.

Dean Williams
Supervisor's signature

date

Employee's signature

date

Merit Raise Yes _____ No X

Appendix C.
Questionnaire

