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The Impact of Community Oriented Policing in Omaha, Nebraska

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THE IMPACT OF COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING IN OMAHA, NEBRASKA

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ABSTRACT

Community oriented policing (COP) has been adopted by a number of police departments throughout the country as a new policing philosophy. Some of the departments have implemented it in high crime areas and others have used it city-wide. The Omaha, Nebraska Police Department is currently in the process of implementing COP in the entire city. This has occurred gradually since 1989 when 15 officers were assigned to work in Omaha's low-income housing developments. In 1990 these officers formed the Selective Patrol Unit and started practicing community oriented policing. A bicycle patrol was added in 1992 and COP expanded to other parts of Omaha with the Weed and Seed program. The city-wide implementation started in December 1993.

This paper is a preliminary analysis of COP in Omaha. Crime data and Omaha Conditions Surveys (OCS) from 1990 to 1994 were evaluated to determine if COP produced a change over time in crime and citizens' answers to questions about crime and the police. The Omaha sample for the survey questions came from the Metropolitan portion of the OCS. The North Omaha portion of the OCS was used to select residents who lived in and around the Omaha Housing Authority's (O.H.A.) low-income housing developments where the Selective Patrol Unit worked. The surveys didn't indicate if respondents lived in or around the housing developments. So the O.H.A. sample contained individuals in the same zip codes as the housing developments with incomes

below $10,000 per year. Because this sample may not represent the O.H.A. area, the findings may not reflect what is actually occurring there. Some of the data in the North Omaha portion of the OCS did not go beyond 1991 or the questions were not asked. Because of this I also looked for changes between whites and nonwhites or between the income categories.

Four hypotheses were tested: (1) Crime would decrease over time in Omaha as COP was implemented. UCR crime date and victimization surveys were evaluated for changes over time. The Omaha data didn't support the hypothesis. In the O.H.A. area the crime data did support the hypothesis, but the decrease in victimization rates was not statistically significant. Nonwhites support the hypothesis and whites do not. For income it was mixed. (2) Citizens will perceive crime as less of a problem as COP is implemented. Citizens' perceptions of the crime situation and the priority of crime problems were evaluated. There was no support for the hypothesis in Omaha and the race data. However, there was support in the O.H.A. area and the lowest income category. (3) A decline in the fear of crime will occur. No support was found in Omaha, but support was found in the O.H.A. area, with nonwhites, and the $0-9,999 income category. (4) Citizens' quality of interaction with the OPD officers would improve as measured by their attitudes, perceptions, and satisfaction with the OPD. There was no support in Omaha and a conclusion was hard to draw in the O.H.A. area. For nonwhites and the $0-9,999 income category there were some improvement not reflected in Omaha.

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CHAPTER 1

PERSPECTIVE OF COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING

Since its inception, policing in America has undergone constant change. The modern-day police force began with foot patrol officers who were in close contact with the public. Technology enabled the police to change their patrol strategy. The automobile, two-way radio, and telephone moved the police to embrace preventive patrol and rapid response as a way to deter and reduce crime. These modern inventions enhanced communication and efficiency among police, but effectively isolated them from the people they were sworn to protect.

Beginning in the 1960s through today, the evolution continues. In some ways, policing has come full circle. There is a shift back to the police-citizen interactions gained through foot patrols, but lost when police were placed in patrol cars isolated from the public. The team policing models of the 1960s and early 1970s were born from the realization that these interactions were critical. This philosophy continues into the 1990s with community policing and problem-oriented policing.

Throughout the years, a common theme developed. The focus was placed on policing neighborhoods and involving the citizens to help solve problems that produced the area's crime and fear of crime.

This concept of involving citizens currently falls under the broad category of community oriented policing (COP), which encompasses the philosophies of community policing and problem-oriented policing. As more police departments realize their current approach of preventive patrol and rapid response is not effective in controlling crime, they are turning to COP as a possible solution.

In November 1989, the Criminal Justice Newsletter estimated as many as 300 law enforcement agencies were practicing community policing in one shape or another. I suspect that current estimates are much higher. Community oriented policing is even being practiced in other countries such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Britain (Clairmont, 1991; Leighton, 1991), and Israel (Friedmann, 1992). Robert Trojanowicz, an advocate of community policing, said:

> As we approach the 21st century, we see that community policing is the wave of the future . . . Among the trendsetting big-city police departments nationwide, more than half have formally and visibly adopted community policing. As urban, rural, and suburban police departments of all sizes follow their lead, community policing makes the transition from being a promising trend to becoming the mainstream (October 1990:11).

The Omaha Police Department (OPD) in Omaha, Nebraska is also following suit by changing its policing philosophy. Historically, the OPD has used the traditional policing approach of preventive patrol and rapid response by placing their officers in patrol cars. In 1989, the OPD initiated their COP effort by placing 15 officers into 5 low-income housing developments to address increasing crime. In July 1990, the OPD and the Omaha Housing Authority (O.H.A.) formed a partnership to further battle crime and the residents' fear of crime in these housing developments. This partnership created the

Omaha Police Department's Selective Patrol Unit (S.P.U.). The S.P.U. expanded operations by adding a bicycle patrol in the low-income housing areas in April 1992. In 1993, the OPD started looking at the possibility of implementing community policing in their entire department and city-wide. Currently, they are going through the implementation process. This paper is a preliminary analysis of community oriented policing in Omaha.

Before I discuss COP in Omaha, I need to describe what it is. This first chapter contains sections on how COP evolved, and how cities nationwide are embracing it. To understand where policing has been and where it is going the approaches and philosophies of team policing, community policing, and problem-oriented policing will also be defined in this chapter.

Chapter Two offers the context and evaluation of past studies to determine the effectiveness of team policing, foot patrols, and community oriented policing. Some of these studies have shown that these police approaches have reduced the crime rates; lowered citizens' perception of crime and fear of crime; and improved citizens' attitudes, perceptions, and satisfaction with the police.

In Chapter Three, I will discuss what the Omaha Police Department has accomplished with COP and where they are going in the future. In Chapters Four and Five, I will describe how my analysis of Omaha's COP effort will be done and present the results showing any changes that occurred since the OPD implemented community oriented policing. This will be done using two different types of data. First, I will use Omaha's

crime data provided by the Crime Analysis Bureau of the police department. I will also use selected questions from the Omaha Conditions Surveys that were conducted from 1990 to 1994. Part of this evaluation will examine the effectiveness of the Selective Patrol Unit, Omaha's first COP effort.

Like the Omaha Police Department, many other cities introduced COP in areas where traditional methods had little impact. In Portland, Oregon the police department started a community oriented policing unit in the Columbia Villa Housing Project, a low-income housing development. This area experienced gang violence, heavy drug traffic, and drive-by shootings. "Children acted as lookouts and runners for the drug dealers; some even became small-time peddlers. Teens were pressured to join gangs and commit crimes against other residents as rights of initiation" (Englert, 1990:2).

The Housing Authority of Portland contacted the Multnomah County Sheriff's Office in April 1989 and asked them to provide police officers to work in the area for one year. The Sheriff's office responded and formed the Safety Action Team (SAT) composed of one lieutenant, three deputies, and two community service officers. Their goals were to reduce the fear of crime, reduce criminal activity in the project, and empower the tenants to regain control of the area. To accomplish these goals, the officers walked the area and talked to the residents. To provide the officers increased mobility, five mountain bikes were donated by two businesses and the Rotary Club. The officers identified drug dealers and gang members and warned them that they and their families would be evicted if the criminal activity continued. They also enforced trespassing

ordinances on non-residents who caused problems. In addition, a Police Athletic League was established and outings organized for children. Job placements were provided for youth, and the elderly and handicapped received transportation in a marked police van.

Lieutenant Englert concluded that the SAT program was successful in meeting its three goals:

> Within the first month of the SAT program, the fear of crime had been significantly reduced in Columbia Villa. As the fear of crime diminished, tenants gradually became confident enough to make detailed calls to the police and sheriff's department when criminal activity was observed.
>
> Eventually, through the efforts of the SAT, an atmosphere of pride began to replace despair in the project. Because of the mobility of the SAT team and the newly acquired diligence of the residents, open air drug deals are no longer the norm in the project. Gang activity diminished as the gangs were denied new members. Now, the project's youth center activities around the SAT officers (Englert, 1990:5).

The strides COP has made in some areas appears to be dramatic, but as COP is rapidly becoming the "mainstream" approach to policing in many cities, it must be studied and scientifically evaluated to determine its effectiveness. Other policing approaches used through the years have also undergone this scrutiny. When team policing was the "mainstream" in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Schwartz and Clarren (1978) evaluated Cincinnati's effort to see if it was effective in reaching its stated goals. Additionally, Sherman, Milton, and Kelly (1973) evaluated team policing in seven cities to determine if they contained the basic elements essential to team policing. Foot patrol, a tactic used in COP, has also been examined to see if it reduces crime and fear of crime. Several studies have already occurred to evaluate some police departments' COP efforts. One fear reduction study was in Houston (Brown and Wycoff, 1987) and another was in

Newark (Pate et al., 1985; Williams and Pate, 1987). Other cities include Flint (Trojanowicz, 1982); New York City (McElroy et al., 1993); and Oakland (Reiss, 1985). Problem-oriented policing has been evaluated in Newport News (Eck and Spelman, 1987b) and Baltimore County (Cordner, 1985, 1986 and Taft, 1986).

It is essential that police departments learn from each other's failures and successes. Through this knowledge, a greater understanding of what works and what doesn't work is discerned. If COP is effective in reaching some of its goals, other police departments can learn from these efforts and implement them in their own jurisdictions.

For this reason, it is vital that changes in police practices and methods be analyzed to see if meaningful results occur. Past police techniques and practices must be understood to see how they have contributed to the evolution of community oriented policing. The rest of this section examines this evolution of policing, from early foot patrols to motorized patrols, team policing, and current COP efforts. Community policing and problem-oriented policing, two components of COP, will also be discussed.

How Community Policing Came About

The philosophy of community policing has been accepted by many because of the growing realization that the traditional approach of preventive patrol and rapid response was not effective. To understand why, let's go back to when the modern police force began and briefly review police history.

When Sir Robert Peel started the first organized police force in London, his Bobbies were on foot and in close contact with the citizens they served. Their mission

was to walk the streets so they could "be seen in every part of the beat every ten or fifteen minutes and thus to be available to assist citizens in need, to become acquainted with inhabitants, and to be a deterring presence for criminals" (Cole, 1989:221).

This policing model was soon adapted in the United States. However, with the professional reform that followed and technical advances such as the telephone, two-way radio, and automobile, police strategies changed. The telephone made it possible for citizens to call the police twenty-four hours a day. As calls increased, the police became reactive in their approach to law enforcement. The radio enabled the police to communicate better with each other. It also contributed to reactive responses as officers, dispersed throughout the department's jurisdiction, were dispatched to calls by radio. Police were put in cars to increase response and reaction times, and cruised their area randomly to deter criminal activity. Police could now cover large geographic areas and arrive at the scene of an incident within minutes. The police philosophy soon shifted to preventive patrol and rapid response. The prevailing philosophy was that crime could be deterred by a visible motorized patrol (Sparrow et al., 1990). The police became reactive and police work was primarily incident-driven.

This philosophy was scrutinized beginning in the 1960's when the Uniform Crime Reports showed increases in crime during that time period. Also, in the late 1960s and early 1970s there were many grievances with police responses to civil rights demonstrations, race riots, and political protests. These grievances produced questions from the public, government leaders, scholars, and police administrators about police practices and

racial conflicts between minorities and the police. In fact, Samuel Walker said that the "vast majority of the riots of the 1964-1968 period were precipitated by an incident involving the police" (Kenney, 1989:272). According to Goldstein (1990), this increasing hostility toward the police caused by the racial disturbances in the 1960s made the police aware that they had distanced themselves from minorities. Eck and Spelman (1987c) suggested that the riots in the 1960s caused the police to examine their community ties.

David Carter (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1990) felt one of the solutions was for the police to establish communications with the community. He said that the 1967 President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice examined policing and recommended changes in how the police related to the community and how they delivered service. Carter continued by saying:

> In 1968, two additional important series of government reports addressed the relationship between law enforcement and the community. Both the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (Kerner Commission) and the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence examined the riots of the 1960s and the circumstances that contributed to civil disorder. Important findings indicated that the police paid too little attention to effective organization and deployment strategies and also to community issues and concerns (1990:166).

The first attempts to improve community ties were community relations units and civilian review boards. However, the community relations units didn't change the behavior of the street officers. Additionally, there were objections to the civilian review boards, so most of them were dismantled. Because of these apparent failures, police administrators then decided to initiate efforts that would increase police-citizen interaction.

Researchers also questioned the effectiveness of random motorized preventive patrols, and incident-driven police work (rapid response) in deterring crime. According to Samuel Walker: "Community policing and problem-oriented policing have their roots in the police 'research revolution' of the 1960s and 1970s. A number of studies have challenged the assumptions underlying traditional police work" (1992:176).

One of these research projects was the 1972 Kansas City preventive patrol experiment (Kelling et al., 1974). This study found no significant difference in crime rates between the areas with increased patrol coverage and the areas with less patrol coverage. Walker (1992) said there were two significant findings from this experiment. First, increased patrols in an area didn't reduce crime. The second finding was that reducing patrols in a beat didn't lead to increases in crime. These findings revealed that officers on patrol have a lot of uncommitted time, and the time they do spend on random motorized patrol was not effective in deterring crime. This study "suggested that police departments could be more flexible in patrol assignment. They did not have to adhere to a rigid formula of maintaining continuous patrol coverage in all areas, twenty-four hours a day" (Walker, 1989:133). Police departments could pull their officers from random patrol and use them elsewhere without fear that the crime rate would increase in the area they were removed from. This study also found no significant differences between the areas and the level of citizens' fear or their satisfaction with police (Kelling et al., 1974).

Another study was done in Kansas City to examine how response times affected a suspect's apprehension. They discovered it was not police response times, but how

quickly people contacted the police that increased the chance of an arrest (Kansas City Police Department, 1980). These results challenged the long-standing assumption that rapid police responses were needed to increase the likelihood of an arrest and improve the residual effects of reducing and controlling crime. This study shows that rapid response alone was ineffective in catching suspects and suggests that the police could use their resources in more productive ways.

Sparrow, Moore, and Kennedy said the problem with the traditional style of policing was that the:

> . . . goals and methods are often too narrow and ineffectual to help troubled cities win back the ground they have lost. Even in less dire circumstances, traditional policing often cannot lend cities and neighborhoods all the support it might. Crime fighting, rapid response, and the like offer neither police nor residents much of a handle when it comes to addressing-far less preventing-such diffuse problems as fear and community tension (Sparrow et al., 1990:6).

As it became apparent from these studies and others that the methods being used were ineffective in controlling crime, eliminating the fear of crime, and increasing citizens' satisfaction with the police, researchers and police administrators started considering other means. Foot patrols were one of these approaches. Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux (1990) felt that community policing's roots grew from two such foot patrol experiments. One was in Newark, New Jersey and the other in Flint, Michigan. "Both experiments reflected the growing realization that something important may have been lost in the process of putting officers into patrol cars, and that there might be a way to

update the role of the old-fashioned beat cop to address contemporary community problems" (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1990:7).

Others say an article by Wilson and Kelling (1982) titled "Broken Windows" was a major influence in changing the philosophy of the police toward community oriented policing. This article warned that one broken window left unrepaired would produce many more broken windows. Broken windows imply that nobody cares about the area, and even more physical deterioration is likely to result. It may even be an invitation to criminals. "Broken Windows" symbolizes "untended" behavior that causes the breakdown of community controls. This lack of community control may not lead to serious crime, but the residents may perceive a crime problem and fear of crime would exist because of the disorder and physical deterioration in the area. To correct this problem, the police would have to come into a neighborhood to prevent disorder and deterioration from occurring. By doing so, police would restore public order and create a safer neighborhood.

Because of the ineffectiveness of random and incident-driven policing methods, the idea soon emerged that if you want to develop crime fighting and order maintenance, citizens need to help the police by being involved in the "co-production of order". Thurman, Giacomazzi, and Bogen said that "co-production of order" is often called community policing, and explained this term by saying " . . regardless of their prepared-ness, the police cannot do the job alone-the public must be effectively involved in

reporting crime, volunteering their time to help the police, and actively participating in the problem solving of crime and related issues" (1993:554-555).

To accomplish these goals, the police needed to shift their approach to community orientation. To propagate this, there was a need to get back to the police-citizen interactions lost when police were put in patrol cars and isolated from the public. Cole felt that:

> the extensive use of motorized patrols has meant that residents have only a fleeting glimpse of officers as they cruise through their neighborhoods. In many urban areas the police are perceived as an outside force having little contact with the community and little knowledge or understanding of the problems peculiar to the neighborhood. In addition, it is argued, officers are not in a position to build up a rapport with residents that would increase cooperation (1989:220).

Community policing incorporates the basic concept of community orientation. This philosophy of community orientation has carried through from the 1960s team policing effort to community and problem-oriented policing of the 1980s and 1990s. "Despite the failure of the team policing concept in some agencies, the idea of a 'community context of policing' has remained, due to increasing evidence that the bureaucratic model and conventional police practices have not been effective" (Riechers and Roberg, 1990:105). To gain a better understanding of community orientation, team policing, community policing, and problem-oriented policing need to be explained.

Team Policing

During the 1960s, team policing was attempted by many police departments as a way to regain this police-citizen interaction. According to Fink and Sealy (1974), team policing started in Aberdeen, Scotland as a patrol experiment in the late 1940s.

> The idea was to replace traditional beats with a larger district, to be patrolled by a team of constables under the command of a sergeant who had sufficient discretionary authority to adjust patrolling methods and administrative disposition of the men in his command to suit the needs of the district. The idea spread to Salford, England, in 1950, and to the United States in the early 1960s, when it made an experimental appearance in Syracuse, New York . . . (Fink and Sealy, 1974:151).

Fink and Sealy continue by saying Syracuse contained a "new element appropriate to the times-the participation of the community" (1974:152).

An important concept of team policing was the shift "from law enforcement to order maintenance and conflict resolution" (Fink and Sealy, 1974:162). In 1973, the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals (NACCJSG) emphasized the need to increase citizen-police cooperation as a way to "prevent and control crime" (U.S. Department of Justice, 1977:2). It noted that the police had become isolated from the community. The basic rationale behind team policing was for the team to learn "its neighborhood, its people and its problems" (NACCJSG, 1973:154).

One of the best definitions of team policing follows:

> Total team policing can be defined as: (1) combining all line operations of patrol, traffic, and investigation into a single group under common supervision; (2) forming teams with a mixture of generalists and specialists; (3) permanently assigning the teams to geographic areas, and; (4) charging the teams with responsibility for all police services within their respective areas. (NACCJSG, 1973:156)

Elements of team policing fell under two categories (U.S Department of Justice, 1977). The first category included organizational and team building aspects. Officers permanently assigned to teams were responsible for a given neighborhood. By working as a team, they could provide better services to the community.

This category also includes the ideas of enlarging the patrol officers' role and creating a situation where patrol officers and investigators work together on the team. The patrol officers' roles were increased to include their participation in team and operational planning, and decision-making. This 1977 report by the U.S. Department of Justice said one of the primary goals was to encourage cooperation between patrolmen and detectives. The reason for having detectives on the team was to "streamline the investigative process and develop a more effective departmental investigative capability" (U.S. Department of Justice, 1977:5). This report continued by saying the 1967 President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice "pointed out that the rigid separation of patrol and investigative branches not only led to conflict between the two groups but also hindered efforts to solve crimes" (U.S. Department of Justice, 1977:1). This report also claimed that sharing information between patrolmen and detectives would produce better coordination of activities and police services.

The fourth key element called for a decentralized organization. Decision-making was to shift from the upper levels of police administrators to the patrol officers in the lower level of the department.

Team policing's second category of critical elements fell under community relations. First, officers were assigned to stable geographic areas. The officers worked in a defined neighborhood for an extensive period of time. This was done so the police could focus on the needs of their assigned neighborhood or geographic area. Permanent

assignment ensured that the officers would quickly learn their neighborhood and they could gain the trust of the residents (U.S. Department of Justice, 1977).

Service orientation and increased citizen contact was the second element under the community relations category. Officers would participate in community activities and use non-crime services to help citizens with some of their problems. To improve the image of the police and encourage the flow of information from the citizens, non-crime services were considered as important as law enforcement duties (U.S. Department of Justice, 1977; Fink and Sealy, 1974). The team was "encouraged to provide assistance to the people of the community, making job referrals for the unemployed, medical referrals for the ill or the addicted, and performing similar liaison services between the people and social agencies" (Fink and Sealy, 1974:155). The idea was that increased police-citizen contact would improve the public's trust and attitude toward the police, which in turn would improve communication between the two, causing the area's problems to be solved (U.S. Department of Justice, 1977). Foot patrols were extensively used as a way to accomplish this.

The third element in the community relations category sought to increase citizen participation in law enforcement. This was done through crime prevention programs, community meetings, volunteer programs, and advisory councils (U.S. Department of Justice, 1977).

Although it seemed team policing was a strategy whose time had come, it "reached its peak in the early 1970s and then faded away quickly" (Walker, 1993:33). Despite this, the concept of community oriented policing has continued.

Key Components of Community Policing

Many scholars, including Herman Goldstein (1987), Don Clairmont (1991), along with Robert Trojanowicz and Bonnie Bucqueroux (1990) say community policing is a philosophy. Trojanowicz points out that community policing is much different from police-community relations. He said:

> Police-community relations is not a philosophy, but rather a limited approach that was often viewed as public relations aimed at reducing hostility toward the police among minorities. In essence, police-community relations implies a narrow, bureaucratic response to a specific problem, rather than a fundamental change in the overall mission of the department and increased expectations of the community (Oct, 1990:8).

Riechers and Roberg said although "community policing programs vary from city to city, they all share some common assumptions, goals, and characteristics" (1990:106). This philosophy is preventive and proactive in nature as the citizens and police work together to identify problems and solve their root cause by either law enforcement or non-law enforcement means. Community policing "rejects the 'crime attack' model of policing in favor of an emphasis on order maintenance and quality of life problems" (Walker, 1993:39). Community policing strives to solve not only existing crime, but also disorder problems and physical deterioration in an area; because these problems are determined to be either a cause of crime or great concern to the residents.

Community policing does not focus on quantitative measurements such as the number of arrests made, number of traffic tickets given, response times, or clearance rates that are so common in the traditional police department. Instead, community policing focus on "qualitative measures, such as citizen involvement, fear of crime, improvement in quality of life, and real and perceived improvement in chronic problems" (Trojanowicz, 1990:9).

The principle of community policing is a partnership between the police and the community, where the community is a co-producer of solutions (Leighton, 1991) or as Thurman et al., (1993) said "co-production of order." The focus is on the neighborhood or community. In order to solve problems specific to an area, decentralized decision-making needs to occur in the police department. "This involves enhanced decision making by relatively low-ranking officers on the basis of a high level of community input" (Walker, 1993:37). Normandeau (1993) said the police need to find out from the citizens their needs and expectations. Mary Ann Wycoff said:

> . . . police and citizens should experience a larger number of nonthreatening, supportive interactions that should include efforts by police to
>
> 1. Listen to citizens, including those who are neither victims nor perpetrators of crimes;
> 2. Take seriously citizens' definitions of their problems, even when the problems they define might differ from ones the police would identify for them;
> 3. Solve the problems that have been identified (Greene and Mastrofski, 1988:105).
>
> According to Wycoff, listening to the citizens is based on a number of beliefs:
>
> 1. Citizens may legitimately have ideas about what they want and need from the police that may be different from what police believe they need;

> 2. Citizens have the information about the problems and people in their areas that police need in order to operate effectively; and
> 3. Police and citizens each hold stereotypes about the other that, unless broken down by nonthreating contacts, prevent either group from making effective use of the other (Greene and Mastrofski, 1988:105-106).

Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux define community policing as:

> . . . a new philosophy of policing, based on the concept that police officers and private citizens working together in creative ways can help solve contemporary community problems related to crime, fear of crime, social and physical disorder, and neighborhood decay. The philosophy is predicated on the belief that achieving these goals requires that police departments develop a new relationship with the law-abiding people in the community, allowing them a greater voice in setting local police priorities and involving them in efforts to improve the overall quality of life in their neighborhoods. It shifts the focus of police work from handling random calls to solving community problems (1990:5).

When citizens nominate problems and help set police agendas, it "often reveals that the community views social and physical disorder - from potholes to panhandlers - as higher priorities than actual crime" (Trojanowicz, Oct 1990:11). As a result, police may spend a lot of time on issues not directly related to crime.

To solve community problems, some key technical components of community policing must be implemented. First, the police must come in close contact with the citizens. This close contact breaks down barriers between the police and the residents and improves communications. Wycoff describes four goals of increased police-citizen interaction:

> 1. A better attitude on the part of citizens toward the police;
> 2. A better attitude on the part of the police toward citizens;
> 3. More effective police service, with "service" and "effectiveness" being defined by the police; and
> 4. More effective police service, with citizens working together to define

> "service" and ["]effectiveness." These definitions might include: (a) the provision of more or different types of service by police, (b) an increase in order, (c) a reduction of levels of fear among citizens, and (d) a reduction in crime (Greene and Mastrofski, 1988:106).

To increase police-citizen contact and break down the barriers, officers need to be freed from their patrol car and radios to maintain daily contact with the citizens in the same beat every day (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux 1990). The permanent assignment of police officers to a neighborhood instills "mutual feelings of trust and responsibility between the officers and the community" (Riechers and Roberg, 1990:107-108).

To ensure the police remain visible and accessible, a number of tactics have been used. Storefront offices, foot patrols, bike patrols, motorcycle patrols, and horse patrols have been found to be extremely successful according to some reports of community policing. In a public housing complex in Tulsa, Oklahoma; Community Police Officers (CPOs) used a horse patrol to break down barriers. The horses were an icebreaker with the citizens. "This allowed both adults and children the excuse of petting the horse as an opportunity for them to tell the CPOs about problems, including drug dealing, without drawing undue attention to themselves" (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1990:295).

Freeing the officers from their radios gives them a chance to talk and work with the residents without being constantly dispatched to calls. The officers have frequently complained that they don't have time to work the citizens' problems and concerns because they are too busy answering calls for service. The Los Angeles Police Department's Wilshire precinct found themselves in this situation.

> Street drug dealing was rampant; there were drunks everywhere; major streets had been all but taken over by prostitutes. The area seemed dangerous and uninviting, and Wilshire's respectable residents clamored constantly for increased police presence and attention. Many of Wilshire Area's patrol officers were frustrated too. Virtually all they did was answer 911 calls, many to situations that though indisputably important were not even remotely emergencies-scenes of stolen cars or burglaries many hours old-and they felt they were wasting their time (Sparrow et al., 1990:8).

According to Cordner and Hale (1992), the Houston and Newark studies showed one of the successful components in community policing was when the officers were provided time to interact with the citizens.

With the barriers removed, the residents start talking to the police, provide them information about problems, and participate in solving the area's problems. The end result is another technical component - the residents become co-producers of solutions to the problems in the ares.

In 1985, the Los Angeles Police Department started the Wilshire Community Mobilization Project with eight SLOs (Senior Lead Officers). As residents got to know the officers, bonds formed. These bonds produced information on crimes. One individual came into the police station and told an officer he could give him information on a shooting that had occurred the day before. The officer then went out and picked up the suspect (Sparrow et al., 1990).

Public meetings and citizen advisory councils are another tactic used to break down barriers and get residents involved in the solutions. A number of police

departments have been successful with these types of meetings, including Baltimore County and Philadelphia.

> In each of Philadelphia's 23 police patrol districts, neighborhood advisory councils have been formed with the explicit purposes of (1) providing community access to police policymaking and (2) establishing an accountability linkage between the police and the consumers of police services, the public. These advisory councils meet regularly with district captains to identify and assess community problems, and jointly to determine strategies (police and community) to resolve those problems (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1990:385).

Other activities include establishing neighborhood watch programs, liaison officers, police sponsored recreational programs, meeting residents and business owners, and attending community meetings.

Two other components of community policing go together. They are "an expanded police role in society . . . and greater linkage of the police service with the 'community' and external environment" (Clairmont, 1991:471). The officers' new role emphasizes service as they become community organizers and planners, ombudsmen, liaisons, and "brokers" of services (Walker, 1993; Greene and Mastrofski, 1988; Eck and Spelman, 1987c) and not simply crime fighters.

To help solve problems in the community the police can organize the citizens or seek help from agencies outside the police department. Many police departments have formed partnerships with government agencies or private organizations to tackle community problems. In some instances code enforcements are required, mental health assistance is needed, roads need to be repaired, garbage collected, and playgrounds repaired.

In Madison, Wisconsin, one officer solved a gambling and drinking problem in a local park by getting city officials to pass an ordinance against gambling (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1990). Officers have also worked with city officials to clean up decaying neighborhoods and apartment complexes.

The Houston Police Department's efforts in the Link Valley apartment development is an example of how civic organizations can help police solve neighborhood problems (Sparrow et al., 1990). In 1986, drug trafficking hit the area and quickly took it over. Many of the residents left the area and the abandoned apartments were taken over by drug dealers who catered to a drive-through clientele. The Stella Link Revitalization Coalition formed from several local civic associations and helped the police and the Link Valley residents reclaim their streets.

The solution was to focus on the customer because arresting the dealers was not working. If they took away the customers, the dealers would leave. The second approach was to tackle the area's physical decay. The plan was for the police:

> to secure the streets of Link Valley and interrupt the flow of drive-through drug buyers. Mindful of the inefficacy of their traditional buy-and-bust tactics, they decided instead to throw a perimeter around the area, to block most access points and oversee, car by car, entrance through the few remaining (Sparrow et al., 1990:24).

They felt people wouldn't want to drive through the police roadblocks to purchase drugs. The coalition's task was to clean up the area and repair or secure the apartments so drug dealers could not move back in.

The media publicized the plans well in advance, and when police arrived in Link Valley, they didn't find any drugs or dealers. The next day cleanup started. The cordon was kept in place for a month as some customers entered the area, but the drug trafficking stopped. "Link Valley has stayed quiet. The police operation, the cleanup, the physical improvements, and the attendant public spotlight have apparently broken the cycle of crime and decay permanently" (Sparrow et al., 1990:27).

Community Policing Vs. Problem-Oriented Policing

Currently, there is a debate raging between criminal justice experts as to whether community policing and problem-oriented policing are the same. Community policing has some of the same elements as problem-oriented policing. The Criminal Justice Newsletter says, "Community-oriented policing is a generic term used to describe a variety of programs, also known in some cases as problem-oriented policing" (November 1989:1). Cordner and Hale said problem-oriented policing is a "concept that complements community policing, and that has been developing both in conjunction with community policing and separately" (1992:13).

Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux (1990) believe community policing and problem-oriented policing are not the same. They said community policing uses problem-solving techniques as a tactic. Herman Goldstein, a proponent of problem-oriented policing, also says that problem-solving techniques are being used in some community policing programs. Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux continue by saying that police departments who use problem-oriented policing identify a problem to their officers through crime-mapping

or crime analysis. With community policing the officer may discover the same problem on his own. Herman Goldstein disagrees with this. He says with problem-oriented policing, problems can be identified by the top-level management of a police department as a citywide problem, or from an officer as a problem affecting a particular area (1990).

Although Goldstein (1987) feels efforts in community policing tie in with problem-oriented policing, there are some differences. He says:

> Problem-oriented policing goes a step further than what is commonly conveyed in community policing by asserting up front that the police job is not simply law enforcement, but dealing with a wide range of community problems-only some of which constitute violations of the law. It further asserts that enforcement of the law is not an end in itself, but only one of several means by which the police can deal with the problems they are expected to handle (Goldstein, 1987:16).

Another difference Goldstein (1990) highlights is how the police engage the community. With community policing, a relationship is developed with all or parts of the community to reduce tensions, create goodwill, improve relations, and open communications between the police and the community. These ties are permanent, and the efforts are "more influenced by a desire to improve relations with the community" (Goldstein, 1990:57) than by solving problems. In problem-oriented policing, if the police feel they need to get the community involved, then they bring in a specific group to help. The ties with the community last as long as the problem exists.

Goldstein says problem solving is less systematic with community policing. With problem-oriented policing, the objective is to solve a specific problem by systematic analysis. This entails much greater and detailed data collection and analysis of

information about problems. "This means an in-depth probe of all of the characteristics of a problem and the factors that contribute to it" (Goldstein, 1990:36).

With problem-oriented policing, the officers look for the underlying source of the incident and intervene in the cause and effect cycle to eliminate the cause of the problem. According to Goldstein:

> Officers are encouraged to think in terms of problems rather than incidents. An officer permanently assigned to a community in a program that incorporates the problem approach is encouraged to pick up on the relationship between and among incidents occurring in the same family, in the same building, or in the same general neighborhood. The officer is encouraged to recognize related and recurring incidents as symptomatic of problems begging for solutions and to search for the solutions (1987:16).

Goldstein (1979) says there are three key elements of problem-oriented policing. First, problems should be defined with greater specificity. Terms such as crime, robbery, burglary, or theft are not specific enough. These behaviors can be attributed to a number of different motives and occur under different circumstances. Goldstein said:

> It seems desirable . . . to press for as detailed a breakdown of problems as possible. In addition to distinguishing different forms of behavior and the apparent motivation . . . it is helpful to be much more precise regarding locale and time of day, the type of people involved, and the type of people victimized. Different combinations of these variables may present different problems, posing different policy questions and calling for radically different solution (1979:246).

Eck and Spelman (1987a) call this "Scanning."

Goldstein's (1979) second key element is to research the problem. Eck and Spelman (1987a) call this second part "Analysis" and summarize this element by saying "information about problems must be collected from sources outside the police agency

and not just from internal sources" (1987c:37). In other words, the police shouldn't just use their crime analysis statistics, but dig deeper into the problem using information and data from many sources. Eck and Spelman (1987c) suggest using businesses, other government agencies, and citizens. Goldstein (1990) said for the police to understand the problem they need to gather information from community surveys; interview people who are knowledgeable of the problem; conduct research of literature; look in police files; talk to officers, victims, and convicted offenders; and look at what other communities with similar problems had done. Cordner and Hale (1992) also agree that the police need to gather a lot of different data to identify and analyze problems.

The third element Goldstein (1979) discusses is to explore alternative solutions. Eck and Spelman (1987a) call this element "Response," and say the police "must engage in a broad search for solutions, including alternatives to the criminal justice process" (Eck and Spelman, 1987c:37). According to Goldstein (1990), these solutions can be traditional police responses if analysis indicates this to be the best solution. However, these solutions are not limited to measures for reducing crimes and they include "anything that might be done to deal with the problems the community looks to the police to handle" (Goldstein, 1990:104). They include referrals to other agencies and a coordinated police response with help from other agencies. At this point, the police may need to get citizens or other public and private agencies involved. Other solutions may include enforcing laws the police don't normally focus on, such as building code violations, or trespassing.

Baltimore County's COPE program was successful in tackling problems that were "not normally considered to be within the realm of law enforcement responsibilities, but nevertheless contribute to fear among citizens, e.g., inadequate streetlighting, closed playground, overgrown lots, neglected potholes, uncollected garbage, and dilapidated houses or buildings" (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1990:389). In Baltimore County, the police conducted an in-depth investigation and convinced the county's development agency to start legal action against a landlord who had taken out a loan to fix building violations but had not made the improvements. In the Loch Raven Apartments, burglaries were averaging six a month and there were many street robberies. The COPE officers noted that the apartment complex had structural damage, street and building lights were broken, people could hide in trees and shrubs because they were unkempt, and the area was infested with rats and stray dogs. The police got a number of organizations together to help the residents. Two local neighborhood associations helped the residents form their own association; Baltimore Gas and Electric repaired street lights; and Animal Control, Health, Fire, and Housing Departments put pressure on the apartment manager to repair the buildings. The living conditions improve, robberies stopped, and the burglaries dropped to one every two months (Eck and Spelman, 1987c).

There was also a similar success in Newport News where the New Briarfield Apartment complex had a large number of burglaries and the highest crime rate in the city. The police found out that the owners were in default on a loan from HUD and were about to foreclose. The police chief worked with other city agencies and they convinced

the city managers that it would be cheaper to tear down the complex and build a new one then bring it up to standards.

Eck and Spelman (1987a) take Goldstein's approach one step further by adding a forth element called "Assessment." In this step, officers evaluate a solution to see if it was effective in solving the problem. If the problem had not been corrected, then any of the above three steps could be initiated again.

As I mentioned earlier, community policing and problem-oriented policing share some of the same components and both exist under the umbrella of COP. The intent of this section was to show similarities between the two and the many ideas they share. In fact, many police departments implementing community policing have also incorporated the elements inherent in problem-oriented policing. Goldstein (1990) identifies Flint, Michigan; New York City; and Los Angeles, California as departments that have done this. The Omaha Police Department is another one.

CHAPTER 2

PAST STUDIES

Numerous studies have been conducted since the 1970s to evaluate the effectiveness of police strategies that employ the concept of police-citizen interaction. These studies include the Cincinnati Team Policing program in the early 1970s, foot patrol experiments in the late 1970s to early 1980s, and COP during the 1980s. Many of these evaluations used some of the same measurable variables to test their hypotheses that I will use to evaluate the Omaha Police Department in the final chapter of this thesis.

In the next few sections of this chapter, I will discuss some of the hypotheses of these past studies and the variables used to test them. Although I use the term COP in these hypotheses, each of the studies mentioned above can be substituted.

Hypotheses and Associated Variables

Crime and victimization have been evaluated in almost all of these past studies. The hypothesis says that fewer crimes will occur in areas that have COP than in areas that don't. One of the reasons this should occur is because COP focuses on the area's crime problems and is more proactive than a patrol that just responds to calls for service. Through problem intervention, the police may prevent a future crime from occurring as they eliminate opportunities for crime by fixing the root cause; thus driving the offenders out of the area. Additionally, because of their trenchant presence, the police may be more

of a deterrent than a random vehicle patrol. Another reason why crime should decrease is related to the increased police-citizen contact. As barriers are broken down, citizens may provide the police more information about crimes or help in other ways to rid the area of crime.

The crime data usually evaluated are the UCR Part I and II offenses. There are two problems with interpreting UCR data. First, many crimes are never reported to the police so it is difficult to evaluate changes. Another problem that should be considered is that more crimes may be reported as the residents get to know the police and trust them more. To adjust for these problems, victimization surveys are also conducted to measure changes in crime.

Disorder problems, sometimes called social disorder, have also been evaluated. The hypothesis tests Wilson and Kelling's "Broken Windows" theory that COP can reduce disorder and neighborhood decay. Although these problems are considered less serious than the UCR Part I Index crimes, many residents feel they must be addressed. They consist of things such as a loud party, a group of rowdy teenagers, prostitution, the homeless, drunks, or drug addicts. The same reason that COP should be effective on crime holds true for this category. The variables analyzed are obtained from citizen surveys designed to measure their perceptions of these problems.

Citizens' perception of crime in the areas has been evaluated to test the hypothesis that citizens will notice less crime in the COP area. Numerous variables are used in this

analysis including asking respondents about categories of crime, specific crimes, or about their general perception of the area's crime problems as a whole.

Fear or worry about crime has also been studied. The hypothesis is that COP reduces citizens' fear or worry about crime and social disorder more than the traditional police approach. "The traditional police response to fear of crime has been to attack crime, in the hope that reducing crime overall will ultimately lessen fear" (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux 1990:131). The Kansas City studies showed that random patrols and rapid response weren't effective in reducing crime, fear of crime, or increasing the chance of making an arrest at the crime scene (Kelling et al., 1974; Kansas City Police Department, 1980). Because crime was not deterred, citizens' fear of crime was not lowered. The Kansas City Preventive Patrol Study (Kelling et al., 1974) also found that people didn't notice an increase in patrol coverage. With COP, the citizens should notice the police more and become less fearful of crime because of the deterrent effect produced by their presence.

Fear can also come from the disorder problems in the area. The traditional police response has focused on more serious crimes, not some of the lesser disorder problems that affect most cities. With COP, the police may attack some of these disorder problems, thus reducing residents' fear.

Variables used to determine fear and worry about crime have been measured with surveys. Respondents were asked to rate their fear or worry about crime in the area,

along with their concern of being a victim of crime or specific types of crime. Self-protective measures have also been used. The expectation is that as these measures decrease, citizens feel safer and fear crime less.

Citizens' satisfaction with the area is the fifth type of evaluation conducted. This hypothesis states that citizens will be more satisfied with an area that utilizes a COP philosophy than with one that doesn't. Increased satisfaction occurs because the residents feel somebody cares about them and wants to improve their quality of life by reducing crime and disorder problems. This variable is measured by surveys that ask respondents the degree of satisfaction they have with the area or if the area has improved.

A final evaluation frequently conducted is on police-citizen relationships. Here, they test the hypothesis that citizens in COP areas more positively rate the police than in areas served by the traditional motorized patrol. This occurs because the police are taking an active part and showing the residents that they care about them and their environment. The variables measured are collected by surveys and include citizens' satisfaction with the police, perceptions of how the police treated them, their perceptions of the officers' attitudes, and how effective they feel the police are.

The remainder of this section will discuss a number of studies, the variables used to test these hypotheses, and their findings. I will also explain the experimental design used. Some of the studies were questionable because of either design flaws or lack of statistical analysis. These problems make it impossible to determine the effectiveness of the strategy tested. Additionally, some of the studies contained more than one

experimental treatment associated with community policing. I will report the results from each one separately. It is essential in our exploration of COP to know what was effective and if the hypothesis was supported. In the conclusion of this chapter, I will show how the studies support a particular hypothesis.

The Cincinnati Team Policing Experiment

The Cincinnati Community Sector Team Policing (COMSEC) experiment was evaluated by The Urban Institute for the Police Foundation (Schwartz and Clarren, 1978). The "experiment and evaluation lasted from March 1973 until September 1975. Its major goals were to reduce crime and improve police-community relations" (Schwartz and Clarren, 1978:3). It was initiated in District 1 where 25 percent of the city's reported crimes occurred. This district contained a business area, along with middle-class and low-income residential areas. The district was divided into six sectors and a team was assigned to each sector.

Surveys of citizens and small businesses were used to determine their perceptions of crime and the police. Five surveys were conducted. The first was at the beginning of the experiment then at the 6, 12, 18, and 30 month time periods. The results from District 1 were compared with the results from Cincinnati's other districts. During the first 18 months of COMSEC, the number of citizens in District 1 who reported feeling "very unsafe" walking in their neighborhoods at night decreased; but in the rest of the city no significant improvements were noted. District 1 residents also reported being less fearful of traveling in Cincinnati. This decrease was greater than the decrease in the rest of the

city. Citizens' satisfaction with police service did not change, but remained high during the experiment in both District 1 and the rest of the city.

The crime data was analyzed using UCR Part I and Part II crimes. This data was collected from August 1971 to August 1975 and was broken down into seven 26-week periods. Two of the periods were before COMSEC was implemented (March 1972 - March 1973), and the other five periods were during COMSEC (March 1973 - August 1975). A time series analysis was used to evaluate reported crimes. Burglary showed a significant decrease in District 1 during the first 18 months and increased in the rest of the city except for a decrease in District 7. This decrease in District 7 was not as great as in District 1. After 30 months burglary increased in District 1, however it was still lower than before COMSEC. For the other reported Part I crimes there appeared to be no measurable effect from COMSEC.

The analysis of victimization surveys found that burglary and robbery of businesses in District 1 declined during the first 18 months, and remained steady for the rest of the city. But in the last year of the program, the rates in District 1 returned to the levels before the program started.

These findings in Cincinnati may not be a true representation of what could have been accomplished. The authors pointed out that the program eroded gradually after the six-month point as the officers felt that management failed to support team policing.

> After 18 months of team policing, COMSEC officer expressed the belief that police managers had returned to pre-COMSEC operations and philosophy, with only the administrative structure of team policing remaining.

> Consequently, in analyzing the experimental findings, the last year of the study (between 18 and 30 months after implementation) is believed to be unrepresentative of the impact of a fully functioning team policing program (Schwartz and Clarren, 1978:25).

Foot Patrols

A myriad of police departments have used foot patrols to increase police-citizen interaction. Some departments have used them by themselves or in conjunction with other activities as part of their COP efforts. The findings from four of these studies will be discussed on the following pages. The mixed results make it difficult to come to a general conclusion on the effectiveness of foot patrols. One conclusion that appears to be fairly consistent is that foot patrols did not reduce crime.

One of the first experiments was conducted in Newark, New Jersey from 1978-1979 by the Police Foundation (1981). The project was designed to introduce foot patrol officers to upgrade and stabilize target neighborhoods. According to Greene and Mastrofski (1988), they wanted to address the untended property and untended behavior defined as a community problem in the "Broken Windows" article. Eight beats had been patrolled on foot consistently since the beginning of the Safe and Clean Neighborhoods Program. These beats were matched into four sets of two beats each. One beat was selected to continue foot patrols, and they were terminated in the other beat. Additionally, foot patrols were started in four new areas.

Using victimization surveys and reported crime, the Police Foundation concluded that foot patrols didn't have a significant effect on the crime level. In support of foot

patrols, the report said that citizens' fear of crime went down and feelings of personal safety increased when foot patrols were added. This was further validated when they found a reduction in the use of self-protective measures in the beats where foot patrols were added. Additionally, residents in the beats where foot patrols were added also noted a much greater decline in the severity of crime problems than in the other two areas and evaluated police performance as being better.

Another study was conducted in Flint, Michigan from 1978-1981 (Trojanowicz, 1982). The effort in Flint went further than the Newark experiment. In Newark, they used foot patrols as a limited tactic to see if they could deter crime. But in Flint, foot patrol officers were used as part of a strategy to involve police in community problem-solving.

> In addition to law enforcement responsibilities, foot patrol officers in Flint were charged with being 'catalytic agents who encouraged citizens to band together in the effort to combat crime'. Such activities reflect the expanded police role envisioned by Wilson and Kelling (Greene and Mastrofski, 1988:207).

Fourteen neighborhoods were targeted by placing twenty-two foot patrol officers into neighborhood base stations. These foot patrols were in addition to motorized patrols, crime prevention, and undercover operations. The neighborhoods were selected because of crime concerns, and because they exhibited the strong citizen support that was essential for its success (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1990). The results from the foot patrol areas were compared with the control areas that did not have foot patrols.

The crimes evaluated were burglary; automobile theft; assault; vandalism; robbery; criminal sexual assault; and larceny from a home, a person, or a vehicle. Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux (1990) reported that crimes declined by 8.7 percent in the experimental neighborhoods, while in the city as a whole crime increased.

> Breaking the figures down further, of the nine crimes analyzed, all except burglary and robbery declined over the three years, with criminal sexual conduct down most (46%). If burglary and robbery are subtracted from the total, the rate for the remaining seven crimes dropped 21.8% during the experiment (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1990:215).

Cole (1989) said robberies and burglaries increased in the city as a whole, but didn't increase at the same rate in the experimental beats.

To see what residents thought about the crime problems in the area, Trojanowicz used a panel sample to survey the same individuals over a three-year period. At the end of this period, 48 percent of the residents felt foot patrols had reduced crime in their areas, 15 percent said it had not, while 37 percent had no opinion (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1990).

> When the people surveyed the third year were asked if they felt crime was a more serious problem in their neighborhoods, compared to other neighborhood, only 14% said this was true. Roughly half (49%) said their area had fewer crime problems, while another 26% rated the crime problem in their area as average (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1990:217).

He also reported that the panel said, "their victimization rate was cut in half by the end of the third year of foot patrol" (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1990:219).

Additionally, he asked about their fear of crime. "At the end of the third year, roughly 70% of those surveyed reported feeling safer as a result of foot patrol...This

perception of safety increased each year during the three years of the experiment" (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1990:216-17).

There were problems that make this study's findings questionable. First is the problem with the survey used to determine citizens' perceptions of reduced crime and public safety. There was nearly a 50 percent panel mortality as the researchers lost almost half of their survey participants by the end of the third year. In a book edited by Greene and Mastrofski, this problem was discussed in a chapter authored by Greene and Taylor.

> A panel of local community residents-6 from each of the 14 patrol areas-reported on citizen perceptions of crime and public safety. By the third year of the evaluation, the total number of panel residents had declined to 44. Such a high level of respondent mortality makes inferences about the program effects tenuous (Greene and Mastrofski, 1988:207).

Pate (Kenney, 1989) noted that because the panel sample was small, averaging three people per area, the validity was in question.

Greene and Taylor pointed out other problems. There were no tests of statistical significance used to measure citizens' fear of crime or the reduction in crime. They also noted that there was no mention of any controls for the displacement effect; and because there were wide variations in reported crime between the foot patrol areas, they didn't feel that foot patrols caused the crime reduction. They said:

> . . . in certain foot patrol areas, crime declined by as much as 66 percent, while in others, crime increased by as much as 52 percent. Crimes such as vandalism and assault decreased when examined across foot patrol areas, while robbery increased. This pattern suggests that crime rate changes in program areas were not influenced by the foot patrol program, but rather

> were driven by local dynamics in each area (Greene and Mastrofski, 1988:207).

One last problem with this study dealt with the control beats. The study started out with twenty-two police officers in fourteen beats and later went to forty-four officers in forty-four beats, then down to thirty-six officers in thirty-six beats. Eventually, the whole city was covered by foot patrols (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1990). Because the control beats were constantly changing, it was impossible to control for the experiment.

In 1983 a study in Boston was conducted (Bowers and Hirsch, 1986), where 300 officers were placed on foot patrol throughout the city. These officers were responsible for less serious crime and non-crime service calls. The researchers wanted to examine changes in the priority of calls-for-service (serious crime, less serious crime, and non-crime related) among the 105 beats based on the different levels of foot patrol (high, medium, low, unstaffed, or no change). They analyzed differences in the priority of calls received from 1981 to 1984.

Greene and Taylor (Greene and Mastrofski, 1988) said no statistical differences were noted between the level of foot patrol service and crime control or order maintenance. The types of crime were not affected by the level of foot patrol activity.

> Violent crimes, such as aggravated or simple assault, were unaffected by changes in foot patrol staffing, while street robbery dropped but commercial robbery rose in the foot patrol beats with added staffing. Property offenses actually increased in the foot patrol beats where additional officers had been added, suggesting some reporting effects, although burglary produced little change. Disturbance behaviors, those most closely associated with the order maintenance activities of the police,

> fluctuated across the high staffing beats but in inconsistent directions; minor disturbances increased, gang calls increased, and noisy parties dropped. (Greene and Mastrofski, 1988:214)

Police involvement in area problems is an important element in COP, and one of the tactics in COP is foot patrol. This involvement may be more important than simply having an officer in the area. Ben Davis uses a quote by Robert Trojanowicz to elaborate on this:

> . . . if an officer's walking along (the beat) in the traditional way, he won't affect the crime rate. Patrolmen who operate that way are just motorized officers without a car. Basically, they're doorshakers. But when the officer becomes actively involved in the community, that's when crime problems begin to be solved (Davis, 1984:41).

To determine if just the foot patrol tactic or a COP program called "ombudsman policing" was more effective, Antony Pate (Kenney, 1989) evaluated a 1986-1987 experiment in Baltimore. Ombudsman policing was "an effort by police officers to ascertain and address the problems identified by residents of particular neighborhoods" (Kenney, 1989:119). Two different neighborhoods were picked; South Baltimore, located in southeast Baltimore, and New Northwood/Howard Park, located in northwest Baltimore. Three experimental areas in each neighborhood were selected to randomly receive the treatment of either foot patrol, ombudsman policing, or no new police program. A random panel sample of residents in each of the six experimental areas was surveyed before and 12 months after the experimental treatment started. They also evaluated crime data for the six areas going back 29 months prior to the start of the experiment.

The analysis of the survey questions produced a number of findings that appear to favor ombudsman policing over foot patrols. First, there were statistically significant improvements in the evaluation of police effectiveness in both ombudsman policing areas. In the foot patrol areas a decrease in police effectiveness was found.

Citizens' perceptions of area problems were also evaluated. When respondents were asked about disorder problems, statistically significant reductions were found in the ombudsman policing areas, and statistically significant increases were noted in the foot patrol areas. For perceived property and personal crime, the two ombudsman areas showed a reduction in both types of crime, but it was not statistically significant. For foot patrol it was mixed as the southeast area showed an increase and the northwest area a decrease in both types of crimes. When asked about the "likelihood of crime," all of the areas except the foot patrol in the southeast had a decrease. As for area safety, all areas had an increase.

The surveys also asked respondents if they had been a victim of a burglary, larceny from person, larceny from auto, auto theft, vandalism, assault, or robbery. The only statistically significant reduction was auto theft in the ombudsman policing areas. There were several statistically significant findings when respondents were asked if they knew anybody living in the area who had been a victim of these crimes. When both foot patrol areas were combined, six of the crimes showed statistically significant reductions. When both ombudsman policing areas were combined; awareness of all crimes decreased, but only assault was statistically significant. When the foot patrol areas were

evaluated separately by neighborhood, all the crimes in the northwest area decreased, but in the southeast area three increased. A mixed result also occurred in the ombudsman area when evaluated individually. Burglary, larceny from auto, and vandalism increased in one neighborhood and decreased in the other.

The analysis of reported crime was broken down into Part I and Part II crimes. When both areas were combined, the foot patrol and ombudsman areas had a reduction in both types of crimes, but the only statistically significant decrease occurred in the ombudsman policing areas for Part II crimes. A separate analysis of Part I crimes showed a decrease in all areas except the northwest ombudsman area; and for Part II crimes all areas decreased except the southeast foot patrol area.

The positive findings in this study for ombudsman policing would lead you to believe that citizens' worry about crime would decrease. But when the residents were asked, both foot patrol areas and the ombudsman area in the northwest had an increase. The ombudsman area in the southeast neighborhood had the only decrease.

Other Community Oriented Policing Studies

Other studies were conducted that went beyond simply putting foot patrol officers in areas. These studies were designed to either evaluate elements of COP or the whole philosophy. The National Institute of Justice funded research to evaluate different law enforcement programs designed to address the problems of fear of crime, disorder, the quality of police service, citizens' satisfaction with their neighborhood, and crime. The Police Foundation was given a grant to evaluate the programs; one in Newark, New

Jersey (Pate et al., 1985; Williams and Pate, 1987) and the other one was in Houston, Texas (Brown and Wycoff, 1987). Both studies were conducted from 1983-1984.

In the Newark study, a task force was put together to look at the reasons behind the fear of crime and ways to deal with it. The task force determined that fear of crime was caused by three sources.

The first source of fear was that citizens lacked local information about crimes and ways to prevent them. Their solution was for the police to develop, publish, and distribute a monthly newsletter designed to increase crime prevention activities.

The second source was categorized as "signs of crime." Social disorder and physical deterioration were considered here. They had two approaches in their solution. First, they established a Directed Patrol Task Force of twenty-four officers who performed specific operations in their areas at least three evenings per week. Some of these functions were foot patrols to enforce laws and maintain order, bus checks to enforce ordinances and maintain order on the buses, enforcement of state disorderly conduct laws to reduce loitering and disruptive behavior, and vehicle checkpoints. Their second approach was a neighborhood clean-up to attack the physical deterioration. Included here were efforts to repair streets, improve lighting, and collect garbage.

The task force determined that limited quantity and quality of contacts between the police and the public was the third source of fear of crime. They proposed a coordinated community policing policy as the solution. This solution:

> . . . was designed to address all three major causes of fear identified by the task force:lack of information; sense of distance between ordinary citizens

> and the police; and the social and physical signs of crime. Specifically, besides replicating the newsletter and the signs of crime programs, this coordinated effort included a police community center and a directed police-citizen contact component (Williams and Pate, 1987:58).

A "storefront" office was established so citizens could walk in and report crimes. The officers used the police-citizen contact program to meet with residents and determine what their concerns, fears, and problems were; and to distribute crime prevention information and a police newsletter. Wycoff said this project also included "intensified law enforcement and order maintenance" (Greene and Mastrofski, 1988:108).

Three neighborhoods were selected along with a control area. "Each area consisted of about 18 square blocks and contained approximately 4,500, largely black residents of low- to middle-income levels, living in about 1,500 units" (Williams and Pate, 1987:60).

Williams and Pate reported that the newsletter and "signs of crime" (including the Directed Patrol Task Force and neighborhood clean-up) programs were not effective in reducing the fear of crime. They felt that the "signs of crime" program may not have been successful "because the enforcement efforts were implemented at random and without extensive contact with citizens" (1987:67). The coordinated community policing program with its close and frequent police contact with the citizens had the greatest impact and appeared to be the only successful part of this study. A regression analyses for this program was conducted on the cross-section and panel data. Results on both sets of data indicated significant differences for: reductions in perceived social disorder problems, reductions in worry about property crime, reductions in the level of perceived

area property crime problems, and improvements in evaluations of police service. In addition, the panel data showed two other significant findings: a decline in fear of personal victimization and an increase in satisfaction with the area.

The Houston study contained five strategies that were designed and implemented by a task force composed of nine officers and one civilian employee of the police department. First, was a victim recontact program. "This strategy was designed to demonstrate police concern for victims. Police officers contacted recent crime victims by telephone to express the Department's sympathy and to ask whether the victims needed any assistance" (Brown and Wycoff, 1987:75). A community newsletter was also distributed. The newsletter included crimes that were prevented or solved and crime prevention tips. A citizen contact patrol program was the third strategy implemented. During their tour of duty, officers would stop and visit with residents at their homes, stores or offices. The officers would introduce themselves and ask if there were any problems in the area the police should know about. The fourth strategy was a police storefront office established in one neighborhood. Finally there was a program started to organize the community's interest in crime prevention. Block meetings were held and a group of residents were identified to meet with the police and discuss area problems along with possible solutions. This group conducted a neighborhood clean-up campaign, a drug information seminar, identified "safe houses" for children, and established a program to mark residents' personal property.

Four areas participated in the program and the fifth area was used as a control group. "The areas were racially mixed, low-to middle-income neighborhoods, containing an average of 5,000 persons residing in approximately 2,300 housing units. Each area was roughly one square mile in size" (Brown and Wycoff, 1987:79).

The study used an experimental design for the victim recontact and newsletter programs. Half of the victims were randomly chosen to receive the victim recontact strategy and half did not. Data for this strategy was collected at the end of the test period. To test experimentally the impact of giving accurate crime data about the neighborhood on residents' fear, 660 addresses were randomly selected in one neighborhood. A newsletter containing an insert with information on crimes that had occurred in the areas during the previous month was sent to 220 households. Another group of 220 households received the newsletter without the crime data, and the last group of 220 didn't receive a newsletter. This survey data was collected before and after the program.

A quasi-experimental design was used to compare changes over time in the treatment areas with the control area for the citizen contact patrol program, storefront, and the community organization program. The data for these strategies was collected by surveys before the programs were started and at the end of the program periods.

In the quasi-experimental evaluations they used a cross-sectional sample in which individuals were interviewed once (either before or after the program was initiated); and a panel sample where individuals were interviewed both before and after the strategy was implemented.

The study found no statistically significant differences in the panel or cross-section analysis for the victim recontact program and the newsletter. The other three programs had mixed results.

The cross-sectional results of the citizen contact patrol program and police storefront produced a significant decrease in citizens' perceptions for: fear of personal victimization, the level of personal and property crime, and social disorder. Additionally, the citizen contact patrol program resulted in a significant increase in satisfaction with the area. The community organization program decreased significantly the perceptions of social disorder and increased the evaluation of the police.

In the panel analysis, the citizen contact patrol program had significant reductions in perceptions of area social disorder, greater satisfaction with the area as a place to live, and improvements in the evaluation of the police. The storefront significantly reduced fear of personal victimization and residents' perceptions of personal crime only. The panel analysis of the community organization program produced four significant differences. "Respondents in the program area had lowered perceptions of personal and property crime and social disorder in the area, and also reported higher evaluations of the police" (Brown and Wycoff, 1987:85).

A fear reduction quasi-experiment was conducted in Britain to replicate the citizen contact patrol programs that were considered successful in Newark and Houston (Bennett, 1991). A pre/post-test design was used to survey respondents before and one year after they implemented elements in the program. One element was the continuous

presence of an officer in the experimental area for two of the daytime shifts. The other element was resident contacts. Here the police contacted one adult in each household during the one-year evaluation period. During these contacts the officer asked the resident if they had any crime problems or quality of life issues that the police could help them with. The West Midlands Police Department, which serves Birmingham, and the Metropolitan Police Department, which serves London, participated in this study. The first survey was conducted in June and July 1987. The second survey was conducted in August and September 1988.

Among the items Bennett evaluated were fear of crime, satisfaction with the police, and victimization rates. For fear of crime, he reported "reductions in worry about victimization and improvements in perceptions of personal safety in both" (1991:7) experimental areas. However, in Birmingham the control area also had improvements in all four of the items measured under the fear of crime category; while in London the control area showed an improvement in one of the four items in this category. Because there were no significant differences between the control and experimental groups, Bennett concluded that the resident contact patrol program did not have an impact on fear of crime. As for satisfaction with the police, improvements occurred in both the experimental and control areas. However, the improvement was significantly greater in the experimental areas. For the victimization rates, Bennett found no significant difference between the experimental and control group areas.

In 1983, Reiss (1985) conducted a study in a portion of Oakland, California's Central Business District (CBD) that was a "hot spot" for crime. The crime rate in this area had been rising over the years and so had the fear among people that went into this area. Soft-crime was another source of fear, and Reiss said it included:

> . . . verbal and physical harassment, behavior offensive to private morals such as lewd and lascivious conduct, blaring sounds, panhandling, jostling, chronic loitering, littering, bizarre and frightening behavior, soliciting or importuning, and public behavior disclosing the use or influence of alcohol and drugs (1985:6).

Oakland implemented a diversified patrol strategy using foot patrol, mounted patrol, Cushman small vehicle patrols, a motorcycle patrol, and a car patrol. Also established was a Report Incidents Directly program in which people could fill out a postcard sized incident report on "any irritating or disruptive behavior" (Reiss, 1985:22) and give it to the police. The focus was on soft-crime and "untended" behavior (Greene and Mastrofski, 1988).

Reiss evaluated the results by comparing changes in crime rates for the central district with rates from the entire city. Since the program started in early 1982, his base rate was for 1981 and he used crime data from 1982 and 1983 to compare differences. The study showed a drop in the rate of personal and property crimes in the CBD, and these decreases were greater than the declines city-wide. But when Greene and Taylor (in Greene and Mastrofski, 1988) re-examined the data they questioned the findings because there were no statistical tests reported.

The police department in Reno, Nevada implemented a concept called "Community Oriented Policing-Plus" in June 1987. It was evaluated using a longitudinal survey research method (Bradshaw, Peak, and Glensor, 1990 and 1992). There were five telephone surveys conducted (June 1987, March 1988, November 1988, March 1989, and April 1990) in which respondents were asked a number of questions including their perception of the Reno Police Department's image and overall performance, and if Reno was a safe place to live. Part I offenses reported to the police were also examined.

Statistically significant increases were noted for citizens' perceptions of the police department's image and performance. In June 1987, 31.6 percent said the department had a "good" or "very good" image. By April 1990, it increased to 56.5 percent. In June 1987, 49.1 percent rated the department's performance "good" or "very good." This number improved to 73.8 percent in April 1990. There was also a significant increase in respondents who felt Reno was a safer place to live. For the reported Part 1 offenses, the numbers increased over the evaluation period. The authors felt this increase could have occurred because more land was annexed and the population grew.

The Madison, Wisconsin Police Department implemented an Experimental Police District (EPD) in one of their six districts in April 1988. The EPD was part of a "Quality Policing" concept that used community policing and problem-solving policing.

> The Quality/Productivity management philosophy emphasizes the importance of knowing the needs and preferences of the customer, the analysis of systems to improve processes and products, the involvement of employees in decisions about how to improve systems, and the use of quantitative data for organizational decision-making (Wycoff and Skogan, 1993:9).

Wycoff and Skogan (1993) evaluated citizens' perceptions using a quasi-experimental design. A random sample of Madison residents were surveyed before and two years after the EPD started. The first survey was conducted in February and March 1988, just before the EPD station was opened, and the second survey was conducted in February and March 1990. They analyzed differences in the residents' attitudes in the EPD and Non-EPD areas over time; along with differences in attitudes between the EPD and the Non-EPD area.

The general finding was that there was a reduction in citizens' perceptions that crime was a problem in the EPD area. When asked if certain types of problems were "somewhat big" or "big", significant decreases in robbery and burglary were reported in the EPD area; while significant increase occurred over time in the Non-EPD area. When compared across the groups, the only significant difference between the two areas was for robbery. One interesting finding was the ineffectiveness of the EPD on drug use and the sale of drugs. The EPD area had a six percent increase in residents who felt drug use and sales by adults and juveniles were big problems. In the Non-EPD area, there was no change for drug use and sales by adults, and a two percent decrease for juveniles. The difference between these two areas was significant. All of the respondents were also asked questions about the EPD area, which had historically been known as an unsafe part of town. "Residents served by the EPD were significantly less likely than Non-EPD respondents to feel that disorder and crime were serious problems in their areas" (Wycoff and Skogan, 1993:74).

The residents were also asked if they were a victim of robbery, burglary or vandalism to their home in the last year. The EPD area reported a slight decrease in robbery and vandalism, while the Non-EPD area reported no change for robbery and a slight decrease in vandalism. For burglary, there was a significant difference as the EPD area had no change and the Non-EPD area had an increase. Additionally, residents were asked if they knew anyone victimized from burglary or attempted burglary during the last year. The EPD area showed a slight but significant decline and the Non-EPD area showed a slight but insignificant increase. The difference between the two areas was not significant.

Respondents were asked about fear and worry of personal victimization. All residents showed slightly less worry over time, but no statistical differences were found between the EPD and Non-EPD area. For worry about property crime, the Non-EPD area had increases in all three categories and the EPD area had increases except in one category. Again, there was no significant difference between the two areas.

Satisfaction with the police was also evaluated. When they asked residents about citizen-initiated contact with the police, the EPD area was less satisfied with the officers' behavior over time and the Non-EPD area had no change. The opposite was true for officer-initiated contacts. The EPD areas improved while the Non-EPD area showed more dissatisfaction. No statistically significant differences were found within the groups over time and they did not run a statistical test between the two groups.

The authors point out that some of the findings from the citizen surveys did not produce as many positive results for community policing as expected. They felt that one of the reasons could have been that "community policing began to emerge late in the test period" (Wycoff and Skogan, 1993:82).

In Baltimore County, they developed a unique program called the Baltimore County's Citizen-Oriented Police Enforcement (COPE) program. As part of this program, they implemented the Community Foot Patrol Officer (CFPO) program. The COPE program used problem-oriented policing to identify and reduce citizens' fear of crime.

Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux said the police department stressed that the CFPOs were officers who walked the beat, identified problems, interacted with the residents, and developed solutions to problems using "resources from both inside and outside the department" (1990:184).

The program was evaluated using pre/post test research design. They measured citizens' fear of crime, citizens' awareness of COPE officer in the area, and satisfaction with the police services. In the 24 COPE neighborhoods door-to-door surveys were conducted by the researchers and the COPE officers (Greene and Mastrofski, 1988). Additionally, there was in independent assessment to evaluate changes in reported crimes. The program was evaluated by Dr. Gary Cordner at the University of Baltimore. He concluded:

> . . . COPE reduced fear by 19% in target communities, crime by 12% . . . Community awareness of police presence and satisfaction with police

> service rose 20% and 16%, respectively, a fact attributed to COPE's highly visible nature and its emphasis on creating positive interaction with citizens (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1990:390).

The program was also evaluated in three stages. Fear of crime declined through each stage; reported crime initially increased and then dropped; and awareness of the police presence increased steadily throughout the program.

> Citizen satisfaction with police services generally declined from stage one to stage two of the program (directed patrol to crime prevention), and then increased during stage three (problem-solving). Nonetheless, citizen satisfaction with police services was found to be high during all three stages of the program (Greene and Mastrofski, 1988:215).

This study also had problems that affect the validity of the findings. Greene and Taylor (Greene and Mastrofski, 1988) said there were no tests for statistical significance and the design of the study was pre/post and did not have a control or comparison group to evaluate the results with.

Conclusion

These evaluations have shown that the positive effects of COP were mixed and differed from study to study. In fact, some of the studies had completely different findings even when they evaluated the same variables. Although this makes it hard to conclude if a hypothesis has been proven, some general conclusion can be drawn.

First is the issue of COP as an effective philosophy to reduce crime. From the studies I presented, it appears that crime was not reduced. No significant differences were found in the Cincinnati team policing experiment, the foot patrol experiments in Newark and Boston, and the studies in Britain and Reno. In Baltimore, there were some

significant reductions. However, some of the positive results were diluted when the foot patrol and ombudsman areas were evaluated separately and the same crimes increased in one area and decreased in the other. Burglary and robbery went up in Flint, but no statistical tests were conducted on the other crimes that were reported to have decreased. Oakland and Baltimore County reported that crime went down, but the results were also questionable because no statistical tests were conducted.

There were some positive findings that support the two hypotheses that COP will reduce citizens' perceptions of crime and social disorder. In Baltimore, the ombudsman areas had significant decreases in the perception of social disorder, but the foot patrol areas had significant increases. In this study, perceptions of reduced crime were mixed. Results in Madison, along with the Houston and Newark fear-reduction studies also found some significant differences that support both hypotheses.

With regard to fear of crime, the findings were not consistent across studies, but COP appears to be effective in many instances. In the first Newark experiment, fear of crime went down when foot patrols were added. In the second Newark experiment and in Houston, there is again evidence to support community oriented policing. On the opposing side of this argument, fear increased in Baltimore and no significant differences were found between the experimental and control groups in Britain and Madison. In Flint and Baltimore County, fear went down but there were no test of statistical significance.

An overwhelming finding from these studies is that COP increases citizens' satisfaction and approval of the police. The team policing experiment in Cincinnati was

the only study that did not produce a change in satisfaction with the police. The foot patrol study in Newark showed improvements in police performance, and the ombudsman areas in Baltimore had significant improvements for police effectiveness. For the Newark fear-reduction studies, evaluations of the police increased in both the cross section and panel analysis of the coordinated community policing strategy. In Houston, the community organization strategy also had significant increases in both cross sectional and panel analysis. This increase also occurred in the panel analysis of the citizen contact patrol program. Significant increases with police satisfaction were reported in Britain, and in Reno the image and performance of the police also increased significantly. When the police initiated contact in Madison, citizens' satisfaction with them increased, but it wasn't significant. Finally, in Baltimore County, police satisfaction increased but there were no statistical test.

As more studies are conducted, we may be able to arrive at better conclusions of COP's effectiveness. In the final chapter of this paper, I will evaluate Omaha's COP efforts adding to the growing body of research on this subject. But first I need to talk about community oriented policing in Omaha. The next chapter covers this subject.

CHAPTER 3

COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING IN OMAHA

The Omaha Police Department is currently in the process of implementing community oriented policing department-wide. Citizens, elected officials, and officers from all branches of the police department are involved in this endeavor. Omaha has implemented some COP strategies in the past, but nothing of this magnitude. This section will describe what the OPD has done in the past and what they are currently doing to implement COP department and city-wide.

One of Omaha's first efforts was District Awareness - Community Oriented Policing Via Performance. The *Omaha World-Herald* reported that this program "urged officers to step out of their cruisers and meet with residents, business owners and neighborhood groups to discover their daily difficulties" (April 10, 1994:6). This program started in 1982 and quickly disappeared.

In early 1989, the Mayor decided to place fifteen officers into the city's five low-income housing developments to address the crime problems. These areas were "hot spots" for crime, gang activity, and drug traffic. "Shootings occurred nightly. Innocent residents fell victim to gang retaliation. Fear dominated the lives of the tenants of the brick buildings, then serving as bunkers, known as the 'projects'" (Dinsmoor, Unpublished:i). The developments were run by The Omaha Housing Authority (O.H.A.)

and included the Southside Terrace, Hilltop, Spencer, Pleasantview, and Logan Fontenelle.

According to Major Jack O'Donnell, of the Omaha Police Department, each shift had two officers who walked the streets and one back-up officer in a patrol car that served as a "paddy wagon." Because the assignment was dangerous and undesirable, officers were assigned to these housing developments in reverse seniority. There was "very little focus or direction" (Dinsmoor, Unpublished:1) because the officers had different supervisors. Major O'Donnell said that this approach didn't solve any of the problems in the housing areas.

In 1990, Jack O'Donnell was in charge of the North Sector for the Omaha Police Department. He realized that these housing developments were a haven for crime and the police were receiving many calls for service there. He felt community policing was one way to stop this, but realized that the police department alone couldn't change the area. The O.H.A. also realized that their efforts alone were not enough to eliminate the drug and gang problems in the housing developments, even though they were nationally known for their efforts.

So on June 28, 1990, Jack O'Donnell and other command officers from the OPD's North Sector met with Mr. Robert Armstrong, the Executive Director of the O.H.A., and his staff to discuss police protection in the housing developments. What emerged was a partnership between the police and the O.H.A. that would benefit both agencies. The OPD had no money in its budget to effectively attack the enormous crime problems in

these housing developments, but grant money was available to the O.H.A. to help the police fight the crime, drug, and gang problems plaguing these housing developments. Also, by exchanging information, the police and the O.H.A. could identify trouble-makers and address concerns to improve residents' safety. This partnership "was committed to improving the quality of life of O.H.A. residents by making the housing developments a safer place to live" (Dinsmoor, Unpublished:1). During this meeting, the O.H.A. supervisors brought maps of their housing developments showing the trouble spots and the trouble units.

In a June 29, 1990, memo to Deputy Chief Circo, Jack O'Donnell stated:

> The purpose of the meeting was to give a brief overview of a new approach to reducing the fear of crime and apprehending criminals in the City of Omaha. It was explained to everyone at the meeting that the nine officers currently assigned to the beat patrol in the housing developments will be involved in Community Problem Solving Policing. All the nine current beat officers will be placed under the direct supervision of Sergeant Dan Heidelberg who will report directly to Lieutenant Joseph Davitt. The nine officers and Sergeant Heidelberg will work directly with each housing development to identify problems and work with the housing development community to apprehend those individuals involved in any type of illegal activity.

In the days following the meeting, Sergeant Heidelberg met with the O.H.A. Sector Supervisors responsible for each of the housing developments. During these meetings, key information concerning crime areas, troublemakers, gang leaders, license numbers, vehicle descriptions, escape routes, and tactics used by drug dealers were given to him.

Selective Patrol Unit

As part of this new partnership, the OPD officially created the Selective Patrol Unit (S.P.U.) on July 15, 1990. The O.H.A. provided space in one of their Hilltop Housing Development buildings for the unit's headquarters. They also offered the S.P.U. ". . . full and complete cooperation of all staff members, executive, supervisory and support. It also committed to follow-up with residents, using information supplied by S.P.U. officers, and employ all available options to address a problem, up to and including eviction" (Dinsmoor, Unpublished:1-2).

In November 1990, the O.H.A. received a grant from the Department of Housing and Urban Development. The O.H.A. used $232,000 of the $250,000 grant to pay the salaries of six more officers to patrol the housing developments. The additional officers brought the total to 18 police officers, 2 sergeants, a lieutenant, and a captain to patrol O.H.A.'s five housing developments.

On December 2, 1991, the Department of Housing and Urban Development awarded the O.H.A. a $525,400 Public Housing Drug Elimination Program (PHDEP) Grant to address the problem of drugs and gang violence in public housing areas. As part of this grant, the O.H.A. bought the S.P.U. $100,300 worth of new equipment (25 Saber II 48 Channel VHS radios, a Body-Bug system, 2 facsimile machines, a video camera with night infrared, and a Saber II charger).

The 17-year-old radios used by the S.P.U. had a history of functioning poorly. Whenever the radios were down the officers had to stay in their cruisers for safety

reasons, unable to walk the housing developments and talk to the residents. The unreliability of these radios also prohibited the unit from conducting surveillance operations; and they were unable to communicate directly with the Gang, Narcotics, and Organized Crime Units.

The new Saber II radios made it possible for the S.P.U. to conduct foot patrols and several successful surveillance operations in the housing developments. Each channel was secure so police scanners couldn't intercept conversations. The Executive Director of the Omaha Housing Authority, his Sector Supervisors, and the O.H.A. Crime Line Security Coordinator were also equipped with these radios. This enabled the O.H.A. to quickly report crimes to the S.P.U. officers, decreasing response times.

The Body-Bug system provided necessary surveillance equipment. The S.P.U. recorded drug transactions and gang activity in and around the housing developments using the video camera. The unit was successful arresting drug dealers in numerous undercover narcotics sting and surveillance operations using this equipment.

S.P.U.'s Mission, Goal, and Objectives

The S.P.U. is a specialized unit that patrols the Omaha Housing Authority's low-income family housing developments in an effort to make it a safe place to live. In keeping with the COP philosophy, the unit adapted community policing and they incorporated the problem-solving techniques associated with problem-oriented policing. The officers' tasks were to establish one-on-one relationships with the residents, increase

their trust in the police, and open lines of communications. The unit worked with residents to identify problems and sought their help to implement solutions.

According to a September 5, 1990, memo by Jack O'Donnell, the goal of the S.P.U. was "to reduce the fear of crime within the Omaha Housing Authority Developments." In 1991, Lieutenant Thorson wrote an inner-office memo expanding this goal "to reduce the fear of crime in areas between and around these developments because incidents that occur in these areas also directly impact the quality of life within the housing developments." The Standard Operating Procedures of the S.P.U. states:

> The goal is to reduce the incidence of crime in the area and assist the residents in taking more responsibility of the area. It is believed that this can be accomplished by using several methods. Officers and residents must establish a "trust-system" between them. The officers should also be prepared to act as a "liaison" officer between the residents and other governmental agencies in resolving non-police related problems. Last but certainly not least the officers must work with the residents in reducing the "fear" of crime in the housing developments (Omaha Police Department, 1993:Unnumbered).

From the start, a lack of community involvement was a major problem that needed to be corrected. Many of the developments' residents would not tell the police about criminal activity, and were less than cooperative when the police investigated crimes. One Sector Supervisor told Sergeant Heidelberg that many of the tenants were afraid to speak up for fear of retaliation from gang members. But, Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux (1990) stated when Community Police Officers routinely stop and talk with residents on the street, visit them at home, and attend neighborhood meetings, they can freely pass on vital information without calling attention to themselves. "It was believed

that this lack of involvement was rooted in fear, as well as a lack of trust...It was further agreed that in order to obtain this involvement from the residents a mutual trust must be established between the officers and the residents" (Dinsmoor, Unpublished:2).

Garnering the residents' trust and cooperation would take time. A "trust-system" had to be established so the residents' believed the officers wanted to reduce and eliminate crime, drugs, and gangs; and the officers needed to believe the residents shared that goal as well. Both proactive and reactive approaches were used to build mutual trust. The proactive approach focused on communications and the prevention of problems before they took root in the community. The reactive approach dealt with immediate problems and the prevention of similar problems from occurring in the future.

> This included the strict enforcement of all statutes and ordinances, as well as immediate response to calls for service within the developments. What distinguished this reactive approach from others, however, was the goal. Rather than simply "putting out a fire" by responding to situations in the housing developments, the officers strove to give the residents a sense of being heard and valued. This, it was thought, would eventually lead to the establishment of trust. Through this trust, the leap could eventually be made from crime detection to crime prevention (Dinsmoor, Unpublished:2).

The tactics associated with both of these approaches will be described later.

To reduce the fear of crime, the S.P.U.'s primary objectives were to reduce crime, drug, and gang activities within the O.H.A. developments and to address problems around the developments. Jack O'Donnell wrote in two of his memos that he felt certain tasks done by the unit would help reduce the fear of crime: (1) Have the unit members meet every person living in the housing developments; (2) Establish a communication

system with all O.H.A. Management Staff and residents; (3) Develop a positive working relationship with the O.H.A. staff; (4) S.P.U. officers attend monthly meetings of the Housing Authority Tenants Organization and; (5) Develop communications between S.P.U. officers and other officers in the area so they could share information.

When the S.P.U. first started, the officers worked from 1000 hours until 0200 hours. Two officers work the "B" shift (1000 hours - 1800 hours), and split their time between the five developments conducting spot checks. This two-officer patrol also conducted administrative tasks such as delivering information exchange forms between the O.H.A. and the Selective Patrol Unit. Eight officers worked the "C" shift (1800 hours - 0200 hours), and two-officer teams were placed in each of the following O.H.A. developments: Southside Terrace, Spencer, and Logan Fontenelle. They also combined the Pleasantview and Hilltop housing areas and used a two-officer unit to cover both. The hours of operation changed to address various problems in the developments. All of the S.P.U. officers worked for one sergeant who reported to the North Sector Lieutenant. That lieutenant reported directly to the North Sector Captain.

The officers were to respond to all calls for service within their assigned housing development. They would not be diverted to supplement calls or support operations in other areas of Omaha unless approved by the S.P.U. sergeant or the North Sector Lieutenant. This was done for two reasons. "First, it would insure an immediate response to calls for service within the developments. Secondly, it would insure that the officers would not be taken away from the developments, and that all of their time and

effort would be focused there" (Dinsmoor, Unpublished:3-4). By only responding to calls in their areas, they would be able to determine first-hand what caused the incident. They could then attempt to solve the problem, alleviating further incidents from occurring. If the officer was tied up on another response, a non-S.P.U. patrol would take the call. Sherman, Milton, and Kelley (1973) found that some of the officers involved in team policing disliked other patrols coming into the team's area because they messed up all the good things they had done. This was not a big concern with the Selective Patrol Unit.

S.P.U. Training

Training for the S.P.U. began immediately. The first training session in July 1990, involved S.P.U. members, O.H.A. senior staff, and several command officers whose areas of responsibility included the housing developments. This training enabled the O.H.A. staff and police officers to meet each other. Also during this meeting, the police explained their policies and procedures to the O.H.A. staff. In turn, the O.H.A. staff provided information about their facilities, their policies, and their procedures to the police.

Discussing each other's policies and procedures was useful to both parties. The officers learned ways to channel information to O.H.A. personnel to produce evictions, repair lighting, or report other problems that would hinder their work. Tours of each O.H.A. housing development were provided to familiarize the officers and the command staff with these areas.

This meeting was also an opportunity for the OPD's North Sector Area Supervisors to gain an understanding and suggest how the S.P.U. could work in cooperation with their cruiser officers in the housing developments. Their attendance and support was critical. Without the North Sector Supervisors' involvement, their officers may have resented the S.P.U., and a united front would not occur.

Community policing and problem-oriented policing were not formally addressed at this first session. However, the officers were given literature to read on the philosophies. They did discuss what was expected of the officers and the mission, goals, and objectives of the Selective Patrol Unit. Brainstorming sessions occurred, allowing participants to suggest some solutions to the areas' problems. The officers "came to understand that instead of simply making an arrest and ending a situation for the moment, they would become involved in defining and analyzing problems, developing solutions and selecting and implementing the best possible solutions" (Dinsmoor, Unpublished:2).

On August 6, 1990, there was a second meeting between the OPD and the O.H.A staff. The purpose of the meeting was to evaluate the effectiveness of the S.P.U. during the first weeks of operation. Sergeant Heidelberg reported the unit was responsible for the arrest of ninety people on 113 charges (36 traffic, 22 warrants, 48 misdemeanors, and 7 felonies). One of the arrests was an individual called the "Beast." He was a Blood gang member and instigator of gang activity in the Southside Terrace Homes. During this meeting an O.H.A. Sector Supervisor stated he had been getting more cooperation from the residents, especially on narcotics information. They also discussed plans to add

more foot patrol operations, targeting main offenders, and the surveillance of narcotics activities.

Meetings between these two organizations occurred every six months to discuss and analyze problems, brainstorm possible solutions, share information, and evaluate the effectiveness of the Selective Patrol Unit. Additionally, the S.P.U. conducted periodic in-service training to increase members' effectiveness within the housing developments.

On March 5, 1991, the S.P.U. conducted a two hour in-service training session on field observation cards, special operations, search warrants, surveillances, foot patrols, ban and bar letters, trespassing and loitering problems, O.H.A. tenant rules, O.H.A. information exchanges, and there was a discussion on curfews. In February 1992, the Narcotics Unit trained the S.P.U. on the use of confidential informants, evidence handling, and undercover procedures.

As the bonds and partnership grew stronger with the O.H.A. and its residents, the S.P.U. began to tackle the problems that plagued the housing developments. Community and problem-oriented policing elements inherent in COP were supplemented by traditional police tactics; as both proactive and reactive approaches were used to establish relationships and increase trust between residents and police.

Proactive Approach And Operations

The proactive approaches were designed to facilitate communications and prevent problems. They included foot patrols, bicycle patrols, an exchange form, attendance at tenant meetings, a ride-along program, Operation "Officer Friendly", youth

"Overnighters", a victim/witness support program, early intervention programs, a referral program, a Police Athletic League, and an OPD Buddy Program.

Foot patrols provided an accessibility that wasn't possible with the police patrolling the areas in vehicles. By meeting face-to-face, officers and residents got to know each other, barriers came down, and communications improved. The idea was that informal conversations would lead to discussions regarding the areas' problems.

In November 1990, the S.P.U. conducted a door-to-door survey to see if residents had any problems or complaints. During this survey, residents had positive comments about the foot patrols. Some residents said they noticed an improvement in the gang and crime situations over 1989.

With the assistance from some local bike enthusiasts, the S.P.U. started a bicycle patrol in April 1992. The bike was simply an icebreaking tool for the S.P.U. to increase interactions with the residents by making them more approachable. "Due to the built-in topic of conversation, the bike, many communication barriers were destroyed and replaced with friendly relationships" (Dinsmoor, Unpublished:5). Foot patrols were effective in accomplishing this, and they thought officers on bikes could be just as effective.

A bike offers some advantages over foot patrol or vehicle patrol. Officers on bikes can respond much faster than on foot, and the bikes can go places vehicles can't. The bike can also be used to pursue suspects much quicker than an officer on foot. Finally, an officer on a bike provides an element of surprise. Because of their speed, mobility, and stealthiness, a bike patrol officer can appear quickly from almost anywhere,

catching suspects off-guard. The bicycle patrol was a very effective enforcement tool. During its first nine months the bike patrol was involved with 259 arrests (Dinsmoor, Unpublished:7).

The officers were required to perform either foot patrol of bicycle patrol in the housing developments at least two hours per shift. The tactic they used was their choice.

Special events were another way to build rapport with inner-city residents. The S.P.U. met residents at an annual celebration known as AUGUSTFEST. The theme of this annual event, which started in 1990, was "to encourage youngsters to return to the classroom . . . and to stress the importance of attaining an education" (Dinsmoor, Unpublished:4). In addition to providing security for the event, the S.P.U. also hosted a bike rodeo.

Soon after the S.P.U. established its bike patrol, they started sponsoring bike rodeos in the low-income housing developments. "These rodeos were used as an avenue to impart bicycle safety to the youth of the developments, as well as offer another opportunity for residents to interact with officers on a personal level" (Dinsmoor, Unpublished:5). During these events, door prizes and bike flags were given away, and bikes were repaired free of charge by officers and local bike shops. The bike patrol also spoke to Girl Scouts and Boy Scouts.

In October 1990, the S.P.U. officers were involved in a Halloween "Officer Friendly" Operation. The officers passed out bags filled with candy that was supplied by the O.H.A. to about 250 children. During this giveaway, information was received by

one of the officers about a person with a gun. The individual was found and arrested. The officers then remained on foot in the developments so the children could trick or treat safely.

Two other programs proposed by O.H.A. as part of a $525,400 PHDEP grant were the Police Athletic League and the OPD Buddy Program. The Police Athletic League targeted youth likely to become involved in gangs and drugs. It was a collaborative effort between the Omaha Public School System, the OPD, and the O.H.A. The Police Athletic League provided an opportunity for the youth to participate in constructive activities instead of gangs and drugs. It also strengthened trust and a cooperative spirit between the police and the at-risk youth. The league provided officers with an opportunity to get to know the kids in an environment other than on patrol. This program was not limited to public housing youth, although the vast majority of the participants were from the low-income housing developments. The officers acted as coaches, teammates and advisors.

The OPD Buddy Program paired an officer with two youth between the age of eight and eighteen. The officer met with their buddies and parents twice a week. It promoted comradery and built relationships between the youth and the S.P.U. officers that patrol the area.

As part of the OPD Buddy Program, the S.P.U. and the O.H.A. staff hosted its first "Overnighter" in March 1991. Sixty-five children, between ten and twelve years old, spent the night with the S.P.U. officers and O.H.A. staff members in an O.H.A. facility.

This facility had a gym, study center, Ping-Pong tables, billiards tables, a big screen television, and a lunchroom. During the twenty-two hours, the officers, staff, and children played sports, games, and watched television and videos. They also discussed the dangers of drugs and gangs; and learned about self-esteem, choices and responsibilities. "This activity served to, once again, break down barriers, foster relationships and build trust between officers and resident youth" (Dinsmoor, Unpublished:4-5). This event was so successful that it is repeated every fall and spring. It has even included junior high/middle school students.

These activities fostered goodwill among the residents, but more action was still needed to control problem tenants. The key was communications between the S.P.U. and the Omaha Housing Authority. This was accomplished by the creation of the "Information Exchange Form." Both the S.P.U. and the O.H.A. staff used this form to provide information to the other agency. If people were uncooperative or extremely cooperative with the S.P.U., one was sent to the O.H.A. staff. The police also used these forms to note arrest, violations of any O.H.A. policies, along with destructive behavior by tenants or guests; and sent them to the O.H.A. staff for possible eviction actions against the tenant. Eviction would occur if the tenant was involved in any criminal activity away from the housing developments, assaulted someone, threatened anybody with a weapon, displayed violent behavior, or were involved in illegal drug activity. To do this, S.P.U. officers received arrest information and contact reports from other officers in the department concerning O.H.A. property or tenants. In addition, this

> . . . form allowed officers to relay information to O.H.A. about litter problems, street or side-walk maintenance, street light maintenance, tree trimming needs, or any other environmental issues observed during their patrol. These issues not only directly affected the quality of life for residents, but also had a profound effect on criminal activity. An area that was dimly lit and shrouded by overgrown trees could serve as a prime breeding ground for drug dealing and other covert activity (Dinsmoor, Unpublished:4).

In exchange, the O.H.A. staff sent the Selective Patrol Unit forms containing information received from tenants and other sources about crimes or other illegal activities occurring in the housing developments. This information was extremely useful in helping the police make arrests and making the area safer.

The unit also started a ride-along program where O.H.A. supervisors rode with S.P.U. officers during patrol. This was another approach used to exchange information about activities in the low-income housing developments.

To help facilitate the exchange of information between the police and the residents, the Selective Patrol Unit officers attended monthly tenant meetings. During these meetings the officers listened to the residents' questions, requests for action, and comments about the unit's activities. The officers clarified misconceptions and asked for the residents' continuing help.

All of this information made arrests possible. To make convictions stick, the residents were also needed to testify in court. To ensure that residents made their scheduled court appearances, a Victim/Witness Support program was started. The O.H.A. staff provided individuals without transportation a ride to and from court. This program "served to diminish the occasional problem of lack of cooperation on the part of

resident witnesses" (Dinsmoor, Unpublished:5). It also helped fill the critical need for follow through on the part of the residents and for them to take more responsibility for the area.

The S.P.U. and the O.H.A. also recognized the need to prevent problems from taking root in the community. Their proactive approach led to an Early Intervention program and a Referral program. Using the Early Intervention program, officers identified tenants who were headed for trouble and informed the O.H.A. staff. The staff would contact the individual and offer assistance to help the person solve their problem. The officers used the Referral program to get the O.H.A. Gang Intervention staff and Drug/Alcohol counselors involved with troubled residents.

Reactive Approach And Operations

To improve problems that needed immediate attention and prevent them from occurring again, the S.P.U. used reactive approaches and operations. One approach was to incorporate enforcement tactics used by the Criminal Investigations Bureau. The S.P.U. wrote and executed search and felony arrest warrants; and conducted buy/bust, surveillance, and reverse sting operations. They also used informants. These operations were designed to rid the developments of criminal violators and make the residents feel safer. The O.H.A. residents and staff praised these efforts. In fact, most of the individuals "arrested in the housing developments for serious crimes were not residents" (Dinsmoor, Unpublished:5).

"Based on input from officers and residents, it was determined that both open-air drug dealing and drive-by shootings were facilitated by the existence of relatively short thoroughfares through housing developments" (Dinsmoor, Unpublished:5). To correct this problem, the Selective Patrol Unit examined traffic patterns. Streets were changed to "one way" in the Logan Fontenelle and Spencer Street housing developments. Additional stop signs were also put up in the Spencer Street development. In the Hilltop housing area, they placed a barricade across a street preventing access to the development from a heavily-traveled outside street. These changes were done with the approval of the O.H.A. staff.

Another deterrent approach was traffic checkpoints. This tactic was developed as a result of both residents' complaints and inputs. The checkpoint plan was coordinated and approved by the police department, City Prosecutor, the O.H.A. staff, and officers of the tenant organizations. When the checkpoints were in effect, a sign was posted notifying drivers that it was in progress. If a driver decided not to enter the housing development through the checkpoint they could turn around without being detained by the police. When a vehicle entered the checkpoint, the police would ask for a driver's license, a vehicle registration, and proof of insurance. If these documents were not in order or some other violation was noted, the problem was immediately addressed. Officers made numerous arrests for possession of drugs and weapons, and flushed out individuals with outstanding warrants. This tactic was successful and residents' support was great.

Ban and Bar letters help prevent problems from recurring. In cooperation with the S.P.U., the O.H.A. staff and their attorneys, the City Legal Department, and the Prosecutor's Office, the Omaha Police Department added to their Standard Operating Procedure Manual instructions on using the O.H.A. Ban and Bar Letters. This Ban and Bar Letter incorporated city and state trespass laws to prohibit non-residents involved in criminal activity from entering O.H.A. property. After the letter was given to the offender, a copy was placed on file with the Selective Patrol Unit. If the individual returned, they were prosecuted on criminal trespass charges.

The foot, bicycle, and intensive patrols were also part of the reactive approach. The intensive patrol technique was used to saturate a particular "problem area with as many officers as possible, for a brief period of time" (Dinsmoor, Unpublished:7). The goal of the intensive patrol was to make the area undesirable to criminals by contacting as many residents as possible. This operation was usually done because residents requested it.

The S.P.U. developed a relationship with a wide variety of agencies. Within the police department, they worked with the Gang, Narcotics, Traffic, Mounted Patrol, and the Weed and Seed Units. They exchanged information and worked together to conduct investigations, sting operations, and drug raids. Working relationships were also formed with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; U.S. Attorney's Office; the Douglas County Prosecutor; along with the City Prosecutor and Legal Department. The Omaha

Public Power District also assisted the unit by replacing street lights within 24 hours of being notified.

The Selective Patrol Unit was a separate unit in the police department until March 7, 1994. At that time it fell under the Weed and Seed program, but still operated in Omaha's low-income housing developments.

Expansion of Community Policing in Omaha

The work done by the S.P.U. has been a springboard for the expansion of community policing in Omaha. On November 9, 1992, Mary McPherson from the San Diego Police Department provided training on problem-oriented policing to 200 Omaha officers including the Selective Patrol Unit. Between April and December 1993, the department trained 122 officers from the Northeast Precinct in community policing and the problem solving model. Additionally, the Omaha Police Department has expanded the Bicycle Patrol into all four precincts of the city. Community policing was also used in the Benson public housing areas and the north Omaha Fairfax neighborhoods as the Weed and Seed program expanded.

The city-wide implementation of community oriented policing started in December 1993, when a group of ten representatives traveled to Portland, Oregon to obtain information to help develop Omaha's COP plan. The ten members of this group consisted of representatives of the police department, city government, consultants, and a member of a local Neighborhood Association.

Following this trip, it was determined that a strategic plan would be put together to implement community oriented policing for the entire city of Omaha. In January 1994, the strategic planning process was briefed to the senior staff of the Omaha Police Department. On February 3, 1994, the proposed Strategic Plan was presented to the Mayor's staff for preliminary approval. The Mayor's office gave approval to develop the strategic plan on February 25, 1994. Three days later the police department created its Community Policing Support Unit to develop the plan. This unit was composed of a lieutenant, a sergeant, three officers, and a secretary. Omaha Police Chief James Skinner and Mayor P.J. Morgan outlined the strategic planning process during a news conference in late March 1994.

This effort incorporated inputs from the entire city as well as from the police officers and employees. Eight public meetings were conducted in April 1994 to obtain inputs from the community. During these meetings, police explained the community policing philosophy and the planning process that was going to take place. Individuals attending the meetings also filled out questionnaires addressing problems in their neighborhoods and how they felt the police should respond to them. Overall, there were 524 police employee one-on-one interviews, 224 community surveys, and 165 outside agency surveys conducted.

As part of the plan, a thirty-five-member Chief's Steering Committee was formed. This committee wrote the police department's mission statement, defined policing for Omaha, and set goals that would be used to develop the plan. This committee was

composed of fourteen police officers, eighteen citizens, two of the Mayor's aides, and was led by a consultant. The Mayor, City Council, and the Police Chief selected the citizens who participated on the committee.

The Community Policing Support Unit hosted the first meeting of the Chief's Steering Committee on May 4, 1994. This committee then met at Creighton University on May 19 and 20 to lay the foundation for Omaha's community oriented policing philosophy.

The mission statement this group wrote said: "Omaha's Police Department, in partnership with our community, is dedicated to equitably serve and protect, with respect and dignity, all individuals" (Omaha Police Department, 1995:9). They defined policing in Omaha as: "a philosophy of interdependent shared responsibility, a partnership within our community -- police and citizens -- in developing proactive community-based strategies to make Omaha and its neighborhoods safe, vital, and healthy" (Omaha Police Department, 1995:10). The committee also developed four goals:

> GOAL 1: Strengthen Community Empowerment and Support:
> Create a more involved, responsible community by building stronger partnerships, improving customer service, providing more open and responsive communications, and delivering programs that promote involvement in problem solving, crime prevention, and education.
>
> GOAL 2: Develop and Empower Personnel:
> Develop training, management, and organizational approaches that are consistent with the Mission and policing philosophy of the Omaha Police Department; assure that the recruiting and hiring philosophy and practices are consistent with the characteristics and needs of our community; provide a work environment that supports customer service, personal responsibility and accountability, and fosters a teamwork attitude.

GOAL 3: Reduce Crime and Fear of Crime:
Identify and implement strategies to reduce crime and fear of crime and improve the safety and the quality of life of citizens of Omaha.

GOAL 4: Strengthen Fiscal Support and Improve Planning and Evaluation:
Seek and promote, through a partnership with the community, increased financial support for the Omaha Police Department to make upgrades consist-ent with ongoing goals and objectives. Develop efficient and effective management strategies that will support quality short and long range planning, budgeting, fiscal management, and project evaluations (Omaha Police Department, 1995:21-24).

Eight separate planning teams composed of 67 police employees and 109 Omaha residents were also developed. They looked at each of the police department's bureaus to see how each one could better conform with the mission statement and goals established by the Chief's Steering Committee. These planning teams developed action plans for each bureau that were included in the strategic plan.

In October 1994, the planning teams completed 137 action plans that correspond-ed with the goals established by the Chief's Steering Committee. The strategic plan was presented to the Mayor for approval in February 1995.

Training and information on community oriented policing and updates on the strategic plan occurred during the months of June through October. The police recruit class was given one-day training on community policing and the police were apprised of the plan's progress. Also during this time period, community policing presentations were given to numerous community groups. These presentations continued throughout 1994.

The Omaha Police Department is now in the process of implementing the strategic plan. The action plans developed by the planning teams have been formalized.

Priorities have been established and timelines have been determined to implement each of the action plans. These items have also been projected into the budget through the year 1999. At this point in time, it appears that the Omaha Police Department is well on its way in establishing its form of community oriented policing for the city of Omaha, Nebraska.

CHAPTER 4

EVALUATION OF COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING IN OMAHA

The study of community oriented policing continues as researchers determine if it is successful and goals are achieved. In the second chapter of this paper, each of the studies either had successes or failures that adds to the growing amount of evidence. My research question focuses on Omaha, Nebraska. Will Omaha have some of the same successes or failures noted in the other COP studies? My prediction is that because COP was being implemented in the city, some of the same successes noted in these past studies will also occur in Omaha.

Hypotheses To Test

To test this prediction, four hypotheses will be evaluated in this paper. Because community oriented policing was gradually being implemented, the data that coincides with each hypothesis can be studied for changes that occur over time. The first hypothesis is that crime will decrease over time in Omaha as COP is implemented. The second hypothesis is that as COP is implemented, citizens will perceive crime as less of a problem. My third hypothesis is that fear of crime will decrease with the implementation of COP. The last hypothesis is that citizens' quality of interaction with the officers of the Omaha Police Department will show improvements over time as COP is being implemented.

Research Design and Methodology

Survey

Omaha Conditions Surveys were conducted in the city of Omaha and the surrounding counties in 1990, 1991, 1993, and 1994. Two different surveys (Metropolitan and North Omaha) were conducted from 1990 to 1993. In 1994, only the Metropolitan survey was conducted. These surveys asked a number of questions about the Omaha area and are a good tool to measure COP's effectiveness in Omaha.

Each of the Metropolitan surveys conducted random telephone interviews of adults 18 years or older in the Omaha metropolitan area. The person interviewed was the one who would have the next birthday in the household. The random telephone numbers in 1990 and 1991 were obtained from independent firms and given to the Center for Public Affairs Research. In 1990, the last digit of each telephone number was dropped and replaced with a random number ranging from zero to nine. This procedure ensured that households with unlisted telephone numbers had an equal chance of being surveyed. In 1991, they sorted the 8,000 telephone numbers provided to them on the fifth digit. For the 1993 and 1994 surveys, they used a modified random digit dialing design to include unlisted telephone numbers in the sample.

The first Metropolitan survey contained 779 cases and was conducted between January 11-29, 1990. The 1991 survey contained 632 adults interviewed from February 20 to March 9. This sample also included twenty-four randomly selected individuals from the North Omaha sample, and seven randomly selected individuals from a separate Hispanic sample. In 1993, 802 respondents were interviewed from June 24 to July 19. Finally, the 1994 survey occurred between October 10 and November 11. It contained 800 respondents.

In addition to the Metropolitan surveys, there were separate random interviews of minority households in several census tracts in North Omaha. These surveys used the same interview protocol as the Metropolitan surveys. The random sample was selected using actual telephone numbers known to be within the targeted areas. The problem with this method was that it excluded unlisted telephone numbers.

There were 200 cases in the 1990 and 1991 North Omaha surveys, and 575 in 1993. Interviews for the first North Omaha survey were conducted from January 30 to February 5, 1990. In 1991, the interviews occurred from March 14-19; and the final survey was from August 12-24, 1993. Census tracts 7 through 12 and 59.02 were used in 1990 and 1991 because the latest census indicated they had a minority population of at least 85 percent. In 1993, the number of census tracts increased to seventeen because they used areas where the black population was 40 percent or higher according to the 1990 Census. This increase in census tracts will affect the composition of my sample. I will explain how I handled this problem in the section titled "North Omaha Sample."

For each of the surveys, the Center for Public Affairs Research found that the overall demographic characteristics of survey respondents closely resembled the population of the area. In the 1991 Metropolitan sample, some differences were noted as minorities and males were under-represented. Also in both the 1993 Metropolitan and North Omaha surveys and the 1994 Metropolitan survey there were slight under-representations in the lowest income category and over-representations in the highest income category.

Metropolitan Sample

Respondents who lived in and around the city of Omaha were included in all of the Metropolitan surveys. Because I want to look at the effects of COP as it is being

TABLE I.--METROPOLITAN SAMPLE DEMOGRAPHICS

Year	1990 (%)	1991 (%)	1993 (%)	1994 (%)
A. Sample Size	433	401	489	494
B. Age				
18-34	36.5 (158)	25.9 (104)	40.1 (196)	37.7 (186)
35-64	43 (186)	39.9 (160)	42.1 (206)	43.1 (213)
65+	20.1 (87)	19.2 (77)	17.2 (84)	18.2 (90)
UNK	.5 (2)	15 (60)	.6 (3)	1 (5)
C. Ethnic/Race				
White	85.2 (369)	86.5 (347)	89.4 (437)	87.2 (431)
Black	11.5 (50)	9.5 (38)	8.4 (41)	8.3 (41)
Asian	.9 (4)	.2 (1)	--	1 (5)
American Indian	.7 (3)	.2 (1)	.2 (1)	.6 (3)
Hispanic	1.4 (6)	2.5 (10)	1.2 (6)	2 (10)
Other or Unknown	.2 (1)	.9 (4)	.8 (4)	.8 (4)
D. Income				
$0-9,999	10.4 (45)	13 (52)	8.2 (40)	5.7 (28)
$10-24,999	34 (147)	22.9 (92)	21.3 (104)	23.5 (116)
$25-49,999	36 (156)	35.7 (143)	41.4 (201)	37.7 (186)
$50,000+	8.5 (37)	14.2 (57)	21.3 (104)	22.9 (113)
UNK	11 (48)	14.2 (57)	8.2 (40)	10.3 (51)
E. Gender*				
Male	43.4 (188)	37.9 (152)	48.3 (236)	47 (232)
Female	56.6 (245)	61.8 (248)	51.7 (253)	53 (262)

NOTE: Figures in parentheses are numbers of respondents.

* The sex of one respondent in 1991 was Unknown (.2%).

implemented in Omaha, I reduced my sample size to include only Omaha residents. Table I contains this sample and its demographic characteristics. The 1990 sample was reduced to 433 people who lived in the Omaha Public School District. For 1991, there were 401 respondents who lived in the city of Omaha. In 1993, 489 people lived in the Omaha city limits; and in 1994 there were 494 people living in the Omaha city limits.

North Omaha Sample

My second sample group will represent individuals who live in or around the O.H.A. low-income housing developments where the S.P.U. operated. Street addresses were not recorded during the surveys so I couldn't determine if a particular respondent lived in or near the developments. I contacted the O.H.A. and learned that their housing developments were in zip codes 68102, 68107, 68110, and 68111; and the average resident's income was under $23,000 per year.

With this information, I decided my O.H.A. sample would consist of respondents who lived in the O.H.A. zip codes areas and had an income below $10,000. Although this is not exact, I believe that my sample closely reflects those individuals who live in or around these developments. The goal of the S.P.U. was to improve conditions inside the housing developments and the areas bordering them. With this in mind, attitudes of individuals inside and surrounding the developments should be similar. Because there was only a small number of individuals in the Metropolitan surveys who lived in the O.H.A. zip code areas and earned under $10,000 per year, my sample came from the North Omaha surveys. The demographics are in Table II. In 1990, my sample size was fifty-one and in 1991, fifty-four individuals met my criteria.

In 1993, the survey area expanded and contained more census tracts. To remain consistent, and use the same geographic area so comparisons could be made over time, I

TABLE II.--O.H.A. SAMPLE DEMOGRAPHICS

Year	1990 (%)	1991 (%)	1993 (%)
A. Sample Size	51	54	54
B. Age			
18-34	31.4 (16)	24.1 (13)	59.3 (32)
35-64	47.1 (24)	24.1 (13)	31.5 (17)
65+	21.6 (11)	46.3 (25)	9.3 (5)
UNK	--	5.6 (3)	--
C. Ethnic/Race			
Black	100 (51)	94.4 (51)	100 (54)
American Indian	--	1.9 (1)	--
UNK	--	3.7 (2)	--
D. Gender			
Male	43.1 (22)	38.9 (21)	31.5 (17)
Female	56.9 (29)	61.1 (33)	68.5 (37)

NOTE: Figures in parentheses are numbers of responses.

selected only those individuals in the same census tracts used in the previous surveys. Another problem encountered was that the 1993 survey did not ask for zip codes, so I could not select cases in the same zip codes as the O.H.A. developments. To see if this was going to be a problem, I looked at the prior surveys to determine what percent of my cases had incomes under $10,000 and lived in the O.H.A. zip code areas. In 1990, fifty-two respondents had incomes under $10,000 and fifty-one lived inside the O.H.A. zip code areas (98 percent). In 1991, fifty-four of the fifty-five cases (98 percent) with incomes under $10,000 lived within the O.H.A. zip codes. It appears from this information that income drives where the people live. So for 1993, I assumed that the probability was high that my sample of fifty-four (with incomes under $10,000 who lived

in the same census tracts as the two previous surveys) lived in or around the O.H.A. housing developments.

Outcome Measures

Crime

To test the hypothesis that crime will decrease over time in Omaha as COP is implemented, I will evaluate yearly changes in the number of crimes for both the Metropolitan and North Omaha samples. Two methods are used in the United States to measure crime. The first method is the FBI's Uniform Crime Report (UCR). The UCR contains data on crimes reported to law enforcement agencies. I will evaluate the UCR data from 1987 to 1994 for the entire city of Omaha. To evaluate what effect the S.P.U. had on crime, the Omaha Police Department also provided me with crime data for the O.H.A. low-income housing areas from 1989 to 1991. Each crime (except arson) will be evaluated individually, then grouped by crimes against persons and crimes against property for the city of Omaha and the low-income housing areas.

The second method used to measure crime is the Bureau of Justice Statistics' National Crime Survey (NCS). The NCS data comes from household surveys that asks individuals if they were victims of crime. Because many crimes are not reported, victimization surveys are frequently used to measure the crime rate. Both the Metropolitan and North Omaha surveys contained three questions that are part of the NCS and should be a good indicator of changes in crime:

(1) Did anyone break into your (apartment/home), garage, or another building on your property?

(2) (Other than the incident(s) just mentioned) Did you find a door jimmied, a lock forced, or any other signs of an ATTEMPTED break-in?

(3) Was anything at all stolen that is kept outside your home, or happened to be left out, such as a bicycle, a garden hose, or lawn furniture? (other than any incidents already mentioned).

Both of the 1990 Metropolitan and North Omaha surveys ask if the individual was victimized between July 1 and December 31, 1989. Additionally, both of the 1991 surveys ask if they were victimized between July 1 and December 31, 1990. The 1994 Metropolitan survey asked about the time period from April 1 to September 31, 1994. The telescoping problem that is controlled for in the NCS can't be controlled in this evaluation. Table III shows which years the crime data will be evaluated.

TABLE III.--CRIME DATA

Metro	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994
Crime Data	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Break-In (BI)				X	X			X
Attempted BI				X	X			X
Stolen Outside				X	X			X
O.H.A.								
Crime Data			X	X	X	X		
BI				X	X			
Attempted BI				X	X			
Stolen Outside				X	X			

Citizens' Perception Of Crime

Two areas were evaluated to determine any changes in citizens' perceptions of crime, gangs, and drugs. The first areas was their perception of changes in the crime situation. They asked if the crime situation in the Omaha area changed in the past few years for the better, has it remained about the same, or has it changed for the worse? The second area evaluated changes with how citizens prioritized crime problems. The

following questions were asked:

(1) What are the three best things about the Omaha area?

(2) What are the three worst things about the Omaha area?

(3) What are the three most important problems that the Omaha area should be trying to address?

(4) What is the one best thing about your neighborhood?

(5) What is the one worst thing about your neighborhood?

(6) What is the one most important problem that your neighborhood should be trying to address?

Table IV shows these questions and the years they were asked.

TABLE IV.--CITIZENS' PERCEPTION OF CRIME

Metro	1990	1991	1993	1994
Crime Situation Changed	X	X		X
3 Best Things	X	X	X	X
3 Worst Things	X	X	X	X
3 Important Problems	X	X	X	X
1 Best Neighborhood		X	X	X
1 Worst Neighborhood		X	X	X
1 Imp. Neigh. Problem		X	X	X
O.H.A.				
Crime Situation Changed	X	X		N/A
3 Best Things	X	X		N/A
3 Worst Things	X	X		N/A
3 Important Problems	X	X		N/A
1 Best Neighborhood		X	X	N/A
1 Worst Neighborhood		X	X	N/A
1 Imp. Neigh. Problem		X	X	N/A

Citizens' Fear of Crime

The surveys asked if the respondents were very worried, a little worried, or not at all worried about crime. This question was asked on the 1990, 1991, and 1994 Metropolitan surveys; and on the 1990 and 1991 North Omaha surveys. This question will test the hypothesis that fear of crime will decrease with the implementation of COP.

Citizens' Quality of Interaction With OPD Officers

I will use a variety of questions from the four Metropolitan surveys to test if citizens' attitudes, perceptions, and satisfaction with the Omaha Police Department will improve over time as COP is being implemented. Table V shows which years these questions were asked.

TABLE V.--CITIZENS' ATTITUDES & PERCEPTIONS OF THE OPD

Metro Only	1990	1991	1993	1994
Sat W/ Police Protection	X		X	
Sat W/ Police Response		X		X
Called OPD Was Officer Courteous		X		X
Called OPD Was Officer Helpful		X		X
Called OPD Was Officer Professional		X		X
Stopped By OPD Was Off. Courteous		X		X
Stopped By OPD Was Off. Professional		X		X
Officer Demeanor		X		X
Officer Characteristics		X		X

The following questions measure citizens' satisfaction with the Omaha Police Department:

(1) How satisfied are you with police protection at the present time?

(2) When you called the Omaha Police Department in the past two years, how satisfied were you with how quickly the police responded to your call?

There are two sets of questions that focus on residents' experiences with the police. The first set was asked to individuals who had called the Omaha Police Department in the past two years:

(1) Was the officer courteous?

(2) Was the officer helpful?

(3) Was the officer professional?

The second set of questions were asked to individuals who had been stopped (at any time) by an Omaha Police Department officer:

(1) Was the officer courteous?

(2) Was the officer professional?

Another set of questions asked individuals about their general views of the OPD officers. These questions dealt with officer demeanor and officer characteristics. The questions on officer demeanor follow:

(1) OPD officers are usually courteous.

(2) OPD officers are respectful toward people like me.

(3) OPD officers use more force than they need to in carrying out their duties.

(4) Most police officers are usually rude.

(5) Police officers show concern when you ask them questions.

The questions on officer characteristics were:

(1) OPD officers are physically fit.

(2) OPD officers are prejudiced against minority persons.

(3) OPD officers are not able to answer citizens' questions correctly.

(4) OPD officers respond quickly to calls for service.

Additionally, some of the respondents answered "law enforcement" to the questions in Table IV. Any changes over time in how law enforcement is perceived will also be a good indication of how citizens feel about the OPD.

Analysis Procedures

A two-part time-series analysis will be used in this study to see if the implementation of COP in Omaha supports my four hypotheses. The first part of the analysis will look at the entire city of Omaha. This design is possible because the first survey in 1990 occurred before COP was implemented in the entire city of Omaha. The other surveys will reflect data as COP is being introduced in Omaha. The second part of the analysis will focus on the O.H.A. housing areas where the Selective Patrol Unit was operating. The first North Omaha survey that occurred in 1990 will be the baseline as there was no real community policing effort in the O.H.A. housing areas. The latter evaluations will reflect data that coincides with the implementation of the Selective Patrol Unit. Table VI shows what activities were going on in Omaha when each survey was conducted. All of the survey questions will be analyzed using the "Statistical Package for the Social Sciences" program.

In a normal time-series design, three measurements are usually made before and after the introduction of the independent variable. Because my data is from 1990 to 1994,

TABLE VI.--COMMUNITY POLICING ACTIVITIES

1990 Metropolitan Survey (January 11-29, 1990)

1. COP was not yet implemented city-wide.

1990 North Omaha Survey (January 30 - February 5, 1990)

1. Fifteen officers working in the O.H.A. housing developments, but there was no direction or focus.

1991 Metropolitan Survey (February 20 - March 9, 1991)

1. Jefferson Square foot patrol created in July 1990 to address homeless in the Jefferson Square Business District.

1991 North Omaha Survey (March 14-19, 1991)

1. SPU started in July 1990; 8 months old.
2. August 1990, SPU involved in AUGUSTFEST.
3. October 1990, Halloween "Officer Friendly."
4. Preparation for the March 26-27, 1991 "Overnighter."
5. Information Exchange cards were being used more.
6. Traffic problems were addressed in the Hilltop and Spencer Homes in late 1990.

1993 Metropolitan Survey (June 24 - July 19, 1993)

1. Bicycle patrol expanded to other parts of the city.
2. Problem-oriented policing training provided in November 1992.
3. April 1993, started training on community policing.
4. Weeds and Seeds program expanded.

1993 North Omaha Survey (August 12-24, 1993)

1. Bike patrol started in April 1992; held some bike rodeos.
2. Ban and Bar letters started in July 1991.
3. New equipment purchased by the PHDEP Grant was being used.
4. More "Overnighters" occurred.
5. Traffic Checkpoints started in October 1991.

1994 Metropolitan Survey (October 10 - November 11, 1994)

1. City-wide implementation of community policing started in December 1993.
2. Strategic Planning to implement community policing.
3. Public meetings held to discuss community policing.
4. A lot of publicity over the implementation plans for community policing.

this was not possible. The internal validity of this method is sometimes questioned because extraneous variables can cause the noted change. Some of these changes can be caused by history or maturation.

Two other problems with the North Omaha sample need to be addressed. First, some of the questions were asked in 1990 and repeated in 1991. Since the S.P.U. started in July 1990, a time period of eight months may be too short to reflect changes in the 1991 survey. The other problem is that some of the questions were asked in 1991, after the S.P.U. was started, and repeated in 1993. Because a pretest measure was not conducted, it is impossible to determine if the first measurement is an improvement or decline over the period before the S.P.U. started. The only conclusion that can be drawn is that after the S.P.U. started, attitudes changed in a certain direction.

CHAPTER 5

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION IN OMAHA

In this last section I will show the results of the crime data and the 1990 to 1994 Omaha Conditions Surveys. The Metropolitan surveys will be used to depict data for the entire city of Omaha. The North Omaha surveys will be used for the O.H.A. housing areas. I will also discuss the findings of my analysis and draw some conclusions on the effectiveness of community oriented policing in Omaha.

Crime

The first hypothesis is that crime will decrease over time in Omaha as COP is implemented. The UCR crime data and victimization surveys will be evaluated to determine if a decrease has occurred.

The 1987 to 1994 UCR Part I Index crimes (except arson) for the entire city of Omaha along with the 1989 to 1991 data for the O.H.A. housing developments are shown in Tables VII through IX. This information was received from the Omaha Police Department. The percentage of change between the two years is in parentheses.

The first column in Table VII is the total number of Index crimes against persons for the city of Omaha and the O.H.A. area. In Omaha, crimes against persons increased 54.9 percent from 1987 to 1994. In the O.H.A. area from 1989 to 1991 crime increased 1.5 percent, while in Omaha it increased 17.9 percent during this three-year period.

Table VIII is a breakdown of the crimes against persons. For the city of Omaha, each of these crimes increased. From 1989 to 1991 there were some differences between Omaha and the O.H.A. area. Murder stayed the same in the O.H.A.

TABLE VII.--UCR TOTAL INDEX CRIMES

	Crimes Against Persons		Crimes Against Property		Total	
	Omaha	O.H.A.	Omaha	O.H.A.	Omaha	O.H.A.
1987	2537		21847		24384	
	(+9%)		*(-3%)*		*(-2%)*	
1988	2774		21170		23944	
	(-1%)		*(-3%)*		*(-3%)*	
1989	2750	194	20594	320	23344	514
	(+14%)	*(-9%)*	*(-.3%)*	*(-33%)*	*(+1%)*	*(-24%)*
1990	3140	177	20534	214	23674	391
	(+3%)	*(+11%)*	*(+1%)*	*(+6%)*	*(+1%)*	*(+8%)*
1991	3242	197	20762	226	24004	423
	(+8%)		*(+5%)*		*(+6%)*	
1992	3517		21830		25347	
	(+11%)		*(-1%)*		*(+1%)*	
1993	3899		21626		25525	
	(+1%)		*(+9%)*		*(+8%)*	
1994	3930		23611		27541	

TABLE VIII.--UCR CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS

	Murder		Rape		Robbery		Assault	
	Omaha	OHA	Omaha	OHA	Omaha	OHA	Omaha	OHA
1987	29		189		570		1749	
	(-3%)		*(+14%)*		*(+25%)*		*(+4%)*	
1988	28		216		710		1820	
	(-18%)		*(-13%)*		*(-10%)*		*(+4%)*	
1989	23	3	188	4	638	34	1901	153
	(-48%)	*(-67%)*	*(+15%)*	*(+175%)*	*(-5%)*	*(-21%)*	*(+21%)*	*(-10%)*
1990	12	1	217	11	604	27	2307	138
	(+192%)	*(+200%)*	*(-5%)*	*(-18%)*	*(+5%)*	*(-40%)*	*(+3%)*	*(+22%)*
1991	35	3	207	9	634	16	2366	169
	(-29%)		*(+3%)*		*(+7%)*		*(+10%)*	
1992	25		213		678		2601	
	(+28%)		*(-2%)*		*(+11%)*		*(+12%)*	
1993	32		209		752		2906	
	(+3%)		*(+4%)*		*(+22%)*		*(-5%)*	
1994	33		217		918		2762	

area and went up in Omaha. Rape more than doubled in the O.H.A. area and went up 15.4 percent in Omaha. Robbery was the only crime that was less in 1991 than in 1989 in both Omaha and the O.H.A. area. In the O.H.A. area robbery was cut in half. For assault both areas had an increase, however it was larger in Omaha (24.5 percent) than in the O.H.A. area (10.5 percent).

The total number of Index crimes against property for Omaha and the O.H.A. area are in the middle column of Table VII. Omaha had an increase over the years. From 1989 to 1991 there was a .8 percent increase in the city of Omaha and a decrease of 29 percent in the O.H.A. area.

Table IX is a breakdown of the crimes against property. In the city of Omaha burglary was the only crime that decreased and larceny decreased from the 1987 numbers but increased after COP started in 1989. The crime that increased the most was motor vehicle theft. There were some differences between Omaha and the O.H.A. area from 1989 to 1991. In the O.H.A. area all of the property crimes decreased even though they fluctuated each year. During this same time period all of the crimes increased in Omaha except burglary, which decreased 16 percent. This decrease in burglary was greater than the 11 percent decrease in the O.H.A. area.

The total number of UCR Index crimes for Omaha and the O.H.A. area are in the last column of Table VII. The number of crimes in Omaha increased over the years. In the O.H.A. area the total UCR Index crimes went down 21.5 percent. Comparing Omaha to the O.H.A. area from 1989 to 1991, Omaha increased and the O.H.A. area decreased.

The second part of the analysis will look at the victimization data to see if it decreased over time as COP was being implemented. The results from the victimization questions asked on both the Metropolitan and North Omaha surveys are in Table X. The sample column contains the percentage and number of respondents (in parentheses) who

TABLE IX.--UCR CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY

	Burglary		Larceny		Motor Vehicle Theft	
	Omaha	OHA	Omaha	OHA	Omaha	OHA
1987	5338		15292		1217	
	(-14%)		*(-1%)*		*(+15%)*	
1988	4580		15185		1405	
	(+4%)		*(-5%)*		*(+4%)*	
1989	4760	70	14368	188	1466	62
	(-12%)	*(+9%)*	*(+4%)*	*(-44%)*	*(-8%)*	*(-48%)*
1990	4190	76	14997	106	1347	32
	(-5%)	*(-18%)*	*(+.3%)*	*(+17%)*	*(+29%)*	*(+25%)*
1991	3986	62	15040	124	1736	40
	(-3%)		*(-2%)*		*(+87%)*	
1992	3880		14703		3247	
	(+0%)		*(-5%)*		*(+17%)*	
1993	3879		13958		3789	
	(+13%)		*(+6%)*		*(+15%)*	
1994	4398		14843		4370	

were victimized by a break-in, attempted break-in, or a theft of anything from outside their homes within six months of the survey. The demographic characteristics show the percentage and number of respondents in those categories that were victimized by the particular crime.

To properly evaluate this data, the dates of the surveys and the period they cover should be restated. Both of the 1990 surveys asked people if the crimes occurred between July 1, 1989 and December 31, 1989. Both of the 1991 surveys asked respondents about the time period of July 1, 1990 to December 31, 1990. The 1994 Metropolitan survey covers April 1, 1994 to September 31, 1994. The data from the victimization surveys in Table X shows that each of the three incidents decreased from the 1990 to 1991 surveys and went back up in the 1994 survey for Omaha. I used a program called "Biostatistics" to see if the changes from year to year were statistically significant. The results are contained in Table XXIV. The numbers shown in this table are the levels of

TABLE X.--VICTIMIZATION SURVEY

	Break-In			Attempted Break-In			Stolen Outside		
	1990 %(N)	1991 %(N)	1994 %(N)	1990 %(N)	1991 %(N)	1994 %(N)	1990 %(N)	1991 %(N)	1994 %(N)
Omaha									
Sample	9.7(42)	4.5(18)	7.7(38)	8.1(35)	3.5(14)	7.5(37)	16.6(72)	10.5(42)	17.0(84)
Age									
18-34	***18.4(29)	7.7(8)	10.2(19)	8.9(14)	3.8(4)	*9.1(17)	***24.7(39)	*17.3(18)	**22.0(41)
35-64	7.0(13)	4.4(7)	7.5(16)	9.7(18)	3.1(5)	9.4(20)	15.6(29)	10.0(16)	18.3(39)
65+	0	2.6(2)	3.3(3)	3.4(3)	5.2(4)	0	4.6(4)	5.2(4)	4.4(4)
Don't Know	0	1.7(1)	0	0	1.7(1)	0	0	6.7(4)	0
Race									
White	**7.9(29)	**3.2(11)	7.4(32)	*6.8(25)	2.9(10)	7.9(34)	*14.9(55)	10.7(37)	16.0(69)
Nonwhite	20.6(13)	14.0(7)	8.1(5)	15.9(10)	8.0(4)	4.8(3)	27.0(17)	10.0(5)	24.2(15)
Income									
$0-9,999	13.3(6)	*5.8(3)	0	15.6(7)	3.8(2)	10.7(3)	15.6(7)	9.6(5)	28.6(8)
$10-24,999	11.6(17)	9.8(9)	5.2(6)	7.5(11)	5.4(5)	6.0(7)	17.0(25)	15.2(14)	14.7(17)
$25-49,999	7.1(11)	4.2(6)	11.3(21)	6.4(10)	2.1(3)	9.7(18)	17.3(27)	11.9(17)	15.6(29)
$50,000+	16.2(6)	0	5.3(6)	10.8(4)	3.5(2)	6.2(7)	16.2(6)	7.0(4)	23.0(26)
Don't Know	0	0	11.5(3)	0	3.6(2)	3.8(1)	18.2(6)	3.5(2)	7.7(2)
Gender									
Male	8.5(16)	*7.2(11)	9.1(21)	6.9(13)	5.3(8)	7.8(18)	18.6(35)	13.2(20)	18.1(42)
Female	10.6(26)	2.8(7)	6.5(17)	9.0(22)	2.4(6)	7.3(19)	15.1(37)	8.9(22)	16.0(42)
O.H.A.									
Sample	15.7 (8)	5.6(3)	N/A	13.7(7)	7.4(4)	N/A	15.7(8)	11.1(6)	N/A
Age									
18-34	12.5(2)	0		12.5(2)	23.1(3)		18.8(3)	15.4(2)	
35-64	12.5(3)	7.7(1)		16.7(4)	7.7(1)		12.5(3)	23.1(3)	
65+	27.3(3)	8.0(2)		9.1(1)	0		18.2(2)	4.0(1)	
Gender									
Male	13.6(3)	9.5(2)		4.5(1)	9.5(2)		18.2(4)	14.3(3)	
Female	17.2(5)	3.0(1)		20.7(6)	6.1(2)		13.8(4)	9.1(3)	

* P < .05
** P < .01
*** P < .001

significance. In Omaha, the decreases from 1990 to 1991 were statistically significant for break-ins (p=.006), attempted break-ins (p=.008), and if anything was stolen from outside the person's house (p=.014). From 1991 to 1994 the increase was only significant for attempted break-ins and if anything was stolen from outside. Overall from 1990 to 1994, break-ins and attempted break-ins decreased. However, they were not statistically significant as depicted in Table XXIV. One possible cause for the increase in victimization from 1991 to 1994 could be the fact that in 1994 different months were used. These months included spring and summer, which historically have more crime than the winter months because the weather is nicer.

Comparing the victimization data in Table X with the UCR property crimes of burglary and larceny in Table IX produces the same trends. Table IX shows that burglary decreased in Omaha from 1989 to 1994 and Table X also has a decrease for break-ins and attempted break-ins from the 1990 (July 1-December 31, 1989 time frame) to 1994 surveys. For larceny Table IX shows an increase from 1989 to 1994. An increase is also shown in Table X from the 1990 to 1994 surveys under the "Stolen Outside" category.

In the O.H.A. area each of the three incidents also decreased in 1991, although Table XXIV does not show a statistically significant difference. Because there are only two years of data in the O.H.A. area more is needed for a better conclusion of COP's effectiveness. As COP expanded in Omaha under the Weed and Seed program it was used in the Benson public housing areas and the north Omaha Fairfax neighborhoods. As these areas are predominantly minority and low-income, the race and income categories of the Omaha sample are a good place to look for changes over time. There were some notable differences. First, non-whites reported a large decrease in the number of break-ins and attempted break-ins each year. This did not occur for whites, as they reported

more attempted break-ins in 1994 than in 1990 and a small drop in the number of break-ins. In the "Stolen Outside" category whites were higher in 1994 than they were in 1990 and nonwhites were lower. Second, if the person earned less than $25,000 they reported fewer break-ins each successive year. All of the income categories except the $25-49,000 and "Don't Know" had less attempted break-ins in 1994 than there were in 1990. When asked if anything was stolen from outside their homes, the income categories with increases from 1990 to 1994 were the $0-9,999 and $50,000 plus categories.

There are mixed results for community oriented policing's effectiveness on crime and victimization in Omaha. With increases in the UCR Index crimes, I must conclude that the implementation of COP in the city of Omaha did not reduce the crime rate. The only support for my hypothesis that crime and victimization rates would decrease over time in Omaha as COP was implemented can be found in the burglary data. Burglary was the only UCR Index crime that decreased. Break-ins and attempted break-ins decreased from 1990 to 1994 in the victimization surveys; but because these changes were not statistically significant I can not say they support my hypothesis.

However, some of the data from the O.H.A. area does support my hypothesis. First, the total UCR Index crimes were lower in 1991. Second, the UCR Index crimes against property were also lower. The 29 percent decrease in property crime in the O.H.A. area occurred while there was an increase in Omaha. Additionally, all of the property crimes listed in Table IX were lower in the O.H.A. area. Third, even though crimes against persons went up, there was less of an increase in the O.H.A. area than in Omaha. When each of the crimes in Table VIII is examined individually, the O.H.A. area had better results than Omaha on each one except rape. Finally, in the victimization surveys there were decreased in all three of the categories from 1990 to 1991. However, Table XXIV shows these changes from 1990 to 1991 as not being statistically significant.

More data from additional years is needed to determine if this improvement will last. In Omaha all of the categories also decreased in 1991 and then went up in 1994. This same trend may occur in the O.H.A. area.

There are demographic differences in the Omaha portion of Table X that also supports the effectiveness of COP on crime. There was a large decrease in break-ins and attempted break-ins each year for nonwhites. In the "Stolen Outside" category there was an increase for the whites and a decrease in the nonwhites from 1990 to 1994. Turning to the income categories, the results were mixed.

Citizens' Perception of Crime

The second hypothesis says that as COP is implemented citizens will perceive crime as less of a problem. Citizens' perceptions of the crime situation and the priority of crime problems will be evaluated for changes over time.

Table XI contains the results from both the Metropolitan and North Omaha surveys for the question: "Has the crime situation in the Omaha area changed in the past few years for the better, has it remained about the same, or has it changed for the worse?" In the metropolitan surveys, no response or "don't know" was received by 11 people (2.5 percent) in 1990, 19 people (4.7 percent) in 1991, and by 12 people (2.4 percent) in 1994. For the O.H.A. area there was one "don't know" reply in 1991 comprising 1.9 percent of the sample. Because less than five percent of the sample either had no response or answered "don't know," I excluded these responses from the table. That is why the sample column of the table doesn't add up to 100 percent. Additionally, these responses were not used in the chi-square calculations to determine significant differences between the groups. The demographic characteristics were also calculated without these responses.

TABLE XI.--CITIZENS' PERCEPTIONS OF CRIME

	Better			Same			Worse		
	1990 %(N)	1991 %(N)	1994 %(N)	1990 %(N)	1991 %(N)	1994 %(N)	1990 %(N)	1991 %(N)	1994 %(N)
Omaha									
Sample	3.2(14)	4.7(19)	2.8(14)	19.2(83)	28.9(116)	10.9(54)	75.1(325)	66.6(247)	83.8(414)
Age									
18-34	3.8(6)	3.1(3)	2.2(4)	19.9(31)	25.5(25)	14.6(26)	76.3(119)	71.4(70)	83.1(148)
35-64	2.8(5)	3.2(5)	2.9(6)	23.9(43)	34.4(53)	9.0(19)	73.3(132)	62.3(96)	88.1(185)
65+	3.6(3)	8.0(6)	4.5(4)	10.7(9)	32.0(24)	10.1(9)	85.7(72)	60.0(45)	85.4(76)
Don't Know	0	9.1(5)	0	0	25.5(14)	0	0	65.5(36)	0
Race									
White	3.1(11)	4.2(14)	2.6(11)	20.6(74)	30.3(100)	11.2(47)	76.3(274)	65.5(216)	86.2(362)
Nonwhite	4.8(3)	10.2(5)	4.9(3)	14.5(9)	30.6(15)	11.5(7)	80.6(50)	59.2(29)	83.6(51)
Income									
$0-9,999	6.7(3)	*14.3(7)	8.3(2)	13.3(6)	*22.4(11)	16.7(4)	80.0(36)	*63.3(31)	75.0(18)
$10-24,999	1.4(2)	1.1(1)	6.0(7)	17.9(26)	26.1(23)	10.3(12)	80.7(117)	72.7(64)	83.6(97)
$25-49,999	5.3(8)	2.9(4)	1.7(3)	20.4(31)	34.8(48)	11.1(20)	74.3(113)	62.3(86)	87.2(157)
$50,000+	0	3.6(2)	1.8(2)	26.5(9)	35.7(20)	8.9(10)	73.5(25)	60.7(34)	89.3(100)
Don't Know	3.2(1)	9.8(14)	0	19.4(6)	27.5(14)	24.0(6)	77.4(24)	62.7(32)	76.0(19)
Gender									
Male	4.4(8)	4.8(7)	4.0(9)	20.3(37)	33.1(48)	13.3(30)	75.3(137)	62.1(90)	82.7(186)
Female	2.5(6)	5.1(12)	1.9(5)	19.2(46)	28.4(67)	9.3(24)	78.3(188)	66.5(157)	88.7(228)
O.H.A.									
Sample	9.8(5)	20.4(11)	N/A	7.8(4)	24.1(13)	N/A	82.4(42)	53.7(29)	N/A
Age									
18-34	12.5(2)	23.1(3)		0	23.1(3)		87.5(14)	53.8(7)	
35-64	8.3(2)	23.1(3)		8.3(2)	15.4(2)		83.3(20)	61.5(8)	
65+	9.1(1)	16.7(4)		18.2(2)	29.2(7)		72.7(8)	54.2(13)	
Don't Know	0	33.3(1)		0	33.3(1)		0	33.3(1)	
Gender									
Male	*13.6(3)	15.0(3)		*18.2(4)	20.0(4)		*68.2(15)	65.0(13)	
Female	6.9(2)	24.2(8)		0	27.3(9)		93.1(27)	48.5(16)	

* P < .05

The Omaha sample shows a small increases in the percentage of people who felt the crime situation got better from 1990 (3.2 percent) to 1991 (4.7 percent). In 1994 this figure dropped to 2.8 percent, which was even lower than the 1990 level. Table XXIV shows that none of these changes were statistically significant. The increase in the number of people who felt the crime situation was worse in 1994 than in 1990 was statistically significant. This number went up from 75.1 percent in 1990 to 83.8 percent in 1994. This negative trend does not support the hypothesis.

The percentage of residents in the O.H.A. area who felt the crime situation was better more than doubled from 1990 (9.8 percent) to 1991 (20.4 percent). However, Table XXIV does not show this as a statistically significant difference. Those who felt the crime situation was worse did drop significantly ($p=.003$) from 82.4 percent in 1990 to 53.7 percent in 1991. Although these changes from 1990 to 1991 were similar to Omaha, the percentages were much larger in the O.H.A. area. This data seems to support the hypothesis that as COP is implemented in the O.H.A. area citizens' perceptions of the crime problem will decrease.

Going back to the Omaha data, there are a couple of other differences between the white and nonwhite categories that need to be pointed out. The percentage of whites that felt the crime situation was better decreased from 3.1 percent to 2.6 percent in 1994. For the nonwhites the opposite occurred, as there was a small percentage increase. For those who said the crime situation was worse there was almost a ten percent increase in whites from 1990 (76.3 percent) to 1994 (86.2 percent). In the nonwhite category there was a much smaller three percent increase from 1990 to 1994. No statistically significant differences were found between the two race categories. From this data I can conclude that white citizens' perceptions of crime do not support the hypothesis. Although the

results from the nonwhites are more positive than the whites, I can not say with confidence that there is support for the hypothesis.

In the income category of the Omaha area, the survey respondents who earned under $25,000 felt the crime situation was better in 1994 than in 1990. As the income increased so did the percentage of respondents who felt the crime situation was worse in 1994. In fact the $0-9,999 income category had a five percent decrease from 1990 (80 percent) to 1994 (75 percent) in the respondents who said the crime situation was worse. All of the other categories increased except those who did not report their income. These differences seem to support the hypothesis for the low-income respondents.

The second part of this hypothesis looked at how citizens prioritize crime. Open-ended questions were asked in both surveys to solicit responses about the three best things, three worst things, and three most important problems in the Omaha area. Open-ended questions were also asked about the one best thing, one worst thing, and most important problem in the respondents' neighborhoods. Tables XII through XIV show the results from these questions. The number of responses were calculated by counting the number of times a particular item was mentioned as being one of the three best, worst, or most important problem. This number is in the parentheses of the table. The percentage was figured by dividing this total by the number of respondents who answered the question. For example; in the 1990 Metropolitan survey "low crime rate" was mentioned 11 times as the "best thing about Omaha," 9 times as the second best, and 8 times as the third best for a total of 28. A total of 404 respondents answered the question for a 6.9 percent rate (28/404 = 6.9%).

In Table XII, the percentage of respondents who said one of the best things about the city of Omaha and their neighborhoods were the low crime rates increased over the

years. This was true for Omaha and the O.H.A. areas. Additionally, the O.H.A. area had a greater percentage increase than Omaha in these numbers.

TABLE XII.--THREE BEST THINGS ABOUT OMAHA AREA AND ONE BEST THINGS ABOUT YOUR NEIGHBORHOOD

	1990 %(N)	1991 %(N)	1993 %(N)	1994 %(N)
A. 3 Best-Omaha				
Low Crime Rate	6.9(28)	6.9(26)	15.5(71)	15.9(75)
Law Enforcement	3.0(12)	1.6(6)	3.3(15)	--
B. 3 Best-O.H.A. Area				
Low Crime Rate	2.8(1)	9.6(5)	--	--
Law Enforcement	2.8(1)	9.6(5)	--	--
C. 1 Best-Omaha Neighborhood				
Low Crime Rate	--	5.8(22)	9.2(43)	11.7(55)
Law Enforcement	--	.8(3)	.6(3)	--
D. 1 Best-O.H.A. Neighborhood				
Low Crime Rate	--	2.1(1)	8.2(4)	--
Less Gang Activity	--	--	2.0(1)	--

There are opposite findings for crime in Table XIII than in the previous table for Omaha. The percentage of people who said crime was one of the worst things in Omaha increased dramatically from 1990 to 1994. When asked about the worst things in their neighborhoods, crime also increased with each year in Omaha. The findings for gangs and drugs were mixed. There was a reduction over the years in the number of respondents who said gangs and drugs were one of the worst things about Omaha. But when asked about the worst thing in their neighborhoods, more Omaha residents mentioned gangs and drugs in 1994 than in 1991.

TABLE XIII.--THREE WORST THINGS ABOUT OMAHA AREA AND ONE WORST THINGS ABOUT YOUR NEIGHBORHOOD

	1990 %(N)	1991 %(N)	1993 %(N)	1994 %(N)
A. 3 Worst-Omaha				
Crime	19.1(77)	12.9(48)	30.2(139)	61.7(291)
Gangs	28.5(115)	15.5(58)	13.0(60)	8.9(42)
Drugs	31.0(125)	10.7(40)	.9(4)	1.3(6)
Law Enforcement	6.2(25)	5.6(21)	6.3(29)	--
Crimes/Gangs/Drugs Combinations	--	10.5(39)	10.8(50)	8.5(40)
B. 3 Worst-O.H.A.				
Crime	26.5(13)	18.4(9)	--	--
Gangs	38.8(19)	28.6(14)	--	--
Drugs	38.8(19)	6.1(3)	--	--
Law Enforcement	14.3(7)	20.4(10)	--	--
Crimes/Gangs/Drugs Combinations	--	12.2(6)	--	--
C. 1 Worst-Omaha Neighborhood				
Crime	--	7.7(19)	12.9(44)	19.7(68)
Gangs	--	2.0(5)	2.9(10)	3.8(13)
Drugs	--	.8(2)	.6(2)	.9(3)
Law Enforcement	--	2.0(5)	1.2(4)	--
D. 1 Worst-O.H.A. Neighborhood				
Crime	--	15.8(6)	12.8(6)	--
Gangs	--	10.5(4)	12.8(6)	--
Drugs	--	5.3(2)	4.3(2)	--
Law Enforcement	--	2.6(1)	4.3(2)	--

Turning to the O.H.A. area, the percentage of survey respondents who said crime was one of the worst things in Omaha decreased. This decrease from 1990 to 1991 was greater in the O.H.A. area than in Omaha during this time period. There was also a decrease in the number of respondents who mentioned gangs and drugs as one of the worst things about Omaha. In the O.H.A. area, the number of respondents who said crime and drugs were the worst things about their neighborhoods decreased from 1991 to 1993. This decrease in crime corresponds to an increase in the Omaha area

neighborhoods. One negative trend with the O.H.A. data was the increase in people who mentioned gangs as one of the worse things in their neighborhood.

Table XIV contains the results of the most important problems in Omaha and in the respondents' neighborhood. Citizens in Omaha view crime as an increasing problem for the city, while in the O.H.A. area fewer respondents considered it an important problem for Omaha. Because there is only two years of data in the O.H.A. area, I can't conclude that this downward trend will continue in subsequent years. It may increase in subsequent years and mimic the Omaha data.

TABLE XIV.--THREE MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEMS IN OMAHA AND MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM IN YOUR NEIGHBORHOOD

	1990 %(N)	1991 %(N)	1993 %(N)	1994 (N)
A. 3 Important Problem Omaha				
Crime	19.0(80)	11.9(46)	29.3(139)	65.8(316)
Gangs	39.6(167)	16.1(62)	17.9(85)	9.0(43)
Drugs	50.7(214)	15.1(58)	1.9(9)	1.0(5)
Law Enforcement	2.8(12)	4.4(17)	5.3(25)	--
Crimes/Gangs/Drugs Combinations	--	19.0(73)	14.5(69)	12.7(61)
B. 3 Important Problem O.H.A.				
Crime	21.3(10)	12.5(6)	--	--
Gangs	38.3(18)	14.6(7)	--	--
Drugs	48.9(23)	14.6(7)	--	--
Law Enforcement	14.9(7)	10.4(5)	--	--
Crimes/Gangs/Drugs Combinations	--	14.6(7)	--	--
C. 1 Important Problem-Omaha Neighborhood				
Crime	--	14.8(32)	23.9(84)	44.1(157)
Gangs	--	1.9(4)	4.0(14)	5.1(18)
Drugs	--	3.7(8)	3.1(11)	2.0(7)
Law Enforcement	--	2.3(5)	1.1(4)	--
Crimes/Gangs/Drugs Combinations	--	--	1.0(3)	.3(1)
D. 1 Important Problem-O.H.A. Neighborhood				
Crime	--	13.2(5)	8.0(4)	--
Gangs	--	10.5(4)	24.0(12)	--
Drugs	--	10.5(4)	20.0(10)	--
Crimes/Gangs/Drugs Combinations	--	2.6(1)	--	--

One difference between Omaha and the O.H.A. area was the perception of crime in the neighborhoods. In Omaha, it was perceived as more of a problem throughout the years, but in the O.H.A. area less people felt it was an important neighborhood problem.

There are a couple of general conclusions that can be made from all of this data. First, the findings in Omaha do not support my hypothesis that as COP is implemented, citizens' perceptions of crime problems will decrease. There was a statistically significant increase in the number of Omaha respondents who felt the crime situation was worse in 1994 than in 1990. Additionally, even though more people said one of the best things about Omaha was the low crime rate, there was a much larger increase in those who felt crime was one of the worst things in Omaha. This same large increase was noted when crime was mentioned as an important problem in Omaha. These same findings also occurred in Omaha when they focused on their neighborhoods.

In the O.H.A. area there appears to be some support for my hypothesis. There was a statistically significant decrease in the number of people who said the crime situation was worse, and this decrease was greater than in Omaha. The trend for crime also went in the direction it should to support my hypothesis in all three of the tables that contained the data for the best, worst, and most important problems. Less people identified gangs as the worse thing about Omaha and as a problem, but more people identified it as a neighborhood concern. Because of this trend, I have to conclude that community oriented policing had no effect on citizens' perceptions of gangs. The mixed results for drugs also lead me to conclude that COP did not effect it.

Citizens' Fear of Crime

The third hypothesis is that a decline in the fear of crime will occur as COP is implemented. Both the Metropolitan and North Omaha surveys asked citizens: "Are you

very worried, a little worried, or not at all worried about crime?" The results are in Table XV. In the Omaha area, no response or "don't know" was received by two people (.4 percent) in 1990, three people (.7 percent) in 1991, and by one person (.2 percent) in 1994. For the O.H.A. area there was one "don't know" reply in 1991 comprising 1.9 percent of the sample. Because less than five percent of the sample either had no response or answered "don't know," I excluded these responses from the table. That is why the sample column of the table doesn't add up to 100 percent. Additionally, these responses were not used in the chi-square calculations to determine significant differences between the demographic categories. The demographic characteristics were also calculated without these responses.

In Omaha there was an increase in the percentage of respondents who were very worried about crime from 1990 to 1994. Additionally, fewer people were a little worried or not worried about crime in 1994 than they were in 1990. In Table XXIV there were no statistically significant differences from 1990 to 1994. These results do not support the hypothesis.

A comparison of the race and income categories found in Table XV for Omaha shows two interesting findings. The first finding was that whites became more worried about crime and nonwhites became less worried about crime. For very worried the percentage of whites increased by 8.4 percent and it decreased by 14.9 percent for non-whites from 1990 to 1994. The percentage of whites also dropped in the not worried category by 4 percent and increased for the nonwhites by 4.9 percent. Statistically significant differences occurred between the two race categories in 1990 and 1991. Under income, the only category that had a decrease in the percentage of respondents who were very worried about crime from 1990 to 1994 was the $0-9,999 category. There were three categories ($0-9,999, 50,000+, and "Don't Know Income") that had an

TABLE XV.--DEGREE OF WORRY ABOUT CRIME

	Very Worried			Little Worried			Not Worried		
	1990 % (N)	1991 % (N)	1994 % (N)	1990 % (N)	1991 % (N)	1994 % (N)	1990 % (N)	1991 % (N)	1994 % (N)
Omaha									
Sample	52.0(225)	35.4(142)	57.1(282)	40.2(174)	52.4(210)	38.1(188)	7.4(32)	11.5(46)	4.7(23)
Age									
18-34	48.7(77)	*44.2(46)	51.1(95)	44.3(70)	*47.1(49)	44.6(83)	7.0(11)	*8.7(9)	4.3(8)
35-64	52.4(97)	31.4(50)	59.4(126)	39.5(73)	60.4(96)	36.3(77)	8.1(15)	8.2(13)	4.2(9)
65+	59.3(51)	33.3(25)	64.4(58)	33.7(29)	48.0(36)	28.9(26)	7.0(6)	18.7(14)	6.7(6)
Don't Know	0	35.0(21)	0	0	48.3(29)	0	0	16.7(10)	0
Race									
White	***49.0(180	**33.9(117)	57.4(247)	***42.8(157	**56.2(194)	38.4(165)	***8.2(30)	**9.9(34)	4.2(18)
Nonwhite	71.4(45)	46.9(23)	56.5(35)	25.4(16)	30.6(15)	35.5(22)	3.2(2)	22.4(11)	8.1(5)
Income									
$0-9,999	71.1(32)	**46.2(24)	*64.3(18)	26.7(12)	**38.5(20)	*25.0(7)	2.2(1)	**15.4(8)	*10.7(3)
$10-24,999	52.1(76)	39.1(36)	67.2(78)	37.7(55)	50.0(46)	29.3(34)	10.3(15)	10.9(10)	3.4(4)
$25-49,999	49.4(77)	38.0(54)	52.7(98)	43.6(68)	54.2(77)	43.5(81)	7.1(11)	7.7(11)	3.8(7)
$50,000+	41.7(15)	19.3(11)	55.4(62)	55.6(20)	71.9(41)	40.2(45)	2.8(1)	3.8(5)	4.5(5)
Don't Know	42.4(14)	30.9(17)	53.8(14)	48.5(16)	47.3(26)	30.8(8)	9.1(3)	21.8(12)	15.4(4)
Gender									
Male	***39.6(74)	**26.0(39)	**44.6(103)	***51.3(96)	**60.0(90)	**48.1(111)	***9.1(17)	**14.0(21)	***7.4(17)
Female	61.9(151)	41.7(103)	68.3(179)	32.0(78)	48.6(120)	29.4(77)	6.1(15)	9.7(24)	2.3(6)
O.H.A.									
Sample	72.5(37)	46.3(25)	N/A	19.6(10)	42.6(23)	N/A	7.8(4)	9.3(5)	N/A
Age									
18-34	93.8(15)	61.5(8)		0	23.1(3)		6.3(1)	15.4(2)	
35-64	70.8(17)	38.5(5)		20.8(5)	61.5(8)		8.3(2)	0	
65+	45.5(5)	45.8(11)		45.5(5)	41.7(10)		9.1(1)	12.5(3)	
Don't Know	0	33.3(1)		0	66.7(2)		0	0	
Gender									
Male	59.1(13)	45.0(9)		27.3(6)	45.0(9)		13.6(3)	10.0(2)	
Female	82.8(24)	48.5(16)		13.8(4)	42.4(14)		3.4(1)	9.1(3)	

* $p < .05$
** $p < .01$
*** $p < .001$

increase in the percentage of respondents not worried about crime from 1990 to 1994. Finally, of all the known income categories the $0-9,999 category went from the lowest percentage of respondents saying they were not worried about crime in 1990 to the highest percentage in 1994. There were statistically significant differences between the income categories in 1991 and 1994. This data appears to support a reduction in the fear of crime in the nonwhite and low-income populations of Omaha.

Comparing changes from 1990 to 1991 between the O.H.A. and Omaha samples also support the position that community policing is having some positive changes on the nonwhite and low-income groups. There was a 16.6 percent drop in the Omaha sample who were very worried about crime and a much larger 26.2 percent drop in the O.H.A. sample. Table XXIV indicates that this drop from 1990 to 1991 in the O.H.A. area was statistically significant. This data supports my hypothesis in the O.H.A. area.

Quality of Interaction

The final hypothesis said that citizens' quality of interaction with the OPD officers would improve as COP is implemented. This would be measured by their attitudes, perceptions, and satisfaction with the Omaha Police Department. Since there is so much data to analyze, Table XXIII at the end of this section will show where the hypothesis was supported.

The first set of data on law enforcement comes from the open-ended questions on the best and worst things in Omaha, the best and worst things in individuals' neighborhoods, and the most important problems found in Tables XII through XIV. In Table XII, there were three times as many respondents in the O.H.A. area from 1990 to 1991 who said law enforce-ment was one of the best things about Omaha. In Omaha it decreased from 1990 to 1991 and then returned to the same level in 1993 that it was in

1990. In Table XIII, the number of people who identified law enforcement as one of the worst things in Omaha increased in 1991 for the O.H.A. area and remained fairly constant for all of Omaha. When asked about the worst thing in their neighborhoods, there was an improved attitude toward law enforcement in Omaha and there was a negative attitude in the O.H.A. area as more people identified law enforcement as the worst thing. In Table XIV, law enforcement was considered less of an important problem for Omaha by respondents in the O.H.A. area than in the city of Omaha. These mixed results make it impossible to draw any solid conclusions about how respondents felt about law enforcement.

The rest of the questions in this section were only asked on the Metropolitan surveys. In the demographic characteristics I will be able to discuss differences between the race and income categories and show any changes over time. Table XXIII will show these changes that support my hypothesis for nonwhites and those in the $0-9,999 income category.

Table XVI contains the data to the question "how satisfied are you with police protection?" The top portion of the table breaks down each year by the degree of satisfaction. The second half of this table combines both the satisfied categories and shows the results along with the demographics of the sample. The column on the right side of the table labeled "Change Over Years" contains the statistical difference for the reply from one year to the other and is also included through Table XXII.

The top portion of Table XVI shows that no response or "don't know" was received by six people (1.4 percent) in 1990 and three people (.6 percent) in 1993. Because less than five percent of the sample either had no response or answered "don't know," I excluded these responses when calculating the chi-squares for the demographic characteristics. If any of the respondents didn't know or didn't report which demographic

category they fell in and it was below five percent, I also deleted those responses and performed the chi-squares without them.

Although there was a statistically significant decline in the percentage of respondents "very satisfied" with police protection, there was a significant increase in those "somewhat satisfied." The bottom part of this table shows that these two categories combined produced very little change in satisfaction with police protection from 1990 to 1993.

TABLE XVI.--OMAHA AREA RESPONSE TO SATISFACTION WITH POLICE PROTECTION

	1990 (N = 433) % (N)	1993 (N = 489) % (N)	Change Over Years
Very Satisfied	43.0 (186)	34.6 (169)	***p=.011***
Somewhat Satisfied	40.4 (175)	49.3 (241)	***p=.008***
Somewhat Dissatisfied	10.2 (44)	11.2 (55)	p=.702
Very Dissatisfied	5.1 (22)	4.3 (21)	p=.676
No Response/Don't Know	1.4 (6)	.6 (3)	p=.369
OMAHA AREA DEMOGRAPHICS FOR VERY AND SOMEWHAT SATISFIED			
Sample	83.4 (361)	83.8 (410)	p=.941
Age			
18-34	***76.4 (120)	*83.7 (164)	
35-64	87.4 (160)	80.9 (165)	
65+	93.0 (80)	94.0 (78)	
Race			
White	***88.7 (322)	***86.2 (375)	
Nonwhite	60.3 (38)	67.3 (33)	
Income			
$0-9,999	77.3 (34)	90.0 (36)	
$10-24,999	82.2 (120)	84.5 (87)	
$25-49,999	86.4 (133)	83.1 (167)	
$50,000+	88.9 (32)	86.3 (88)	
Unknown	93.8 (30)	80.0 (32)	
Gender			
Male	82.3 (153)	86.0 (202)	
Female	86.3 (208)	82.9 (208)	

* p < .05 between the categories in that survey year
** p < .01 between the categories in that survey year
*** p < .001 between the categories in that survey year

There were statistically significant differences between the races in both years. Whites had a decrease in their satisfaction with police protection and nonwhites increased. Additionally, the two lowest income groups had an increase. If a respondent earned less than $25,000 they were more satisfied with police protection and if they earned over $25,000 they were less satisfied in 1993 than in 1990. These differences between the income categories were not statistically significant.

The next three tables show the responses of residents in the Metropolitan survey area who had called the Omaha Police Department two years prior to the survey. Table XVII reflects their answers to the question: "How satisfied were you with how quickly the police responded to your call?" In the 1991 survey, 162 people called the police in the prior two years. Of those, 59.9 percent were satisfied with the response time. In 1994, 246 respondents called the police in the past two years and 33.7 percent were satisfied with the response times – a statistically significant reduction. The second part of Table XVII combines the satisfied and somewhat satisfied responses and shows the demographic characteristics of the individuals who called the police. The top portion of Table XVII shows that "don't know" responses were given by one person (.6 percent) in 1991 and one person (.4 percent) in 1994. Because a very small percentage of the sample answered "don't know," I excluded these responses from the table. They were also not used in the chi-square calculations. In 1991, one of the individuals would not say which race they belonged to. Since that person was a small percentage of my sample, I omitted it from the chi-square calculation.

On the bottom half of Table XVII, there was a significant reduction from 1991 to 1994 in the percentage of people who were satisfied or somewhat satisfied with the response time. For race, there was also a drop in the satisfaction in both whites and nonwhites. However, the drop was greater for the whites. There was no change in the

respondents with incomes of $0-9,999 and drops in the other known income categories. Although nonwhites had less of a drop and the low-income category had no change it does not support my hypothesis. It only suggests more satisfaction with police response times than occurred in the whites or other income categories.

TABLE XVII.--OMAHA AREA SATISFACTION WITH POLICE RESPONSE TIME

	1991 (N = 162) % (N)	1994 (N = 246) % (N)	Change Over Years
Satisfied	59.9 (97)	33.7 (83)	***p=.000***
Somewhat Satisfied	23.5 (38)	35.4 (87)	***p=.015***
Somewhat Unsatisfied	6.2 (10)	12.2 (30)	p=.068
Unsatisfied	9.9 (16)	18.3 (45)	***p=.029***
Don't Know	.6 (1)	.4 (1)	p=.655
OMAHA AREA DEMOGRAPHICS FOR SATISFIED AND SOMEWHAT SATISFIED			
Sample	83.3 (135)	69.1 (170)	***p=.002***
Age			
18-34	77.1 (37)	63.9 (62)	
35-64	83.8 (62)	75 (87)	
65+	90.5 (19)	65.5 (19)	
Don't Know	94.4 (17)		
Race			
White	**87.0 (120)	71.2 (151)	
Nonwhite	63.6 (14)	59.4 (19)	
Income			
$0-9,999	71.4 (15)	71.4 (10)	
$10-24,999	83.3 (35)	62.1 (36)	
$25-49,999	90.9 (50)	70.3 (64)	
$50,000+	82.1 (23)	72.4 (42)	
Don't Know	80.0 (12)	81.8 (9)	
Gender			
Male	86.4 (57)	69.1 (76)	
Female	82.1 (78)	69.6 (94)	

* p < .05 between the categories in that survey year
** p < .01 between the categories in that survey year
*** p < .001 between the categories in that survey year

Individuals who called the OPD during the past two years prior to the surveys were also asked if the officers were courteous, helpful, and professional. Table XVIII

contains the results. In the 1991 survey, 85.2 percent of these respondents said the officer was always courteous, 79 percent said they were always helpful, and 83.3 percent said the officer was always professional. By 1994, the percentages in each of these three categories had decreased significantly to 55.7 percent, 49.2 percent, and 63.4 percent respectively.

TABLE XVIII.--ASSESSMENT OF OFFICER CHARACTERISTICS BY RESPONDENTS FROM METROPOLITAN SURVEY WHO CALLED THE OPD

	1991 (N = 162) % (N)	1994 (N = 246) % (N)	Change Over Years
A. Was Officer Courteous			
Always	85.2 (138)	55.7 (137)	***p=.000***
Most Of The Time	8.0 (13)	20.3 (50)	***p=.001***
Some Of The Time	3.1 (5)	15.4 (38)	***p=.000***
Never	2.5 (4)	3.7 (9)	p=.700
Don't Know	1.2 (2)	4.9 (12)	p=.083
B. Was Officer Helpful			
Always	79.0 (128)	49.2 (121)	***p=.000***
Most Of The Time	6.2 (10)	18.7 (46)	***p=.000***
Some Of The Time	8.6 (14)	17.5 (43)	***p=.017***
Never	4.3 (7)	9.8 (24)	p=.063
Don't Know	1.9 (3)	4.9 (12)	p=.193
C. Was Officer Professional			
Always	83.3 (135)	63.4 (156)	***p=.000***
Most Of The Time	6.8 (11)	17.9 (44)	***p=.002***
Some Of The Time	3.1 (5)	10.6 (26)	***p=.009***
Never	3.7 (6)	3.3 (8)	p=.952
Don't Know	3.1 (5)	4.9 (12)	p=.525

Table XIX combines the "always" and "most of the time" responses listed in Table XVIII and shows the demographic characteristics for Omaha on each of the three officer characteristics. Because less than five percent of the sample answered "don't know," I again excluded these responses from the chi-square calculations of the demographics portion of the table. Also in the demographics, if any of the respondent

TABLE XIX.--DEMOGRAPHICS WHEN RESPONDENTS ANSWERED "ALWAYS" OR "MOST OF THE TIME" FOR OFFICER CHARACTERISTICS

	1991 % (N)	1994 % (N)	Change Over Years
A. Was Officer Courteous	**93.2 (151)**	**76.0 (187)**	***p=.000***
Age			
18-34	*85.7 (42)	*72.5 (66)	
35-64	97.2 (70)	82.6 (95)	
65+	100.0 (21)	96.0 (24)	
Don't Know	100.0 (18)		
Race			
White	***97.1 (134)	***83.7 (169)	
Nonwhite	76.2 (16)	56.3 (18)	
Income			
$0-9,999	90.0 (18)	64.3 (9)	
$10-24,999	92.9 (39)	72.2 (39)	
$25-49,999	94.6 (53)	84.3 (75)	
$50,000+	100.0 (27)	83.3 (45)	
Don't Know	93.3 (14)	81.8 (9)	
Gender			
Male	93.8 (61)	78.1 (82)	
Female	94.7 (90)	81.4 (105)	
B. Was Officer Helpful	**85.2 (138)**	**67.9 (167)**	***p=.000***
Age			
18-34	*75.5 (37)	68.1 (62)	
35-64	88.7 (63)	73.7 (84)	
65+	100.0 (21)	73.1 (19)	
Don't Know	94.4 (17)		
Race			
White	*89.1 (122)	73.3 (148)	
Nonwhite	71.4 (15)	59.4 (19)	
Income			
$0-9,999	85.0 (17)	64.3 (9)	
$10-24,999	83.3 (35)	61.1 (33)	
$25-49,999	89.1 (49)	76.1 (67)	
$50,000+	85.2 (23)	70.9 (39)	
Don't Know	93.3 (14)	90.9 (10)	
Gender			
Male	84.6 (55)	70.5 (74)	
Female	88.3 (83)	72.1 (93)	

TABLE XIX.--CONTINUED

	1991 %	(N)	1994 %	(N)	Change Over Years
C. Was Officer Professional	**90.1**	**(146)**	**81.3**	**(200)**	***p=.023***
Age					
18-34	87.5	(42)	81.5	(75)	
35-64	94.3	(66)	87.7	(100)	
65+	95.2	(20)	92.0	(23)	
Don't Know	100.0	(18)			
Race					
White	**95.6	(129)	***88.6	(179)	
Nonwhite	76.2	(16)	65.6	(21)	
Income					
$0-9,999	95.0	(19)	92.9	(13)	
$10-24,999	90.5	(38)	81.5	(44)	
$25-49,999	92.6	(50)	86.4	(76)	
$50,000+	96.2	(25)	85.5	(47)	
Don't Know	93.3	(14)	90.9	(10)	
Gender					
Male	90.6	(58)	81.9	(86)	
Female	94.6	(88)	88.4	(114)	

* p < .05 between the categories in that survey year
** p < .01 between the categories in that survey year
*** p < .001 between the categories in that survey year

didn't know or didn't report which demographic category they belonged to and it was below five percent, I also deleted those demographic categories and figured the percentage and chi-square without them.

There was a significant decrease from 1991 to 1994 in the number of people who said the officers were courteous, helpful, and professional in Table XIX. Both of the race categories decreased under each of these officer characteristics. The decrease was larger in the nonwhites for courteous and professional. Each of the income categories decreased from 1991 to 1994. The two lowest income categories had the biggest decrease for courteous and helpful. For professional, the lowest income category decreased the least.

TABLE XX.--ASSESSMENT OF OFFICER BEHAVIOR BY METROPOLITAN RESPONDENTS WHO WERE STOPPED BY OPD

	1991 (N = 205) % (N)	1994 (N = 264) % (N)	Change Over Years
A. Courteous			
Yes	88.3 (181)	84.5 (223)	p=.295
No	11.7 (24)	13.2 (35)	p=.729
Don't Know	0	2.3 (6)	p=.076
	Demographics For Yes Response		
Age			
18-34	82.4 (56)	*81.0 (85)	
35-64	88.5 (77)	92.2 (107)	
65+	96.4 (27)	83.3 (30)	
Don't Know	95.5 (21)		
Race			
White	***91.1 (164)	***89.5 (196)	
Nonwhite	65.2 (15)	69.2 (27)	
Income			
$0-9,999	73.3 (11)	84.6 (11)	
$10-24,999	85.2 (46)	80.6 (50)	
$25-49,999	91.4 (74)	86.7 (85)	
$50,000+	85.3 (29)	93.7 (59)	
Don't Know	100.0 (21)	75.0 (9)	
Gender			
Male	85.0 (85)	83.9 (120)	
Female	91.4 (96)	89.6 (103)	
B. Professional			
Yes	92.2 (189)	89.0 (235)	p=.313
No	7.8 (16)	8.7 (23)	p=.856
Don't Know	0	2.3 (6)	p=.076
	Demographics For Yes Response		
Age			
18-34	94.0 (63)	86.7 (91)	
35-64	87.5 (77)	94.9 (111)	
65+	96.4 (27)	91.4 (32)	
Don't Know	100.0 (22)		
Race			
White	**93.9 (169)	***93.6 (205)	
Nonwhite	78.3 (18)	76.9 (30)	
Income			
$0-9,999	86.7 (13)	100.0 (12)	
$10-24,999	90.7 (49)	87.1 (54)	
$25-49,999	95.1 (77)	91.8 (90)	
$50,000+	88.2 (30)	95.2 (60)	
Don't Know	95.2 (20)	75.0 (9)	
Gender			
Male	88.9 (88)	90.2 (129)	
Female	95.3 (101)	92.2 (106)	

* p < .05 between the categories in that survey year
** p < .01 between the categories in that survey year
*** p < .001 between the categories in that survey year

The data in Table XIX does not support my hypothesis for the entire city of Omaha. It also appears that COP had no effect on the nonwhites and low-income population.

Table XX contains the results of the Metropolitan survey for the question: "Have you ever, at any time, been stopped by a Omaha Police Department Officer?" In 1991, there were 205 people who said an OPD officer had stopped them. Of those, 88.3 percent said the officer was courteous and 92.2 percent said the officer was professional. In 1994, there were 264 respondents who reported being stopped by an OPD officer. There was an insignificant decrease in the percentage of these people who said the officer was courteous (84.5 percent) and professional (89 percent). For the demographic portion of the table, 2.3 percent of the respondents in 1994 said they didn't know if the officer was courteous or professional. This response was dropped from the chi-square analysis and also omitted when the percentages were calculated because it was such a small number. There was a decrease in the percentage of whites who said the officer was courteous, but an increase in the nonwhites. Under income, there was an increase in the $0-9,999 and $50,000 plus categories. For professionalism there was a decline in both race categories and an increase in the $0-9,999 and $50,000 plus categories.

Tables XXI and XXII contain the views of individuals in the 1991 and 1994 Metropolitan Survey toward the OPD officers. The tables show the percentage and the number of individuals who "strongly agree/agree," are "undecided," "disagree/strongly disagree," or "don't know" on a number of questions that measure the OPD officers' demeanor and characteristics. Demographic characteristics are shown under each question for the percentage and number of respondents who "strongly agree" and "agree" with each statement. "Don't know" responses to the questions were given by over five percent of the respondents for items "c" and "e" in Table XXI, along with all the questions in Table XXII. For these questions the chi-square was calculated for both years

TABLE XXI.--OMAHA'S VIEWS ON DEMEANOR OF OPD OFFICERS

	1991 %	1991 (N)	1994 %	1994 (N)	Changes Over Years
A. Omaha police officers are usually courteous					
Strongly Agree/Agree	86.8	(348)	86.8	(429)	p=.921
Undecided	5.0	(20)	5.5	(27)	p=.855
Disagree/Strongly Disagree	5.0	(20)	5.3	(26)	p=.960
Don't Know	3.2	(13)	2.4	(12)	p=.602
Demographics For Strongly Agree/Agree Response					
Age					
18-34	85.1	(86)	84.6	(154)	
35-64	89.6	(138)	91.3	(190)	
65+	96.0	(72)	93.1	(81)	
Don't Know	89.7	(52)			
Race					
White	***93.5	(315)	***91.7	(385)	
Nonwhite	62.5	(30)	70.5	(43)	
Income					
$0-9,999	*78.0	(39)	84.6	(22)	
$10-24,999	87.6	(78)	85.7	(96)	
$25-49,999	92.9	(130)	90.3	(168)	
$50,000+	96.4	(54)	91.8	(101)	
Don't Know	88.7	(47)	83.3	(20)	
Gender					
Male	89.3	(134)	**85.1	(194)	
Female	89.9	(214)	92.5	(235)	
B. Omaha police officers are respectful toward people like me					
Strongly Agree/Agree	84.8	(340)	83.6	(413)	p=.692
Undecided	5.5	(22)	6.1	(30)	p=.812
Disagree/Strongly Disagree	6.5	(26)	6.9	(34)	p=.918
Don't Know	3.2	(13)	3.4	(17)	p=.983
Demographics For Strongly Agree/Agree Response					
Age					
18-34	*85.3	(87)	**79.4	(143)	
35-64	87.1	(135)	88.3	(182)	
65+	94.5	(69)	96.5	(83)	
Don't Know	84.5	(49)			
Race					
White	***91.7	(309)	***90.9	(378)	
Nonwhite	60.4	(29)	57.4	(35)	
Income					
$0-9,999	**82.0	(41)	76.9	(20)	
$10-24,999	88.9	(80)	78.2	(86)	
$25-49,999	92.1	(129)	89.1	(164)	
$50,000+	87.5	(49)	92.7	(102)	
Don't Know	78.8	(41)	82.6	(19)	
Gender					
Male	86.7	(130)	**81.3	(182)	
Female	88.2	(210)	91.3	(231)	

TABLE XXI.--CONTINUED

	1991 %	(N)	1994 %	(N)	Change Over Years
C. Omaha police officers use more force than they need to in carrying out their duties					
Strongly Agree/Agree	17.0	(68)	15.8	(78)	p=.695
Undecided	21.7	(87)	15.0	(74)	***p=.012***
Disagree/Strongly Disagree	53.4	(214)	63.2	(312)	***p=.004***
Don't Know	8.0	(32)	6.1	(30)	p=.327
Demographics For Strongly Agree/Agree Response					
Age					
18-34	14.4	(15)	***18.8	(35)	
35-64	16.3	(26)	13.6	(29)	
65+	20.8	(16)	14.4	(13)	
Don't Know	18.3	(11)			
Race					
White	***11.8	(41)	***10.9	(47)	
Nonwhite	50.0	(25)	50.0	(31)	
Income					
$0-9,999	*30.8	(16)	***35.7	(10)	
$10-24,999	16.3	(15)	19.0	(22)	
$25-49,999	13.3	(19)	11.3	(21)	
$50,000+	10.5	(6)	9.7	(11)	
Don't Know	21.1	(12)	26.9	(7)	
Gender					
Male	**15.1	(23)	14.7	(34)	
Female	18.1	(45)	16.8	(44)	
D. Most police officers are usually rude					
Strongly Agree/Agree	6.5	(26)	7.5	(37)	p=.653
Undecided	9.7	(39)	6.5	(32)	p=.102
Disagree/Strongly Disagree	80.0	(321)	82.8	(409)	p=.324
Don't Know	3.7	(15)	3.2	(16)	p=.823
Demographics For Strongly Agree/Agree Response					
Age					
18-34	6.8	(7)	*12.9	(23)	
35-64	6.5	(10)	5.3	(11)	
65+	5.6	(4)	3.5	(3)	
Don't Know	8.8	(5)			
Race					
White	***4.8	(16)	***6.0	(25)	
Nonwhite	21.3	(10)	20.0	(12)	
Income					
$0-9,999	12.2	(6)	7.7	(2)	
$10-24,999	7.8	(7)	10.9	(12)	
$25-49,999	5.0	(7)	6.0	(11)	
$50,000+	5.5	(3)	6.4	(7)	
Don't Know	5.8	(3)	12.5	(3)	
Gender					
Male	6.8	(10)	9.7	(22)	
Female	6.7	(16)	6.0	(15)	

TABLE XXI.--CONTINUED

	1991 % (N)	1994 % (N)	Change Over Years
E. Police officers show concern when you ask them questions			
Strongly Agree/Agree	73.3 (294)	74.5 (368)	p=.741
Undecided	15.7 (63)	10.3 (51)	***p=.021***
Disagree/Strongly Disagree	5.5 (22)	10.5 (52)	***p=.010***
Don't Know	5.5 (22)	4.7 (23)	p=.697
Demographics For Strongly Agree/Agree Response			
Age			
18-34	69.2 (72)	***66.7 (124)	
35-64	72.5 (116)	77.5 (165)	
65+	81.8 (63)	83.3 (75)	
Don't Know	71.7 (43)		
Race			
White	***76.7 (266)	*76.6 (330)	
Nonwhite	52.0 (26)	61.3 (38)	
Income			
$0-9,999	*73.1 (38)	*64.3 (18)	
$10-24,999	69.6 (64)	72.4 (84)	
$25-49,999	83.2 (119)	76.9 (143)	
$50,000+	73.7 (42)	74.3 (84)	
Don't Know	54.4 (31)	80.8 (21)	
Gender			
Male	73.0 (111)	72.8 (169)	
Female	73.8 (183)	76.0 (199)	

* p < .05 between the categories in that survey year
** p < .01 between the categories in that survey year
*** p < .001 between the categories in that survey year

with the "don't know" response in. This was done so the numbers would remain consistent across time making it easier to compare changes from one year to the other.

In Table XXI, the only question that showed an improvement in the officers' demeanor in Omaha was item "c" (the use of force by the officers). The percentage of people who agreed with this statement decreased and the number who disagreed with it increased significantly. Because both of the agree and disagree categories for question "e" had an increase, I can not say there was an improvement over time. When asked if

TABLE XXII.--OMAHA'S VIEWS ABOUT OPD OFFICERS' CHARACTERISTICS

	1991 %	(N)	1994 %	(N)	Change Over Years
A. Omaha police officers are physically fit					
Strongly Agree/Agree	63.1	(253)	66.0	(326)	p=.405
Undecided	20.7	(83)	15.0	(74)	***p=.032***
Disagree/Strongly Disagree	10.7	(43)	14.6	(72)	p=.102
Don't Know	5.5	(22)	4.5	(22)	p=.595
Demographics For Strongly Agree/Agree Response					
Age					
18-34	***51.9	(54)	**60.8	(113)	
35-64	60.6	(97)	64.8	(138)	
65+	85.7	(66)	78.9	(71)	
Don't Know	60.0	(36)			
Race					
White	62.2	(216)	67.3	(290)	
Nonwhite	70.0	(35)	58.1	(36)	
Income					
$0-9,999	71.2	(37)	71.4	(20)	
$10-24,999	67.4	(62)	69.0	(80)	
$25-49,999	65.7	(94)	67.2	(125)	
$50,000+	49.1	(28)	61.1	(69)	
Don't Know	56.1	(32)	69.2	(18)	
Gender					
Male	59.2	(90)	64.2	(149)	
Female	65.7	(163)	67.6	(177)	
B. Omaha police officers are prejudiced against minority persons					
Strongly Agree/Agree	17.5	(70)	14.2	(70)	p=.208
Undecided	23.9	(96)	18.4	(91)	p=.053
Disagree/Strongly Disagree	49.1	(197)	60.9	(301)	***p=.000***
Don't Know	9.5	(38)	6.5	(32)	p=.125
Demographics For Strongly Agree/Agree Response					
Age					
18-34	***22.1	(23)	*15.6	(29)	
35-64	18.1	(29)	15.0	(32)	
65+	15.6	(12)	8.9	(8)	
Don't Know	10.0	(6)			
Race					
White	***12.7	(44)	***9.0	(39)	
Nonwhite	52.0	(26)	50.0	(31)	
Income					
$0-9,999	28.8	(15)	**25.0	(7)	
$10-24,999	16.3	(15)	17.2	(20)	
$25-49,999	14.0	(20)	15.1	(28)	
$50,000+	22.8	(13)	8.0	(9)	
Don't Know	12.3	(7)	11.5	(3)	
Gender					
Male	*14.5	(22)	16.4	(38)	
Female	19.4	(48)	12.2	(32)	

TABLE XXII.--CONTINUED

	1991 %	1991 (N)	1994 %	1994 (N)	Change Over Years
C. Omaha police officers are not able to answer citizens' questions correctly					
Strongly Agree/Agree	9.5	(38)	13.6	(67)	p=.074
Undecided	21.7	(87)	17.8	(88)	p=.168
Disagree/Strongly Disagree	58.1	(233)	62.6	(309)	p=.193
Don't Know	10.7	(43)	6.1	(30)	***p=.017***
Demographics For Strongly Agree/Agree Response					
Age					
18-34	9.6	(10)	15.6	(29)	
35-64	9.4	(15)	10.3	(22)	
65+	10.4	(8)	16.7	(15)	
Don't Know	8.3	(5)			
Race					
White	**7.5	(26)	***10.0	(43)	
Nonwhite	22.0	(11)	37.1	(23)	
Income					
$0-9,999	**23.1	(12)	***39.3	(11)	
$10-24,999	12.0	(11)	17.2	(20)	
$25-49,999	3.5	(5)	12.4	(23)	
$50,000+	10.5	(6)	7.1	(8)	
Don't Know	7.0	(4)	7.7	(2)	
Gender					
Male	7.9	(12)	15.9	(37)	
Female	10.5	(26)	11.5	(30)	
D. Omaha police officers respond quickly to calls for service					
Strongly Agree/Agree	59.6	(239)	57.1	(282)	p=.493
Undecided	17.5	(70)	13.2	(65)	p=.091
Disagree/Strongly Disagree	16.0	(64)	23.7	(117)	***p=.006***
Don't Know	7.0	(28)	6.1	(30)	p=.684
Demographics For Strongly Agree/Agree Response					
Age					
18-34	51.0	(53)	53.2	(99)	
35-64	56.9	(91)	59.6	(127)	
65+	75.3	(58)	58.9	(53)	
Don't Know	61.7	(37)			
Race					
White	***61.1	(212)	***60.3	(260)	
Nonwhite	52.0	(26)	35.5	(22)	
Income					
$0-9,999	53.8	(28)	57.1	(16)	
$10-24,999	62.0	(57)	56.9	(66)	
$25-49,999	65.0	(93)	55.9	(104)	
$50,000+	57.9	(33)	60.2	(68)	
Don't Know	49.1	(28)	46.2	(12)	
Gender					
Male	64.5	(98)	57.8	(134)	
Female	56.9	(141)	56.5	(148)	

* p < .05 between the categories in that survey year
** p < .01 between the categories in that survey year
*** p < .001 between the categories in that survey year

the officer was courteous, more nonwhites agreed in 1994 than in 1991 but the opposite occurred for the whites. The $0-9,999 income category also had an increase while the others had a decrease over time. More whites and less nonwhites, along with the $0-9,999 income category said officers were rude. Finally, there was an increase in the

TABLE XXIII.—SUPPORT FOR FOURTH HYPOTHESIS

Item	Omaha	O.H.A.	Nonwhite	$0-9,999
Law Enforcement (LE) is the best thing about Omaha	No	Yes		
LE is the worst thing about Omaha	No	No		
LE is the worst thing in neighborhood	Yes	No		
LE is important problem in Omaha	No	Yes		
LE is important problem in neighborhood	Yes			
Satisfaction w/police protection	No		Yes	Yes
Satisfaction w/response time	No		No	No
Called-was officer courteous	No		No	No
Called-was officer helpful	No		No	No
Called-was officer professional	No		No	No
Stopped-was officer courteous	No		Yes	Yes
Stopped-was officer professional	No		No	Yes
Omaha officers usually courteous	No		Yes	Yes
Omaha officers respectful	No		No	No
Omaha officer use excessive force	Yes		No	No
Most officers are rude	No		Yes	Yes
Officers show concern when asked questions	No		Yes	No
Omaha officers are physically fit	No		No	Yes
Omaha officers are prejudiced against minority persons	Yes		Yes	Yes
Omaha officers can't answers questions correctly	No		No	No
Omaha officers respond quickly to calls	No		No	Yes

nonwhites who said officers show concern when asked questions. For the whites there was no change.

The only question in Table XXII that showed an improvement in the officers' characteristics for the entire city of Omaha was: "Omaha police officers are prejudiced against minority persons." The percentage of people who agreed with this statement decreased insignificantly, and the number who disagreed with it increased significantly by 11.8 percent from 1991 to 1994. Both race categories had a decrease in the percentage of respondents who agreed with this statement, and those in the $0-9,999 and $50,000 plus income categories also had a decrease.

When asked if "Omaha police officers are physically fit," there was an increase in the percentage of respondents who both agreed and disagreed with the statement. Both of these increases make it difficult to say that this statement supports my hypothesis. For race, more whites and less nonwhites agreed with the statement in 1994. The reply does not appear to be influenced by income as each category increased in 1994.

There was also a significant increase in the respondents who disagreed with the statement "Omaha police officers respond quickly to calls for service." In the income category, the respondents who earned $0-9,999 had the biggest increase over 1991 in those who agreed that Omaha police officers respond quickly to calls.

For Omaha, only four questions went in the predicted direction. Thus there is not enough support for the hypothesis. In the O.H.A. area I am unable to determine if there is support for the hypothesis because of the mixed results for law enforcement. Some

positive improvements were seen for the nonwhites and the $0-9,999 income category that were not reflected in the total Omaha data.

TABLE XXIV.--SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN YEARS FOR TABLES 10, 11, AND 15

	1990-1991	1991-1994	1990-1994
VICTIMIZATION			
Break-Ins (Omaha)	***.006***	.068	.335
Break-Ins (O.H.A.)	.171		
Attempted Break-Ins (Omaha)	***.008***	***.016***	.828
Attempted Break-Ins (O.H.A.)	.462		
Stolen Outside (Omaha)	***.014***	***.007***	.941
Stolen Outside (O.H.A.)	.685		
CITIZENS' PERCEPTIONS OF CRIME			
Better (Omaha)	.349	.184	.870
Better (O.H.A.)	.216		
Same (Omaha)	***.001***	***.000***	***.000***
Same (O.H.A.)	***.045***		
Worse (Omaha)	***.000***	***.000***	***.001***
Worse (O.H.A.)	***.003***		
DEGREE OF WORRY ABOUT CRIME			
Very Worried (Omaha)	***.000***	***.000***	.136
Very Worried (O.H.A.)	***.011***		
Little Worried (Omaha)	***.000***	***.000***	.558
Little Worried (O.H.A.)	***.020***		
Not Worried (Omaha)	.056	***.000***	.111
Not Worried (O.H.A.)	.941		

Conclusion and Discussion

The police department in Omaha, Nebraska has made great strides implementing community oriented policing. They started in 1989 by placing 15 officers in the O.H.A low-income housing developments. In July 1990, this team of officers became known as the Selective Patrol Unit and started utilizing COP. Within a couple of years COP

expanded to other parts of Omaha under the Weed and Seed program. Some of these areas included additional minority and low-income neighborhoods. In December 1993, the Omaha Police Department started the process of implementing COP city-wide. This study has looked at COP in Omaha to see if the philosophy was effective in producing the expected changes predicted in my four hypotheses.

For the entire city of Omaha, the changes that were predicted did not occur. None of the data evaluated supported any of the four hypotheses For the first hypothesis, there was not a decrease in crime. The total number of UCR Index crimes increased 12.9 percent, crimes against persons increased 54.9 percent, and crimes against property increased 8 percent. The second part of this hypothesis looked at the victimization data. From 1990 to 1994 break-ins and attempted break-ins decreased in Omaha, but it was not statistically significant. The second hypothesis said that citizens will perceive crime as less of a problem as COP is implemented. This hypothesis was not supported by the data from Omaha because there was a statistically significant increase in the number of people who felt the crime situation was worse in 1994 than in 1990. When asked about their priority of crime, there was a large percentage increase in the number of individuals who said crime was the worst thing about Omaha. The third hypothesis predicted that fear of crime would decrease as COP is implemented. However, Omaha had an insignificant increase in the percentage of people "very worried" about crime and an insignificant decrease in those "not worried" about crime. For the final hypothesis on quality of interaction with the Omaha Police Department, there were only four questions that

showed an increase in citizens' attitudes, perceptions, and satisfaction with the Omaha Police Department. This small number of positive responses does not support the hypothesis.

In the O.H.A. area there is evidence that COP produced the changes predicted in my hypotheses. For the first hypothesis on crime, the total UCR Index crimes decreased along with crimes against property, supporting the hypothesis. Under the victimization portion of this first hypothesis all three crimes decreased, but the decrease was not statistically significant. Regarding the second hypothesis, there was a statistically insignificant increase in the number of people who said the crime situation was better in Omaha and a statistically significant decrease in the number who said it was worse, again supporting the hypothesis. As for the priority of crimes, there also was support for the second hypothesis as the number of respondents decreased who said crime was the worst thing in their neighborhood. The third hypothesis is supported in that residents in the O.H.A. area had a statistically significant decrease of 26.2 percent in those who were very worried about crime. For the fourth hypothesis, citizens' attitudes, perceptions, and satisfaction with the Omaha Police Department were mixed making it hard to draw any type of conclusion.

There is a limitation to the conclusions drawn from the O.H.A. sample. The North Omaha portion of the OCS where this sample was obtained did not indicate if the respondents lived in or around the O.H.A. housing developments. So this sample included respondents in the same zip codes as the housing developments with incomes

below $10,000 per year. Because this O.H.A. subsample may not accurately represent the O.H.A. area, the findings may not reflect what is actually occurring in or around these low-income housing developments.

As for race and income there was a mixture of support for the hypotheses. The victimization data and fear of crime were two of these areas for race. Under income, citizens' perceptions of crime and fear of crime support the hypothesis. Finally, one positive aspect that support the last hypothesis was the improvements over time in the nonwhites and the $0-9,999 income categories especially when they were compared to the negative trends in Omaha. This appears to be a good indication that nonwhites and low-income residents had improved feelings about the police.

However, caution must be used when interpreting the O.H.A. results because there is only two years of survey data. As in the Omaha data, negative trends in subsequent years could also occur in the O.H.A. area. The only way to boost the confidence of the findings in the O.H.A. area is to collect more data beyond the last year included in this study.

Another word of caution is that this study was not a true time-series analysis. Because I do not have three years of data before Omaha started implementing COP there is no indication of what the trend was before 1990 for the survey questions. An upward or downward trend from the previous years might have continued with the data in this study and I would not be able to recognize it. Since I do not know what the previous years were and if a trend was going up or down, I can not say with confidence that

community oriented policing brought about the change. I can only draw conclusions on changes between the time periods of the data being evaluated and say that it appears to be caused by community oriented policing.

Given the situation in Omaha, these results are not surprising. During the time period that this study looked at, COP was slowly being implemented in the city. But, the majority of the COP efforts were focused in the Omaha Housing Development's low-income housing areas and also expanded to other low-income areas in Omaha. In essence there were two different programs occurring with different dosages of COP being given to Omaha. There was a large amount given to the low-income areas and a small amount applied to the city of Omaha as a whole. These different amounts of community oriented policing may be affecting the findings in this study.

This study should be the beginning of a more thorough evaluation of COP in Omaha, Nebraska. The Omaha Conditions Surveys should continue to ask many of the same questions that were used in this study. The additional data from these surveys will be helpful in answering many of the same questions I asked as Omaha continues to implement community oriented policing into the year 1999.

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