University of Nebraska at Omaha

DigitalCommons@UNO

12-1-1987

Cimilicy as a Panacea to Nigeria's Political Problems

Gregory Ojiewulu Ucheagwu
University of Nebraska at Omaha

Cimilicy as a Panacea to Nigeria's Political Problems

A Thesis

Presented to the

Department of Political Science

and the

Faculty of the Graduate College

University of Nebraska

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts

University of Nebraska at Omaha

by

Gregory Ojiewulu Ucheagwu

December, 1987

UMI Number: EP73787

UMI®

Dissertation Publishing

UMI EP73787

ProQuest®

THESIS ACCEPTANCE

Acceptance for the faculty of the Graduate College,
University of Nebraska, in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree Master of Arts, University
of Nebraska at Omaha.

COMMITTEE

Joong Gun Chung   _Political Science_
Name   Department

Orville D. Menard   _Political Science_

Tommy R. Thompson   _History_

Joong Gun Chung
Chairman

_11/27/87_
Date

CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to express my profound gratitude to all the teachers who played various roles in my intellectual engineering. However, some of them deserve special mention -- Dr. G. Chung, Dr. O. Menard and Dr. T. Thompson for agreeing to serve on my thesis committee.

I particularly wish to thank the chairman of my thesis committee, Dr. Chung, for his time, patience, and informative guidance through the gruelling period of my research.

Apart from serving on my thesis committee, Dr. Menard and Dr. Thompson have made meaningful contributions toward my intellectual growth. I thank the former for introducing me to the rudiments of Civil-Military thought, while a lot of credit should go to the latter for exposing me to some critical historical concepts and ideas during my undergrudate days.

It has been a great pleasure working with the three of you.

INTRODUCTION

A study of the political development in Nigeria should be seen and explored in the context of civil-military relations. The most myopic observer will understand why and how the military cannot be insulated from the political

process or the futility and inextricability of distinguishing the military from the civilians.

In essence, with regard to Nigerian political development, two powerful institutions, i.e., the civil and the military have confronted, complemented and cooperated with each other. These two institutions have been fully entrenched prior to, and since, Nigeria received her independence from Britain -- the former by the conventional and stereotypical notion of civilian supremacy over uniformed officers (which still lacks scientific validity over this asserted mandate to rule), and the latter by its exclusive monopoly over the instruments of force and coercion.

Mere conjecture suggests that this super-ordination of civilians over the military would have been sustained if the politicians had not resorted to questionable politics by endangering the polity and consequently providing he motives, dispositions, and opportunity for the military to intervene.

The vast continent of Africa is a typical example and a living testimony of what European balkanization can bequeath to a region. The European military confrontation with the African nations, with the latter's subsequent capitulation, introduced an element of force in their political and cultural fabric because colonialism and colonial status was acquired, sustained by the application of force.

This external reinforcement has been fully entrenched and has shaped and molded the thoughts and attitudes of the African man.

The decolonization period equally attests to this element of force as an integrated part of the African socialization process. The wide use of intimidation and thuggery, which is akin to para-military organizations by African politicians, reflects and manifests the experience of colonial inheritance.

It is also worthy of note that individualism, communalism, democracy, autocracy, decentralization, and centralization, have all been cherished values in African political tradition.

The British presence in Nigeria left a legacy of centralization while decentralization was maintained, by acknowledging, reinforcing, and perpetuating the tribal cleavages, geographical and regional divisions. Prior to contact with the British colonial administrators, Nigeria had existed as quasi-independent, and interdependent units.

THESIS STATEMENT:

These elements of centralization stemming from colonialism, and decentralization deriving from tribal cleavages, distinct political cultures and regional identification calls for a distinct unique political treatment. Therefore, Cimilicy, in view of the country's history and in recognition of civil-military frictions will

provide and equilibrium or a reluctant, but inevitable, balance to accomodate the contending forces of governance. The military is a _de facto_ institution in the political process. Therefore, the author advocates constitutional enshrinement of the military as an indispensable partner in the governing process.

Before posing the relevant questions that will guide this project, it is prudent to clarify the concept of cimilicy.

Arthur Nwankwo defines cimilicy as a "positive integration of civilians, military, and democracy for concert and harmony in government." 1/ In the same vein, Chuba Okdiagbo defines dyarchy or the synthesis of civil-military thought as: "the politicization of the armed forces and the militarization of the people." 2/ The author's fusion of civil-military thought is derived from the above.

While cimilicy synthesizes civil-military thought, embodying democracy represented by the civilian government and authoritarianism exemplified by the military rule, an incorporation of Nnamdi Azikiwe's dyarchy doctrine is also of crucial and paramount importance to this study. Azikiwe opines that:

> Historically, the military caste is part and parcel of society. Philosophically, if democracy implies government of the many, by an elected or selected few from the many, for the benefit of the many; and if civilians and soldiers are component of the many from whom the few are elected or selected, why should the civilians reserve to themselves the exclusive privilege to rule? Sociologically, civilians and

soldiers are members of the various communities that
form our nation. Politically, government of human
beings is corrective by its very nature. It makes no
difference whether it is civil or military, and lastly,
psychologically, the love of power is innate in man.
... The civilian as well as the soldier inherits this
trait from our pristine ancestors. Thus, it would be
criminal folly to expect a soldier to be satisfied to
take a back seat. 3/

The geologic principle of 'uniformitarianism' 4/ i.e.,
'the past is the key to the future,' plays a dualistic
albeit, paradoxical role in the explanation of political
development in Nigeria. First, with the knowledge of the
past, it seeks to explain the present and make projections
for the future. Secondly, knowledge of the past reinforces
current prejudices and frustrates, even stifles, painstaking
efforts to formulate a viable and stable political system.
Is democracy an imported political system in Africa? Is
Nigeria a de facto nation, or a conglomeration of power
hungry tribes, or a quasi-independent nations? Does the
inherent polarization and further balkanization of the
country provide a panacea or at least a tentative solution
to the problems facing the nation? Most importantly, using
the aforementioned guide, i.e., the principle of
uniformitarianism, how did the civilian superordination over
the military come about in the first place?

A lot of questions come to mind about this perceived
politically neutral, but sensitive military institution. Is
it pertinent out of academic curiosity and expediency to
draw and analogy between military neutrality and domestic
crisis on one hand, and the defense of the territorial

integrity of the nation on the other knowing that continued domestic deterioration may render the territorial integrity of the nation vulnerable? Or should the military exercise some martial restraints for the perceived fallible and perfect civilian structure to remedy itself? Is there any correlation between declining civilian legitimacy and military popularity and vice versa?

It is a conventionally held notion that coups are generally carried out by majors and colonels who occupy the middle level tier of the army, and who have legitimate concerns about their social and economic enhancement. In furtherance to the above, concerning the middle level tier of the army as coup makers, how does that notion apply to Nigerian generals in the later coups who already had succeeded economically? How true is the statement that the officer corps is a middle-class preserve?

Proffering an academic guess that economic gain provides the motives, are there other subterranean factors? Is it also prudent to postulate that considering the tribal and regional configurations of the Nigerian polity that military interventionism is clearly seen in terms of hegemony?

As will be seen in subsequent pages in the project, the military men on assumption of office reflect and replicate their predecessors' objectives, i.e., the civilians, by the pursuit of naked power -- power for the group, class, tribe, region, and the center.

The questions posed so far are not all conclusive as more questions will be asked as the project requires. This study is subdivided into four areas: pre-colonial Nigeria and the colonial legacy; characteristics of civilian administration; characteristics of military interventionsism and military rule; and finally, cimilicy as a fusion of civil-military thought.

Pre-Colonial Nigeria and Colonial Legacy

Obafemi Awolowo views Nigeria as a state -- the product of multiple nations. 5/ Robert Cord defines a nation as a "people with its own history, culture, and language; the necessity for a formal government and a clearly defined home not a prerequisite." 6/ The above suggests the importance of language as a crucial determinant of nationhood. In the words of Chief Awolowo:

> You can unite, but you can never succeed in unifying peoples whose language has set distinctly apart from one another. The tendency to cohere was ingrained at birth and is self-sustaining in all the individual members or tribal groups of the same nation; there is no such inherent tendency in the members of two different nations. 7/

The significance and implication of this language variable is that ethnic groups such as Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, Ibo, Tiv, Ibibio, Kanuri, Edo, Edoma, Ijaw and Nupe cannot be classified as members of one nation . It follows that each of the above-named ethnic units can exist independently or separately as a nation because of linguistic and cultural disparities. The attributes of nationhood derive from an

all-encompassing language, albeit with different dialects, and a commonality in culture and ancestry. 8/

Crawford Young goes further to argue the precedence of state-building over nation-building which is a reversal or an antithesis of the Nigerian situation. He asserts that:

> In many circumstances, state-building deserves priority over nation-building, the competence, probity, effectiveness, fairness, representativeness, and distributive justice of the state in its conduct of public affairs will usually be more decisive in creating fellow-feeling than any heavy-handed insistence on national loyalty. 9/

The phrase "heavy-handed insistence" may be interpreted as the forced unification or amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria by the colonial power, and in the - contemporary era -- the forced national integration by the military administrators.

The Nigerian scenario epitomizes Walter Schwarz's conception of a dual nationalism -- modern and primordial. The former is exemplified by the identification with the state in the face of colonial rule. This group was drawn from the civil servants, soldiers, politicians, professional men and school children. The latter deals with primordial ties or what the author refers to as tribal nationalism that transcends national feelings to particularistic preoccupation. This latter nationalism is not concerned with Nigeria as an indivisible and corporate entity, but as sub-entities gravitating around the three major tribes -- the Ibo, Yoruba, and Hausa. Walter Schwarz further argues that in a culturally diverse society like Nigeria with about

four hundred linguistic groups, suffer not so much because of the ethnic cleavages, but due to the triangular, tribal conflict of the three dominant tribes of Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Ibo, who individually have a common language and a common way of life. He did not only attest to their respective status of nationhood, he referred to them as big nations. 11/

In retrospect, Obafemi Awolowo laments the hypocritical conduct of the colonialists, cognizant of the societal cleavages, but very reluctant to conciliate what they deviously brought together. He opines that the "North had its own penal code as distinct from Nigeria's criminal code, and the fundamental human rights entrenched in the Nigerian Constitution were amply qualified in order to preserve some outmoded and repugnant Northern customs and usages." 12/

A lot of discussions have been conducted on the genesis and foundations of pure democratic political thought. With recourse to the preceding statement, is democracy an imported concept in the stream of African political thought? In fact, the true concept of democracy is not alien African political traditions and foundations.

Zaki Ergas acknowledges the existence of three forms of political organization prior to the advent of the colonialists:

> 1.) The decentralized, and at times, over-extended empires such as Soughay and Mali; 2.) The smaller, more centralized and better integrated kingdoms such as Ashanti and Bugandi; and 3.) The "acephalous" tribal societies, some of which were occupied or under the loose domination of 1.) and 2.). 13/

The aforementioned buttresses and conforms with Robert Rignor's classifications of decentralized and centralized societies. While the former, i.e., the Kikuyu, Kambi, Masai, and the Ibos ahd a built-in mechanism for citizen participation in the political process, the latter such as the Hausa-Fulani emirates in Northern Nigeria, the Yoruba, and the Ashantis had a more circumscribed and centralized system, with 'recognized heads or chiefs often selected from royal lineages.' 14/

These elements of centralization and decentralization have rendered most African nations ungovernable and has always been a constant source of intrigue and fission, particularly in a society where the contending tribes or quasi-nations are near equal or at par with each other. According to Thomas Hobbes, because of equality, we perceive others as potential competitors and this leads to conflict as we employ force and fraud to achieve our ends, ultimately, leading to war. 15/

Ian Lustick, in his article on "consociationalism versus control," proffers a means to stability in deeply divided societies by postulating that a "control" model is requisite to the achievement of stability in a "vertically segmented society" insofar that the superordinate segment has preponderant influence and control over the subordinate segment(s). The "control model" is simply a governing process in pluralistic or multi-cultural societies whereby

the superordinate segment exerts control and influence over subordinate segments.

> Examples of such lopsided relationships includes South Africa; black-white relations in the American South before W. W. II, Mestizo-Indian relations in Bolivia; Jews and Arabs in Israel; Trans-Jordanians and Palestinians in post-civil war Jordan; Arabs and Kurds in Iraq since 1975; Russians and other nationalities in the Soviet Union; Tutsi and Hutu in Burundi; Ahmaric and Rommo Eritrean, Somali, and Galla in pre-revolutionary Ethiopia; and mainlanders and native Formosans on Taiwan. 16/

In addition to the aforementioned is colonialism where the art of superordinate control over weak and lesser units was perfected. The author concurs with Lustick's model of superordinate control as a source of political stability with qualification.

A distinction should be made between control as mutually agreed on by the parties concerned for the sake of stability and imposition as evident in colonialism. The imposition aspect is morally repugnant and unacceptable. The control model is interim, tentative, and ephemeral. While guaranteeing a brief period of political bliss it leads into a precarious and uncertain future.

Robert Tignor attributes most contemporary political behaviors to the colonial past. He opines that the creation of colonial chiefs in acephalous, i.e., chiefless or headless societies has caused a decisive break with the pre-colonial past. 17/ A careful and meticulous look at the Ibo society prior to colonization will illuminate and buttress this assertion. "The Ibos are highly individualistic, and egalitarian, every man considering

himself as good as everyone else and demanding a voice in his local affairs. Since everyone had a right to rise in society, Ibo culture emphasized competition." 18/ These are some of the democratic qualities that epitomize the Ibo society.

Also equally important by way of contrast are the inherent pitfalls in this democratic process characterized by the "wasted uncoordinated effort, slow decision-making, and a lack of unity typical of such people and which was underlined in facing more disciplined autocratic societies." 19/

For the mere fact that government was organized on a local or village level does not preclude the existence of democracy even in its most pristine form. The administration of justice possessed the same democratic quality. "Quarrels between individuals of different families in the ward were settled before the people, the ward elders acting as arbiters. An unpopular elder would be ignored and no one would speak to him." In the contemporary era, this means dwindling popularity and when transformed to electoral politics means punitive sanctions or no vote.

Also, a man may attempt to settle and harmonize relations with his hostile partner. In contemporary parlance, this means settling out of court. Webster, Boahen, and Idowu attest to the fact that:

> If an elder who was a powerful and persuasive speaker
> could quote history or an earlier similar case for
> either side, it had an influence on the assembly. If,
> however, there was suspicion that the elder was in any

way connected with the individual he was speaking for, instead of helping, he might hurt the case for which he spoke. 20/

This implies in modern legal usage the forensic arguments based on precedents, and the prejudicial aspects the law fervently wishes to dispense with. The aforementioned contradicts Awolowo's assertion that, "The training of Nigerians in democratic practices only got to a half-hearted start in 1951 -- the very last year of this period." 21/

The pastoral Masai of Kenya also lends credence to the existence of democratic principles and practices prior to colonial rule. Tignor states that, "The pastoral Masai were divided into two age groups roughly of warriors and elders. The latter met in councils to resolve disputes and make policy." 22/ These are the comforts and prerequisites of a society -- defense of the citizens and the territorial boundary, policy-making, implementation and adjudication of disputes.

Tignor argues that the introduction of colonial chiefs in segmentary, decentralized societies eroded traditional values of economic self-sufficency and political autonomy, 23/ and supplanted with concentration of power into the hands of imposed mediocre chiefs who did not have the mandate of the people. He also contends by citing Kenya as an example where the executive, legislative, and judicial powers were consolidated under the Kikuyu chiefs, though the

judicial powers clearly resided in the Kiamas, local councils prior to the colonial period. 24/

The author does not absolve or exonerate African societies from autocratic or authoritarian practices, but such words as reinforcement and entrenchment provide an incisive understanding of the impact of colonialism on African cherished democratic traditions. It left a legacy of action and attitudes which has been hard to supplant. 25/ Thus, the propagation and intellectualization of democracy, nursed and nurtured as a nineteenth century thought, is misleading. Early African practitioners of democracy were colonized by contemporary proponents of democratic or quasi-democratic ideas. Such nations include Britain, France, Spain, Belgium and Portugal. 26/

Constitutionalism

Simply put, constitutionalism is "government in which power is distributed and limited by a system of laws that must be obeyed by the rulers." 27/ Constitutionalism is an important component of democracy as it relates to checks and limits of governments. The assertion by Rhoda Howard that the African passivity to constitutionalism and the rule of law is derived from its imposition from above 28/ is right. The fact is that colonialism eroded constitutionalism even in its most pristine form. The contemporary African leaders' lack of receptivity to democratic ideas is not an abhorrence of democracy in itself, but a squint-eyed skepticism at a concept that is associated with former colonial empires.

Rhoda Howard also agrees with Rignor that the rings of constitutionalism were removed when the British overhauled the native court system by thrusting upon the traditional chiefs stupendous powers hitherto unknown to some African societies with the consequent effect of undermining popular consent as expressed through the elders.

To further corroborate and buttress the repercussions of colonialism on post-colonial African nations, Howard describes:

> The English practice of imposing foreign law and re-interpreting traditional law and authority was not reversed upon independence, rather it provided a precedent for the new centralizing, executive-based governments. Separation of powers was an important theme of the new constitutions, yet it had been unknown under colonialism. 29/

If the corollary of foreign law is constitutionalism, how can constitutionalism erode constitutionalism, judging from the author's logic of the origin of constitutionalism? The fact is that colonialism stifled constitutionalism, and ironically expects constitutionalism to be upheld in post-colonial societies. To put it more succinctly, the British colonial law was imposed by force of conquest over the territories she ruled. 30/

Since human beings are creatures of habit and governments reflect environmental conditions, it is not naive to suggest that approximately one hundred years of colonial rule 31/ has fully reinforced the leadership's desire for a centralized political system in Nigeria. This

does not, however, submerge the yearnings for democratic
rule.

Constitutionalism was not an exclusive preserve of only
the decentralized societies in Africa. Frederick Schwarz
argues that the Yoruba chiefs have the semblance of
autocratic power, symbolic of Fulani emirs or the Tudor
monarchs. He states that:

> In fact, theirs was a constitutional monarchy built
> upon overlapping family, lineage, and clan units. At
> the center of a Yoruba state there was an Oba, or king,
> but substantial power was also held by heads of
> families and clans and sub-chiefs who did not owe their
> office to the Oba. Traditional electors or councilors
> chose him from among eligible males of the royal
> families; if the councilors decided that his rule
> should end, he would be politely sent a parrot's egg as
> an indication that he should depart. When that
> happened, he would commit suicide. 32/

This may sound bizarre, but nevertheless, it is a tenet of
constitutionalism. The difference is the degree or
intensity of its application.

Obafemi Awolowo recounts the ominous effects of
indirect rule on the Yoruba people of Nigeria. Indirect
rule implies the empowerment of African cheifs who were not
popularly elected by the people - the British puppets.
Awolowo says:

> There is no doubt that in its original treatment of
> Paramount Chiefs the British government mistook a part
> for the whole. The dictatorial powers which
> some Yoruba chiefs are wielding today are the making
> of the British government, who at the beginning
> misconceived the true nature of the Yoruba monarchy.
> 33/

Essentially, colonialism has imparted and taught the
Africans the Machiavellian principles of achieving,

sustaining , exercising power without any moral or ethical scruples. The African leaders have come to appreciate the wisdom and effectiveness of power consolidation. As Machiavelli states in The Prince, "It must be considered that there is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of things." 34/ The erection of colonial structure was indeed a 'new order of things.' Thus, Nigerian politics has been oscillating from how to reconcile the structural disruption reinforced by colonialism on one hand, and the painstaking efforts at the fusion or synthesis of civil-military powers on the other.

Another aspect that needs reconciliation is the Eurocentric notion of equating development with Westernization. 35/ The author's contention is that development is relative to a country's socio-economic and political culture. It has no bearing on technological sophistication or pristine formation.

Walter Rodney does not see development in purely economic terms, but rather, as "an overall social process which is contingent on man's efforts to deal with his natural environment." 36/ Rodney also agrees with Warda that, "Such concepts as 'development' or 'modernization' must be recognized for what they are: metaphors, poetic devices, short-hand tools, abstractions that have some importance in defining, outlining, or describing reality, but that should not be mistaken for 'reality itself.'" 37/

In other words, development is a subjective value judgement that cannot and should not be universally applied to countries of different cultural milieu. 38/

Corruption

It is common knowledge that corruption is the bane of Nigerian society. While African nations, Nigeria in particular, are regarded as practitioners of corruption, the colonial administration and its impact should not be overlooked as a reinforcing trait in this socio-economic and political malady. Robert Tignor argues that the Ibo and Kikuyu chiefs from Nigeria and Kenya were among the first to build European-style homes. 39/ Considering the above -- was this an oversight or deliberate condonement of corruption on the part of the colonizing power cognizant of their, i.e., the chiefs' negligible and paltry salaries which will inevitably result in corruption. 40/

There is a parallel or correlation between the wisdom of indirect rule and corrupt practices under colonial rule. Since indirect rule maintained political stability and kept the subjects in line, 41/ one can confidently infer that the colonialists could care less over the activities of a few African chiefs who deviated from the norm, but still maintained the peace.

Corruption does not operate in a vacuum. It takes two to make a deal. When an expatriate boasted that he had many Nigerian ministers in his pocket, 42/ attention was generally focused on the unpatriotic Nigerian public

officials, without considering the external element of the deal which was mutually agreed upon.

As the great Roman senator and orator Cicero once stated, "For honesty is not particularly virtuous when there is no one with the ability or the ambition to corrupt it." 43/ Or when a woman is accused of infidelity, no attention is paid to her male partner's persistent and aggressive overtures, which consequently leads to her infidelity.

The aforementioned explanation is not intended in any way to exonerate the Nigerians from corruption or corrupt practices, but it seeks to contradict and, if possible, reverse the stereotypical impression that corruption is an innate trait characteristic of Nigerians and Africans as a whole. Corruption is a universal phenomenon. Walter Schwarz draws an analogy between Nigeria and western history in respect to corruption. He posits that the "politician who calculates the outcome of elections in terms of bribes and thugs seems to have come straight from the English rotten boroughs or the era of Reconstruction in the United States." 44/

Corruption is a relative term subject to mis-definition and misinterpretation and sometimes confused with lobbying. Lobbying in the contemporary era is defined as "an effort to persuade public officials, whatever their initial feeling is about a group, to adopt and enforce its policies." 45/

The pre-colonial attitudes of African societies toward gifts made to people in power in return for political

services and favors rendered 46/ is in the author's judgement considered lobbying in its most embryonic form. When members of interest groups dine with members of congress, they have an ulterior motive, i.e., the promotion and advancement of their interests.

In summary, Odumegwu Ojukwu has this to say on the effects of colonialism on the decolonized state, "Colonial state generates a colonial posture. This posture automates a series of complexes which remain with the African long after the colonial stimulus has ceased to have direct contact." 47/ This statement vividly illustrates the post-colonial Nigeria in all its ramifications.

The Nigerian leaders who fought in unison toward the attainment of national independence have come to grips with "real politik" considerations of power and the zero-sum game 48/ concept of power distribution. According to Ojukwu:

> Our leaders in the fight for freedom very soon realized the corrupt possibilities of power, the temptation of which proved too strong for their weak frames. The country was thrown into a power conflict -- region versus region, ethnic group versus ethnic group, clan versus clan -- until finally, the country began to disintegrate. 49/

The deduction from this argument is that political independence, without economic sovereignty is tantamount to neo-colonialism or phoney independence. Franz Fanon states that, "independence is not a word which can be used as an exorcism, but (is) an indispensable condition for existence of men and women who are truly masters of all the material means which make possible the radical transformation of

society." 50/ The colonial legacy as will be shown in the following pages will influence and reflect the efforts the Nigerian society has invested to rediscover itself and forge a viable political system.

NOTES

1 Ikenga Nuta, The Diarchy Proposition, West Africa (April 1985), p. 610.

2 J. Bayo Adekson, Nigeria in Search of a Stable Civl-Military System (London: Gower Publishing Company Ltd. 1981), p. 5.

3 Ibid, p. 14.

4 Harold L. Levin, Contemporary Physical Geology (Philadelphia: Saunders College Publishers, 1981), p. 175.

5 Obafemi Awolowo, The People's Republic (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 84.

6 Robert L. Cord, James A. Medieros, and Walter S. Jones, Political Science - An Introduction (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, inc., 1974), p. 51.

7 Awolowo, The People's Republic, p. 89.

8 Ibid, p. 88.

9 Frank M. Stark, "Theories of Contemporary State Formation in Africa: A re-assessment," Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. XXIV (February 1986), p. 340.

10 Walter Schwarz, Nigeria (London: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1968), p. 15.

11 Ibid, p. 14.

12 Awolowo, The People's Republic, p. 70.

13 Zaki Ergas, "In Search of Development: Some Directions for Further Investigation," Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. XXIV (February 1968), p. 329.

14 Robert Tignor, "Colonial Chief in Chiefless Societies," Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. IX (March 1971), p. 342.

15 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan - Parts One and Two (Indiana: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1958), pp. 105-106.

16 Ian Lustick. "Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Consociationalism versus Control," World Politics, Vol. XXXI (April 1979), p. 330.

17 Tignor, Colonial Chief, p. 340.

18 J. B. Webster, A. A. Boahen, and H. O. Idowu, The Growth of African Civilization - The Revolutionary Years (Lagos: Longmans, Green and Company, <Ltd. 1967), pp. 174-175.

19 Ibid, pp. 175-176

20 Ibid, pp. 179

21 Awolowo, The People's Republic, p. 60.

22 Tignor, Colonial Chief, p. 341.

23 Ibid, p. 347.

24 Ibid, p. 341.

25 Ibid, p. 339.

26 Eze Ogueri, African Nationalism and Military Ascendancy (New York: Conch Magazine, Ltd. 1976), p. 32.

27   William Morris, ed.,   The American Heritage
Dictionary of the English Language

28   Rhoda E. Howard, "Legitimacy and Class Rule in
Commonwealth Africa: Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law,"
Third World Quarterly (April 1975), p. 324.

29   Ibid, p. 326.

30   Ibid, p. 325.

31   Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Nigeria - The Tribes,
The Nation, or the Race (Massachusetts: The Massachusetts
Institute of Technology Press, 1965), p. 1.

32   Ibid, p. 31.

33   Obafemi Awolo, Path to Nigerian Freedom, (London:
Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1947), p. 73.

34   Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince and Dsicourses (New
York: Random House, Inc., 1951), p. 21.

35   Howard J. Wiarda, "The Ethnocentrism of Social
Science," The Review of Politics (April 1981), p. 169.

36   Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa,
(Washington, D.C. : Howard University Press, 1981), p. 6.

37   Wiarda, Ethnocentrism of Social Science, pp.
166-77.

38   Ibid, p. 169.

39   Tignor, Colonial Chief, p. 350.

40   Ibid, p. 351.

41   Ibid, pp. 350-356.

42   Ogueri, African Nationalism, p. 9.

43   Cicero, <u>Selected Works</u> (Middlesex: Penguin Books Limited, 1969), p. 54.

44   Walter Schwarz, <u>Nigeria</u>, p. 20.

45   Walter F. Murphy and Michael N. Danielson, <u>American Democracy</u> (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1979), p. 179.

46   Tignor, Colonial Chief, p. 353.

47   Chukwuemeka O. Ojukwu, <u>Random Thoughts</u> (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1969), p. IX.

48   Tignor, Colonial Chief, p. 353.

49   Ojukwu, <u>Random Thoughts</u>, p. 5.

50   Franz Fanon, <u>The Wretched of the Earth</u> (New York: Grove Press, 1966), p. 158.

CHAPTER II

Civilian Control and Characteristics of Civilian
Administration

According to Jackson and Rosberg:

> The attractions of politics are many. Men have engaged
> in politics to pursue lofty ideals and ideologies to
> serve a state or its people, to advance a cause or
> interest, to wield power, and enjoy the fame,
> privileges, and honors that power brings. 51/

With recourse to the above, one is tempted to ask how did the civilians attain superordination over the uniformed officers?

Common sense dictates, by applying Machiavellian logic, that a parallel cannot be drawn between an armed and disarmed man. 52/ Gaetano Mosca concurs with the preceding analogy that a class equipped with superior weaponry often times imposes its leadership over the ill-equipped class. Mosca further argues that is has been possible to subordinate the standing army to the civil authority only "through an intense and widespread development of the sentiments on which juridical defense is based, and especially through an exceptionally favorable sequence of historical circumstances." 53/

These strings of historical circumstances have roots or genesis in the Middle Ages, whereby the proliferation of the militias with their attendant evils were done away with and replaced with a standing army, whose command was "entrusted to gentlemen who differed in birth, temperament and background from their soldiers." 54/ It follows that when the officer corps is peopled and controlled by gentlemen drawn from the politically dominant ranks of society, 55/ it is inconceivable that such men will nurse the intention or desire to dislocate the status quo.

Civilian attempts to subordinate the military in the governing process is not restricted solely to the western nations. In fact, a modicum of evidence, albeit substantially refuted by Morton Fried 56/ suggests that the soldiers have for centuries been considered the lowest rung of Chinese society. 57/ Claude Welch, Jr., corroborates the above by invoking the Confucian ethics in China that elevates the scholar and undermines the soldier. "Rule by the pen rather than the sword formed the ideal, if not always the reality, of Confucian political values." 58/

While the importance and status of the Chinese military cannot be completely denied as argued by Morton Fried, moreover, its diminution by a small segment of the anti-military class -- the "literati" is misleading and grossly unrepresentative of the Chinese society. 59/

Common sense dictates, and history will bear an immortal witness to the unfortunate irony of faith that the few will dictate the policies that will guide the many. A great deal of confusion surrounds the status of the military with regard to civilian governments. Conflicting opinions abound. However, the focus of the present discussion gravitates around the quest and necessity to trace the origin of civilian supremacy over the military.

The Zulus of South Africa can also be considered as pioneers and supporters of civilian control. Omer-Cooper has this to say about the efficient and stratocratic society of the Zulus:

> The young men split up amongst the regiments, soon came
> to feel a strong sense of esprit de corps and the
> nature of the system was such as to strengthen
> and emphasize the loyalty of the soldiers to their
> ruler in every possible way. From him, they received
> their arms and regalia, their immediate leaders owed
> their position to his will. 60/

It can also be argued that the ability of the Zulus' kings

to maintain control and dominion over their soldiers derive

from a thorough demonstration of valor and military prowess,

as evidenced by one of their great rulers -- Shaka. 61/

The Zulus under Shaka witnessed another historical

breakthrough in civil-military thought when two traditional

tribal chiefs were given military authority and allowed to

command forces made up largely of their own tribal

following, although this measure resulted in secessionist

drives, as the chiefs sought desperately to break away from

the king. 62/

The last point clearly shows the earlier attempt to

civilianize the soldiers and militarize the civilians.

Secessionist initiatives in the Zulu kingdom can be

construed or likened to a modern coup d'etat, even though

they were not directly aimed at the central polity. But,

given a scenario, where all the tribes adopt a secessionist

pattern, the central polity will ultimately collapse.

The Concretization of Civilian Control

Since the logic of civilian engineering was conceived,

how has it been lubricated and maintained?

Samuel Huntington shows that "objective civilian

control" can be obtained by "maximizing military

professionalism, by militarizing the military, thereby making them the tool of the state." 63/ Members of the officer corps want to be seen and identified with their exclusive profession. "His commission to the officer is what his license is to a doctor." 64/ This implies that without the ominous presence of other paramilitary groups and cognizant of the perils of their profession, i.e., war and the defense of the state, as Morris Janowitz argues, their continual obsession with the threat of danger requires a strong sense of solidarity if the military is to operate effectively. 65/ This solidarity comes with autonomy, trust, and competence that the military can conduct its affairs without "extraneous interference." 66/

Given the fundamental premise that any officer corps is professionalized only to the extent of its subordination to civilian control, Samuel Huntington believes that:

> The isolation of the military was a prerequisite to professionalization and peace was a prerequisite to isolation. Paradoxically, the United States could only create a professional military force when it was lacking any immediate use for such a force. The dark ages of military political influence were the golden age of military professionalism. 67/

Eric Nordlinger contends that military officers are professionals in the sense that they place a high premium on autonomy, exclusiveness, and expertise. 68/ This generates a feeling of introspection and great expectation for the profession they guard tenaciously and jealously.

Civilian Control by Stealth

Education is a _sine qua non_ to the socialization and indoctrination of members of any society. As Glessner Creel observed a long time ago of Chinese society, "The scholars composed the official documents, and lost no opportunity to insert, under the guise of rhetorical flourishes, statements which would advance the principles and claims of their class." 69/

The formative stage of military professionalism can in fact be traced to the reform measures of the Prussian system. According to Samuel Huntington:

> Probably the most revolutionary aspect of the Prussian system was its assumption that genius was superfluous, and even dangerous, and that reliance must be placed upon average men succeeding by superior education, organization, and experience. This approach, on the other hand, subordinated the individual to the collective will and intelligence of the whole, and yet guaranteed to the individual wide freedom of action. So long as he remained upon his proper level and within his sphere of responsibility. 70/

Another aspect of civilian control by subterfuge, although a bit far fetched, dates back to the origin of human inequality. Jean-Jacques Rosseau offers an explanation that natural man was independent and solitary, but as he engages in repetitive relations which gave rise to perceptions that produced thoughts of comparative qualities, he begins to observe the weak and the strong, the beautiful and the ugly. 71/

Rousseau's logic further contends that the acquisition of private property with division of labor and specialization is the foundation of a civil society. Labor becomes fully entrenched in this acquisition of private

property, since it is possible to to differentiate the talented from the non-talented. Everyone becomes enslaved in this new dispensation. The rich depend on the labor of the poor, while the poor depend on the employment of the rich. 72/

For the rich to consolidate their gains, they needed political institutions and from this, the first notion of justice was conceived. As a result, the rich has surreptitiously, and cleverly converted usurpation to unalterable right. 73/ The aforementioned only goes to show the inextricability of economic wealth from political power, or more succinctly put, the legitimacy of economic power on political power. The top echelon of the military has always been a significant segment of the power structure .

In summary, commenting on the conditions of professionalism, Samuel Huntington parallels it to the "growth of populations in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the development of technology, the beginnings of industrialism, the rise of urbanism and if the author may add, the rise of capitalism. All contributed to increased functional specialization and division of labor." 74/ Thus, civilian control was acquired, cemented, and institutionalized in some parts of the world, particularly the Western world, by a gradual and consistent process initiated by the ruling classes.

TABLE I

Democracies and Crypto-Military Democracies	Income Per Capita
Senegal (?)	$ 360
Mauritus	1,000
Israel	6,270
Sri Lanka	380
Malaysia	1,870
Philippines (?)	590
Japan *	10,200
Canada *	12,940
United States *	11,338
Costa Rica	1,280
Guatemala (?)	1,150
Honduras (?)	750
Panama (?)	2,150
Bolivia (?)	400
Colombia (?)	1,430
Brazil (?)	1,610
Equador (?)	1,165
Peru (?)	980
Venezuela	2,680
Argentina (?)	2,470
Denmark *	10,250
Finland *	10,270
Turkey (?)	990

Iceland *	9,040
Norway *	12,838
Sweden *	$11,510
United Kingdom *	7,640
Austria *	8,500
New Zealand	5,060
Australia *	11,172
Belgium *	5,060
France *	8,890
The Federal Republic of Germany *	10,670
Holland	-
Spain	-
Portugal	-
Switzerland *	14,300
Greece	3,380

Tables of the regimes adopted from Roy C. Macridis, Modern
    Political Regimes (Boston, Toronto: Little, Brown and
    Company Ltd., 1986), p. 80.

Figures on Income per capita are drawn from the World
    Factbook, published by the Central Intelligence Agency,
    1986. TABLE I, continued

TABLE II

Totalitarian Countries (Communist)	Income Per Capita
Mozambique	$ 150
Angola	500
Cambodia	—
Viet Nam	300
People's Republic of China	330
North Korea	1,170
Mongolia	—
Poland *	6,190
Czechoslovakia *	8,280
Hungary *	7,200
Romania	5,200
Bulgaria *	6,295
Albania	900
Yugoslavia	5,600
People's Republic of Germany *	9,800
USSR	7,120
Cuba	1,530

TABLE III

Authoritarian Regimes (Dynastic)	Income Per Capita
Morocco	$ 500
Bahrain *	10,000
Jordan	1,900
Kuwait *	13,620
Oman *	6,300
Qatar *	27,000
Saudi Arabia *	10,335
United Emirates *	24,000
Nepal	142
Brunei *	7,300
Haiti	240

Authoritarian Regimes (Single Party)	Income Per Capita
Tunisia	$ 1,280
Ivory Coast	780
Kenya	280
Malawi	210
Tanzania	210
Zambia	410
Mexcio	2,200
Peru	980

* denotes countries with high income per capita, in excess of $6,000.

The question mark is representative of the twelve crypto-military democracies that overtly project themselves as democratic regimes, but are surreptitiously governed by the   military.

Authoritarian Regimes (Military)	Income Per Capita
Algeria	2,430
Egypt	466
Libya *	7,180
Sudan	350
Benin	270
Gambia	170
Ghana	-
Guinea	300
Guinea - Bissau	180
Liberia	490
Mali	140
Mauritania	460
Nigeria	630
Sierra Leone	-
Togo	340
Upper Volta (Burking Faso)	160
Burundi	250

Ethiopia	120
Malagasay	–
Rwanda	–
Somalia	380
Uganda	220
Cameroon	800
Central African Republic	280
Thailand	1,030
Congo	1,140
Gabon	3,690
Zaire	200
Iraq	–
Yemen (North)	580
South Yemen	430
Bangladesh	130
Pakistan	300
Burma	180
Indonesia	540
Republic of Korea	2,000
Guyana	510
Paraguay	1,020
Chile	1,590
Uruguay	1,800
Dominican Republic	1,090

Civilian control has been very successful in countries with high per capita income with minor exceptions like Libya, Brunei, and Poland. However, as statistically illustrated on Table I, while civilian control has been fully entrenched in purely democratic countries, it has also been systematically sustained in communist totalitarian countries, and precariously maintained in dynastic and single party authoritarian countries.

The civilian control in communist totalitarian states stem largely from a political system controlled by a "small elite, dominant in all spheres of life, based on doctrine and ideology, and founded on mass support." 75/ Civilian control has been maintained in dynastic regimes on the basis of traditionalism, 76/ aided by religion. 77/ The data also illustrates (Table III) that all the countries under the military regimes, with exceptions of Libya, Brunei, and Poland have low per capita income.

Class Formation in Nigerian Political Process

Having dealt with the genesis and origin of civilian control, attention should also focus on other aspects and characteristics of civilian administration.

Contrary to conventional wisdom that in African political thought every human problem revolves around tribalism, the author is inclined to share Richard Sklar's contention that beneath the facade of tribalism lies the often neglected causative factor of which tribalism is the effect or consequence. In essence, the pioneer political leaders or what Sklar called the "Nigerian bourgeoisie" 78/ employed in the face of intra-class conflict and took advantage of regional and tribal sentiments to create an aura of fictitious, collective deprivation to enhance and advance their own personal interests. Since superior education 79/ is paramount among other factors that determine inclusion into the ruling class or political elite, perhaps Kenneth Dike was right when he asserted that "the educated Nigerian is the worst peddler of tribalism." 80/

The unfortunate and humiliating aspect of this class formation was the lack of comprehension of the paradoxical nature of independence or statehood -- political independence devoid of economic freedom. James O'Connel comments on the Nigerian experience when the imperial power acts as an interest group with a view to securing certain goals for the post-independence period, by encouraging or supporting the power of one set of local leaders. These goals may be the "national interest of the metropolitan power, or they may even be the local vested interests of

colonial bureaucrats who want to remain in the country under conditions that favor their own well-being." 81/

The aforementioned implies that the early nationalist politicians in a desperate effort to secure political independence, traded off some significant economic advantages which naturally constituted the life-blood and sustenance of the political state.

Contrary to the western notion of political practices, whereby political aspirants have distinguished themselves in the private sector, the Nigerian politicians recognize the essence , the rudiments of political power as a linkage or conduit for the attainment of economic advantages. 82/

It is pertinent to distinguish between two types of Nigerian politicians. The first group Richard Sklar describes as "high ranking politicians, senior administrators, major chiefs, lords of the economy, distinguished members of the learned professions." 83/ The second group are professional people who do not have economic leverage or backbone. While the former engage in politics to enhance and consolidate already acquired gains, the latter join politics as an immediate means to eke out a sustenance and possibly as a potential means to delve into the private sector as political circumstances permit.

Another aspect that is worth mentioning is the grand collusion between the metropolitan powers and Nigeria's dominant class. The vigorous efforts made to extradite the former corrupt minister in Shagari's administration, Alhaji

Umaru Dikko 84/ has proven abortive. Thus, the ancient biblical teaching has been reaffirmed that "those who have, will have more bestowed on them while those who have nothing, even the little they have will be taken away from them." 85/ The unpatriotic siphoning of indigenous wealth to foreign accounts can only stimulate and replenish foreign economies to the utter neglect and impoverishment of the indigenous economies.

Industrial Stagnation

Politics and economics are spiritually inseparable. Each reinforces the other. Therefore, good politics lubricate the economic machinery while a sound economy sustains the political state. It is an article of faith, that in spite of Africa's natural and intellectual resources, administration 86/ or a gigantic civil service bureaucracy is the dominant primary industry that guarantees employment to her citizens.

Nigeria is not immune from this lack of economic foresight. According to Richard Joseph, "The inability of the merchant class to take the initiative and generate capital and increase production has militated against industrialization in Nigeria." 87/ This lack of production and a high premium on consumption has placed the Nigerian economy in a very precarious state. Since the civil service carries this burden of Sisyphus, its problem is further compounded by the incipient lack of skills and creative innovation requisite for development. 88/

The economic argument advanced above does not subscribe to the non-existence of the private sector of the economy. But, it does point to the capricious and volatile secularization of the private sector of the economy. Larry Diamond believes that: "State planning and a firm grip over economic resources must be eschewed or curtailed to enable individuals to take the initiative and increase their standard of living independent of the state." 89/ Zaki Ergas also agrees that the "lack of authentic entrepreneurial or business class necessitates the ease with which the state can control most of the official economy for its prebendal purposes." 90/

The logical sequence of this calamitous circumstances is aided by the hotly contested political offices, which degenerate to a situation of near anarchy, thereby making it possible for the military to intervene and centralize every sector of the state.

Constitutional Mal-Engineering

Having attained political independence on October 1, 1960 91/ from Britain, the question most Nigerians ask is: to what extent does the political system, structure, and participants affect the prospects of an adequate constitutional engineering in the post independent Nigeria? The adoption of the parliamentary system of government is only understandable to the extent that Nigeria was a colonial protege of Britain. Choice, therefore, becomes an essential and paramount tenet of sovereignty in a nation's

right to competently decide her own political fate and destiny. This lack of choice constitutes the first fundamental flaw in constitutional engineering.

Federalism shall be explored in the context of dualistic paradoxical approach: how to hold the nation together on one hand, and how to balkanize the regions to eschew the hegemony or dominance of the major tribal regional groups on the other.

The aspect of federalism that institutionalized ingrained conflict into Nigeria's body politic is the misguided impression that the dominant party is predestined to maintain preponderant political influence before and after competitive elections.

This dominance derives its original impetus from the proportional distribution of parliamentary seats based on geography and population size. Obviously, the Northern People's Congress (NPC), because of its favorable status in the tripod power structure, determined the political direction and terms of party coalition by playing the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) and the Action Group (AG) against one another. 92/

With recourse to the above and considering the paradoxical tenet of Nigeria's political system, it follows that parliamentary supremacy ultimately favors the dominant party of the Northern Region in control of parliament. 93/ Taken to its logical conclusion, this implies that the

dominant party is supreme. In essence, the constitution becomes a supine document, relegated to a secondary status.

It is the authors's conviction that all political institutions and participants should submit to the superordinate role of constitutional guidance. Given the fundamental premise that the parliamentary system fuses rather than diffuses executive and legislative powers, 94/ then the Prime Minister as the chief executive with a majority control of parliament 95/ can make unilateral policy initiatives within the confines of the constitution.

There is nothing intrinsically wrong in chief executives and their appendages issuing policy directives, but the lack of safeguards against arbitrary and manipulative devices sometimes to the extent of undermining the constitution can flay political tempers.

Since the proportional principle is the basis of executive directives, should it have a universal application or be limited to electoral politics? Certainly, the post-independent Nigeria politics clearly show a "blanket " coverage beyond electoral politics. Adele Jinadu offers a vivid explanation as to the attempts made by the dominant northern executive to equalize the composition of the Nigerian officer corps and the educational disparities between the northerners and southerners:

> The executive or administrative action giving
> expression to them apparently contradicted the freedom
> from discrimination entrenched in the 1960 and 1963
> constitutions, as long as one group is favored to the
> detriment of others. 96/

These strings of executive initiatives do not affect only the civilian administrators and politicians. In fact, the impact is more profoundly felt within the military hierarchy. Eric Nordlinger argues that:

> Civilian interference has a multiple and decided impact upon the officers. Such actions generally lower the professional competence and self-image of the officer corps by substituting political for achievement criteria, call into doubt the soldiers' identities as independent and respected officers, factionalize an otherwise cohesive officer corps, warp the hierarchical structure, and weaken the officers' power to defend their corporate interests. 97/

This aspect of the military vis-a-vis the civilian administrators will be dealt with in detail in the next chapter. However, it is worth mentioning that the introduction of the quota system in the recruitment of the officer corps by the Defense Minister Alhaji Ribadu 98/ culminated in a rising disenchantment within the officer ranks.

Omitted before the arguments on constitutional mal-engineering and contrary to Billy Dudley's assertion that Nigeria became really "federal" in 1954, 99/ the author wishes to inject the notion that Nigeria was indeed a de facto confederation or a Trifederal system during the period in question.

Applying Dudley's argument will support the author's contention and contradict Dudley's postulation:

> Unlike the central government which had no representatives outside Nigeria, the regional governments had separate "offices" abroad, for instance, the eastern, western, and northern offices in Britain ... Central government was relegated to the role of playing second fiddle to the regions, a

> situation possibly best shown in the formulation and
> execution of the first "National" Development Plan for
> the country, the 1955-60 National Plan of Development
> which placed the development initiatives in the
> regions. 100/

Dudley's postulation has more relevance to the growing power of the central government after independence and the political necessity to control the country's newly indigenized armed forces and the instruments of foreign policy making. 101/

Another aspect that fostered federal growth was the need to reconcile the regional bickerings arising out of revenue distribution, owing to lopsided regional derivations. 102/ The author concurs with Ben Nwabueze's argument that:

> If the federal system can be structured to guarantee
> against control of the center by any one group, then it
> is desirable, in the interest of national unity, that
> the center should be strong as possible in order to be
> able to give effective leadership and direction to the
> contrary. In the final analysis, the relative size,
> population-wise, of the federating units would prove of
> decisive importance. 103/

Evidently this guarantee against the control of the center by any one group is glaringly absent in Nigeria's constitutional process. Due to this constitutional pitfall or deficiency, the nation's mood has been chiefly characterized by the struggle for political power and the fear of domination. 104/

Also relevant to the notion of group dominance at the center is the imponderance of diffusing parliamentary executive power, considering the nature of Nigeria's pragmatic politics. Ben Nwabueze catpures the spirit of

this constitutional quagmire by positing that the Nigerian society lacks the historical antecedents of the parliamentary system. That even though the monarch ceases to govern personally due to constitutional evolution, ushering in elected ministers, the status of the monarch still evokes respect.

The rugged, tempestuous Nigerian politics does not permit such an atmosphere of cordiality:

> If anything, the prime minister regarded himself as the president's superior and often behaved as such towards him. He lacked the attribute of kingly majesty in the eyes of the ministers. They had been either colleagues or opponents in partisan politics and the differences in tribal sentiment and loyalty introduced to make still more difficult the cultivation of the attitudes that should inform the relationship. 105/

The political dilemma of diffusing executive authority is encapsulated in a double-barreled question, how can one exercise the powers he does not have? And how can one go about pretending to have the powers he cannot exercise? The tacit response is that conflict is necessarily to be expected in an arrangement whereby executive authority is vested in one person and exercised by another, 106/ as evidenced in Nigeria's parliamentary system.

A lot of emphasis has been placed on the necessity of adopting a political system that is amenable to the Nigerian society, but it is worth mentioning for instance that when something is taken out of a political system, the purpose and ends of that system are altered, and when an external system is imposed on a traditional society, there is bound to be friction. Therefore, faced with the

preponderant influence and latitude the Northern-based party (NPC), was enjoying in the Federal House of Representatives, the Southern parties advocated for a strong senate. This gives equality of regional representation, to countervail northern dominance in the House of Representatives. 107/ Juxtaposed with the British parliamentary system is an attempt to dislodge or emasculate the influence of the House of Commons.

A pertinent question arises at this point. Does balkanization of the regions and states contribute to the diffusion of powers of those that get elected in civilian regimes or appointed in the case of military government? Evidence clearly points to the contrary. An explanation can be traced to the paradoxical nature of Nigeria's federalism in respect to the balkanization of the regions and later the states. The fact is that the states are emasculated as the fragmentation ensues particularly the new states that will depend on the federal government for initial survival. 108/ The irony here is that the group that dominates the center can mobilize and monopolize the resources to enhance her regional and tribal group interest.

Balkanization is an artificial creation, although with the best intentions. In practical terms, while boundaries can be drawn and redrawn, the inability to construct and fashion the human mind to the tune and merits of balkanization makes the whole exercise in peaceful federalism an illusion. Balkanization of regions and states

does not affect or alter peoples' perceptions, thoughts, attitudes, or concepts.

Stratocratic Federalism

Discussion of federalism is not confined or restricted to civilian administrators. However, an attempt will be made to briefly discuss a federal government under the military regime, conscious of the fact that the constitution is laid in abeyance, while the rule by decree prevails. This non-constitutional, but legitimate regime rules by coercion as opposed to persuasion. This does not preclude the civilians from being coercive, neither does it deter the military from acting in a somewhat benevolent manner.

On assumption of office, military officers assume supreme law-making functions. Adele Jinadu argues that "Essentially, power is decentralized rather than deconcentrated solely because the various state governments had no independent executive powers; they exercised only delegated executive power." 109/ Reinforcing this lack of consociational or concensus framework is the elimination of state governors in 1975 as members of the supreme military council 110/ -- the equivalent of civilian parliament. The operation of a military or unitary decentralized government does not excuse or permit the lopsided practice of the systematic method of excluding other segments of the society previously represented on the supreme law-making body.

The military claims to be a corrective regime 111/ and should seek, in view of the fissiparous structure of the

society, to recognize and rectify the structural anomalies that have bedeviled the Nigerian society. Instead, the military tends to reflect the psychology and philosophy of their civilian predecessors.

A glaring and vivid picture of the exclusion and alienation of a group from the center of political power is characterized by the Omaha World Hearld:

> In this nation ruled by the military, it was only this year (i.e., 1987) that an Ibo reached the rank of a general. Although Ibos account for about a quarter of Nigeria's one hundred million people, there is only one Ibo on Nigeria's supreme political organ, the nineteen man Armed Forces Ruling Council. 112/

In general, one grave concern in respect to further balkanization or creation of more states is the fact that some rural areas hitherto unknown will attain special urban recognition. While this may be perceived or widely accepted as a progressive thrust, attention should also focus on the avalanche of casualties in this massive urbanization process.

Cognizant of the fact that seventy-five percent of Nigerians are peasant farmers and most of them own their plots, urbanization and industrialization of the rural areas may require the confiscation of lands to effectuate these development purposes.

The paradoxical implications of the aforementioned is the process of reconciling the independent, albeit, wretched dwellings of the peasant farmers and the new dependency epitomized by the lack of skills requisite for survival in an urban society. This massive urbanization process becomes

particularly inimical to a society that cannot afford and does not subscribe to, or operate a welfare system. Herbert Ekwe-Ekwe likens the would-be or potential status of the peasant farmers as "either proletarianized or completely marginalized as lumpens." 113/

While the author does not advocate for an industrial stagnation policy, the simple fact remains that industrialization and urbanization is attainable at a prodigious and stupendous cost. It simply does not augur well in the short run for a society that is willing to dispossess its rural indigenes and at the same time abdicate its social responsibility, particularly during the transitory period when the farmers have not been fully assimilated into the urban setting.

Overall, the need to balkanize in the true spirit of federalism devoid of the appurtenances of linkage politics at the center, fuels mutual suspicion and alienation, further compounded and complicated by third world conditions of poverty, illiteracy, and ethnic separation. 114/

Ethnicity, or tribalism, is the raison d'etre for the adoption of a federal government, 115 and in the absence of a weak or emasculated central government, it is therefore imperative that the contending tribal forces are equally represented at the center of political power. Therefore, it was not a surprise that having suffered isolation at the center and lacking cohesion in the region, Western Nigeria

sowed the seeds toward the dissolution of the First Republic. 116/

The Presidential Experiment

With the collapse of the First Republic and after a long period of military interregnum, what makes the Second Republic, i.e., the Presidential System so different from the first and politically attractive and captivating to the Nigerian populace? While there may be a few differences and similarities, however, the Nigerian experience provides a very peculiar feature, i.e., difference in its similarity. The tribe, as previously noted, was the springboard for attaining political success, while the party was employed as a conduit and facade for tribal consolidation.

No one can divorce the issue of ethnicity from Nigeria's politics -- ethnicity gives the feeling of 'being' and fashions peoples' feelings, attitudes toward others. What a politician cannot achieve at the center of political power can only be redressed by consolidating in his immediate community. This does not necessarily arise from the "willful manipulation of political elite" 117/ as evident in the First Republic, but also the regional resurgence and class consciousness in the Second Republic. 118/ When regional awareness is generated, the interests of the tribal chieftains are safeguarded.

One of the most salient features of the 1979 Nigerian Constitution is the provision stipulating for the mandatory federal character composition of the executive bodies of the

registered political parties. 119/ Given the federal character of the parties making it different from the first Republican constitution is the question of whether the voting results reflect the composition and federal character of the country. Judging from the election results of 1979, one is tempted to acquiesce with Martin Dent who remarks that, "There was a sad level of regional and tribal correlation in voting behavior." 120/

The litmus test to determine the voting patterns in the 1979 elections can be found in the strong regional identification of the voters. Larry Diamond debunks Dent's postulation on tribal voting by positing that the Hausa votes were hotly contested by three parties, namely, the National Party (N.P.N.), and the Peoples' Redemption Party (P.R.P.), and the Great Nigerian Peoples' Party (G.N.P.P.). 121/

With recourse to the above, the following scenario lends credence to strong regional consolidation through voting:

1. The three parties as aforementioned are predominantly Northern political parties.
2. Even though the dominant party, the N.P.N., lost votes in Kano, the benefits of the loss were not reaped by the Southern parties, the N.P.P. and the U.P.N., but by fellow Northern parties. Thus the votes were contained and confined within the Northern electoral domain (see Tables 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8).
3. Larry Diamond's postulation of class polarization of Hausa votes re: Kaduna and Kano is only meaningful in its relation to Kano, but not Kaduna whose state legislative assembly 122 was overwhelmingly controlled by N.P.N. members with the consequent impeachment of the P.R.P. state governor. 123 (see Table 6).

4. The Ibo votes were consolidated in the two predominantly Ibo speaking states, Anambra and Imo, under the banner of the Nigerian Peoples' Party (N.P.P.) (see Tables 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8).

5. The minority states in Nigeria, Bendel, Rivers, Cross River, Kwara, Niger, Benue, Plateau and Gongola constitute the "gray areas" of Nigerian politics and make alignments based on political circumstances. This does not undermine the collective strength of the minority states as evidenced by the early attempts of the middle belt states in the North to organize a "majority of minorities movement" in Nigerian politics. 124/

6. The Yoruba votes were contained within the predominantly Yoruba speaking states, Lagos, Ondo, Oyo, Ogun, under the banner of the Unity Party of Nigeria (U.P.N.).

The logical deductions of the voting spread of the minority states are as follows:

1. Given the preponderant influence of the National Party of Nigeria (N.P.N.) as reflecting the divergent character of the Nigerian bourgeoisie 125, albeit, under Northern Leadership, it is only possible that the availability of funds enhanced and facilitated her electoral success in Rivers, Cross River, Niger, Kwara and Benue states minus allegations of electoral fraud. 126/

2. The Unity Party of Nigeria's victory in Bendel State is partly due to the geographical proximity and the historical fact that Bendel state, formerly the Midwest Region was created from the askes of the former Western Region, though the Eastern and Midwestern Regions had enjoyed a lasting political honeymoon during the First Republic. 127/

3. Finally, in the absence of a united, cohesive middle-belt movement, creaking under the Hausa Fulani domination and exasperated over the reprisal allegedly carried out against some of their people following the abortive coup of February, 1976, 128/ the people of Plateau State were left with no choice but to align with the Ibo dominated N.P.P.

Lord Acton's popular maxim that power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely best epitomizes the intoxicating nature of the N.P.N.'s exercise of national power. The "appointment of 19 presidential liaison officers

who have to some extent obviated the need for the federal government to work through elected officials in each state" 129/ naturally created tensions between the N.P.N. dominated national government and state governments who saw this act as a clever subterfuge to capture political power in the states the N.P.N. lost during the elections.

Concluding, the Second Republic reconciled the incongruities and confusion inherent in the parliamentary system of the First Republic in matters pertaining to diffusion of executive authority. In essence, Section 170 of the 1979 Nigerian Constitution stipulates that the "President shall be the Head of the State, the Chief Executive of the Federation and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federation." 130/

By adopting the presidential system of government, it also follows that the rudiments and ingredients of limited government are observed such as mutual checks and balances, separation of power between and among the tri-partite branches of government -- the executive, the legislative, and the judiciary. In addition is the tacit acknowledgement of the Senate as the superior house of Congress, while maintaining the bi-partisan nature of Congress. In the main, the urgent need to balkanize, to devolve or decentralize power is ironically and simultaneously accompanied by a resurgence of regionalism.

TABLE 4

VOTES RECEIVED, BY PARTY, 1979 SENATE ELECTION
(Seats Won Are in Parentheses)

State	GNPP	UPN	NPN	PRP	NPP
Anambra	12,832	10,932	210,101	19,574	699,157(5)
Bauchi	188,819	28,959	323,392(5)	127,279	39,868
Bendel	38,332	316,511(4)	250,194(1)	2,055	80,639
Benue	46,452	14,769	332,967(5)	–	75,532
Borno	278,352(4)	22,145	184,633(1)	31,508	–
Cross Riv.	161,353(2)	77,479	310,071(3)	–	68,203
Gongola	223,121	124,707(2)	203,226(1)	30,708	17,830
Imo	101,184	7,553	145,507	8,609	750,518(5)
Kaduna	233,824	85,094,	410,888(3)	278,305(2)	61,807
Kano	35,430	13,831	233,985	683,367(5)	–
Kwara	32,383	126,065(2)	54,282(3)	328	1,020
Lagos	14,480	428,573(5)	35,730	2,556	52,738
Niger	71,498	13,860	175,597(5)	8,139	207
Ogun	1,018	230,411(5)	31,953	–	119
Ondo	4,905	501,522(5)	49,612	–	6,417
Oyo	9,472	758,696(5)	200,372	2,497	4,397
Plateau	41,287	20,024	154,792(1)	19,017	220,278(4)
Rivers	46,985	20,106	153,454(3)	30	86,138(2)
Sokoto	305,292	34,145	571,562(5)	38,305	–
Seats Won Out of 95	8	28	36	7	16

Source: (Tables 4 - 8)   Adapted from West Africa, No. 3241 of
   27 August, 1979, pp. 1572-73; and No. 3258 of 24 December 1979,
   p. 2365.

TABLE 5

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

State	No. of Seats	GNPP	UPN	NPN	PRP	NPP
Anambra	29	–	–	3	–	26
Bauchi	20	1	–	18	–	1
Bendel	20	–	12	6	–	2
Benue	19	–	–	18	–	1
Borno	24	22	–	2	–	–
Cross Riv.	28	4	2	22	–	–
Gongola	21	8	7	5	–	1
Imo	30	–	–	2	–	28
Kaduna	33	1	1	19	10	2
Kano	46	–	–	7	39	–
Kwara	14	1	5	8	–	–
Lagos	12	–	12	–	–	–
Niger	10	–	–	10	–	–
Ogun	12	–	12	–	–	–
Ondo	22	–	22	–	–	–
Oyo	42	–	38	4	–	–
Plateau	16	–	–	3	–	13
Rivers	14	–	–	10	–	4
Sokoto	37	6	–	31	–	–
TOTAL	449	43	111	168	49	78
% of 100%		9.6%	24.7%	37.4%	10.9%	17.4%

TABLE 6

STATE ASSEMBLIES

State	No. of Seats	GNPP	UPN	NPN	PRP	NPP
Anambra	87	1	–	12	–	73
Bauchi	60	9	–	45	2	4
Bendel	60	–	34	22	–	4
Benue	57	6	–	48	–	3
Borno	72	59	–	11	2	–
Cross Riv.	84	16	7	58	–	3
Gongola	63	25	18	15	1	4
Imo	90	2	–	9	–	79
Kaduna	99	10	3	64	16	6
Kano	138	3	1	11	123	–
Kwara	42	2	15	25	–	–
Lagos	36	–	36	–	–	–
Niger	30	2	–	28	–	–
Ogun	36	–	36	–	–	–
Ondo	66	–	65	1	–	–
Oyo	126	–	117	9	–	–
Plateau	48	3	–	10	–	35
Rivers	42	–	1	26	–	15
Sokoto	111	19	–	92	–	–
TOTAL	1,347	157	333	487	144	226
% of 100%		11.66%	24.72%	36.15%	10.69%	16.78%

TABLE 7

STATE GOVERNORS

Party	Number	States
NPN	7	Bauchi, Benue, Cross River, Kwara, Niger, Rivers, Sokoto
UPN	5	Bendel, Lagos, Ogun, Onda, Oyo
NPP	3	Anambra, Imo, Plateau
GNPP	2	Borno, Gongola
PRP	2	Kano, Kaduna

TABLE 8

	PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS				
		Waziri Ibrahim (GNPP)	Obafemi Awolowo (UPN)	Shehu Shagari (NPN)	Aminu Kano (PRP)	Nnamdi Azikiwe (NPP)
State	Total Votes Cast	% Votes Rec'd.	% Votes Rec'd.	% Votes Rec'd.	% Votes Rec'd.	% Votes Rec'd.
Anambra	1,209,038	1.67	0.75	13.50	1.20	82.58
Bauchi	998,683	15.44	3.00	62.48	14.34	4.72
Bendel	669,511	1.23	53.23	36.19	0.73	8.60
Benue	538,879	7.89	2.57	76.39	1.35	11.71
Borno	710,968	54.04	3.35	34.71	6.52	1.35
Cross River	661,103	15.14	11.76	64.40	1.01	7.66
Gongola	639,138	34.09	21.67	35.52	4.34	4.35
Imo	1,153,355	3.00	0.64	8.80	0.89	86.67
Kaduna	1,382,712	13.80	6.68	43.12	31.66	4.72
Kano	1,220,763	1.54	1.23	19.94	76.41	0.91
Kwara	354,605	5.71	39.48	53.62	0.67	0.52
Lagos	828,414	0.48	82.30	7.18	0.47	9.57
Niger	383,347	16.50	3.69	74.88	3.99	1.11
Ogun	744,668	0.53	92.11	6.23	0.31	0.32
Ondo	1,369,547	0.26	94.51	4.19	0.18	0.86
Oyo	1,396,547	0.57	85.78	12.75	0.32	0.55
Plateau	548,405	6.82	5.29	34.73	3.98	49.17
Rivers	687,951	2.18	10.33	72.65	0.46	14.35
Sokoto	1,348,697	26.61	2.52	66.58	3.33	0.92
		10.0%	29.2%	33.8%	10.3%	16.7%
TOTAL	16,846,633	4,916,651		1,732,113		
		1,686,489		5,688,857		2,822,523

NOTES

51   Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, _Personal Rule in Black Africa_; (California: University of California Press, 1982), p. 14.

52   Machiavelli, _The Prince_, p. 54.

53   Gaetano Mosca, _The Ruling Class_, (New York: McGraw Hill, 1939), p. 228.

54   Ibid, pp. 229-30

55   Ibid, p. 235

56   Morton H. Fried, "Military Status in Chinese Society," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 57 (1951), pp. 348-350.

57   Marion J. Levy, _The Family Revolution in Modern China_, (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1949), p. 49.

58   Claude E. Welch, Jr., "Civil-Military Relations: Perspective from the Third World," _Armed Forces and Society_, Vol. II (Winder 1985), p. 186.

59   Fried, _Military Status in Chinese Society_, p. 355.

60   J. D. Omer-Cooper, _The Zulu Aftermath: A Nineteenth Century Revolution in Bantu Africa_, (Illinois: Northwestern University Press), p. 36.

61   Ibid, p. 32

62   Ibid, pp. 36-37

63   Samuel P. Huntington, <u>The Soldier and the State: Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations</u>, (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 83.

64   Ibid, p. 10.

65   Morris Janowitz, <u>The Professional Soldier</u>, (Illinois: Free Press, 1960), p. 175.

66   Huntington, <u>Soldier and the State</u>, p. 57

67   Ibid, p. 229.

68   Eric A. Nordlinger, <u>Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments</u>, (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1977), p. 47.

69   Glessner H. Creel, "Soldier and Scholar in China," <u>Pacific Affairs</u>, (1935), p. 343.

70   Huntington, <u>The Soldier and the State</u>, p. 51.

71   Jean-Jacques Rosseau, <u>The Social Contract and Discourses</u>, (London, Melbourne, Toronto, New York: Everyman's Library, 1973), p.81.

72   Ibid, pp. 83-87

73   Ibid, p. 89

74   Huntington, <u>The Soldier and the State</u>, p. 32

75   Dell G. Hitcher and Carol Levine, <u>Comparative Government and Politics</u>, (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1981), p. 64.

76   Roy C. Macridis, <u>Modern Political Regimes</u>, (Canada: Little, Brown and Company, 1986), p. 223

77   Hitchner and Levine, _Comparative Government_, p. 63. Note: Haiti and Brunei have fallen to stratocratic regimes.

78   Richard L. Sklar, "Political Science and National Integration - A Radical Approach," _Journal of Modern African Studies_ (1967), p. 6.

79   Ibid, p. 7.

80   _West Africa_ (July 9, 1966), n. pg.

81   James O'Connell, "The Inevitability of Instability," _Journal of Modern African Studies_ (1967), p. 182.

82   Richard L. Sklar, "Contradictions in the Nigerian Political System," _Journal of Modern African Studies_ (1965), p. 204.

83   Ibid, p. 204.

84   _West Africa_ (December 22/29, 1986), p. 2671.

85   _The Bible: Revised Standard Version_, (St. Matthew XXV, 29), p. 809.

86   Rodney, _How Europe Underdeveloped Africa_, p. 19.

87   Richard A. Joseph, "Affluence and Underdevelopment: the Nigerian Experience," _Journal of Modern African Studies_, (1978), p. 226.

88   O'Connell, The Inevitability of Instability, p. 186.

89   Larry Diamond, "Issues in Constitutional Design of A Third Nigerian Republic," _African Affairs_, Vol. 86, (April 1986), p. 209.

90 Zaki Ergas, "In Search of Development: Some Directions for Further Investigation," _Journal of Modern African Studies_ (1986), p. 311.

91 J. O. Irukwu, _Nigeria at the Crossroads_, (England: Witherby and Co., Ltd., 1983), p. 127.

92 Billy J. Dudley, _Instability and Political Order: Politics and Crisis in Nigeria_ (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1973), pp. 52-54.

93 Sklar, Contradictions in the Nigerian Political System, p. 209.

94 Cord, et al, _Political Science_, p. 386.

95 Ibid, p. 387.

96 Adele Jinadu, "Federalism, the Consociational State and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria," _Publius: Journal of Federalism_, Vol. XV (Spring 1985), p. 81.

97 Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics, p. 71.

98 Robin Luckham, _The Nigerian Military: A Sociological Analysis of Authority and Revolt: 1960-67._ (London: Cambridge University Press, 1971), pp. 188-189.

99 Billy J. Dudley, "Federalism and the Balance of Power in Nigeria," _Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies_, (March 1966), p. 16.

100 Ibid, p. 18.

101 Ibid, p. 19.

102 Benjamin O. Nwabueze, _Constitutionalism in Emergent States_, (New Jersey: Farleigh Dickinson University Press, 1973), p. 96.

103 Ibid, pp. 97-98.

104 Ibid, pp. 98-99.

105 Ibid, p. 57.

106 Ibid, p. 56.

107 Sklar, Contradictions in Nigerian Political System, pp. 212-213.

108 Jinadu, Federalism and Consociationalism, p. 85.

109 Benjamin O. Nwabueze, <u>A Constitutional History of Nigeria</u>, (Essex, New York: Longmans, Inc., 1982), pp. 220-221.

110 Jinadu, Federalism and Consociationalism, p. 86.

111 Patrick Utomi, "Legitimacy and Governance: One More Year of Military Rule in Nigeria," <u>Journal of Africanist Opinion</u>, Vol. XIV (1985), p. 41.

112 <u>Omaha World Hearld</u>, "Nigeria Has Recovered From Civil War," (July 16, 1987), p. 5.

113 Herebert Ekwe-Ekwe, "The Nigerian Plight: Shagari to Buhari," <u>Third World Quarterly</u>, (July 1985), p. 622.

114 Donald Rothchild, "The Limits of Federalism: An Examination of Political Institutional Transfer in Africa," <u>Journal of Modern African Studies</u> (1966), p. 288.

115 Ibid, p. 287.

116 Irukwu, Nigeria at the Crossroads, pp. 136-138.

117 Larry Diamond, "Cleavage, Conflict and Anxiety in the Second Nigerian Republic," <u>Journal of Modern African Studies</u> (1982), p. 630.

118 Enukora J. Okali, "Revolution or Tradition in Kano?" <u>West Africa</u> (January 4, 1982), p. 5.

119 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, p. 75.

120 <u>West Africa</u>, (August 6, 1979), p. 1406.

121 Diamond, Cleavage and Conflict, pp. 647-9.

122 Richard A. Joseph, "Democratization Under Military Tutelage," <u>Comparative Politics</u> (October 1981), p. 93.

123 Diamond, Cleavage and Conflict, pp. 647-9.

124 Joseph, Democratization Under Military, p. 92.

125 Diamond, Cleavage and Conflict, p. 634.

126 <u>New Nigerian</u> (February 4, 1980), p. 3.

127 Dudley, <u>Instability and Political Order</u>, p. 73.

128 Joseph, Democratization Under Military, p. 93.

129 Diamond, Cleavage and Conflict, p. 641.

130 The 1979 Nigerian Constitution, p. 65.

CHAPTER III

Characteristics of Military Interventionism

and Military Rule

This Chapter will deal with the causal and time factors of military interventionism. An attempt also will be made to explore the twisted path of the Nigerian military from its humble origin to its status of eminence.

Social Composition of the Nigerian Officer Corps Prior to 1966

A distinction should be made between the poor image of the Nigerian military during the colonial era and the professional image a few years before independence in 1960. Fueled by the public perception that the military is a domain of the not-too-smart or semi-illiterate, the latter is propelled to revamp, resuscitate and rejuvenate the military as a reputable, esteemed, and respectable institution. Ali A. Mazrui talks about the African colonial army as the "lumpen militariat" devoid of professional norms, ethics, and discipline. 131/ The Nigerian colonial army is no exception to this assertion.

In addition, the question is the ideological disdain and ignominy held for the colonial army because of a well

founded belief that the subjugation of Nigeria was in part aided and facilitated by the collaboration of some indigenous elements with the British imperial administration. 132/ N. J. Finer talks about the low social status of the Nigerian infantry and an officer corps that was predominantly peopled by British officers until 1956 when fifteen slots out of two hundred and fifty officer positions were given to Nigerians. 133/ With the advent of independence in 1960 came the rapid Nigerianization of the officer corps. This trend was accompanied by massive promotions to fill the vacuum left by the British officers. In a small army of about 10,500 men, the officer corps had catapulted to an amazing five hundred and eleven men. 134/ With the access to western military academies, the Eastern Nigerians, predominantly peopled by the Ibos, came to have a disproportionate representation in the officer corps.

It is worth mentioning that among the three dominant tribes and minorities, the Northerners, chiefly represented by the minority middlebelters 135/ accounted for the first five graduates from Sandhurst Academy. 136/ This early start by the Northerners was ignited in part by the military tradition of the Fulani conquests 137/ and also by the Southern perception, i.e., the Eastern and Western Nigeria of the army as a domain of the not too bright. 138/ But this parochial perception of the army started to change with the recruitment of university graduates. 139/ The army's social image and prestige was also enhanced by her

participation in the U.N. peacekeeping mission in the Congo.
140/

This newly found popularity and prestige in the army was existing simultaneously with repeated, desperate quests to equalize the officer ranks dominated by the Ibo Easterners because of their educational leverage. To allay tribal suspicion and sectional dominance, a quota system or proportionality principle was introduced to dislodge the Eastern dominance and mollify the Northerners. 141/ It is natural to speculate that the Ibo Eastern Officers who will be stalled by promotional freeze to achieve this equilibrium will be immensely unhappy. While this may provide a subtle motive for intervention, usually the officer crops waits for something more concrete and substantial to happen before stepping in.

Disposition

This section deals with an officer corps endowed with the Sandhurst formula 142/ of military subordination to political institutions and its juxtaposition with the traditional setting. In looking for possible explanations for factors that dispose the military to overthrow a civilian regime or military government, two factors or variables play a dominant and paramount role as a genesis or starting point for this academic excavation.

In the context of civil-military relations in respect to military intervention, the civilian cum politicians act as the independent variable or the causative factors, while

military intervention is the dependent variable or the effects and repercussions of the civilian mal-administration. It must be clearly understood that soldiers are also prone or susceptible to human foibles. Soldiers are not paragons of perfection. Soldiers and civilians are created in the same image, subject to particular inclinations, aspirations, and prejudices.

Martial values do not provide an intellectual gestalt toward the understanding of how and why the military reacts when politics is no longer conducted with finesse and decorum. In the words of A. R. Zolberg, "Beneath their uniform, the Gowons, Lamizanas, Bokassas, and Mobutus are men with the same range of virtues and vices, wisdom and foolishness as the Balewas, Olympios, Yameogos, Nkrumahs they replaced." 143/

Even though Zolberg was drawing this analogy of the military as governors and their civilian predecessors, the same analogy can be superimposed or applied to pre-military administration or disposition to intervene. The state of Israel which has developed that siege mentality is a nation where every citizen is considered a potential soldier amid the will to foster and sustain democratic political institutions. Thus, the futility of drawing a fine line between these two powerful institutions. Professor Orville Menard goes further to describe the inextricability of the military from the nation it serves:

> An army is an emanation of the nation it serves
> reflecting social, political, and technological

foundations. To study an army is to gain insights into the nation it serves because a nation and its army are interdependent. An army is not a mirror image of the nation, nor a microcosm -- the nation writ small, it is in organization, purpose, attitudes, and behaviors, conditioned by the sustaining state. 144/

The aforementioned statement implies that the civil and military relations and institutions are intertwined. The military attitudes, perceptions and actions are reflections of the societal or environmental conditions.

Colonial Legacy Re: Military Intervention

The concept of authoritarianism is not alien to the Nigerian polity. The emirate system in Moslem Northern Nigeria is based on autocratic rule. 145/ This centralized form of leadership has been co-existing with the decentralized leadership of Southern Nigeria, albeit not without friction. The advent of colonialism fully cemented and entrenched authoritarian centralization as a widespread phenomenon. Thus, over time, the forces of centralization inherited, imposed, reinforced by colonialism tends to triumph over decentralization due to long experience and habituation. Frederick Schwarz's description of single party African democratic states without opposition 146/ can be analogized to authoritarian military governments. Just as colonial governments cannot contain indigenous uprisings without resorting to military repression so also are civilian administrations faced with domestic upheavals, enabling the military to intervene by invitation or inclinations. Thus, the colonial legacy provides the traditional cum inherited disposition to intervene.

Ideological Factors

Ideological considerations play a partial role in disposition. Fred Greene postulates that changed recruitment of the officer corps with recourse to their socio-economic status has a correlation to interventionism, holding that officers of lower class status may not identify with the aristocratic foundations of prior military recruitment. 147/ The fact is that the officers corps, irrespective of their positions are motivated by more upward mobility, or the preservation of an already gained status. A colonel may wish to become a general someday, and a general whose comfortable position is threatened by budgetary restrictions may decide to step in to solidify his position. 148/

Prior to the first military intervention in January, 1966, the officer corps was indeed a melting pot in terms of recruitment from different socio-economic milieu. Parents of some of the officers had occupations that ranged from a railwayman, tailor, farmer, to a tax clerk. 149/ There were also the new generation of aristocratic military officers -- the son of the Emir of Katsina, Col. Hassan Katsina and Col. Odumegwu Ojukwu, son of a millionaire businessman, the late Sir Louis Ojukwu. Among the new generation military officers were Majors Nzeogwu and Ifeajuna, the former was an apostle of revolutionary political thinkers, Mao Zedong, Marx, and Fanon, while the latter had wide contact with

radical intellectuals in the civil service and universities.
150/ (See Table 9).

Politicization

Civil and military institutions are interdependent
units, and sometimes the politicization of the military
becomes inevitable in order to resolve an impasse. When a
leadership vacuum is created in an army with four brigadiers
looking for a general officer commanding, political meddling
in the military's internal affairs becomes a necessity.
This was the situation of the Nigerian military prior to
1966. Ironsi, an Ibo, was chosen over Maimalari, Ogundipe,
and Ademulegun as a political gesture of reconciliation.
151/ This gesture was resented by some Northerners who
apparently saw the possible duplication of civilian
institution with military leadership, or those who saw the
military as a future alternative government.

An understanding of the three tribal regional parties
will illuminate or clarify the immense politicization the
military was undergoing in post-independent Nigeria. The
Northern People's Congress had its base in the North, while
the Action Group and the National Convention of Nigerian
Citizens were based in the West and East respectively.
Edward Feit's description of Nigerian political parties as
"machines" and the expansion of the political machines
beyond regional boundaries became the bone of contention.

Clearly, the source of the military politicization came
about when some leaders of the Northern Peoples Congress

tried to co-opt and seduce the army into agreeing to put down the rioting in the Western region of Nigeria. 152/ The former head of state of Nigeria, General Obasanjo, in his account of the Nigerian conflict attests and corroborates the aforementioned by asserting that the president at that time, Dr. Azikiwe and Prime Minister Sir Tafawa Balewa clearly sought and cultivated the support of the armed forces. 153/ The alleged secret meeting between the Sauduana, Sir Ahmadu Bello and Brig. Ademulegun, Lt. Col. Largema, and the chief protagonist in the Western election crisis Chief Akintola 154/ must have fueled the suspicion among Ibo army officers that the Ibo General Officer commanding, Ironsi, was about to be ousted, and a rectification of the tribal, regional in balance in the higher ranks about to be made. 155/

Nordlinger argues that the use of a professional standing army to quell domestic disturbances has a debilitating effect on the martial qualities, morale, reputation and prestige of the military. The army is trained, organized and equipped to defend the nation from her enemies. 156/ External enemies are those that reside outside of a country's territorial boundaries, while the hazardous and unscrupulous actions of the internal enemies who are citizens can, in fact, hamper or impede the successful defense of the nation against external enemies. In essence, a nation at peace with her neighbors must strive to maintain domestic tranquility. Nordlinger and Luckham

are right to argue that the military's undertaking of the unsavory role of police will indeed precipitate a military intervention, 157/ but downplayed or overlooked the ominous impact a continued domestic deterioration can have on the national interest.

The appropriate question to be posed at this juncture is -- at what level of domestic deterioration beyond the police control, can the military intervene? Is it when two or twenty or two hundred people are killed? In the case of Nigeria, more than two thousand people were killed in the 1965 Western regional election 158/ due to the diabolical machinations of the civilian politicians. While not holding brief or extolling the virtues of politicizing an officer corps which are sometimes inevitable, the fact remains that whether the officer corps is politicized or not, there comes in a nation's history a time when the officers can easily invoke Samuel Finer's doctrine of the "manifest destiny" of soldiers to intervene. "Unlike other sectional bodies, the army is the only national institution that symbolizes independence, sovereignty and equality of all people -- savior of the nation." 159/

Class Interest of the Officer Corps

Closely related to the ideological factors is the class interest of the officer corps. An analogy can be drawn between the stifled, indigenous civilian middle class prior to independence who looked forward to the colonialists

departure and middle level officers, disenchanted with their superior officers.

Contrary to Eric Nordlinger's assertion of the officer corps as a preserve of the middle class 160/ is the inherent stratifications in the military that make some positions economically more rewarding than others. The author posits that in as much as the officer corps may be classified as professionals, it is grossly unfair to lump all the officers together as representing the same class interest. In fact, the middle level of the officer corps is comparable to the civilian middle class, but the generals are indeed elite stratocrats. Patrick Utomi confirms this contention in respect to Nigeria's fifth coup stating, "If the younger officers intervened to seize power, the Generals who were essentially part of the establishment would be victims and so they moved to capture power in order to protect their own interest." 161/

Professionalism and Intervention

There are two factors in professionalism which play a crucial part in respect to intervention. The first is the adulteration or the diminution of the professional integrity of the army and second is the level or scope of non-military knowledge.

Nordlinger argues that the military would cherish to exercise complete monopolistic control over the management of coercion. Also, the military likes to conduct its internal affairs autonomously on the basis of the

bureaucratic procedure of the military structure. 162/ In addition, a great number of the officer corps attended military academies where they imbibed specialized knowledge of intelligence gathering, managerial and logistical skills, history, economics, political science, sociology 163/, etc. Samuel Huntington also concurs and agrees with Nordlinger by holding that "military expertise requires a broad background of general culture for its mastery, bringing the insights of the social sciences to bear upon military problems and decisions." 164/ The irony of this liberal academic discipline is that while it enhances the efficiency of the military, it also confers on them the moral wisdom to assess and sometimes judge political decisions. These are the officers who nurture resentment toward civilian administrators. They know the intricate elements of power politics. They possess the yardstick to measure the competence, imperfections and defects of a civilian regime.

Professionalism is often seen as a double-edged sword, with dualistic or paradoxical implications. One aspect of professionalism deals with the military subordination to civilian supremacy, while the other deals with how the military forcefully arrogates and superordinates its rule over the civilians. Henry Bienen argues that for the professional militaries to maintain insular identities, they have to be structurally fashioned to fulfil a primary responsibility, like defense and the prosecution of war which endears them more to matters that concern military

welfare. The military's socialization process provides the inward looking attitude that helps to preserve its cohesion and ensure its survival. 165/

The aforementioned is basically a western concept of military professional ethic which has to be juxtaposed or reconciled with the traditional norms and precepts of the African environment. "The military establishment may be a modern organization albeit, by definition nontraditional, But the attitude of the soldier to the wider society is more deeply conditioned by traditionalist sympathies than by the modern characteristics of their particular professions." 166/ This goes to show that the martial insular attributes of the military are temporarily suppressed or submerged until such a time when the environmental conditions provide the disposition to intervene. The appointment of the four professional soldiers to their regions of origin: Lt. Col. Ojukwu (East); Lt. Col. Fajuyi (West); Lt. Col. Ejoor (Midwest); Major Katsina (North) 167/ indicates the traditionalism and sensitivity to environmental conditions. The professional ethic conflicts with traditionalism or environmental factors such as sectionalism, regionalism, etc. Given the fundamental premise that historically there has been strong regional sentiments, and a quest to control the center, it lends credence to a historical logic that the composition of the first Nigerian coup d'etat was a clever and surreptitious attempt by the Ibos to dominate Nigeria. 168/ This, however, was not the intention, but provides the

justification, rationale, and disposition for further reprisals and interventions.

Military's Corporate Interest and Integrity

The defense or enhancement of the military's corporate interests is easily the most interventionist motive. 169/ The politicization of the police and its use by leading National Party of Nigeria members to conduct a nationwide campaign of violence against their opponents, must have provided the disposition leading to the December 1983 coup. 170/ It is not beyond a reasonable conjecture that the military must resent these actions of this paramilitary organization. According to Nordlinger, it transmits a message to the military that the armed forces are replaceable. 171/

Policy Issues: Udoji Awards

Economic deterioration provides an indirect disposition. The pitfall in most military regimes in Nigeria is that economic rejuvenation can only be achieved by serious and genuine sacrifices, not by salary bonanzas and increments to mollify potential trouble makers in the army, though this is a necessary evil in order to consolidate the military regime.

The 1975 Udoji awards was an act of utmost generosity, but bereft of any economic vision or reality. The inflationary trend set in motion hampered the agricultural sector, as most farmers abandoned their vocations to migrate to the urban areas to benefit from this misguided government

generosity. 172/ The aforementioned standing on its own does not provide a primary motive for intervention, but it does in conjunction with the other variables.

The 1973 Census

One of Gen. Gowon's original plans was to restore a civilian government in 1976 after a proper head count. Given the crucial role numbers play in the allocation of electoral seats, the 1973 census results received widespread attack and condemnation because of alleged escalation and manipulation of the census figures in favor of the Northern states of Nigeria. 173/ The sectional bickerings were perceived by Gowon as a rebaptism or recrudescence of the first republic. As a result, the 1976 deadline for the return to civil rule was cancelled indefinitely.

To compound Gowon's problems, it follows that corruption and decadence inherent in the regime, which would have faded away by the inception of a civilian government, continued unabated, to the utter disgust of senior military officers who were worried about the military's reputation. 174/ It is worth mentioning here that a military's desire to overthrow a government -- civilian or military -- is like sending a "thief to catch a thief." In most cases, they perpetuate the same acts they profess or pretend to to resent.

The disposition to overthrow Gowon may also have emanated from the fact that he was chosen as a compromise and consensus leader to mitigate the major tribal bickerings

since he is a member of a smaller Birom tribe. 175/ It does appear that Gowon was getting very comfortable after nine years as commander-in-chief and forgot that the military king makers will one day expect him to step down.

Having dealt extensively on the why factors of military intervention in Nigeria, the next sections will focus on the when factors, i.e., when and at what stage does the military intervene?

Opportunity

Disposition is a prelude for opportunity to intervene. While disposition and opportunity are distinct categories, they sometimes share a gray area or to say the least, over lap one another. For instance, the deliberations on the economic wisdom of accepting the International Monetary Fund loan may provide the disposition, while its utter rejection provides opportunity as in Nigeria's seventh albeit, unsuccessful coup. 176/

There is a correlation between civilian performance and the opportunity to intervene. A military with disposition oftentimes allows the deteriorating civilian institutions to run their course by falling from the olympian heights to the abysmal depths, losing the support of the populace. Brigadier Kure of the Second Mechanized Division of the Nigerian army was right when he said that for a coup to succeed, it must have the blessing of the people. 177/ Here, the blessing of the people may be interpreted as the dwindling leadership of the civilian politicians and a

corresponding popularity of the new military ousters. But, certainly, there are catalysts that spur or ignite the flame of intervention.

Political Corruption or Procedural Flaws in Leadership Selection

David Easton defines politics as the human interactions involved in the authoritative allocations of values for society. 178/ The lack of success in electoral politics in Nigeria has revolved around the election of officials who authoritatively allocate values for society. While the author holds that the consensus reached in politics is the reconciliation of conflicting differences, the contrary is exemplified by Nigerian politicians who thrive on escalation of tribal and regional differences.

The opportunity for the first military intervention came about when the Northern Peoples Congress - tribal and regional political and cultural party based in the Northern part of Nigeria - tried to extend its influence to the Western region of Nigeria, whose resident tribal party - the Action Group, should have won the 1965 regional election if it was free and fair. Consequently, the police could not contain the violence unleashed by members of the Action Group resulting in more than two thousands deaths. 179/

Up to the 1983 general elections, it became evident that the politicians had not learned from political lessons of the past. The election was rigged according to the military Head of State of that time, Major General Buhari.

180/   Herbert Ekwe-Ekwe gives an account of the election
when he says that:

> The National Party of Nigeria and an increasingly
> politicized police force unleashed a nationwide
> campaign of violence and terror against candidates and
> supporters of the opposition. A thousand people were
> killed in disturbances that followed these elections in
> the months leading to the December coup of 1983. Two
> thousand others associated with the opposition were
> detained and a state of semi-martial law was declared
> throughout the country as the regime called out the
> military to reinforce police duties. 181/

Severe Economic Strangulation

For a nation that puts almost all her eggs in one
basket, the oil glut in the early 1980's brought Nigeria's
economy to a standstill. For a nation that received oil
revenues in excess of $26 billion by 1980, a drop to $10
billion in 1983 was an unmitigated disaster to the economy.
In addition, when the President imposed severe austerity
measures, he warned that such measures demands sacrifice
from all. 182/ Apparently, he was indirectly referring to
the military who irrespective of the economic status of a
nation does not subscribe to the tinkering with the
military's budget. Also, the military and the general
public could not comprehend or reconcile the President's
stringent economic measures with the politicians extravagant
and ostentatious display during a period of scarcity and
thrift by the buying Lear jets and Mercedes limousines. 183/

Legitimacy Deflation of Civilian Administrators

As was earlier established in this project, there are
two powerful political institutions in Nigeria -- the
civilian and military. They complement, cooperate, and

sometimes antagonize each other. Each institution thrives on the other's deflation. The legitimacy deflation of the civilian administrators is marked by a corresponding legitimacy inflation of the military, while the legitimacy dilution of the military inflates the popular yearnings for a civilian government or for a benevolent military government. Legitimacy deflation in military regimes does not matter so much unless the army is factionalized and politicized as was glaringly apparent in Nigeria's second coup when some politicians were penetrating some groups in the military. 184/ Legitimacy deflation of politicians, according to Nordlinger, is the aggregate of the performance failures of civilian governments, chiefly, rampant political corruption, gross incapacity to stem the tide of economic deterioration, and a lack of consensus and tolerance from the opposition which is fraught with ominous consequences. 185/ It follows that when there is no proper procedural leadership selection process, coupled with economic disintegration, social disequilibrium becomes inevitable, leading ultimately to the military usurpation of the governing process.

Military Interventions

The mathematical formula for military intervention is disposition plus opportunity. It may have been possible that the military interventions in some African nations, i.e., Algeria, Congo-Leopoldville, Dehomey, Central African Republic, and Upper Volta must have provided a treacherous,

reinforcing precedent to the first Nigerian military intervention on January 15, 1966. 186/ It is also possible to suggest that the red carpet reception given to Major Ifeajuna on arrival in Ghana by Kwame Nkrumah must have given a signal to the Ghanaian military that it was okay to overthrow an incompetent civilian regime as long as the rationale and justification was there. 187/ Ifeajuna was a key conspirator in the January coup of 1966.

Since independence in 1960, Nigeria has witnessed seven military coups. The author considers fours of them as unsuccessful, while three were successful. The coups against the civilians tend to be more successful and less bloody than a faction of the military overthrowing the military establishment. The first and second coups, January 15 and July 29, 1966, were considered fiascoes because the former led to the factionalization of the army and altered the political balance of the country by the demise of the custodians of Northern Nigeria leadership, Sir Tafawa Balewa and the Sauduana of Sokoto, Sir Ahmadu Bello. 188/ The latter coup culminated in a civil war that led to the secession of the Eastern region as the Republic of Biafra. With the exception of the 1983 coup, 189/ the four other coups were palace coups, a euphemism for a faction of the army overthrowing the military government.

The Anatomy of a Coup d'etat

As a starting point, the author's fundamental premise gravitates around the notion that military regimes parallel,

or may be analogous to, civilian institutions in the pursuit of power and distribution of resources.

Before a coup attains a practical conception, division of responsibility is paramount. A coup has initiators/plotters, supervisors/co-ordinators, executors/implementers, just like a civilian government has the legislators, adjudicators, and executives -- all members of a civilian government. For the military the demaraction of responsibility sometimes depends on the size of the officer corps and the distribution of ranks, i.e., the number of majors, colonels, brigadiers, and generals. It logically follows that in the pre-1966 Nigerian army that had one major general and three brigadiers, 190/ it is not uncommon for the January 1966 plotters to overlap duties and responsibilities as was asserted by the leader of the coup, Major Nzeogwu, when he said that the coup was planned by officers none of whom was above the rank of major. 191/ The architects of the January 1966 coup were the plotters, supervisors, and executors as evidenced by the conception of the plan through execution. 192/ (See Table 9).

The second coup followed almost the same pattern as the first with the inclusion of two Lt. Cols. Muhammad and Akahan. The absence or demise of two brigadiers - Maimalari, Ademulegun, and three colonels, Pam 193/ Kur Muhammad, Largema, victims of the first coup, also lends credence that the initiators were also the co-ordinators as well as the executors.

The civil war undoubtedly must have further politicized the army. In the words of William Gutteridge, "Once the military in a particular state has lost their political virginity, then the discipline of a professional tradition of an acceptance of civilian authority is dissipated." 194/

The third coup, in furtherance to the aforementioned, was carried out by middle level and senior officers including Brig. Danjuma and Brig. Muhammad, who were key plotters in the second coup of July 29, 1966. No evidence ties them to the execution of the plot, but their endorsement and plan may well have been decisive. 195/ The interesting element in the third coup was the growing influence of senior army officers in respect to military takeovers.

The fourth coup was an aberration. It lacked all the ingredients requisite for a coup. At least, some unsuccessful coups were given credit for partial success. The fourth coup was ill conceived, ill disposed and unprofessionally executed. 196/

The fifth and sixth coups were explicitly senior officers' coups. One is compelled to ask the whereabout of these senior army officers when the earlier coups had a Sandhurst trademark. The Plausible explanation is that most of these men in their late 30's and early 40's were commissioned about the time of the first coup 197/ or shortly after, from the Nigerian Sandhurst -- the Defense Academy, operational from January 1964. 198/ The senior

officers of the fifth and sixth coups are children of circumstance, whose careers were conceived at a period of national turbulence and trauma. Their attainment of eminence as top brass in the military holds in part to the deaths of numerous officers in previous coups, the civil war, promotions on being victorious at the end of the Nigerian-Biafra war, and also their roles in post war coups, albeit, as junior/middle level officers.

The seventh attempted coup has a similarity to the fourth coup in terms of regional orientation. A significant number of the coup participants were drawn from the middle belt region - Benue/Plateau cluster (See Table 9). Although policy issues have been advanced as the main bone of contention culminating in the attempted coups, and while not trying to undermine the importance of demobilization and the rejection of the IMF loan as disposing factors for intervention, a subterranean emphasis should also be placed on the regional objective and purpose of the seventh and fourth coups.

The ascent of Gowon as military Head of State of Nigeria following the July coup of 1966 marked the prominence of minority groups in all facets of the society and the balkanization or dismemberment of the regions to reduce or eliminate their threat. 199/ In addition, one should not discount the Hausa/Fulani- middlebelt rivalry, epitomized by the late Gen. Muhammad and Yakubu Gowon. 200/ Gowon was overthrown by Muhammad, who was subsequently

killed by officers from Gowon's middlebelt, demanding his reinstatement and those of his cronies purged by Muhammad. It follows that the draconian treatment meted out to the middlebelt officers in the wake of Muhammad's assassination 201/ must have provoked the vengeful design of the attempted seventh coup which was nipped in the bud before its execution.

In respect to the first and second coups of 1966, the wresting of power from the corrupt civilian politicians was received with unbounded felicitation 202/ but this popular euphoric feeling has to be reconciled with the unidimensional cast of casualties. Given the considerable success of the January coup in the North, perhaps the July coup and possibly the civil war would have been averted if the Ibo majors had not shown inconsistency and vacillations with the execution of their intentions. In a post coup interview, the ring leader, Major Nzeogwu, had this to say about the execution of the coup:

> Both of us in the North, myself and Major T. C.
> Onwuatuegwu did our best. But the other three who were
> stationed in the South failed because of incompetence
> and misguided considerations in the eleventh hour. 203/

A lot of creative energies should not be dissipated trying to discover the intentions of coup plotters. There are no yardsticks to measure or assess the intentions of coup plotters as opposed to the results, implications, and outcome of the coups.

Unification Decree Number 34

The July coup of 1966 among other things was held as a retaliation for the Northern victims of the first coup and also to stave off or dislodge what was later perceived as a clever and surreptitious attempt by the Ibos to dominate the rest of the country.

The introduction of the unification decree #34, abolishing the regions and the quota system for recruitment to the civil service, and centralizing the regime, confirmed the suspicion of the Northerners, as an Ibo ethnic subterfuge to advance their regional and sectional interests because of their educational leverage. 204/

In other words, what the Ibos were not able to attain under the civilian administration has been achieved under the leadership of an Ibo military head of state.

The sixth coup of August 27, 1985 is unique for two reasons. First, it is the first time a Nigerian military head of state assumed the title of President and commander-in-chief 205/ of the armed forces. Second, apart from a serious division within the supreme military council, the powerful role and influence of a particular "old boy network" - the Bida Mafia, should not be jettisoned overboard. A group of classmates in the secondary school days, who also attended the Nigerian Military Training College, The Indian Military Academy (See Table 9) were also dissident members of the supreme military council. 206/

Another question comes to mind. What role does a king maker play after the successful execution of a coup? A good

explanation is found in Nigeria's third and sixth coups. As mentioned earlier, Gowon was chosen as a compromise leader, owing to the fact that he came from a minority tribe. It implies that those who conceded leadership to Gowon will one day want to become the head of state. Gowon's rivalry with Muhammad led to the former's overthrow by the latter, even though tertiary reasons such as corruption, neglect of traditional chiefs and administrative norms were advanced as controlling factors for Gowon's ousting. 207/

In Nigeria's fifth coup, the head of state Buhari was not the prime mover behind the coup. He was invited "not self-appointed" to be the chairman of the nineteen member Supreme Military Council. 208/ In fact, Major General Babangida was the mastermind of the December 1983 coup that brought the regime to power and was said to have declined to become head of state. 209/ It is only possible that when conflict of interest developed within the Supreme Military Council, and when his opinions were discarded, it was very easy for him to rally around his long time classmates to execute the sixth coup.

The composition of the Supreme Military Council has a significant contribution to the cycle of instability and of military interventions from July 29, 1975, to December 1985, spanning five military coups, at least one member of the Supreme Military Council has been involved or implicated in the coups (See Table 9). The near academic guess is that the title "supreme" confers on the ruling military elite an

unrestrained access to power. Each member considers himself a potential head of state. It is no surprise that President Babangida replaced the Supreme Military Council with the Armed Forces Ruling Council, and the Federal Executive Council with the National Council of States. 210/

There is also another dimension of the Nigerian military in respect to intervention, i.e., the element of superstition. The Nigerian officer corps has fallen victim to a historical jinx or fortuitous coincidence that a coup is predestined to occur every ten years, particularly in the month of July (See Table 9). Defense Minister Major-General Domkat Bali has this to say about Nigeria's seventh coup:

> In coming to this hypothesis, i.e., the aforementioned, they - the plotters - have drawn attention to the fact that there was a coup in January, 1966, an unsuccessful attempt in February 1976 and the latest abortive plot which was scheduled for the end of 1985 or early 1986. 211/

The author's earlier postulation that successful coups tend to be less bloody than abortive coups is strongly buttressed by a careful assessment of the seven coups. The first, second, fourth and seventh coups were unsuccessful. The lopsided violence and outcome of the first coup led to further reprisals, i.e., the second coup, consequently leading to a civil war. The execution of thirty plotters in the fourth coup, demanding the reinstatement of Gowon and his governors 212/ is akin to the seventh coup whose culprits were executed also.

The seventh coup introduced another element in military takeovers in Nigeria. Previous coups were conducted by army

officers, but the seventh coup had a considerable number of air force officers (see Table 9).

The regional ethnic composition of military interventions and takeovers (see chart data) confirms and reaffirms Nordlinger's skepticism about the Nigerian army's possession of 'secular nationalizing character.' 213/ The military under challenging circumstances come to exhibit and replicate the exact traits of their civilian predecessors.

Evaluation

There is no conclusive, positive evidence linking the level of political culture to frequency of military intervention in Nigerian politics. Nigerians in general do not like centralized military rule. 214/ The well entrenched environmental conditions makes it almost impossible for the society to accept the notion of complete "civilian control." According to Gutteridge, "Successive military rules had apparently removed some obstacles in the way of Nigerian stability, for instance by eliminating the imbalance in size, population and power," but the crucial question is: Who is at the helm of national affairs or who delegates federal power and responsibilities? This question can only be found and answered, not by mere looking at civilian institutions per se, but by focusing on the particularistic attitudes of the political participants who will employ every odious method to clinch political power, which inevitably results in social disequilibrium that

invites the military who continues the unfinished work of the civilian predecessors.

The military's replication of civilian biases is glaringly demonstrated in the composition of Buhari's Supreme Military Council. According to Ekwe-Ekwe:

> Thirteen of the nineteen members of the ruling Supreme Military Council (SMC) are Northern Muslims, most of whose families are closely related to the powerful local emirs. Apart from the head of the navy, all service chiefs and commanders of the principal military divisions come from the North. Recent appointments and promotions in the armed forces, parastatals, the Central Bank and diplomatic services also reinforce this pro-Northern trend. 216/

Only the pedestrian minds will place a high premium on the superficial elements that ignites a military intervention, but beneath it lies the same tribal proclivities that has bedeviled the Nigerian society for a long time now.

It is also interesting to note that as far as the Nigerian experience is concerned, the myth ascribed to majors as the unrepentant perpetrators of military coups has been seriously challenged by the later coups of senior military officers. This does not undermine the strategic importance of the majors, who are closer to the men of the infantry, but the fact is that coups fluctuate within the officer ranks.

TABLE 9

MILITARY INTERVENTION - THE CONSPIRATORS

		EDUCATION	ETHNIC/REGIONAL ORIGIN	MOTIVES
January 15, 1966	Maj. Nzeogwu	Sandhurst	Ibo/East (MW)	Tribal Politics
	Maj. Ifeajuna	Sandhurst	Ibo/East	
	Maj. D. O. Okafor	MONS		Corruption
	Maj. Anuforo	Sandhurst	Ibo/East	
	Maj. Onwuatuegwu	Sandhurst	Ibo/East	
	Maj. Ademoyega	MONS	Yoruba/West	
	Capt. Nwobosi	Sandhurst	Ibo/East	
	Maj. Chukwuka	Sandhurst	Ibo/East	
Commander-in-Chief Maj. Gen. Ironsi			Ibo/East	
July 29, 1966	Lt. Col. Muhammad	Sandhurst	Hausa/North	Unification Decree #34
	Maj. T. Y. Danjuma	S.S.	North(MB)	
	Lot. Col. Akahan	Sandhurst	North(MB)	
	Maj. Daramola	NCO	Yoruba/West	Military repri-
	Maj. Adamu	S.S.	Hausa/North	sals for the vic-
	Maj. Usuman	NCO	Hausa/North	tims of the first
	Maj. Alao	Sandhurst	Yoruba/North	coup
	Maj. Kyari	S.S.	Hausa/North	
Commander-in-Chief Lt. Col. Gowon		Sandhurst	Angas/North(MB)	
July 29, 1975	SMC *Col. Garuba		North	Corruption
	SMC *Col. Shehu Yar Adua		Hausa/North	
	SMC *Brig. T. Y. Danjuma	S.S.	North	
	SMC *Brig. M. Muhammad	Sandhurst	Hausa/North	
	SMC *Brig. Buhari		Hausa/North	
Commander-in-Chief Maj. Gen. Muhammad				

*members of the Supreme Military Council

MB - middlebelt

TABLE 9, continued

MILITARY INTERVENTION	THE CONSPIRATORS	EDUCATION	ETHNIC/REGIONAL ORIGIN	MOTIVES
February 13, 1976	SMC Lt. Col. Dimka		North (MB)	Demobilization of the army,
	SMC Maj. Dabang		North (Plateau)	The overthrow
	SMC *J. D. Gomwalk		North (MB)	of Gowon
	SMC *Gen. Bisalla	Sandhurst	North (MB)	
Commander-in-Chief Lt. Gen Obasanju		S.S.	Yoruba/West	
December 31, 1983	SMC *Brig. Sanni Abacha	NMTC	North	Mismanagement of
	SMC *Maj. Gen. Babangida		North	the economy; pol-
	SMC *Maj. Gen. Buhari		Hausa/North	itical corruption,
	SMC *Maj. Gen. Bali		North (MB)	vote rigging, mis-
				use of public funds
Commander-in-Chief Maj. Gen. Buhari			Hausa/North	
August 27, 1985	SMC *Brig. Dogonyaro	NMTC/Indian	North	Policy friction
	SMC *Maj. Gen. Vatsa	NMTC	North	within the
	SMC *Brig. Magoro	NMTC/Military	North	Supreme Military
	SMC *Maj. Gen. Nasko	NMTC/Acad.	North	Council
	SMC *Maj. Gen. Abacha		North	
Commander-in-Chief Maj. Gen. Babangida		NMTC =	North	
December 20, 1985 SMC	*Maj. Gen. Vatsa		North (MB)	Rejection of the IMF
	Lt. Col. Bitiyong		North (MB)	
	Lt. Col. C. Oche		North (MB)	
	Lt. Col. M. Lyorshe		North (MB)	
	Wing C. B. Ekele		North (MB)	
	Squad L. M. Luther		North (MB)	
	Squad L. A. Ahuar		North (MB)	
	Maj. D. Bamidele		West	
	Navy C. A. Ogwuji		Ibo/East?	

*Supreme Military Council

NOTES

131   Ali A. Mazrui, "The Lumpen Proletariat and the Lumpen Militariat: African Soldiers and the New Politican Class, " Political Studies (March 1973), p. 9.

132   My Live: The Autobiography of Alhui Sir Ahm Bello Sandana of Sokoto (Cambridge University Press, 1972), p. 23.

133   N. J. Finer, The Nigerian Army 1956-1966 (London: Methuen and Col, Ltd., 1971), p. 18.

134   Luckham, The Nigerian Military, p. 90.

135   N. J. Finer, The Nigerian Army, p. 39.

136   Ibid, p. 37.

137   Ibid, p. 40.

138   Ibid, p. 42

139   Luckham, The Nigerian Military, p. 129.

140   Nigeria: A Country Study (Washington, D.C.: American University, 1982), p. 247.

141   Nordlinger, Soliders in Politics, p. 41.

142   Luckham, The Nigerian Military, p. 1.

143   Aristide R. Zolberg, "The Military Decade in Africa," World Politics, Vol. XXV (January 1973), p. 319.

144   Andrew J. Goodpaster, et al, Civil-Military Relations (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Reserach, 1977), p. 77.

145   Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Nigeria, The Tribes, The Nations, or the Race (Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1965), p. 76.

146   Ibid, p. 153.

147 Fred Greene, "Toward Understanding Military Coups," Africa Report (February 1966), p. 14.

148 Nordlinger, Soliders in Politics, p. 68.

149 Luckham, The Nigerian Military, p. 112.

150 Ibid, p. 39.

151 N. J. Finer, The Nigerian Army, p. 149.

152 Edward Feit, "Military Coups and Politican Development," World Politics (January 1968), p. 190.

153 Olusegun Obasanjo, My Command (Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books (Nigeria) Ltd., 1980), p. 5.

154 N. J. Finer, The Nigerian Army, p. 160.

155 Ibid, p. 125.

156 Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics, p. 90.

157 Luckham, The Nigerian Military, p. 201.

158 P. D. McCaskie, Africa South of the Sahara (London: Eurpoa Publications Ltd., 1986), p. 762.

159 Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback, (Middlesex, England: Penjguin Books, Ltd., 1962), p. 29.

160 Eric Nordlinger, Soliders in Politics, p. 32.

161 Patrick Utomi, Legitimacy and Governance, p. 40.

162 Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics, p. 47.

163 Ibid, p. 48.

164 Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 14.

165 Henry Bienen, "Military Rule and Political Process," Comparative Politics, (January 1976), p. 207.

166 Ali A. Mazrui, "Soldiers as Traditionalizers," World Politics, (January 1976), p. 251.

167 John De St. Jorre, <u>The Brother's War - Biafra and Nigeria</u>, (Massachusetts: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1972), p. 41.

168 Ibid, p. 43.

169 Nordlinger, <u>Soldiers in Politics</u>, p. 65.

170 Ekwe-Ekwe, From Shagari to Bhuari, p. 616.

171 Nordlinger, <u>Soldiers in Politics</u>, p. 75.

172 Levi A. Nwachukwu, "Why Gowon Fell," <u>Africa Report</u>, (September-October 1975), pp. 10-11.

173 Ian Campbell, "The Nigerian Census: An Essay in Civil-Military Relations," <u>Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics</u>, (November, 1976), p. 250.

174 Ibid, p. 251.

175 <u>Time</u>, (August 12, 1966), p. 27.

176 McCaskie, <u>Africa South of the Sahara</u>, p. 744.

177 <u>West Africa</u>, "Coups as Peoples Wish," (March 17, 1986), p. 591.

178 David Easton, <u>A Framework for Political Analysis</u>, (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 51.

179 Claire Sterling, "Can Nigeria Catch Up With Its Reputation," <u>The Reporter</u>, (May 19, 1966), p. 39.

180 Larry Diamond, "The Coup and the Future," <u>African Report</u>, (March-April, 1984), p. 10.

181 Ekwe-Ekwe, <u>Third World Quarterly</u>, p. 616.

182 Ray Wilkinson, "A Defeat for Democracy," <u>Newsweek</u>, (January 9, 1984), p. 42.

183 Craign Canine and Ray Wilkinson, "After the Velvet Glove Coup," <u>Newsweek</u>, (January 16, 1984), p. 38.

184 M. J. Dent, <u>The Military and the Politicians in Nigerian Politics and Military Rule Prelude to the Civil War</u>, ed. S. R. Panter-Brick, (London: Athlone Press, 1970), p. 86.

185 Nordlinger, <u>Soldiers in Politics</u>, p. 85.

186 Fred Greene, <u>Toward Understanding Military Coups</u>, p. 13.

187 N. J. Finer, <u>The Nigerian Army</u>, p. 177.

188 Martin Kilson, "Behind Nigeria's Revolt."

189 Diamond, "The Coup and the Future," p. 9.

190 N. J. Finer, <u>The Nigerian Army</u>, p. 149.

191 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, (February 5-12, 1966), 21213.

192 De St. Jorre, <u>The Brother's War</u>, p. 47.

193 Frederick Forsyth, <u>The Biafra Story</u> (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books Ltd., 1969), p. 36.

194 William Gutteridge, "Undoing Military Coups in Africa," <u>Third World Quarterly</u>, (January 1985), p. 80.

195 Campbell, The Nigerian Census, p. 251.

196 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, (July 16, 1976), 27833.

197 Diamond, "The Coup and the Future", p. 13.

198 N. J. Finer, <u>The Nigerian Army</u>, p. 110.

199 Donald Horowitz, "About Face in Africa: The Return to Civilian Rule in Nigeria," <u>Yale Review</u>, (Fall/Summer 1978-79), p. 201.

200 Ibid, p. 203.

201 Keesing's, 27833.

202 Colin Legum, "Can Nigeria Escape Its Past?" <u>African Report</u>, (March 1966), p. 19.

203 A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, <u>Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria</u>, <u>Vol. I</u>, (London: Oxfourd University Press, 1971), p. 140.

204 Nordlinger, <u>Soldiers in Politics</u>, p. 160.

205 <u>West Africa</u>, (September 2, 1985), p. 1781.

206 McCaskie, <u>Africa South of the Sahara</u>, p. 773.

207 <u>Keesing's Contemporary Archives</u>, (August 25-31, 1975) 27293.

208 Canine, p. 38.

209 <u>West Africa</u> (September 2, 1985), p. 1789.

210 McCaskie, <u>Africa South of the Sahara</u>, p. 773.

211 <u>West Africa</u>, (March 10, 1986), p. 537.

212 <u>Keesing's Contemporary Archives</u>, (July 16, 1976), 27833.

213 Nordlinger, p. 38.

214 David Pallister, "Nigeria's Generals," <u>World Press Review</u> (November 1985), p. 46.

215 Gutteridge, Undoing Military Coups in Africa, p. 83.

216 Ekwe-Ekwe, From Shagari to Buhari, p. 621.

CHAPTER IV

Cimilicy as a Fusion of Civil-Military Thought

This final and brief chapter is concerned with the reconciliation of consensus politics, epitomized by the military's lack of accountability and competitive politics with purported forms of accountability. Given the premise that the military provides political stability or consensus politics, 217/ is it fair and reasonable to postulate that the civilians escalate and polarize conflict?

The response to the aforementioned is somewhat paradoxical in the sense that incessant and frequent military interventions actually divides the military and emasculates its traditional role of defending the nation. 218/ While the military will blame the civilian politicians for providing the motives for intervention, the glaring fact remains that a coup d'etat is a disruption of socio-economic, and political life, and more coups constitute a baneful scourge to the society it purports to stabilize.

"Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains. One thinks himself the master of others, and still remains a greater slave then they." 219/ This, taken out of its literal Rousseaun context and juxtaposed with the inherent incapacity of the Nigerian society to forge or construct a viable political system is due to its built-in cleavages.

To compound and complicate Nigeria's quest for a stable political system is the colossal presence of an "omnipotent standing army" which Gaetano Mosca describes as one of the worst forms of government, 220/ ominously hanging on the society like the "Sword of Damocles," entering and exiting the political stage at its whims and caprices. To forestall the frequency of military coup d'etat and make its possibility or attempt analogous to the prosecution of a civil war can only be achieved by a balancing process.

It is worth mentioning that every society operates a somewhat civil-military government, even at a minuscule

level, but differences and variations come about when questions are posed as to the extent of the military's power, participation and responsibility in the governing process.

Cimilicy as a Balancing Process

The main purpose and objective of this thesis is an academic attempt to reconcile the forces of coercion and persuasion. Can this Herculean task be effectuated? With recourse to the simple logic of numbers and ratio, the aforementioned can be realized by first considering the following factors:

1. That the equitable composition of the officer corps is imperative to the attainment of this goal.

2. That the military installations shall be scattered across the nation -- first, to allay the fears of certain indigenes who feel threatened by the unidimensional concentration of military power in one geographical location. Secondly, prudence dictates on national security grounds that a country should not put "all her eggs in one basket." A sustained attack on the Northern part of Nigeria -- the nucleus of military power -- will render the entire country vulnerable. While the first assures internal harmony, the second guards against external vulnerability.

In reaching this political equilibrium, recognition should be made of the fact that the military has been in power for eighteen out of twenty-seven years of Nigeria's independence. In furtherance of the above, the balancing process shall weigh the interests of the many against the interests of a few, i.e., between the interests of approximately 100 million people and the interests of 160,000 members 221/ of the armed forces.

In consonance with the 1979 Nigerian constitution, the President shall be popularly elected by the people. 222/ An insertion into the constitution should be that, "The defense ministry portfolio shall be reserved exclusively for members of the armed forces." The elected civilian President shall appoint a member of the armed forces as the defense minister in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, and subject to Senate confirmation.

The President also shall reserve the prerogative to appoint other competent professional soldiers to positions of cabinet rank as exemplified by the appointments of George C. Marshall and Alexander Haig in Truman and Reagan's administrations, respectively.

Active service status shall not constitute an impediment toward the attainment of this objective, but those politicized military officers who desire a larger share of political power, opines M. K. O. Abiola, "should be allowed to at least temporarily resign their commission in order t contest elections like everyone else." 223/

This balancing approach is best suited and appropriate to the Nigerian political situation. The thought of electing active service military officers is absurd and chimerical. This will not only balkanize and factionalize an already politicized military, but will engender an "erosion of that tradition of loyalty and hierarchical order endemic in a disciplined militia." 224/

Applying the theory of large numbers one cannot reasonably imagine or fathom a situation where the interest of a microcosm, i.e., the military that represents a tiny but powerful constituency can be contrasted with the interests of the majority. In essence, while the selection or appointment of government officials are carried out in a unilateral, undemocratic fashion, however, the confirmation process provides the requisite checks inherent in a limited democratic government.

In summary, having traced the origin and genesis of democratic practices, civilian control, civil-military partnership, it is the author's conviction that political systems do not, in essence, generate frictions, but certain nebulous insertions concocted intentionally or inadvertently, particularly in areas of constitutional engineering, puts a heavy burden on the political system. The consequent political malfunction is expressive of the somewhat unorthodox methods applied by the political participants to articulate their demands.

For a diverse and multi-cultural society like Nigeria with an "omnipotent standing army," the necessity for the construction of a political system should always give consideration to the majority, though in the final analysis, a modicum or microcosm of the sanctum of power tends to control the entire society.

NOTES

217 Ladipo Adamolekun, <u>Politics and Administration in Nigeria</u>, (Ibadan: Spectrum Books Ltd., 1986), p. 120.

218 Fubara David-West, "The Military in Power," <u>West Africa</u>, (July 14, 1986), p. 1465.

219 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, <u>The Social Contract</u>, p. 165.

220 Gaetano Mosca, <u>The Ruling Class</u>, p. 149.

221 J. Bayo Adekson, <u>Stable Civil-Military Systems</u>, p. 92.

222 The 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, p. 50.

223 Ab'Obe Obe, The "Political Debate," <u>West Africa</u>, (April 14, 1986), pp. 768-9.

224 Anthony A. Akinola, "The Diarchy Debate," <u>West Africa</u>, (May 13, 1985), p. 938.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adamolekun, Ladipo. Politics and Administration in Nigeria.
    Ibadan: Spectrum Books, Ltd., 1986.

Adekson, Bayo J. Nigeria in Search of A Stable
    Civil-Military System. London: Gower Publishing
    Company, Limited, 1981.

Awolowo, Obafemi. The People's Republic. London: Oxford
    University Press, 1968.

Awolowo, Obafemi. Path to Nigerian Freedom. London: Faber
    and Faber, 1947.

Bello, Ahmadu. My Life: Autobiography of Alhaji Sir Ahmadu
    Bello, Sauduana of Sokoto. London: Cambridge
    University Press, 1972.

Cicero. Selected Works. Middlesex: Penguin Books, Limited,
    1960.

Cord, Robert L.; Medieros, James A.; and Jones, Walter S.
    Political Science - An Introduction. New Jersey:
    Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1974.

Dent, M. J. The Military and the Politicians in Nigerian
    Politics and Military Rule: Prelude to the Civil War
    ed. S. R. Panter-Brick. London: Athlone Press, 1970.

De St. Jorre, John. The Brother's War - Biafra and Nigeria.
    Massachussetts: Houghton, Mifflin Company, 1972.

Dudley, Billy J. Instability and Political Order: Politics
    and Crisis in Nigeria. Ibadan: University Press, 1973.

Easton, David. A Framework for Political Analysis. New
    Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1965.

Fanon, Franz. The Wretch of the Earth. New York: Grove
    Press, 1966.

Finer, N. J. The Nigerian Army 1956-1966. London: Methuen
    and company, Limited, 1971.

Finer, Samuel E. The Man on Horseback. Middlesex: Penguin
    Books. Limited, 1962.

Forsyth, Frederick. The Biafra Story. Middlesex: Penguin
    Books, Limited, 1969.

Goodpaster, Andrew J., et al. Civil-Military Relations.
    Washington, D. C.: American Enterprise Institute for

Public Policy Research, 1977.

Hitchner, Dell G., and Levine, Carol. Compartative
    Government and Politics. New York: Harper and Row
    Publishers, 1981.

Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan - Parts One and Two. Indiana:
    Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1958.

Huntington, Samuel P. The Soldier and the State Theory and
    Politics of Civil-Military Relations. Massachusetts:
    Harvard University Press, 1957.

Irukwu, J. O. Nigeria at the Crossroads. London: Witherby
    and Company, Limited, 1983.

Jackson, Robert H., and Rosberg, Carl G. Personal Rule in
    Black Africa. Califonria: Unversity of California
    Press, 1982.

Janowitz, Morris. The Professional Soldier. Illinois: Free
    Press, 1960.

Kirk-Greene, A. H. M. Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria, Vol.
    I. London: Oxford University Press, 1971.

Levin, Harold L. Contemporary Physical Geology.
    Philadelphia: Saunders College Publishers, 1981.

Levy, Marion J. The Family Revolution in Modern China.
    Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1949.

Luckham, Robin. The Nigerian Military: A Sociological
    Analysis of Authority and Revolt, 1960-67. London:
    Cambridge University Press, 1971.

Machiavelli, Niccolol. The Prince and the Discourses. New
    York: Random House, Inc., 1951.

Macridis, Roy C. Modern Political Regimes. Canada: Little,
    Brown, and Company, 1986.

McCaskie, P. E. Africa South of the Sahara. London: Europa
    Publications, Limited, 1986.

Morris, William, ed. The American Heritage Dictionary of
    the English Language. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin
    Company, 1976.

Mosca, Gaetano. The Ruling Class. New York: McGraw Hill,
    1939.

Murphy Walter S., & Danielson, Michael N. American
    Democracy. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,

1979.

Nordlinger, Eric A. Soliders in Politics: Military Coups
    and Governments. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
    1977.

Nwabueze, Benjamin O. Constitutionalism in Emergent States.
    New Jersey: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1973.

Obasanjo, Olusegun. My Command. Ibadan: Heinemann
    Educaitonal Books, 1980.

Ogueri, Eze. African Nationalism and Military Ascendancy.
    New York: Conch Magazine, Limited, 1976.

Ojukwu, Chukwuemeka O. Random Thoughts. New York: Harper
    and Row, Publishers, 1969.

Omer-Cooper, J. D. The Zulu Aftermath: A Nineteenth Century
    Revolution in Bantu Africa. Illinois: Northwestern
    University Press, 1966.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. The Social Contract and Discourses.
    London, Melbourne, Thoronto, New York: Everyman's
    Library, 1973.

Schwarz, Frederick A. O., Jr. Nigeria - The Nation, or The
    Race. Cambridge: The Massachusetts Institute of
    Technology Press, 1965.

Schwarz, Walter. Nigeria. London: Frederick A. Praeger
    Publishers, 1968.

Webster, J. B., Boahen, A. A., and Idowu, H. O. The Growth
    of African Civilization - The Revolutionary Years.
    Lagos: Longman's Green and Company, Limited, 1967.

Articles and Journals

Akinola, Anthony A. The "Diarchy Debate." West Africa.
    (May 13, 1985, 938.)

Bienen, Henry. "Military Rule and Political Process."
    Comparative Politics, (January 1976), 251.

Canine, Craig, and Wilkinson, Ray. "After the Velvet
    Glove." Newsweek, (January 16, 1984), 38.

Campbell, Ian. "The Nigerian Census: An Essay in Civil
    Military Relations." Journal of Commonwealth and
    Comparative Politics, (November, 1976), 250.

Creel, Glessner H. "Solider and Scholar in China." Pacific
    Affairs, (1935), 343.

David-West, Fubara. "The Military in Power." West Africa,
     (July 14, 1986), 1465.

Diamond, Larry. "Issues in Constitutional Design of a Third
     Nigerian Republic." African Affairs, Vol. 86 (April
     1986), 209.

Diamond, Larry. "Cleavage, Conflict, and Anxiety in the
     Second Nigerian Republic." Journal of Modern African
     Studies, (1982), 630.

Diamond, Larry. "The Coup and the Future." Africa Report,
     (March-April, 1984), 10.

Dudley, Billy J. "Federalism and the Balance of Power in
     Nigeria." Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies,
     (March, 1966), 16.

Ekwe-Ekwe, Herbert. "The Nigerian Plight: Shagari to
     Buhari." Third World Quarterly, (July 1985), 622.

Ergas, Zaki. "In Search of Development: Some Directions for
     Further Investigation." Journal of Modern African
     Studies, Vol. XXIV (February, 1968), 329.

Feit, Edward. "Military Coups and Political Development."
     World Politics, (January, 1968), 190.

Fried, Morton, H. "Military Status in Chinese Society."
     American Journal of Sciology, Vol. 57, (1951), 348-350.

Gutteridge, William. "Undoing Military Coups in Africa."
     Third World Quarterly, (January 1985), 80.

Greene, Fred. "World Understanding Military Coups." Africa
     Report, (February, 1966), 14.

Horowitz, Donald. "About Face in Africa: The Return to
     Civilian Rule in Nigeria." Yale Review, (Fall-Summer
     1978-79), 20.

Howard, Rhoda E. "Legitimacy and Class Rule in Commonwelath
     Africa: Constitutionalsim and the Rule of Law." Third
     World Quarterly, (April, 1975), 324.

Jinadu, Adele. "Federalism, the Conscoiational State, and
     Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria." Publius, Vo. XV (Spring
     1985) 81.

Joseph, Richard A. "Affluence and Underdevelopment: the
     Nigerian Experience." Journal of Modern African
     Studies (1978), 226.

Joseph, Richard A. "Democratization Under Military

Tutelage." <u>Comparative Politics</u>, (October 1981), 93.

Kilson, Martin. "Behind Nigeria's Revolt."

Legum, Colin. "Can Nigeria Escape Its Past?" <u>Africa Report</u>
    (March, 1966), 19.

Lustick, Ian. "Stability in Deeply Divided Societies:
    Consociationalism versus Control." <u>World Politics</u>,
    Vol. XXXI (April 1979), 330.

Mazrui, Ali A. "The Lumpen Proletariat and the Lumpen
    Militariat: African Soliders and the New Political
    Class." <u>Political Studies</u>.

Mazrui, Ali A. "Soldiers as Tradtionalizers." <u>World
    Politics</u>, (January, 1976), 251.

Morris, William, ed. <u>The American Heritage Dictionary of
    the English Language</u>. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin
    Company, 1976.

Nuta, Idenga. "The Diarchy Proposition." <u>West Africa</u>,
    (April 1, 1985), 610.

Nwachukwu, Levi A. "Why Gowon Fell." <u>Africa Report</u>,
    (September-October, 1975), 10-11.

O'Connell, James. "The Inevitability of Instability."
    <u>Journal of Modern African Studies</u>, (1967), 18.

Obe, Ad 'Obe. The "Political Debate." <u>West Africa</u>, (April
    14, 1986), 768-9.

Pallister, David. "Nigeria's Generals." <u>World Press
    Review</u>, November 1985), 46.

Rothchild, Donald. "The Limits of Federalism: An
    Examination of Political Institutional Transfer in
    Africa." <u>Journal of Modern African Studies</u>, (1966),
    28.

Sklar, Richard L. "Political Science and National
    Integration - A Radical Approach." <u>Journal of Modern
    African Studies</u> (1967), 6.

Sklar, Richard L. "Contradiction in the Nigerian Political
    System." <u>Journal of Modern African Studies</u>, (1965),
    204.

Sterling, Claire. "Can Nigeria Catch Up with Its
    Reputation?" <u>The Reporter</u>, (May 19, 1966), 39.

Tignor, Robert L. "Colonial Chiefs in Chiefless Societies."

Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. IX (March, 1971). p. 342.

Utomi, Patrick. "Legitimacy and Governance: One More Year of Military Rule in Nigeria." Journal of Africanist Opinion, Vol. XIV (1985), 41.

Welch, Claude E. "Civil-Military Relations: Perspectives from the Third World." Armed Forces and Society, Vol. II (Winter 1985), 186.

Wiarda, Howard J. "The Ethnocentrism of Social Science." The Review of Politics, (April, 1981), 169.

Wilkinson, Ray. "A Defeat for Democracy." Newsweek (January 9, 1984), 42.

Zolberg, Aristide R. "The Military Decade in Africa." World Politics, Vol. XXV (January, 1973), 319.

Other References

The Bible, Revised Standard Version (St. Matthew XXV, 29), 809.

Keesing's Contemporary Archives

Nigeria: A Country Study. (Washington, D. C.: American University, 1982), 41.