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A SURVEY OF LITERATURE STUDY OF THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE AFFIRMATIVE CASE COMPONENTS
BETWEEN THE 1950's
AND THE 1970's

A Thesis

Presented to the
Department of Communication
and the

Faculty of the Graduate College
University of Nebraska

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts
University of Nebraska at Omaha

by

Mary Lou Klipfel

May 1978

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



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
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Date

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Purpose

Douglas Ehninger wrote that "debate is what we say it is."¹ The structure of the activity has mirrored the needs of the times. But what is it today? And is it different than yesterday, or twenty years ago? To answer these questions it is necessary to examine briefly the development of competitive debating. Between 1748-1895 debate assumed the formats of the Latin Syllogistic Disputation, the Memorized Forensic Era, and the Literary and Debating Societies.² From 1895 until the 1930's debating was articulated through triangular leagues and forum debates.³ In the 1930's the tournament form of the status quo was initiated.⁴

¹
Douglas Ehninger, "Debating as Critical Deliberation," Southern Speech Journal, 24 (Fall, 1959): 30.

²
David Potter, "Significant Changes in Collegiate Debating 1748-1948," Gavel, 30 (May, 1948): 73-4.

³
William Colburn, Strategies For Educational Debate, (Boston: Holbrook Press, Inc., 1976), pp. 1-2.

⁴
Ibid., p. 5.

All of these formats included a resolution to be debated by speakers defending opposing views. Those supporting the resolution, the affirmative, expressed their views in the framework of structured arguments.

This framework evolved into the structure, today known as the case. During the times of the Literary and Debating Societies the topics were predominately philosophical⁵ or metaphysical⁶ and the secret nature⁷ of these societies perpetuated parochial problems as resolutions. These were unlike our current, policy-oriented topics. During the era of the triangular leagues and forum debates the philosophical subjects gave way to "political, economic and sociological issues of the time."⁸ But it was not until tournament debating adopted uniform policy propositions that the literature began to discuss the structured case as we conceptualize it today. Contemporary competitive academic debate employs propositions of policy argued from a case structure format.⁹

⁵
Glenn Capp R., Jr., "History and Analysis of Inter-collegiate Debating in America" (MA Thesis, Baylor University, 1967), pp. 22-23.

⁶
Karl R. Wallace, History of Speech Education in America, (New York: Appleton-Centru-Crofts, Inc., 1954), p. 249.

⁷
Ibid., p. 246.

⁸
Ibid., p. 261.

⁹Austin J. Freeley, Argumentation and Debate 4th Ed., (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1976), p. 40.

The method of awarding decisions during the time of societies rested on the merits of the questions.¹⁰ It was not until the topics were standardized under the leagues that decisions were based on the arguments advanced.¹¹

It was also during this time that debaters began to debate both sides of the topic. The proposition of policy format denied voting for a topic on its inherent merits. This structure has allowed debaters to debate both sides regardless of their individual ideology.¹² Rohrer explained this with the idea that most if not all debate propositions involve social and political issues with valid arguments on both sides.¹³ Therefore, for the practical purposes of tournament debating, the contemporary debater must understand both affirmative and negative analysis and will obviously require familiarity with the affirmative case.

10

Potter, Gavel, p. 74.

11

Capp, "History and Analysis of Intercollegiate Debating in America," p. 20.

12

Richard D. Rieke and Malcolm Sillars, Argumentation And the Decision Making Process, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1975), pp. 280-281.

13

Daniel M. Rohrer, "The Nature and Functions of Policy Systems in Debate" 28 December 1976, 52nd Annual Speech Communication Association of America Convention, San Francisco, California.

This historical sketch on the development of propositions of policy constituted the crux of the literature on affirmative cases and their components.¹⁴ It was not until the current era in debate evolution that the case as an entity received elaboration. But when the tournament format flourished, the affirmative case, its form and components, was discussed, debated, diagrammed, and dissected in the literature and in debate rounds.¹⁵

In the beginning there was the "needs" case, but this is no longer the favorite or most frequently chosen approach. In fact, the need-plan case has been among the least heard case types in collegiate varsity rounds.¹⁶ Debaters and coaches have twisted affirmative cases into forms with modular components that allow for presenting several plans to justify the resolution.¹⁷ They have turned the resolution

14

Arthur N. Kruger, Argumentation and Debate: A Classified Bibliography, 2nd Ed., (New Jersey: The Scarecrow Press, Inc. 1975), pp. 94-110; Egbert R. Nichols, "A Historical Sketch of Intercollegiate Debating," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 22 (April, 1936): 213-20; 22 (December, 1936): 591-602; 23 (April, 1937): 259-78; Potter, "Significant Changes in Collegiate Debating," pp. 73-4.

15

Kruger, Argumentation and Debate, pp. 94-110.

16

Donald R. Terry, Modern Debate Case Techniques, (Skokie: National Textbook Company, 1970), p. 1. "The affirmative case, if based on a need must deal with basic areas where the present system creates harms or evils that cannot be removed without changing the structure of the status quo."

17

William H. Bennett, "Mini-Affirmative Case Form." Forum, (1974-5): 3-4; Allan Lichtman, Charles Garvin and Jerry Corsi, "The Alternative-Justification Affirmative: A New Case Form," JAJA, 10 (Fall, 1973): 59-60.

into a hypothesis and the debate round into a hypothesis-testing experiment.¹⁸ And they have applied concepts from systems analysis in an attempt to accrue an improved system of policy comparisons.¹⁹ As the forms of the affirmative cases have changed, so the criteria used in evaluating them have also changed. The following questions arose regarding the affirmative case requirements.

1. Have there been changes in the basic requirement of the affirmative case?
2. If there have been changes, are they because of changes in the judging criteria used to evaluate these basic requirements?
3. What is the effect of these changes on competitive interscholastic debate?

Basically the writer sought to discover if the requirements of inherency, significance, topicality, solvency, and burden of proof were being recloaked in new names under new structures or if changes in debate decision-making had altered these requirements and thus altered some fundamental requirements in affirmative case construction.

18

David Zerafsky, "Argument as Hypothesis Testing," Paper presented at the 62nd annual meeting of the Speech Communication Association, San Francisco, California, December 1976, pp. 1-18.

19

Bernard Brock, James W. Chesebro, John Cragan and James F. Klumpp, Public Policy Decision Making System Analysis and Comparative Advantage Debate, (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1973)pp. 85-116; Thomas Harris and Robert Smith, "A System Analysis of the Current Debate Controversy," JAJA, (Winter, 1973): 355-60.

Survey of Literature

The trend in argumentation research has been to describe the history of debate at a single institution,²⁰ describe a particular format,²¹ and to analyze some current practice, such as a judging practice.²² An extensive search revealed that there has not been a comprehensive study to analyze changes which have occurred in the interpretations of affirmative case requirements. A few

20

Otto F. Bauer, "A Century of Debating at Northwestern University, 1855-1955" (MA Thesis, Northwestern University, 1955); Donald O. Olson, "Debating at the University of Nebraska" (MS Thesis University of Wisconsin, 1947); for further examples see Kruger, Argumentation and Debate, pp. 45-53.

21

Richard Acland, "Oxford Debating, Gavel, 12 (May, 1930), pp. 8-10; H.M. Jordon, "Tournament Experiment with Debate Types: Forensic, (March, 1946): 75-6. James O'Rourke, "Contemporary Issues Debate, : Speaker and Gavel, 10 (November, 1972), pp. 2-3; William Sendlak, "The Protagoras Memorial Tournament: Some Theoretical Considerations," JAF, 8 (Winter, 1972), : 117-122. For other examples see Kruger, Argumentation and Debate, pp. 272-331.

22

Joseph Baccus, "Debaters Judge Each Other, Quarterly Journal of Speech, 23 (February, 1937) pp. 74-80; Bruno Jacob, "Factors Responsibilities for Unsatisfactory Debate Decisions," (MA Thesis University of Denver, 1936); Sidney C. Wilmington, "A Study of the Relationship of Selected Factors to Debate Effectiveness and to Debate Rating Reliability," (MA Thesis, Northwestern University, 1967); for other examples see Kruger, Argumentation and Debate, pp. 332-346.

sources have analyzed isolated affirmative components, but they have not discovered any conclusions which could answer the questions posed in this paper.²³

David Zarefsky²⁴ and John DeBross²⁵ discussed, in generalities, how interpretations of inherency, topicality, etc. have changed. But neither applied any type of criteria or model to measure semantic and/or actual alterations in these concepts. Their papers were not interpretative and did not apply much of their discourse to the role of the affirmative case components in the competitive round.

Walter Ulrich spoke on the "Recent Changes in the Nature of Inherency,"²⁶ in April of 1976, but did not apply judging criteria to his findings or analyze any other case component. It merely discussed the evolution of inherency. His findings are included in the analysis of this concept in Chapter 2.

23

Kruger, Argumentation and Debate: Terry, Modern Debate Case Techniques; David A. Thomas, Advanced Debate, (Illinois: National Textbook Company, 1976): 3-64, 71-101, 113-135, 142-151, 156-160.

24

David Zarefsky, "Changing Concepts in Forensics."

25

John C. DeBross, "Change in Basic Concepts."

26

Walter Ulrich, "Recent Changes in the Nature of Inherency." 1-3 April 1976, States Speech Communication, Chicago, Illinois.

In one section of his book, Counterpoint: Debate About Debate, Arthur Kruger discussed different definitions of prima facie from the literature of the 1960's,²⁷ but since then there have been additions to the literature which require analysis. He, like Ulrich applied no criteria with which to measure change.

Dr. Annette Shelby described the development of the burden of proof in her dissertation, "The Development of the Theory of Argumentation and Debate."²⁸ Her analysis was descriptive in nature and explored burden of proof from an argumentation theory viewpoint and did not examine it in relationship to competitive academic debate.

Other sources discussed isolated case types but did not compare their inherency, significance, solvency, topicality, and burden of proof requirements.²⁹ It would be pointless to continue to list other sources which might allude to the author's topic but were not duplicative due to their lack of comparative analysis and lack of a measurement tool.

27

Arthur N. Kruger, Counterpoint: Debate About Debates, (New Jersey: The Scarecrow Press, Inc. 1968), pp. 365-374.

28

Annette Nevin Shelby, "The Development of the Theory of Argumentation and Debate" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Louisiana State University, 1974).

29

Terry, Modern Debate Case Techniques: Thomas, Advanced Debate, pp. 3-64, 71-101, 113-135, 142-151, 156-160. Other sources applicable here are noted and explained in later chapters which deal specifically with the affirmative requirements of different case types.

Therefore the writer could discover no study identical to this one nor any study which directly answered her four research questions.

The following procedure section describes the literature which the writer surveyed and analyzed to find answers to these inquiries.

Procedures & Design

In order to answer the research questions it was necessary to organize and limit to material surveyed. Within this section the design and limits of the study are explained.

This thesis studied the affirmative case components of inherency, significance, plan, topicality and burden of proof from a survey of literature. The relevant literature included texts, journal articles, theses, dissertations, and convention papers.

This writer isolated the time periods of the 1950's and the 1970's in order to compare for change. As mentioned, the tournament format did not evolve until the 1930's, and in the 1940's World War II restricted competitive interscholastic debate, so it appears that the 1950's provide a stable time period to compare with the present.

The literature of the 1960's was not included because it was reasoned that any major changes which occurred during

that time were reflected in the writings of the seventies. Alterations not mentioned in the 1970's literature would probably have been insignificant and of short duration.

The purpose of this paper was to survey the research on the listed concepts and apply this information to four research questions. The writer did not attempt to pass judgement on the innovative or traditional aspects of the case. One purpose was to see if change had occurred, not to evaluate the value of that change, or lack of it.

Since the purpose was to compile accurate information on the concepts under study, exact quotations were used in this research. This was to avoid unnecessary inferences and excessive contamination by the bias of the author.

After the research was completed on each affirmative element, a comparison of the findings was then made using four case structures and three judging philosophies as criteria. The findings were then applied to the four research questions.

This next area will discuss the parameters of the study, the definitions of the case, the definitions of the basic affirmative case, components, and the explanation of the four major case types and three judge philosophies.

Parameters of the Study

This study was limited to a survey of affirmative cases under propositions of policy. Kloph and Lohman defined this term as "a desire to change an established policy

operation or procedure, and urge that a new way be followed in the future."³⁰

The rationale for this limitation is divided into three parts. Benjamin argued in his dissertation in 1951 that "value assertions are not arguable," and that "fact may or may not be arguable depending on the existence of a generally recognized authority."³¹ LaGrave pointed out in 1973 that only through a proposition of policy may inherency be developed.³²

Arthur Kruger claimed in 1954 that the literature was inadequate in describing how to debate policy questions.³³ During the past 20 years with the "publish or perish" push, the field has witnessed a proliferation of patten related to propositions of policy; and this paper reviewed it in light of its research questions.

Definitions of the Case

Before writing specific definitions of the components of the affirmative case, it was necessary to research various

30

Donald W. Klopf and Carroll P. Lahman, Coaching and Directing Forensics (Skokie, Illinois: National Textbook Company, 1973), p. 95.

31

Robert L. Benjamin, "Definition: It's Nature and Function in Argumentive Discourse" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1951), p. 142.

32

Charles W. LaGrave "Inherency, a Historical View" Issues, Volume 6, Number 7 Part 1, pp. 12-13.

33 Arthur N. Kruger "Logic and Strategy in Developing the Debate Case," Speech Teacher, 3 (March 1954), pp. 89-106.

definitions of the case. This was done through a survey of the literature. As mentioned earlier the case format unfolded as topics changed and as methods of decision making matured. Litchman, Garvin and Corsi contributed to this history with their research that discovered that the 1930's brought forth "an increasing sophistication and structure in argumentative techniques,"³⁴ that by "the 1950's debaters were generally expected to structure their affirmative rationales into several clearly demarcated 'need contentions.'"³⁵ In the late 1950's these authors discovered that "most teams adopted a parallel case structure built around several distinct arguments for change, each of which fulfilled the burdens of inherency and significance."³⁶ The 1960's delivered the Comparative Advantage case,³⁷ conceived to fit the changing times, and nurtured it with spirited ivory tower debates on its legitimacy.³⁸

This succinct history combined with the following hybrid of definitions allowed the author to develop an operational definition of "case" for this paper.

34

Allan Litchman, Charles Garvin and Jerry Corsi, "The Alternative Justification Affirmative: A New Case Form:" JAJA (Fall, 1973), volume X, Number 2, pp. 59-69.

35

Ibid.

36

Ibid.

37

Ibid.

38 David Zarefsky, ed. The Comparative Advantage Case. (Evanston, Illinois and Brunswick, Maine: Championship Debate Enterprise, 1970), p. 97.

A "case" may be defined as: the specific pattern of reasoning developed to support a proposition.³⁹ Other authors have extended it to include the assembling of an outline of proof to secure audience acceptance.⁴⁰ Case is a generic term which according to the literature may be used by both the negative and affirmative. Since this paper isolated the affirmative case, it was necessary to consider the requirements of that case in order to develop a reliable definition.

39

George W. Ziegelmueller and Charles A. Dause Argumentation: Inquiry and Advocacy, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1975), p. 162. Craig R. Smith and David Hunsaker, The Bases of Argument-Ideas in Conflict. The Bobbs-Merrills series in Speech Communication, Ed. Russell R. Windes. (1972), p. 124. Harrison Boyd Summer, Forest Livings Whan, and Thomas Andrew Rouse How to Debate (New York: The H. W. Wilson Company, 1950), p. 160. David Potter Ed. Argumentation and Debate (New York: The Dryden Press, 1954), p. 61. Robert C. Dick, Argumentation and Rational Debating (Dubuque, Iowa, William C. Brown Company Publisher, 1972), p. 45. William H. Bennet, Pragmatic Debate (Vermillion, South Dakota: Championship Debate Enterprise, 1971), p. 5. Klopff and Lahman, Coaching and Directing Forensics, p. 145.

40

James J. Murphy and Jon M. Ericson, The Debater's Guide, (Indianapolis: The Bobbs Merrill Company, Inc., 1961), p. 99. A Craig Baird, Argumentation, Decisions, and Debate (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1950), p. 318. Halbert E. Gulley, Essentials of Discussion and Debate, (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1959), p. 106. Henry Lee Eubank and Jeffery Auer, Discussion and Debate: Tolls of a Democracy 2nd Ed. (New York: Appleton Century Crofts, Inc., 1951), p. 405.

The requirements for what constituted a valid affirmative case varied vastly in the literature. The McBurney, O'Neil and Mills text presented the requirements which the literature of the 1950's demanded.

In every debate the affirmative case must include two main lines of argument. First of all, the affirmative must establish a need for a change - that something is wrong with the present system. And second, the affirmative must show that the proposal it advocates would produce certain benefits - that it will correct the major evils found in the present system, and possibly bring other advantages as well The affirmative may find it desirable to include defensive arguments, either showing that the change proposed will not create new evils, or that no better plan exists than the one the affirmative offers.⁴¹

Their criteria was supported by other texts such as Potter and Kruger.⁴²

The requirements from the literature of the 1970's were articulated by Ziegemeuller and Duase. The Affirmative

. . . must be prepared to show a significant past, present, or future problem, or harm as suggested by the ill issues. He must be able to causally relate that ill to the basic philosophy of the present system as suggested

41

James H. McBurney, James M. O'Neill and Glen E. Mills, Argumentation and Debate, (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1951), p. 124.

42

David Potter, Argumentation and Debate, (New York: The Dryden Press, 1954), p. 65; Arthur Krueger, "Logic and Strategy in Developing The Debate Case," Speech Teacher. III (March, 1954), 89-106.

by the same issue or inherency concept. He must be prepared to outline a specific plan and demonstrate how it would solve the problem of the ill as required by the cure issue. And he must be prepared to respond to disadvantages to his proposals as indicated by the cost issue.⁴³

This same point of view was espoused by Newcombe and Robinson with the addition that the affirmative must define and follow its terms; and was summed up by Terry when he wrote that:

Cases should be evaluated according to their extent of their superiority over the status quo, regardless of whether they claim to be eliminating harm, mitigating harm, or augmenting advantages.⁴⁵

This survey has considered several definitions and interpretations of case and will now integrate these into an operational definition. For the purpose of this thesis the concept of the affirmative case was defined as: An organizational structure developed to support the resolution by fulfilling its burden of proof, by being inherent, significant, topical, solvent and free of disadvantages.

This definition was used synonymously with the term "Affirmative Case" throughout the thesis.

⁴³

Ziegemueller and Dause, Argumentation: Inquiry and Advocacy, p. 162-163.

⁴⁴

Judson Newcomer and Karl Robinson, Teaching Speech Communication: Methods and Materials, (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1975), p. 406-407.

⁴⁵

D. R. Terry, Modern Debate Case Techniques, p. 31.

Definitions of Affirmative Components

This research compared the major affirmative case requirements within four major case structures, using three models of judging criteria. Clarification of these requirements was developed through the following definitions.⁴⁶

Burden of Proof: The burden of proof is the risk of the proposition. It is the obligation of the man who affirms the propositions to prove his case. He must provide good and sufficient reason for adopting the proposition and must convince those who render the decision.⁴⁷

Inherency: The state of being an intrinsic, inseparable, necessary part of the status quo. The term is used to describe a feature of the status quo which exists and will continue to exist in the absence of the affirmative plan.⁴⁸

Significance: Significance is the degree of importance of a conclusion. Significance may be qualitative or quantitative.⁴⁹

46

Within each chapter, which concentrated on a sole requirement, comparative definitional analysis occurred, but for perspicuity each of the affirmative case components is defined here.

47

Austen J. Freeley, Argumentation and Debate, 3rd ed. (California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1971), p. 32.

48

Thomas, Advanced Debate, p. 350.

49

Thomas, Advanced Debate, p. 352.

Solvency: This is the ability of the plan to solve the affirmative problem. It is the responsibility of the affirmative team to present a specific proposal which is within the intent of the proposition and which satisfies the rationale for changing the status quo.⁵⁰

Topicality: This is the state of conformity to the intent of the debate resolution. A case is topical if it justifies the full intent of the resolution. A plan is topical if the needs are solved, or the comparative advantages are gained, as a direct result of those planks in the plan which implement the resolution.⁵¹

The requirement of prima facie will not be analyzed separately since by definition an affirmative case must have all of the above elements to be considered prima facie.⁵²

Definitions of Case Types

The four major case types which were used in this research were the Needs, the Comparative Advantage, the Criteria Case, and the Alternative Justification case. Elucidated below are the results of a survey of the literature to provide functional definitions of these case types.

⁵⁰ Colburn, Strategies for Education Debate, p. 140.

⁵¹ Thomas, Advanced Debate, pp. 352-3.

⁵² Ibid., p. 350.

The Needs case was used "nearly exclusively at inter-collegiate tournaments until 1960's. This longevity has provided this case with the additional title of the "traditional" approach.⁵³ Smith and Hunsaker summed up the requirements of this case type.

The advocate in advancing a policy proposition with a problem which needs solution as the underlying rationale for the proposition, must organize his material arguments in the following fashion:

- 1) demonstration that a problem exists;
- 2) demonstration that the problem is harmful;
- 3) demonstration that the problem is a significant one, which affects his audience;
- 4) demonstrate that the problem is inherent, or structurally part of, the present system;
- 5) proposal of a solution which will meet the problem presented;
- 6) demonstration that the solution will be workable and practical to put into effect.⁵⁴

This definition encompasses those provided by Weaver, Freeley, and others.⁵⁵

53

Dick, Argumentation and Rational Debate, p. 49.

54

Smith and Hunsaker, The Bases of Argument-Ideas in Conflict, p. 135-6.

55

James Weaver, Judging Debate, ed. Joe McAdoo, (Springfield, Missouri: MidAmerica Research, 1975) p. 43. Freeley, Argumentation and Debate, 4th Ed. p. 181. Roy V. Wood, Strategic Debate, 2nd Ed. (Skokie, Illinois: National Textbook Company, 1972), p. 18 and p. 77. Marilyn J. Young, Coaching Debate, (Clayton, Missouri: The Alan Company, 1975), p. 42. Dick, Argumentation and Rational Debate, p. 47. Bennet, Pragmatic Debate, p. 30. William Yaremchuk, "Another Look at the Traditional Debate Case," Issues, 7 (December, 1973): 7. Terry, Modern Debate Case Techniques, p. 1. Klopff and Lahman, Coaching and Directing Forensics, p. 145.

The derivatives of this case type - the Need Harm Advantage,⁵⁶ the Modified Needs Analysis Affirmative,⁵⁷ the Inverted Needs Case,⁵⁸ and the Comparative Need Approach,⁵⁹ offer a variety of structures under the traditional approach; but, since they provide no radical requirement differences, they were considered under the general "Needs Case."

The Comparative Advantage Case was defined for this paper as one which contained the following elements.

- 1) An explanation of the basic analysis of the affirmative. Included should be an explanation that the affirmative justifies the plan on the basis of cost-benefit analysis.
- 2) Definition of key terms if necessary.
- 3) Presentation of the affirmative plan. All the specifics of the affirmative plan that are changes from the present system and are involved in the casual link to the affirmative advantage should be explained.
- 4) Proof that the affirmative plan will accrue the advantages.
- 5) Proof that the alleged new condition is an advantage.
- 6) Quantitative significance.
- 7) The present system lacks the advantageous condition.⁶⁰

56

Bennet, Pragmatic Debate, p. 30

57

Freeley, Argumentation and Debate, 4th Ed., p. 181.

58

Smith and Hunsaker, The Bases of Argument-Ideas in Conflict, p. 137.

59

Terry, Modern Debate Case Techniques, p. 102.

60

James F. Klumpp, "The Comparative Advantages Cases: A Causal Explanation," (unpublished paper University of Minnesota), pp. 9-10.

This Comparative Advantage philosophy was also articulated by Terry, Thomas, Sanders,⁶¹ etc. Ziegelmüller and Dause pointed out a major distinction between a Comparative Advantage Case and the Traditional Case.

The comparative advantages case requires the determination of a secondary level of goals and the establishment of all its causal links on this secondary level. This approach to case analysis should be used when both the present system and the affirmative proposal are capable of achieving the primary goal of the proposition or when neither the present system nor the affirmative proposal are fully capable of achieving the primary goal of the proposition.⁶²

Finally, English, Young, Cragan and Shields wrote that all of these requirements must be present in the first affirmative constructive.⁶³

61

Freeley, Argumentation and Debate, 4th Ed., p. 187. Weaver, Judging Debate, p. 43. Smith Hunsaker, The Bases of Argument-Idea in Conflict, p. 139. Terry, Modern Debate Case Techniques, pp. 16-7. Gerald H. Sanders, Introduction to Contemporary Academic Debate, (Minneapolis: Campus Press, 1972), p. 53. Wood, Strategic Debate, p. 83. Klopff and Lahman, Coaching and Directing Forensics, p. 147. Dick, Argumentations and Rational Debate, pp. 49-40.

62

Ziegelmüller and Dause, Argumentation: Inquiry and Advocacy, pp. 164-5, 171.

63

William B. English and B.L. Ware, "A Comparison of the Need Plan and the Comparative Advantage Approach: There is a Difference," Proceedings: National Conferences on Argumentation ed. James Luck, p. 9. Young, Coaching Debate, p. 45. John F. Cragan and Donald C. Shields, "The comparative Advantages Negative," JAFSA, 7 (Spring, 1970), p. 86.

This writer recognized that during the 1960's there existed the debate over the legitimacy of the Comparative Advantage case⁶⁴ but agrees with the literature of the 1970's that it is a viable case structure with the requirements listed above.

The off shoots of the CA case - the Relative Efficacy Case,⁶⁵ the Relative Efficacy Secondary Effects,⁶⁶ and the modified CA⁶⁷- were considered in this paper under the Comparative Advantage structure due to their minor philosophical and structural differences.

The third case examined in this paper was the Criteria Case. Thomas explained its philosophy in his text:

. . . .this construct establishes certain values upon which policy should be based. It then maintains that the affirmative proposal can do a better job of fulfilling these criteria than can the present system.⁶⁸

64

Zarefsky, The Comparative Advantage Case.

65

Sanders, Introduction to Contemporary Academic Debate, p. 65.

66

Ibid., p. 66.

67

Wood, Strategic Debate, p. 21 and 85.

68

Thomas, Advanced Debate, p. 20-21.

Freeley,⁶⁹ Bennet⁷⁰ and Young⁷¹ wrote similar definitions in their texts. Sanders explained the role of the "Criteria" in the Criteria case.

The affirmative develops a set of criteria by which any plan should be judged. The criteria must be well developed and defensible. Then, the affirmative team must prove that their plan is comparatively advantageous over the status quo in meeting these criteria.⁷²

He later delineated between the goals case and the goals criteria. In a goals case "a team presents goals which are not necessarily the goals of the present system."⁷³ For the purpose of this paper the two formats will be considered as one since they both must meet the following requirements.

1. Is there an inherent problem?
2. Is there a rationale for change?
3. Does the plan solve the problem?
4. There are no disadvantages.⁷⁴

⁶⁹ Freeley, Argumentation and Debate 4th ed., p. 190.

⁷⁰ Bennet, Pragmatic Debate, pp. 37-78.

⁷¹ Young, Coaching Debate, p. 48.

⁷² Sanders, Introduction to Contemporary Academic Debate, p. 64.

⁷³ Ibid., p. 65.

⁷⁴ Lewinski, Mietzler and Settle, "The Goal Case Affirmative: An Alternative Approach to Academic Debate." JAF Vol. IX No. 4. (Spring, 1973), pp. 458-463.

A final characteristic of the Goals Criteria case is that it provides a structure to evaluate values. Thomas, McBath and others posited that the philosophy of this case evolved around value analysis.⁷⁵ Chesebro analyzed the criteria case in his article, "Beyond the Orthodox: The Criteria Case," and developed criteria to evaluate the value being argued in this case structure.

How was the value selected by the affirmative? Why was it selected? What justification exists for being the nation's highest priority for dealing with poverty. What are the operational characteristics of the value? How does one measure or know when one has achieved the value.⁷⁶

This values orientation is the major philosophical distinction between the Criteria Case and the other formats.

This structure is required to prove the same components as the other case structures. These questions can be answered in light of the evaluation requirements for a Criteria Case presented earlier.

The last case format which was analyzed in this paper was the Alternative Justification Approach. Freeley explained it with his comment that:

This variation is an ancient technique useful with broad propositions, in which the affirmative offers a multiplicity of independent reasons for adopting the resolution.⁷⁷

75

Thomas, Advanced Debate p. 24-27. McBath, ed., "Forensics is Communication," p. 116.

76

James W. Chesebro, "Beyond the Orthodox: The Criteria Case." JAJA Vol. 7 No. 4, pp. 209-215.

77

Freeley, Argumentation and Debate 4th ed., p. 190.

The affirmative "offers not one case but several supporting a resolution."⁷⁸ Bennet,⁷⁹ Lichtman, Garvin and Corsi supported⁸⁰ this interpretation in their articles. This case is also known as the contingency case,⁸¹ and the Mini or Modular⁸² format.

These four case types were analyzed within each chapter as to what role the issues of Inherency, Significance, Topicality, Solvency and Burden of Proof played in these different formats. The variation of these issues was measured using three judging philosophies. These judging philosophies were stock issues, hypothesis testing and systems analysis.

⁷⁸ Goodnight, Balthrop and Parson, "The Problem of Inherency, Strategy, and Substance," p. 234.

⁷⁹ Bennet, Forum, "Affirmative Case Innovations," (1974-75).

⁸⁰ Lichtman, Garvin and Corsi, "The Alternative-Justification Affirmative": p. 54.

⁸¹ Bennet, Pragmatic Debate, p. 36.

⁸² Young, Coaching Debate, p. 59.

Definitions of Judging Philosophies

The judge who uses a stock issues approach believes that "The affirmative team in a debate must win all of the stock issues in order to win the Debate." Colburn, Baird and others defined the stock issues as: Inherency, Significance, Solvency.⁸³ Rieke and Sillars extended the requirements to include the issue that the plan can be implemented with "more advantages than disadvantages."⁸⁴ To carry the burden of proof an affirmative must fulfill these requirements.

Henderson defined the role of the judge in a hypothesis testing format when he wrote and presented the following at a Speech Communication Association Convention:

The role of the judge is that of the intelligent citizen trying to determine the probable truth of the proposition. He regards the proposition as a hypothesis and the debate as the means of testing it.⁸⁵

83

Colburn, Strategies for Educational Debate, p.128. Baird, Argumentation Decisions and Debate p. 314-315. Dick, Argumentation and Rational Debating, p. 19. George McCoy Musgrave, Competitive Debate, (New York: H.W. Wilson Company 1957) 3rd ed. p. 58. Freeley, Argumentation and Debate 4th ed. p. 52. Brooks Quinby So You Want to Discuss And Debate(Portland, Maine: J. Weston Walch, 1954), p. 67. Wood, Strategic Debate, p. 19. John Ritter and T. L. Brink, "Adjuncts Extratopical But Acceptable" JAJA (Spring 1972) Vol 8 No. 4, p. 223-225. Melzer, "First Aid to the Beginning Debater" (NVEA Handbook, 1950-1951), p. 39. English and Ware, TCU Conference, 1973.

84

Rieke and Sillars, Argumentation and the Decision Making Process, p. 293.

85

Bill Henderson, "Debate as a Paradigm for Demonstrating Truth through Hypotheses Testing," (unpublished paper SCA Convention, 1974), p. 2.

He clarified this concept further in a later writing with this analysis:

The proposition becomes a research hypothesis for our citizen judge, and the arguments introduced by the advocates serve as the means by which the judge concludes the probable truth of the hypothesis.⁸⁶

Zarefsky explained two additional characteristics of this paradigm.

The generic defense of the proposition, which may be strategically the wisest choice in any case, becomes a necessity within the hypothesis testing paradigm.⁸⁷

The hypothesis testing model directs that the judge make a yes-or-no decision rather than a this-versus-that decision.⁸⁸

When a judge has assumed a hypothesis tester role, he

- 1) evaluates the data provided by the debaters;
- 2) uses the data as a test of truth of the proposition.

The final judging philosophy which this paper explored was the systems analysis approach. Klumpp et al. applied this concept in Implications of a Systems Model of Analysis of Argumentation Theory.

86

Bill Henderson, "Debate as a Paradigm for Demonstrating Truth through Hypotheses Testing," Issues, 9 (February, 1976), p. 16.

87

David Zarefsky, "Argument as Hypothesis Testing" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the SCA, December 1976, p. 12.

88

Ibid., p. 13.

Systems Analysis assumes a complexity in which actions are interrelated to numerous other actions. Systems becomes a method of isolating certain relationships for some intensive study. The systems analysts in public policy then takes the description of the system, applies analysis of goals to the description and thus evaluates the system.⁸⁹

Klumpp defined the characteristics of a social-political system in his paper at the Speech Communication Association Convention in 1976. These were: multiple causation, equifinality and inherent interrelatedness of the systems components.⁹⁰

Kneupper discussed the relationship of systems analysis in the "real world" to debate and concluded that the "real world" criteria for decision making should be applied to the "debate world."⁹¹ Brock et al. listed the specific criteria which the debate judge who uses a systems analysis philosophy would apply to the round in order to make his decision.

89

James F. Klumpp, Bernard L. Brock, James W. Chesebro, and John F. Cragan, "Implications of a Systems Model of Analysis of Argumentation Theory," presented at Central States Speech Convention, April 7, 1973, p. 3.

90

James F. Klumpp, "Inherency from the Perspective of System Analysis," presented at Central States Speech Convention, Chicago, Illinois, April 2, 1976.

91

Charles W. Kneupper, "A Defense of General Systems Theory," Forensic, March 1976, p. 11.

- 1) The affirmative must demonstrate that the present system, with the inclusion of the debate resolution, will make more progress toward the stated goals of society than the operation of the present system without the resolution.
- 2) The affirmative must fulfill its significance obligation.
- 3) The affirmative must fulfill its cost-benefit obligation.
- 4) The affirmative must fulfill its uniqueness obligation.⁹²

Thomas summed up the differences between stock issues, judging analysis and systems analysis criteria:

Stock issues analysis seeks to evaluate whether a stated policy resolution ought to be affirmed or negated; whereas systems analysis seeks to evaluate which policy system among the available alternative systems ought to be selected. This distinction leads to several critical differences in the way a debate must be judged.⁹³

This study examined the five major affirmative issues within the four major case formats using the above described judging philosophies to study what changes have occurred in these affirmative case components.

92

Brock, Chesebro, Cragan and Klumpp, Public Policy Decision Making System Analysis and Comparative Advantage Debate, p. 105.

93

David A. Thomas, "The Swing to Systems Analysis: A Revolution in Debate Judging Standards?", presented at the Southern Speech Communication Association Convention, San Antonio, Texas, April 1976, p. 5.

CHAPTER II

INHERENCY

After a survey of the literature on inherency the writer concluded that the most efficacious way to analyze this construct was to consider the following areas: the development of inherency; its definition and requirement; its three dimensions; the types of inherency; the role of inherency in the four major cases; and how three judging philosophies interpreted inherency.

The Development of Inherency

Inherency, while existing from the beginning of a case component, has only recently been the center of a "debate about debate." LaGrave wrote that while theorists from the 1930's on consistently emphasized inherency in argumentation and debate theory, the amount of space devoted to its theoretical explanation did not match the importance accredited to the concept.¹ Only recently has inherency "emerged as one of the more controversial constructs of the contemporary period."²

¹ Charles W. LaGrave, "Inherency A Historical View," Issues 6 (May 1973): 6.

² Annette N. Shelby, "The Development of the Theory of Argumentation and Debate" (Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State University, 1974), p. 335.

Even in the 1970's theorists such as Goodnight and Parson have indicated the lack of literature and "detailed consideration" of inherency. In their article they attempt to clarify some of the contemporary questions on this component. This clarification did not necessarily resolve anything, but it did rekindle the discussion of inherency in the forensic community.³ For example, Litchman and Corsi dismissed the legitimacy of Goodnight et al.'s article saying it failed to even define the form.⁴ Parson shortly replied and the argument continued.⁵

Ulrich discussed the development of the concept of "inherency" at a Central States Speech Association Convention in 1976 and observed that progress in practice and theory has been incremental in nature.⁶

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Tom Goodnight, Bill Balthrop and Don Parson, "The Problem of Inherency: Strategy and Substance," JAFSA 10 (Spring 1974): 230.

4

Allan J. Litchman and Jerome R. Corsi, "The Alternative Justification Case Revisited: A Critique of the Problem of Inherency," JAFSA 11 (Winter 1975): 147.

5

Don W. Parson, "Response to a Critique of the 'Problem of Inherency'", JAFSA 12 (Summer 1975): 46-48.

6

Walter Ulrich, "Recent Changes in the Nature of Inherency," Paper presented at the Central States Speech Convention, Chicago, Ill., April 1976, p. 1.

Later in his speech he condemned the sheep-like tendency of debaters to accept textbook inherency requirements without analyzing them.⁷ Teams often accept inherency as a tautology and assume that others view it as such.⁸

Definitions and Requirements of Inherency

The literature has established that inherency is controversial and should be. But what is this elusive affirmative component?

Wood wrote that debaters could prove that their case was inherent if the problem is caused by a "structural defect in the present system."⁹ Terry explained what he called the burden of inherency by adding to this definition that the "affirmative must demonstrate that its plan can produce results that are currently unattainable?"¹⁰ He made the link between the cause of the problem, the norm, and the solution, the plan.

⁷
Ibid., p. 7.

⁸
Ibid., pp. 6-7.

⁹
Roy V. Wood, Strategic Debate, 2nd. ed. (Skokie: National Textbook Company, 1972), p. 78.

¹⁰
Donald R. Terry, Modern Debate Case Techniques, (Skokie: National Textbook Company, 1975), p. 41.

Lawson agreed with this analysis and added that beyond this "abstract definition, the definition of inherency becomes fuzzy."¹¹ Newton,¹² Bennett,¹³ Flanagan¹⁴ and Goodnight et al.¹⁵ concluded in their inherency studies that the major requirement of inherency is that a change be required to alter the system. In other words the affirmative problem area cannot be solved by a minor repair, and the system is not self-repairing. Sanders provided a new dimension to this discussion with his writings on the significant flaw:

I advocate the use of my concept of the 'significant flaw' in an important defect in the present system which must be overcome before a given problem area can be removed from the system. However, as differentiated from the general concept of inherency, the 'significant flaw' does not have to be so deeply embedded in the status quo that some radical change must take place before it can be removed sic ¹⁶

11

Harold Lawson, "The Concept of Attitudinal Inherency," Issues 6 (October 1972): 11.

12

Kenneth Newton, "The Present System as System," Issues 8 (March 1975): 5.

13

William H. Bennett, Pragmatic Debate, (Vermillion: Championship Debate Enterprise, 1971), p. 25.

14

George A. Flanagan, "A Descriptive Study of the Perception of the Comparative Advantage Case," (MA Thesis, Central Missouri State University, 1973), p. 7.

15

Goodnight, et al., "The Problem of Inherency: Strategy and Substance," pp. 230 and 235.

16

Gerald H. Sanders, Introduction to Contemporary Academic Debate, (Minneapolis: Campus Press, 1972), p. 40.

After summarizing these studies the writer concluded that inherency is the affirmative component which perpetuates the problems of the status quo and that only by altering or removing it can solvency be achieved and advantages accrued.

Inherency Dimensions

Besides possessing the above connotations in terms of a perpetuating force, inherency has three dimensions. A team can only prove inherency when it has met the requirements of these dimensions. LaGrave wrote that theorists agreed that these dimensions were cause, permanence and reform.¹⁷ Specifically he recorded that

Under inherency analysis that exact cause has to be determined, otherwise there will be no guarantee that the affirmative plan will take care of the problem.¹⁸

He succinctly summarized the causality explanations of Zarefsky,¹⁹ Goodnight et al.,²⁰ Thompson,²¹ and Cushman

17

LaGrave, "Inherency a Historical View," p. 7.

18

Charles W. LaGrave, "Inherency a Historical View Part I," Issues 6 (April 1973): 13.

19

David Zarefsky, The Comparative Advantage Case, ed. (Evanston: Championship Debate Enterprise, 1970), p. 3.; David Zarefsky, "Argument as Hypothesis Testing", paper presented at the annual meeting of the Speech Communication Association, San Francisco, California, December 1976, p. 17.

20

Goodnight, et al., "The Problem of Inherency: Strategy and Substance", P. 230.

²¹ Wayne Thompson, Modern Argumentation and Debate, (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 82.

and Larkin²² when he noted that inherency "can be defined as the name of a relationship between a condition and its environment."²³ Zarefsky, in his unpublished article, expounded on the on-going process of proving causation and on proving probability of solvency.

First, the causal question is not an inquiry into the reasons for the existence of conditions in the past. Presumably, debaters are powerless to change the course of history. Rather, it is an inquiry into the reasons for ongoing processes or problems. Second, causation is not a physical property, nor is it unitary. One does not ask, does A lead to B which leads to C?" in a mechanistic sense. Rather, causation is a matter of psychological Entailment. One seeks to determine whether a particular system contains enough "facilitating conditioning" for a given result that one might expect the result to follow. Causation is proved in a rhetorical sense.²⁴

Traditionally this dimension of causality has been singular in nature, but recent literature has compiled information on the prospect that inherency may be multi-dimensional. Cherwitz and Hikins wrote that

Inherency is a composite or aggregate of several distinct factors, each of which operates to preclude the status quo

22

Donald P. Cushman and Thomas Larkin, "Affirmative Case Construction Strategies on the 1971-72 Debate Topic," Issues 5 (January 1972): 7.

23

LaGrave, "Inherency A Historical View, Part 2," p.7.

24

David Zarefsky, "Changing Concepts in Forensics," (unpublished paper): 3.

from correcting the exigencies of a particular policy dysfunction.²⁵

They delineated four causes which every case must isolate if it hopes to claim inherency. First, it must have a formal cause. This can be found in the "various institutions and laws which preclude solution of the problem."²⁶ Second, the affirmative must establish material cause.

Material cause is established and defended by indicating either that competing avenues to a solution do not exist or that they are riddled with problems of their own which render them ineffectual.²⁷

Thirdly, the affirmative must prove efficient cause. To do this the case must demonstrate an institution's general usage.²⁸ And finally, the affirmative "must search for those attitudes or motives which insure the perpetuation of the formal cause."²⁹ They must discover those attitudes which cause certain structures to continue. For example, racial prejudices perpetuated segregation which denied equal economic opportunities for all students. This they labelled the final cause. Cherwitz and Hikins summarized

²⁵

Richard Cherwitz and James Hikins, "Inherency as a Multidimensional Construct: A Rhetorical Approach to the Proof of Causation" JAF 14 (Fall 1977): 83.

²⁶

Ibid., p. 85.

²⁷

Ibid., p. 87.

²⁸

Ibid., p. 86.

²⁹

Ibid.

with this inherency definition:

Inherency is a unique construct of the policy disputant which is discoverable only after the necessary and sufficient elements of which it is comprised are identified.³⁰

In the early 1970's with the advent of the application of systems analysis to debate, Brook et al. discussed the concept that the "resolution should be perceived as a plan of action producing multiple effects."³¹ Specifically on inherency they wrote,

[it] is not, from a systemic perspective a question of single causes, but rather the result of multiple interactions stemming from the principle of a functional design. Some sources have claimed that the concept of multiple causality removed the affirmative from the burden of isolating an inherent flaw in the status quo.³²

This claim will be analyzed in the section under systems analysis in this chapter.³³

Goodnight et al. provided definite examples of "inherent barriers" which lend themselves to multi-causality analysis.

30

Ibid., p. 90.

31

Bernard L. Brock, James W. Chesebro, John F. Cragan, and James F. Klumpp, Public Policy Decision-Making: Systems Analysis and Comparative Advantages Debate, (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), p. 97.

32

Ibid., p. 109.

33

The multilevel effects of systems analysis will be discussed in more depth in the section on systems analysis in this chapter.

Considering such concepts bureaucratic adjustments through case law, experimental programs, contingency plans and administrative fiat, the debater who searches for long-range barriers to social solutions within the traditional confines of unique cause-effect inherency finds himself engaged in a less than productive endeavor.³⁴

Besides proving causal links the affirmative must prove that the problem is a recurring and persistent one³⁵ Unger posited that one can claim permanence if the threat of continued occurrence of a situation is grave enough.³⁶ Hence we have first negatives screaming for the affirmative to prove propensity and proclivity.

The final dimension is that of reform.³⁷ The affirmative must prove that the best way to cure the sick status quo is with the antibiotic of the affirmative plan. Unger ventilated his thoughts on this when he warned affirmatives that they must discover if there are any other solutions which could help the status quo recuperate.³⁸ If there are other solutions to the problem through a minor repair of the status quo, the problem is not inherent. The reform offered must be from outside the system.

To be inherent an affirmative case must meet the requirements of cause, permanence and reform.

³⁴ Goodnight, et al., "The Problem of Inherency" Strategy and Substance, p. 232.

³⁵ LaGrave, "Inherency, A Historical View, Part 1," p. 13.

³⁶ James Unger, "An Application of Theories to Academic Debate" The New Debate: Readings in Contemporary Debate Theory, (Information Research Association, 1975), pp. 32-3.

³⁷ LaGrave, "Inherency A Historical View, Part 1," p. 13.

³⁸ Unger, "An Application of Theories to Academic Debate," p. 34.

Types of Inherency

The research on the types of inherency uncovered three: structural, attitudinal and existential. The description and validity of each is discussed in these next paragraphs.

Zarefsky defined structural inherency as "the reasons for change stem from the institutional mechanisms or structures of the present system."³⁹ Colburn,⁴⁰ Freeley,⁴¹ and Wood⁴² supported this interpretation in their beginning debate texts. Shelby argued that one could prove structural inherency by proving that certain structures, though organically sufficient, are malfunctioning and "prevent the achievement of the desired objective."⁴³

³⁹
Zarefsky, The Comparative Advantage Case,
p. 2.

⁴⁰
C. William Colburn, Strategies for Educational Debate, (Boston: Holbrook Press, 1972), p. 134.

⁴¹
Austen J. Freeley, Argumentation and Debate, 4th. ed. (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1976), p. 168.

⁴²
Wood, Strategic Debate, p. 20.

⁴³
Shelby, "The Development of the Theory of Argumentation and Debate," p. 283.

Goodnight et al. explained that further scholarship on inherency is necessary to discover

what specifically constitutes structure in a given field of argument.⁴⁴

They continued:

Structure is composed of at least two inter-dependent but distinct features: general laws and administrative bureaucracy.⁴⁵

The nature of structure is therefore permanent (laws) yet changing (bureaucracy).

If an affirmative team proves that their inherency is derived from a structural flaw, they must isolate laws, institutions, etc., which have perpetuated the problem.

Besides listing structures the affirmative may discover the attitudes which have caused the "inherent problem" and attempt to alter these. Historically, attitudinal inherency developed when the wording of the propositions implied maintaining the harmful cause but extinguishing its effects. It was also propelled by resolutions which called for changes which the status quo was tending towards.⁴⁶

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Shelby, "The Development of the Theory of Argumentation and Debate," p. 283

⁴⁵

Ibid., p. 240.

⁴⁶

Martin A. Cannon, "The 1950 Debate Question and the Burden of Proof," The Rostrum, (February 1951): 8.

Zarefsky defined attitudinal inherency as "intractable human attitudes" which "prevent the solution of problems identified by the affirmative."⁴⁷ The legitimacy of this concept is still being debated orally in debate rounds and in journal print. Lawson⁴⁸ and Rhodes⁴⁹ contended that it should be debated and decided as an issue and that there are no absolutes concerning its status.

Cox studied the judging philosophies of the 1973-74 National Debate Tournament and discovered that

. . . .A majority of coaches and judges from all sections of the nation either viewed attitudinal inherency as theoretically valid or specified the conditions on which they would accept the approach.⁵⁰

Of those surveyed, 33.8% believed that attitudes were "perfectly valid ground on which to base inherency."⁵¹

47

Zarefsky, The Comparative Advantage Case, p.3.

48

Lawson, "The Concept of Attitudinal Inherency", p.12.

49

Jack Rhodes, "Attitudinal Inherency: Handle with Care," Proceedings National Conference on Argumentation, ed. James Luck (Unpublished manuscript), p. 79.

50

J. Robert Cox, "A Study of Judging Philosophies of the Participants of the National Debate Tournament," The New Debate: Readings in Contemporary Debate Theory, Information Research Association, 1975), pp. 16-17.

51

Ibid., p. 14.

Recently Cherwitz and Hikins wrote that: "By definition, all inherency arguments are attitudinal since all institutions are rooted in motives."⁵² Zarefsky explained why motives are such an important issue to analyze since they tell the debater why the situation exists. "In some instances, these motives may thwart the effectiveness of the change; in others, they may make it unnecessary."⁵³ Cherwitz and Hikins retitled the concept and said that attitudes, traditions etc. - "often serve the same purpose as do written statutes" and therefore "may constitute an inherency's formal cause."⁵⁴

In order for an affirmative case to "carry attitudinal inherency" it must locate the "source of disfunction,"⁵⁵ (the motive for continuance of the problem), and then to gain solvency must identify an "efficacious mechanism whereby legal or constituted power may be divested of one body and transferred to another."⁵⁶ Ling and Seltzer defined

52

Cherwitz and Hikins, "Inherency as Multidimensional Construct," p. 89.

53

Zarefsky, "Changing Concepts in Forensics," p. 3.

54

Cherwitz and Hikins, "Inherency as a Multidimensional Construct," p. 85.

55

J. Robert Cox, "Attitudinal Inherency Implications for Policy Debate," SSCJ, 40 (Winter, 1975): 159-60.

56

Ibid., p. 161.

attitudinal inherency as the "attitudinal bias of powerful men, rather than an inherent structural flaw."⁵⁷ So the affirmative tries to alter the source of the decision making or establishes laws which coerce behaviors.⁵⁸ Examples of cases which might employ attitudinal inherency are those discussing civil rights⁵⁹ and inadequate domestic programs due to the attitudes of congressional funding.⁶⁰

Rhodes listed five types of attitudinal inherency which would assist the debater in proving that the problem was attitudinally inherent:

- Type 1: Any level of government obstructed by another level.
 - 1-A International conflict
 - 1-B Federal - state conflict
 - 1-C State-local
- Type 2: One branch of government obstructed by another branch.
- Type 3: One agency of government obstructed by itself.
- Type 4: Government obstructed by powerful private interests.
- Type 5: Government obstructed by prevailing public opinion.⁶¹

⁵⁷ David Ling and Robert Seltzer, "The Role of Attitudinal Inherency in Contemporary Debate," JAF 8 (Winter, 1971): p. 278.

⁵⁸ The Chapter on the plan will discuss this concept in relationship to solvency.

⁵⁹ Freeley, *Argumentation and Debate*, 4th. ed., p. 171.

⁶⁰ Ling and Seltzer, "The Role of Attitudinal Inherency in Contemporary Debate," p. 278.

⁶¹ Rhodes, "Attitudinal Inherency: Handle With Care," p. 83.

Flanagan described four criteria for evaluating attitudinal inherency in his thesis:

1. An attitude should be characteristic of an institution over a long time period, not of a particular group at a particular point in time.
2. I have to be shown that structural modifications within the context of the present system will not circumvent or change the institution's attitude.
3. The affirmative has to show a distinctive impact on the present system in terms of empirical, verifiable harms.
4. The affirmative also has to show that the plan will change the attitudes.⁶²

The underlying assumptions of these criteria can be cross-referenced back to the three dimensions of inherency and the basic "stock issues" analysis of affirmative requirements.

According to this research an affirmative team may prove its inherency through structural and/or attitudinal analysis. Before discussing the most recent type of inherency-existential, it is necessary to examine Strange's concept of "essences" and its relationship to inherency. Strange wrote that: "What is required for a determination of 'inherency' is to decide what is the essence of the present system, and whether that essence must be changed to achieve the goals of the proposal."⁶³ He defined "essences"

⁶²

Flanagan, "A Descriptive Study of the Perception of the Comparative advantage Case", p. 117.

⁶³

Kenneth M. Strange, "Inherency: Motives in Structure," presented at the Central States Speech Association Convention, Chicago, Illinois, April 1976, p. 1.

as "those aspects of a system that will remain serene after any change that the system itself is capable of generating."⁶⁴

This philosophy may be applied to the search for structural and/or attitudinal inherency. It is currently in controversy and while maybe it is philosophically relevant, it has little practical relationship to the realities of the competitive debate round.

The final type of inherency is existential. Ulrich defined it as: "The existence of a problem as proof that a problem is inherent."⁶⁵ He then denied its legitimacy with the statement:

Unless this form of inherency is developed beyond the mere descriptive stage, existential inherency can be termed the absence of inherency, since no reason for the failure of current program is given.⁶⁶

Cherwitz and Hikins agreed with this view when they wrote:

"The mere existence of a problem cannot in and of itself warrant the conclusion that the need is inherent."⁶⁷

The literature of the 1950's did not mention existential

⁶⁴

Ibid., p. 4.

⁶⁵

Ulrich, "Recent Changes in the Nature of Inherency," p.11.

⁶⁶

Ibid.

⁶⁷

Cherwitz and Hikins, "Inherency as Multidimensional Construct," pp. 85-5.

inherency. Most literature discussed discovering the cause, and with existensional inherency this discovery would be unnecessary. This analysis leads one to question the legitimacy of this form. Since we have equated causality with inherency if there is no cause to identify, there can be no inherency.

In comparing literature it can be seen that Church disagreed with this position when he argued: "If the cause or barriers are real, then their existence sufficiently justifies the debators' concern."⁶⁸ Due to its recent development, existential inherency has not yet reached its peak in the literature and is currently banally bantered by high school debaters who negatively scream the affirmative inherency is merely existential, you must drop it. While this type of inherency may have only a brief encounter in the game, we must remember the first similar objections to attitudinal inherency. Debate, in time, will validate or discard this type of inherency.

The Role of Inherency in Major Case Types

The next division of this chapter will review the literature on the role of inherency in the four major cases: the needs case, the CA, the criteria case and the AJ case.

68

Russell T. Church, "Political Inherency and Real Argument: Toward a Realistic Rhetoric of Problem-Solving," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Forensic Association, December 1971, p. 9.

The needs case requires the establishment of an inherent problem. The affirmative must establish a problem which is causally related to the plan, that will continue if the state of the art remains unchanged, and that will be alleviated when the plan is adopted.⁶⁹ Yaremchuk contended that due to its structure the "needs-plan" case is the most effective in assisting debaters in "understanding the role of inherency as an ultimate factor in decisions."⁷⁰

In proving inherency in the case format the debaters may prove that barriers (structural or attitudinal) exist and that they must be removed or that the status quo approach has been incremental in nature.⁷¹ In other words, gaps in the solution exist due to conflicting priorities and a plan is needed to fill them. The affirmative may indict laws, gaps, attitudes, state inactions, administrative decision, apportion committee biases, and court decisions as inherent flaws.⁷² His success in establishing the legitimacy of these will be dependent upon his argumentation skill, that of his opponents and what the judge perceives as legitimate inherency.

69

See Section on Stock Issues in Chapter 1 and sections on the definitions and requirements of inherency in this chapter for further clarification.

70

William A. Yaremchuk, "Another Look at the Traditional Debate Case," Issues 7 (December 1973): 6

71

Ralph Towne, "An Expansion of General Systems Theory in Debate", in Proceedings: National Conference on Argumentation, ed. James Luck, (Unpublished Manuscript): 17-8.

72Ulrich, "Recent Changes in the Nature of Inherency." p.6.

Most of the literature surveyed discussed inherency as a comparative issue--specifically delineating the needs and CA case. LaGrave wrote "advantages and needs cases can be analyzed along dimensions of inherency."⁷³ English and Ware argued that both must prove "why the present system cannot improve conditions."⁷⁴ Though both must illustrate inherency they later explained how the approaches differed.

The advantages case and the need-plan approach differ in that a separate type of inherency is compatible to each respective category of cases. The need-plan type of inherency deals with a more complete rejection of some combination of present mechanisms, actions or goals. In this approach, the affirmative case offers some substitute for that part of the status quo which it rejects. The advantages case does not completely reject either the philosophy or the structure of present policies.⁷⁵

Byrne, during the same conference, had this comment:

The need case derives inherency from rejections of present mechanism and the substitution of a different mechanism. The advantage case derives inherency from a change not in the mechanism itself, but change in the structural limits of the mechanism.⁷⁶

73

LaGrave, "Inherency A Historical View, Part 2." p.7.

74

William B. English and B.L. Ware, "Comparison of the Need Plan and the Comparative Advantage Approach: There is a Difference," in Proceedings: National Conference on Argumentation, ed. James Luck, (Unpublished manuscript), p. 10.

75

Ibid.

76

Penny Byrne, in Proceedings: National Conference on Argumentation, ed. James Luck, (Unpublished manuscript), p. 10.

Young⁷⁷, Dick⁷⁸ and Colburn⁷⁹ write that the major inherency difference between the CA and the need case is that in a CA the affirmative must prove that the advantages are unique to the plan and in the needs case an inherent need is stressed.

This is how the two were analyzed on a comparative level. In isolating analysis of the inherency of the CA most of the literature agreed that there is still confusion about the role of inherency in this format. In his thesis on the CA, Peter Settle discovered that formal theory did not provide guidelines for the evaluation of any requirement of the CA case.⁸⁰ He also discovered that the literature on the CA was theoretically inconsistent.⁸¹ Boucher, in a similar thesis, also concluded that "definite CA rules criteria do

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Marilyn Young, Coaching Debate, (Clayton: The Alan Company, 1975), p. 47.

⁷⁸
Robert C. Dick, Argumentation and Rational Debating, (Dubuque: Wm. C. Brown Co., 1972), p. 49.

⁷⁹
Colburn, Strategies for Educational Debate, p. 139.

⁸⁰
Peter L. Settle, "An Analysis of Critic Consistency in Evaluation of the Comparative Advantage Affirmative Debate," (MA Thesis, Marquette University, May 1973), p. 16.

⁸¹
Ibid., p. 49.

not exist."⁸² Boucher's findings discovered literature which stated that "in the CA case inherency must be established" and the "CA case does not prove inherency."⁸³ These findings were based mainly on the literature of the 1960's when the CA was still battling acceptance; since then debates in the literature and on the convention floor have helped establish agreements on the CA case. Wood,⁸⁴ Freeley,⁸⁵ Bennet,⁸⁶ Colburn⁸⁷ and Terry⁸⁸ all concluded their CA analysis with the statement that the present system must be inherently incapable of producing the advantage, and each advantage must be the result of the adoption of the resolution (unique to it).

Young summed up the current state of inherency in the CA.

It is important to note at this juncture that the use of the CA case does not relieve the affirmative of the burden of demonstrating inherency.⁸⁹

⁸² Daniel X. Boucher, "An Application of Criteria and Rules to Comparative Analysis in Academic Debate", (MA Thesis, University of Akron, June 1970), p. 79.

⁸³ Ibid., pp. 33-4.

⁸⁴ Wood, Strategic Debate, p. 84.

⁸⁵ Freeley, Argumentation and Debate, 4th ed., p. 138.

⁸⁶ Bennet, Pragmatic Debate, p. 32.

⁸⁷ Colburn, Strategies for Educational Debate, p. 138.

⁸⁸ Terry, Modern Debate Case Techniques, p. 18.

⁸⁹ Young, Coaching Debate, p. 47.

LaGrave pointed out that the affirmative may not call the component inherency, but they still fulfill the dimensions of cause, permanence and reform in their case.⁹⁰

And McBath added that finally "theorizing has caught up with practice, and with it has come recognition that causal inherency likewise operates in the CA approach."⁹¹ Therefore, according to current writing a CA case must prove that its "problem" area is inherent and that its advantages are "unique." The literature did not specifically delineate which type of inherency is most advantageous in the CA but implies that any type would be acceptable if it allowed the affirmative to meet its inherency requirements.

According to the literature, to carry its affirmative burden, a team must prove that its case is inherent whether it be in needs, CA, or criteria form. Lewinski, Meitzler and Settle explained their interpretation of the inherency of the criteria case.

The goal case asserts that the elimination of structural barriers which preclude the attainment of compelling goals of the status quo is sufficient just for change.⁹²

90

LaGrave, "Inherency A Historical View, Part 2" p.6.

91

James H. McBath, ed. Forensics as Communication, The Argumentative Perspective, (Skokie: National Textbook Company, 1975), p. 103.

92

John D. Lewinski, Robert Mitzler and Peter Settle, "The Goal Case Affirmative: An Alternative Approach to Academic Debate", JAF 9 (Spring, 1975): 73.

Terry said that in a criteria case, the inherency must be strong enough to prevent any minor repairs from solving the problem.⁹³

Chesebro defined the relationship between inherency and the value judgment analysis intrinsic within the criteria case.

Developed within recent years, the concept of a criteria case is generally applied to affirmative cases which feature value judgments as strongly as actions. In these criteria cases, the affirmative presents a set of values which are not operating within the present system embody the theoretical requirements of the resolution.⁹⁴

Affirmatives prove inherency by arguing that new values could have avoided problems⁹⁵ and/or that certain status quo values should be rejected⁹⁶ if the affirmative and negative agree on a goal.

The area of disagreement becomes that of specific means to reach that goal or over those criteria which define the most effective means of reaching the goal in goals criteria.⁹⁷

93

Terry, Modern Debate Case Techniques: p. 59.

94

James W. Chesebro, "Beyond the Orthodox: The Criteria", JAF 7 (Winter, 1971): 208.

95

Ibid., p. 213.

96

Ibid., p. 314.

97

Goodnight, et. al., "The Problems of Inherency: Strategy and Substance," p. 234.

Goodnight et al. argued that while inherency is necessary in a criteria case it is difficult to find structural inherency.

As a nation of socially conscious people we have been writing values into structure for years and, since debate does not typically call for revolutionary judgments in value, the debater attempting to discover a structural gap that leaves out a significant problem area in total is faced with an almost impossible task. His options are to ignore the issue (which probably occurs all too frequently) or to choose a less widely recognized area for case analysis.⁹⁸

The inference from this writing and others on inherency in the criteria case is that it would be effective to prove that inherency has attitudinal roots. The status quo is maintained by values that are actualized through structural institutions. The indicting of those attitudinally perpetuated structures, which gives the affirmative double inherency, is probably the most efficacious path on which the criteria case could find causality. This means the affirmative would indict structural and attitudinal flaws, and could claim inherency on two levels.

Experts in the field have not isolated their study of the inherency of the alternative justification case. This is probably because, as Litchman, Garvin and Corsi wrote, the AJ affirmative extends the logic of the parallel advantage case.⁹⁹ Kneupper explained that the AJ is merely

98

Ibid., p. 231.

⁹⁹Allan Lichtman, Charles Garvin and Jerry Corsi, "The Alternative Justification Affirmative: A New Case Form," JAF 10 (Fall, 1973): 99.

a collection of several cases¹⁰⁰ and this author extrapolates that the inherency analysis of these other cases may be applied to the mini cases of the AJ approaches. Seltzer posited that since each component was independent in an AJ format the judge must view each in isolation.¹⁰¹ Therefore, the requirements for inherency must be applied to each advantage or need areas. This burden could increase the overall affirmative inherency burden. (But of course if one follows a pure AJ approach the affirmative may drop all but one component and then has a narrowed burden. . .) The AJ components must be inherent. The literature has postulated that for a case to be accepted it show inherency, and according to contemporary writing the four major case types require that their formats do this. In theory, to win a debate a debater must prove that something in the status quo precludes the adoption of his plan to actualize the resolution.

The affirmative case in these formats must prove inherency (causality) to a problem and its solution. At no place in either of the divisions of literature did any source specifically deny this. In the needs case causality is

100

Charles W. Kneupper, "A Defense of General Systems Theory," Forensic (March, 1976): 11.

101

Robert Seltzer, "The Alternative Justification Affirmative Practical and Theoretical Implications," JAJA 11 (Summer, 1974): 131.

generally presented in an expost facto perspective. It looks to the past to analyze the cause of the problem. The CA case has a futuristic perspective, the team with this case looks to the future to discover a solution for a present problem. The needs case usually effects the cause by removing it and the CA case usually only alters it. The difference between the two concerns the amount of change. The needs case implies a more drastic change, therefore it often seems to have stronger inherency. The criteria case's inherency is usually attitudinal. Therefore the criteria's case finds its inherency rooted in values. The causes of the problem are perpetuated via societal values. The AJ case uses the causality of the other cases since it is merely a collection of several justifications of the resolution. The above conclusions are based upon literature findings but are not gospel conclusions on this construct; and all are subject to various interpretations in any given debate round argument.

Interpretations of Inherency in Judging Philosophies

The writer surveyed the literature to discover how three judging philosophies interpreted inherency. The stock issues approach has furnished the criteria for judging evaluation until recently.¹⁰² The stock issue

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Zarefsky, "Changing Concepts in Forensics," p. 1.

approach (as defined in the procedure section) requires the affirmative to win all the stock issues in order to win the debate. Therefore, the affirmative must prove that its case, regardless of its form, is inherent; if it fails to do this a negative ballot is warranted. The literature did not specify the types of inherency that would be acceptable--it would most likely depend on the specifics of the case, the skill of the debaters, and the frame of reference of the judge. While this position philosophically exists, there is no evidence to prove how often it is applied by the judge in competition round. Ulrich wrote:

As a practical matter, inherency in isolation usually does not win many debates, but it can minimize the advantage to a degree so that 2NCs can overcome the advantages.¹⁰³

Ulrich did not believe that by winning one issue a negative could win the debate. This philosophy is in direct contradiction with the "purist" stock issues philosophy. Obviously, there is room for research on the use of this judging approach; but for this paper the writer merely notes that if a judge adheres to a pure stock issues approach, he will require the affirmative to prove inherency, along with the other issues, to win the ballot.

If a judge believed himself to be a hypothesis tester, he would have agreed with the following quotation from Zarefsky.

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p. 9. Ulrich, "Recent Changes in the Nature of Inherency,"

I would maintain that the argumentative proposition stands in parallel relationship to the scientific hypothesis. It is a statement to be tested, and the test consists in determining whether it can withstand the challenge of such arguments as may be brought to bear against it.¹⁰⁴

Strange related the hypothesis testing philosophy to inherency when he wrote:

Consideration of essential characteristics develops only when there is concern for what can be changed without fundamentally altering the nature of the system. In short, the essential quality of a feature can only be evaluated in an examination of its hypothetical absence.¹⁰⁵

The inherency is the causal link to the problem and the judge acts as a scientist or logician attempting to evaluate this causality and the impact on its absence.

Henderson wrote that this approach would probably help the affirmative side since

A negative team would be hard-pressed to repair enough loopholes or offer enough subsidiary methods by which similar advantages might be obtained as those offered by these affirmative cases. Instead, the negatives would be forced to focus upon direct clash with the underlying assumptions of the case, or suffer defeat.¹⁰⁶

104

Zarefsky, "Argument as Hypothesis Testing," p. 6

105

Strange, "Inherency: Motives In Structure," p. 3.

106

Bill Henderson, "Debate as a Paradigm for Demonstrating Truth Through Hypothesis Testing," paper presented at the Speech Communication Association Convention 1974, p. 9.

It would be to the affirmative's advantage in proving their inherency if the judge believed in this philosophy.

An affirmative case must prove causality (inherency) to a hypothesis tester judge, the most effective way to do that according to Zarefsky is through attitudinal inherency.

All inherency ultimately is attitudinal. Since a specific proposition is being tested, the possible motives for examination are the proposition and the non-proposition.¹⁰⁷

Despite this opinion, there is nothing which really would prevent a debater from using structural or even existential inherency for this judge. There is nothing inherent in this philosophy which would demand a specific brand of inherency. A hypothesis tester is merely seeking to determine the validity of the research hypotheses; and the nature of the causality which perpetuates the status quo problem does not really theoretically add or subtract to the measuring of this truth.

A final note on the hypotheses tester. Since to test a hypothesis one studies the past in an attempt to predict the future, it might be most effective to use a CA format to this judge. The CA philosophy is also future centered. The two would provide a congruent mix.

One of the major characteristics of Systems Analysis is its multiple causality analysis. Unger wrote that

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Zarefsky, "Changing Concepts in Forensics," p. 4.

"most likely a given problem will find its roots in a multifacted situation."¹⁰⁸ Lichtman and Rohrer explained this further.

Elements in a policy system interact with each other, so that the system forms an organized whole that is not merely the sum of its individual constituents.¹⁰⁹

Systems Analysis embodies this multiple causality interpretation of analysis. The system analysis view of inherency

Maintains the essence of the inherency issue - the relationship between the social system and its characteristic three effects - but recognizes the change in social science argumentation that antiquate inherency as univocal causal argument.¹¹⁰

This philosophy also stated:

The causal argument at the heart of inherency serves 3 functions: to prove the permanence of the problem, to generate solutions to the problem to prove that the plan will meet the need.¹¹¹

Specifically on the multiple characteristic Klumpp wrote:

The systems analyst believes that a useful concept of causality must consider multiple causes, multiple effects and equifinality (the effect may be produced by more than one causal complex).¹¹²

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Unger, "An Application of Theories to Academic Debate," P. 30.

¹⁰⁹Allan J. Lichtman and Daniel M. Rohrer, "Presumption and Burden of Proof, A Reevaluation," Issues 7 (February, 1974): 2.

¹¹⁰James F. Klumpp, "Inherency from the Perspective of Systems Analysis," presentat at Central States Speech Convention, Chicago, April 1976, p. 9.

¹¹¹Ibid.

¹¹²Ibid., p. 3.

In a systems analysis decision making paradigm the judge realizes the interactions inherent in the system and allows inherency to be proven through a multiple causality analysis.

Thomas gave an advantage of this philosophy when he wrote the following:

In traditional debate analysis, judges have typically translated this demand for logical rigor to mean identifying a single cause producing a single effect in an airtight, seamless weld. Such a high standard of proving an inherent causal link has resulted in the outright rejection of comparative advantages (or disadvantages) which could not be proven as unique to the affirmative plan. It has also generated some far-fetched assertions of causal relationships, such as "residential building codes cause most of the unemployment among blacks," "suburban developments cause millions to starve in the third world," and similar mental gymnastics.¹¹³

Kneupper pointed out that a case may have its inherency proven by "alterations in components or in the introduction or removal of components in order to alter system output."¹¹⁴ Towne wrote (see note 71) on how systems analysis would provide a holistic approach to an incrementally oriented status quo.

A case which embodies a systems analysis structure will analyze its inherency within a multiple causality framework simply - the problem is perpetuated by many factors.

¹¹³

David A. Thomas, "The Swing to Systems Analysis: A Revolution in Debate Judging Standards?" presented at the Southern Speech Communications Association Convention, San Antonio, April 1976, p. 11.

¹¹⁴

Kneupper, "A Defense of General Systems Theory," p. 10.

A team may prove its inherency through multiple methods and may do it with structural and or attitudinal inherency.

Klumpp et al. explained the structural mechanism:

The theory of causal argument, its importance, its uses grow from the inherency argument. It elaborates the "blame" frame of the model, isolating the factor responsible for the ill by establishing a causal link between some structural element of the present system and the problem.¹¹⁵

Klumpp in another paper explained the role of attitudinal inherency in systems analysis.

The purpose or goal of the system may be the constant and the structure may itself evolve to accomodate new environments. The dimension of choice by choice makers (what we have come to call attitudinal inherency) adds a new dimension to social study.¹¹⁶

Strange's views on essence (and attitudinal inherency) are philosophically compatible with system analysis.

A knowledge of the way a system works is critical to an analysis of essential characteristics. This is especially the case with regard to an understanding of the functions and operations of the system related to internal generation of change.¹¹⁷

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James F. Klumpp, Bernard L. Brock, James W. Chesebro and John F. Cragan, "Implications of a Systems Model of Analysis of Argumentation Theory," presented at the Central States Speech Convention, April 1973, pp. 5-6.

116

Klumpp, "Inherency from the Perspective of Systems Analysis," p. 6.

117

Strange, "Inherency: Motives in Structures," p. 2.

It should be noted that the process of discovering the essence of a system has converged with the process of discovering the way the system works. The essential nature of any feature can be determined only by the importance of its influence on other aspects of the system, and this, in turn, is recognized by the tendency of the system to perpetuate the essential feature.¹¹⁸

By discovering the "essence" of the system the affirmative will be aided in identifying specific inherencies of the system. Essences may be discovered through a systems analysis tool, and their discovery may illustrate the structure of multiple causality with the system.

The type of inherency argument would depend upon the specific arguments advanced in the specific case. Nowhere in the literature is the use of existential inherency applied to systems analysis. A debater could employ this inherency if he could defend its application. Its use would indeed be a debatable issue in the round since it is still such a controversial form of causality.

Towne,¹¹⁹ Thomas¹²⁰ and Kneupper¹²¹ have agreed that a system analysis approach may be used regardless of case type. A team should not be penalized by their judge for their case format if their judge uses systems analysis. There is

118

Ibid., p. 4.

119

Towne, "An Expansion of General Systems Theory in Debate," p. 15.

120

Thomas, "The Swing to Systems Analysis: A Revolution in Debate Judging Standards?" p. 6.

121 Kneupper, "A Defense of General Systems Theory," p. 110.

nothing intrinsically prohibitive within any format which would preclude it from becoming analyzed from a systems analysis perspective. Specifically in an AJ format a system analysis approach might be applied to each component or it may even consider the case as a whole system. Though in this second interpretation the judge would maintain that the affirmative be responsible for carrying all components.

In comparing the stock issues approach to the systems analysis approach the former analyzes inherency from static reality and the later from process reality. Brock et al.¹²² contended that this difference explains the benefits of system analysis.

The weakness in the traditional stock issues approach to analysis suggest that since decision-making has moved away from its problem-solution ideal to more practical models, argumentation should follow this same pattern. For this reason we have recommended that a systems model replace stock issues as the standard pattern for analysis in argumentation.¹²³

Regardless of this difference, both forms must demonstrate inherency. Decision making in debate is following trends in decision making in the real world. The benefit of this is obvious. It helps inculcate debaters with models which are applicable in their "life after debate."

Besides adding to their general decision making skills Brock et al. also hypothesized that systems analysis was a

122

Brock et al. Public Policy Decision Making: Systems Analysis and Comparative Advantage Debate, P. 158.

123

Ibid., p. 152.

more effective way for debaters, as decision makers, to discover inherency.

Systems theory facilitates the comparison of the inherent differences between two systems. The affirmative demonstrates inherency when it shows that the new system has characteristics different from the old and that they are not only responsible for the gained positive effects, but that they also flow from the proposition. So the substantial nature of inherency which varies from topic to topic is discovered more from a comparison of two systems than from a causal analysis of present circumstances.¹²⁴

The systems analysis approach views inherency as a multiple causality component in case structure.

Some sources have denied the validity of systems analysis as a legitimate debate paradigm. Penny Ricchio argued that a systems approach would allow the affirmative to opt for the status quo and ignore a proposal for change.¹²⁵ Specifically she wrote:

. . . Since the affirmative is supposed to have isolated the truth, it leaves the negative with the options of not debating at all or of doing their own general systems analysis to find a second version of the "truth." Carried to an extreme, this could result in the ludicrous position of the affirmative defending the status quo with the negative calling for the adoption of the resolution.¹²⁶

Systems analysis would therefore be an invalid model to apply to competitive debate which assigns an affirmative

¹²⁴

Ibid., p. 159.

¹²⁵

Penny Ricchio, "A Response to General Systems Theory As A Possible Case Structure," Forensic 61 (January, 1976): 7.

¹²⁶

Ibid.

and negative position to argue on a given resolution.

Flanigan denied its application with the following analysis.

If we consider a system that may be altered in overall policy impact by manipulation of its internal characteristics then our problem solution may not arise from an inherent problem.¹²⁷

In other words, internal manipulation denies the concept of inherency. Since all changes would occur within the system, there would never be a place for an inherent change. The issue of its multiplicity would be moot.

Despite these points this writer can discover no evidence in any of the major systems analysis literature which could lead one to these conclusions. If the plan is the result of an "overall policy" as Flanigan said, then it is a "change" from the status quo. There is no argument in the literature that a change cannot come from within a system. For example, most of the high school and college topics center around some type of federal action - when the government begins some new program which had been precluded through some flaw in the status quo - an inherent change has occurred. All of this could have occurred within one system. Also in systems analysis one is analyzing the interaction of several systems and a change in one system may be precluded by some structure in another. For example, a

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Rita Rice Flanigan, in Proceedings: National Conference on Argumentation, Ed. James Luck, (unpublished manuscript), p. 24.

change in an economic policy might be necessary to insure adequate defense. Therefore the change may not be labeled noninherent, for it crosses system components. A judge with a system analysis outlook on debate will accept multiple inherency from the affirmative and will view the policies offered by both teams according to system analysis criteria.

This chapter has reviewed the literature on the development of inherency; its definition and requirements; its three dimensions; the types of inherency; the place of inherency in the four major cases; and how the three judging philosophies interpreted inherency.

Application to Research Questions

This information from the literature of the 1950's and 1970's will now be applied to the research questions.

1. Have there been changes in the basic requirements of the affirmative case? The literature agreed that for an affirmative to carry its "burden of proof" it had to prove inherency. The affirmative must demonstrate causality to the problem, advantages etc. During the 1950's inherency could be proved with the "structural flaw." During the 1970's inherency can be carried with structural, attitudinal, and in some cases existential in nature.

2. If there have been changes, are they because of changes in the judging criteria used to evaluate these basic requirements? During the 1950's inherency was

judged according to the stock issues philosophy. A team had to prove all the stock issues, which of course included inherency, to win their case. During the 1970's the literature said that a judge may use the stock issues approach; be a hypothesis tester and attempt to compare two policies one with the causality of the status quo with a new one; or be a system analyzer and interpret inherency as multiple causality construct.

3. If there have been changes, are they because of the changes in affirmative case formats? According to the literature of the 1950's the predominate case was the need-plan format. The new forms of the CA (which was refined during the 1960's), the criteria, and the alternative justification case, prove their inherency with a combination of the inherency forms. (This is a change, not due to new formats as much as the development of new inherency forms.) All four of the case forms analyzed required the proof of inherency "causality" in order to be accepted.

4. What is the effect of these changes on competitive interscholastic debate? The major changes which can be inferred from the literature is that inherency has increased in complexity: The new forms, the different judging philosophies, and new case formats, have made it more difficult decide during the debate round what is the legitimate inherency of the particular case, or has the affirmative adequately proven their causality. As mentioned earlier in this chapter one solution to this is for the debaters to

debate the role of inherency within the round. Judges should encourage debate on theory in the hope of clarifying it to the debaters in the round, with the long term benefit of clarifying it to the forensics community.

The affirmative team must still clearly demonstrate causality, but they have more ways to accomplish this. As in the 1950's the status quo must not be able to minor-repair the problem--the resolution must be implemented via a change in the system. Inherency was found to be a vital component in the affirmative case.

CHAPTER III

SIGNIFICANCE

This chapter will define the affirmative component of significance, then analyze types of significance, examine the role of significance in the four major case formats, analyze how three judging philosophies interpret the concept and apply this information to the four research questions.

Definitions of Significance

Cushman and Larkin defined significance as:

The importance of a particular issue. An issue is important or significant when it affects a large number of people with some directly resultant change in their behavior.¹

Bennett defined it as the "magnitude and/or scope of the problem".² The term of "significance" has synonyms in harm - "the loss or denial of something of value because of the issue,"³ and impact.⁴ Significance is the reason why we can no longer tolerate the status quo and are willing to risk the new resolutions.

1

Donald P. Cushman and T. Larkin, "Affirmative Case Construction Strategies on the 1972-73 Topic," Issues 5 (January 1972): 7.

2

W.H. Bennett, Pragmatic Debate, (Vermillion: Championship Debate Enterprise, 1971), p. 8.

3

Cushman and Larkin, "Affirmative Case Construction Strategies on the 1971-72 Topic," p. 7.

⁴Bennett, Pragmatic Debate, p. 6.

Flanagan explained the role of significance (harm) in the case structure.

Harm - In a cause-effect relationship harm is the result of the evil. It is an undesirable condition whose existence is allowed by some structural or attitudinal inadequacy of the present system.⁵

The significance of a case is the result of the inherency; in other words, it is the effect of the cause or causes.

Types of Significance

Significance can be quantitative, qualitative or potential.

McAdoo argued that an affirmative team should show examples of quantitative significance.

In many cases a team will attempt to show significance through the number of people killed, injured, or hurt or the amount of money that is being lost. Since lives and money are easily quantifiable and/or measurable this method may be expected. Other means of detecting a significant problem (psychological manifestations are an example) should not be overlooked.⁷

An affirmative case may quantitatively prove its significance by illustrating physical, economical or psychological harms. Documenting the existence of these harms will rarely fulfill this burden; the affirmative must prove the link between their specified inherency and their indicted significance⁸

⁵George A. Flanagan, "A Descriptive Study of the Perception of the Comparative Advantage Case," (MA Thesis, Central Missouri State University, 1973), pp. 6-7.

⁷Joe McAdoo, ed. Judging Debate. (Springfield: mid America Research, 1975), p. 14.

⁸See analysis on existential inherency in Chapter 2 for further elaboration on this point.

In discussing quantifiable significance Brock et al. argued that:

Quantification is the easiest way to determine significance so whenever applicable it is preferred; but not all advantages are quantifiable. When not quantifiable, significance must be demonstrated qualitatively.⁹

McAdoo admitted that qualitative proof is acceptable but "usually developed in areas where quantified evidence is lacking and is usually much harder to defend."¹⁰ Though it may be more difficult to prove, most sources agreed that theoretically an affirmative did not need to prove "bodies on the flow," but were correct in advancing qualitative proof of significance. If an affirmative case is indicating a status quo value or philosophy, it would not be required to document the economic or physical harm; but instead would present a logical, well-evidenced argument on a philosophical level. Cases that would have qualitative significance would include issues such as privacy, censorship and political representation. These would involve value oriented issues.

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Bernard L. Brock, James W. Chesebro, John F. Cragan and James F. Klumpp, Public Policy Decision-Making: Systems Analysis and Comparative Advantages Debate, (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), p. 130.

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McAdoo, ed., Judging Debate, p. 14.

Since quantifiable significance is theoretically legitimate, it is a valid way for teams to prove this affirmative case requirement. This may occur in any case under any resolution.

McAdoo argued that "non quantifiable policies should not be excluded from competitive debate."¹¹ The trend towards quantifiable policies may deny debaters significant areas of study, such as those mentioned above.

Young wrote that a team could integrate both of these channels in analyzing a philosophical or qualitatively oriented resolution.¹² The team should analyze the philosophical harm as a philosophical evil, and then search for its pragmatic manifestation.

The affirmative can prove significance by proving that that the problem is quantitative, qualitative, or potential - "unless action is taken now, a substantial problem will have to be confronted in the future."¹³ Dick termed this the preventive philosophy.¹⁴ An affirmative would be allowed to use potential significance by, for example, arguing that we must stop nuclear proliferation. The contention

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Marilyn J. Young, Coaching Debate, (Clayton: The Alan Company, 1975), p. 59.

¹³Zarefsky, ed. The Comparative Advantage Case, p. 4.

¹⁴Robert C. Dick, Argumentation and Rational debating, (Dubuque: Wm. C. Brown Co., 1972), p. 52.

would be that its existence implies the potential for its use. Political leaders, terrorists etc. might find some justification for pushing the destructive button, if the weapons remain. Potential significance may be qualitative and/or quantitative. When discussing it as a future harm it may be considered qualitative and when and if it happens, a quantitative harm has occurred.

All three of these means may be used to prove significance. Their effectiveness is dependent upon how well they are linked in evidence to the inherency and on how well individual debaters mold them into arguments and extensions.

The Role of Significance Within

Four Case Formats

This next section will analyze the role of significance in each of the four major case formats. The analysis will include a comparison of the cases in light of Zarefsky's criteria for proving significance. He wrote that there are two dimensions for measuring significance. First, the affirmative must prove that the degree of change will be significant; and secondly, the reason for making a change significant enough to justify abandoning the status quo.¹⁵

The literature on the role of significance in the traditional case is scanty and superficial. Most of this

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Zarefsky, ed. The Comparative Advantage Case, p. 3.

writer's comments will be inferential innature, due to the immature state of the literature. This is true with the whole concept. Scholarly studies of significance have been almost nonexistent.

In the traditional need-plan approach the affirmative must prove that evils exist and that "they are serious enough to warrant a change from the status quo."¹⁶ Wood added that the problem must be widespread.¹⁷

The traditional case requires significance. Combining Zarefsky's first criteria with the inherency analysis from Chapter 2, this writer infers that to be successful an affirmative must look to the past and discover the harms of the inherency in an ex post facto perspective. These harms of yesterday would be documented quantitatively or qualitatively. A potential harm could be used only if a precedent had occurred. Zarefsky's second criterion--the reason (motive)--for change would again tell the affirmative to look at the inherency and discover why the significance prevails. When the affirmative team discovers the barrier, they will be able to document the problems that will continue without the resolution. The philosophy of significance in a needs case would find its crux in eradicating past problems.

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William Behl, Discussion and Debate, (New York: The Ronald Press, 1953), p. 60.

17

Ray V. Wood, Strategic Debate, 2nd ed. (Stokie: National Textbook Company, 1975), p. 80.

Before discussing the role of significance in the CA case, it is enlightening to review a comparative analysis of significance in need-plan and CA case. Terry contended that a needs case is not inherently more significant than a CA. Specifically he wrote:

It is generally assumed that a need case is more significant than a comparative-advantage case because the former must demonstrate an unmitigated evil whereas the latter must demonstrate only comparative benefits. Reference to our hypothetical scale, however, would show that a need case is not necessarily more significant than a movement from a positive number to a higher positive number. For example, is a movement from minus two to zero more significant than a movement from plus one to plus eight.¹⁸

English and Ware also posited that the CA is as significant as the needs-plan format.

Since the advantages approach allows the affirmative to advance advantages, it can contain just as much significance as does the need plan case, even though it offers nothing radically different. At some point, a given number of advantages equals the greatest need in psychological impact. The significance in such a case, is of course, dispersed rather than centralized as it is in the need plan case.¹⁹

Schunk agreed that the CA case and the need plan case must show significance²⁰ but he denied the dispersed analysis of English and Ware.

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Donald Terry, Modern Debate Case Techniques, (Stokie: National Textbook Company, 1975), p. 31.

19

William B. English and B.L. Ware, "A Comparison of the Need Plan and the Comparative Advantage Approach: There is a Difference," in Proceedings: National Conference On Argumentation, ed. James Luck, (Unpublished manuscript), p.11.

²⁰John F. Schunk, in Proceedings: National Conference On Argumentation, ed. James Luck, (Unpublished manuscript), p.30.

Multiplicity of justification is not a unique feature of advantages, denied to problems. In short, a need plan case's significance may be equally dispersed.²¹

These sources agreed that both cases must demonstrate significance, and one is not intrinsically more significant than the other.

The literature on the CA will now be applied to Zarefsky's criteria on degree and motive.

In his thesis on the CA Boucher wrote that the resultant change should be a substantial one."²² Freeley, Sanders, and Colburn argued that the advantages must be significant.²³ Brock et al. added additional meaning to significance.

Significance, when used in a comparative advantages debate, has two related meanings. In one sense significance means measuring; in another sense it means weighing. When a negative uses the term significance to mean measure, he is often asking for quantification.²⁴

The CA case must prove that its advantages will bring about a substantial change. The CA case must convince the judge

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Ibid., p. 32.

22

Daniel Boucher, "An Application of Criteria and Rules to Comparative Analysis in Academic Debate," (MA Thesis, The University of Akron, 1970), p. 74.

23

Austin J. Freeley, Argumentation and Debate, 4th ed., (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1976) p. 189; Gerald H. Sanders, Introduction to Contemporary Academic Debate, (Minneapolis: Campus Press, 1972), p. 54; C. William Colburn, Strategies for Educational Debate, (Boston: Holbrook Press, Inc., 1972), p. 138.

of the acceptability of its significance by accurately documenting the degree of its significance. Flanigan contended that one of the best ways to prove significance is with quantifiable harms of death and economic loss.²⁵ Settle discovered through this survey of debate coaches, that quantifiable significance is not the only kind judges will accept in a CA.

Intercollegiate debate critics consistently accept methods other than quantification for the demonstration of the significance of the advantages.²⁶

Qualitative and potential analysis is acceptable in the CA. Its use is dependent upon the particular issues being debated. Due to its futuristic orientation, the CA is well suited for the use of potential significance. In fact this case format is probably the one most congruent with this type of significance. A degree of change must be evidenced in the CA case and may be proven through all three types of significance arguments.

Establishing motive in a CA case can be accomplished by isolating a problem and resolving it to improve it for the future. There has been an ongoing controversy in

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Rita Rice Flanigan, in Proceedings: National Conference on Argumentation, ed. James Luck, (Unpublished manuscript), p. 23.

26

Peter L. Settle, "An Analysis of Critic Consistency in Evaluating the Comparative Advantage Affirmative Debate Case," (MA Thesis, Marquette University, May 1973), p. 54.

the literature over whether the significance in a CA should be proven the same way harm is established in the needs case. (Are the motives the same?) Boucher discovered much disagreement in this area when he surveyed the CA in textbooks.

1. The CA Case must involve need.
2. In the CA Case there is no need.
3. The CA Case involves a need through implication.
4. The absence of a value not previously considered may now become a need.
5. The CA Case is used when the negative agrees to the existence of a problem.²⁷

Settle discovered in his thesis research that while CA affirmatives must prove significance, judges do not require "harm in the traditional manner."²⁸ In the CA format:

Intercollegiate debate critics will require the demonstration of an undefined form of harm in one third of the cases examined.²⁹

These authors illustrated the lack of clear development of this issue. Flanagan in his MA work on the CA, established more concise explanations of significance and its motive. He did this when he defined the CA format into the following divisions.

- I. No Harms (standard) The affirmative advocates change on the basis that conditions can be improved, not that there is an inherent harm in the status quo which must be removed.

²⁷Boucher, "An Application of Criteria and Rules to Comparative Analysis in Academic Debate," p. 15.

²⁸Settle, "An Analysis of Critic Consistency," p. 53.

²⁹
Ibid.

- II. Corrections of Harms (modified) The Affirmative advocates change on the basis of removing harms from the status quo. The removal of these harms regardless of their magnitude, constitutes an advantage over the present system.
- III. Conceded or Implied Harms (conditional) A CA debate is conceivable only when the harm is implicit in the proposition for debate or when the negative concedes the need and proposes a counterplan.³⁰

The motive of the CA will differ according to its individual perspective, such as in the three cases cited above. But its main difference from the needs approach is that while both evidence a problem, the needs perspective proves that the past was significantly harmful and the CA proves that the future will be significantly better.

The CA case must prove significance to carry its burden. This proof involves the use of evidence to establish that a problem of some magnitude exists. The degree of significance must be substantial and the reason (motive) must prove how the future will be more advantageous than the status quo.

The significance of the criteria case can be analyzed according to its degree and motive. Chesebro explained the relationship between the degree of change and the value which is central to this format.

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George A. Flanagan, "A Descriptive Study of the Perception of the Comparative Advantage Case," (M.A. Thesis, Central Missouri State University, 1973), p. 3.

For the Critic-judge the criteria case represents the introduction of new value issues, but essentially his basis for a decision remains the same. He may expect the affirmative to argue that their proposed values are significant and consistent with past, present and future events.³¹

The criteria affirmative must give evidence that its new values are substantially more advantageous. This degree of change can be established with quantitative, qualitative or potential significance. Since values are the crux of this format, qualitative proof should be very acceptable. The affirmative is arguing from a philosophical point of view, a perspective intrinsic to values of argumentation.

The major motive for change in the criteria case, is that with the adoption of this case certain significant values will be accrued. Lewenski, Metzler, and Settle wrote that this case asserts elimination of a goal and asserts no harms under present policy. They concluded that the criteria case is not necessarily removing a significant problem, but its significance comes in achieving a precluded goal.³² Chesebro reasoned that:

Consideration of the criteria case seems justified because it would more realistically feature the significance of the value itself as part of policy formulation.³³

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James W. Chesebro, "Beyond the Orthodox: The Criteria Case," JAFA 7 (Winter, 1971): 214.

32

John D. Lewinski, Robert Metzler, and Peter Settle, "The Goal Case Affirmative: An Alternative Approach to Academic Debate," JAFA 9 (Spring, 1973): 459.

33

James W. Chesebro, "Beyond the Orthodox: The Criteria Case," p. 211.

The criteria affirmative must demonstrate significance by proving a reasonable degree of value change and by arguing from a position which indicates a status quo value situation.

Most sources did not isolate the alternative justification case when they analyzed affirmative components. Freely was one of the few who discussed AJ significance, and he analyzed it the same way he did independent advantages in the CA.

If only one or two advantages survive the negative's attack, they must be sufficiently significant in themselves to justify adopting the resolution. If the affirmative offers independent advantages and claims any one of them is sufficient to justify adopting the resolution, then each advantage must in fact be of substantial significance.³⁴

Since this case is merely made up of several of the cases format discussed, it would be reasonable to assume that the AJ must demonstrate the requirement of significance. It must fulfill the requirements of degree and motive for each component.

A survey of the literature on the four major case types revealed that significance is a trait that all cases must possess if they desire ballots in the debate round.

McBurney and Mills labeled the stock issues those concerning ill, blame, cure, and cost.³⁵ Specifically on the ill issue (significance) they developed the question:

³⁴

Freeley, Argumentation and Debate, 4th ed., p. 170.

³⁵ James H. McBurney and Glen E. Mills, Argumentation and Debate, (Macmillian: New York, 1951), p. 51.

"do conditions exist that appear to be evils? Are these alleged evils real evils?"³⁶ The stock issues judge feels an affirmative decision is justified when a harm exists and change is required.

As discussed in the introductory chapter, the stock issues judge requires that all stock issues be won in order for the affirmative to carry its burden. Therefore, the fulfilling of this requirement is necessary if the affirmative hopes for a ballot from a stock-issues judge. Despite this theoretical equality of issues, Elizabeth Ann McGee discovered in experimental research that the need issue was the most frequently determined critical event in individual debates, regardless of all other variables.³⁷

In the traditional case she found that: "Both groups of judges and debaters agreed that the most frequently occurring critical event was the need issue."³⁸ Her definition of the "need issue" is equivalent to this paper's definition of significance.

The stock issue judge requires the proof of significance; the affirmative must document "evils" or harms which need to be removed. It is a vital issue in the round

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Ibid.

³⁷Elizabeth Ann McGee, "A Study to Determine the Extent of Argument Between Critic Judges and Debaters Concerning the Nature and Timing of Critical Events for Different Types of Affirmative Cases," (MA Thesis, Florida State University, 1971), p. 71.

³⁸Ibid., p. 66.

as the above evidence indicates.

The only work which related the hypothesis-tester model to significance was Henderson's. He succinctly summed up his position with the following analysis:

In Hypothesis Testing the larger difference obtained in the samples, the less confidence we have in accepting the hypothesis of Zero difference. In debate the less significance the affirmative gives the proposition or the negative . . . the less willing a judge would be to adopt the proposition. As a consequence, significance remains a vital issue within this judging paradigm.³⁹

If you are a hypothesis tester, you will demand that the affirmative prove that there is a significant difference between their plan and the status quo. This writer extrapolates that this difference be a significant improvement over the present system. The following chapter which analyzes the weighing of advantages and disadvantages explores this concept of measuring affirmative and negative significance more clearly.

There has been a dispute in the literature over the role of significance in the systems analysis model. Ricchio argued that a systems analysis approach to a problem did not demand significance.

Traditional cases assume a need for the affirmative to demonstrate a significant reason for change. A general systems approach does not; it merely asks the affirmative to analyze a system and evaluate the degree to which it is working in

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Bill Henderson, "Debate as a Paradigm for Demonstrating Truth Through Hypothesis Testing," unpublished paper SCA Convention, 1974, p. 5.

relationship to its goals. The systems theory advocates do not necessarily need to demonstrate a qualitative or quantitative harm, although this may be the result of their analysis. With this theory either position, depending on what the affirmative team determines to be the truth, can be justifiably defended. A tangible level of significance need not be a major concern for the affirmative team.⁴⁰

Kneupper denied Ricchio's analysis in his article.

As to the significance requirement, Ricchio's criticism is simply inaccurate. No systems theorist has argued that advocates using a systems approach are free from the logical burden of demonstrating significance. Moreover, Brock et al. in applying systems analysis to comparative advantages debate clearly indicate that the affirmative must fulfill its significance obligation, quantitatively and/or qualitatively.⁴¹

Thomas agreed with Kneupper and contended at the SSCA Convention in 1976 that

The systems analyst must ultimately offer a significant reason for favoring one alternative over other alternatives. This is no different from the requirement to produce a compelling need in a classical need-plan case, or to produce significant advantages in a comparative advantages case.⁴²

Thomas also pointed out the specific mechanism for proving significance in this approach.

40

Penny Ricchio, "A Response to General Systems Theory as a Possible Case Structure," Forensic 2 (March, 1976): 5.

41

Charles W. Kneupper, "A Defense of General Systems Theory," 3(March, 1976): 10.

42

David A. Thomas, "The Swing to Systems Analysis: A Revolution in Debate Judging Standards," presented at SSCA Convention, San Antonio, April 1976, p. 14.

Systems analysis does not claim merely to demonstrate significant advantages to a particular policy change. What it claims is the probability of finding the greatest cost benefit or cost effectiveness ratio so that the best system may be implemented.⁴³

In relating significance as a voting issue he explained it with:

The systems analysis approach adds the requirement that both teams must submit alternative policies for the judge's consideration. The voting issue then becomes: Which side's alternative policy produces the most favorable ratios?⁴⁴

The systems analysis approach involves a weighing of significance by the judge. Due to this weighing, it could be inferred that significance may have more weight in this model than others. But it must be recalled that comparison occurs in hypothesis testing and it is a "critical issue" in the traditional format. Though its role differed, significance was required in all judging philosophies.

Application of Information to Research Questions

This chapter has reviewed the definition of significance, discussed types, and surveyed the literature to determine its relationship to the four major case formats and three judging philosophies. This information will now be applied to the four research questions.

⁴³

Ibid., p. 16.

⁴⁴

Ibid., p. 15.

1. Have there been changes in the basic requirements of the affirmative case? According to the literature most sources agreed that significance was a vital component in all affirmative cases. They varied in ways of proving it and in "how much" is significant, but they still found significance to be a necessary requirement. And no source contended that an affirmative could lose significance and still win the debate. Reasoning from omission leads this writer to the conclusion that significance was required in the cases of the 1950's and it is still required in the cases of the 1970's.

2. If there have been changes, are they because of changes in the judging criteria used to evaluate these basic requirements? The different judging philosophies may theoretically measure significance in different ways, but the end result is still that the affirmative must show that the need it is solving, or the advantage that it is accruing, is more significant than maintaining the status quo or adopting the plan with its disadvantages. New judging philosophies have not mitigated the affirmative's responsibility to show a significant gain from adopting the proposed affirmative.

3. If there have been changes, are they because of the changes in affirmative case formats? The literature recorded that all four case types required significance. The needs case finds its significance in past actions, and the CA case finds its in future predictions. Some cases

such as the criteria case might be better proven with qualitative proof since it would be evaluating a value while others might be more effective with quantitative proof or potential proof. All required that significance be shown.

4. What is the effect of these changes on competitive interscholastic debate? The major finding from the literature was that significance is one of the most crucial arguments in the debate round. While this isn't new, it reassures coaches that they have been doing the right thing in telling their negatives to press for numbers, impact, thresholds, etc., and in telling affirmative teams that they must remind the judge of the "significant savings" of their plans. In theory there has been no real change. But in practice, debate has moved away from qualification type significance to quantification - the "bodies on the flow" argument. One of the reasons for this shift was probably the emphasis on plans in our legislative bodies. As decision makers in the real world sought numbers to justify their actions so did debaters. But coaches should remember that it is correct to prove significance in three ways and that teams should not be penalized for taking philosophical approaches if they are significant. The theory has not changed - merely the application of it in some rounds.

CHAPTER IV

THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE AFFIRMATIVE PLAN

This Chapter will analyze the requirements of the affirmative plan. It will examine the literature on the importance of the plan, the requirements that the plan solve the problem, and that it accrue no disadvantages, discuss the role of the plan within the four major case structures, interpret the plan's position within three judging philosophies and apply these findings to the research questions posed in Chapter 1.

Importance of the Plan

In his writings in 1953, Elton Abernathy argued that too much attention was paid to the plan.¹ Specifically:

The second affirmative speaker will need to defend his proposal as not being the producer of worse evils than it is designed to correct. This is the point at which some debaters resort to a "plan." Yet, I observe again that it seems much more important to defend the theory, the principals, of most debatable proposals than it is to defend or attack one particular version. It is my judgement that entirely too much attention is usually paid to the plan by both affirmative and negative. The great social economic, and political questions of our day can better be discussed in terms of their desirability in principle. Rarely indeed can even this be adequately explored in a single hour.²

¹Elton Abernathy, "The Second Affirmative Speech," Southern Speech Communication Journal 19 (September, 1953):55.

²Ibid., p. 56.

Though there was disagreement about the importance of the plan most sources of that time agreed with Chenoweth that a plan must be presented and that it must be practical.³

Most authors of literature on the plan of 1970 have agreed with Weaver's interpretation of the role of the plan:

In all cases of propositions of policy, affirmative teams must present a specific plan which will solve the suggested problem (bring about the advantage) and which can be shown to be workable.⁴

Controversy has come during both time periods over how specific the plan should be. Chenoweth discussed the pros and cons of this in the fifties.

Although we can conclude that a plan should be offered, there is much disagreement on how general a plan should be. Some directors of debate advise their students to present very nebulous plans so that the negative will have very little to attack. These coaches believe that the fewer details offered, the less vulnerable the plan. In direct opposition to this theory, other teachers say that a very general plan is excellent evidence in itself of a weak case, and an alert negative team can capitalize on this weakness. Perhaps this latter opinion is the stronger argument. It does seem hardly possible to consider and defend the benefits and the workability of a plan unless it is outlined in some detail.⁵

³ Eugene C. Chenoweth, "Bearing the Affirmative Burden," Speech Activities 6(Summer, 1950): 52.

⁴ James Weaver, Judging Debate, ed. Joe McAdoo, (Springfield: Mid America Research, 1975), p. 43.

⁵ Chenoweth, "Bearing the Affirmative Burden," p. 52.

Kruger argued during this time that a plan must be able to prove its costs, machinery, and enforcement.⁶ Literature of the seventies agreed that the plan should include the components of an implementing agency, enforcement stipulations and a means of financing.⁷

Today affirmative is therefore required to present a plan - its degree of specificity is dependent upon the individual team, coach, norms of the circuit etc. The literature gives no mandates.

Before discussing two major requirements of the plan, it is necessary to realize that an affirmative plan may be a plan of chance, one which substitutes a new policy for an old one, or a plan of discontinuance, one which allows the cancellation of a status quo policy without mandating an alternative.⁸ Both of these plans must meet the solvency and no disadvantage requirements; and in this paper were not analyzed separately as their equal requirements did not call for it.

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Arthur Kruger, "Logic and Strategy in Developing the Debate Case," Speech Teacher 3(March, 1954): 104.

7

William Benneth, Pragmatic Debate, (Vermillion: Championship Debate Enterprises, 1971), p. 7; Donald R. Terry ed., Modern Debate Case Techniques, (Skokie: National Textbook Company, 1975), p. 11

8

Hooqestaat, "The Burden of Proof on Resolutions of Discontinuance," Central States Speech Journal 21 (Fall, 1970): 200.

Solvency

In the 1950's Potter wrote that the affirmative must "present a plan to solve the need"⁹ and must "show how the plan remedies the evils in the present system."¹⁰

In 1972 Chenoweth and Dick agreed on this in their texts.¹¹

In the 1970's Sanders wrote that "the third segment of the affirmative case should be a Plan Meet Need segment."¹² Though many texts uttered this view, Cole Campbell concisely summed up their thoughts with the following statement from his article "The Affirmative Plan:"

An affirmative team must demonstrate that its particular proposal to implement a proposition of policy gain a solution to significant inherent needs for change, or can obtain advantages from change as argued in the affirmative need or advantage contentions.¹³

⁹ David Potter, ed. Argumentation and Debate, (New York: The Dryden Press, 1954), p. 66.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 68.

¹¹ Chenoweth, "Bearing the Affirmative Burden," p. 52; Robert Dick, Argumentation and Rational Debating (Dubuque: Wm. C. Brown, 1972), p. 49.

¹² Gerald H. Sanders, Introduction to Contemporary Academic Debate, (Minneapolis: Campus Press, 1972), p. 44.

¹³ Cole C. Campbell, "The Affirmative Plan," The New Debate: Readings in Contemporary Debate Theory, ed. Robert J. Branham, (Information Research Association, 1975), pp. 167-8.

During the 1950's this concept was labelled "plan meet need" and was merely an offshoot of causality. First the affirmative discovered the cause (inherency) of their problem and then argued that by eliminating the cause with their plan they could achieve the desired effect. For example when an affirmative argued that current Presidential powers perpetuated unilateral military intervention, they would assert that placing additional checks on the President would decrease this activity; therefore the plan would solve the need. In the 1970's this concept obtained the label of solvency and cause-effect reasoning was no longer sufficient to fulfill this requirement. Affirmatives today are required to prove with evidence that their plans will solve their indicted problems. Using the above example, a team would document in their first affirmative constructive the efficacy of their checks on Presidential power.

The requirement of solvency appears to have gained in importance in the round. An indication of this is the amount of second negative time devoted to structuring and researching of solvency attacks. Solvency arguments have changed during the past twenty years. Debaters in the 1970's affirmatively must prove the predictability of their plans and negatively posit well-structured arguments of alternate causality to deny this prediction.

Though this requirement has changed, the literature of the 1970's agreed that the affirmative was required to prove that its plan will solve the structural or attitudinal inherency of the status quo.

Ulrich argued that solvency structures should not come from within the status quo. Current structures should not be simply minor repairs, but the change must be inherent. This change may be attitudinal or structural in nature.¹⁴ If the status quo could be enlarged there would be no need to adopt the resolution. A case that is solvent but not inherent is obviously not prima facie.

This solvency sounds simplistic when applied to the solving of a structural problem; but when the affirmative began to indict attitudinal inherency on case side, the authorities were quick to ventilate their opinions on the problems of solving an attitudinal problem. Even in 1950 Baird testified on the difficulty of proving solvency to a "course of action contrary to popular approval."¹⁵ Rhodes at the TCU Conference espoused that the solvency burden for attitudinal inherency was so great that the affirmative was actually assuming an "additional risk of losing the debate."¹⁶

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Walter Ulrich, "Recent Changes in the Nature of Inherency," Paper presented at the Central States Speech Convention, Chicago, Illinois, April 1976, p. 4.

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A. Craig Baird, Argumentation, Discussion and Debate, (New York: McGraw-Hill Novak Co., 1950), p. 26.

16

Jack Rhodes, "Attitudinal Inherency: Handle With Care," in Proceedings: National Conference on Argumentation, ed. James Luck TCU, 1973, (Unpublished manuscript), p. 78.

The affirmative team which argues that attitudes which prevent enactment are restricted to one group and then uses a group which is not attitudinally contaminated to enact the solution presents a more difficult problem. Such an approach can be theoretically valid but it imposes a significantly heavier burden than does a traditional analysis.¹⁷

Specifically to prove solvency the

Affirmative would have to demonstrate why the attitudes which have tainted the men in power have not contaminated the men to whom they appeal. They must show that their plan has safeguards which still prevent those who oppose it from using their power to block the goal of the plan. This burden is necessitated by the fact that the affirmative does not remove the inherent causal force of attitude, but rather masks it with a symptomatic solution.¹⁸

The affirmative must remove the desire of men to regain control. If they were so devious to cause the problem, the propensity for them to circumvent the affirmative proposal is high.¹⁹ Cox applied this problem to an international proposition.:

For example, the affirmative team that argues for the creation of a multi-national government on the grounds that sovereign states are mired in the zealous nationalism ignores the "availability" of a fiat mechanism; no pre-existent or transcendent source of authority can be located to bring the new agency into being over the attitudinal opposition of several nations.²⁰

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David Ling and Robert Seltzer, "The Role of Attitudinal Inherency in Contemporary Debate," JAF 8 (Winter, 1971): 281.

18

Ibid., p. 282.

19

Ibid., p. 283.

20

J. Robert Cox, "Attitudinal Inherency: Implications for Policy Debate," SSCJ 40 (Winter, 1975): 161.

When applying the problem to a Congressional situation, Colburn contended that linking attitudinal inherency to structural inherency would lessen the affirmative burden.

If an affirmative argues. . . that their plan is based on the fact that members of Congress should vote in a manner which could not reasonably be expected knowing certain political pressure or should change their attitude about the proposal under consideration, the negative team does not have to accept the argument because the affirmative team has not advocated a structural change in current policy tools. Attitudinal changes are not structural changes, and the affirmative team must propose an actual policy program change in the status quo.²¹

Cox extended on this mixture of inherency types and contended that "the act of adopting a new policy creates a new scene or environment which alters the basis of the old attitudes."²²

In other words, the new structure reshapes the attitudes.

Cox also mentioned certain affirmative rights which would assist their solvency in attitudinal circumstances.

An affirmative would seem to have the right to imbue the personnel of its agency with the philosophy and values associated with its policy.²³

An Affirmative also would seem to have the right to grant its administrative agency the authority for ongoing policy decisions.²⁴

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C. William Colburn, Strategies for Educational Debate, (Boston: Holbrook Press, Inc. 1972), p. 133.

22

Cox, "Attitudinal Inherency: Implications for Policy Debate," p. 167.

23

Ibid., p. 163.

24

Ibid., p. 164.

It is not enough for a negative to assert that since the inherency is attitudinal the plan cannot be solvent. Cox elucidated two requirements a negative team must meet if they assert circumvention of the affirmative's solvency on attitudinal inherency.

- 1) A motive or attitudinal basis for circumvention of the policy must be established. In instances where the affirmative has relied upon attitudes as the inherent cause of some dysfunction, the motive is the same as exists in the present system.
- 2) A mechanism for the actualization of the opposing attitude must be revealed.²⁵

Though attitudinal inherency may be more difficult for the affirmative to solve, this does not grant the inverse and allow the negative more impact. The negative is now saddled with the above requirements.

The rights which Cox grants to the affirmative may appear to allow the affirmative an excess of power or an abuse of fiat. This writer contends that to overcome some attitudinal barriers some powers must be given to affirmative boards; but that to guarantee to them the values orientation of the affirmative team is an abuse of affirmative fiat.²⁶

There is no concensus in the literature as to whether any plan to overcome attitudinal inherency can be proven solvent. As mentioned in earlier chapters this is probably an issue that can and should be decided in the actual debate round.

²⁵Ibid., p. 166.

²⁶For further analysis of fiat power see Chapter 6 on Burden of Proof.

Avoidance of Disadvantages

The affirmative case must prove solvency, but it also must accrue no new disadvantages which would outweigh the significance claimed. Potter in 1954²⁷ and Settle in 1973²⁸ are representative of each time period and illustrate the concerns of both time periods on endorsing this affirmative requirement.

Unger elaborated on disadvantages, in an analysis of the relationship between the degree of change and the extent of the disadvantages:

The judgemental gap or unknown must also be considered. It is important to understand that its weight in the process is almost always negative in impact. The greater the degree of change from the known to the unknown, the more likely we are to produce undesirable consequences.²⁹

Rhodes related this specifically to attitudinal inherency during the TCU Conference.

When a team advocates changing the structure to circumvent the attitudes, it is saying that the end justifies the means. The resultant

27

Potter, Argumentation and Debate, p. 68.

28

Peter Settle, "An Analysis of Critic Constistency in Evaluating the Comparative Advantage Affirmative Debate Case," (MA Thesis, Marquette University, May 1973), p. 54.

29

James Unger, "An Application of Theories to Academic Debate," The New Debate: Readings in Contemporary Debate Theory, ed. Robert J. Branham, (Information Research Associates, 1975), p. 43.

value judgment is one of the most serious that a society can face. Only when the goals are clearly established and the obstructionism thoroughly trenchant should the debater feel comfortable with advocating a change which presumes that overriding an objection is a better procedure than attempting to persuade someone to a different course of action.³⁰

Affirmatives of both time periods must have prepared plans which produce predictable results in terms of solvency and the absence of disadvantages.

The Role of the Plan in Four

Affirmative Cases

The next area of analysis discusses the role of the plan within four major case structures.

The traditional need-plan approach obviously requires a plan. Chenoweth related how the plan linked to the need in this case and therefore why it was vital.

If the affirmative is to present a sound case, it seems apparent that its first obligation is setting up criteria for evaluating the status quo. These criteria should also be used to appraise the proposed plan or plans for eliminating the defects in the present situation. Such criteria fundamentally consist of two divisions.

The first part is the setting up of objectives or goals in a situation. The second is the presenting of specifications, which are really the ways and means of achieving the objectives or goals.³¹

³⁰
Rhodes, "Attitudinal, Inherency: Handle With Care,"
p. 83.

³¹
Chenoweth, "Bearing the Affirmative Burden, p. 51.

Zarefsky wrote that the plan in this approach must solve the need and avoid the risk of new problems³² (disadvantages).

The needs case required a solvent plan and one that accrues few or no disadvantages. The significance of the case must outweigh the disadvantages.

Brock et al. defined comparative advantage debate as:

Fundamentally a clash between two systems. Advantages and disadvantages of the affirmative of the affirmative and negative systems are compared and a decision is rendered on the basis of which system is more desirable.³³

The desirability of the system is measured by several criteria and Freeley mentioned two which were relevant to the CA format. He said that the "affirmative must present a plan that is perfectly integrated with the goals and assumptions it has specified."³⁴ And also that "the advantages must outweigh the disadvantages."³⁵ In analyzing the presentation of the CA Young declared:

32

David Zarefsky, ed. The Comparative Advantage, (Evanston: Championship Debate Enterprises, (1970), p. 1.

33

Bernard L. Brock, James W. Chesbro, John F. Cragan, and James F. Klumpp, Public Policy Decision Making: Systems Analysis and Comparative Advantages Debate, (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), p. 116.

34

Freeley, Argumentation and Debate, 4th ed. p. 189.

35

Ibid.

Since the CA case is a comparison between the advantages offered by the resolution and disadvantages of the status quo, the plan must be presented first.³⁶

To measure the new affirmative plan against the status quo, Klumpp suggested using a cost benefit analysis approach.³⁷ He then isolated specific ways for the affirmative to prove that the plan is cost beneficial.

- 1) No causal link exists between the plan and the disadvantages.
- 2) The alleged condition is not a disadvantage.
- 3) Some plank in the affirmative plan provides a counteracting or intervening cause for the disadvantage.
- 4) The disadvantage will not be quantitatively significant.³⁸

The CA format must be solvent and free of disadvantages.

In comparing the CA plan to the needs case plan, Goodnight et al. claimed that the CA case becomes "little more than the affirmative presenting a partial solution to a harm."³⁹ Klumpp denied this simplified comparison when he purported the following differences in emphasis.

36

Marilyn Young, Coaching Debate, (Clayton: The Alan Company, 1975), p. 47.

37

James F. Klumpp, "The Comparative Advantage Case: A Causal Explanation," (unpublished paper, University of Minnesota), p. 8.

38

Ibid., pp. 11-12.

39

Tom Goodnight, Bill Balthrop, and Donn Parson, "The Problem of Inherency: Strategy and Substance," JAF 10 (Spring, 1974): 233.

The needs case

Centers first on the problem and then on the plan, with the former usually receiving the most time and emphasis. In contrast, the comparative advantage approach treats the two areas simultaneously, the affirmative requests the critic judge's rejection of the present system on the basis of his acceptance of the affirmative proposal. The affirmative plan receives the most time and emphasis.⁴⁰

He argued later that the links in a CA come from the present conditions;⁴¹ therefore, the plan will be the center of the CA case construction.

The plan in the CA model must accrue advantages, and these advantages must outweigh any disadvantages. The major distinction between the CA plan and the traditional format's plan is that in a CA the plan is the cause being analyzed and in the other it is the effect-or-result of the problem. Both fulfill the same burdens but the CA puts increased emphasis on the plan.

The Criteria case has a plan which attempts to realize new values. Like the cost benefit analysis of the CA the criteria case plan attempts to

Demonstrate that the new relationships established by the value would set into motion a better set of controls or actions for the future.⁴²

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Klumpp, "The Comparative Advantage Case: A Causal Explanation," p. 4.

⁴¹

Ibid.

⁴²

James W. Chesebro, "Beyond the Orthodox: The Criteria Case," JAF 7 (Winter, 1971): 213.

The new plan besides advancing new values and preventing detrimental occurrences, must make sure "that the net gains of the new value exceed the loss of other values."⁴³ Other than its task to implement values, the plan in the criteria case must fulfill the same "solvency" and "no disadvantage" requirements of the traditional and CA plans.

The alternative justification case presents several plans; in theory each alone should be solvent and have no disadvantage since they are merely mini CA or needs plans. But in practice, during an actual round a debater using this format may drop one or two plans and only extend one claiming that it justifies the resolution. Thomas explained a problem in this approach when he wrote that a

Dilemma arises in an alternative justification case where an affirmative offers three mini-cases in three separate problem areas, and wants me to vote for them if they drop two of them but carry the third one on rebuttal but the negative wants my ballot precisely because the affirmative failed to carry their burden in two of their three areas.⁴⁴

Freeley also found fault with the AJ approach.

Many judges believe that the integrity of the proposition constrains the affirmative to the advocacy of one policy change. They would thus view the minicase as parts of a whole and consider the disadvantages of any part as applying to the entirety of the resolution.⁴⁵

⁴³

Ibid., p. 214

⁴⁴

David Thomas, Judging Debate, ed. Joe McAdoo, p. 111.

⁴⁵

Freeley, Argumentation and Debate, 4th ed., p. 141.

The theorists are still volleying their jargon at each other over this issue. In some parts of the country, you can drop two plans, and in others you must carry them all; but in most places the resulting benefits must outweigh the accepted disadvantages.

The major distinction between the role of the plan in this case format and others is that in some cases, (when the judge accepts the AJ format), if the disadvantages to one or two of a team's advantages mitigate their significance, the affirmative may still win the ballot by proving that the remaining component is more significant than any specific disadvantage against it.

The Role of the Plan Under Three

Judging Philosophies

Now that the role of the plan in the four case formats has been explored, the next section will examine the plan within three judging philosophies.

Freeley delineated three stock issues which must be carried in any given round.

Stock issues for the proposition of policy are drawn from the three potential elements of the affirmative case; need, plan and advantages.⁴⁶

The stock issues judge requires the presentation of a plan. Musgrave explained this in his text.

⁴⁶

Freeley, Argumentation and Debate, 3rd ed., p. 53.

The affirmative must show that some benefits will result; otherwise it has failed to give reason for adopting the plan, and lost the debate.⁴⁷

Also as mentioned earlier, one philosophy of the stock issues approach is that all issues must be carried; according to this view the plan is vital to an affirmative ballot.

When discussing the role of the judge as a hypothesis tester, Zarefsky synthesized the following observation:

The function of a plan is to illustrate the principles embodied in the proposition, thereby focusing the argument upon those principles. But all debate about the plan itself is conditional or hypothetical in nature. Consequently, it may not always be necessary to present a plan: the principles of the proposition may be self evident.⁴⁸

In theory, the affirmative does not have to present the plan. (See section on role of the plan for evidence). Despite the theoretical freedom nowhere in the literature were examples cited where this occurred. This might be a rare occurrence where the theory has preceded the practice.

Henderson related this philosophy to the weighing of significance and disadvantages. In hypothesis testing the judge must weigh the "proposition advantage against the risk of incurring any disadvantages developed by the negative."⁴⁹

⁴⁷George McCoy Musgrave, Competitive Debate, (New York: The H.W. Wilson Co., 1957), p. 19.

⁴⁸David Zarefsky, "Argument as Hypothesis Testing," Paper presented SCA, December 1976, pp. 7-8.

⁴⁹Bill Henderson, "Debate as a Paradigm for Demonstration Truth Through Hypothesis Testing," (unpublished paper SCA Convention, 1974), p. 5.

Henderson, in another article, cited an inherent problem in using this paradigm. He explained:

The inescapable fact of making decisions from partial information. . . is that the possibility exists of making one or the other type of error, whichever way the decision is made. Scientists must choose which risk should be taken in setting the significance level for the null hypothesis. So, too, must the debate judge. Here exists the . . . problem. . . does the proposition being tested merit the risk. In science the errors risk wasted investigation or absent investigation. In debate the errors risk wasted change or absent needed change.⁵⁰

If the change is based on faulty data, disadvantages may occur and the research hypothesis (the new plan) should be rejected.

Litchman and Rohrer questioned the validity of the whole approach with their indictment that:

Even if the hypothesis testing were an appropriate analogy, the manner in which Zarefsky uses it would be unacceptable. . . This is true because the object of statistical testing is to form a probability distribution around the null hypothesis which will reveal the probability of obtaining various sample results given that the null hypothesis is true. Such a distribution can be formed only for a hypothesis that is specified exactly. The research hypothesis, however, need not be precisely spelled out, but can consist of every conceivable alternative.⁵¹

50

Bill Henderson, "Debate as a Paradigm for Demonstrating Truth Through Hypothesis Testing," Issues 9 (March, 1976): 11.

51

Allan J. Litchman and Daniel M. Rohrer, "Critique of Zarefsky on Presumption," Proceedings: National Conference on Argumentation, ed. James Luck, 1973, p. 42.

Though the validity of this approach is still in question and has not yet been refined, those judges who do accept it, and do see themselves as hypothesis testers, generally require a plan and require that the plan's advantages outweigh the disadvantages. Their model for discovering this is to establish the plan as a research hypothesis and then to scientifically test it.

The systems analysis philosophy dissects the plan into two areas of inquiry, that of probability and that of cost benefit analysis. Probability may be defined as the propensity of the affirmative to solve its indicted problem. This is not a new concept for Kruger wrote in 1954 that probability is what constitutes a prediction for solving a need.⁵² One can establish solvency through probability theory. Dick agreed with this end and described how to accomplish it:

In any policy proposition, the affirmative must predict the workability and efficacy of its plan, and therefore it is helpful for the team to look for something literally analogous that has worked or is working elsewhere.⁵³

52

Kruger, "Logic and Strategy in Developing the Debate Case," p. 101.

53

Robert C. Dick, Argumentation and Rational Debating, (Dubuque: Wm. C. Brown Co., 1972), p. 49.

Though this concept has been existant for some time, systems analysis has increased the emphasis on probability arguments.⁵⁴ Some sources have questioned this emphasis, but Kneupper clarified this doubt.

Systems theory does not eliminate an advocate's burden to show a probability of solvency of the plan. Brock et al. clearly imply this as a prima facie case requirement when they discuss predictive obligation.⁵⁵

Klumpp argued that multiple or complex causality does not mitigate the affirmative's burden to prove solvency, for even with single causality "we cannot guarantee."⁵⁶

Specifically:

The fundamental justification for policy change rests on a comparison of the probability of the effects resulting from the present system and from the affirmative plan.⁵⁹

In the systems analysis approach, the judge determines the probability of the plan to solve the multiple causality of the problem and then weighs the new system against the old.

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James F. Klumpp, Bernard L. Brock, James W. Chesebro, and John F. Cragan, "Implications of a System Model Analysis of Argumentation Theory," presented Central States Speech Convention, 1973, p. 8.

⁵⁵

Charles Kneupper, "A Defense of General Systems Theory," Forensic 61 (March, 1976): 11.

⁵⁶

James F. Klumpp, "Inherency from the Perspective of Systems Analysis," Presented at Central States Speech Convention, April 1976, p. 5.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 4.

In this weighing process, the affirmative advantages are measured against the negatively argued disadvantages. The form for this balancing is through a cost/benefit analysis model. The judge with a systems analysis philosophy would agree with Unger on the following:

A systematic analysis of the resolution requires that the affirmative introduces change into the present system without destroying the overall structure of society.⁵⁸

There should be no disadvantages. Thomas corroborated this point.

Multiple mutual causality is inherent within a system; but it is complex and produces both cost and benefits, directly and indirectly. All should be of interest to the policy chosen.⁵⁹

The judge - policy chooser should weigh the benefits of both systems to decide on the best policy option. This multiple causality intrinsic to the systems analysis approach amplifies the disadvantage possibilities by its very nature. Towne described this when he wrote that "any changes in

58

Brock, et al., Public Policy Decision-Making Systems Analysis and Comparative Advantages Debate, p. 100.

59

David A. Thomas, "The Swing to Systems Analysis: A Revolution in Debate Judging Standards," Presented at the Southern Speech Communication Association Convention, San Antonio, April, 1976, pp. 13-14.

the sub-system will necessarily affect the relationships and the problems of the whole."⁶⁰ Brock et al. specifically linked systems analysis and cost benefit analysis with this summary statement:

Our method, and especially our formulation of cost-benefit analysis, requires that the policy-maker be conscious of the unity of our societal of the overall system. A thorough understanding of the policy-maker's area of concern and its relationship to society is the best guarantee of a sound base for debate and intelligent decision-making.⁶¹

The judge with the systems analysis view will examine the plan's probability (solvency) and compare its benefits with any disadvantages which would be the result of altering the system.

Application of Information to Research Questions

This chapter has analyzed the affirmative plan, its requirements, its role in four case structures, and its position within three judging philosophies. The information gleaned from the literature after this analysis will be applied to the four research questions.

1. Have there been changes in the basic requirements of the affirmative case? The literature of the fifties and seventies agreed that the affirmative case must present a plan

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Ralph Towne, "An Expansion of General Systems Theory in Debate," in Proceedings: National Conference on Argumentation, ed. James Luck, (Unpublished manuscript), p.16.

61

Brock et al., Public Policy Decision-Making Systems Analysis and Comparative Advantages Debate, p. 83.

that solves a cited problem and is free of disadvantages. The literature did differ on how specific a plan should be; but most agree that administration, financing and enforcement mechanisms were necessary for solvency. Different cases and judging philosophies gave varying degrees of emphasis to the plan, but basically all concluded that a plan was necessary and that it meet the two requirements mentioned above.⁶² The structural and attitudinal problem must be solved.

2. If there have been changes, are they because of changes in the judging criteria used to evaluate these basic requirements?

The stock issues judge requires that the affirmative prove that their solvent, disadvantage-free plan will solve an inherent and significant problem.

The hypothesis tester, in theory, may allow a planless case, but in practice requires that the affirmative prove that their research hypothesis produces minimal risk and incorporates correct data to avoid statistical errors which could preclude solvency and create more risks than the status quo.

The systems analyzer views the plan as a solution to a problem developed due to multiple causality which must be

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The chapter on topicality will discuss the debate on "spiking" using adjuncts in a plan to prevent disadvantages.

carefully implemented so that the alterations in the system do not cause adverse reactions. This judge usually employs a cost-benefit paradigm to measure the affirmative's significance against the plan's disadvantages.

All of these points of view require that an affirmative present a solvent plan that does not accrue more harm than good.

3. If there have been changes, are they because of the changes in affirmative case formats?

The needs case views the harm area as the central focus of the debate while the CA case claims that the plan is the eye. This diversity of emphasis demands different strategies but does not deny the necessity of the plan. The Criteria case requires a solvent, nondisadvantageous plan to articulate and achieve some dormate status quo goal. The AJ case was the only format which offered much controversy and that was because of the unresolved question of whether an affirmative could drop two of their three plans (because they developed too many disadvantages) and win the round by proving significance, inherency, solvency and no disadvantages on the remaining component. Basically, the theoretical requirement of the plan in the affirmative case has remained constant.

4. What is the effect of these changes on competitive interscholastic debate?

The names of the cases have changed and the judges may be utilizing different models, but the comparison of two time

periods in the literature revealed that the plan is a mandatory requirement for an affirmative ballot.

The literature revealed that there were no changes in the plan structure between the 1950's and the 1970's. This study does not review the literature on the increased sophistication of solvency and disadvantage attacks, but the writer hypothesizes that a study of that material would reveal the importance, and increased emphasis, on the role of the plan in the interscholastic debate round.

In the "real world debate round" (if that is not a contradiction in terms) the affirmative's plan in the 1970's must be solvent and must produce more significance than the negative can dream up in their 2NC disadvantages which claim immense impact and exotic creativity.

CHAPTER V

TOPICALITY

This chapter will discuss the definitions of topicality, the need for topicality controls, specific topicality guidelines, the development of parameters, negative approaches to topicality, the role of topicality within four case formats, the role of topicality within three judging philosophies, and will then apply this information to the four research questions.

Definitions of Topicality

Topicality has been defined as

The issue in a debate of whether or not the affirmative case, or a major part of it, is within the contextual intent of the resolution. It can be a voting issue in a debate; if a significant part of a case is not topical, then the affirmative has not met their burden of showing that the topic should be adopted.¹

Thomas further explained the role of topicality in the debate round.

The issue of topicality in academic debate is becoming increasingly significant as the topics become more broadly worded. At stake is the question whether or not the affirmative proposal is within the scope of the topic, and the real crux of an issue often turns on whether

1

William H. Bennett, Pragmatic Debate, (Vermillion: Championship Debate Enterprises, 1970), p. 5.

2

Donald R. Terry, Modern Debate Case Techniques, (Skokie: National Textbook Company, 1970), p. 11.

it meets the resolution. A case is, without doubt, outside the resolution if it bears no relationship to the topic.²

These questions represent the current philosophy on the status of topicality.

The Need for Topicality Controls

The literature of both time periods documented the need for topicality controls. Capp explained the historical origin of the problem.

In cases where one school chose the topic it was often cast in trick form with the hope that the challenged debaters would choose it before discovering its flaws. This sort of trickery led to wrangling disagreement over the meaning of terms.³

This occurred before there was a national topic. During the 1950's Potter wrote that the affirmative should be prepared to carry the burden of proof without trickery.

Because of the forensic custom, the affirmative must do certain things in order to carry its burden of proof. Fundamentally, the best affirmative case is that one which meets the problem head on, frankly, and endeavors to debate the question on its merits. This means that the affirmative will select strong arguments for its case, will document them thoroughly, and will be prepared to defend them against the negative attacks. This approach can be labeled as the traditional or conventional case. Its merit is that the affirmative without strategy or trickery comes to grips with the question and is prepared to debate the resolution on its merits.⁴

² Donald R. Terry, Modern Debate Case Techniques, (Skokie: National Textbook Company, 1970), p. 11.

³ Glenn R. Capp, "History and Analysis of Intercollegiate Debating in America," (MA Thesis, Baylor, 1967), p. 31.

⁴ David Potter, ed. Argumentation and Debate, (New York: The Dryden Press, 1954), p. 69.

Besides blatant trick cases debaters often invited topicality attacks by the legitimate yet narrow interpretation of the topic. Chenoweth, Potter, and Summer Explained the faults of narrow cases in their literature of the 1950's.

Plans known as trick cases, should be avoided. Inasmuch as the purpose of debate is to develop in the student a proficiency in the use of valid arguments and good evidence, it appears that debate is defeating its goal if students are encouraged to spend time on trick plans.⁵

It is possible for the affirmative to develop an unusual interpretation of the debate question. The advisability of this procedure will depend upon the nature of the question and the type of interpretation used. It has happened too often that a team has used a surprise interpretation as a substitute for good sound work on a debate proposition.⁶

Extreme affirmative cases, or those based upon freakish or strained interpretations, of those whose support is scattered over a wide variety of points, are seldom effective.⁷

These sources concluded that "trick cases" diminish the academic benefits of debate. Trick and narrow cases preclude debaters from analyzing the real issues of the topic. And this superficial approach led to poorly proven cases and shallow analysis.

⁵
Eugene C. Chenoweth, Discussion and Debate, (Dubuque: William C. Brown Co., 1951), p. 52.

⁶
Potter, Argumentation and Debate, p. 69.

⁷
Harrison Boyd Summers, How to Debate, (New York: The H.W. Wilson Co., 1950), p. 166.

Rieke and Sillars condemned the use of narrow and trick cases in their writing in 1975.

The immediacy of decision, when combined with the fact that this field deals with young (or learning) debaters, yields perhaps greater susceptibility to "trick" or what have been called "one-tournament" cases. These are cases that have a superficial reasonableness about them and an underlying fatal weakness. The theory is that by the time the opponents discover the weakness, the debate is over. Sometimes, such a case can win extensively over the course of two or three days, only to be exposed a week later when opponents have had time to study it. Presumably by that time the case is no longer being used.⁸

David Shepard cynically explained the current situation as he saw it in 1973.

Quite clearly we have a problem in intercollegiate debate where debate and common sense have parted company. The extravagant stipulated definition debate leads to an exercise which is no less silly than a Medieval syllogistic debate.⁹

Both time periods agreed that these types of interpretation of the resolution are a hinderance to the development of argumentation skills. This section discussed the need for topicality boundaries in order to insure worthwhile debating; the next section discusses specific guidelines for establishing acceptable topicality.

8

Richard D. Rieke and Malcom Sillars, Argumentation and The Decision Making Process, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc. 1975), p. 286.

9

David Shepard, "Burden of What?" JAFPA 4(Winter, 1973): 362.

Topicality Guidelines

Both periods of literature which were surveyed offered suggestions on what constituted a topical case.

Quimby wrote in 1954 that there is "no official interpretation of the national debate topic which must be accepted."¹⁰ Musgrave agreed and argued that "the affirmative has the right to make any reasonable definition of each of the terms of the proposition."¹¹ But he qualified this by adding that the affirmative "must advocate everything required by the topic itself."¹² In other words while the affirmative has the right to interpret the resolution according to its own criteria, it must include the essence of the topic. The literature then indicated the cases which were too narrow. (This was documented in the previous section.) The guidelines offered in the fifties were general and allowed the affirmative much latitude in their definition and interpretation of the topic.

In the 1970's Sanders offered the following guideline for interpretation. "Every debate proposition is based upon some principle, this principle should be the overriding

10

Brooks Quimby, So You Want To Discuss and Debate, (Portland: T. Weston Walsh, 1954), p. 53.

11

George McCoy Musgrave, Competitive Debate, 3rd ed. (New York: H.W. Wilson Co., 1957) p. 13.

12

Ibid., p. 16.

factor in the defining or interpreting of the resolution.¹³
 In other words the interpretation should be related to the central thesis of the topic. Brock espoused that a case is topical if "it is what a reasonable man would accept as the meaning of the words and phrases with a given topic or a given proposition."¹⁴

Both of these sources agreed that the affirmative case should interpret the topic according to what is commonly referred to as the "spirit of the resolution." The case should reflect the theme of the resolution. (A topic on medical care should not find its inherency and significance in energy development and distribution.) Bennet complained that this philosophy was too vague.

Nobody knows what the spirit of the topic is, what direction the writers had in mind. It is probable none of the people who selected the topic could agree on its exact intent anyway. the attack is justified if the debater has reason to think the judge is agreeable to it.¹⁵

DeBross explained that this argument has undergone a name change. He picturesquely phrased:

13

Gerald H. Saunder, Introduction to Contemporary Academic Debate, (Minneapolis: Campus Press, 1972), p. 29.

14

Bernard Brock, "Parameters of the Debate Resolution. A Forum: Owen Coon Debate Tournament, Northwestern University," The New Debate: Readings in Contemporary Debate Theory, ed. Robert J. Branham, (Information Research Associates 1975), p. 56.

15

Bennett, Pragmatic Debate, pp. 52-53.

On the road of change . . . sometimes we even meet an old friend, like the 'spirit of the resolution,' disguised by a personality change is "The Reasonable Man."¹⁶

Regardless of the terminology the ambiguity of this topicality argument remains. What is the "spirit of the resolution?" What issues are linked to what resolutions? Williams argued that "debate resolutions should mean what the debate community says they mean."¹⁷ Brock supported this point of view when he stated that:

It is absolutely essential that a process for determining the resolution be established by the forensics community itself. What I mean by this, in a way, it's a process of enactment and through one tournament after another, you operationally establish the meaning of a debate question.¹⁸

Williams later qualified his original position when he claimed that the debate community should set standards but that their interpretation should not be the only criteria nor should it be applied to all cases.

If a particular case is accepted by the debate community generally, then I should not decide it is not topical (unless, of course, there is winning negative argument to that effect). This may well mean that I may vote against a case on topicality early in the year and reject the same negative topicality arguments at a later

16

John C. DeBross, "Change in Basic Concepts?" (Unpublished paper), p. 5.

17

Tennyson Williams, Jr. "Do Debate Resolutions Mean Anything? An Analysis of Topicality Problem," (Unpublished manuscript), pp. 2-3.

18

Brock, "Parameters of the Debate Resolution A Forum: Owen Coon Debate Tournament, Northwestern University," p. 55.

tournament, once I find that the debate community has generally decided that the case is a reasonable interpretation of the resolution. Probably the most obvious shortcoming of this approach is that it does nothing to resolve the problem of loss of respect by important people outside the debate community.¹⁹

Though the community may set yearly standards, certain guidelines that can be applied to every topic need to be established. Thomas explained three constraints on topicality.

The affirmative is vulnerable to topicality attacks when the plan fails to fully implement the resolution in all its operative terms; when the plan goes beyond the requirements of the resolution; or when the case does not justify all the proposed changes in policy required by the resolution.²⁰

The forensic community in the 1970's established topicality guidelines by voting against cases considered nontopical via specific theoretical criteria to measure the degree of topicality.

Though these guides exist, most sources agreed that topicality was an argument to be decided upon within each round and that teams and not judges should be the ones who should argue the issue. Thomas condemned judges who voted negatively on topicality due to preconceived ideas.

We believe some of our fellow judges err when they take it upon themselves to vote against an affirmative case on grounds of topicality in the absence of any negative topicality arguments.²¹

¹⁹

Williams, "Do Debate Resolutions Mean Anything?" p.3.

²⁰

David A. Thomas, "What Makes an Affirmative Case Topical?" Issues 7 (October, 1973): 15.

²¹

Ibid., p. 2.

William concurred with this point of view.

Remember that the affirmative may well have a valid explanation for their interpretation—one which the judge may not have thought of. The implication of this assertion is that topicality is a legitimate issue to be debated. If the negative chooses not to debate the issue, then the judge should accept the case as topical for the purpose of that particular debate.²²

The surveyed literature revealed that both time periods attempted to provide guidelines for topicality. But in the world of the competitive debate rounds, debaters have found these guidelines to be too broad and discovered that there was much room for the interpretations of the topic. Hence developed the concept of establishing topic parameters.

The Development of Parameters

The Sedalia Conference posited that "The AFA define generally terms and parameters of the national topic."²³

They recommended that:

Organizations appointing members to the SCA Committee on Intercollegiate Discussion and Debate should instruct them to include with each proposition submitted for final vote a brief statement of its substantive parameters.²⁴

Following is a summary of the pros and cons of this suggestion from the Conference members.

²²Williams, "Do Debate Resolutions Mean Anything?" p.6.

²³James H. McBath, ed. Forensics as Communication, (Skokie: National Textbook Company, 1975), p. 74.

²⁴Ibid., p. 28.

Conferees who supported the resolution argued that a statement of substantive parameters of the proposition would enable forensics educators and debaters to understand more clearly the intent of the framers of the proposition. Such a statement could lead to more informed voting in the selection of propositions. Conferees also viewed this resolution as one response to misinterpretations of the propositions and as a step toward developing consensus on reasonable interpretations of the proposition. Opponents of the resolutions argued that it would not result in clarifying and limiting the scope of the proposition selected for debate since the interpretive statement itself would be subject to interpretation. Moreover, if the resolution achieved one of its objectives, the responsibility of the debater to analyse the proposition would be usurped. Supporters of the resolution replied that the statement submitted with each proposition would be informative not prescriptive.²⁵

Outside of the conference, Unger hypothesized that parameters would not advance argumentation. He wrote that while they might help within the round they are theoretically useless for the development of argumentation.²⁶

Despite their lack of theoretical advantages parameters may be helpful in limiting the topic. Besides setting suggested guidelines, they increase the burden of the affirmative to defend their narrow definition. The negative has the new argument of claiming that the affirmative's case falls outside of the established parametrical topicality.

Critiques on the state of the art which argued against narrow cases and "trick" definitions, led to the establish-

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶James J. Unger, "An Application of Theories to Academic Debate," The New Debate: Readings in Contemporary Debate Theory, ed., Robert J. Branham, (Information Research Association, 1975), pp. 66-67.

ment of parameters on the college level. Their recent institution precludes an accurate evaluation of their effectiveness, but they are a definite step in establishing uniform limitations on topic interpretations.

Negative Approaches to Topicality

Just as the affirmative has the option to define the terms to its advantage the negative, as mentioned, has the right to launch topicality attacks. Ruth McGaffey expressed this view in her essay in Judging Debate.

In educational debate, a proposition is given to the debaters. This should give both teams an equal opportunity to prepare for the debate. The affirmative is not supposed to be able to debate any topic that they want to. I hold to what seems to be a minority position, that most reasonable people will recognize. To me, therefore, the negative is always justified in arguing that the affirmative is not defining the topic reasonably and should be given a loss because they are not upholding the proposition. If the negative wins that argument, they win the debate, even though they may lose every other point. However, the argument must be made and developed and supported like any other major argument in the debate.²⁷

Though he consents to the legitimacy of topicality attacks,

Tuckness adds a qualification to the position:

The negative has more of an obligation to the judge than to merely ask for a rejection of the affirmative case because it is nontopical. Saying it does not make it true. The negative team is obligated to demonstrate to the judge why the affirmative case is not within the scope of the topic.²⁸

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Ruth McGaffey, Judging Debate, Ed., Joe McAdoo, (Springfield: Mid America Research, 1975), p. 48.

²⁸ Jack D. Tuckness, Judging Debate, Ed., Joe McAdoo, p. 28.

There are a variety of ways a debater may establish topicality attacks. Following are several avenues presented by the literature.

A. Giving a different definition for a key word or phrase and then explain why this definition should be used rather than the stated or implied affirmative definition. To clinch the point the speaker must show how, if his/her definition is acceptable it means that the affirmative point is untropical.

B. Showing that the context and/or rules of grammar as applied to the resolution mean that the affirmative definition cannot be correct.

C. Point to an error of term omission. If the topic were "Resolved: That scarce resources should be put under the control of an international agency; and the affirmative case called for gold to be so controlled, then the negative should argue that the case is untropical because it controls only one resource.

D. Point to an error of need omission. Occasionally when a topic has a key word in plural form and/or includes two key elements, the affirmative case may justify only one change in need/advantage analysis but include both changes in the plan. When this happens, the affirmative has not justified adopting the entire topic; the case is neither topical nor, in this writer's view, prima facie.²⁹

Unger advanced an additional avenue. He warned that defining terms by locating their separated definition in literature can lead to contextual problems of propositional interpretation.

When we turn to the literature, we must make sure we are turning to the literature for the relevant terms. That we do not segregate up the terms of the proposition and say "Well, a-ha! In the expert literature this particular part of the proposition means such and such!" If we are truly seeking the sanction of expert opinion, then we ought to seek it for the whole proposition.³⁰

These are several ways which the negative may argue topicality attacks against an affirmative case.

²⁹Bennett, Pragmatic Debate, p. 53.

³⁰Unger, "An Application of Theories to Academic Debate," p. 63.

Besides these arguments the negative may challenge the affirmative's terms. They would do this to prevent the affirmative from using trick or narrow definitions. Below are cases for challenging terms and how to do it effectively.

1. It is always reasonable to request a source for a definition if none is supplied. A blanket assertion clarifies nothing and the purpose of definition is clarification.
2. Any time the debater feels his opponents are trying to be "tricky" he should protest and be sure to carefully explain why he thinks the definition is tricky. The debater should conclude by offering a reasonable, documented counter-definition.
3. The debater should always feel free to withhold acceptance of terms until he hears the plan. Since tricky definitions most often are used to set up a wierd or minor change plan this is a rule of caution. Thus, if an affirmative saves its plan until the second speech, the first negative should point out he is withholding acceptance until he has heard the clarification a plan will provide.
4. The debater should never base all his attack on definitions. After he has explained his objections, he should attack the rest of the case just as he would any other case. He should defeat it on its own grounds as well as on its definitions.
5. The debater should not attack definitions just because they sound different or unusual.³¹

If the negative can prove that the case is not topical and/or that its definitions are not legitimate (they are too narrow, outside the parameters), then it has denied the link between the affirmative case and the topic. There then is no reason to adopt the case.

³¹Bennett, Pragmatic Debate, pp. 52-3.

The affirmative may protect itself by following good argumentation criteria on definitions. Chenoweth, Ehninger, and Behl provided examples of these in their texts.

1. Definitions should be concrete and definite.
2. Definitions should be as brief as possible.
3. Definitions should be fair and unprejudiced. They should not be stated in a way that will give an advantage to one side.
4. Definitions should fit the context of the question, proposition, or resolution.
5. Definitions should not include terms that need defining.
6. Definitions should contain neither the term to be defined nor any undefined synonym of it.
7. Appropriate tests should be applied to the definitions.
8. A definition should not be circular.
9. Definitions should be taken from an authoritative source.
10. Definitions should be all inclusive.
11. Definitions should be mutually exclusive.³²

This section described channels of negative analysis on the issue of topicality. It is imperative for an affirmative to be aware of these attacks so that it can avoid these and prove that its case is topical.

The Role of Topicality Within

Four Case Formats

This section will analyze the role of topicality within four case formats. The literature which was reviewed for the earlier part of this chapter did not

³²Chenoweth, Discussion and Debate, p. 37; Douglas Ehninger, Influence, Belief, and Argument, (Glenview Scott, Foresman and Company, 1974), pp. 44-5; and William Behl, Discussion and Debate, (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1953), pp. 51-2.

delineate its topicality discussion into specific case types.

The needs case topicality is never isolated in the literature. This writer infers that since it is general, topicality requirements should be applied to this format.

With the development of the CA case the literature began blossoming with opinions on topicality and how it related to the CA case. Sanders explained that "the crucial principle to follow is that the plan should flow directly from the resolution."³³

With the development of the CA case came the controversy over extratopicality adjuncts which assisted in affirmative solvency and mitigated anticipated disadvantages. Williams wrote that the "affirmative must provide justification for every part of the resolution."³⁴

Campbell explained this more specifically with:

Extratopical provisions are those which do not directly follow from the proposition. If the advantages or need solution of the affirmative derives from extratopical provisions in an otherwise topical plan, the plan is still rejected as not supporting the proposition, which is the primary responsibility of the affirmative team.³⁵

33

Sanders, Introduction to Contemporary Academic Debate, p. 32.

34

Williams, "Do Debate Resolutions Mean Anything?" p. 4.

³⁵Cole C. Campbell, "The Affirmative Plan," The New Debate: Readings in Contemporary Debate Theory, Ed. Robert J. Branham, (Information Research association, 1975) p. 186.

Thomas related this to topicality attacks.

When a plan contains planks not essential to the resolution such planks are considered extratopical. Any advantage derived from extratopical planks are vulnerable to topicality attacks.³⁶

The authorities are divided over the legitimacy of adjuncts. Terry posited that adjuncts may be acceptable in some situations.

While added means may supplement the implementation of a resolution, they cannot be the rationale for the change it proposes.³⁷

Ritter and Brink provided criteria to test adjuncts to determine the legitimacy of their role in solvency and topicality.

Each extra-topical adjunct plank should be tested with two questions. 1) Is the entire plan (resolution plus adjuncts) an adequate means to a desired end? 2) Is the resolution portion of the plan essential to create this adequate means? If the answer is yes on both counts, then the plan must not be rejected simply because of the role of the adjuncts. The resolution may be adopted because it is essential to create an adequate means to reaching the end.³⁸

Others wrote that the negative should call attention to extratopical planks in order to minimize the significance of the affirmative advantage.

36

Thomas, "What Makes an Affirmative Case Topical?" pp. 14-15.

³⁷Terry, Modern Debate Case Techniques, p. 12.

³⁸John Ritter and T.L. Brink, "Adjuncts Extra Topical But Accepted," Jafa 8 (Spring, 1972): 224.

The effectiveness of this approach will often depend upon the preference of the judge and the arguing skill of the team.³⁹ Williams explained another way to argue against adjuncts.

The approach I would suggest to the negative is that they link the justification argument with a disadvantage which applies to the unjustified plan plank; the disadvantages become even stronger than normal since it adds on the unknown risks involved in a change-especially a change for which no advantage has been claimed.⁴⁰

He concluded his adjunct analysis with:

The affirmative's right to fill in the details of their implementation of the resolution cannot extend so far as to include doing things which are not even implied by the resolution. To the extent that non-implied planks overcome plan-meet-need and/or disadvantage arguments, then the case should be rejected on grounds of topicality.⁴¹

Most sources agreed that advantages could not be the total result of adjuncts, but there is still a debate over their role in assisting in proving solvency and minimizing disadvantages. Despite the controversy the literature still required the CA case to produce defined terms and fulfill the terms of the resolution.

³⁹Campbell, "The Affirmative Plan," p. 187.

⁴⁰Williams, "Do Debate Resolutions Mean Anything?" pp. 4-5.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 5.

On the criteria case Chesebro wrote.

The obligation of the criteria affirmative is to demonstrate that their definition accurately identifies the essential features of the proposed value, yet also requires the adoption of the philosophical intent of the resolution.⁴²

In other words, the criteria affirmative must show that its case fulfills the resolution. It is subject to all the topicality requirements discussed earlier.

The AJ case must prove topicality for each of its components, since as mentioned earlier it is merely a collection of several plans. The literature has not resolved itself on whether the affirmative may drop all components but one. Regardless of whether there are three or only one component left at the end of the round, whatever is left must be topical.

All cases, in the structures analyzed, must define their terms and prove that the resolutions are directly linked to their plans. Gray areas include the concepts of adjuncts and the validity of the AJ approach.

The Role of Topicality Within Three Judging Philosophies

The literature did not delineate distinct interpretations on topicality according to the different judging

42

James W. Chesebro, "Beyond the Orthodox: The Criteria Case," JAF 7 (Winter, 1971): 212.

philosophies. The following analysis is the result of inferential judgements by the writer from the literature surveyed.

The judge with the stock issues approach will demand that the terms be defined, and according to contemporary interpretations the failure to do this would allow the negative to launch topicality attacks. The affirmative would also be responsible for proving that the adoption of their plan actualizes the resolution. The purist stock issue judge will not give a ballot to an affirmative case whose topicality is in doubt. Topicality is a voting issue to a stock issues judge.

The hypothesis tester would require that the affirmative prove that the plan is a mechanism for instituting the resolution, otherwise it would have no research hypothesis to test. There has been no literature which has discussed extratopicality, adjuncts, etc., in relationship to this philosophy. Since controversy is inherent in a scholarly examination of a hypothesis, this writer assumes that topicality would be a debatable issue, one which would or could be decided round by round.

The systems analysis looks for a plan which can operate compatibly as a subsystem within a larger system. He realizes that the plan must interact favorably with all the other systems. Brock et al. argued that narrow topics

are best suited for this approach.

In today's complex society affirmative positions. . . like a resolution that the United States should adopt a world government, are too difficult to analyze with any degree of precision. They resemble the syllogistic disputations on questions like "How many angels can dance on the head of a pin?" Debates on such propositions may be fun, but they simply are not realistic questions of public policy.⁴³

The judge with this philosophy would prefer narrow topics, but regardless of the topic he would require the plan to implement the intent of the resolution. Otherwise there would be no argument. If the resolution were not advanced by the affirmative, there would be no change in the total system and no altered system to analyze. This writer hypothesizes that a system analyzer judge would accept adjuncts which warded off disadvantages or helped with solvency since they would make the subsystem more compatible with other systems. But this philosophy would still require that the advantage must come from the principle of the resolution.

All three judging philosophies require implementation of the resolution. The defining of the resolution where topicality arguments are conceived is open to debate in all three philosophies, though the nature of the latter two are more theoretically receptive to these types of arguments. Topicality is a voting issue for the stock issues

43

Bernard Brock, James Chesebro, John Cragan, and James F. Klumpp, Public Policy Decision Making Systems Analysis and Comparative Advantages Debate, (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1973), p. 159.

judge and could be, depending on the round, for the other two types.

Application of Information to the
Research Questions

This information will be applied to the four research questions.

1. Have there been changes in the basic requirements of the affirmative case? The literature of both time periods agreed that the affirmative must prove that its case embodies issues intrinsic to the resolution. It also agreed that the interpretation was open to debate. Both time periods provided guidelines for topicality attacks, though the literature of the 1970's was more specific. The basic change noted by the writer was that the literature of the 1950's talked in terms of "definitions" and the literature of the 1970's discussed this concept in terms of "topicality." The 1970's analyzed extratopicality and adjuncts more thoroughly than earlier writings. At this time the literature has come to no agreement on what is or is not acceptable.

2. If there have been changes, are they because of changes in the judging criteria used to evaluate these basic requirements? Judges in all three philosophies required the definition of terms. The major area of controversy came in the area of extratopicality. Some

judges will accept adjuncts while others regard them as blatantly extratopical. The other difference is that the stock issue judge would vote negatively on topicality alone, while other judges view the debate in more of a wholeistic approach, topicality being merely one issue of decision. For example, the systems analyzer judge would probably weigh the topicality against disadvantages and then decide.

3. If there have been changes, are they because of the changes in affirmative case formats? The major change has occurred in the area of adjuncts. The stock issues case requirements have remained the same throughout the two time periods. As the CA case developed so did the controversy on extratopicality. It is still unresolved. The criteria case must actualize the values of the resolution through its definitions and topicality interpretations. The AJ case is still in theoretical trauma. All cases must define their terms and be prepared to defend their interpretations of the topic.

4. What is the effect of these changes on competitive interscholastic debate? There have been two major changes. The first is the development of parameters on the college circuit. The forensic community has attempted to put a limit on topic interpretations on the expanding policy resolutions. The legitimacy of these limits is still being debated in coaches' lounges and in the literature. The other change is the increased use of adjuncts to pre-empt disadvantages and maximize solvency. Again, the acceptability of these is dependent upon the specific round.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN
THE AFFIRMATIVE CASE, DURING THE TWO
TIME PERIODS SURVEYED.

The affirmative components of inherency, significance, plan, and topicality when properly integrated will produce what is termed a prima facie case. This is a case which stands on its own until refuted. A case must be prima facie in order to achieve its burden of proof. This chapter will analyze changes which have altered the affirmative case as an entity and highlight those items which have remained constant.

Specifically this chapter will review the literature on the definitions of prima facie; the definitions and requirements for the affirmative burden of proof; apply this and other literature to the four case formats which have been analyzed throughout this paper; apply this information and other material from the literature to the three judging philosophies, in order to examine the changes; and then apply all of this information to the four research questions.

The Prima Facie Case

Potter defined prima facie, according to the interpretations of the 1950's, and provided the link between it and the burden of proof.

The affirmative can satisfactorily discharge its burden of proof by establishing a prima facie case. . . It is a case which would stand logically complete if it were not attacked by the negative. Someone has defined it as the minimum which the affirmative must prove to establish its case.¹

This definition is listed in most introductory texts of the seventies.²

Brock et al. found fault with this traditional approach and made the following argument.

What is a Prima facie case? Meeting the affirmative burden of proof. What is the affirmative's burden of proof? The presentation of the stock issues. Furthermore they interpret this to mean that all stock issues must be presented . . . Weaknesses in the concept of prima facie case appear as the traditional argumentation becomes a tautology with little qualitative judgment.³

Prima facie has become a synonym for a stock issues case, and therefore is limited to that judging model.

1

David Potter, ed. Argumentation and Debate, (New York: Dryden Press, 1954), p. 64.

²Donald R. Terry, Modern Debate Case Techniques, (Skokie: National Textbook Company, 1975), p. 14; Gerald H. Sanders, Introduction to Contemporary Academic Debate, (Minneapolis: Campus Press, 1972), p. 33; Austin J. Freeley, Argumentation and Debate, 4th ed., (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Co., Inc., 1976), p. 38. James Weaver, Judging Debate, ed. Joe McAdoo, (Springfield: MidAmerica Research, 1975, 19750, pp. 38-9; Robert C. Dick, Argumentation and Rational Debating, (Dubuque: William C. Brown Co., 1975), p. 7; Craig R. Smith and David M. Hunsaker, The Bases of Argumentation Ideas in Conflict, ed. Russell R. Windes, (The Bobbs-Merrill Series in Speech Communication, 1972), p. 141; and William Bennett, Pragmatic Debate, (Vermillion: Championship Debate Enterprises, 1971), p. 7.

³Bernard L. Brock, James W. Chesebro, John F. Cragan, and James F. Klumpp, Public Policy Decision-Making Systemes Analysis and Comparative Advantages Debate, (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1973), p. 155.

Brock et al. inferred that a wider definition for prima facie is needed. We need to develop one applicable for all judging paradigms.

Analysis of the Burden of Proof

In 1953 Ewbank wrote that the Burden of Proof rests with those who support change.⁴ Again Potter summarized the definition of this term, according to the interpretations of the fifties.

The burden of proof is the risk of the propositions . . . The burden of proof rests always with the affirmative. It never shifts from side to side.⁵

The basic texts of the 1970's agreed with this view.⁶

Because presumption is for the present system and against the proposition, the affirmative side must assume the burden of proof. That is, it must present supported reasons that offset the presumption.

4

Henry Lee Ewbank and J. Jeffrey Auer, Discussion and Debate: Tolls of a Democracy, 2nd ed., (New York: Appleton Century Crofts, Inc., 1951), p. 409.

5

Potter, Argumentation and Debate, p. 63.

6

Freeley, Argumentation and Debate, p. 34; Bennett, Pragmatic Debate, p. 5; Smith and Hunsaker, The Bases Of Argumentation-Ideas in Conflict, p. 139, Cole C. Campbell "The Affirmative Plan," The new Debate: Readings in Contemporary Debate Theory, ed. Robert J. Branham, (Information Research Associates, 1975), 168; and Roy Wood, Strategic Debate, (Skokie: NTC, 1972), p. 17.

7

Dick, Argumentation and Rational Debating, p. 7.

Hoogestraat explained the reasoning behind this definition of burden of proof.

The obvious basis for the generalization that presumption favors the status quo is that change involves an effort and expenditure of time, or energy, or money, or other commodity. . . . The affirmative must justify his proposed change as being sufficiently advantageous to offset the expenditure of effort involved.⁸

Zarefsky further explained the role of Burden of Proof and suggested the following. The Burden of Proof

. . . . rests with the affirmative and does not shift. In recent years, this term has been confused with the burden of he 'who asserts must prove,' the obligation of any advocate to justify his claims. . . . by substituting for 'burden of proof' as I am describing it, the term, 'burden of the proposition.'⁹

When a negative team presents a counterplan, it must carry an advantage over and above the affirmative policy.¹⁰

The Burden Of Proof then must be proven by the negative who is advocating a new plan. (This obviously does not

8

Hoogestraat, "The Burden of Proof on Resolutions Discontinuance," CSSJ, 21 (Fall, 1970), p. 199.

9

David Zarefsky, "Changing Concepts in Forensics," (Unpublished paper), p. 6.

10

Thomas J. Hynes Jr., "The Counterplan: An Historical and Descriptive Study," (MA Thesis, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1972), p. 41.

include Zarefsky's position on presumption.)¹¹ This is one example when the burden of proof does not rest with the affirmative. The second case is in a resolution of discontinuance.

If the affirmative chooses to advocate simple discontinuance of an existing plan or policy, the burden of proof should be assigned to the negative.¹²

Hoogestraat is the only source that presented this point. No other discussed it in theory or practice, so it would be accurate to state that in the interscholastic debate round the affirmative must carry the burden of proof.

The Relationship Between Fiat and The Burden of Proof

Fiat is the power to will change in policy systems. There are two reasons for its presence 1) to avoid debates over "will" and focus instead on "should," and 2) to allow probative examination of a policy system not yet implemented.

11

David Zarefsky, "A Reformulation of the Concept of Presumption," Presented CSSA Convention, 1972), p. 10. This paper recognizes the current controversy over presumption, but will not discuss the specifics of this debate because it is still theoretical in nature, and specifically applicable in the actual debate round.

12

Hoogestraat, "The Burden of Proof on Resolutions of Discontinuance," CSSJ, p. 200.

Musgrave wrote in the 1950's that the "should adopt" segment of the resolutions "obligates the affirmative to recommend that action be taken in the reasonably near future."¹³

During the Texas Christian University Conference of 1973, Church pointed out that if the fiat strategy is strictly prohibited debaters will have to be able to

demonstrate the probability that their plans could be enacted and enforced. Affirmatives might assume this additional burden in several ways. First debaters could use empirical and opinion evidence to argue that the public and various political constituencies accept and support the affirmative proposals.¹⁴

Polk argued that this would be unreasonable and that fiat is justified because it sets pragmatic limits on the debate and because it rests on the "reasonable man philosophy."¹⁵ If the affirmative can prove a significant reason to change, there is no reason why the "reasonable man" would not adopt it.

In the actual debate round the rule is that affirmatives are granted fiat on the "should" issue. They are not required to give evidence supporting issues such as "Congress will accept the plan."

13

George McCoy Musgrave, Competitive Debate, 3rd ed. (New York: HW Wilson Co., 1957), p. 15.

14

Russell Church, "Fiat Power" An Irrational and Immoral Strategy," in Proceedings: National Conference on Argumentation, ed. James Luck, (Unpublished manuscript), p. 97.

¹⁵Polk, in Proceedings National Conference on Argumentation, p. 113.

The argument has developed over to what extent the affirmative can fiat its plan. This is especially controversial concerning the issue of attitudinal inherency. Flanigan contended that debaters should not be allowed to fiat attitude change.¹⁶ Ling and Seltzer added that, if debaters were allowed to do this, debate would become a meaningless activity because "decision making is outside the realm of rational process."¹⁷ The arguments against the fiat of solvency against attitudinal inherency are twofold: 1) it allows decision making outside the reasonable process and 2) when attitudes are indicted and then changed in the plan, the affirmative advantage comes not from the new policy but from the mere assumption of fiat power.

The use of affirmative fiat (beyond the "should" limits) allows the negative some right of fiat. Lawson argues that the affirmative has the right to implement their policy through fiat power but

the affirmative grants the negative team the right to impose any reasonable repair or alternative by fiat, and forfeits the right to argue that attitude precludes the adoption of such a repair or alternative.¹⁸

In competitive debate rounds the negative is allowed to expand status quo structures, but it is not allowed to mandate their efficacy.

¹⁶

Rita Rice Flanigan, Proceedings National Conference on Argumentation, p. 117.

¹⁷

David Ling and Robert Seltzer, "The Role of Attitudinal Inherency in Contemporary Debate," p. 280.

¹⁸Harold Lawson, "The Concept of Attitudinal Inherency," p. 12.

The affirmative is allowed to use its fiat power to prove that once it establishes the "should" of the situation the "would" will occur. But as evidenced above, many sources still deny the affirmative the right to fiat attitude changes. This limit places a heavy burden on teams who only indict attitudes as their inherency.

The Role of Burden of Proof Within

Four Case Formats

This next section discusses how the burden of proof and the requirement of prima facie have developed between the two time periods under study in relationship to the four major affirmative case formats.

Freeley described these two requirements and how the traditional case met them. The affirmative must prove a need for a change, and a plan to solve the need.¹⁹ By meeting these requirements the traditional case meets its Burden of Proof. Flanagan wrote that the burden of proof placed upon teams with a traditional case included a rejection of some aspect of the status quo.²⁰

Though Freeley wrote the above in the 1970's, his point of view is based upon the philosophies of earlier writings. Zarefsky explained the concept of prima facie

19

Freeley, Argumentation and Debate, 4th ed., p. 19.

20

Flanagan, in Proceedings: National Conference on Argumentation, p. 22.

in a new light. He argued that the requirement of prima facie is really unnecessary since it is (for the traditional case) a summary term for significance, inherency, workability, etc.²¹ In other words, when a case has met its burden in all of these issues, it is intrinsically prima facie. This is similar to the philosophy of Brock et al. on Burden of Proof.

Most literature concurred that the traditional case fulfills its burden by meeting the stock issue requirements. Though some requirements may be receiving more attention today, a shift in emphasis does not deny the fact that in theory a needs case must meet all of these requirements.

Boucher, in his thesis on the CA, wrote that the CA fulfills its burden of proof by proving his claims.²² Cragan and Shields were more specific when they explained how the CA met its burdens:

When a debater affirms an advantage that is significant, and that also flows uniquely from the plan, he meets what would be in the traditional case the burdens of need, inherency, and meet-need.²³

Other authors contended that a comparative analysis is one of the most efficient and effective ways to prove

²¹

Zarefsky, "Changing Concepts in Forensics," p. 6.

²²

Daniel X. Boucher, "An Application of Criteria and Rules to Comparative Analysis in Academic Debate," (MA Thesis, University of Akron, June 1970), p. 75.

²³

Cragan and Shields, "The Comparative Advantage Negative," p. 86.

its burden of proof.²⁴ English and Ware posited that the CA format is more persuasive than the traditional case and this assists it in meeting its burden of proof.²⁵

Settle and Boucher found that there were no consistent guidelines for evaluating any requirements of the CA.²⁶ Despite this view, most sources concurred that the CA case must fulfill the requirements listed above by Cragan and Shields in order to meet its burden of proof.

In order to prove that the criteria case is prima facie, an affirmative should prove: quality is desirable, quality is lacking, and the plan will produce it.²⁷

Chesebro added that the criteria case "provides an opportunity to determine the prima facie requirements for a proposition of value."²⁸

24

Allan J. Lichtman, Daniel M. Rohrer, and Joseph Misner, "The Role of Empirical Evidence in Debate: A Systems Approach" Issues 9 (October, 1975): 8.

25

William English and B.L. Ware, "A Comparison of the Need Plan and the Comparative Advantage Approach: There is a Difference," in Proceedings: National Conference on Argumentation, p. 12.

26

Peter L. Settle, "An Analysis of Critic Consistency in Evaluating the CA," p. 16; and Boucher, "An Application of Criteria and Rules to Comparative Analysis in Debate," p. 79.

27

James Weaver, Judging Debate, p. 43.

28

James Chesebro, "Beyond the Orthodox: The Criteria Case," JAJA 7 (Winter, 1971): 209.

Terry defined the relationship between the criteria case and the burden of proof. In the criteria case,

The affirmative which has the burden of proof must overcome the negative presumption that present value claims enhance certain basic goals. The affirmative can undermine this presumption . . . but it cannot shift its requirements to the negative, challenging the opposition for proof of the validity of current values.²⁹

In a criteria case, if the affirmative chooses to defend a status quo goal, and the negative attempts to minimize it, they lose presumption.³⁰ This assists the affirmative in carrying out its burden of proof. Basically the criteria case meets its burden by offering

. . . sufficient justification for change by indicating that the status quo is incapable of meeting its admitted purpose.³¹

The affirmative who argues the Alternative Justification approach must

. . . satisfy for each of its proposals the same requirements of significance and inherency that one would apply to those proposals if they constituted the entirety of the affirmative case.³²

29

Donald R. Terry, Modern Debate Case Techniques, (Skokie: National Textbook Company, 1975), p. 41.

30

Daniel J. O'Neil and Charles Wigley III, "Negative Approaches to the Goals Case," Advanced Debate, ed. David Thomas, (Skokie: NTC, 1975), p. 154.

31

Ibid.

32Allan Lichtman, Charles Garvin, and Jerry Corsi, "The Alternative Justification Affirmative: A New Case Form," JAF 10 (Fall, 1973): 62.

Goodnight explained the changing role in the AJ format.

In times past, the negative needed, to win only one major argument (usually inherency) whereas new affirmative case strategy seems to reverse this tendency.³³

Currently judges of debate rounds have not reached an agreement about how many components an affirmative must carry in order to win the round. Some judges still expect the affirmative to carry every case which they initiate.³⁴

Another problem with the AJ and the burden of proof involves the judging philosophy. Parson indicted this approach as philosophically incorrect. He contended that debaters become advisors and not advocates of a policy.³⁵ Seltzer and Ricchio have also agreed with Parson's criticism of this format.³⁶

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Tom Goodnight, Bill Balthrop, and Donn Parson, "The Problem of Inherency: Strategy and Substance," JAF 10 (Spring, 1974): 229.

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David Thomas, Judging Debate, P. 114.

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Donn W. Parson, "Response to a Critique of The Problem of Inherency", JAF 12 (Summer, 1975): 47.

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Robert Seltzer, "The Alternative Justification Affirmative Practical and Theoretical Implications," JAF 11 (Summer, 1974): 135; and Penny Ricchio, "A Response to General Systems Theory as a Possible Case Structure," Forensic 2 (January, 1976): 7.

In the AJ format, each part must carry its burden of proof and be prima facies. The question which remains is how many components must the affirmative carry to win the round. In the actual debate round judges are allowing affirmatives to carry single components if it can prove that that component fulfills all requirements of the burden of proof. In other words if it is inherent, significant, topical, solvent, and free of disadvantages, it can win the round. While the journals may be fighting out the AJ's legitimacy, judges are taking definite stands for it every weekend by accepting it on ballots.

In all four case structures the affirmative must prove a burden of proof, though the interpretations of these terms differed in each of the formats.

The Role of Burden of Proof Within

Three Judging Philosophies

The three judging models discussed in this paper will now be analyzed in light of the concept of the burden of proof.

Chenoweth provided three questions which the stock issues judge would use in evaluating the burden of proof. Is the case significant and inherent? Does the plan solve the problem? And is the case free of disadvantages?³⁷ As

³⁷Eugene C. Chenoweth, "Bearing the Affirmative Burden," Speech Activities, 6 (Summer, 1950): 85.

Zarefsky was quoted earlier, the meeting of these requirements is synonymous with meeting the traditional issues, those required by the stock issues judge. This philosophy requires that the affirmative case fulfill all of its basic requirements.

The hypothesis tester also requires that the affirmative carry the burden of proof. Henderson defined the relationship between the hypothesis tester and this proof.

The judge regards the data provided him the means to test the truth of the proposition. To the extent that the data leads him to accept the risks inherent in the propositions, he votes affirmative. If the data does not lead him to accept those risks, he votes negative. Presumption is against the resolution; not against change.³⁸

Zarefsky agreed and wrote that "so long as the negative opposes the proposition it retains presumption."³⁹ While this presumption perspective may not be unique to the hypothesis tester, it is more emphasized in this judging model than others.

Henderson contended that this philosophy would improve judge effectiveness.

If the judge were a 'single policy evaluator,' there would be less diffusion by the necessity to defend alternatives as thoroughly as attacking the one suggested by the proposition.⁴⁰

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Bill Henderson, "Debate as a Paradigm for Demonstrating Truth through Hypothesis Testing," Issues 9 (March, 1976): 11.

³⁹David Zarefsky, "Argument a Hypothesis Testing," Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the SCA, San Fransico, California, December, 1976, p. 10.

Though this paradigm may limit the area of debate, Thomas found fault in the idea that this model requires the judge to be a subject expert.⁴¹ Lichtman and Rohrer provided additional reasons why this model should not be applied to the debate round.

Hypothesis testing and debate are not analogous. The purpose of hypothesis testing is to determine the statistical probability that a statement is true. The determination requires only a null hypothesis, the one being tested. The goal of debate is to select the best policy from a range of alternatives. That inherently requires a comparison of two or more systems to determine their relative merits. A hypothesis can be tested in isolation. A policy proposal must be tested by comparison to alternative systems.⁴²

There are theoretical problems with the application of this model. The most effective philosophy would be one which integrates the best of all three. And for all practical purposes this is probably what occurs in the real debate round. At this time there is not literature to support or deny this hypothesis. It is open for research.

The literature is still debating the validity of systems analysis as a judging model. Currently, when it is applied, judges measure the burden of proof in a risk analysis; if the risks outweigh the disadvantages, the affirmative carries its burden.

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Thomas, Judging Debate, p. 109.

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Allan J. Lichtman and Daniel Rohrer, "Critique of Zarefsky on Presumption," Proceedings: National Conference on Argumentation, p. 41.

Brock et al. defined systems analysis and its interpretation of the burden of proof.

The burden of proof in systems theory requires demonstrating that the proposed system is superior to the present system.⁴³

Thomas defined presumption and systems analysis.

At the fundamental level, systems analysis assumes that change is inevitable in any case, regardless of the proposals implicit in a given resolution. From this perspective, the debate judge errs when he awards presumption to the negative side on the basis that the status quo is inadequate until a prima facie case is provided against it, because the status quo is not static.⁴⁴

He extended this with the conclusion that under systems analysis "judges may not appeal to presumption as the sole basis for the rejection of an affirmative proposal."⁴⁵

This change in presumption may be a lessening of the affirmative burden. This is similar to the shifting emphasis under the hypothesis testing model.

In relationship to prima facie a systems analysis approach believes that the

affirmative must compare two specific systems and demonstrate that the system it recommends better achieves a set of established goals than the old system being replaced.⁴⁶

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Brock et al, Public Policy Decision Making: Systems Analysis and Comparative Advantages Debate, P. 155.

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David A. Thomas, "The Swing to Systems Analysis: A Revolution in Debate Judging Standards?" Presented at the SSCA Convention, San Antonio Texas, April 1976, p. 9.

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Ibid., p. 10.

⁴⁶Brock et al, Public Policy Decision Making: Systems Analysis and Comparative Advantages Debate, p. 155.

Thomas agreed that not only must the affirmative prove a prima facie case, but added that the negative must also present a "coherent policy system."⁴⁷ The judge is required to compare policy systems to determine which is more desirable. The judge in a systems analysis approach is "seen as a chooser of policy options."⁴⁸ He supported this forensic development when he wrote:

I believe there is considerable merit in systems analysis as a toll for academic debate. Where both teams are responsible for advocating a position in the debate the evaluation formula on the bottom of the AFA ballot makes more sense
 'In my opinion the better debating was done
 '49

In all philosophies a judge is choosing one system over another, but since in the systems approach there is more emphasis in the literature on it, it appears more vital to that model.

Unger argued that it is often difficult to compare two different policies. It is often difficult to establish a comparison of different values.⁵⁰ In Judging Debate, Thomas contended that it is frequently a problem for judges to choose "the best system/policy" due to an

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Thomas, "The Swing to Systems Analysis," p. 7.

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Ibid.

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Ibid., p. 16-7

⁵⁰James Unger, "An Application of Theories to Academic Debate," The New Debate Readings in Contemporary Debate Theory, ed. Robert J. Branham, (Information Research Associates, 1975), p. 37.

inadequate background.⁵¹

The judge who actualizes this philosophy compares two policy options, using specific criteria to determine the most advantageous system to follow. Due to the newness of this approach the criteria it uses for evaluation of the two policies have not been clearly established or uniformly agreed upon.

Application of Information to
the Research Questions

This information will be applied to the four research questions, and then general conclusions shall be drawn from the material surveyed in this study.

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Thomas, Judging Debate, p. 109.

1. Have there been changes in the basic requirements of the affirmative case? The survey of literature performed by this writer discovered that Debate texts written during the 1950's and the 1970's required the affirmative to prove that it met its burden of proof and had established a prima facie case. Presumption, that which the affirmative must overcome in order to present its burden, is currently in the midst of an academic debate over the legitimacy of always assuming that the negative be granted presumption.

The right of fiat has occupied space in recent journals and coaches are debating whether debaters should be given a new burden, the burden to prove that their plan will be adopted. The burden of proof, despite changes in interpretations (which are discussed below) is a requirement the affirmative must meet.

2. If there have been changes, are they because of changes in the judging criteria used to evaluate these basic requirements? The traditional/stock issues approach equated the burden of proof with the meeting of the stock issues. The hypothesis tester measured the burden of proof in terms of risk analysis and probabilities. And the judge who is a systems analyzer demanded two policy systems, one from the affirmative as well as one from the negative. The purpose of this was to perform a comparative analysis.

3. If there have been changes, are they because of the changes in Affirmative case formats? The traditional case required that the affirmative meet all of its stock issues in order to meet the burden of proof in this case. The literature revealed that the CA case today must meet these same requirements, as the needs case. The Criteria Case also must meet these requirements, though it is value oriented. Each component of the AJ case must meet the burden requirements of the type of case that it is.

4. What is the effect of these changes on competitive interscholastic debate? The major change is that debaters must be able to adapt to the judging style of their judge. In previous years it was sufficient to prove to the judge that your case met the stock issues. You would then have carried your burden of proof. Now, if the judge is a hypothesis tester or systems analyzer, he will be looking for a comparison of policies; and the affirmative must be prepared to meet this new interpretation.

Summary

Marshall McLuhan once remarked: "We shape our tools, then our tools shape us." This is what has happened within the context of the affirmative case structure. The forensic community has shaped and reshaped the affirmative case, and its criteria for evaluation; and then these forms have altered some of our practices. Despite the accepted changes in interpretation and emphasis which have been discussed in each chapter, it is now time to return to that underlying question posed in the introduction. That is: Have there been changes in the basic requirements of the affirmative case, or is the new literature merely reiterating static concepts disguised by new names?

The literature has expanded its discussion of these components. On inherency we now debate structural, attitudinal, and existential levels, and in systems analysis, analyze it as a multidimensional construct. On significance, the literature of the seventies has not added much to that of the fifties. The only difference noted was in how the hypothesis tester and systems analyzer measured significance. They were both comparative in orientation. On topicality, while both periods agreed that the resolution was to be defined and actualized by the plan, the literature of the seventies spent more time on specifics. It argued about parameters and the legitimacy of adjunct. Concerning

plan requirements, both time periods agreed that the plan needed to be solvent and free of disadvantages, though the newer judging paradigms measured this requirement with different emphasis. On discussing the burden of proof, sources agreed that the case format was irrelevant. All cases were required to show that they had fulfilled their burden of proof, if they desired adoption.

The literature of the seventies has added new dimensions to the basic requirements of the affirmative case; most of them at this point are still in proposal form, waiting for a new verdict each debate round or in each new article. The eventual decision on their validity will help to standardize the interpretations of these affirmative requirements.

"The more things change the more they remain the same." The new forms of the affirmative case have caused shifts in emphasis on these requirements; and the new models have established different criteria for decision making; but after all the jargon is removed, it becomes apparent that for an affirmative case to have won the ballot in the fifties or in the seventies it must somehow have shown that its plan, which implements the resolution, alters advantageously some inherent significant situation.

Zarefsky contended that significance may be potential in nature; the forensic community may potentially drastically alter the affirmative case's requirements. But during the past twenty years its changes have been mainly attitudinal

and incremental in nature. Where we have altered structures, the interpretations have remained fairly traditional; and where we have allowed new interpretations, we have maintained a familiar structure. The new case structures and judging models provide the structure for this potential change to become actualized and to become accepted.

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