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Logic Programs vs. First-Order Formulas in Textual Inference

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Abstract

In the problem of recognizing textual entailment, the goal is to decide, given a text and a hypothesis expressed in a natural language, whether a human reasoner would call the hypothesis a consequence of the text. One approach to this problem is to use a first-order reasoning tool to check whether the hypothesis can be derived from the text conjoined with relevant background knowledge, after expressing all of them by first-order formulas. Another possibility is to express the hypothesis, the text, and the background knowledge in a logic programming language, and use a logic programming system. We discuss the relation of these methods to each other and to the class of effectively propositional reasoning problems. This leads us to general conclusions regarding the relationship between classical logic and answer set programming as knowledge representation formalisms.

1 Introduction

In the problem of recognizing textual entailment, the goal is to decide, given a text $T$ and a hypothesis $H$ expressed in a natural language, whether a human reasoner would call $H$ a consequence of $T$. The following example is No. 115 in the collection of problems proposed as the Second PASCAL Recognizing Textual Entailment Challenge Bar-Haim et al. (2006):

$T$: The World Bank has also been criticized for its role in financing projects that have been detrimental to human rights and the natural environment.

$H$: The World Bank is criticized for its activities.

Expected answer: Yes.

Recognizing textual entailment is a special case of a more general and practically important problem, textual query answering.

To recognize the fact that $H$ is “entailed” by $T$, we often need to use some background commonsense knowledge. For instance, in the example above it is essential that financing is an activity.

The approach to recognizing textual entailment employed in Bos and Markert (2005) and implemented in the system Nutcracker\(^1\) can be summarized as follows:

(i) $T$ and $H$ are represented first by discourse representation structures Kamp and Reyle (1993) and then by first-order formulas,

(ii) potentially relevant background knowledge is identified and expressed by a first-order formula $BK$,

(iii) an automated reasoning system is used to check whether the implication

$$T \land BK \rightarrow H$$

is logically valid.

\(^1\text{http://www.cogsci.ed.ac.uk/~jbos/RTE/}.$
Related work is described in Akhmatova (2005); Fowler et al. (2005).

The approach to the problem proposed in Baral et al. (2005); Tari and Baral (2005); Nouioua and Nicolas (2006) is similar, except that it relies on logic programs as the representation language instead of first-order formulas, and on logic programming systems as computational tools instead of first-order reasoners. The following example comes from the introduction to Baral et al. (2005):

\[ T: \text{In Paris, on March 15th, John packed his laptop in the carry-on luggage and took a plane to Baghdad.} \]

\[ H: \text{His laptop was in Baghdad on March 16th.} \]

**Expected answer:** Yes.

Here again some background commonsense knowledge is needed to recognize that yes is the correct answer: a trip from Paris to Baghdad by air does not normally take more than a day; a person and his carry-on luggage are normally in the same city. Baral et al. represent the text \( T \) by a set of rules,\(^2\) along with background knowledge \( BK \); \( H \) is represented by a ground atom. Then an answer set solver and a constraint logic programming system are used to establish the fact that \( H \) is entailed by logic program \( T \cup BK \).

Each of the two knowledge representation languages—first-order formulas and logic programs—has its own advantages. A first-order formula may have a complex, nested form; this is essential because discourse representation structures are often deeply nested. On the other hand, the semantics of logic programs is nonmonotonic; this is crucial when background commonsense knowledge is expressed by defaults (note the word “normally” in the examples above).

In this paper we argue, however, that these two versions of the logic approach to textual entailment have more in common than meets the eye. A large part of the work done by Bos and Markert can be understood in terms of the logic programming methodology advocated by Baral et al. Many textual entailment problems used to test the Nutcracker system can be solved by the answer set solver DLV\(^3\) instead of the first-order theorem prover VAMPIRE\(^4\) and the model builder PARADOX\(^5\) that were actually employed in Nutcracker experiments.

The first-order reasoning problems that can be naturally expressed by logic programs have a distinctive syntactic feature: they belong to the “effectively propositional,” or “near-propositional” formulas Schulz (2002). The relationship between effectively propositional reasoning (EPR) and answer set programming (ASP) Lifschitz (1999); Marek and Truszczyński (1999); Niemelä (1999) is one of the topics discussed in this paper. This will bring us, at the end of the paper, to some general conclusions regarding the relationship between classical logic and answer set programming as knowledge representation formalisms.

### 2 Representing EPR Formulas by Logic Programs

We consider here first-order formulas that may contain equality and object constants, but not function constants of arity \( > 0 \). An **EPR formula** is the universal closure of a quantifier-free formula in conjunctive normal form. We will show how to turn any EPR formula \( F \) into a logic program \( \pi(F) \) such that \( \pi(F) \) has a stable model iff \( F \) is satisfiable.

In the definition of \( \pi \) we assume that every clause in \( F \) is written as an implication with a conjunction of atoms (possibly empty) in the antecedent, and a disjunction of atoms (possibly empty) in the consequent:

\[
A_1 \land \cdots \land A_m \rightarrow A_{m+1} \lor \cdots \lor A_n.
\] (2)

\(^2\)This is done manually; automating the translation is mentioned in the paper as future work.

\(^3\)http://www.dbai.tuwien.ac.at/proj/dlv/.


\(^5\)http://www.math.chalmers.se/~koen/paradox/.
Besides the predicate constants occurring in $F$, the program $\pi(F)$ will contain two new predicate constants: the unary constant $u$ (for “universe”) and the binary constant $eq$ (for “equals”). For any atomic formula $A$, by $A^{eq}$ we denote $eq(t_1, t_2)$ if $A$ is an equality $t_1 = t_2$, and $A$ otherwise.

Program $\pi(F)$ consists of

(i) the facts $u(c)$ for all object constants $c$ occurring in $F$;

(ii) the rules

$$
eq(X, X) \leftarrow u(X)$$

$$
eq(Y, X) \leftarrow \neq(X, Y)$$

$$
eq(X, Z) \leftarrow \neq(X, Y), \neq(Y, Z);$$

(iii) the rules

$$p(Y_1, \ldots, Y_k) \leftarrow p(X_1, \ldots, X_k), \neq(X_1, Y_1), \ldots, \neq(X_k, Y_k)$$

for all predicate constants $p$ occurring in $F$;

(iv) the disjunctive rules

$$A_{m+1}^{eq}; \ldots; A_n^{eq} \leftarrow A_1^{eq}, \ldots, A_m^{eq}, u(X_1), \ldots, u(X_k)$$

corresponding to the conjunctive terms (2) of $F$, where $X_1, \ldots, X_k$ are the variables that occur in the consequent $A_{m+1} \vee \cdots \vee A_n$ of (2) but do not occur in its antecedent $A_1 \wedge \cdots \wedge A_m$.

If, for instance, $F$ is

$$\forall X (p(a) \wedge p(b) \wedge \neg p(c) \wedge (p(X) \rightarrow X = a))$$ (3)

then $\pi(F)$ consists of the rules

$$u(a) \leftarrow u(b) \leftarrow u(c) \leftarrow$$

$$\neq(X, X) \leftarrow u(X)$$

$$\neq(Y, X) \leftarrow \neq(X, Y)$$

$$\neq(X, Z) \leftarrow \neq(X, Y), \neq(Y, Z)$$

$$p(Y) \leftarrow p(X), \neq(X, Y)$$

$$p(a)$$

$$p(b)$$

$$\leftarrow p(c)$$

$$\neq(X, a) \leftarrow p(X).$$ (4)

As usual in answer set programming, by a model (stable model) Gelfond and Lifschitz (1988, 1991) of $\pi(F)$ we understand a model (stable model) of the corresponding ground program. It is clear that $\pi(F)$ is a (possibly disjunctive) program without negation. Its stable models are simply minimal models. Each rule of $\pi(F)$ is safe—every variable occurring in its head occurs also in its body. The stable models of this program can be generated by the answer set solver DLV.

**Theorem**  For any EPR formula $F$, the following conditions are equivalent:

(i) $F$ is satisfiable,

(ii) $\pi(F)$ has a model,

(iii) $\pi(F)$ has a stable model.

If $F$ does not contain equality then this assertion remains valid if all rules containing $eq$ are dropped from $\pi(F)$. 
For instance, formula (3) is satisfiable; accordingly, program (4) has a stable model:

\[ \{ u(a), u(b), u(c), p(a), p(b), eq(a, a), eq(b, b), eq(c, c), eq(a, b), eq(b, a) \}. \]

**Proof** We begin by proving the second claim, that is, assume that \( F \) does not contain equality and that the rules containing \( eq \) are dropped from the program \( \pi(F) \). From (i) to (ii). \( F \) is the universal closure of a quantifier-free formula, and it is satisfiable. Consequently \( F \) has an Herbrand model. By adding to this model the atoms \( u(c) \) for all object constants \( c \) we get a model of \( \pi(F) \). From (ii) to (iii). The result of grounding \( \pi(F) \) is a finite program without negation; since it has a model, it has a minimal model. From (iii) to (i). By removing the atoms \( u(c) \) from a model of \( \pi(F) \) we get an Herbrand model of \( F \). Consider now the general case, when \( F \) may contain equality. Let \( F^* \) be the formula obtained from \( F \) by

- replacing each equality \( t_1 = t_2 \) with \( eq^*(t_1, t_2) \), where \( eq^* \) is a new binary predicate constant;
- conjoining the result with the universal closures of the formulas

\[
eq^*(X, Y) \rightarrow eq^*(Y, X),
\]

\[
eq^*(X, Y) \land eq^*(Y, Z) \rightarrow eq^*(X, Z)
\]

and

\[
p(X_1, \ldots, X_k) \land eq^*(X_1, Y_1) \land \cdots \land eq^*(X_k, Y_k) \rightarrow p(Y_1, \ldots, Y_k)
\]

for all predicate constants \( p \) occurring in \( F \);
- converting the result to prenex form.

It is clear that \( F^* \) is an EPR formula that does not contain equality, and that it is satisfiable iff \( F \) is satisfiable. The rules of \( \pi(F^*) \) that do not contain \( eq \) can be obtained from the rules of \( \pi(F) \) by replacing each occurrence of \( eq \) with \( eq^* \). Consequently \( \pi(F^*) \) has a model (stable model) iff \( \pi(F) \) has a model (stable model). It remains to apply the part of the theorem proved above to \( F^* \).

This proof shows that, in the case when \( F \) does not contain equality, the models of \( \pi(F) \) are essentially identical to the Herbrand models of \( F \).

From the theorem we see that testing an EPR formula for satisfiability can be accomplished using an answer set solver. In the next section we investigate the applicability of this idea to the problem of recognizing textual entailment.

### 3. EPR Formulas in Experiments with Textual Entailment

Recall that Bos and Markert [2005] recognize textual entailment by determining whether implication (1) is logically valid.\(^6\) In many cases, the negation

\[ T \land BK \land \neg H \]

(5)

of formula (1) can be converted to a prenex form with all existential quantifiers in front of the universal quantifiers ("\( \exists \forall \)-prenex form"). Then the sentence \( F \), obtained from this prenex form by Skolemization and then converting the quantifier-free part to conjunctive normal form, is an EPR formula. It is clear that (1) is logically valid iff \( F \) is unsatisfiable.

The possibility of converting (5) to \( \exists \forall \)-prenex form is essential because it guarantees that no function constants of arity \( > 0 \) are introduced in the process of Skolemization. It is clear that conjunction (5) can be written in \( \exists \forall \)-prenex form if every conjunctive term can be written in this form.

\(^6\)Like other existing systems for recognizing textual entailment, Nutcracker is not completely reliable. Generally, formulas \( H \) and \( T \) only approximate the meanings of RTE sentence pairs. For instance, Nutcracker currently ignores the semantics of plurals, tense, and aspect. Also, formula \( BK \) may not adequately represent all relevant background knowledge.
How restrictive is this requirement? The website shown in Footnote 1 gives the first-order formulas corresponding to 799 textual entailment problems from the second PASCAL collection that were produced by Nutcracker. In 711 cases (89%), both $T$ and $\neg H$ can be converted to $\exists \forall$-prenex form. The conjunctive terms of $BK$ come from two sources: most are automatically extracted from WordNet, the others are hand-coded. All conjunctive terms of the first kind are universal sentences, so that each of them is $\exists \forall$-prenex. Among the hand-coded parts of $BK$ that Bos and Markert chose to include we found several exceptions, but they are never essential: dropping the “difficult” hand-coded part of $BK$ from any of the 711 implications (1) that we have studied never makes a logically valid formula invalid.

The model builder PARADOX terminates, in principle, on any EPR formula; it generates a model if the formula is satisfiable, and reports that it is unsatisfiable otherwise. For this reason, in each of the 711 cases (with the inessential “difficult” terms dropped) Bos and Markert would be able to test the formula for satisfiability by running PARADOX alone, without invoking also the theorem prover VAMPIRE.

In these 711 cases we could also test the logical validity of (1) by running the answer set solver DLV, as described in the previous section. Interestingly, the runtime of DLV was smaller than the runtime of the model builder PARADOX in most cases, even though DLV did some redundant work: whenever the program $\pi(F)$ has a model, it computed one of its minimal models. We should add that all these runtimes are pretty small, usually less than a second.

The main computational difference between model builders, such as PARADOX, and answer set solvers, such as DLV, is that model builders typically start by looking for a finite model with a small universe (say, a singleton); if there is no such model then search is extended to larger universes. If the input is an EPR formula containing $N$ object constants, then answer set solvers ground the given program with the universe of size $N$, which means essentially that they only look for a model of cardinality $N$. Good answer set solvers, such as DLV, perform grounding “intelligently” and sometimes introduce auxiliary predicates that make the size of the grounded program smaller.

It is interesting also that among the 711 EPR formulas from Nutcracker experiments that we have investigated, 514 are Horn—all their conjunctive terms (2) are definite ($n = m + 1$) or negative ($n = m$). If $F$ is a Horn EPR formula then the program $\pi(F)$ is nondisjunctive; since there is no negation in this program, it can have at most one stable model. Note that deciding whether a ground nondisjunctive program without negation has a model can be done in linear time.

4 Conclusion

The properties of the translation $\pi$ established in this paper suggest that EPR reasoning can be described as the common part of classical first-order logic and logic programming under the stable model semantics: (Figure 1). In terms of expressiveness, the availability of formulas more complex than EPR is a strong side of classical logic; the availability of negation as failure is a strong side of declarative logic programming. Representations used in the existing work on the analysis of textual inference in terms of classical logic belong mostly to the common part of the two areas.

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7System DLV has the option $\text{OM}$ that disables testing for minimality, but in our experiments it did not have a noticeable effect on runtimes.
References


