Opposition Strategy and Survival in Praetorian Brazil, 1964-1979

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Opposition groups in authoritarian political systems are constrained not only by the presence of coercive forces, but also by the indeterminate and uncertain application of repression. This article suggests the use of Albert Hirschman's rational model of dissent as an analytic framework for the study of interest articulation within mixed regimes. After deriving several behavioral attributes associated with dissent, the article then explores the utility of the Hirschman model within the Brazilian context. Several political strategies that allowed opposition forces to survive more than a decade of severe repression by the praetorian regime are examined. Political "safety zones" that permit opposition forces to avoid or neutralize repressive constraints also are identified. The article concludes with an assessment of the framework's potential for comparative research.

In April, 1964 the armed forces of Brazil deposed civilian President Joao Goulart and established a praetorian regime that has ruled the country for the last eighteen years (Schneider, 1971; Stepan, 1971; Flynn, 1978). True to the normal pattern of a coup d'etat (Nordlinger, 1977, pp. 112-113), the military acted to shrink the size of the political arena in order to stabilize what they and supportive civilian groups perceived to be a chaotic and threatening situation (Skidmore, 1967). Despite the often brutal and notorious attempts to curtail certain types of political activity, some opposition and dissent to the authoritarian government have managed to survive. In fact, the opposition's strength has grown over the years to the point where the current military president, Joao Baptista Figueiredo, now presides over a government-sponsored democratization plan, known as abertura or "opening" (Levine, 1980, pp. 49-50).1

*This article is a revised version of a paper delivered at the 1980 Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association. The advice and support of Maurice Simon, Donald Kelley, and Paul Beck as well as several anonymous reviewers have improved this essay.

1 Included in the major changes of the Figueiredo Administration's abertura policy are (a) the revocation of certain constitutional articles (e.g., 185 and 477) and institutional acts (e.g., AI-5) that have served as the legal basis for violating the protections on civil liberties listed in
The collapse of freely elected civilian governments and their replacement by various types of authoritarian regimes have been a major topic of comparative research since the rise of European fascism. Analysis of the reverse process by which authoritarian forms give way to more democratic ones has been studied only recently. Much of this new scholarship has focused on the internal dynamics of the ruling groups and institutions (Huntington and Moore, 1970). Less attention has been paid to the role of the opposition (McLennan, 1973; Chalmer and Robinson, 1980). This article suggests an analytic framework for the study of opposition forces within an authoritarian political system and then explores the utility of that framework within the Brazilian context. Before proceeding, it will be useful to indicate what this article does not purport to do. First, this essay does not chronicle in sequential fashion recent Brazilian political history. The time frame selected for analysis covers the period from the onset of military authoritarianism in 1964 until the government's implementation of the “opening to democracy” in 1979, a watershed year which “witnessed the most dramatic changes in Brazilian political atmosphere since the ouster of Joao Goulart 15 years earlier” (Levine, 1980, p. 49). Second, partly for conceptual reasons and partly because it has been done elsewhere (Fleischer, 1979; 1980), no attempt is made at an indepth examination of the Brazilian political party system. Instead, this article concentrates on the identification of political strategies that allowed opposition forces to survive more than a decade of severe repression by the praetorian regime. Thus, along with gaining insights into the politics of Brazil, the purpose of this essay is to introduce a conceptual framework for the study of opposition movements and to assess the analytic potential of the framework.

The 1946 Constitution; (b) the re-establishment of habeas corpus and judicial supremacy; (c) the withdrawal of the presidential prerogative to suspend federal, state, and local elected officials; (d) a broad amnesty decree for persons convicted of non-violent political crimes against the regime; and (e) the reorganization of the political party and election rules to permit a multiparty system (see Latin American Index, Vols. VI and VII).

Debate still continues about the scope and effect of the abertura policy. Some observers (e.g., Alves, 1981, p. 9) argue that although the changes have “resulted in real gains, these have been limited to granting crucial individual rights guarantees ... it does not warrant the common characterization of a period of transition to democracy.” Contrasting views can be seen in Pang’s (1981, p. 57) observation that, “the designers of the policy of abertura want to use it as a vehicle to provide a credible degree of political democracy and social reforms ...” Levine (1982, p. 60) likewise points out that, “... the events of 1981 demonstrated that abertura (literally ‘opening’) had penetrated more deeply into society than had previously been imagined and had affected more people’s lives.”

Evaluations of abertura, of course, depend on one’s definition of democracy. Objectively, the changes have made a significant step toward a rule of law, ended the state of emergency powers of the president, and allowed for the return from exile of over 4,500 individuals, many of whom have been prominent opponents of the regime.
Since its inception the praetorian government of Brazil has struggled with what Dahl (1973, p. 13) terms "the dilemma of mixed regimes." Encompassing the complete range of governments that fall between democratic and totalitarian states, mixed regimes vary from one-party states with universal suffrage to competitive oligarchies. According to Dahl (1973, pp. 13-18), mixed regimes normally tolerate some form of "loyal" opposition and/or find it difficult, if not impossible, to eliminate all "disloyal" opposition. Because the rulers of these diverse governments deliberately choose not to install a comprehensive police state, yet refuse to permit wide-open participation, mixed regimes become caught in a Catch-22 situation: "if they could tolerate some opposition, could they indefinitely enforce any limits to toleration—short of the wide limits set in polyarchies?" (Dahl, 1973, p. 13). Consequently, "mixed regimes are prone to oscillate between liberalization and repression" (Dahl, 1973, p. 18).

Between 1964 and 1979 four successive military administrations in Brazil tried to escape this participation dilemma by searching for a balance between continued praetorian domination of society and unrestrained political competition. Having created neither a totalitarian nor a democratic government, the Brazilian military found itself in the politically painful quandary of mixed regimes. From the leadership's perspective, rapid movement in either direction posed twin dangers. To yield to demands for liberalization risked an uncontrolled chain reaction of repressed political interests that could lead to a polyarchy and ultimately to a redistribution of political and economic power. Conversely, if the forces for liberation overtly threatened the regime's principal allies, the degree of suppression required to gain control of runaway political elements might well have transformed the mixed regime into a totalitarian state.

In fact, the one constancy about political participation in Brazil during this period was the remarkable fluctuation in the degree of political suppression. Government policy toward newspapers from 1964 to 1979 conveniently illustrates this raising and lowering of the barriers to political expression common in mixed regimes. At one time or another, some Brazilian newspapers were closed, articles were deleted, and strict censorship imposed. But, at other times the same newspapers published direct

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2 A totalitarian situation in Brazil would be unacceptable to many of the praetorian regime's allies primarily because of the restraints on the international flow of capital and probable loss of some markets. Other reasons include Brazil's image overseas and the sheer cost of a comprehensive and effective police state apparatus, as well as a police state's impact on the quality of life even for the regime's allies.
attacks on important public policies, exposed serious scandals involving
major government officials, and even printed various forms of humor
ridiculing the foibles of the military rulers (Pierce, 1979). This expansion
and contraction of publishing limits fits neatly with Dahl's description of
ruler behavior in mixed regimes.

However, just as the pressure for liberalization and the counter­
pressures for continued suppression cause a mixed regime to waffle as to
the exact boundaries of permissible public debate, so also do the repressed
groups find themselves in a political dilemma. Viewed from the opposi­
tion's perspective, the narrow but indeterminate limits on interest arti­
culation in a mixed regime likewise pose serious strategic problems. To
abide by the regime's guidelines means to acquiesce to prevailing political
arrangements. On the other hand, to defy the government means to risk
political and even physical liquidation. As Linz (1973, pp. 219-226)
clearly explains, it is evident that the varying degrees of "semifreedom"
found in a mixed regime act as a political puzzle for rulers and ruled alike.

Sensitivity to both sides of the participatory dilemma must be incor­
porated into theoretical propositions about the political dynamics of
authoritarian systems. Though it has been commonplace to report the
composition of dissident movements and the troubles besetting them, not
many studies go beyond the level of chronological description and at­
tempt to develop an analytic framework. For example, numerous ac­
counts of opposition politics contain substantial detail on personalities
and coalitions but offer no insights into the strategies governing opposi­
tion actions. Similarly, some studies succumb to the "drama" of guerrilla
theater by trying to capture the *modus operandi* of the rebels. Other
analyses, lured by the temptation of data availability, focus on "sectoral"
or "corporatist" groups that actively cooperate with the regime in making
and implementing policy. Unfortunately, few concepts that can serve as
a foundation for cross-cultural comparison of opposition behavior emerge
from this literature.

As an exploratory effort to probe the opposition's difficulties with the
participation dilemmas of mixed regimes, this essay concentrates on the
strategy of political actors who belong to neither government-sponsored
corporatist structures nor underground cells of active resistance.
Operating within the ever-shifting zone of "semifreedom," these indi­
viduals and groups strive for basic institutional and/or policy changes
while attempting to avoid the extremes of coopted loyalty to or violent re­
jection of the mixed regime. Gino Germani (1970, p. 368) in his eight­

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3 To categorize sectoral or corporatist groups as part of an authoritarian regime's opposi­
tion is somewhat misleading. The main thrust of corporatist writing demonstrates that these
governmentally organized syndicates constitute one of the main pillars of mixed and
hegemonic regimes.
fold categorization of citizen responses to authoritarian governments recognizes this class of political behavior and labels it "active deviationist." This special type of citizen in the mixed regime articulates opposition to prevailing policy without the institutional protection available within government-sponsored corporatist channels and without the physical protection afforded by membership in a clandestine group. By foregoing the resources of legitimacy or weapons, this "active deviationist" (individual or group) must rely on more fragile political resources and must devise finely tuned strategies of political and physical survival. Analysis of their methods and strategies of expression not only will illuminate how such citizens manage to survive, but also will contribute to the general understanding of policy formulation in nondemocratic systems.

**AN "INDIVIDUALISTIC" MODEL OF DISSENT**

A substantial portion of the literature on opposition politics starts from the governmental side of the participation dilemma. Discussions of opposition and dissent are approached from the logical emphasis on the institutions, processes, and dynamics of mixed regimes. One of the most typical research questions asked is: how does an authoritarian government stay in power? Theoretical struggles with this theme usually produce typologies derived from a rather small number of analytic dimensions. Among the more popular categories are: (1) the degree of mass participation, (2) the extent of regime legitimacy, (3) the degree of political suppression, and (4) the power capacity of the political system (Blondel, 1969; Huntington and Moore, 1970; Almond and Powell, 1978). Whatever the chosen dimensions, the analytic perspective stays fixed on the organizational and operational problems of the authoritarian government.

Another common approach to mixed regimes employs political parties as the unit of analysis. The advantage here, of course, is that the one-party state can be equated, *ipso facto*, with an authoritarian regime. This labor-saving distinction yields many research benefits. For example, descriptions of authoritarian policy initiation, adoption, and implementation can be hung neatly onto a standard structural and behavioral analysis of the single party. Similarly, many important insights about interest articulation within the authoritarian setting can be gained from following the internal maneuverings of intraparty factions. Again, however, the theoretical attack centers on the authority and power of the government and/or the dominant political party.

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4 Also see Juan Linz (1973a, pp. 211-319) for a discussion of the alegal opposition, which is defined as "dissidents who can prove that they have an initial identification with the system, or have evolved to their position out of the tendencies within the system . . ."
By an explanatory switch to the other side of the participation dilemma, a fuller understanding of opposition politics can be obtained. Imposing systematic order on such slippery aspects of dissent as origins, motives, themes, and strategies demands a conceptual scheme which adopts the individual as the unit of analysis. Equally important, the uncertainties, the choices, and the consequences of interest articulation within a zone of "semifreedom" must be incorporated into any proposed framework for opposition politics. Admittedly, developing propositions about the behavioral attributes of opposition forces is no easy task.

Several years ago Albert Hirschman (1970) developed a rational model of membership response to the problem of decline, or "repairable lapses," in the performance of economic and political organizations. His identification of the options open to consumers/members who dislike the way things are going in a particular firm/organization makes Hirschman's conceptualization especially applicable to the opposition side of the participation dilemma. Normally, people are loyal to a given firm/organization; that is, considerable deterioration must set in before discontent builds up.\(^5\) If the situation begins to worsen, individuals can choose to remain passive and tolerate lower levels of performance (i.e., loyalist behavior). But to prevent further decline or to recuperate previous levels of performance individuals can select from two alternative options: exit and voice. Exit refers to the economist's standard remedy for consumer dissatisfaction—switching to a competing product or leaving the organization. To resort to voice

\[\ldots\text{is for the customer or member to make an attempt at changing the practices, policies, and outputs of the firm from which one buys or of the organization to which one belongs. Voice is here defined as any attempt at all to change, rather than escape from, an objectionable state of affairs, whether through individual or collective petition to the management directly in charge, through appeal to a higher authority with the intention of forcing a change in management, or through various types of actions and protests, including those that are meant to mobilize public opinion (Hirschman, 1970, p. 30).}\]

Although voice can be overdone (i.e., protests can hinder rather than help recovery), "voice has the function of alerting a firm or organization to its failings." Because voice "must then give management, old or new, some time to respond to the pressures that have been brought to bear on it" (Hirschman, 1970, p. 33), voice in comparison to exit is a more restrained option for initiating change within a firm/organization.

\(^5\) A classic example of a voiceer referring to this wait for "management" to rectify its deteriorating ways is, of course, Thomas Jefferson's statement in The Declaration of Independence: "Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shown, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed."
Though exit and voice are alternative modes of action, voice is the more difficult or, as Hirschman puts it, the more “messy” option. Usually, an individual selects between loyalty and exit; but when the exit option is unavailable or costly, then voice is the only remaining course of action.  

From this, it is an easy step to postulate that voice arises from discontented, but nonexiting consumers/members. In particular, Hirschman suggests that firms and organizations do business with a mixture of alert and inert customers. As he explains, a given deterioration in quality will inflict very different losses on different customers (because the appreciation of quality varies greatly). The alert customer or “connoisseur” would be most prone to exit if quality declines (Hirschman, 1970, p. 48). However, if exit is blocked as it is in authoritarian settings (e.g., the refusal to grant passports), then politically alert citizens (“connoisseurs”) must voice their dissatisfaction if they wish to reverse government decline. But, “for voice to function properly, it is necessary that individuals possess reserves of political influence which they can bring into play when they are sufficiently aroused” (Hirschman, 1970, p. 70). Translated into propositional form, the source of voice will be citizens who believe they possess enough political resources (and interest and information) to influence a regime’s actions. Conversely, politically inert or uneducated citizens (e.g., peasants) will be absent from the choir of “voicers.”

Due to the differential impact of quality decline, different individuals will voice distinctive complaints. Products for which ready substitutes exist permit easy exit. On the other hand, products which are unique make exit costly. In regard to public goods and services, Hirschman theorizes that declines in capital-intensive or tangible good public activities like parks, roads, and sanitation will provoke less “voice” than declines in labor-intensive or personal service public activities such as education, health, and law enforcement. Interestingly, voice is held to be the most likely and most important response to declines in what Hirschman (1970, pp. 52-53) calls “quality of life” products (e.g., civil liberties). Complaints can be registered about product quality (e.g., substantive public policy) as well as product production and delivery (e.g., procedural public policy). Voiced complaints also vary as to the thematic emphasis on the personalistic effects of quality decline versus the broader, community-wide effects of quality decline. One can

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6 To amplify this point Hirschman refers to the Soviet Union.
7 Hirschman (1970, p. 61) notes that exit is a function of the ease of leaving the country and living in another culture/nation. As an example, he points to the common flight by Argentine dissidents to Uruguay.
hypothesize that voicing personal hardship is politically easier and safer than voicing communal hardship. If voice is the most difficult of the three options, why do persons select it? Hirschman (1970, pp. 37-38) answers this question by listing a number of viewpoints typical of “voicers.” First, “voicers” are individuals who prefer to remain with the firm/organization and expect it to recover its original superiority over competitors. Second, “voicers” feel that they must “do something” and that they can have an impact. Third, “voicers” expect other individuals to join them in expressing dissatisfaction, and thus expect to be successful. To put this another way, individuals justify voice behavior with the hope of putting the firm/organization “back on the track.” This hope is reinforced by the belief that they, in fact, can point out the way back and that others will actively support their vision of quality. In a sense, “voicers” feel they have “no where else to go,” and therefore they have maximum incentive to articulate dissatisfaction with deterioration in product quality.

Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in a Praetorian Context

The first step in applying Hirschman’s framework to interest articulation in authoritarian settings is the separation of “voicers” from “exiters” and “loyalists.” The physical action of exiters makes identification relatively simple. Since the abandonment or the destruction of primordial social institutions such as the family, the tribe, the church, and the state is ordinarily unthinkable (Hirschman, 1970, p. 76), individuals will be classified as having chosen to exit if: (1) they participate in any group committed to armed struggle against the mixed regime (e.g., the VAR-Palmares Revolutionary Avant-Garde, an urban guerrilla group that operated in Brazil during the late 1960s and early 1970s), or (2) they leave the country voluntarily—that is, not under imminent threat of arrest or actual banishment. To vote with one’s feet is to walk away from the deteriorating firm/organization; to vote with bullets and bombs is to demolish the deteriorating firm/organization. Although their methods may seem poles apart, defectors and terrorists, unlike voicers, have given up the hope of putting the firm/organization “back on track.” In contrast, “voice always involves the decision to ‘stick’ with the deteriorating firm/organization” (Hirschman, 1970, p. 38).

Some authoritarian governments have legitimized personal discontent with the delivery of public services. Poland for some time has had a television show that acts as an “ombudsman” for citizen complaints with local public services (e.g., sanitation).

Martyrdom, of course, is the ultimate form of exit!

Barghoorn’s (1973, p. 70) typology of Russian opposition movements includes one category labeled “subversive opposition” which he characterizes as “system-rejective.” Members of such subversive groups engage in violence because they believe in a vision of the future that encompasses a different type of hegemonic regime.
Distinguishing between "voicers" and "loyalists" is relatively more complex because voice always includes an element of loyalty (Hirschman, 1970, p. 82). That is, both loyalists and voicers choose to stay with the firm/organization because both types of individuals usually "care" about the firm/organization's fate. Loyalists and voicers part company over the appropriate response to deterioration. According to Hirschman (1970, p. 38), loyalists: (1) refuse to leave the firm/organization, (2) refuse to actively participate in actions designed to change the firm/organization's policies, (3) suffer in silence, confident that things will soon get better, and (4) often exhibit an irrational attachment to the firm/organization. Furthermore, loyalists are less likely to perceive deterioration or believe that they can continue to receive enough benefits to outweigh the costs of exit or of voice (Hirschman, 1970, p. 99). In a phrase, loyalists differentially tolerate lower quality levels than voicers. Because loyalists are easier to satisfy, they will continue active support (either in the form of buying the deteriorating product or remaining within the declining organization) in spite of their dissatisfaction.

In the application of Hirschman's propositions to the praetorian context loyalists are citizens who refuse to exit or voice despite disagreements with the regime. Loyalists can be identified not only by a "my country right or wrong" attitude, but also by their willingness to behave in accordance with government guidelines or remain dependent on government favors. In addition, individuals who disagree with the regime but refuse to articulate their discontent also fall into the loyalist category. Examples of Brazilian loyalists abound; they would include the industrializing bourgeoisie, the military officer corps, and the civil service. The "loyalty" of individuals belonging to these groups can be directly associated with the benefits that have accrued to them from the post-1964 regime's policies (Flynn, 1978, p. 529).

Government-sponsored occupational syndicates have constituted a second type of "loyal" political organization in Brazil. These numerous corporatist structures are held to be the "cornerstone of the sistema" (the Brazilian "establishment") because their recognition, finances, leadership, and membership benefits come from the government (Schmitter, 1973, pp. 206-209). Whether the sindicatos were controlled through the direct use of pelegos (pro-government agents operating within the organization) or more simply through the licensing of a single legal association for each occupation, this type of economic organization allowed the government to "eliminate spontaneous interest articulation and establish a limited number of authoritatively recognized groups that interact with the government apparatus in defined and regularized ways" (Malloy, 1977, p. 4). Given this dependency on the regime's benevolence, sindicato members in their official capacities should be con-
considered loyalists. This classification does not preclude a natural difference of opinion between sindicato members and the government over the exact slice of the public pie destined for the group. Although corporatist structures permitted the Brazilian state to subordinate civil society, the corporatist arrangement also permitted “the opening of institutionalized areas of the state to the representation of organized interests of civil society” (O'Donnell, 1977, p. 48). That is, corporatism, like any control structure, involves a reciprocal bargain (Cyert and March, 1963, p. 33) and thus patron-client loyalty often yields mutual socioeconomic benefits for both parties (Chalmers, 1972, pp. 61-76; Collier and Collier, 1977, pp. 489-512). From a more comparative perspective, system-acceptable groups organized along economic sectoral lines operate legally in many different political systems, and may articulate “programmatic” positions not necessarily in agreement with policies pursued by the regime in regard to the sector's salient interests without being considered disloyal.

Privately organized interest groups comprise another potential source of regime loyalists. Some social and economic groups can choose deliberately to grant or withhold allegiance to the regime. For example, some private groups have been among the Brazilian regime's most enthusiastic boosters, as exemplified by the Sao Paulo business community, especially its more rabid members who “contributed (funds) to official bodies of repression” (Banderia, 1975, p. 204). In other situations private groups may swing back and forth between loyalty and vocal opposition, such as the Catholic hierarchy and some elements of the mass media. At the individual level, citizens may choose to express loyalty by casting their ballot for the pro-government party or they may choose other less loyal options, including voting for an officially permitted opposition party (e.g., the MDB) or by casting a blank ballot.11

Because choice of response to deterioration lies at the heart of Hirschman's conceptualization, his model considers inaction as a manifestation of loyalty. To acquiesce passively or to withdraw (even in despair or disgust) from political action is, for Hirschman, to remain loyal. By this logic, then, the large numbers of apolitical or inactive citizens in mixed regimes like Brazil embody another sizeable portion of loyalists. In Hirschman's categorization, an individual must act to either exit or “voice” complaints with the firm/organization's performance in order not to be labeled as loyal. To summarize briefly, loyalists are citizens who deliberately act to support the praetorian regime or who submit to the regime by foregoing the exit or voice options. Loyalty may flow from one or more motives: (1) ideological or philosophical agreement

11 Although Hirschman views non-voting as a passive act and therefore a sign of loyalty, casting a blank ballot should be considered “voice.”
with the regime, (2) receipt of tangible rewards conditioned on loyalty, (3) rational calculus over the benefits and costs of any political action vis-à-vis other personal priorities (Olson, 1965), and (4) inability or unwillingness to exit or voice.

“Voicers” concur with loyalists as to the importance of working within the firm/organization, while at the same time adopting a product and/or system-disapproving stance. Voice aims at securing change—e.g., inclusive participation—by working within the regime or by engaging in acts held to be illegal only in dictatorships. Exit, by comparison, seeks change from outside the regime or through system-rejective actions which would be regarded as criminal by most, if not all, governments. As dissatisfied, non-exiting customers/members, voicers repudiate the motives and means of both loyalists and exiters. That is, voicers deliberately choose to maneuver politically between the extremes of allegiance and antagonism, between enthusiasm and enmity, and between collaboration and conflict.

Even though Hirschman alludes to voice strategies only briefly, nevertheless his comments supply clues to some provocative hypotheses about the character of voicers. First, voice will not be limited to career politicians, but will emanate from a range of individuals with diversified backgrounds. Second, because voice can take many forms, its use requires inventiveness. In a mixed regime, this observation is especially apt when read in the light of Hirschman’s view that voice will be more effective if it is direct, straightforward, and public. At first glance, close adherence to this prescription would seem to guarantee a quick trip to the nearest jail. Hirschman (1970, p. 100), however, proposes an intriguing and risky solution: the threat of exit. Since “connoisseurs” are valuable customers/members, their exit would accelerate quality decline and, thus, the firm/organization needs to retain some “connoisseurs.” This means that prominent or popular persons from various societal sectors can exert some leverage with an authoritarian regime. As an example, Hirschman notes the blow to a government’s legitimacy caused by the resignation-in-protest of an important official. Consequently, political “connoisseurs” can voice with a considerable, though indeterminate, range of volume and have some sense of protection from serious reprisal.

Trying to maintain this delicate balance between loyalty and system rejection imposes on voicers a politics of survival within the shifting limits of permitted interest articulation. Solitary individuals, groups of various sorts, and well-established institutions may choose the voice option. Levine (1979, p. 83) in describing the growing pressure for an opening (abertura) to democracy in 1978 illustrates this diversity of Brazilian voices:
The major issue in the campaign for increased democratic freedom is amnesty for the regime's enemies and former exiles who have returned home but whose political voices have been silenced. Some have also advocated amnesty for the torturers and agents of repression to achieve a state of national forgiveness. Archbishop Arns has been deeply involved in the amnesty campaign; so are the National Conference of Bishops, Dalmo Dalleri, a leading lawyer; feminist Terezinha Zerbini; Bentes Monteiro; and General Pery Constant Bevilaqua, a conservative, legalist army officer dismissed under the Institutional Act, AI-5.

What these individuals and institutions (as well as others described in following sections) had in common was a willingness "to trade off the certainty of exit against the uncertainties of an improvement in the deteriorating product . . . and the estimate customers/members have of their ability to influence the organization" (Hirschman, 1970, p. 77). Voicers, in summary, are alert citizens who act to terminate product and/or organizational decline by bringing their influence to bear on the firm/organization's policy making.

For the purpose of imposing a rudimentary conceptual order on opposition politics in a mixed regime, four behavioral dimensions can be derived from Hirschman's model of voice behavior (see Table 1). The first dimension indicates the source of dissatisfaction. Are complaints coming from a "voice crying in the wilderness," from a small informal group, from an organization, or from an alliance of several groups? The next pattern considers the scope of the remedy sought to repair the lapse in governmental quality. Does the voice seek merely a personal redress of grievances, a group benefit, a class action, or a nationwide change? The third property refers to the opposed policy's centrality to the regime's own interests and operations. Has the complaint been lodged against a trivial concern, against some less-than-vital national policy, against a specific but critical national policy, or against the very nature of the regime and all its works? A fourth behavioral attribute encompasses the "publicness" versus the anonymity of the voiced complaint. Is the discontent voiced in an open, direct, straightforward fashion, is it expressed from behind a collective smoke screen, is it circulated as an anonymous declaration, or is the complaint only discovered by "reading between the lines" of a seemingly innocuous document?

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<td>Strategy Used</td>
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12 Usually, frontal assaults on a mixed regime will be camouflaged, especially if the level of repression is high.
Despite some obvious difficulties of operationalization, the behavioral properties of voice derived from Hirschman's analytic framework have the potential to advance the study of opposition politics along several fronts. Most directly, this individualistic approach can rectify the anecdotal character of much of the previous literature. Second, the development of behavioral attributes of opposition voice also allows the theorist to combine them into additional propositions suitable for research (see Appendix). And finally, the explanatory shift to the opposition's strategies for coping with political suppression in a "semifree" environment adds a completeness to the study of the participation dilemmas within mixed regimes.

Brazilian Impediments to Voice

A brief review of the significant obstacles to interest articulation in Brazil will furnish a practical background to this exploration of voice behavior using the Hirschman framework. Over the past eighteen years, the Brazilian praetorian regime has defined and redefined the boundaries of permissible political expression. A continuous stream of institutional acts, complementary acts, decree laws, and other "instructions" has been used as the regime's principal legal instruments for molding the political arena. As Roett (1972, p. 145) observes, "The Institutional Acts are a significant and interesting departure in Brazilian political life" and "constitute the justification for military intervention." Because almost every facet of politics was touched in some way by these restrictive regulations, an outline of a few of the more relevant and notorious edicts will convey a sense of the conditions that constrained voice behavior prior to the abertura policy initiated in 1979.

Appearing nine days after the golpe, the First Institutional Act (AI-1) contained several provisions designed to reorganize the formal executive and legislative processes. In addition, "it enables the Supreme Command (of the Revolution) to suspend political rights of citizens for ten years (cassacao) and to cancel the mandates of congressmen, state assemblymen, and municipal councilors, with the President to enjoy the same power for 60 days after taking office" (Schneider, 1971, p. 127). During 1964 the purges affected more than 3,500 individuals at the federal level and at least the same number at the subnational level.13 Included among these punitive measures were the cassation of the 3 previous civilian presidents, 116 elected representatives, 555 forced military retirements, 165 voluntary transfers to the reserves, and 1,528 firings (Schneider, 1971, pp. 199-200). Subsequent institutional acts ex-

13 Other compilations of the victims of the Brazilian armed forces' first wave of political purges can be found in Edmar Morel, O Golpe Comecou em Washington (1965) and in John W. F. Dulles, Unrest in Brazil: Political-Military Crises, 1955-1964 (1970).
tended this power and imposed greater restrictions on the activities of ostracized citizens. In response to a rising tide of resistance from different political quarters and an outbreak of urban terrorism, the military government closed the national congress and issued the draconian AI-5 (December 13, 1968) which effectively eliminated any pretext to a representative process (Schneider, 1971, pp. 274-278). Among its provisions, AI-5 gave the President full authority to impose political sanctions without scrutiny by the judiciary (Fiechter, 1975, p. 161), and it was later incorporated into the Constitution through a set of amendments in October, 1969.

While it was in force AI-5 served as the basis for cassation after cassation and quite rightly was the bête noire of the opposition forces. But other laws also threatened the voicing of discontent. For example, AI-14 "established the penalties of death, perpetual imprisonment, banishment, or confiscation of goods for those guilty of participating in psychological, revolutionary, or subversive war against the state" (Roett, 1972, p. 159). Decree-Law 898 (September 27, 1969) "tightened control on the press by punishing with prison sentences ranging from 6 months to 2 years the propagation either of 'false and tendentious news' or of true facts 'half-told or distorted' " (Fiechter, 1975, p. 174). Other important documents that imposed restrictions included the 1966 Rules for the Freedom of Expression and Information, the 1967 Press Law, and the 1969 Law of National Security. The constraining power of these and all the other extraordinarily numerous political regulations issued from 1964 to 1979 emerged not only from their severe penalties but also from their arbitrary

14 Fiechter (1975, p. 82) states that with the adoption of AI-2 the process of "authoritarian consolidation" was set in motion. Also see Flynn (1978, p. 330) who reaches the same judgment.

15 Busey (1969, pp. 58-85) points out that the extra constitutional measures utilized by the armed forces — i.e., the institutional acts, complementary laws, and decree-laws — are a normal feature of Brazilian political life.

16 All through 1968 political opposition and even violence against the regime increased. Especially provocative was the Alves affair which became a test of strength between the national congress and the military junta. At the same time, factional maneuvering within the officer corps escalated and ultimately led to the "coup within the coup." Promulgated on December 13, 1968, Institutional Act 5 apparently was part of the strategy of General Sarmento to prevent the "hard line" officers from gaining control of the government. The basic effect of AI-5 was the abandonment of any pretense of democracy, "controlled" or otherwise (Skidmore, 1971, pp. 266-278; Flynn, 1978, pp. 418-425).

AI-5 was rescinded as part of the bargain over the abertura policy worked out between the pro-government ARENA party and the opposition MDB party. Proposed by the National Security Council during President Geisel's last year in office, the national congress approved the end of these exceptional powers for president on September 21, 1978, effective January 1, 1979 (Latin American Index, Vol. VI: 71).

17 For a comprehensive list of laws and regulations concerning the mass media in Brazil in the post-1964 period, see Pierce (1979, Appendix).
application by the president and related security agencies. In a very real sense, the Brazilian president acted (and continues to act) as an umpire in the political system.18

Unlike many of the praetorian’s “legal” techniques, the official approval of published materials has long been part of Brazilian life (Skidmore, 1967, p. 36). While instances of political prohibition occurred prior to the present regime (Jornal do Brasil, 8/30/1961), censorship since 1945 usually affected only the moral or sexual content of books, films, radio, records, and television. Predictably, the military government transformed the Censorship Service into a comprehensive and oppressive guardian of the moral and political order (Schmitter, 1973, p. 217; Pierce, 1979, pp. 23-54). It was not uncommon to find several hundred items banned in a given year (Veja, 6/8/1975), thus the existence of vigorous censorship created “delicate relationships” between the mass media and the government (Veja, 6/29/1977). As noted in the opening section, the degree of state control over public media varied remarkably. Essentially, the press found itself engaged in a continuing joust with the censors over the precise borders of political expression. Artists, composers, scholars, and writers constantly had to test the somewhat elastic limits of “semifreedom” as delineated by the censors.

In order to control dissent the Brazilian armed forces erected “the most massive censorship operation in the Western hemisphere and perhaps in the noncommunist world” (Pierce, 1979, p. 27). Responsibility for enforcing the numerous acts and decrees was given over to a bewildering array of intelligence and police units, such as the National Intelligence Service (S.N.I.), the Department of Political and Social Order (D.O.P.S.), the federal police, the military police, and the police of the several states.19 An Operations Center for Internal Defense (C.O.D.I.) functioned in each state. I.P.M.s (Inqueritos Policial-Militar—Military-Police Investigations) became a common practice for tracking down “subversion.” Soon after their establishment the zealousness and ambiti-

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18 President Figueiredo’s handling of the 1981 bomb attempt at the Riocentro is a recent example of the Brazilian president's role as an arbiter between political forces. Investigation of the incident directly incriminated top officials in the First Army who were believed to be trying to frighten or warn the pro-abertura group that was sponsoring a May Day music concert. With moderate politicians backing the President, the counter-intelligence section of the First Army tried to blame left-wing terrorists. However, other officers such as Admiral Julio de Sa Bierrenbach, who sat on the Military Supreme Court, criticized the results of the official inquiry (Levine, 1982, pp. 60-61). Eventually, internal discord in the military was papered over by an apparent bargain in which President Figueiredo agreed not to sanction the officers responsible for the bombing on the condition that the commanders deactivate the right-wing terrorist section (Fleischer, 1981, pp. 41-42).

19 An indepth analysis of the operation of the intelligence agencies headquartered in Brasilia and their relation to the workings of presidential decisionmaking can be found in De Goes (1978, pp. 23-60).
tion of lower rank officers led to the I.P.M.s’ degeneration into an “in­
discriminate use of authority and power and the paying-off of old scores,
personal and political” (Flynn, 1978, p. 332). In addition to the govern­
ment’s own security forces unofficial, vigilante-style groups appeared
during the late 1960s and through the 1970s to exacerbate the life of
the opposition. The dreaded “Death Squads” (Esquadro da Morte), the
Commandos for Hunting Communists (C.C.C.), and the OBAN (Opera­
tion Bandeirantes) all engaged in an imaginative variety of brutal attacks
on political figures who were deemed unacceptable to the vigilantes’
powerful allies who bankrolled the repressive activities.20 The Brazilian
political control forces—official and unofficial—became internationally
infamous for their use of torture while interrogating prisoners. Though
controversy continues to surround the exact extent of the torture and
police repression (Alves, 1973; Feichter, 1975; Lernoux, 1978), never­
theless, the various security forces constituted an ever-present threat to
bold voices.

Although this quick survey of the suppression apparatus adequately
demonstrates the regime’s authoritarian character, it should not be con­
strued as evidence that the military established a full-scale totalitarian
state. The absence of an inclusive ideology and a hegemonic party of
mobilization would preclude Brazil from this latter political condition
(Cardoso, 1973, p. 173). Also, the senior military and civilian figures in
the regime have remained divided over the use of extremely repressive
tactics and the need to widen the regime’s political support and legitimacy
(the search for the so-called “second leg”).21 At the operational level, this
division of opinion led to intermittent and ineffective attempts beginning
in 1965 through the mid-1970s to halt the indiscriminate torture and
murder. For example, in response to the public outrage over the 1975
death under torture of the well-known journalist Vladmir Herzog (and
subsequent other deaths), President Ernesto Geisel sacked General
D’Avila Melo (the army commander in Sao Paulo who had responsibility
for the situation), and shortly thereafter Geisel dismissed the head of
C.I.E.X. (Centro de Informacoes Exercito—Army Intelligence Center) in

20 Flynn (1978, pp. 434-435) describes links between the business community (especially in
Sao Paulo) and vigilante groups like OBAN. He goes on to detail extensive criminal activities
in drugs, prostitution, and other vices on the part of these organizations.

21 One of the principal arguments used by the praetorian regime to justify its continued
rule was its superior ability (compared to past civilian governments) to foster economic
development. However, as economic growth (the Brazilian “miracle”) slowed during the
middle 1970s, some officers and their civilian allies began to search for other ways to increase
the regime’s popular support. This second basis of legitimacy came to be called the “second
leg.” President Geisel’s policy of slowly moving toward democracy (descompressao) that
finally led to the abertura reforms can be seen as an effort to construct the “second leg”
a concerted effort to end further embarrassing incidents (Flynn, 1978, pp. 496-498). Although the Herzog affair sharply reduced the number of “political deaths,” the cassations and restrictions still continued until 1979.

Because the Brazilian military has been trapped within the participation dilemmas peculiar to mixed regimes, the barriers to interest articulation have been in a state of flux throughout the history of the regime. Juan Linz (1973b, p. 235), noting this ambivalence, said: “It is true that, despite internal tensions, the military has been able to exercise power, but their hesitant efforts to ‘civilianize’ their rule have had only limited success.” It is the hesitancy of liberalization that makes the risks of voice much more unpredictable in an authoritarian situation. But even in the presence of “secret police,” the indeterminate consequences of political expression make voice behavior possible.

The Opposition’s Voice

From 1964 to 1979 Brazil’s praetorian regime tried to silence opposition voices with wave after wave of cassations. Despite this vigorous campaign to “sanitize” the political arena, dissent did not disappear; rather, many voices identified serious decline in the regime’s performance and made innumerable suggestions for the improvement of public policy. By utilizing the behavioral properties derived from Hirschman’s framework, examples of articulated discontent can be brought to bear on the participatory dilemmas occurring within mixed regimes.

The first behavioral property drawn from Hirschman’s model of dissent relates directly to the identification of voicers. Because public policy differentially affects alert citizens, Hirschman hypothesized that voice will come from many quarters. The Brazilian case affirms this proposition and could be demonstrated easily by a cursory examination of publications that normally were available within the country. Citizen disenchantment with post-1964 public policy cut across almost all social categories and life styles. However, a sharp demarcation between active and potential voicers separated labor groups from the rest of the modern work force (McDonough, 1978). Since a major target of the military coup was the growing political power of the enfranchised urban workers, this group was controlled rigidly not only through the mechanism of labor syndicates, but also through other devices such as a tightly controlled wage policy (arrocho salarial), the pro-government bias of the grievance procedures, and the use of gerrymandered representation to minimize the vote of urban workers (Mericle, 1977, pp. 303-338). Although this corporatist leash curtailed much of labor’s voice in Brazil, other spokesmen

22 Beginning in May, 1978 and continuing through 1979 and into 1980 Brazil suffered
have served as labor’s surrogates. It was not unusual to hear these non-labor voices bemoaning the inflationary erosion of the minimum wage or decrying the deliberate disregard of safety procedures by employers and the government.\textsuperscript{23}

Another hypothesis about the source of voice addresses the organizational character of voices. Recall Hirschman’s remark that voicers expect others to join them in expressing dissatisfaction. This implies a natural aggregation process, provided no obstacles exist. In Brazil examples of voice at all levels of organization except alliances flourished. In confirmation of Hirschman’s thesis about “connoisseurs,” some of the most visible manifestations of personal voice came from: (a) individuals with problems or viewpoints which attracted the attention of the mass media, (b) free-lance as well as university-based intellectuals, and (c) many performing artists.\textsuperscript{24} Moving to small and middle-sized groups, all manner of associations, clubs, leagues, and movements evolved at the grassroots (Schmitter, 1971; Alves, 1981). At the level of large-scale organizations, again diversity of voicers prevailed, ranging from traditional institutions such as the National Council of Catholic Bishops to modern, industry-wide lobbying organizations (Blume, 1968; Bruneau, 1972; Dye and Souza e Silva, 1979).

The one organizational level prohibited by the government was the broad coalition. Other than the officially recognized opposition party (MDB),\textsuperscript{25} the praetorian regime moved to dismember serious attempts at construction of any opposition front. For example, after the breakup of

\textsuperscript{23} Besides the more “academic” studies by research institutes like the Fundacao Getulio Vargas, most periodical news magazines carried stories describing the plight of the working class. A cartoon representative of the working class and their troubles (entitled Orelhao) became very popular.

\textsuperscript{24} Two theater groups provide a fascinating example of combining intellectuals, artists, and individuals willing to act as “angels.” Grupo Opiniao in Rio and Teatro de Arena in Sao Paulo were in the vanguard of protest theater since 1965. Though their subjects were serious, both theater groups have managed to evade censorship by hiding behind comedy (Thomas, 1972).

\textsuperscript{25} As an effort to control political competition and to avoid the image of a military dictatorship, President Castello Branco abolished the pre-1964 political parties in October, 1965 and in December, 1965, he permitted the establishment of two political parties: (1) the National Alliance for Renovation (ARENA), the pro-government party, and (2) the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB), the “official” party of opposition (Schneider, 1971, pp. 173-15). This “artificial” party system lasted until the 1979 party reform which reestablished a multiparty system.
the Frente Ampla ("broad front") in 1968 (Schneider, 1971, p. 262), opposition voices turned cautious about alliance building lest they run afoul of AI-5. This obstacle to multiple group coalitions did not prevent individuals and groups from voicing in concert on significant policy questions. Whether the issue was inflation, the excesses of the "Death Squads," or controlling meningitis, thematic convergence, in effect, came to substitute for formal organizational links. Some tentative steps to construct an opposition alliance were initiated during the 1977-78 presidential succession politics. The normal factional feuds within the military (e.g., the Figueiredo vs. Frota intrigues) over presidential succession were augmented by the appearance of two other candidates, Magalhaes Pinto and Bentes Monteiro. Though neither challenger won the presidency, Monteiro, the candidate of the MDB, attracted a surprisingly large following. Levine (1979, p. 71) observes "... for the first time in 14 years, businessmen, labor leaders, and intellectuals spoke out publicly alongside of the MDB politicians." During this same period President Geisel, in response to the gains made by the MDB in 1976 and 1978, put forward a new party "reform" (effective January 1, 1979) which was designed to encourage realignments and the birth of additional political parties. According to Fleischer (1981, pp. 19-21), the government "calculated" that the party reorganization would splinter the opposition and thus allow ARENA to retain an absolute majority in the national congress.

With a spectrum of individuals, groups, and organizations expressing policy viewpoints it naturally follows that the remedies sought would be equally diverse. Hirschman's conceptualization of voice suggests that discontent over quality decline will be articulated first on policies which have personal impact, and especially on those policies which touch on the "quality of life," such as housing, education, and civil liberties. It is in-

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26 During this period (1964-79) one could pick up almost any Sunday edition of the Jornal do Brasil and find in its Caderno Especial section well-developed essays on many public issues by spokespersons representing a range of different viewpoints. The other major papers and magazines, despite the censors, also managed a lively discussion of many public questions.

27 Pang (1981, pp. 57-58) provides a concise review of the 1979 return to a multiparty system in Brazil. In brief, through the last half of the 1970s, the pro-government ARENA party increasingly lost strength (in terms of delegates and senators in the national congress and governors and representatives in the states) to the opposition MDB party. As part of the democratization policy, the regime took a calculated gamble (with good odds) that changes in the rules governing elections and political parties would divide the unified opposition and result in a fragmented and quarrelsome set of opposition parties. The divide-and-conquer strategy worked as expected; five opposition parties and one pro-government party came into existence (Fleischer, 1981).

28 Complaints about basic public goods and services, according to Hirschman (1970, p. 53), should be more frequent and with more volume "in societies in which social mobility is
Interesting to observe that the praetorian regime, in response to substantial complaints about slum conditions (e.g., *Jornal do Brasil*, October and November, 1971), launched large-scale housing projects (*Manchete*, no. 991). A similar voice-and-response sequence happened in educational policy (Haussman, 1971). On the other hand, government response in the area of civil liberties, despite a steady litany of dissatisfaction, proceeded very slowly. Problems of national scope and their potential remedies (often at odds with government policy) likewise have comprised a fair share of Brazilian voice behavior. Besides extensive media attention to topics like regional imbalance, pollution, illiteracy, and malnutrition, an abundant supply of objective policy analyses were purchased readily in most bookstores. Many of these volumes were written by scholars held suspect by the regime (Schmitter, 1970, pp. 123-128). In fact, these critical analyses were recommended reading in university classes on Brazilian public policy (Torloni, 1976).

The extensive enunciation of desired remedies within Brazil demonstrates that an admittedly limited, but nevertheless salutary, national debate on the course of public action remained alive through the whole period. However, an authoritarian regime propped up by a police state apparatus seems anomalous with open policy debate. Ames (1976, p. 282) provides a partial explanation. According to his research on Brazilian policy making, the military regime came to power without many intensely held policy goals. Other than in crucial economic and security areas (Stepan, 1971; Flynn, 1978, pp. 519-521), the praetorians allowed the traditional policy process to proceed with little or no modification. To facilitate its political and economic doctrines the Brazilian military relied on a voice-response sequence to generate some legitimacy for the regime (Fiechter, 1975, pp. 207-212).

The effort to put the organization "back on the track" casts the voicer in the role of policy opponent. An extension of Hirschman's logic yields the following hypothesis: as the overall quality of public goods declines, inhibited . . . everyone has a strong motivation to defend the quality of life at his own station."

29 After President Geisel's actions in response to the Herzog affair, public airings of police abuse became more frequent. One typical example of personal discontent over the quality of civil liberties was a newspaper interview of a manual laborer falsely accused of murdering a police officer. The story, including the victim's picture (with the corporal damage visible), detailed the laborer's unrest and subsequent torture; it should be noted that the local police commander was reprimanded for the incident (*Jornal do Brasil*, 4/14/1977). Similarly, after the Herzog affair, the courts began to award monetary settlements for damage caused by torture.

30 Some of the more well-known authors are Caio Prado Junior, Fernando Cardoso, Octavio Ianni, and Paulo Freire.
discontent will be voiced increasingly about policies central to the regime. Again, as with the previous aspects of voice behavior, the types of policies opposed cover a wide span of government action. Rather than catalogue the totality of disliked policies, a focus on some of the more central programs of the military government, such as economic development, territorial integration, and social peace (Torloni, 1976, pp. 34-35) will suffice.

Economic development was given the highest priority by the military after the 1964 coup d'état. The resulting "miracle" temporarily salved the conscience of the middle-class supporters of the regime, but once the economy faltered, many citizens began to have second thoughts about their saviors. The consequent dissatisfaction soon generated a significant volume of voice and the government's popularity plummetted (Sanders, 1973). Since the first problems appeared in the "miracle," the government has been confronted with a constant drumbeat of discontent, which has ranged from the sophisticated criticism of the "phantom cabinet of the republic of Ipanema" (Fiechter, 1975: 125) to the September, 1978 mass petition (signed by more than one million Brazilians) calling for a price freeze (Levine, 1979, p. 71) to the more recent epidemic of labor strikes throughout the country (Veja, 4/4/1979; Alves, 1981).

Territorial integration policies likewise suffered under attacks of voice. Although any plan to improve the lot of the poverty-ridden population in Northeastern Brazil would be difficult at best, the military regime, according to its critics, selected projects only for their publicity value instead of funding truly beneficial ones. Policies designed to foster social peace also were targets for the regime's critics, as exemplified by Lucio Kowarick's book The Logic of Disorder: Capitalist Expansion in the Metropolitan Area of Sao Paulo and by Candido Ferreira de Camargo's book Sao Paulo 1975 – Growth and Poverty. Even in the areas of procedural policy the government's suppressive apparatus did not prevent loud voices from speaking out against such basic regime practices as AI-5, censorship, repeated closings of the national legislature, reliance on indirect and manipulated elections, and official corruption.

31 Led by Roberto Campos, former economic minister under Castello Branco, the "shadow cabinet" carried on a running debate over economic policy with the Costa e Silva cabinet, headed by Delfim Neto, the finance minister.

32 Some typical stories about the failures of territorial integration policies are: (a) "The Routine of Calamity" (Veja, 6/2/1976), (b) an interview with the Boas brothers on the shortcomings of Indian policy (0 Pasquim, No. 412), and (c) a special Sunday section devoted to N. E. Brazil (Jornal do Brasil, 6/1/1977).

33 Camargo's book, which was co-sponsored by Cebrap and the Archdiocese of Sao Paulo, describes urban life from the city dweller's perspective. Its portrayal of Sao Paulo's maladies captures the economic contradictions operating against the working class and outlines the structure of power which marginalized the poor. Cebrap (Brazilian Center of Analysis and
Fernando Gasparian, editor of the weekly magazine *Opiniao*, which was forced to close in 1977, offered his own view of policy topics considered by the regime to be too sensitive for free discussion: “... we cannot publish anything about oil, state monopolies, ‘risk contracts,’ balance of payments, income distribution, (and) atomic energy” (Visao, 7/4/1977; Pierce, 1979, pp. 32-33). Other features of the regime for which voice taboos existed were the personalities of the current administration (especially the president) and the “honor” of the armed forces. The precedent confirming the “off-limits” character of the military was the Alves affair of 1968 (Schneider, 1971, pp. 271-275). In sum, other than the indicated topics, few regime policies escaped voice in Brazil. This inclusive articulation of dissatisfaction substantiates Hirschman’s statement that “connoisseurs” “actively support their vision of quality.” Hirschman’s related assertion that alert citizens “feel they have nowhere else to go and therefore have maximum incentive to articulate dissatisfaction” also receives confirmation from these examples.

If, as Hirschman commented, voice requires inventiveness, then the Brazilian case easily validates the supposition. As would be expected, the openness of voice fluctuated with the degree of repression. But even in the period labeled by Schneider (1971, p. 241) as “the descent into dictatorship,” some voices always managed to be heard. For example, despite the presence of AI-5 and the security forces, the publication of criticism never ceased, as the mocking cartoons of Henfil, Lan, and Ziraldo attest. In newspapers and in anthologies these political cartoonists derided the regime on multiple topics: (a) the Death Squads, (b) the strategies of the pro-government party (ARENA), (c) development programs to assist N.E. Brazil, (d) the cost of living, (e) election procedures, (f) government corruption, and (g) the errors of cabinet ministers and public agencies. Significantly, caricatures of the president and the armed forces demonstrably were absent from their work. However, the armed forces did not escape totally the sting of voice. Some of the more popular comedy writers incorporated less than flattering images of the military into their artistic productions.

Voice in Brazil has been more than circumspect. Seemingly in adherence with Hirschman’s prescription that direct, public voice is the most effective, some organizations challenged the regime frontally. In-
stitutional actors like the Catholic Church, following the Brazilian tradition of conciliation (Rose, 1966), have tried to make peace with the military, while at the same time trying to retain their freedom to complain about selected issues—e.g., torture, controls on the Church’s activities, social justice, amnesty, redemocratization, and support for workers’ rights. Through this entire time the Catholic hierarchy often left the pulpit to make dramatic gestures to prod the regime along the path of social justice (Bruneau, 1974). Besides its expected defense of clergy from abuse by the security forces, the Church supported with many public pronouncements a diverse set of lay organizations such as ACO (Catholic Workers’ Action), ACR (Rural Catholic Action), JAC (Catholic Agrarian Youth), JUC (Catholic University Youth), and JOC (Young Catholic Workers). The hierarchy often took the lead to forge links with other groups, as exemplified by the amnesty campaign headed by Archbishop Arns of Sao Paulo (Latin American Political Report, 10/6/1978)

Publishers of major newspapers and magazines also fought a series of running battles with the regime and its censors. At one time or another almost every national newspaper and magazine fell under some degree of censorship (DeCew, 1978). But the restrictions did not prevent the media from printing stories and editorials which hardly gave comfort to the regime. The press, according to Pierce (1979, pp. 28-54), took advantage of the erratic rules and challenged the decisions of the censorship service. More provocative to the regime were the alternative media—or “midget press.” This group included many nationally known publications that appeared regularly such as the Jornal do Brasil, the country’s most influential newspaper (Schneider, 1971, p. 377), and the Forma de Brasil, the country’s most influential magazine (DeCew, 1978, p. 62). In retaliation for the editorials (listed above), the government withdrew all public announcements and advertisements from the JB’s pages, which caused a revenue loss of about 20 percent. Though this hurt financially, the paper’s directors decided not to give in and continued the anti-regime editorials. The main anxiety focused on newpaper supply; that is, would the government cut off the JB’s overseas supply?

Some newspapers refused the censors space to do their work, creating the paradoxical situation of a censor forced to review articles out on the sidewalk in front of the paper’s headquarters (New York Times, 4/3/1976). Other examples of mischievous media counter-reaction to censorship included the printing of absurd recipes or figures in place of censored stories and the posting of censored articles on the newspaper’s outside bulletin board (Pierce, 1979: 28-32).
satirical and intellectual publications such as *Opiniao*, *Pasquim*, *Movimento*, *Ex*, and *Mais Um*. Some were short lived, others were closed and returned under a new title, and others struggled under varying degrees of censorship. The important point is their existence and their ability to voice disagreement with the regime's policies.

Through the application of Hirschman's logic to interest articulation within the Brazilian political system, a number of limits on voice behavior imposed by the praetorian governors can be identified. Given the military's original motives for intervention, the prohibition of openly defiant, nationwide (or even local) alliances is the most distinguishable and easily understood limit on voice. One can suggest that without this limit the regime would have lost its authoritarian character. Along with this fundamental strategic restraint, proscribed topics fell within the relatively narrow confines of the nature of the regime, its principal spokesman, and its crucial policies. Other than the marginalized labor groups (urban and rural), the regime did not effectively prevent the expression of voice by individuals and groups from a large part of the literate population. "What is striking in Brazil is the very great variety of structures represented and the multiple levels and axes along which the political universe crystallizes" (Chalmers, 1972, p. 62). Put another way, the basic structure of interest articulation in Brazil parallels that found in other mixed regimes characterized by "semi-opposition" (Linz, 1973, pp. 191-210).

Safety Zones for Voicers

During the lifespan of AI-5 the Brazilian praetorian government stripped 4,682 persons of their political rights, or an average of slightly more than one person per day between 1968 and 1978 (Vision, 1/27/1979). Yet, in the face of these arbitrary judgments the policy formulation process was characterized by a rather extensive and sophisticated public debate. The paradox of articulated discontent side by side with active suppression is the essence of the participation dilemmas that occur within mixed regimes. To understand more about this situation attention must be given to the capacity of voicers to avoid or neutralize political constraints and to enlarge their zone of political safety.

The most common interpretation of Brazilian politics has depicted it as a type of patrimonial elite system (Roett, 1973). Though some adherents to this viewpoint argue that the ruling groups form a tight-knit tropical power elite (Lernoux, 1978), most versions portray a substantial degree of inter-elite competition over policy issues (McDonough, 1978), and thus fit into the more general model of Latin American politics proposed by Anderson (1967) and elaborated upon by Chalmers (1972; 1977), Malloy
(1977), and Wynia (1978). In terms of voice safety, the important element in the patronimical model is the presence of competition. Disagreement among elites opens the door for discontented citizens to engage in voice. For example, the Brazilian military has had its share of factionalism, which sometimes produces military-civil linkages as each side jockeys for further advantage (Castello Branco, 1976; Coelho, 1976).  

The presidential succession maneuvering of generals within the officer corps and their efforts to solidify the support of politically important civilian groups have become so intense as to be almost the equivalent of campaigning in more open systems (Flynn, 1978, p. 518). Similarly, segments of the business community have lined up with the opposition as a tactical method for pursuing a given policy position (Lamounier and Cardoso, 1975, pp. 45-76; Flynn, 1978, pp. 496-498).  

Exploitation of such elite cleavages not only offers voicers a path into the policy process, but also bestows some degree of legitimacy to the voiced discontent. Diversity of elite opinion motivates elite factions to reach out beyond the decision-making contenders to various segments of the attentive publics in a search of additional allies. Once competition for popular support begins, unilateral dependency disappears and reciprocal (but not necessarily symmetrical) bargaining ensues.  

A good example in the Brazilian case is the continual need of the president to reaffirm his authority position not only with the military but also with broader publics (Chalmers, 1972, pp. 70-72). As McDonough (1978, p. 33) points out: “This disposes the elites to what might be called ideological anxiety. Having only partial legitimacy, the regime must prove itself through its performance.” And once performance becomes the ultimate

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37 A list of cleavages within the Brazilian armed forces would include: (a) the Sorbonne Group vs. the linha dura; (b) pro-Lacerda vs. anti-Lacerda officers; (c) the legalists vs. the golpistas; (d) the nationalists vs. the internationalists; and more recently, (e) the pro-abertura vs. the anti-abertura factions.

38 A list of cleavages within the business community would include: (a) the nationalists vs. the internationalists; (b) free market vs. state enterprise; (c) the pro-abertura vs. the anti-abertura factions; and (d) large corporations vs. smaller firms and businesses. A particular red flag to the internationalist financial community of Sao Paulo which led them to oppose certain regime policies—e.g., less centralization, more income distribution, agrarian reforms—was the fear that the military and the technocrats would follow the “Peruvian” model.

39 Inter-elite bargaining arose partially out of elite fear of mass politics (McDonough, 1978, p. 38), partially out of the elites’ need to avoid immobilisme (Chalmers, 1977, pp. 25-35), and ultimately from the praetorians’ “search for the second leg.”

40 As President Geisel’s struggles with Generals Frota and D’Avila Melo demonstrate, even a popular, high-ranking officer who succeeds to the presidency always must maintain a broad and solid disposizitivo militar, i.e., a group of officers whom he can depend on for political support in factional feuds (see Flynn, 1978, p. 497; Levine, 1979, p. 70).
justification for the praetorian intervention, then the regime, because of feedback requirements, must permit some degree of voice.

A second approach to the toleration of opposition with the Brazilian mixed regime emphasizes the political/economic resources of the voicers and the concomitant weaknesses of the military rulers. For example, some voice will evade regime controls because of the technological costs and inefficiencies associated with comprehensive police forces (Linz, 1973a, p. 226). More typically, although the military can cleanse the public arena of popular politicians, it cannot totally liquidate professional and technical personnel. In fact, the military may well become highly dependent on specialists in public agencies and on civilians with experience in financial and managerial operations (Nordlinger, 1977, pp. 119-122).

To paraphrase Hirschman, if the alert citizens have “nowhere to go” to find quality products, neither does the military have “anywhere to go” to produce quality public products. The Brazilian case, perhaps more than any other present praetorian government, has exhibited a close mutual interaction between the officer corps and the civilian managers of capitalist institutions (Sanders, 1973). In terms of voice safety, the policy disagreements that will occur naturally among economic movers and shakers (e.g., the type and impact of income tax deductions) will open a large field within which voicers can maneuver safely. Second, strong critical opinions by influential economic figures will be tolerated because political reprisals for economic viewpoints would chill the regime’s relationships with its technical support. Third, individuals and groups with specific economic resources can and do exert policy pressure successfully, especially in areas where the regime lacks clear policy goals.

Nordlinger (1977) in a chapter entitled “Officers as Governors” elaborates on the Brazilian military’s extreme faith in technical solutions. The extraordinary managerial training necessary to achieve the upper ranks of the officer corps, as documented by Stepan (1971), makes the Brazilian military one of the most professional of all Third World armed forces. (The stringent requirements seem to come right out of Plato’s Republic). Despite this extensive administrative background, the Brazilian military still depends heavily on civilian technical and financial experts to formulate and implement national policy (e.g., see O Militocivilismo, Jornal do Brasil, 4/12/1973).

The resignation-in-protest of Severo Gomes, President Geisel’s first minister of industry and commerce, serves as a good case-in-point. Gomes was a discordant voice arguing for less dependency on external capital and for an economics of social justice. Shortly after his resignation he released a collection of his lectures under the title O Tempo de Mudar (”A Time to Change”), which took direct aim at the government’s policy of state enterprises and the lack of democracy in the country. Gomes was not stripped of his political rights upon publication of this volume.

An ironic example of conflicting goals pitting the regime against different economic viewpoints has been the government’s campaign to conserve gasoline. On one side has been General Oziel de Almeida Costa, president of the National Petroleum Council, who has pressured bus companies and the owners of private airplanes, sports cars, and yachts to go
For many of the same reasons the military has had to enter into mutual arrangements with citizens whose major resources are predominantly political. For example, Skidmore (1973, p. 9) documents the Brazilian military’s reliance on old-time moderate-to-conservative politicians (primarily from the former UDN Party) for a variety of purposes.\(^4^4\) When mixed regimes are built with a significant civilian base, as in Brazil (Pedreira, 1975), the armed forces out of necessity must accommodate their civilian partners. Therefore, less than rigid boundaries on voice behavior will be enforced. At the same time, because the mixed regime depends on civilian support, Hirschman’s solution—i.e., the threat of exit—becomes a viable bluff.

Another basic protection for voicers evolves from the social character of many transitional societies. In countries like Brazil familial and friendship ties condition policy conflict (Schneider, 1971, p. 33). Societal relationships based on parentela, compadre, and panelinha linkages create an elaborate set of connections cutting across social institutions. More simply put, “good old boy networks” underpin much of Brazilian politics. Although informal networks can maintain the status quo, they also can moderate the consequences of interpersonal and group conflict. For example, when faced with a group of protestors who are “connected” to important military and/or civilian personages, the security police have found themselves in a “no-win” situation.\(^4^5\) Turning this point around, because of social linkages the Brazilian military is not a closed corporation, rather “the military, like any other citizens, are susceptible to the same winds that sweep public opinion in general . . .” (Pedreira, 1975, p. 507).

One last form of voice insurance depends upon a person’s (or group’s) ease on fuel. On the other side, one finds Cabramar, the largest manufacturer of recreational boats, allied with Embraer, the state industry producing private airplanes. All the while, of course, little effect has been felt by either the wealthy sportsmen or the small businessmen and laborers who depend on resort trade (Veja, 3/14/1979).

44 See, for example, “Velhas Familias Politicas Continuam Atuantes,” or “The Old Political Families Continue Operating” (Jornal do Brasil, 8/4/1974). Even though Tancredo Neves (a leader in the old PSD) described the 1964 Revolution with the now well-known label “Estado Novo da UDN,” some very important dissident voices came from the old UDN (National Democratic Union) ranks, in particular Magalhaes Pinto and Pedro Aleixo.

45 During the nationwide student uprisings in 1977 and 1978, the police forces often were stymied in their attempts to control the situation. For example, at the Federal University of Brasilia the police were under orders to go easy since the international press was covering the event. Still, some students were badly injured, and after being hauled to detention centers, the police then discovered that many of the student protestors were the children or relatives of highly placed military and civilian officials of the national government. The ensuing brouhaha allowed the students to exploit the police’s dilemma and thus generate valuable national attention for their grievances.
status or popularity. Recall that Hirschman hypothesized the protective quality of prominence. Even in the most totalitarian system the pec­cadillos of national heroes are overlooked. In less firmly entrenched mixed regimes mass affection for performing artists and athletes may exceed that accorded to the president. To move directly against a popular figure could easily create a martyr and play into the hands of the violent "exiters." Instead, the regime becomes trapped in a subtle game of "cat and mouse" with popular figures who engage in voice.46

Voicers, in summary, develop safety zones not only out of their own resource base, but also within the structural anomalies and organizational behavior of the regime. Dahl (1973, p. 16) reminds us, "since at least limited opportunities are available to oppositions, some oppositional elements will almost certainly use their opportunities to press for further lowering of the barriers." By pressing at the margins of permitted expression, voicers can enhance their bargaining advantage with the regime. Although voicers may not be in agreement on a given policy or strategy, their aggregated efforts can enlarge the area of public discourse and possess the potential to influence policy decisions.

VOICE AND THE "TENSIONS" WITHIN AUTHORITARIAN SYSTEMS

What does Hirschman's "individualistic" approach to dissent add to the study of Brazilian politics and to the more general study of interest articulation in non-democratic systems? Do the categories of citizen response to deterioration in government policies—exit, voice, and loyalty—offer a useful analytic approach to the participation dilemmas in a mixed regime? Does the concept of "voice" aid in explaining the persistence and survival of non-violent opposition within bureaucratic/authoritarian politics?

From the viewpoint of one school of Brazilian political analysis it is possible to argue that all of the safety factors for voice listed here are trivial. This perspective defines any individual who possesses economic,

46 The performing artist most famous for his continual "cat and mouse" game with the praetorian regime has been Chico Buarque de Hollanda, who composes and sings his own songs as well as writes allegorical short stories. Some of his compositions have been censored, whereas others have been approved, although everyone could read his meanings between the lines. He even has written subtle children's songs to counteract the regime's educational materials (see Os Saltimbancos). A cynic might comment that Hollanda's "game" was merely a scheme to boost his popularity and his profits. Even if one grants this motive, his songs such as Pedro Pedroire and Meu Caro Amigo served to inspire voice. Also, Hollanda was not without colleagues in this "game." Other composer-singers who tested the limits of expression include Gilberto Gil, Nara Leao, Ruy Maurity, Milton Nascimento, and Caetano Veloso, to name a few. The point here, of course, was Chico Buarque's pressure against the indeterminate limits of "semifreedom"—sometimes he succeeded, sometimes he failed; but the regime was careful not to resort to physical reprisals.
TABLE 2

POLITICAL PUNISHMENT IN BRAZIL BY OCCUPATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Politicians</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>656 (63%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Professions and Businessmen</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>117 (11%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Servants</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>47 (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>97 (9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judicial Officers</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15 (1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue Collar and White Collar Workers, Urban and Rural</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>62 (6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without Identification</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>52 (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>380</strong></td>
<td><strong>238</strong></td>
<td><strong>428</strong></td>
<td><strong>1046 (100%)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


political, and/or social resources as a member of the *sistema* (“establishment”) (Dos Santos, 1974, pp. 459-486). Furthermore, outside of these influential elites no true opposition survives (Quartim, 1971). This model divides Brazilian society into a unified elite and a downtrodden mass. The examples of voice behavior described in this essay raise questions about the failure of the homogeneous elite model to explain a number of important aspects of interest articulation in Brazil. First, the existence of elites does not necessarily imply a closed, oligarchic decision structure (Payne, 1968). As previously noted, competitive elites who try to mobilize middle- or lower-class followings have incentives to open, not close, debate. Second, elites act to redress citizens’ personal grievances, if for no other reason than to strengthen patron-client ties. Third, on a large scale, because the Brazilian praetorian regime has been committed to “development” and its legitimacy has rested partially on performance, the regime has had to strive to satisfy fundamental “quality of life” needs, or risk smoldering discontent. Fourth, the social origins of the Brazilian armed forces, coupled with the informal social networks, have produced a politically heterogeneous officer corps with very close links to the middle sectors (Stephan, 1971, pp. 30-56).

A more accurate view of the opposition’s place within Brazilian politics postulates a direct relation between the *segmentos ilustrados* (cultured/educated sectors) and the coercive aspects of the regime. Coelho (1976, pp. 180-185), using data gathered by Marcus Figueiredo (see Table 2), argues that the regime concentrated its purges on these elite sectors precisely because they possess the resources necessary to challenge the regime. Coelho contends that the civilian political class and other
members of the *segmentos ilustrados* bore the brunt of the regime's restrictions because the military and the "technobureaucracy," who sit at the center of policy making, utilized a social control strategy based on elite isolation. That is, the regime tried to separate the different *segmentos ilustrados* from each other. However, this strategy has not been totally successful; Coelho describes the activity of "legal dissidents" who have carved out "areas of experimentation" which functioned as safety valves for a regime which has not been able to institutionalize itself. In conclusion, Coelho suggests that the "areas of experimentation" permitted the regime to evaluate more correctly the risks of policies designed to foster *abertura*.

Walder De Goes (1978, p. 17) in his book on the presidency of General Geisel elaborates with additional detail the position taken by Coelho. De Goes (1978, pp. 17-23) addresses "the contradictions inside the military-bureaucratic system" which contributed to political disequilibrium and, in turn, imposed limits on the power of the president. In a section entitled "Ideas About the Future," De Goes (1978, p. 127) outlines the strategic ideas underlying negotiations between "the integral forces of the regime and the elites who are in dissent" and points out, These ideas flow from a simple rationale: it is necessary to make changes sufficiently rapid and deep so as not to accumulate destabilizing frustrations with the regime, but not so fast and so deep as to threaten the primacy of the forces that currently dominate the political system (De Goes, 1978, pp. 127-128).

Discovering this delicate balance, De Goes argues, has been crucial to the regime's continuation because failure to develop creative solutions could lead to a political explosion.47 Coelho and De Goes offer a description of Brazilian politics which captures what O'Donnell (1979, pp. 285-318) calls "the tensions in the bureaucratic-authoritarian state." From 1964 to the 1979 *abertura* policy, the Brazilian military government did not permit unrestrained public opinion formation, yet it did not quash all public debate. Rather, as with all mixed regimes, the government struggled with the inherent paradox of the participation dilemmas. From the government's side of the quandary, extreme suppression would have alienated many regime allies and shortcircuited the voice-response mechanism necessary to performance-based legitimacy. From the opposition's side of the quandary, the indeterminant zone of "semifreedom" made articulation of dissent risky, but also possible and fruitful. Opposition voices, although they did not always escape political and physical reprisals, managed to

47 The Figueiredo Government's democratization policy of *abertura* can be seen as an effort to find a "creative solution," in De Goes' terms, between the pro-regime forces and the elites in dissent.
keep up a persistent stream of demands which the regime could not shunt aside. Over time voicers established their political positions to the point where the praetorian rulers had to negotiate with the “dissident elites” in order to secure continuing legitimacy and to avoid system disruption. According to Fleischer (1981, p. 39), it is just such bargaining between the government and the opposition that led the president’s political strategists to urge the adoption of the current democratization policy.

Hirschman’s rational model of dissent can provide an explanatory framework for organizing some components of regime-dissident relationships in Brazil. First, Hirschman’s categories of response to organizational deterioration—exit, voice, and loyalty—can assist in identifying and sorting out the different types of political actors operating within the praetorian regime. The behavioral properties of the three forms of response allow the analyst to distinguish more accurately, for example, between two businessmen in Brazil—one who articulates discontent about a regulation governing the stock exchange versus one who articulates discontent with the policy of estatização (state control of economic activity). Second, the propositions derived from Hirschman’s model can guide the discovery of patterns of opposition behavior. By transcending chronological details, the content and style of dissent can be linked to the strategic choices of the opposition (either as individuals or as a collective entity or group). Thus, as already noted, fluctuations in the topics and the prominence given to them by the mass media can be related to regime repression as well as to editorial decisions. Finally, by drawing attention to the voicer’s capacity to construct political “safety zones,” Hirschman’s framework makes a start at accounting for the opposition’s survival in the face of the regime’s use of coercion.

Some aspects of Brazilian political life do not fit neatly into the Hirschman formulation. A particularly vexing problem flows from the element of choice and the identification of voicers and loyalists. Since individuals and groups can move back and forth between the different forms of response behavior, the consistent classification of an individual or group into one category may be precluded. Another troublesome issue for the model involves the problem of propaganda. Other than suggesting some motives for loyalty (e.g., trading allegiance for tangible rewards), the logic of the framework ignores the organization/ regime’s capacity for manipulation which could affect the “connoisseur’s” judgment about deterioration. On balance, Hirschman’s approach to dissent shifts the analytic focus away from the praetorian regime’s capacity for societal control and onto the voicer’s ability to win concessions, and thus contributes to a more accurate and realistic understanding of the dynamics of Brazilian politics.

At a more general comparative level, Hirschman’s model of voice
behavior amplifies the work of Dahl, Linz, O’Donnell, and others on the character of participation in an authoritarian setting. Cardoso (1979, p. 48), for example, lists three factors governing the capacity for authoritarian control: (1) the circumstances under which the regime came to power, (2) the degree of weakness or strength of the civil society, and (3) the technical capacity for control available to the regime. The concept of voice elaborates on the “degree of weakness or strength of civil society” through its identification of the resources and strategies that undergird opposition survival and undermine regime control. Hirschman’s work also deductively yields propositions which can serve as the basis for cross-cultural comparisons (for example, see Booth, 1979). And third, this approach proposes some causal factors that account for the “constant experiments” and “strange combinations” of participation and choice that Linz (1973b, p. 252) has observed within contemporary authoritarian regimes.

On the negative side, Hirschman’s categories of exit, voice, and loyalty are open to all of the standard difficulties associated with typologies. Second, the concept of voice, because it is a “micro” approach to politics, does not address in a direct fashion the structural arrangements that also condition the behavior of mixed regimes. Third, because “connoisseurs” are politically exceptional individuals, the behavioral attributes of voice do not apply necessarily to the political response of average persons living within the context of a mixed regime. Fourth, Hirschman’s framework is, at best, a partial theory of dissent and needs to be fitted with other insights on the nature of participation within non-democratic systems (see Collier, 1979, pp. 363-397).

In the last analysis “voice” calls attention to political behavior that underlies the “fragilities” of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes (O’Donnell, 1979, p. 310). By linking the dissatisfaction of alert citizens to the articulation of dissent, the concept of voice has the potential for explaining the “constant experiments” with liberalization typical of mixed regimes. As a result of this synthesis, it becomes evident, therefore, that the boundaries of “semifreedom” in a mixed regime are not a sole function of the barriers to participation, but rather are an interactive function between these barriers and voice behavior.

References


Grassroot Organizations, Trade Unions and the Church: Challenge to the Controlled Abertura in Brazil.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association.


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APPENDIX

Selected Propositions Derived from A. O. Hirschman's, Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Response to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States

Some General Propositions
1. Considerable deterioration must build up within a firm/organization before voice occurs.
2. Voice will be chosen if exit is unavailable or costly.
3. Voice will emanate from discontented consumers/members who possess some degree of political/economic resources.
4. Voice will be persistent.
5. Direct, public voice will be more effective.
6. Alert customers, or “connoisseurs,” will exert leverage on the firm/organization through the threat of exit.
7. Voice will be an aggregative process.
8. Voice will be more likely about personal hardship than communal hardship.

Some Specific Propositions Relevant to Mixed Regimes
1. As the overall quality of public goods declines, discontent will be voiced increasingly about policies that are central to the regime.
2. Deterioration in labor-intensive public goods and services will provoke more “voice” than declines in capital-intensive public goods and services.
3. Decline in “quality of life” policies (i.e., civil liberties) most likely will produce the most intensive voice.
4. The boundaries of “semifreedom” will be an interactive function of voice behavior and the regime’s technical capacity for social control.