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An inquiry into the history, background and progress of the Atlantic Union Committee

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AN INQUIRY INTO THE HISTORY, BACKGROUND, AND PROGRESS OF THE ATLANTIC UNION COMMITTEE

A Thesis
Presented to
The Faculty of the Department of History
The University of Omaha

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

by
Bill Warren Bodager
June 1959
FORWARD

The quest for peace and harmony between sovereign nations has been long and arduous and the goal has been the most illusive ever sought by diplomats and statesmen. The schemes which have been proposed, some of which have been tried with varying degrees of success, are multitudinous. These plans vary all the way from treaties to leagues, confederation, federations and even complete union of two or more nations.

As one possible solution in the quest for peace, certain prominent Americans have been proposing, since World War II, that the factors involved in a more effective union between the certain experienced democracies, generally the North Atlantic Treaty sponsoring powers, should be explored. These people are banded together into what is called the Atlantic Union Committee and this organization proposes that a convention of certain designated personages from these democracies be convened to investigate the prospects of a more effective union. Their primary effort since their inauguration in 1949 has been directed toward securing the passage of a Congressional resolution to effect the calling of such a convention.

This study will include a review of the historical background of other attempts at world or regional union,
a statement of the events leading to the formation of the Atlantic Union Committee and a recountal of the action and issues surrounding its attempts to obtain the passage of a Congressional resolution calling for an exploratory convention.

The writer wishes to take this opportunity to express his appreciation to Dr. A. Stanley Trickett for his valuable guidance and generous assistance; to Mr. Justin Blackwelder, Executive Secretary of the Atlantic Union Committee, for his many letters of valuable advice and encouragement; to the staff of the Library of the University of Omaha, and particularly Mr. James F. Holly, Associate Librarian, for their aid in obtaining source material both from within and without the Library; and to Miss Margaret Byrnes, Base Librarian at Offutt Air Force Base, for the many books she obtained through inter-library loans.
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CHAPTER I

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The analogy between the state in a society of states and the individual in a society of individuals is complete.... In short, the individual human being enriches his nature, strengthens his moral life and adds to his own worth by that form of social and political association and service which is found in close and intimate contact with his fellow man. Truly, man is, as Aristotle so long ago said, a political animal. He is not truly man unless and until he finds himself to be a member of a social and political group.

Precisely the same considerations apply to the life and activity of nations. When two or more sovereign states agree together to promote some common and noble end, they do not limit their sovereignties; they rather enrich them. By this co-operation and association each sovereign state reveals the fact that it has a moral consciousness and a moral purpose. It makes it plain that it cannot, and will not, live for itself alone, but will do all that lies in its power to promote the common interest of mankind. This does not limit sovereignty; it increases the value of sovereignty by ennobling it.

Through the centuries many well-wishers of mankind have envisioned plans which they contended would achieve permanent peace. Many of these plans never got any further than the minds of the originators and perhaps a few of their devoted followers, whereas some of the other plans were catapulted into actuality in a relatively short period of time. It has not been necessarily the soundness of the plan which

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insured its acceptance but rather some one of several catalytic agents such as various types of impending or actual world or regional crises, active backing of one or more major world political figures, efficient organizational support, and the finality of the plan or scheme developed, which helped to overcome the inertia of the body politic in resisting change. It might be stated that the more unique the plan is, the stronger the catalysts must be.

This chapter will be devoted to an investigation of the catalytic agents or lack thereof which were evident in some of the successful and unsuccessful plans which aimed to integrate two or more nations to some extent.

I. PLAN OF PIERRE DUBOIS

Pierre Dubois, avocat royal from 1300 to 1314 for Philippe le Bel, king of France, was one of the early medieval proponents of a world organization for peace. He published his chief work, De recuperatione Terre Sancte, in the early part of the Fourteenth Century and he advocated a federation of the Christian sovereign states. Plans for a new crusade to retake the Holy Land were much in vogue during that period and Dubois reasoned that peace among the Christian rulers was a necessary prelude to the successful undertaking of another crusade. It has been suggested by some that Dubois used the subject of the Holy Land to draw attention to his proposal. The plan never got beyond the covers of
the manuscript because, judged by at least one authority, it was too far in advance of its time.  

II. PLAN OF DANTE

Early in the Fourteenth Century Alighieri Dante, the Italian writer, proposed in the De Monarchia the establishment of a world state under an all-powerful emperor. It was really a plan for the reconstitution of the Roman Empire. Italy at that time was in political turmoil, impotent because of the factions constantly fighting one another. It was in a strain of passionate patriotism that the De Monarchia was written. Dante intended to show his countrymen the only principles of government by which he believed safety could be found amid such dire peril. Thus Dante's plan also was conceived with the hope of curing a major crisis of the day. But his plan was not implemented either, because, although it was glorious in its spirit, it was medieval in its conception and, in the words of Lord Bryce, it was "an epitaph instead of a prophecy."  

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4Ibid., p. 280.
III. PLAN OF GEORGE PODBRAD

In 1461 George Podebrad, king of Bohemia, proposed an international parliament to be participated in by the foremost Christian nations of Europe. One of its primary purposes was to protect Christianity from the Turks and rightfully so, for only eight years before Constantinople had fallen into the hands of the Turks. So here again is evidenced the recognition of the need to have a crisis which the proponents of the proposal can promise to alleviate. This plan differed from the others in that it was actually proposed in treaty form to the governments of the several countries, but even though sponsored by a king it remained, like its predecessors, a mere proposal.  

IV. PLAN OF CRUCE

Little is known about the background of Eméric Cruce, French author and cleric, but it probably was the devastations of the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648) that caused the stirrings in his mind which resulted in the publication of the New Cyneas or Discourse of the Occasions and Means to Establish a General Peace, and the Liberty of Commerce Throughout the Whole World in 1623. It was termed one of the most completely formulated peace plans of early modern

times. 6 The plan called for an assemblage of the ambassadors of the various sovereigns who would sit in judgment of each other's differences. 7 Cruce's appeal went unheeded in the war chambers of the princes and kings of Europe; his elaborate plans were never implemented. 8 Although this plan was the most practical of those discussed thus far, the pressure of the times was not intense enough and it did not have the active support of any of the leading political figures of the day.

V. PLAN OF SULLY

The most celebrated of all the early peace plans was The Grand Design, published in 1638. It was attributed to Henry IV of France but according to most authorities it was conceived and written by his finance minister, duc de Sully. 9 It was proposed in The Grand Design to divide Europe equally among fifteen powers in such a way that none would have cause to envy or fear the possessions or power of any other one. The plan was at least partially a reflection of the dynastic ambitions of Henry IV to destroy the Austrian Empire and actually was aimed at the reduction of the House of

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7Hemleben, op. cit., p. 25. 8Ibid., p. 30.

Hapsburg. It was never implemented. The only catalytic agent evidenced in connection with this plan was the reputed authorship of a head of a state, which, although it gave the plan much publicity, was not sufficient to overcome the public inertia to this innovation.

VI. PLAN OF GROTIOUS

The contribution of Hugo Grotius, the great Dutch jurist, toward reaching the goal of world peace was the development of the principle of the pacific settlement of disputes by arbitration in accordance with the principles of International Law which differentiated it from the prior concepts of mediation. This theme was developed in his most famous work, De jure belli ac pacis, published in 1625. It later gained for him the title of the Father of International Law. Grotius' plan for a tribunal never was formalized into a working plan and, of course, was never implemented but it served as the germ for many plans to follow.  

VII. PLANS OF WILLIAM PENN AND JOHN SELLERS

William Penn's plan, as enunciated in his An Essay

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Towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe which was published in 1693, is noteworthy because of the apparent disinterestedness of the author. Using the basic concept of The Grand Design Penn proposed, in addition, a general parliament of Europe to resolve the differences between sovereigns. He was probably prompted by the wars of Louis XIV in the later part of the Seventeenth Century. But Louis XIV was not to be frustrated in his desires for empire by the Quaker pacifist's ideas nor by Penn's disciple, John Sellers, who submitted a plan in 1710 to the British Parliament essentially along the same lines as the plan of Penn. Although there were world conditions which demanded action, the catalyst still was not strong enough for the European princes to surrender any portion of their sovereignty.

VIII. PLAN OF SAINT-PIERRE

The hopes of Louis XIV to dominate Europe were dashed in the War of the Spanish Succession (1702-1713), and France was paralyzed by the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713.


14Hemleben, op. cit., pp. 53-57.
Charles Irenée Castel Saint-Pierre, French social philosopher, as a secretary to one of the three French plenipotentiaries at the conference at Utrecht, witnessed the difficulties attendant upon the settlement of the terms of peace and as a result drew up his proposal to perpetuate the peace. His proposal entitled *Mémoires pour rendre la paix perpetuelle en Europe* was published in 1713 and was translated the next year in English entitled *A Project for Settling an Everlasting Peace in Europe, First Proposed by Henry IV of France, and Approved of by Queen Elizabeth, and Most of the Then Princes of Europe, and Now Discussed at Large, and Made Practicable*. The English title is quite explanatory of the fact that he was attempting to attach a degree of authority to his scheme which would tend to increase its chances of acceptance. His plan was similar to that of Sully's as it essentially was a federation of the European Christian kingdoms, but it did differ in details. His plan was drawn up in the form of a treaty which was ready to be signed by the sovereigns of the countries of Europe. It would appear there were three important ingredients to help

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insure the acceptability and implementation of the plan. After eleven years of terrible war, Europe should have been ready to accept a plan to keep the peace. The scheme had the respectability of the revered names of Henry IV and Queen Elizabeth attached to it and the plan was in a form ready for signature. Three reasons are cited for its failure to be implemented: Saint-Pierre was unpopular in court circles and was actually expelled from the French Academy in 1718, the arguments were not strong enough to convince the sovereigns of the time to surrender any of their sovereignty or their ambitions to increase their dominions, and the world was not yet ready for so dynamic a plan. 19

IX. PLAN OF ROUSSEAU

It probably is a mistake to call Jean Jacques Rousseau's publication entitled A Project for Perpetual Peace the plan of Rousseau. It is admittedly the work of Saint-Pierre. Rousseau, the French philosopher, merely revived the plan; clarifying, condensing, and making some changes to meet the situation of the times. 20 It was published during the Seven Years War which might be considered as one reason for the relatively popular acceptance it did receive. But the monarchs of Europe were not yet ready.

19 Hemleben, op. cit., p. 72.
X. PLAN OF HAMILTON, MADISON, AND JAY

No survey of schemes and plans for union would be complete without a recounting of the events which led to the federation of the thirteen American colonies. The account is so well known that only a brief review of the events will be mentioned here and then only as they relate to the efforts at implementation. There is one other important reason why it is necessary to review the account of the American success at federation. The leader of one of the current active groups advocating federation, who is also an active member of the National Council of the Atlantic Union Committee, relies heavily in way of justification of the movement on the experiences of these early Americans.21

The United States Constitution cannot be called the plan of just three men but was truly the inspiration of all the participants of the Constitutional Convention. Alexander Hamilton, Thomas Madison, and John Jay, as well as many others, worked with great vigor to secure ratification of the Constitution but the efforts of these three individuals are the most renowned because of the Federalist Papers which they wrote.22


The background for the implementation of the Constitution, as far as this study is concerned, starts during the period of the Confederation. The country was filled with the discontented. The dangerous restlessness of the people, the absurd fiscal extravagances of Rhode Island, and, above all, the insurrection in Massachusetts cast consternation over all the thinking men of the country. Congress, in dire need of money and power, placed solemnly before the people the choice of life or death for the nation but there was no sign of willingness of the states to subject themselves to the taxing power of Congress. "Everywhere there was great cause of despondency: disorder within the states, plots and threatenings on the border, loud laments over commercial distress and heavy taxes, and worst of all, a reckless disregard of political obligations."23 Here, then, was not a general war or threat of one but rather the threat of revolution and anarchy which, perhaps, was just as serious.

Almost before the Articles of Confederation took effect there was a movement under foot to amend and incorporate in them the elements deemed necessary to survive. This movement included efforts by George Washington, Alexander

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Hamilton, James Madison, Rufus King, Thomas Jefferson, and others. This was followed by a meeting of the commissioners of Virginia and Maryland at Mount Vernon in 1785, to work out an agreement concerning navigation on the Potomac River and Chesapeake Bay. The two states agreed in part but in some areas it was determined that Pennsylvania and Delaware had an interest and so the commissioners decided to meet the next year at Annapolis with these two states also represented. The Virginia legislature, however, invited all thirteen states to send representatives. The meeting was in September, 1786, but the representatives of only five states actually appeared. Because of the paucity of representation the delegates could not negotiate on the revision of the commercial treaties between the several states. However, they did adopt the report of Alexander Hamilton which pointed out the main discrepancies and defects in the Articles of Confederation. The report called for the states to send delegates to another convention to be called in Philadelphia in May, 1787, for the purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation. This report was sent to the Congress which, in turn, joined in the call for the Philadelphia Convention.

Thus the difficulties encountered to finally call a convention

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25Beloff, op. cit., p. xxiii.
of the delegates of the states to remedy the obvious difficulties should be noted.

It was decided to write a new Constitution rather than revise the Articles of Confederation. This new document was submitted to the state legislatures by the Congress in September, 1787. The issue was fought out in each state legislature and in some of the states the ratification was secured only because of the prestige of the Constitution's supporters and the propagandizing they did to justify their actions. Here is where the explanatory papers of Madison, Jay, and Hamilton were so effective. 26

In summary, two catalysts, impending crisis and the support of the most important political figures, were very much in evidence in the implementation of the United States Constitution.

X. PLAN OF BENTHAM

The plan of Jeremy Bentham, English philosopher, which was entitled "A Plan for an Universal and Perpetual Peace", 27 needs only passing mention because it was not published until 1839, long after his death and never was implementation ever seriously considered. It called for the establishment of an


international court whose judgements would be enforced by public opinion in a world where all countries were disarmed.  

XI. PLAN OF KANT

The plan of Immanuel Kant, German philosopher, which was published in 1795 was entitled *Zum ewigen Frieden*. He was undoubtedly influenced by the Treaty of Rastatt concluding the war between France and Prussia in 1795 and he, too, like Saint-Pierre prepared his plan in the form of a treaty ready to be signed. The scheme of the philosopher of Konigsberg was similar to others before him in that it was a general federation of European states. But it was far more radical than its predecessors in some of its concepts of international morality, rights, and privileges. It was probably this in spite of the great popularity and interest in this plan which negatived its possibility of implementation.

XII. PLAN OF ALEXANDER I

The Holy Alliance was an agreement of several of the

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28 Hemleben, op. cit., pp. 82-85.
31 Hemleben, op. cit., pp. 87-95.  
32 Hemleben, loc. cit.
European heads of government in which they promised to govern in accordance with the Christian principles of peace and mutual good will. There were no executive or legislative bodies nor was there a specific means provided to settle international disputes.\(^{33}\) The origin of the plan was attributed to several persons including Alexander's tutor, La Harpe, who instilled in him great quantities of philosophic liberalism,\(^{34}\) and Baroness Krudener, who later also had great influence over him.\(^{35}\) But regardless, it is a well known fact that the plan had the very active backing of Alexander I.\(^{36}\) In addition, the moment of presentation in 1815, at the Congress of Vienna was most ideal. After twenty years of Napoleon's rampages in Europe, new schemes to keep the peace were more likely to be favorably considered. It is not the purpose of this study to analyze the feasibility and adaptability of the various plans, the intent of the participants in agreeing to implement said plans, or the success of the plans after they were implemented. It is the purpose of this study merely to review the attendant facts surrounding the success or failure of a plan to be implemented.


From this standpoint, the Holy Alliance, regardless of its results, must be considered a success. Three elements which aided in the implementation of the Holy Alliance were: the plan had the very active support of the leader of an important world power, the proposal was submitted at a time when Europe was tired of war and was looking for a means to prevent a recurrence, and there was little apparent loss of sovereignty involved in the Alliance.

XIII. PLAN OF LADD

An organization of an active society to promote a plan was evident for the first time in the promulgation of the scheme of William Ladd. Ladd was an American whose plan for world peace included a congress of ambassadors from all the civilized nations to formulate international law and, secondly, a court of nations to settle disputes in accordance with this law. His scheme was published in a book entitled An Essay on a Congress of Nations for the Adjustment of International Disputes without Resort to Arms. It was supported by the American Peace Society and became one of the most celebrated and influential schemes for peace ever propounded. As a result of organizational backing it

38 Ibid., p. iii.
became widely circulated in the United States and England. It was also introduced by Ladd's disciple, Elihu Burritt, in conferences in Brussels in 1848, Paris in 1849, Frankfurt in 1850, and London in 1851. Some of the seemingly indispensable ingredients to insure implementation were absent such as a major world crisis and active support by one or more heads of state; however, there was the innovation of organized groups to help promote a plan and this device was used to a considerable extent in the attempt at implementation of later peace plans.

XIV. PLANS OF BLUNTSCHI AND LORIMER

The plans of Johann Bluntschi, German scholar, and James Lorimer, Scottish writer, are not placed in the same section because they are necessarily similar but because nothing happened to implement them for the same reason. In 1867, Bluntschi published a tract entitled The Organization of European Federation in which he proposed a confederation of eighteen specified European states. The proposal had certain safeguards to preserve the independence and freedom of the individual states. Lorimer's plan also called for an international government with a separate executive function.

39 Ibid., pp. xliii-xliv.
40 Barnes, op. cit., p. 901.
His plan was published in 1884 and was entitled The Institutes of the Law of Nations. Although both of these plans were quite scholarly and were the result of taking the best from prior plans, there was no indication that the authors made any real effort to implement their plans. These proposals were published during a period of the century of peace in Europe and people were apparently satisfied with the peace of the world as provided by politicians such as Otto von Bismark.

XV. PLAN OF NICHOLAS II

Czar Nicholas II of Russia was the prime mover behind the Peace Conferences at The Hague. In that this was merely a proposal for a conference to promote international understanding and peace, it differed from the other proposals which in most cases were schemes for world or regional organization. On August 24, 1898, Nicholas II proposed that the nations send representatives to The Hague for a conference to promote international understanding and peace and further proposed that the nations consider a possible reduction of armaments. The motive of Nicholas is still in doubt but the influence of Alexander I and The Holy Alliance must be considered as part of it. Additionally, some historians

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have indicated that his desire to limit armaments resulted from the fact that Russia could not financially keep up in the arms race.\textsuperscript{43} A second note dispatched by Russia in January, 1899, proposed the agenda for the conference and it was convened in The Hague in May of the same year.\textsuperscript{44} Thus, from the standpoint of this paper, Nicholas's plan must be considered a success. He proposed a convention to discuss peace and that convention was convened. Subsequent to President Theodore Roosevelt's suggestion in 1904 for a second conference, Nicholas II did formally propose a second conference to meet at The Hague and the representatives of the nations assembled there in June, 1907.\textsuperscript{45}

\textbf{XVI. PLAN OF WILSON}

The proposal of Woodrow Wilson was announced in his address to Congress on January 8, 1918, in these words, "A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike."\textsuperscript{46} It must not

\textsuperscript{43}Hemleben, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 126.
\textsuperscript{44}Scott, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 3. Russian Circular.
\textsuperscript{45}Ibid., pp. 93-111.
\textsuperscript{46}Barnes, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 901.
be supposed that Wilson was the originator of the plan for the League of Nations. He received his initial interest in such a scheme from some of the members of the League to Enforce Peace. In that the Covenant of the League of Nations was a part of the Versailles Peace Treaty, which was signed by almost all the major countries of the world, Wilson's plan was implemented and was a success by the criteria of this study. What were some of the factors surrounding the implementation of this plan? First, there can be no doubt that this particular time, following World War I, was the most propitious time in a century, that is, since the major wars which resulted in the defeat of Napoleon in 1815. As in no period in the past century the citizens of the world were tired of war and were willing to experiment. Secondly, the leading exponent of this plan for a league of nations was the leader of the most powerful nation of the world. As leader of the major power in the world, and the nation which turned the tide of the War, Wilson had a certain bargaining power. Although forced to sacrifice on other points, he was adamant on his plan for the League of Nations and he hoped that any inequities in the Treaty could be worked out through the arbitrative provisions of the League.

Thirdly, many of the war weary people of the world had organized into individual groups all of which proposed some

47 Barnes, op. cit., p. 901. 48 Ibid., pp. 901-03.
type of a world organization to enforce peace. An enumeration of some of these groups and their ideas follows. A very important group in England was the British League of Nations Society which was formed in 1915, to advocate an agreement among civilized nations which would serve as a basis of permanent peace among them. One of the most influential associations in the United States at this time was the American League to Enforce Peace. It also was formed in 1915 to adopt a program of action to follow which would look toward the prevention of future wars. Among its important personages was William Howard Taft, who was its President. By 1918, thirty-four state governors had agreed to serve as Vice-Presidents of the Organization. Another American peace organization was the League of Free Nations Association. Its aim was to make known to the American public the conditions necessary for the success of the Peace Conference and, further, to support the policy of Woodrow Wilson. In England, the Fabian Society also offered a very detailed plan, including a proposed constitution.

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51 Ibid., p. 43. 52 Ibid., p. 96. 53 Phelps, loc. cit.

Another organization in England was the Union of Democratic Control. Its particular objective was the democratic control of foreign policy which was a forerunner of the concept of open covenants openly arrived at. Another British organization was the Community of Nations which proposed a new world order which included a court to settle justiciable disputes and a council to handle the nonjusticiable disputes.

The people of other countries also organized into groups which promoted peace plans. In 1915, the Nederlandsche Anti-Oorlog Raad, later renamed the Central Organization for a Durable Peace, was organized at The Hague. It had international flavor in that it counted nationals from all the major powers in its number. Essentially its program called for the establishment of an International Court and a Council of Mediation. It required concerted action against any nation failing to resort to either or abide by their rulings.

One of the most influential organizations in France was the Association de la Paix par le Droit. Its platform was similar to that of the Central Organization for a Durable Peace in that it aimed to provide for a means to settle international disputes.

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Another society was formed in France in 1917 called the Ligue pour une Société des Nations. This group was engaged largely in popularizing the idea of a league of nations. It is not important to know in detail the program of these various groups but only that they were internationalist in nature. The groups were representative of the tremendous ground swell of a change in the public's attitude toward international cooperation. Thus Wilson's job to write the Covenant of the League of Nations into the Peace Treaty, which was most difficult at best, would probably have been impossible without the help provided by these active groups.

XVII. PLAN OF COUNT COUDENHOVE-KALERGI

One of the plans between the Wars which developed much notoriety was a federal union of the several European States, which was proposed by Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, Austrian scholar, in Vienna in 1922. He organized a Pan-European Association to foster his plan. In 1925, Edouard Herriot, the French Premier, indorsed the plan and

58 Hemleben, op. cit., p. 176. 59 Ibid., p. 177.

60 Phelps, op. cit; Hemleben, op. cit; Marburg, op. cit; These treatises all have discussions of the plans of other societies and individuals less well known which were introduced during this period.

became an active supporter of it. The following year
Aristide Briand, French Foreign Minister, became an ardent
supporter and the principles of the plan were incorporated
by him in a proposal he submitted on behalf of the French
Government to the League of Nations Assembly in September,
1929. Finally in the spring of the following year he
addressed his "Memorandum on the Organization of a Regime
of European Federal Union" to twenty-six European govern-
ments and asked for their comments. The reaction was
mixed. Some enthusiastically indorsed it, some were skepti-
cal and advised caution, and some were openly critical and
even hostile. Discussion of the Briand proposal continued
for a year but the world depression destroyed its chances
for acceptance because it seemed as though all political
efforts were then directed toward economic recovery.

An analysis of the failure indicates that at least
two of the necessary catalysts were present. In addition
to Briand and Herriot, Paul Humans, Foreign Minister of Bel-
gium, Edward Benes, later to become President of Czechoslo-
vakia, and Salvador de Madariaga, important Spanish official,

62 Alfred E. Bingham, The United States of Europe
(New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1940), p. 55.
63 Ibid.
64 Eaton, op. cit., p. 48.
65 Bingham, op. cit., pp. 57-58.
actively worked for the proposal. The Pan European Association was organized to propagandize it. But the other and, perhaps, the most important factor was missing. There was no major world crisis, at least from a peace or war standpoint, to cause the politicians to accept such a revolutionary scheme at this time.

XVIII. PLAN OF CORDELL HULL

The Charter of the United Nations was not primarily the handiwork of Cordell Hull but the United States Secretary of State was the prime mover in laying the groundwork during the early stages of the War to insure that there would be an international organization after the War. Hull had always been a confirmed and uncritical believer in a general international organization and was a firm supporter of Wilson's proposal. Early in the War a secret planning group was organized in the State Department under the supervision of Leo Pasvolsky to start the preliminary planning for the peace treaties and an international organization. To preclude the recurrence of one of the reasons that the United States did not join the League of Nations, important Congress-

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66 Bingham, op. cit., p. 58.
68 Ibid., pp. 17-18.
ional leaders including Senator Warren Austin and Representative Charles Eaton, were invited to and did participate in the discussions with this group.69

The first hint to the public of the possibility of another international organization appeared after the meeting of Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt off Argentia in August, 1941, which resulted in the Atlantic Charter. The eighth article mentioned the future "establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security."70

The next important step was the joint declaration on January 1, 1942, by the United States, Great Britain, Russia, China, and twenty-two other countries subscribing to the principles of the Atlantic Charter.71 It should be noted in those early days the commitments were limited to a security organization.

The Moscow Declaration of October 30, 1943, signed by Great Britain, Russia, United States, and China resulted from a meeting attended by Bull; and the representations on the future world organization are largely the fruit of his efforts.72 It was here that the scope of the forthcoming world organization was broadened beyond the security aspects in the

69Chase, op. cit., p. 20.


paragraph which stated, "that they recognize the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security." The Tehran Declaration signed by Russia, Great Britain, and the United States on December 1, 1943, reiterated the same goal. Anticipating, by this time, the role the United States was to play in the formation of the world organization and to insure general acceptance of the idea, the leaders in Congress succeeded in getting the adoption of the Fulbright and Connally Resolutions looking toward a general international organization. The Fulbright Resolution was passed by the House of Representatives on September 21, 1943, by a vote of three hundred and sixty to twenty-nine and the Connally Resolution was passed by the Senate on November 5, 1943, by a vote of eighty-five to five.


74Ibid., p. 409. December 11, 1943.


76Ibid., pp. 9221-22. November 5, 1943.
In the meantime the other major countries initiated planning action, although to what extent, in some cases, is still secret. The British Foreign Office formed a group under C. K. Webster, the veteran adviser in 1919 at Paris. It was apparent that Russia and China made quite extensive studies but the efforts of the other countries including some of those in exile were quite limited.  

The United States initiated the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations which were held in the summer of 1944 to discuss detailed plans for the international organization, which had been agreed upon in the prior conferences. The Conference was between the representatives of Russia, China, Great Britain, and the United States. The proposals were completed in October, 1944, and they established the general guidelines and organization for the United Nations Organization. It should be noted that upon public release of these proposals in the United States there was very little, if any, objection to America's adherence to the international organization as it was proposed.

There were, however, still a few unresolved areas of a substantive nature in connection with the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. These would have to be resolved by the heads of

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77 Harley, op. cit., p. 27.

the major powers over the bargaining table. That bargaining table was set up at Yalta in February, 1945. The chief objective at Yalta as far as Roosevelt was concerned was to secure agreement on the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals for the creation of the international organization.\(^79\) The rationale of the decisions made there are not important for the purposes of this study but it is interesting to note that some of the items negotiated on with respect to the international organization were the veto power, the voting power of the Soviet Union and the trusteeship system.\(^80\) It is important to remember, however, that it took the leaders of the respective countries to resolve the matters involved, and it was to the derogation of each other's established position.

With the important areas of disagreement resolved by the major powers concerned, the Big Three issued a call for all countries who had declared war prior to April 1, 1945, to meet in San Francisco on April 25, 1945, to establish an international organization with the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals as a basis.\(^81\) The Charter for the United Nations was drafted in less than two months and was implemented upon ratification.


\(^{80}\)Chase, op. cit., p. 29.

\(^{81}\)Ibid.
by the several states. This was a separate document in itself and was not a part of a general peace treaty as was the Covenant of the League of Nations and many of the other world organization proposals previously discussed.

It should not be assumed that there were no independent efforts being made for a world organization. The books and organizations of many individuals had great effect in making the United Nations more palatable when it was presented to the people, even though it was not along the same lines of the many plans proposed. At least these efforts made the body politic aware of the concept of world organization.

One of these internationalists, Lionel Curtis, proposed a voluntary world federation in which the member states would surrender their authority over those areas which concerned more than one national state. It was to be implemented initially on a small scale, with a federation of Great Britain and some of her dominions. This was to be followed on a voluntary basis by the other nations of the world. 82 Clarence Streit was another, who, similarly to Curtis, in 1939 recommended a federation of the experienced democracies. 83 At that time it included about fifteen


countries, mostly of Western Europe and the United States, but by 1941 half of these countries were under the Nazi yoke. He then recommended immediate union of the United States and Great Britain, to be followed after the successful conclusion of the War by the remaining democracies joining this established federation. Other books which were published during this period which were closely in agreement with the proposal of Streit's were those of W. Ivor Jennings, W. B. Curry, and Nicholas Murray Butler. George Catlin proposed a world union which would begin by the impetus of a federation of the United States and Great Britain.

84 Streit, Union Now with Britain (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1941).


Philip Nash\textsuperscript{89} and Harold Nicolson\textsuperscript{90} were two others who published plans for the new world order. Oscar Newfang submitted a scheme for a world federation to be initiated by an amendment to the Covenant of the League of Nations.\textsuperscript{91} Some of those who indorsed regional unions were Raymond Leslie Buell,\textsuperscript{92} Alfred M. Bingham,\textsuperscript{93} Ely Culbertson,\textsuperscript{94} Peter Jordan,\textsuperscript{95} and Norman Angell.\textsuperscript{96} They all insisted on the necessity of the region as the \textit{sine qua non} of union. Later on Howard Eaton staffed a proposed constitution for the projected United Nations organization among more than a hundred leading scholars, public officials, journalists, and publicists and he published a tentative constitution or one which could be used as a point of

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{89} Philip Curtis Nash, \textit{An Adventure in World Order} (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1944).
  \item \textsuperscript{90} Harold Nicolson, \textit{Why Britain is at War} (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books Limited, 1939).
  \item \textsuperscript{91} Oscar Newfang, \textit{World Federation} (New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1939).
  \item \textsuperscript{92} Raymond Leslie Buell, \textit{Isolated America} (New York: Albert A. Knopf, 1940).
  \item \textsuperscript{93} Bingham, \textit{op. cit.}
  \item \textsuperscript{94} Ely Culbertson, \textit{World Federation Plan} (Garden City, New York: Garden City Publishing Company, Inc., 1943).
  \item \textsuperscript{95} Peter Jordan, \textit{Central Union of Europe} (New York: Robert M. McBride and Company, 1944).
  \item \textsuperscript{96} Norman Angell, \textit{For What Do We Fight?} (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1939).
\end{itemize}
Here, then, was another successful implementation of a world organization plan. The background of the United Nations was outlined in greater detail than the other plans in order to indicate the attendant difficulties under present world political arrangements to implement a plan of this sort. There can be no doubt that the horrendous world conflict had great effect in the people's acceptance of this proposal. In fact, the very first sentence of the preamble of the Charter in part says, "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind..." Secondly, there is no doubt that it was only the tremendous pressure of Roosevelt which kept the proposals from sinking in the mire of postwar problems, perhaps never to be resolved, as it today appears to be the case in many of the other areas of disagreement of those days. Stalin and particularly Churchill, steeped in the diplomatic ways of yesteryear, would probably have preferred to rely on power balances. So again the importance was emphasized of having a leader of one of the major powers whose prime consideration is the establishment

97 Eaton, op. cit.

of a world organization.

It should be stated that the Charter of the United Nations did not represent the end position which was desired by many of the aforementioned writers. As will be reported later, it was the activities of some of these people and their followers which resulted in the initiation of the Atlantic Union Committee.
CHAPTER II

THE ORIGINS OF THE ATLANTIC UNION COMMITTEE

The study of the origins of the Atlantic Union Committee should start with the founder and first president. Not only is this the logical approach but it is necessary to be cognizant of the background and political philosophy of Owen J. Roberts, as well as his associates in the Atlantic Union Committee, to understand the purposes of the Atlantic Union Committee. Justice Roberts had a full and renowned career before becoming associated with the Atlantic Union Committee and even today this association is one of his lesser publicly recognized contributions to the American scene.

I. JUSTICE ROBERTS - PRIOR TO THE SUPREME COURT

Owen Josephus Roberts was born in Philadelphia on May 2, 1875, and was reared in that city. From what must be considered a rather conservative background, he went to the University of Pennsylvania and then on to the Law School of the same university from which he graduated with highest

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1"Owen Roberts Dies; Former Judge, 80" New York Times, May 18, 1955, p. 1. This was a two column announcement of his death and gave in considerable detail the events of his life. No mention was made of his connection with the Atlantic Union Committee.
honors. He remained and taught at the Law School and specialized in real property. His law school teaching was intermixed with private practice as well as work with the district attorney's office. He severed completely his connection with the Law School in 1919.

During the next period of years he devoted himself to private practice and it was of the most varied character. The practice involved everything from acting as the poor plaintiff's advocate in a negligence case to representing the Pennsylvania Railroad in a tax case against the federal government. However, he gained his greatest fame and notoriety, prior to his Supreme Court appointment, as an associate prosecutor in the Teapot Dome Scandle cases which he, primarily, was responsible for bringing to a successful conclusion.

II. JUSTICE ROBERTS - AS ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

Roberts was appointed to the Supreme Court in 1930, during the period when the court was to obtain a balance between liberal and conservative members. The conservative majority of the Court was reduced by 1932 to Justices Willis

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4McCracken, op. cit., pp. 325-30.
Van Devanter, James Clark McReynolds, George Sutherland, and Pierce Butler and they were generally opposed by Justices Charles Evans Hughes, Harlan Stone, Benjamin Cardozo, and Louis Brandeis on the constitutional issues. In many of the five to four decisions during that decade, it was the vote of Roberts which decided the issue. It was during that period that Justice Roberts was described as a thoughtful middle-of-the-roader, naturally conservative, but distinguished by an open, alert, and receptive mind. He grew in stature in the Supreme Court during this period and his reputation was later enhanced by his role as chairman of the Board of Inquiry, charged with investigating the Pearl Harbor disaster. He resigned from the Supreme Court in 1945. The reason will be conjectured upon later.

III. JUSTICE ROBERTS AS A MAN

The above brief chronicling does not fully depict the character and the personality of Roberts. In addition to what

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6 "Courts Reverse", Literary Digest, April 10, 1936, pp. 8-9; Griswold, op. cit., pp. 332-36.
7 Griswold, op. cit., pp. 332-36.
9 Griswold, op. cit., pp. 348-49.
was inherent in the activities listed, he was described by his associates and contemporaries as deeply loyal and uncompromisingly honest. He also has been described by the Dean of the Harvard Law School as having a mind which was powerful and analytical as well as methodical and precise. He was a loyal churchman whose life was marked by a great depth of religious conviction. It has been stated that the source of his influence over other men was to be found in the four characteristics: thoroughness, simple godliness, sincerity, and boundless energy. It was the name and prestige as well as the leadership ability of Justice Roberts that was used to promote the objectives of the Atlantic Union Committee.

IV. CLARENCE STREIT AND THE FORMATION OF FEDERAL UNION

It is necessary to review briefly the background of one of Justice Roberts' more important co-workers, Clarence Streit. He was born in Missouri and was reared in Montana. He went to the University of Montana where his interest in politics was evidenced by his student activities. He was a


11 Griswold, op. cit., p. 333.


13 Ibid.
Rhodes Scholar, which may, perhaps, explain his tendency towards a strong Anglophile attitude. He served, following World War I, in Paris at the Versailles Peace Conference in a role which allowed him to witness the work of international negotiation and diplomacy. But it was during the period he was the *New York Times* correspondent to the League of Nations at Geneva during the twenties and early thirties that he developed his thesis of federation of the experienced democracies. This concept resulted from his conviction that leagues, confederations, and treaties would not guarantee the peace. His thesis was first published in 1939, under the title of *Union Now*. Certainly, the concept of federation was not unique, as evidenced by the many proposals already discussed in this study, but his arguments for a federation of the experienced democracies were so forcefully presented that his book soon became a non-fiction best seller. Tremendous grass roots activity resulted in the establishment of Federal Union organizations throughout the United States and abroad and they were ministered to by a well organized central organization under the chairmanship of Clarence Streit.¹⁴

Among the many other things which Streit did to effect the implementation of his proposal was to seek the

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support of a man of unquestioned national stature. To steer clear of partisan politics he decided to enlist the backing of a member of the Supreme Court. This led to his contacting Justice Roberts on August 5, 1941.15

V. THE CHANGING VIEWS OF JUSTICE ROBERTS

Until that day in August, 1941, there was no published speech or paper by or about Justice Roberts which reflected his interest in or philosophy of foreign affairs. Undoubtedly, a man with the breadth of interests that his associates report Justice Roberts had, must have had some strong ideas about foreign affairs and certainly about the constitutional aspects of foreign affairs. But how could a man of the conservative background of Justice Roberts, the sort of man who would be expected to believe that the best interests of the country would be served by the preservation of the status quo, be so completely converted to what in all honesty must be considered as rather a radical innovation? The extent of this conversion will be documented in the following pages but first to answer the question just posed. The reason was the character and makeup of this man as described by his close associates above. He had an open and receptive mind and all his biographers describe him as being intellectually honest. When he was

once convinced of the rightness of a cause he would give it his full support to the extent required by the circumstances.\textsuperscript{16} For example, Roberts was reported to have been ready to resign from the Supreme Court in 1940, to lead the campaign for universal military training which he fervently believed in at that time.\textsuperscript{17} That Streit's thesis was accepted by Roberts, a man who was described as not given to spinning new theories and concepts, but a man whose mind was methodical and analytical,\textsuperscript{18} spoke well for the basic soundness of the proposal.

VI. THE EXTENT OF JUSTICE ROBERTS' CONVERSION

After the War broke out, Justice Roberts's involvement with the Pearl Harbor Board of Inquiry did not permit him to give much direct support to Streit's organization.\textsuperscript{19} However, Roberts was the first of eight important personalities who signed a full page advertisement in the \textit{New York Times} on December 18, 1941, placed by Federal Union, Inc., which requested:

That the President of the United States submit to Congress a program for forming a powerful Union of free people to win the war, the peace, the future;

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{16}Felix Frankfurter et al., "Owen J. Roberts; In Memoriam", \textit{Pa. L. R.}, Vol. 104, pp. 311-79.
  \item \textsuperscript{17}Streit, \textit{loc. cit.} Hitler's crash through the Lowlands obviated this necessity.
  \item \textsuperscript{18}Griswold, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 333
\end{itemize}
That this program unite our people, on the broad lines of our Constitution, with the people of Canada, the United Kingdom, Eire, Australia, New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa, as may be found ready and able to unite on this federal basis.

That this program be only the first step in the gradual, peaceful extension of our principles of federal union to all peoples willing and able to adhere to them, so that from this nucleus may grow eventually a universal world government of, by, and for the people.\(^{20}\)

The association between Justice Roberts and Clarence Streit continued and Streit reported in those dark days of World War II he received much moral support from Roberts.\(^{21}\)

In May, 1942, Justice Roberts was quoted as follows:

"...The founders of this Republic discovered a new principle—that sovereign nations could yield to a federal government certain defined powers to be exercised not against the sovereign states but to be exercised directly upon the peoples of those states. Can any supranational law ever operate successfully that does not bind every individual in the nation that makes up the union?..."\(^{22}\)

However, it was on May 1, 1943, in a speech before the American Society of International Law that Roberts became irrevocably committed to a Streit-like proposal. He said:

I believe that we have come to realize that we cannot, as a nation, live in isolation; to understand that, if we are to have the essentials of our free democratic way of life we must join other nations in means and methods.

\(^{20}\)New York Times, December 18, 1941, p. 31. This advertisement was also signed by John Foster Dulles.

\(^{21}\)Streit, loc. cit.

to perpetuate world peace through world cooperation...
We have learned that leagues, treaties, agreements, voluntary submission of disputes to a world court, fall short of reaching the goal....Our own national experience of federation of independent sovereigns seems to point to at least one avenue to be explored. Is it not plain that, so long as national sovereignty remains absolute, no means will exist for preventing the abnegation of the obligations of international good faith. Must there not be a fundamental framework of government to which the people of each constituent nation surrenders such portion of their nation's sovereign perogatives as is essential to an international order; that each nation be bound by certain agreed rules so that no single nation, and no group of nations, can for any reason, or for no reason, assert its or their unbridled will by resort to arms.23

Justice Roberts continuing discussed the form of the world government and its delegated powers. In conclusion, he indicated that it would be necessary to start with the United States, Great Britain, and, perhaps, some of the Western European democracies.24

Justice Roberts resigned from the Supreme Court in July, 1945. He never publicly announced the reason for his action, but Clarence Streit strongly implied it was to give him greater freedom to champion Federal Union, Inc.25 This was further substantiated by Elmo Roper26 and George C. Roberts, "Supra-National Law", Vital Speeches, Vol. 9, pp. 457-59.

23Ibid.
24Ibid.
Marshall who both knew Justice Roberts quite well.

VII. JUSTICE ROBERTS - AFTER RETIREMENT

After retirement from the bench Justice Roberts served as Dean of the University of Pennsylvania Law School for three years, he was the President of the American Philosophical Society for a like period of years, and he performed many other public spirited tasks right up to his death. In these posts, however, he no longer felt gagged as he had before while holding an official governmental position.

Organizationally, Roberts remained unaffiliated directly with Federal Union, Inc., but in 1946 he was most instrumental, both financially and editorially, in the founding of Freedom and Union which is the official publication of that organization. Roberts was listed as a contributing editor from the first issue and he continued as such until his death, although in the last few years of his life he contributed few if any articles. He is still

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27 "Marshall Member of Atlantic Union", New York Times, May 19, 1955, p. 11. Marshall is quoted as follows, "Justice Roberts' services to defense as well as to the judiciary were manifold, but perhaps the finest thing he did was the sacrifice he made in resigning from the Supreme Court to devote himself to the cause of Atlantic Union."


carried on the editorial page of the magazine as having been a contributing editor during the period in which he lived. The editorial policy and the objective of the magazine were stated in the first issue as follows:

*Freedom and Union* itself will champion the principle of individual liberty, equality, and fraternity through an ever peacefully expanding federal union of the free... We shall tackle the emotional as well as the structural and practical problem of such federation today. We shall teach the federal union philosophy that seeks freedom, peace, and prosperity...  

We believe the United States... should seek prompt federal union with British Commonwealth, France and the other experienced Atlantic democracies as the best means of preventing war and safeguarding liberty.  

During the period prior to the formation of the Atlantic Union Committee, Roberts wrote quite a number of articles for *Freedom and Union*. In February of 1947, he advocated an organic union of all free men as the best security for peace in a world troubled by autocrats. The next month he spoke out forthrightly criticizing Winston Churchill and John Foster Dulles for talking in terms of a Western European federation. He stated that the only solution was for the United States to join with these countries and give them the benefit of its federal

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experience. In early 1918, he wrote an article in which he called for a federal union of the Atlantic democracies. Two months later he appealed for positive political leadership and a start toward federation. In an early 1949 Freedom and Union article he declared that the United Nations could not insure the preservation of the peace and that this assurance of peace could only be obtained by a federal union of the United States and the other Atlantic democracies.

The Freedom and Union was not the only place where Roberts was disseminating his ideas, ideas which reflect almost completely the Federal Union, Inc. concepts. At an Associated Press Luncheon in the spring of 1946, he discussed the ideas motivating his actions in great detail. At that time he cited the failures of normal diplomacy, the League of Nations, and the United Nations, and he discussed the peril of the atomic bomb. He stated he believed that there could never be world peace until a world parliament was established with representatives of "other people" and not

He explained that this world parliament could have limited powers just as does the federal government of the United States. He further stated that immediate simultaneous federation of the whole world was not feasible, but that it was more practical to start with a small number of the experienced democracies. Rotarian also acted as his forum in 1946, when again he espoused his ideas about federation. Later, in an article published in the New York Times, Roberts called for an immediate convention of the representatives of the Atlantic democracies to work out a plan to achieve recovery and peace by federation into what he called a Transatlantic Union. In this article he based his argument largely upon economic considerations and the gains in this area which would result from a federation.

Early in 1949, Justice Roberts, in writing the Forward for Lionel Curtis' new book, wholeheartedly indorsed the thesis of Curtis in that the task of preserving the peace among the sovereign states could be achieved only by placing the ultimate


39 "Roberts Proposed Democracies Unite", New York Times, January 2, 1948, p. 1. This was a front page article and thus the importance the editor of the New York Times attached to it may be judged accordingly.
responsibility on the people themselves. The United States must join with the people of Western Europe in shouldering this great responsibility.\(^4\) This has been a brief resume of some of the published statements of Justice Roberts during this period.

VIII. OTHER INTERNATIONALIST ORGANIZATIONS - AFTER THE WAR

To understand the relationship of the Atlantic Union Committee to other internationalist organizations which were active during the period, one need go back only to the end of World War II. The United Nations Charter had not yet been ratified by all the member nations until articles, speeches, and books began to appear, expressing dissatisfaction with the United Nations. Later, in 1947, the college debate topic was, "Resolved: That a federal world government should be established."\(^1\) This provoked more discussion, more argument, and more books and speeches.

At the same time world peace groups began to organize all over the world, all sparked by people who were dissatisfied with the United Nations. They were held together by the common bond of the desire for a guaranteed peace. To

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\(^1\) J. Weston Walch, Complete Handbook on Federal Government (Portland, Maine: J. Weston Walch, Publisher, 1947).
try to describe them all and the various things they stood for would be a study in itself. It must suffice to cite some of the most important organizations and to state briefly their beliefs and efforts.

The World Movement for World Federal Government was founded in Luxembourg in 1946, and exercised loose central control over the more than seventy national organizations in twenty nations working for world government. Some of the national organizations in the United States were the Committee to Frame a World Constitution, World Federalists, U. S. A., World Republic, Americans United for World Government, Student Federalists, Massachusetts Committee for Federal World Government, and World Citizens Committee of Georgia. As recounted so ably by the founder, many of the original converts to Federal Union, Inc. had gone further during this period and become supporters of some of these world federation schemes. Although Clarence Streit never considered himself a part of these numerous plans for world federation, he did, during the years 1946-49, give most of them encouragement and

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printed favorable reports on their activities in his magazine, *Freedom and Union*. This was done, perhaps, in the belief that the more people who espoused the principles of world or regional federation, the sooner the body politic would be educated to accept those concepts.

In February, 1947, at a convention in Asheville, North Carolina, several of the most active world federation groups in the United States; namely, World Federalists, U. S. A., Americans United for World Government, Student Federalists, World Republic, Inc., Massachusetts Committee for Federal World Government, and World Citizens's Committee of Georgia, merged into a single organization called the United World Federalists under the presidency of Cord Meyer. They launched the new body with an impressive list of supporters, including Chester Bowles, Raymond Graham Swing, Norman Cousins, and many United States Senators and Representatives. Their objective was peace through the transformation of the United Nations Organization to a world federation. Federal Union, Inc., continued to stand apart from this organization and was differentiated by one Federal Unionist who stated

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45 Hamer, *loc. cit.* De Rusett, *op. cit.*, pp. 89-90, It was not all inclusive however. At least two organizations, World Republic and Committee to Frame a World Constitution, continued to operate separately.

46 Hamer, *loc. cit.*

that both organizations wanted peace but that Federal Union, Inc. put freedom first; and that the United World Federalists intended to work through the United Nations to obtain its goal and the Federal Unionists through a union of the experienced democracies.\textsuperscript{48}

During the period following World War II, Justice Roberts constantly sought to unite the various groups with federalist interests and went further in the direction of world federation than he may have thought wise in an attempt to achieve a compromise program.\textsuperscript{49} He testified before the House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs in 1948 at a hearing on two world federation resolutions. The testimony, while in opposition to the resolutions, was not in bitter disagreement with their objectives but suggested that the Federal Union proposals would accomplish the same end more expeditiously and with greater safety.\textsuperscript{50} Even after he took over active leadership of the Atlantic Union Committee he continued his conciliatory attitude toward the world federalist groups.\textsuperscript{51}

\textsuperscript{48}Hamer, \textit{loc. cit.} Hamer was managing editor of \textit{Freedom and Union}.


\textsuperscript{50}"Congress Hears Views on How to Strengthen U.N.", \textit{Freedom and Union}, July-August, 1948, pp. 22-29.

\textsuperscript{51}Streit, \textit{loc. cit.}
IX. EVENTS DIRECTLY LEADING TO THE FORMATION OF THE ATLANTIC UNION COMMITTEE

As early as January, 1948, Justice Roberts called for an immediate convocation of the representatives of the experienced democracies to start working out a plan of federation. In the fall of the same year, Estes Kefauver won election as a United States Senator from Tennessee on a platform which featured prominently the Atlantic Union plank. Additionally, Will Clayton, who had just recently resigned as Under Secretary of State, and Robert Patterson, former Secretary of War, both came out forthrightly for Atlantic Union. It was then that Streit and some of his co-workers in Federal Union, Inc., decided that the time had come to supplement the basic educational work, to which their organization was confined by its tax status, with an independent committee. The purpose of this committee would be to concentrate on getting Congress to pass a resolution inviting the representatives of the other democracies to a convention to explore the possibilities of federation. Justice Roberts was the obvious man to lead this organization but, until that time, he had not involved himself in any organizational


work in the cause of federation. However, when Clarence Streit approached him on January 9, 1919, with the proposition that he take the lead in the founding of such a committee and be its active president, he agreed without a moment's hesitation.\(^{54}\)

Justice Roberts sent out invitations to a number of leaders and they met in New York City on January 23, 1919.\(^{55}\) This meeting resulted in an action committee being formed for the purpose of:

(a) enlisting public support for a resolution to be introduced in Congress inviting the other democracies, with whom the United States is forming an alliance, to meet American delegates in a federal convention to explore possibilities of uniting in a Federal Union of the Free, and

(b) continuing this support until such a Federal Union of democracies becomes an accomplished fact.\(^{56}\)

This action committee which was called the Atlantic Union Committee was incorporated in Washington, D. C., on February 11, 1919, for the purposes as listed above.\(^{57}\)

\(^{54}\) Streit, "Owen J. Roberts and Atlantic Union", Pq. L. R., Vol. 104, pp. 363-64.

\(^{55}\) Ibid. It is interesting to note that this meeting was not reported upon in the New York Times.

\(^{56}\) De Rusett, op. cit., p. 99.

\(^{57}\) Justin Blackwelder, executive secretary of the Atlantic Union Committee, in a letter to the author, April 22, 1959.

\(^{58}\) Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U. S. Senate, on the North Atlantic Treaty, II, Eighty-first Congress, p. 535. Testimony by Owen J. Roberts. The At-
Official announcement of the formation of the Atlantic Union Committee was made by Justice Roberts in Washington on March 15, 1949. Roberts was chosen as president and he said, in this initial announcement concerning the new organization, that he did not consider the proposed federal union of these Democracies as a substitute, or alternative, for the North Atlantic Pact then under Congressional consideration, but rather as the next logical step. Will Clayton and Robert Patterson, both elected as vice-presidents of the Atlantic Union Committee, issued statements indicating their views that the proposed federation of the democracies was the only way to effectively counter the Soviet Union. Elmo Roper, market consultant, was elected treasurer and Walden Moore, long a Federal Unionist, was elected secretary. Needless to say, Clarence Streit was on the Board of Governors.

The background and published statements of the officers and others closely associated with the Atlantic Union Committee seem to confirm its stated objectives. Later, Atlantic Union Committee later incorporated in the state of New York and revised their objectives somewhat. See Appendix A, p. 160.

60 Ibid.
Clarence Streit, commenting on the Atlantic Union Committee, said it was established for the purpose of organizing political actions for the principles that Federal Union advocates. Federal Union left the field of local chapter organization and the holding of annual national conventions to the Atlantic Union Committee, in order to avoid duplication of its work or becoming involved in its political action. There were also independent political appraisals of the purpose of the Atlantic Union Committee which arrived at similar conclusions.


62 De Russett, op. cit., p. 97; "History is Catching up with 'Union Now'", Fortune, April, 1949, pp. 78-79.
CHAPTER III

EIGHTY-FIRST CONGRESS

The major activity of the Atlantic Union Committee has been directed toward securing Congressional passage of an exploratory convention resolution. The remainder of this study will be confined primarily to a review of those efforts, as well as of other events which affected or were related to those efforts. This chapter describes this activity during the Eighty-first Congress.

The type of Congressional action sought was the passage of a concurrent resolution. A concurrent resolution places Congress on record as to its present sentiment regarding public policy. It is not signed by the President and it does not carry the same force as public law. It may, however, be a potent factor in determining the policy of the Administration. Concurrent resolutions introduced in the Senate may have multiple sponsors, whereas those introduced in the House of Representatives may have but one sponsor.

I. EARLY ACTIVITY

On February 11, 1949, the same day that the Atlantic

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1See the By-laws of the Atlantic Union Committee in Appendix A. Page 160.

Union Committee was incorporated, Justice Roberts and Will Clayton met with President Truman and informed him of their project. The President approved a concurrent resolution to explore Atlantic Union subject to the Secretary of State's acquiescence. Conferences held within the month with Dean Acheson, Secretary of State, and Senator Arthur Vandenberg (R., Mich), Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, resulted in the ascertainment of their objections. Acheson stated that if the exploratory convention resolution were introduced at that time, it might interfere with the ratification of the pending North Atlantic Treaty. This was the first of what turned out to be a long list of State Department objections, each additional one seeming to materialize just as the prior one faded away.

The Atlantic Union Committee decided to cooperate with the State Department and withheld an exploratory convention resolution until the North Atlantic Treaty had been ratified and even assisted to obtain approval of the Treaty. Additionally, they believed that bipartisan

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4 Ibid.
5 "Atlantic Alliance and Union", Freedom and Union, April, 1949, pp. 2-3.
sponsorship of the Treaty was so far committed to the other North Atlantic Powers that it could not be deflected at that time.6

II. IN SUPPORT OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

The North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington on April 4, 1949. Clarence Streit, commenting on the ceremony, noted that the United States Marine Corps Band was designated to provide the music and among their selections was "I Got Plenty of Nothin'" from Porgy and Bess.7 In later years it was to be the theme of the Atlantic Union Committee that the North Atlantic Community "got plenty of nothin"; or at least very little, when they got the North Atlantic Treaty.8 The Treaty was always referred to as only the first step.

Justice Roberts, Robert Patterson, and Will Clayton were called before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to testify on the North Atlantic Treaty in early May, 1949. All three made strong statements in support of the Treaty. Roberts emphasized the political aspects,9 Clayton discussed

6"Atlantic Union Committee Formed", Freedom and Union, April, 1949, pp. 6-7.


8Ibid.

9Hearings before the Foreign Relations Committee, United States Senate, on the North Atlantic Treaty, Eighty-first Con-
the economic problems, and Patterson spoke concerning the military situation. All three testified as officers of the Atlantic Union Committee and were subjected at length to friendly exploratory questions concerning Atlantic Union. Hope, as indicated by the tenor of the articles in Freedom and Union, was high during this period.

III. ATLANTIC UNION COMMITTEE RESOLUTION

INTRODUCED INTO CONGRESS

The North Atlantic Treaty was ratified by the Senate on July 21, 1949, and five days later on July 26, 1949, the Atlantic Union Committee Resolution was introduced in both Houses of Congress. Senator Kefauver (D., Tenn.) introduced the Resolution in the Senate and proclaimed that its purpose was to permit the investigation of the possibilities of a federal union of the certain Atlantic Democracies. He also announced that "it would commit us to nothing more than

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10 Ibid., pp. 376-413. 11 Ibid., pp. 508-24.


The five House of Representatives Concurrent Resolutions were introduced by Representatives Hale Boggs (D., La), Clifford Davis (D., Tenn.), Walter Judd (R., Minn.), George Smathers (D., Fla.), and James Wadsworth (R., N.Y.).

The sponsorship of these Resolutions represented a broad political spectrum. It included Republicans and Democrats, liberals and conservatives, and, interestingly, all sections of the country were represented.

In the press conference, held the day the Resolutions were introduced and attended by many of the sponsors, Senator Kefauver expressed the feeling of most of the group when he

\[13\text{Ibid., p. 10144.} \quad 14\text{Ibid., p. 10144.} \quad 15\text{Ibid., p. 10255.}\]
emphasized again that the Resolutions were only for an exploratory convention. He went on, however, and stated his own personal belief concerning the desirability of a federal union of the North Atlantic Community. Senators Hill, Baldwin, Maybank, Chapman, and Gillette and Representatives Judd and Wadsworth made similar but more non-committal statements relative to an Atlantic Federation.

On the very same day, the United World Federalist Resolution, which in essence sought to strengthen the United Nations and further its development into a world federation open to all nations, was introduced into both chambers of Congress. It was introduced in the Senate by Senator Charles Tobey and was co-sponsored by eighteen other Senators including Senators Graham, Hendrickson, Hill, Thye, Sparkman, and Withers, who had also co-sponsored the Atlantic Union Committee Resolution. At that time, the combined total sponsorship of these federation plans was thirty-five Senators, a rather high percentage of that august body. The House members who introduced the United World Federalist


Resolution did not include any of the five who had introduced the Atlantic Union Committee Resolution in the lower chamber.

IV. PUBLIC RELATIONS OF THE ATLANTIC UNION COMMITTEE

Much of the responsible press gave favorable and encouraging support to the Atlantic Union Committee and the Resolution they supported. Even before the Resolution was introduced in Congress, the Washington Post editorially applauded the move for a regional convention as an indication of the restoration of statesmanship in the making of United States foreign policy. 19 The Minneapolis Morning Tribune urged this exploratory convention as a furtherance of the free world's security. 20 Felix Morley, in the Pathfinder, declared that the North Atlantic Treaty should be developed into a more perfect treaty. 21 Thomas L. Stokes, syndicated writer, commented favorably on the leadership of the Atlantic Union Committee and called their program a step in the right direction. 22 Fortune editorially commented on the formation

22 Ibid., p. 13.
of the Atlantic Union Committee and proudly reflected on the fact that they discovered Clarence Streit in 1939. The Christian Science Monitor felt that men such as Patterson and Clayton could hardly be dismissed as "starry-eyed."

All comment was not favorable, however. The New York Daily News loosed a diatribe against Justice Roberts and his proposal. It stated in part that the United States could not save "weaklings from their weaknesses or fools from their folly", and if the United States tried, it would only weaken itself militarily, economically, and philosophically. This view was also mirrored in the other McCormick family owned newspapers, the Washington Times Herald and the Chicago Tribune.

The New Yorker commented favorably on the formation of the Atlantic Union Committee but did not give its objectives much chance of success because people's minds were in a fixed national mold. Many of the newspapers did not completely commit themselves to the Resolution offered by the Atlantic

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23"History is Catching Up with 'Union Now'," Fortune, April, 1949, pp. 78-79.
Union Committee but editorially they made many encouraging remarks. The Christian Science Monitor, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Louisville Courier-Journal and the St. Louis Post-Dispatch were newspapers which favored an exploratory convention because they considered it a new bold yet realistic approach to foreign policy. So did the Buffalo Courier Express, the Dallas Morning News, and the Philadelphia Bulletin. William Lindsay White of the Emporia Gazette committed himself when he said he "... hereby nails to its masthead the banner of the recently formed Atlantic Union Committee."

John Knight, owner and publisher of the Akron Beacon Journal, the Chicago Daily News, the Detroit Free Press, and the Miami Herald was not impressed with the arguments of the Atlantic Unionists and was afraid that the United States would be "left holding the sack." Elmer Davis was another political commentator who argued against the world govern-

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33John S. Knight, "Is Atlantic Union Realistic
This was just a brief review of some of the press comments on this Resolution facing Congress. There were many others in the sources cited. In summary, it is believed that the favorable press comments stemmed almost directly from the reputation of the top officers of the Atlantic Union Committee. Will Clayton, Owen Roberts, and Robert Patterson had reputations for political sagacity which were almost beyond criticism.

Tremendous efforts were made during those early days to enlist the support of the national legislators as well as influential personages. A tally was printed monthly in Freedom and Union, indicating Senators and Representatives committed to support the Resolution. The list grew long and was quite imposing. Because of the length of the list only a few of the adherents will be mentioned and primarily because of a later change in their circumstances which may portend greater things in the future for the Atlantic Union Committee objectives. Senator Hubert Humphrey (D., Minn.), later to become one of the foremost candidates for the

Now"; Freedom and Union, October, 1949, pp. 4-6. It should be noted that Freedom and Union has a very enlightened editorial policy and was often provided as a forum for opposition writers.

Democratic nomination for President, announced his support in early August, 1949. By the middle of September, 1949, Christian Herter, Republican Representative from Massachusetts, added his name to the growing list of sponsors. Of more interest were the statements of John Foster Dulles in his campaign for Senatorship of New York. He stated that the North Atlantic Treaty was just a first step, that a greater degree of unity among the Western nations was essential to safeguard the peace of the world, and that the United States should take the lead in seeking a political union of the Atlantic Security Pact Powers. He promised he would vote for the Atlantic Union Committee Resolution if elected to the Senate.

To help secure passage of the Exploratory Convention Resolution, the Atlantic Union Committee enlisted influential personages to be on the National Council of that organization. This afforded much publicity in local newspapers and aided in the promotion of the Resolutions. Another and, perhaps, a greater purpose was the fact that these names indicated indorsement of the Resolutions. Each new issue of

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Freedom and Union listed new members of the National Council and this imposing roster was also too long to record all the names here. Included were educators, leaders in business and industry, military officers, clergymen, and leaders of various national organizations. The list read like a miniature *Who's Who*.38

Vocal opposition also developed. In early August, 1949, the Patriots' Executive Committee was formed to fight world governments. Mrs. Lola Lee Bruington, executive secretary of the National Defense Committee of the Daughters of the American Revolution, was elected leader of the group of eighty-five patriotic organizations. She said the new organization's objective was to oppose specifically the proposals of the United World Federalists and the Atlantic Union Committee. She stated that both plans meant reducing United States armed forces to a status of a mere internal police force and since "...these idealists would have us weaken our own position, both in the matter of arms and national security, we cannot but believe that their attempt is Communist-inspired, although they may not be aware of the fact."39

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V. HEARING BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

In the last hurried days of the first session of the Eighty-first Congress, the House Foreign Affairs Committee decided to hold hearings on the various world and regional federation proposals. In the Hearings which commenced in early October, 1949, Justice Roberts testified and stated frankly that he believed the only salvation for the West in the face of Russian Communism was federal union. He stated that an exploratory convention was the next step in that direction. He said he admired the objectives of the United World Federalists but that strengthening the United Nations in the face of Russian objections was quite improbable. When questioned by Representative Lawrence Smith concerning the affront the Atlantic Union Resolution might be to the uninvited countries, Roberts replied that only countries with a common denominator could federate. He declared that it would be quite impossible to federate a democracy and an autocracy in that the former works from below and the later from above. Roberts reminded the Committee members the Resolutions committed the United States to nothing. Any change which might result would have to be effected through United States Constitutional

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processes. Representative Wadsworth testified in favor of the Atlantic Union Resolution as opposed to the United Federalist Resolution on the basis that the later would be an ideological "tower of Babel." Representative Clifford Davis also testified in favor of the Atlantic Union Committee Resolution. Senator Estes Kefauver said he believed that Atlantic Union was the next logical step in American foreign policy, which in the past included the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty. He reminded the Congressmen that the possibility of the Russian veto was not a matter of concern with respect to the Atlantic Union Committee Resolution. Representative Boggs testified in favor of the Atlantic Union Committee Resolution and cited other regional groupings within the United Nations as precedent for the legality of a regional federation within the United Nations. He, along with some others, testified he believed the proposals of the two groups could be combined. As previously planned the Committee closed the Hearings for the First Session without a decision.

As it became obvious that an increasing number of people thought the Atlantic Union Committee and the United World Federalists should combine the best of their programs into one program, Streit took the initiative in the December,

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41 Ibid., pp. 141-57. 42 Ibid., pp. 77-86.
43 Ibid., pp. 277-79. 44 Ibid., pp. 29-30.
1949, issue of Freedom and Union. He proposed that a second enacting clause be added to the Atlantic Union Committee Resolutions, to provide that the Atlantic Federal Convention be just the next step in strengthening the United Nations, which would be the fundamental objective of the foreign policy of the United States. In other words, Streit promised that he would support the United World Federalists' ultimate goal if they would agree to the attainment of his objective first. 46

Hearings on the federation proposals were scheduled again in the Second Session on January 23, 1950, and on this date the House Foreign Affairs Committee spent its entire time on the Atlantic Union Committee Resolution. Almost the entire day was, in fact, spent questioning Will Clayton, who had not been available for the First Session Hearings. He gave his prepared statement in which he stressed the economic considerations which mandated that the Free World unite in order to be able to resist the onslaughts of the Communist World. 47 This testimony was oriented toward the desirability of a federal union of the Atlantic

Democracies and was not limited to the preliminary step of an exploratory convention. He answered questions concerning regional groups and the United Nations, the pending European unification efforts, and the exclusiveness of the Exploratory Convention Resolution. Most of the questioning appeared to be friendly as all the Representatives seemed to have great respect for Will Clayton. Additionally, there were submitted and entered into the record a statement by Roberts urging action on the Resolution, and a prepared statement delivered by Streit, in which he proposed the solution whereby the objectives of the Atlantic Union Committee and the United World Federalists might be joined in one resolution as described above. However, none of the Resolutions were ever reported out of the House Foreign Relations Committee, nor were any official statements made thereon.

VI. BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

In January, 1950, a large group of the members of the

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48 Ibid., pp. 6-33. 49 Ibid., p. 41.
50 Ibid., pp. 33-41. A brief description is given on pages 69-70.
The Subcommittee Hearings began as promised and lasted for nine days during the month of February, 1950. The members heard testimony on seven different proposals. The Subcommittee Report was eight hundred and eight pages long and included the testimony of seventy-seven witnesses and the statements of eighty-one additional personages.\footnote{Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Committee}


By the time the Hearing began, the total number of Senators who supported at least one of the seven Resolutions was reported to be forty-eight.55 Many of the Senators supported two or more of the proposals.

Testimony on the Atlantic Union Committee Resolution commenced on February 8, 1950. It began with an introductory statement by Senator Kefauver, who reported there were at that time twenty-five Senators who indorsed the Resolution. He defined the objective of the Resolution and recommended that an exploratory convention be the basis for a solid foreign policy, rather than continuing to rely on stopgap measures such as the Truman Doctrine and the European Recovery Program known as the Marshall Plan.56

Owen Roberts gave a very lucid explanation of the need for the passage of the Resolution and of the help it would be in preserving the peace. He testified concerning the benefits to be gained by favorable Congressional action on the Resolution. He discussed the juridical aspects of a North Atlantic Federation within the United Nations as well as the effect upon nations which were not to be invited, at least initially, to the convention of the experienced


55Ibid., pp. 172-73. 56Ibid., pp. 228-32.
democracies. He answered Senator Thomas' questions about whether the United States would have to take the flag off the Capitol, his quaint way of asking about loss of sovereignty, in a very able manner. 57

Dr. Harold Urey, American chemist and Nobel Prize winner in 1934, was the next witness. He stated that the United States could not afford to become isolated in an atomic world. He also reminded the Subcommittee that time was of the essence in the atomic and hydrogen bomb race and that this factor mandated early negotiation on federal union. 58 The next man called was Will Clayton, who testified on the necessity of not only an exploratory convention but also a federal union of the Atlantic Democracies. His argument was based primarily on economic considerations. 59

The next witness was Clarence Streit, who gave, as usual, an erudite presentation along the lines which he had been propounding since 1939. His statement was updated to include necessary changes, such as the countries to be initially invited and the urgent need for calling an exploratory convention at that time, which he supported by citing relevant current events. 60 Robert Patterson was

57Ibid., pp. 232-55. 58Ibid., pp. 255-64.
59Ibid., pp. 265-80. 60Ibid., pp. 280-93 and 298-312.
unable to appear at the Hearing but he submitted a strong appeal for an Atlantic Federation and for the Exploratory Convention Resolution.61

It was at this hearing that the position of Dean Acheson became known. Prior to the ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty he had appealed to the backers of the Exploratory Convention Resolution not to submit their proposal until after the North Atlantic Treaty had been approved by the Senate. He had made no specific commitment since then but he had made statements over the months which, by implication, could be construed to mean he believed the bonds of the North Atlantic Community needed strengthening. He sent Dean Rusk, Deputy Under Secretary of State, and John Hickerson, Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs, to appear at the Subcommittee Hearing. They both testified as to the importance of the United Nations and its value as then constituted. Hickerson went on to state that if the proposed exploratory convention did not succeed, the cause of collective security in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would be damaged considerably. Under present circumstances the exploratory convention was more likely to expose divisions between the proposed members that it was to lead to substantial progress in the desired direction. He declared the State Department would support the Resolution only if it would advance

61 Ibid., pp. 279-80.
American interests, it had the support of peoples of the nations concerned, there was a reasonable chance of agreement, and it would strengthen the North Atlantic Community. Hickerson said it was the State Department's position that the Resolution did not have those four prerequisites. There followed a rather heated discussion between Senator Kefauver and Mr. Hickerson on this position of the Department of State.

There also was a group of witnesses who testified generally on all the seven Resolutions before the Subcommittee. Representatives Lawrence Smith (R., Wis.) and Clare Hoffman (R., Mich.) argued against any proposal which would result in loss of sovereignty. There were also strong statements against any possible loss of sovereignty by the representatives of various organizations as well as by private individuals. Included was the testimony of Omar Ketchum for the Veterans of Foreign Wars, Mrs. William Leetch for the New England Women's Society, John Trevor for the American Coalition representing forty-five patriotic organizations, Edward Jerome for the National Economic Council, Inc.

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63 Ibid., pp. 446-55.  
64 Ibid., pp. 469-79.  
65 Ibid., pp. 479-94.  
66 Ibid., pp. 625-29.  
67 Ibid., pp. 619-25.  
68 Ibid., pp. 634-40.  
69 Ibid., pp. 640-44.
Elsie Johnston for the National Society for Constitutional Security, Ralph Parr for the National Sojourners, Inc., and many others. There were others who testified in support of a world or regional government. Some of these were Byrl Whitney for the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, Ray Short for the National Junior Chamber of Commerce, Mrs. Jane Hayford for the World Organization of Mothers of All Nations, Inc., Russell Smith for the National Farmers Union and many others both in an individual capacity as well as from an organizational standpoint. Additionally, there were many prepared statements in support of the Atlantic Union Committee Resolution from people who could not attend the Hearing. These included many statements submitted by Senators and Representatives as well as many influential personages from all over the nation.

VII. AFTERMATH OF THE SENATE HEARINGS

The testimony by the representatives of some of the organizations which had been so vociferous against any world government plan was expected, but the statement of the State Department position came as quite a surprise. Time stated

\[\text{70 Ibid., pp. 568-76.} \]
\[\text{71 Ibid., pp. 669-74.} \]
\[\text{72 Ibid., pp. 508-16.} \]
\[\text{73 Ibid., pp. 531-36.} \]
\[\text{74 Ibid., pp. 559-64.} \]
\[\text{75 Ibid., pp. 584-87.} \]
\[\text{76 Ibid., pp. 764-84.} \]
that the Subcommittee had listened with increasing skepticism. This skepticism was reinforced when Hickerson gave his testimony. When Hickerson said that the establishment of such a federation, far from providing additional strength, could be a source of weakness and greater internal divisions, *Time* judged that the Senators seemed to agree.77 Thus Hickerson's statement could not go unchallenged by the Atlantic Unionists. On March 13, 1950, Senator Kefauver made a very strong rebuttal on the floor of the Senate to the State Department position. His main point was the lack of foresight on the part of the State Department. He pointed out that the Resolution was for just an exploratory convention of uninstructed private citizens of the countries involved; therefore, the results of the convention should not commit or embarrass any nation. He stated that all the State Department had to offer were stopgap measures, whereas the Atlantic Union Committee Resolution was a far-reaching one. He urged the Senate to take the initiative in foreign affairs and pass the Resolution. There were friendly interventions by Senators Douglas, Fulbright, Lehman, Flanders, and Alexander Smith which strengthened this rebuttal.78


That the Senate would take the initiative continued to be the hope of the officers of the Atlantic Union Committee. The Atlantic Union Committee continued efforts to encourage more national legislators to commit themselves for the Resolution. Efforts were also continued to attract more people of influence to become members of the National Council. By the end of the year there were twenty-four Senators committed to the Resolution, including the newly elected Senator from California, Richard Nixon. The House support had by that time grown to sixty-seven members.79

The Atlantic Union Committee scheduled another work conference in Washington from May 31 to June 2, 1950, as a follow-up of their January actions. One hundred-fifteen delegates from twenty five states were present and the conference involved work sessions, visits to Congressmen, and speeches by some of the friendly Congressmen.80

This activity was followed by an open letter, signed by nine ex-State Department staff members, addressed to Senator Thomas Connally (D., Tex.), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, asking for his support for the Atlantic Union Committee Resolution. They included Robert


Bliss, former Assistant Secretary of State; Joseph Grew, former Under Secretary of State; Garrison Norton, former Assistant Secretary of State; Arthur Lane, former Ambassador to Poland and Italy; Lithgow Osborne, former Ambassador to Norway; Herbert Pell, former Minister to Portugal and Hungary; William Phillips, former Under Secretary of State; Paul Porter, former American Chief of Economic Mission to Greece; and William Standley, former Ambassador to Russia.

On August 10, 1950, twelve Congressmen visited the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson and Ambassador Averell Harriman to impress them with the urgency of Atlantic Union. Attending were Senators Kefauver, Thye, Fulbright, Sparkman, and Hendrickson and Representatives Boggs and Herter. The State Department called the meeting worthwhile.

During this period, Louis Domeratzky, former Chief of the European Unit of the Division of International Economics, U.S. Department of Commerce, published a series of articles on the financial aspects of an Atlantic Union, which were supported by many statistics. These articles...

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82 "Congressmen, Former Diplomats Urge Atlantic Union", Freedom and Union, September, 1950, p. 5.
received wide and favorable comment by the press. Also, during this period *Time* featured Clarence Streit on their front cover and devoted the feature article of the same issue to a rather sympathetic treatment of the Atlantic Union Committee. It was in February, 1950, that Streit was also nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize.

It is necessary to mention just briefly events in the other Atlantic Pact Nations as they relate to the Atlantic Union Committee and its objectives. In 1950, the Canadian Senate passed a resolution which approved of the United States calling an exploratory convention such as the one recommended by the Atlantic Union Committee Resolution. Paul Reynauld, as President of the Economic Commission of the Consultative European Assembly, stated that he thought Europe was not yet ready for Atlantic Union. He stated that the great industries of the United States would bankrupt comparable industry of the European nations. The British Parliament also debated an exploratory convention motion

84 *Elijah from Missoula*, *Time*, March 27, 1950, pp. 22-25.
which was sponsored by forty members of Parliament. It, too,
was opposed by the officials of the Foreign Office.88

VIII. THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE REPORT

The report of the Subcommittee was adopted by the
full Committee on Foreign Relations on September 1, 1950,
and issued as the report of the full Committee. None of
the seven Resolutions was reported out of Committee89 and
it seemed to the backers of some of the Resolutions that
this was an effort, originating in the State Department, to
present a fait accompli to prevent the Resolutions from
reaching the floor of the Senate in that year.90 The
Committee neither recommended nor rejected any of the seven
Resolutions nor did it offer any alternative. The report
stated that any resolution which the Committee might have
drafted which was not objectionable to any one concerned
would not have been very helpful, whereas a strong affirma-
tive resolution might well have encouraged disunity and

88 Streit, "M.P.'s Discuss Atlantic Union", Freedom and
Union, October, 1950, pp. 2-4.

89 Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations on
Resolutions Relative to Revisions of the U.N. Charter, Atlantic
Union, World Federation, etc., Eighty-first Congress, Second
Senate Report Number 2501.

90 Streit, "Senator Thomas Makes a Disappointing
animosity instead of constructive ideas.\(^1\)

The report gave two reasons for the Committee's indecision. One was the doubt that remained in its mind as to "whether any international organization can in fact relieve East-West tension or whether that tension must instead be relieved by other means before any international organization can operate effectively."\(^2\) This statement would seem to apply only to the world federation plans and not to the Atlantic Union Committee proposal. The other reason the Committee gave for its inaction was that "the menacing attack on Korea, which occurred after the hearings had been brought to a close, brings imponderable factors to bear upon the whole problem" which the Committee had not yet "fully considered."\(^3\) The report also indicated that the Committee thought that Russia might leave the United Nations permanently after which the Organization might have more


\(^2\)Ibid., p. 4.

\(^3\)Ibid., p. 4.
vitality than heretofore supposed.\footnote{Ibid., p. 4.}

In addition, the implication of the Senate Report as well as the Hearings seemed to indicate that the divided efforts of these various groups sponsoring different Resolutions, and particularly the differences between the United World Federalists and the Atlantic Union Committee, played an important part in the Committee's inaction during the Eighty-first Congress.
CHAPTER IV

EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS

I. CONGRESSIONAL ACTION

The Atlantic Union Committee Resolution was introduced early in the Eighty-second Congress and was identical to the Resolution offered in the previous Congress.¹ Senator Estes Kefauver (D., Tenn.) again sponsored the Resolution in the Senate and made a strong appeal recommending early consideration of it.² The Resolution was co-sponsored by Senators George Aiken (R., Vt.), Harry Cain (R., Wash.), Frank Carlson (R., Kan.), Zales Ecton (R., Mont.), Ralph Flanders (R., Vt.), William Fulbright (D., Ark.), Walter George (D., Ga.), Guy Gillette (D., Iowa), Robert Hendrickson (R., N.J.), Thomas Hennings (D., Mo.), Lister Hill (D., Ala.), Hubert Humphrey (D., Minn.), Lester Hunt (D., Wyo.), Edwin Johnson (D., Col.), Harley Kilgore (D., W.Va.), Herbert Lehman (D., N.Y.), Russell Long (D., La.), Burnet Maybank (D., S.C.), John McClellan (D., Ark.), James Murray (D., Mont.), Mathew Neely (D., W.Va.), Richard Nixon (R., Calif.), Joseph O'Mahoney (D., Wyo.), John Sparkman (D.,

¹See Appendix B, p. 161.

There were nine identical Resolutions sponsored in the House of Representatives by Representatives Laurie Battle (D., Ala.), Hale Boggs (D., La.), Clifford Davis (D., Tenn.), Robert Hale (R., Me.), Christian Herter (R., Mass.), Walter Judd (R., Minn.), Michael Mansfield (D., Mont.), George Miller (D., Calif.), and Francis Walter (D., Pa.).

It is again interesting to note the wide political and geographical spectrum of sponsorship of the Resolutions. Most of the co-sponsors in the prior Congress acted as co-sponsors again in the Eighty-second Congress as well as some additional Senators. Noticeably missing, however, was Senator Joseph McCarthy (R., Wis.). In addition to the nine Representatives who sponsored individual Resolutions, there were over eighty additional members of the lower chamber who had promised to support the Resolutions.

At a press conference held on January 15, 1951, the day the Resolutions were introduced into the House and the Senate, the urgency of immediate consideration of the Resolutions was the keynote. Senator Kefauver declared that it was a military necessity to create an Atlantic Union. He

3Ibid., p. 261.  
4Ibid., p. 303.  
was followed by Senators Hill and Hendrickson and Representatives Mansfield, Boggs, Walter, and Hale who also asserted that the North Atlantic Treaty alone was insufficient to deter the Communist threat in Western Europe.  

During neither session of the Eighty-second Congress did the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hold any hearings, nor did it issue any report or statement on the Resolutions.  

The House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Organizations, chaired by Representative Battle, held three executive sessions (closed meetings) on the North Atlantic Federation and the United Nations. William Sanders, Special Assistant and Planning Advisor in the Bureau of United Nations Affairs, and Edwin Martin, Director, Office of European Regional Affairs, testified at these closed sessions.  

No reported action was taken nor was an official

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6 Hemer, loc. cit.


statement ever issued by the House Foreign Affairs Committee concerning the Resolution. 9

Justice Roberts, while speaking in Great Britain about the Atlantic Union Committee Resolution, said in part, "The reason that it has not gone to the floor is the Secretary of States thinks that it is not the right way to do it. He is afraid that if the United States President calls this conference, the nationals of our own nation and other nations will feel that we are committed to whatever this conference reports." 10 Later, Clarence Streit, who undoubtedly understood Congressional feeling regarding the Resolutions better than any other man, also said that Secretary Acheson was the main "obstacle." 11

II. ACTIONS OF THE ATLANTIC UNION COMMITTEE

The Atlantic Union Committee was far from inactive during this Congressional lull. A strategy conference was convened in May, 1951, in Washington with over two hundred key persons attending. Included in this three day conference were work sessions where ways and means of promoting Atlantic

9 See footnote number seven on page eighty-seven.
Union were discussed, calls on Capitol Hill which resulted in six more Representatives committing themselves to the Atlantic Union Committee Resolutions, and visits to the White House and the State Department. The latter two visits resulted in no visible change of attitude. It was the conclusion of the conferees that more grass roots work had to be accomplished in order that Washington would become more responsive to the Atlantic Union Committee plan. Mrs. Chase Osborne was cited as the Atlantic Union Committee Councilwoman of the Year for her speeches to seventy-two organizations, which resulted in endorsements from fifty-eight groups and five hundred new members. 12

Mrs. Osborne was not the only member of the Atlantic Union Committee making speeches during this period. All the top officers as well as Senator Kefauver were busy during this lull addressing a great variety of organizations and groups. Senator Kefauver, who had publicly announced his retirement as Chairman of the Senate Investigating Committee to devote more time working for the passage of the Atlantic Union Committee Resolution, 13 was a much sought-after speaker at that time. In many of his addresses

12 "Atlantic Union Committee Leaders Meet", Freedom and Union, July-August, 1951, p. 5.

he talked about the Atlantic Union Committee Resolution. Clayton, Roberts, and Streit were just a little less vocal or, perhaps, just reported on a little less because they lacked the public interest that Senator Kefauver then had. During this period Life magazine editorially backed the proposal to examine the possibilities and merits of Atlantic Union.


16 Roberts "The World Needs a Cop on the Corner", Saturday Evening Post, March 24, 1951, pp. 29, 122-26. In this article on page 124, Roberts said, "The plan for federation, as proposed in these resolutions, would unite, for economic and military security, such free UN members as might respond to an invitation from the sponsors of the Atlantic Pact. In essence it would substitute one supranational department of defense and of foreign affairs for the dozen which now attempt to argue out policy among themselves. Probably the federation would in time create a common currency and strive gradually to eliminate tariff barriers." The Resolutions did not provide for this but rather for an exploratory convention. Statements like this tend to confuse the public as to the meaning and purpose of the Atlantic Union Committee. "Justice Roberts Urges Atlantic Union Now", Foreign Policy Bulletin, Vol. XXX, No. 29, April 27, 1951, pp. 3-4.


18 "Let's Look Into It", Life, April 9, 1951, p. 36.
The Atlantic Union Committee held its first national convention in Memphis in November, 1951. This was the first time that the rank and file of the membership had the opportunity to help make policy. In addition to other purely organizational matters, the delegates resolved to attempt to place an exploratory convention plank in the platform of the major political parties the following summer, rejected the proposal for a new organization for education and non-political activities, rejected a recommendation to submit a broader watered-down resolution to the Congress, and set a goal of establishing at least one Atlantic Union Committee chapter in every Congressional district. At that time there was a total of one hundred thirty-seven Atlantic Union Committee chapters. All the officers of the organization then holding office were re-elected. Among messages of well-wishing from all over the world came cables from Dwight Eisenhower, George C. Marshall, William Drees, Prime Minister of the Netherlands, and Edouard Herriod, President of the French National Assembly.

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The National Council of the Atlantic Union Committee met again in May, 1952. It was at this meeting that a division appeared within the National Council as to the extent of support to be given to European federation efforts. Some, including Oscar Jaszi, Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Oberlin College, and Stephen Borsody, Professor of History at the Pennsylvania College for Women, thought that the moves toward an Atlantic and European federal union, if animated by the common spirit of true democratic federalism, were not only not antagonistic but could contribute toward the earlier realization of both aims. Others, including Streit, believed that an earlier realization of Western European integration would imperil the foundation of Atlantic Union. The Council did, however, pass a resolution to support efforts to implement the non-military features of the North Atlantic Treaty, including the attainment of greater political and economic unity within the North Atlantic Treaty Countries. Their recommendations were forwarded to General William Draper, who had been designated the United States Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Council.

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23 See text of Article II of North Atlantic Treaty on page 94.
24 "West Assembly Urged", New York Times, May 23, 1952,
The second Atlantic Union Committee Congress was held in Buffalo in November, 1952. It was decided to broaden the scope of Atlantic Union Committee's immediate activities to include, in addition to the efforts to secure Congressional passage of an exploratory convention resolution, promotion of efforts to encourage the North Atlantic Council to implement Article II of the North Atlantic Treaty, support of all actions of the NATO nations leading to greater unity, and encouragement of all major United States legislation promoting unity of the North Atlantic Community. Messages from well-wishers included a telegram from President Truman who said the Atlantic Union Committee had performed a notable service by promoting a broader understanding of the need for continued cooperation among the peoples of the North Atlantic Community. Similar messages were received from Lord Ismay, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and Anthony Eden, British Foreign Minister.  

III. NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

The North Atlantic Treaty was primarily a military alliance to provide for the common defense. However, 

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Article II of the Treaty provided for something more than defense in these words:

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by a strengthening of their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflicts in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.\(^{26}\)

During the first two years after the Treaty was signed no special action was taken to implement this provision.\(^{27}\) However, at the Foreign Ministers Council Meeting in Ottawa in September, 1951, the Council gave serious consideration to further implementation of Article II.\(^{28}\) To consider this problem, the Council appointed a Committee, with Lester Pearson as chairman. The Committee found some cooperation between certain countries in specific areas but no common overall effort. The Pearson Committee, in its final report submitted to the NATO Foreign Ministers Council Conference in Rome in February, 1952, reported these findings. It also advised dissolution of the Committee, transference of its tasks to the Council, and recommended further implementation


\(^{27}\)Ibid., pp. 150.

\(^{28}\)Ibid., pp. 201-02. Text of Ottawa Declaration.
of Article II of the Treaty, particularly in the areas of coordination and consultation on foreign policy and in economic affairs. 29

IV. ATLANTIC UNION AND THE NATO COUNTRIES

Senator Guy Gillette, perhaps activated in part by the State Department position in the 1950 Senate Hearings that the attitude of the participating powers would be an important factor in whether it supported the Resolution or not, 30 initiated, in conjunction with twenty-six other Senators, a letter to thirty-nine NATO country legislators of all political parties except the Communist Party, asking their opinion concerning the proposed convention. 31

Gillette commented on the response in these words, "I have found the reactions among the leaders in the Atlantic parliaments almost unanimously favorable to our proposal for an Atlantic federal convention. I do not mean by this that they have all necessarily indorsed any particular plan or formula or structure. But they have expressed eagerness to work out some better way of strengthening the North Atlantic Community." 32

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29 Ibid., pp. 151-52.
30 See pages seventy-five and seventy-six.
32 Ibid. p. 7.
Certainly, though, the British political community was not wholeheartedly behind the concept of Atlantic Union. Winston Churchill declared, "...the British Commonwealth of Nations, spread all over the world, is not prepared to become a state or group of states in any continental federal system on either side of the Atlantic." Anthony Eden mirrored a similar view in a speech at Columbia University. Harold Nicolson, British diplomat and writer, was even more strongly against an Atlantic federal union, mainly on the issue of sovereignty. However, Herbert S. Morrison, in quite non-commital language, spoke of eventual Atlantic Union. Arnold Toynbee, English historian, strongly supported Atlantic Union in these words, "...we now have to establish between us a closer political union than can be obtained through even the most cordial cooperation between sovereign Governments." The British Atlantic Union Committee was inaugurated in the summer of 1952.

38 "Friends of Atlantic Union", Freedom and Union,
One author who has studied the Atlantic Union movement in Great Britain declared that there had rarely been a movement of such historic importance which had aroused so little public interest in Britain as the movement toward Atlantic unity. The idea of lasting union with the United States affected many deep-rooted prejudices in England, both of the Right and of the Left. The Socialists looked at the United States as the citadel of reaction and appeared ignorant of what had happened in the last twenty years. The Conservatives saw the United States as jealously intent upon wrecking the structure of British imperial power.39

By the summer of 1952, there were Atlantic Union Committee organizations in Canada, France, and the Netherlands, in addition to those in Great Britain and the United States.40 There was other important support during this period which should be mentioned. Earlier, the Canadian Senate passed an exploratory convention resolution. Dutch Foreign Minister, Dirk Stikker, indicated his support of the Resolution then pending before the United States Senate.41

September, 1952, p. 24. The organization in Great Britain appears to be quite limited as compared to the organization in the United States.


41 "New Dutch Committee Promotes Federation", Freedom and Union, October, 1951, p. 38.
Herriod, President of the French National Assembly, joined the French Atlantic Union Committee.42

V. POLITICS AND THE ATLANTIC UNION COMMITTEE

Senator Kefauver announced his candidacy for the Democratic nomination for the President early in 1952, and he campaigned in many parts of the nation. Two of his opponents in the primary races, Senator Richard Russell (D., Ga.) in Florida and Senator Robert Kerr (D., Okla.) in Nebraska, made an important issue of his advocacy of Atlantic Union, implying sinister motives which might even call for an investigation. Senator Kefauver met the issue forthrightly and spoke out for Atlantic Union. He won handily in Nebraska and made such an unexpectedly good showing in Florida that these election contests were seized upon by Clarence Streit as proof that internationalism, generally, and the Atlantic Union, specifically, had grass roots support.43

Council member, Dr. Harold Urey, made the official Atlantic Union Committee appeal at the Democratic and


Republican Conventions. He received scant attention from the subcommittee drafting the Republican foreign policy plank and the Republican platform did not even mention North Atlantic by name. When urging the Atlantic Union Committee's position before the full Democratic Resolutions Committee, Dr. Urey received friendly questions and comments. However, the small drafting committee on foreign policy included Scott Lucas, who was a personal foe of Kefauver, and, together with the advice of the State Department, they watered down the Democratic plank to "...encourage ...increasing solidarity of the nations of the North Atlantic Community." 44

However, the Atlantic Union Committee found solace in the fact that both the vice-presidential nominees, Richard Nixon and Estes Kefauver, were among the Senatorial sponsors of the Resolution. Additionally, both candidates for President were considered to favor a strong accent on unity within the Atlantic Community, although neither had specifically indorsed the Atlantic Union Committee Resolution. 45

In the election issue of Freedom and Union, which pointed out the pros and cons of both Parties with respect to Atlantic


Union considerations, Streit found it hard not to show partiality toward Eisenhower.46

Streit viewed the election results as an improvement in the outlook for the Atlantic Union Committee from many viewpoints. In the Senate the supporters increased by one. Senator Thomas Connally (D., Tex.), Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and foe of Atlantic Union, retired and was replaced by Senator Alexander Wiley (R., Wis.), who was non-committal but friendly. Although the House support dropped somewhat it was not due primarily to election losses but rather to resignations and retirements. Representative Robert Chiperfield (R., Ill.), the new Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, although not favorably inclined to the Atlantic Union Committee Resolution, was judged as likely to follow the President.47 John Foster Dulles was looked upon by the Atlantic Union Committee as a good choice for the position of Secretary of State. Some of his prior statements have already been mentioned.48 In addition to his campaign promise in 1949, to vote for the Atlantic Union Committee Resolution, he was reported in 1950


48 See pages forty-one, forty-two, and sixty-six.
to have said, "There can be little doubt but that this principle of federalism ought to be thoroughly explored." 49

As late as November, 1952, he sent a message to the Atlantic Union Committee Convention in Buffalo which stated in part that NATO "can hardly succeed if it is merely a political alliance of temporary expediency." 50

Eisenhower's interest in the North Atlantic Community needs no proof and as NATO commander he was well aware of the problems of trying to negotiate with a dozen or so different sovereigns. That he recognized the need for greater unity can be cited in many instances, but he always talked in terms of a Western European Community. 51

On the last day of the year in an open letter to General Matthew Ridgeway, NATO commander, Eisenhower presaged his policy for the next year when he said in part, "I hope that this year (1953) will mark decisive progress toward essential goals. Included in that progress will be I hope, increasing economic, political and military unity in the Western and continental European nations. As their divided strength combined, effectiveness will be multiplied so that Western

49" 'One World' - '56 Issue?", United States News and World Report, February 24, 1956, p. 86.


Europe will become a strong and vigorous community for peace and freedom."52

Streit, although aware of Eisenhower's inclination for a European defense community, still had high hopes for favorable Administration consideration of the Atlantic Union Committee Resolution.53


CHAPTER V

EIGHTY-THIRD CONGRESS

I. ATLANTIC UNION AND THE ADMINISTRATION

In neither President Eisenhower's Inaugural Address, nor in his State of the Union Message, was any mention made of the political integration of the North Atlantic Community or of an exploratory convention to investigate the possibilities thereof. But Streit based his hopes for an exploratory convention on the seventh of the nine principles enunciated by the President in his Inaugural Address which stated, "Appreciating that economic need, military and political wisdom combine to suggest regional groupings of free peoples, we hope, within the framework of the United Nations, to help strengthen such special bonds the world over. The nature of these ties must vary with the different problems of different areas." The Atlantic Union Committee, however, soon learned that the Administration intended to support the Western European integration program including the European Defense Community Treaty. This Treaty embodied many of the ideas

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which Eisenhower had espoused before he became President.

Clarence Streit was advised early in Eisenhower's administration by one of its top foreign policy-makers that if the Administration or Congress were to make any move toward Atlantic Union, or if a resolution calling for a convention to explore such a plan of union were introduced into Congress with substantial Republican support, then all hope for the European Defense Community Treaty would be lost, for the French and other Europeans would much prefer Atlantic Union. Thus the Atlantic Union Committee, promising not to introduce an exploratory convention resolution, pledged their support to the Administration's program.

The debate in France on the Treaty was long and vociferous and had many facets. Some of the factors which played a part in the eventual failure of French ratification were a change of Governments in the middle of the debate, fear of German militarism, refusal of Britain to become a part of the Community, probable loss of control over their armed forces, various aspects of the sovereignty issue, and others. The Treaty was finally rejected by France in August of 1954.

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With the death of the European Defense Community Treaty an exploratory convention of the nations of the North Atlantic Community was again a subject of discussion. However, it was too late for any Congressional action to be taken during the Eighty-third Congress.

II. ATLANTIC UNION AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

There were several unrelated events which occurred during this period which had some bearing on the objectives of the Atlantic Union Committee. These will be briefly discussed in this section.

In an open letter directed to the officials at the NATO Council prior to the meeting held in Paris in April, 1953, eighty-six Americans, thirty-seven Britons, thirteen Frenchmen, and nineteen Canadians urged the economic integration of the North Atlantic Community as well as the formulation of a common foreign policy. Some of the Americans who signed the letter were Lithgow Osborne, Will Clayton, Joseph Grew, Henry Ford II, Christian Herter, George C. Marshall, Karl Compton, Thomas Finletter, General William Donovan, and Bearsley Ruml.

A private international study conference was held in Copenhagen in early September, 1953, and was attended by private individuals and groups from the various North Atlantic

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7 Streit, loc. cit.
nations. The chief result of this conference, participated in by members of the Atlantic Union Committee, was the resolution forwarded to the NATO Council recommending that a permanent parliament be established to govern the relations between the member nations of NATO.\(^9\)

In October, 1954, a group of one hundred sixty-nine notables from eight of the fourteen NATO Nations made a public declaration for a general broadening of the NATO program, particularly with regard to implementation of Article II of the Treaty. Some of the Americans who signed the declaration were Owen Roberts, Will Clayton, Harry Truman, Adlai Stevenson, George C. Marshall, Learned Hand, Joseph Grew and Estes Kefauver.\(^10\) By the time the declaration was presented to the Council of Ministers at Paris in December, 1954, the list of signers had grown to two hundred.\(^11\) The Council took no specific action on this appeal but, as usual, merely recommended implementation of Article II in general terms.\(^12\)


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It was entitled *Freedom Against Itself* and in it he again brought together all the factors considered in his earlier books. He pointed to the "Great, Growing, Imminent Danger", particularly of an economic nature. Streit was also given the forum of *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* to point out his belief that Atlantic Union was the answer to the new Russian regime under Georgi Malenkov.

Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery, deputy commander of NATO, was one other man whose voice was heard during that period who cited the lack of unity and decision-making as a major detriment to effectiveness of NATO. His suggested remedy was political unity and a central organization.

III. ATLANTIC UNION COMMITTEE

The Atlantic Union Committee assembled again in the fall of 1953, in Philadelphia. The members reaffirmed their belief that union of the free peoples was the sole means of establishing freedom and peace in the world. Further, recognizing the potentialities of union inherent in NATO,

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the members urged the creation of advisory parliamentary
groups within NATO, further unification of the defense
forces, and creation of a central body to coordinate the
policies of the NATO Nations. The conferees also agreed
to reintroduce an exploratory convention resolution as
soon as it was politically feasible. The broadening scope
of the aims of the Committee should be noted. Eisenhower
sent a letter of praise to the Convention, stating in part,
"Concepts of the nature and form of the Atlantic co-operation
may vary, but there can be no question as to the vital
necessity of such cooperation." Roberts was re-elected
President of the organization.

The 1954 Atlantic Union Committee Convention was held
in Washington in November. Kefauver keynoted the meeting
and stated that the Atlantic Union movement had had to await
other events, including final disposition of the European
Defense Community Treaty, but "now the concept of Atlantic
Community lives again in the executive councils of this and
other nations and it is our present great opportunity."

16"Free World Choice Cited", New York Times, November
23, 1953, p. 30; "Sovereignty at Philadelphia", Freedom and
Union, December, 1953, p. 20.

17"'One World' - '56 Issue?", United States News and
World Report, February 24, 1956, p. 84.

18"Roberts is Re-Elected", New York Times, November
22, 1953, p. 49.

19"Atlantic Union Probed", New York Times, November
The delegates resolved to spend more money and devote greater energy during the next year to insure an early hearing for an exploratory convention resolution which Kefauver promised to introduce.  

IV. ATLANTIC UNION COMMITTEE AND THE ELECTION

Kefauver's first term as Senator expired with the Eighty-third Congress and in the Primary in Tennessee he was opposed in his bid for the Democratic nomination for Senator by Representative Pat Sutton (D., Tenn.). In what was termed a hard campaign, revolving to a great extent around the issue of internationalism, Kefauver won in spite of mud-slinging, innuendo, and Senator McCarthyism. It was considered a significant victory for Atlantic Union because it had been one of the big issues of the campaign.  

Prior to the 1954 Congressional election, Streit closely evaluated the relative chances for an exploratory convention resolution which would result from a Democratic victory and from a Republican victory. The Atlantic Union Committee had friends on both sides of the Senate and the House of Representatives and these, of course, were

20Ibid.  
recommended for re-election. However, he felt stodgy Republican leadership was hindering the President in his foreign policy. Therefore, he recommended a Democratic victory which would result in the Congressional committee leadership reverting to Democratic control. This, he believed, would most benefit the Atlantic Union Committee. 22

The election results were to the satisfaction of Streit and, presumably, to the Atlantic Union Committee. Lyndon Johnson (D., Tex.) as Senate Majority Leader was friendlier than William Knowland (R., Calif.) had been. Representative John McCormack (D., Mass.), the Majority Leader in the House, had been friendly to the Atlantic Union Committee Resolution in prior years. Senator Walter George (D., Ga.), probable Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee had been a co-sponsor of the Resolution in earlier Congresses. Representative James Richards (D., S.C.), expected to head the House Foreign Affairs Committee, was friendly although he had never been a sponsor. 23 The Atlantic Union Committee faced the new year with hope.

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22 Streit, "Republican or Democrat in November", Freedom and Union, October, 1954, p. 5.
CHAPTER VI

EIGHTY-FOURTH CONGRESS

I. CONGRESSIONAL ACTION - FIRST SESSION

The time period spanned by the Eighty-fourth Congress was an active one for the Atlantic Union Committee, particularly in the matter of bringing its program before the Congress. An Exploratory Convention Resolution was again introduced in the Senate on February 9, 1955, by Senator Estes Kefauver, who made a dramatic and moving appeal on the matter of the urgency of Congressional action on the Resolution. He also gave a lucid explanation of the ways in which the new Resolution differed from prior ones and the reasons therefor. The Resolution was co-sponsored by Senators Ralph Flanders (R., Vt.), Hubert Humphrey (D., Minn.), Henry M. Jackson (D., Wash.), Herbert Lehman (D., N.Y.), Russell Long (D., La.), P. V. McNamara (D., Mich.), Michael Mansfield (D., Mont.), James Murray (D., Mont.), Matthew Neely (D., W. Va.), Richard Neuberger (D., Ore.), J. C. O'Mahoney (D., Wyo.), Frederick Payne (R., Me.), W. Scott

(D., N.C.), and John Sparkman (D., Ala.).

Twelve identical Resolutions were introduced in the House of Representatives by Representatives Hale Boggs (D., La.), W. Sterling Cole (R., N.Y.), Clifford Davis (D., Tenn.), Robert Hale (R., Me.), Chet Holifield (D., Calif.), Lercy Johnson (R., Calif.), Lee Metcalf (D., Mont.), Abraham Multer (D., N. Y.), Barratt O'Hara (D., Ill.), J. Percy Priest (D., Tenn.), Francis Walter (D., Pa.), and Clement Zablocki (D., Wis.).

There were some important changes in the Resolutions offered in this Congress. First, the title of the Resolution was changed from Atlantic Union Convention to Atlantic Exploratory Convention which more clearly defined its objective. The whereas portion of the Resolution was considerably shortened, deleting reference of the connection with the United States Federal Convention of 1787 as well as why the invitation was limited to the North Atlantic Treaty sponsoring powers. The resolving clause was changed to state that the delegates would meet in a convention rather than a federal convention, that the delegates would explore and report rather than merely explore, and that the delegates could explore any form of union, federal or otherwise, rather than only federal union.

\(^2\)Ibid. \(^3\)Ibid., pp. 1347, 1454. \(^4\)Ibid., pp. 1366-70.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on the Senate Resolution on July 25 and 29, 1955. Two things were readily apparent which indicated the increased stature of this Resolution. The full Foreign Relations Committee, instead of only a subcommittee, conducted the Hearings on the Resolution, and the Resolution was the only one under consideration during these Hearings as compared to the total of seven during the 1950 Hearings. Unfortunately, the Big Four Summit Conference distracted that publicity which would normally be given a Foreign Relations Committee hearing and completely overshadowed these legislative efforts in Washington.

It is not necessary to review the statements of all the people who testified before the Committee. Essentially, it would consist of little more than repetition of what they had been saying through the years and had testified to at the prior Hearings. Only the salient points will be mentioned.

The Hearings were opened by Senator Kefauver who made a moving appeal in support of the Resolution. He was followed by most of the officers and some of the National Council members of the Atlantic Union Committee. Then

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followed an array of people, similar to the group which appeared at the 1950 Hearings, to speak for or against the Resolution, either in a private capacity or as the representative of some group. The Veterans of Foreign Wars was still unalterably opposed to the Resolution and the American Legion gave only lukewarm support and only to the extent that the Resolution would result in the improvement of cooperative efforts among the North Atlantic Powers. The American Coalition, which again went on record as being opposed to the Resolution, then represented over ninety patriotic organizations. Influential backing for the Resolution which was not evidenced in 1950, came from the Congress of Industrial Organizations, whose spokesman was its President, Walter Reuther. One other item of interest was the request by Senator William Langer (R., N.D.) that the Atlantic Union Committee submit to the Foreign Relations Committee a copy of its By-laws, a list of its officers, and a copy of its financial statement. All these were filed as an appendix to the Report of the Committee Hearing.

Of far greater importance was the position of the Department of State, which was presented to the Committee by Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary of State. Murphy's

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6Ibid., pp. 85-99.
7Ibid., pp. 128-29.
8Ibid., pp. 137-141.
9Ibid., pp. 142-43.
10Ibid., p. 20.
11Ibid., pp. 103-121.
testimony included a letter from Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, addressed to the Committee Chairman, Senator Walter George. The State Department had two important objections to the Resolution. First, the State Department believed that the President should not call an exploratory convention because this would lend too great a degree of officiality to it. The invitation should be less auspicious. Second, to limit the initial invitation to only the sponsors of the North Atlantic Treaty might be injurious to the harmony then existing between all the NATO Countries.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 84-85.}

Secretary Dulles' letter was popularly interpreted by the press as an indication of State Department opposition to the Resolution. Therefore, on August 5, 1955, Senator Kefauver addressed a letter to the Secretary, requesting clarification of this point. Kefauver indicated his interpretation of the letter was that it was meant to give guidance to the Committee and, after the requested changes were effected, the State Department might be expected to support the proposal. Dulles answered on August 22, 1955, stating that he certainly was in favor of the objective of the Resolution which was to promote greater unity among the NATO Powers and that he was not expressing opposition to possible alternatives to the present Resolution, but went on to say
that his message must be considered as being in opposition to the Resolution as it stood. He stated that it was feasible that the exploration of possibilities of increased Atlantic unity could be initiated by a congressional resolution which would not be subject to the aforementioned objections but he reaffirmed his position that the initiative must rest with the legislature and not the executive branch. 13

These objections of the State Department were certainly not irreconcilable and the entire atmosphere of the Committee Hearing seemed much more favorable than in 1950. After the Hearing, Senator Walter George told Clarence Streit that one of the Committee's earliest actions in the next session of Congress would be to make a decision on whether to report the Resolution out on the floor or not. Streit predicted that the Resolution would be amended to reflect the State Department suggestions and be on the floor of the Senate by January or February, 1956. 14

II. ATLANTIC UNION COMMITTEE

The greatest shock to the Atlantic Union Committee

13Ibid., pp. 228-31. This correspondence was published in the Report of the Hearings conducted in 1956.

during this period was the death of its renowned founder, Justice Owen J. Roberts died in May, 1955, and was eulogized across the land. That he has been impossible to replace is evidenced by the fact that his name is still carried in the place of honor on the masthead of the Atlantic Union Committee letterheads, posters, and literature. Justice Roberts was succeeded as President of the Atlantic Union Committee by Elmo Roper, noted marketing consultant, who had been active in the organization since its initiation in 1949.

The National Council of the Atlantic Union Committee met in Washington in the later part of May, 1955, and their efforts were directed toward insuring a hearing in the Second Session for the Resolution. As indicated monthly in Freedom and Union, Congressional support increased as well as membership in the National Council.

The 1955 Atlantic Union Committee Convention was held in Washington in November. The tone of the Convention was one of hopeful optimism and it was resolved to continue action to get the Resolution on the floor of Congress. The following officers were elected: President, Elmo Roper;


Vice-president, Will Clayton; Secretary, Lithgow Osborne; Treasurer, George Shea; Chairman of the Executive Committee, Gerald Henry. A membership increase was noted, reversing a trend which had been evident since the end of the Korean War.  

III. PUBLIC RELATIONS

Meager publicity marked the period of the Eighty-second and Eighty-third Congresses for the Atlantic Union Committee. The crusading fervor of editors and writers on the subject of world government had subsided somewhat. However, coincident with the introduction of the new Resolutions on the floor of Congress in 1955, editors began to express themselves again. Generally, the newspapers took the same stand as four years before and their attitudes were recorded monthly in Freedom and Union.  

There were two major news sources with wide following whose policies must be mentioned. David Lawrence editorialized in the U. S. News and World Report against international federalism and world government and, although he did not mention the Atlantic Union Committee Resolution by name, it

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18 A column on press comments was carried in each issue of Freedom and Union during this period.
was certainly included within the purview of his comments.\footnote{David Lawrence, "One World", U. S. News and World Report, May 13, 1955, p. 140.} Life magazine, in addition to being greatly impressed with the large politically responsible support, was favorably inclined toward the explore and report concept.\footnote{"The Totality of NATO", Life, May 7, 1956, p. 40.}

During the period, two very important personages of the immediate postwar period joined the National Council of the Atlantic Union Committee. Had they been convinced earlier of the rightness of the movement, as they quite evidently were in 1955, the history of the Atlantic Union Committee might be entirely different. George C. Marshall, former Chief of Staff, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense, joined the Council in May, 1955 in response to the invitation of Justice Roberts.\footnote{Streit, "Owen J. Roberts and Atlantic Union", Pa. L. R., pp. 354-55.} Former President Harry S. Truman joined later the same year.\footnote{"Truman Joins Council", New York Times, October 8, 1955, p. 10.}

Other important support during this period came from the American Federation of Labor - Congress of Industrial Organizations in the form of a letter from George Meany, its President, to Senator James Murray (D., Mont.), one of the Resolution's co-sponsors, in these words, "...because your exploratory convention is not committed to any definite
formula, the AFL-CIO can express agreement with the objectives which your group seeks." However, Senator John Bricker (R., Ohio), one of the most vocal opponents, called the Resolution an "exploration of the desirability of junking the American Declaration of Independence", and stated that under Atlantic Union the "United States would become a vassal province of a regional superstate evolving out of NATO." It is also interesting to note that in hearings on one important governmental appointment in which Senate confirmation was required, membership in the Atlantic Union Committee became an important issue. During the hearings prior to the confirmation of John Marshall Harlan to the Supreme Court, the Senate Judiciary Committee heard much testimony about his membership in the Atlantic Union Committee and his tendency to support the idea of world government. Harlan, with reference to the Atlantic Union Committee, stated that he had done no work, that he had attended no meetings, and that he would resign from the organization if his nomination to the Bench were confirmed.

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24 "'One World' - '56 Issue?", U. S. News and World Report, February 24, 1956, p. 82.

IV. NATO ACTIVITIES

The NATO activity, as it related to the Atlantic Union Committee or its goal, was quite limited during 1955. The few scattered items will be reported, however.

In the report of the sixth annual meeting of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, the success of the past years was noted and the view was expressed that cooperation in the future must be on an Atlantic rather than European basis.\textsuperscript{26} Gaetano Martino, Foreign Minister of Italy; Paul-Henry Spaak, Foreign Minister of Belgium; J. W. Beyer, Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs; Lester Pearson, Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Paul Van Zeeland, Former Prime Minister of Belgium, all expressed themselves in favor of an Atlantic exploratory convention.\textsuperscript{27} General Pierre Billotte became President of the French Atlantic Union Committee.\textsuperscript{28} Additionally, both General Alfred Gruenther and Field Marshall Bernard L. Montgomery, commander and deputy commander of NATO respectively, declared that greater unity was needed in NATO to meet the Russian


threat. At the December NATO Council Meeting in Paris, the Foreign Ministers, noting the lack of implementation of Article II of the North Atlantic Treaty, instructed the permanent deputies to inaugurate necessary action conducive to that end.

The next year, 1956, was more interesting, as the United States Government reversed itself twice on the issue of increased NATO cooperation and unity. Early in February, 1956, President Eisenhower and British Foreign Minister Eden issued a joint policy statement, indicating continued support of the continental efforts toward unity. This was substantiated shortly thereafter by John Foster Dulles at his press conference, in which he stated he believed economic problems could be handled better by other organizations such as the Organization for European Economic Cooperation. He went on to state that the members of NATO were not selected for economic considerations but primarily for military and strategic reasons.

Then came a Dulles address before the Associated Press

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29 "NATO Chiefs Urge Close Unity to Save Alliance", Freedom and Union, November, 1955, pp. 6-8.
in New York on April 23, 1956, in which he called for an enlargement of NATO beyond its originally conceived status as a defensive military alliance. He suggested that NATO become an agency of cooperation for political, economic, and social progress throughout the world and he said he would propose this at the forthcoming North Atlantic Council Meeting the following week in Paris. This proposal, which was made at the Council Meeting, resulted in the appointment of a committee of three foreign ministers, Lester Pearson of Canada, Halvard Lange of Norway, and Gaetano Martino of Italy, to study the means of common action to increase the unity within the Alliance.

The Committee soon was being called the "Three Wise Men." Their recommendations were based on answers to questionnaires which were sent to the member nations. The Committee submitted its report to the NATO Council in December, 1956. The recommendations included mandatory prior consultation in advance of any major shifts in foreign policy by member countries. Dulles said that the United

37Callender, loc. cit.
States could not subscribe to such a policy because of a constitutional limitation and because the United States had multifarious defense pacts in many parts of the world which could not be subject to prior NATO approval. However, he did agree, in principle, that it was a goal toward which the NATO Powers should work.\(^{38}\) Dulles was severely criticized by foreign diplomats for the apparent reversal of his April, 1956, position as well as the fact that he was seeking a privileged position for the United States within the North Atlantic Treaty.\(^{39}\)

V. CONGRESSIONAL ACTION - SECOND SESSION

Although Congressional support for the Atlantic Union Committee Resolutions continued to grow, and in spite of Senator George's promise that the Resolution would be an early item on the agenda of the Foreign Relations Committee, it continued to languish in committee. During an executive session early in 1956, brief consideration was given the Resolution, but it was decided to delay action for the time being because it was felt that floor debate on an exploratory convention might interfere with the Foreign Aid Bill then


under consideration. Another factor in the delay was the question as to whether or not Italy and Germany should be invitees to the exploratory convention. 40

Finally, Senator George called for hearings on the Resolution for July 11, 1956. Senator Humphrey opened the proceedings and circulated a revised draft of the Resolution which had been modified in order to meet some of the State Department objections to that submitted at the First Session Hearings. 41 Among the changes, was that which requested the President merely to transmit the exploratory convention proposal of the Congress. The limitation of the invitees to the proposed convention, the other major State Department objection, was unchanged, however. 42

Generally, testimony was limited to those persons who had not spoken in the First Session Hearings unless they had something to add which had not been brought up in those earlier Hearings. Again, there were statements from individuals and groups, expressing opinions on both sides of the issue but there were few persons of the importance of


42 Ibid.
those already mentioned. An exception was General Gruenther, whose testimony of May, 1956, before the same Committee on another matter but with reference to the Atlantic Union Committee Resolution, was entered into the record. He had then stated that if the United States were willing to make such an offer it would have a favorable influence on the members of NATO because it would create in the minds of these countries a feeling that the United States recognized the mutuality of interests binding the United States and Western Europe.\(^{43}\)

Clarence Streit also appeared before the Committee and, among other things, testified to the satisfactoriness of the revised Resolution as far as the Atlantic Union Committee was concerned. In addition, he suggested, based on conversations with Secretary Dulles in May, 1956, that the Resolution be further revised to include all the members of the North Atlantic Treaty, not because he necessarily thought that that was the most desirable course but because it would probably satisfy the Department of State.\(^{44}\)

The July 11th Senate Hearings were just two weeks before adjournment. It appeared it was too late to get House action since the matter had not yet been scheduled in the House Committee of Foreign Affairs. On July 24, 1956, the

\(^{43}\text{Ibid.}, \text{ pp. 221-22.}\)

\(^{44}\text{Ibid.}, \text{ pp. 199-207.}\)
day before the final Senate Foreign Relations Committee action on the Resolution, Streit, perhaps sensing unfavorable Committee action, addressed a letter to President Eisenhower, and asked for Administration support for the Resolution. In his answer two days later, Eisenhower expressed deep concern for the matter. But he pointed out that the Government was then supporting a program calling for further unity of a fifteen nation community and that the resolution under consideration provided for only a seven-nation community. He considered it incongruous for the Administration to simultaneously be supporting both.

As expected, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee officially announced on July 25, 1956, that it was postponing further consideration of the Resolution. Carl Marcy, Chief of the Foreign Relations Committee staff, wrote Streit the next day and stated that it was postponed because of the steps being taken within the NATO framework to strengthen that organization.

45 "Text of Letters to and from Eisenhower and Dulles", Freedom and Union, September, 1956, pp 5-6.

46 Ibid.


VI. ATLANTIC UNION AND THE ELECTION

It was assumed early in the election year of 1956 that internationalism could hardly lose the election. Most of the major presidential possibilities were for international unity or cooperation in one form or another. This included Estes Kefauver, Adlai Stevenson, Averell Harriman, Mennen Williams, and Stuart Symington for the Democrats and Dwight Eisenhower, Richard Nixon, Christian Herter, and John Foster Dulles for the Republicans. William Knowland and John Bricker were against internationalism in most any form and two other presidential possibilities, Thomas Dewey and Earl Warren, had made no commitments.

By election time in the fall, it was obvious that although Eisenhower and Dulles were internationalists in their thinking, they were not Atlantic Unionists. Additionally, it was thought that Stevenson was probably more favorably inclined to the concept of an exploratory convention than Eisenhower, although he had not committed himself. Primarily, though, the factor that induced Streit to advise a Democratic vote was the fact that Congressional support for an exploratory convention was four to one, Democrat.

49 "'One World' - '56 Issue?", U. S. News and World Report, February 24, 1956, p. 82.

Streit reviewed the election results as a strengthening of the Atlantic Union Committee hopes. Still maintaining that the President had been hindered by isolationist Republican leadership, he stated that Eisenhower's tremendous victory in the face of the overall Republican Party Congressional losses should be a big help in getting Congressional Republicans to do his bidding. Additionally, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was to be chaired by Senator Theodore Green (D., R.I.), who was benevolently neutral, with Senators Humphrey, Sparkman, Fulbright, Long and Mansfield, all favorable to the exploratory concept, among the hold-over members. In the House, however, the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee would be Representative Thomas Gordon (D., Ill.), who was passive on the Resolution.

The Atlantic Union Committee held its Sixth National Convention in Louisville in early December, 1956. Letters were dispatched to the various Atlantic Union Committees in the NATO countries stating that dangerous divisions within the Atlantic Alliance made it more imperative than ever to build a closer Atlantic relationship and appealed for their continued efforts to bring about a greater unity. Additionally, the Organization sent letters to Eisenhower, Dulles,

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and Chairmen Green and Gordon of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee respectively, appealing that they make it clear in the December, 1956, NATO Council Meeting that the United States based its foreign policy on the solid rock of the Atlantic Community and that the United States Government would supplement its efforts at the ministerial level with action at the citizen level by calling a citizens exploratory convention to explore further possibilities of unity.\(^{52}\) Roper, Osborne, Clayton, and Henry were re-elected to their former posts in the Atlantic Union Committee, while a new treasurer was elected in the person of John Robinson, of New Jersey. Kefauver promised to introduce another exploratory convention resolution in the next Congress and work for its passage.\(^{53}\)


\(^{53}\)Ibid.
CHAPTER VII

THE EIGHTY-FIFTH AND EIGHTY-SIXTH CONGRESSES

I. ACTION IN THE EIGHTY-FIFTH CONGRESS

In spite of Senator Estes Kefauver's promise, there was no Atlantic Union Committee Resolution introduced in either the Senate or the House during the Eighty-fifth Congress. Even though a resolution was not introduced in Congress, the position of the State Department would probably have taken was presaged in late December, 1956, when Secretary Dulles wrote to Clarence Streit and said, "...at present I would hesitate to complicate the implementation of the NATO plan by indorsing what might be regarded as a competing proposal."¹

There was action, however, in the Eighty-fifth Congress on a Resolution which contained many of the features of former Atlantic Union Committee Resolutions. At the NATO Parliamentary Conference in November, 1957, a Resolution was approved which in part recommended that the NATO Governments take the necessary action to bring about "a conference composed of leading representative citizens selected on a non-partisan basis and directed to convene as often as necessary to examine exhaustively and to recommend

¹"Memo to Secretary Dulles", Freedom and Union, April, 1957, p. 9.
how greater cooperation and unity of purpose, as envisioned by the North Atlantic Treaty, with the Atlantic Community may best be developed."

Senator Theodore Green, as head of the American delegation at the NATO Parliamentarian Conference, submitted the NATO Parliamentarian Conference Resolution to the Senate in the form of a Senate Concurrent Resolution. This Resolution, which reflected that it was the sense of Congress that the President use his best efforts to bring about a NATO citizens conference, was favorably reported out of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 24, 1958. The State Department opposed the Presidential initiative of this Resolution as it had the earlier Atlantic Union Resolution. The State Department said that such a resolution would be interpreted as lack of confidence on the part of the United States Government in efforts to insure Atlantic unity through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Organization for European Economic Cooperation, European Coal and Steel

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3Ibid.

4Ibid. p. 6424.
Community, Common European Market, and Euratom. 5

The Green Resolution was never passed by either the Senate or the House of Representatives. The Resolution, once out of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was in the hands of the Democratic Policy Committee of the Senate, headed by Senator Lyndon Johnson (D., Tex.). Often resolutions requiring no United States Government action were passed by the procedure of asking for unanimous consent, but such action can be blocked by one Senator. Senator William Knowland (R., Calif.) blocked the Resolution by this procedure. Then, according to Senator Thomas Hennings (D., Mo.), a friend of the Resolution, it was decided not to schedule it for debate because of the practice which the Democratic Policy Committee had adopted of dropping all measures requiring concurrence of the House when there was not a reasonable prospect of favorable action. These Senate leaders decided such action was not likely at that point in time and ruled against floor action. Some supporters held the State Department, directly or indirectly, responsible for the failure of Congressional adoption of the Green Resolution.6

5"Atlantic Citizen Conference Backed by Senate Committee", Freedom and Union, June, 1958, pp. 4-5.

6Streit, "Congress Fails to Act on Atlantic Conference", Freedom and Union, October, 1958, p. 5.
II. OTHER ACTIVITIES IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNTRIES

This was a period of much activity by persons concerned with the unity of the North Atlantic nations. These activities, in 1957, included two NATO Foreign Ministers Council meetings, the NATO Parliamentary Conference in Brussels, the European-American Association meeting in Cannes, France, a seminar at Princeton University on the future of NATO, the Atlantic Treaty Association meeting in Rome, the Atlantic Union Committee Board of Governors meeting in Washington, and the Conference on Atlantic Community at Bruges, Belgium.\(^7\)

The Citizens Conference Resolution approved by the 1957 NATO Parliamentarian Conference was reaffirmed at the 1958 Conference. Arrangements were made for the Citizens Conference to convene in London in June, 1959. Its purpose was defined to be a study of ways of developing NATO politically, economically, culturally, and militarily.\(^8\)

Perhaps the most important thing which led to increased unity during this period was Russia's launching of an earth satellite. Within days of that event the President urged that the NATO nations pool their scientific strength against the


potential enemy. James Reston declared that this Russian satellite finally startled the Western nations out of their narrow nationalistic preoccupations and along the long overdue process of rebuilding the Atlantic coalition. The worry and concern was climaxed in Paris in December at the NATO Heads of Governments Conference. The primary purpose of this meeting was to reaffirm the existing unity between the nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and to strengthen the Alliance in view of the latest Soviet threat. The final Conference communique mentioned in only the most broad terms a desire for and need of political consultation, pooling of scientific information, and economic cooperation. The NATO Foreign Minister Council Meetings in May, 1958, and December, 1958, added nothing to prior accomplishments except "fervent hopes."

Another development of importance which occurred during this period and which should be reported was the Conference

9"Text of Remarks and Addresses by the President and the Queen during Day", New York Times, October 18, 1957, p. 4.


on North Atlantic Community which met in Bruges, Belgium in September, 1957. This was a non-governmental sponsored group whose objective was the development of cultural and moral ties between the North Atlantic countries. The Standing Committee established by the Conference met in Zurich, Switzerland in May, 1958 and determined to concentrate their efforts on relations between the members of the Atlantic Community, the response to the intellectual and moral challenge of totalitarianism, and relations of the Atlantic Community with the underdeveloped and uncommitted world.

Of more direct interest and greater immediate concern was the establishment of the International Movement for Atlantic Union which was started "on the margin of the Conference in Bruges" mentioned above. The original group met in Paris and was composed of some of the personages at Bruges who had traveled on to Paris at the invitation of

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14 Summary of the Findings of the Conference on North Atlantic Community, Inclosure to a letter dated October 21, 1958 to author from E. H. Kloman, Assistant to the Director of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania.


Clarence Streit. A provisional committee was established with General Pierre Billotte of France and Clarence Streit, as co-presidents. They issued invitations for a July, 1958, meeting in Paris.\(^\text{17}\) The policy announced at the July, 1958, meeting included plans for exploring all possibilities for revision of the North Atlantic Treaty in order to improve member nation relations, to harmonize foreign policies, to arrange for exchange of technical information, and to aid in solving economic problems. It also provided for support of the NATO Parliamentarian Conference Resolution for the London Citizen Conference in 1959. However, its chief aim was to induce the Western Governments to call a conference of eminent private citizens to examine and recommend steps towards greater unity within the Atlantic Community.\(^\text{18}\)

### III. ATLANTIC UNION COMMITTEE

During the period of the Eighty-fifth Congress, while the Atlantic Union Committee was standing aside in favor of Green Resolution,\(^\text{19}\) there seemed to be slight public activity on the part of the Committee. There were no

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\(^{17}\)Ibid., pp. 12-13.

\(^{18}\)"International Movement for Atlantic Union", *Atlantic Union News*, December, 1958, pp. 3-4.

Atlantic Union Committee conventions. On the eighth anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, some of the Senatorial supporters of an Atlantic Exploratory Convention, Senators Estes Kefauver, Joseph Clark, Ralph Flanders, Wayne Morse, and Richard Neuberger, wrote an open letter to Secretary Dulles, pointing out that after eight years the time had certainly arrived for prompt consideration to be given to a program which would result in greater realization of the potentialities of the Treaty.\textsuperscript{20} Similarly, earlier in the year Clarence Streit wrote to Dulles saying that the implementation of the North Atlantic Treaty must be complete or nearly so and that the Administration had no further excuse for not supporting an Atlantic Union resolution.\textsuperscript{21}

A minor flurry of activity and hope was noted in the latter part of 1957 in conjunction with the NATO Heads of Government Conference. A meeting between President Eisenhower and Congressional leaders on December 3, 1957, called to develop a bipartisan policy prior to the Conference, included Michael Mansfield, long a supporter of Atlantic Union resolutions. Christian Herter was appointed Under

\textsuperscript{20}"Senators Urge Atlantic Convention", \textit{Freedom and Union}, May, 1957, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{21}"Memo to Secretary Dulles", \textit{Freedom and Union}, April, 1957, pp. 9-11.
Secretary of State and his well publicized support of Atlantic Union resolutions was also considered an indication of possible change in the Administration's policy. During December, 1957, the New York Herald Tribune, generally looked upon as an unofficial Administration spokesman, editorially stated, "Personally, Secretary Dulles would like to see the NATO alliance take a long step toward Atlantic Union with some delegation of national sovereignty to a common Parliament. He is not openly proposing it because he believed Congress would slap it down."  

By election time in 1958, Clarence Streit was apparently reluctant to recommend either party as being the best for the Atlantic Union Committee. Significantly, there were no recommendations in Freedom and Union. He probably took that position because neither the Republican Administration nor the Democratic controlled Congress had assumed any responsibility for an Atlantic Union resolution during the Eighty-fifth Congress.

The perennially optimistic Streit was heartened by the results of the November election. He pointed out that eleven of the original Taft "wing" of the Republican Party, for long

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23"In 1958: a 3d 'Pearl Harbor' - or Freedom's Happiest Year?", Freedom and Union, January, 1958, pp. 3-5.
so strongly opposed to Atlantic Union, were no longer in Congress. Some of those out of Congress were Senators William Knowland (R., Calif.), John Bricker (R., Ohio), Arthur Watkins (R., Utah), George Malone (R., Nev.), William Jenner (R., Ind.), and Charles Potter (R., Mich.).

Other statistics show that of the six Senators up for re-election who had supported exploratory convention resolutions, five were re-elected and of the ten Senators who opposed the concept, nine were retired by action of the voters. In the House, the Atlantic Union supporters fared similarly, as one hundred twenty-six out of the one hundred thirty supporters of the program were returned to Congress. In the words of Senator Kefauver, "Support for an exploratory convention was a political asset and not a political liability."  

IV. CONGRESSIONAL ACTION IN THE EIGHTY-SIXTH CONGRESS

The history of the Eighty-sixth Congress is still being made but an important part of it, as reflects upon the Atlantic Union Committee, was made on March 19, 1959, when new Atlantic Union Committee Resolutions were intro-

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25 Ibid.

duced in both the Senate and the House. It was introduced in the Senate by Senator Hubert Humphrey (D., Minn.) and co-sponsored by Senators Estes Kefauver (D., Tenn.), John Sherman Cooper (R., Ky.) and Clifford Case (R., N. J.). In the House, identical Resolutions were introduced by Representatives A. S. J. Carnahan (D., Mo.) and Clement Zablocki (D., Wis.). At the time it was reported that support in Congress was powerful and widespread and extended far beyond the actual sponsors of the three Resolutions.

There were extensive changes in the Resolutions submitted in the Eighty-sixth Congress from those considered earlier. The "whereas" clauses reflected much reliance on the NATO Parliamentarian Conference and particularly the London Citizens Convention. The "resolving" clause placed no responsibility on the Executive branch whatsoever, not even for mere transmission of the invitation, as immediately preceding resolutions had done. The explore and report

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28 Ibid., p. 4222.

concept remained, but it was to be merely an investigation of a more effective and democratic unity in advancing common economic and political interests. In addition, perhaps, the connotation of prior resolutions which tended to imply eventual union was no longer so much in evidence.
CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

It is necessary to look back over the ten years since the Atlantic Union Committee was organized to review its progress toward its stated goals. The Certificate of Incorporation and the By-laws of the organization provide that the purposes of the Corporation are to promote Congressional action requesting the President to call an exploratory federal convention of the NATO sponsoring powers, to promote widespread understanding of the principles of federal union, and to promote the formation of such union as in the opinion of an exploratory convention offers the best prospect of attaining world peace. Because of State Department pressure, apparently, the latest resolutions supported by the Atlantic Union Committee are considerably less than that called for in the By-laws. Of course, Congressional action is but a means to an end, an end which is stated as the attainment of world peace. The next intermediate step contemplated by the Atlantic Union Committee By-laws is a federal union, or at least such union as the exploratory convention members would recommend. This, too, seems to no longer be a necessary prerequisite in

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1Atlantic Union Committee By-laws. Appendix A, p. 160.
that the latest resolutions supported by the Atlantic Union Committee call for an exploration of ways toward more effective unity. This is much less than a federal union as originally contemplated in the By-laws. It is possible, however, that the delegates to a convention, even though not required to investigate federal union, might certainly do so and it is further possible that they might recommend federal union as the solution offering the best prospect for attaining world peace. In consideration of these factors, caused by changing conditions, it must be concluded that the Atlantic Union Committee By-laws no longer accurately reflect its aims and purposes.

It is likewise appropriate to review some of the various catalytic agents, and the extent to which their presence is evident, in connection with this peace proposal. In the past, those catalytic agents whose absence or presence seemed to most noticeably affect the success of implementation of a proposal were efficient organizational support, active support of a leading world political figure, and actual or impending world or regional crisis.

The Atlantic Union Committee is probably one of the most powerful and influential groups of people ever assembled in support of a cause of this kind. Although the overall membership of around ten thousand is not particularly overwhelming, the National Council of over six hundred includes
people of power, intellect, and influence drawn from all parts of the nation. For example, in this group of six hundred there are over one hundred fifty presidents of major United States corporations and nearly one hundred university presidents as well as many outstanding leaders in the field of religion. The extent of the work and participation of the National Council is somewhat hazy, but there can be no doubt that if all their efforts were galvanized toward the goals of the Atlantic Union Committee, the passage of a Congressional Resolution would be greatly aided.

With respect to the second catalytic agent, the leader of the movement, the man whose name has been most closely connected with Atlantic Union, was not a Henry IV, a Nicholas II, or a Woodrow Wilson, from the standpoint of influential political leadership. Past experience indicates that success requires the active leadership of a political "great" among the chief leaders of the foremost powers of the world and, further, that he must actively participate in the effort, not merely acquiesce and give formal support.

With respect to the first step in the Atlantic Union Committee program, passage of a Congressional resolution, it seems that the man who holds the key to success is the

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Secretary of State of the United States. Secretary Dean Acheson was against an exploratory convention from the beginning for a variety of reasons, although it is doubtful that he ever was frank enough to reveal the real reasons for his disapproval. The next Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, although committed to the proposal before taking that high office, also opposed several of these resolutions after coming to a position where he might have rendered real support. Likewise, his public statements may not have reflected the real reason for his disaffection. He has now been replaced by another Secretary of State, one who at an earlier date actually introduced an exploratory convention resolution on the floor of the House of Representatives. Since Christian Herter's appointment, no predilection for Atlantic Union has been evidenced.

The passage of an exploratory convention resolution would be just the beginning, and the form and shape that a convention's recommendation for increased unity takes, will determine the extent of leadership required to obtain successful implementation thereof. If a federal union is recommended, it will certainly meet with powerful opposition and nothing less than the active and determined leadership of the Administration will suffice to see it through. Something less than federal union, like increased political consultations or arrangements for better dissemination of
information, might not require such prominent and determined leadership to secure implementation.

The last and most important element to aid in the successful implementation of a peace proposal is the world or regional situation. The extent and severity of a crisis confronting the world powers is a factor recognized by all of the leaders of the movement and is evidenced as such by their statements and the fact that they have always, seemingly, expended greater efforts toward acceptance of their program during periods of increased international tension. But nothing has happened, visibly at least, during the past ten years which has sufficiently threatened the existence of the United States. In spite of all the predictions of impending political and economic crises made by Clarence Streit and others, the average Western politician, though admitting the need for greater unity, does not believe the situation serious enough as yet to require the federation of the North Atlantic democracies. This state of circumstances was described by the editors of Life magazine who said that Atlantic Union was certainly worthy of discussion but that it was "unlikely to get further than that at a time when Western civilization does not feel its back to the wall."³

As to the future, it must be stated that likelihood of attainment of the objectives of the Atlantic Union Committee will probably continue to be determined primarily by the state of world conditions as well as the degree of active support by the Administration in office in the United States.
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A very good study of the background and formation of the League to Enforce Peace. It describes its failure and the reasons therefor.

A complete rendition of the Federalist papers with a good sixty page introduction on the background of them.

A proposal for European federation. Included is some historical background of proposals for federation in Europe in the early part of the Twentieth Century.

An erudite study with a philosophical approach of the Holy Roman Empire. A good concise handling of Dante's De Monarchia.
A very potent argument written at the beginning of World War II for increased American interest in world affairs. Advocates a federated Europe.

A collection of speeches the author made during the 1920's on the subject of world peace.

A collection of essays which point to the necessity for internationalism on the part of Americans. Advocates a federal world government.

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An account in fair detail of the relevant events concerning NATO.

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A proposal for world federation which was to be accomplished by an amendment to the Covenant of the League of Nations.

A book written at the War's beginning to explain how it happened. The world government solution comes in the final chapter.

An unannotated collection of documents relating to peace or some facet thereof.

A handbook compiled at the end of World War I which presents the development of the League of Nations. There are short sketches on the many organizations in favor of the League.

A very good account of Alexander I and the background of the Holy Alliance.

A very good discussion of Du Bois primary literary works using original as well as secondary source material.

A quite scholarly work, with the background and basic consideration behind the post-World War II movements for world and regional federation.
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A list of all the members of the Atlantic Union Committee, with a brief description of their positions, arranged alphabetically by state.

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This monthly periodical published by Federal Union, Inc., is an invaluable source for the study of the Atlantic Union Committee. Its every issue carried items bearing importantly on the subject of this study. Its platform was and is used by all the leaders of the Atlantic Union Committee movement.

A short but good discussion of the Atlantic Union movement in Great Britain.

"History is Catching up with 'Union Now'", Fortune, April, 1949, pp. 77-78.
An encouraging editorial written shortly after the announcement of the Atlantic Union Committee organization. Speaks quite favorably about Clarence Streit.
"Let's Look Into It", Life, April 9, 1951, p. 36.
An editorial supporting the proposal to examine the merits of Atlantic Union.

The primary source for the record of the important events surrounding the Atlantic Union Committee.

A strong stand against all world government plans.

A forecast of the part internationalism would play in the 1956 elections. Statements by the various leading contenders for the Presidential nomination.

A strong appeal for Atlantic Union.

A speech made before the Associated Press, in which the author pointed out the need for a "Parliament of the World".

Speech before the American Society of International Law. One of the first speeches of Roberts in which his internationalist tendencies were noted.

A strong appeal logically presented on the need for Atlantic Union.

One of the many articles by Roberts during the immediate post-war period pointing out the falacies of the United Nations.

A very impressive argument by the author of how Atlantic Union would effectively counter Russia.

A discussion of NATO and its failings, and how they could be remedied by an Atlantic federation.

"The Talk of the Town", New Yorker, March 26, 1949, p. 17.

An editorial commenting favorably on the Atlantic Union Committee proposal.


An editorial commenting favorably on the explore and report concept of the Resolution submitted in the Eighty-fourth Congress.


Report of the Conference held at Bruges, Belgium.


Time's account of the 1950 Senate Hearings and the effect on the Committee members when State Department officials spoke against the various resolutions.
APPENDIX
PURPOSES

1. To promote support for congressional action requesting the President of the United States to invite the other democracies which sponsored the North Atlantic Treaty to name delegates, representing their principal political parties, to meet with delegates of the United States in a federal convention to explore how far their peoples, and the peoples of such other democracies as the convention may invite to send delegates, can apply among them, within the framework of the United Nations, the principles of free federal union;

2. To promote a widespread understanding of the principles and advantages of a federal union of free peoples so as to make possible a fair evaluation of any plan that may be recommended by such convention, and to proffer advice and assistance in formulating the terms on which any such union is to be established; and

3. To promote the formation of such a union of democracies as, in the opinion of the committee, offers the best prospect of attaining world peace..."
APPENDIX B

SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 57

Whereas the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty have declared themselves "determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage, and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law," and "resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security"; and

Whereas they have agreed to article 2 of that treaty to "contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being" and to "seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies"—and to "encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them"; and

Whereas the principles on which our American freedom is founded are those of federal union, which were applied for the first time in history in the United States Constitution; and

Whereas our Federal Convention of 1787 worked out these principles of union as a means of safeguarding the individual liberty and common heritage of the people of thirteen sovereign States, strengthening their free institutions, uniting their defensive efforts, encouraging their economic collaboration, and severally attaining the aims that the democracies of the North Atlantic have set for themselves in the aforesaid treaty; and

Whereas these federal union principles have succeeded impressively in advancing such aims in the United States, Canada, Switzerland, and wherever other free peoples have applied them; and

Whereas the United States, together with the other signatories to the treaty, has promised to bring about a better understanding of these federal principles and has, as their most extensive practitioner and greatest beneficiary, a unique moral obligation to make this contribution to peace; and
Whereas the United States and the other six democracies which sponsored the treaty have, by their success in drafting it and extending it to others, established a precedent for united action toward the attainment of these aims, and the creation of a free and lasting union; Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That the President is requested to invite the democracies which sponsored the North Atlantic Treaty to name delegates, representing their principal political parties, to meet this year with delegates of the United States in a federal convention to explore how far their peoples and the peoples of such other democracies as the convention may invite to send delegates, can apply among them, within the framework of the United Nations, the principles of free federal union.²

APPENDIX C

SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 12

Whereas the preservation of democratic institutions everywhere demands united action by the world's leading democracies; and

Whereas the North Atlantic Treaty has already committed its members to "contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institution", and to "encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them"; and

Whereas it is essential to determine by what means the democracies can further unify their efforts in the military, political, and economic fields to achieve these objectives; and

Whereas the Nine Power Agreement to extend the North Atlantic Treaty and defense system to include the German Federal Republic makes such exploration still more timely; and

Whereas it is desirable that this problem be considered by delegates who would act in accordance with their individual convictions and make a public report of their joint findings and recommendations; Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That the President is requested to invite the other democracies which sponsored the North Atlantic Treaty to name delegates, including members of their principal political parties, to meet in a convention with similarly appointed delegates from the United States and from such other democracies as the convention may invite, to explore and to report to what extent their peoples might further unite within the framework of the United Nations, and agree to form, federally or otherwise, a defense, economic, and political union.3

REVISED DRAFT OF SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 12

Whereas the preservation of democratic institutions everywhere, without regard to color, creed, race or religion, demands united action by democracies; and

Whereas one of the surest hopes for peace in the world is for even the stronger democracies to become still stronger and more united; and

Whereas our existing international machinery appears unable to cope with a number of problems resulting from Communist efforts to undermine and create instability in some democracies; and

Whereas we need to unite our efforts with other democracies further in such fields as the joint training of scientists and engineers and the creation of a pool of scientific and engineering aid for underdeveloped countries if they are to become strong bastions of democracy; and

Whereas the North Atlantic Treaty has already committed its members to "contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institution," and to "encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them", and

Whereas it is essential to determine by what other means the democracies can further unify their efforts in the military, political, and economic fields to achieve these objectives; and

Whereas it is desirable that this problem, which concerns the basis rather than the conduct of our relations with other democracies, be considered by delegates who would act in accordance with their individual convictions and make a public report of their joint findings and recommendations: Now, therefore be it

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring --

1. That the President is requested to transmit to the other democracies which sponsored the North Atlantic Treaty the proposal of the Congress that they name delegates to meet in a convention with delegates from
the United States and from such other democracies, where-

ever situated, as the convention may invite, to explore
and to report to what extent their people might, within
the framework of the United Nations, and in accord with
the basis principles of the Constitution of the United
States, achieve more effective and democratic unity in
advancing their common economic, and political affairs,
their join defense and the aims of world peace and
individual freedom.

2. At such convention there shall be ___ delegates from
the United States at least two-thirds of whom shall be
drawn from private life. They shall be appointed and
vacancies filled, half by the President of the Senate
and half by the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
Not more than one-half of the delegates shall be
members of any one political party.

3. The delegates shall each have one vote in the
convention; they shall not be subject to governmental
instruction but shall act in accordance with their
individual convictions.

4. The number of delegates invited from each country
shall be in broad proportion to its population by the
last official census, but shall be so constituted that
the delegates from no country shall form a majority of
the convention.

5. All arrangements preparatory to the convention
shall be made by a joint committee of Congress composed
of the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House
and the chairman and ranking minority member of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee and of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee. The convention shall establish
its own rules and agenda.

6. There is hereby authorized to be appropriated out
of the contingent funds of the House and Senate not other-
wise appropriated so much as may be required to provide
for the expenses of the delegates from the United States
and of such staff as may be necessary and for the share
of the United States in the costs of the convention.  

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4Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate, on S. Con. Res. 12, Part 2, Eighty-
fourth Congress, Second Session, (Washington: Government
APPENDIX E

SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 17

Whereas united action by democracies is essential for preservation of democratic institutions everywhere, without regard for race, religion or region, and will bring new hope for disarmament and peace; and

Whereas the North Atlantic Treaty has already committed its members to "contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions," and to "encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them"; and

Whereas it is increasingly urgent that the free peoples gain more strength - moral, political, scientific, industrial and economic - while avoiding present financial dangers; and

Whereas the strength that proverbially lies in unity offers the free peoples vast, untapped resources for solving this dilemma; and

Whereas the Third NATO Parliamentarians' Conference unanimously recommended that a conference be officially called "composed of leading representative citizens selected on a non-partisan basis and directed to convene as often as necessary in order to examine exhaustively and to recommend how greater cooperation and unity of purpose, as envisioned by the North Atlantic Treaty, within the Atlantic Community may best be developed", and

Whereas the Third NATO Parliamentarians' Conference also proposed that "the members of the conference should, as far as possible, be officially appointed but should act in accordance with their individual convictions ..."; Now therefore be it

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring)

1. That the Legislatures of the other democratic governments of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization shall be invited to name delegates to meet in a convention with delegates from the United States and from such other democracies, where situated, as the Convention may invite, to explore and to report as to what extent their people might, within the framework
of the United Nations and in accord with the basic principles of the Constitution of the United States, achieve more effective and democratic unity in advancing their common economic and political affairs, their joint defense and the aims of world peace and individual freedom.

2. That the Convention should be composed of leading representative citizens officially appointed on a non-partisan basis but free to explore the problem fully as individuals without being officially instructed or able to commit their governments.

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