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Philosophy of Science


Consensus reporting is valuable for presenting unified scientific evidence to the public. When a consensus does not exist, I argue that scientists ought not to default to majority reporting in its place. Majority reporting has several epistemic drawbacks because it can obscure underlying justifications and lines of evidence, which may be in conflict or contested. I argue that minority reporting, in conjunction with majority reporting, is an epistemically superior mechanism for scientists to report on the full range of reasons and evidence available within a group. This paper addresses several objections, including worries over group cohesion, fringe reporting, and elite capture.


This is the accepted manuscript of a symposia paper.

This is a manuscript accepted for publication in Philosophy of Science. This version may be subject to change during the production process.

Dang H. Minority Reports: Registering Dissent in Science. Philosophy of Science. Published online 2023:1-14. DOI:

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