Presentation Title

Security of Programmable Logic Controllers

Advisor Information

William Mahoney

Location

Milo Bail Student Center Ballroom

Presentation Type

Poster

Start Date

8-3-2013 1:00 PM

End Date

8-3-2013 4:00 PM

Abstract

Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) are the computational building blocks behind industrial networks of various functionalities. The main method of communicating with PLCs is through the Internet Protocol (IP) using a defined protocol, the Common Industrial Protocol (CIP). However, this leads to serious implications when considering the security of PLCs. CIP does not encrypt any information communicated to or from PLCs, allowing network attackers to read, manipulate, and corrupt specific commands simply by sniffing the CIP traffic on the same network as the PLCs and mainframe. My research project was to identify such attacks. The method to analyze the attacks is to thoroughly understand the construct of CIP. Knowing of how commands are used through CIP allows understanding of intentional attacks and the prevention thereof. In order to analyze the attacks further, I can take the role of an attacker sending hazardous commands to PLCs. This lead to immense knowledge behind the Common Industrial Protocol and the communication between the mainframe and the PLCs. Furthermore, this can lead to significant increase in security in industrial networks.

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Mar 8th, 1:00 PM Mar 8th, 4:00 PM

Security of Programmable Logic Controllers

Milo Bail Student Center Ballroom

Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) are the computational building blocks behind industrial networks of various functionalities. The main method of communicating with PLCs is through the Internet Protocol (IP) using a defined protocol, the Common Industrial Protocol (CIP). However, this leads to serious implications when considering the security of PLCs. CIP does not encrypt any information communicated to or from PLCs, allowing network attackers to read, manipulate, and corrupt specific commands simply by sniffing the CIP traffic on the same network as the PLCs and mainframe. My research project was to identify such attacks. The method to analyze the attacks is to thoroughly understand the construct of CIP. Knowing of how commands are used through CIP allows understanding of intentional attacks and the prevention thereof. In order to analyze the attacks further, I can take the role of an attacker sending hazardous commands to PLCs. This lead to immense knowledge behind the Common Industrial Protocol and the communication between the mainframe and the PLCs. Furthermore, this can lead to significant increase in security in industrial networks.