Numerous electoral systems have been devised over the years but, in decision-making, many forums still rely on the same procedure that was used in ancient Greece: majority voting. Hence, majority rule. In many plural multi-ethnic and/or multi-religious societies, the effects have often been negative. This article considers voting procedures in three inter-related contexts: decision-making, elections, and governance. With regard to conflicts in Northern Ireland, the Balkans, and Ukraine, it shows, both in decision-making and in elections, how simplistic win-or-lose ballots have exacerbated tensions. And it then suggests a more inclusive polity in which win-win voting systems might help to alleviate these differences. Indeed, if a more accurate measure of the collective will could be deployed, and if that mechanism were non-majoritarian, there would be little or no basis for majority rule. Instead, reliance could be placed on inclusive structures: preference voting in decision-making, and all-party coalitions in government.
"MAJORITY RULE: A DYSFUNCTIONAL POLITY CONSENSUS: AN INCLUSIVE DEMOCRACY,"
International Dialogue: Vol. 5, Article 4.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/id-journal/vol5/iss1/4