Document Type
Article
Publication Date
3-20-2014
Publication Title
Journal of International Business Studies
Volume
45
Issue
8
First Page
961
Last Page
979
Abstract
We develop a resource security theory by examining the intent of acquisitions of scarce resources by multinational firms. Results suggest that owners of firms can shape the intent of resource acquisitions. Specifically, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) tend to acquire and pay more for resources for exploration rather than exploitation. This is because SOEs’ owners – governments – are most concerned with securing their country’s future. We contribute to the literature by suggesting that ownership influences resource acquisitions, that resource security is of importance to multinational enterprises, and that SOEs invest abroad to safeguard both their own and their home countries’ future.
Recommended Citation
Bass, A., Chakrabarty, S. Resource security: Competition for global resources, strategic intent, and governments as owners. J Int Bus Stud 45, 961–979 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1057/jibs.2014.28
Comments
This version of the article has been accepted for publication, after peer review (when applicable) and is subject to Springer Nature’s AM terms of use, but is not the Version of Record and does not reflect post-acceptance improvements, or any corrections. The Version of Record is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1057/jibs.2014.28
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