Date of Award
5-7-2026
Degree Type
Thesis
Degree Name
Master of Science (MS)
Department
Political Science
First Advisor
Dr. Brett Kyle
Abstract
Commitment problems explain why multiple parties cannot agree on issues of concern due to a lack of trust, even when cooperation would benefit all parties involved. These problems take place when actors cannot make credible commitments about future behavior because of mistrust, uncertainty, or the absence of neutral enforcement mechanics, leading to delays, lack of cooperation, and sometimes conflict or war. Scholars have approached commitment problems from multiple angles. Fearon (1995) identifies them as empirically observable mechanisms that prevent states from reaching peace agreements. Powell (2006) extends this framework, arguing that commitment problems are due to the inability to bind oneself to an agreement coupled with the incentive to defect from it. North and Weingast (1989) demonstrate that institutional and constitutional rules can make commitments more credible by limiting what leaders can do arbitrarily.
Recommended Citation
Ajama, Mohamud, "COMMITMENT PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL SITUATIONS INVOLVING MULTIPLE STRATEGIC ACTORS AND HOW ACTORS TRY TO OVERCOME COMMITMENT PROBLEMS" (2026). Political Science Theses, Dissertations and Student Creative Activity. 3.
https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/poliscistudent/3
Comments
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