Devolution, Fiscal Federalism, and Changing Patterns of Municipal Revenues: The Mismatch between Theory and Reality

Authors

Dale Krane, University of Nebraska at OmahaFollow
Carol Ebdon, University of Nebraska at OmahaFollow
John R. Bartle, University of Nebraska at OmahaFollow

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

10-2004

Publication Title

Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory

Volume

14

Issue

4

First Page

513

Last Page

533

Abstract

Theories of fiscal federalism, such as those propounded by Musgrave, Tiebout, and Brennan and Buchanan, prescribe assignment of revenue sources among federal, state, and local governments. In this article, we demonstrate that the recent diversification of municipal revenue sources in response to devolutionary forces does not follow the expectations of the fiscal federalism theories. Our analysis suggests that the use of an institutional approach to the study of fiscal federalism would help to reduce the mismatch between theory and reality.

Comments

This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory following peer review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version Krane, D., Ebdon, C., & Bartle, J. (2004). Devolution, fiscal federalism, and changing patterns of municipal revenues: The mismatch between theory and reality. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 14(4), 513-533 is available online at: http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/content/14/4/513.abstract.

Recommended Citation

Krane, Dale; Ebdon, Carol; and Bartle, John R., "Devolution, Fiscal Federalism, and Changing Patterns of Municipal Revenues: The Mismatch between Theory and Reality" (2004). Public Administration Faculty Publications. 58.
https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/pubadfacpub/58