This novel application of the Stackelberg leader-follower game from economic theory illuminates situational constraints that point to a sweet spot, an optimal level of investment in cyber defense, for deterrence by denial.
Deterrence is a form of persuasion intended to manipulate the cost-benefit analysis of would-be attackers and convince them that the cost of taking an action against the defender outweighs its potential benefit (Brantly, 2018; Wilner, 2017).1 It is the prevention (of a target) from committing unwanted behavior by fear of the consequences (United States (US) Department of Defense (DoD), 2008; Taipale, 2010). Deterrence differs from compellence by focusing on prevention using ex ante actions. Compellence uses power to force an adversary, post hoc, to take a desired action under threat of possible escalation in the future (Brantly, 2018).
"Deterrence in Cyberspace: A Game-Theoretic Approach,"
Space and Defense: Vol. 12:
0, Article 6.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/spaceanddefense/vol12/iss0/6
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