Space and Defense
Article Title
Earth to Orbit: Three Models for Strengthening Space Deterrence
Abstract
Nuclear, cyber, and integrated deterrence models hold lessons for space deterrence strategy, including declared thresholds, resilient space architecture, and the embrace of international competition in technological innovation. The United States depends heavily on space capabilities, significantly more than any other country. Not only does space enable navigation, communications, environmental monitoring, and other vital capabilities, but space has also been described as the most essential warfighting domain.1 However, the U.S. space architecture mirrors its early days: relying on important, expensive payloads on a limited number of satellites. While providing important capabilities to U.S. decision-makers, kinetic and non-kinetic weapons can easily target these satellites. Responding to a kinetic attack in space with another kinetic attack would exponentially endanger further space assets with debris clouds. Therefore, deterring kinetic conflict from space is especially important. Many active conversations revolve around space deterrence. Various schools of thought propose different frameworks, and there is a multitude of policy recommendations. Some argue that challenges to space deterrence resemble those in other domains and can be modeled after deterrence strategies used in areas like nuclear and cyberspace. Others believe space is incredibly unique and a framework should be built from the model of integrated deterrence. In the end, space deterrence requires important reforms surrounding thresholds and communication, space architecture, Space Domain Awareness (SDA), attribution, and new policy. Throughout this review, I will analyze these